The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging
Golov, Avner.
2017
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Abstract: Almost 2500 years ago Thucydides discerned that "the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must". Accordingly, weak states ally to balance
against potential threats when they don't have the independent capability to secure their
interests. Once nations form an alliance, however, does Thucydides' observation remain
valid? This research sheds new light on alliance ... read moremanagement dynamics, challenging the
prevalent notion that weak members - protégés - are merely subjected to structural
constraints and pressure from their stronger allies. Occasionally, the weak do not only
suffer what they must, but sometimes do what they wish—or manage to get the stronger
protector to compromise. Nations who join alliances to increase their security by counting
on their allies' protections do not abandon their own deterrence. There is an interplay
between the protégé's direct deterrence and the protector's extended deterrence, which is
engendered in two main classes of protégés: those who construct deterrence policy on strong
direct deterrence foundations, allowing for extended deterrence mainly to strengthen the
independent power of the protégé; and protégés that entrust the protector with the nation's
deterrence, while retaining some independent capabilities. To better understand these mixed
forms of deterrence this study proposes two forms of deterrence: "Direct Complementary
Deterrence" - when extended deterrence is used to complete and strengthen the protégé's
capabilities; and "Extended Complementary Deterrence" - where the dominant element is the
protector's deterrence and the protégé's capabilities are meant to complement it. This
analysis suggests a third new concept, the protégé's "Deterrence-Independence Dilemma", to
illustrate its fundamental motivation when crafting deterrence policy. Relying on the three
proposed concepts, this study offers a causal mechanism to predict when protégés will be
more attentive to the protector's pressure, and when they will be more resolved to preserve
their leeway. The main elemental insight offered by this study is that different alliances
have different nature, depending on the protégé's deterrence hedging behavior. To manage
alliances, countries should tailor an appropriate policy that takes into account the
deterrence policy of a protégé, the protector's extended deterrence and the interaction
between them. The methodological limitations of this research render it mainly a critical
work that challenges the conventional wisdom related to extended deterrence, and offers an
innovative basis for further research into the dark side of extended deterrence - the role
of the protégé.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2017.
Submitted to the Dept. of Diplomacy, History, and Politics.
Advisor: Robert Pfaltzgraff jr..
Committee: Richard Shultz, Dennis Ross, and Leopoldo Nuti.
Keyword: International relations.read less - ID:
- z603r891p
- Component ID:
- tufts:22748
- To Cite:
- TARC Citation Guide EndNote
