



The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging

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Abstract

Almost 2500 years ago Thucydides discerned that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". Accordingly, weak states ally to balance against potential threats when they don't have the independent capability to secure their interests. Once nations form an alliance, however, does Thucydides' observation remain valid? This research sheds new light on alliance management dynamics, challenging the prevalent notion that weak members – protégés – are merely subjected to structural constraints and pressure from their stronger allies. Occasionally, the weak do not only suffer what they must, but sometimes do what they wish—or manage to get the stronger protector to compromise.

Nations who join alliances to increase their security by counting on their allies' protections do not abandon their own deterrence. There is an interplay between the protégé's direct deterrence and the protector's extended deterrence, which is engendered in two main classes of protégés: those who construct deterrence policy on strong direct deterrence foundations, allowing for extended deterrence mainly to strengthen the independent power of the protégé; and protégés that entrust the protector with the nation's deterrence, while retaining some independent capabilities. To better understand these mixed forms of deterrence this study proposes two forms of deterrence: "Direct Complementary Deterrence" – when extended deterrence is used to complete and strengthen the protégé's capabilities; and "Extended Complementary Deterrence" – where the dominant element is the protector's deterrence and the protégé's capabilities are meant to complement it.

This analysis suggests a third new concept, the protégé's "Deterrence-Independence Dilemma", to illustrate its fundamental motivation when crafting deterrence policy. Relying on the three proposed concepts, this study offers a causal mechanism to account for the deterrence policy of the Austro-Hungarian protégé during the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885-1887 and the July Crisis of 1914, as well as the Israeli policy during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Gulf War of 1991. The proposed model designed to enrich the discussion about when protégés are more attentive to the protector's pressure, and when they are more resolved to preserve their leeway.

The main elemental insight offered by this study is that different alliances have different nature, depending on the protégé's deterrence hedging behavior. To manage alliances, countries should tailor an appropriate policy that takes into account the deterrence policy of a protégé, the protector's extended deterrence and the interaction between them. Altogether, this work challenges the conventional wisdom related to extended deterrence, and offers an innovative basis for further research into the dark side of extended deterrence – the role of the protégé.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Puzzle

The literature exploring the motivations of states to form alliances is abundant. Almost 2500 years ago Thucydides discerned that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".¹ Accordingly, weak states ally to balance against potential threats when they don't have the independent capability to secure their interests. This explanation is the basis for contemporary realist approach to alliance formation, as set forth by Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer and Jack Snyder.² Once nations form an alliance, however, does Thucydides' observation remain valid?

There are many studies explaining how dominant powers ("protectors"³) manage alliances.⁴ Nevertheless, how do inter-alliance dynamics affect the behavior of the weaker member in the alliance – the protégé? This question has not yet been a focal point for many researchers.

This research addresses the theoretical lacuna about the role of the protégé – "the dark side of extended deterrence". Its objective is to shed some light upon the protégé's cost-benefit calculus and deterrence policy in extended deterrence

¹Ibid.5.8 (V. 89).

² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., rev (New York: Knopf, 1978); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 1st ed (New York: Norton, 2001); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68.

³ The literature commonly refers to the dominant power as the defender. However, it also refers to the weaker party as the defender when addressing bilateral form of deterrence. Therefore, for the sake of the convenience of the readers this paper distinguished between the "protector" (the dominant power in extended deterrence) and the protégé (the weaker party in extended deterrence) and the defender (the party which acts to deter a potential aggressor in bilateral deterrence).

⁴ For example, see George Liska, *Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979; Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997); Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 156–79, doi:10.1080/00396339708442901; Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliances and the Expansion and Escalation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," in *New Directions for International Relations: Confronting the Method-of-Analysis Problem*, ed. Alex Mintz and Bruce M. Russett (Lexington Books, 2005), 117–34.

interaction – when a country extends its power to protect an ally (the protégé) against a potential threat. This study does so by offering three new concepts: the "deterrence-independence dilemma," "direct complementary deterrence," and "extended complementary deterrence". The first concept is the hypothesized dilemma the protégé confronts in extended deterrence interaction. The two new forms of deterrence are the two hypothesized policy alternatives the protégé possesses to solve this dilemma in the framework of extended deterrence. These new concepts will be developed further in this study.

Research Questions

This study is designed to establish a causal mechanism, if one exists, between the protector's extended deterrence policy and the protégé's deterrence policy, while using the protégé's cost-benefit calculus as an intervening variable. Addressing these variables should provide a sufficient basis to model the role of the protégé in extended deterrence, and to incorporate it into the literature dealing with extended deterrence.

Two main research questions lie at the core of this research:

1. How does the protector's extended deterrence commitment, as well as the demands in exchange for this commitment, shape the protégé's cost-benefit calculus?
2. How is the protégé's cost-benefit calculus translated to deterrence policy against an imminent threat?

Research Contribution

This study purports to shed more light on the complex interaction created by extended deterrence through three main contributions:

First, it singles out the role of an important side in this strategic triangle – the protégé – that has yet to be properly studied; the other sides being the potential adversary and the protector. Secondly, it enriches the literature related to extended deterrence by proposing a new conceptual framework which not only produce new and innovative insights about the policy of the protégé, it also contributes to evaluate to intellectual benefit and limitations of the two dominant theoretical schools in alliance literature. Lastly, this research aims to provide a basis for a further discussion about

the policy implications for extended deterrence in promoting both nuclear nonproliferation and strategic stability. As the next section discusses, these are two chief challenges for contemporary policy makers in the realm of national security.

What Lies Ahead

This chapter introduces the reader to the main goals and questions which shaped this study. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework on which this study was constructed - namely extended deterrence literature. The theoretical discussion examines the unique interaction of extended deterrence through the lens of deterrence theory. It then broadens the theoretical foundations of this research by integrating an analysis derived from alliance theory into the discussion. Chapter 3 proposes a synergy of the two theories and constructs an innovative framework to test extended deterrence from the angle of the protégé. This analysis aims to "fill the holes" in the existing literature about extended deterrence. Three main concepts form the core of this chapter, two forms of deterrence hedging (direct and extended complementary deterrence) and the main underlying calculus of the protégé when hedging – the deterrence-independence dilemma. The three concepts were designed to bridge between the need to account for the deterrence policy of the weaker party in the alliance, and the aspiration to comprehend the policy of the alliance.

Chapter 4 expounds upon the research method chosen to test the proposed conceptual framework. This chapter discusses the operational challenges deterrence scholars face and determines this study's boundaries in light of those challenges. A three-level historical analysis is the methodological structure of this research. Its objective is to suggest a cogent causal mechanism for each one of the four case-studies, and then compare them to improve the external validity of the suggested conclusions.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 analyze four different case-studies. Two involve Austro-Hungarian protégés, and two contain Israeli protégés. Interestingly, the first Austrian case (the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885-1887) was barely subjected to research efforts, while the second case (the July Crisis of 1914) was the focal point of a rich historical and theoretical discussion. The Israeli cases (The Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Gulf War of 1991) are also attractive since they reflect abnormal Israeli decisions to

unprecedentedly adapt strong elements of extended deterrence. Each of the cases consists of five sections. The historical analysis starts with an overview of the main events necessary to form the strong factual basis on which the analysis is built. The second section presents the main actors in the deterrence triangle: the protégé, the protector, and the adversary. The analysis expounds the interests and capabilities of each of the actors to illustrate a clear picture of the relationships between the three actors. This analysis assists in comprehending the similar conditions as well as disparities between the four cases and eventually allows for a comparison between them. The third section analyzes the deterrence policy of the protégé, namely, its hedging between direct and extended deterrence. The principal motivations that account for the protégé's policy are discussed in the fourth section, which tests the assumption regarding the theoretical contribution of the proposed concept of a deterrence-independence dilemma. Lastly, the concept's benefits are juxtaposed with the two dominant theoretical frameworks in alliance management literature. This allows for an evaluation of the theoretical magnitude of the proposed concept to the existing literature.

Chapter 9 and 10 conclude this study. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the observations gathered in the four case-studies. By compiling the findings, this study can cautiously support the research's assumptions. First, protégés do hedge, and eschew a decisive deterrence policy which counts merely on the protector's extended deterrence, or employing a purely direct deterrence policy. Second, deterrence hedging yields two main forms of deterrence: direct and extended complementary deterrence. Lastly, when formulating their deterrence policies, nations in alliances balance deterrence with independence. The comprehensive analysis illustrates the contribution of the proposed framework to alliance management literature, and to unearth a new layer in the complicated dynamics extended deterrence creates.


These conclusions point out the need for further research that will apply the new concepts to more case-studies. Chapter 10 sheds light upon some policy implications that can alleviate the challenge of alliance management in the twenty-first century. In essence, the protector requires do tailor its extended deterrence to its ally as part of adjusting its policy to the specific context. This practical contribution is essential

given the current intellectual endeavors to formulate the best American policy towards its allies in order to mitigate the new threats alliances face today, while promoting the interests of the American people as well as U.S. allies' interests.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Jacob J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell opine, "In both the bipolar and unipolar international settings, allies have been indispensable to maintaining the global order that has allowed for the peace and prosperity of the 'American' century".¹ The "maintaining cost" for the U.S. was extending its deterrence to include its allies. This form of deterrence is unique since it challenges that duality principle of deterrence, and entangles three parties: the protector, the protégé and the potential adversary. As illustrated in Figure 1, this study exerts the knowledge available on extended deterrence to inquire how protégés translate the inputs received from protectors and the perceived threats to two particular outputs: deterrence policy toward the adversary, and alliance policy toward the protectors. This chapter presents the existing knowledge on extended deterrence, as well as the two dominant frameworks to explicate alliance management interaction. Altogether, this chapter provides the theoretical basis required for the discussion in the proposed assumptions.

Figure 1 The Protege in Extended Deterrence Triangle



Extended Deterrence

Deterrence is the use of threats to prevent an action that an adversary might take.²

Thomas Schelling explains deterrence as: "influencing the choices that another party

¹ Jacob J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 5.

² Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Wiley, 2004), 30; James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 5th ed (New York: Longman, 2001), 344; Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 89 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 42–79; Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 37,

will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave".³ Contrary to preventive strategies, deterrence aims to persuade the adversary to refrain from taking an action rather than destroying its capabilities to take that action. Unlike compellence strategy, which seeks to convince the opponent to take a desired action or to halt and/or undo an action which has already been embarked upon, deterrence is used to prevent an action which has yet to be taken. Thomas Schelling concludes, "the threat that compels rather than deters, therefore, often takes the form of administering the punishment until the other acts, rather than if he acts".⁴ The aim of deterrence is to prevent a crisis from unfolding. In this regard, it is a de-escalatory tool for an early stage of the crisis, though it may lead to an escalation if the opponent assesses that war is imminent. By raising the cost of escalation, deterrence is used to deescalate crises.

Deterrence theory distinguishes between two forms of deterrence: extended deterrence – "the attempt to prevent an attack against a third party"; and direct deterrence (or central deterrence) – the attempt to prevent an attack against home territory or forces.⁵ German Chancellor Bismarck's balance of power diplomacy in the last two decades of the 19th century are examples of direct deterrence. Bismarck formed several coalitions that ensured Germany had the upper hand against its potential adversaries, particularly France. As Henry Kissinger explains, the German Chancellor's strategy was to arrange "more relationships with more countries than

doi:10.1080/13523261003640819; Keith B. Payne, "Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 13–29; Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 33–34; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (January 1, 1979): 289–324; Colin Gray, "The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On," *Comparative Strategy* 22, no. 5 (December 1, 2003): 429–61; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 7th ed (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 116–32; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 1974); Richard K. Betts, "The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can-and Can't-Do Now," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (April 2013): 87–99; Morgan, *Deterrence Now*; Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1960); Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

³Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 13.

⁴*Ibid.*, 196.

⁵Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336, doi:10.2307/2010415.

any conceivable opponent and thereby be able to choose among many allies, as circumstances required".⁶ At the same time, German attempts to prevent Russian expansion to the Balkans or Russian support of Serbian patriotic movements, both of which would have endangered the Austrian interests in the Balkans, are examples of extended deterrence.⁷ This form is unique since it involves more than two parties: the protector (which seeks to employ deterrence), the adversary or challenger (the target of the deterrence policy), and the protégé (the target of the challenger and who is being protected by the protector).

Specific common examples of extended deterrence include the American use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe during the Cold War, and Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany's pledges of unconditional support for the Austria-Hungarian policy against the Serbians before World War I to prevent a Russian military response against Vienna.⁸ The first example is commonly perceived as a successful one, whereas the German policy was an utter failure resulting in a disastrous war.

Bernard Brodie, in his seminal piece about the American post-World War II policy in the face of the Soviet threat, sets the foundation of extended deterrence as the main pillar of the American containment strategy whose objective was to prevent a Soviet expansion: "the minimum security objectives for the United States must include not only its own national independence but also that of other countries which presently have and cherish such independence, especially those which enjoy democratic political institutions comparable to our own".⁹ The concept of extending one's deterrence over its allies was first developed by Herman Kahn in his book, *On Thermonuclear War*.¹⁰ During the Cold War the U.S. exercised extended deterrence to deter Soviet expansion on the one hand, and prevent nuclear proliferation by U.S. allies attempting to cope with the Soviet threat on the other hand. Francis Gavin, for

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 157.

⁷ William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 2d ed (New York: Knopf, 1950); Jonathan Steinberg, *Bismarck: A Life* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁸ For a great description of the German considerations and policy see, Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History*, 1st American ed (New York: H. Holt, 1994), 18–21.

⁹ Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," *World Politics* 11, no. 2 (1959): 173, doi:10.2307/2009527.

¹⁰ Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War.*, 126

instance, notes that "a large part of the U.S. military commitment to Western Europe during the Cold War was motivated not only by the need to deter the Soviets but by a pressing need to keep the Federal Republic of Germany non-nuclear. Similar dual concerns – protection and restraint – motivated U.S. security arrangements with Japan and South Korea".¹¹

Nonetheless, as a strategy, extended deterrence was used long before nuclear weapons were developed. For example, Thucydides observes similar interaction between the Delian League led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League headed by Sparta in 5th century B.C. Both powers managed their alliances by providing their allies with protection against assaults by members of the rival alliance.¹² The introduction of nuclear weapons and their devastating nature, however, triggered a rich intellectual discussion in academia and in the policy arenas about complexity of extended deterrence in the nuclear era.¹³

Many researchers opine that today extended deterrence has been rendered even more complicated than during the Cold War. When the world was divided between two blocs led by the two nuclear superpowers, international politics, including other nations' policies, was dictated mostly by relations between the two superpowers. Nevertheless, in the "second nuclear age" international politics has a much more multipolar nature. This term was used by Keith Payne and Colin Gray, and later by Paul

¹¹Francis J. Gavin, "Politics, History and the Ivory Tower-Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 4 (August 1, 2012): 588–89.

¹² A great example is the Corinthian speech during the assembly of the Peloponnesian League after Athens imposed the Megarian decree, Strassler and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 1.67-1.71.

¹³ Exemplars of early thinking about extended deterrence are, Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1946); Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence"; Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*; Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. For a later discussion see, Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited"; Paul K. Huth, "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 2 (1990): 270–90; Colin S. Gray, *Maintaining Effective Deterrence* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); David N. Schwartz, "On Extended Deterrence," in *Security and Arms Control: A Guide to International Policymaking*, ed. Edward A. Kolodziej and Patrick M. Morgan, Volume 2 vols. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 139–58; Francis J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," *International Security* 40, no. 1 (July 1, 2015): 9–46, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00205; Payne, "Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence"; Morgan, *Deterrence Now*; Freedman, *Deterrence*; George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*; Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, "Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation," *Survival* 57, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 29–52, doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1068554.

Bracken, to distinguish the Post-Cold War world from the Cold War one.¹⁴ Bracken explains, "The second nuclear age is a multiplayer game. It has many independent nuclear decision-making centers... this is the biggest single difference between two eras, and its implications are far reaching".¹⁵ Examples of this extended deterrence in the "second nuclear age" are the deterrence relations between the U.S., Iran, and Israel or the U.S., Japan, and North Korea.

Bracken, Waltz, Patrick Morgan, Payne, T.V. Paul, Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff expound that the rapid dynamics of contemporary reality and the mixture of conflicting and shared interests between different powers pose a serious challenge for extended deterrence.¹⁶ For instance, Paul explains, "as the twenty-first century dawned, deterrence had become complex because of changes along several dimensions of the international system: an increase in the importance of multiple-state and non-state actors; the distribution of power...; power relationships...; and goals, ideals, and issues".¹⁷

According to Morgan, "after 1990 the dominant political relationships in the system became quite different in character. Political relations among leading states have remained relatively moderate and significantly cooperative, remarkably free of profound security concerns. The most potent states have acute conflicts with only a few other actors, if any, and none of them great powers. As a result, deterrence is now far less central and salient. This is most apparent for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence".¹⁸ The new international security environment of the "second nuclear age" challenges the capacity of today's powers, including the U.S., to produce a

¹⁴ Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Paul J. Bracken, *The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics*, 1st ed (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2012).

¹⁵ Bracken, *The Second Nuclear Age*, 106.

¹⁶ Bracken, *The Second Nuclear Age*; Keith B. Payne, *The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008); Patrick M. Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 1 (April 1, 2012): 85–107, doi:10.1080/13523260.2012.659589; T. V. Paul, "Complex Deterrence: An Introduction," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1–27; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 86–120; Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Anticipating a Nuclear Iran: Challenges for U.S. Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

¹⁷ Paul, "Complex Deterrence: An Introduction," 8.

¹⁸ Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," April 1, 2012, 87–88.

credible deterrence policy that can prevent potential adversaries from attacking the protégé, while convincing the protégé to refrain from developing independent military capabilities.

The attractiveness of extended deterrence is also undermined by the growing accessibility and motivations for new states to acquire nuclear weapons and to join the prestigious "nuclear club" in the developing new international order as contended by Scott Sagan in his seminal works.¹⁹ These trends cast a serious shadow over extended deterrence — in particular the American attempts to preserve stability in East Asia against China and North Korea, in Europe against Russia, and in the Middle East against Iran. Given the constraints of the protector, the role of the protégé increases, and as such, so does the intellectual obligation to understand its part in extended deterrence dynamics.

Analyzing the Protector in Extended Deterrence

The magnitude of extended deterrence in American strategy stimulated the intellectual efforts to explore this phenomenon. However, the bulk of deterrence studies examine deterrence from the view of the protector, which seeks to extend its deterrence. For example, over the years, deterrence scholars have emphasized the challenge of presenting credible threats while defending allies from a potential threat. Morgan notes, "directly attacked, a state was quite likely to respond militarily. It was less apt to do so if a third party was attacked instead, no matter how closely it was associated with that party's welfare, because military response would be costly and risky and it had not yet actually been attacked itself. Hence the threat to respond to such an attack was less credible".²⁰

Schelling concurs: "the difference between the national homeland and everything 'abroad' is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if

¹⁹ Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 54–86, doi:10.2307/2539273; Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*, Third Edition edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012).

²⁰Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, 15–16.

unspoken, and threats that have to be made credible".²¹ Former British Defense Secretary Denis Healey underscores the challenge embodied in extended deterrence, not only against the adversary. He claims that a more challenging task is to provide credible assurances to allies: "it takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans".²²

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing initiated the discussion in the "deterrence-versus-restraint" dilemma the protector faces when exercising extended deterrence.²³ Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour explain, "feeling secure, the Protégé may behave irresponsibly, thereby provoking the very confrontation the Defender [the protector] had hoped to avoid. But if the Defender's commitment is too weak, the Challenger may be emboldened to address its grievance too aggressively and preclude a peaceful resolution of the dispute".²⁴ Michael Altfeld and Bruce De Mesquita conclude the protector's decision to intervene and assist other parties is reliant upon the protector's value of the target, the expected costs of war, and the protector's marginal contribution to the probability of victory.²⁵ Relying on this work, Vesna Danilovic, Zagare and Kilgour, and Brett Benson developed the concepts of the protector's commitment and intrinsic interest as principled determinants to assess the protector's policy in alliances.²⁶ Danilovic, for example, suggests that the credibility of the protector's commitment is an outgrowth of his regional interests, rather than his shared interests with the protégé, as Snyder proposes. Her research demonstrates that, "if these interests or issues at stake are interpreted in terms of ties between a

²¹Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 36.

²² Lawrence Freedman, "Stephen Pinker and the Long Peace: Alliance, Deterrence and Decline," *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 667, doi:10.1080/14682745.2014.950243.

²³ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton University Press, 1977), 432, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0wmf>.

²⁴ Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914," *International Studies Review* 8, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 624, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00630.x.

²⁵ Michael F. Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1979): 87–112, doi:10.2307/2600275.

²⁶ Vesna Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Zagare and Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence"; Brett V. Benson, *Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

major power and the protégé's region, their effects on deterrence attempts and outcomes are very strong".²⁷

Other studies sought to broaden the traditional bilateral approach to deterrence when analyzing the tangled dynamics that extended deterrence creates. Timothy Crawford's "Pivotal Deterrence," for instance, addresses situations when "the defender sits in a pivotal position between ambitious adversaries, and it seeks simultaneously to deter both of them".²⁸ The American attempt to deter India and Pakistan from escalating their use of force during the Kashmir Conflict (1962-1965) is an example of "pivotal deterrence".

Another example is Morgan's concept of "Collective Deterrence".²⁹ Morgan describes a situation in which a deterrence scheme is employed by two or more states simultaneously. NATO or future EU forces are examples of this form. Morgan discusses the advantages and difficulties inherited in such a form of deterrence. He concludes, "collective actors experience greater problems with credibility than individual states".³⁰

Stephen Quackenbush also seeks to explore the complexity of extended deterrence. He claims that extended deterrence cannot be fully understood without including also the deterrent attempts by the protector to defend itself against the threat – direct deterrence.³¹ For this reason, he opines, American statements aimed to protect Soviet attack on U.S. allies should be examined with the American measures to deter Soviet attack on American soil.

The protector and his relations with the other actors involved have been at the center of extended deterrence literature. Very limited efforts have been made to explore the motivations, the available alternatives, and the calculus of the protégé. This is bizarre since these studies show a direct link between the protégé's behavior and the

²⁷Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, 168.

²⁸Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 20–21.

²⁹Patrick M. Morgan, "Collective-Actor Deterrence," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 158–82.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 171.

³¹Stephen L. Quackenbush, "Not Only Whether but Whom Three-Party Extended Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (August 1, 2006): 580–81, doi:10.1177/0022002706290431.

protector's deterrence commitments, as well as the impact the protégé has on deterrence failures and successes. For example, Snyder depicts the bargaining interaction generated by alliances. He differentiates between two games: "the adversary game" – between the protector and the potential aggressor; and the "alliance game" – between the protector and other members in the alliance.³² These two games interact with each other and influence the policies of all involved players: the adversary and the protégé. In the "adversary game" the protector acts to deter the potential adversary from attacking the alliance members. In the "alliance game", the protector seeks to maintain control over the alliance policy, while minimizing his share in the burden and restrain the other members in the alliance according to his national interests.

Snyder identifies three determinants for the internal bargaining dynamics. The primary determinant is the relative dependence of a state in the alliance or the extent it is perceived as dependent by its allies.³³ The more dependent the alliance member is or perceived to be, the less leverage it will have while bargaining with its allies. According to Snyder, dependence is an outgrowth of four elements:

1. A state's need for assistance in war
2. The allies' capacity to supply the assistance
3. The state's degree of conflict with the adversary
4. The state realignment alternatives.³⁴

The more assistance the state necessitates the higher the capability of its allies to assist, the higher the conflict with its adversary, or the fewer alternate alliances a state has – the greater its dependence will be, and the weaker its stance in the bargaining dynamics.

Snyder's second determinant for bargaining power is the state's commitment to the alliance. The higher the commitment, the less power the state has when bargaining with other members. According to Snyder, commitment can be defined according to

³²Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 1997, 194.

³³*Ibid.*, 166–68.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 167.

the verbal promise in the alliance contract as well as the interests in aiding the ally apart from the promise.³⁵ Traditionally, commitments were divided to two groups: offensive and defensive. The first type of commitment aims to allow members in the alliance to gain concessions from nonmembers, whereas defensive commitments are designed to protect allies from non-allies.³⁶ Levy argues that "prior to 1815, the vast majority of earlier peacetime alliances were offensive in nature, in that the initiation of military action was explicitly called for in the treaty and not conditional upon an external military attack".³⁷

Zagare and Kilgour broadens the discussion concerning alliance commitments. They explore the use of "straddle strategy" which involves probabilistic support, depends on specific conditions or the support of external institutions.³⁸ Benson combines the two approaches for commitment classification: its nature and goal, in his six-commitment typology. Their studies are elaborated in the former chapter.³⁹ They too stress the process of bargaining between the alliances members in determining the type of commitments alliance exercises. The weaker side usually demands a clear and confining commitment, while the powers tend to protect their political flexibility by using vague and conditional assurances.⁴⁰

Snyder's third determinant of states' bargaining power is the allies' interests in the specific issue about which they are bargaining. According to Snyder, "the higher the bargainer values what is being asked to give up, and the lower it values what the partner would give in return, the more it will resist a particular proposal".⁴¹ Unlike the other two factors, this one attributes a secondary role to the perceived danger. The main dynamic is between the allies, and the defender's promise lies at the core of these dynamics.

³⁵Ibid., 168–69.

³⁶Benson, *Constructing International Security*, 4; Jack S. Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 4 (1981): 590–91; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," ed. Stephen M. Walt et al., *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 123–24.

³⁷Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior," 590.

³⁸ Zagare and Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence."

³⁹ Benson, *Constructing International Security*.

⁴⁰Ibid., 32–41.

⁴¹Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 1997, 170.

Delving into the "alliance game," Snyder describes protector's "security dilemma": if the protector increases the security of its ally, it may decrease its own security and may be dragged to war – "entrapment". Snyder explains, "entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially".⁴² However, if the protector limits its pledge, it may encourage its ally to doubt its commitment, and thus to abandon the alliance. Snyder suggests several ways to abandon alliances: "the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected".⁴³

Germany faced this dilemma in July 1914. Eventually, it aligned with Austria-Hungary to deter Russia from attacking its Austrian ally, after the latter acted to crush the Serbian uprising which included the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Benson, following James Fearon's work on extended deterrence, describes this dilemma as "the problem of moral hazard" – when a commitment from the protector encourages the protégé "to provoke the adversary in an attempt to gain concessions".⁴⁴ Benson argues that the moral hazard protectors face can account for the diversity in the commitments they provide: from very strong commitment to vague ones.

According to Jeremy Pressman, Benson, and Zagare and Kilgour, the protector uses unequivocal commitments and "straddle strategy" which involves probabilistic support of a protégé, dependent on third party approval, to prevent a threat to its protégé (thus, to its own interests), while maximizing maneuvering spectrum if deterrence fails.⁴⁵ It does so by using nonbinding commitments, and using compellence to minimize the protégé's freedom of action. During the Gulf War of

⁴²Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 467, doi:10.2307/2010183.

⁴³Ibid., 465.

⁴⁴Benson, *Constructing International Security*, 3. For Fearon's study please look, James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90.

⁴⁵ Pressman, *Warring Friends*; Benson, *Constructing International Security*; Zagare and Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence."

1991, for instance, the U.S. sought to deter Saddam Hussein from using WMD against Israel, while supplying vague promises to the Israeli ally about the nature of the American response. The U.S. also sought to prevent Israel from acting alone against Iraq since the U.S. assessed it might have risked the unity of the international coalition against Iraq, which included several Arab countries.⁴⁶ The U.S. confronted the "entrapment-abandonment dilemma": it wished to convey credible assurances to Israel to avoid an Israeli unilateral action, while preventing an Israeli unilateral action against Iraq that would have surely escalated the crisis and threatened American interests in the coalition against Iraq.

Other studies about extended deterrence highlight the protégé's part in both the adversary and the alliance games. Werner, for instance, infers that the interaction between the protégé and the potential aggressor can shape the protector's decision to intervene, and the prospects for deterrence to succeed.⁴⁷ Pressman portrays the restraining effects between protectors and protégés from the same alliances. His contribution to alliance theory is described in the next section.

Conjointly it seems that although extended deterrence literature acknowledges the impact that the protégé may have on his relations with both the protector and the potential attacker, delving into the protégé's motivations and understanding how they are translated into deterrence policy remains an intellectual lacuna. Given the absence of studies whose focal point is the protégé, alliance scholars use two main analytical frameworks when observing the behavior of small powers in alliance: the neorealist school and alliance restraint theory.

The Neorealist School

According to neorealist school, alliance management is determined mostly by the structure in which it operates. Neorealist scholars explain that structure describes the principle according to which the units in the system are arranged, the functional

⁴⁶ James Addison Baker and Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992* (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995); David A. Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint: Israeli Decision-Making in the Gulf War," *International Journal* 47, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 328–69, doi:10.2307/40202763.

⁴⁷Suzanne Werner, "Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2000): 721, doi:10.2307/2669277.

differentiation of the units, and the distribution of their relative capabilities.⁴⁸ Waltz defines the organizing principle of international politics as an anarchic system, as there is no central authority nor global governor.⁴⁹ He also concludes that the differentiation of units is small as in an anarchic environment, states will have similar level of governance. The main variable is, thus, the distribution of capabilities.

Barry Buzan criticizes Waltz's rigid concept of structure: he assents to the definition of anarchic system but suggests different levels of governance in international politics, hence, he allows for non-state actors to shape international structure. He defines these two elements as deep structure. The systematic pattern in the distribution of attributes is the "distributional structure" for Buzan.⁵⁰

Altogether, the nature of the structure is a direct outgrowth of the number of great powers in it as well as the relations between them. John J. Mearsheimer contends that, "great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military assets: nuclear deterrent and formidable conventional forces".⁵¹ Other scholars, include other aspects of national power, such economic power and "soft power".⁵² Joseph Nye, who coined the term "soft power" explains this element refers to "the broad appeal of cultural, ideological, and institutional factors" that allows a state to promote its interests in the international arena with other states.⁵³ Robert Keohane and Nye contend, "as the utility of force declines, and as issues become more equal in importance, the distribution of power within each issue will become more important. If linkages become less effective in the whole, outcomes of political bargaining will increasingly vary by issue area".⁵⁴

⁴⁸James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 5th ed (New York: Longman, 2001); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56, doi:10.2307/2538981.

⁴⁹Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 100–101.

⁵⁰ Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 65.

⁵¹Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 5.

⁵²Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Conflicts after the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1996): 5+; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed (New York: Longman, 2001); Buzan, Jones, and Little, *The Logic of Anarchy*; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 2001.

⁵³Nye, "Conflicts after the Cold War," 6.

⁵⁴Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. "Power and Interdependence." in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*, 2d ed. This excerpt is from their book, *Power and Interdependence*, 2d ed, 1989. 124

Following the definitions for power, one can observe three main possible structures for international systems:

- A uni-polar structure characterized by having one superpower which possesses significantly more power than all other powers in the structure. As Walt emphasized, it does not mean that it has more than the combined power of the rest, but that there is no potential for a stronger alliance. Walt notes that in the uni-polar world, "the single superpower faces no ideological rival of equal status or influence".⁵⁵ Walt claims that the Post-Cold War order is a uni-polar one given the American military superiority over its adversaries.
- In a bipolar system, there are two superpowers that have similar capabilities, and much more than the other units in the structure. These units usually align with one of the big powers or decide to maintain neutral. The international order during the Cold War is the most popular example for this order as the two superpowers, the U.S and the Soviet Union, led two rival blocks.
- Multi-polar structures are dominated by three or more great powers that share a similar relative power. Mearsheimer distinguishes between unbalanced multi-polar structures, when one of the powers is aspiring to be the hegemon; and a balanced multi-polar structure that lacks a potential hegemon.⁵⁶ He concludes that multi-polar structures are more war-prone than bipolar ones as having two poles increases the prospects of creating a balance of power. Multi-polar with potential hegemons, Mearsheimer notes, is the most dangerous as the prospect for counter balancing forces are lower, thus, the structural constraints over the potential aggressor are minimal.⁵⁷

How does structure influence alliance management? This question requires an inquiry of the relations between structure and alliance formation first since different theories assume different motivations for nations to align, thus they yield a different management interaction. To this end, two main neorealist theories should be briefly discussed: Balance of Power and Balance of Threat.

⁵⁵Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 92.

⁵⁶Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 338–39.

⁵⁷Ibid.

Waltz's "balance of power" theory focuses heavily on the distribution of national capabilities as the main motivation for both protectors and protégés when aligning with each other. They both wish to improve their own capabilities against another state with a greater capability, assessing that the joint capability is sufficient to deter it. Waltz writes, "As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. The reactions of other states to the drive for dominance of Charles V, Hapsburg ruler of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France, of Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany, illustrate the point".⁵⁸ George Liska, although he wrote his masterpiece on alliance before Waltz's theory, also concludes that "states enter into alliances with one another in order to supplement each other's capability".⁵⁹

Nonetheless, as Walt points out, when aligning nations do not only wish to balance merely against capabilities, but take account of their intentions when assessing who should be balanced. For him, Intention, not power, is crucial: "states balance against the states that pose the greatest threat, and the latter need not be the most powerful states in the system".⁶⁰ According to Walt's theory, "balance of threat", protégés join alliances to increase security against perceived threats chiefly by enhancing deterrence against the threat. To use Ian Hurd example, this is the reason why "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons".⁶¹ Walt expounds, "Whereas balance of power theory predicts that states will react to imbalances of power, balance of threat theory predicts that when there is an imbalance of threat (i.e., when one state or coalition appears especially dangerous), states will form alliances or increase their internal efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability".⁶² Walt defines threats as "a function of power, proximity, specific offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions, and the expected response

⁵⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 28.

⁵⁹ Liska, *Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence*, 26.

⁶⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263.

⁶¹ Ian Hurd, "Constructivism," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298.

⁶² Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263.

to an emerging threat is to attempt to balance against it".⁶³ Walt maintains that balance of threat "should be viewed as a refinement of traditional balance of power theory".⁶⁴

These two theories describe differently the effect international structure has over alliance management dynamics. In a multipolar world, Morgenthau claims, "alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple-state system".⁶⁵ Jervis also argues that in multipolar systems, states are incentivized to align in order to increase their security.⁶⁶ In this multipolar structure alliances tend to have an ad-hoc nature as a result of the number of alternative alliances every state has, and the rapid dynamics characterize multipolar interaction. In a multipolar systems, Waltz concurs, "there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low".⁶⁷ According to balance of Power theory, in this complex structure, great powers are obliged to consider smaller powers' interests in order to prevent defections.⁶⁸ Therefore, Waltz opines, multipolar structure favors small powers (protégés), and limits the power the great powers (protectors) possess within the alliance.

Walt accepts the argument about the fluidity of alliances in a multipolar world, because the major powers will possess more options as their numbers increase, and because shifts in the distribution of capabilities will be more frequent when there are more great powers in the system. It will also be more difficult for each state to determine where the greatest threat lies, and international alliances are likely to be more flexible and fluid.⁶⁹ He, nevertheless, contends that multipolarity strengthens the position of great powers. Less robust alliances leave the strong to decide who he wish to align with, and with the better hand in the bargaining with potential allies. For him, alliances in multilateral world do not increase the risk of abandonment of the

⁶³Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 89.

⁶⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 263.

⁶⁵Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 185

⁶⁶Robert L. Jervis, "What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?," in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, ed. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 465.

⁶⁷Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 168.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 166–67.

⁶⁹ Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 163.

protégé, but the protector's. For that reason, he predicted in 1997, "the gradual reemergence of multipolarity will give Washington a great deal of latitude".⁷⁰

Bipolar systems push states to align with one of the superpowers to either balance against their enemy or to gain protection and prestige by aligning with a superpower. These alliances are expected to have a stronger basis and higher cohesion as the international system is divided to two firm blocks headed by the two superpowers.⁷¹ Waltz opines, that a bipolar structure favors the great powers. In this structure, third parties cannot tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from one alliance or by joining the other. While attributing a central role to distribution of capabilities between alliance members, he infers that powerful states control alliance policies. An example for this approach is Waltz's analysis of the strategic flexibility the two superpowers had during the Cold War when managing their alliances: "both superpowers can make long-range plans and carry out their policies as best they see fit, for they need not accede to the demands of third parties".⁷²

In contrary to Waltz, Walt contends that bipolarity strengthens the position of the weaker powers. Walt expounds that "the bipolar rivalry gives the two leading states additional incentives to keep their allies in line".⁷³ Operating under bipolar structural conditions, Walt suggests, great powers are preoccupied with the balance of powers between the two blocs. They wish to enhance their block at the expense of the other. This highlights the risk of abnonnement – the shift of one of the allies to the other block. As a result, the bargaining power of smaller states vis-à-vis the greater powers, is higher. Walt demonstrated his argument using the US-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East: "because each [superpower] seeks to acquire allies at the other's expense, weaker regional powers have profited by encouraging the competition. Thus Egypt received over \$1 billion in economic aid from both the United states and the Soviet Union between 1954 and 1965, ranking third among less developed countries in total superpower assistance".⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Ibid., 164.

⁷¹Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979.

⁷² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 170.

⁷³ Walt, 164

⁷⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 156.

In unipolar structures, states are stimulated to align with the unipole to increase their security against their regional adversaries, or to improve their status. Another incentive is to join a counter alliance, if the superpower is perceived as a danger to other states' interests. In discussing the end of the Cold War, Waltz emphasizes the change of weaponry and changes of polarity. As a result, the sole superpower – the U.S. – enjoys a policy elasticity. Waltz argues that, "a dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it".⁷⁵ For Waltz, the bargaining interaction between the defender and the protégé is skewed toward the first, and is an outgrowth of the distribution of capabilities between them.

Here Walt accepts Waltz's argument. "If the unipole is geographically distant, reasonably restrained in its ambitions and conduct, and, most importantly, does not try to conquer others", Walt opines, "it is likely to face no more than occasional episodes of soft balancing".⁷⁶ Under these conditions, states will have less incentive to align than in multipolar or bipolar orders. In a unipolar structure, Walt suggests, the unipole has less need for allies, thus, he is less preoccupied by the risk of abnonnement. Consequently, he argues "its partners have more reason to doubt any pledges it does make".⁷⁷ This neorealist debate is served in the study as alternate explanations for the protégés' behavior. Another common argument derived from the protector's aspiration, not only to balance against the potential adversary, but to restrain its ally as well.

It is noteworthy that Snyder attributes a crucial part for the structural constraints over the alliance interaction. Specifically, Snyder contends that international structure determines which "game" is more dominant: against the adversary or the ally. In a multipolar system the protector faces constraints emanate from both "alliance game" and "adversary game". In particular, Snyder explicates, alliance members "are inhibited from conciliating the adversary for fear the ally will take it as a prelude to realignment, and will realign preemptively".⁷⁸ In a bipolar world the ally has little

⁷⁵ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 38.

⁷⁶Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 120.

⁷⁷Ibid., 97.

⁷⁸ Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 1984, 485.

concern for constraints originated in the alliance. in light of the decrease in the alliance dilemma, the "game against the adversary dominates the alliance policy."⁷⁹

Alliance Restraint Theory

The neorealist literature is heavily influenced by Waltz' balance of power, and its revised form of Balance of threat by Walt. It neglects, as Pressman argues, "an equally important category of motivations: alliances as mechanisms of control".⁸⁰ Robert Osgood writes in 1968, "Next to Accretion, the most prominent function of alliances has been to restrain and control allies, particularly in order to safeguard one ally against actions of another that might endanger its security or otherwise jeopardize its interests".⁸¹ Paul Schroeder also challenged to monopoly of the security argument in his article, "*Alliances 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management*".⁸² While balancing against the enemy is prevalent in times of war, he opines, alliances often serve as a management instrument between wars. His analysis indicates that controlling an ally is a common motivation of alliance formation, as well as nations' behavior while managing alliances in international politics. However, he concludes "no magic formula for using alliances as tools of managements for the purpose of promoting international peace and stability".⁸³ In his book, "*Alliance Politics*", Snyder attempted to produce one model which encapsulates both the external-threat argument, as well as the restraint one. His model, comprised of the "alliance game" and the "adversary game" was presented earlier in this chapter.⁸⁴ A bold intellectual attempt to undermine the traditional dominance of Walt's theory was made by Patricia Weitsman. In her book, "*Dangerous Alliances*", Weitsman argues that "it is not enough to assess whether a state is threatened to predict its alliance behavior. We need to look at just how threatened that state is. Low level threat will produce certain

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 8.

⁸¹ Robert Endicott Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 22.

⁸² Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. Klaus Knorr, National Security Studies Series (Lawrence: Published for the National Security Education Program by the University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227-62.

⁸³ Ibid., 256.

⁸⁴ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 1997, 194.

alliance patterns, while moderate and high level will yield different results".⁸⁵ Future studies of alliances should include internal threat level in alliances, rather than clinging to the external threat approach.⁸⁶ Alliances, she argues, can be an outgrowth of enmity, when two enemies decide to align to manage the tensions between them and preserve peace: "Under certain circumstances alliances are formed for the sole purpose of keeping peace among adversaries".⁸⁷ This phenomenon is coined as "tethering alliance". This type of alliance is characterized by a high level of internal threat, and as a result, low cohesiveness.⁸⁸ Weitsman uses the Austrian-Italian alliance before World War I as an example for this fragile alliance which eventually failed to endure the breakout of war.

Though the literature on the restraining effect of alliances has been enlarged, only recently an intellectual effort has been taken to explain variance in restraint performances. In his book, *"Warring Friends"*, Pressman compare different case studies to account for the main determinants of restraint success and failure. He expounds, "if the powerful ally mobilizes, it can compel weaker allies to be restrained, if the powerful state is the restraineed, it can mobilize its power resources to go alone and ignore the restraint attempt".⁸⁹ Pressman identifies four conditions that influence the likelihood of power mobilization:

- Deception – states can hide their intentions from their allies. This may prevent the mobilization of power from occurring. Nevertheless, Pressman notes that withholding information from one's allies is especially tricky in alliances that embody a thick institutional web of interaction".⁹⁰
- Leadership unity – power mobilization may be costly. Hence, unity among the leadership and agreement on the nature of the threat, the appropriate response and its implementation is crucial in restraining an ally. For that

⁸⁵ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3–4.

⁸⁶ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 29–30.

⁸⁹ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 15.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15–16.

reason, a unified leadership is more likely to advance a successful restraint policy than a divided one.⁹¹

- National security priorities – states form alliances to promote their national interests. If the alliance jeopardizes their national interests or threatens their security, it may stipulate restraining attempts by the powerful states, or evoke opposition to these attempts by the weaker states. If the contested military policy does not endanger the highest national security priorities, restraint is expected to face less opposition by the weak states.⁹²
- Policy alternatives – creating substitution to the same outcome desired by the restrainee "can help restrainers restrain their allies".⁹³ The alternative policy can be a different military option or can be different in nature, including diplomatic or economic measures. Pressman also adds using domestic pressure, but claims there is only limited evidence of its efficacy.

Pressman contribution to alliance restraint theory is not merely his conclusions for the causes of restraint success and failure; he also brings the role of material power back to the discussion. By doing so he shortens the gap between the two theories of alliance formation and management. In fact, he states that alliance restraint theory and balance of threat theory are not mutually exclusive: "they often jointly explain the origin of an alliance", and can account for variance in alliance management.⁹⁴ In this study, both theories are used as alternate explanations for the protégé's deterrence behavior to assess the theoretical contribution of new concepts proposed in the next section.

⁹¹ Ibid., 16.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 9.

Chapter 3: Moving from the Protector to the Protégé

Both alliance and deterrence literature provides us with a deep understanding about the motivations of the protector as well as his policy alternatives, when employing extended deterrence. This chapter takes advantage of the rich literature about the protector and alliance dynamics to hypothesize the motivations and deterrence policy of the protégé. Specifically, this chapter infers from the protector's "deterrence-versus-restraint" dilemma, to delineate the dilemma of the protégé. It later discusses the deterrence related alternatives available for the protégé to cope with this dilemma, namely extended and direct complementary deterrence.

The Protégé's "Deterrence- Independence Dilemma"

According to the neorealist school, protégés join alliances to increase security against a potential threat chiefly by enhancing deterrence against the threat. On other hand, as alliance restraint scholars indicate, protégés act to protect their interests within the alliance, thus they seek to maintain independence to act as they wish rather than being subordinated to the protectors' demands.¹ This is the "deterrence-independence dilemma" of the protégé.

The Israeli dilemma during the Gulf War of 1991 illustrates this concept. The Israeli government was preoccupied with maintaining its ability to act unilaterally against Iraq, while pressuring the American administration to show a greater commitment to defend Israel against the Iraqi nonconventional threat.² On one hand, Israel sought to deter Iraq from launching non-conventional attack against Israeli targets by relying on Israeli and American military capacity. On the other hand, Israel wished to improve its position vis-à-vis its American ally in order to block American compellence attempts, and to influence the American policy against Iraq.

¹ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 1997, 177–80; Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 15–17.

² Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint"; Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," in *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel: Report of a Jaffee Center Study Group*, ed. Joseph Alpher (Jerusalem: JCSS, 1992), 184–208; Avigdor Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Avner Golov, "Deterrence in the Gulf War," *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no. 3 (November 1, 2013): 453–72.

As the Israeli example demonstrates, the protégé's "deterrence-independence dilemma" is a result of two simultaneous interactions: against the potential threat (Iraq) and with the protector (the U.S.). This dilemma is similar to the protector's dilemma presented by Snyder, in the sense that deterrence remains the core objective against the potential aggressor. However, in the interaction with the protector, the protégé acts not merely to impede restraint attempts and to increase its influence over the protector's policy, but also to develop an independent capacity to deter the potential adversary.

Returning to the Israeli case, by developing independent deterrence capacity, the Israeli government intended to protect itself if extended deterrence failed, in addition to improving its resilience to withstand American pressure to restrain Israeli policy, and to have greater leverage to influence the American war plan against Iraq. In fact, regarding the inter-alliance interaction, this model mirrors Snyder's well-established double-game model that protectors face when extending their deterrence over other states.

The Protégé's Deterrence Policy

Assuming the protégé is guided by the "deterrence-independence dilemma", its goal is to maximize its own security while minimizing the political constraints on its policy imposed by the protector's policy. To achieve that goal, the protégé has three chief alternatives: to rely solely on extended deterrence, to rest only on direct deterrence, or to hedge by merging these two deterrence mechanisms.

In the case of "pure" extended deterrence, nations "leave" their security to other nations as part of alliance formation. Nations that face new threats, James Morrow argues, "seek increased security through the cheapest means available at the time".³ Therefore, the state is expected to form or join an alliance when the expected benefit of the alliance is greater than the benefits of the other alternatives. According to

³James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (1993): 214.

Morrow, "when there are prospective allies with few conflicting interests, an alliance seems promising".⁴

Christensen and Snyder argue that perception of defense-offense capabilities is a chief determinant for a state's decision to align. If states estimate that their rival's defensive capabilities are dominant, they are likely to pass off the cost of stopping the threat to others (Buck Passing); if they believe offensive capabilities are dominant, they are more likely to join other allies.⁵ Since this research is limited to alliances, all protégés by definition enjoy extended deterrence to some extent.

This decreases the motivation of the protégé to exercise a "pure" direct deterrence policy and to rely merely on self-capabilities – its second alternative. The protégé, like any other actor, is expected to develop independent deterrence capacity (direct deterrence) when the expected utility of this alternative is higher than other alternatives, including extended deterrence.⁶ Assuming the protégé is already part of an alliance (thus he already decided to depend on extended deterrence) a shift in his policy occurs when the utility of direct deterrence surpasses the utility of extended deterrence. This can happen if the protégé develops the capability to increase his security by using self-capabilities (mainly military ones). Morrow contends that "when a nation can improve its military rapidly, the attraction of arming increases. Arming is cheap compared with forming alliances when there are easily mobilized resources or when military technology is advancing quickly".⁷

Another incentive for the protégé to employ direct deterrence may be an ally's decision to weaken its commitment. As Morrow notes, "the value of an alliance hinges on its credibility".⁸ Therefore, blurring one's commitment or conditioning it to external stakeholders reduces the attractiveness of alliances, and may encourage the protégé to enhance its direct deterrence even if it does not abandon the alliance. This process

⁴Ibid., 231.

⁵Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990.

⁶Liska, *Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World"; Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse"; Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 1984; Pressman, *Warring Friends*.

⁷Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," 231.

⁸Ibid., 214.

is reversible, as solving disputes with current or potential allies may increase the credibility of alliances, thus reducing the incentives to develop independent military capabilities.

To put it simply, nations' ability to rapidly improve military capability and the commitment given by the protector are the two main factors in assessing protégés' motivation of exercising direct deterrence. However, it would be misleading to assume that nations are required to choose between relying on the alliance's deterrence and relying on direct deterrence. As stated, Quackenbush advocates for the formation of new models that can encapsulate the dynamics created when both forms of deterrence operate together at the same time.⁹ His focal point is the protector, but his argument can and should be extended to the protégé.

In fact, Morrow stresses that, "over time the nation's security policy almost never relies solely on either arms or allies but rather on a combination of the two".¹⁰ Hence, a model designed to capture the policy of the protégé should be able to observe both extended and direct deterrence signals and define the relationship between them. This leads to the protégé's third alternative: hedging. This alternative has been neglected in deterrence literature. Therefore, this study explores how protégés craft their direct deterrence policy when they enjoy the protection of an ally. Following the rationale presented above, protégés that join alliances are expected to have both extended and direct deterrence elements, and in doing so create a virtually new form of deterrence – complementary deterrence, where one element completes the other. One should ask in what aspect these different forms of deterrence complete each other? Lawrence Freedman notes that deterrent threats "may vary according to what is to be deterred and how this is best achieved".¹¹ In fact, Freedman suggests two factors that differentiate between different deterrence policies: objective and means. Since the protégé and the protector wish to prevent the same action, their deterrent objective is similar. Therefore, the chief variance between the protector's extended deterrence and the protégé's direct deterrence lies in the means to achieve their goal.

⁹ Quackenbush, "Not Only Whether but Whom Three-Party Extended Deterrence."

¹⁰ Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," 214.

¹¹ Freedman, *Deterrence*, 32.

Resting on this rough distinction, this study hypothesizes a spectrum of the possible combinations of extended and direct deterrence policies. This is the hedging area whose outcome is the complementary form of deterrence. It can roughly be divided to two groups of combinations: direct complementary deterrence and extended complementary deterrence.

Direct Complementary Deterrence

In its pure form, direct deterrence is the ultimate self-help approach to deterrence – a state can rely solely on its own capability when deterring potential threats to its national interests. When it is incorporated in a broader deterrence policy along with external protection, direct deterrence is rendered a complementary form of deterrence. Direct deterrence remains the dominant element in the protégé's deterrence policy, but extended deterrence is used to complement and strengthen the protégé's capabilities. In September 2012, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly threatened to attack Iran's nuclear program should Iran cross the Israeli-defined red line, as presented in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly.¹² By doing so, Israel signaled its resolve to deter Iran by using its own military capability, rather than relying on the America's threats to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.¹³

Israel's own threats and military might, however, did not make extended deterrence dispensable. The Israeli government never decided to concede the American deterrent leverage against Iran. In fact, while exercising direct deterrence, Israel pushed the U.S. to enhance its commitment to prevent a nuclear Iran.¹⁴ The protégé is likely to maintain the threat of third party intervention as long as it strengthens its

¹² Haaretz, "Full Transcript of Netanyahu Speech at UN General Assembly," *Haaretz*, September 24, 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/full-transcript-of-netanyahu-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.386464>.

¹³ For instance, see President Barack's interview to *The Atlantic Magazine* at March 2, 2012. Jeffrey Goldberg, "Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff'," *The Atlantic*, March 2, 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/>.

¹⁴ Matt Spetalnick and Dan Williams, "Netanyahu to Obama: Tighten Sanctions If Iran Defies West," *Reuters*, September 30, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-iran-idUSBRE98T0J920130930> }

credibility, or until it jeopardizes its capacity to project direct deterrence in order to maximize deterrence against the adversary.

Moreover, by employing direct deterrence, Israel sought to strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis its American ally, and allow for an independent Israeli response should American deterrence fail. This reveals that direct complementary deterrence's main benefit is maximizing the agency of a protégé by reducing his dependency on the alliance. However, as the public debate between the Israeli government, headed by Netanyahu, and the Obama administration demonstrates, this behavior may lead to an internal crisis in the alliance: between the protégé and the protector. Since the protégé still wishes to preserve the alliance and enjoy the protection of the protector whose deterrence capabilities are more powerful, his policy is expected to be restrained. Enjoying the protector's strong power is why the protégé joined the alliance in the first place when balancing against the potential threat. Therefore, in reality, we expect to observe different combinations of direct deterrence alongside extended deterrence, thus creating a spectrum of direct complementary deterrence.

Extended Complementary Deterrence

A second alternative nations possess is employing extended complementary deterrence. This means incorporating independent means to strengthen the credibility of the already existing extended deterrence. Here, the dominant element is the protector's deterrence and the protégé's capabilities aimed to complement it. Hence, this behavior can be seen as local reinforcement of the protector's deterrence. Japan is a classic example. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-Japan alliance was a bedrock on which Japan's national security strategy was constructed. Counting on the American extended deterrence was Japan's chief response to the threat raised from the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. Along with the American protection, Japan developed limited conventional power to protect the country from external threats. The Japanese maritime power is the most prominent element of the Japanese military forces. The White Paper of 2016 states, "The peace and security of Japan is

ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan's own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements".¹⁵

In recent years, Japan decided to react to the growing threat from China and North Korea by enhancing its own military capabilities, while deepening cooperation with the U.S.¹⁶ This response reflects the Japanese extended complementary form of deterrence: the alliance with the U.S. was still the main instrument to cope with severe security challenges. However, Japan developed self-capacity to withstand what the country's white paper defines as "gray-zone" situations, that is, "neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests".¹⁷ By empowering its own military, Japan has evolved a complementary response to its threats that U.S. protection may be less effective against. The American protection is still the heart of the Japanese strategy, particularly when addressing existential threats; the Japanese forces aim to deal with the remaining threats, and render the alliance's deterrence stronger and more comprehensive.

As the Japanese policy demonstrates, by employing extended complementary deterrence threats, the protégé can maximize deterrence and its security against the threats, while not hindering the extended deterrence employed by the protector. The protégé maximizes deterrence measures against the perceived threat by integrating his direct deterrence signals with the protector's extended deterrence ones. The main downside of this policy is that the protégé concedes some of its agency against the aggressor as it still relies mainly on the protector's extended deterrence when dealing with the potential threat. David Santoro and John K. Warden allude to this point when pointing out the need to allow Japan more latitude in face of gray zone threats.¹⁸

The two forms of complementary deterrence do not represent a dichotomous decision. Instead, they represent a scale comprised of the protégé's possibilities of deterrence policy, as Figure 2 illustrates. On the right side is the policy of direct deterrence – the pure form of direct complementary deterrence. On the left side is a

¹⁵ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2016," 164, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html.


¹⁶ Ibid., 172; Grygiel and Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier*, 83.

¹⁷ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2016," 2.

¹⁸ David Santoro and John K. Warden, "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age," *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 155–56, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038182.

pure form of extended deterrence where the protégé relies absolutely on the protector's commitment.

Figure 2 The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging Spectrum



Chapter 4: Methodology

Overall, the purpose of this research is to test causal relationships between the inputs from the adversary (threat) and the protector (alliance commitment along restraining efforts), and suggesting one path of how they are translated to output by the protégé (its deterrence policy and consent to restrain its use of force). This section discusses how deterrence and its performances are measured, and the research method designed to support the intellectual purpose of this study, namely a combination of in-depth analysis and case comparison. This chapter defines the theoretical boundaries of this study as well as its limitations. The research's conclusions should be examined in light of these methodological settings.

Measuring Deterrence

When measuring deterrence in general, one should address the practice of deterrence as well as its performance. The practice of deterrence is measured by the behavior of the defender, but the performances of deterrence are measured by the behavior of the attacker. For example, to measure the American policy of deterrence against the Soviet threat one is required to test the American behavior. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein argue that a nation that employs deterrence "must define the unacceptable behavior, make public the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess at least rudimentary capabilities to implement the threat".¹ These conditions are evidences of deterrence policy.

However, to assess deterrence performances, one should examine the adversary's behavior. In the American case, we should look for evidence that the Soviet policy was in fact changed due to the American threats. However, it has always been a great challenge for deterrence researchers to determine the impact of deterrence policy. Freedman illustrates this challenge: proving deterrence works "is particularly challenging. It is obvious when it fails. B has been told not to do X ... but X is nonetheless done. But when deterrence succeeds, all that is known is that X has not happened".² This

¹ Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence," 344.

²Freedman, *Deterrence*, 29.

could be due to a range of factors, including the option that B had never intended to do X. Therefore, this research designs to test if the adversary distinguishes between the protector's extended deterrence and the protégé's direct deterrence; and if so, whether the protégé's threats hinder, strengthen or has no impact on the protector's attempts to deter the potential adversary.

Deterrence literature distinguishes between two types of extended deterrence: general and immediate. General extended deterrence refers to a situation "when the opponents who maintain armed forces regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack".³ Lebow and Stein point out that this type of deterrence "leaves few behavioral traces,"⁴ and thus it is very difficult to research. For this reason, the following study focuses on immediate extended deterrence: "when an attacker contemplates military action against another country and a third party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with attack".⁵

Indicators for offensive intentions might be very hard to detect as well as demonstrating one's intentions to use deterrence in order to prevent the attacker from attacking the protégé. This methodological difficulty initiated a theoretical debate between the two pairs of scholars.⁶ Though all agreed upon the necessary conditions of immediate extended deterrence – offensive intention from the attacker and deterring reaction by the protector – their definition of the operational threshold from which we can codify a case as extended deterrence is different.

Lebow and Stein set a higher bar, that is, when the attacker has "serious intention" to use force. They expound, "there must be evidence to indicate that the challenger considered an attack, as well as evidence that a defender attempted to deter when the attacker has serious intention to use force and where the defender attempted to deter".⁷ This criterion has been criticized by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett for ignoring all cases of bluffs and uncertainty regarding the attacker during the crisis.⁸

³ Ibid., 40.

⁴ Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence," 347.

⁵ Ibid., 342.

⁶ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1, 1990): 466–501; Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence."

⁷ Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence," 343.

⁸ Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory," 478–80.

Freedman presents another approach which supports the argument made by Huth and Russett. He claims that, "deterrence can seem far less problematic when we start from the point of view of the deterred" (the attacker).⁹ Hence, deterrence should be measured as an outcome of a political process generated by the emergence of a perceived threat (by the attacker or the protector). Accordingly, deterrence is a self-induced fear of the consequences, which may be grounded in reality or not. This definition includes bluffs and uncertainties to some extent, but it also demands political decisions that denote the magnitude of the threat in the eyes of the threatened state.

Research Method

The methodology of this research consists of two phases: "in-depth" study and comparative method. In the first phase, four cases are analyzed to draw a causal mechanism, if one exists, between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett claim that case study analysis possesses the "ability to reveal the cause of the effects is greater than other methodologies, and its potential for policy is greater for it does not focus only on the starting and finish point, but on the historical sequence and process".¹⁰

Specifically, this research employs "process-tracing". George and Bennett define this method as the use of "histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case".¹¹ In their recent book, Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel propose a new definition of process-tracing which wishes to isolate the direct linkage between the dependent and the independent variables, from its impact on the intervening variables. Accordingly, process-tracing is "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures

⁹Freedman, *Deterrence*, 30.

¹⁰Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 6–7.

¹¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 6.

of events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case".¹²

The purpose of process-tracing is "to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable".¹³ Many researchers attribute a high value for using this method to study complicated multi-causality relationships that often characterized social sciences.¹⁴

In order to achieve its goal, process-tracing should be conducted correctly. George and Bennett, for example, warn that a single case-study analysis should be applied to a wide range of alternative hypotheses for left-out variables could threaten the validity of this analysis. Vincent Pouliot, too, expounds "a practical analysis is always provisional and must remain open to contestation and revision because configurations of practices are so complex and shifting that one can never claim to have found the one causal practice".¹⁵ For that reason, this research merges deterrence theory and alliance theory to test many alternative hypotheses, namely the dominant realist theoretical frameworks for alliance management studies, thus widening the range of potential explanations, and maximizing the validity of this research.

Pouliot contends that process-tracing should not be limited to "in-depth" studies that include merely one case studies, but should also incorporate comparison between different case-studies. He notes, "a good practice-tracing account should, first, explain the social effects that practices of interest generate at the level of action (local causality); and, second, abstract mechanisms away from context to gain cross-case leverage (analytical generality)".¹⁶ Bennett and Checkel propose a list of ten best

¹² Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T Checkel (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.

¹³George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 206.

¹⁴ Nina Tannenwald, "Process Tracing and Security Studies," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 219–27, doi:10.1080/09636412.2015.1036614; David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 823–30; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices"; Vincent Pouliot, "Practice Tracing," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T Checkel (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 237–59.

¹⁵ Pouliot, "Practice Tracing," 259.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 258.

practices for process –tracing. They also highlight the role of alternative explanations and combining case comparison, "when useful for the research goal and feasible".¹⁷ This leads to the second phase of this research methodology.

The second phase retests the proposed mechanism, by dividing the cases into two dyads: two crises between a Russian attacker, German protector and an Austrian protégé (in 1886 during the "Bulgarian Crisis", and the in 1914 before World War I); the second dyad contains an American protector, Israeli protégé and two different attackers (a Syrian attacker in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and an Iraqi attacker in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991).

Table 1 Selected Case Studies

Year	Adversary	Protector	Protégé	Alliance Commitments	Deterrence Hedging
1886	Russia	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Relatively Weak	Extended Complementary
1914	Russia	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Relatively Strong	Extended Complementary
1973	Egypt/Syria	U.S.A	Israel	Relatively Weak	Direct Complementary
1991	Iraq	U.S.A	Israel	Relatively Strong	Direct Complementary

The rationale behind the case selection in the first two dyads is to consider two cases that are very similar in the identity of the countries involved and the time frame in which they took place, but hold a significant discrepancy concerning the alliance assurances given by the protector. The two dyads represent two forms of hypothesized deterrence hedging: direct and extended complementary deterrence, and an internal trend within each dyad: both Austro-Hungary and Israel embrace stronger extended deterrence elements in the second case (1914 and 1991 respectively) than in the earlier case (1885 and 1973). This combination of method of agreement and method of difference should provide ground to test the extent to which the variance within the independent variables (the protégé's deterrence-

¹⁷ Bennett and Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," 29. For the discussion about the ten best practices see p. 20-31.

independent dilemma) influences the dependent variable (the protégé's deterrence hedging policy), with respect to alternative explanations.¹⁸ The similar trend in very different dyads can highlight the role of similar conditions that can produce such a similar result, while pointing to the variables that can explicate the variance in each dyad and the different outcome in the protégé's deterrence policy.

It is important to stress that this study includes one dyad from the nuclear era (the Israeli dyad) and one dyad from the pre-nuclear era (the Austrian one). Given the nuclear deterrence attributed to the two members in the U.S.- Israel alliance this provides an opportunity to retest our findings from a pre-nuclear era on two individual cases when nuclear weapons were involved, and to assess the independent contribution of nuclear weapons on the protégé's calculus and policies.

The research consists of small number of case-studies (small N). This method allows to explore the interaction between many variables when proposing a causal mechanism to explicate the deterrence policy of the protégé. This effort yields a highly credible analysis of the observed cases. However, the generation-potential embodied in this method is limited. First, it is vital to have a large pool of cases to control the alternative variables while allowing variance in the dependent and independent variables.¹⁹ This research examines variance within each case-study, thus, enables a richer pool of observations, but its control over the alternative explanations is very limited.²⁰ The research may also suffer from a case selection-bias, "when the nonrandom selection of cases results in references, based on the resulting sample, that are not statistically representative of the population".²¹ Hence, this research's conclusions hold solely a relatively low external validity. Using a comprehensive analysis comprised of case-comparison in two levels: within each dyad and among the two dyads, alleviates this methodological flaw, but it does not solve it. Hence, this study's purpose is to challenge the current dominant theories in alliance management,

¹⁸James Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (February 1, 2007): 122–44, doi:10.1177/0010414006296345; Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing."

¹⁹ This phenomenon is often referred as the "degree of freedom problem". See, George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 30.

²⁰ To read on the 'degrees of freedom problem' and case studies see, *Ibid.*, 28–30.

²¹ David Collier, "Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 462.

and to serve as a good basis for a further research aimed to enrich the rich literature on extended deterrence. The conclusions presented in the last chapter should be seen as the foundations for this innovative intellectual endeavor.

This study is based mostly on historical research, and particularly national archives. As Marc Trachtenberg claims, using historical evidence could help the scholar to penetrate the mind of a leader and to study its behavior in retrospect: "to look at the world through the eyes of those who controlled policy and who played key roles in deciding what a particular state actually did".²² However, any historical research is subject to some sort of bias, due to the researcher's beliefs, the sources available or the theoretical framework on which the research was built. In order to confront these potential biases this research maps the disputes regarding the role of the two independent variables. The dispute will be presented even if one argument is to be found more reliable than the other, due to robust evidence from formal classified documents. The debate regarding the German intentions in the prelude of World War I, and the success of Israeli deterrence during the Gulf War are the most prominent example in this research.

Lastly, it is noteworthy that this research designed to test the theoretical framework available by the literature to comprehend the dynamics extended deterrence creates. Hence, it takes advantages of the historical analysis for theoretical purposes. By comparing the theory's prediction with the historical observation one can point out theoretical success of explaining relations between different variables, and shed light upon discrepancies between the theoretical and historical literature.²³ "Theory is above all an instrument of analysis and, depending on what that analysis reveals, can also serve as the basis for interpretation", claims Trachtenberg.²⁴ Therefore, this study incorporated theoretical lens from deterrence and alliance literature to test alternative assumptions regarding the deterrence policy of the protégé and the alliance management dynamics. The rich theoretical basis upon which this historical

²²Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History* (Princeton University Press, 2006), 141.

²³ *Ibid.*, 40–41.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

analysis was built, mostly influenced from realist discourse about extended deterrence, allow for the testing of the existing literature, while simultaneously evaluating the theoretical contribution of the new framework proposed by this study. Altogether, this methodology is designed to produce the necessary intellectual tools to understand the historical context, thus, to portray the "story of the protégé," and to test Thucydides' famous statement.

Chapter 5: The Bulgarian Crisis (1885-1887)

In the end of 1887 a leading German newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*, published an article describing the situation in the post Bulgarian Crisis Europe:

"History designates years which one may call prophetic. Among these prophetic years will be reckoned the one at whose end we now stand. The peace of the world has been preserved, it is true; and life in the several countries is still going on as usual; but no one can be sure any longer that the peaceful day will be followed by an equally peaceful morrow. The pulse of the century grows feverish. The political and economic atmosphere has become dull and oppressive. What we are experiencing is comparable to the crackling in the walls of an unsound house which usually precedes a catastrophe".¹

The Bulgarian Crisis positioned contradictory forces in Europe against each other. In this regard it was not unique. However, as the German article illustrates, during this crisis the risk of local tensions rendering a continental conflict was real and high. Amidst this crisis the Austro-Hungarian monarchy struggled against Russian power over influence in the Balkans. When facing the Russian threat, Austrian deterrence strategy encompassed several elements: direct deterrence along with mixed protection from its German ally, and cooperation with England. The Austrian strategy reflects an interesting case of deterrence hedging: between independent capabilities and extended deterrence, and between two different protectors.

This chapter discusses the protégé's policy, namely the Austro-Hungarian, during the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885-1887. It starts with an overview of the crisis. Since this crisis is less well known than the Balkan crises that followed in the beginning of the 20th century, this chapter presents the main events in length. The chapter then provides an analysis of interests and relative capabilities of the main actors in the deterrence triangle: The Austrian protégé, the German protector, and the Russian adversary. This overview is the basis for the core of the chapter: the discussion in the Austrian deterrence hedging and the contribution of using the concept of deterrence-

¹ *Neue Freie Presse*, January 1, 1888 as cited in Joseph Vincent Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922), 303.

independence dilemma to grasp the motivations that guided the Austrian behavior. The chapter closes with a short discussion of the theoretical contribution of this concept in respect to two main existing theories explaining alliance management dynamics.

The Bulgarian Crisis: An Overview

In the lead up to the crisis, the Balkan Peninsula comprised Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly autonomous and loosely governed by the decaying Ottoman Empire. In the 1870s the Balkans became a political hot spot with Russian, Austrian, German, Ottoman, and nationalistic interests tugging the region in different directions. In February 1878, after winning the war with the Ottoman Empire, not content with occupying Bessarabia, Russia violated Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests by creating an independent Bulgaria. With Great Britain as an ally in his opposition to the Russian advance in southeastern Europe and Bismarck as an "honest broker," the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Count Andrassy, managed to force Russia to retreat from its excessive demands at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878.² Bulgaria was broken up again, Serbian independence guaranteed, Russia retained Bessarabia, and Austria-Hungary was allowed to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.³

Schmidt claims that for Germany, the Berlin Congress of 1878 was the only way to avoid a full commitment for either Russia or Austria.⁴ According to Joseph Vincent

² According to Fuller, Bismarck took Austria-Hungary's side against Russia after "Russia's threatening conduct after the Congress of Berlin. The fact is that he [Bismarck] took Austria's side from the very beginning; and he virtually made his decision in her favor in 1876, when he informed Russia that he would not allow either party to suffer a decisive defeat in a trial at arms. He would promise Germany's neutrality in a conflict between Russia and Austria only in case Russia guaranteed the treaty of Frankfurt; and when Russia refused this condition, he left her to take the consequences of an adventure opposed by both Austria and England." *Ibid.*, 24.

³ Military occupation of those two provinces turned out to be more than the expected mere formality. It took 150,000 troops and several weeks of fighting before the lands were under Austro-Hungarian authority. Since no agreement could be reached on whether the newly acquired lands should operate under the Hungarian or the Austrian part of the monarchy, they were placed under the jurisdiction of the common Habsburg Ministry of Finance. Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918* (London ; New York: Longman, 1997), 255.

⁴ Rainer F. Schmidt, "Andrassy Und Bismark: Konvergenz Oder Divergenz Der Konfliktlösungsmodelle in Der Orientkrise Der Jahre 1875 Bis 1878?," in *Ungleiche Partner?: Österreich Und Deutschland in Ihrer Gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung: Historische Analysen Und Vergleiche Aus Dem 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Michael Gehler et al. (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), 292.

Fuller, "Bismarck felt the effect upon Russia was serious enough to warrant approaching both her enemies, England and Austria for alliances".⁵ Similarly from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina reasserted Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans, but Russia's actions made Austria-Hungary suspicious of Russia's expansionist ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. Though the Balkans proper was economically dominated by other major powers, the Straits in particular were of huge import. Russia was an agricultural economy and the Straits were vitally important to its agricultural exports. The tension between the two powers in Eastern Europe reached a peak in Bulgaria in 1885.

1885: The Serbo-Bulgarian War

On September 18, 1885, during the reign of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria a revolution to unify Bulgaria and East Rumelia broke out led by Bulgarian nationalists, much to the consternation and surprise of the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, and Russians.⁶ Although Russia was originally in support of unification, deteriorating relations between the cousins, Tsar Alexander of Russia and Prince Alexander, made Russia hesitant in pushing forward with the unification. The Serbians also feared their influence diminishing in the Balkans and opposed the unification of Bulgaria as they saw Bulgaria violating the tenets of the Berlin Treaty and changing the *status quo* for their own benefit. Serbia, seeking compensation for Bulgaria breaking the Berlin Treaty, declared war on Bulgaria for the annexation of Eastern Rumalia, partially lured by the promises of Austria-Hungary to settle the issue through diplomacy. For Austria-Hungary, according to Foreign Minister Kálnoky, Serbia was a pawn in the Balkans, much like Bulgaria was a Russian pawn in the race for pan-Slavism in the region. Any "gain to Serbia at the expense of Bulgaria, seemed, therefore, to the ultimate profit of Austria-Hungary".⁷ Assuming Serbia would gain an easy victory, Kálnoky wrote to the

⁵ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

Note: The region of East Rumelia, which was primarily Bulgarian was controlled by the Ottomans during leading up to the Bulgarian unification in 1885.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Anton Graf Wolkenstein, that “the time has passed, when incidences in the Balkans could daunt and shake all of Europe”.⁸

War between Serbia and Bulgaria erupted on November 14, 1885 and lasted until November 28, 1885. Although Russia did not intervene on behalf of Bulgaria, the Serbians were losing due to the inefficiency of their military and internal strife. On 25 November 1885, the Great Powers sent a collective note to Bulgaria and Serbia, demanding that they cease the hostilities. While Serbia agreed, Bulgaria refused and attacked again on November 26. Kálnoky subsequently sent Khevenhüller to King Alexander.⁹ Austria-Hungary intervened to protect the Serbian nation when Bulgarian forces started to move into Serbia, and conveyed a resolved message to Bulgaria urging King Alexander to end the war. The Bulgarian king heeded the ultimatum to cease the advance of Bulgarian troops into Serbia. The final peace accord was signed in Bucharest in March 1886. The result of the war ensured that the major European powers accepted a unified Bulgaria but no territorial powers changed hands.

1886: The Abdication of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria

In the fall of 1886 a Russian sponsored officers’ revolt removed Prince Alexander from power and restored Russian lordship in Bulgaria, stepping up the Austro-Hungarian crisis and renewing tensions between the European powers. The abdication of Prince Alexander on September 7, 1886 put fresh strains on the Triple Alliance between AH, Germany and Italy. A deadlock was reached in the Alliance negotiations when Kálnoky, finding that neither of his allies was prepared to support Austria against Russia in the Balkans, took back all his concessions.¹⁰

Britain, like Austria, had inherited a tradition of opposition to Russian policy in the Near East. Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury held a view that “while the real danger to Great Britain was problematical, reasons of prestige which no British Government

⁸ “die Zeiten vorüber seien, wo Inzidenzfälle am Balkan ganz Europa zu beängstigen und erschüttern vermögen.” Josef Brein, “Anton Graf Wolkenstein-Trostburg: Sein Wirken Als Österreichisch-Ungarischer Botschafter in St. Petersburg von 1882 Bis 1894” (Magister thesis, University of Vienna, 2010), 30.

⁹ Walter Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895* (Vienna, Austria/Cologne and Weimar, Germany: Böhlau, 1993), 77.

¹⁰ Fuller, *Bismarck’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 150.

could ignore compelled a resolute opposition to Russia's advance towards Constantinople".¹¹ In fact, in 1885, Salisbury had supported the unification of Bulgaria when he found out that Russia was opposed to it, and made unsuccessful attempts to persuade Alexander to withdraw his abdication.¹²

In the immediate aftermath of the abdication, a series of events led to strained relations between the European powers, particularly France and Germany. First, the heavy handed measures by the Germans against the Poles, a traditional method of Prussia to curry favor with Russia, backfired in its overzealous nature.¹³ On this occasion, the campaign expelled alien Poles and Jews to make room for German colonists. Although, both these races were hated by many Russians, they were "nevertheless Russian subjects, attacks on whom must be resented by their government".¹⁴ This led to a weakening of the League of Three Emperors comprised of Germany, Russia and AH. According to Fuller, "the relations between Russia and Austria had been chiefly damaged; now the seeds had been sown of a conflict between Russia and Germany".¹⁵ However, the conflict developed no further at that time, and Bismarck still looked upon the Russian alliance as his guarantee against a rapprochement between Russia and France.¹⁶

Tensions between France and Germany had been escalating, but in 1886, France's position appeared secure. France was still isolated and satisfactorily at odds with both England and Russia.¹⁷ Bismarck continued to entertain the idea of a partnership with Great Britain, which, Lord Salisbury, to some extent reciprocated. On August 13, he remarked, "that England was too weak in military power to keep peace in the Near East alone, and would welcome an understanding with Austria for the purpose".¹⁸ However, Bismarck, fearing Austria-Hungary's ability to control the matter, confined

¹¹ W. N. Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," *The Slavonic Review* 5, no. 13 (1926): 68.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 56.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁸ *German Foreign Office Publication*, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, August 13 1886 as cited in *Ibid.*, 63.

himself to advising Salisbury that if "Great Britain needed troops to maintain her interest in the Near East, she should subsidize the Turkish army".¹⁹

Fuller opines that for Germany, at this point there were three possible courses of action to resolve the Bulgarian Crisis and the larger issue of conflict in the Near East.²⁰

1. Support Austria-Hungary unreservedly from the start, announcing that Germany will join its ally in the event of a war.
2. Espouse Russia's claims and persuade Austria-Hungary for a consideration to concede to them.
3. Stay in the background; let Austria-Hungary go ahead on their own, assuring support of some form to deter Russia, while not openly including Germany.

According to Fuller, the first option was inconceivable for Bismarck. The second course of action, which Bismarck "set great store", was a "practical impossibility".²¹ The third course of action, according to Fuller, had the "most to recommend it".²² Although, the Hungarians in the government wanted Austria to oppose Russia; the Austro-Hungarian reaction to the abdication was subdued. Kálnoky declared that no action was called for, especially "since it was now evident that it would not be supported by Germany".²³

Bismarck continued to try and gather support for Austria-Hungary, primarily by bringing Britain into the fold. Fuller writes, "The power most eligible for the position of Austria's ally was England, the enemy of her enemy, Russia and her own former partner at the time of the congress of Berlin".²⁴ However, Bismarck was always suspicious of the commitment of Britain to the Austrian cause, making him hesitant in his actions.²⁵

For their part, Russia decided to make its action in Bulgaria as little extraordinary as possible, sending General Kaulbars, the brother of the former Bulgarian Minister of

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 77.

²¹ Ibid., 79.

²² Ibid., 80.

²³ Ibid., 71.

²⁴ Ibid., 80.

²⁵ Ibid., 90.

War, and instructed "to study the situation, and, by his counsel, to assist the Bulgarians in putting an end to the present crisis in their affairs".²⁶ However, this action only riled the other powers into action, citing a speech by Randolph Churchill where he announced England's determination to support the freedom and independence of Bulgaria. However, he was clear to state that England's interests in the Bulgarian question, it should leave the initiative to others; that if it must act, it should do so in agreement with the whole Triple Alliance and not just one or two of the members; and that it should not abandon hope of a settlement by peaceful means.²⁷

In 1886, British politician Sir Charles Dilke stated, "In October last two great refusals of alliances took place. France, I am told, declined a formal alliance with Russia, and Austria declined an alliance with Great Britain, although in both cases we ought to use the phrase 'declined with thanks',".²⁸ Fuller notes, "The writer's sources of information were sufficiently respectable to entitle his words to great consideration, but in neither case is it possible to put one's finger upon a definite offer of alliance".²⁹ Fuller adds, as the month of October passed, "without bringing about any definite alignment of the Powers on the Bulgarian question", Russia had taken merely indecisive steps – "One of the most disturbing facts about the situation was that no one knew what Russia now wanted to do – least of all, the Russians themselves".³⁰

Towards the end of 1886, the "French peril" forced the Germans to escalate military development to keep pace with the French resulting in the German Army bill, which only served to further escalate tensions in Europe and render the tensions in the Balkans a large scale war. The Austrians were told by *Generalquartiermeister* Waldersee, "We regard a French war as a near eventuality and wish, therefore, to avoid with all possible care a simultaneous war with Russia... the French army is at present stronger than ours".³¹

²⁶ Ibid., 91.

²⁷ Ibid., 92.

²⁸ Ibid., 102.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 117.

³¹ Ibid., 127.

1887: The Danger of an Inevitable European War

In July 7, 1887, Ferdinand of Coburg ascended as monarch of Bulgaria. The Powers held back from any formal pronouncements and allowed events to play out; however, Russia was wary of the election of Prince Ferdinand.³² If Russia opposed, "a trusty combination of three Great Powers stood ready to seize her by the throat". Fuller writes, "Russia must finally come to realize that her attempts to disturb the order of things he [Bismarck] stood for was hopeless".³³

To make matters worse, in March 1887, an event known as the Schnaebelle Incident almost brought France and Germany to war, mostly stemming from unsatisfactory local conditions in Alsace and Lorraine. The incident was sparked when Guillaume Schnaebelle, a mid-level and obscure French police inspector was arrested by the German secret police on suspicion of espionage.³⁴

In another measure to keep the Russians out of the Balkans, Austria-Hungary formed an alliance, the Mediterranean Entente, with Britain and Italy in February 1887, against a possible Russian attack. W. N. Medlicott states, "The tripartite understanding between Austria-Hungary, Italy and Great Britain for the maintenance of status quo in the Mediterranean regions [was] a development linking together policies hostile to Russia in the Balkans and France in North Africa".³⁵

When the Triple Alliance Treaty was renewed in 1887, Italy gained a promise of German support of Italian colonial ambitions in North Africa in return for Italy's continued friendship.³⁶ Austria-Hungary had to be pressured by Bismarck into accepting the principles of consultation and mutual agreement with Italy on any territorial changes initiated in the Balkans or on the coasts and islands of the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

³² Ibid., 215.

³³ Ibid., 215.

³⁴ Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershey, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia and Africa, 1870-1914* (Washington: Govt. print. off, 1918), 128–29.

³⁵ Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," 66.

³⁶ Alfred Francis Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, English ed. (Cambridge, 1920), 104–14.

On the other hand, in the Reinsurance Treaty of June 18, 1887, Bismarck promised to join Russia in “opposing every attempt to disturb the territorial status quo in the Balkans, without a previous agreement between the two Powers, and to recognize the legitimacy of the preponderant and decisive influence of Russia in Bulgaria, and though in the first article of the treaty the pledge of benevolent neutrality expressly excluded the case of a war against Austria or France, resulting from an attack against either by one of the contracting Powers, he proceeded to give Russia diplomatic support at Constantinople when called upon to do so”.³⁷

In 1887, as what seemed to be a settled issue regarding Bulgaria came to a head when Alexander III of Russia was made aware of Germany’s real policy in Bulgaria vis-à-vis Prince Ferdinand. These “Bulgarian Documents” seemed to the Russians as a betrayal of the Germans to both the Three Emperor’s League and the Reinsurance Treaty. This in turn increased the Francophile demonstrations in the Russian press.³⁸ Tensions were partially absolved in a meeting between Bismarck and the Tsar, but according to Fuller, the “interview by all indications to have brought forth no immediate results. In fact, it had none, but formed only one step in the readjustment of Russo-German relations”.³⁹

Resolution of the Crisis

The German attitude towards the Bulgarian crisis can be summed up in Bismarck’s writing:

“We shall keep out of the war with Russia so long as is compatible with our honor and safety, and so long as the independence of Austria-Hungary, whose existence as a Great Power is a primary necessity for us, is not called into question. We desire that friendly Powers having interests in the East which we do not share should make themselves strong enough to hold Russia’s sword in its scabbard or to make head against her if circumstances should lead to a breach. So long as no German interest were at stake, we should remain neutral; but there is

³⁷ Medlicott, “The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887,” 76.

³⁸ Fuller, *Bismarck’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 243.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 265.

not the remotest possibility that a German Emperor would ever give armed support to Russia in striking down or enfeebling one of the Powers on whose support we count for preventing a Russian war or helping us to face one. Holding this point of view, our policy will always compel Germany to take her place in the line of battle, if the independence of Austria-Hungary should be endangered by a Russian attack, or if England or Italy should be in peril of invasion by French armies".⁴⁰

To that end in December 1887, a Triple Entente with Italy and Britain was secretly formed in opposition to Russia. Russia capitulated within a week after this coalition's completion. This outcome, however, did not prevent Europe from being shaken by a war scare in December 1887 mostly led by military cliques in the Powers.⁴¹ In particular, in November, the central powers made a great stir over the movement of a cavalry division from the interior of Russia to the neighborhood of Lublin. Bismarck inferred that the "Russians were trying to provoke Austria-Hungary to make the first attack since becoming acquainted with the terms of the Austro-German Treaty".⁴²

According to Fuller, "Russia had been preparing to give way as to Bulgaria since early in December [1887]. Her only desire by this time was to get rid of Prince Ferdinand: anything else seemed preferable to the existing state of affairs".⁴³ However, the suggestion to replace him was met with no response from the other Powers. On December 18, Russia announced its surrender to the Triple Entente on the Bulgarian question. The Russian ambassador approached Kálnoky and declared, "in the name of the Emperor, that Russia has not the slightest intention of going to war; still less of attacking Austria-Hungary... No one thinks of shedding a single drop of blood for Bulgaria: a peaceful solution will be found for that question".⁴⁴ Fuller writes, "It was plain enough to her by this time that she could no longer stand out against the forces opposing her".⁴⁵ Gone was Russia's aim of prevailing in Bulgaria – gone because

⁴⁰ Ibid., 269.

⁴¹ Ibid., 277.

⁴² Ibid., 278.

⁴³ Ibid., 283.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 286.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 285.

Germany had failed to support them and backed its opponents. All the favorable clauses of the Reinsurance Treaty were renounced in Russia's capitulation to Austria.

Lavino at Vienna correctly estimated the conclusion of the crisis in his Times article on December 19:

"But this one fact must not be lost sight of, that the arrangement now to be settled between Russia and her two neighbors will admit to no quibble on Russia's part. Germany and Austria-Hungary mean to treat as being the stronger parties in any possible conflict. The essential point for them is to demonstrate that Russia can henceforth no longer play the part of arbiter of peace in Europe; that it is not open to her to make suspicious alliances with France; that she cannot march into Bulgaria at her pleasure; that she has not the permission to bully Turkey, and to coerce that Power into allowing the passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles, under fallacious pretexts; and finally, that her attitude towards Germany and Austria-Hungary henceforth must not be that of a stronger and domineering, but of a weaker and subservient State".⁴⁶

Analyzing the Deterrence Triangle

The Austro-Hungarian Protégé

The operation of the Compromise of 1867, brought the Austrian and the Hungarian empires together, but led to the weakening of the Austrian position and a strengthening of the Hungarians. As a consequence of the Franco-Austrian War, and the Austro-Prussian War the Habsburg Empire was on the verge of collapse in 1866, as these military endeavors resulted in monumental state debt, and a financial crisis.⁴⁷ The Habsburgs were forced to reconcile with Hungary to save their empire and dynasty. The Habsburgs and part of the Hungarian political elite arranged the Austro-

⁴⁶ *Times*, December 20, 1887 as cited in *Ibid*.

⁴⁷ Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 326–64; David F. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 82.

Hungarian Compromise of 1867, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the populace wanted full independence.⁴⁸ According to Franz Joseph, only three people contributed to the compromise: "There were three of us who made the agreement: Deák, Andrassy and myself".⁴⁹ It established the Dual Monarchy system with separate parliaments and prime ministers governing each nation.

Unity of the empire was maintained through the rule of a single head of state, reigning as both the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and common monarchy-wide ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and finance under his direct authority. The armed forces were combined with the Emperor-King as commander-in-chief, the first of which was Joseph I.⁵⁰ During the 1880s the emperor had a close relationship with the Austrian General staff, Beck, which expressed in mutual respect. This relationship nurtured the emperor's sympathy toward the Austrian military force.⁵¹

Foreign policy for the Austro-Hungarian Empire was controlled centrally under the direct control of Vienna; however, the foreign minister was always Hungarian chosen by the Habsburg royal house. In the lead up to the 1879 Austro-Hungarian-German alliance, Andrassy was the Foreign Minister, but resigned largely because of eroding political support and health issues.⁵² He was replaced by Gustav Kálnoky, the former Ambassador to St. Petersburg. Foreign Minister possessed great power over the monarchy's foreign policy particularly when the interests at stake involved Austrian obligations to international treaties. The Austrian Chancellor was secondary when making decisions in foreign affairs. Lothar Höbelt notes, "The 'Reich Chancellor' was

⁴⁸ Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, 210.

⁴⁹ Adam Kozuchowski, *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 83, <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/book/27732>. Ferenc Deák de Kehida (17 October 1803 – 28 January 1876) was a Hungarian statesman and Minister of Justice. He was known as "The Wise Man of the Nation".

⁵⁰ Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, 211.

⁵¹ Lothar Höbelt, "Kein Bismarck Und Kein Moltke: Regierung, Militär Und Außenpolitik in Österreich-Ungarn 1860 Bis 1890," in *Das Militär Und Der Aufbruch in Die Moderne 1860 Bis 1890: Armeen, Marinen Und Der Wandel von Politik, Gesellschaft Und Wirtschaft in Europa, Den USA Sowie Japan*, ed. Michael Epkenhans and Gerhard P. Groß (Munich, Germany: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003), 75.

⁵² Francis Roy Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914*, *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers* (London, Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972), 100–101.

in an isolated role. His position was never as closely interlocked with the government of 'Austria' or 'Hungary' as Bismarck's in Prussia".⁵³

Austrian Interests

Unified Bulgaria was a two-fold threat to Austria-Hungary's interests. First, the act of unification was a blunt violation of the Berlin agreement of 1878 which protected the monarchy from both the threat of growing nationalism and Russian expansion to the Balkans. In the 1880s, a conservative inspired Slavic nationalism developed at an accelerated pace in Russia threatening Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans by evoking a pan-nationalistic movement that would mitigate Austro-Hungarian influence in the region.⁵⁴ It also jeopardized Vienna's commerce with the Balkan countries, and the road connects the monarchy to Asia through the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁵ The status quo determined by the Berlin Treaty prevented the minorities in the Balkans from fulfilling their national inspirations. For the Austrian monarchy which comprised of many minorities this was crucial.⁵⁶ One successful national campaign can lead to the collapse of the status quo and ignite large scale rebellion in the monarchy. To maintain stability, Vienna was reluctant to allow the unification of Bulgaria and East Rumelia as it sought to protect the status quo and prevent this potential "domino effect".

Second, a unified Bulgaria, suspiciously supported by Russia, could also have served as the door for Russian influence in the Balkans and risk the monarchy. In this regard, Vienna was more preoccupied with the implications of the Bulgarian campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly Macedonia. Kálnoky displayed great anxiety from the start on the matter, writing to Paget that it is of "pressing importance to prevent the revolution from spreading to Macedonia" and had "telegraphed Baron Calice to urge the Sultan's Government, whatever might be their decision in regard to

⁵³ „Der 'Reichskanzler' nahm eine isolierte Stellung ein. Seine Position war nie so eng mit der Regierung, Österreichs' oder, Ungarns' verklammert, wie die Bismarcks in Preußen.“ Höbelt, "Kein Bismarck Und Kein Moltke: Regierung, Militär Und Außenpolitik in Österreich-Ungarn 1860 Bis 1890," 75.

⁵⁴ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 120–23.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 121–23.

⁵⁶ See Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918*, 354–55.

the events in Rumelia and Bulgaria, to take every precaution for the maintenance of tranquility in Macedonia, and to place troops in proper positions to guard that frontier".⁵⁷ To that end, Kálnoky also wanted the Powers to "warn the Prince [Alexander] and the Bulgarian Government that an invasion of Macedonia would not be tolerated".⁵⁸ Losing Bulgaria, and putting Macedonia under an immediate threat would have allowed Russia to be positioned on the monarchy's borders, thus, constraining the Austrian influence in the region and being a continuous immediate threat.

Another critical concern from the unification of Bulgaria was the demands of Serbia for 'compensation', in case the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria should be recognized. As stated earlier, for Austria any Serbian achievement at the expense of Bulgaria, Russia's pawn, would be a positive whereas in the current state of affairs, when Bulgaria promotes its interests, endanger both Serbia's and the monarchy's interests in the Balkans. Not only a Bulgarian achievement would have been translated to a Russian one over the monarchy; it could also undermine Austria's alliance with Serbia.

Austrian Capabilities

As can be seen in Table 2, Austria-Hungary's military capability was the weakest among the European powers requiring Austria-Hungary to build strong military alliances or rest on its ally. Germany had a higher Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score than the other European powers except for Great Britain (mostly because of Britain's significantly larger naval force). The CINC score is calculated based on military strength and readiness for mobilization, including factors such as industrial and energy production, population growth rate, and economic output.

⁵⁷ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 26.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

Table 2 Composite Index of National Capability Score of European powers 1884-1888⁵⁹

	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.048	0.046
<i>France</i>	0.105	0.101	0.099	0.096	0.093
<i>Germany</i>	0.113	0.115	0.114	0.123	0.127
<i>Great Britain</i>	0.208	0.216	0.201	0.195	0.189
<i>Russia</i>	0.092	0.094	0.095	0.092	0.090

The economic situation of Vienna did not allow it to close the gap. The Financial Crisis of 1873 in Austria-Hungary put the empire behind its contemporary nations. The principal weakness of the Austria-Hungarian economy was its continued dependence on foreign capital – 60% of which came from Germany and 30% from France.⁶⁰ According to Bérenger, the monarchy’s goal of making Vienna into a great financial center was doomed to fail. Although by the early 1880s the economy substantially recovered, Austria-Hungary could not aspire to being a dominant economic power like Britain and France.⁶¹ Austria-Hungary also spent considerable funds to subsidize King Milan of Serbia to keep their interests alive in the Balkans, which diverted considerable resources from developing infrastructure and military expenditure. Rothenberg writes that, “in the closing decades of the nineteenth century the Dual Monarchy found it increasingly difficult to keep up in the European armament race. Unable to fully exploit its manpower potential, only slowly developing an industrial capacity, divided by national rivalries, and hampered by a cumbersome political structure, the empire gradually was falling behind in relative military strength”.⁶²

Even in terms of iron and steel production (Figure 3) and energy consumption, which are generally accepted proxies for indicators of levels of industrialization and economic wealth, Austria-Hungary was significantly behind its counterparts in Europe, except for Russia that was still a mostly agricultural based economy. The lack of military spending in part was driven by the economic deficit in Austria and the

⁵⁹ David J. Singer, Bremer Stuart, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965,” in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Sage Publications, 1972), 19–48.

⁶⁰ Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, 232.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Gunther E. Rothenberg, *Army of Francis Joseph* (Purdue University Press, 1976), 105.

dichotomous views of the two parliaments in the dual monarchy. "Concerned about the continuing imperial deficits, the economy-minded Liberals opposed the ten-year proviso which determined the army's peace and war strength. They favored slashing military expenditures and even attempted to lower the peace-time establishment to two hundred thirty thousand men".⁶³ Albrecht concluded in 1886, that given the economic situation in the Dual Monarchy, there were only limited moves that could be made to improve its military posture: "Troops could be shifted, some new cadres created, but not much else was possible".⁶⁴

However, in 1886, with the crisis arising out of the Serbo-Bulgarian war demonstrating the need for a larger army, the Reichstag and the Hungarian parliament passed legislation to increase military manpower. Every able-bodied man between the ages of nineteen and forty-two, unless he was a member of the armed forces or the reserves, was now obligated to serve.⁶⁵

In terms of equipment, by 1885 all major powers, including Austria-Hungary had introduced bolt-action repeating rifles. The artillery division received new field guns, which for their day were good pieces, but since Austria-Hungary did not produce adequate heavy steel barrels until after the turn of the century, and also for reasons of economy, these were still equipped with bronze barrels. They rapidly became obsolete and it was a sign of Austria-Hungary's lag in armaments.⁶⁶


⁶³ Ibid., 106.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 109.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 111.

Figure 3 Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of Tons)⁶⁷




However, compared to Russia, Austria-Hungary still enjoyed a relatively stronger position in terms of economic and industrial growth. One example of Austria-Hungary's industrial advantage over Russia was the establishment of an extensive railway network that would allow for relatively rapid troop mobilization. In 1870 the Dual Monarchy had but ninety-six hundred kilometers of track, much of it in the hands of private foreign-controlled companies. After the 1873 financial crisis, the state took over most of the major lines and expanded a number of strategic communications. Most important were the improvements, mainly double-tracking, of the five lines into northeastern Galicia and the building of two new lines into the northeastern part of this strategic province. To supervise the railroads in war and to provide for better logistics, the general staff railroad section was expanded and a special Railroad and Telegraph Regiment organized in 1883 vastly improving mobilization time: "By the late 1880s deployment time for the Austro-Hungarian army had been cut from six to three weeks".⁶⁸

⁶⁷Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

⁶⁸ Rothenberg, *Army of Francis Joseph*, 111.

Figure 4 Primary Energy Consumption (Thousands of tons of Coal)⁶⁹



Gunther Rothenberg comments that militarily Austria-Hungary counted heavily on German support, but from the military point of view the Treaty of 1879 had one major weakness: it lacked definite military commitments.⁷⁰ Although at times the German military seemed willing, the politicians would not allow such action. The chief obstacle was Bismarck, who felt that binding military arrangements would prevent diplomatic flexibility during a crisis. The Chancellor did not wish to have to choose between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and after 1879 he tried to revive the ruptured Alliance of the Three Emperors.

The monarchy used diplomacy, and particularly forming alliances to enhance its position in European politics. Facing the possibility of conflict with Russia in this area, Austria-Hungary looked for an ally. In 1879 Austria-Hungary and the German Empire signed the Dual Alliance, by which the two sovereigns promised each other support in

⁶⁹ Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

⁷⁰ Rothenberg, *Army of Francis Joseph*, 112.

the case of Russian aggression.⁷¹ Austria-Hungary and Germany were natural allies and joint interests as autocracies; both were major powers in central Europe with shared borders, and there were strong cultural links – the ruling Austrian elite were mostly ethnically German.⁷² Austria-Hungary was the most powerful of the German states until Germany effectively united under Prussian rule. The power bloc they formed was quite formidable, however, as Austria-Hungary weakened, Germany was guaranteed to have control in the alliance.

After the victory of Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Austrian monarch Franz Joseph resigned himself to playing a prominent but secondary role to Prussia, which had an agenda of German unification and achieved that to some extent. Austria's relationship with Germany was partially motivated by the position and status of the ruling Habsburg family. After being driven from Italy in 1859, and from Germany in 1866, the Habsburgs devoted themselves to building a strong corridor against Russia and uniting under its protection the various nationalities of Danubian Europe.⁷³

After his appointment as foreign minister in 1871, Count Andrassy formed policy with the intention of preserving the *status quo*. Discarding the anti-Bismarck bias of his predecessor, Beust, he sought the friendship of the Germans in order to strengthen Austria-Hungary's position in a possible confrontation with Russia in the Balkans. The alliance with Germany allowed Austria to expand on their Balkan agenda. Although, Hungarian public opinion favored Turkey and was hostile towards Russia, at the time of the 1876 Balkan Crisis, Austria took the opportunity to abandon the principle of upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴ Without waging war, Austria-Hungary was able to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina whereas Russia, the victor, was forced to give up its conquests following the Congress of Berlin in 1878. After the signing of the Austria-Hungary-German alliance of 1879, Andrassy. His successor, Kálnoky, continued his pro-German policy to secure the monarchy's interests in the Balkans.

⁷¹ Gordon Martel, *The Origins of the First World War*, 3rd ed, Seminar Studies in History (Harlow, England; New York: Pearson/Longman, 2003), 21.

⁷² Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, 252.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 255.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Kálnoky, together with General Freidrich Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, pushed to initiate military coordination with Germany. In 1882, after some back-channel negotiations due to the mutual concern that a formal meeting might jeopardize the parallel attempts to renew the Three Emperors' Treaty, the first meetings had been held in Strobl between Beck and General Waldersee.⁷⁵ Lackey notes, "The Strobl discussions would form the basis for Austro-German military cooperation throughout the remainder of the 1880s and provide the essentials for Austro-Hungarian strategic doctrine against Russia until 1914".⁷⁶ In the discussions the two generals shared their war plan and military concerns. The Austrian general inquired for the size of the German support in a war with Russia. Waldersee offered the Austrian forces to use the German Silesian railroads to improve mobilization and pledged for a deployment of over 400,000 troops in the eastern theater.⁷⁷ Lackey concludes that Beck "was now confident that Germany would honor both the spirit and the letter of its alliance commitments".⁷⁸

The chief communication between the two armies was made through the military attaches, but Beck wished to establish a joint command structure and conduct frequent coordination meetings. In September 1882 Beck met with his German counterpart, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. The German general confirmed the German pledges from the Strobl discussions and restated that "In a war against Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary would immediately have to go on the offensive".⁷⁹ However, Lackey points out, Moltke refused to the Austrian joint commanding institution request: "As long as the general staffs were in agreement as to the prosecution of the war, Moltke declared, there would be no need for a joint command structure".⁸⁰ The 1882 military coordination between the two monarchies was a cornerstone for their future relations. Lackey concludes, "Beck's discussions with

⁷⁵ Scott Warren Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff: Civil-Military Relations and the Making of a Modern Military State, 1867-1906" (Ph.D., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1991), 515.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 515–16.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 516–17.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 517.

⁷⁹ Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, 1 edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 305–6.

⁸⁰ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 521.

Waldersee and Moltke cemented the friendship and cooperation between the Prussian and Austro-Hungarian general staffs and laid the groundwork for the strategic planning of both powers throughout the 1880s. Both sides followed up these initial contacts with on-going communication".⁸¹ In February 1883 the growing coordination engendered a German decision to exchange all military intelligence regarding Russia.⁸² Nevertheless, Lackey explains, "The allied military discussions, however, did not succeed in changing Bismarck's attitudes toward the alliance".⁸³ The German Chancellor adhered to his approach of limiting the alliance to defensive nature and to collaborate with the Russians in order to prevent a catastrophic war. Hence, Francis Roy Bridge infers, "In most other respects [rather than military planning], the Austro-German relations remained much the same".⁸⁴

In addition to the German alliance, Vienna maintained a network of alliances aimed to enhance its might. In 1881, an alliance with Serbia, which after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had turned to Austria-Hungary for protection, made this Balkan state a satellite of the Habsburg monarchy. At the same time, the renewal of the Three Emperors' League between the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian monarchies brought Russian recognition of Habsburg predominance in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula.⁸⁵ The Three Emperors' League was an important element in the structure of alliances that Bismarck set up to stabilize Europe. Relying on Austria-Hungary as the fundamental partner, Bismarck tried to neutralize all the areas in which the Habsburg monarchy might be drawn into conflict. It was essential to avoid being involved in a confrontation at an inopportune moment and in regions of little interest

⁸¹ Ibid., 521–22.

⁸² Ibid., 522.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 135.

⁸⁵ The Three Emperors' League was an informal alliance among Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, announced officially in 1872 on the occasion of the meeting of respective emperors Francis Joseph, William I, and Alexander II. The chief architects of the alliance were Julius Andr assy, Otto von Bismarck, and Prince Gorchakov. The aims of the league were to preserve the social order of the conservative powers of Europe and to keep the peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Although the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 shook the alliance, the agreement was secretly renewed in 1881 but disrupted again in 1885 as a result of the Balkan Crisis. However, it remained in force until 1887, when it was eclipsed by the German-Austrian alliance of 1879. The German Chancellor Graf von Caprivi refused to renew even this in 1890, thus opening the way for the Franco-Russian rapprochement and the creation of the Triple Entente. See W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 27 (1945): 61–83, doi:10.2307/3678575.

to Germany. Bismarck therefore attempted to lessen the possibility of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia by making them partners in the Three Emperors' League.⁸⁶

The signatories of this Alliance promised to consult one another on any changes in the status quo in the Ottoman Empire, and, while Russia was given assurances that its position regarding Bulgaria and the Straits, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, would be recognized, Austria-Hungary received from Russia the promise that there would be no objection to a possible annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future.⁸⁷ The Three Emperors' League was Bismarck's attempt to keep relations cordial between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the near east and avoid a two front war vis-à-vis France, however, Fuller states that Russia's acquiescence to this tripartite treaty is "almost inexplicable". The treaty gave Germany the free hand against France while Russia received no free hand against Turkey in return. However, according to Medicott, the Three Emperor's League was regarded by Russia, "mainly as a pledge against the formation of anti-Russian coalitions".⁸⁸ Medicott and Hist state that, "The collapse of the Three Emperors' Alliance in the first major crisis it had to face, namely the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-86, suggests that the solution was hardly a happy one".⁸⁹

In 1882, Italy joined the Austro-Hungarian-German Dual Alliance, forming the Triple Alliance. This served Germany by protecting their southern border in the case of war against France, and allowed Austria-Hungary to prevent Italian led irredentist movement in Austria.⁹⁰ After it had lost in the competition with France to establish a colony in Tunisia, Italy approached Germany to find a partner in its anti-French policy and Bismarck used the opportunity to neutralize another European trouble spot. Bismarck told the Italians that the "road to Berlin led through Vienna", which led to the Triple Alliance in May 1882 between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.⁹¹ It was

⁸⁶ Jonathan Steinberg, *Bismarck: A Life* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 328.

⁸⁷ Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 42-47.

⁸⁸ Medicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," 67.

⁸⁹ Medicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 61.

⁹⁰ Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918*, 218.

⁹¹ Grenville, John; Wasserstein, Bernard, eds. (2013). *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts*. Routledge. p. 38.

a defensive treaty against a French attack on Italy or Germany.⁹² It stated that, in the event of any signatory coming to war with another power, the partners of the alliance would remain neutral. Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany would come to provide military aid if Italy and Germany were attacked unprovoked by France, and if Austria-Hungary was attacked by Russia (Italy promised to remain neutral in this scenario).

The treaty did not settle the problems existing between the Habsburg monarchy and the Italian kingdom, but for Bismarck it sufficed that they were neutralized. Bismarck and Kálmoky were in agreement that "A dubious ally was better than a country without commitments that could be won over easily to an opposing camp".⁹³ However, this alliance failed miserably when first tested in the Balkan Crisis of 1886. Medlicott suggests that this is evidence that Bismarck's solution was not very effective.⁹⁴ The deterioration of German-French relations in the following years convinced Bismarck of the indispensability of the Triple Alliance, and he made every effort to force Vienna to renew the alliance in 1887. By threatening to withdraw protection against Russian aggression, Bismarck forced Kálmoky to consent to his demands, but there can be no doubt that Austria-Hungary was impeded in its national interests by having to adapt its foreign policy to the German and Italian demand for the isolation of France.

Although Kálmoky succeeded in avoiding any new obligation in Western Europe, he was less successful in defending more-immediate Austrian interests. He managed to evade the Italian request for the support of an active Italian colonial policy, but he was unable to keep Italy out of involvement in Balkan affairs. It was on Kálmoky's initiative that the original Italian demand for a declaration in favor of the *status quo* along the Ottoman coasts and the Adriatic and Aegean seas was extended to the interior of the Balkan Peninsula. In addition, Kálmoky granted the Italians the right to ask for compensation in case of any change in the territorial *status quo* without defining this term.

In 1887 Austria-Hungary also entered into a Mediterranean Alliance with Italy and Great Britain, and later with Spain. The treaty recognized *status quo* in the

⁹² Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 64–67.

⁹³ Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918*, 408.

⁹⁴ Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 61.

Mediterranean Sea.⁹⁵ One of the objectives was to halt Russian expansion in the Balkans and gain control of the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It also protected Italian interests against France, uniting forces hostile to Russia in the Balkans and to France in North Africa.⁹⁶

In 1883, at the behest of Bismarck to reduce danger of war, Austria-Hungary and Romania entered into a secret defensive agreement. As part of the treaty Austria-Hungary agreed to aid Romania if they were attacked and in return Romania agreed to hold down anti-Austrian aggression that was forming in the rise of nationalism in Romania. However, this treaty only served to further great mistrust between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The German Protector

In the 1880s Germany was an imperial kingdom ruled by Kaiser Wilhelm I, with a parliament elected by universal male suffrage. However, all foreign policy was primarily controlled by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, supported by the Emperor.⁹⁷ Bismarck was responsible for the machinations of European policy in much of the 19th century with a philosophy of *realpolitik* – as Kissinger defines it, "foreign policy based on calculations of power and the national interest".⁹⁸

German Interests

Bismarck's interests in the Bulgarian Crisis were fairly simple. The dominant position of Germany in international politics, which it had held since 1871, was to be maintained. The Austrian alliance was to remain the basis of that position, and the interests of Austria in the Balkans were accordingly to be furthered to the greatest extent which other factors would permit. Kissinger expounds, "Germany perceived no national interest in the Balkans. But it did perceive a major interest in the preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire".⁹⁹ Good relations with Russia, only

⁹⁵ Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 94–95.

⁹⁶ Medicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," 66–68.

⁹⁷ William Harbutt Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism; an Exposition of the Social and Economic Legislation of Germany since 1870*, [2d ed.] (London :, 1891), 175, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015065986344>.

⁹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 137.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 139.

second in importance to those with Austria, were to be kept as far as possible unimpaired. These, Fuller writes, “were the fundamental principles by which Bismarck guided himself. The Bulgarian problem as such was the least important element in his calculation”.¹⁰⁰

German interests in Austria-Hungary and alleviating the Russian threat coincided. In fact, Bismarck assured Austrian diplomat Heymerle that he would “never allow Austria to be injured”.¹⁰¹ However, Bismarck was reluctant to engage in supporting Austria in the case of indirect aggression by Russia. According to Russian diplomat Saburov, Bismarck explicitly said, “our interest orders us not to let Austria be destroyed, but she is not guaranteed against an attack”.¹⁰² Medlicott writes, “Haymerle's willingness to enter the Triple Alliance, and his persistence in seeking support against indirect aggression by Russia, suggest that at this stage he was less concerned about the possible weakening of the Dual Alliance than about the securing of some guarantee of Austria's position in the Balkans. Bismarck had no intention of agreeing to this: circumstances might arise in which it would be to Germany's interest to assist Austria against Russia, but he intended that he, and not Austria, should define these circumstances”.¹⁰³ According to Bismarck, “Germany must see that neither Austria nor Russia is completely defeated. They are both necessary... Germany would not be obliged to intervene in an Austro-Russian war in the early stages, and when she did so would be moved by her own interests”.¹⁰⁴ If one of these countries faced a defeat, it could lose its power in European politics and undermine the balance of power system Bismarck created to maintain stability, or even worse from a German point of view – to join France to get protection.¹⁰⁵

German policy vis-à-vis Bulgaria was motivated through non-aggression against Russia. In an interview with Prince Alexander of Bulgaria in 1884, Bismarck stated: “Germany has no interest in Bulgaria; our interest is peace with Russia”.¹⁰⁶ After the

¹⁰⁰ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 76.

¹⁰¹ Medlicott, “The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887,” 72.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence*, 52–53.

¹⁰⁶ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 19.

1885 Bulgarian reunification, Bismarck continued to pursue a neutral stance on the matter, urging Austria-Hungary and Russia to promote harmony and localization of the conflict and solve the conflict through diplomacy as they obliged according to the Three Emperors' Alliance.

For Bismarck, France was the biggest enemy. Since the French loss to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, Germany has been wary of French retaliation. Much of German foreign policy in the latter half of the 19th century was aimed towards protecting Germany from what Bismarck considered an inevitable act of aggression from the French as they recovered to power in the late 1870s and build a relationship with the Russians and the English. Bismarck did not believe that the French would ever forgive the humiliation of their defeat, particularly the loss of the territories of Alsace and Lorraine. According to Kissinger, "The magnitude of Prussia's victory in the 1870 war had produced a permanent French desire for *revanche*, and German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine gave this resentment a tangible focal point".¹⁰⁷

Through 1887, the French military threat forced Bismarck to prioritize German interests through secret and contradictory agreements over prior alliances. To that end, Kissinger concludes, "Bismarck's diplomacy had produced a series of interlocking alliances, partially overlapping and partially competitive, which ensured Austria against Russian attack, Russia against Austrian adventurism, and Germany against encirclement, and which drew England into resisting Russian expansion toward the Mediterranean".¹⁰⁸

In approaching Russia and Austria-Hungary for alliances, according to Medlicott and Hist, Bismarck was "asking in effect that in return for his more or less passive friendship they [Russia and Austria-Hungary] should refrain from contracting an alliance with France".¹⁰⁹

Bismarck was careful to point out that Germany's reluctance to take the risk of war with France would be greatly diminished without external support from the other Powers, interested in maintaining the *status quo* in Europe. He writes, "If the alliance

¹⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 138.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 159.

¹⁰⁹ Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 63.

of the friendly Powers threatened by the same warlike nations should fail us, our situation in a war on two frontiers would not be hopeless; but a war against both France and Russia, even if it turned out to be as glorious a military exploit for us as the Seven Years' War, would still be so great a calamity for the country that we should endeavor to avert it by a friendly arrangement with Russia – if it had to be waged *without an ally*".¹¹⁰

German Capabilities

The German army received a place of honor among the German leadership. Smith writes, "It was the Prussian army that had made Germany a nation, and the maintenance of German unity was felt to depend upon the strength and efficiency of the federal army".¹¹¹ Bismarck too attributed the army a prestigious power. In his famous 'blood and iron' speech in 1862, Bismarck stated, "The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions – that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but the blood and iron".¹¹² After the unification of Germany, Bismarck changed his strategy to a more diplomatic one, but the role of the army, as this chapter illustrates remained central. His vision, as reflected in his speech on February 8, 1886 was to be able to position one million troops on each frontier: eastern and western. However, this vision was only materialized on 1888.¹¹³

Due in part to conscription in 1870, the German empire had one of the largest and most powerful military forces in Europe rivaled only by France and Russia (Table 2), which was under the direct control of the Kaiser and not the German parliament. The Radicals in the parliament traditionally pressured for an annual regulation law, facing an opposition from the army and the conservatives. Bismarck's compromise was a law which put the military under a seven-year regulation.¹¹⁴ It enabled the army to build itself regardless of the political balance of powers in the Bundestag. And so it did

¹¹⁰ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 268.

¹¹¹ Munroe Smith, *Bismarck and German Unity, a Historical Outline* (New York: The Macmillan company; [etc., etc.], 1898), 69.

¹¹² Steinberg, *Bismarck*, 2011, 465.

¹¹³ Smith, *Bismarck and German Unity, a Historical Outline*, 70.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 69–70.

Table 3 Regular Military Personnel of the European Powers (Thousands)¹¹⁵

	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	279	295	297	295	280
<i>France</i>	526	519	536	519	569
<i>Germany</i>	457	459	460	503	504
<i>Great Britain</i>	240	256	265	273	273
<i>Russia</i>	803	803	820	837	900

Bismarck exploited the French aggressive armament to push the German parliament to approve a new German military bill in 1886 which increased the number of active force to 468,000. This was the German response to the French arms race during the decade prior to this bill. The German leadership was not worry from an immediate threat from France. Fuller notes, "the reforms of 1875... had left France formidable but still in a position of inferiority to Germany".¹¹⁶ In November 1886, the acting Chief of the General Staff, Count Waldersee, described the French army "as in every way far behind the German".¹¹⁷ However, Bismarck was preoccupied from the trend and its ramification of the balance of powers between Germany and France in the long term. According to Fuller this was a common notion among the military too: "German military authorities had begun seriously to calculate the chances of Germany's being passed in the race if something were not done".¹¹⁸

After 1886, with simmering tensions in Europe German military expenditure ramped up significantly, and by 1888 was the largest spender on defense, outstripping France, which only contributed to further diplomatic tensions. In January 1888 the German fighting power in the event of a war was increased by 700,000 men rendering the terrifying German military to a giant.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."


¹¹⁶ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 114.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Smith, *Bismarck and German Unity, a Historical Outline*, 70.

Figure 5 Military Expenditure (Thousands of Nominal British Pounds)¹²⁰



Bismarck's strategy never relied merely upon the German army, but involved diplomacy as well. Before 1871 Bismarck used secret alliances and Germany's (or Prussia's) military capabilities to enhance the power of the German state until it fixed its place as a super power, which named as a strategy of "a place in the sun". After 1871, Bismarck used the same means to protect the status quo, rather than challenging it. According to Kissinger, "Bismarck's later policy sought to restrain power in advance by some consensus on shared objectives with various groups of countries".¹²¹

He realized that German interests could no longer be served by war and the 1872-73 *Dreikaiserbund* (Three Emperors' Alliance) did not adequately serve German security concerns of protection against a potential French aggression, and against Bismarck's "le cauchemar des coalitions" – the nightmare of hostile, encircling coalitions.¹²² Forming alliances with other countries while thwarting any attempt to consolidate an anti-German coalition was Bismarck's strategy. The Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, which was signed on October 1879, effectively served this goal as well as the Three Emperor's' Alliance.

Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

¹²¹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 167.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 138.

According to Medlicott and Hist, after the Three Emperors' Treaty, "Bismarck either to admit his preference for Austria, and so risk alienating the Russians, or deny it, and risk the loss of Austrian support".¹²³ If Bismarck had allowed his relations with Austria and Russia to remain on their earlier footing "none of the consequences which he painted so graphically in 1879 would have followed". Russian expansionist policy had been exhausted by the war with Turkey and the diplomatic defeat which followed it. According to Medlicott, Russia would probably in any circumstances have settled down after 1879 into a phase of more or less quiescent diplomacy which would have excluded allying with France or any ambitious campaigns in the Balkans. If this is the case the October treaty was unnecessary; but "Bismarck did not take this view, and instead embarked on the impossible task of attempting to create Russian confidence in German friendship while keeping a markedly anti-Russian treaty in existence".¹²⁴ In 1887 Bismarck formed a secret alliance with Russia after the collapse of the Three Emperors' Alliance, the so-called Reinsurance Treaty. The treaty provided that each party would remain neutral if the other became involved in a war with a third great power and that this would not apply if Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria.¹²⁵ Facing the competition between Russia and Austria-Hungary on the Balkans, Bismarck felt that this agreement was essential to prevent a Russian convergence toward France and to continue the diplomatic isolation of the French so ensuring German security against a threatening two-front war. He thereby hazarded the expansion of the Russian sphere of influence toward the Mediterranean and diplomatic tensions with Vienna by signing this treaty.¹²⁶

Fuller writes that leading up to 1880, "Bismarck unquestionably gave evidence of a desire for at least a close understanding with England; but there is no warrant for assuming that this desire lasted throughout his chancellorship. Circumstances had altered by 1881, and, with them, Bismarck's views".¹²⁷ Bismarck, in an attempt to bridge an alliance between the English and Austria-Hungary pointed out, that Great Britain and Germany alone could not "govern the world", but that a third party,

¹²³ Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 64.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 274-81.

¹²⁶ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 189.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 5.

namely Austria-Hungary would be needed. Great Britain's own interests, he argued, should impel it to take Austria's part against Russia; and he blamed it severely for having "frivolously antagonized Austria".¹²⁸

Bismarck was keen to avoid German intervention between Austria-Hungary and Russia and leave the problem to others. In a meeting with the German Ambassador to Vienna, Prince Henry Reusz, Bismarck stated, "we should not be the first to put ourselves in opposition to Russia's aspirations... [this task should be left] to other opponents whose interests are more menaced than ours, or equally menaced".¹²⁹ He mentioned Romania, Turkey, and England, as the opponents in question.¹³⁰

Fuller writes that the "power most eligible for the position of Austria's ally was England, the enemy of our enemy, Russia, and its own former partner at the time of the congress in Berlin".¹³¹ However, it was unsafe to go ahead with any calculations based on British support, because of the division of opinion on foreign policy existing within the British government. Bismarck understood that a lasting commitment from the British would be unlikely. Hatzfeldt said to Churchill "that a lasting alliance with England would require a law, which would hardly receive the approval of the English Parliament: otherwise nothing could be accomplished but a ministerial agreement, of which the only result would be that we should serve as relay horses as long as we were needed".

The Russian Adversary

Russian Interests

When Alexander III became Tsar of Russia in 1881, he was neither anxious to preserve cordial relations with Germany nor keep those with Austria, unlike his father who was assassinated earlier that year. In fact, was quite relieved when the negotiations on the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty collapsed. In a report he wrote, "I am well content that Germany has been the first to refuse the renewal of the treaty, and I do not

¹²⁸ *German Foreign Office Publication*, iv, p. 139. Hatzfeldt to Herbert Bismarck as cited in *Ibid.*, 50.

¹²⁹ Bismarck to Reusz, 8 Sept. 1883, *G.P.*, iii, no. 606. as cited in Medicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 80.

¹³⁰ Medicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 80.

¹³¹ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 80.

particularly regret the ending of the entente".¹³² However, the Russian Tsar was aware of his relative military power and wished to promote the Russian interests in the Balkans while avoiding war. In fact, Alexander III, unlike his father, had no special sympathy for the army. According to Bruce Menning, he "refrained from direct involvement in military affairs...He ignored military minutiae and absented himself from military parades..."¹³³

The relationship with Berlin allowed Russia to focus its resources to defend its interests in Asia and Europe against its biggest adversary – England. Hence, the Russian leadership during the 1880s was mostly employing a defensive strategy, and the threat on Russian access to the Black Sea which provided passage to the Mediterranean, rested in its core. To improve the Russian position in East Europe Russia expansion in Central Asia. William Langer expounds, "Pressure in the Near East could always be alleviated by an advance in Central Asia".¹³⁴ In July 1884 the Russian Foreign Minister Nicolay Giers, conveyed the following message to his ambassador in London, Baron de Staal:"Our movements in central Asia have been commanded by our own interests, as well as by the necessity of securing a defensive position against the hostility displayed by the English government towards us since the Crimean War and more recently during the war with Turkey".¹³⁵

One of the main causes for the Tsar's wish for peace was his reform to cleanse Russia from non-Russian elements.¹³⁶ As part of this policy the Slavic identity had been glorified. Russia under Alexander III was the protector of Pan Slavism. Following this ideology, Russia believed it had a responsibility for the safeguarding of the Slavs in the Balkans, which influenced Russian interests in the region, particularly in light of the decay of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Balkans became a zero-sum game between Russia and Austro-Hungarian spheres of influence. Adhering to its peaceful

¹³² Serge Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," *The American Historical Review* 23, no. 2 (1918): 344, doi:10.2307/1836570.

¹³³ Bruce Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914*, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 89.

¹³⁴ William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 2d ed (New York: Knopf, 1950), 309.

¹³⁵ Baron A. Meyendorff, *Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de Staal* (Paris, 1929), Volume I, 25 as cited in *Ibid*.

¹³⁶ Charles Lowe, *Alexander III of Russia* (London: W. Heinemann, 1895), 183–84.

interests, by the treaty of 1881, Russia had limited its freedom of action in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, under the condition the union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia should be recognized if it came about. Medlicott explains, "Russia's accession to the Austro-German entente had given it a negative and defensive character which had made it, for the time being, a guarantee of peace".¹³⁷ Giers instructions to his ambassador in London, Baron Mohrenheim, strengthens this argument: "It is to our interest to maintain it as long as possible. It guarantees us [Russia] against Germany and saves us from a conflict in the immediate future with Austria".¹³⁸

However, as the rift between Alexander III of Russia and his cousin Prince Alexander of Bulgaria grew, the Russians were anxious to delay the union.¹³⁹

In 1885, Russia had no intention to push for its claims in its Eastern territories such as Afghanistan to the point of war with the British. In fact, Russia was trying to get assurances from its allies to avoid war if possible. After the meeting between the emperors of Austria-Hungary and Russia on August 25, 1885, Russian foreign minister, Giers stated in writing that Russia had hopes of a peaceful solution for the difficulty.¹⁴⁰

Following the revolution in East Rumelia in 1885, Russia was caught between a rock and a hard place. Having supported the unification of Bulgaria and East Rumelia (but not under the leadership of Prince Alexander, in whom the Tsar and the Russians had lost faith), it could not oppose the unification, and enforce the observance of a treaty made against its will in the Treaty of Berlin. On the other hand, Russia could not be seen cowing to the triumph of Prince Alexander.¹⁴¹ The Russian government found it difficult to arrive at any policy or diplomatic solution. As a compromise, the Russian leadership recalled all Russian officers from the Bulgarian military and left the initiative on policy to the other European powers (particularly the Treaty Powers) for advice.

¹³⁷ Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 78.

¹³⁸ Giers to Mohrenheim, covering letter and notice, 6/18 Aug. 1883, *Russian embassy archives* as cited in *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 19.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

On September 24, 1885, Russia put forward the proposition "that the Representatives of the Treaty Powers (Germany and AH) should meet at once at Constantinople under the presidency of the Doyen, Count Corti, not in a formal Conference, but in order to concert together on the question of the Revolution in Eastern Rumelia, with a view to unity on advice".¹⁴² Menning opines, "a proud Russian Emperor swallowed his frustration over a failed Balkan policy, and the more bellicose Russian nationalists drank deeply from the cup of anti-Austrian bitterness".¹⁴³

Russian Capabilities

The lessons from the war with Turkey (1774) indicated the need in a new reform which was conducted under the Russian Minister of War P.S. Vannovskii. According to Menning, when Vannovskii was appointed by the Tsar he inherited "leadership of an army which in reality had been only partially reconstructed to confront war in the industrial age".¹⁴⁴ The Russian army's main advantage over any other army, including Austria-Hungary – its size. According to Menning, between 1881 and 1891 the Russian peacetime strength amounted to "approximately 31,000 officers and 850,000 troops. The availability of reserves in the event of mobilization could roughly triple these figures".¹⁴⁵ As Colonel F. Chenevix-Trench, a former British Military Attaché to St. Petersburg noted in 1886: "the Russian army must always be a very formidable foe from its great numerical strength".¹⁴⁶

It should be stressed that while Russia had a significantly large military force, in terms of capabilities Russia was lacking, mostly because of its sprawling geography. The Russian military capability, while significantly larger than Austria-Hungary, was spread over a large area and was also required to protect its Eastern borders against Japan, giving Austria-Hungary a relative advantage.

Furthermore, Russia suffered from serious setbacks, including relatively primitive weapons, an ineffective and corrupted military administration, a cumbersome mobilization system and bad rail network which hindered the Russian capacity to

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets*, 91.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 88.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 108.

¹⁴⁶ Chenevix-Trench, *Report on the Russia Army*, 7 as cited in Ibid., 115.

translate its quantitative advantage to military achievements.¹⁴⁷ Taking all of these elements into account (Table 1) reveals that the Russian army suffered from a significant inferiority in comparison to the German Army, but held some advantage over the Austrian one.

The Russian economy was also behind its European counterparts both in terms of industrialization (iron and steel production) and energy consumption (Figure 3 and 4) and could not compensate for the quality inferiority. In terms of military expenditure, Russia was ahead of Austria-Hungary but that is simply a function of having a larger military force (Figure 5). The lack of resources constrained the Russian armament attempts. For example, In a review issued by the Minister of War it was stated that in 1881 Alexander III "had deigned to emphasize the necessity in all measures related to military affairs observation of the strictest economy, and if possible, even the reduction of expenditures in the military sector".¹⁴⁸ Menning adds, "In effect, for ten years Vannovskii worked within a budgetary framework in which with only several exceptions he had to fund new projects from existing revenues".¹⁴⁹ Altogether, the reality did not favor Russia, as reflected in the Russian resolve to avoid war. The Russian army could have gained achievements in a campaign against Austria-Hungary alone, but the price was dear, and the risk of German assistance to Vienna rendered this option very risky.

As a result of Bismarck's courtships Russia had one close friend in Europe – Germany. Bismarck wished to wedge between Moscow and Paris and he successfully did. Christopher Clark explains, "Although France and Russia shared an interest in opposing the imperial designs of Britain, their spheres of influence on the imperial periphery were too far apart to permit close cooperation... It was also difficult to see why the Russians should compromise their good relations with Germany".¹⁵⁰ Berlin offered Moscow an effective tool to restrain its main opponent in the Balkans - AH, while

¹⁴⁷ For a comprehensive and thorough analysis please see Ibid., 87–122..

¹⁴⁸ *Ocherk deiatel'nosti voennogo ministerstva za istekshee desiatiletie blagopolozhnogo Tsarstvovaaniia Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra Alekseevicha 1881-1891* (SPB, 1892), ii as cited in Ibid., 91.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Christopher M. Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, First U.S. edition (New York: Harper, 2013), 128.

France attempted to block the Russian designs on the Turkish Straits.¹⁵¹ As long as Bismarck led Germany in his pro-Russian path, Moscow could focus on the threat originated in London and on domestic instability. The price, however, was that when Germany supported AH, Russia was isolated and could not propose a counter force, as happened in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and during the end of the Bulgarian Crisis.

Deterrence Hedging

Extended Deterrence

For the Dual Monarchy, the alliance with Germany was the foundation for regional policy and military strategy. Not only did this alliance dissolve the threat of a military confrontation with Germany, it provided Austria with a powerful deterrent tool against its main perceived threat – Russia. As the analysis above shows, the Austrian army alone suffered from a great inferiority against the Russian one, and the Austrian leadership was well aware of its relative weakness. Therefore, Kálnoky's strategy against Russia was "to come to an understanding with Russia, but at the same time to secure ourselves against it with other alliances".¹⁵² In April 1886 Friedrich Beck, the Chief of the Austrian army, reported to the emperor that while "an imposing force of seven cavalry and twenty-six infantry divisions could advance into Russian Poland on the twentieth day of mobilization... much work still needed to be done before the Monarchy could wage war against Russia with any confidence".¹⁵³ Beck was heavily concerned by the Austrian slow mobilization pace "due to the Austrian railway capacity".¹⁵⁴

On March 7 1887, Archduke Albrecht, the inspector general of the army, estimated the thirty-six Austro-Hungarian divisions allocated for Bulgaria would have to fight

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² „sich mit Rußland zu verständigen, sich aber andererseits gegen dieses durch andere Bündnisse abzusichern.“ Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 41.

¹⁵³ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 585–86.

¹⁵⁴ Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 41.)

sixty-two Russian divisions in the event of a war.¹⁵⁵ Even in the event of English military assistance, Kálnoky estimated, Austria may not be able to destroy the Russian army. In February 1887, Kálnoky wrote to the British Ambassador in Vienna, Augustus Paget, "if it really come to a war Britain and Austria-Hungary might not be able to destroy Russia, but they could at least secure lengthy breathing space by co-operating to bleed her white".¹⁵⁶ The German protection allowed Austria to confidently promote its interests in the Balkans knowing Russia was deterred to oppose Vienna militarily.

However, German assistance did not come without a price. Bismarck, hoping to prevent a Franco-Russian alliance, wished to satisfy Moscow by including Bulgaria in the Russian sphere of influence. In June 1884, Bismarck instructed the German Ambassadors in Vienna and Moscow to convince both Austria and Russia to delineate the spheres of influence, particularly concerning Bulgaria and Serbia.¹⁵⁷ Throughout the Bulgarian Crisis, Bismarck pressured Vienna to accede to his partition plan. He stressed that if Austria refuses it, it "must not reckon on German support for her forward policy".¹⁵⁸ After Prince Alexander's abdication, Bismarck sent a message to the German Ambassador in Vienna: "as for our programme, for which I am striving to win the approval of the other two imperial courts, I can only recommend an agreement whereby Austria recognizes the Russian influence in Bulgaria, and Russia, the Austrian in Serbia".¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Kálnoky, backed by the Austrian Emperor, declined Bismarck's proposition.¹⁶⁰ This was a demand the monarchy could not agree to. According to Bridge, "When, ultimately, Russia was not about to give Austria-Hungary free rein in Serbia, [Kálnoky] was not willing cede Romania and Bulgaria to Russia's unfettered influence. The creation of spheres of influence would mean to not only give up Austria-Hungary's strategic interests, but also the valuable commercial interests it had established in Bulgaria; these relationships were further expanding

¹⁵⁵ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 163.

¹⁵⁶ Kálnoky, memorandum on a conversation with Paget, *Politisches Archiv I/461*, 8 February 1887 as cited in *Ibid.*, 166.

¹⁵⁷ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 51.

¹⁵⁸ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 356.

¹⁵⁹ *German Foreign Office Publication*, v, 62-63 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 86.

¹⁶⁰ Brein, "Anton Graf Wolkenstein-Trostburg: Sein Wirken Als Österreichisch-Ungarischer Botschafter in St. Petersburg von 1882 Bis 1894," 29.

due to the fact that the Tsar's tactless treatment of Prince Alexander and his government kept alive Russophobia in the principality".¹⁶¹ As aforementioned, for Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria could have been the first domino piece which could generate a greater chain of events resulting in an aggressive Russian presence in the Balkans at the expense of the monarchy.

Given the Austrian rejection, throughout the Bulgarian Crisis Bismarck made it clear that German obligations under the Dual Alliance would not be categorically applied to all Austrian actions in Bulgaria. As the tension between Austria and Russia reached a peak, Bismarck stated that "we have no intention of allowing ourselves to be bound by the alliance to the tail of the Hungarian comet, but to establish a regular orbit of calculable dimensions".¹⁶² In fact, according to Langer Bismarck reminded Kálnoky that "under the terms of the Three Emperors' Alliance Austria was obliged not only to keep Russia informed of her plans, but to reach a special agreement with Russia before taking action".¹⁶³ In his 'Hecuba' speech on January 11, 1887, Bismarck publicly discarded Bulgaria from the German extended deterrence: "it is a matter of complete indifference to us who rules in Bulgaria and what becomes of her".¹⁶⁴

Bismarck's goal was to prevent an Austrian-Russian confrontation even at the expense of Austrian interests in Bulgaria, as long as Serbia remained in the Austrian sphere of influence. In this regard, Langer notes, "in Berlin it was regarded as certain that if Russia became involved in a war with Austria and Germany, France would immediately strike". The 'Hecuba' speech was given at a time when Bismarck's concerns in light of

¹⁶¹ „Wenn schließlich die Russen Österreich-Ungarn keine freie Hand in Serbien ließen, war er [Kálnoky] seinerseits nicht bereit, Rumänien und Bulgarien dem uneingeschränkten Einfluß Rußlands zu überlassen. Die Schaffung von Einflußsphären würde bedeuten, nicht nur Österreich-Ungarns strategische Interessen zu opfern, sondern auch die wertvollen wirtschaftlichen Interessen, die es in Bulgarien aufgebaut hatte; diese Beziehungen breiteten sicher weiter aus, da des Zaren taktlose Behandlung von Fürst Alexander und seiner Regierung die Russophobie im Fürstentum am Leben hielt.“ Francis Roy Bridge, "Österreich(-Ungarn) Unter Den Grossmächten," in *Die Habsburgmonarchie Im System Der Internationalen Beziehungen, Part 1*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna, Austria: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), 271.

¹⁶² German Foreign Office, *Neue Verwicklungen Im Osten*, ed. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, *Die Große Politik Der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914 5* (Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922), 1022.

¹⁶³ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 356.

¹⁶⁴ Bismarck, *Die gesammelten Werke*, Vol. 13, 213 as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 163. Bismarck referred to Shakespeare's famous speech of Hamlet who inquires what is Hecuba to him. Fuller notes, "Bulgaria was no more to Germany than Priam's wife to the player". Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 133.

the French military mobilization and the French political change which promote a Franco-Russian rapprochement.¹⁶⁵ Hence, when the peril of war among European powers spiked, Austria was left without a credible protector in regard to the Russian threat in Bulgaria.

Understanding Germany could not be relied upon in the Bulgarian Crisis, Austria sought an alternate ally to join against Russia. During the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Austria exercised a successful coordination with England, with whom Vienna identified a wide spectrum of overlapping interests in East Europe against Russia. The Austrian plan was to reach an understanding with London about the necessity to protect the status quo in the Balkans which favored them, and to halt the Russian attempts to stretch its sphere of influence into the united country of Bulgaria. Kálnoky pushed London to take the initiative against Moscow, which would allow him to remain in the position of bolstering the English actions. However, the British government was not so enthusiastic to take the lead on the confrontation against Russia, and the British cabinet supported a cautious policy in the Balkans. Having Austria as an ally did not satisfy most of the cabinet members – they wished to gain the pledge of Bismarck. In November 1887 the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury shared with Bismarck his doubts concerning the Austrian pledges: "unless she was certain of assistance from Germany, she might not feel strong enough to hazard a war with Russia, and a consequent invasion on its North-Eastern frontier where Italy and England could hardly help her. In that case she would sit still, and accept compensation in Turkish territory. She has favored that policy in former years: and even now it is reported, I know not with what truth, that the Emperor of Austria personally inclines to it. She could only take the opposite and bolder line, if she felt sure of the ultimate support of Germany".¹⁶⁶

Kálnoky doubted when and how England would keep its pledges. One evidence of the wary Austrian attitude toward the Britain is seen in the report of the First Secretary at the German Embassy in St. Petersburg, Bernhard von Bülow, to Bismarck about a message from the Austrian Ambassador in London, Alajos Károlyi, to Kálnoky on

¹⁶⁵ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 377–78.

¹⁶⁶ Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," 85.

October 1, 1886: "he, Count Károlyi, would asked the minister urgently, to not get involved with England; England wanted to shove Austria against Russia, but did not think about sticking up for Austria, should it come to war between it and Russia".¹⁶⁷

Moreover, the potential British contribution in the event of an Austrian-Russian war was doubtful as well. Unless Germany joins the campaign against Russia, Lord Salisbury informed the German Ambassador "it would be up to Austria to defend interests in regions inaccessible to the British Fleet".¹⁶⁸ Since the main threat to Austria from Russia was the continental passage through Galicia, the contribution of the British navy in this arena was very limited. For this reason, the Mediterranean Agreement had a very doubtful and limited actual contribution to Austria's deterrence against Russia.

During the negotiations over the Mediterranean Agreement, when London inquired about what would Vienna seek in a prospective agreement between the countries, Kálnoky responded that "England could best defend India in the Straits and the Black Sea, but expressing doubts as to whether England would come promptly to the assistance of Austria, and as to the possibility of binding a parliamentary government".¹⁶⁹ Eventually, Austria signed an agreement with England which, among others, defined both countries' commitments to preserve the *status quo* in Balkans. Although the question of credibility remains unanswered, the Austrian-British alliance's main contribution was the strengthening of the anti-Russia coalition which casted a serious shadow over Russian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea if Russia was to fight Austria.

By signing the Mediterranean Agreement, Austria increased the "deterrence umbrella" that protected her, along with German protection against the threat over its territory. The agreement's purpose was to gain more protection for Austrian

¹⁶⁷ „er, Graf Károlyi, bäte den Minister dringend, sich nicht mit England einzulassen; England wolle wohl Österreich gegen Rußland vorschieben, würde aber nicht daran denken, für Österreich einzutreten, sofern es zum Kriege zwischen diesem und Rußland kommen sollte.“ German Foreign Office, *Die Dreibundmächte Und England*, ed. Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, *Die Große Politik Der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914 4* (Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922), 276.

¹⁶⁸ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 367.

¹⁶⁹ Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887," 73.

interests in the Balkans and protection for the Austrian army outside its borders. This is in addition to, not instead of, German assurances. In November 1886, Kálnoky expounded his approach toward the Bulgarian crisis when meeting with a Hungarian delegation. He first illustrated the limitations of the Dual Alliance: "it is only natural that two great States of such extent...should have also some interests not common to both, and lying without the sphere of interest of one or the other. There are no obligations to protect these interests...Relations such as exist between Austria-Hungary and Germany are then only call into practical force when the absolutely united interests of both countries are concerned...".¹⁷⁰

After advocating for the alliance with Germany, despite its limitations, he noted that in Bulgaria the monarchy would count on England: "The identical view held in England on the important European questions now under discussion, the identity of important interests and the wish for the maintenance of peace, permit us to hope that England will also join us if it should come to a question of intervening for the maintenance of the Berlin Treaty and the legal status created by it".¹⁷¹

Kálnoky's distinction between joint interests with Germany and other interests suggests an interesting interpretation of the Dual Alliance. The first type of interest was protected by the alliance, whereas the latter was not. To protect the interests not covered by the alliance, Austria had to find a complementary alternative. Since the monarchy estimated it shared many overlapping interests with England in the Balkans, an English protection was an attractive means to enhance Austrian deterrence to issues not covered by the Dual Alliance. Hence, the Mediterranean Agreement was indeed a strategic achievement for Austria and an important deterrent tool against the Russian threat. The English protection was in fact an element in the Austrian extended complementary deterrence policy designated to "fill the hole" left by the German alliance. On January 12, 1888 Kálnoky illustrated his strategy as well as the limitations of the alliance with Germany: "If Russia attacks us, then Germany would not hesitate for one moment about fulfilling its alliance obligations. If we, however, in any circumstances whatever, are the attackers, then Germany would stay neutral,

¹⁷⁰ *Times*, November 15, 1886 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 108.

¹⁷¹ *Times*, November 15, 1886 as cited in *Ibid.*, 109.

according to the treaty, even if attack had the defensive character of anticipating an enemy attack; and we would have to rely on our own strength and on any support our other allies supplied".¹⁷² This statement unearths another element in the Austrian extended complementary deterrence – this is where Austrian self-capabilities enter into our discussion.

Direct Deterrence

Though extended deterrence was a main pillar in Austrian policy against Russia, Vienna never abandoned its own deterrence against the threat from Moscow. Given its questionable alliances, particularly in regards to the Bulgarian Crisis, Austrian leadership responded to the Russian potential threats in Bulgaria by partially sustaining on its own deterrence prestige. In a letter to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Emeric Széchényi, on January 1887 Kálnoky argued that Bismarck's 'Hecuba' speech, which neglected Bulgaria and the Austrian interests in her, had convinced him that Austria would have to rely on its power to protect its interests in Near Eastern Europe.¹⁷³ Lackey also notes that this crisis demonstrated "that the Monarchy needed the capability of protecting its own Balkan interests".¹⁷⁴ Along with the agreement with England, this is another evidence of Kálnoky's extended complementary deterrence approach – Austria should rest on Germany when it can, and should acquire other tools to cope with challenges that are not covered by the Dual Alliance.

Although Kálnoky expressed in words the Austrian response to the frustration from the alliance with Berlin in 1887, the Austrian independent deterrence element unfolded much earlier in the crisis, during the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. After the failed Serbian attack on the Bulgarian army, and the marching of Bulgarian army into Serbia, Austria signaled its resolve to stop the Bulgarian advancement. On November 25 Kálnoky conveyed a message to King Alexander of Bulgaria, warning "that he would

¹⁷² Kálnoky to Széchényi, No. 2, secret, *Politisches Archiv I/464*, January 12 1888 as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 413.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 462.

¹⁷⁴ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 636.

cause a great war if he continued to advance".¹⁷⁵ According to Fuller, when delivering the message, the Austrian envoy made it clear that further attempts to advance would probably be opposed by Austrian troops".¹⁷⁶ Fuller also notes that Austria was fully aware of the potential risk of a Russian response its actions may stimulate.¹⁷⁷

It should be stressed that there is a dispute among historians about the initiative taken by the Austrian minister in Belgrade: whereas Fuller suggests that Khevenhüller was charged "by Kálnoky to add a strong commentary to the note on his own part";¹⁷⁸ Rauscher contends the envoy was instructed not be threatening in his tone, but instead cordially but assertively",¹⁷⁹ Regardless of the actual tone of the Austrians, however, it is obvious that by sending the Austrian minister to the Bulgarian king, Kálnoky decided to exploit the Austrian deterrence prestige.

As the crisis prolonged, tensions between Vienna and Moscow increased. On November 13 1886, after Russia sent the Kaulbars Mission to Bulgaria, Kálnoky threatened Russia with war if it uses force against Bulgaria: "even a temporary single-handed occupation of Bulgaria by foreign troops, without the previous consent of Turkey and the other powers, would be a violation of the treaties which, in our opinion, is not admissible".¹⁸⁰

Kálnoky's statement was an outgrowth of a political pressure, mainly from the Hungarian parliament which pushed for an Austrian response. In the debate in September, which was nurtured from the wariness toward Berlin's policy, the Hungarian premier István Tisza declared that "in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I hold that... the monarchy, while repudiating all designs of expansion or conquest, should employ all its efforts and influence to encourage the development of those [Balkan] states and prevent their falling under any foreign protectorate or

¹⁷⁵ E. C. Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg. Sein Kampf mit den Zaren und Bismarck* (Vienna, 1920), 229 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 44.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁷⁹ *bat ihn zugleich ,im Tone nicht drohend, sondern freundschaftliche aber bestimmt zu sein'.* Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 78.

¹⁸⁰ [*Münchener*] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 16. *Geschichiskalander*, 1886, 260-261 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 108-9.

permanent influence not provide for in the treaties... the government stands firmly by its repeatedly expressed opinion that, under the existing treaties, unless Turkey should assert her rights, no power is entitled to undertake any single-handed armed intervention or to set up any protectorate in the Balkan Peninsula".¹⁸¹ The discussion in the Hungarian parliament concluded with a decisive voice, as Fuller notes: "the opposition expressed some discontent, but on the whole had reason to congratulate itself upon having convinced the government of the impossibility of making any concessions whatever to Russia".¹⁸² On November, both premiers, expressed "their determination to go to war rather than yield a jot to Russia in the Balkans".¹⁸³ Andrassy, too, joined the vocal opposition, arguing for an Austrian offensive move, assuming Germany would follow it.¹⁸⁴

The Austrian declarations were not empty words. As Lackey points out, "Working behind the scenes to give substance to these statements was Friedrich Beck", the Chief of the Austrian Army. After inquiring about the readiness of his army for a war with Russia, and concluding it was not ready, Beck sought "to maximize existing military strength in Galicia" while promoting doctrinal changes and investing more money in the army so it would be able to conduct a mass mobilization in a relatively short time using modern weapons.¹⁸⁵ In the core of this reform was the approval of the Landstrum Laws in 1886 which produced the legal basis for a mass mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian society in the event of war and allocating more resources to purchase new military equipment.¹⁸⁶ Austria-Hungary was resolved to improve its independent capability to cope with Russia that would support its direct deterrence.

In the aftermath of the crisis the monarchy sought to exploit the peaceful time to improve its position using deterrence hedging: on the one hand, Kálnoky urged

¹⁸¹ [Münchener] Allgemeine Zeitung, October 3, 1886. *Geschichtskalender*, 1886, 247 as cited in *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁸³ [Münchener] Allgemeine Zeitung, November 1887 as cited in *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁸⁵ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 586.. For the discussion of Beck's reforms please see *Ibid.*, 586–90.

¹⁸⁶ For further discussion of the laws please see Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 594–97; Rothenberg, *Army of Francis Joseph*, 109.

Bismarck to initiate a dialogue to clarify the conditions under which Germany were to assist AH. Kálnoky's purpose was to enhance the German umbrella by broadening the *casus foederis* for the alliance;¹⁸⁷ Simultaneously, Beck, supported by the emperor and foreign minister, pushed for enlargement and additional improvements of the monarchy's military forces.¹⁸⁸ On December 1887, Beck, Albrecht, Kálnoky, the two national defense ministers, and other government officials, upon demand, agreed to increase Austria-Hungary's armaments, including increasing the number of troops, horses, and artillery, stationing an infantry division as well as an infantry regiment in Galicia, and improve railroad infrastructure for mobilization.¹⁸⁹ This was an outgrowth of the Austrian lack of confidence in its capacity to respond the Russian threat using its existing military power and allies. At the joint council of ministers on September 28, 1887, Kálnoky stated that Austria was left to itself in the Balkans: understandably, Germany "could not be dragged into a conflict because of Bulgaria" due to France; "Russia were unreliable, and England and Italy too could not be counted on. On the other hand, France seemed 'particularly favorable' toward the Russian wishes. Finally, one could only expect an action from the Ottoman Empire, if England attacked the Tsarist Empire and supported Turkey financially. [...] Thus, the current situation presented itself for the monarchy not favorably, and accordingly one had to restrain oneself in the Bulgarian question".¹⁹⁰

Interestingly, throughout the Bulgarian Crisis the monarchy had never made the decision to count solely on its protectors' extended deterrence, nor did it decide to employ a pure direct deterrence policy. Kálnoky, the architect of the Austrian hedging strategy wished to merge the different elements of the Austrian deterrent assets. The Austrian policy had strong elements of extended deterrence for the main role of the

¹⁸⁷ Kálnoky to Széchenyi, No. 2, *secret*, *Politisches Archiv I/464*, January 12 1888 as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 414.


¹⁸⁸ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 636.

¹⁸⁹ Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, *Franz Josefs Weggefährte: Das Leben Des Generalstabschefs Grafen Beck* (Vienna, Austria: Amalthea Verlag, 1930), 309–10.

¹⁹⁰ "wegen Bulgarien nicht in einen Konflikt hineinziehen lasse... „Rußland sei unzuverlässig, und auch auf England und Italien dürfe man nicht zählen. Dagegen zeige sich Frankreich gegenüber den russischen Wünschen 'besonders gefällig'. Vom Osmanischen Reich könne man schließlich nur dann eine Aktion erwarten, wenn England das Zarenreich angreife und die Türkei mit Geld unterstütze. [...] Somit präsentiere sich die momentane Situation für die Monarchie nicht günstig, und daher müsse man sich in der bulgarischen Frage zurückhalten Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 86–87..

German protection and the attempt to strengthen it with English cooperation. However, one of the secondary pillars of this strategy was Austrian military power, particularly concerning the Russian threat in the Balkans which was not covered by Berlin's assurances. Vienna used its might for deterrence purposes to some extent though its relative weakness, while acting to improve its military capacity. Therefore, on the deterrence hedging scale, the Austrian strategy is positioned in the left side of extended complementary deterrence, but toward the middle, as illustrated in Figure 6. Deterrence hedging which involved both alliance protection and independent capabilities Kálnoky's "middle course" between risking the Dual Alliance by pursuing an independent policy, and risking the Austrian interests by adhering merely to Berlin's instructions.

Figure 6 The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging – Austria-Hungary (1885-7)



Since the monarchy had an agreement with Russia, to which Germany was a signatory, the Russian issue was mainly under the authority of the Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the military leadership acceded to Kálnoky's approach. As Lackey notes, "Beck, in concert with War Minister Bylandt, again attempted to find a middle course that he hoped would both please the political and military leaderships in Berlin and deter the Russians from a rash offensive".¹⁹¹ On December 8 1887, the Ministry Council revealed a consensus among the civilian leadership too. Kálnoky, Tisza and Taaffe concurred: Austria-Hungary should not provoke Russia, and avoid war.¹⁹² The assented decision among the Austrian

¹⁹¹ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 617.

¹⁹² Ibid., 619.

leadership was to adhere to Kálnoky's deterrence hedging strategy, which mainly relied on extended complementary deterrence – to cover threats not covered by the alliance with Berlin. What can account for his strategy and what were the Monarchy's main motivations? The next section addresses these questions.

Deterrence-Independence Dilemma

Austrian documents imply that the Austrian deterrence hedging is an outgrowth of two weaknesses: the absence of a reliable ally in regards to Bulgaria, and insufficient independent capability to withstand Russian power. As a result, Austria felt its vital interest in Bulgaria were at risk, and that the German attempts to hinder its efforts to protect those interests were unjustifiable and dangerous. Prince Lichtenstein, the Austrian Military Attaché in Berlin, expressed the price of the alliance for Austria-Hungary: “the price for Germany’s continued support against Russia would mean to ‘give up the political independence of the imperial monarchy’, which would be forced into a relationship of dependence, similar to Bavaria after 1866”.¹⁹³ The monarchy sought to protect its interests, and given the lack of a reliable partner in the Bulgarian arena, it wished to maximize its capability to do so independently.

Interestingly, the heralds of the Austrian deterrence-independence dilemma were unearthed before the Bulgarian Crisis. In the negotiations with Germany over the nature of the Dual Alliance, then Foreign Minister Gyula Andrassy, was determined to ensure the alliance is merely against Russia, and to provide Austria with freedom to collaborate with other nations, particularly England, and France – Germany's worst enemy.¹⁹⁴ In regard to England, Andrassy's main concern was a potential threat of a French-Italian alliance with Russia which would force England to take sides and may lead to an isolation of Austria and Germany in Europe. Hence, Bridge notes, Andrassy insisted that the monarchy "must be free to say to Britain that she had no

¹⁹³ „der Preis der deutschen Unterstützung gegen Rußland ‘in dem Aufgeben der politischen Selbstständigkeit der kaiserlichen Monarchie’ bestehen müsste, ,die in ein gewisses Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zu Deutschland zu treten gezwungen werden würde, ähnlich wie Bayern nach 1866“, Günther Kronenbitter, *“Krieg Im Frieden: Die Führung Der K.u.k. Armee Und Die Großmachtspolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906-1914* (Munich, Germany: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003), 285.

¹⁹⁴ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 110.

commitments whatever against France, provided the latter did not join a coalition against the Central Powers".¹⁹⁵ Kálnoky adhered to this approach and opposed Bismarck's propositions to extend the alliance to a Franco-German War in the negotiations about the renewal of the agreement in 1883.¹⁹⁶

Whereas Austrian cooperation with England was embraced by Bismarck, a similar relation with France – his biggest enemy – contradicted his strategy to isolate Paris. Austria had no significant dispute with France, and it wished to maintain good diplomatic relations with Paris. The biggest threat from France to Austria stemmed from the risk Paris posed to Germany, which would eventually impact the monarchy's power.¹⁹⁷ In March 1887, Kálnoky wrote to Archduke Albrecht that in the event of a French victory over Germany "the republican and socialist menace would sweep through Europe like a flood when a dam has been broken".¹⁹⁸ As the relations with Germany tightened, the relations with France deteriorated. However, even as tensions increased between Vienna and Paris, maintaining diplomatic freedom in Europe remained a fundamental element in Austrian strategy. This principle was a prominent element in Austrian policy during the Bulgarian crisis.

Throughout the crisis it was clear to Vienna that an Austrian move against Russia could jeopardize the alliance with Germany whereas following the German propositions may risk Austrians interests in Bulgaria. Hence, the Austrian discussions about the policy in the Balkans revolved around the credibility of the German pledge and whether they can justify a strategic compromise on Austrian vital interests to preserve the alliance intact. The chief argument against the alliance was about the ambiguous nature of the German commitment to support Austria against Russia.

The German cautious policy can be tracked to the negotiations on the Three Emperors' Alliance. In September 1880, for instance, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister then, Heinrich Karl von Haymerle, pointed out the problem of credible German pledge to act in a case of aggression against Austria: "to attack Germany, Russia must

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 106.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 135.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 151.

¹⁹⁸ Memorandum by Archduke Albrecht on military co-operation between Germany and Austira-Hungary, *Politisches Archiv I/466*, 7 March 1887, with comments by Kálnoky as cited in Ibid., 164.

straightway invade German territory, the fact of aggression would be clearly established, and the *casus foederis* for Austria would then apply. Russia, however, could attack Austria not only directly but also through its neighbors, and particularly Rumania. To Haymerle's inquiry whether Germany would consider the *casus foederis* to apply if Russia attacked Austria in this 'indirect' manner, and if Austria were compelled to retaliate, Bismarck did not reply with the desired clarity".¹⁹⁹ The ambiguous German assurances ignited a vocal political debate within the Hungarian parliament on September 1886.

After two parliament members attacked the policy of the government, the Hungarian Opposition leader, Count Apponyi, accused Bismarck of betrayal: "I solemnly affirm that the tendency on Russian's part to subdue Bulgaria completely to her will, which conflicts directly with the interests of our monarchy, has been supported by German diplomacy".²⁰⁰ The Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza was more moderate toward Berlin but blatantly threatened Moscow with an assertive Austrian response to Russian attempts to change the status quo in Bulgaria.²⁰¹ Kálnoky advocated for the alliance with Germany but explained that due to the rehabilitation of the French army, the Germans could not put as many troops on the Eastern border as they originally planned in the 1882 dialogue.²⁰²

However, it seems that Kálnoky's genuine view was presented in a meeting with Hungarian delegation on November 1886. He outlined the limitations of the alliance with Germany, but was sanguine that Germany would not hinder Austrian moves to promote its interests: "The continuance of each country as a strong and independent Power forms for both an important interest".²⁰³ Hence, Kálnoky assumed that when Austria's vital interests will be under an immediate threat, Germany would support it. His view was strengthened by Bismarck's messages. Even though the German Chancellor emphasized he would not buttress an Austrian decision to initiate a military campaign against Russia, he noted that "if this policy should miscarry, it is always from

¹⁹⁹ Medicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87," 72.

²⁰⁰ [Münchener] Allgemeine Zeitung, September 23. Aus Oesterreich, Septmber 21 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 87.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 164.

²⁰³ *Times*, November 15, 1886 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 108.

us, rather than from England, that Austria can expect succor".²⁰⁴ This signaled Vienna that the Dual Alliance would eventually serve as a safety net if the monarchy faced a predicament. No other ally could have made a similar pledge to Austria, and Kálnoky valued it.

Nevertheless, Austria shared with its ally its dissatisfaction with the German pledges. In his March memorandum which was approved by Kálnoky, Archduke Albrecht questioned the Austrian's commitment to restrain its policy within the boundaries of the Dual Alliance should the German commitment remain ambiguous: "if Austria-Hungary could not extract a definite promise that eighteen German divisions would appear in the east, it should declare herself freed from all obligations to her ally".²⁰⁵ In December 1887 and again in 1888, as tensions with Russia reduced, Kálnoky pressured Germany to discuss the *casus foederis* of the treaty between the countries. He noted, "if we know that we should certainly have to forgo the huge military advantages...then it would be our duty to consider again and in good time how and under what circumstances it would be possible and advisable to wage a war against Russia, and whether it should be undertaken at all or avoided".²⁰⁶

As Kálnoky explains, though the trigger for the debate was the crisis in Bulgaria, the questions it raised involved Austria's capability to defend herself. In the same telegraph, the Austrian Foreign Minister argued that to protect its borders against a Russian invasion, the Austrian monarchy relied on a preemptive strategy. Kálnoky genuinely repeated the Austrian military approach promoted by the military echelon before the crisis. In mid-1882, for instance, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Friedrich Count von Beck stated that the Austro-German military plan should be principally based on an offensive campaign: "The basic idea of warfare for the allies must be that of the offensive, which will take the form of a great, strategic, double envelopment".²⁰⁷ Franz Joseph, too, noted in December 1887, if war with Russia is

²⁰⁴ *German Foreign Office Publication*, v, 125 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 88.

²⁰⁵ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 163.

²⁰⁶ Kálnoky to Széchenyi, No. 2, secret, *Politisches Archiv I/464*, January 12 1888 as cited in *Ibid.*, 414.

²⁰⁷ "Die Grundidee der Kriegsführung der Verbündeten muß der ganzen Sachlage nach die Offensive sein, welche die Form einer großen, strategischen, doppelten Umgehung tragen wird.", Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 40.

inevitable, Austria's and Germany's joint plan was to conduct an offensive war.²⁰⁸ According to Bridge, in a secret document Kálnoky explained that "the extremely unfavorable geographical conformation of Galicia rendered the Austro-Hungarian line of march hazardous in any case; but the allies would give up enormous advantages and severely compromise the whole issue of the war if they waited for the Russians to attack. The only guarantee of success lay in an immediate offensive and a simultaneous thrust from Germany".²⁰⁹ However, as Fuller concludes, Bismarck was determined to "come out decisively in favor of his chosen ally only when she was threatened with actual material injury which could not be prevented otherwise".²¹⁰

In light of the German resolve to avoid an Austrian-Russian confrontation in Bulgaria Kálnoky was obliged to adjust a policy in line with Bismarck's proposition. As the tensions with Berlin grew, he admitted that "if Russia occupied Bulgaria, the monarchy might not fight immediately; but the prospect of a prolonged Russian occupation was 'unthinkable for Austria-Hungary. The question of what would happen to Roumania is automatic and unanswerable". This is indeed an evidence that Austria was not willing to act without Germany. Throughout the crisis Kálnoky adhered to his "middle course" approach – "in the definitive settlement of the Bulgarian situation Russia's cooperation is unquestionably essential".²¹¹ Finally, on January 5, 1888 the Ministerial Council, in response to Bismarck's reluctance to discuss the German commitment in the event of a preemptive campaign, agreed that the monarchy should maintain passive as long as the Russians do not initiate military moves.²¹² The Austrian admission that a solution should be reached with Russia rather than being imposed on it is an evidence of Bismarck's success in influencing his ally's policy, as well as an evidence of Austria's preference of maximizing deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, over maximizing its independence vis-à-vis Germany.

The Austrian calculus was guided by the aspiration to maximize deterrence against Russia while minimizing tensions with Berlin. The alliance with Germany was an

²⁰⁸ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 174.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 174–75.

²¹⁰ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 110–11.

²¹¹ [*Münchener*] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 16, 1886, *Geschichtskalender*, 260-261 as cited in *Ibid.*, 109.

²¹² Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 624.

indispensable asset for the monarchy. Very early in the crisis, Kálnoky rejected the notion of opening a war with Russia, claiming that Germany would not approve this move, and without Germany by its side, the monarchy might be isolated, and this was something Austria would not be able to survive.²¹³ In the ministerial meeting on December 18 1887, when the Austrian ministers seriously discussed the expected outcome of preventive war, Kálnoky stated that the monarchy could only proceed in complete accord with Germany.²¹⁴ After being informed about the Khevenhüller ultimatum, Bismarck had instructed the German Ambassador in Vienna, Prince Heinrich VII Reuß, to make clear to Kálnoky that Austria “could not march into” Serbia without consent from Germany and Russia.²¹⁵ Kálnoky subsequently instructed Wolkenstein to explain to Russia that “Austria did not intend to invade Serbia, and would not make such a decision without common understanding of its allies”.²¹⁶

Even the most vocal voice against Kálnoky's policy, the former Foreign Minister Andrassy, advocated for military initiative assuming Germany would join the campaign: "if it was possible to bring Bismarck to sign a treaty which assured us of Germany's cooperation without our having to accord full reciprocity as regards to France, it should be ten times easier to hold him to the obligation after his signature".²¹⁷ Despite the magnitude of the German assistance for his criticism, Andrassy failed to address the question of what Austria should do if Germany does not follow it.

Another evidence for the Austrian objection to act alone can be found in a dispatch aimed to urge Bismarck to discuss the alliance's trigger for action, on January 12, 1888. The Austrian Foreign Minister, perhaps genuinely perhaps manipulatively, excluded the possibility of an Austrian campaign against Russia without the German assistance: "it is out of the question that Austria-Hungary *alone* should attack Russia".²¹⁸ Kálnoky then strengthened this point: "we are quite aware that it would be madness, both

²¹³ German Foreign Office, *Neue Verwicklungen Im Osten*, 967–68.

²¹⁴ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 174.

²¹⁵ German Foreign Office, *Neue Verwicklungen Im Osten*, 24.

²¹⁶ „Österreich beabsichtige nicht, in Serbien einzumarschieren, und werde einen solchen Beschluss ohne vorherige Verständigung mit seinen Alliierten nie fassen.“ Ibid., 25.

²¹⁷ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 110.

²¹⁸ Kálnoky to Széchényi, No. 2, secret, *Politisches Archiv I/464*, January 12 1888 as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 414.

from a military and from a political point of view, to undertake alone an aggressive war against Russia".²¹⁹ In case of a defensive campaign against a Russia attack Kálnoky commented, "the guarantee of success lies only in the immediate attack, combined with a simultaneous thrust on the part of the German army".²²⁰

Eventually, Vienna avoided any action that could seriously shake the Dual Alliance. However, Austria acted in order to protect its vital interests in Balkans as long the alliance is likely to endure. By preserving the alliance with Berlin while taking additional measures to protect its interests, Austria wished to maximize its deterrence against Russia and independence within the Dual Alliance.

The Austrian intervention in the Serbo-Bulgarian war was an interesting example of an Austrian attempt to maximize its independence as long as the risk of endangering the alliance was low. Austria was committed to protect its Serbian ally against Bulgaria - Russia's protégé. When Kálnoky informed Bismarck about the Austrian determination to assist King Milan of Serbia if he launched an attack on Bulgaria, Bismarck bluntly dismissed the Austrian argument and stated that "if the Serbs had to fight, they should fight against Bulgaria and they should do so *"en champs clos"* without involving other powers".²²¹ "I could not join you in a fight", Bismarck clarified, "for France would then fall upon us at once, and the rest is beyond foreseeing".²²² When King Milan invaded Bulgaria, Austria did not support the Serbian campaign. Only after the Bulgarian army threatened Serbian territory did Austria intervene while ensuring Russia the intention of stopping the fight, not to occupy Bulgaria.²²³

Fortunately, the Serbian attack and the Austrian intervention did not trigger a Russian attack, and a direct military confrontation between the two rivals was avoided. However, the Austrian military delegation dragged Germany into the quarrel. Whereas before the Serbian decision to attack Bulgaria, Bismarck assessed that war

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Bismarck, *Werke*, VIII, 529 as cited in Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 352).

²²² E. C. Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg. Sein Kampf mit den Zaren und Bismarck* (Vienna, 1920), 204-205 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 38.

²²³ Ibid., 44; Friedrich Haselmayr, *Die Wahrung Des Europäischen Friedens Durch Bismarck in Der Bulgarienkrise von 1885-1888*, *Diplomatische Geschichte Des Zweiten Reichs von 1871-1918* 3 (Munich, Germany: Bruckmann, 1957), 15.

between his allies was improbable, the Austrian decision to intervene without consulting him put him on high alert.²²⁴ According to Egon Caesar Corti, "When toward the end of October things in Serbia escalated, Bismarck suggested toward the ambassadors of France and Italy, that one might find the solution to the crisis, in that one let Serbia [...] loose against Bulgaria, and when both combatants had debilitated each other, Rumania could be hounded against both powers to restore peace".²²⁵

Austria-Hungary did not share its ally's vision when giving the Bulgarian King an ultimatum to stop his forces' advance into Serbia. When Bismarck was informed about the Austrian ultimatum, he was furious. Not only could Austria have invoked a war with Russia to protect Serbian interests and malfunctioned leadership, it decided to do so in contrary to German interests and without its approval. Fuller notes, Bismarck "found no terms strong enough to condemn that step and the whole policy that lay behind it".²²⁶ He cautioned if "the breach with Russia should be brought about by an Austrian advance into Serbia without the preliminary understanding provided for by the treaty, Germany would not consider the case as occasion for a German-Russian war".²²⁷ However, for Austria protecting Serbia was a necessary step to protect the monarchy's vital interests in the Balkans. Though it was clear that Germany would not support this move, Kálnoky did not expect Bismarck to abandon the alliance due to Austrian policy. The price of losing Serbia, was high and the price for the alliance, thus, was low. This is yet further evidence that for Austria, the Dual Alliance aimed to protect mutual interests but would not hinder the monarchy to protect its own interests. To maximize its deterrence against Russia, while maximizing its independence, particularly on those issues that are not protected by the alliance, Austria should seek for complementary measures that do not put in risk the protection from Germany.

²²⁴ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 41–43.

²²⁵ „Als sich gegen Ende Oktober die Dinge in Serbien zuspitzten, erwähnte Bismarck gegenüber den Botschaftern Frankreichs und Italiens, daß man die Lösung der jetzigen Krise vielleicht auch darin suchen könne, daß man Serbien [...] auf Bulgarien losließe, und wenn sich beide Kombattanten gehörig geschwächt hätten, Rumänien zur Wiederherstellung des Friedens auf beide Mächte hetze.“ Egon Caesar Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg: Sein Kampf Mit Zaren Und Bismarck* (Vienna, Austria: L.W. Seidel & Sohn, 1920), 212.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

²²⁷ *German Foreign Office Publication*, v, 27. December 7, 1885, Bismarck to Reuss as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 47).

Alternative Explanations

The Neorealist School

Different neo-realist theories provide different forecasts regarding the protégé's behavior. According to Waltz's Balance of Power theory, the multipolar structure of the European system and the distribution of power should have left Germany with limited leverage over its Austrian ally. The multipolar nature of 19th century Europe provided Austria-Hungary with various opportunities to form alliances and to balance against the Russians. Germany was one of the most powerful countries in Europe, but it was one out of several almost equal powers. Hence, the argument goes, Berlin should have taken its Austrian ally's demands into consideration and strengthened its commitment to maintain the alliance. Accordingly, the German leverage was expected to be very limited.

Walt and Mearsheimer, too, contend that multipolarity leads to flexible and fluid alliances due to the increase in the number of optional allies. Mearsheimer upholds Waltz's rationale, claiming that in multipolar systems "Minor powers in such a system have considerable flexibility regarding alliance partners and can opt to be free floaters"; Walt, on the other hand, opines that since the major powers can choose whom they wish to ally with, multipolarity favors them.²²⁸

In contrary to Waltz's and Mearsheimer's predictions, and in line with Walt's, the multipolar nature of the European system strengthened, rather than weakened, the German position within the alliance with Austria. Not only an Austrian decision to abandon the alliance was improbable and did not result in German strategic concessions; having a parallel alliance between Austria and England decreased the burden from Germany and allowed it to limit the German commitment to Vienna in case of a defensive war against Russia in the Balkans. The Austrian policy as reflected in Kálnoky's statements was a German double achievement: in regard to the Austrian attempts to halt Russia in Bulgaria, Austria eventually counted on England, not

²²⁸ Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 163; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 14.

Germany; and if Austrian deterrence were to fail, Austria expressed its assent not to rush for a reaction despite the threat over its interests in the country.

After the Russian mission of Kaulbars Austrian statements indicated a possibility of shift in Austrian policy, however eventually Kálnoky revealed an inclination to reach a diplomatic agreement with Russia in the absence of German support, rather than follow the parliament's pressure and go to war. Fuller contends, "Bismarck's discouraging attitude toward Austria kept Kálnoky and his colleagues from straying too far from the path of caution and conciliation of Russia".²²⁹ Langer too, connects the Austrian behavior and Bismarck's strategy: "Bismarck's strong stand removed the danger of Austrian action and gave the Near Eastern situation an opportunity to calm down".²³⁰ Though it is questionable whether Kálnoky could have preserved his policy in case of a more assertive Russian intervention in Bulgaria, this analysis indicates an Austrian policy and statements that significantly diminished the odds that an Austrian-Russian war would breakout – a scenario that Bismarck wholeheartedly wished to prevent; and that Germany would be dragged to this war should it occur.

The structural realist explanation fails to predict these strategic achievements, mainly because it lacks a subjective analytical approach, and relies mainly on the objective capabilities-based approach. By exploring reality through the lens of balance of power, Waltz misses crucial aspects of the Austrian view.

The first absent element is the Austrian perception of German credibility. In deterrence theory, the credibility of threats and assurances are products of the nation's capability, and its resolve to actually use them if deterrence fails. Nations can possess the most powerful weapons, but as long as they are not perceived determined to use their military capabilities, deterrence is likely to fail. In alliance theory the protector's resolve plays a major role in binding the protégé's policy to the protector's. However, demonstrating one's resolve is challenging as eventually is about shaping the adversaries' as well as the allies' perceptions. Unlike the capabilities element which has a strong material nature, perceptions are purely subjective.

²²⁹ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 95.

²³⁰ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 356.

The multipolar structure in Europe created many opportunities for Vienna to reduce the threat Russia posed by aligning with other powers, as the structural-realist argument forecasts. Nonetheless, the same system did not provide Austria with an ally that shared the same fundamental interests as Germany. For Vienna, as reflected in Kálnoky's speech at the Parliament in November 1886, German interests encompassed the existence of a strong Austro-Hungarian empire. No other European power had similar interests.

In January 1888, when the Austrian Foreign Minister urged Berlin to clarify the trigger of a German assistance to Austria-Hungary, he shared his view of the non-German alliances Austria has: "Italy engaged in Massawa and with obligations towards Germany, would hardly be able to commit herself to major military efforts anyway. As regards England, there is no doubt whatever that public opinion there will declare against the aggressor, whoever this may be".²³¹ Kálnoky writes that this to demonstrate that Austria has no ally to rely on to promote an offensive campaign against Russia, a concern raised by Bismarck. Nevertheless, the sense of unreliable partners, except of the German one, can be applied to some extent also for the case of an Austrian defensive war, especially because this war would likely start with an Austrian preemptive attack, as Kálnoky explains in his dispatch.

Bridge concludes, "the Roumanian alliance promised a support that would hardly materialize, and the Triple Alliance no support at all. Moreover, the alliance with Serbia, Italy and Roumania were all pledged with irredentism".²³² Bridge explains that "all these alliances were important if the monarchy needed rear-cover to concentrate its resources on the Russian front".²³³ Given the suspicion towards the English policy and its limited contribution to a land war against Russia, England too did not provide sufficient protection to allow the monarchy to distance its policy from the German power. Lackey concludes, "Germany remained the Monarchy's only hope in combatting the Russian colossus".²³⁴

²³¹ Kálnoky to Széchenyi, No. 2, secret, *Politisches Archiv I/464*, January 12 1888 as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 414.

²³² *Ibid.*, 152.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 612.

The German credibility was also an outgrowth of its close cooperation with the Austrian army. As the proposed analysis indicates, the relations among the military leaderships were evolved since the establishment of the Dual Alliance and consisted of sensitive information sharing and policy coordination meetings. For both Kálnoky and Beck the military coordination with Germany was a tool to enhance the German commitment to the alliance and to increase the alliance's efficacy in the event of war against Russia, in light of Bismarck's determination to maintain the German commitment as ambiguous as possible.²³⁵ Vienna had no similar cooperation with other power in Europe, which enhanced the credibility of German assurances.

Therefore, the Dual Alliance was the best asset for the monarchy's deterrence prestigious. Though Austria had potential allies in Europe, and with some it formed formal alliances, Germany offered Vienna a strong ally with a credible basis for cooperation. No other power was able to substitute the German assurances should Austria face a serious predicament. For this reason, losing the alliance with Germany was a red line for the civil and military Austrian leaderships. The neorealist approach, whose focal point is distribution of capabilities fails to take into account the Austrian perception of German credibility.

Moreover, using the Balance of Power Theory produces a competitive reality between the powers, in which one nation's gain implies other nations' loss – a zero sum game. This view excludes the perception of the nations' intentions and suggests that all powers threaten each other. However, the Austrian view does not support this argument. The Austrian policy treated alternate alliances as a complementary instrument to the alliance with Germany, not as a substitute. An important factor was that for Germany the main threat was an anti-German alliance headed by France, whereas for the monarchy the biggest concern originated in Russia. These different threat perceptions allowed for the simultaneous formation of several alliances with third parties such as England and Italy, based on *ad hoc* cooperation or local understanding without strategically undermining other alliances. For this reason,

²³⁵ Scott Lackey, *The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army, Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the General Staff* (ABC-CLIO, 1995), 101–2.

Austria's alliance with England, whose focal point was the Mediterranean and the Balkans, did not jeopardize the alliance with Germany.

In fact, the Austrian rapprochement with England was made in coordination with Germany and was reliant on Bismarck's approval. The Chancellor encouraged the Austrian-English negotiations since English interests in the Balkans could reduce the German burden of supporting Austria against Russia. According to a German foreign office memorandum from September 23, 1887, if Austria were to initiate a military confrontation with Russia, "we could not take part in it. Such a policy might, rather, count upon the support of England".²³⁶ In this memorandum, Germany repeated the necessity to postpone the Austrian measures until England is taking the initiative to ensure London can be relied on. When addressing the Austrian support of Serbia in the offensive campaign against Bulgaria, Bismarck criticized Austria: "the Austrian ought to wait until they hear the English canon. The English had the greater interest in the matter, but they keep telling the Austrian theirs is the greater, which the Austrians have come to believe".²³⁷

In his autobiography Bismarck expounds his rationale to pull England to his side: "the German Empire in alliance with Austria would not lack the support of England, and the peace of Europe the common interest of both empires, would be guaranteed by 2,000,000 fighting men".²³⁸ He adds that "Germany would be guilty of a great folly if in Eastern struggles which did not affect her interests if she were to take a side sooner than the other powers who were more directly concerned".²³⁹

Another German incentive for an Austrian-English alliance was the threat from France. The rapprochement between London and Vienna made it less likely that England would join an anti-German alliance with Russia and France. However, Bismarck insisted Germany would be excluded from the formal agreement. By joining the alliance, Germany could have isolated Russia, thus, pushing Moscow to Paris' arms. By

²³⁶ *German Foreign Office Publication*, v, 125 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 88).

²³⁷ Herrmann von Mitnacht, *Erinnerungen on Bismarck* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1904-05, 2 vols), ii, 46 as cited in *Ibid.*, 47.

²³⁸ In a letter for the King of Bavaria from September 10, 1879 as cited in Otto Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto*, trans. Arthur John Butler (London: Smith, Elder & co, 1898), 264.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 291.

keeping Germany outside the Mediterranean Alliance Bismarck sought to maintain his "honest broker" status among the Russian leadership and prevent a Franco-Russian alliance. "For perfect security against disruption of the chosen combination", Bismarck notes, "is not to be had by Germany, while it is possible for her to hold in check the anti-German fits and starts of Austro-Hungarian feeling so long as German maintains the bridge which lead to St. Petersburg, and allows no chasm to intervene between us and Russia which cannot be spanned".²⁴⁰ The German Chancellor went further and strengthened the German-Russian relationship by signing a secret bilateral defensive alliance.

Altogether it seems that both monarchies did not uphold to the structural realist view of reality. This theoretical explanation yields a "zero sum game" between major power and fails to the complicated system that Bismarck sought to create in Europe, thus, the "win-win" situation an Austrian-English alliance could produce to Berlin and Vienna. Using Walt's Balance of Threat Theory which adds the aspect of nations' intentions, or how they perceived by other nations, can contribute to account for the Austrian behavior and identify the shared interests with Berlin due to different threat perceptions.

The Waltzian argument, however, can enlighten the limitations of the German power over Austria, where Walt's argument is less helpful. The most salient example is the German failure to compel Austria to reach an agreement with Russia over their sphere of influence in the Balkans, and by doing so acknowledging Bulgaria as "a territory under Russian influence". Despite his assertive campaign Bismarck never broke the Austrian opposition. From the beginning of the crisis the German Chancellor stressed that if Austria did not reach an agreement with Russia, Germany might not feel obliged to support the monarchy's policy in the Balkans: "loyalty and unreservedly as we Germans would back you up if Russia attacked you, we could never contemplate the employment of German army as an auxiliary force in the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence on the lower Danube".²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 276.

²⁴¹ E. C. Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg. Sein Kampf mit den Zaren und Bismarck* (Vienna, 1920), 244-246 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 51.

Even though the multipolar nature of European politics, Germany needed the Austrian monarchy on its side. Walt, who focuses heavily on balance against threat failed to predict it. Bismarck concerned from an isolation of Germany. Given the rivalry with France and the traditional mistrust with Russia, Germany could have not lost its Austrian ally.²⁴² In his autobiography Bismarck admits, "if Russia compel us to choose between it and Austria, I believe that the disposition which Austria would display towards us would be conservative and peaceable, while that of Russia would be uncertain".²⁴³ When justifying this statement Bismarck emphasizes the need to prevent the worst case scenario for Germany – an anti-German alliance headed by France: "we must and can honorably maintain the alliance with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; it corresponds to our interests, to the historical traditions of Germany, to the public opinion of our people... we cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose sight of the possibility that the policy of Vienna may willy-nilly abandon us".²⁴⁴ He explains, "if a secret treaty of Reichstadt was possible without our consent, without our knowledge, so also was a renewal of the old coalition – Kaunitz's handiwork – of France, Austria and Russia, whenever the elements which it represented, and which beneath the surface were still present in Austria, should gain the ascendancy there".²⁴⁵ This notion was not Bismarck's alone. On May 1887 the German Chancellor heard the same message from his Ambassador in Vienna: "We cannot test the friendship of our honest friends that often, I believe".²⁴⁶

Therefore, even though Bismarck maximized the leverage he had over Vienna, he could have not force it to settle the issues it had with Russia in a way that blatantly jeopardized the Austrian interests according to the monarchy's view. Here the multipolar nature of the European system plays a major role, as expected by the structural-realist school. This evidence contradicts Walt's argument about the major power's latitude to choose its allies in a multipolar system and to change alliances

²⁴² Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto*, 254–56.

²⁴³ In a letter for the King of Bavaria from September 10, 1879 as cited in *Ibid.*, 262.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 282.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 254.

²⁴⁶ „Die Freundschaft unserer ehrlichen Freunde dürfen wir, glaube ich, nicht zu oft solchen Kraftproben aussetzen.“, Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 117.

rapidly. Germany enjoyed political freedom since Vienna knew the Germans depended on the alliance, not because Germany had other good alternatives. Conversely to Walt's main argument, the indispensability of the alliance for both allies was its main source of power for Berlin, not a German latitude to leave the alliance.

Alliance Restraint Theory

In his autobiography, Bismarck discusses the decision to ally with Austria-Hungary. One of his arguments touches the restraining aspect of alliance highlighted by Pressman: "the German alliance is the best calculated to secure for Austria a peaceful and constructive policy".²⁴⁷ Bridge is even more blatant suggesting that "When [Bismarck] agreed to the alliance of 1879, his goal was to make Austria-Hungary a servant of Germany..."²⁴⁸ In fact, Pressman suggests two explanations to the German decision to ally with Austria: "Germany wanted to prevent Austria from starting a war with Russia..." as well as "to prevent Austria from starting a war with Russia".²⁴⁹

Pressman's argument about the crucial role of the protector's power mobilizing capability sheds some light upon the Austrian policy, and particularly the German success to restrain it: Bismarck's achievement can be explained by the unity among the German leadership. Of note was the political support Bismarck received from the German Emperor Wilhelm I, who shared the Chancellor's determination to promote rapprochement with Russia and prevent it from aligning with France.²⁵⁰ The Emperor and Bismarck had a strong relationship in which the latter enjoyed high trust from his Kaiser. Jonathan Steinberg notes, "the old king had for more than twenty-five years supported Bismarck in both senses of the word, approving his work and policy and as well as tolerating his increasingly impossible and irrational behavior".²⁵¹ Wilhelm's support of Bismarck during the Bulgarian Crisis was another expression of their relationship. In September 1879, during the negotiations over the Dual Alliance the

²⁴⁷ Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto*, 274.

²⁴⁸ „Als [Bismarck] dem Bündnis von 1879 zustimmte, war es sein Ziel, Österreich-Ungarn zum Diener Deutschlands zu machen.“ Bridge, "Österreich(-Ungarn) Unter Den Grossmächten," 371.

²⁴⁹ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 24.

²⁵⁰ Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, 1950, 177–80.

²⁵¹ Steinberg, *Bismarck*, 2011, 431.

Emperor shared his concerns from Bismarck's attempt to form an alliance with Austria-Hungary against Russia: "were the German Empire to become involved in war with Russia, a change so deeply to be regretted in the mutual relations of the two empires would cause me the most poignant grief...".²⁵²

Bismarck worked hard to instigate the Emperor to approve the alliance with Austria, which he eventually did. In his written response to the Emperor, Bismarck opines that the alliance with Vienna was the bedrock for a broader alliance with Russia: "if the German Empire were to come to such an understanding with Austria, an understanding which should have in view the cultivation of peace with Russia as sedulously as before, but should also provide for joint defense in the event of an attack by it upon either of the allied powers, I should see in it an essential security for the peace in Europe. Thus mutually assured, both empires might continue their efforts for further consolidation of the Three Emperors' Alliance".²⁵³

When the option of the Three Emperor's Alliance emerged, and when it was threatened by the events in Bulgaria, Bismarck and his monarch were on the same page. It enabled the German Chancellor to enjoy absolute support from the Emperor throughout the crisis to maintain good relations with Russia, even at the expense of undermining the alliance with Austria, and to conduct military preparations against France, despite a vocal political opposition.²⁵⁴

Relying on the emperor's support, Bismarck was capable of gaining the support of the German parliament to promote his policy. Bismarck managed to gain the necessary support from the parliament even when vocal politicians doubted his decision to focus on the French threat rather than showing more German resolve to intervene in the eastern front to support its Austrian ally, Bismarck. The most prominent example is the discussion in the Reichstag about the new bill the German army consolidated in light of the French military investments and mobilization in the beginning of 1887.²⁵⁵ In his 'Hecuba' speech on January 11 1887, he declared that "if we had to reckon only

²⁵² Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto*, 266.

²⁵³ In a letter for the King of Bavaria from September 10, 1879 as cited in *Ibid.*, 261.

²⁵⁴ Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 129–30.

²⁵⁵ Rauscher, *Zwischen Berlin Und St. Petersburg: Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Außenpolitik Unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881-1895*, 96.

with our relations in the East, they would require no such exposition. But with regard to France it is quite otherwise". He stressed that war with France "is possible any day", and that if the government new bill which designed to equip the German army with new and better rifles does not pass "we have to face the possibility of defeat in such a war".²⁵⁶

In regarding to his policy toward Austria-Hungary, Bismarck stated that "our relations with Austria are based upon the consciousness on the part of both of us that unimpaired existence of each as a Great Power is a necessity for the other... there are specific Austrian interests for which we cannot commit ourselves... whatever interests Austria has in Constantinople, Austria alone must judge: we have none there".²⁵⁷ The new bill was approved and Bismarck's policy prevailed.

Bismarck was also capable of restraining his military commanders who traditionally served as an opposition to a conciliatory policy toward Russia. The most silent example through the Bulgarian Crisis was the shift in the Chief of the German Army's, General Moltke's, position while discussing military coordination with Vienna. Throughout the crisis the German general communicated to his Austrian colleagues encouraging messages regarding the willingness of the German military to buttress the monarchy in a military conflict against Russia. In early December 1887 he even suggested a winter offensive campaign to surprise Russia.²⁵⁸ However, later in the same month, the German general showed reluctance to support Austria in the event of a war with Russia, claiming that Austria has nothing to gain from this war.²⁵⁹ Lackey claims that Moltke "had now apparently been reined in by the chancellor".²⁶⁰

Following Pressman's theoretical framework, the German success can be also an outgrowth of the German understanding that an alliance with England could allow Austria to increase its security by other means. If Austria could count on England, it

²⁵⁶ Otto Bismarck, *Die Politischen Reden Des Fürsten Bismarck*, ed. Horst Kohl (Stuttgart, 1892), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3364602>, xii, 184 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 132.

²⁵⁷ Bismarck, *Die Politischen Reden Des Fürsten Bismarck*,., xii, 216-217 as cited in Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, 133.

²⁵⁸ Lackey, "General Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff," 118.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 624.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 623.

would feel less vulnerable and would be less tempted to exercise a preventive attack against Russia; and if war between Vienna and Moscow was to erupt, Berlin would be dragged only as a last resort to protect the monarchy. By enabling Austria to increase its security, Germany reduced the potential opposition to its restraining attempts.

Lastly, the absent of any Austrian attempt to hide its moves was a crucial factor in the German achievement. Bismarck acted when Kálnoky shared his concerns about the situation in Bulgaria. The only exception was his surprise about the Austrian ultimatum to the Bulgarian king. However, here lies the weakness of Pressman's argument. It rightly predicts that the flow of information between Vienna and Berlin is a chief determinant for the German restraining success, but it does not explain why Austria behaved differently in different situations: why it notified its German ally about its activities in Bulgaria but did not do so regarding to Serbia. The theory is useful in explaining why the Germans managed to restrain Austria but it overlooks what Germany aimed to restrain. The proposed analysis, based on the deterrence-independence dilemma, infers that the Austrian assistance to Belgrade was aimed at enhancing the monarchy's independence, assuming it would not damage its alliance, thus, its deterrence against Russia.

The focal point for Pressman is the restraining attempts by the protectors when there are contradictory interests among the alliance members. There was indeed a clash of interest between the German and Austrian allies, and it was necessary for Bismarck to clarify that Germany would not automatically be dragged into war by Austria to restrain the Austrian policy. However, this is only the beginning of the story. The Austrian policy, as this analysis indicates, was not about confronting Germany, but about enhancing Austrian capability to secure its interest in the Balkans while fostering the alliance with Berlin. In fact, Pressman's argument misses the complexity of the Austrian policy: the mixture of direct deterrence and two deterrence systems that complete each other. How did Vienna decide on this path and did not concede to German demands, nor demand Bismarck to strengthen his assurances, and in the event of a German refusal, to abandon the alliance? This question, which addresses the Austrian calculus, remains unanswered using Pressman's argument.

Conclusion

In his autobiography Bismarck leaves a message to the future leadership of Germany: "in the future not only military equipment but also a correct political eye will be required to guide the German ship of state through the currents of coalitions to which we are exposed in consequence of our geographical position and our previous history. We should not avoid the dangers which lie in the bosom of the future by amiability and commercial pourboires to friendly powers. We should only increase the greed of our former friends and teach them to reckon on our anxieties and necessities".²⁶¹

As Bismarck implied, the struggle between Moscow and Vienna in the Balkans threatened to drag all European powers to a large scale war from the second half of the 19th century. However, this threat was realized only on July 1914, when World War I erupted. The proposed analysis offers a window to the Austrian calculus when facing one crisis, over Bulgaria, which ended with no big war. It points out the Austrian deterrence hedging encompassed at least three different sources of power: German protection, English cooperation and self-capabilities. This chapter also highlights the historical as well as theoretical contribution of using the concept of deterrence-independence dilemma to account for the Austrian behavior. The explanation holds a complementary contribution, in addition to the neo-realist explanations and Pressman's for the Austrian behavior during the Bulgarian Crisis. In the conclusion of this research, this chapter's findings are juxtaposed to the findings of the Austrian policy in the pre-World War I crisis which included the same actors but ended with an immense conflict. This crisis is the research subject of the next chapter.

²⁶¹ Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto*, 290.

Chapter 6: The July Crisis (1914)

The "tragic poker game" – this is how Historian Christopher M. Clark describes the July crisis that led to World War I in 1914: "On both sides they imagined that 'bluffing' would suffice to achieve success. None of the players thought that it would be necessary to go all the way. The tragic poker game had begun".¹ Clark's analogy is still debatable among historians, however, it illustrates the dynamics between the two sides: the continental monarchies and the Triple Entente Alliance. Since this research's purpose is to enrich our understanding of extended deterrence interaction, this chapter's focal point is narrower: the "game" between the Austrian protégé, the German protector, and the Russian adversary.

The chapter opens with a brief overview of the events that paved the road to World War I. It then presents the main capabilities and interests of the three countries, and ends with an analysis of the Austrian deterrence hedging during the July crisis. The German unequivocal support of Austria, contrary to Bismarck's policy 30 years earlier, influenced the Austrian calculus and engendered a different Austrian deterrence hedging than the one during the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885-88. The chapter ends with the contribution of deterrence-independence dilemma to account for this change of Austrian behavior.

The July Crisis: An Overview

Major Changes in Europe between 1888 and 1914

Growing Tensions between Austria and Serbia

Contrary to the amicable and protégé-protectorate relationship shared by Serbia and Austria-Hungary during the Balkan Crisis of 1885-1887, at the turn of the century, the relationship began to deteriorate. Clark claims that the source of this gradual erosion of relations between Austria-Hungary and the various Balkan states, particularly Serbia and Romania, who were key allies, was the "deepening interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues" with respect to minorities in the Habsburg Empire.²

¹ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 450.

² *Ibid.*, 82.

Foreign and domestic policies became entangled in the case of those minorities for whom there was an independent 'motherland' outside the boundaries of the empire, primarily Serbia and Romania. Due to the dualist nature of the government of Austria-Hungary, there was "little Vienna could do to prevent oppressive Hungarian cultural policies from alienating Romania and Serbia. While the Romanians were successfully insulated from acting, irredentist activity in Belgrade exploded".³

After the regicide in 1903, Serbia altered its previous course with the accession of a new king. The new Serbian policy threatened Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, particularly as the Austro-Hungary-Serbian Commercial Treaty was running out. Renewal negotiations foundered since Serbia wanted to reduce its economic dependence on Austria, which took about 80 to 90% of all exports and supplied 50 to 60% of all imports.⁴ In January 1904, Serbia placed a munitions order with a French firm rather than an Austrian one, which was the norm, leading to further erosion of the relationship.⁵ Finally, a Serbo-Bulgarian customs union was formed in August 1905, which ruined the trade negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The formation of the Serbo-Bulgarian customs union worried the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not merely because of its commercial potential but as a political entity that could potentially form a league of Balkan states "hostile to Austria-Hungary and receptive to promptings from St. Petersburg".⁶ According to Clark, this was not simply paranoia. The customs agreement "was in fact the third of sequence of secret alliances between Serbia and Bulgaria, of which the first two were clearly anti-Austrian in orientation. A Treaty of Friendship and a Treaty of Alliance had already been signed in Belgrade on May 12, 1904 in circumstances of the strictest secrecy".⁷

Tensions between Vienna and Belgrade peaked in March 1906 with the Pig War, which was a tariff conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary lasting until June 1909. The Pig War started with the prohibition of export of live Serbian pigs to Austria-Hungary. On March 1 Austria-Hungary closed off the frontier to trade resulting in Serbia finding

³ Ibid., 81.

⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica 1911 Edition: Volume 24, s.v. "Servia"

⁵ Michael Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999*, 1st American ed (New York: Viking, 2000), 281.

⁶ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 81.

⁷ Ibid.

alternative markets. However, foreign trade increased by 10 million Serbian Dinars, credits for slaughterhouses and canning plants were obtained from France, and imports were arranged from Germany. Serbian hostility to Austria-Hungary had increased, and a need for a trade outlet to the Adriatic Sea developed, sharpening Serbia's nationalist ambitions with regard to Bosnia.

Finally, according to Samuel Williamson, "The annexation crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-1909 permanently estranged the two countries".⁸ Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, permitted Austria-Hungary to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they counted to ultimately possess. Serbia, however, hoped that at some point some provinces would come to it and give its access to the Adriatic, hence, it wanted to prevent the annexation. After the proclamation of annexation, Serbia lodged a protest with the European Powers, demanding either a return to the *status quo* or compensation calculated to assure the independence and material progress of Serbia. Austria-Hungary refused to receive the Serbian protest and denied that Serbia had any right to raise a question about the annexation.

The creation of The Black Hand in 1911, which was devoted to the unification of all south Slavs by any means, became a "government within the government" in Serbia.⁹ Captain Dragutin Dimitrijevic, a Serbian military officer was affected by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1911, he founded 'Union or Death', which later became the 'Black Hand'. They had two aims: the liberation of all Serbs under foreign rule and the creation of a Kingdom of Serbia that incorporated all Serbs.¹⁰ Members of the Black Hand had to sign a form that stated that they were willing to give up their life for the movement. The Black Hand set about liaising with other known secret Serb organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and terrorist action was encouraged against Austria-Hungary, what they believed were occupying forces. In the lead up to July 1914, The Black Hand was responsible for multiple acts of terrorism against Habsburg

⁸ Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 39, <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781107336995>.

⁹ Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 40, <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781107336995>.

¹⁰ Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, The New International History Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 122.

officials, culminating in the assassination of the heir apparent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

The Inter-superpower rivalry during the first decade

The beginning of the twentieth century reflected regional stability in the Balkans. Russia and Austro-Hungary adhered to their status quo policy while striving for local gains that did not jeopardize stability. In 1903 the two countries signed the Murzstag agreement, which mitigated the tensions between them by maintaining the status quo in Macedonia.¹¹ Russia looked eastward and completed the Trans-Siberian Railway project, which connected it to the Pacific coast. The Russian orientation, however, suffered a severe blow after the defeat in the war with Japan (1905-1908). Moscow then rebalanced toward the Balkans. The Russian policy encouraged pro-Slavic movements which threatened the sovereignty of the Austrian empire. Moscow was also engaged in a deliberate attempt to create a Balkan alliance.¹² In 1908, Russia supported the Serbian cause, but the crisis ended with a triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia. Russia, under pressure from Germany, was forced to abandon Serbia. The humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was a factor in determining the course of events which led to the War.¹³ Kissinger notes, "though Germany thought it was teaching Russia the importance of German goodwill, Russia resolved never to be caught flat-footed again".¹⁴

Under Russian influence, Serbia and Bulgaria settled their differences and signed an alliance, originally directed against Austria-Hungary on 13 March 1912.¹⁵ Serbia then signed a mutual alliance with Montenegro, while Bulgaria did the same with Greece. The League was victorious in the First Balkan War in October 1912, where it successfully wrestled control of almost all European Ottoman territories. Following

¹¹ Simon Peuple, *Heinemann Advanced History: European Diplomacy 1870-1939*, ed. Martin Collier and Erica Lewis (Oxford: Heinemann, 2002), 28.

¹² Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 81.

¹³ Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershey, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia and Africa, 1870-1914* (Washington: Govt. print. off, 1918), 374.

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 196.

¹⁵ R. J. Crampton, *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, (1987), pp. 62.

this victory however, old differences between the allies re-emerged over the division of the spoils, particularly Macedonia, leading to the effective break-up of the League, and soon after, on 16 June 1913, Bulgaria attacked its erstwhile allies, beginning the Second Balkan War. By July 1914, no such Balkan League had formed.

In parallel to the growing tensions between Russia and Austria, struggles between their respective allies – France and Germany – appeared more aggressive. This rivalry dramatically manifested in the two Morocco crises. As both Paris and Berlin wished to realize their imperial aspirations in North Africa, the countries occasionally collided. In 1905, the German emperor William II responded to a Spanish-France partition agreement of Morocco, supported by Britain, by visiting Tangier and declaring Morocco's independence--a direct challenge to the French policy. Eventually, war was avoided and settlement was accomplished after the two powers acknowledged French influence in the Morocco while maintaining the German economic rights.¹⁶ The agreement was a French diplomatic achievement, but an equally important achievement for Paris was its united front with Britain against the Germans. Sidney Bradshaw Fay notes, "The main importance of the First Morocco Crisis lies in the fact that from the outset it strengthened the ties between France and England, and led to new secret understandings between them".¹⁷ In 1904, France and Britain signed a series of agreement, known as the Entente Cordiale, which settled their imperial aspirations. In 1907, under French pressure, Russia – Paris' ally – and England signed a similar agreement regarding their spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The Anglo-French cooperation remained firm in the second Morocco crisis (1911), when London seriously planned to use military force against Germany to protect French interests in Africa.¹⁸ Gradually, the Austro-German alliance was not only facing more challenges, but their adversaries' power was growing. Martin Gilbert contends, these "habits of consultation created what were known as the Triple

¹⁶ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: The Macmillan company, 1928), 189–92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 189–90.

¹⁸ Peaple, *Heinemann Advanced History*, 34–35.

Entente: Britain, France and Russia, giving the Central Powers a fear of encirclement".¹⁹

Changes in Europe and the Post-Balkan War Period 1911-1914

The period between 1911 and 1914 saw several significant localized conflicts that, according to Williamson, "challenged the international political system". The Moroccan Crisis of 1911, the Italian-Turkish War of 1911, and two Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 "decisively altered the European situation and revealed the real possibility of both an Austro-Russian and/or an Austro-Serbian war in 1912-1913".²⁰ According to Williamson, these events also influenced the perception and attitudes of European leaders; in fact, British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey assumed that the situation in July 1914 was simply another iteration of earlier crises.²¹ Other leaders also felt that the July Crisis of 1914 will play out in a similar manner, as a localized conflict. For instance, the German representative of Saxony stated, "one expects a localization of the conflict since England is absolutely peaceable and France as well as Russia likewise do not feel inclined towards war".²² John Vasquez, too, infers that "A focus on Austria-Hungary sees the First World War as a third Balkan war that gets out of hand".²³ This is despite the shift in the German policy in 1914 in respect to its risk-averse attitude prior to the July Crisis. Dale Copeland, for instance, exhibits the caution characterized Berlin in the two Balkan conflict. He notes, that Germany was deliberately restraining Austria "whenever events threatened to draw Russia in... Vienna was permitted to make aggressive moves only when it was clear that Russia would not intervene".²⁴ All through the period of 1911-1914, according to Williamson, "Three times the Vienna leadership considered the

¹⁹ Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History*, 1st American ed (New York: H. Holt, 1994), 5.

²⁰ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 36.

²¹ Ibid.

²² David Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?*, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 177.

²³ John A. Vasquez, "Was the First World War a Preventive War?" in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 218, <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781107336995>.

²⁴ Dale C. Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 177.

question of war and opted instead for peace, almost certainly because Berlin offered no assured support and Emperor Franz Joseph and Archduke Franz Ferdinand blocked military calls for a showdown. But the risks of war remained real".²⁵ Russia's "trial mobilization exercise" during the First Balkan Wars was dangerously interpreted by the Austro-Hungarian Empire as an act of intimidation. Matters were further complicated between Germany and Russia in the winter of 1913, when German General Liman von Sanders was assigned to Constantinople to train Turkish troops, which the Russians saw as a threat to their influence in the derelict Ottoman Empire and the control of The Straits.²⁶

Williamson notes that the Balkan conflicts resulted in major strategic changes. "Italy gained tenuous control of Libya; Serbia doubled its population and geographical size at the expense of Turkey; Bulgaria was humbled during the Second Balkan War; while Romania slowly moved away from its secret ties with the Triple Alliance and into the Russian orbit. And two allies, Italy and Austria-Hungary, openly struggled for control of the newly created Albanian state that served to block Serbian access to the Adriatic".²⁷

Rapid militarization across Europe was another major aspect of Europe in early 20th century. David Fromkin writes that "in the industrial age, Europe's business had become the business of preparing to fight a war".²⁸ The German armament manufacturer, Krupp was the single largest business in Europe. Its rivals, Skoda, Creusot, Schneider, and Vickers-Maxim, were also enormous.²⁹ In Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II entered into a naval arms race with Great Britain, the dominant naval force in the world at that time, diverting military resources to the formation of the navy. However, the "Anglo-German naval race eased after 1913 when Berlin accepted a 16:10 ratio of British supremacy".³⁰ This was even conceded by "budget shifts in 1911–

²⁵ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 36.

²⁶ Ibid., 38.

²⁷ Ibid., 36.

²⁸ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 29.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 36.

1912 that scaled down naval building and shifted funds to the army in Germany's 1912 army law".³¹

Table 4 Composite Index of National Capability Score³²

As seen in Table 4, Germany was trailing behind Great Britain in terms of total national military capability (CINC) at the turn of the century, but by 1906 had emerged as the predominant military force in Europe. The CINC score is an amalgamation of material strength, measured through industrial output of iron and steel, energy consumption, expenditure on military, including armaments, and size of the military, and population and economic growth rate.³³ Austria-Hungary remained the weakest in terms of national military capability among the European powers leading up to the war. Austria

	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914
Austria-Hungary	0.042	0.042	0.038	0.041	0.042	0.047	0.044	0.044	0.042	0.044	0.045	0.068
France	0.073	0.070	0.062	0.069	0.070	0.072	0.070	0.070	0.071	0.072	0.068	0.075
Germany	0.135	0.134	0.123	0.132	0.136	0.146	0.135	0.136	0.137	0.137	0.143	0.158
Great Britain	0.143	0.135	0.121	0.123	0.122	0.121	0.117	0.116	0.118	0.117	0.113	0.138
Russia	0.113	0.113	0.163	0.124	0.119	0.121	0.119	0.118	0.120	0.124	0.116	0.111

had fallen behind in armaments.

The crises between 1911 and 1914 and the impending threat of war also led to the need to strengthen the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the Triple Entente between France, Russia, and Britain, with the latter "far more successful" given the German and Austrian suspicion towards the Italian commitments.³⁴

³¹ Vasquez, "Was the First World War a Preventive War?" 210.

³² "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer. See, Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 37.

Events Leading to August 1914

It is widely agreed that the catalyst for World War I was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian-Serb, on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo. However, tensions between the European powers were at a simmering point. Barbara Tuchman writes, "Europe was a heap of swords piled as delicately as jackstraws; one could not be pulled out without moving the others".³⁵ Austria-Hungary felt it was compelled to respond, not just as retaliation for the assassination, but as opportunity to crush the Serbian expansion and the pan-Slavic nationalist movement in the Balkans. Furthermore, there was "occasion to absorb Serbia as she had absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909" – a last effort to prop up a decaying imperial power.³⁶

The German Kaiser, a close friend of Franz Ferdinand, was deeply shocked by his assassination. It was decided by the German leadership that Berlin must "take things in hand and preserve the peace of Europe".³⁷ However, on July 5, Germany sanctioned the use of force by Austria-Hungary in crushing the purported source of the Black Hand, Serbia, and assured that Austria-Hungary could count on Germany's "faithful support" if its punitive actions against Serbia brought it into conflict with Russia.³⁸ This declaration is now known as the "blank check". The Austro-Hungarian Empire, now with the unconditional backing of the German military, issued an ultimatum to the Serbian government with a list of demands on July 23. The ultimatum was specifically designed to be unacceptable to the Serbians. Nevertheless, the Austrian document was not unreasonable as Clark notes, "The Austrian note was a great deal milder, for example, than the ultimatum presented by NATO to Serbia-Yugoslavia in the form of the Rambouillet Agreement drawn up in February and March 1999 to force the Serbs into complying with NATO policy in Kosovo".³⁹

On July 23, when Serbia received the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, Russia entered into a "period preparatory to war", which was essentially a military mobilization exercise

³⁵ Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 18.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 71. In 1909, Russia, weakened by the war with Japan, had been forced to acquiesce by a German ultimatum and her support of Austria-Hungary in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³⁷ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 404.

³⁸ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 86.

³⁹ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 456.

on July 25. On July 26, Berlin and Vienna received various alarms about a Russian mobilization across European Russia.⁴⁰ The Serbians responded to the ultimatum on July 27. Clark notes, "in their replies to the individual points, the drafters offered a subtle cocktail of acceptances, conditional acceptances, evasions and rejections".⁴¹ It is interesting to note that the Russian military was preparing for war even before the Serbians rejected the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum seemingly after discovering the Austrian decision to convey Serbia a tough ultimatum.⁴²

Ultimately, according to Williamson, Austria wanted, and got, its war with Serbia. "The Austrian desire for military action is the essential difference from the earlier crises, whether in 1908-1909 or during the Balkan Wars stemmed primarily from fear, the restoration of prestige, possible territorial gain from the collapse of Serbia, the need to assert its Great Power status, a conviction that earlier failures to act had only made the international situation worse... [And] with the hope that German support would deter Russia, the Habsburgs gambled everything".⁴³

On July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, even though the Austro-Hungarian military was ill equipped and was not ready for war. On July 30, Russia officially began mobilizing for war to support Serbia. The night of July 29-30, Copeland writes, "Is probably the most pivotal of the crisis".⁴⁴ It is the night German leaders confirmed British opposition and scrambled to find a last-minute solution. Germany's civilian leadership, keen to keep the war localized or at least blame Moscow for opening a continental war, asked the Russians to stand down.⁴⁵ On July 31 Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia to demobilize within twelve hours, which the Russians ignored.⁴⁶ On August 1, France began mobilizing in support of Russia, their ally in the Triple Entente, and Germany declared war on Russia.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 479–80.

⁴¹ Ibid., 464.

⁴² Ibid., 426–27.

⁴³ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2d ed (New York: The Macmillan company, 1930), 223.

⁴⁴ Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," 185.

⁴⁵ Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 82–85.

⁴⁶ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 87.

British attempts to conduct an international conference to mitigate the crisis failed. On August 3, Germany declared war on France and began mobilizing to enforce the Schlieffen Plan of invading Luxemburg and Belgium to defeat France in a quick and decisive enveloping action, before the behemoth of the Russian military could be fully mobilized. Part of the Schlieffen Plan required the right wing of the German military to enter France through Luxembourg and Belgium. The German invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality was guaranteed by the major European powers, including Germany, brought the formerly equivocal British into the war against the Germans. On August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany. By August 4, all the major European powers were at war. Clark concludes, the “pre-war European system had somehow locked itself into a position from which a war was the only way out”.⁴⁷

Analyzing the Deterrence Triangle

The Austro-Hungarian Protégé

In Austria, the parliament had been prorogued in March 1914. Concerns about Transylvania and the preservation of Magyar power dominated the agenda in Hungary, along with fears of what would happen when Franz Ferdinand, a moderate, came to the Habsburg throne.⁴⁸ In the Dual Monarchy, polycratic system, two men emerged as especially influential: Austrian General Staff, Field Marshal Lieutenant Franz Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf and Count Leopold von Berchtold, the joint Foreign Minister.⁴⁹ The ruling monarch, Emperor Franz Joseph was 84 years old and deeply swayed by Berchtold.⁵⁰

While the emperor was shaken by the assassination of his nephew and heir apparent, and interrupted his holiday to return to Vienna, he soon resumed his holiday at his imperial villa five hours away from Vienna. Hence, most of the decision-making during

⁴⁷ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 325.

⁴⁸ Williamson Jr., “July 1914 Revisited and Revised,” 39.

⁴⁹ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 101.

⁵⁰ Williamson Jr., “July 1914 Revisited and Revised,” 42.

the July Crisis fell to Count Berchtold, Count Conrad, István Tisza (the Hungarian Premier) and the other ministers in the Ministerial Committee.⁵¹

On July 21, Franz Joseph was reportedly surprised by the severity of the ultimatum that was to be sent to the Serbians, and expressed his concerns that Russia would be unwilling to stand idly by; yet he nevertheless chose to not question Berchtold's judgment.⁵² In his advancing age (84), Franz Joseph was unable to take an active part in the war in comparison to past conflicts, according to Palmer.⁵³ As on June 30, the decision making camp in Vienna was split between Conrad calling for immediate action against Serbia, and Tisza advocating for diplomatic encirclement of Serbia, with Berchtold acting as mediator.⁵⁴ Eventually, intelligence reports from Serbia and Bosnia about conspiracies against the Habsburgs helped, "solidify the emerging consensus for action against Belgrade... the intelligence provided details for treating the murders as an international issue, as a foreign policy problem and not just a domestic concern".⁵⁵

Austrian Interests

The Austrian interests in the July Crisis revolved around Serbia. It was a widely accepted notion in Vienna that "Serbia coupled with Russia posed a decisive and growing danger".⁵⁶ Furthermore, "Serbia and Montenegro as allies was troublesome; a Serbia-Montenegro united under the Karadjordjevids and with Russia as its protector was unacceptable".⁵⁷ Williamson notes, "Serbo-Russian relations were the most threatening foreign combination for any Austro-Hungarian statesman".⁵⁸ To avoid such a situation, it was imperative that Austria-Hungary bring Serbia back into their sphere of influence as it was circa 1885. To do so, Austria-Hungary needed to contain the rise of nationalistic activities in Serbia, convey a resolved message for all other

⁵¹Alan Palmer, *Twilight of the Habsburgs: The Life and Times of Emperor Francis Joseph*, 1st American ed (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1995), 328.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 330.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 332–33.

⁵⁴Samuel . Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, Making of the 20th Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 192.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Balkan states from walking a similar path to Serbia and prevent further Russian penetration into the region.

Russian influence in the Balkans had steadily gained space in the early 20th century, making the Russians the primary target of suspicion for Austria-Hungary. Williamson notes, "thanks to French funds and British permissiveness, St. Petersburg had engaged in an aggressive policy in the Balkans, had clashes with Germany over Constantinople and had begun secret naval talks with London... the Russian threat played a far greater role, one could argue, in shaping the two allies' reaction to Sarajevo than the Anglo-German naval race or even the Austro-Serbian antagonism".⁵⁹ Berchtold watched the Russian growing power and boldness in the Balkans with great anxiety. He assessed that "in view of Russia's armaments program, the general situation could only get worse with time".⁶⁰

A memorandum drawn up by Matschenko of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, and Berchtold, explicitly warned from the Russian offensive intentions, emboldened by the alliance with Paris: "the policy of Russia, like that of France, is pursuing aims that are in the last resort aggressive and directed against the *status quo*; and the Franco-Russian alliance, as a product of these parallel tendencies, is decidedly of an offensive nature".⁶¹ The goal of this alliance, according to the Matschenko memorandum was to end the division of the Balkan states and to unite them all, or a decisive majority of them, in a new Balkan League directed against the West".⁶² Subsequently the Austrians should be concerned with keeping control in the Balkan region and worry by the growing threat of Serbia as a regional power and a threat to Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the region: "There is no doubt that Serbia, under Russian influence, would agree to pay a fair price in Macedonia for Bulgaria's entry into an alliance directed against Austro-Hungary and aiming at the acquisition of Bosnia".⁶³ The

⁵⁹ Ibid., 196–97.

⁶⁰ F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914*, Foreign Policies of the Great Powers (London, Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972), 369.

⁶¹ *Memorandum by Sektionstrat Franz Baron von Matscheko*, Secret, undated (before 24 June 1914) as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 444.

⁶² Ibid., 445.

⁶³ Ibid., 446.

Matschenko document was originally written in June 1914 and later changed to persuade Germany to support the Austrian response against Serbia.⁶⁴

The revised version of the document illustrated the dramatic impact the monarchy attributed to the Serbian crisis. The revised memorandum determined that "For the Monarchy, the necessity imposes itself all the more imperatively to tear apart with a firm hand the threads which its opponents are seeking to form into a net above its head".⁶⁵ Berchtold, too, argued in July that "a failure to take vigorous action on this occasion would be universally regarded as such as clear 'renunciation of our Great Power position'... no Balkan government would dream of casting its lot with such a feeble Power".⁶⁶ Bridge adds, "Suddenly and dramatically, it seemed to Vienna, that brand of south Slav nationalism which flourished in Serbia and spread its tentacles into the Monarchy appeared as an immediate and mortal threat to the position of the Habsburg as lords of Bosnia, and by implication, to the very existence of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power".⁶⁷

Austrian Capabilities

The Austrian capabilities in July 1914 were not striking, to say the least. As can be seen in Table 4, in 1914 Austria-Hungary, "though ranking only after Russia and Germany in population . . . spent less than any Great Power—a quarter of Russian or German expenditure, a third of British or French, and even less than Italian". There was an effort to catch up; between 1906 and 1914 armament outlay had risen by 64% (123%, if the allocations made during 1912 and 1913 are taken into account), but even so this represented only 21% of the total national budget.⁶⁸ In 1913 with the wave of manpower increases across European armies, the Habsburgs also increased their forces, an act that had not been done since 1889.⁶⁹ The monarchy's standing army increased to 475,000 and the wartime might of one and a half million troops, but the organizational reforms in the army were only in onset, and even this improvement could not balance the growth of the French and Russian military buildup. As seen in

⁶⁴ Ibid., 368–69.

⁶⁵ *Memorandum by Sektionstrat Franz Baron von Matscheko*, Secret, undated (before 24 June 1914) as cited in Ibid., 446.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 369.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 368.

⁶⁸ Rothenberg, *Army of Francis Joseph*, 172.

⁶⁹ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 36.

Figures 7 and 8, the Austro-Hungarian military still remained the weakest force among the European nations by 1914, in terms of personnel and annual expenditure on defense. Bridge notes, "The military situation in 1914 was hardly tempting, from an Austro-Hungarian point of View".⁷⁰

Even in terms of economic development and industrialization, for which, a proxy measure is iron and steel production, Austria-Hungary was at the bottom relative to their European counterparts (Figure 7). As stated in the former chapter, Iron and steel production is a reflection of a nation's industrial strength and along with energy consumption is an indicator of industrial production, and hence capability on a national scale. Overall, the economic situation was gloomy as a result of expensive military campaigns in the Balkans during the Balkan Wars, vulnerable industries due to the falling off of trade in 1913, and lack of foreign investments, particularly in the Balkans.⁷¹ Bridge concludes, "Internationally, the Monarchy still remained a weak state, financially dependent on others – above all on the Germans, who controlled more than half of the foreign investment in Austria-Hungary and bought some 40 per cent of her produce".⁷² Nevertheless, Bridge argues, "there was still room for improvement – such as might occur if the Monarchy could re-establish its position in the Balkans".⁷³

*Figure 7 Iron and Steel Production (Thousands of Tons)*⁷⁴


⁷⁰ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 373.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 372.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.



In the diplomatic arena, Austria-Hungary's successes were few: the creation of Albania that prevented Serbia from access to the sea, the possibility of Greece joining the Triple Alliance and Bulgaria that was no longer aligned to Russia and considering joining with Berlin and Vienna. However, there were also significant foreign policy failures, namely, the defection of Romania from the Triple Alliance, the possibility of a Serbian-Montenegrin union that would give Serbia access to the sea, and evidence of "Franco-Russian aggressiveness and fear that a new Balkan League might emerge against the dual monarchy".⁷⁵

To counter this threat, in March 1914, Tisza and Berchtold made a move towards Bulgaria to frustrate a new Balkan League – even considering a "Greek-Romanian-Bulgarian alignment that would encircle and isolate Serbia".⁷⁶ In fact, the Matscheko memorandum captures the political predicament the monarchy faced in July 1914. It concluded, "of course the balance sheet shows a few positive features... Set against these favorable factors, however, are unfavorable ones, which weigh heavier in the balance".⁷⁷ For the Habsburgs, Williamson concludes, among the negatives in foreign policy, "the Romanian question had the most urgency, the Serbian the most emotion, the Russian the most danger and the alliance-entente competition the most

⁷⁵ Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 166.


⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁷⁷ *Memorandum by Sektionstrat Franz Baron von Matscheko*, Secret, undated (before 24 June 1914) as cited in Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 443.

complication".⁷⁸ As a result, according to Clark, by 1914, the majority of European powers had become indifferent to the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They viewed it as "the lapdog of Germany with no autonomous geopolitical identity... and had accepted the view that the monarchy had run out of time and must soon make way for younger and better successor states".⁷⁹

Nonetheless, the monarchy had a close ally, namely, Germany. Berlin and Vienna shared a personal relationship between the leadership – the German Kaiser and the Austrian emperor had met each other and visited each other on several occasions in the spring of 1914.⁸⁰ Since 1879, the Dual Alliance, and the mutual assurances it holds, were renewed and preserved by the monarchy and its German Ally. If under Bismarck the treaty was the essence of the relations between the countries and the military coordination between their armies, in 1914 the treaty was the basis for a much deeper relationship.

Figure 8 Military Personnel (Thousands)⁸¹



Not only the military staffs met routinely, including in the period leading to the war,⁸² the alliance was the basis of the Austrian war plan which comprised of two main plans:

⁷⁸ Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 170.

⁷⁹ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 356.


⁸⁰ Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 178.

⁸¹ "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

⁸² Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 180.

Plan B (for Balkans) detailed the requirement for six Austro-Hungarian armies in the field, three to invade Serbia, with a further three guarding the Russian border to dissuade an attack from that quarter; Plan R (for Russia) essentially revised Plan B, allowing for a greater volume of troops to guard against Russian assistance for the Serbians in the south, while assuming German protection in the north.⁸³ In contrast to Bismarck's policy, the German commitment was not vague, and virtually was translated to a well-coordinated war plan between Berlin and Vienna.

Figure 9 Military Expenditure (Thousands of Nominal Pounds)⁸⁴



The Habsburgs did not possess adequate power to withstand the threat from Russia. Militarily, politically, and economically Vienna was reliant on Berlin. However, the Austrians did not stop perceiving themselves as a great power, nor they wish to let others. Knowing that Germany was apprehensive of the monarchy's future, Williamson explains, what concerned Austria-Hungary vis-à-vis Germany, was not how Berlin viewed Vienna, but "rather how Vienna conceived of itself as a great power".⁸⁵ To that end, policy makers in Vienna believed that they needed to demonstrate their strength to the Serbians and Russians. "A great power had to act like a great power, to show that it had the capacity to determine its own future".⁸⁶ The fact that Austria-

⁸³ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 425.

⁸⁴ "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

⁸⁵ Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 179.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Hungary no longer had the capabilities of an independent great power did not undermine the Austrian perception.

The German Protector

In the lead up to the July Crisis, “constitutionally” the key actor and decision maker in Germany was Kaiser Wilhelm II, with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg as the face of the civilian government and Chief of German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger as the primary architect of German military strategy.⁸⁷ However, in June of 1914, the various European governments faced some form of internal political crises, including Germany. In Germany, the conservative Bethmann-Hollweg lost the majority to the Social Democratic party in the Reichstag, and the “ripples from the Zabern incident and its civil-military ramifications” continued.⁸⁸

The Zabern incident was a crisis of domestic policy which occurred in Germany in October 1913. It was caused by political unrest in Zabern in Alsace-Lorraine after a second-lieutenant insulted the Alsatian population. The military reacted to the protests with arbitrary illegal acts. These infringements led to a debate in the German Reichstag about the militaristic structures of German society, as well as the position of the leadership of the Empire in relationship to the Kaiser.⁸⁹

The German Kaiser in July 1914 was not the same as in 1885 as Wilhelm succeeded Frederick III in 1888. After he ascended the German throne, he dismissed Chancellor Bismarck, and launched Germany on a bellicose “New Course” in foreign affairs that culminated in his support of Austria-Hungary in July 1914. Langer emphasizes the negative international consequences of Wilhelm's erratic personality:

“He believed in force, and the 'survival of the fittest' in domestic as well as foreign politics... William was not lacking in intelligence, but he did lack stability, disguising his deep insecurities by swagger and tough talk. He frequently fell into depressions and hysterics... William's personal

⁸⁷ Helmuth von Moltke the Younger was the nephew of celebrated German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.

⁸⁸ Williamson Jr., “July 1914 Revisited and Revised,” 38.

⁸⁹ Richard William Mackey, *The Zabern Affair, 1913-1914* (University Press of America, 1991), 29.

instability was reflected in vacillations of policy. His actions, at home as well as abroad, lacked guidance, and therefore often bewildered or infuriated public opinion. He was not so much concerned with gaining specific objectives, as had been the case with Bismarck, as with asserting his will. This trait in the ruler of the leading Continental power was one of the main causes of the uneasiness prevailing in Europe at the turn-of-the-century".⁹⁰

German Interests

The German interests are subjected to historical debate, whose context is the war of guilt, revolving around the question of which nation caused the war?⁹¹ This debate was generated in the War Guilt Clause in the Treaty of Versailles which determines the following: "*The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and her allies*".⁹² This article reflected the intellectual consent during the war and after it ended: Germany used Russian mobilization as an excuse for aggression.

In the 1920s, however, a group of revisionist scholars undermined this notion by diminishing the German guilt and relying on official German documents. Their main argument was that Germany wished to contain the crisis and to keep the Austro-Serbian war local.⁹³ They pointed out the contribution of the Russian decision to mobilize its army to the regional escalation, which eventually expended the war in the continent. Sidney Fay, for instance, inquires about the contribution of nationalism, the international system, economic imperialism, and the role of the

⁹⁰ Paul Lachlan MacKendrick and William L. Langer, eds., *Western Civilization*, A Harper-American Heritage Textbook (New York: American Heritage Pub. Co, 1968), 528.

⁹¹ Annika Mombauer's book is the most recent impressive work capturing this discussion. See Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus* (London ; New York: Longman, 2002).

⁹² <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa7.html>

⁹³ For example see, Max Montgelas Graf, *The Case for the Central Powers, an Impeachment of the Versailles Verdict* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1925); Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 1928.

press in creating the "slide into war" dynamics in the prelude to the war.⁹⁴ Other efforts were made to assess the roles of the Entente powers in the events that led to the war.⁹⁵ Williamson, in his recent work, states that "Germany gave Vienna a 'blank check,' Paris gave Russia a 'blank check,' and France and Russia gave Belgrade a 'blank check.'"⁹⁶

After World War II an anti-revisionist school revived the notion of the German guilt. The German Weltpolitik, its national pride, the offensive nature of its military plan and its imperialist aspirations produced a significant "will for war", as Fritz Fischer puts it.⁹⁷ This German Paradigm, as Samuel Williamson calls it, shifts the historical and moral focus once again to Germany.⁹⁸ Fischer, in his seminal works "Germany's Aims in the First World War" and "War of Illusions", expounds that Germany pushed for war due to its fear of the Russian rising power and the shift in balance of powers in favor of the Franco-Russian alliance, while aiming to reduce domestic pressure. He concludes, "the fundamental changes in economic conditions, the wide-spread prosperity, the rapid growth of the population, the swift expansion in all branches of economic life, combined to create a general conviction, which was reinforced by nation-wide propaganda, that Germany's frontiers had become too narrow for her, but that the ring of powers round her would never consent to their extension".⁹⁹

Therefore, the "German paradigm" states that when the Serbo-Austrian crisis started, Berlin preferred a continental war over restoring the status quo. Its imperial

⁹⁴ Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 1928.

⁹⁵ For an early work see, Erich Brandenburg and Annie Elizabeth Adams, *From Bismarck to the World War* (London: Oxford university press, H. Milford, 1927); Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War; an Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926).. For a more recent work see, Ronald P. Bobroff, "War Accepted but Unsought," in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 227–51; Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised."

⁹⁶ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 50.

⁹⁷ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*; Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914* (New York: Norton, 1975); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence, Perspectives in Security* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Jack L. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984): 58–107, doi:10.2307/2538636.

⁹⁸ Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 30–31.

⁹⁹Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 11.

aims, offensive military strategy and domestic tensions yielded a belligerent German leadership in July 1914. In his recent article, Copeland goes a few steps further, claiming that "Germany actively sought war in July 1914, and that by the end of July German leaders preferred world war to a negotiated peace, even to one that gave Austria most of what it wanted".¹⁰⁰

This historical debate has not been resolved. However, it has been enriched by new International Studies approaches such as the Marxist one, the spiral model of inadvertent war, and power transition theory, that take a more objective approach, and seek to draw lessons for international relations theories.¹⁰¹ The proposed analysis in this chapter adapts this approach. Specifically, it follows Clark's observation in which "There is no smoking gun in this story; or, rather, there is one in the hands of every major character. Viewed in this light, the outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime".¹⁰² Moreover, "the First World War offers so much data that conclusions can be drawn from it to suit any *a priori* hypothesis which contemporary strategists wish to advance," as Paul Kennedy opines.¹⁰³ Since the objective of this analysis is not to draw new historical insights but to test the proposed theoretical framework, it addresses all the schools concerning the German aims equally. For the purpose of this study, the rich intellectual discussion about the German interests can be divided into two groups: a German failure of localization of the war, and a German preventive war strategy.

The first school describes a German failure of localization.¹⁰⁴ Germany sought to deter a Russian intervention allowing Austria-Hungary to act in Serbia. Historians from this

¹⁰⁰ Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," 180.

¹⁰¹ For instance see, Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2007): 155–91; Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez, "Introduction," in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3–29; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*.

¹⁰² Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 261.

¹⁰³ Levy and Vasquez, "Introduction," 3.

¹⁰⁴ See Fay, *The Origins of the World War, 1928*; Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, vol. 3 (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1952); Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*; Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised"; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68; Tuchman, *The Guns of August*; Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994; Vasquez, "Was the First World War a Preventive War?"

school stress that the German civilian leadership sought to preserve the *status quo* and Germany's power in the current European political system. For instance, in December 1912 and July 1913, Germany and Britain joined in sponsoring the Ambassadors' Conference in London to help "broker compromise solutions to the thorniest problems arising from the First Balkan War, and they urged restraint on their respective bloc partners Austria-Hungary and Russia".¹⁰⁵ Further evidence of German reluctance to go to war can be seen when a crisis broke out in the Balkans in April-May 1913 over the Serbo-Montenegrin occupation of the Albanian city of Scutari. Based on correspondence between Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow and the German Ambassador in London, Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, Clark concludes that the Kaiser was "opposed to any moves that would incur the risk of war".¹⁰⁶ According to this school, the German leaders in their support for Austria-Hungary, and their over-confidence in the feasibility of keeping the war local, contributed to escalating the crisis. Clark notes, "Nothing in how they [the German leadership] reacted to the events of summer 1914 suggests that they viewed the crisis as the welcome opportunity to set in train a long-laid plan to unleash a preventive war on Germany's neighbors.

On the contrary, Zimmermann, Jagow, and Bethmann were remarkably slow to grasp the scale of the disaster unfolding around them".¹⁰⁷ Vasquez also writes, "The Kaiser, unlike Moltke, did not see the assassination as an opportunity to fight a preventive war. Further evidence of the Kaiser's unwillingness to support a preventive war comes from Moltke, who throughout the July Crisis regarded him as an opponent and an obstacle to going to war".¹⁰⁸ Vasquez highlights the dispute between the emperor and the military faction headed by General Moltke, which assertively promoted the notion of preemptive war in the end of July.

The second school upholds the notion of a German preventive war. Accordingly, the German leadership, particularly the military leadership, advanced war with Russia,

¹⁰⁵ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 321.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 330.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 520.

¹⁰⁸ Vasquez, "Was the First World War a Preventive War?" 211.

assessing that time was on the Entente Alliance's side.¹⁰⁹ The bulk of the German high command believed that "the striking power of Russia would be sufficient to nullify the calculations embodied in the Schlieffen Plan".¹¹⁰ Moltke was constantly concerned that the rapid advancement of the Russian and French military capability was eroding the "capacity to prevail in a future conflict".¹¹¹

According to Fischer, The German leadership regarded "war with France and Russia as extremely likely, if not imminent, and sometimes even inevitable".¹¹² Since war was inevitable, Germany had to stop this trend from resuming before it was too late. This was the primary reason why many in the German military echelons advocated for a preventive war. Copeland argues that this notion penetrated into the German civilian leadership. According to Fischer, war was also designed to solve domestic challenges for the German leadership. War can be used "to consolidate the position of the ruling classes with a successful imperialist foreign policy." A.J.P. Taylor indeed claims that Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor of Germany, could have stopped the war, but instead he let the German and Austrian military leadership ensure their mobilization efforts are not being halted.¹¹³

The German leadership understood that it needed a major war sooner rather than later because without such a war, the Russian colossus would overwhelm the system once it had completed its industrialization program. "We are ready, and the sooner it comes, the better for us," argued Moltke on June, 1 1914.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, a localized crisis won by Austria would not do the job--only a total war that would eliminate the French threat in the west to give the Germans time to reduce Russian power in the east would permanently solve Germany's security problem. To that end, Copeland

¹⁰⁹ See Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*; Fischer, *War of Illusions*; Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War"; Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*; Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised"; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, Oxford History of Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954); Levy and Vasquez, "Introduction."

¹¹⁰ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 332.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 327.

¹¹² Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 29.

¹¹³ Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*.

¹¹⁴ Eckardstein, *Lebenserinnerungen*, Vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1921), 184 as cited in Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 50.

notes, "given a choice between world war and a negotiated peace, the German leadership preferred the former and did nothing to achieve the later".¹¹⁵

However, according to the German paradigm, Berlin should start a war when conditions are favorable: when it joins a military superiority, while using a Russian action that can be labeled as aggressive, thus, justifying the German response.¹¹⁶ "The Chancellor held unwaveringly to his line", claims Fischer, "'localisation' of the conflict, should this prove impossible, then Russia must be branded as the aggressor, thus assuring Britain's neutrality".¹¹⁷ In July 1914 the German leadership believed both conditions were met. Not only the general staff was convinced of the German strategic advantage over its Russian enemy, the Russian decision to mobilize its army on July 29 was perceived as a cogent argument to justify the use of the German military machine to both the German people and the European powers.

These two narratives imply different sets of German interests; however, there is a common ground. Both schools assume German support in an Austrian war against Serbia, and German aspiration to avoid war with England, and if possible with France. Austria-Hungary asserted that Serbia and Russia were supporting pan-Slavist movements that would weaken their empire and eventually encircle Germany. Thus, they had to crush this movement before it was too late. Kissinger emphasizes this point in the German calculus, "Germany believed that Austria's success might break their ever-tighter encirclement by disillusioning Russia with the Triple Entente, they ignored France, which they deemed irreconcilable, and evaded mediation by Great Britain lest it spoil their triumph".¹¹⁸

After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph wrote to the Kaiser, "Russia's policy of encirclement directed against the Monarchy... has for its final aim to make it impossible for the German Empire to resist the aims of Russia or its political and economic supremacy. For these reasons those in charge of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary are convinced that it is in the common interest of the Monarchy, as

¹¹⁵ Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," 181.

¹¹⁶ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 57–61.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹¹⁸ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 210.

in that of Germany, to oppose energetically and in time in this phase of the Balkan crisis, the development foreseen and encouraged by Russia by a pre-concerted plan".¹¹⁹ The assumption was that French and Britain could be left passive while Austria-Hungary was taking care of the Serbian problem, while Germany dealt with Russia.

Nonetheless, it should be stressed that as in 1885, the biggest threat for Berlin originated in Paris. France was obliged to join Russia in the event of war, and Germany committed to assist Austria if it fought against Russia. Hence, for Berlin, putting pressure on the Russo-French alliance could end in one abandoning the other, thus, weakening the alliance, or a two-front War. According to Tuchman, in this war General Schlieffen contended that "the whole of Germany must throw itself upon one enemy, the strongest, most powerful, most dangerous enemy, and that can only be France".¹²⁰ The German general referred to the situation in the first years of the twentieth century. In 1914, France posed an even bigger threat. The French government, now backed with a strong army and a Russian ally, as well as an alliance with Britain, threatened to change the balance of power in Europe and leading a coalition to isolate Germany.

The Schlieffen plan virtually determined an automatic chain of events out of the control of the civilian leadership. Hence, once the plan was operated, Germany was on unstoppable path to war. Kissinger stresses the main flaw in the Schlieffen plan: what would happen if France did not declare a war? Then, Germany would have to take the risk of being attacked by France after Russian mobilization was completed, or attack non-belligerent Belgium and risk a British response, in order to get to non-belligerent France. He concludes, "Germany would regard France as neutral only if it agreed to cede one of its major fortresses to Germany – in other words, only if France put itself at Germany's mercy and abdicate its position as a great power".¹²¹

The common notion in Berlin was that war with France was inevitable as the French were determined to restore their prestige and the territorial losses in the defeat in

¹¹⁹ "Letter of Franz Joseph to the Kaiser." World War I Document Archive. Brigham Young University, 07 Jan. 2013. Web. 06 Sept. 2016.

¹²⁰ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 23.

¹²¹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 206.

the Franco-Prussian war of 1871.¹²² Victor Hugo's famous statement demonstrated this French motivation: "France will have but one thought: to reconstitute her forces, gather her energy, nourish her sacred anger, raise her young generation to form an army of the whole people, to work without cease, to study the methods and skills of our enemies, to become again a great France, the France of 1792, the France of an idea with a sword. Then one day she will be irresistible. Then she will take back Alsace-Lorraine".¹²³ Fischer too stresses the German assumption about the inevitability of the coming war: "The German leadership regarded "war with France and Russia as extremely likely, if not imminent, and sometimes even inevitable".¹²⁴ When Germany looked at Europe on the eve of World War I, it saw a powerful French army and a successful French diplomacy. It indicated that Hugo's threat of war might soon realize. The German calculus was the following: If France did not join Russia, the anti-German coalition would be weakened; if France joined the war, Germany could destroy its main enemy, securing the German military superiority.

German Capabilities

Germany had the most powerful and efficient military in Europe, as Table 4 shows. Nevertheless, the combined forces of Russia and France would be a serious threat to German military superiority. The rapid advancement of the Russian military particularly posed a serious concern. Clark notes, "From the standpoint of the most influential German military commanders, it seemed blindingly obvious that the geopolitical situation was shifting rapidly to Germany's disadvantage".¹²⁵ To rectify this military deficit, Moltke introduced the German Army Bill of 1913 sought to increase peacetime military strength. He noted that in the case of a two front war against France and Russia, with little help from Austria, and no help from Italy, Germany would be able to field 192 fewer infantry battalions in the west than Britain, France, and Belgium combined.¹²⁶ The bill passed in July 1913, and the army grew by 136,000 officers and soldiers, but it failed to "meet German security needs, because they triggered hikes in armaments expenditure in France and Russia that quickly offset

¹²² Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 37.

¹²³ Cited *Ibid.*, 36.

¹²⁴ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 29.

¹²⁵ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 326.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 330.

German growth".¹²⁷ Germany could overcome any individual foe. However, the European political system was divided into two rival alliances, and against the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany together with Austria-Hungary did not enjoy superiority. It should be stressed that the military leadership was even more confident, estimating France and Russia are still too weak to cope with the German industrial capacity and military power.¹²⁸ According to Tuchman, the Kaiser's reaction to his ambassador in London, who mistakenly reported for England's and France's expected passiveness, reflects the German confidence in a one front war with Russia: "Now we can go to war against Russia only. We simply march the whole of our Army to the East".¹²⁹ Wilhelm was much less confident when he realized his Ambassador was wrong: not only London could promise neutrality but Paris was about to join Moscow.

In the European politics of 1914 Germany had to rely on its Austrian ally's assistance. In the post Bismarck Germany, the alliance with Austria-Hungary was the main diplomatic asset. Although both sides worked together to deepen relations between them, the Germans were always suspicious regarding the Austrian resolve to do their part in case of a German-French war. Fromkin notes that in the Moroccan Crisis of 1911, "Germany had learned that the Hapsburgs would not support interests that were merely German. However, they would expect Germany to support them in defense of their own interests. It was, in that sense, a one-way alliance".¹³⁰ Nonetheless, the alliance with Austria-Hungary was central to Germany's strategy – the Austro-Hungarian military was necessary to help defend against Russia in the eastern front in the initial stages while Germany executed the Schlieffen Plan in the western front against France.¹³¹

The Russian Adversary

Russian Interests

Russian interests were similar in 1914 to what they were in 1885 – promote Slavic nationalism under the umbrella of Russia and hence maintain influence in the Balkans, and hence, the Straits, which was critical to the Russian economy. The Straits had

¹²⁷ Ibid., 331.

¹²⁸ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 54.

¹²⁹ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 93.

¹³⁰ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 271.

¹³¹ Zuber, T. "The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered". *War in History* Vol 6(3), July 1999. Pp. 262

remained at the center of Russian strategic thinking. To that end, Sazonov essentially “sponsored the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance against Turkey”.¹³² However, with the disruption of the Dardanelles Straits in 1912, Russia lost millions of Rubles in trade, making Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov state to the Czar, “Imagine what would happen if, instead of Turkey, the Straits were to go to a state which would be able to resist Russian demands”.¹³³ Between 1903 and 1912, 37% of Russia’s exports passed through the Dardanelles, with wheat and rye exports as high as 75 – 80%.¹³⁴ The control of the Straits that gave Russia passage into the Mediterranean was vital to the life blood of the nation’s economy.

A secondary interest for Russia was the opportunity to muscle in on Ottoman controlled territories after the inevitable collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Clark notes that “the viability of the Ottoman Empire itself, whose collapse and partition were becoming an axiomatic element in Russian strategic thinking on the near and medium-term future”.¹³⁵ The expectation of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire loosened control of territories that both Austria-Hungary and Russia felt “historically entitled to exercise hegemony in those areas from which the Ottomans withdrew”.¹³⁶ Russia felt a natural attachment to the pan-Slavic movement in the Balkan Peninsula, and the withdrawal of the Ottomans also raised questions about the control of the Straits, which were of critical importance to Russian policy makers. Clark writes that, “Austria and Russia maneuvered like chess players hoping with each move to cancel out or diminish the opponent’s advantage”.¹³⁷ Russian and Austrian rivalry in the Balkans continued through the turn of the century but by 1903, various agreements and understandings brought about a joint commitment to the Balkan *status quo*.

Russia had denied from the start, the right for Austria-Hungary to take action against Belgrade after the assassination, and Sazanov, true to his word, after it became known that Austria-Hungary was preparing an ultimatum, told Sir George Buchanan that

¹³² Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 324.

¹³³ Sazonov to Nicholas II, 23 November 1912, as cited in *Ibid.*, 341. Clark cites Bovykin's work which was published in Russia. V.I. Bovykin, *Iz istorii vozniknoveniya pervoi mirovoi voiny (Otnosheniya Rossii i Frantsii 1912-14)* (Moscow, 1960), 126.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 340.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 339.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

“anything resembling an Austrian ultimatum in Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent, and she might be forced to take some precautionary military measures”.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the French, particularly, President Poincare had pressed hard for Russian firmness on the Serbian question.¹³⁹ However, Sazanov was still willing to negotiate with Vienna. Though he found the points of the ultimatum “unacceptable, absurd, and insulting”, he told Austrian Ambassador Szapary, “Take back your ultimatum, modify its form and I guarantee you we will have a result”.¹⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the Russian pre-mobilization rendered these hopes baseless.¹⁴¹ The pre-mobilization, however, has to be completed without initiating hostilities since the Russians wanted to render some hope for negotiation, and more importantly wanted to influence public opinion by showing Austria-Hungary as the aggressor and not giving Germany a pretext for invoking the *casus foederis*.¹⁴² This is why the decision was made to undertake preparatory measures. A full mobilization was made in response to Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.

Russian Capabilities

Russia was a much more dangerous adversary in 1913 than it was in the end of the 19th century. In those interim years Russia grew both in terms of economic and military power. Clark notes that, “With each advancing year, Germany’s prospective enemies, and Russia in particular with its swiftly expanding economy and virtually infinite manpower, would grow in military prowess until they enjoyed an unchallengeable superiority that would permit them to select the moment for a conflict to be fought and decided on their own terms”.¹⁴³ With French funding, Russia engaged in massive armament investments in the wake of the Agadir and Balkan Crises. In November 1912, the Russians stepped up their measures against Austria-Hungary, but there was no mobilization from either side.¹⁴⁴ The Russians also retained the senior conscript class, which sharply raised troop strengths along the German

¹³⁸ Buchanan to Grey, St Petersburg, 18 July 1914, *BD*, vol. 11, doc. 60, 47 as cited in *Ibid.*, 481.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 483.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 482.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 483.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 484.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 327.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 328.

frontier.¹⁴⁵ The peacetime strength of the Russian army in 1914 was double that of the German, at around 3000,000 more than the combined strengths of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies. By 1916-17, that number was expected to exceed two million.¹⁴⁶ In 1914 these military measures were complemented by the French financed Russian strategic railway program to improve mobilization capability.¹⁴⁷

According to Tuchman, the Russian army suffered from significant flaws as a British military observer reported from Manchuria: "poor intelligence, disregard of cover, disregard of secrecy and swiftness, lack of dash, lack of initiative, and lack of good generalship".¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 7, between 1912 and 1914 Russian productive strength was actually decreasing, and was lower than Germany's. However, for deterrence purpose the size of the Russian army compensated for its flaws. According to Tuchman, the Russian army was envisaged "as a gigantic mass, initially lethargic, but once thoroughly roused into motion, rolling forward inexorably with, no matter how many losses, endless waves of manpower to fill the places of the fallen".¹⁴⁹ In 1914 Russia was in a position to adequately fight Austria-Hungary, but its target was not Vienna but Berlin. To that end, the Russian army had to collaborate with the French army.

Indeed, Russia was in a strategic alliance with France. With Bismarck's dismissal, the Russians expected a reversal of policy in Berlin. When the Reinsurance Treaty was not renewed in 1890, Moscow alert increased as the threat of isolation became feasible. The Russian solution was the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894. Its political purpose was indeed to prevent an isolation of each one of its members. Its military purposes, however, aimed toward one threat – Germany.¹⁵⁰ To cope with the German superiority, Paris and Moscow had to impose a two front-war which obliged Berlin to split its power. For that purpose, the French and the Russians invested heavily in building railroads and training the Russian forces so that would be able to mobilize

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 331.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 69.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 68.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 72–73.

800,000 troops to the German border within two weeks.¹⁵¹ The French and the Russian military leadership coordinated their military plan before and during the July crisis. As aforementioned, the French money invested in Russia covered for the Russian lagging economy. Together the two allies posed a serious challenge to the Triple Alliance. According to Kissinger, in 1912, "the new French President, Raymond Poincare, informed the Russian Ambassador with respect to the Balkans that 'if Russia goes to war, France will also, as we know that in this question Germany is behind Austria".¹⁵²

Russia also found Britain as a partner and reached a formal understanding with it about the rivalry in Central Asia. Russia detested England's alliance with Japan, and resented it as the primary power that historically prevented Russia from controlling Constantinople and the Straits. Russian Tsar Nicholas II, once said, "An Englishman is a *zhid*" combining his disdain for Jews and the English into one sentiment, according to Tuchman.¹⁵³ However, old hatreds dissolved in the face of the larger issue of peace in Europe. Both parties realize they should appease each other in order to promote stability while peacefully protecting their interests in Asia.¹⁵⁴ According to Tuchman, "under the urging of the French, who were anxious to have their two allies come to terms", an Anglo-Russian convention was signed in 1907.¹⁵⁵ In 1912, England, France and Russia started military staff talks, though limited and with no legal binding.¹⁵⁶ The understanding between France, Russia and Britain, supported by supplemented by agreements with Japan and Portugal, formed the Triple Entente Alliance. By 1914 this alliance challenged the power of the Triple Alliance. Clark notes, "the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire".¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 69–70.

¹⁵² Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 199.

¹⁵³ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 9.

¹⁵⁴ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 158–59.

¹⁵⁵ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 9.

¹⁵⁶ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 1994, 197.

¹⁵⁷ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 159.

Deterrence Hedging

Extended Deterrence

Like in the Bulgarian Crisis, the German extended deterrence was the main pillar in Austrian strategy against Russia. Vienna acknowledged its relative military inferiority in the event of war with Moscow, and relied on German support. For that reason, when discussing the necessity of acting against Serbia, immediately after getting the news from Sarajevo, the Austrian Emperor instructed his chancellor to gain the support of Germany first.¹⁵⁸ In a meeting with the Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold on July 2, the German Ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, suggested that if an Austrian would request a German backing, "this time Berlin would respond favorably".¹⁵⁹ Following this statement, the first move Austria undertook after the funeral of the Austro-Hungarian heir was to send the Hoyos Mission to Berlin headed by the Chief of Cabinet and a personal friend of the chancellor to inquire further the German position. The news from Berlin could have not been better to the Austrian ears.

Count Hoyos, met the German Kaiser on July 5. The report written by the Austrian Ambassador to Berlin, László Szógyény, described a deep commitment expressed by the emperor though he would have to consult the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg: "...His Majesty empowered me to convey to our Supreme Sovereign [Franz Joseph] that we can count, in this case too, upon the full support of Germany".¹⁶⁰

A day later, the German Chancellor restated the German unconditional commitment to support Austria in Serbia, as was reported by Szógyény: "whatever our decision turned out to be, we could be confident that Germany as our ally and a friend of the Monarchy would stand behind us".¹⁶¹ Williamson notes, "Unlike the tenuous German support in the previous three Balkan crises, Vienna now had an unequivocal statement of support from Germany".¹⁶² It is important to note that the German emperor felt

¹⁵⁸ Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 374; Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, vol. 2 (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 133.

¹⁵⁹ Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 195.

¹⁶⁰ Szogyenyi to Berchtold, Berlin, 5 July 1914, in Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (eds.), *Österreichs-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, vol. 8, doc. 10058, 306-307 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 413.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 414.

¹⁶² Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 196.

genuine sympathy for his Austrian allies and believed an Austrian harsh response would be justified. On July 5, after reading Tschirschky's dispatch of June 30 requesting Austria-Hungary to calm its reaction to the assassination, the Kaiser was upset: "this is utterly stupid! It is none of his business, since it is entirely Austria's affair [to determine] what she intends to do... will Tschirschky be so kind as to stop this nonsense! It was high time a clean sweep was made of the Serbs".¹⁶³ Fromkin proposes an explanation to the Kaiser's behavior: "Kaiser Wilhelm ordinarily would have refused to support Austrian aggression. He had refused such support. But he – practically alone – genuinely was outraged by the killing of his friend, or at least he seemed to be".¹⁶⁴

From an Austrian view, the German consent to give Vienna a "blank check" did not merely enable Austrian military campaign while assessing the Russian threat had been significantly reduced, it also incentivized the militant leadership in Austria-Hungary to pressure for an assertive military campaign. Williamson expounds, "rather than believing that Austro-Hungary could lose German support, the Habsburgs feared the consequences of not taking advantage of Berlin's backing".¹⁶⁵ The main argument, as Berchtold expressed it in the July 7 meeting of the Common Ministerial Council, was that the monarchy should exploit the German support to solve the Serbian problem which held an existential threat, as Vienna saw it.¹⁶⁶

Clark analyzes the Austrian militant response as an outgrowth of the dramatic atmosphere in which this decision was made: "at the core of the Austrian response – to an extent that does not apply to any of the other actors in 1914 – was temperamental, intuitive leap, a 'naked act of decision', founded in a shared understanding of what the Austro-Hungarian Empire was and must be if it were to remain a great power".¹⁶⁷ The Austrian leadership believed the German guarantees could prevent the expansion of the war with Serbia and were resolved to use this

¹⁶³Wilhelm II, marginal comments on Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, Vienna, 30 July 1914, in Imanuel Geiss(ed.), *Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914. Eine Documentensammlung* (Hanover, 1963/4), vol. 1, doc 2, 59 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 412.

¹⁶⁴ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 263.

¹⁶⁵Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 179.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 189; Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:168. Williamson, 189, Albertini, 2, 168

¹⁶⁷Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 430.

opportunity to solve a strategic threat that could undermine the stability of the entire empire.

Therefore, for the monarchy the role of the German protection was to deter Russia from joining the war next to the Serbs. This is a clear extended deterrence element in Austrian policy. Williamson explains, "Berchtold hoped that early and decisive support would deter Russian intervention".¹⁶⁸ Subsequently, at the Common Ministerial Council meeting on July 19 the discussion revolved around Plan B designed for a war in the Balkans, rather than Plan R in the event of a possible Russian attack on Galicia.¹⁶⁹ On July 27, after receiving clear signals for Russian mobilization, Franz Conrad asked Berchtold to urge Berlin to dissuade Russia from entering the war. As Williamson notes, "he continued to hope that Germany would deter Russian involvement".¹⁷⁰ Plan R was executed only on August 4, after both Germany and Russia declared full mobilization.

It is worth noting that the possibility of Russian intervention was discussed in the July 7 ministerial council meeting, and Conrad himself presented a very pessimistic analysis of Russian intentions. However, Williamson contends, "paralleling this realism ran another, almost fantasy approach. Conrad hoped that Berlin's unequivocal support would forestall Russian intervention".¹⁷¹ Even though a scenario of a European war was not utterly excluded from the Austrian calculus, the German assurances served as a basis for an extended deterrence policy which dominated the Austrian behavior in the first month of the crisis leading to World War I.

Until very late in July, in Berlin too, the prevalent estimation was that Russia would not act.¹⁷² When Wilhelm met the Austrian Ambassador on July 5, he explicitly mentioned the possibility of an Austrian-Russian war and pledged to stand by his ally. Nevertheless, he added his analysis of probability of the Russian response: "Russia,

¹⁶⁸Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 196.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 202; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 452. Williamson 202 C 452

¹⁷⁰Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 206.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*

incidentally, as things stood today, was not by any means prepared for war and would certainly think long and hard over whether to issue the call to arms..."¹⁷³

This perception was reinforced in the German leadership meeting in the afternoon of the same day: "the opinion prevailed among us that the sooner the Austrians make their move against Serbia the better, and that the Russians – though friends of Serbia – will not join in after all".¹⁷⁴ This estimation of Russian inaction can account for the Kaiser's negative answer when War Minister Falkenhayn asked him in the meeting if preparations should be made in an event of a European war.¹⁷⁵ On July 6, according to Clark, the German Kaiser repeated his estimation that "the Tsar would not in this case place himself on the side of the regicides. Besides, Russia and France were not prepared for war".¹⁷⁶

In early July, Bethmann's strategy, supported by the Kaiser and the military leadership was that an Austrian prompt action would lead to a capitulation of Belgrade before the German Emperor returned from his vacation on July 25. Only after his return, when it was clear that an Austrian attempt to present a *fait accompli* before Russia prepared its forces was improbable, the German leadership started serious discussions about a new strategy.¹⁷⁷ However, even in the last days of July, after the decision to mobilize the army had been made, the Kaiser estimated that England and France would remain out of the conflict, thus, deterring Russia from attacking Austria-Hungary; and Bethmann and Conrad did not seriously challenge this notion.¹⁷⁸

On July 21, Bethmann stated in a circular to the German ambassadors in Rome, London, and St. Petersburg that "we urgently desire a localization of the conflict; an intervention by any another power will, in view of the divergent alliance

¹⁷³ Szogyenyi to Berchtold, Berlin, 5 July 1914, in Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (eds.), *Österreichs-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, vol. 8, doc. 10058, 306-307 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 413.

¹⁷⁴ Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:142.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 2:159.

¹⁷⁶ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 416.

¹⁷⁷ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 211–13.

¹⁷⁸ The German hope partially derived from a misunderstanding between Grey and the German Ambassador at London. Please see Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:514; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 530–31; Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 3:34–35.; even before this accident the German leadership was not certain that Russia will fight despite of its mobilization. See Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:670–71.

commitments, lead to incalculable consequences".¹⁷⁹ On July 13, Moltke wrote to the German military attaché in Vienna that "Austria would be well advised to beat the Serbs and then make peace quickly, demanding an Austro-Serbian alliance as the sole condition, as Prussia did with Austria in 1866". Clark notes that at this point Moltke still believed it was possible that Austria would launch and complete its strike on Serbia without triggering a Russian intervention.¹⁸⁰ The German confidence was supported by the Humbert intelligence report on French military readiness that assessed "the French government, and in particular the French military command, would be in no mood to press the Franco-Russian Alliance into war over Serbia; the Russians too, would surely be discouraged". Clark contends "the internal memoranda and correspondence of these days suggest that both the political leadership and the military and naval commands were confident that the strategy of localization would work".¹⁸¹

On July 29 the German Kaiser sent a cable to his cousin, Czar Nicolas, asking him to stop the military mobilization and to concede to his mediation proposition to solve the Russian-Austrian crisis diplomatically: "of course, military measures on part of Russia which could be looked upon by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid, and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help".¹⁸² The "Willy-Nicky" cables constituted the last German effort to halt the Russian mobilization. Acceding to the German paradigm they did not reflect the true intention of the German leaderships which sought an opportunity to wage a war with Russia, while blaming Moscow for the aggression and leaving Britain out of the conflict.¹⁸³ Regardless of the historical interpretation, after the "Willy-Nicky" channel had failed it was clear in Berlin that war was about to start.

¹⁷⁹ Bethnam Holweg to ambassadors in St Petersburg, Paris and London, Berlin, 21 July 1914 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 515–16.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 517.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Baron M. F. Schilling, *How the War Began in 1914 : Being the Diary of the Russian Foreign Office from the 3rd to the 20th (Old Style) of July, 1914*, trans. William Cyprian Bridge (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1925), 55.

¹⁸³ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 85–86.

Would have Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia without German support? This question remains hypothetical. However, the likelihood of a sole Austrian campaign in Serbia is not high. Williamson opines, "The answer is probably not".¹⁸⁴ Vienna could have initiated border incidents, or act without informing Berlin. However, Williamson expounds, it would have been a very difficult and improbable mission to convince Tisza of the necessity of the military action without German assurances. Fromkin takes a harsher stand. He claims that it was only because of the security it [Germany] provided that Franz Joseph, Berchtold, and Conrad set out on the path that led to war against Serbia".¹⁸⁵

Berlin made the decision to stand by its ally in the campaign against Serbia. Unlike the German policy in the 1880s which protected Austria-Hungary only in case of a direct attack on its territory, in the summer of 1914 the German protection encompassed Austrian interests in the Balkans, namely in Serbia. On July 30 the German Ambassador to Russia warned the Czar, that the Russian mobilization in response to the Austrian actions would trigger a German mobilization.¹⁸⁶ On July 26 the German Military Attaché to St. Petersburg stated in a meeting with the Russian Minister of War that mobilization against Vienna would create a threatening situation. On the same day the German Ambassador warned the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russian mobilization would generate war.¹⁸⁷ On July 31, Germany sent an ultimatum for Russia to demobilize its forces within 24 hours. On August 1, following no response from St. Petersburg, the German emperor signed a declaration of war with Russia.

Direct Deterrence

Although the German protection was imperative for the Austro-Hungarian response against Serbia, Vienna's policy was never about a pure form of extended deterrence, meaning resting merely on German deterrence against Russia. German power was used for the augmentation of Austrian power, not a substitute for it. According to the

¹⁸⁴Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 197.

¹⁸⁵ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 264.

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 231.

¹⁸⁷James Brown Scott, *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War* (New York: Oxford university press, American branch, 1916), 84.

joint German-Austrian war plan, or Plan R for the Austrians, forty Austrian and twelve German divisions were planned to block the Russian first attacks expectedly to be comprised of thirty-five divisions after twenty days, sixty divisions after thirty days, and one hundred divisions after six weeks.¹⁸⁸

Austria, with the German assistance would be the first defense line until more German forces could be sent from the western front, hopefully, after a successful German campaign in France and before the bulk of the Russian army reached Galicia. One of the main underlying premises of the German Schlieffen plan was that it would take Russia six weeks to launch a big offensive, which was provided Germany sufficient time to mobilize forces and defeat France. Fischer notes, by concentrating the German military effort in the west, Germany's plan was "entirely dependent on the Austro-Hungarian army...".¹⁸⁹ Williamson concludes, "Austria would have to deter Russia long enough to allow the Germans to win in the west; the Germans would have to win quickly in the west to keep Austria-Hungary from being overrun by the Russians".¹⁹⁰ Williamson's note highlights the direct deterrence element in the Austrian war plan. German public threats are vital to deter Russia but given the alliance Russia formed with France against Germany, Austrian forces were in the heart of the deterring force, and the deterrence failure which ended in a World War. Therefore, on the deterrence hedging scale (Figure 10), the Austrian deterrence policy was positioned in the side of extended complementary deterrence, however, it was not an example of pure form of extend deterrence.

Whereas in the Bulgarian Crisis Austria-Hungary sought to use its own capabilities as well as approaching England, as complementary elements to the German protection; in July 1914 the German assurances completed the Austrian war plan against Russia. The Austrian deterrence hedging was not about putting different puzzle pieces together to complete an effective deterrence policy, but to use the German umbrella to promote Vienna's interests under this protection. After ensuring Germany's assistance, the monarchy was focused on maximizing the Austrian interests in the


¹⁸⁸Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 23; Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 180–82.

¹⁸⁹ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 37.

¹⁹⁰Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 181.

alliance rather than maximizing deterrence against the Russia adversary. The Austrian goal was expressed in three main accidents during the July crisis, as discussed in the next section. These events illustrate the main underlying the Austrian policy: to deter Russia while enhancing Vienna's independent policy.

Figure 10 The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging – Austria-Hungary (1914)



Deterrence-Independence Dilemma

The German "blank check" was indeed an important milestone in the July crisis leading to World War I. However, stopping the analysis of Austrian policy after it received the German support would overlook three interesting events that can shed more light on the Austrian chief motivations that shaped its deterrence policy in July 1914. These events demonstrate that the German "check" might have not been utterly blank, that Austria failed to understand it, and more importantly, that after securing deterrence against Russia, Austria-Hungary wished to maximize its independence within the alliance. By doing so, Vienna acted to solve the deterrence-independence dilemma.

The first dispute between Vienna and Berlin occurred after the German Kaiser expressed his support in an Austrian action in Serbia in response to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. For Berlin, the commitment was given under the impression that Austria-Hungary could and should conduct a swift and successful campaign that would surprise Russia and make it almost impossible to respond before Belgrade fall. However, when reporting on the Kaiser's willingness to back the dual monarchy, the Austrian ambassador depicted the Austrian proposed response as a friendly

recommendation: "According to his [Kaiser Wilhelm's] view, however, this action should not be delayed".¹⁹¹ By any means, the German pledge was not reliant on whether Austria-Hungary followed this recommendation. After meeting the German Chancellor and getting his confirmation of the Kaiser's unconditional support, Szógyény reported that "it was the view of the German government that we must judge what ought to be done to sort out this relationship [with Serbia]... I gathered that both the chancellor and his imperial master view an immediate intervention by us against Serbia as the best and most radical solution of our problem in the Balkans".¹⁹² Here again, the ambassador's message supported the Austrian feeling that Germany offered unconditional support with friendly advice, which left the decision to the Austrians.

Another convincing message about the German intention to support the dual monarchy while providing latitude in determining the response, originated directly from the German Kaiser. In his response to Franz Joseph's request for assistance, Wilhelm wrote that "although he must 'refrain from taking a view on the question of current relations between Vienna and Belgrade', he saw it as 'a moral duty of all civilized states' to counter anti-monarchist 'propaganda of the deed' with 'all the available instrument of power'".¹⁹³ Therefore, in the ministerial council meetings during July the alternative of a quick response did not enjoy any superiority over the other alternatives and was removed very rapidly due to internal considerations for a slower response. After securing Berlin's support, Vienna acted following its own domestic and international constraints. In face of a German inquiry of the Austrian delay in late July the Austrian chancellor informed his German counterpart that Austrian forces would not be prepared before August 12.¹⁹⁴ The monarchy showed no sign of following its ally's advice to act promptly, despite the discontent of Berlin.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Szogyenyi to Berchtold, Berlin, 5 July 1914, in Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (eds.), *Österreichs-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, vol. 8, doc. 10058, 306-307 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 413.

¹⁹² Szogyenyi to Berchtold, Berlin, 6 July 1914, in Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (eds.), *Österreichs-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, vol. 8, doc. 10076, 320 as cited in *Ibid.*, 414.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 520.

¹⁹⁴ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 201.

¹⁹⁵ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 69; Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 202; Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 376.

There is agreement among historians about the reasons for the Austrian cumbersome behavior. One reason derived from the political system of the dual monarchy. A decision to go to war in the Balkans required internal unity, particularly among the Austrian and the Hungarian leaderships. For this reason, Franz Joseph requested that any war decision must be accepted by the Hungarian Premier.¹⁹⁶ Tisza, was not utterly against military action, but claimed it should follow a diplomatic response. He demanded that a "firm but not unfulfillable" ultimatum should be conveyed to the Serbs. Another condition was that Transylvania which was part of the Hungarian territory should be protected from a potential Romanian attempt to exploit the opportunity and attack.¹⁹⁷ For two weeks, Tisza alone withstood the political pressure to accept war as a solution to the Serbian crisis.¹⁹⁸ On July 14 the Hungarian Premier discarded his opposition to solve the crisis militarily.

The second reason for the Austrian delay originated in the army. To respond to the monarchy's need of working force during the harvest season, Conrad initiated a policy of harvest-leaves: troops were sent home to help harvest the crops, and return for their units for the annual summer maneuvers.¹⁹⁹ In early July the units of Zagreb, Graz, Bratislava, Cracow, Timisoara, Innsbruck, and Budapest were on leave until July 25. The Austrian decision was to wait until their return, rather than hindering the harvest and endanger the deception campaign designed to surprise Europe with a military campaign in Serbia. The visit of French President Raymond Poincaré and Prime Minister René Viviani to Russia led to another short delay. The main consideration was to prevent them from coordinating a quick response to the Austrian move. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was eventually set for July 23. Although the monarchy's forces bombarded Belgrade on July 29, one day after the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, the first ground battles started two weeks later.²⁰⁰

For Austria-Hungary the most important thing was that Germany expressed unconditional support. Once German protection was secured, the monarchy acted to

¹⁹⁶Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 42.

¹⁹⁷Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 424.

¹⁹⁸Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 197–200.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 199–200; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 425–26.

²⁰⁰Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 85–86; Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 205.

enhance its independence in a way that does not jeopardize the German umbrella. Williamson explains the Austrian approach to the alliance with Germany: "the Hapsburg statesmen envisioned themselves as a great power. The Hapsburg monarchy was not a satellite or a client state. On some issues the Dual Monarchy pursued a dependent policy, on others an independent policy, and occasionally the two governments even clashed".²⁰¹ As throughout the crisis Germany never confined its protection to an Austrian quick action, Austria did it its way.

The second event strengthened this point. On July 27 the news about the Serbian response to the Austrian Ultimatum reached Berlin. The Kaiser's first reaction was that this was "an excellent result for a forty-eight hours [deadline]. This is more than we could have expected! But this does away with any need for war".²⁰²

He was astonished to be informed about the Austrian partial mobilizations: "I would never have ordered a mobilization on that basis".²⁰³ He immediately instructed Foreign Minister Jagow to communicate to Vienna that "every cause for war [had] vanished".²⁰⁴ Instead of the planned attack on Serbia, the German Kaiser offered a temporary occupation of the evacuated city of Belgrade while guaranteeing a Serbian compliance with the ultimatum's conditions. He was willing to manage the negotiations between Austria and Serbia to maintain peace: "this I will do in my own way and as sparingly of Austria's national feeling and of the honor of her arms as possible".²⁰⁵ Clark explains, that the order of the Kaiser "was not acted upon... His instructions to Jagow had no influence on Berlin's representations to Vienna". Bethmann did dispatch a cable to Vienna which, according to Clark, "incorporated some of Wilhelm's proposal, but omitted the crucial insistence that there could now be no reason for war".²⁰⁶ Bethmann decided to abate the message to Berlin, according to Clark, "to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold the Austrian back".²⁰⁷ Bethmann's weakened message did not instigate Austria-Hungary

²⁰¹Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 179.

²⁰² Holger Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich* (Munich, 1994), 153 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 522.

²⁰³Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Wilhelm to Jagow, Neues Palais, 28 July 1914, in *Geiss*, July 1914, doc. 112, 256 as cited in Ibid.

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 523.

²⁰⁷Ibid.

to refrain from declaring war on Serbia in the day after, after which the German Kaiser himself approved a State of Imminent Danger of War – one stage before military mobilization.

Noteworthy, in the last days of July Bethmann sent contradictory messages to Vienna. To his ambassador at Vienna, Bethmann conveyed the following message: "we are, of course, prepared to do our duty as allies, but must decline to let ourselves be dragged by Vienna, irresponsibly and without regard to our advice, into a world conflagration... in order to prevent general catastrophe, or at any rate put Russia in the wrong, we must urgently advise that Vienna should initiate and pursue conversations".²⁰⁸ Luigi Albertini argues, "This meant that either Vienna must be reasonable and agree to yield or Germany would leave her to her fate".²⁰⁹ A day later the German Chancellor asked the monarchy to show willingness to compromise to reduce international pressure and to blame Russian aggression for the imminent conflict while promoting the military campaign against Serbia. Eventually Bethmann did send a dispatch to Vienna, genuinely expressing the Kaiser's request to avoid mobilization. However, this cable arrived hours after the Austrian decision to go to war had already been made.²¹⁰ Fischer explains that the Emperor, "unlike the Chancellor, was unaware that Austria's declaration of war on Serbia was imminent, he passed this proposal on to Jagow without much urgency".²¹¹

Berchtold was resolved to proceed to war, and not to yield to Berlin's proposals. Williamson suggests that the diplomatic initiatives promoted by England and the political pressure on Vienna to neglect its war plan while agreeing to international mediation incentivized Vienna to declare war on Serbia before Austrian forces were prepared.²¹² Albertini adds, that the German conciliatory messages, "finally made Berchtold decide to make the situation worse by ordering the general mobilization of the Monarchy".²¹³

²⁰⁸Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 3:18.

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:667–68.

²¹¹ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 71–72.

²¹²Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 220.

²¹³Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 2:664.

According to Fischer and Fromkin, the Austrian concern from the international pressure was supported by Moltke and Jagow.²¹⁴ The latter sent another cable to Vienna – a day before the Kaiser read the Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum – urging Vienna to declare war as "the English proposal for a conference to keep the peace could not be resisted much longer".²¹⁵ Supported by parts of the German leadership, the monarchy could not afford to miss the opportunity of political consensus, a German unequivocal support and a good excuse to solve the Serbian problem. Berchtold, as Clark infers, "resisted any alternative course, including the idea of a 'Halt in Belgrade' that Berlin seemed to favor".²¹⁶ Eventually, Clark concludes, "Berchtold and Hoyos pressed for a declaration of war against Serbia. Conrad reluctantly accepted the idea on July 27. Franz Joseph assented a day later".²¹⁷

One can argue that in contrast to Bismarck, the German policy toward Austria-Hungary in 1914 was weak and permissive. A more assertive and unified policy could have dissuaded Vienna from moving forward against Belgrade. This is a fairly valid argument, whose causes will be discussed later in this chapter. This argument may explain the Austrian decision to ignore peaceful voices from Berlin, but it does not illuminate the Austrian main motivations. Using the deterrence-independence dilemma implies that a German threat to withdraw from the pledge to Austria should Vienna disobey the Kaiser's wish could have suggested a price for Austrian independence. Then the Austrian leadership would have faced a serious dilemma of how to balance between these two goals.

Nevertheless, Germany did not do that, and Austria-Hungary counting on the strong German commitment acted to maximize its independence. Since Vienna enjoyed a political latitude, its main concern was how to maximize its independence. In the Deterrence-Independence Dilemma, Vienna felt confident it could have both sides of the scales without being required to concede.

A third evidence of Austrian attempts to maximize its independence within the alliance with Germany emerged on July 31 when Germany started mobilization, and

²¹⁴ Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 69; Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 219.

²¹⁵Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 219.

²¹⁶Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 206.

²¹⁷Ibid., 205.

war was imminent. The German emperor conveyed a message to the Austrian monarch calling him practically to issue Plan R and to send the Austrian forces to Galicia: "in this hard struggle it is of the greatest importance that Austria directs her chief force against Russia and does not split it up by a simultaneous offensive against Serbia".²¹⁸ The Russian moves and German reaction surprised the Austrian leadership. The Austrian war plan depended on the capability to assess the Russian threat after five days of mobilization. Only then the Austrian army should determine to follow either plan R in case of a war with Russia, or Plan B in case of a local war with Serbia. Conrad, either still hoping that St. Petersburg can be deterred, or pushed to advance the war in the south before war begins the north, decided after four days – on July 30 – to deploy the Austrian forces according to Plan B. When he received the German request, his forces were on their way to the Serbian border. Unwilling to split the forces Conrad initially adhered to Plan B. Williamson expounds, "Conrad wanted war and it would come sooner in the south than in the north".²¹⁹ Fromkin also opines that choosing Plan R was de facto conceding the war with Serbia for the war with Russia. However, Conrad had always wanted a war with the first – never with the second.²²⁰

Only the Russian mobilizations initiated on July 31 gradually convinced Conrad to make a shift to plan R.²²¹ This did not happen before the monarchy had declared full mobilization on August 4. Conrad's erroneous decision to stick to Plan B and hesitation in commanding the military to move to Plan R led to an ineffective and disorganized deployment in the Russian and Serbian arenas.²²² At the end of the day, it was not the German request but the Russian mobilization that persuaded Conrad to abandon his war against Serbia. Once again, Austria-Hungary acted to enhance its independence in the alliance, even despite German demands to change course of action. When deterrence failed, independence was a compromise the Austrians were willing to make to defend themselves.

²¹⁸ Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (eds.), *Österreichs-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise bis zum Kriegausbruch 1914*, Vol. VIII, no. 11125, 944-5 as cited in Fritz Fellner, "Austria-Hungary," in *Decisions For War, 1914*, ed. Keith Wilson, 1 edition (London: Routledge, 1995), 22.

²¹⁹Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 207.

²²⁰Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 272–73.

²²¹*Ibid.*, 250.

²²²Williamson Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 206.

Altogether, these three accidents demonstrate how the deterrence-independence dilemma can account for the Austrian behavior at 1914. However, the deterrence-independence dilemma does not provide merely a historical contribution to the Austrian view in the pre-World War I crisis; it also holds a theoretical one, as the next section demonstrates.

Alternative Explanations

The Neorealist School

The prevalent notion in the neorealist school is that Germany was dragged into the war by its Austrian ally. In his book, *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz analyzes the German-Austrian alliance in 1914 to illustrate his argument about the leverage small powers have in a multipolar system: "if Austria-Hungary marched, Germany had to follow; the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the Middle of Europe".²²³ Waltz presents the pre-World War I escalation dynamics to support his structure-based theory which highlights the power of international structure and national relative capabilities as main determinants in shaping alliance's dynamics and policy. Waltz's analysis of "chain gang" dynamics has served as a basis for the realist discussion aimed to comprehend the dynamics within Austrian-German alliance in the July Crisis.²²⁴ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder expounds, "In multipolarity, the approximate equality of alliance partners leads to a high degree of security interdependence within an alliance. Given the anarchic setting and this relative equality, each state feels its own security is integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As a result, any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it".²²⁵ These neorealist studies highlight the balance between contradictory and joint interests among the alliance members and the

²²³Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979), 167.

²²⁴ For a discussion in chain gang please see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990; Zagare and Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence." For a discussion in the abandonment see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95, doi:10.2307/2010183; Benson, *Constructing International Security*.

²²⁵ Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990, 140.

bargaining interaction as a result of the first. In a chain gang the major power concedes its interests to protect the joint interests embodied in the alliance.

This chapter presents the Austrian view. The derived analysis undermines Waltz's argument, even when taking the historical debate about the German intentions during the crisis into account. From the Austrian point of view, both schools leave a big gap in Waltz's theory. If Germany either advanced war as a preemptive campaign or it failed to limit it to the Serbian arena, the chain gang description is not sufficient to explain the Austro-German dynamics. According to the Austrian view, Austria-Hungary waged war with Serbia encouraged by Berlin to promote their joint interests. Regardless of whether the Russian response caught the two allies by surprise or not, the Austro-German alliance reflected a very coherent policy of the alliance accepted by both parties aimed to serve both countries. The bargaining dynamics between allies with contradictory interests, which plays a chief role in the neorealist theory, barely influenced the decision-making process in Vienna for the simple reason that Germany did not bargain for its support. As this analysis illustrates, for the monarchy the German commitment was provided with no substantive conditions.

Moreover, to what extent can one account contribution for the German behavior to the treaty with Austria given the reactions of other European countries to the crisis, which cannot be explained by the European alliance structure? As Fromkin opines, "it has been widely believed for a long time that the political structure of the European world in 1914 – in particular an allegedly overly rigid alliance system – caused the conflict to enlarge and bring in the Great Powers. In retrospect, that seems not to have been true. Italy was bound to Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, but nonetheless remained neutral in 1914 and thereafter joined the Allies. Great Britain, on the other hand, had no treaty alliance with France and Russia but united with them nonetheless".²²⁶ By no means does this analysis imply that structure or alliance commitments had no impact on the German decision to support its ally. The proposed argument is that the German behavior necessitated a further inquiry to discover additional explanations that can account for the variance in European countries' behavior. This is the context in which the deterrence-independence dilemma should

²²⁶Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 266.

be framed: it provides an additional aspect in explaining the July Crisis from the protégé's view.

It should be also stressed that historical records indicate that Waltz's theory can partially explicate the German failure to influence its ally's behavior during the crisis. Fearing the Dual Monarchy would join the anti-German alliance, Germany did not want to convey the impression it was willing to constrain Vienna and prevent it from protecting its interests. According to Clark, this guided Bethmann when he softened the Kaiser's demand to Austria-Hungary after reading the Serbian response to the ultimatum. The diaries of Kurt Riezler, Bethmann's closest adviser and confidant, too express the dilemma Germany faced in early July: "it's our old dilemma with every Austrian action in the Balkans. If we encourage them, they will say we pushed them into it. If we counsel against it, they will say we left them in the lurch. Then they will approach the western powers, whose arms are open, and we lose our last reasonable ally".²²⁷

However, the Waltzian argument is one out of several appropriate explanations that can account for the German policy. The preventive war advocates suggest a different explanation: Berlin might generate war to hit Russia before the balance of power between the two countries was to undergo a tremendous shift in favor of the Russians.²²⁸ Germany might seek to seize the opportunity to remove a big threat to its allies whose future was not clear, as the failure of localization scholars argue.²²⁹ Mysterious as the German motivations were, they led to a very generous policy toward Austria-Hungary, as it was perceived in Vienna. Consequently, the zone of mutual interests increased, and the zone of dispute, which involves bargaining interactions, was narrowed to marginal issues. If one is to accept this "Austrian" analysis, then the foregone inference is that Germany had not been dragged to war, but entered a war, intentionally or inadvertently, with its ally to protect their joint

²²⁷ Karl Dietrich Erdmann (ed.), Kurt Riezler. *Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente* (Göttingen, 1971), diary entry 7 July 1914, 182-3 as cited in Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 422.

²²⁸ See Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War"; Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*; Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised."

²²⁹ See Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*; Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised"; Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990; Tuchman, *The Guns of August*.

interests. This explanation reveals the weakness and strength of the neorealist explanations. As this case shows, using the "deterrence-independence dilemma" along the neorealist arguments can enrich our analytical toolbox when trying to comprehend extended deterrence dynamics.

Alliance Restraint Theory

The Austrian view of promoting joint interests rather than bargaining conflicting interests limits the theoretical contribution of Pressman's theory to explain the Austrian behavior. Pressman, as stated in the previous chapter, ascribed the alliance with Austria-Hungary to the German aspiration of preventing Vienna from attacking Moscow.²³⁰ According to Pressman, we would have expected to witness German attempts to restrain the Austrian response to the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir, and particularly to spur Russian aggression; and Austrian attempts to assuage the German pressure. This theory fails to explain the actual buttress Germany offered the Dual Monarchy. Despite one serious German attempt to halt the Austrian offense or to confine it to the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal, the overall dynamics between the two allies did not involve restraining measures. Some historians even suggest that Germany pushed Vienna to move forward and initiate a war. Fromkin, for instance, contends that "the Austrian alliance did not pull Germany into war; it was the German alliance that pushed Austria into the war: the war against Russia and its worldwide allies".²³¹ Copeland comments, "the war that broke out in that fateful summer of 1914 had one, and only one, primary cause: the profound fear among German leaders that their nation was in irreversible decline relative to a rising Russian colossus".²³² Whether one accepts this argument or not, the proposed analysis indicates that Pressman's framework is not an effective tool to capture the dynamics of the German-Austrian alliance, as it was perceived by Vienna.

Nonetheless, Pressman's argument can illuminate the main reasons for the failure of the single German attempt to restrain Vienna, after the Kaiser instructed his

²³⁰Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 24.

²³¹Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 267.

²³²Copeland, "International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War," 167.

government to send a clear message to Austria-Hungary to accept the "Halt-in Belgrade" plan and to avoid a big war. Using Pressman's theory, one element above all others explains the German failure – the lack of united leadership in Berlin.

The German Emperor, who traditionally served as the core of the German decision-making process in national security and foreign affairs issues, gradually lost his position in the second half of July. When he returned from his cruise on July 26 the Kaiser realized that his plan of a quick Austrian response to the assassination was not implemented, and he faced a unified military leadership who wished to support Austria-Hungary despite of the growing risk of a European war. As the clock was ticking and Russian mobilization initiated while the hope for English neutrality waned, the military leadership, led by General Moltke started to play a more assertive and chief role in shaping German policy. While the German Emperor and the Chancellor signaled Vienna their support for a diplomatic solution or at least an Austrian impression about trying to prevent a war with Serbia, Moltke was urging Conrad to embark on mobilization. Berchtold, after receiving the conflicting messages from Berlin, replied with a question: "who rules in Berlin – Moltke or Bethmann?"²³³ The duplicity in German policy toward its ally culminated in Zimmerman's dispatch to Tschirschy instructing him the following: "please do not for the time being carry out [German] Instruction No. 200" which urged Vienna to accept the English negotiation proposal.²³⁴

The German Emperor did not utterly lose his influence, as he was still the one to sign the declarations of war and order mobilizations. Moltke's frustration when being held by the Kaiser in the last hours before invading Luxemburg demonstrated that Wilhelm was still the strongest voice in German politics.²³⁵ However, the message that reached Vienna was mainly positive, and when the Emperor changed his mind, the friction between the German leadership, did not pose serious reasons for Austria-Hungary to doubt its assessment of the German commitment. Fromkin notes, "During the last week in July, Wilhelm's instructions had been disregarded by his own chancellor and

²³³ Annika Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War*, New Studies in European History (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 205.

²³⁴ Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 3:22.

²³⁵ For the debate between Wilhelm I and Moltke on August 3, please see Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 95–96..

foreign minister, his military leaders, and the Austrian emperor and his government. Wilhelm's orders still counted for something, but not for everything".²³⁶ Clark also explains the governance deficit of the German Kaiser: "he was out of touch with developments in Vienna, where the leadership was now impatient to press ahead with the strike on Serbia. And, more importantly, having been away at sea for the better part of three weeks, he was out of touch with developments in Berlin".²³⁷

In the last days of July, the German civilian leadership too changed its tone and promoted military preparations. Albertini contends that Bethmann's incoherent messages to Austria in the last days of July reflected a change of balance of powers within the German leadership, now inclining toward the military leaders.²³⁸ The Austrians, motivated by the assurances they received from Berlin, felt no need to compromise on their war plan, which intended to solve the Serbian problem, and nothing less than that. The Russian mobilization, too, while threatening Germany strengthened the Austrian notion that Berlin had no choice but to keep its pledge. Therefore, the Kaiser's attempt to restrain Austria-Hungary was doomed to fail.

As in the analysis of the Bulgarian Crisis, Pressman proposes a great analytical tool to analyze how the German attempts to restrain Austria-Hungary were not fruitful. However, this theory does not seek to explore what virtually was the Austrian policy that the German civilian leadership sought to restrain; and what did Austria-Hungary do after facing a weak pressure from Berlin. Pressman's analysis misses the much more complicated picture and Austrian policy that promoted the interests of the Dual Monarchy in the framework of the perceived joint efforts of the alliance. As the proposed analysis suggests, however, by using the deterrence-independence dilemma framework one can better comprehend the limits of restraint theory, and when and how it should apply.

²³⁶ Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer*, 239.

²³⁷ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 523.

²³⁸ Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 1952, 3:22–23.

Conclusion

Williamson writes, "Nearly a century after Sarajevo historians know a great deal about what happened, when it happened, and who made it happen. We still, however, know far less of why things happened, and what prompted some of the decisions".²³⁹ This chapter is designed to take advantage of the rich historical literature about the July 1914 Crisis to delineate the Austrian perspective and its main output: deterrence policy vis-a-vis Russia. Contrary to its behavior in the Bulgarian Crisis, the monarchy relied mainly, although not absolutely, on German protection. However, this chapter demonstrates that after receiving the unequivocal support from Berlin, Vienna acted to maximize its independence. As in 1885, the monarchy acted while preserving the German support, and avoided any action that could jeopardize it. This chapter illustrates how using the proposed concepts of deterrence-independence dilemma and deterrence hedging, widens the analytical lens available to comprehend the Austrian behavior, its causes, and explains the variance in Austrian policy in the two Austrian cases in this study, as discussed in the conclusion part. The next chapter test the contribution of these lens to explicate the behavior of an Israeli protégé.

²³⁹Williamson Jr., "July 1914 Revisited and Revised," 58.

Chapter 7: The Yom Kippur War (1973)

In November 2013 Henry Kissinger, the American secretary of State and National Security Adviser in 1973, addressed an Israeli audience in a documentary: "We saved you during the 1973 War".¹ Kissinger's statement may well illustrate the American perception of the role the US played in October 1973, however, the prevalent Israeli does not concur. The Israeli deterrence hedging consisted of a very strong direct deterrence element along with American protection. For this reason, the analysis of Israeli policy during the 1973 War does not begin with the extended deterrence element like the two Austrian cases, but with direct deterrence. This demonstrates the main disparity between the Israeli and the Austrian deterrence policy: the first relied heavily on direct deterrence, the second depended mainly on extended deterrence.

Before delving into this analysis, this chapter briefly presents the main events before and during the war, and discusses the interests and balance of power within the deterrence triangle, which includes an American protector, an Israeli protégé, and Egyptian and Syrian adversaries. Following the analysis of Israel's deterrence hedging during the 1973 War, this chapter proposes an analysis of Israeli chief motivations in shaping the deterrence policy relying on the deterrence-independence dilemma. The main conclusion is that a strong Israeli assessment of its deterrence, enabled flexibility and room for American influence. However, when direct deterrence was weak, Israeli leadership sought to restore its prestige and was significantly less attentive to American requests. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the contribution of deterrence-independence dilemma to the two dominant theoretical frameworks in alliance management theory.

The Yom Kippur War: An Overview

The 1973 Yom Kippur War can be divided to three phases: the prelude to the war, the Arab surprise attack on two fronts, and the Israeli counter attack in the end of the first

¹ Amir Oren, "Kissinger Wants Israel to Know: The U.S. Saved You During the 1973 War," Haaretz, (November 2, 2013), <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.555704>.

week of the war which gradually initiated a confrontation between the two superpowers: the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The Prelude to the War

On October 24, 1972, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat gathered Egypt's Armed Forces Supreme Council and declared his strategy to break the "no war no peace" status quo with Israel after the end of the War of Attrition in 1970: "The time for words is over, and we have reached a saturation point. We have to manage our affairs with whatever we have at hand; we have to follow this plan to change the situation and set fire to the region. Then words will have real meaning and value".² The prevalent belief is that Sadat planned to wage war in order to break Israeli confidence, and instigate the Israeli leadership to negotiate with him, while achieving some territorial gains to improve Egypt's position in future bargaining.³ In order to cope with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Sadat planned a two-front war with Syria. The first half of 1973 was characterized with continuous negotiations and coordination between Sadat and the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.⁴ On September 12, the two presidents decided that Operation Badr – named after the Prophet Muhammad's first victory – would start on October 6.⁵

The Egyptian and Syrian preparations for war were ignored by the Israeli intelligence but not due to lack of information. Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) followed the Syrian arms sales from Moscow, the Egyptian decision to remove Soviet military personnel, as well as the maneuvering of two armies in early October.⁶ Nevertheless, according to the Israeli intelligence assessment, Syria would not start a war with Israel without Egypt; Sadat would not start a war before Egypt possessed the capability to hit Israel deep enough to neutralize the Israeli Air Force (IAF), and cope with Israeli

² Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ghanī Gamasi, *The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt* (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 1993), 150.

³ Ze 'ev Schiff, *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2013), 11–12; Janice Gross Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," in *The October War: A Retrospective*, ed. Richard B. Parker (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 81–82; Yoram Meital, "The October War and Egypt's Multiple Crossings," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53–46.

⁴ Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources*, SUNY Series in Israeli Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 34–35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁶ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 14–15.

aerial superiority.⁷ This was not expected before 1975.⁸ These principles which framed the Israeli perception was supported by a highly effective Egyptian deception campaign.⁹

October 6, 1973 was Yom Kippur – the Day of Atonement. This is the holiest day in Judaism. Many Jews fast and to go to synagogue on this day. In Israel this is a public holiday and the country's public life shuts down: businesses are closed, there is no radio and television broadcasting, no public transportation, and though not a legal obligation, very few use their private vehicles. The day before Yom Kippur, Chief of Staff David Elazar ("Dado") was preoccupied by the intelligence gathered in the northern and southern borders and declared a C alert – among the highest states of preparedness. Hence, on the eve of Yom Kippur the IDF was on high alert. Nonetheless, the bulk of the IDF power was its reserve forces, and they were yet to be called, and the Israeli government was the only authority that could issue such a decree.

However, the October 5 cabinet meeting ended with no decision about additional move as the Head of the Israeli Intelligence, General Eli Zeira, repeated his assessment that there was a low probability for war.¹⁰ The Egyptian mobilization along the Suez Canal was described merely as a maneuvering exercise, and the Syrian movement of forces was attributed to a fear of Israeli response to an air battle on September 13 when a dozen Syrian aircraft were shot down by the IAF. This was also the Israeli reply to the CIA inquiry about the chances of war given the Arab military movement on October 5.¹¹ The American assessment embraced the Israeli one due to its good reputation, and since they had no information which contradicted the Israeli inference.¹²

At 4 AM, on October 6, the Head of Israeli Mossad, Zvi Zamir, sent an unequivocal message: "Information has been received confirming that Egypt and Syria intend to

⁷ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 45–47.

⁸ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 31.

⁹ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 26–30.

¹⁰ Shlomo Nakdimon, *Low Probability* (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1982), 86.

¹¹ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, 27–28.

start a war today. Zero hour is 18:00!".¹³ Zamir learned about the plan during his meeting with Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian businessman and senior in the in the Egyptian presidential office who was handled by Mossad. His message propelled a chain reaction in Israel. At 5 AM, Elazar convened the General Staff. In this meeting Zeira said that "the new information increases the chances of war, but Intelligence Branch still believes the probability to be low".¹⁴ Elazar, nonetheless, stated "I must work on the assumption that the Arabs will open fire this evening. I will demand total mobilization, and hope it will be approved".¹⁵

He went to meet the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, who objected his request. Dayan believed that one armor corps for each of the two commands would be sufficient. They decided to bring the issue to Prime Minister Golda Meir. At 8 AM they presented their arguments to Meir who was accompanied by Ministers Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili. Meir approved the recruitment of 100,000 men and rejected Elazar's request for a preemptive attack.¹⁶ As a last ditch attempt to prevent the war, according to Ze'ev Schiff, Meir asked U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Keating to warn the Arabs: "The spilling of blood must be prevented".¹⁷ Schiff notes, "Golda and her ministers have just made a decision exceptional in the history of warfare; Israel is to announce to her enemies that she knows of their intention to attack, and even the hour when the offensive is to begin".¹⁸

The Cabinet convened at 12 PM, believing that six hours still remained for the war, if it actually started. According to Uri Bar-Joseph Shortly before 2 PM, while the ministers discussed the option of attacking Syria if Egypt was to attack Israel, sirens were heard Meir, resumed her argument without noticing the sirens and called to regather the forum at 4:30. After additional sirens were heard she asked: "What is this?" The cabinet stenographer, replied: "It seems that the war has begun".¹⁹ At the

¹³ Ibid., 38.

¹⁴ Ibid., 39.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 40.

¹⁷ Ibid., 42.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 202.

same time thousands of artillery shells and hundreds of aircrafts hit Israeli posts and military assets in the northern and southern borders.

The Arab Surprise Attack

The first offensive wave caught the IDF flat-footed and was unexpectedly successful for both Egypt and Syria. In the south, five Egyptian brigades were crossing the Suez Canal facing very limited Israeli resistance since most of the Israeli forces were yet to be deployed to their fire positions. Out of the approximately 300 tanks that defended the Bar Lev line from an Egyptian crossing of the Canal, only a third survived the first 24 hours of fighting. Bar Joseph noted, "The IDF remained without any significant force to block the Egyptian army in its move eastward, into the heart of the Sinai".²⁰ In fact, on October 7 only two brigades, in addition to the one in the Sinai, were positioned between the Canal and Tel Aviv.²¹ Not before October 8 were the reserve forces able to deploy on a defensive line and block the Egyptian swarm 10 kilometers east of the Canal. According to the IDF plan, a counterattack was to be initiated but it failed to push the Egyptians back. The results were disastrous for the IDF, but eventually the first Egyptian attack was stopped. On October 14 Egypt conducted a second and unsuccessful offensive attempt to breach the Israeli line and seize the key passes in the peninsula: Mitla and Giddi.²² This Egyptian failure was an opportunity for the IDF to exercise a second counterattack – an opportunity it did not miss.

In the north, the Arab military achievement was greater. On the first day, a massive force of tanks, artillery batteries and SAM batteries joined three infantry divisions and broke the Israeli defensive line at three points. By the end of the second day Syrian forces reached the Jordan River.²³ However, the severity of the situation was yet to be clear in the northern command. Only during the first night it was understood that there are no tanks between the Syrian forces and the Jordan River in the southern part and in the center of the Golan Heights. The Commander of the Golan Territorial Brigade received an order to prepare for demolition of the six Israeli bridges over the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 210.

²¹ Hanoch Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days* (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv Book Guild, 1978), 68.

²² Walter J. Boyne, *The Two O'clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel*, 1st ed (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), 52–53.

²³ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 210–13.

Jordan River. "This was the most difficult moment of the Golan Heights... the feeling was that we were facing a disaster", he recalls.²⁴ After the gloomy reality had been conveyed to the military headquarters in Tel Aviv, Dayan decided to leave the command center and go to the north, according to Bar-Jospeh, "to watch the situation closely, if we are going to lose the Golan Heights".²⁵ When he arrived in the North, the Head of the Northern Command told him, "the fighting in the Height's southern sector ended and we lost. We don't have the force to stop them".²⁶ By October 9 more than 120 Israeli tanks were destroyed, leaving only fifty tanks to defend the entire Golan Heights.²⁷

The Chief of Staff decided to mobilize the Israeli forces in the eastern command northward and leave the border with Jordan almost defenseless.²⁸ Along with the reserve forces, the IDF managed to make the Syrian forces retreat, and withstand the Syrian counter attack. By October 10 the Syrians were withdrawing from all the territories they gained in the first two days of the war, save Mount Hermon – a strategic asset for its height relative to the Israeli and Syrian Golan Heights.

The rapid Syrian military achievements could not be translated to political ones, and the main cause originated in Cairo. The Syrian military gains met the Syrian objectives and positioned it in a strong position for cease-fire negotiations.²⁹ After a successful two days, the Syrian President asked the Soviet Union to prepare a cease-fire UN resolution. The Egyptian response to the Syrian initiative was, according to Bayne, very dismissive: "Sadat was indignant, cataloging both the Egyptian and the Syrian victories and stating flatly that Assad could quit the war if he wished, but Egypt would fight on".³⁰ While the Syrian leadership was ready to end the war in their current positions next to the Jordan River, Sadat had not yet achieved his goal. According to Kissinger, Sadat was not yet ready to end the war, "believing he could extract further

²⁴ Ibid., 217.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (Jerusalem:Edanim, 1976 Hebrew), 595 as cited in Ibid.

²⁷ Asaf Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 90.

²⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 58.

²⁹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 52.

³⁰ Ibid.

concessions from prolonging the war".³¹ As a result of the differences between the "Egyptian clock" and the Syrian one, along with a flawed coordination between them, the Soviets remained passive.

It should be stressed that the reports the White House received in the first days of the war were very cautious but overall positive, and did not reflect the situation on the ground. According to Kissinger, the joint estimate by the CIA and DIA was that Israel was expected to "to turn the tide on the Golan Heights by Tuesday night [October 9]".³² On the Egyptian front the prediction was "Several more days of heavy fighting might follow as the Israelis work to destroy as much as possible of Egypt's army".³³ Therefore, Kissinger decided to promote a UN Security Council discussion which would result in a cease-fire decision within several days. This would provide Israel with the time needed to regain its losses while ending the war quickly. In his memoirs, Kissinger expounds, "Once the Israeli Army reached the lines at which the war had started, we could accept a simple cease-fire".³⁴

Only on October 9 Kissinger was exposed to the dire reality in both fronts. The information given by Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, convinced Kissinger that "a different diplomacy would soon be necessary. In a protracted war of uncertain outcome, diplomacy might have to supply the impetus to break a military stalemate".³⁵ From this moment the American strategy was to postpone a cease-fire resolution to allow the IDF to change the situation in the battlefield. Kissinger expounds, "we decided to stall the Soviet cease-fire initiative to give Israel an opportunity to make gains against Syria that it could balance in any negotiation against its losses in the South".³⁶

An Inter-Superpower Confrontation

In the first week of the war the conflict's focal point was the military confrontation between Israel and its two Arab neighbors. During this period the American policy

³¹ Henry Kissinger, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 161.

³² *Ibid.*, 112.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 146.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 161.

wished to build upon the détente relations among the superpowers to solve the war between their respective allies. Kissinger writes, "Our strategy... was to use the then prevailing policy of détente to seek a joint approach with the Soviet Union. This was to prevent the Soviet Union from emerging as the spokesman for the Arab side, isolating us in the Islamic world, and dividing us from Europe".³⁷ In fact, in the early stages of the war, Kissinger upheld a neutral approach--conditional upon similar Soviet behavior. As he saw no genuine parallel Soviet attempt, and revealed the gloomy reality on the battlefield, Kissinger cautiously moved towards his ally.

However, the more successful the Israeli counter attack became, the Arab pressure on the two superpowers increased, emphasizing the superpowers' contradictory interests. The tensions among them reached a nuclear zenith when the war between the allies was almost over.

In the north the IDF started moving eastward into Syria on October 11 while fighting Syrian forces as well as Iraqi and Jordanian reinforcement forces that were sent to assist. The Israeli strategy was to destroy the Syrian army as fast as possible to allow transfer pressure to the southern front.³⁸ IDF stopped after reaching a position which put Damascus in the range zone of Israeli artillery.³⁹ A sole Israeli attack on October 21 was aimed to capture Mount Hermon before the imminent cease-fire.⁴⁰

As the fighting in the north stabilized, the gravity center concentrated on the Southern front. IDF took advantage of a failed Egyptian attack on October 14 to conduct a big counter attack. By the morning of October 16 two Israeli divisions – Sharon and Adan – crossed the Suez Canal.⁴¹ By October 22 the IDF cut the road between Suez and Cairo, virtually cutting the supply route of the Third Egyptian Army, which was positioned on the eastern side of the Canal.

Immediately after the failure of the second Egyptian attack, the Soviet pushed for a UN Security Council resolution which called for an immediate cease-fire and gradual

³⁷ Ibid., 38.

³⁸ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 176–77.

³⁹ Ibid., 199–200.

⁴⁰ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 215.

⁴¹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 144.

withdraw of Israeli forces to the ante-war lines.⁴² However, the Soviet faced an American attempt to postpone any such resolution to enable the IDF to achieve military gains that would empower Israel – U.S.'s ally – in future negotiations. The message from Jerusalem to Washington was that "a cease-fire in place would not be welcomed".⁴³

Israeli successful campaign in the south and the risk of Arab defeat urged Kissinger to fly to Moscow on October 19 to discuss the cease-fire resolution with the Soviets. On his way back to Washington, Kissinger stopped in Israel to present the cease-fire proposal and alleviate Israeli objections. The agreed formula, expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 338, called for an immediate cease-fire and implementation of Resolution 242.⁴⁴ This Security UN Council Resolution was decided after the Six Day War and called for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories conquered in the recent conflict [the Six-Day War], the termination of all states of belligerency, and the right of states to live within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force".⁴⁵ Kissinger notes that this resolution provides "a mandate sufficiently vague to have occupied diplomats for years without arriving at agreement".⁴⁶ Israel and Egypt accepted the resolution immediately, Syria did not.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, stopping the fight when both armies wish to improve their positions until the last moment before the cease-fire take place had proved to be very difficult. Local fighting between Israeli and Egyptian forces violated the resolution. Israel took advantage of the local violations to complete the encirclement of the Third Egyptian Army. In order to stop the fighting and prevent Egyptian humiliation, the two superpowers accepted UN Security Council 339 which reaffirmed the former resolution, which called the two sides to return to the position held when the cease-fire took place, and pledged the United Nations Secretary-General to undertake

⁴² Ibid., 144–45.

⁴³ Jacob Eriksson, "Israel and the October War," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 42.

⁴⁴ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 217–19.

⁴⁵ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 145.

⁴⁶ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 304.

⁴⁷ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 220–21.

measures toward the placement of observers to supervise the cease fire.⁴⁸ The cease-fire was set for 7 AM on October 24. However, battle grounds were still taking place when the cease-fire entered into effect. Sadat, sending urgent signals to both his Soviet ally and the American president, asked for a joint American-Soviet force to supervise the cease-fire resolution. The Syrian message was followed by a personal letter from the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to President Ricard Nixon. In the letter the Soviet leader urged for a dispatch of joint force to enforce cease fire on Israel. If Washington decides not to send men, however, Moscow implied it might do act unilaterally: "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel".⁴⁹

The American President interpreted the message as "perhaps the most serious threat to US-Soviet relations since the Cuban missile crisis eleven years before".⁵⁰ Walter Boyne notes, Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Kremlin felt satisfied that they had struck just the right notes of friendship, firmness, and threat. It did not occur to them that the United States might interpret this as more than another move in the Middle East chess game".⁵¹ In Washington the letter was perceived as part of cumulative actions, including the order for seven Soviet divisions of paratroopers and infantry of hasty flight to the Middle East, high alert of the Soviet airborne forces, and the halt of the Russian airlift, suggesting possible preparations to transfer the Russian troops from Europe to Syria and Egypt.⁵² In addition, the American intelligence detected two Soviet Scud missile brigades east of Cairo. Schiff adds, "When the missile brigades passed through the Bosphorus, sensitive recorders noted nuclear weapons abroad

⁴⁸ Ibid., 238.

⁴⁹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, KissingerOffice Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20. No classification marking. A note on the letter indicates that it was received at 10 p.m. on October 24, as cited at U.S. State Department, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974 -," *Office of the Historian*, accessed March 3, 2017, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v15/d146>.

⁵⁰ Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 938.

⁵¹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 245.

⁵² Kissinger, *Crisis*, 348–49; Bernard Reich, "Crisis Management," in *The October War: A Retrospective*, ed. Richard B. Parker (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 167; Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 189.

their ships".⁵³ For the U.S. there were two options, according to Boyne, "It could acquiesce – or it could escalate".⁵⁴ Kissinger chose the latter.

Before midnight of October 24 Kissinger assembled the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG). This forum was an interdepartmental body assembled to coordinate the American policy during the war. The forum was headed by Kissinger and included the deputy secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁵ The group decided that the American response to Moscow would be "conciliatory in tone but strong in substance".⁵⁶ Kissinger also conveyed a message to Egypt in the president's name: "I ask you to consider the consequences for your country if the two great nuclear countries were thus to confront each other on your soil".⁵⁷ To support the American formal responses, the group decided to increase the readiness of the American forces around the world to DefCon III, the 82nd Airborne Division was put on alert for possible movement, and three aircraft carriers were instructed to move toward the Mediterranean.⁵⁸ Kissinger notes, "We all agreed that any increase in readiness would have to go at least to DefCon III before the Soviets would notice it".⁵⁹ Asaf Siniver concludes, "These military measures had a clear political, and their principal advantage was their high visibility".⁶⁰ In his memoirs, Kissinger claims that the Soviet proposal was "unthinkable. If we agreed to a joint role with the Soviet Union, its troops would re-enter Egypt with our blessing. Either we would be the tail to the Soviet kite in a joint power play against Israel, or we would end up clashing with the Soviet forces in a country that was bound to share Soviet objectives regarding the cease-fire or could not afford to be perceived as opposing them".⁶¹ Kissinger concludes, "We were determined to resist, by force if necessary, the

⁵³ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 289–90.

⁵⁴ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 246.

⁵⁵ James Schlesinger, "The Airlift," in *The October War: A Retrospective*, ed. Richard B. Parker (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 160.

⁵⁶ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 350.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 351.

⁵⁸ Reich, "Crisis Management," 166.

⁵⁹ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 350.

⁶⁰ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 98.

⁶¹ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 348.

introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East, regardless of the pretext under which they arrived".⁶²

The American response resulted in a Soviet decision to abandon their request and accept the cease-fire formula with no explicit demand for an Israeli withdrawal. The Egyptians, too, suddenly were appeased by an international delegation of observers, not a joint Soviet-American force.⁶³ As the tension between the nuclear superpowers reduced, a compromise was found to allow for an immediate cease fire: as part of a new UN Security Council Resolution 340 the two sides were called to return to the line of the original cease-fire.⁶⁴ Since nobody could tell where the forces were positioned on October 22, the resolution demand Israel and Egypt to halt the fighting and negotiate their withdrawal lines. In addition, IDF agreed to allow for humanitarian assistance for the captured Egyptian forces without breaking the encirclement. The agreement was followed by direct Israeli-Egyptian talks led by General Aharon Yariv of Israel and General Muhammad al-Gamasy of Egypt at kilometer 109 on the Cairo-Suez road on October 28. These talks were later removed to kilometer 101. This talks served as the basis for future disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt and ultimately the Camp David negotiations in 1978.⁶⁵

Analyzing the Deterrence Triangle

The Israeli Protégé

For Israel, the Yom Kippur War was the fifth round of violent confrontation between Israel and its neighbors since its establishment. In 1948 the new State of Israel fought for its independence against the Arab militias supported by armies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraqi expedition force. The Israeli victory led to an enlargement of the territory allotted to the Jewish state in respect to the original U.N. Partition Plan. In 1956 Israel, along with the UK and France attacked Egypt to attain freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. During the Suez Crisis Israel occupied the Sinai

⁶² Ibid., 331.

⁶³ Ibid., 369.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Richard B. Parker, "Introduction," in *The October War: A Retrospective*, ed. Richard B. Parker (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 9.

Peninsula but a joint American-Soviet intervention forced it to withdraw.⁶⁶ In 1967 Israel conducted war with Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported by Iraq and Saudi forces. The outcome of the Six-Day War was outstanding: within less than a week Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, Syria's Golan Heights and East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan.⁶⁷ Israel's territory was significantly enhanced allowing the Jewish state for the first time a real strategic depth.

In face of Egyptian President's, Gamal Abdel Nasser, policy of "three nos" ("no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it..."⁶⁸), no serious attempt to put an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict was made. In 1969 Nasser promoted war of attrition believing this would force Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. For seventeen months hostilities between Egypt in Israel continued. The cease-fire agreement signed by Meir and Nasser on August 7, 1970.

Meir was the first Israeli woman prime minister. She succeeded Prime Minister Levi Eshkol after his sudden death in February 1969. She headed the Labor party, which was the biggest party in Israeli politics. On Saturday evenings Meir used to gather a small forum of ministers from the cabinet to discuss issues in preparation for the Cabinet meeting the following day. Since the discussions took place around the kitchen table, this forum was known as "Golda's Kitchen". It comprised of Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, Minister of Education and Culture Yigal Allon, Minister without portfolio Yisrael Galili, and Minister of justice Ya'akov Shimshon Shapira. Other officials were called whenever necessitated. Out of this forum the "war cabinet" was created, including Allon, Galili, and often Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan.⁶⁹ Although this small forum had no formal authority, it played a crucial part in Israeli decision-making before and during the Yom Kippur War as these members became Golda Meir's personal advisers.

⁶⁶ Robert Owen Freedman, "Introduction," in *Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations*, ed. Robert Owen Freedman (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2012), 2–3.

⁶⁷ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 7.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁹ David Rodman, "The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 7, no. 3 (January 1, 2013): 148, doi:10.1080/23739770.2013.11446570.

Israeli Interests

In 1973 the main Israeli interest was to maintain the status quo. The end of the attrition war ensured that at least in the southern front Israel would enjoy military tranquility. The Nixon administration, busy in domestic issues and the war in Vietnam, also showed no signs of resolve to press Israel to take any significant diplomatic steps. Though the declared goal of the government was to establish a full peace with the Arab neighbors, Egyptian President Sadat was perceived as a weak leader and his proposals presented to the U.S. by the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi were far from what Israel could agree to.

Even the Egyptian proposals in early 1973 maintained the Arab principle of conditioning peace with Israel on a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-Six-Day War lines (1967 lines) in all fronts, and condition the generation of the direct talks with Israel to an Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai.⁷⁰ Far reaching as the Egyptian proposals were from Cairo's view, Vanetik and Shalom conclude, they "did not meet Israel's expectations for a settlement with Egypt".⁷¹ The Israeli principle since 1967 was that the occupied territories were a strategic asset that should be kept until Israel's neighbors agree to live peacefully with her.⁷² In this regard, Meir argued several days before the war erupted: "For as long as peace does not come we will remain in place where we are today – in the north, in the south, and in the east".⁷³ Dayan's speech on April 12, 1973 encapsulated the Israeli stance: "The question is how to live in the meantime? What does 'in the meantime' mean? Until we have a better offer [than Ismail's], that we feel we are not forced to accept but want to accept [...], and if there is an offer that is better for us than the current situation... it should be accepted. I have yet to hear such a proposal. To this day [...] I have not heard a better offer than the current situation".⁷⁴ According to Shlomo Aronson, this was Israel's "status quo

⁷⁰ Boaz Vanetik and Zaki Shalom, *The Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace Process, 1969-1973: From the Rogers Plan to the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War* (Brighton Chicago: Sussex Academic Press, 2013), 210–12.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Cited in Matti Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle-East* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co, 1976), 36.

⁷⁴ Minutes of Labor Party Secretariat meeting, 12 April 1973, ISA 828/2 as cited in Vanetik and Shalom, *The Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace process, 1969-1973*, 221–22.

syndrome": "a psychological satisfaction with the situation along the existing border".⁷⁵

It should be stressed that even when the Israeli leadership assessed that rejecting the Egyptian offers could trigger a war, it was determined to adhere to its position. Hence, in a secret meeting on April 18 1973, Golda decided to reject Ismail's proposal.⁷⁶ If war was to start, then Israel should make it clear the Arabs initiated it. If Israel was to be blamed for the war, it could jeopardize its political assets, and more importantly its American support. This argument presented by both Meir and Dayan during the discussion with Elazar on the morning of October 6. Their rationale, as presented in the discussion, was that the world would blame Israel for the war. Israel's military power is strong enough, therefore, Israeli government should act to strengthen its political power.⁷⁷ This was crucial to ensure political freedom for the IDF to strike the Arab armies, and ultimately destroy them. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Israeli approach upheld a strong relationship between the outcome of the war and Israeli deterrence: only by a rapid, convinced and decisive victory can Israel prolong the interval between the wars, and perhaps convince the Arabs they cannot achieve their objectives through violent means.

Israeli Capabilities

As Table 5 shows, the Israeli army suffered from quantitative inferiority in terms of number of troops and armor. Moreover, most of the Israeli society was part of the IDF regular or reserve forces. This has two dramatic implications: Israeli society, once recruited, has no strategic depth in terms of more people to recruit. The reserve forces that are called when war begins should be sufficient to hold until it ends. Furthermore, the reserve forces comprised the people that nurtured the Israeli economy. When most of the Israeli society is recruited for war, businesses suffer, thus the economy is damaged. The greater Arab societies permitted them to maintain sizable standing

⁷⁵ Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136.

⁷⁶ Vanetik and Shalom, *The Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace process, 1969-1973*, 220–21.

⁷⁷ Nakdimon, *Low Probability*, 109–12.

armies. Boyne notes, "This was a key difference, one that almost spelled the end of Israel as a nation in 1973".⁷⁸

Table 5 Sizes of the Armies in the Yom Kippur War⁷⁹

	Population	Troops	Tanks	Artillery	Aircraft
<i>Egypt</i>	35,700,000	260,000	2,250	800	620
<i>Syria</i>	6,775,000	120,000	1,270	400	410
<i>Israel</i>	3,180,000	275,000*	2,000	350	488

* When mobilized

Israel's qualitative superiority not only compensated for its quantitative weakness against both Syria and Egypt, but rendered the IDF stronger than their two armies combined. Israeli forces were equipped with advanced western weapons, mostly American. This had immediate impact on the capability of the Air Force and the Navy.⁸⁰ The aerial superiority was crucial to change the balance of power on the ground. Boyne indicates that the Israeli qualitative edge was not merely an outgrowth of advanced weapons. He claims this was also a "matter of discipline, training, dedication, and enormous sacrifice by the Israeli airmen". Israeli technological development generated a rapid improvement in the ground forces. To this technological leap the IDF added an intensive training program based on the lessons drawn from the Six-Day War and the Attrition War. For all of this, Luttwak and Horowitz claim the army of 1972 was "a far more capable force than the one of 1967 both absolutely and – what is more important – relative to its enemies".⁸¹

In addition to its conventional power, Israel also enjoyed nuclear deterrence in 1973. The story of the Israeli nuclear program, as Avner Cohen notes, is a story of opacity.⁸²

⁷⁸ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 2.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁸⁰ For further reading please see, Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army, 1948-1973* (Cambridge, Mass: Abt Books, 1983), 330–36.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 335.

⁸² Cohen's work is probably the largest endeavor devoted to gather the accessible information about Israel's nuclear program. Please see, Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

There is much secrecy about the technological aspects of the program. The known political aspects of the Israeli efforts reveal part of the story, as Cohen admits. It is, however, widely agreed that Israel launched its nuclear program in the late 1950s. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was the main driving force behind this extraordinary technological and economic effort. According to Cohen, "Some time before the Six-Day War, Israel had achieved a nuclear weapons capability, but it had no weapons as such, and in the tense days of the crisis, that capability was quickly made operational".⁸³ This was despite a determined American attempt to halt the Israeli program and protect the American nonproliferation policy. The American pressure on Israel, which included threats of abandonment, yielded an Israeli written commitment not to be "the first to introduce nuclear weapons onto the Arab-Israel area".⁸⁴ According to Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas Miller the Israeli commitment was reaffirmed as part of the "Nixon-Meir Understanding" in September 1969. The understanding presumably included an Israeli pledge not to publicize its nuclear capacity either by testing weapons or declaring its existence. This nuclear opacity policy remained the main principle for Israel's nuclear deterrence during the Yom Kippur war and after.

According to Boyne, before the war, Israel had "enough nuclear material prepared for as many as twenty-five nuclear weapons".⁸⁵ In the case of an existential threat these warheads were designed to be delivered on Jericho missiles over a distance of three hundred miles.⁸⁶ In fact, it is reported that Israel armed its nuclear weapons twice during the Yom Kippur War: on October 9 in response to the dire situation in the battlefield after the successful Arab attack, and following the Soviet threats to intervene, including the indications for Soviet nuclear weapons sent to Egypt.⁸⁷

⁸³ Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 274.

⁸⁴ Zaki Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy Between Dimona and Washington* (Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 117.

⁸⁵ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 59.

⁸⁶ Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, 1st ed (New York: Random House, 1991), 129.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 225–39; Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 314–16; Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991: An Israeli Perspective*, SUNY Series in Israeli Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 139–49.

Although some argue the Israeli move was a pure deterrence signal, others suggest it was designed to instigate Washington to initiate a massive airlift. Ze'ev Maoz opines, "the arming of nuclear missiles was more an act of panic than a calculated effort at deterrence".⁸⁸

However, it should be noted that interestingly there is no evidence that either Egypt or Syria believed their actions would trigger an Israeli retaliation using its alleged nuclear capabilities.⁸⁹ According to Murhaf Jouejati, the Syrians were convinced that Moscow and Washington would not permit Jerusalem to use its reputed capability.⁹⁰ Stein opines that the Egyptian Chief of Operation, General Gamasy "discounted entirely the possibility that Israel would use its nuclear weapons since Egypt never had any intention of going further than the passes".⁹¹ According to Mohamed Hassenein Heikal this was also Sadat's opinion.⁹²

According to Stein, the Egyptian General Staff attributed four strategic advantages to Israel, none referred to its nuclear deterrence: "air superiority, superior technology, higher standard of training and the unconditional support of the United States".⁹³ Therefore, Israel's power was not only a product of its military superiority, but included the American support.

U.S.-Israel relations evolved over several decades, and though a formal alliance had never signed between the countries their relations are often described as such. For example, in his memoirs Kissinger related to Israel as "a de facto ally".⁹⁴ According to Ben-Israel, the relations between Washington and Jerusalem resemble an alliance though they do not contain a formal treaty.⁹⁵ Pressman concludes, that "in terms of essential elements of an alliance, Israel and the United States were allies by the 1970s and arguably after the 1967 war, even if they lacked a formal defense treaty".⁹⁶

⁸⁸ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 316.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 315–16.

⁹⁰ Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," 83.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Isaac Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine* (Moshav Ben-Shemen: Modan, 2013), 80.

⁹³ Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," 82.

⁹⁴ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 160.

⁹⁵ Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 84.

⁹⁶ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 85.

The first development of the relations between the countries was the decision of the Kennedy administration to sell defensive weapons – Hawk anti-aircraft missiles – to Israel in 1962.⁹⁷ In his meeting with the then Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir, President Kennedy also stated, "I think it is quite clear that in case of an invasion the United States would come to the support of Israel".⁹⁸ According to Shlomo Aronson, this was "the first American executive promise to guarantee Israel's boundaries".⁹⁹

However, only in the aftermath of the Six-Day War did Washington and Jerusalem become closer. Israel, abandoned by its French ally which declared an embargo due to pressure from the Arab world, desperately sought a new ally. This was the opportunity to deepen the relations with the U.S. After the war Prime Minister Levi Eshkol met President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington. This meeting signaled the dawn of a new era for US-Israel relations. The president lifted the Middle East arms embargo and for the first time the U.S. sold Israel offensive weapons – fifty advanced F-4 Phantom jets.¹⁰⁰ In 1970, Israel acceded to the American pledges to assist protect Jordan from a Syrian takeover. President Nixon "was deeply impressed by the determination shown by the Israelis at a time when America's formal allies had quit on him and demonstrated the value of a strong Israel".¹⁰¹ This crisis, William Quandt opines, brought U.S.-Israel relations "to an unprecedentedly high level".¹⁰²

The new status was expressed in the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding which stated the U.S. pledged to help "Israel to enhance its military self-sufficiency".¹⁰³ Another aspect was an increase of military aid: from 140 million in 1968-1970 to 1.145 billion in the years of 1971-1973.¹⁰⁴ During the Yom Kippur War the size of the American assistance was \$2.2 billion.¹⁰⁵ The advanced American weapons were not

⁹⁷ Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 83; Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 82.

⁹⁸ Nina J. Noring, ed., "Document 121, Memorandum of Conversation between Kennedy and Meir, Palm Beach, Florida, December 27, 1962," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 280–81, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/topical>.

⁹⁹ Aronson and Brosh, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, 72.

¹⁰⁰ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 82.

¹⁰¹ Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1981), 455.

¹⁰² William B. Quandt, *Peace Process* (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 83, <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/book/31436>.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 103–4.

¹⁰⁵ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 82.

only approved but also transferred to Israel on C-5 Galaxy planes as part of "Operation Nickel Grass". By the end of the war Israel received nearly 12,880 tons of supply, and forty F-4 Phantom Jets, thirty-six A-4 Skyhawks and twelve C-130 transport planes. During the war the Soviet Union sent 11,174 tons of supplies to its Arab allies.¹⁰⁶

The U.S-Israeli cooperation during the 1973 War was not limited to arms sales. Kissinger conducted frequent talks and consultations with the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Israel Ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz. On several urgent issues, Kissinger directly contacted Prime Minister Meir. Moreover, during the war Kissinger instructed Scowcroft "to give them [Israelis] every bit of intelligence we have".¹⁰⁷ It should be stressed that the relations between the espionage organizations as well as the military commanders was very good to begin with as they shared their estimations about joint challenges and conducted direct communication throughout the war.¹⁰⁸

The American Protector

The Yom Kippur war caught the American administration unprepared. The president was occupied by the Watergate scandal, which led to the resignation of his two trusted aids: Chief of Staff Bob Heldeman and adviser for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman, and risked Nixon's political survival.¹⁰⁹ As a result, Nixon neglected foreign affairs issues. In the list of these issues the most important topics were the opening to China, the détente with the Soviet Union, and the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed with North Vietnam.¹¹⁰ Hence, when the fire started in the Middle East, Kissinger who served in two positions – the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State – was the unchallenged decision maker in Washington, and his attention focused on the American withdrawal from Vietnam.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 92–93.

¹⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 146.

¹⁰⁸ Motta (Mordechai) Gur, *From the North and from the West* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1998), 209.

¹⁰⁹ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 87.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*; Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East*, 155. Siniver 87, Aronson 155

¹¹¹ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 87–89.

American Interests

When Henry Kissinger was informed about the news of an imminent war he did everything he could to prevent it. War would jeopardize his strategy to initiate peace talks between the Egyptians and the Israelis to move Egypt from the Soviet bloc to the American one. Following the reelection of President Richard Nixon in November 1972, Kissinger opened a back channel with Egypt through the Egyptian national security adviser, Hafez Ismail. After three years of American policy which supported the status-quo between Israel and Egypt, Kissinger planned to start a direct negotiation between the countries after Israeli election on October 30 1973.¹¹² Twenty-four days before this date, however, Egyptian forces attacked Israel. After receiving the news Kissinger decided to use the crisis as a spur for his strategy: to end the crisis with Egyptian-Israeli negotiations under American patronage. In the first talk with President Nixon after the news about the war reached Washington, Kissinger pointed out "the primary problem is to get the fighting stopped and then use the opportunity to see whether a settlement could be enforced". Nixon asked, "You mean a diplomatic settlement of the bigger problem [the overall Middle East crisis]?". "That is right", Kissinger replied.¹¹³

According to Siniver, Kissinger's stratagem during the 1973 War followed four objectives: "to ensure Israel's continued superiority in the balance of Middle East military power; to prevent the Soviets from gaining ground in the region; to dismantle the threat of an Arab oil embargo; and most importantly, to make the United States the principal actor in the post-war diplomacy".¹¹⁴ Accordingly, the American interests during the war were to some extent conflicting: Washington wished to watch an Israeli victory, but not an Arab humiliation which would make peace talks under an American patronage impossible in the aftermath of the war. "I never doubted", Kissinger explains, "that a defeat of Israel by Soviet arms would be a geographical disaster for the United States"¹¹⁵. He however points out that he had no interest to watch Sadat

¹¹² Ibid., 89.

¹¹³ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 36.

¹¹⁴ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 87.

¹¹⁵ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 146.

destroyed, "The peace process dominated by America would end before it was started".¹¹⁶

The U.S should support its ally but not ostensibly to avoid an Arab reaction. This consideration was crucial in the discussions between the Israelis and the Americans about the nature of the American airlift: "Israel favored the most ostentatious means of delivery; all American policymakers were agreed that we should do our utmost to prevent a confrontation with the Arab world – especially the moderates among them – though not to the point of impairing American strategic interests", summarizes Kissinger.¹¹⁷ This consideration was one of the causes for the delay in the American assistance to Israel, as elaborated in the next section.

The U.S. also wished to use the détente with USSR to prevent an active Soviet intervention in the region, in order to eventually shove the Soviets from the region, while pulling Egypt to Washington's hands. Kissinger notes, "We saw an opportunity to start a peace process by convincing the Arab states that the Soviets could provoke war but not achieve diplomatic progress; hence American diplomacy was indispensable".¹¹⁸

The challenge of balancing between the contradictory goals led to a dramatic shift in the American policy during the war. In the first week of the war, when the American assessment of the balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbors was heavily influenced by the pre-war perception of Israeli superiority, Kissinger wished to promote a very cautious policy, avoiding a blatant public support in his ally while trying to achieve the same behavior from Moscow. He and President Nixon agreed that it would be favorable for the U.S. not to take sides, and remain neutral.¹¹⁹ However, after Kissinger realized the threat posed to his ally, and Soviet de facto rejection of his neutral approach, he showed more resolve to support Israel and to hold a firm stand against the Soviets. The most salient examples during the war were the American decisions to deliver the assistance to Israel in American airplanes and the American

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 315.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 159.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 160.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 36.

decision to deter the Soviets from acting unilaterally in the last days of the war, respectively. These decisions are analyzed in this chapter.

The American Capability

As Table 6 reveals there was no parallel power to the United states in the extended deterrence triangle. The only foe who could challenge the American forces was the Soviet Union, which was aligned with the Arabs during the war. However, Sadat never wished to confront the U.S., not only for its power, but also because of his political goal to eventually align with Washington. Therefore, the American threat to intervene in the crisis militarily was very credible, as can be shown by the Egyptian decision to recall their request for the joint superpowers' joint task force to be dispatched to the region after Kissinger clarified his objection to the request.¹²⁰

Table 6 Composite Index of National Capability Score – the Yom Kippur War¹²¹

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
<i>Egypt</i>	0.0065	0.0064	0.0067	0.0069	0.0075	0.0081	0.0087
<i>Syria</i>	0.0014	0.0014	0.0015	0.0015	0.0017	0.0017	0.0018
<i>Israel</i>	0.0016	0.0017	0.0018	0.0019	0.0025	0.0023	0.0033
<i>U.S.</i>	0.2085	0.2039	0.1975	0.1798	0.1689	0.1633	0.1572
<i>USSR</i>	0.1667	0.1700	0.1694	0.1729	0.1740	0.1724	0.1689

More importantly though was the balance of power within the U.S.-Israel alliance. Unlike the Austrian-German alliance, the US-Israel one was comprised of non-equal powers: The American superpower and the Israeli military power. In 1973 the U.S. spent twenty-five times as much on defense, the American population was a hundred times greater, and the U.S had almost seventeen military personnel in the regular army for every Israeli one.¹²² The American nuclear might also held a massive

¹²⁰ Ibid., 354.

¹²¹ "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer. See, Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

¹²² "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer. See, Ibid.

advantage in both quantitative and qualitative terms over the alleged Israeli young program.¹²³

Moreover, the American superpower was one of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council which entitled it to veto any of the council's resolutions. This political power was crucial for Israel given the political inferiority Israel had in the U.N. General Assembly as a result of the support of all Arab countries and most of the nonaligned nations for the Arab side, and the reluctance of any other member in the Security Council to use its veto to defend Israel. Finally, America financially and militarily led the NATO alliance which consisted of 16 members. Under Article 5 the members are committed to the principle of collective defense. To put it simply, the American protector had a huge advantage over his Israeli ally in all aspects of national power. For the U.S., Israel was an important, maybe even a vital ally; for Israel, the U.S. was an indispensable asset.

The question is what interests did this alliance serve for the Americans? As Elizabeth Stephens points out, Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. It was in the American interest to protect this regime as part of the ideological rivalry with the Soviets during the Cold War.¹²⁴ Stephens opines, "Israel had effectively blocked Soviet expansion through proxies, while its military strength and potential had defended the moderate Arab regimes".¹²⁵ Military wise, Israel held three main benefits for the U.S.: first, its use of the American weapons against the Soviet weapons operated by the Arabs enabled the Americans to test their products' performance in the battlefield and improve their capabilities against the Soviets. For example, during the Yom Kippur War, Israel captured Soviet weapons, and explore them jointly with the U.S.¹²⁶

¹²³ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 81.

¹²⁴ Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel & the World after 40 Years* (Washington, [D.C.]: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1990), 188; David Makovsky, "The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict from 1945 to 2000: Why the Arabists Are Wrong," in *Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations*, ed. Robert Owen Freedman (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2012), 30–31; Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective*, JCSS Study, no. 20 (Jerusalem, Israel : Boulder, Colo: Jerusalem Post ; Westview Press, 1992), 13.

¹²⁵ Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the "Special Relationship"* (Brighton [England] ; Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 33.

¹²⁶ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 82.

Second, in several occasions Israel was willing to act on U.S. request in the Middle East, thus, to protect American interests using its military power. Before 1973, Israeli forces were used to protect Jordan and Lebanon in 1958, and Jordan again in 1970.¹²⁷ The last event, as previously discussed, "planted the seeds for the U.S.-Israel alliance".¹²⁸ Finally, there is the intellectual dimension of U.S.-Israeli ties: "how military power might be exercised and the ways in which military organizations ought to behave".¹²⁹ Israeli experience, research and technological advancement render it a strong partner in terms of military doctrine, and development of new and sophisticated weapons.¹³⁰ The U.S. had an interest to take advantage of the Israeli industry for its sake, while preventing Israeli products from being sold to Washington's opponents. Altogether, the during the Nixon administration the U.S. perceived Israel as an asset and an important ally in the region and decided to promote security cooperation to a new peak.¹³¹

The Arab Adversaries

Arab Interests

In October 1970, Anwar Sadat succeeded the Egyptian President Nasser after his death. In February 1971 Sadat signaled his intention to lead a change in Egypt's foreign policy. Instead of Nasser's pro-Soviet and anti-Israel policy, Sadat declared in the Egyptian National Assembly his willingness to open the Suez Canal and negotiate peace with Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.¹³² In July 1972 Sadat expelled more than 15,000 Soviet personnel from Egypt and returned Soviet equipment. Sadat also opened a secret channel with Washington, and after the American elections sent his security adviser to speak directly with Kissinger. The

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Michael Karpin, *The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That Means for the World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 183–84.

¹²⁹ Stuart A. Cohen, "Lights and Shadows in US-Israeli Ties, 1948-2010," in *Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations*, ed. Robert Owen Freedman (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2012), 146.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 143–46.

¹³¹ Freedman, "Introduction," 4.

¹³² Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 88.

American responses did not satisfy Sadat, who wished to break the diplomatic stalemate.¹³³

Sadat's war plan included a two-front war jointly with Syria whose objectives are limited, but "sufficient to shatter the Israeli security doctrine".¹³⁴ The Egyptian plan aimed to cross the Canal and hold a narrow strip on the eastern bank. A successful defense of this territory could either instigate an international or Arab intervention, or could be leveraged by a second wave of attack to capture the two key passes in the Sinai Peninsula: Giddi and Mitla.¹³⁵ The military success would restore the pride to the Egypt, while allowing to negotiate with Israel from a better position than before.

To promote his plan, Sadat had to overcome three obstacles: he needed to maintain an open channel and good relations with the White House while deceiving the American intelligence about his war plan; and he needed to do so while securing Soviet arms supply before and during the war; and convince Syria to join the attack. The last challenge was especially difficult given the Syrian President's different perception of the war's objectives. The original Syrian war plan demanded an Egyptian advance farther from the Canal, to the key passes and Sharm al-Shaykh along a Syrian campaign to seize the entire Golan Heights.¹³⁶ According to Assad's biographer, Patrick Seale, the Syrian strategic objective was not to further diplomacy but "the return to the Arabs of the territories Israel captured in 1967".¹³⁷

The disparity between the two Arab leaders engendered a duplicate Egyptian war plan: one, ambitious to satisfy Assad and ensure his participation, and one, moderate to guide the Egyptian army. According to Yoram Meital, the Egyptian decision to reject the early Soviet cease-fire proposals was an outgrowth of Sadat's aspiration "to create a new situation. The change in the circumstances, he felt, should be incisive enough not to be perceived as merely temporary, but rather to compel the sides to adopt completely new attitudes".¹³⁸ On October 14, however, Sadat deviated from his

¹³³ Meital, "The October War and Egypt's Multiple Crossings," 52.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 53.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 54–55.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 54; Eyal Zisser, "Syria and the October War: The Missed Opportunity," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 73–74.

¹³⁷ Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: Tauris, 1988), 197.

¹³⁸ Meital, "The October War and Egypt's Multiple Crossings," 58.

limited war plan to decrease the Israeli pressure in the Syrian front. This military failure would lead to a shift in the southern front.

Arab Capabilities

As Table 5 Egypt alone had a quantitative advantage over the IDF. The joint force with Syria significantly outnumbered the Israeli forces in manpower, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Moreover, this joint force was supported by eleven Arab nations. As Boyne notes, "Kuwait and Saudi Arabia financially backed the war and committed over 3,000 troops. Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Morocco contributed a combined force of 10,000 troops, 150 tanks, and three fighter and bomber squadrons. Lebanese radar operators guided Syrian aircraft and allowed Palestinian terrorists to set up artillery positions within Lebanon's borders".¹³⁹ Jordan also sent the 40th Armored Brigade to the aid of Syria after the successful Israeli counter attack.¹⁴⁰

As part of the preparations for the war, the Arab forces tried to reduce the qualitative inferiority in respect to the IDF exploiting arms sales from the USSR. For example, to cope with the Israeli aerial superiority the Egyptian army was equipped with advanced Soviet surface-to-air missile systems and water-crossing equipment.¹⁴¹ The Egyptian forces also exercised the Canal crossing to cope with the well-trained Israeli forces.¹⁴² The Syrian army also acquired advanced Soviet SAMs and anti-tank missiles and invested in tough and highly professional training in the months leading up to the war.¹⁴³ Altogether, the Arab assessment was that they could overcome Israeli qualitative superiority, particularly in the air. Since the IDF estimated they could not, they failed to grasp the Arab intentions in early October.

The Soviet support was not limited merely to arms sale. Moscow was the only access Egypt and Syria had to a nuclear umbrella given the nuclear deterrence of both Israel and the U.S. Eventually, Moscow indeed used its nuclear power to pressure the U.S. to stop the Israeli blockade over the Third Egyptian Army. USSR also served as the Arabs' ally in the UN Security Council. For that reason, President Assad approached

¹³⁹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 2.

¹⁴⁰ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 180.

¹⁴¹ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 19–22.

¹⁴² Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," 82.

¹⁴³ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 3.

Moscow to ask for an immediate cease-fire resolution at the UN after completing the Syrian successful assault in the first two days of the war. The Soviets then checked the opinion in Cairo and followed the Egyptian request to avoid such a decision given the Egyptian military's achievements.¹⁴⁴ USSR was also a main actor in pushing for a cease-fire in the last days of the war to prevent the annihilation of the Third Egyptian Army.¹⁴⁵ However, as Galia Golan explains, the Soviet support was limited. They wished "to maintain their credibility with the Arab world without intervening militarily to save Egyptians, but also without destroying the relationship with Washington".¹⁴⁶

Finally, the Egyptian-Syrian forces were supported by Arab economic pressure, namely the threat of an oil embargo which eventually materialized. In August 1973, Saudi King Faisal promised Sadat to use the "oil weapon" in the event of war with Israel.¹⁴⁷ Throughout the crisis Saudi Arabia conveyed a clear message to Washington: to avoid an Arab boycott the U.S. should pressure Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders. The Nixon administration was preoccupied with this risk. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that if Israel started gaining major victories while being actively assisted by the U.S., American interests in the Arab world would be in jeopardy.¹⁴⁸ Nixon himself warned Kissinger not to side with Israel too much lest the oil countries reacted. On October 7 Nixon opined, "we don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states – the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting – will break ranks".¹⁴⁹

The Arab pressure grew significantly after the American airlift started. Kissinger argued that the American assistance was a response to Soviet intervention, and not an anti-Arab policy. However, according to the CIA, the Arab threat was a bluff.¹⁵⁰ On October 17, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Algeria jointly reduced their production by 10 percent, and Libya and Bahrain by 5 percent.¹⁵¹ After Nixon requested the American congress to approve the \$2.2 billion military assistance to Israel, Saudi

¹⁴⁴ Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and the October War," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 106.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 112–13.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 111–12.

¹⁴⁷ David S. Painter, "Oil and October War," in *The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 175.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 89.

¹⁵⁰ Painter, "Oil and October War," 175.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 176.

Arabia declared a total embargo of oil shipment to the U.S. Within a few days, other Arab producers adapted the same policy. The embargo would end, according to the Saudis, when Israel withdrew to the 1967 lines.¹⁵² Eventually, Kissinger did not capitulate to the Arab pressure. According to Schlesinger, he observed that "no great power allows itself to be strangled without response".¹⁵³ Reich however concurs, although the "oil weapon" was important in affecting policies elsewhere, it "appeared to have little or no appreciable effect on the United States".¹⁵⁴ The overall impact of the embargo and production cutbacks, according to Painter, was "barely noticeable by the time they ended, but initially they sharply reduced the amount of oil available in international market". In the U.S., serious oil shortages did not occur, but the embargo and production cutbacks intensified economic problems, particularly inflation, "which was now accompanied by stagnation and increased unemployment".¹⁵⁵

Deterrence Hedging

Direct Deterrence

The place direct deterrence had in Israeli policy during the Yom Kippur War derived from the traditional role of independent military might in Israeli national security paradigm. Israel never had a formal document which presents its national security strategy, but Israeli security principles or security concept, as it defined by Israeli experts and expressed in speeches made by Israeli leaders, most notably the security survey conducted by the first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion in 1953.¹⁵⁶ His security principles shaped the Israeli approach, and though they have undergone significant adjustments to the security challenges Israel faced through the years, they still serve

¹⁵² Ibid., 177.

¹⁵³ Reich, "Crisis Management," 173–74.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 169.

¹⁵⁵ Painter, "Oil and October War," 190–91.

¹⁵⁶ Yiśra'el Ṭal, *National Security: The Israeli Experience* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000), vii; Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 269–71; Yehuda Ben Meir and Gabi Siboni, "Between Updated National Security Perception to IDF Strategy," in *IDF Strategy in the Perspective of National Security*, ed. Meir Elran, Gabi Siboni, and Kobi Michael (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2016), 37.

as the basis for the Israeli security concept.¹⁵⁷ In 1973, Ben Gurion's original principles were very dominant in shaping the Israeli strategy which attributed a primary role to deterrence.

The Israeli security concept comprised three principles, or "legs" as referred to in Israeli literature: deterrence, early warning, and decision.¹⁵⁸ Israeli deterrence aims to allay its Arab neighbors to avoid war. Acknowledging the hostile intentions of Israel's neighbors as well as Israel's quantitative inferiority in terms of population, military size and territory, Ben Gurion inferred that the only way for Israel to prevent war was to convince the Arabs that they could not destroy the State of Israel using military power, namely projecting deterrence.¹⁵⁹ As Israel Tal highlights, "the quantitative balance of power precludes any chance of Israel's forcing a conclusive decision upon the Arab states, while the opposite case – that of a final decision over Israel by the Arabs – is credible".¹⁶⁰ He adds, the knowledge that there would be no "second chance for the Israelis, made security perceived as "a fundamental requirement of Israel's very existence, and it has been the main national consideration ever since the War of Independence".¹⁶¹

In order to minimize the quantitative gap between the IDF and the Arab armies, Ben Gurion established a mandatory military service and adapted the very effective and large scale reserve mobilization system of the Swiss.¹⁶² To compensate for the quantitative weakness and achieve military superiority Ben Gurion emphasized the

¹⁵⁷ In the past decade two attempts to formalize the Israeli principles had been made. Between 1997-1999 Then Minister of Defense Yitzhak Mordechai promoted an attempt which did not finalize to update the traditional security principles. In 2005 the Meridor committee wrote a formal document which has never been approved by Prime Minister Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert. In 2015 the IDF published an unclassified version of Israel's military security strategy. Ben Meir and Siboni, "Between Updated National Security Perception to IDF Strategy," 40–41; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "Israeli Defense Forces' Defense Doctrine - English Translation," August 12, 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/26880/israeli_defense_forces_defense_doctrine_english_translation.html.

¹⁵⁸ Ben Meir and Siboni, "Between Updated National Security Perception to IDF Strategy," 37; Avi Kober, "Deterrence, Early Warning and Strategic Decision: The Israeli Security Conception in the Wake of the Gulf War," *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no. 3 (December 1, 1994): 228; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "Israeli Defense Forces' Defense Doctrine - English Translation," 4.

¹⁵⁹ Tal, *National Security*, 51; Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 15.

¹⁶⁰ Tal, *National Security*, 40.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 133–34.

need in qualitative edge over Israel's adversaries.¹⁶³ In his speech on March 4, 1958 Ben Gurion stated: "the prospect for peace with the Arabs depends on the efforts to enhance Israel's power and security from a political, military and economic aspect."¹⁶⁴ His words expressed Israel's solution to its security problem: a high quality army armed with the most advanced weapons, supported by a strong economy and a superpower diplomatic protection could convince the Arabs that they have to accept the existence of the Jewish State and live peacefully with her. Maoz notes, "The Arab states must come to understand that they cannot destroy Israel and that the price for continued conflict is more than they can bear".¹⁶⁵ Hence, for Ben Gurion, deterrence was not merely to a tool to prevent war, but ultimately, to achieve peace.

Ben Gurion was not under the illusion that deterrence could be always guaranteed. If deterrence fails, Israeli intelligence was expected to provide an early warning on imminent threats, and most importantly, on imminent war.¹⁶⁶ This warning was essential to generate the reserve recruitment and prepare preemptive strikes to halt the enemy's offense. After three days the reserve power - most of the IDF manpower – should reach the fronts and render the defensive battles to an offensive campaign.¹⁶⁷ The goal was to achieve what Israelis call "decision" - a clear, decisive and visible victory on the battlefield which allowed for successful political solution and restore deterrence prestige.¹⁶⁸ Ben-Israel expounds, only if Israel's enemies will be knocked out every time they initiate military confrontation, it is possible that after several rounds they will reach the conclusion that may have to find an alternative to military confrontations.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, Israeli deterrence relies mostly on deterrence by punishment which seeks to inflict a severe damage to the enemy if he attacks, as Ariel Levite expound.¹⁷⁰ It should be noted, that unlike the western concept of deterrence, for Israelis deterrence was to be accumulated, and every round should end in an

¹⁶³ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 12–13.

¹⁶⁴ "סיכוי השלום עם הערבים מונח בהגברת כוחה וביטחונה של ישראל מבחינה מדינית, צבאית וכלכלי"¹⁶⁴

Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 77.

¹⁶⁵ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 15.

¹⁶⁶ Tal, *National Security*, 77–80.

¹⁶⁷ Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army, 1948-1973*, 339.

¹⁶⁸ Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, Publications of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, no. 12 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 43.

¹⁶⁹ Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 63.

¹⁷⁰ Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, 42.

increased accumulative deterrence until the Arabs abandon the military option.¹⁷¹ According to Maoz, "Cumulative deterrence means successive and effective uses of force in both limited and massive military encounters".¹⁷²

This Israeli security triangle was the dominant concept in Israel's security establishment in October 1973. In fact, Israeli assessments concluded that both Syria and Egypt were deterred from starting a war: Syria would not fight alone against the IDF and Egypt could not launch an effective attack until it improved its capability to cope with the superiority of the Israeli Air Force.¹⁷³ For Israel, there was one main source for deterrence: the might of the IDF, and it guided the Israeli government on the eve of the war. On October 5, as the reports about the Soviet evacuation and Egyptian and Syrian military mobilizations were accumulated, Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar wished to strengthen Israeli deterrence and publicly stated, "The enemy must know that Zahal [the Israeli defense force] has a long arm, and when this arm reaches the depth of his territory it turns into a fist!".¹⁷⁴

On October 6, after realizing the Israeli intelligence mistake regarding the Egyptian and Syrian intentions, Prime Minister Meir asked Ambassador Keating to send a clear deterring message to Cairo and Damascus. Schiff notes, the assumption was that the Arabs may be deterred at the last moment when they realize that their plans are known.¹⁷⁵ In fact, Meir followed the recommendation put forth by the Chief of Intelligence in the morning cabinet meeting.¹⁷⁶ Kissinger, following her request delivered the message to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin (so he could forward the message to Syrian leadership) and to Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed el-Zayyat: "if they attack, the Israeli response will be extremely aggressive".¹⁷⁷ Even after Israeli leadership unearthed the Arab war plan, they believed war can be prevented by strengthening Israeli deterrence.

¹⁷¹ Doron Almog, "Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism," *Parameters* 34, no. 4 (Winter/2005 2004): 6; Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 63–65.

¹⁷² Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 15.

¹⁷³ Parker, "Introduction," 4.

¹⁷⁴ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 36.

¹⁷⁵ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 42.

¹⁷⁶ Eli Mizrahi, "Summary of the Consultation at the Prime Minister, October 6 1973," *Israelim* 5 (2013): 222.

¹⁷⁷ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 16.

The principle of self-reliance was to be maintained even in the event of war. The Israeli Chief of Staff, Elazar, realizing the military preparations could not be completed according to the original war plan, assessed that the defensive battles would be more difficult than originally predicted. However, he assumed that even if the first Arab attack would result in some achievements, they would be overturned after the reserve forces actively join the fighting. It may take the IDF an extra day or two to move to offensive campaign, but within a week the war could have been rendered to military achievement.¹⁷⁸ Minister of Defense Dayan was even more confident. In the October 6 morning cabinet meeting he assessed that a large reserve recruitment can be deferred as the regular forces positioned in the borders could hold the war far from the Israeli cities.¹⁷⁹ As Israeli confidence was high there was no need to consider external protection.

Nonetheless, Israeli deterrence failed as Egypt and Syria seemingly decided to launch an attack to gain limited achievements – mainly to restore the land lost in the previous war. Israeli intelligence did not provide a sufficient early warning which hindered the IDF ability to fight on October 6. This strategic failure highlighted the second element of Israel's deterrence strategy – namely the American deterrence – which was secondary and received a main role only when Israel's capability to defend herself was severely harmed.

Extended Deterrence

The Israeli discussion about the security concept magnified the military element – the only credible way to convince the Arabs that they cannot defeat Israel by military force is to have a more powerful army than them. Having both the capability and the resolve to use this force to defend the nation should produce a strong deterrent message for Israel's adversaries. Since the nation's survival was permanently on stake, the Israelis saw no room for counting on other powers. This approach of self-reliance is rooted in early Zionism, and gathered to an organized conceptual framework in Ze'ev Jabotinsky's work on the concept of "Iron Wall" which illustrates the Israeli objective. According to Maoz, the "Iron Wall" theme suggests that "Israel has a number of things

¹⁷⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 46–47; Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 42.S, 42; Dado 46–47

¹⁷⁹ Mizrahi, "Summary of the Consultation at the Prime Minister, October 6 1973," 223–26.

working for it in the long run: its staying power, the military blows it hands the Arabs every time they try to attack it, and the development of a model society that outperforms Arab societies".¹⁸⁰ In fact Ben Gurion wished to create an "Iron Wall" to convince the Arabs to deviate from their militant approach. Nonetheless, Israel never adopted a pure form of direct deterrence policy. This is true for the two Zionist thinkers, as well as for the 1973 war.

To enhance the Israeli power Jabotinsky proposed to get British support.¹⁸¹ When his paper was published, in 1923, Great Britain was the greatest superpower and the most influential in the region. When Ben Gurion presented his principles, in 1953, he adhered to the same principle, but did not uphold for a specific power. In fact, he exercised a very cautious policy concerning the relations of the new Jewish state with the two superpowers during the Cold War. In the event of imminent war, the Israeli precondition was the support of one power to prevent international isolation. Maoz expounds, "Israel must ensure the explicit or tacit support of at least one major power before going to war".¹⁸² During the first two decades after the State of Israel was established, the French power showed the most enthusiasm to embrace Israel, but after the 1967 war and the French embargo as a result of it, Israel found a new partner – the U.S.¹⁸³

Adhering to its traditional approach, in October 1973 Israel perceived the American support as complementary to Israel's military. Although the partnership between the two countries significantly increased in the seven years between the Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, American assistance was limited to arms sales and diplomatic protection in the international arena. No American military power was part of Israel's war plan. This was true even in the event of a severe predicament. Hence, when Israel's existence was threatened in the first days of the war, or at least this what the dominant Israeli notion was, no Israeli request for American military manpower was made to the American administration.

¹⁸⁰ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 9.

¹⁸¹ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 11–22.

¹⁸² Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 14.

¹⁸³ Ben-Israel, *Israel Defence Doctrine*, 83.

One may infer that American protection had no role in Israeli strategy, thus, extended deterrence played no role in October 1973. This argument, however, overlooks the Israeli concept of its deterrence policy. For Israel, its deterrence is directly influenced from its capacity to conduct a short war. As mentioned earlier, after deterrence collapses, the IDF should initiate a blitzkrieg to gain rapid military achievements: to avoid international pressure to stop the war before the IDF meets its objectives and to end the war before it becomes an attrition war which can allow for a shift in the balance of power.¹⁸⁴ To do this, American protection is necessary. The U.S. could block a Soviet or an Arab diplomatic initiative to force a cease fire before the IDF completes its plan, and could push for a cease fire when Israeli goals are met. The U.S. was also the main logistical "breathing path" in case of a long war. The American logistical support provided Israel with the capability to maintain its military superiority for a significantly longer period than otherwise Israel could have done. This enhanced deterrence against the Arabs as long as they knew they could not expect to change the balance of power using attrition war. According to Janice Gross Stein, when preparing for the war the Egyptian General Staff attributed a high value for what they perceived as American unconditional support for Israel.¹⁸⁵

In the Cold War atmosphere, the American protection had also a military aspect which contributed indirectly to the Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis the Arabs. Washington was a deterrent factor against a Soviet intervention in Israeli-Arab confrontations, presumably next to the Arab side. This type of Soviet intervention could obviously change the balance of power between Israel and its adversaries, and severely damage Israeli deterrence. American protection, thus, guaranteed that the threat to Israel would be limited to its neighbors – a threat which Jerusalem already proved to be able to withstand – and that in the case of Soviet intervention, the small Israeli power would get the support of the most powerful country on earth. Kissinger acknowledged the American contribution to Israeli deterrence. "In order to get the fighting stopped


¹⁸⁴ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 14.

¹⁸⁵ Stein, "The Failures of Deterrence and Intelligence," 82.

we cannot give the Soviets and Arabs the impression that we are separating too far from the Israelis. That will keep it going," he told General Haig on October 6.¹⁸⁶

Experts who adhere to the traditional concept of extended deterrence may focus on the American resolve to balance against a potential Soviet intervention, or may infer that extended deterrence had no part in Israeli deterrence strategy. In both cases, they would miss the Israeli view, and the deterrence hedging as a result of it. Israel's direct deterrence element was indeed strong. However, it did not stand alone in Israeli strategy. For Israelis, American protection aimed to strengthen Israeli deterrence by perpetuating the Israeli military edge. On the deterrence scale, Israeli deterrence hedging should be located on the right side, close to the edge, as illustrated in Figure 11. However, treating it as a form of direct deterrence would ignore the highly important role American protection played during the 1973 war.

Figure 11 *The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging – Israel (1973)*



In fact, in the Yom Kippur War, Washington was the one to block the Syrian cease fire initiative in the UN which was supported but not promoted by Moscow since October 10. After the Israeli offensive succeeded on both fronts, Sadat joined Assad's call for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal to the pre-war lines. The Arab pledge faced an American objection.¹⁸⁷ After Israel exploited the Egyptian local violations of the October 22 cease fire to encircle the Third Egyptian Army, Egypt desperately urged its Soviet ally along with direct pledges to Washington to force IDF to withdraw and break

¹⁸⁶ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 43.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 273.

the continental blockade.¹⁸⁸ The U.S. was the only force to prevent a bad UN Security Council Resolution to Jerusalem, which could compel it to withdraw and thus release the Egyptian captured force.

For the Israelis, nevertheless, the most important American contribution during the war was the airlift. Due to the strategic surprise, the Israeli war plan was never implemented and IDF faced a series logistical predicament. Israel, which has a very limited capability to fight long wars to begin with, faced a logistical shortage due to war losses and real danger of emptying the stocks, when there was no sign for the war's end. Not only Jerusalem was concerned from the possibility of an attrition war, it was alerted from the military capacity to defend the country in the current confrontation. The most dramatic reaction was Minister of Defense Dayan's. After returning from a visit in the fronts in the second day of the war Dayan declared: "This is a war on the 'Third Temple', not for Sinai", meaning it was a war for the future of the entire state.¹⁸⁹ The perception grew in Dayan was that the Arabs would not stop in the current line. They would agree to a cease-fire and restart the war within a month exploiting Israeli moral, economic, and military fatigue. Therefore, Dayan recommended to evacuate the lines and redeploy IDF forces in defensive lines in Sharm a-Shekh and the slopes of the Golan Heights – the last place where the IDF can protect the State of Israel.¹⁹⁰ Bar Joseph notes, "if Dayan's proposal was accepted, the tactical defeat of the war's first day could have become a strategic defeat in the war as a whole".¹⁹¹

According to an interview Avner Cohen conducted with Arnan "Sini" Azaryahu, the aide of Minister Israel Galili, the impression Dayan got from his visit to the battle field was so strong he suggested to Prime Minister Meir to prepare the nuclear option "for demonstration".¹⁹² According to Azaryahu, both Minister Alon and Minister Galili

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 318–21.

¹⁸⁹ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 92.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 229–31.

¹⁹² Interview with Arnan "Sini" Azaryahu, interview by Avner Cohen, January 2008, The Avner Cohen Collection, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahu>.

immediately rejected this proposition. The discussion was ended when Meir told Dayan "forget it".

To understand the impact of Dayan's words one should grasp the role he was playing in shaping the Israeli ethos of the IDF's prestige after the big victory in the Six Day War. In 1967, Schiff writes, he became "the war leader. Who led and enthused both the army and the nation".¹⁹³ He adds, Therefore the military leadership had "to balance the depressing and terrible effect of Dayan's presence".¹⁹⁴ After sharing his dark estimation of the situation Dayan put his resignation on the table: "if you think there is somebody more capable of handling the duties of defense minister, then give it to him", he told Meir. She immediately replied, "God forbid!", and conclude this discussion.¹⁹⁵

The situation as it perceived in the central command in Tel Aviv was indeed dire. In the first two days of the fighting 724 Israeli soldiers were killed – more than during the entire Six Day War.¹⁹⁶ Kissinger explains, "you have to multiply that by a hundred to get the equivalent American casualties".¹⁹⁷ The military leadership in the headquarters knew on October 7 that without rapidly managing to deploy a strong defensive lines in the Sinai and on the Jordan River, there would be no military power who could stop the Arabs from reaching Israel's cities.¹⁹⁸ Nonetheless, Elazar did not accept Dayan's pessimistic estimation. He argued that this was a difficult war, which Israel had not fought since the War of Independence, but he saw no reason to retreat.¹⁹⁹ His opinion, as expressed to Meir, was that if the situation gets worse, than Dayan's plan could be considered. Elazar was mainly apprehensive of the erosion of the IAF. The continued heavy losses and extraordinary rate of use of munitions could have brought it to a redline in few days.²⁰⁰ On October 11 his staff had estimated that the IAF would reach the dreaded red-line status within five days.²⁰¹ Minister of Trade and Industry and ex-

¹⁹³ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 147.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 93.

¹⁹⁶ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 90.

¹⁹⁷ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 72.

¹⁹⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 71.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 129.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 109.

²⁰¹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 105.

Chief of Staff, Haim Bar Lev, too, after returning from the South called Golda and shared his estimation of the situation: "the situation is bad. Perhaps very bad, but not desperate".²⁰²

From day one Israel sent Washington a request for military assistance. The Israeli list in the first days of the war were relatively modest, reflecting the Israeli over-optimism and confidence in the beginning of the fighting. The first resupply request included merely 200 tons of equipment which should be carried in the air only if "an emergency comes up".²⁰³ By the end of first week, the Israeli list had lengthened and included advanced weapons and F-4 Phantom jets. The American response to Israeli request in the first days was slower than expected in Jerusalem. On October 6 Kissinger told Mordechai Shalev, Israeli minister in Washington, "We will almost certainly approve tomorrow the military equipment within reason that you may need, especially if the Soviets line up with the Arabs; then we will certainly do it".²⁰⁴ In the first days of the war, as Schiff notes, the dominant notion in Israel was that "Washington only listens without replying".²⁰⁵ As the situation on the battle field became difficult, the Israeli pressure was more intense and the frustration from the American lack of delivery increased.

Only on September 14, after a personal appeal from the Israeli Prime Minister, did Nixon instruct Kissinger to use the American fleet to conduct the airlift to Ben-Gurion Airport.²⁰⁶ Meir arrived at the airport and hugged the two American pilots.²⁰⁷ Her reaction genuinely expressed the hope and relief in Israel after receiving the delayed American assistance.

The causes for the delay are still subjected to historical debate. Part of the delay was an outgrowth of miscommunication between Israeli representatives and American officials. In the first days of the war Israel did not convey the message of urgency in the resupply as well as the Israeli logistical restraints to carry the growing list of military aid necessitated for the war. On October 9, Kissinger informed Dinitz that the

²⁰² Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 3.

²⁰³ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 45.

²⁰⁴ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 50.

²⁰⁵ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 95.

²⁰⁶ Nixon, *RN*, 927.

²⁰⁷ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 217.

president had ordered the delivery of consumables and aircraft. Kissinger shared his colleague that the heavy equipment would reach not before the war is over. According to Kissinger, Dinitz suggested El Al planes for the delivery, "There was no talk of an American airlift – except if tanks were urgently needed in an emergency".²⁰⁸ However as Matti Golan notes, "In the condition Israel was in at the time this was like begging the poor".²⁰⁹ Even after Kissinger was aware of the Israeli logistical shortage, the prevalent notion in the Pentagon was that there is no urgency. According to Kissinger, even on October 11, after the Israeli first offensive effort had failed, the defense department estimated there is no urgency. In Washington, the estimation was that Israel still possessed stocks for two weeks and the war would end earlier.²¹⁰

Another cause for the delay was an American decision to postpone the aid as long as possible to avoid crisis with the Arab allies, and particularly in face of the risk of being banned by the Arab oil countries. In his letter to Kissinger, William Quandt argued that "if we act too early or too visibly on this key issue, we will insure attacks on US citizens and an oil embargo in key Arab states". As was mentioned earlier, this American apprehension can be found between Kissinger and Nixon.²¹¹ Bernard Reich explicates, "The United States, assuming that the fighting would be over in a few days, tried to limit its involvement and to maintain a low profile because of concern about the Arab reaction".²¹² Kissinger himself writes in his memoirs, "We sought to give Israel the confidence and the means to face the next few crucial days when the outcome hung as much on Israel's self-assurance as on its arms. But we also strove for a low profile in the method of resupply; we were conscious of the need to preserve the American position in the Arab world".²¹³ Therefore, even when Nixon instructed Kissinger "The Israelis must not be allowed to lose",²¹⁴ he did not want American planes to carry the supply out of the fear of Arab reaction. The State Department and the Department of Defense initiated negotiations with commercial airlines. They rejected to deliver the supply due to security and political reasons and the lack of assertive pressure from the

²⁰⁸ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 153.

²⁰⁹ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 53.

²¹⁰ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 179.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

²¹² Reich, "Crisis Management," 163.

²¹³ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 159.

²¹⁴ Reich, "Crisis Management," 164.

Pentagon left the American navy as the only available option to Nixon when he finally acceded to Meir's pledge.

In his talks with Dinitz, Kissinger blamed the Ministry of Defense for holding the American assistance: "That's a bigger problem now than we thought. I must tell you, don't go running around Defense. Scowcroft will handle it".²¹⁵ Siniver notes, "Remarkably, Dinitz did not question Kissinger's assertion that his hands were tied by the bureaucracy. As arguably the most powerful man in Washington at the time, it was unlikely that Kissinger was constrained by Defense Secretary Schlesinger, who at the time had been in office for only three months".²¹⁶ According to Quandt, Kissinger instructed Schlesinger: "I remember Kissinger saying to Schlesinger in one of the meetings, 'You are going to have to bear the responsibility for whatever delay there is because I have to deal with the Israelis on the diplomatic front. Nixon and I cannot be viewed as the problem; right now, is not the time'".²¹⁷ Golan contends, "Kissinger calculated that the military aid to Israel, while not making the crucial difference in the field, could damage the still hoped-for cooperation with Moscow and future relations with the Arab countries".²¹⁸

Kissinger's ploy was very successful as indicated in Abba Eban testified: "Our heroes were Nixon and Kissinger. Our enemies were the Pentagon and Schlesinger".²¹⁹ However, the American delay held an operational price, particularly in the northern front. On October 12, Dinitz informed Kissinger that Israel halted its offensive campaign in Syria due to lack of ammunition.²²⁰ This was a valid report. According to Elazar, due to the American delay the IDF limited its aerial activities in the crucial day of October 9.²²¹ In the south Meir halted the crossing of the Suez Canal until the airlift started.²²² More importantly though was the Israeli feeling that while they struggle for their survival their closest ally had other considerations that surpassed this

²¹⁵ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 91.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

²¹⁷ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 92.

²¹⁸ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 46.

²¹⁹ Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance*, 1st ed (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 163.

²²⁰ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 212.

²²¹ Bartov, *Dado*, 139.

²²² Eriksson, "Israel and the October War," 40.

consideration. A prominent example is the testimony of General Yeshayahu Bareket, the Air Force attaché in Washington given at a conference, "40 years since the Yom Kippur War". When describing the meeting between the Israeli delegation to Washington and the American President, Bareket said he was amazed to hear the president discussing the portions to disguise the American assistance. In response to this discussion, he said: "this morning I drove from my house to the Pentagon. Suddenly I did not see the road as tears emerged in my eyes. I, General Bareket, a hero, for I thought what do I do here? Whom do I represent? Do I have a state at all? do I have a place to return? And I sit here hearing you discussing what color should the planes' tails be. We don't ask for American soldiers, we don't want American blood, we will do the job. Just assist us with the tools".²²³ A similar frustration is described in the IDF attaché to Washington, Mordechai "Motta" Gur.²²⁴

On October 13, Dinitz showed a more determined approach in his meeting with Kissinger: "If a massive American airlift to Israel does not start immediately, then I'll know that the United States is reneging on its promises and its policy, and we will have to draw very serious conclusions from all of this".²²⁵ Siniver explains that this was a threat that Israel would seek support in the American congress, making the American delay another potential criticism against the already flagellated administration.²²⁶ For the first time since the war started the American president was personally involved: "Goddamn it, use every one we have. Tell them [the Pentagon] to send everything that can fly".²²⁷ Golan concludes, "For Israel the need for supplies was an agony of life-and-death proportions. For Henry Kissinger, it was a golden opportunity, and provided the leverage to achieve his political objective – or so he thought".²²⁸ According to Bayne, "When President Nixon decided that here would be an American airlift, the

²²³ Institute for National Security Studies, *The Story of Yeshayahu Bareket: Dark Moments at the White House, 40 Years since the Yom Kippur War* (Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgcJMyGQJ9Y>.

²²⁴ Gur, *From the North and from the West*, 210–12.

²²⁵ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 92.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 45.

Israelis had less than a two-week supply of ammunition. By the time the airlift arrived, the IDF had ammunitions for little over a week".²²⁹

Eventually the American Operation, Nickel Grass had a significant contribution to Israel. First, Washington signaled Moscow that a Soviet intervention would trigger an American response. Bayne stresses that the airlift "demonstrated that the United States was going to support Israel directly, not just through the United Nations or NATO".²³⁰ Second, the airlift signaled the American resolve to support its ally in face of the Soviet massive resupply to the Arabs to protect Israeli military superiority. The Egyptian Director of Operations, General Muhammad al-Gamasy highlights the operational magnitude of American support: "The United States' positive response was a life-giving artery to Israel...without the direct and flagrant assistance from the United States, Israel would not have been able to mark the success of the last phase of the war".²³¹ Third, it provided Israeli society with a morale boost after experiencing strategic surprise and loss of national confidence.²³² According to Mordechai Gazit, "Not only psychologically, but from a point of view of the morale boost for the Israeli army and the Israeli population, the airlift was of tremendous importance". David Rodman, too, highlights this aspect: "it demonstrated to Israelis that they were not entirely isolated in a hostile world".²³³ He also notes, "the psychological importance of superpower support for a small, beleaguered country with few reliable friends in the international system at a moment of grave national peril should not be dismissed lightly".²³⁴

Altogether, it seems that the American airlift improved Israel's military capability to restore its deterrence in the war and in the aftermath of it. Rodman however states, "Overall, American arms transfers made a rather modest contribution to Israel's military victory in the Yom Kippur War. The establishment of the arms pipeline came too late to influence events on the Golan front, as Israel defeated Syria (and its Arab allies) before American assistance began to reach the Jewish State in significant

²²⁹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 86.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 88.

²³¹ Reich, "Crisis Management," 164.

²³² Eriksson, "Israel and the October War," 40.

²³³ Rodman, "The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War," 112.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 112–13.

amounts. On the Sinai front, the tide of battle had turned in Israel's favor before American arms transfers began to reach IDF forces. While these arms bolstered the IDF's cross-canal offensive in the last days of the war, the US ultimately stepped in to limit the Jewish State's triumph on this front. From a strictly military point of view, Israel benefited most from the American arms pipeline after the end of the war, when the IDF rebuilt and expanded its order of battle".²³⁵

It is worth noting that after receiving the new Israeli intelligence estimate Kissinger ordered to prepare the Sixth fleet for deployment: "It will probably take us a week to round up the sailors. We will have to move it by tomorrow if something is going on", he told General Alexander Haig, the White House Chief of Staff.²³⁶ However, this American signal was not aimed toward Israel's adversaries on the battle field. On October 11 Kissinger clarified to Egypt's Foreign Minister, "No United States forces are involved in military operations. No United States forces will be involved in any way unless other powers intervene from outside the area with direct military action..."²³⁷ Virtually, along the obvious threat of dragging USSR into the conflict, The U.S. signaled its resolve to stay militarily distant from its ally as long as the Soviets stayed out. The U.S was very clear regarding its reluctance to join the conflict militarily.

This leads to the traditional form of American extended deterrence as it was unearthed in October 24. After receiving the Soviet threat of possible unilateral action, Kissinger signaled his resolve to deter Moscow by sending the American response which virtually rejected the Soviet proposal for joint force to be dispatched to the region, along with the high alert of the US military. From the first day of the war Kissinger and Haig agreed that Washington "cannot be soft" against the Soviets.²³⁸ However, the American reaction was unpredictable in Moscow and increased the tensions between the two superpowers as well as the risk of nuclear escalation. In his memoir, Kissinger notes, "We were not prepared to send American troops to Egypt, nor would we accept the dispatch of Soviet forces. We had not worked for years to reduce the Soviet military presence in Egypt only to cooperate in reintroducing it as

²³⁵ Ibid., 112.

²³⁶ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 28.

²³⁷ Ibid., 193.

²³⁸ Ibid., 63.

the result of a U.N. resolution".²³⁹ As Kissinger's goal was to weaken the Soviets in the Middle East he was resolved to show his commitment to help his Israeli ally if the Soviet act unilaterally.

This accident indicated for another crucial aspect in the American umbrella. Though its direct target was USSR, the American protection indirectly influenced the calculus of the Arabs. They could not align to the Soviet in order to improve their military capability without triggering a counter American-Israeli response. Since they could not have a Soviet support without an American response they had to choose between a situation in which they have inferior position in respect to the Israeli army, and a new situation that bring the two nuclear superpowers to an edge of a military confrontation on their soil.

This American move virtually strengthened Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis its adversaries. On November 13, 1973, Prime Minister Meir attributed the American threats a great success: "The Soviet threat was heard to dispatch forces to Egypt in order to compel Israel to withdraw to the lines of October 22... We are convinced that thanks to the alert declared by the President of the United States in the American armed forces, undesirable developments were averted".²⁴⁰ But the American protection did not come without a price. As Schiff notes, "Soviet intervention has created increased Israeli dependence on the United States".²⁴¹ This is the subject of the next section.

Deterrence-Independence Dilemma

What can account for the Israeli deterrence hedging? In this case, again, one can evaluate the unique contribution of the concept of deterrence-independence dilemma. Deterrence is a main objective in Israel's national security unwritten doctrine. For Israelis, only deterrence can enlarge the intervals between cycles of fighting, and ultimately convince Israel's neighbors to have peaceful relations with her. Simultaneously, preserving independent capability to protect the nation is part of the Israeli security ethos. For example, in 1954 Israel's Prime Minister Moshe Sharett expressed his objection to an American-Israeli Pact: We have "opposed to her

²³⁹ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 331.

²⁴⁰ Reich, "Crisis Management," 168.

²⁴¹ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 291.

humiliating military supervision... it would mean the increase of dependency on the United States and the decrease of our independence".²⁴² Ariel Sharon was concerned from the implication of the American airlift during the Yom Kippur War. He argued that the absolute reliance on the American assistance strengthened his concern from the risk of being too dependent on Washington.²⁴³ Maoz concludes the Israeli approach: "Israel should prefer independence of action over binding alliances that might limit its freedom of action".²⁴⁴ He expounds, "Israeli policymakers generally considered the liabilities of a defense pact – the constraints it would impose on Israel's freedom of action and the questionable reliability of even the friendliest state – to outweigh the benefit of such an alliance".²⁴⁵ This was true also for the relationship with the U.S. Pressman concludes that when aligning with the U.S., "Israel welcomed material support, but it wanted no strings attached".²⁴⁶

For Israelis, these two objectives: deterrence and independence, are mutually dependent. Israel has to preserve its freedom to act in order to maintain a credible deterrence, and strong Israeli independent deterrence ensure great political latitude. If Israel's enemies assess that it might hesitate to use its power due to international pressure, Israeli deterrence would be undermined and may even fail to prevent an Arab assault. Moreover, in case of deterrence failure, Israeli freedom of action is necessary for powerful response whose aim is to restore deterrence and increase Israel's cumulative deterrence vis-à-vis its neighbors.

However, often these two values cannot be fully accomplished. This was the case in October 1973. On two subjects, Israeli leadership was required to balance between the desire for deterrence against Syria and Egypt, and independence from the American pressure. An analysis of Israeli behavior on this issues indicates that Israeli leadership was willing to compromise its independence only when it estimated deterrence was strong. When Jerusalem assessed deterrence was weak, it was

²⁴² Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948-1956*, LSE Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 262.

²⁴³ Ariel Sharon and David Chanoff, *Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 345.

²⁴⁴ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 15.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 87.

determined to maintain independence as much as possible, as long as its behavior does not jeopardize the alliance with Washington, thus, weakening the Israeli deterrence prestige.

The first event was the Israeli decision to avoid a preemptive strike even when it was clear that war was imminent. This happened on October 6, when Israeli intelligence received credible information that Egypt and Syria planned to start a joint attack on the evening of the same day. In the cabinet meeting in the morning Minister of Defense Dayan was against a preemptive strike. When explaining the decision to deviate from the Israeli war plan, Dayan highlighted that it was imperative that Israel would not be blamed for the war. Anyway, he argued, Israel could react quickly if the Arabs attack: if Syria attack first, the IAF can strike Egypt, and vice versa.²⁴⁷ Chief of Staff Elazar held the opposite position. He thought preemptive strike could save many lives and seriously damage the Arab offensive.²⁴⁸ Moreover, he described the move as a preventive strike rather than a preemptive one – which does not exculpate the Arabs from being the aggressors.²⁴⁹

In fact, when Elazar received the news about the coming war, he initiated the plan and increase alert in the army. Israeli Air force was instructed to be ready to launch a preemptive strike on October 6 at 1 PM (one hour before the eruption of the war and five hours before the expected time).²⁵⁰ He agreed to postpone the final decision in few hours hoping Washington would understand the situation and support his recommendation. However, no Israeli attempt to get an American approval was made. Meir embraced Dayan's stance though this option "attracts the heart".²⁵¹ In her autobiography she recalls, "'Dado', I said, ' I know all the arguments in favor of a preemptive strike, but I am against it. We don't now know, any of us, what the future will

²⁴⁷ Mizrachi, "Summary of the Consultation at the Prime Minister, October 6 1973," 219.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 220–21.

²⁴⁹ Bartov, *Dado*, 23.

²⁵⁰ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 2; Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 397.

²⁵¹ Mizrachi, "Summary of the Consultation at the Prime Minister, October 6 1973," 223–24.

hold, but there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we will get nothing from anyone... with heavy heart I am going to say no".²⁵²

Israeli decision to concede aerial strike revealed an abnormal Israeli behavior. Unlike in 1967, when Israel conducted a very successful air strike which destroyed the Egyptian air force in less than three hours and ensured an Israeli aerial superiority throughout the confrontation, in 1973 Israel was restrained. The American objection was an important consideration in Israeli decision but its influence was subjected first of all to Israeli confidence in its power. In other words, the Israeli overconfidence allowed for an American successful restraint impact. According to Schiff, "Israel's political isolation and dependence on the United States are factors that influence the minister's decision [to avoid preemption]. The feeling that the occupied territories form a sufficient defensive belt to absorb the first blow, and that the balance of forces is in any case in the IDF's favor, play a part".²⁵³ The Israeli calculus was best presented by the Deputy to the Prime Minister Allon: Israel can allow to leave the initiative to the Arabs to protect its political assets in the international arena.²⁵⁴

In fact, Israeli civilian leadership, led by Dayan, was confident in Israel's capability to deter the Arabs by signaling them they discovered their plan, and successfully conduct war with them if they decide to adhere to their war plan.²⁵⁵ Golan claims that when the Israeli leadership nullified the option of preemptive strike they believed "they were making a great military sacrifice for the sake of their friendship with the United States".²⁵⁶ According to Golan, Meir wanted Kissinger to be aware of the Israeli decision and immediately after the Prime Minister Meir made the decision she met Ambassador Keating and informed him about her decision.²⁵⁷

After getting the updated Israeli estimation that war was to start, less than two hours before it actually did, Kissinger quickly acted to prevent this prediction. His strategy was to rely on Israel's deterrence while ensuring Israel do not preempt, as Golda promised. Kissinger was subjected to both Israeli and American intelligence failure,

²⁵² Eriksson, "Israel and the October War," 39.

²⁵³ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 41.

²⁵⁴ Nakdimon, *Low Probability*, 127.

²⁵⁵ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 190–99.

²⁵⁶ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 44.

²⁵⁷ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 41–42.

and was convinced that the Arabs would not attack Israel. The day before Kissinger received the CIA report to the president that "The military preparations that have occurred do not indicate that any party intends to initiate hostilities".²⁵⁸ On October 6 the message from the Israeli Prime Minister was that "Since the Arabs were certain to be defeated...the crisis must result from their misunderstanding of Israeli intentions".²⁵⁹ Kissinger admits, "my view was still colored by the consistent Israeli reports, confirmed by U.S. intelligence dispatches, that such an attack was nearly impossible".²⁶⁰ Golan opines, "Till the very outbreak of the fighting, however, Kissinger remained more concerned with the possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike than an Egyptian-Syrian attack... He was not much worried about the outcome of the war and estimated it would last at most three or four days, leaving the Egyptian and Syrian armies destroyed".²⁶¹

Kissinger did not have to work hard to get Israeli restraint. When Ambassador Keating met Meir, he received her word for Israeli restraint. As Hanoch Bartov writes, "Keating heard an already made decision".²⁶² When Kissinger first heard about the new situation in the Middle East, an Israeli decision was already given. Israeli deterrence and military superiority allowed Meir to forgo one of Israel's great military advantages. After deterrence collapsed and Israeli confidence was no longer high, Israeli resolve to maintain independence and withstand serious American pressures increased, as the next part illustrates.

The second disputed issue between Israel and the U.S. was the American decision to promote a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. As was mentioned earlier, Kissinger's strategy sought to end the fighting with an Israeli advantage, but to avoid an Egyptian humiliation, and to initiate negotiations between the two countries using an American mediation. Schiff notes, "The United States neither wants an Israeli failure, nor a decisive victory that will make after negotiation difficult".²⁶³ As long as the Arab campaign was successful, both the U.S. and Israeli shared the same interest

²⁵⁸ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 13.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger*, 41–42.

²⁶² Bartov, *Dado*, 25.

²⁶³ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 264.

– to delay a cease-fire resolution and gain more time until Israel launches a successful attack. After the momentum shifted to the Israeli side, a growing gap between Jerusalem and Washington emerged. The more successful the Israeli counter offensive was, the deeper the friction within the U.S.-Israel so called alliance became.

The herald of the tensions appeared to be in the discussion on the American airlift. Apart from the bureaucratic and political causes for the delay, Kissinger's plan was to use the assistance as leverage over Israel in the aftermath of the crisis. Siniver expounds, "One reason for the delay was the administration's desire to keep its options open at the end of the war".²⁶⁴ On October 7 Kissinger told Haig, "if we don't help them [the Israelis], they won't come out ahead and we will wind up with nothing".²⁶⁵ According to Nixon, too, the airlift was an instrument for the post-war negotiations: "In order to have the influence we need to bring Israel to a settlement, we have to have their confidence".²⁶⁶ Peter Rodman concludes, Kissinger "wanted Israel to be aware, at all times, that it was dependent on us and that it had to be responsive to what we had in mind on the diplomacy".²⁶⁷

However, the misconception of Israeli power characterized the American decision making throughout the first week of the war. It led to a very sluggish response. For instance, on October 6 at 9AM (two hours after the war started) the first Washington special Action Group (WSAG) gathered. The intelligence estimate was still confused: "We [the intelligence agencies] can find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian/Syrian offensive across the Canal and in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the weight evidence indicates an action-reaction situation where a series of responses by each side to perceived threats created an increasingly dangerous potential for confrontation".²⁶⁸ On October 8, in a conversation with Kissinger Nixon said, "Fortunately, the Israelis will beat these guys so badly I hope that we can make sort of reasonable [proposal]".²⁶⁹ While the Israeli Minister of Defense talked about "the destruction of the Third Temple", President Nixon was apprehensive from an

²⁶⁴ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 91.

²⁶⁵ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 97.

²⁶⁶ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 93.

²⁶⁷ Reich, "Crisis Management," 165.

²⁶⁸ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 33.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 142.

absolutely different issue: " The one thing we have to be concerned about, which you and I know looking down the road, is that the Israelis, when they finish clobbering the Egyptians and Syrians, which they will do, will be even more impossible to deal with than before... "²⁷⁰. Nixon expressed the dominant American concern in the first days – not from an Israeli defeat, but how to instigate the Israelis to come to the negotiation table in the aftermath of another big victory.

On October 6, Kissinger shared his estimation with the British Ambassador in Washington, "we suspect within a couple of days, unless our judgment is really off, the Arabs will be on their knees begging us to do this [calling for a return for the cease-fire lines and call for a cease fire]".²⁷¹ In a talk with the Republican Senator Jacob Javits, Kissinger stated, "We are assuming that the Israelis can take care of themselves. If this is wrong, we have to go back to the drawing board".²⁷² However, in the first days of the war, Kissinger did not comprehend the American misperception of Israeli power, thus, he did not go back to the drawing board. This can explain why Kissinger instructed the American Ambassador at the UN in the evening of the first day of the war, "If the military situation takes a turn and Israel starts beating up on the Arabs, it should be kept in mind that we are prepared to stick, even if – with the resolution for a status quo ante".²⁷³ This proposal will be utterly rejected in Israel.

Only on October 9, Kissinger realized "Israel stood on the threshold of a war of attrition that it could not possibly win, given the disparity of manpower". Hence, he concluded, "An Israeli victory based on its existing inventory, supplemented by a limited amount of special high-tech equipment from the United States, was no longer possible. A major resupply effort of Israel would be necessary if the war were to be brought to a rapid conclusion".²⁷⁴ However even then, according to Kissinger, the CIA Director William Colby estimated that "Israel was doing well on the Syrian front and holding its own in the Sinai; Israel was simply trying to obtain the maximum military aid from us

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 139.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 59.

²⁷² Ibid., 46.

²⁷³ Ibid., 65.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 145.

before victory, as a sign of unrestricted support not so much for the war as for the period afterward".²⁷⁵

Eventually, the American administration adhered to its approach, and linked between the American assistance and the cease-fire. On October 19 Nixon asked the Congress to approve a \$2.2 billion defense assistance to compensate for Israeli losses. In his speech he also stated "The United States is making every effort to end the dispute quickly and honorably, in days and not in weeks".²⁷⁶ Before his speech he sent a letter to Meir underscoring the magnitude of the cease-fire for the U.S. The American understatement about the affinity between the airlift and the cease-fire initiative was clear to Israel.²⁷⁷ For Jerusalem it was not clear, however, whether Kissinger's sudden travel to Moscow on the same day would postpone the cease-fire or would accelerate it.²⁷⁸ Israel did not want to stop its advancement and opposed the asymmetrical solution proposed by the Soviets on behalf of the Arabs. Israeli demand was that if Israel was required to withdraw in the north, Egypt would have to withdraw in the South.

On October 22 Kissinger discussed the details of the cease-fire resolution with the Israeli leadership. Meir was upset for getting a "take it or leave it" resolution which was not discussed with Israel beforehand. Siniver notes, Prime Minister Meir was "'absolutely mad with Kissinger' for dictating an agreement on which she was not consulted".²⁷⁹

However, the main Israeli concern was not about the details of the cease-fire agreement but the post-agreement reality. Israeli misgiving was best presented by Elazar in the cabinet meeting: Israeli forces did not accomplish their offensive mission, nor did they deploy on defensible lines. The threat was that the Arab states would exploit the break to reorganize their armies and reinitiate war. Israel will thus lose the current momentum it holds and would face a war in worse conditions.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 147.

²⁷⁶ Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 265.

²⁷⁷ Bartov, *Dado*, 285; Gur, *From the North and from the West*, 211.

²⁷⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 284.

²⁷⁹ Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 94.

²⁸⁰ Bartov, *Dado*, 309.

The meeting with Kissinger on October 22 left the Israeli leadership suspicious: Is Kissinger a true friend of Israel? Will Washington reposition herself toward the Arabs and may even stop the airlift? Or may it accede to Israeli moves?²⁸¹ During the meeting Kissinger suggested that Washington would accept an Israeli violation of the cease-fire: "You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I'm flying". Meir replied, "If they don't stop we won't". Kissinger interrupted, "even if they do...".²⁸² Siniver concludes, "After deliberately delaying the supply of much-needed arms to Israel during the first week of the war, Kissinger was now willingly turning a blind eye to a hypothetical Israeli violation of the cease-fire".²⁸³

On October 23, the message from Washington was clear: stop the offensive activities.²⁸⁴ Moreover, the American Secretary of State urged Israeli government to show sign to return to the cease-fire lines of October 22, in the spirit of UN Security Resolution 339. Israel's response was the following: when Egypt started the war the world remained silent and did not demand an immediate Egyptian withdrawal. Now when we are on offense both the West and the East come to help them.²⁸⁵ Israel was resolved to take advantage of the Egyptian violations to deepen the Israeli hold in the western side of the Canal. According to Kissinger, "Golda informed us that Israel would not comply with the proposed solution or even talk about it".²⁸⁶

On October 24 Kissinger conveyed an American threat of dissociating from Israel if it does not comply. This threat also implied stopping the airlift.²⁸⁷ In an early morning meeting of the Israeli cabinet on October 25 Elazar opposed the American request: returning to the October 22 lines means to take from Israel its gains and return to an intolerable military situation.²⁸⁸ If the Egyptian decide to attack they will find Israeli forces exposed in vulnerable defensive lines. Eventually the compromise decided was that Israel would allow for humanitarian relief for the Third Army while staying on the

²⁸¹ Ibid., 327.

²⁸² Memcon, Meir, Gazit, Kissinger and Rudman, 22 October 1973, 1:35 p.w. – 2:15 p.m. RG 59, SN 70-73, POL 7 US/Kissinger, National Archives as cited in Siniver, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 95.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Bartov, *Dado*, 328.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 333.

²⁸⁶ Kissinger, *Crisis*, 315.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 330.

²⁸⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 348.

October 25 lines despite a new UN Security Council Resolution 340 which formally called for the withdrawal of the October 22 lines.²⁸⁹ The actual lines to which both sides will retreat will be determined by them in future negotiations.

This was an important achievement for Israel. Despite heavy American pressure Israel protected its biggest military gain in the southern front. According to Bartov Israeli determination to oppose the American pressure ensured post war negotiations from a superior position.²⁹⁰ According to Boyne, this "artful compromise" was "the first step in a long series of negotiations that would lead to the Geneva Middle Peace Conference and ultimately to Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel in 1977".²⁹¹

This compromise was not seen as a great political success in Israel, and particularly within the military command center. The dominant feeling was that victory was stolen and IDF was stopped before it could subdue the Egyptian army.²⁹² A complete victory was not only necessary to restore the national confidence and morale after Israeli society experienced an existential threat and the biggest challenge since the establishment of the state; destroying the Egyptian army was essential, in the eyes of the Israelis, to enhance deterrence, to guarantee that Egypt would not be able to initiate a new war soon, and to start negotiations from a strong position. When victory was not achieved, it was no secret that Israel was stopped by its close ally. In her speech on October 25 Meir publicly stated that Israel accede to the American pledge for a cease-fire.²⁹³ In a discussion of the military leadership one day earlier Elazar explained, "the airlift created a dependency on the U.S. which obliged us to accept the cease fire which was decided by Washington".²⁹⁴

Unlike in the beginning of the war, when confronting the question of cease-fire Israel was not receptive to American pledges to concede its independence, though the American pressure was significantly heavier in respect to the decision to shun a preemptive strike. The severe predicament Israeli society faced and the strategic magnitude which was attributed to the cease-fire did not allow the leadership to be

²⁸⁹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 262–63.

²⁹⁰ Bartov, *Dado*, 350–51.

²⁹¹ Boyne, *The Two O'clock War*, 263.

²⁹² Schiff, *October Earthquake*, 288.

²⁹³ Bartov, *Dado*, 349.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

flexible as it was in the first day of the war. Israeli Prime Minister struggled to protect Israeli independence and interests, even in face of credible American threat to abandon its ally and to stop the resupply in such a crucial moment in the fighting. Eventually, Israel had to compromise to some extent and reach an agreement with Washington to maintain the alliance. However, the disparity between the Israeli behavior in the beginning and in the end of the war demonstrated the Israeli determination to protect independence when the deterrence is perceived fragile.

Alternative Explanations

The Neorealist School

Leading scholars from the neorealist school attributed different impact for the bipolar structure of International system during the Cold War. For Waltz, this structure is ideal for the American superpower as he expects small powers like Israel to woo big powers in order to increase their security. The American Superpower does not need small power to protect its security, thus, it is expected to have the upper hand in the alliance management interaction. Accordingly, Israeli decision to align with the U.S. should have yielded an Israeli heavy reliance on the American protection, and Israeli obedience in the event of contrast interests with the U.S.

Walt, on the other hand, predicts an Israeli leverage over its American ally. The competition between the two superpowers, he opines, provides small powers with bargaining power. The more impact the small power possess on the balance between the two blocs, the more leverage it is expected to enjoy in the "alliance game" vis-à-vis its protector. In fact, Walt contends that in 1973 Kissinger wished to expel the Soviets "by demonstrating that the Russian cannot provide its Arab allies with the wherewithal necessary to reconquer the occupied territories"²⁹⁵. He cited Quandt's book by which, "in 1972, U.S. Middle East policy consisted of little more than open support for Israel". As part of this support, the American military assistance reached a peak and American pressure on Israeli government to initiate negotiations with Egypt was minimized.²⁹⁶ However, Walt's argument is not presented without reservation. As

²⁹⁵Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 119.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

he stresses, in extreme scenarios when the behavior of the small power may trigger an inter-superpower confrontation, the superpower would then be willing to coerce his ally to protect its own interests. In fact, he gives the American reaction to the Soviet threat of possible unilateral intervention in the war as an example to support this argument: "when a serious superpower confrontation began to take shape during the October War, the United States did not hesitate to force Israel to spare the trapped Egyptian Third Army".²⁹⁷

The two theoretical frameworks propose an effective though partial basis to account for the Israeli deterrence hedging. Israel was indeed apprehensive from the Soviet aggressive support to its Arab allies and the only partner who could equate this aspect was the U.S. No other country could have provided Israel with the necessary amount of logistical support to cover for the shortage of ammunition and weapons. To this end, Waltz's balance of capabilities is valid. However, this argument overlooks two issues. First, it ignores the fact that Israeli obedience in the early days of the war was an abnormal Israeli behavior. Unlike the American failure to prevent an Israeli preemptive strike in 1967, Israeli government followed the American demands. Second, it fails to predict the Israeli reluctance to the American demand for a cease-fire in the last days of the war. Balance of Power Theory whose focal point is the international structure and the distribution of relative capabilities fails to account for the variance in Israeli behavior where the other variables are very similar. Therefore, it requires an additional explanation that can shed light on the validity of the balance of power argument in different situations. This is precisely what the concept of deterrence-independence dilemma aims to do. It explains why Waltz's prediction was more solid when the perceived risk for deterrence is low – which allows the protégé to restrain its independence; and why it is less valid when deterrence was perceived as unstable in the end of the war.

This concept can contribute to the Balance of Threat Theory, too. Walt's conceptual framework links between the perceived threat and the nation's behavior, and the Soviet threat and the American assertive support in a cease fire. It can also explain the Israeli resolve to ignore the UN Security Council Resolution with the tacit support of

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 240.

Kissinger, before the Soviet threat was presented. However, two points should be stressed. First, when accounting for the outcome, Walt observes the behavior of the protector. According to his argument, if the protector pursues a vital interest, then he would coerce the protégé. However, if no essential interest is at stake, the protégé would enjoy a great freedom. For Walt, the main factor lies in the protector which is the more powerful party. This theoretical framework almost ignores the role of the protégé and the dynamics between him and the protector.

In the Yom Kippur War Israel was not a passive player. When Israel assessed the threat was low it was more open to American demands; when it faced a serious predicament, it was determined to withstand the American pressure. What the deterrence-independence dilemma proposes is a counter explanation for the protégé's motivation. When combining these two theories – of the protector's and the protégé's behavior – one can better account for the alliance outcome. When Israeli confidence was high, the American relatively soft demand for restraint successfully prevented an Israeli preemptive strike. However, when the American support of a cease-fire agreement faced an assertive Israeli opposition, it could not achieve an Israeli restraint so easily. Here Walt's contribution is prominent: instead of conceding the Israeli determination, the U.S. exercised an assertive policy vis-à-vis its ally. Walt's theory can account for the American policy and assist scholars to understand the final diplomatic outcome which was a compromise between the two allies. However, it should be merged with a theoretical framework which captures the role of the protégé, and predict expected compromise.

Second, it seems that Walt attributed much more bargaining power to Israel than it truly had during the war. Walt's inference derived from the protector's fear of abandonment of the protégé, thus, empowering the rival bloc at the expense of the American one. An Israeli decision to realign with the Soviets could have been a game changer, but it was improbable. Not only the Soviet Union supported Israel's enemies, the joint moral basis and interests between the two democracies, which was empowered by the Jewish American population, had no parallel alternative. Hence, the Israeli leverage derived from the potential threat of leaving the American bloc was non-existent. This point is demonstrated in Prime Minister Meir's speech in the

government meeting on October 25: "there is only one country to which we can approach and sometimes to whom we need to accede – even when we know we must not. But she is our only friend and she is very strong... there is no shame when in this circumstances a small state like Israel is obliged to yield to the U.S."²⁹⁸ The Israeli latitude was not an outgrowth of Jerusalem's capacity to abandon Washington, as Walt claims, but its insistence on protecting independence when deterrence was perceived weak, as the proposed analysis illustrates.

Alliance Restraint Theory

The American success to restrain the Israeli government during the Yom Kippur War can be explained by restraint theory. For instance, Pressman explicates the Israeli decision to avoid preemptive strike: "one major reason Israel opted not to attack first was a series of strong and consistent warnings from the United States against starting the war".²⁹⁹ The American administration led by Secretary of State Kissinger was determined to prevent an Israeli attack, which could jeopardize his attempts to move Egypt from the Soviet bloc through Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. For Pressman, the difference between the American failure to restrain Israel in 1967 and the success in 1973 was the American decision to "mobilize power resources to prevent an opening Israeli strike".³⁰⁰

Following Pressman's determinants, one can consolidate a cogent argument to support his conclusion regarding the American success during the Yom Kippur war. Kissinger, exploiting his unique position in the core of the American national security decision-making process managed to produce a united leadership. Siviner observes, "A series of domestic crises which coincided with the onset of the war on 6 October 1973 not only signaled the beginning of the president's downfall, but also catapulted Kissinger, his national security adviser and recently-appointed secretary of state to a position of unparalleled power in projecting American interests abroad".³⁰¹ He adds, "As the president's national security adviser Kissinger controlled and managed the

²⁹⁸ Bartov, *Dado*, 349.

²⁹⁹ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 100.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 80.

³⁰¹ Siviner, "US Foreign Policy and the Kissinger Stratagem," 85.

flow of information and advice from the defense and foreign policy bureaucracies to the White House".³⁰²

Moreover, the rivalry with Moscow and the opportunity Egyptian President Sadat offered to Washington to weaken the Soviet hold in the region served as a great interest for Kissinger. Pressman expounds, "Whereas in 1967 Cold War concerns undermined or limited the U.S. restraint effort, in 1973 the desire to block Soviet meddling propelled the U.S. policy of alliance restraint".³⁰³ Finally, in contrary to Israeli behavior in the Six Day War and the invasion of Lebanon in 1977, in the October War Israel did not try to deceive the U.S. and shared its military plan with her.³⁰⁴ This allowed the U.S. to effectively mobilize its power and restrain Israeli policy, according to Pressman.

This argument has two main flaws. First, Pressman ignores the American failure to convince Israel to withdraw to the October 22 lines, thus, to comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions 338, 339, and 340. Washington failed to restrain the Israelis even though the pressure it used was much heavier than in the case of Israeli preemption. If one is to accept Walt's argument about the American determination to avoid a confrontation with USSR, it is questionable to what extent can restraint theory account for American failure when direct confrontation with Moscow was at stake. A more convincing explanation for this variance lies on the Protégé's part, as the proposed analysis demonstrates: the Israeli determination to withstand the American pressure can explain this variance.

Moreover, Pressman contends that the Nixon administration successfully mobilized its resources. But what resources exactly were mobilized given the very short notice that Kissinger had before the war started? In fact, when Kissinger was informed the decision to restrain had been already made in Israel. Israeli documents reveal a real Israeli concern from the American response to an Israeli preemptive strike. However, there is no mention of any specific American step that was taken and served as a crucial factor in changing the Israeli original plan of using preemptive aerial assault.

³⁰² Ibid., 87.

³⁰³ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 81.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 79.

Again, it demonstrates that the main contributor to the Israeli decision originated on the Israeli side: the Israeli confidence that the Arabs could be deterred, or stopped easily if deterrence failed. Israeli confidence was a necessary but not sufficient condition by its own to account for the Israeli restraint. A credible American threat was also necessary. But in terms of explaining the variance in Israeli decision making the Israeli confidence made the Israelis much more attentive to the American pledges. Like in the Austrian case, narrowing the analysis to the capability of the protector to mobilize his resources provides only one side of the story. To understand the outcome of the protector's policy, and particularly the motivation of the protégé, it is necessitated to merge the proposed concept of deterrence-independence dilemma.

Conclusion

According to Bar-Joseph, "The sudden Arab attack of Yom Kippur 1973 is the most traumatic event in Israel's stormy history".³⁰⁵ As part of the dire experience, Israelis faced difficult reality in which they could not alone overcome the Arab assault. Hence, they had to approach Washington. Though the IDF managed to block the Egyptian and Syrian attacks and reoccupy the Golan Heights before the American decision to embark the airlift was made, American assistance was crucial in stabilizing the northern front and conduct a successful counterattack in the south. In this regard, Kissinger's statement. "we saved you", is valid. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, Israeli dependence on America did not ease the American attempts to restrain its ally. As this analysis indicates, Israeli leadership was much more attentive to the American requests when Israeli deterrence was perceived as strong. After deterrence collapsed, Israelis were more determined to protect their independence to restore the deterrence's prestige. Understanding the Israeli calculus and its implications on Israeli deterrence hedging is crucial in assessing the dominant explanation for the inter-alliance management dynamics between the U.S. and Israel. The next chapter tests this conclusion in another crisis, when Israel requested to deploy American troops on its soil for the first time in its history.

³⁰⁵ Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep*, 1.

Chapter 8: Gulf War (1991)

"Who in January 1990 could have predicted that, within a year, American and Syrian troops would be fighting side by side in the Middle East, that the Soviet Union would staunchly support a massive American military operation in the Third World, that the United Nations Security Council would authorize a collective security action, that the Iraqi Air Force would seek refuge in Iran, or that Israel would weather a sustained ballistic missile attack against two of its largest cities without responding? Any one of these developments would seem to qualify as a "talking dog", David Welch states.¹ As he points out, the Gulf War provides scholars with a unique environment to test some of the traditional assumptions in International Relations Studies.

This chapter takes advantage of this intellectual opportunity, while focusing on the last observation – Israeli policy during the war. By using the proposed concept of deterrence-independence dilemma, this analysis sheds light on an abnormal Israeli decision to remain passive in light of continuous Iraqi attacks on the Israeli population. It supports the conclusion from the 1973 analysis about Israeli openness to American pressure when deterrence was perceived as strong and contributed a unique explanatory inference about the motivation behind the Israeli decision. Virtually, this analysis proposes a new important factor in the causal mechanism that starts with the American coercive diplomacy and ends with the Israeli restraint. This element is vital to assess the theoretical contribution as well as the limitations of both neorealist and restraining theoretical frameworks.

Following the other chapters' format, the analysis of the Gulf War opens with a presentations of the war's main events. It then draws the interests and capabilities of the main three actors in the deterrence triangle, namely the Israeli protégé, the American protector and the Iraqi adversary. The last sections present an analysis of the Israeli deterrence hedging and the proposed concept of deterrence-independence dilemma as a strong theoretical tool to understand the Israeli calculus in formulating this policy. Lastly, this analysis juxtaposes the proposed concept with the other dominant theoretical frameworks to enlighten the concept's theoretical contribution.

¹ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 329.

The Gulf War: An Overview

The Gulf Crisis - Main Events

The literature on the Gulf War is abundant, and its chain of events is well presented in other studies.² The purpose of this section is to highlight the main events while concentrating on the Israeli front. Formulating a time framework for this front will be the basis for a further analysis of the deterrence triangle which includes American protection over the Israeli ally.

On August 2, 1990 the Iraqi army invaded and occupied Kuwait. Kuwait had traditionally been perceived in Iraq as an integral part of the country.³ However, the trigger for the invasion was seemingly the economic crisis Saddam Hussein faced at the end of the devastating war with Iran, resulting in an approximate 70-80 billion dollars.⁴ The oil fields of the rich Arab monarchy were a quick and accessible remedy for the Iraqi predicament. Invading Kuwait was also a means to erase the \$10 billion Iraqi debt to Kuwait and to gain more power within OPEC.⁵ Six days after the invasion Iraq proclaimed a formal annexation of Kuwait as its 19th district.

The Iraqi occupation was immediately denounced by the international community and most of the Arab countries. The UN Security Council resolution which was confirmed a few hours after the Iraqi invasion condemned the Iraqi assault and demanded an immediate withdrawal from Kuwait.⁶ The Arab league passed a resolution which called to solve the crisis diplomatically within the league, while opposing a non-Arab

² For example see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991* (Princeton University Press, 1995); Shlomo Gazit, "The Gulf War - Main Political and Military Developments," in *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel: Report of a Jaffee Center Study Group*, ed. Joseph Alpher (Jerusalem: JCSS, 1992), 7-44; Kevin M. Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War* (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

³ Eugene L. Rogan, "The Emergence of the Middle East into the Modern State System," in *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Louise Fawcett, Third Edition (OUP Oxford, 2013), 57.

⁴ Gazit, "The Gulf War - Main Political and Military Developments," 8.. For a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi economic crisis in early 1990 see Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 37-41.

⁵ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 40.

⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990," August 2, 1990, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>.

intervention.⁷ Iraq was supported by the PLO, Sudan, and Mauritania. Libya, Yemen, and Jordan upheld a milder position and opposed a non-Arab military intervention.⁸

The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran and authorized a naval blockade to enforce its resolutions. On November 29, 1990 the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which set an ultimatum for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait – January 15, 1991. If Iraq did not comply, the resolution empowered states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait.⁹

In the meantime, the American administration worked to form an anti-Iraq coalition comprised of 34 Arab and non-Arab countries. Germany and Japan, though they did not get militarily involved, contributed economic support. U.S. troops represented 73% of the coalition's 956,600 troops in Iraq.¹⁰ The coalition operated in coordination with the Russians. A day after the deadline the coalition led by the U.S. initiated a massive air and naval campaign against Iraq's military assets in Kuwait and Iraq – Operation Desert Storm began. The campaign was more successful than expected, resulting in very minimal number of casualties. According to Kevin Woods, "the initial night's work played out better than the Coalition air planners hoped. Instead of the twenty to twenty-five aircraft losses some had expected, the early morning air attacks of 17 January suffered the loss of a single F-18... there simply was no air defense system after the morning of 17 January".¹¹

After five weeks, the ground campaign began. Three major drives: from the west toward Iraq's heartland, in the east toward Kuwait City, and the main effort in the center in Western Kuwait.¹² The coalition forces surged toward Kuwait City and liberated Kuwait. They were also invading Iraq while destroying the Iraqi army. President Bush decided to end the campaign after 1000 hours of ground attack and called a unilateral cease-fire on February 28. Bush claimed that the war had achieved

⁷ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 71.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 70–71; Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 104.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990," November 29, 1990, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9706763.62514496.html>.

¹⁰ Lyla M. Hernandez et al., eds., *Gulf War Veterans: Measuring Health*, Committee on Measuring the Health of Gulf War Veterans, Institute of Medicine (Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 1999), 95.

¹¹ Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 4.

¹² *Ibid.*, 6.

its goals and he wished to avoid further fighting which could have put the unity of the coalition at risk and led to unnecessary political and human cost.¹³ Bush advocated for his decision in a speech to the American nation, "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met".¹⁴ Three days later cease-fire talks initiated in Safwan next to the Iraq-Kuwait border. On April 3, 1991, the UN Security Council Resolution obliged Saddam to reveal his nuclear, chemical, and biological infrastructure and stocks, and all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers.¹⁵ At the time of the cease-fire the American toll was about 79 deaths, 212 wounded and 45 missing.¹⁶

The Israeli Arena

Through the crisis Saddam used the Iraqi missiles as a military tool to attack U.S. allies, namely Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Israel, though the last country was not a formal member in the coalition. In a 1996 interview about the decision to attack Israel the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz explained, "Israel was part and parcel of the military aggression against Iraq. They did not participate directly, openly, but they provided all support to the aggression against Iraq so...well, when you are attacked by an enemy, you attack your enemies".¹⁷ And indeed, when he was asked in a pre-war press conference, "if the war starts... will you attack Israel?", Aziz replied, "Yes, absolutely, yes".¹⁸

Israel was well aware of the Iraqi intention and shared its misgivings with Washington after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.¹⁹ During the crisis approximately 43 missiles were launched into Israel. the first missiles were launched in the early morning of January 18: five hit Tel Aviv and three fell in Haifa, engendering few fatalities.²⁰ Another missile salvo hit Israel on the morning of January 19 resulting in very limited damage. By the

¹³ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (Knopf, 1998), 484–90.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 486.

¹⁵ Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, xviii.

¹⁶ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 486.

¹⁷ Tariq Aziz, Interview on Frontline, Frontline, January 25, 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html>.

¹⁸ Washington Post, 10 January 1991 as cited in Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 332.

¹⁹ Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance*, 1st ed (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 382; Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 104.

²⁰ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 332.

end of the war, 38 missiles fell in Israel, leading to 2 direct civilian deaths, and 11 indirect casualties (due to heart attacks and misuse of chemical warfare kits), 208 injuries and damage to 1,302 houses, 6142 apartments, and 23 public buildings.²¹ Overall the estimated damage was approximately \$650 million.²²

During the crisis, the Israeli government was concerned that the Iraqi attacks would not be limited merely to conventional weapons. On April 1990 Saddam publicly warned Israel from launching an attack on Iraq's nuclear infrastructure referring to his WMD capabilities, "Iraq would set half Israel's territory on fire if Israel attacked Iraq".²³ Referring to this threat Shamir notes that the Iraqi threat consisted of "words that Jewish history, and Israel's seemingly endless struggle to achieve security in the face of Arab enmity, have taught Israelis not to dismiss lightly".²⁴ Iraq resumed threatening Israel, specifically referring to its chemical weapons along more general threats stating that Israel would be "the first target" in the event of an American attack.²⁵

Subsequently, on October 1990, the Israeli government started the distribution of gas masks to the Israeli population.²⁶ By January 1991, Israeli society was instructed and exercised how to prepare for Iraqi chemical attacks. During the war, Israelis would carry their protection kit with them everywhere they went. A special alarm system ("Viper") warned them after missiles were launched, and before they hit the ground; allowing the citizens to enter a sealed room and prepare their masks.

Eventually Saddam did not use WMD. The closest he got was launching two Scud missiles armed with concrete warheads which could carry chemical weapons to Dimona. Avigdor Haselkorn suggests that it was a warning shot, "Saddam was apparently hoping to convince his enemies that if they were thinking about toppling him, he was ready and able to bring down Israel and perhaps the entire Middle East with him".²⁷ According to Hal Brands and David Palkki, "Actions such as Iraq's firing of

²¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Gulf War (1991)," accessed November 17, 2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/history/pages/the%20gulf%20war%20-%201991.aspx>.

²² Avraham Ben-Zvi, *From Truman to Obama: The Rise and Early Decline of American-Israeli Relations* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2011), 194.

²³ Barak Mendelsohn, "Israeli Self-Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 94, doi:10.1080/0141-2390312331279698.

²⁴ Itzhak Shamir, *Summing Up: An Autobiography*, 1st American ed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 218.

²⁵ Mendelsohn, "Israeli Self-Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War," 94.

²⁶ Shamir, *Summing up*, 220.

²⁷ Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 75.

a concrete-filled warhead at Israel in 1991 were designed to play on Islamic imagery, symbolize solidarity with Palestinian stone throwers, and elicit such Arab support".²⁸ The Iraqi intentions were vague, but the Israeli fear was real.

Analyzing the Deterrence Triangle

The Israeli Protégé

For the Israeli government, the Gulf War was not its battle, though it could have assisted and was surely influenced by the crisis. The struggle was between Israel's enemy – Iraq, and its closest ally – the U.S, and the message conveyed from Washington was clear: do not intervene in this conflict. Israel's Prime Minister Shamir notes, "We seemed not to be in the picture at all except as objects of Saddam Hussein's fury and perhaps also as its victims".²⁹ Arens, too, complained about being isolated by Israel's closest ally during the preparations for the war despite the Israeli expected price for the American policy.³⁰

In the war, Israel faced a distant enemy which was under a massive attack by a much more powerful force than the IDF. Never before, and never since the war would Israel face this situation. Levite stresses this point, "for the first time, Israel was attacked solely and directly by a country that not only lacks common borders with it, but lies several hundred miles away. Meanwhile that country, Iraq, was being continuously subjected to a massive air assault by the coalition forces... ".³¹

Israeli Interests

Facing this reality, the main Israeli dilemma was how to stay out of the confrontation while protecting itself. In his autobiography, Shamir expounds the main underlying principles of Israeli policy, "that we were in no way a party to the crisis; that we would do nothing to ignite a conflagration in the Gulf or to nourish the anti-Israel propaganda then being disseminated by the Arabs in the United States to the effect that Israel was pushing the United States into a war with Iraq so that our battles would be fought for

²⁸ Hal Brands and David Palkki, "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?," *International Security* 36, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 157.

²⁹ Shamir, *Summing up*, 219.

³⁰ Moshe Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1995), 176.

³¹ Ariel Levite, "The Gulf War : Tentative Military Lessons for Israel," in *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel: Report of a Jaffee Center Study Group*, ed. Joseph Alpher (Jerusalem: JCSS, 1992), 148.

us; that we would not get involved unless forced to do so but, if forced, we would take care of our own defence; and that we would not offer unsolicited advice".³²

Before the war started, Israel's primary objective, as Welch defines it, was "the destruction of Iraq as a long-term military threat".³³ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg explains, "Iraq traditionally figured in Israeli threat calculations to the extent to which it could bolster the eastern front by dispatching expeditionary forces through Jordan".³⁴ An Iraqi defeat which results in a broken Iraqi army was, thus, an Israeli interest. When conflict between Iraq and the coalition was perceived as inevitable, Israel's Chief of Staff Dan Shomron assessed that "there was no doubt but that this war could only benefit the security of the State of Israel".³⁵ Since Israel was no party in the coalition, its contribution to this goal was very limited, and summarized in intelligence sharing and military consultation. According to Eisenberg, "Israel provided the United States with background information on Iraqi commanders and the deployment, tactics, and weaponry of Iraqi forces, while Israeli military intelligence attachés assisted their Pentagon counterparts in deciphering satellite photos and analyzing Iraqi troop movements".³⁶ U.S. forces also benefitted from the IDF's experience in desert warfare and used Israeli-designed weaponry and American equipment which was modified by the Israeli military industry for desert fighting.³⁷ In an interview Shamir claimed that Israel was "even today active and contributing to this war. We are contributing intelligence and advice".³⁸

A secondary goal was to prevent an Iraqi attack. However, after Israel was attacked by Iraq, the magnitude of the second goal dramatically increased. Before the war Israel was guaranteed by Washington that the first coalition's offensive wave would destroy

³² Shamir, *Summing up*, 220.

³³ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 362.

³⁴ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency: Israel and the 1991 Gulf War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 304, doi:10.1080/01402399208437487.

³⁵ Dan Shomron, 'A Personal Report on the Gulf War', *Yediot Aharonot* suppl., 8, September 1991, 3 as cited in *Ibid.*, 305.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 314.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Yosef Charif, "A Special Interview with Yitzhak Shamir", *Ma'ariv*, 22 February, 1991 as cited in *Ibid.*, 315.

most of Saddam's capacity to strike Israel.³⁹ When it was clear this was not the case, Israel pushed for a more aggressive American campaign against Scud sites in western Iraq – from which Saddam launched the attacks against Israeli cities. These preventive measures were important to stop the Iraqi conventional attacks while preventing potential nonconventional ones. Whereas before the war Israeli attempts aimed to prevent any Iraqi attack, as the war started the main concern in Jerusalem was to limit the Iraqi attacks to conventional weapons only.

Minimizing the war's cost for Israel also had an important economic aspect. In the first days of the war the Israeli economy was losing \$25 million each day due to low productivity. As the war continued economic life was improved but along with the damage caused by the Iraqi missiles, and the cost of the Israeli defensive measures in face of a potential use of WMD, the war was a significant burden on Israel's economy. According to Arens, the overall estimated damage was more than one billion dollars.⁴⁰

Timing was also a crucial element. Israel was in the midst of a massive immigration of Jews from the ex-soviet territories. The total estimated cost of this national project was \$ 50-70 billion.⁴¹ To respond to the Israeli economic pledges, following the war Bush approved \$650 million of economic assistance to cover the cost of the war's damage, as well as \$400 million in loan guarantees for the absorption project.⁴² Germany also transferred \$165 million as humanitarian aid and \$700 million as a military aid to compensate for the involvement of German companies in Iraq's nuclear and chemical programs.⁴³

Another Israeli goal was to repair the "special relationship" with the United States. Before the crisis the two allies suffered from very tense relations. Eisenberg expounds,

³⁹ Scott B. Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint: U.S.-Israel Relations During the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991" (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1999), 6.

⁴⁰ Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 169.

⁴¹ The Israeli estimation assumed an absorption of one million Jews until the year of 2000. (Shamir, *Summing up*, 210).

⁴² Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 192; Ben-Zvi, *From Truman to Obama: The Rise and Early Decline of American-Israeli Relations*, 199. The tensions revolved around the loans continued after the war as the Bush administration linked the American assistance to the Israeli constructions in the west Bank. Only after Shamir's government was replaced by Rabin's Bush approved a more comprehensive loan plan of \$ 10 billion (Ibid., 204.).

⁴³ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 339.

"Poor personal chemistry between Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and President George Bush, sharp differences over Israeli policies in the occupied territories, and Israel's need for increasing amounts of American aid in absorbing the flood of Soviet Jewish immigrants had resulted in strained relations between the two allies on the eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait".⁴⁴ Haas also draws a grim picture when describing the relationship between the two leaders, "these two guys had not hit it off. No illusions, this was not a warm and close and fuzzy relationship".⁴⁵

The tension reached a peak on October 13, 1990 when, as part of the UN National Security Council's announcement, the US agreed that, "Israel has no sovereignty in Jerusalem".⁴⁶ The Israeli sense of political crisis increased as American efforts to form the coalition against Iraq began. The Bush administration sought to include important Arab countries, including many of Israel's enemies. These efforts were taken with a deliberate policy of creating distance with Israel. Minister of Defense Arens notes that during the months before operation "Desert Storm", almost no American or European diplomat visited in Israel. However, they did visit Syria, Egypt and other countries in the region.⁴⁷ Israel understood that the American administration perceived the Arab countries as the key to victory.⁴⁸ In that regard Israel can only be a potential liability. By collaborating with the U.S. Israel could strengthen the military cooperation between them and amend the relations among their political leaderships. The war was, thus, an opportunity to lead a change in the relations between the two allies. Indeed, during the war the two allies signed a special agreement on the "status of forces", entailing American troops in Israel and Israeli personnel in the U.S. would receive a "privileged status".⁴⁹ Shamir describes better collaboration among the political echelons, too, "when war began, contact was frequent and close".⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 305.

⁴⁵ Richard Haas, Interview in Frontline, Frontline, January 25, 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/haass/1.html>.

⁴⁶ Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 172.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁴⁸ Shamir, *Summing up*, 219.

⁴⁹ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 339.

⁵⁰ Shamir, *Summing up*, 222.

Israeli Capability

As Table 7 shows, the Israeli army was far inferior to the Iraqi army. This table offers a sense of the relative power distribution among the main actors, however, it misleads due to the special conditions of the Gulf War. In this war the Israeli forces did not fight Iraqi ones. The IDF's main mission was to handle the threat posed by the Iraqi missiles and WMD arsenal. To this end Israel prepared two plans.⁵¹ The first option was an aerial strike against strategic targets in Iraq. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv notes, "Hundreds of fighters and bombers would be needed, and they would have to fly through the air space of hostile Arab states – a mission that could be very costly. An even greater risk was getting into dogfights with U.S. pilots".⁵² To minimize the last risk, Arens repeatedly requested the Identity Friend or Foe (IFF) electronic codes from the White House so American jets could identify the Israeli ones. His request was constantly rejected. the Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger recalls, "I told the Israelis this: that in the end we were not going to deconflict" (a military jargon for stepping aside).⁵³ In his memoirs, the Secretary of Defense James Baker argues that the purpose was to prevent an Israeli preemptive strike, "if we had given the Israeli government those codes, sooner or later they would have struck back at Iraq".⁵⁴

*Table 7 Composite Index of National Capability Score – Iraq, Israel and U.S (1988-1992)*⁵⁵

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
<i>Iraq</i>	0.0108	0.0110	0.0125	0.0083	0.0060
<i>Israel</i>	0.0027	0.0030	0.0030	0.0029	0.0036
<i>U.S.</i>	0.1328	0.1467	0.1394	0.1356	0.1461

Another flaw was the expected military achievement of this operation. Hitting the well-concealed Iraqi launchers turned out to be a difficult mission. It required the Israeli jets to fly low and take the risk of being hit by the Iraqi anti-air craft missile

⁵¹ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 394.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁵⁴ Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 390.

⁵⁵ "Correlates of War Project", National Military Capabilities v4.0; Singer. See, Singer, Stuart, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965."

systems. Since the Israeli Air Force (IAF) had no intention to expose its men, the efficacy of the Israeli campaign was doubtful - particularly since the most powerful air force in the world was already operating in this area.⁵⁶ As one Israeli official argued to Welch, "Under those circumstances, a retaliatory strike would have been like a drop of water in an ocean. It might even have gone unnoticed".⁵⁷

Lastly, to reach western Iraq Israeli planes had to fly over the territory of an Arab country. The most probable path was through Jordan. However, since the entire region was on high alert it was improbable that the Israeli aircrafts would not be detected, triggering a Jordanian response to defend Jordan's sovereignty. Due to the sensitive relations with Iraq, the Jordanians were not willing to accept it and they made it clear to both Israel and the United States. Saudi Arabia, too, according to Baker rejected the Israeli request to use its aerial space for a military operation. A military clash between Israel and one of these two countries, according to Shamir, might undermine the Coalition's unity and "almost surely would result in serious conflict between the United States and Israel".⁵⁸

The Second Israeli alternative was to fly commando forces to Western Iraq to locate and destroy Scud missile sites and launchers. According to Eisenberg, "Israel's plans called for combat helicopters and planes to flood the sky above western Iraq, for its pilots to approach their targets at lower altitudes, for a sustained ground assault, and for the use of commando units to track down the launchers and call in airstrikes against them. Sending helicopters to Western Iraq was even more risky than sending jets, and in addition to the pilots, it endangered hundreds of Israeli troops; however, its efficacy was expected to be higher. Nevertheless, as Arens admitted a year after the war, "nobody in the IDF expected the operation to eliminate missile attacks altogether; yet it was believed that a painful blow at Iraq's missile force would significantly alleviate the pressure on the Israeli public and tarnish Saddam's war's strategy".⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 312.

⁵⁷ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 345.

⁵⁸ Shamir, *Summing up*, 223–24.

⁵⁹ Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel After the War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 1, 1991, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/1991-03-01/israel-after-war>.

The limited Israeli capacity to cope with the Iraqi military challenge rendered the gap between Israel and the U.S. greater than Table 7 reveals. Not only was the American army the most powerful on the globe, but its capacity to destroy the Iraqi army and damage its missile power was exponentially greater than the Israeli one. The asymmetric balance of power among the U.S.-Israeli alliance became even more asymmetric, leaving Israel dependent on its ally's military.

Fortunately for the Israelis, the alliance had evolved since the Yom Kippur War. Since the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. and Israel formalized their security ties in successive Memorandums of Understanding. In September 1975 the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding which expresses the U.S.'s commitment to Israel's economy, energy security, and defense - including considering for the first time, arms transfers of sophisticated American weapons.⁶⁰ According to the memorandum, in the event of a security threat to Israel, the American government "consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, of assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices".⁶¹ The November 1981 Memorandum of Understanding called for strategic cooperation and joint military exercises, and established an organizational framework to discuss military affairs. National Security Decision Directive 111, signed by President Ronald Reagan on October 29, 1983, advanced the dialogue to strategic cooperation. On the same year the Joint Political Military Group was formed to discuss and implement joint military efforts such as combined planning, joint exercises and logistics.⁶² The 1988 Memorandum of Agreement determined that, "Israel is currently designated... as a major non-NATO ally of the United States", providing Israel with access to more American financial and military programs, virtually affirming the "special relationship" between the countries.⁶³ The Joint Security Assistance Planning Group was established

⁶⁰ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 83.

⁶¹ For the full text see Jewish Virtual Library, "Israel-United States Memorandum of Understanding - 1975," accessed November 18, 2016, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/mou1975.html>.

⁶² Cohen, "Lights and Shadows in US-Israeli Ties, 1948-2010," 153.

⁶³ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 84.

to discuss Israeli requests for security assistance.⁶⁴ The deeper relations between the countries also had an economic aspect. As part of the peace agreement with Egypt, the U.S. committed to a \$3 billion aid to Israel each year.⁶⁵ Altogether, the "special relations" between Washington and Jerusalem render a well-established alliance.

During the Crisis, the American aid included unprecedented elements. Before the war, the U.S. established a secure communications link between the defense ministries. This line provided Israel with an early warning of missile attacks directly from American satellites, allowing the Israeli population to find shelter and prepare before the missiles reach their targets. President Bush also instructed to equip Israel with American manned Patriot batteries which were originally designed to intercept aircrafts, but were converted to anti-missile weapons. The IDF was susceptible regarding the operational performances of the American batteries, but the joint U.S.-Israeli "Arrow" project was not nearly operational, leaving Israel with no other active defense alternative.⁶⁶ In addition, the Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz (who were considered to be a friends of Israel) were sent to "hold the hands" of the Israelis. Scowcroft explains, "Telephone calls were not going to do the trick and Larry was known as a particularly close friend".⁶⁷ Shamir claims that the American team led by these two officials "met regularly and for hours with our military people, analyzing each day's situation and in direct touch with the coalition forces".⁶⁸ "From the start of the crisis", an Israeli intelligence officer says to Melman and Raviv, "we were in the Pentagon and at the Navy, Air Force and Army headquarters almost every day. We exchanged information and assessments about the Iraqi army, its capability, and its operative plans".⁶⁹ "What Eagleberger did not provide", Scott Lasensky notes, "was the full range of intelligence data Israel was requesting, including real-time reconnaissance information on western

⁶⁴ Cohen, "Lights and Shadows in US-Israeli Ties, 1948-2010," 153.

⁶⁵ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 82.

⁶⁶ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 390.

⁶⁷ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 456.

⁶⁸ Shamir, *Summing up*, 222.

⁶⁹ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 382–83.

Iraq".⁷⁰ The administration was concerned that Israel would use this information to promote a military response.

To reduce the pressure from the Israeli government to respond to the Iraqi attacks the American army operated in Western Iraq hunting launchers and Scud sites. According to Lasensky the, "U.S.-led coalition forces carried out dozens, perhaps hundreds of Scud hunting missions over western Iraq".⁷¹ However, the American "hunting" campaign was not successful as the Israelis hoped. There were two main reasons for this failure: the first reason was the lack of coordination between the American political echelon and the military one, which led to a situation in which, according to Pressman, "The United States devoted less military effort to stopping the missile attacks than it had led Israel to believe".⁷²

President Bush, Secretary of defense Richard Cheney, and even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell were resolved to do whatever they could in order to reduce the Iraqi attacks on Israeli cities, or at least to show Israel they are doing everything they can, implying that Israel cannot do more damage to the Iraqi missile forces.⁷³

According to Powell, he instructed to devote 30 percent of the sorties to launcher-killing missions.⁷⁴ Lasensky notes, " No definitive number of sorties has been released, but all three government officials interviewed for this paper said the actual number was far below what top officials reported possibly as low as 5-10 percent of the initial claims".⁷⁵ General Schwarzkopf, the allied commander, was not so enthusiastic to divert significant resources to this mission. Schwarzkopf expounds, "there was a tradeoff. Hunting Scuds would slow down another part of the campaign. Our other time schedules were diverted by this".⁷⁶ According to one American official, "He kept complaining about political interference".⁷⁷ The commander of the IAF, General Avihu

⁷⁰ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 6.

⁷¹ Ibid., 7.

⁷² Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 112.

⁷³ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 400.

⁷⁴ Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 512.

⁷⁵ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 16.

⁷⁶ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 401.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Bin-Nun accused the Americans for allocating less than three percent of the sorties to Western Iraq.⁷⁸

Melman and Raviv also point out that the Checkmate team – an Air Force planning team for the aerial campaign in Iraq – decided "without telling their political masters, that it would be useless to tie up sophisticated bombers in a fruitless search [for launchers]".⁷⁹ They advised General Charles A. Horner to minimize the forces allocated to western Iraq, despite the political instructions.

This explanation implicates the second reason for the American operational failure. Hunting mobile launchers in the Iraqi desert was a very difficult mission, as the Israelis found out themselves after conducting an aerial exercise. An Israeli pilot who participated in the practice claims, according to Melman and Raviv, "It was like trying to find a needle in a haystack".⁸⁰ By the end of the war not even one Iraqi mobile launcher was destroyed, and the Administration faced growing Israeli charges.⁸¹ Arens in particular complained that the U.S did not do enough to destroy the launchers, and claimed the IDF could do things the American army cannot.⁸² Despite its operational ineffectiveness, the American campaign succeeded to convince the Israelis to remain passive.

The American Protector

American Interests

For the U.S., the Gulf War was nearly a two-front campaign. The first arena was in the Persian Gulf. US's coercive goals vis-à-vis Iraq include compelling Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, and to deter him from taking four actions: (1) invading Saudi Arabia; (2) conducting terror attacks against the U.S, and its allies; (3) destroying Kuwait's oil fields and installations; and (4) using chemical and biological weapons (CBW). To defend the Saudis, the U.S. deployed an army of 200,000 soldiers. To deter Saddam from taking other unacceptable actions, Bush sent the Iraqi leader a letter, delivered by Secretary of State Baker to the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, "the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of

⁷⁸ Ibid., 398.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 403.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 399.

⁸¹ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 17; Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 215.

⁸² Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 456,468.

Kuwait's oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort".⁸³

After the war began Bush was not satisfied with these goals, and added one more objective: to inflict severe damage to the Iraqi army. In his diary Bush writes, "Should Saddam survive the war, I did think we could at least attempt to ensure that his military might was diminished or destroyed".⁸⁴ Scowcroft concurs, "it was essential that we destroy Iraq's offensive capability. This was also a major objective, although it had not been feasible to list it openly as such while a peaceful solution to the crisis was possible".⁸⁵

While advancing the American interest in the Gulf, it was imperative for Washington to leave Israel out of the conflict. In this regard, Washington had two main concerns. The first was that Saddam would escalate the crisis by using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against Israeli targets. This escalatory move would demand an appropriate response from the U.S. or its allies and could render the conflict an uncontrolled devastating confrontation. For this reason, the Americans did not only wish to convince the Israelis to restrain themselves, but to coordinate their response, if they decide to act. During this consultation, the U.S. could confine the Israeli reaction.⁸⁶

The second American concern was about the ramifications of Israeli retaliation. According to the Bush administration, an Israeli response could have forced the Arab states to renege on their commitment, thus, hindering the military campaign against the Iraqi army. James Baker, who served as Secretary of State during the crisis explained in a post-war interview, "We were very concerned about what Israeli intervention in the war might mean for our effort to keep the coalition together, there's no doubt about that".⁸⁷ In his book, he restates his concern, "though I had been

⁸³ Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., *Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, 1st edition (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 1991), 178–79.

⁸⁴ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 464.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 463.

⁸⁶ Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 128; Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 384–86.

⁸⁷ James Baker, Interview in Frontline, Frontline, January 25, 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/baker.html>.

able to secure agreements from all our Arab coalition partners that if Saddam attacked Israel first, and Israel struck back, they would remain firm, no Arab leader could be sure that the masses wouldn't take to the streets, and threaten the stability of their regime".⁸⁸

Restraining the Israelis became a main American objective as defined in the National Security Directive 54, signed by President Bush, "The United States will discourage the government of Israel from participating in any military action... Should Israel be threatened with imminent attack or be attacked by Iraq, the United States will respond with force against Iraq and will discourage Israeli participation in hostilities".⁸⁹ Colin Powell describes this mission as, "the supersensitive need to keep Israel out of the fight".⁹⁰

Before the war Bush pledged Shamir to guarantee that Israel would not preempt; after the war started the Americans pressured their Israeli counterparts to remain passive in light of the Iraqi missile attacks, "keep your head down and your guns holstered".⁹¹ The American dilemma was how to respond to the Israeli pressure to assist the American campaign in Western Iraq, "the more it conceded to Israel, the easier it made an Israeli military operation; yet the more it resisted, the more difficult it would be to demonstrate to the Israelis that the United States was making every possible effort to find and destroy the Scuds".⁹² Throughout the war, the administration had to walk on this delicate line not to trigger an Israeli military action.

American Capabilities

As Table 7 illustrates, the American power alone was disproportionately stronger than the Iraqi army. Enhanced by the Coalition forces, the U.S. army fought in an asymmetric battle against a much weaker enemy. Levite describes this asymmetric balance of power, "a broad multinational coalition, enjoying marked superiority in almost every conceivable category of resources and capabilities, pitted against a single

⁸⁸ Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 385.

⁸⁹ The White House, "National Security Directive 54," January 15, 1991, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_54.htm.

⁹⁰ Powell, *My American Journey*, 488.

⁹¹ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 314.

⁹² Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 336–37.

isolated Third World country".⁹³ Nevertheless, the Americans were not sure their superiority would eventually deter Saddam from taking one of the prohibited actions. Saddam's brutal past proved to the US that he is "too reckless, relentless, and aggressive to be allowed to possess weapons of mass destruction".⁹⁴

Schneider reveals that President Bush expressed his perception of Saddam during the crisis as he had noted on more than one occasion that Saddam "has never possessed a weapon he did not use".⁹⁵ Bush's staff had every reason to believe that Saddam would use nonconventional weapons during the war and America could do nothing to deter him. Their perceptions were supported by the intelligence community. A week into the war the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) assessment was that, "Saddam evidently believes the U.S. has both a chemical and a nuclear potential in the theater, but DIA assesses that this would not deter him from employing chemical weapons against coalition forces".⁹⁶ Two days before the Coalition attack, U.S. intelligence estimated, "we have strong indications that Iraq is prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with U.S. forces over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait".⁹⁷

Therefore, The Bush administration employed an assertive deterrence campaign to convince Saddam that an Iraqi nonconventional attack would be very costly for Iraq. To achieve this goal, American messages did not preclude a nuclear retaliation. One example is the letter from Bush to Saddam implying "the strongest possible response". Another example is General Schwarzkopf's interview in which he warned that, "if Saddam Hussein chooses to use weapons of mass destruction, then the rules of this

⁹³ Levite, "The Gulf War : Tentative Military Lessons for Israel," 148.

⁹⁴ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes," *Foreign Policy* 14, no. 1 (December 2003): 1, doi:10.1017/S1052703600006109.

⁹⁵ Barry R. Schneider, "Deterrence and Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-1991 Gulf War," The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series (USAF Counterproliferation Center: Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, August 2009), 29, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518900.pdf>.

⁹⁶ Defense Intelligence Agency, IRAQ: Potential for Chemical Weapons Use (January 25, 1991), File 970613_dim37_9id_txt_0001.txt. Washington DC (Gulf Link) as cited in Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 173.

⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction" (TOP SECRET), 15 January 1991, iii. (Declassified extract December 2002). < <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/> >.

campaign will probably change"⁹⁸. Nonetheless, On Aug 14, Defense Secretary Cheney specifically described the American commitment to use its wide spectrum of military tools against Iraq in the event of WMD attack, "[it] should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces".⁹⁹

U.S. actions supported its deterrent message. According to a 'Greenpeace' report in mid-January 1991, the US possessed more than five hundred nuclear weapons in the region.¹⁰⁰ However, the real numbers are likely to be smaller as part of the nuclear weapons were released by conventional weapons in the preparation before the war. The American nuclear arsenal was mostly accommodated to Tomahawk cruise missiles.¹⁰¹ Tomahawks could carry a nuclear warhead anywhere from 5 to 150 kilotons to a range of 2160 kilometers. Hence, the US could threaten Baghdad from every position in the Gulf, the red sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.

However, it should be stressed that the U.S.'s nuclear capability was only used as a bluff to deter Saddam. Early in the crisis Bush excluded the use of nuclear weapons in response to an Iraqi nonconventional attack. Two American committees discussed the American retaliation policy: The National Security Council Deputies Committee and its sub-committee.¹⁰² Both committees determined that nuclear retaliation is immoral and could contradict American interests. As most of the Iraqi relevant targets were positioned within heavy populated centers, striking them with nuclear weapons would violate the demand for discriminatory use of force and could lead to a high number of civilian casualties. Moreover, Iraq was a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Attacking it with nuclear bombs, would be a callous violation of an international

⁹⁸ Robert C. Toth, "American Support Grows for Use of Nuclear Arms : Weapons: Heavy U.S. Losses Could Boost Pressure on Bush. Opponents Warn of a Wide Backlash.," *Los Angeles Times*, February 3, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-02-03/news/mn-917_1_tactical-nuclear-weapons.

⁹⁹ William M. Arkin, "U.S. Nukes in the Gulf," December 31, 1990.

¹⁰⁰ R. Jeffrey Smith and Rick Atkinson, "U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use Of Nuclear, Chemical Arms," *The Washington Post*, January 7, 1991, A22.

¹⁰¹ Noam Ophir, "U.S. Deterrence Policy toward the Use of CBW in the Gulf War" (MA Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 2004), 180.

¹⁰² The "small group" consisted of the national security advisor and seniors from the state department, the Pentagon, CIA and the Joint staff. See Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 85–89.

pledge to refrain from attacking NPT members with nuclear weapons.¹⁰³ Doing so would also likely widen the gap between the US and the Arab world, and risk the unity of the coalition. Subsequently, Gates' committee recommended a conventional retaliation. Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security Adviser, illustrates the general attitude toward the dilemma of American retaliation to a nonconventional attack, "In any event, the general feeling was that if the Iraqis used chemical weapons that we would simply expand that target base significantly and damage Iraq and the civilian infrastructure and the economy much worse than we were under that war plan".¹⁰⁴

General Glosson, who was tasked with planning the aerial campaign, addressed the question of nuclear contingency planning in an interview in 1996, "The dumbest thing that the coalition could have done would have been to even contemplate the use of any kind of nuclear weapon for any purpose. That is not something that you can limit".¹⁰⁵ President George Bush and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, confirmed the administration opposition to the use of nuclear retaliation in their joint book, "no one advanced the notion of using nuclear weapons, and the President rejected it even in retaliation for chemical and biological attacks".¹⁰⁶

Baker supports this argument too, "the President had decided, at Camp David in December that the best deterrent of the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq would be a threat to go after the Ba'ath regime itself. He had also decided that U.S. forces would not retaliate with chemical or nuclear weapons if the Iraqis attacked with chemical munitions..."¹⁰⁷ This approach is also compatible with the presidential military command. According to the 10th clause, "Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorists acts against U.S. or Coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait's oil fields, it shall become the explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I

¹⁰³ Smith and Atkinson, "U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use Of Nuclear, Chemical Arms," 69–70.

¹⁰⁴ Robert Gates, Interview in Frontline, January 25, 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/gates/1.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Buster Glosson, Interview in Frontline, Frontline, January 25, 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/glosson/1.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 463.

¹⁰⁷ Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 359.

also want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq".¹⁰⁸

The American superiority over Iraq was not only a tool to deter Saddam and severely strike the Iraqi army. It was also an instrument to prevent an Israeli retaliation. Bush repeatedly told Shamir there was nothing Israel could do that the American forces were not already doing.¹⁰⁹ This argument, along with the benefits that the alliance with the U.S. offered Israel, helped to "'enlarge Shamir's space' and provide him with sound justification for not retaliating", according to Lasensky.¹¹⁰ The American administration also used a negative incentive to deter Israel from retaliating to the Iraqi attacks. Welch suggests that Shamir realized that, "unless Israel held back, the United States would reconsider its patronage... the possibility of losing American diplomatic and material support in the postwar environment appears to have played a major role in convincing Shamir that, until and unless the red lines were crossed, Israel should forbear".¹¹¹ This is an example of how the U.S. took advantage of its military, economic, and diplomatic power to cause Israel to remain passive.

The Iraqi Adversary

Iraqi Interests

The Iraqi leadership was aware of the American military superiority. However, Baghdad assessed that the American resolve to participate in an attrition war with the biggest Arab army was the weakest link they should attack. Subjected to this perception of unresolved American leadership, Saddam did not believe America would attack. Shlomo Gazit explains, "The most dangerous of Saddam Hussein's misperceptions held that the United States had not yet overcome the trauma of Vietnam and that it was a democracy in decay, a paper tiger".¹¹² After Operation Desert Storm was embarked upon, the Iraqi war plan aimed to prevent the U.S. from achieving significant military gains while maximizing the damage over the American

¹⁰⁸ The White House, "National Security Directive 54," Clause 10.

¹⁰⁹ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 455; Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 7; Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 312.

¹¹⁰ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 7.

¹¹¹ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 351.

¹¹² Gazit, "The Gulf War - Main Political and Military Developments," 13.

morale. Convinced Iraq could imitate the experience of the U.S. army in Vietnam, Saddam pushed for an attrition war. His goal, as Woods states, was to not lose rather than winning the war.¹¹³ He expounds on the Iraqi rationale, "to win, Saddam needed to challenge the legitimacy, not necessarily the militaries, of his near and far enemies".¹¹⁴

Israel was a great target in this regard. By attacking Israel, the Iraqi leader wished to drag Israel into the war. Saddam relied on the high credibility of Israeli deterrence and tried to trigger an Israeli military response. The Arab countries – the basis for the coalition's legitimacy – could not fight their "brothers" next to Israel. This could undermine the unity of the coalition and lead to its collapse. According to Mendelson, "Saddam believed that public opinion and the fear that it would destabilize the Arab regimes would not allow Arab leaders to keep their promise to the US to remain in the coalition even if Israel reacted to an unprovoked Iraqi attack in its cities".¹¹⁵ Hence, Shai Feldman opines, "Israel's failure to dissuade Iraq [from launching missile attacks] should be primarily attributed to the success of its deterrent".¹¹⁶

Moreover, by leading the war against Israel Saddam aspired to become *the hero* and the eventual leader of the Arab public. Amatzia Baram explained in a conference addressing Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein, "that by attacking Israel Saddam wished to fix himself as the SalāH ad-Dīn of his age."¹¹⁷ Massive Arab support would make it impossible for any Arab leader to support the war against Iraq, and render the war between the U.S. and Iraq a war with the entire Arab world. He believed that the populations in these states, "want [their governments] to act like Iraq does and would... prefer to stand together behind a strong Arab leader".¹¹⁸ For this reason, Saddam's August 12 initiative conditions the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on an Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the Six-Day War. Saddam's logic did not stand the test of reality. In his memoirs, General al-Ayyubi claims that,

¹¹³ Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 162.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Mendelsohn, "Israeli Self-Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War," 95.

¹¹⁶ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 191.

¹¹⁷ Amatzia Baram, "Iraqi Decision Making Saddam Hussein," September 20, 2010, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?295550-1/iraqi-decision-making-saddam-hussein>.

¹¹⁸ Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 162.

"for the first time in history, the Zionist entity was now within the range of an effective weapon held by the Arab hands of the valiant soldiers of Iraq...I wished that at least some Arabs, both on the popular and official levels, were with us as we stood ready to execute our mission...Had this been the case, the Zionist entity would have backed down and submitted to Arab will".¹¹⁹

Iraqi Capability

To achieve his goal Saddam had to reach Israel and inflict great damage to generate sufficient political pressure on Jerusalem to join the war. To do so the Iraqi army possessed three main options: 1. A ground attack of Iraqi forces from Jordan. 2. Iraqi conventional attacks over civilian and military targets in Israel either by air power or surface-to-surface missiles. 3. An Iraqi nonconventional attack on population centers, mainly by using chemical weapons.¹²⁰ A ground attack required Jordan to accept an Iraqi invasion – an act it wished to avoid in order to prevent war with Israel and political tensions with the U.S. Allocating ground forces for Israel would also have weakened the Iraqi force that fought the coalition. In early January, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein of Jordan secretly met in London. They had agreed that Jordan would be a demilitarized zone and its air space would not be violated by the IAF as long as Israel does not suffer large casualty attacks.¹²¹

The aerial bombing option was also very risky. The IAF enjoyed a great superiority over the Iraqi one, and the task of conducting a long-range attack required in-flight refueling which would have exposed the Iraqi aircrafts. The Israeli intelligence assessed that Iraqi could attack Israel with one hundred jets, and the IAF would destroy 90, and probably up to 96 of them.¹²² This plan became even more risky after the Coalition aerial campaign started. The few Iraqi jets that survived the attack were now obliged to cross through an American -dominant air-space before facing the IAF.

¹¹⁹ Staff Lt. Gen. Hazim Abd-al-Razzaq al-Ayyubi, "Forty-Three Missiles on the Zionist Entity," FBIS translation JN2511082498 (1998), 11 as cited in *Ibid.*, 151.

¹²⁰ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 189; Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 159.

¹²¹ Moshe Zak, "Secret King Hussein-Shamir Gulf War Pact Revealed," *Jerusalem Post Service*, September 29, 1995, <http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/1685/secret-king-hussein-shamir-gulf-war-pact-revealed/>.

¹²² Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 135.

Therefore, the most effective means to attack Israel was by launching Scud missiles. The Iraqi missiles were obsolete weapons based on German technology from World War II. The Soviet Union used this technology in order to develop liquid-fuel rockets to a range of 300 kilometers. The Iraqi military enhanced the fuel tank in order to increase the range to 600 KM (for al-Hussein) and 750-900 KM (for the al-Hijarah).¹²³ They could carry big conventional warheads as well as warheads armed with chemical or biological weapons. When they hit the target these missiles generated a big explosion, however, since the Iraqi modification damaged their precision. This combination of low accuracy and large destruction power made the Iraqi missiles a very effective psychological weapon against big urban populations. During the war the Iraqi commander of the missile unit, General Hazim al-Ayyubi reported to Saddam about the status of his arsenal, "Iraq started the war with 230 missiles and 75 'special warheads'. So far they had fired 52 missiles. Thirty-four of the remaining missiles had maintenance problems. Moreover, there was only enough fuel for 118 missiles total, regardless of type or maintenance status".¹²⁴ Post-war Iraqi data given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iraq possessed twenty-five biological warheads, fifty chemical warheads, and percussion fuses which enabled 40 percent dispersal effectiveness.¹²⁵

Saddam's challenge was to use his limited missile capability to trigger an Israeli response, on the one hand, while preserving deterrent power against both Israel and the U.S. if his regime faces an existential threat. The Iraqi strategy, as reflected in Saddam's order in the first day of the war, was to use his conventional power against Israel while preserving the nonconventional power. Saddam instructed to attack Israel with only conventional warheads, and to use the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons 'in return for the warheads they use'.¹²⁶ In the end, Saddam did not use his WMD.

¹²³ Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 200–201; William Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War* (Rand Corporation, 2001), 30–31.

¹²⁴ Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 198.

¹²⁵ The UN inspectors assessed that the overall Iraqi unconventional arsenal totaled 105 warheads. See Amos Gilboa, "Milhernet Hamifratz Harishona—Hamodi'in Hayisraeli Veparashat Rashei Hakrav Hachimim Hairakim" [The Gulf War—Israeli Intelligence and the Iraqi Chemical Warheads Affair], *Mabat Malam*, no. 62 (2012): 38.

¹²⁶ "Saddam and His Advisers Discuss Iraqi Missile Attacks on Targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia",

Diplomatically, Iraq was supported by Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), however none of them entailed an important alliance which could help Saddam to promote his goals. Appeasement with Iran removed the threat from its eastern border and provided a sanctuary for Iraqi aircrafts.¹²⁷ It did not, however, empower Saddam in his war with the Coalition. The only diplomatic aid Saddam received was the relations with Russia which worked with the anti-Iraq alliance while maintaining diplomatic relations with Saddam. Theoretically, Russia offered Saddam a partner with a veto power in the UN Security Council but the Moscow was experiencing an economic collapse and domestic crisis.¹²⁸ Russia at the time did not have the resources or the will to withstand the American-led coalition. Hence, its main contribution was as a communication channel between Saddam and the international community. This channel, however, was ineffective in protecting the Iraqi interests, as Saddam learned after the Soviet failure to promote the cease-fire agreement it formulated with Iraq to avoid an American ground campaign.¹²⁹

circa January 17/18, 1991 as cited in Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark Stout, eds., *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 294.

¹²⁷ Gazit, "The Gulf War - Main Political and Military Developments," 14.

¹²⁸ Galia Golan, "Implications of the Gulf Crisis on Soviet Middle East Policy," in *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel: Report of a Jaffee Center Study Group*, ed. Joseph Alpher (Jerusalem: JCSS, 1992), 107.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 112.

Deterrence Hedging

Direct Deterrence

In January 1991 Israel faced a new reality, not only were its main cities under a severe threat for the first time since the War of Independence; the threat of a nonconventional attack was real. Fifty years after Jews were murdered in gas chambers, there was a strong concern that gas could soon kill more Jews, this time, in their country. To comprehend the Israeli response, and particularly its use of deterrent signals, one should dive into the Israeli concept of Cumulative Deterrence. As discussed in the former chapter, this conceptual framework assumes a continuous struggle between Israel and its hostile Arab neighbors. In each round Israel is required to defeat the Arab attack and inflict a painful price to the enemy's army, and sometimes to his society. In 1973, for instance, Israel acted to destroy the Third Egyptian Army, while attacking the Syrian energy production infrastructure and the regime's assets.¹³⁰ The Israeli goal has been to extend the intervals between the rounds of violence, and eventually convince the Arabs to reach a peaceful settlement with the Jewish state.

The purpose of deterrence, as has been developed in the West, is to prevent the potential adversary to undertake the prohibited action, mainly by posing an intolerable punishment. This element – deterrence by punishment – also exists in the Israeli concept of deterrence. However, the Israeli concepts reveals another and more dominant element: deterrence by denial - the first form of deterrence designed to increase the cost for the enemy's action by massively retaliating against his assets. The second form intends to decrease the benefits of his action by thwarting the attack or minimizing its damage.¹³¹ Jointly, the desired outcome is to render the adversary's planned action unworthy and dangerous, assuming it would significantly minimize the chances he would decide to act.

In contrary to the Western concept of deterrence which observes deterrence as an independent event whose outcome is either success or failure; the Israeli concept suggests a process which consists of rounds of violence. Deterrence is measured in

¹³⁰Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 187.

¹³¹ Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence by Denial and Punishment," in *Components of Defense Policy*, ed. Davis B. Bobrow (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 209–37; Freedman, *Deterrence*, 37.

accumulative terms. Due to the assumption that deterrence is measured over time, Israel's concept of deterrence traditionally includes a strong element of prevention. According to this notion of deterrence, if the enemy challenges the Israeli threats, he should first be stopped, before Israel acts to restore and then improve its accumulative deterrence. The leader of the political opposition and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, illustrates the duality of the Israeli concept, "the IDF is designed to deter, and if deterrence fails – to decide the battle".¹³² General Israel Tal expounds, "We have never placed the capacity to deter as against the capacity to fight, but have rather regarded deterrence and the strength to win as two sides of the same coin".¹³³ Therefore, Feldman argues that Israeli deterrence is "a variation of Glenn Snyder's 'deterrence by denial'",¹³⁴

The objective of punishing the enemy for his actions – the main principle in Western strategic thinking – is only secondary in the Israeli thinking. The most prominent Israeli conventional example for this form of deterrence is the retaliatory punitive policy against the Arab villages that supported terror attacks against Israeli society during the 1950s.¹³⁵ Another example is Israel's nuclear deterrence. Feldman explains, "the Arab states' inability to rule out the possibility that Israel has acquired a nuclear arsenal is expected to deter them from confronting the Jewish state with existential threats". The capabilities attributed to Israel are used to demonstrate the heavy price for such an Arab attack, rather than foiling it. This offensive element strengthens, rather than excludes, Israeli defensive deterrence policy – by punishing the enemy Israel can improve its accumulative deterrence. However, before punishing, Israel should deny from its enemies the achievement of their objectives.

This dual-form of deterrence was unraveled during the Gulf Crisis of 1991, too. Before the war, Israel warned Saddam that *any* Iraqi strike would be met with retaliation. On August 30, Prime Minister Shamir publicly said that "If we are attacked by Iraq, we

¹³² Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 186.

¹³³ Israel Tal, "Israel's Security in the Eighties," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 17 (Fall 1980): 13–14.

¹³⁴ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 186.

¹³⁵ See Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

will repel the attack and the attacker will regret his action".¹³⁶ On January 10, Defense Minister Arens also addressed Israel's capability to defend itself against the Iraqi threat while hitting back hard, "Iraq's capacity to harm Israel is very limited, but if we are attacked, we will respond without hesitation".¹³⁷ At the United Nations General Assembly Foreign Minister David Levy stated that, "Israel will know how to defend itself if attacked, and its punch will be hard and painful".¹³⁸ These statements reflected the Israeli concept of dual-deterrence: denying Iraq the desired damage to Israeli population while proposing a massive retaliation.

As Operation Desert Storm began, the IAF heightened its alert status and conducted constant aerial patrols.¹³⁹ After the second Iraqi missile attack, the IAF responded by sending two jets eastwards, waiting for an order to cross the Jordanian border on the way to Iraq.¹⁴⁰ The order from the political leadership was never given, but Israel signaled its readiness to act.

After the war started and Iraqi missiles were launched at Israel, Israeli deterrence's focal point was to limit the Iraqi attacks to conventional weapons. This is another example of the dual nature of Israeli deterrence policy: Israeli signals incorporated defensive and offensive elements. On the defensive side, the Israeli government distributed gas masks and instructed the population to seal a special room in each house and apartment to reduce the civilian vulnerability to chemical attacks.¹⁴¹ Parallel measures were taken in the IDF. In late December, the IAF practiced military operations under nonconventional war conditions. IAF personnel and centers were equipped with Nuclear Biological and Chemical protection and sensors. Haselkorn argues that the goal was to show that the IAF could operate effectively under such conditions.¹⁴² Israeli passive defense measures were aimed to minimize the damage an Iraqi nonconventional attack would yield.

¹³⁶ Eitan Rabin, "Shamir: 'Whoever attacks Us will regret it'", *Ma'ariv*, August 31, 1990 as cited in Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 197.

¹³⁷ "Arens, 'We are Ready to and Prepared, and if Attacked We Will Respond Without Hesitation'", *Yediot Aharonot*, January 11, 1991 as cited in *Ibid.*, 198.

¹³⁸ Shlomo Shanir, "Lecy at UN: 'If Israel is Atacked by Iraq – It Will Operate Immediately and Independently'", *Ha'aretz*, October 2, 1990 as cited in *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 394.

¹⁴⁰ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 334.

¹⁴¹ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 199; Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 318.

¹⁴² Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 131.

On the offensive side, Israel attempted to convey a credible deterring message that any Iraqi nonconventional strike would be massively retaliated against. While addressing this scenario, Israeli officials were less vague about the nature of Israeli response than in their pre-war threats, and often implied to their attributed nuclear capabilities. On December 29, 1990, the IDF Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron spoke to the Commerce and Industry club in Tel Aviv, and wished to restate Israel's ambiguous nuclear policy: that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region. He, however, stated, "Israel would not be the first to *use* nuclear weapons in the Middle-East, virtually deviating from the Israeli traditional policy".¹⁴³ According to Feldman, as far as could be ascertained, General Shomron simply misspoke on that occasion, and his deviation from standing policy was completely unintentional.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Israel's Ambassador to the US, Zalman Shoval, repeated this statement, and three weeks later, Israel's Ambassador to Belgium used the same statement.¹⁴⁵ On February 4, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Barak wished to correct the impression. To the question, what would lead Israel to launch a counter-operation against Iraq? General Barak replied, "Iraqi use of nonconventional weapons against Israel".¹⁴⁶ Israeli messages were supported by the American Secretary of Defense Cheney. He was interviewed to CNN on February 2, 1991. After he had been asked about the possibility of an Iraqi WMD attack, Cheney stated the following, "I assume that he [Saddam] knows that if he were to resort to chemical weapons - that would be an escalation to weapon of mass destruction and that the possibility would then exist - certainly with respect to the Israelis for example - that they might retaliate with unconventional weapons as well".¹⁴⁷ When he was asked whether in his view Israel would respond with tactical nuclear weapons to an Iraqi chemical attack, Cheney stated, "that decision the Israelis would have to make- but I would think that he has to be cautious in terms of how he proceeds in his attacks against Israel".¹⁴⁸ This

¹⁴³Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 201.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Dani Sade, "The Red Line- The Use of Nonconventional Weapons Against Israel," February 4, 1991.

¹⁴⁷Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 202. CNN Cable News Network's 'Evans and Novak' program, February 2, 1991. CNN Correspondent Blitzert told Feldman that his impression was that "Mr. Cheney had chosen his words very carefully on that occasion, and hence was sending a clear deterrent message" (Ibid, 208).

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

statement, not only invoked the fear of an Israeli nuclear retaliation, but it implied that this reaction to an Iraqi nonconventional attack would be legitimized by the American administration.

Welch notes that Israel might follow its verbal messages by deeds. According to western sources, in the first week of operation Desert Storm Israel rolled a Jericho ballistic missile out into the open and then rolled it back under cover. U.S. officials confirm that the event took place, though they disagree on its meaning.¹⁴⁹ Some see it as an Israeli attempt to deter Saddam, as Israelis hoped that Soviet satellites would detect it and convey this message to Saddam. Welch supports this notion, "since a Jericho missile would have been completely ineffective in anything but a nuclear mode; the implication is that this was a nuclear deterrent threat".¹⁵⁰ Others offer another purpose. According to their interpretation, this was a signal intended to show Washington that, "Israel's patience was wearing thin".¹⁵¹

Since these explanations are not mutually-excluded, they both can account for the reported resolve of Israel to defend itself relying on its own capabilities, Washington played a highly important role in Israeli policy.

Many researchers attributed the Israeli nonconventional deterrence a great success. Baram, for instance, argues, "while Israel's conventional deterrence suffered a certain setback, its nonconventional deterrence remained intact".¹⁵² Steinberg claims that the Iraqi nonconventional restraint, "provides a strong basis for concluding that Israeli deterrence policies and threats of massive retaliation succeeded".¹⁵³ Eisenberg and Feldman uphold the same conclusion.¹⁵⁴ Payne shows a more cautious analysis suggesting that both American and Israeli implicit nuclear threats, "appear to be a plausible explanation for Iraqi restraint with regards to chemical and biological weapons".¹⁵⁵ Other scholars challenge this stance. Maoz, for example, claims there is not sufficient information to determine if the IDF, rather than the American army, was

¹⁴⁹ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 348–49.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 349.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² Amatzia Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses," *Orbis* 36, no. 3 (June 1992): 399.

¹⁵³ Gerald M. Steinberg, "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War," *Nonproliferation Review* 7, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2000): 57.

¹⁵⁴ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 309; Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 204.

¹⁵⁵ Payne, "Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence," 414.

the main factor that dissuaded Saddam from using WMD, and whether their nonconventional threats were his main concern rather than the conventional ones.¹⁵⁶ The CIA too, highlights these points, "If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons ... two possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons and would use them if provoked. ... Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW [chemical weapons] ... would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a top priority including the liberation of Kuwait".¹⁵⁷ Golov stresses the difficulty of distinguishing between the impact of the Israeli deterrence and this of the American extended deterrence. He infers it is difficult to substantiate, "that it was US, rather than Israeli, deterrence that figured more prominently in Iraqi calculations".¹⁵⁸ Brands and Palkki explain, "because Saddam frequently failed to distinguish US from Israeli policies, he held Israel largely responsible for the conflict and assumed hidden Israeli involvement".¹⁵⁹ The next section expounds on the American extended deterrence.

Extended Deterrence

Less than a week before Operation Desert Storm had begun, Shamir restated the Israeli self-reliance policy: Israel's defense "always was and always will be the sole and exclusive responsibility of the government of Israel".¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, during the war the Israeli government deviated from its declarations, and from Israel's long-standing policy. The most prominent decision was to send a request for the deployment of American Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-missile missile batteries, including more than seven hundred U.S. Army and Dutch military personnel in Israel.¹⁶¹ Before the war, Arens refused Eagleburger's proposal for U.S. manned Patriot Batteries. Eagleburger

¹⁵⁶ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 324.

¹⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, "Performance in the Persian Gulf War," March 1991, <www.fas.org/irp/gulf/intel/961031/002mc_91.txt.

¹⁵⁸ Golov, "Deterrence in the Gulf War," 465.

¹⁵⁹ Brands and Palkki, "Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb," 157.

¹⁶⁰ Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1991 as cited in Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 329.

¹⁶¹ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 6.

recalls, "I understood why: because Israelis have always had the view that they would defend themselves".¹⁶² What led Arens to change his mind and to ask for the batteries after the first Scud attack on Israeli cities? According to Melman and Raviv, it was mainly about the missiles' psychological effect, "the intended effect was that of a placebo to calm the Israeli public".¹⁶³ Bush as well opines, that the Patriot "turned out to be more effective in terms of morale than militarily".¹⁶⁴

Another consideration was using the crisis to tighten the relations with Washington, and eventually to strengthen Israeli deterrence. Feldman notes, stationing U.S. troops in Israel "comprised a new milestone in US-Israeli strategic cooperation and in America's commitment to Israel: for the first time in Israel's history, American combat units were sent to take an active part in its defense".¹⁶⁵ Feldman adds, "This comprised a clear signal of America's commitment to Israel's security, and thus a significant contribution to Israel's cumulative deterrence".¹⁶⁶ Like in the Yom Kippur War, the American assistance was a strong signal of its resolve to support its ally. In 1973 Washington delivered military equipment; in 1991 it sent American troops. This signaled its unpretendingly strong commitment for Israel's security. The impact of the American policy was that those who wish to fight Israel should know that Jerusalem would be assisted by the most powerful country in the world.

In addition to the American active defense, Washington and Jerusalem established a secure 'hot line' with Washington called "Hammer Rick". This enabled Arens to have occasional talks with Cheney, and to convey missile warning from U.S. headquarters to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli population before the Iraqi missiles hit their cities. The time given for the Israeli public to find a shelter – usually between 90 seconds to five minutes – turned to be very effective in saving lives.¹⁶⁷ This is another evidence for the Israeli approach toward the role of the U.S.: The American satellites and warning system, along with the Israeli passive defensive steps decreased the damage made by

¹⁶² Ibid., 385.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 390.

¹⁶⁴ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 222.

¹⁶⁵ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 192.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Levite, "The Gulf War : Tentative Military Lessons for Israel," 153; Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 201.

the Iraqi attacks. The American assistance supported the Israeli deterrence, and particularly its deterrent by denial element.

This Israeli policy was unprecedented. Israeli government partially subjected two of its main security principles to the American assistance. In respect to deterrence, the Patriot batteries served as a chief active-defense ingredient in Israel's deterrence by denial measures against the Iraqi missile attacks. Early warning, which usually used to prepare for an eminent war, was now designed to prepare the Israeli population for an eminent missile attack, and was in the hands of the American operators. But above all, the Gulf War resulted in a rare Israeli restraint. As Lasensky points out, "Israel had never before stood idle while under attack".¹⁶⁸

In a first glance, this observation does not belong to the section about the American protection, as the Israeli decision was whether to retaliate or not. However, this was not the main dilemma, as perceived in Jerusalem. For Shamir, the choice was between conducting an Israeli retaliation operation along with the American efforts or relying solely on the American campaign. In his autobiography Shamir presents the Israeli alternatives to solve this dilemma: the IAF "could be directed to locate and destroy the Iraqi launchers. Or we might rely on the United states carrying out such missions with the aid of the IAF. Or – and this was the option of my choice – the IAF could act in conjunction with the US air force, each force allocated its own time and place of action".¹⁶⁹ As Bush excluded the last option, Israel chose the second. Restraint, thus, was not perceived as no punishment for the Iraqi aggression, but punitive actions exercised by the American ally.

Arens also argues that Israel never forgo its right to retaliate the Iraqi attacks if the government decides to act. The Israeli decision was subjected to two main factors: weather conditions that meet the operational conditions of the IAF, and an American evacuation of areas in Western Iraq to allow for the Israeli forces to operate alone.¹⁷⁰ According to Arens, Eagleburger claimed that the U.S. could not join the attack or

¹⁶⁸ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 6.

¹⁶⁹ Shamir, *Summing up*, 223.

¹⁷⁰ Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 206.

transfer intelligence information for the Israeli operation; nor they would arrange an air-corridor using an Arab aerial space. If Israel decided to act the U.S. would withdraw its forces so the IDF could act alone.¹⁷¹ During the war, Israeli requests to coordinate its response with Washington, mainly by Arens, were dependent upon a consent between President bush and Prime Minister Shamir – an agreement that was never achieved.

The American campaign using Israeli intelligence assistance was more powerful, though may be less effective against the Scud launchers than what the Israelis believed they could do.¹⁷² The Israeli approach was more "microscopic" and "creative" than the American one, and focused on the missiles sites in Western Iraq, thus, the Israelis expected their operation to be more effective in hindering the Iraqi capacity to launch more missiles.¹⁷³ However, the overall impact of the American campaign in Western Iraq on Israel's accumulative deterrence was expected to be positive – the enemy was being punished; and Israel was willing to leave the punishment for a much more powerful state. the Iraqi army would be massively stroke; though it would not be Israel to strike it, the Iraqi price would be high. As Shamir underlines, the decision to cooperate with the Americans "was not a surrender of Israel's right to self-defence but Israel's contribution to the erasing of an evil regime".¹⁷⁴

Shomron explains, "I regard the destruction of the Eastern front – which is taking place by the day and by the hour – as our objective... The decision not to react at this stage is a consequence of... a consideration of our national security".¹⁷⁵ Tal demonstrated this calculus when explaining the Israeli restraint, "Israel did not lose anything of its deterrent power, even though it did not respond to missile attacks *on itself*. The United States pressed Israel not to intervene in the war, so that the Arab members of

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 189.

¹⁷² Ibid., 215; Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 398; Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 343.

¹⁷³ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 384; Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 215.

¹⁷⁴ Shamir, *Summing up*, 224.

¹⁷⁵ Amir Oren et al., "IDF Operation Against Scuds Mat Allow Hussein's Survival", *Davar*, February 2, 1991 as cited in Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 191.

the anti-Iraqi coalition it had put together would not abandon it. Israel acceded to the American request".¹⁷⁶


Hence, for the Shamir restraint was about resting on the American protection to punish the Iraqi attackers while actually damaging his capacity to conduct more assaults against the Israeli population. In terms of deterrence, this was another example for an Israeli reliance on American deterrence rather than on its own capabilities. Along with the decision to station American active defense systems and using the American warning system, Israel's deterrence policy was now attributing a great and unprecedented role to American protection concerning its offensive elements.

Therefore, this analysis indicates a unique role for the American Extended Deterrence in Israeli deterrence policy. Israeli deterrence hedging, which usually comprised of a very strong element of direct deterrence, incorporated significant elements of American protection. It should be stressed that Israel's independent deterrence remained the core of Israeli policy vis-à-vis Iraq in January 1991, particularly against the nonconventional Iraqi threat. However, the American protection which traditionally used to strengthen Israeli deterrence, provided Israel with military capabilities which Jerusalem lacked. By doing so, Washington offered its Israeli ally means it did not possess. Accordingly, Israeli deterrence hedging was still positioned in the right side of the deterrence scale, but further to the left in respect to its 1973 policy, reflecting the unique reliance on American protection during the Gulf War (Figure 12). Melman and Raviv encapsulate the abnormal Israeli policy in 1991, "Give us political and moral support, plus ammunition – the Israelis always used to say – and we'll do the job ourselves. The Gulf War was the exception".¹⁷⁷ What was the main motivation led to this unprecedented Israeli policy? This question is addressed in the next section.

¹⁷⁶ Tal, *National Security*, 197.

¹⁷⁷ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 396.

Figure 12 The Protégé's Deterrence Hedging – Israel (1991)



Deterrence-Independence Dilemma

During the Gulf War Israel was required to balance between its deterrence and independence. Traditionally in Israeli strategic thinking, one value enforces the other. However, during the crisis, like in 1973, these two values contradicted each other. The American campaign against the Iraqi army entitled Israeli deterrence to incorporate some elements in the great American military might for its deterrence purposes. Doing so, nonetheless, enhanced American influence over Israel's policy, thus, constraining its independence. Eventually Jerusalem decided to "outsource" some elements of its deterrence policy to the U.S. in order to strengthen its deterrence. By doing so, Jerusalem yielded its independence to some extent. One of the outcomes of this strategic decision was the Israeli restraint throughout the crisis. Many scholars focus on this decision when exploring the Israeli policy during the crisis.¹⁷⁸ These studies provide a narrow examination of the Israeli calculus. As proposed in the last section, Israeli policy should be perceived as a deterrence hedging: between independent and extended deterrence. The dilemma whether to react to the Iraqi attacks was part of a broader dilemma: should Israel leave parts of its policy in Washington's hands?

¹⁷⁸ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint"; Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency"; Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War"; Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint." Welch, Lasensky, Feldman, Eisenberg

What, thus, led the Israeli government to submit vital interests to American policy? Like in 1973, the answer lies in the confidence Israel held for its deterrence prestige. However, it should be stressed that treating the Israeli behavior as an outgrowth of a one-time decision, as in October 1973, may be misleading. Welch opines, "At no point did Israel decide as a matter of policy not to respond to Iraq's attacks... the 'decision' was under constant review and subject to change at any time".¹⁷⁹ Lasensky concurs, "There was not a single 'moment of truth' engagement, but rather of series of diplomatic exchanges in which the United States and Israel would debate the strategic and political merits of restraint".¹⁸⁰ The first encounter was December 11, 1990. In the meeting Shamir agreed to avoid a preemptive strike against Iraq, but insisted that Israel would preserve the right to defend itself if Saddam attacks.¹⁸¹ He also pointed out in front of President Bush, "we should try to consult beforehand, before something is launched".¹⁸²

The second American pledge was conveyed three days before the United Nations' ultimatum to Iraq expired, on January 12. Eagleburger and Wolfowitz were sent to Israel with a letter from the President to Shamir, "Do not get involved in the fighting, not even in response to Iraqi provocation".¹⁸³ After the first Iraqi missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa on January 18, Bush called Shamir to ensure he would remain passive. Bush recalls, "From What Shamir said, it became obvious that Israel would restrain itself for the time being".¹⁸⁴ A day after, following another Iraqi missile attack the Israeli message was much more assertive, "We have been attacked and are not doing anything", Shamir told Bush, "Our people don't understand. By our intimate relationship, we have to find a way to participate in this war..."¹⁸⁵.

On January 19, according to Melman and Raviv, the Commander of the IAF used the special line to Washington to inform the Americans that "We will be going in with both

¹⁷⁹ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 340.

¹⁸⁰ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 2.

¹⁸¹ Shamir, *Summing up*, 221–22; Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 310; Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 383.

¹⁸² Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 425.

¹⁸³ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 384.

¹⁸⁴ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 453.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 455.

air and ground forces, and I want to give you the coordinates".¹⁸⁶ Wolfowitz, who took the call, replied, "That's got to be the subject of higher level consultation".¹⁸⁷ This call was made a few hours before the Israeli cabinet had an emergency gathering to discuss the Israeli strategy in response to the Iraqi attacks. Melman and Raviv claim, this was "one of the most important and dramatic meetings in Israel's history".¹⁸⁸ Although Shamir faced a strong opposition from his cabinet members, he was determined to maintain the Israeli restraint policy and to preserve close coordination with the American administration and army. "For the first time", Melman and Raviv notes, "after undergoing a serious attack, Israel did not respond".¹⁸⁹

On January 22, after the first attack resulting in an Israeli death, Prime Minister Shamir sent a personal letter to President Bush essentially asking him, "to step aside and allow Israel to retaliate".¹⁹⁰ Bush refused and offered to double the Patriot deployment in Israel and to provide updated intelligence. Shamir was upset by the American answer and called this offer, "inhumane".¹⁹¹ On February 10, Arens arrived to Washington with the Israeli Chief of Staff Shomron and his deputy, General Ehud Barak for a half-day visit. He requested to coordinate retaliation. The American reply was a firm, "no". Bush doubted the IDF could accomplish something the American army cannot. Arens message then was, "If you don't let us do it... then at least do so yourselves".¹⁹² This visit was, according to Bush, "difficult and unpleasant".¹⁹³ Eventually, Shamir confirmed to conduct an exercise flight over Jordan without American approval, but it was one day before the war was over, and weather conditions thwarted this plan.¹⁹⁴

Israel was willing to abandon its long-standing principle of self-reliance in order to watch its most powerful enemy being crushed and increase its accumulative deterrence vis-a-vis Iraq. The American campaign suggested a powerful tool to achieve this goal, so it made a calculated decision to do so by relying on U.S. might.

¹⁸⁶ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 392.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 393.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 394.

¹⁹⁰ Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 389.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 390.

¹⁹² Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 399.

¹⁹³ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 467.

¹⁹⁴ Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 230.

The argument made by the opposition to this policy was that by restraining the IDF after the Israeli public commitment to react, Israeli deterrence's credibility would be damaged both against Iraq and other potential enemies in the region.¹⁹⁵ However, this price would be marginal with respect to the expected benefit of restraint. The reward for Israel would be a destruction of one of its great threats – the Iraqi army. Rabin illustrated the strategic magnitude of the American campaign to Israel's interests, “if someone had come a year ago and said that the destruction of Iraq's military power, and maybe even the destruction of the megalomaniacal regime of Saddam Hussein, would come about by a mighty force, and Israel would not have to spill the blood of its soldiers, and that we would have a warning period of five and a half months before the war broke out - he would have been told that he was fantasizing. Even with all the injuries and the destruction the missiles caused, this is a deluxe war”.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, as Table 7 shows, the post-war Iraqi army was a much lesser threat to Israel than before the war.

Shamir writes in his autobiography, “...I was unhappily absolutely sure that if we did not want Israel to be the cause of a possible failure of the US-led attempt to smash Saddam Hussein, we had no alternative other than to work within the framework proposed by the administration”.¹⁹⁷ Practically it meant, “co-operating with the United States in the areas of intelligence and consultation without any direct Israeli military intervention – always provided, of course, that our losses were not too heavy”.¹⁹⁸ Shamir's reservation is important to understand the Israeli underlining motivation.

It implies that the American non-deterrent incentives, like financial aid and the Eagleburger delegation surely encouraged the Israeli government to restrain, but deterrence considerations were also a crucial element in this decision. To support this inference, one should use a “what if” analysis. Though this type of analysis is always hypothetical and should be cautiously treated, in the case of 1991, it can shed more light on the Israeli motivation to adhere to strategic restraint.

¹⁹⁵ Welch, “The Politics and Psychology of Restraint,” 342; Arens, *War and Peace in the Middle-East 1988-1992*, 174.

¹⁹⁶ Eisenberg, “Passive Belligerency,” 314.

¹⁹⁷ Shamir, *Summing up*, 224.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Had Israel kept its strategy should Iraq use chemical weapons or if one of the missile attacks led to a high number of civilian casualties? The common answer to this question is no. One piece of evidence is Shamir's reservation when advocating for his decision to restrain the IDF. Shamir's aide suggests a similar conclusion, "Shamir admitted... that if, God forbid, there would have been a hit causing the deaths of dozens of civilians, he would not have been able to keep his cool".¹⁹⁹

Another evidence can be found in Washington. The American administration understood that the mission of restraining Israel would be very difficult in case of a devastating Iraqi attack, or if Saddam was to resort to nonconventional weapons. For example, Richard Haas, the National Security Council Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, confirms that had Iraq used a nonconventional weapon against Israel, the U.S. could not have stopped Israel from retaliating.²⁰⁰ Haas recalled that after the first Iraqi missile attack on Israel there were rumors about Saddam sending chemical warheads, "my reaction was if that's true you can't keep the Israelis from holding back and at that point we said if it is true that the Iraqis have used chemicals then we're talking about the nature of the Israelis' response, not whether the Israelis respond".²⁰¹ Avigdor Haselkorn notes that "in response to an Iraqi chemical or biological attack, Washington, rightly or wrongly, expected Israel to resort to its nuclear missiles".²⁰² Hence, he claims, instead of seeking to block Israel, Washington tried to assure that the Israeli response would be conventional.²⁰³

Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides another piece of evidence for this argument. In his meeting with IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, Powell was told that in the case of an Iraqi chemical attack, "you know what we must do".²⁰⁴ General Powell explains, "I had a pretty good idea of what he meant. Israeli missile crews were reportedly on full alert. And who knew what they would be firing". What was the Israeli threshold for triggering a military response? Welch expounds, "While there was no universally agreed standard for what constituted 'substantial'

¹⁹⁹Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance*, 1st ed (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 394.

²⁰⁰Haas, Public Broadcasting Service.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*

²⁰²Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 101.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 128.

²⁰⁴ Powell, *My American Journey*, 511–12.

fatalities, Israelis and Americans retrospectively discuss figures in the range of 30 to 300".²⁰⁵ He adds that, "There is near unanimous agreement on both sides that a chemical attack - with or without casualties - would have elicited an Israeli response because of its symbolic implications: it would simply not have been possible for a state founded in the wake of the Holocaust to stand idle while its citizens were gassed".²⁰⁶

The Americans were so suspicious regarding their capability to hold the Israelis, they offered them to retaliate, but doing so in coordination with Washington. After the second Scud attack on Israeli cities, President Bush sought to minimize the damage of the expected Israeli response, so he offered Israel's Prime Minister to execute a limited retaliation, "maybe some of the northern airfields could be targeted by your missiles and then this would make a good contribution to our efforts...I have not discussed this with our military, but that would be a more proportional response to these horrible attacks on Israel".²⁰⁷ Haselkorn claims that on January 1991 U.S. intelligence assessed that Israel's new Jericho surface-to-surface missile was operational and could reach 1400 kilometers (nearly twice the distance to Baghdad).²⁰⁸ According to Haselkorn, the American estimation was wrong. The missile was not operational, and could only reach targets in western Iraq. Melman and Raviv add, "firing long-range missiles against launchers hidden in the sand dunes of western Iraq would be an absurd waste".²⁰⁹

Altogether, it seems that despite the American incentives to remain passive, Israel was likely to intervene in the war should Iraq conduct a successful conventional attack or use WMD. The Israeli retaliation was not expected to have a significant impact on in the battlefield, its main contribution was about restoring deterrence. Shamir himself implied to the low operational contribution of an Israeli retaliation in front of the cabinet members, "What do we gain from this, just to have the satisfaction that we retaliated?"²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 345.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 455.

²⁰⁸ Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 132.

²⁰⁹ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 389.

²¹⁰ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 336-37.

Israel could have conceded its independence when deterrence was not severely challenged by Iraq, while being enforced by the U.S., Israel would pay a small price: its credibility in order to gain an immense gain in the realm of capabilities, watching the Iraqi army being smashed. Former Prime Minister Rabin stated, "Our deterrent capability proved itself".²¹¹ A post-war public survey revealed that 72 percent of the Israeli public did not perceive any damage to the nation's deterrence.²¹² Tal also infers that "Israel did not lose anything of its deterrent power..."²¹³ Another supportive indication is the Syrian assessment of Saddam's missile attacks against Israel, they, "were extremely detrimental to the Arab causes. They brought no visible gain to the Arabs... at the same time the attacks enabled Israel to reap abundant fruits at the very low cost of slight casualties and material damage..."²¹⁴

Had Israeli deterrence faced a severe threat, Israel was willing to risk all the above-mentioned benefits for the sake of restoring its direct deterrence credibility. Similarity with the Israeli policy in 1973, as deterrence was relatively strong, Israeli was more receptive to American pressure. If Israeli deterrence was perceived as collapsing, there are strong indications to assume it would have acted the same as in 1973, and was much less attentive to the American pledges. As formerly mentioned, Shamir contends that his policy, "was not a surrender of Israel's right to self-defense but Israel's contribution to the erasing of an evil regime".²¹⁵ Had Israel believed the situation obliged it to defend itself, Shamir would be likely to do so. "I know", Shamir concludes, "that our restraint was indicative of our strength; that we were able to do what was best for us..."²¹⁶

²¹¹ Emanuel Rosen, 'Our Deterrent Capability Proved Itself (Interview with Yitzhak Rabin), *Ma'ariv*, 22 Feb. 1991 (Hebrew) as cited in Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 309.

²¹² Asher Arian, "Security and Political Attitudes: The Gulf War," in *War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel: Report of a Jaffee Center Study Group*, ed. Joseph Alpher (Jerusalem: JCSS, 1992), 301.

²¹³ Tal, *National Security*, 197.

²¹⁴ In Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 340.

²¹⁵ Shamir, *Summing up*, 224.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

Alternative Explanations

The Neorealist School

The neorealist school proposes a sound framework to assess the inter-alliance dynamics between the U.S. and Israel during the Gulf War. Both Waltz and Walt concur that the unipolar international order which America inherited after the Collapse of the Soviet Union left it in a powerful position. Being the sole superpower significantly reduced Washington's dependency on its allies. In this world order the unipole's - the U.S.'s – main objective was to prevent a creation of a counter coalition which could undermine its superiority, and use alliances to promote its interests. According to Waltz, "One of the most important benefits is greater freedom of choice in the conduct of foreign policy".²¹⁷ Walt, too, opines, "With less need for a large and cohesive alliance network, the unipole (in this case the United States) has greater leeway to opt for its preferences".²¹⁸

Specifically, the post-Cold War world alliances serve as an effective instrument to restrain allies. According to Waltz, "The Bush administration saw, and the Clinton administration continued to see, NATO as the instrument for maintaining America's domination of the foreign and military policies of European states".²¹⁹ In this environment the small powers have limited means to restrain the unipole and influence his policy, mostly by influencing domestic American politics.²²⁰ "Small and medium powers will try to free ride on the unipole whenever possible", Walt contends, "while insisting on alliance norms that retain their voice in alliance decision making".²²¹

Analyzing the U.S.-Israeli interaction during the Gulf War through a neorealist lens yields a cogent argument. The Bush Administration requested that Israel would not retaliate after the Iraqi attacks, and indeed it did not. A great Israeli consideration was the powerful might of the U.S. which provided Israel with an opportunity to destroy one of its biggest threats – a distant enemy with a large army – without risking an Israeli soldier. In that sense, Israel decided to free-ride resting on the American

²¹⁷ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 120.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 95.

²¹⁹ Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 21.

²²⁰ Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 117–18.

²²¹ Ibid.

campaign. Accordingly, by signaling its resolve to retaliate, the Israeli government wished to influence American policy as much as they could, namely the American war plan in Iraq.

Nevertheless, this analysis enlightens only part of the picture. The American demand held a high, though not dramatic, price for Washington, particularly for the American war strategy. To reduce the Israeli pressure and to signal its resolve to halt the Scud attacks, Cheney instructed the military to allocate significant aerial power to Western Iraq to destroy Scud launchers and sites. These instructions were never fully implemented due to an objection from the military command, namely, by General Norman Schwarzkopf and the Air Force commander. However, the tensions between the civilian and the military leadership revolved around the decision to attack Iraqi launchers demonstrated that the cost of the American superpower had paid to maintain its influence over its Israeli ally was not marginal. The American unipole, although a great power, could not ignore its ally's demand free of significant constraints. Preserving the alliance and its influence on its Israeli ally persuaded Washington to accept significant constraints over its policy.

Furthermore, the neorealist explanation partially accounts for the Israeli calculus during the war. Israel's free-ride was not its ideal strategy, but an outgrowth of a successful American restraining campaign. Its "instinct", as presented by Shamir, was to defy the American request and intervene in the war. The structural concerns, in this regard, clashed with the Israeli principle of retaliation. Had the U.S. not embarked on aggressive inductive measures, it is reasonable to think that Israel would have "ignored" the structural logic and attacked Iraq, rather than free-riding on American power. The Israeli policy, thus, should be seen as a compromise between structural and cultural conditions. Welch for instance claims, "The great success of the United States in restraining Israel was a function primarily of its positive efforts to promote Israeli security..."²²² Lasensky also highlights the role of American diplomacy, as one of the principal reasons for the Israeli restraint, "the U.S. strategy of coercive diplomacy made effective use of both positive and negative measures".²²³ Eisenberg too, argues

²²² Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 352.

²²³ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 11.

that, "US success in persuading Israel to refrain from joining the war rested on a delicate balance of carrots and sticks".²²⁴

The magnitude of the American policy in restraining Israel is important to demonstrate that the structural conditions, though they did play an important role in the Israeli decision, were faced with counter forces which pushed the Israeli government to react. In fact, Prime Minister Shamir withstood tremendous pressure from highly reputed ministers in his cabinet. The opposition to Shamir's policy led by Minister of Housing Ariel Sharon and Minister of Agriculture Rafael Eitan called to, "unleash the Israeli military".²²⁵ They were supported by Minister of Science Yuval Ne'eman and Minister of Finance Yitzhak Modai. The Air Force commander, General Avihu Bun-nun also advocated for an immediate retaliation. Their main goal was that, "the whole world would understand the message: No one can get away with attacking Israeli cities!"²²⁶

However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy, the IDF Chief of Staff and his deputy Ehud Barak, were on Shamir's side. Although Arens was inclined towards Israeli action, he worked with Shamir.²²⁷ Eventually Shamir succeeded in declining their proposals, but the rationale of "free-riding" was subjected to other considerations, as the next section presents. Altogether, this analysis indicates that the neorealist explanation alone does not yield a complete explanation for the Israeli behavior.

Alliance Restraint Theory

A complementary explanation for the neorealist argument should include America's successful coercive diplomacy, as stated above. As this analysis points out, it was an imperative factor in the Israeli calculus resulting in restraint. Restraint theory, along with the structural conditions which empowered the U.S., thus, should be an effective tool to explain the rare Israeli decision not to punish those who attacked it.

The American success in meeting this goal can be attributed to American diplomacy which let Israel choose between retaliating to restore its deterrent strength, and a

²²⁴ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 319.

²²⁵ Ibid., 311.

²²⁶ Melman and Raviv, *Friends in Deed*, 1994, 393.

²²⁷ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 311.

new strategic reality in which the Iraqi enemy is dramatically weaker and the relationship with Washington is improved. "By using positive and negative sanctions", Pressman concludes, "Washington prevented Israel from retaliating against an Iraqi ballistic missile attack".²²⁸ Feldman concurs, "Israel's decision to refrain from a military response to Iraq's missile attacks improved the odds of obtaining two objectives that significantly affected its overall strategic standing: maintaining an environment in which the coalition forces could continue diminishing Iraq's power, and strengthening the alliance with the United States".²²⁹ They, as well as Welch, Lasensy and Eisenberg agree that the American policy was a main factor in the Israeli restraint. However, they also agree this was not the only factor. Another factor was the Iraqi failure to inflict severe damage on the Israeli population.

Pressman claims, "Had the SCUD missiles included nonconventional weapons and/or caused major casualties, Israel might have responded regardless of the U.S. position".²³⁰ Lasensky explains, "Human and material damage inflicted on Israel during five weeks of intermittent Iraqi Scud attacks did not itself provide Israeli leaders with sufficient justification to retaliate".²³¹ He adds, "every government official interviewed for this study has acknowledged that if chemical weapons were used against Israel, Washington and the other coalition members would have acquiesced to Israel's decision to retaliate".²³² Welch infers, "No factor was more important to Israel's restraint, however, than pure luck".²³³ Lasensky, concurs, " Since the Patriot anti-missile systems proved decidedly ineffective, it was sheer luck that the Scuds did relatively little damage, particularly considering the high population density of many impact sites".²³⁴

Another potential factor was Israeli public support of Shamir's policy. Two weeks into the war a public opinion poll found a 94 percent approval rating for the government's handling of the situation.²³⁵ A threshold of at least 80 percent support in the Israeli

²²⁸ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 109–10.

²²⁹ Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 192.

²³⁰ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 112.

²³¹ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 11.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 353.

²³⁴ Lasensky, "Friendly Restraint," 11.

²³⁵ Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 312.

public was consistently preserved throughout the war.²³⁶ Shamir himself, however, claimed that public opinion was not a crucial factor in his decision.²³⁷ Whether it was fruitful American diplomacy, pure luck, Israeli public support, or all combined, the outcome was fragile Israeli restraint. David A. Welch concludes that, "American officials were never under the misapprehension that they controlled events; indeed, they were aware that, to a great extent, events controlled them".²³⁸

Moreover, by defining the American restraining diplomacy as successful, one ignores President Bush's proposal of an Israeli missile retaliation in the beginning of the war. This proposal contradicted the American policy, and expressed a concession to minimize the risk for the Coalition as it would allow Washington to claim the strike was an Israeli uncoordinated action. Israel never accepted this offer, but the American willingness to allow for some Israeli participation early in the war demonstrates that restraint theory, along with the neorealist school are not sufficient to account for the variance in Israeli deterrence policy. Reasons originated on the Israeli side and influenced by the Israeli concept of deterrence and lack of appropriate independent military capacity were not less important. To comprehend the Israeli restraint, it is necessary to adapt an overarching theoretical framework which includes all factors and yields an outcome which expresses a compromise between them.

This is precisely what the concept of a deterrence-independence dilemma seeks to offer: to weigh the cost and benefits of two main values, and link it with a compromise based on the protégé's perception of his priorities. In this regard, this concept should be seen as a complementary tool to assess the effectiveness of the other two theoretical instruments, while adding more variables that should be taken into account when analyzing the calculus of the protégé.

Conclusion

Israeli defense expert Ze'ev Schiff admitted that if he had been asked to predict the Israeli response to an Iraqi missile attack, "I would have replied without hesitation that

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Shamir, *Summing up*, 224.

²³⁸ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 369.

the immediate reaction would be a vigorous one...".²³⁹ It would be an intellectual error to describe the Israeli restraint during the Gulf War as either a calculated Israeli move of "free-riding", as can be argued by neorealist scholars, or as a total capitulation to American pressure, as can be inferred from restraint theory. These explanations link between the structural conditions and U.S. strategy and the final outcome – Israeli restraint, but they offer merely a partial explanation for the Israeli policy and its underlining motivations. Like in all other cases, the proposed concept of a deterrence-independence dilemma sheds more light on the Israeli protégé's behavior and the limitations of the two dominant schools to account for it. Explaining the Israeli abnormal policy during the Gulf War is not an easy task - it encompasses many variables and considerations that should be taken into account. However, this intellectual challenge held a great theoretical opportunity, not only to explain the traditional Israeli calculus but a unique manifestation of this calculus in reality. By doing so, this analysis delineates the theoretical contribution the proposed concept possesses in explaining the calculus of the protégé, as well as assessing the advantage and weaknesses of the dominant paradigms in International Relations studies. This observation will be elaborated upon in the next chapter.

²³⁹ Ze 'ev Schiff, "Israel After the War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 1, 1991, 32, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/1991-03-01/israel-after-war>.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

The purpose of this study, as presented in the opening chapter, is to shed more light on the motivations, the available alternatives, and the strategic calculus of protégés in alliances; to enrich the literature dealing with how deterrence is employed by alliances – namely, extended deterrence; and to provide a solid basis for further discussion on the practical ramifications of theoretical inferences of alliance management policy crafting. These three objectives guide the structure of the following two chapters, which gathers the lessons and insights drawn in each case study and merges them into one comprehensive analysis.

Accordingly, the first section presents the syllogisms related to the three proposed concepts: direct and extended complementary deterrence, and the deterrence-independence dilemma. In essence, the research supports the hypothesized deterrence hedging of the protégé, as well as the assumed main motivation underlying this behavior. This conclusion should be a focal point for further research of new case-studies due to the small number of case-studies chosen for the purposes of this study.

The second part discusses the theoretical contribution of these two new concepts to extended deterrence literature. It indicates that not only do they hold a unique added value in terms of explaining the deterrence policy of protégés, the concepts can also assist in assessing the benefits and limitations of the dominant current theories when used for the same goal. The analysis implies the need for more intellectual endeavors where the approach for deterrence and alliances is more subjective – tailored to the context under which extended deterrence is operated – and challenges the universal nature of the current theories. The next chapter concludes with a brief discussion of preliminary thoughts on the policy-related impact that this study and its main conclusions offer for nations who are engaged in defensive alliances.

Unearthing the role of Protégés in Extended Deterrence

Conclusion I: Protégés exercise deterrence hedging

The four cases provide evidence for deterrence hedging when protégés craft deterrence policy against a potential adversary. In all four cases, the protégé did not employ purely direct deterrence committed to their independent capabilities, nor did

they utterly count on their protectors' extended deterrence. In 1885, Austro-Hungary exercised a complex policy combining German protection, English cooperation and the Monarchy's might. In 1914, Vienna's deterrence policy was an embodiment of its joint war plan with Germany. Despite the fact that the German army was a critical element in this plan, Austria never abandoned its direct deterrence policy.

The same behavior was observed from Israel in 1973 and 1991. During the Yom Kippur War, Israel took advantage of American political and economic assistance, as well as the airlift of military assistance to strengthen Israel's direct deterrence. In the Gulf War, the American protection comprised of more aspects, including new elements for which Israel had no substitute, such as active defense; thus, the role of the American protection was increased alongside the Israeli policy of direct deterrence.

Altogether, the analysis supports the argument that nations who join alliances to increase their security by counting on their allies' protections do not abandon their own deterrence. There is an interplay between the protégé's direct deterrence and the protector's extended deterrence. Therefore, to truly comprehend the deterrence policy of a protégé, one should take into account its direct deterrence, its protector's extended deterrence and the interaction between them.


Conclusion II: Deterrence Hedging yields two main forms of Complementary Deterrence

This analysis shows that in all four cases, deterrence hedging is engendered in complementary form of deterrence, whose purpose is to balance between the protection offered by the protector and the protégé's self-capability. There is no one way to balance between extended and direct deterrence. The protégé's deterrence hedging can yield different combinations that create a spectrum: the hedging area. This spectrum consists of two chief types of protégés: protégés that construct deterrence policy on strong direct deterrence foundations, allowing for extended deterrence mainly to strengthen the independent power of the protégé; and protégés that entrust the protector with the nation's deterrence, while leaving some independent capabilities intact. To evaluate the nature of the protégé's deterrence policy one should inquire as to what the dominant element is in the protégé's policy?

Specifically, one should examine the role of the protector's indispensable capabilities in the protégé's policy: If the protégé's policy consists of strong elements of external protection which cannot be substituted with the protégé's self-capabilities, the dominant element is extended deterrence. In this form of complementary deterrence, the protégé's exercises direct deterrence to "fill holes" not covered by the protector. If the protégé promotes a self-reliant deterrence policy and uses the ally's protection to empower its own capabilities rather than acquiring new capabilities, this indicates direct deterrence dominance. In this form of complementary deterrence, the protector's extended deterrence completes the protégé's direct deterrence. As stated above, these two forms of complementary deterrence hedging are not dichotomous; they reflect a spectrum of potential combinations of direct and extended deterrence.

For example, in the two Austrian cases, the protégé – Austria-Hungary – exercised an extended deterrence-based policy. German protection was essentially the cornerstone of the Austrian policy. Nevertheless, during the Bulgarian Crisis the monarchy attempted to strengthen its deterrence by adding an alliance with Britain and the Austrian army's power to the limited German protection. In 1914, the role of the German extended deterrence was significantly greater, leaving the Austrian army with a secondary role. The two Austrian deterrence policies fall on the left side of deterrence hedging spectrum indicating an extended complementary deterrence, as illustrated by Figure 13; whereas the Austrian policy in 1914 is on the far left, and the 1885 policy falling more toward the center, alluding to the lower magnitude of the German protection.

Figure 13 Summarizing the Case-Studies: The Protégés' Deterrence Hedging



The Israeli cases exhibit a similar phenomenon related to the direct complementary deterrence side of the spectrum. In both cases, Israel's direct deterrence lay at the core of the Israeli policy. However, in 1973 the magnitude of the American extended deterrence was significantly lower than the unprecedented role it played during the 1991 war. Hence, whereas the Israeli 1973 policy expressed a more independent approach for deterrence, the 1991 case marked a move toward the center of the spectrum indicating for a more balanced merging of extended and direct deterrence elements. The Israeli and Austrian behavior demonstrates the two main forms of deterrence, the protégé's deterrence hedging produces: extended and direct complementary deterrence.

Conclusion III: When formulating their deterrence policies, nations in alliances balance deterrence with independence.

Another new concept this study proposes is the theoretical framework of the protégé's deterrence-independence dilemma. This concept does not only incorporate two of the main explanations for alliance formation – nations' aspiration to enhance their security while influencing the policies of their allies; it also seeks to produce a formulation which elucidates the protégé's motivation underlying the protégé's deterrence hedging. Applying the proposed concept on the four case-studies demonstrates a successful approach to cope with a great theoretical lacuna in both deterrence and alliance theories.

The concept of deterrence-independence dilemma allows for an innovative and cogent analysis of the causal mechanisms that resulted in the Austrian and Israeli deterrence hedging. The two countries wished to strengthen their deterrence while enhancing their leeway within the alliance. However, their behaviors unearth interesting disparities. In the first two cases, Austria pressured Germany to strengthen its commitment to the alliance and broaden the interests which it protected. Since the monarchy relied on external protection, it was clear that the German assurances would come at the expense of Austria's freedom to act as it wished.

In 1885, Bismarck's commitment did not satisfy the Austrians so they approached Britain, knowing the Mediterranean Agreement would tie the monarchy's hands even more. Only after maximizing its deterrence by joining other protectors, Vienna acted to enhance its latitude, particularly concerning its Balkan policy. Before World War I the monarchy followed the same behavior: after guaranteeing a comprehensive and unambiguous commitment from Germany, it acted to preserve independence in specific events in it was forced to forgo its interests, such as allocating forces from the Serbian front to Galicia to reinforce the German line against Russia. For Austria, the main objective was to maximize deterrence while minimizing the cost for independence. Only after deterrence was maximized, the monarchy acted to promote its independence on the condition it did not shake the alliance with Germany.

Israeli policies in 1973 and 1991 were also heavily influenced by the aspiration to balance deterrence and independence, however, it displayed a different pattern than that seen in the Austrian cases. Since Israel relied mainly on its self-capabilities, it wished to promote direct deterrence, meaning to maximize both deterrence and independence within the alliance with the U.S. Requesting American protection was limited to those threats Israel could not handle alone: political and logistical support in the Yom Kippur War, and active defense and counterattacks against the Iraqi missile sites in 1991. The necessary requirement from American aid was that it would enhance Israel's deterrence, while not significantly hindering its autonomy. When Israel's confidence in its deterrence was high, the Israeli government was more attentive to the American pledges; when deterrence was perceived as weak Israel was more resolve to withstand American pressure. This was especially prominent in times of predicament, when American assistance was needed the most, like in the last days of the 1973 war, and in the first weeks of the Gulf War. This illustrates that the delinquent balance between deterrence and independence prominently shaped the Israeli calculus, as it did in the Austrian cases.

In this equation both countries attributed deterrence a higher priority than independence, when the two values clashed. Austria was willing to bind its policy to different partners to increase its deterrence against Russia in the Balkans. Israel considered dramatic deviations from its long-standing self-reliant policy only when

deterrence was strong enough to endure the crisis. Both countries wished to maximize the two values as much as possible, but when they faced a dilemma, deterrence proved to supersede independence.

Enriching Alliance Management Literature

Conclusion IV: the proposed concepts hold complementary explanatory power for alliance management

The two dominant schools in alliance management literature are the neorealist school and advocates of restraint theory. The neorealist school stresses the national interests to increase security against a perceived threat as the main driver for alliances, and thus, as a main determinant for alliance management performances.¹ Neorealist scholars assume that distribution of capabilities and international structure are reliable determinants for alliances' policies and extended deterrence interaction. The second school advocates for intentioned restraining effect alliances pose on their members.² This school also emphasizes the role of nations' capabilities in restraining their allies. According to Pressman, the capability of the protector to mobilize his resources is a good determinant for predicting if the protégée will align with the protector's demands.³

This study points out that the concept of a deterrence-independence dilemma holds theoretical contribution to these two dominant schools. Though the existing theoretical frameworks provide scholars with important tools to analyze alliance management dynamics, they are not sufficient to account for the deterrence hedging employed by the protégé and impact the alliance's performances. Most prominently, the theories fail to account for variances observed in the four single case-study analyses presented in this research.

¹ Please see the discussion presented in chapter two. For further reading see Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979.

² Please see the discussion presented in chapter two. For further reading see Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*; Schroeder, "Alliances 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management"; Pressman, *Warring Friends*.

³ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 15.

A single case-study is expected to maintain most of the structural constraints and hold the variables of the protector's power and mobilization capacity constant. A change in the protégé's behavior when these conditions remain similar implies that more factors should be taken into account to explain this change. In 1885, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was restrained in terms of reconciliatory policy towards Russia in Bulgaria. However, the monarchy showed much less restraint with respect to Serbia and rejected Bismarck's distribution of spheres of influence which would virtually subject Bulgaria to heavy Russian influence. Structural forces and the capability of the German protector to restrain the monarchy are only partially sufficient to explain the different Austrian reaction to the German pledges.

In 1914, Austria was totally dependent on German protection but received a "blank check" to invade Serbia. Germany's absolute commitment, as it was perceived in Vienna, reflected a German decision to support the Austrians according to some historians, or to push Austria into war with Serbia according to others. Both explanations contradict the Balance of Threat theory which assumes great leverage for the protector in alliance bargaining. Balance of Power Theory and restraint theory predict an advantage for the protégé in bargaining, suggesting a successful Austrian campaign to drag Germany into the war. Nonetheless, these theories fail to establish a robust causal mechanism since Berlin and Vienna was hardly conducting bargaining, indicating additional momentous cause for the Austrian deterrence hedging. The two theories are helpful in explaining the failures of the few German restraining attempts that were made in the prelude to the breakout of the war, however this contribution too is partial as illustrated in the sixth chapter.

The Israeli cases also offer a variance of inter-alliance policies which could not be explained merely by using the dominant theories in alliance management. In 1973 Israel showed unprecedented flexibility toward the U.S., abandoning the preemptive option against the Arab armies when it became apparent that war was imminent. Later, Israel was much more determined to stand firm in the face of growing American pressure to restrain the IDF. Balance of Threat and Balance of Power theories predict changes as a result of structural impact, and restraint theory observes the restraining policy of the protector. They all yield merely partial explanations for the Israeli

variance in policies. These existing theoretical frameworks also fail to provide a sufficient explanation for Israeli restraint during the Gulf War of 1991, as well as the fragility of that restraint in light of growing political pressure on the Israeli government to react. Since Israel employed different policies in very similar situations in terms of structural constraints and protector's restraining power, new explanations are required—particularly ones rooted in the protégé's calculus.

This is precisely the purpose of the concept of deterrence-independence dilemma. This dilemma demonstrates how a change in the protégé's calculus impacts its deterrence policy. This calculus is an outgrowth of many factors, including—but not confined—to structural constraints and the protector's restraining measures. During the Bulgarian Crisis, Austria-Hungary acted to maximize deterrence by ensuring German protection of the monarchy. Due to the magnitude of German protection, Vienna was willing to concede its independence. However, in areas that were not protected by the alliance, namely protecting Austrian interests in Bulgaria and Serbia, the monarchy acted to maximize autonomy as long as its efforts did not undermine the alliance. In 1914, Austria again acted to maximize its sovereignty only after guaranteeing maximum protection from Germany. Since Germany provided the monarchy with maximum deterrence, Vienna acted more freely to maximize its leeway, sometimes against German pledges. In fact, the German "blank check" reduced the tension between deterrence and independence to almost zero. Vienna used it in the few cases in which it confronted German requests that were not aligned with Austria's policy or goals.

The Israeli cases reveal an opposite pattern. Israel's image of deterrence was mainly an outgrowth of the IDF's power. Given this perception, Israeli policy links Israel's deterrence with its independence: greater freedom of action allows for more credible threats to use the IDF should the enemy attack. As long as these two values could jointly be pursued, there was no Israeli dilemma. However, the dilemma emerged when Israel's limited capability required American political, economic or military assistance. This was the case in the Yom Kippur War and the Gulf War. In both cases, when assistance was necessary Israel sought to ensure credible deterrence power first. Only when deterrence was perceived as strong was the Israeli government willing

to reduce its latitude. In 1973, Israel ruled out preemption; in 1991, for the first time in its history, Israel accepted American military forces to protect the country.

This analysis illuminates the contribution of the neorealist and restraining argument to account for the protégé's deterrence hedging. When the protégé assesses that it can no longer pursue both deterrence and independence—that is to say it is facing a deterrence-independence dilemma—it is expected to accept constraints from its protector. Then, if the protector's policy has strong elements of extended complementary deterrence (the protection given by the protector serves as a main pillar), the protector's restraining efforts will have more impact on the protégé's policy. On the other hand, if the protégé heavily relies on its self-capabilities—namely employing direct complementary deterrence—the restraining attempts of the protector are expected to produce a limited success, unless the protégé estimates its deterrence is strong. In this event the protégé will be more attentive to the protector's pressure.

This conclusion is also ascertained from a more comprehensive analysis whose aim is to account for similarities as well as the main disparities between the Austrian and Israeli deterrence policies. The analysis illustrates the limits to the explanatory power of the two dominant schools of alliance theory. As Table 6 shows, both countries experienced a shift from the first case to the second, expressing further dependence on the protector's extended deterrence (from (-) which indicates a weaker role of extended deterrence, to (+) which signals a greater role). This was the case with Austria in 1914 as compared to 1885; Israel, too, acceded to be protected by a greater American protection in 1991 than it had accepted during the Yom Kippur War.

This parallel trend can be explained in terms of relative capabilities as well as alliances' commitment. In both cases the change occurs when the protégés possessed weaker self-capabilities against the perceived threat, marked by (-), and while being offered a stronger commitment from their ally (+). Austria was not capable of withstanding alone the Russian power (presumably supported by France) in 1914. In 1885, the balance of power was much more balanced. The Iraqi missiles, too, represented a more complicated challenge for Israel's capabilities than the Arab armies did in 1973. The U.S. provided an unprecedented commitment to Israel's security in 1991 by

sending American troops to defend the Jewish State for the first time since its establishment. Germany also offered Austria and unprecedented and unequivocal commitment in 1914 – to a degree Germany was not willing to propose in 1885. Other variables such as protector's restraining performances and international structure do not exhibit the same pattern. Hence, they cannot explain the similar trend in the countries' behavior.

Table 8 A Comprehensive Analysis of Alternative Determinants for the Protégé's Deterrence Hedging⁴

Protégé/ Variable	Austro-Hungary		Israel	
	1885-7	1914	1973	1991
	1885-7	1914	1973	1991
Role of Extended Deterrence	Significant (-)	Indispensable (+)	Secondary (-)	Important (+)
Form of Deterrence	Extended Complementary	Extended Complementary	Direct Complementary	Direct Complementary
Self-Perception of Deterrence	Rel. Strong (+)	Weak (-)	Weak (-)	Rel. Strong (+)
Relative Power	Medium (+)	Weak (-)	High (+)	Medium (-)
Protector's Commitment	Rel. Weak (-)	Rel. Strong (+)	Rel. Weak (-)	Strong (+)
International Structure	Multipolar (=)	Multipolar (=)	Bipolar (+)	Unipolar (-)
Restraining Efforts	Significant (+)	Almost none (-)	Significant (=)	Significant (=)

⁴ The table shows the nominal measure for each variable in each one of the four case-studies. The sign presented in the parentheses design to single out the trend in the variable within each dyad: the Austrian and the Israeli. A positive sign (+) indicates for a higher measurement of the variable in respect to the other case in the dyad. For example, the German commitment to the alliance in 1914 was stronger than the German commitment in 1885.

Therefore, this analysis implies that self-capability and the protector's commitment are necessary conditions for protégé's adaptation of extended deterrence elements; nonetheless, they are not sufficient. They can account for the Austrian decision to rely heavily on German protection while restraining its policy given that the Russian threat was immense and the German commitment was strong. However, these two variables alone cannot explain why Israel positively considered conducting an attack on the Iraqi launchers had Saddam used WMD, or why it resisted Kissinger's pressure to withdraw to the cease-fire lines in the last days of the Yom Kippur war, when it relied heavily on the American political and military support.

An analysis based solely on the two variables can produce a counter theoretical argument: Israel facing a great threat needed to rest on the American strong commitment more than before; however, the analysis suggests that the Israeli calculus was exactly the opposite – should Israel be attacked by Iraqi chemical weapons it must retaliate. Israel could yield its latitude as long as its deterrence was perceived as strong. A severe attack would dramatically damage Israeli deterrence, and thus push Israel to retaliate—despite its limited military capability and while taking the risk of generating tensions with its American ally. This indicates that more variables are needed to comprehend the causes for the divergent reactions to similar situations of Israel and Austria.

To have a stronger and more cogent argument about the behavior of the protégé one should take advantage of the three proposed concepts of this study. The two forms of deterrence hedging create distinctions among protégé nations: those who exercise extended complementary deterrence and those who employ direct complementary deterrence. The deterrence-independence dilemma, then, proposes an explanation of how different nations balance differently between their desire to promote deterrence against the potential adversary and independence within the alliance. Therefore, these concepts should be taken into account alongside, rather than instead of, other variables espoused in the traditional theories.

Together the traditional and proposed concepts tell a story: protégés are likely to adopt more extended deterrence elements when their capability is not sufficient to cope with the perceived threat, when the ally is willing to increase his commitment to

the alliance, and when deterrence-independence dilemma is expected to result in the protégé's concession on its independence: for direct complementary deterrence when deterrence is perceived as strong; and in the event of extended complementary deterrence when deterrence is conceived to be weak. This story is supported by both the in-depth analysis of each one of the four cases, as well as a more comprehensive comparison between the two dyads of the Austrian and the Israeli cases.

Noteworthy, the variables tested in this research derived from the neorealist theoretical framework on which it was constructed. Therefore, their focal point is the international structure and the relations between the units. As Waltz opines, though they do not provide a complete analysis of the factors affect international politics they are sufficient to predict alliances' behavior.⁵ Subsequently, this study presents a one level analysis: the international level, and attributes a very limited explanatory power to agency and individual leaders who belong to the unit level.

Nevertheless, this study suggests that individual leaders may have a significant independent contribution to alliance management dynamics. Shaping the European system of balance of power, and restraining Austria-Hungary as part of this system, cannot be fully comprehended without pointing out the extraordinary diplomatic skills and personality of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. General Moltke's historical role in pushing Germany and its Austrian ally to World War I on one hand, and the lack of leadership on the part of the Austrian Emperor, Franz Joseph, on the other hand, also illustrate the power of individual leaders to influence alliance interaction, and thus, the policy of the protégé. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's personality and unique relationship with two Israeli military leaders, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff David "Dado" Elazar, had a great impact on Israeli calculus and policy during the Yom Kippur War. The role of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in withstanding the strong opposition from his cabinet to Israel's restraining policy, too, cannot be underestimated. All four case studies suggest that leaders may have an independent contribution to the protégé's behavior.

⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 73–77, 121–22.

The nature of the leadership for both protectors and protégés may lead to abnormal behavior - in contrast to what the suggested framework in this study proposes. Weak leaders may not restrain their subordinates, and thus allow for "inappropriate" deterrence policy. It may also be that strong leaders of protégé countries can individually lead an independent deterrence policy even when the other factors proposed in this research predict a preference for extended complementary deterrence. Strong leaders of protector states may manage to constrain their allies to direct complementary deterrence policy when the proposed theoretical framework in this study suggests a preferred extended complimentary deterrence policy. Therefore, future studies should explore the role of agency given certain structural constraints by considering the impact different leaders pose on the conceptual framework presented in this study, and this interaction's outcome in terms of deterrence policy. By promoting this intellectual effort, new studies can enrich the theoretical basis of the proposed theoretical framework and include two levels of analysis: the international structure and decision maker.

Conclusion V: Extended Deterrence is context-dependent, according to both the protector's and the protégé's views

Thucydides determines that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".⁶ This premise has shaped the theoretical approach underlying extended deterrence literature. The bulk of this literature is written from the protector's view – who is also the stronger power in the alliance – assuming that power dictates the alliance's dynamics. According to Waltz, the founder of the neorealist school, structure and relative capabilities determine interdependence which determines the alliance policy. Therefore, in a bipolar world "alliance leaders are free to follow their own line...".⁷ In a multipolar world leaders are more attentive to their allies. Since

⁶Strassler and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 352.5.8 (V. 89).

⁷Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 170.

interdependence between allies is higher the allies' capabilities render indispensable, and no state can exercise control over its alliance.⁸

Accordingly, the protégé is confined to a responsive role: if the protector is strong enough, it can determine the alliance's policy and the policy of its allies. This assumption is shared by both neorealism and alliance restraint theory. Pressman, for instance, contends, "the success or failure of alliance restraint attempts depends on the willingness of the most powerful ally to mobilize its power resources".⁹ Hence, if the protector fails to restrain its ally, the main reasons come from its relative power in the international system (according to the neorealist scholars), or in its capability to mobilize its power to translate it to a successful policy (as restraint theory researchers argue). Their joint focal point is the strong—the protector. The protector is the generator of alliance dynamics, and extended deterrence interaction included, thus, the its main determinants for the alliance policy is emanated in his behavior.

However, the analysis in this study demonstrates that the protégé often is, in fact, not limited only to a reactive role. Austria promoted collaboration with Britain against Russia while investing more resources to improve its own military power to increase both its deterrence and independence in the Balkans, given that Germany excluded this region from its commitment. Israel, too, was not a "typical" protégé. Adapting a policy which corresponded with the American pledges was occasionally more a result of Israeli considerations allowing for strategic flexibility than a direct outgrowth of the American power and restraining efforts. In 1973 Kissinger did not have to mobilize his power to convince Israel to shun preemption due to Israel's high confidence in its deterrence. When American power was mobilized to convince the Israelis to accept the cease-fire conditions, near the end of the war Israel did not capitulate and forced Washington to agree to a compromise. In 1991, Israeli restraint was a product of many factors—the American coercive diplomacy being only one of them. Altogether, these cases clearly demonstrate the active role of the protégé, as well as the need to consider the protégé's calculus and policy when analyzing extended deterrence dynamics and its impact on the protector and potential adversary.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁹ Pressman, *Warring Friends*, 15.

This research finds that theories focused on the stronger power are less effective when analyzing nations who construct their deterrence policy based on strong sense of direct deterrence. These protector-center theories are, however, more beneficial as a determinant for nations' deterrence policies in extended deterrence-based countries. They are less productive in cases where the protégé manages to promote both values, avoiding the deterrence-independence dilemma. This conclusion, which brings the protégé into the discussion alongside the protector, corresponds with Snyder's model of two parallel interactions that constantly influence each other: between the protector and the protégé, and between them and the adversary.¹⁰ This conclusion also resonates with Quackenbush's proposition of incorporating extended and direct deterrence to account for extended deterrence's complex reality.¹¹ His analysis and conclusion aimed at the role of the protector; but this study indicates the need for a similar intellectual measures with regards to the protégé.

This study holds another theoretical element: it reveals that analyzing all protégés as they follow universal principles of behavior would be misleading. Protégés have no universal nature, and treating them this way could engender a serious bias. The study identifies two types of protégés: those who construct their deterrence policy mostly based on their own power, and those who entrust their deterrence mainly to the protector. Israel is an example of the first type, and Austro-Hungary is an example of the latter. Since this research examined only these two countries, the proposed classification must be tested using bigger sample. It may be that there is richer variance in protégés' deterrence hedging or that the chosen cases are outliers – marking unique phenomena that do not represent other cases in the international arena. Examining the British and French policies against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and China's and North Korea's deterrence calculus in light of the threat from Washington can test whether Israeli behavior genuinely represents the calculus of direct-deterrence-based countries. The deterrence policies of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan against the threat from China, and the Italian and West German policies

¹⁰Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 1997, 194.

¹¹Quackenbush, "Not Only Whether but Whom Three-Party Extended Deterrence," 580–81.

against the Soviet Union, would be interesting potential case-studies for extended deterrence-based states.

If further research supports this two-type classification, it would contribute to a deepened understanding of the complex dynamics involved in extended deterrence reality. However, even before further research is conducted, this study challenges the conventional wisdom presented by all three dominant theories of alliance management. This study argues for a more active role than was traditionally attributed to protégés, and that different protégés react differently to the same dilemma between deterrence and independence. Therefore, to truly comprehend extended deterrence dynamics one should include an analysis of extended deterrence and direct deterrence, consider the views of the protector as well as the protégé, and distinguish between different types of protégés.

To put it simply, extended deterrence analysis is context-dependent, and the context is shaped by both the view of the protector and of the protégé. This inference supports the argument made by Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats that “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally”.¹²

These finding aligns with three other recent, seminal works in deterrence literature, all aiming to adjust deterrence theory to the complex reality of the twenty-first century. T.V. Paul presents a new typology of deterrence relationships: deterrence among great powers, deterrence among new nuclear states, deterrence and extended deterrence involving nuclear powers and regional powers armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, deterrence between nuclear states and non-state actors, and deterrence by collective actors.¹³ He argues that contemporary complex deterrence requires a flexible theory that can be applied to various security challenges.

¹² Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M. Yeats, *Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Xxtended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways* (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 3.

¹³Knopf, “Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue,” 9.

Keith Payne suggests another approach for deterrence: a target-based one. He refers to the Department of Defense's 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept: "DOD must develop strategies, plans and operations that are tailored to the perceptions, values, and interests of specific adversaries".¹⁴ Payne contends that by resting on a universal approach to deterrence which assumes a global form of rationality, the U.S. undertook a "great gamble".¹⁵ Hence, he points out several factors that should guide policy makers when constructing deterrence policy, setting new intervening variables that are crucial for deterrence theory. His list includes, among other factors, ideology, religion, cognitive processes, government structure, internal politics and unique cultural drivers.¹⁶

A recent approach taken by Jeffrey Knopf advocates for a "situation-specific" approach. Such as approach, he claims, "would lay out the range of possible responses that would follow a particular proscribed behavior, such as providing WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] to terrorists, regardless of the particular actor who acts in this way".¹⁷ These three works challenge the traditional universal approach to deterrence by concentrating on the relationship between the defender and the potential adversary. However, their conclusions regarding the need for a tailored-policy of deterrence support the findings of this study, which investigates the relations between the protector and the protégé. The three authors understand deterrence as a very complex challenge; this study points out that extended deterrence, which is more complicated than direct deterrence to begin with, is even *more* complicated and challenging than the literature has so far recognized.

It is important to note that this research's methodological limitations render it mainly a critical piece challenging the conventional wisdom related to extended deterrence, and an innovative basis for further research. It produces a two phase-analysis which allows for an in-depth examination of the causal mechanisms in four cases studies of extended deterrence, while forming two dyads containing Austro-Hungarian and Israeli protégés. Comparison was made within each dyad to account for the change in

¹⁴Department of Defense, "Deterrence Operations: Joint Operating Concept," August 2006, 3.

¹⁵Payne, *The Great American Gamble*.

¹⁶Keith B. Payne, "Understanding Deterrence," *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 5 (December 14, 2011): 416–18, doi:10.1080/01495933.2011.624814.

¹⁷Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," 9.

the protégé's behavior, and between the dyads to identify the causes of their similar trends. The analysis attains a cogent causal mechanism for each one of the cases, as well as a comprehensive argument regarding the explanatory power of the three proposed concepts when assessing extended deterrence interactions, and so this analysis merits high internal validity. However, this methodology suffers from a fundamental flaw in that it holds only a very limited external validity given that the suggested inferences have a weak generalizing power.¹⁸ As was already discussed, more research should be conducted to test the conclusions and findings presented in this study across more countries and cases.

Parallel intellectual endeavors should aim at enriching our understanding of the main factors guiding protégés when they craft their deterrence policy. This research points out that some nations are willing to trust their security in the hands of their protectors whereas others use alliances only to strengthen their independent capabilities. What variables can account for this variance among different nations in different times? According to the traditional realist approach, nations align when they assess their power is not sufficient to cope with the perceived threat. This is also one of the main premises of this study. However, some nations perceive extended deterrence as a sufficient solution to their security problems, whereas others are constantly striving to improve their independent capabilities and minimize their reliance on others. According to Morrow, "Nations facing new threats seek increased security through the cheapest means available at that time".¹⁹ Hence, if nations can improve their military capacity they will do it. If they can't, a credible alliance would push them to ally. However, Morrow notes that "systemic factors alone do not determine security policies".²⁰ Overcoming domestic opposition, for example can hold a great cost for the decision maker when he chooses internal or external balancing. Therefore, Morrow contends, variables from the unit levels should be added to the structural variables to delineate the factors that determine if nations align or develop their independent power.

¹⁸ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 9.

¹⁹ Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," 214.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 216.

This conclusion coincides with the neo-classical realist school which has been developed since the late 1990s. In contrast to the neorealist theory's focus on structural variables, these intellectual attempts aim to merge domestic factors into the neorealist structure-based theory. The main rationale is that international structure affect nations' behavior, but it cannot account for the variance in their policies. More variables should be added, particularly those variables that distinguish nations from each other. Hence, neo-classical realist scholars bring the unit level to the center of the realist discussion. Structural inputs are translated to domestic constrains. Hence, to understand international politics we should also understand how domestic conditions, that are different in different nations, influence foreign policy decisions.²¹

For example, Fareed Zakaria uses an analysis of American policy to illustrate how domestic constraints can limit nations' capability to mobilize their resources and to exhaust their military power when facing external threats.²² Christensen and Snyder's "chain-ganging and buck-passing" is another example relevant for this study. They claim that when nations believe their adversary's intentions are dominated by offensive aims, they will commit themselves to their allies. When the threat they face is dominated by defensive aspirations they will seek to pass on the price of stopping the threat to other nations.²³ Pressman's theory of alliance members' capability to mobilize their resources to coerce their allies, which is central in this research, also demonstrates the intellectual measures taken to explain the role of domestic factors in shaping nations' behavior.²⁴ These are only three examples out of a rich literature about the relationship between domestic variables and national security policy crafting, which indicate that any deep study of nations' deterrence policy should include domestic variables as well.

²¹ To read more about the Neo-classical Realist school see also Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," ed. Michael E. Brown et al., *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131–49; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 2001, 88–98.

²² Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

²³ Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990.

²⁴ Pressman, *Warring Friends*.

This neo-classical approach is also encouraged by some of the findings of the proposed analysis. The affinity of the Austrian leadership to the German nation, the robust relationships among them, and the tensions among the Austrian and Hungarian politicians were tremendous forces that shaped Austrian policy, alongside the systemic ones. The Israeli strategic ethos of "never again," in which Jews would not be dependent on other nations for their security, made Israel's independent capabilities main pillar in the Israeli security doctrine. The Jewish collective memory of the Holocaust augmented Israeli threat perception of Iraq's very limited chemical threat during the Gulf War. As Welch notes, the U.S. and Israel tacitly agreed "that a chemical attack - with or without casualties - would have elicited an Israeli response because of its symbolic implications: it would simply not have been possible for a state founded in the wake of the Holocaust to stand idle while its citizens were gassed".²⁵ Therefore, one cannot fully grasp the cost-benefit calculation leaderships make without understanding the bureaucratic, organizational and cultural context in which they are operate. They all belong to the unit level of analysis, not the international structure. Future studies should explore the contribution of unit level factors on protégés' deterrence hedging. This effort would enrich this neorealist analysis with neo-classical elements designed to account for the variance among nations' deterrence policies in alliances.

Conclusion IV: the impact of nuclear weapons should be explored

Some scholars uphold the notion of "existential deterrence" which argues that "nuclear weapons are able to deter thanks simply to their existence, regardless of the nature of the nuclear posture".²⁶ They imply that the mere existence of nuclear deterrence impact the protégé's position in deterrence relations. Waltz, too, emphasizes the devastating nature of nuclear weapons. However, he conditions their influence on the nation's second-strike capability – the capacity to attack the

²⁵ Welch, "The Politics and Psychology of Restraint," 345.

²⁶ For example see, Lawrence Freedman, "I Exist; Therefore I Deter," ed. Morton H. Halperin and Robert McNamara, *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988): 177–95, doi:10.2307/2538900; Tom Sauer, "A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 5 (October 1, 2009): 745–67, doi:10.1080/01402390903189402.

adversary with nuclear weapons after it launches the first strike.²⁷ Waltz notes, "to deter an adversary from attacking one need have only a force that can survive a first strike and strike back hard enough to outweigh any gain the aggressor had hoped to realize".²⁸ Waltz set the bar for "minimum deterrence," meaning that after securing a second strike capability, nuclear weapons are the ultimate influential weapons against a perceived threat. However, do they maintain their power in face of the protector's restraining pressure?

This study merely allows for the partially inquiry of the impact of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence dynamics. Out of the four case-studies, two involved the existence of nuclear weapons (the Israeli dyad). By juxtaposing this dyad with the Austrian dyad from the pre-nuclear world one may infer the potential impact of nuclear weapons on the protégé's deterrence hedging. The existence of nuclear weapons can account for similar pattern in Israeli behavior along differentiation between the Israeli protégé's behavior and the Austrian one. However, this study suggests that nuclear weapons provide a very limited contribution to this end, suggesting their actual impact should be further studied.

Nuclear weapons played a minor role, if at all, in the Yom Kippur War. Israel did not convey clear or vague nuclear threats before the war, and there are no evidence that the only possible act that could have served as a deterrent tool during the war – the reported decision to arm nuclear weapons – had an impact on the Arab war conduct.²⁹ In 1991, Israel implied its alleged nuclear capabilities; some experts assert that Israel's nonconventional signals deterred Saddam from launching nonconventional attacks.³⁰ Israel's nuclear deterrence was also a main American misgiving underlying Washington's policy toward Israel during the war, according to Haselkorn. Since Saddam Hussein did not use WMD, Israel's nuclear deterrence remained a secondary factor, having a limited effect on the Israeli deterrence-independence dilemma. It could have played a more crucial role if Saddam had escalated. However, even in the

²⁷Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," 738.

²⁸Ibid., 732.

²⁹ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 322.

³⁰ Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses," 399; Eisenberg, "Passive Belligerency," 309; Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," 204; Steinberg, "Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East," 57.

event of an Iraqi chemical attack it is questionable whether Israel would have used its alluded nuclear capabilities, as the Iraqi chemical weapons were not accurate and their expected damage was limited, while the political and moral cost for such a move was high.³¹ Nonetheless, America wanted to ensure some control over the Israeli retaliation to avoid nonconventional escalation.³²

Given the limited attributed contribution nuclear weapons had in the two crises, trying to assess their impact on Israeli deterrence hedging will be too ambiguous. Moreover, as Figure 13 illustrates, Israel hedged differently in both crisis, meaning that the mere existence of nuclear weapons in both Israeli cases did not produce the same outcome. The comprehensive analysis also failed to validate the assumption that nuclear weapons change protégés' deterrence hedging. Israel's overall trend paralleled Austria's: to incorporate stronger elements of extended deterrence as the conventional capability to cope with the perceived challenge decreased while the protector acquiesced with alacrity to broader protection over the protégé. This suggests that Israel's nuclear deterrence had little impact on Israeli overall deterrence policy.

Nonetheless, the Israeli dyad implies that the existence of nuclear deterrence may have a different effect on alliance management dynamics. It may be that nuclear deterrence, for nuclear weapons' absolute destructive power, change the relations between the deterrence-independence dilemma and the protégé's deterrence hedging. Specifically, nuclear weapons may create a lateral deterrence system, alongside the conventional one. For instance, when analyzing the Israeli deterrent performances during the Gulf War, Baram concludes, "while Israel's conventional deterrence suffered a certain setback, its nonconventional deterrence remained intact".³³ His inference suggests two Israeli lateral deterrence signal mechanisms. Other evidence supporting this hypothesis is Israel's consent to an unprecedented adaptation of strong elements of extended complementary deterrence against the conventional threat, while clinging to its own nuclear deterrence when addressing the

³¹ Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land*, 323; Mendelsohn, "Israeli Self-Defeating Deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War," 99.

³² Haselkorn, *The Continuing Storm*, 128.

³³ Baram, "Israeli Deterrence, Iraqi Responses," 399.

nonconventional Iraqi threat. Following this logic, one can argue that in the 1973 war the nuclear deterrence system remained dormant due to a limited Arab threat.

Since the role of nuclear deterrence was minor during the Yom Kippur War, and is still subjected to a great intellectual debate with regards to the Gulf War, this study cannot illustrate the unique effect nuclear weapons have on the protégé's hedging. The study can, however, raise a question about the possibility of having dual-dimension strategy and demonstrate the need to investigate it.

Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate deterrent self-capability. Hence, in crises involving the employment of nuclear deterrence, the interaction between the protector and the nuclear protégé is expected to resemble a direct complementary deterrence alliance. Does this mean that we should expect the same behavior from the protégé when nuclear deterrence is not credible? Absolutely not. It may be that nuclear states count on others when addressing severe threats to their national security which cannot be addressed with nuclear deterrence, thus forming a parallel dimension of alliance management.

The French-American may be such an example. According to the logic suggested by this study, when addressing the risk of a Soviet conventional and limited attack, Paris and Washington are expected to experience an extended complementary deterrence interaction: France would partially concede its dependence in exchange for stronger American commitments against the limited emerging threat. This would happen despite the fact that France possesses a nuclear arsenal, which is designed to defend "the integrity of the national territory, including the mainland as well as the overseas departments and territories, the free exercise of our sovereignty, and the protection of the population constitute the core [of these interests] today".³⁴ In the event of an existential threat, France is likely to act differently and rely first on its own nuclear capability, rendering the alliance with Washington direct complementary deterrence-based.

Interestingly, in 2006, then-President Jacques Chirac stated: "In light of the concerns of the present and the uncertainties of the future, nuclear deterrence remains the

³⁴ 1994 Defense White paper, 4 as cited in Bruno Tertrais, "The Last to Disarm?," *The Nonproliferation Review* 14, no. 2 (July 1, 2007): 252, doi:10.1080/10736700701379344.

fundamental guarantee of our security. It also gives us, wherever the pressures may come from, the power to be the masters of our actions, of our policy, of the enduring character of our democratic values.”³⁵ For France, nuclear weapons are a national asset, against both foes and allies. So it is unlikely that France would forgo its autonomy. It might consider joining others such as the UK or the U.S. while being obliged to coordinate its use of force with others. Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais suggest that Paris might consider promoting trilateral nuclear cooperation with London and Washington in the face of new security threats.³⁶

An opposite scenario is also probable. A country that relies on its conventional power against limited conventional threats may decide to entrust its security to its protector when nuclear threat is entangled or faces an existential threat. In that regard, one can examine Brad Roberts' three categories of threats to U.S. allies in Asia: the gray zone (low level provocations during peace times), the red zone (acts of war during conflicts), and the black-and-white zone (escalatory conflict termination actions such as the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S or its allies).³⁷ Following this definitions, Santoro and Warden contend that whereas the American assurances are credible against severe threat in the red and black-and-white zones, American assurances against gray zone challenges are suffering from credibility problems.³⁸ To cope with this challenge the authors suggest continuing to encouraging Tokyo to invest more in its capabilities to maintain the Japanese maritime edge over China, and incentivize Seoul to preserve the South Korean conventional superiority over the North Korean army. Simultaneously, the authors urge Washington to formulate a more flexible policy in the region, and provide its allies with more leeway in the gray zone.³⁹

Santoro and Warden’s analysis is interesting for the purpose of this study. It points out parallel American policies, against limited and more severe threats. U.S. allies are

³⁵ Speech of President Jacques Chirac during his visit to the French strategic forces, Landivisiau/l’Île Longue (Brest), January 19, 2006, <www.ambafrance-au.org/article.php3?id_article_1492_> as cited in Ibid.

³⁶ Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, “Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation,” *Survival* 57, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 29–52, doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1068554.

³⁷ Brad Roberts, “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense,” *Proliferation Papers* 50, June 2014, 14–15.

³⁸ Santoro and Warden, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” 153–54.

³⁹ Ibid., 155–56.

expected to take advantage of their own power to handle the first group of threats, while relying on the U.S. in face of serious threats. As a result, for example, South Korea may develop conventional power as a chief deterrent instrument against a conventional attack from North Korea, and count on the U.S. nuclear power against the nuclear threat from Pyongyang. Another example may be the Japanese deterrence strategy against China. In face of the more probable scenario of Chinese conventional provocations, Tokyo would rest mostly on its own might. In the event of extreme escalation which triggers a Chinese nuclear threat, Tokyo would rely on American nuclear deterrence. Under these circumstances, the management of U.S.-Japan or U.S.-South Korea alliances will be transforming a significant shift in response to the threat U.S. allies face and their deterrent response. These are only hypothetical arguments for countries that were not part of this study. Further research is necessary to evaluate the validity of the conclusion drawn from the Israeli cases, and to illuminate the effect nuclear weapons have on the proposed concepts in this study.

Altogether, this chapter enriches extended deterrence literature by drawing causal mechanism starting with inputs from the adversary (threat) and the protector (alliance commitment along restraining efforts), and suggesting one path of how they are translated to output by the protégé (its deterrence policy and consent to restrain its use of force). This mechanism is not independent, and should not be perceived as such. It is meant to round out the already well-discussed relationships between the protector and the protégé, and between the protector and the perceived adversary. This analysis not only sheds light on the role of the protégé in extended deterrence interaction—which has so far suffered from a lack of intellectual endeavors—it is also strengthen the literature by offering more pieces in the puzzle of extended deterrence equations. The analysis shows how its conclusions should be juxtaposed with the current knowledge about this complex strategic reality. The next chapter discuss the policy-related implications derived from this theoretical analysis.

Chapter 10: Policy Implications

Sir Winston Churchill's famously declared, "There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that is to fight without them". Brilliantly, Churchill manages to stress the vitality of alliances for nations' security while pointing out that fighting with allies is not an easy task. This research rests on the same premise: that alliances are essential and can hold great benefits, but they are hard to manage. Therefore, this section is devoted to the discussion about how the theoretical insights proposed in this study can contribute to policy-making in the realm of alliance management. Since the focal point of this study is the interaction between the protector and the protégé, the policy recommendations are focused on this end as well.

Know Thy Allies

2500 years ago, Sun Tzu articulated the basic demand of every strategist: "know thy enemy".¹ He later emphasizes the need to know thyself as well. What Sun Tzu's doctrine is lacking, though, is "know thy allies". As this research demonstrates, allies do not react in the same way to the same policies and threats; some countries are more receptive to policy constraints when the deterrence is strong, others may be so when deterrence is weak. Some strive to improve their self-capability to cope with the perceived threat while others seek to be protected by stronger powers. Hence, not all alliances are the same, and they should not be treated as such. This understanding is essential since some alliance-managing tools are expected to have a stabilizing effect on one alliance, while destabilizing others. Specifically, this study points out two types of alliances: when the protégé is primarily resting on his own deterrent power ("direct complementary deterrence alliance"), and when it heavily relies on the protector to deter the potential adversary ("extended complementary deterrence alliance").

Different alliances, then, are expected to produce different reactions to similar stipulations. For example, extending protection over protégés is likely to be more valuable and to support deescalatory measures if the alliance is based on extended complementary deterrence. Expanded protection would have a counter effect if the alliance is constructed on direct complementary deterrence alliance, as illustrated in

¹ Sunzi, *The Art of War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

the next section. The opposite argument can be made regarding the use of military support to enhance the protégé's power in exchange for its restraint: it may be effective in the event of direct complementary deterrence alliance, but counterproductive if the alliance rests on extended complementary deterrence. Knowing one's ally can improve the protector's policy while addressing the specific opportunities and challenges that each form of alliance holds.

Alliances and the Entrapment-Abandonment Dilemma

This study does not merely demonstrate the need to abandon the universal approach to alliances, but provide preliminary tools to study the nature of the alliance and assess its impact on the alliances management interaction. Specifically, classifying alliances to the two proposed groups is essential to cope with the risks embodied in alliance management, notably the risk of entrapment and abandonment. This study reveals that inappropriate policy could increase the tensions within the alliance, corroding the protégé's sense of security, and thus, encouraging the protégé to either use its power to preempt and drag the alliance to a war (entrapment), or to abandon the alliance (abandonment).²

Nonetheless, this study can assist protectors in formulating policies tailored to the nature of their alliances given a specific context. If the protector strengthens its assurances to increase the protégé's security while trying to restrain it, the risk of entrapment is lower when the latter exercises extended complementary deterrence. Restraining measures accompanied with a greater protection is likely to be more effective, resulting in a more confident protégé. Restraining a more independent protégé using the same incentives will be unlikely to succeed. Moreover, restraining the protégé in a direct complementary deterrence alliance while increasing the protégé's independent capacity would likely to be more successful when the protégé feels strong, rather than trying to restrain it when it feels insecure. In both cases there is a higher risk that the protégé decides to abandon the alliance which restricts it from defending itself, or at least that it ignores pressure from the uncommitted protector.

²Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 1984, 467.

The proposed analysis establishes a basis for a new discussion in the entrapment-abandonment dilemma of collective-actors. Morgan, who leads the academic research on collective-actor deterrence defines this entity as "a set of states that form a group aimed at promoting the general welfare, as opposed to one serving only the members' needs and interests: international organizations, or ad hoc groups like the one that has negotiated with Iran on its nuclear weapons ambitions".³ The most prominent example of collective-actor deterrence is NATO. Other examples are The United Nations Security Council, the African Union, the Six-Party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, etc. Morgan explains that collective-actors constrain their members' independence more than small alliances. Nations define differently security threats, the response to these threats, including deterrence and the use of force.⁴ Acting as one monolithic organization requires nations to concede their view and agency. However, reducing one's agency does not occur merely in times of crises. As Morgan notes, maintaining a deterring capability for the collective-actor often comes on the expense of investing in nations' own capabilities and leads to their shrink.⁵ Hence, the entering a collective-actor deterrence mechanism comes with a price for one's agency.

On the other hand, Collective actors offer less credible assurances than alliances due to their size and need to act together. Morgan contends that the credibility challenge collective actors face is bigger than the one characterized alliances: "Collective-actor deterrence often fall short on clearly conveying a commitment to punish violations and the resolve to uphold that commitment".⁶ Therefore, ideally they would merely employ general deterrence by setting norms that would dictate other nations' behavior while deter them from deviating these norms.⁷ Altogether, the proposed analysis suggests that nations who join collective defense are either direct complementary deterrence nations whose confidence is high or extended

³ Patrick M. Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," *Taylor & Francis* 33, no. 1 (April 2012): 94.

⁴ Morgan, "Collective-Actor Deterrence," 169–70.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁶ Morgan, "Collective-Actor Deterrence," 170.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 172.

complementary deterrence whose confidence is low. This can explain their behavior in face of a relative high price and low benefits.

This conclusion can, for example account for the French decision to abandon NATO where the Soviet threat was great, and the decision to rejoin the alliance in 2009, facing no serious security threat. This preliminary conjecture should be tested. Nonetheless, even before this test has been conducted it should be stressed that the challenge of tailoring the appropriate policy to each protégé is a main theme in this chapter. Different protégés require different policy instruments, and in order to merging these different means effectively a policy should be flexible but coherent. It should be capable of providing strong commitment for members whose deterrence policy is extended complementary deterrence, while allowing direct complementary deterrence nations some agency when facing an imminent threat. Otherwise, the risk of abandonment is high when these organizations will be put to test. The German opposition to the American invasion to Iraq in 2003 using the framework of NATO can exemplify this point. More intellectual resources should be allocated to fully comprehend the challenge of managing a collective-actor relying on the proposed concepts in this study. It can serve as a basis for a further discussion on the differences between different protégés and the ways to bridge between them using one security framework in face of a joint threat. This insight does not propose any silver bullet. It mainly highlights the complexity of employing and managing collective-actor deterrence and generates an intellectual discussion about creative means and strategies to cope with this tremendous challenge.

Considering Adaptive Deescalatory Mechanisms

This study points out an interesting phenomenon: protégés wish to maximize their deterrence against the perceived threat, as well as independence within the alliance; when the nation cannot promote both fundamental values, they wish to balance between them according to their relative capabilities and relations with the ally. When balancing, deterrence holds superiority over independence. This suggests that protectors who strive to restrain their allies should provide their allies an alternative path to increase their deterrence to justify and accept the new constraints over their

policy. For nations that employ extended complementary deterrence this suggests the protector should mainly strengthen its commitment; for protégés who exercise direct complementary deterrence this means the protectors are expected to strengthen the already existing capabilities of the protégés or provide them a new tool to increase their might.

Given that alliance management policies should be context-dependent, it is imperative that the protector and the protégé discuss deescalatory mechanisms in the event of imminent threats and potential crises before they take place. This study's insight suggests that members of direct complementary deterrence alliance should prioritize a joint coordination mechanism which allows for a discussion of the protégé's needs and concerns while providing it with a rapid assistance during the crisis. This mechanism should design to rapidly increase the confidence of the protégé to allow for restraining efforts to take place in as an ideal a strategic environment as possible.

American conduct during the Yom Kippur War exemplifies an ineffective mechanism to this end, while the preliminary discussion between Washington and Jerusalem prior to Operation Desert Storm presents a model for such dialogue. The Gulf Crisis enabled the two allies to solve most of their disputes before the alliance faced heavy pressure as a result of the Iraqi attacks. Since there is no guarantee that future crises would unfold in the same manner or allow for such a deep dialogue, though, it is vital that the allies conduct this dialogue on a routine basis.

Allies in extended complementary deterrence alliances should also coordinate their expected actions in face of possible threats. However, their discussion should concentrate on the protector's declaratory as well as actual protective moves to enhance its extended deterrence. According to this analysis, protégés in this type of alliances seek greater protections. The key to their collaboration rests in the credibility of the protectors' assurances. The joint German-Austrian war plan was an effective tool for Berlin to control Vienna's policy, though ultimately Germany decided not to restrain Austria. Bismarck's more ambiguous commitment to the monarchy reduced his capacity to restrain the Austrian reaction to Russia's policy in the Balkans during the Bulgarian Crisis. It should be stressed that the protégé's perception of its own

deterrence is also a critical variable. As this study proposes, a confident protégé's would be more flexible in face of a vague commitment from the protector.

Alternate means to enhance the protection over the protégé may involve third-party extended deterrence. In 1885, Germany encouraged Austria's attempts to discuss potential cooperation with Britain. The British assurances were aimed to Austria's interests the Balkans, a region which was not covered by Germany's protections. As this study shows, the British-Austrian agreement reduced the pressure from Germany while increasing Austria's power against the Russian threat. A similar strategy is proposed by Grygiel and Mitchell; in their book *The Unquiet Frontier* the authors advocate for a regional security arrangement as complementary means to the American bilateral protection.⁸ This would allow Washington to invest in main regional hubs – strong resisters to U.S. enemies, around which regional alliances would be established. Not only would these regional mechanisms increase the regional power of U.S. allies, they would empower weaker states that wish to ally with Washington to increase their security but possess merely limited advantage for the American interests.

According to the authors, in Asia, the U.S.-Japan relationship should be the basis for an anti-China coalition which should contain Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.⁹ In Europe, Poland should be the basis for a counter-Russian regional alliance. Saudi Arabia and Israel are the key to an anti-Iranian coalition in the Middle East. The authors' proposed alliance policy is a good basis for a further discussion in the American alternatives to manage its alliances in light of American interests in the contemporary international arena. Their analysis is region-based, though, and it overlooks the different natures on which these alliances are built. For example, the U.S.-Israel alliance may have dominant direct complementary deterrence elements whereas alliance with Saudi Arabia, Japan and Poland are characterized by an extended complementary deterrence dominance. As this study has shown, this distinction may hold crucial implications for American alliance management strategy.

⁸ Grygiel and Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier*, 166–68.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 168–69.

Thinking about contemporary American challenges, this study offers interesting insights. For instance, to restrain Israeli policy toward Iran the American administration is likely to find stronger protection less fruitful than equipping the Israelis with advanced weapons that could improve their capacity to prevent a nuclear armed Iran. This may be counterintuitive: by arming the protégé, the protector takes a great risk of giving the protégé the capability to undertake the action the protector wishes to prevent. However, as the Israeli analyses in this study point out, a confident protégé in direct complementary deterrence alliances are less likely to act than vulnerable ones. To prevent Israeli response to Saddam in 1991, Washington had to increase the Israeli confidence in its military power. A successful Iraqi attack on Israel increased the tensions within the U.S.-Israel alliance and shortened the distance to an Israeli operation.

In this regard, it should be noted that enhancing the protégé's capability to defend itself does not solely mean improving its offensive capabilities. In fact, Jervis claims that nations can improve their security while avoiding destabilizing effects by investing in defensive capabilities.¹⁰ In terms of deterrence, this means strengthening the protégé's deterrence by denial elements, rather than deterrence by punishment. Jervis illustrates the stabilizing effect defensive capabilities have on the security dilemma vis-à-vis the adversary, namely, how to increase one's security without reducing the security of the opponent and generating an arms race. However, Jervis stresses that to avoid destabilizing impact, defensive capabilities should allow nations to protect themselves while not allowing them to attack their adversaries: "the essence of defense is keeping the other side out of your territory. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land".¹¹ If the defensive weapons can become offensive or can support offensive strategy, then it would likely increase the threat of preemption and spur instability.

Jervis examines the relations between rival states, not among allies; however, his conclusions are important to illustrate the strategic role advanced defensive

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): 50–51, doi:10.2307/2009958.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

capabilities, such as active defense systems, can play in alliance management. If they can increase the protégé's sense of security while not providing it with capabilities to act unilaterally against the perceived threat, transfer of defensive weapons can be a beneficial strategy in direct complementary deterrence alliances.

However, in some cases the protégé would demand offensive means to compensate for its restraint, and ignoring these demands might be more dangerous than acceding. A contemporary example is seen in the Israeli requests for advanced bombs that can penetrate fortified nuclear sites in Iran in exchange for Israeli restraint against the Iranian nuclear program, which is perceived by Israel to be a great threat.¹² At first glance, acceding to the Israeli request could be risky as Jerusalem could operate against Iran without Washington's approval. However, as this analysis suggests, ignoring Israel's request may be riskier. If the Israeli logic used by the Israeli government in both Yom Kippur War and Gulf War remains intact, strengthening the Israeli ally and taking the risk that it would act is a less risky option than leaving it vulnerable in face of a great security threat. This analysis shows how an Israeli government with low confidence may be riskier and less open to American restraining efforts. Therefore, direct complementary deterrence alliance may require protectors to act in counterintuitively to their categorical stance. Identifying the nature of each alliance, and the possible alternatives and their expected outcome in light of this nature, can help protectors manage alliances in time of crises.

Rethinking Equivocal Commitment Strategy

Another example for the risk of adhering to one overarching alliance management strategy is the discussion of the desired commitment protectors should provide their allies to solve the entrapment-abandonment dilemma. Zagare and Kilgour explain that nations exercise straddle strategy which involves probabilistic support, depending on specific conditions or the support of external institutions.¹³ They highlight the benefit of using this strategy only when the protégé possess highly credible alignment alternatives.¹⁴

¹² Haaretz, "Former Obama Adviser: Send B-52 Bombers to Israel," *Haaretz*, July 17, 2015, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.666571>.

¹³ Zagare and Kilgour, "The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence," 623.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 639.

Benson broadens the discussion in alliance commitments, suggesting six types of commitments: unconditional compellent, conditional compellent, unconditional deterrent, conditional deterrent, probabilistic deterrent (if the defender might intervene if there is a conflict but does not promise an automatic assurance), and pure conditional (if the defender commits to assist in case specific conditions are met).¹⁵ The type of pledge is a result of the bargaining game between the protégé and the defender: the ally is likely to request more unconditioned commitments, and sometimes even offensive ones; the defender mainly seeks to subject its pledge to specific deterrent conditions. According to Benson, four main factors shape the defender's commitments: its power relative to the protégé and the attacker; its preference for the protégé's security; its preference for how to settle the dispute involving the protégé; and "the observability of the hostile actions leading to war between the protégé and the adversary".¹⁶

The proposed analysis contributes to this discussion by suggesting that there is a significant discrepancy between different types of alliances, which influences how protégés respond to different commitment-related policies. An unconfident protégé in extended complementary alliance is likely to seek to enhance its security relying on the protector. Hence, using straddle strategy or ambiguous commitment are expected to be risky, encouraging the protégé to search for a new ally or considering other alternatives such as internal balancing (to develop stronger self-capabilities), bandwagoning (aligning with the source of the perceived threat), or buck passing (leave others to bear the burden of stopping a potential threat).¹⁷ Conditioned commitment is expected to be more effective as the protégé's deterrence perceived as relatively stronger. To this end the nature of the alliance is less important as even confident protégés in direct complementary deterrence arrangements may consider limited reinforcement of extended deterrence if they perceive their deterrence to be strong.

¹⁵Benson, *Constructing International Security*, 32–41.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁷ Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies"; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 2001; Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks," 1990; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 1984; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

American Extended Deterrence versus American Military Assistance

This study also highlights the role of U.S. extended deterrence in the international arena. One of the main dilemmas concerning U.S. alliance strategies encompasses the following question: should the U.S. deepen its involvement in other regions to protect its allies, or should it limit its activity to military assistance, providing allies with better capabilities to cope alone with their security challenges? Grygiel and Mitchell suggest a similar distinction between "normal" alliance mechanisms and special forms of support.¹⁸ Although they do not distinguish between these two forms of protections when discussing the American desired alliance policy in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East, this study indicates a distinction should be made, highlighting a tradeoff from the protector's view between leverage and investment of resources.

In extended complementary deterrence alliances, the protector is expected to invest fewer resources than in direct complementary deterrence alliances, since its protection is the cornerstone of the protégé's security. In times of crisis the protector is expected to enhance its commitment to the alliance, thus, to develop a credible capacity to inflict damage on the potential threat, and sometimes to mobilize his power to this end. Nevertheless, the protégé's dependence on the protector allows the latter significant leverage in the inter alliance interaction. In the event of crisis, the protégé is likely to seek more protection from the protector, which leaves the strong power with a strategic asset for its restraining purposes.

Direct complementary deterrence alliances entail a weaker influencing power within the alliance due to the relative dependence of the protégé, while demanding less involvement from the protector. In face of a crisis, the protector is not likely to be asked to use its own force to protect the protégé, but to strengthen the protégé's capabilities to defend itself.

The American administration, as with any other protector, should distinguish between these two forms of protection, and consider the two alternatives for each alliance, determining which one better serves American interests at the given time. It may be that one alternative is not feasible for a specific ally. For example, protégés like Israel,

¹⁸ Grygiel and Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier*, 4.

which already have confidence in their capability to cope with perceived national threats, may not be willing to end up in an alliance that is extended deterrence-based. In other cases, like Taiwan, a real capacity to cope with the adversary may not be achievable. The threat China poses to Taiwan exemplifies this scenario. China enjoys significant superiority over Taiwan in terms of military power, size and economic resilience,¹⁹ and it is seriously unlikely that Taiwan could close the gap in the foreseeable future—even with a large American investment. Hence, a direct complementary deterrence alliance is not an attainable option for this alliance. Other extended complementary deterrence alliances such as the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances might render more self-dependent policy.

In summary, the analysis presented in this study holds an important practical contribution for contemporary alliance management policy discussion. Its underlying message is that there is no one clear strategy that suits all alliances. There is no panacea that can solve the protector's abandonment-entrapment dilemma or construct an effective deescalatory mechanism. Subscribing to a silver-bullet approach would ignore a significant differentiation between different types of protégés, and thus overlook the unique risks and advantages that each alliance holds.

Conclusion

If this study's findings are reliable representation of reality, then deterrence theory is wrong to assume that protégés choose at any given moment between their independent deterrence and their protector's extended deterrence. A more holistic analysis should include all ingredients of deterrence: the protégé's direct deterrence, the protector's extended deterrence and the interaction between them.

This study sheds more light on alliance management dynamics, challenging the prevalent notion that protégés are merely subjected to structural constraints and pressure from their stronger allies. This analysis offers a theoretical framework that

¹⁹ Richard C. Bush, "The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views and Implications," Arms Control Series 5 (Brookings Institution, February 2011), 6, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-policy-of-extended-deterrence-in-east-asia-history-current-views-and-implications/>.

incorporates the dominant explanations for alliance management while trying to evaluate their compatibility with cases of extended deterrence.

This study reveals that occasionally, the weak do not only suffer what they must, but sometimes do what they wish—or manage to get the stronger protector to compromise. This observation offers a causal mechanism to predict when protégés will be more attentive to the protector's pressure and when will they be more resolved to preserve their leeway. The main elemental insight in this study is that different alliances have different nature, depending on the protégé's deterrence hedging. To manage alliances, one should tailor an appropriate policy that takes into account both the protector's and the protégé's view. Despite the methodological limitations of this study, it manages to shed some light upon the dark side of extended deterrence – the role of the protégé.

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