Jonathan Glover, ed. *The Philosophy of Mind.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 170 pp. $3.00, paperbound.

Like other volumes in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy, this paperback anthology is not intended to be a one-volume syllabus for an undergraduate course in the field, or even the backbone of a course, but rather a handy collection of relatively inaccessible but important recent papers to supplement the main fare in a course. Given that apparently sensible rationale for an anthology, should an editor then merely choose what he takes to be the ten most important (and least accessible) pieces in a field regardless of their interrelations or lack thereof, or should he attempt to impose order, find themes to be illustrated, schools to be represented, even if some quality must be sacrificed to fill in all the blanks in the editor's schema?

I take it Glover has leaned toward the former policy; these are his favorite ten articles, and his introductory essay makes what it can (which is not much) of the way the pieces fit together. This is not really a criticism of either Glover's decision or his essay. I applaud the decision, for students are asked to read too many second rate pieces simply because they clearly (if sometimes obtusely) defend particular *isms*. And Glover's introductory essay would have to be trebled or more to draw out the interesting but convoluted chains of implication between his chosen texts. A good course would put half a dozen other readings *between* any two of these,

and Glover's essay could hardly accomplish that task in its short compass.

I would place Glover's choices in two categories: *established* and *promoted*. Like the art collector who buys Monets and Henry Moores to give his collection enough distinction to lend an aura to his idiosyncratic favorites, Glover has given us six oft-cited "classics," Hampshire's "Feeling and Expression," Putnam's "The Mental Life of Some Machines," Davidson's "Psychology as Philosophy," Nagel's "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," Williams' "The Self and the Future," and Parfit's "Personal Identity," and four less familiar pieces, B. A. Farrell's "The Criteria for a Psychoanalytic Interpretation," Patrick Gardiner's "Error, Faith and Self-Deception," Gerald Cohen's "Belief and Roles," and a selection from J. A. Deutsch's *The Structural Basis of Behaviour.*

The first six mentioned need no review. In my opinion there are no *obviously* better candidates (given that other more important pieces by Putnam and Davidson, for instance, are already anthologized elsewhere), although Hampshire's 1960 essay suffers a bit from chronological and topical isolation in the anthology. The other four are more problematic. Farrell's piece, excellent in itself, is also terribly isolated, since psychoanalysis is scarcely mentioned in any of the other papers, and Glover's attempt to reveal the relations of Farrell's concerns to the others expressed in the anthology is not very effective. There are important morals to carry back and forth between, say, Davidson's piece and Farrell's but no very clear hint of this is provided, and certainly not by the papers themselves.

I do not share Glover's view that the other three pieces belong in this company. In my opinion there are four or five papers on self-deception of more importance than Gardiner's, which ably surveys the literature (up to 1969) but does not make any salient contribution to it. Gerald Cohen's paper defends against feeble objections the obvious thesis that "to cite one's [social] role is never to give a good reason for a belief one holds." No reason

is given for thinking that any reflective thinker has been tempted to hold otherwise. The selection from Deutsch provides an admirably clear expression of the rationale for non-physiologically based theory-construction in psychology that nicely illuminates subsequent discussion by functionalists about the nature of psychological theories, but does not seem to me to present a thesis of any controversy or striking originality, although in its day (1962) it may well have provided a quantum leap of clarification in a traditionally murky area.

The six established papers are not all that inaccessible; two are reprinted from *Philosophical Review*, one from *Synthese*, and the other three from anthologies that are rather likely to be in college libraries. Three of the four promoted papers are reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Perhaps this reveals a flaw in the rationale of the series: the great majority of central, influential papers in a field get published in quite accessible places--the organization of our profession may not be optimal, but it is not random either. That means there *tends* to be an inverse relationship between inaccessibility and importance. Since the very best papers as a rule don't need to be anthologized, anthologies in this series tend to be either quirky and uneven, or unnecessary, or as in this instance, a bit of both.

Glover's introductory essay is clear and sound but is not apt to illuminate or restructure anybody's sense of the field. Glover proposes a five-fold division of the field that he claims is "reasonably plausible" problems of justifying mentalistic or psychological *interpretations*; problems of *description and classification* of phenomena; problems of *models*; the *mind-body* problem; and *personal identity*. This succeeds in putting the ten papers into five pigeonholes, more or less convincingly, but I doubt that anyone trying to carve the field at its joints would follow Glover's lines, which seem dictated in an *ad hoc* way by his choice of papers.

The selective bibliography is well-organized and useful, but could well have included twice as many journal articles on each topic, and a general list of journal articles in the field, to go with the general lists of books and anthologies.

—Daniel C. Dennett
TUFTS UNIVERSITY