


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PICK YOUR FIGHT !!
Environmental Advocacy Case Study
Polonoroeste Project - Brazil

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ONE

Introduction

This case is above all a reconstruction of a series of events that, spanning a decade, were to culminate with a situation unprecedented in the sphere of international lending for development: the suspension of funding for a previously approved project, due to environmental reasons. These events are principally connected to the actions of U.S. environmental advocates in Washington, D.C., but they are also a result of the individual endeavors of indians, rubber-tappers, anthropologists, environmentalists, lawyers, congressmen, and bank officials. People who in one way or another have and continue to shape the destiny of an important part of the Brazilian Amazon.

These events are the integral parts of an advocacy campaign, that led by U.S Environmental advocates to force the World Bank to revise its financial support for a multimillion dollar development project in Brazil's northwest region.

In the late 1970's, the country's northwest region, comprised by the states of Rondonia, Mato Grosso and Acre, was already viewed as environmental disaster of international proportions. The area had become accessible through a 1500-kilometer road known as BR-364, and which opened these states to a massive migration that was to cause grave dislocation in

multiple levels.

Numerical figures best portray the magnitude of this social, economic, and environmental catastrophe. The region has lost 600,000 square kilometers to deforestation (and area larger than France), and more than 15 indian tribes to new and foreign diseases. Population growth has exceeded 13 per cent per year (Mahar), and it is presently loosing its biological diversity at a rate of 1500 species per year (Myers). The social aspect can best be described in the words of the American Anthropologist David Maybury-Lewis: "Brazil's northwest has become a booming frontier area whose violence rivals the ferocity of the worst days of the old West in the United States."

Our discussion of the role played by advocates in attempting to address this situation is divided into two time periods, each characterized by different advocacy strategies. These sections are titled "The Anthropologists" and the "The Environmentalists". We have reconstructed the events of these two periods and presented them in a narrative style, in order to give the reader a better sense of their sequence and connection.

We have concluded the case with an analysis and evaluation of the different strategies that were pursued in the campaign. We have choosen to do this for it is our belief that this case has important lessons to teach to anyone involved in advocacy.

TWO

Historical Background

The area affected by the POLONOROESTE Project, the northwestern Brazilian states of Rondonia and Mato Grosso, has had four important historical protagonists: the rain forest, its dwellers (rubber-tappers and indians), the social conflict, and the highway that crosses the state.

In the 1820s, after Brazilian national independence, two groups of political elites engaged in a violent confrontation for the right to control the newly founded government. The masses, including urban workers, rubber-tappers, slaves, peasants and indians created an alliance against the elites and joined the confrontation turning it into a wide spread social clash [Hecht, 1989, p.163].

After the dispute of the right of governance was settled, the extractors of rubber maintained their autonomous condition as self-sustaining entrepreneurs. However, the "aviadors" , those who actually brought the extracted rubber to the city's markets, took full advantage of their role as middle-men. They used their position to absorb most of the revenue generated by the rubber trade. To do so, aviadors protected their profitable positions with threats and monopoly of supplies. These practices made violence a constant element of life in the rain forest.

By the turn of the century, the rubber produced in the Amazon accounted for a considerable share of the rubber on the international market. Yet, the Amazon remained largely isolated from the rest of the country.

At the beginning of the second decade of 1900s, Colonel Candido da Silva Rondon laid the first telegraph line in the zone that was later targeted by the Polonoroeste Project. Da Silva realized the importance of this first step in the integration of remote areas in Brazil:

It would be the first step in the construction of a new Brazil, a nation in which even its remotest inhabitants, including the indians, could play their part. (Occasional Paper 6).

Da Silva was also a friend of the indians. He founded and directed the Indian Protection Service, the predecessor of FUNAI (Brazilian national indian foundation), which has played a key role in the ultimate conditions of the indians.

The telegraph line opened the route that the highway BR-364 traced some decades later. Da Silva never imagined that this opening of the forest would become the antecedent of a national catastrophe.

This century has been marked by social confrontations that prevented extractors, peasants and indians from a normal

development. Tension and stress have been the ingredients of the political, social and economic relationships, not only in Brazil's Northwest but in the entire country as well. Very diverse regions have been linked by problems and solutions without a clear explanation for such connections. For instance, when the problem of landlessness became urgent in the Northeast, Brazil promoted southward migration to the Parana coffee belt. Since then, migration has been utilized to "export" social problems to remote areas.

In the 40s, mining explorations discovered tin and gold in Rondonia. Despite the growth of these two industries, the forest that covered 80 per cent of the state remained mostly intact.

In 1946, a new Brazilian constitution was adopted, calling for a comprehensive long-term plan for the integration and development of the Amazon region. This constitutional canon emphasized the integration of the isolated Amazon basin with the rest of the country as a national aim. Until then, places like Rondonia were almost uninhabited; aside from the traditional indian dwellers, Rondonia's population was composed of itinerant rubber-tappers and prospectors that accounted for 70.000 inhabitants.

At this time the rubber trade experienced an economic decline. The Second World War momentarily revitalized the

profitability of the extraction activity. But when this period of high demand passed, the concentration of landownership was quickly increased and a system of "patron/debt peon" was imposed. Nevertheless a few rubber-tappers were able to remain autonomous.

Returning to the elementary formula of exporting the troubled people instead of solving their problems, the government aimed thousands of colonists towards the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Goias.

The first week of February, 1960, President Juscelino Kubitzchek announced that the cities of Cuiaba(Matto Groso) and Porto Velho(Rondonia) would be connected by a highway(BR-364). The road would cross the heart of the forest over 1500 kilometers.

Immediate colonization projects were initiated, both public and private. The northwest Amazon was brought into the national forefront. Individuals and corporations began profitable speculations and land values went up. Furthermore, worsening the situation, surveys conducted in Rondonia confirmed that the road had opened not only fertile lands but also considerable mineral resources.

When the military took over Brazil's government in the mid 1960's, the national foreign debt was about \$3.5 billion. Twenty

years later, and after the so-called Brazilian miracle, the figure was over the \$100 billion (an increase of almost 3000% in 21 years). This was due to the fact that the military viewed foreign loans as the means to finance its time in office.

In 1966, the Amazon was targeted by different sectors of the military government. A five-year development plan was designed to attract private investment to specific growth sectors. The headquarter for the action plan was the Superintendency for the development of the Amazon (SUDAM), which financed several incentive programs through the "Fundo de Investimento da Amazonia" (FINAM).

Two years later, President Castello Branco initiated "Operation Amazonia", which called for:

(1) Concentration of resources in areas selected in relation to their potential and existing populations...; (2) adoption of a migratory policy.. [and] the formation of stable and self-sufficient regional population groups in the frontier zone...; [and] (3) rationalization of the exploitation of natural resources [especially forest resources].(Brazilian Law 5374 of 1967).

The government relied heavily on loans for big projects such as "Operation Amazonia". The Brazilian economy seemed to be one of the strongest and healthiest in the world. Brazil's foreign trade surplus was only topped by German and Japanese economies. (De Onis cited by Maldonado, 1989).

In 1973, the oil crisis hit those countries, that like Brazil, were largely dependent on oil imports. Nonetheless, Brazil continued to integrate the remote Amazon with the rest of the country with several one-thousand-kilometer highways.

These highways made possible public and private colonization that resettled 100,000 small farmers. They came from the south and southeast, expelled by the mechanization of soybean production systems, the frosts that hit coffee-growing areas, and by the fragmentation of landholding (Mahar, p.29). The government offered 100-hectare lots with basic services and infrastructure at nominal prices. These factors culminated in a massive invasion of Rondonia by thousands and thousands of landless.

The government failed on its promise to give land titles and to provide the infrastructure, technical and financial assistance, agricultural research, and marketing facilities (Mahar, *ibid*). This failure forced desperate settlers to engage in environmentally harmful practices (Mueller, 1980, cited by Mahar).

Finally, by the end of the 70s, the merge of low yields and the lack of sensible government intervention forced more than one-third of the immigrants to leave their plots. Due to this, deforestation became the principal problem of the Amazon from the

environmental point of view. Small farmers had access to cheap land, cleared off their parcels, cultivated them for a couple of years and abandoned them to open the next plot. This cycle led to concentration of landownership and instituted deforestation as a profitable activity for both the poor and the wealthy. The exhausted lots were purchased at extremely low prices by cattle ranchers , while small farmers moved into new parcels that in three years had to be abandoned.

Deforestation began to threaten forest inhabitants: mainly indians and rubber-tappers. The rain forest was (and is) their resource base and their livelihood. By then, these two groups realized that the root of the problem was no longer rubber prices but land tenure. Consequently, the first social movements began to openly challenge rain forest clearing. Rubber-tappers had their first "empates", by which men, women and children marched into the forest with joined hands to stop the chain-saw crews (Hecht).

In 1978, INCRA (Institute of colonization and agrarian reform) offered incentives to the southern landless to move into the empty Brazilian northwest. INCRA was to provide land title for 20,000 migrants a year. However, the actual figure of migrants was about 160,000 a year for the period of 1984-86 (Mahar, p.35). The result of this miscalculation led to uncontrolled squatting, mostly in indian territories.

Brazil's own indian laws and statutes, when violated, were re-written by changing definitions and classifications of both indian and/or forest reserves (Occasional Paper 6, p.18). Federal Constitutional precepts were overruled by temporary necessities. Article 198 "guarantees indians the permanent possession of the lands they occupied since the time of the immemorial" but this too was overruled for convenience (Brazilian constitution cited by Junqueira and Mindlin).

At this time nearly 50 per cent of the farms in Rondonia were without access roads. Consequently, Brazil asked the World Bank for funding (\$434 million) to re-build and pave BR-364. This program was intended to solve the socioeconomic as well as environmental problems in the states of Rondonia and Mato Grosso.

THREE

The Anthropologists

It is hard not to think of environmentalist whenever the subject of the Amazon comes up. This might be a consequence of the fact the world media has chosen to portray the fight to save the Amazon as one fought almost exclusively by environmentalist and in some cases artists. Yet a little know fact is that in the beginning the campaign that was to put a stop to the World Banks loan disbursements for the POLONOROESTE project had little to do with environmentalist (Chernela, 1990). In fact if we had to trace the campaign to its source, this source would undoubtedly be the American and Brazilian Anthropologists that were conducting field research on indigenous groups in Brazil's northwest region during the late sixties and seventies. Unlike the thousands of peasants, miners, ranchers and fortune seekers that were moving into Brazil northwest region during this period, the anthropologists only interest in the area was a scholarly one: to study and understand the cultures and sociability of the native inhabitants of the region.

Observation is an anthropologists trademark. Thus it was only natural that anthropologist in the northwest region began to observe and record the impact that the chaotic migration and development that was taking place in the region in the early 60's and 70's was having on the area's indigenous population. More

and more anthropologist witnessed and wrote about the plight of indian groups such as the Surui, who out of a curiosity for the road(BR-364) and the western goods that came with it, walked out of the forest and into an infectious contact that led to their total decimation.

"A rapid influx of population from all over Brazil would bring diseases as yet unknown to the Nambiquara[local tribe]. The indians would be fascinated by the trucks and busses and by the people and goods they carried. They would hang out at the gas stations and motels, selling souvenirs and fraternizing with the Brazilians. Soon they would have syphilis, gonorrhoea, tetanus, typhoid, yellow fever, and more deadly forms of malaria. (Before the Bulldozer, p.24).

It was information such as this that for the first time depicted, in a systematic and scholarly fashion, the effects that the development of the region was having on local indian groups and their resource base. Information that was latter to prove crucial for the subsequent campaign to halt the World Bank's funding for POLONOROESTE.

Some anthropologist began to stray further from the scholarly path and began to antagonize the Brazilian Government Agency (FUNAI) responsible for indian affairs. In their opinion FUNAI was not only corrupt (some of its directors had been accused of selling indian land to prospectors), but also lacked both the will and the resources to aid the indians. FUNAI had failed to provide the basic health care necessary to protect indian from the new diseases that settlers were bringing into the area, and had shown little interest in halting the massive

squatting that was occurring in demarcated indian lands, and which was pushing tribes of their traditional territories. Having worked for FUNAI in the past, some anthropologist such as Scottish anthropologist Kent Taylor and American anthropologist David Price began to see the paradox of expecting a national government involved in a campaign of conquest and colonization to have an agency responsible with tending for the welfare of its victims. (Before the Bulldozer p.40). As more and more of them became convinced of this fact, anthropologists began to ask the Brazilian Government to allow an independent organization to assume the role of FUNAI and work closely with the government in order to improve the conditions of the indians. Yet, the government, afraid of relinquishing its power to an independent and mostly foreign organization, never gave serious consideration to their request.

Although many anthropologists were engaging in advocacy work in favor of the indians, there efforts had never been effectively organized or consolidated. However a rumor about a new development in the area was to change this and spark a cooperation that had not previously existed amongst them. The project was POLONOROESTE, and for most anthropologist doing work in Brazil, had the potential to multiply the damage that was already occurring in the region.

POLONOROESTE (North West Pole Development), was the Brazilian Government's idea of how to bring what had become a

chaotic, often violent frontier situation, under their control. Aside from bringing order to the region the project was supposed to increase the productivity of the area, thus providing larger tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings for a country massively in debt, and also provide an outlet for the land hungry peasants of south Brazil. About 57% (500 million) of the project funds were to be used for the reconstruction and paving of the old 1,500 km road (BR-364) that crossed a part of the state of Matto Grosso and the totality of the state of Rondonia, and connected the cities of Cuiaba and Porto Velho, and for the improvement of a secondary feeder road network in areas of the northwest region that held the greatest agricultural potential. These roads were intended to improve farm to market access by lowering the cost, increasing the accessibility of inputs, and siphoning off the region's produce (World Bank 1981) Aside from the re-pavement of the road the project was supposed to meet a number of secondary motives. Colonization in the area was to be administered more efficiently by consolidating the activities of the many public agencies with responsibility in the area. This was intended to reduce the amount of bureaucratic red tape that characterized the present colonization of the region. Land titles were to be awarded to migrants, specially in those of areas of greater social conflict. Social and health services and the infrastructure required to provide them were to be improved. And finally, measures to protect the environment and the indigenous population were to be implemented or strengthened.

(Occasional Paper 6) By January 1980 the rumors of the project were confirmed, and it became public knowledge that the Brazilian Government was asking the World Bank to finance(\$434 million) part of POLONOROESTE.

Although the World Bank and the Brazilian Government had been conducting informal discussions about the project since early 1978, the World Bank did not become aware of the existence of indigenous groups in the project site, nor of the problems they had been encountering, until the fall of 1989. Apparently concerned with the impact that the road would have on the indians, the Bank consulted David Maybury-Lewis, who at the time was Chairman of the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University, and who had been the founder of Cultural Survival, an organization dedicated to the welfare of residual ethnic minorities. Maybury-Lewis presented the Bank with the possibility that rather than help improve the current situation in the region, the loan could end up financing further deforestation and destruction of indian lands in the project area. Furthermore, it appeared Maybury-Lewis was able to convince the World Bank of the need to insure the subsistence of the indians, and specially the Nambiquara, whose territory was to be divided by the project. As a result of Maybury-Lewis's personal lobbying the Bank petitioned the Brazilian Government to develop a sub-proposal to the project that would insure the subsistence of the indians in the region. As it was to turn out

the banks petition was a mere formalism designed to protect itself from possible accusations of irresponsibility towards human rights and indigenous groups.

Months later and following Maybury's advice (and against the Brazilian Government's wishes) the Bank hired David Price, recognized as the leading expert on the Nambiquara, to evaluate the sub-proposal that had been drafted by FUNAI to deal with the indian issue. After spending three weeks in the project site (september 1980), and evaluating FUNAI's plan, Price condemned it in his final report to the World Bank in November of that year:

"It is hard to understand how the FUNAI could present the World Bank with such a project. Does the FUNAI fail to realize that its program is divorced from reality and likely to prove counterproductive, or does it suppose that the World Bank will fail to notice? Either the FUNAI is hopelessly incompetent, or it cynically assumes that the World Bank does not really care whether the project is effective." (Before the Bulldozer p.158)

Little did he know he was right on both counts. His report was ignored by the same bank who had requested his advice, and his comments condensed to one recommendation to the Brazilian Government that it should try to improve FUNAI's image.

A month latter Cultural Survival was to publish In The Path of POLONOROESTE: Endangered Peoples Of Western Brazil . In this report edited by David Maybury-Lewis, several anthropologists (Jason Clay, Carmen Junqueira, Denny Moore) wrote about the

problems they saw with the project, and its influence on the long term survival of the area's indians. Clay's article "The Polonoroeste Project" concentrated on the non-indigenous issues of the project:

"To date, most attention from international groups has been focused on the Polonoroeste Project's impact on indigenous peoples in the area. Indeed, much of this publication explores the situation of indigenous peoples in the area and the effects of the Polonoroeste Project on them. To those interested in the provision of adequate safeguards for indigenous peoples in the area, officials in Brazil and at the World Bank have insisted that the Indians are only a tiny aspect of the project, nearly insignificant by comparison to the colonists living on tiny plots. Perhaps, then, the stated objectives of the project need to be reviewed."(Clay,P.9)

Agricultural production was to be one of the principal stated benefits of the project, yet Clay questioned the feasibility of this goal basing himself on the fact that in the Brazilian Project Document it had been indicated that only one percent of the soils in the project area were good, meaning that they were capable of high, though declining, agricultural production for twenty years. Clay also questioned the plans to turn large expanses of land into cattle pastures:

"Brazil's expectation that most of the agricultural land will be converted to pasture also raises serious problems. These soils may not sustain pasture for any length of time. Soil erosion, compacting, nutrient depletion[many minerals from the soil leave with the cattle(Goodland 1980:19)], lateralization, and the inevitable invasion of pasture by noxious weeds all account for the reduced pasture life. Of the 187 government assisted agricultural projects begun in Amazonia between 1965 and 1978 (mostly cattle ranches), nearly all have been abandoned(Goodland 1980:18) (Clay, P.17).

In the end the publication predicted a bleak scenario for the area under POLONOROESTE. By the time that environmentalist were to take over the campaign, most of these predictions had come true: The lack of poor soil had forced many of the migrants to move into slash and burn agriculture, furthering the deforestation in the area, and forcing increasing numbers of indian tribes of their lands. The distributional effects of the project seemed to be favoring absentee cattle ranchers in the area rather than the impoverished migrants to whom the government had sold the area as a "place with land for people without land" (Sawyer, 60 Minutes).

In December 5th of that year (1980), and partially as a response to the World Bank's attitude towards the indian issue, POLONOROESTE became the main issue of the Annual Conference of the American Anthropological Association. The conference had invited Eunice Durham, who at the time was the President of the Brazilian Anthropological Association (ABBA), and David Price to give separate talks on the conditions of the indigenous groups in the project area. As a consequence of their talks, the American Anthropological Association unanimously adopted a motion urging the World Bank to withhold funding from the POLONOROESTE project until measures had been taken to safeguard the members of the tribal societies who inhabited the area (Chernela, 1990).

Although, and according to an article printed by The New York Times on February 15 1981, the World Bank claimed it had

accepted the recommendations made by the Association, the money which began to be disbursed in January of 1981, flowed without a single change having been made to the original FUNAI proposal.

In retrospect it seems that although the anthropologist had the information and the desire to influence the project in favor of the indigenous population of the area, their methods did not allow them to become effective agents of social change. The anthropologists staged a frontal attack on a institution on which they had little or no leverage, except perhaps for the morality of the issues they were raising. These well intentioned scholars were rudely awakened by the fact that in the world of multilateral development morality often takes a back seat to economic concerns.

Not only were the anthropologist powerless against the World Bank, but they were unable to pursue an alternative strategy that could empower them. The environmentalist, who were to take the campaign from here on, recognized this from the very beginning. Realizing that a direct attack on the Bank would be fruitless, they were able to coalesce with an institution with enough power to influence World Bank Policy. That institution was the United States Government.

FOUR

The Environmentalists

The efforts of the anthropologists¹ up until 1983 were directed exclusively at the World Bank (WB). Anthropologists did not consider the possibility of mobilizing the U.S. government in the cause to halt the destruction of the Amazon and its people until the environmentalists² plotted the way.

The contribution of the environmentalists to the efforts to halt the destruction associated with the Polonoeste project did not begin with Polonoeste. The environmentalist had a broader objective. They saw a connection between the U.S. government and the WB and an opportunity to mobilize that connection to do environmental advocacy. Bruce Rich, the environmental advocate who led the environmentalists, realized that the U.S. had strong

¹ We use the words "anthropologists" and "environmentalists" to distinguish between those who were involved in the two time frames of this study. We do not mean to characterize the people involved as either one or the other, nor do we mean to suggest that there were two groups of people doing pursuing totally different goals. In truth, there was so much cooperation that to distinguish made little sense.

² The core group of the environmentalists was composed of Bruce Rich, Brent Blackwelder, and Barbara Bramble. At that time they were working, respectively, for the Sierra Club, Environmental Policy Institute (EPI), and National Wildlife Federation (NWF). Bruce Rich, however, represented the Sierra Club, World Wildlife Fund-U.S., Friends of the Earth, Izaak Watson League of America, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Audubon Society during the congressional hearings.

influence over the WB. Influence that could be directed to empower their concern for the environment on a broader level. Their concern, like the anthropologists, included the Amazon but extended to the rest of the Third World. The environmentalists realized early on that the MDB projects had had heavy impacts on the earth's environment commensurate to the enormous amount of resources it lent. It was therefore an important target for environmental reform.

The Rationale Behind the Campaign

The rationale behind the environmentalists' decision to reform the MDBs - for them to become more sensitive to the environmental impacts of their projects - proceeded from two related reasons. First, was that the MDBs were involved in numerous environmentally significant projects. Second, was that the MDBs, especially the WB, were accessible to the environmentalists through the U.S. government.

The Environmental Impact of the WB

Bruce Rich (1985) in an article written a few months before WB funding for Polonoroeste was halted, summarizes the importance of reforming the MDBs, viz:

In 1983, the four banks (MDBs) together lent over \$20 billion to fund projects in developing countries, nearly four times the amount committed for economic assistance by AID, the largest bilateral agency. In 1983, the WB alone committed over \$15.3 billion in loans to 300 projects in over 80 countries. The net disbursements of the four banks accounted for more than 20% of all international development assistance in

1983.

In recent years, the majority of the bank loans have supported projects in the environmentally sensitive areas of agriculture, rural development, power and irrigation schemes, and roadbuilding. In 1983, for example, 22.5% of WB lending was for agriculture and rural development, 15.5% for transportation projects, principally roads, and 12.2% for power projects. In the same year, 16.1% of IAB lending was for agriculture, 24% for mining and industry, 5.6% for transportation, and 31.8% for energy, mainly hydroelectric projects.

The projects and policies of the banks have an impact on the ecological stability and environmental future of the developing world even greater than is indicated by the huge dollar amounts of their annual loan commitments. Funds lent by the banks are for the most part complemented by even greater sums provided by recipient countries, and the funding of many projects is further supplemented by cofinancing arrangements with other development agencies and private banks. Thus, for every dollar the WB lends for a project, more than two additional dollars are raised from other sources, for the IAB, this cofinancing ratio approaches is three to one.

In addition, Rich notes that bank lending in terms of funding research, training, technology transfer, planning, and other institutional support plus the receptivity of recipient countries to the banks suggestions and requirements magnified the influence of the banks on development policy (Rich 1985).

The environmental impact of the WB in these terms of projects like dams, frontier roads, large-scale agricultural and rural development schemes when combined with what the environmentalists had uncovered about the environmental review processes at the MDBs highlight the compelling reasons to reform the MDBs.

Inadequate Environmental Review Process at the WB

The environmentalists had found out that the environmental review process in the WB was effectively non-existent despite the adoption by the WB of the February 1980 Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to Economic Development. The environmentalists "discovered" that even with the creation the Office for Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OESA) in 1973, the WB still had no effective environmental review process. The OESA is charged with reviewing every project in terms of its consequences on the environment. The OESA staff, however, as late as 1986, had only six staff members out of the WB's total of approximately 6,000 employees. Of the six, only three are involved in reviewing the environmental impacts of most of the WB's more than 300 annual new projects and hundreds of ongoing projects. Of the three, only one is available to review projects in the environmentally sensitive areas of agriculture, energy, and transportation, which account for more than half of the WB's annual lending (Rich 1985).

Another "discovery" was that before May 1984, the only mandatory environmental procedure in the WB was a review by the environmental office at the end of the appraisal stage, before loan negotiations, but after the project had been identified and designed (Rich 1985).

The U.S. Connection to the WB

The second rationale behind the decision to reform the MDBs was the connection of the U.S. to the WB. Historically, the U.S. has exerted strong influence on the WB and other MDBs. An analysis of the history, structure and source of funds of the MDBs, specially of the WB, will reveal why this is so.

The WB was founded at the end of the second World War as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) with the purpose of helping rebuild Europe as well as promote commerce. By 1950, the reconstruction of Europe had largely been accomplished, and the Bank began to focus on the Third World (Price 1989).

Funding for the IBRD initially came from the victors of the second World War. Later on, the WB would be "owned" by member countries. In 1980, there were 139 members. Each member contributes a certain amount of money to the WB and pledges an additional sum. The WB then uses the combination of its "paid-in" and "callable" capital as a guarantee for money that is raised by selling bonds to private investors on commercial bond markets (Price 1989) Most of the funding for the WB comes from the world powers, and this configuration is reflected in the voting arrangement in the WB's Board of Governors, the highest policy-making body. The U.S. dominates the voting in the WB with

19.5% of the vote.³ The United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan are the other major votes with 6.2%, 6.02, and 5.99%, respectively (Rich 1985).

In addition, the U.S., United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and France, as the biggest contributors to the WB are each entitled to appoint their own executive directors to the 21 man Board of Executive Directors. Executive directors are in charge of the day-to-day operations of the WB. They approve loans and have the discretion to refer policy decisions to the Board of Governors (Rich 1985).

Because of its dominant position, the U.S has "viewed the (banks) as an important multilateral foreign policy vehicle to enhance (its) security, economic, and humanitarian interests" (Rich 1985). It was reported by the Treasury Department that on 70 different instances between 1970 and 1980, the U.S. was able to change bank policy, practice, or procedure 80% of the time (Rich 1985).

The Treasury Department and U.S. Congress

Within the U.S. government, the Treasury Department and the Congress have direct relationship with the WB.

³ In the IDB, the voting power of the U.S. is 35%.

The Treasury Department is tasked with coordinating U.S. policy with respect to the MDBs, with the authority to instruct the U.S. executive director in voting and other matters (Rich 1985). The Treasury Department transmits instructions through its Office of Multilateral Development Banks, which is also under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Rich 1985).

Congress plays a key role in overseeing and directing U.S. bank policy. Congressional approval is required for increased contributions and subscriptions to the MDBs. Moreover, Congress must annually authorize funds for the U.S.' subscriptions and contributions to the MDBs that the Administration has already negotiated. This means that without the annual approval of Congress, U.S. funds will not be released. There is no carry-over of the previous year's appropriation (Rich 1985). Within the U.S. Congress, there are two subcommittees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.⁴ Two of these were tapped by the environmentalists.

⁴ These are the House Banking Subcommittee on International Development Institutions, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and the Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee.

An Evolving Strategy Played Out

At the onset, it should be pointed out that the environmentalists developed their strategy as they began to take action. Their's was a strategy that as it evolved crystallized in praxis. In the words of Bruce Rich, the strategy "for the most part, evolved as we went along" (Rich Interview 1990).

At its inception, the campaign to reform the MDBs actually began as an effort in the mind of Bruce Rich as a campaign to stop the massive deforestation of the tropical rainforests. Concerned with the deforestation of rainforests, Bruce Rich made a personal decision in early 1983 to do what he could about the deforestation of tropical rainforest from where he was - in Washington, D.C. In the world, Brazil, Indonesia and Zaire have the largest contiguous tropical rainforests, and it was in these countries that Bruce Rich decided to start a campaign in Washington to address deforestation. Initially, Rich was concerned with the role played by USAID in the deforestation in these countries. However, after finding out that USAID had undergone significant reforms especially after 1975⁵ and after receiving discouraging feedback from congressional staff members about instituting legislative action against USAID, Rich decided

⁵ When four U.S. environmental organizations filed a lawsuit against USAID (EDF, et.al. versus AID, 6 Env'tl. L. Rep. 20,121) for failing to comply with NEPA requirements in financing pesticide sales to developing countries and after the Carter's Administration issued Executive Order No. 12,114 on Environmental Effects Abroad of major Federal Actions.

to focus and "go after the World Bank." His research revealed that the World Bank was funding several projects that had generated negative impacts on rainforests like the Polonoroeste project.

Bruce Rich first step was to research and connect with other people who shared his concerns. In doing these, Bruce Rich "discovered" the lack of adequate and effective environmental review procedures in the MDBs, particularly the WB. He also connected with Brent Blackwelder and Barbara Bramble, and other Washington, D.C. based environmentalists. Together with these people and the organizations they worked for, an informal coalition of Washington, D.C. based environmentalists began.⁸

In June 1983, with the "discoveries" made about MDBs, the environmentalists drafted a legislative proposal that called for environmental reform in the MDBs. The legislative proposal was sent to Brent Blackwelder of EPI, a registered lobbyist, who got the House Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance (chaired by Republican Congressman Patterson) interested in the issue sometime in April of 1983.

⁸ Composed of several individuals from various environmental groups. Among the groups were the Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Environmental Policy Institute, World Wildlife Fund, and the Bank Information Center.

Bruce Rich's analysis of why the issue was taken up is worth stating. He thought that the subcommittee, involved as it was in appropriating public funds for the US' contribution to MDBs, was not dealing with the kind of legislative activity that could give the congressmen political impact with their respective constituencies, international aid being difficult to justify during the Reagan administration and local benefits accruing from foreign aid hard to point out. So it was desirable for the subcommittee to look into the matters raised by environmentalists as leverage for reviewing or cutting back on U.S. contributions to MDBs, a matter that was part of the Republican agenda (Rich Interview 1990).

At this time, Polonoroeste for the environmentalists was just another large-scale project of the many that the MDBs funded. Thus, when the campaign to reform the MDBs began, Polonoroeste was presented as one of several cases where MDB funding had created disaster. The strategy of the environmentalists at this point was to lobby the U.S. Congress for them to pressure the MDBs to reform their environmental policies and procedures.

The June 1983 Hearings

As a result of the legislative proposal, the subcommittee held two oversight (as overseers of MDBs) hearings on June 28 and

29, 1983 to hear statements and studies of authorities concerning the environmental, social, health, and other effects of projects funded by the MDBs.⁹ These were the first hearings ever held on the subject.

During the hearings, anthropologists and environmentalists were testified. Bruce Rich, who coordinated the hearings, Brent Blackwelder, Barbara Bramble, and John Hornberry of the International Institute for Environment and Development, representing most of the major environmental groups in the US, presented cases from all over the Third World that showed the negative effects of MDB-funded projects on health, indigenous populations, and the environment. They also zeroed in on the inadequacy of the environmental procedures and programs of the MDBs, the theme of the proposed legislation that Rich and Blackwelder had earlier sent to the subcommittee, and mentioned some recommendations for the reform of the MDBs. This theme of reforming the MDBs was also taken on by the other witnesses.¹⁰

⁹ Instead of conducting hearings on the proposed legislation sent in by the environmentalists, the subcommittee decided to hold oversight hearings and hear evidence on the negative effects MDB-funded projects have had on development and the environment (Environmental Hearings, June 1983).

¹⁰ The anthropologists, Shelton Davis of the Anthropology Resource Center, Dana Martin of the Washington Office on Latin America, David Price, a former consultant to the World Bank, and Rudolph Ryser of the National Congress of American Indians, who testified on different negative consequences of MDB-financed projects in various countries, also testified on the theme of reforming the MDBs (Environmental Hearings, June 1983).

The testimony of anthropologist, David Price, was the first specific evidence for the upcoming Polonoroeste campaign. He stated that the institution in charge of Indian affairs in Brazil, relied upon by the MDBs to protect the indigenous population, actually did and could not protect the indigenous interests. He also narrated how the World Bank disregarded him.

In sum, the evidence offered at the hearing was a general presentation of the negative impacts that MDB-funded projects have had on the environment and people of the Third World. Indeed, the thrust was to point out that the mandate of the MDBs to help develop the Third World was in fact undermined by the destruction of the natural resource base.

The immediate result of the hearings was the transmission of the hearing transcripts to the MDBs with a request for comments. The hearings also laid down the foundation for more hearings (scheduled more than one year later) and the drafting of recommendations for the reform of the MDBs by the subcommittee itself.

September 1984 Hearings

The hearings held on September 11 and 13, 1984 before the Subcommittee on International Financial Institutions and Finance were devoted primarily to responses to the draft recommendations prepared by environmentalists in consultation with the special

staff of the subcommittee. These hearings were a continuation of the June 1983 hearings. In the hearing on September 11, 1984, James Conrow, who had become Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developing Nations, and various representatives from several U.S. NGOs were heard. All of the testimonies endorsed the recommendations.

The testimony of James Conrow was of particular significance. His testimony helped legitimize the issue of environmental reforms in the MDBs for the U.S. government when he endorsed the draft recommendations and said that the issue was important for the Treasury Department.

In appearing before you in June 1983, I could honestly say that I was unaware of particular problems in these aspects (environmental) of the MDB programs.

The presentations of the other witnesses at the hearings were, frankly, surprising and distressing. When we had an opportunity afterward to cross-check the information presented to the committee, we found substantial corroboration of the information presented by most of the witnesses. However, much of the information - but not all - concerned projects designed and implemented in the 1960's and early 1970's. I think it fair to say that the MDB's have learned a great deal about the environmental aspects of development projects in the last decade.

You have convened these hearings today to discuss the specific draft recommendations which you forwarded with your letter of invitation. With some additional elaborations which I will discuss in a moment, the Treasury Department finds the recommendations acceptable. I believe they can be the basis for an ongoing U.S. policy approach to this aspect of the MDB programs (Environmental Hearings 1984a, at p. 15).

Focusing on Polonoroeste as a Case

Although, the hearings on the recommendations proceeded, the environmentalists felt that no immediate changes were forthcoming. Already, the process they had embarked upon was more than a year old. In the meantime, the deforestation and destruction of tropical forests, particularly of the Amazon was going on at a pace that could render the outcome of the legislative process (draft recommendations) futile.

Sometime between the 1983 and 1984 hearings, Bruce Rich met and began working with Stephan Schwartzman, an anthropologist who had worked in Brazil and for NESCI as a liaison between Brazil and the US. In early 1984 the two decided to focus on the Polonoroeste project as a case study and started writing two dossiers on Polonoroeste, one was on the environment and the other was about the indigenous peoples. The dossiers were circulated to the MDBs, the Treasury Department and the US Congress.

In writing the dossier on the environment, Rich was helped extensively by Brent Millikan, an adviser to the Foundation for Economic Investigation and Research (FIPE) associated with the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Brent Millikan, who testified in the September 1984 hearing before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and Environment, studied the agricultural and colonization aspects of the Polonoroeste

project. His expertise and knowledge was critical to the environmental dossier on the Polonoroeste project.

Focusing on Polonoroeste brought the anthropologists and environmentalists and Americans and Brazilians closer together. Schwartzman and Barbara Bramble's previous involvement in Brazil linked the environmentalists with Maria Allegretti of the Institute for Amazon Studies, who was a close advisor to the late Chico Mendes and the rubber-tappers in the Amazon.

Brazilian Presence

To bring Polonoroeste to the fore in Washington, D.C. various elements came together. One was that a noted Brazilian environmentalist, Jose Lutzenberger,¹¹ was able to come to the U.S. to testify before the U.S. Congress. This was made possible by some generous gift from a friend(Ann Getty) of a friend of Bruce Rich. Another, was that the film by Adrian Cowell, "Decade of Destruction" was made available for showing in the U.S. Congress. Finally, a subcommittee in the US Congress (Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture and the Environment of the Committee on Science and Technology, chaired by Democrat James Scheuer of New York) was willing to conduct a hearing on the Polonoroeste project on short notice.

¹¹ Mr. Lutzenberger is presently the Secretary of the Department of Environment and natural Resources of Brazil. He was appointed in April 1990.

The hearing was held on September 19, 1984. An edited version of the film, "Decade of Destruction" was shown followed by the testimony of Jose Lutzenberger on behalf of Associacao Gaucha de Protecao ao Ambiente Natural (AGAPAN). Jorge Illueca, the Executive Secretary of the National Commission on the Environment, Panama, Brent Millikan, advisor to FIPE, and various U.S. environmentalist and experts including Rich and Bramble also testified. The hearing was covered by TV Globo,¹² which showed Lutzenberger's testimony on national television in Brazil.

In his testimony, Lutzenberger pointed out that "what was being done by Polonoroeste and Rondonia is only to take away pressure from the other areas of Brazil, where pressure is now building up because of concentration of land in fewer and fewer hands." (Environmental Hearings, 1984b at p.11) This was disastrous, according to him, because agriculture in what was once forests is not sustainable, leads to tremendous soil erosion, and displaces and destroys cultures that have learned to live in harmony with the forests. In summing up, Lutzenberger, points to the "legal" reasons for halting MDB funding.

Finally, I would like to ask why the World Bank bothers to write conditions into its loan agreements, and then does nothing when those conditions are blatantly flouted - such as clauses about Indian reserves, virtually none of which have been demarcated in the Polonoroeste region.

In the case of the more environmental conditions, it is obviously impossible to reverse the type of destruction already carried out in Rondonia. But at

¹² TV Globo is a national television station in Brazil.

present, the last large area of untouched forest - the Guapore Valley - is about to be opened up by BR 429 road. According to Rondonia's Ministry of Transportation, the last 100 km of road should be through by November. And yet this road blatantly flouts two conditions in the World Bank's loan agreement. In section 3.13 of the Phase I loan agreement (for "Agricultural Development and Environmental Protection Project" - loan number 2060 BR) it is agreed: "To discourage the agricultural exploitation of areas which have been determined to be unsustainable for agricultural development or of areas whose sustainability for agricultural development has not yet been determined." Why, therefore, does the Bank not object to the colonization of Settlement Projects Bom Principio, Terra Firma, Conceicao, Porto Murinho, Supresa, Cena Grande, Sao Domingos, Monte Cristo, and Sao Miguel when the soil survey maps describe most of this soil as unsustainable for small farmer agriculture?

Secondly, the loan agreement for the first phase, Agricultural Development and Environmental Protection Project (Loan number 2060 BR) states in section 4.05:

The Borrower and the Bank agree that the strengthening of the measures to protect the indigenous Amerindian population in the carrying out of the project. To this end, the Borrower shall take all necessary measures to put into effect promptly the special project for protecting the interests of the Amerindian communities located in the program area.

In the light of that clause, how can the Bank not object to a road which is going through an area regularly hunted by unknown Indians who have killed colonists and rubber-tappers in the area in 1981 and 1983. The regional head of the government Indian agency, Apoena Meirelles, confirmed this in a recent press interview when he said that all new INCRA projects should first have a Certidao Negativo (a no objection agreement) from the Indian agency confirming that there were no Indians in the area. When he was asked if this meant that the BR 429 road was - with reference to the Indians - proceeding blindly, he replied, "Completely blindly" (Environmental Hearings, 1984b at pp. 24-25).

The other testimonies followed the same line - that the Polonoroeste project was disastrous environmentally and socially.

The immediate result of this hearing saw Congressman Scheuer writing the Secretary of the Treasury requesting the treasury to respond to the concerns and suggestions (recommendations) raised in the hearing, "indicating the response of the Bank and the actions taken by the department." Apparently, no reply was ever made by the Treasury to Scheuer.

The Needle that Broke the Camel's Back

After the hearing, the environmentalists sent a copy of their dossiers together with a strong letter signed by US and Brazilian anthropologists, environmentalists, lawyers, academics, and members of the West German Bundestag to A.W. Clausen, the President of the WB. This was in October 12, 1984. The stationary was NRDC's (Natural Resource Defense Council). The letter asked the Bank to enforce the loan conditions.

Although the Bank support for the Program was strictly predicated in the first loan agreement (No. 2060 BR) on the prompt implementation of measures to protect the environment and Amerindian population of the program area, there are strong indications that the bank has lost control over - or will not take effective measures to control the destruction being unleashed in the region.

The prompt implementation of these measures would help forestall increasing concern in the US Congress and the West German Bundestag over evidence of the Bank's inadequate attention to sustainable development management of natural resources and to the indigenous people who depend on these resources (Annex A).

The WB, through the Chief of the Brazil Division, replied to this letter on November 7, 1984. The reply was short and in essence stated that the "Bank is continuing to monitor the situation closely, and that your concerns will be considered as Polonoroeste continues" (Annex B).

The virtual brush-off by the WB was brought by the environmentalists to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, chaired by Republican Robert Kasten. Earlier, the environmentalists testified before Senator Kasten's subcommittee in March 1984 on a public hearing day, and so had some connection with the Senator. Senator Kasten, dismayed by the way the environmentalists, representing an influential segment of the American public, had been brushed off, took up the environmentalists' cause.

Ironically, the reaction of Senator Kasten toward the WB's November 1984 letter was the turning point in the campaign. His letters to Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury Department, on January 23, 1985 and to A. W. Clausen, the President of WB show why.

In the letter to Donald T. Regan, Senator Kasten wrote:

...these organizations and several distinguished environmentalists from around the world ..., have outlined a number of specific concerns, as well as making what I believe are sound suggestions, only to be answered by a one paragraph letter which can only be described as outrageous. The response to these groups is an insult. It serves only to cement feelings by many that international organizations such as the WB are

arrogant and totally unwilling to receive constructive criticism ...

As you well know, securing appropriations for international financial institutions is not an easy proposition under the best circumstances...

I am taking this matter up with you personally
.... (Annex C).

In this letter Senator Kasten attached several internal memoranda of the WB that were leaked to the environmentalists and forwarded to him several months earlier at the public witness day hearing. The memoranda contain the negative assessment of the WB's own staff on Polonoroeste.

Senator Kasten's letter to the President of the World Bank was strong and threatening.

The response from the World Bank was at best a brush-off, but frankly, more correctly described as an insult. As you know better than anyone else, securing support from U.S. contributions to multilateral development institutions is difficult at best. That the World Bank would respond in such a cavalier fashion to groups and individuals who would otherwise support their programs is most difficult to understand. I therefore ask that you respond to me as Chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee (Annex D).

In response, the WB President's signature, for the first time, appeared in the correspondence with the U.S. Congress and environmentalists. In a letter dated February 5, 1985 WB President, A.W. Clausen, acknowledged Senator Kasten's letter and informed him that a reply was in the process.

The reply of the WB president on March 1, 1985 was a proposal to meet with Senator Kasten and other interested parties

to discuss the bank's response. Senator Kasten agreed to the proposal and brought along several environmentalists. Among the environmentalists that attended the meeting on May 22, 1985 were Bruce Rich, Barbara Bramble, Brent Blackwelder and David Maybury Lewis.

Meanwhile, before the meeting with the WB, several magazines and newspapers, including The Financial Times, reported the WB decision to halt a \$250 million loan disbursement for the Polonoroeste project. According to The Financial Times issue on April 11, 1985, "The Bank which has already handed out an amount of \$178.3m for the project, claims that Brazil agreed that the disbursements be suspended."

Thus for the first time, WB funding was halted for environmental reasons.

A Short-Lived but Important Victory

According to Bruce Rich, the WB refuses to admit that funding was stopped. Instead the WB claimed that it was the Brazilian government's decision not to request for additional disbursements (Rich Interview 1990).

On August 26, 1985, the World Bank informed Bruce Rich that funding for the Polonoroeste project was renewed. On August 19, 1985, the World Bank asked for an appointment with the

environmentalists to discuss the WB's future plans for Polonoeste.

Legitimizing the Environmental Issue for the U.S. Government.

An obstacle that faced the environmentalists was the issue of environmental imperialism. Since the concern of the American environmentalists involved development projects financed by a multilateral agency in Third World countries, and since they were asking the U.S. government to intervene in the relationship between the MDBs and recipient countries (especially when the campaign had focused on the Polonoeste project), the environmentalist had to legitimize the environmental issue for the U.S. Congress. As Congressman Bereuter, a member of the House Subcommittee, stated:

I won't concentrate on what is right with them. I would just like to focus on what I think the primary problem is in having the U.S. exercise a larger role through its executive directors in these various MDBs. That is, we will be seen as having protectionist motives. The charge of environmental elitism will be raised.

I can hear the Group of 77, probably with Mr. Castro leading the chorus, talking about imposing your standards to stop development in our countries.

What environmental expertise does exist in, at least, the most sophisticated forums is found in the OECD nations of Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. (sic) That is natural-the 77 are always looking at how the OECD is holding them down the development of the western world and keeping them colonies (Environmental Hearings, June 1983 at p. 116).

How the environmentalists' strategy responded to this perhaps was a critical point in mobilizing the U.S. Congress to take up the environmental cause. The strategic counter argument to this

obstacle took many forms and may be gleaned from the progression of the campaign.

One factor, however, that may have helped legitimize the issue for the U.S. was the presence of Brazilian experts like Jose Lutzenberger and advocates like Chico Mendes.

Working with the Staffs: Lessons Learned

Between the 1983 hearings and the subsequent ones in September 1984, the environmentalists worked closely with a staff member of the Treasury Department, Bob Banque, and the special staff of the subcommittee. From this experience, some lessons about the legislative process were learned and applied to the next hearings. First, identify procedures, and appropriate bodies or committees. Second, be aggressive. Third, do the work involved in moving the process; staffs are usually overworked and will more likely adopt what has already been done. Fourth, be aware that staffs are on the lookout for new ideas (Rich Interview 1990).

FIVE

Analysis and Recommendations

Our analysis of the environmental advocacy strategy utilized by the U.S. NGO's to reform World Bank policies regarding Polonoroeste has given us an insightful view into the environmental advocacy strategy process. The most interesting aspect of our analysis is that it allowed us to identify characteristics of a successful environmental advocacy strategy. There is nothing "earth shattering" about our list of characteristics. However many environmental advocates seem to over look admitting some of these characteristics into their strategies. It is our sincere belief that if the characteristics we have identified are implemented into future environmental advocacy strategies that their potential for success will increase dramatically.

The following is a brief explanation of the characteristics that we have identified as being important in determining the success or failure of an advocacy strategy. It is our hope that by presenting these characteristics in this simple form, this section of our case study can be utilized as a "reference guide" for environmental advocates as they develop and re-evaluate their advocacy strategies.

1. Intrinsically Political

An environmental advocate developing an advocacy campaign must appreciate the fact that environmental and economic development issues are political by nature. The political nature of environmental advocacy is intrinsic at all levels, local, regional, national and international. The policies that control environmental and economic development are created and fostered by groups that have a vested interest in their preservation. Therefore, environmental advocates must focus some of their efforts on gaining the political support of the forces that influence development policy instead of always battling against them.

For example, in this particular case the U.S. environmentalist concentrated their efforts on influencing World Bank policy through the creation of pressure from the U.S. congress. By taking this route, the environmentalist showed that their veil of naivete was removed and that they were ready to pursue their goals within the already established political structures.

2. Making the Path by Walking it

A successful environmental advocacy strategy must be formless in nature but extremely responsive at the appropriate time. When developing a strategy one must avoid the temptation of creating a rigid master plan for their actions. Such a plan has an immediate polarizing effect on the advocacy process and limits the advocates ability to respond when advantages conditions appear.

By "making the path by walking it" we mean keeping the desired goal in mind but developing the strategy over the continuum of the advocacy process. A successful campaign strategy must possess mechanisms to ensure that continuous reevaluations and refinements are performed on the strategy. After each successful or unsuccessful step is taken, a strategy must be reevaluated and appropriately refined to ensure that it is following its original intention in the manner which provides the least possible resistance.

3. Research

Doing the research has a focusing effect on an advocacy campaign because it allows one to identify the issue that is most likely to be successful. By selectively choosing your issue you can focus the energy of your diverse constituents thus maximizing your efforts. As Bruce Rich would say "Pick your fights".

For example, in this case Bruce Rich was able to benefit from the thorough documentation that had been compiled by the anthropologist over the last decade and his own analysis of previous Amazonian advocacy failures. From this information he was able to identify what he believed to be the best issue to base his advocacy strategy upon, public accountability.

4. Idealism versus Practicality

In developing an environmental advocacy strategy one must reach a balance between idealism and practicality if their strategy is going to be successful. This balance of idealism and practicality should not be confused with compromising one's

values or principles. The point of balancing Idealism and Practicality is to increase the potential for achieving immediate short-term goals which increases the legitimacy and the level of support given to the advocate's campaign. This in turn increases the potential for the achievement of one's long-term idealistic goal.

Simply stated, environmental advocacy is a step by step process initiated by an idealistic belief but carried out in a practical manner. So, an environmental advocates must function as a practical visionary if they hope to develop and implement a successful environmental advocacy strategy.

5. Networking

We feel that the importance of networking cannot be over emphasized. Networking should be viewed as the thread that runs through every aspect of advocacy. Networking needs to be done, not only within the NGO community, but also with the media, politicians, artists, bureaucrats, academia and local people.

The essence of networking encompasses the comprehension of two concepts: a) That individual participants have mutual as well as individual interest that must be addressed. b) That trust is an essential element of the advocacy process.

a) Understanding that individual participants have individual interest means realizing that everybody involved in the networking process is motivated by their own agenda. The attainment of the desired common goal will have different meanings for different participants.

For example, U.S. Congressional members share a common concern with U.S. NGO's in the case of Polonoroeste I. Both groups were interested in insuring that U.S. tax payers funds were used in a sustainable way as precluded to by U.S. regulations concerning international development policies. In addition to this common interest U.S. congressional members are also concerned with getting re-elected. At the time of Polonoroeste the Reagan Administration was attempting to reduce the national deficit and the reduction of foreign aid was one of the primary issues being discussed. Therefore, the strong position taken by the Sub-Committee of Foreign Operations in both the Senate and the House of Representatives on environmental impact of multi-lateral funding projects served many purposes. First, it was consistent with the shared concern of the environmentalist as mentioned above. Second, it was in line with the Reagan administration policies for reducing the budget. And third, it provided the committee members with positive press whose value should never be over looked.

b) Due to the diversity in interest of the participants, in order to work together, a certain level of trust must be attained. As we all know, trust does not come easily. Trust is a bond that must be developed over a period of time. Therefore, finding a person of high standing in each related area of the advocacy process is crucial to successful networking.

For example, when Bruce Rich (NRDC\EDF) started the advocacy campaign in 1983 he did not have any contacts in the halls of the U.S. Congress. Realizing this, he then contacted Brent Blackwelder, in the Environmental

Policy Institute, who had been working on environmental legislation and lobbying on the Hill for a number of years. Blackwelder agreed to join the campaign. His long relationship with the members of the Senate and the House, as well as their staff members, provided the campaign with instant credibility and direct access to the political decision-making process.

6. Knowing the Playing Field

Having a working understanding for the playing field on which one implements their advocacy strategy is essential for success. Understanding your playing field is more than just understanding your particular case. It involves a knowledge about the subtleties of advocacy. By subtleties we mean the following:

- identifying key players.
- understanding the interests and the organizational set-ups of key players.
- understanding the difference in opinion in all participant involved (including your own).
- knowing the regulatory and legislative procedures pertinent to achieving the desired goal.

7. Solution Oriented

A successful environmental strategy should not only raise concerns but also seek to find solutions for these concerns. An advocate aspiring to develop a successful strategy should understand the power of a strategy that provides a reasonable solution to the problem. By developing reasonable solutions we

mean solutions based upon the mutual interest of everyone involved.

A solution oriented strategy can provide the advocate with two additional benefits. First, it can create "space" for dialogue and negotiation. This "space" for dialogue increases the opportunities for a flexible, creative, and a mutually beneficial solution.

Secondly, and perhaps most important, creating solutions for your concerns can increase the odds of the strategy's success. As stated earlier in our case study, most legislative bodies and their staffs are severely over worked. So, if one can illustrate the seriousness of their concerns and then produce a reasonable solution to correct the problem, the solution is very likely to be accepted and implemented by the legislative branches either as is or with only minor changes.

8. Aggressiveness

An environmental advocacy strategy should be proactive if it is going to be successful. Opportunities for the espousal of concerns and solutions should be created. One must not always wait for the appropriate time but must invent such a time.

For example, when the U.S. environmental advocates managed to present their concerns at a Congressional hearing many people were quite surprised. However, all they did was grasp the opportunity and present their concerns to the U.S. Congress on National Public Witness Days. On those days the U.S. Congress opens

their doors and listens to any issues that the public might feel need the attention of a legislative body.

9. Democratic Principle

Basing your strategy upon the democratic principle will raise the level of credibility and integrity of your strategy both internally and externally. By basing your advocacy strategy on the democratic principle we mean that an advocate should encourage grass-roots activities and create an atmosphere that is conducive to the existence of different opinions within the advocate's organization.

For example, the presentation that Chico Mendes gave at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1984 was received with great enthusiasm. Many of the Banks Directors cherished the opportunity to speak with someone who came from the region and was intimate with the situation.

10. Building from People's Perception

Often what is perceived to be the problem is not the problem in reality. In many cases the perception of the problem is what determines the policies implemented. Therefore, an advocacy strategy should attempt to combine the general public's understanding of the problem with what the advocate believes to be the true nature of the problem.

11. Utilizing the Media

The media is the best tool for reaching the maximum amount of people. To do so, a successful environmental strategy should utilize every means of communication available. The Polonoeste

advocacy campaign did an excellent job in utilizing all facets of the media: radio, television, film, and the print media.

It is important to remember that the media does not like to be treated as a loud speaker for your individual concerns. If at all possible one should attempt to involve the media in the early stages of their advocacy activities so that at crucial times they will already be on your side.

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