

**TO RID THE SCOURGE OF WAR:
UN PEACE OPERATIONS
AND TODAY'S CRISES**

RACHEL M. GISSELQUIST

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WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
79 John F. Kennedy St.
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Tel: 617-496-2258
Fax: 617-491-8588
E-mail: world_peace@harvard.edu
www.worldpeacefoundation.org

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To Rid the Scourge of War reports both on UN peace operations and peace building, and on the results of two meetings, in May 2001 and November 2001. The analytical body of the report is followed by a postscript summarizing the discussions of the November meeting, especially its conclusions regarding the UN's role in Afghanistan and the earlier Brahimi report on peace operations. The World Peace Foundation and the WPF Program organized and sponsored the first meeting and they jointly organized and sponsored the second with the International Crisis Group and the Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the UN.

Rachel M. Gisselquist is a doctoral student in political science at MIT and a former program associate with the World Peace Foundation. Her work focuses on ethnic politics, the political economy of development, and African politics. She holds a Masters in Public Policy from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a BSFS from Georgetown University.

Introduction

Since the September 11 attacks, the UN has taken a high profile role in Afghanistan: contemplating its future, facilitating the political transition, and providing humanitarian assistance. At the same time, it has taken into account the limits of intervention and foresworn other types of involvement, like sending in blue helmets or setting up a UN transitional administration. A month after the attacks, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, stated that the UN "was 'not seeking' any role in peacekeeping, nation-building or a transitional government in the country."¹ A month later, outlining plans for Afghanistan's political transition, Brahimi emphasized that a UN security force was not recommended.²

The UN has performed admirably in dealing with the Afghan crisis. But following in the wake of a yearlong dialogue on UN peace operations sparked by the report of a special UN panel chaired by Brahimi himself, the UN's response, nevertheless, has raised questions. Even given the difficulties of UN peace making, many of which will be discussed below, there was an absence of forward planning capacity to meet the challenges of Afghanistan. Even given the lessons of peace operations spelled out in the Brahimi report, the UN has seemed very ready — perhaps too ready — to say no to UN peace operations and to hand off responsibility for Afghanistan to other actors.³

This report argues that a fundamental part of the problem in developing the UN's ability to respond to crises is conceptual, as well as organizational and financial. There has been ample thinking on peace operations, but little agreement on what the different types of operations are, what they can be expected to accomplish, how well they have done so far, and what value, if any, the UN adds.

Deviating slightly from standard terminology, this report distinguishes four types of operations, each built upon implicit arguments about the causes of war and the relative signifi-

cance of specific causes in triggering and/or sustaining conflict: (1) traditional peacekeeping, (2) peace enforcement, (3) multidimensional operations, and (4) transitional administration.⁴ It identifies the UN's broad options in Afghanistan — precisely the four types of operations specified — and presents a clear alternative to the confusing array of conceptual nomenclature that scholars and practitioners currently use. It further addresses a key weakness in the literature on peace operations, which although rich and extensive, is too seldom cumulative and generally more descriptive than analytical. Presenting lessons learned within the context of this framework, the report argues that, if these insights are taken into account, the UN has a unique and potentially even more decisive role to play in dealing with contemporary conflicts.

Peace operations have been a central component of the work of the United Nations since its founding in 1945 "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."⁵ The bare-bones principles of today's peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are described in Articles VI and VII of the UN Charter and elaborated through precedent in missions over the last fifty years.

More recently, in response to intrastate conflicts since the Cold War, practitioners have tacked on new programs and practices to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Nevertheless, the UN's record of success in actually facilitating peace and post-conflict reconstruction has been spotty. In part, failures and successes are a function of the nature of the conflicts themselves. Do parties to particular conflicts really want peace? How compatible are their goals? How much will they trust each other (laying down their arms and committing to cease-fires, for example), even with a neutral arbiter in place? In short, how responsive are the world's conflicts to intervention — even well designed and well-implemented intervention?

In addition, the UN's record clearly reflects UN action and inaction. A number of problems during the Cold War can be ascribed to the lack of cooperation on security issues among the nations of the P-5 and the Security Council, a situation of deadlock not anticipated when the UN was established. Particularly since 1989, however, the organization's failure effectively to address genocide, conflict, and humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere can be understood on two related levels. On the one hand, the UN faces problems of "political will" — and financial commitment — from member states, particularly the U.S. How can peace operations be well-planned when planners do not know what resources will be at their disposal, or have to spend their time negotiating for them? What can the UN do to strengthen member support for its peace operations? On the other, in face of unprecedented social changes, the UN faces operational weaknesses in designing and implementing appropriate policy responses to contemporary crises. The proliferation of intrastate conflict, in particular, has posed a central dilemma for an organization founded on the norms of sovereignty and non-interference.

In the last few years, responding in part to criticisms by outside actors, the UN has produced a handful of highly self-critical and well-regarded operational evaluations. In particular, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the so-called "Brahimi report," after the panel's chair, Under Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi), received widespread attention. Other analysts and scholars have also contributed to the vast literature on UN peace operations.

This World Peace Foundation report begins with a historical overview of UN peace operations and then describes the recommendations of the Brahimi report. Next, it defines four types of peace operations within a causal framework and discusses four components of peace operations identified in the literature as

keys to success: the decision to intervene, mandates, impartiality and local legitimacy, and force composition and command. It also discusses financing options.

Discussions of "lessons learned" in UN peace operations often fall victim to three weaknesses. First, they tend to be so simple, vague, and so uncontroversial as to be useless. For example, the UN's Lessons Learned Unit's paper, "Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience," (2000) finds that a "mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable and provide for necessary means for implementation."⁶ Should a mandate ever be unclear, unrealistic, and impracticable? Second, they are not grounded in causal explanations. Drawing on best practices and, especially, on the mistakes of previous missions, they tell planners what to do and not to do, but do not untangle why and under what circumstances specific strategies should work. Conflicts vary significantly, and such one-size-fits-all lessons are easily misapplied. Third, lessons learned often rely on poor research methods. Work tends to be based on a few recent cases; it is unclear why cases are selected for study and how their unique characteristics might have affected outcomes. There are few cross-national statistical analyses or comparative case studies. In taking stock of other studies, this report attempts to avoid the first two weaknesses, while elaborating findings that might be useful in designing future missions and that could be refined with further focused study by UN experts and others.

The World Peace Foundation and the International Crisis Group convened a conference at the United Nations in November 2001 to discuss UN peace operations and peace building, focusing on options for Afghanistan and continuing a World Peace Foundation meeting in May 2001 at Harvard University specifically on peace operations after the Brahimi report. A postscript to this document summarizes the conclusions reached in November at the second meeting.

The Evolution of Peace Operations

In the late 1940s the UN established two observer missions (UNTSO in Palestine in 1948 and UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan in 1949), but it was not until the Suez Crisis that the UN undertook its first force-level peacekeeping operation in 1956.⁷ The basic principles elaborated by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson for UNEF I have guided all subsequent peacekeeping missions:

- consent of the parties;
- use of force only in self-defense;
- voluntary troop contributions by small, neutral countries;
- impartiality and non-intervention; and
- day-to-day control of operations by the Secretary-General.⁸

The success of this mission in allowing French and British forces to withdraw without disgrace from Egypt and in fulfilling its mandate set high expectations for future operations. (Table 1 at the end of this report provides a chronological list of UN missions and basic facts.)

Throughout the next ten years — an “assertive period” in peacekeeping — the UN began seven peace missions, punctuated by the profound disillusionment over the response to the Congo crisis during the early 1960s.⁹ To start, there was disagreement over the authorizing of ONUC and the setup of the operation. Further, the Soviet Union and others refused to pay their regular assessments, and under Article 19, the U.S. submitted a motion (later withdrawn) to the General Assembly disallowing the Soviet Union’s vote. That motion threatened the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the future of the UN as an international organization.

In 1967, at Egypt’s request and without a vote in the General Assembly, the UN withdrew UNEF I from Egypt. The action signaled a new “dormant” period in peacekeeping that lasted until UNEF II was sent to the Sinai in 1973.¹⁰ Following UNDOF in the Golan Heights in 1974 and UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1978, however, no new operations were established until UNIIMOG was sent to the Iran-Iraq border in 1988 to verify compliance with the cease-fire. A year later, UNAVEM in Angola observed compliance with an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops. A few months later, UNTAG, mandated with a wider range of tasks, facilitated the decolonization process in Namibia.

The year 1989 marked a shift from “traditional” peacekeeping — missions deployed to guarantee negotiated settlements between sovereign states — to “second-generation” peacekeeping. Second-generation missions often were deployed in the absence of negotiated settlements and required enforcement capabilities, and challenged some of the basic principles and practices of pre-1989 peacekeeping. The UN deployed thirteen missions between 1989 and 1994 and a concept of “gradually escalating use of force” developed. At the one end of the scale were “level one” observer missions and peacekeeping forces, at the other were “level three” high-intensity operations and sanctions. Most operations during this period were in the middle at “level two” — tasks of preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution measures, assistance to interim civil authorities, protection of humanitarian relief operations, and guarantees and denials of movement.¹¹

In 1992, as Chopra notes, “member states conducted perhaps the greatest experiments in international organization since the drafting and signing of the UN Charter,” simultaneously launching the UN’s largest and most complex operations in Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.¹² The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

(UNTAC) was mandated to carry out internal conflict resolution measures (cantonment, disarmament, and repatriation) and assistance to interim civil authorities (repatriation of refugees, supervision of elections, and transition to democracy). Established in 1992 and completed in November 1993, UNTAC succeeded in fulfilling its mandate despite some attacks on UN troops.¹³ The United Nations Protection Forces I and II (UNPROFOR I and II) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were mandated to prevent a resumption of fighting, facilitate settlement, and protect humanitarian relief operations. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was mandated to protect humanitarian relief operations and to monitor a cease-fire. After problems in fulfilling its mandate, it was joined by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under Chapter VII. Although the operation had some success in fulfilling its humanitarian mission, it became an enforcement mission without the necessary resources. It has been widely criticized for failing to remain impartial. UNOSOM II withdrew in March 1995.

In 1993, the UN established four more missions, in Rwanda, Liberia, Georgia, and Haiti, but any successes were overshadowed by the UN's monstrously insufficient response to the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994. Following the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords in September 1993, the UN established a peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) in the region to facilitate the transition to a coalition government. UN officers warned officials in 1993 and 1994 of preparations for the impending violence, but the UN did not respond effectively.¹⁴ Even once the genocide was underway, the UN failed to deploy sufficient peacekeeping forces — in fact, it withdrew troops. The UN also refused to conduct the relatively simple and inexpensive jamming of radio broadcasts.¹⁵

The UN's failure was due in large part to U.S. policy and reluctance to engage in an-

other "Somalia." Drawing on extensive investigation and interviews with Administration officials, Power concludes that:

[T]he United States did much more than fail to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent authorization of UN enforcements. It refused to use its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a crucial instrument in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term 'genocide,' for fear of being obliged to act.¹⁶

The lack of U.S. "political will" for UN peacekeeping, a key factor in the failure in Rwanda, has plagued UN operations since the early 1990s. In May 1994, a month into the Rwandan genocide, the Clinton Administration publicly released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, a new framework for U.S. peace operations policy. PDD 25 was "designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security." Opponents from both sides have criticized the document for encouraging "too much" and "too little" U.S. involvement in UN peace operations.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the potential demands on peacekeepers are multiplying and deepening. Since 1989, the UN has faced both an increasing number of conflicts and new types of conflicts that call for more costly and intensive involvements. Since 1994, the UN has launched twenty-one peace operations — in the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya, Tajikistan, Angola (twice), Croatia (thrice), Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, Haiti (thrice), Guatemala, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone (twice), Kosovo, East Timor, the Democratic Republic

of the Congo, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. In comparison, just thirty-four peace operations were begun before 1994.

Further, today's conflicts are more often intrastate than interstate. Because of humanitarian concerns, the UN often is called in before cease-fires are achieved. The parties' interests in peace and in UN intervention may be unclear. Parties further may be fragmented, with little ability to commit to cease-fires. War may not be the continuation of politics by other means, but rather a long-term strategy on the part of local belligerents — with strong ties to transnational networks — to extract profits in diamonds, drugs, or other commodities. After years or decades of civil war, economies, political institutions, and social organizations are in disarray. Exclusionary national ideologies or ethnic antagonisms that are difficult to diffuse frequently play a role. Legitimate domestic political authority that is accepted by all sides may not exist.

Following Brown, the causes of internal conflict fall into four broad categories:¹⁸

1. Structural — e.g., weak states, intrastate security concerns, ethnic geography.
2. Political — e.g., discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup politics, elite politics.
3. Economic/Social — e.g., economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, modernization.
4. Cultural/Perceptual — e.g., patterns of group discrimination, problematic group histories.

Factors from each of these categories figure in most of today's conflicts, although it may be that one or a few are more significant.

HOW WELL HAS THE UN DONE SO FAR?

Any survey of UN peace operations raises questions about their efficacy in supporting peace. Yet, work on peace operations by the UN tends to assume that peace operations have a positive effect overall and thus that resources should be devoted to improving them. Many of those who favor working outside of UN channels or not intervening abroad at all question this assumption. A look at the data supports these doubts: for example, using a data set of all interstate cease-fires ending between 1946 and 1992, Fortna — who also conducts more complex regression analyses with different results — shows that a simple comparison of means suggests that peacekeeping had *negative* effects on war termination. In other words, war resumed in 18 out of 54 cases with peacekeepers versus in 2 out of 13 cases without peacekeepers.¹⁹ One possible explanation for this finding is that the UN has intervened unwisely in intractable conflicts. Another is that UN missions were ineffectively designed or implemented. Reasonable doubts about the efficacy of UN peacekeeping certainly go only a small way in explaining lack of member support for UN operations and other problems of political will, but it is nevertheless surprising that official UN sources have paid so little attention to addressing them.

The most recent analyses of the cross-national data support the UN's assumption that peace operations are effective in war termination, but suggest that the possibility of relying on other organizations should be studied carefully. In terms of interstate war, Fortna's analysis, for example, shows that although war was more likely to resume in peacekept conflicts, there was a strong selection effect in whether peacekeeping occurred. The cases in which peacekeepers were deployed were less amenable to resolution; in particular, peacekeepers were less likely to be

deployed in conflicts in which there was a decisive military victory, a factor linked with successful war termination. In terms of intrastate war, recent cross-national statistical work by Doyle and Sambanis found multilateral, UN peace operations to be positively correlated with post-conflict democratization.²⁰ However, in examining the UN's experience with peace operations in fourteen of the twenty-five major conflicts that occurred in Africa between the end-of the Cold War and 1998, Goulding found that the UN was less successful than other organizations. Of the twenty-five major conflicts for which the international community has tried to mediate peace settlements, the UN led thirteen, only two of which were successes. Other international actors led twelve, of which six were successes. He shows that the UN has had a similarly unimpressive peacemaking record in other regions as compared to other international actors.²¹

It may be that the UN has not been less effective in peacemaking than other international actors after all, but that it has responded more often to intractable conflicts. This point could be clarified through further cross-national work that compares the types of conflicts responded to by the UN and other organizations, particularly with regard to variables like whether there was a decisive military victory.²² In addition, as discussed below, UN operations may improve if the UN relinquishes control of military operations to regional or other agents, such as to NATO (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina), ECOMOG (as in Liberia), or the US (as in Somalia).

The Brahimi Report

The Brahimi report has been described by some as “the most important document on peacekeeping ever written,” and by the panel itself and others as “the minimum threshold of change.”²³ Even those who highlight weaknesses in the report acknowledge that it is the first comprehensive attempt to address the operational and technical weaknesses of UN peacekeeping. The report was commissioned in 2000 by Secretary-General Kofi Annan following on the heels of three “remarkably frank” and self-critical UN reports on its role in events in Srebrenica (Bosnia), Rwanda, and Angola.²⁴ Chaired by Brahimi, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Support of the Secretary-General's Preventive and Peacemaking Efforts and a former Algerian foreign minister and UN special representative, the high-level panel included ten members with diverse peace operations experience.²⁵ Drawing on its collective experience, as well as interviews with more than 200 individuals, the panel completed its report in late August 2000. The permanent members of the Security Council endorsed the report at the Millennium Summit in September.

At the heart of the report is a recognition of the need for substantial change, which, it notes, “has been rendered more urgent by recent events in Sierra Leone and by the daunting prospect of expanded United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”²⁶ It further points out, as discussed above, that intrastate conflict since the Cold War has necessitated a shift in the type of UN deployments. Although the report acknowledges problems of political will among member states, it focuses more on “operational and organizational areas of need.”²⁷ Thus, some observers have criticized the report for not “address[ing] the most serious problem facing contemporary peacekeeping missions: lack of international politi-

cal will.”²⁸ This criticism and others outlined below may go beyond the scope of the Brahimi panel and report, but are issues that should be addressed in the continuing dialogue on UN peace operations sparked by the report. The report’s underlying “holistic approach” to conflict is central to its recommendations. It assumes clear linkages between poverty and violence, and development and conflict management. This approach represents a departure from traditional peacekeeping doctrine and reflects the UN’s experience with multidimensional operations, but fails to go far enough in identifying targeted policies and interventions or recommending further research to do so. Although there is clearly a relationship among poverty, institutional weakness, and violence, the causal links are unspecified. Not all poor states are at war and not all war-torn states are poor. Development programs, for example, should be implemented for other reasons, but purporting to address conflict by addressing poverty simply replaces one enormous problem with another. To its credit, the report does identify a few factors that increase the chances of war, like spillovers of violence from conflicts across the border and refugee flows, and presents recommendations to address them.

In addition, despite its many strengths, the report is a political document and fails to take a clear stand on the slippery and sensitive issue of impartiality and use of force. On the one hand, it reiterates a commitment to many of the core principles of peacekeeping — the consent of local forces, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense. On the other, it stresses the need to deter would-be local “spoilers” and the need for stronger and better-equipped forces capable of “defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate.”²⁹ It notes that impartiality “is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of ap-

peasement,” but it does not give any real insight into the tricky issue of how missions can deter spoilers and defend themselves while remaining impartial.³⁰ Similarly, the report fails to take a decisive stand on UN transitional civil administration. Its one recommendation with regard to transitional civil administration is for further research on interim criminal codes.

In terms of preventive action, the report’s bottom line is that conflict prevention and developmental organizations should act in a more integrated fashion and that the UN should make more frequent use of fact-finding missions. In general, the report relies heavily on strategies to improve organizational integration or streamline procedures, often without addressing more fundamental problems. In terms of peace-building, for example, the panel recommends strengthening the UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) as a forum for the formulation of peace strategies. Other significant recommendations with regard to peace-building strategy include budgeting for first-year “quick impact” projects; bringing demobilization and reintegration into the assessed budgets of peace operations in the first phase; and expanding the role of civilian police to include reforming, training, and restructuring local police forces rather than simply documenting and deterring unacceptable behavior.

The Brahimi report essentially contains fifty-seven recommendations, a number of which propose further reviews and reports by UN departments rather than specific changes. The recommendations were organized into twenty areas, as summarized in appendix I.³¹

How Do Peace Operations Support Peace? Four Types of Operations

A variety of structural circumstances and specific events may cause wars. Scholars of interstate conflict find these diverse causes in, among other factors, the absence of legitimate international authority; equal *and* unequal distributions of power; shifts in relative power; cycles of hegemony and decline; demands for resources; lack of democracy; the desire for domestic cohesion; leadership; organizational politics; the rigidity of military doctrines; hyper-nationalism; the security dilemma; the offense-defense balance; and misperceptions.³² Scholars of intrastate war find causes in everything from weak states, zero-sum politics, intrastate security concerns, and modernization to ethnic geography and exclusionary national ideologies.³³ Many of these factors are not amenable to quick change or manipulation. For example, it may take decades to reform national ideologies bent on war, and truly visionary and charismatic leaders come to power only occasionally. UN personnel generally are stationed in the field for relatively short periods of time. They are out-numbered and out-gunned. They have limited resources. Why should we expect them to be able to end wars?

Peace operations have evolved in an ad hoc manner, but they nevertheless are built upon implicit arguments about the causes of war and the relative significance of specific manipulable causes in triggering and/or sustaining conflict. Traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and multidimensional operations often are discussed together, but imply different causal hypotheses. To these three standard types of peace operations, we also can add a fourth, “transitional administration,” exemplified by UN operations in East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, and Cambodia.³⁴

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Traditional peacekeeping facilitates cooperation between parties that have already demonstrated their commitment to peace by signing a cease-fire agreement. At the request of the parties to the conflict, peacekeepers serve as neutral arbiters and observers. Their use of force is limited to self-defense (and sometimes not to that). Traditional peacekeeping is designed to create peace by preventing and mediating disputes and providing information about the intentions of both sides — thus assuaging fears.

As Fortna describes, the literature identifies two functions for peacekeepers: observation of cease-fires and interposition between belligerents.³⁵ Cease-fires work, Fortna argues, when (1) the gains to peace outweigh the gains to attack; (2) violations are easily detected; and (3) accidents and violations with the potential to spiral into war are avoided.³⁶ Thus, peacekeepers keep peace by increasing the costs of attack (especially in terms of costs related to international opinion); serving as neutral referees who provide credible information on compliance to the parties to the conflict and to the international community; and controlling accidental violations at the local and state-to-state level. In Fortna’s analysis, the second two mechanisms are more important than the first.

Therefore, traditional peacekeeping should be useful in dealing with wars caused by fear and lack of information, security dilemmas, and spirals of conflict. As Jervis and others argue, states may go to war even if both sides want to maintain the status quo because they cannot distinguish between the means a state is using to defend itself and the means it is using to prepare for attack.³⁷ Such security dilemmas are particularly acute when offensive and defensive weapons are indistinguishable — as the small arms used in intrastate conflicts often are — and when the offense has a significant advantage over the

defense either because offensive action is more effective or because it is cheaper. Accidents and misperceptions spiral into larger conflicts.

Some element of the security dilemma and conflict spirals often seems to play a role in explaining the continuation of conflicts once begun. It is a truism that violence begets violence. Thus, although an initial aggressor may have already achieved its original objective — or since given up that objective — the sides may be unable to secure peace even if they both now want to and are tired of war after years or even decades of fighting. Even once a cease-fire has been achieved (perhaps with outside intervention), the parties to the conflict may be unable to deescalate tensions and to trust each other. Each still threatens the other and commitments are not credible.

Along similar lines, insecurity and lack of information may explain the genesis of a significant number of conflicts, including many that seem to stem from other causes. Although many scholars disagree, Posen, for example, has used the security dilemma to explain ethnic conflict between Serbs and Croats following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.³⁸ Comparing the Serb-Croat case with the case of Ukrainians and Russians, Posen argues that the former were much more fearful of each other and more conflict-prone because of the way in which a number of geographical, technological, and historical factors affected the balance between offensive and defensive advantage and the perceived offensive threat. In the former Yugoslavia, strong group cohesion was perceived as an offensive threat because of the violent history of Serb-Croat relations and because the geographical intermixing of groups meant that they would act offensively to create ethnic homelands and give small numbers of fanatical leaders greater offensive opportunities to initiate conflict. By contrast, in Ukraine, group identity and solidarity were not perceived as offensive threats because of a differ-

ent history of relations; the devastating possibility of either side using nuclear technology was a powerful deterrent; and settlement patterns were not supportive of offensive action.

If Posen is right, it is possible that some preventive UN deployment — at least to inform each side of the other's peaceful intentions — could have allayed fears and decreased violence in the Balkans. However, as some critics have pointed out, it is difficult to picture the Serbs in this case as basically well-intentioned status quo actors. If the critics are right, traditional peacekeeping at the start probably would have been ineffective. Peacekeeping is ill-equipped to deal with most causes of war, particularly the aggressive, predatory, or expansionist objectives of one or more belligerents. Lightly armed traditional peacekeepers can do little about intentional violations of cease-fires.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Because of humanitarian or other concerns, the UN after 1989 has been compelled to intervene — as it did in Somalia — well before cease-fires are achieved. In such cases, the UN's goal is to bring about a peace, rather than to uphold or observe peace. Lacking a cease-fire, the intentions of the parties to the conflict with respect to peace are unclear. Peace enforcement usually occurs in intra-state conflicts when belligerents are hard to cajole or coerce. Although peace enforcement missions sometimes have peacekeeping-type tasks, peace enforcement missions are distinguished by having more firepower and broader mandates. Thus, peace enforcers, unlike peacekeepers, should be able directly to increase the short-run costs of attack and discourage belligerents from reneging on settlements. Once the gains of peace outweigh the gains of attack, a cease-fire may be accomplished and peacekept along traditional lines.

As a result, peace enforcement missions, in comparison to peacekeeping missions, theoretically can deal with wars caused by the aggressive intentions of one or more belligerents. Clearly the task may be more or less arduous and costly depending on the goals, strength, and organization of revisionist groups. The difficulty of peace enforcement also depends on the particular characteristics of the location of the war itself — for example, a harsh mountainous terrain or dense jungles may favor domestic guerrilla fighters. Operations in Somalia and Bosnia have illustrated the difficulties of intervention before a cease fire is achieved. In particular, they have taught the UN to consider more carefully the decision to intervene. These issues are elaborated below.

“MULTIDIMENSIONAL” OPERATIONS

The term “multidimensional peacekeeping” often is used to describe missions that “include sizable military, police, refugee, humanitarian, electoral, and often human rights components.”³⁹ It thus can refer either to peacekeeping *or* peace enforcement missions. For the purposes of clarity, this report treats the “multidimensional” components of so-called “multidimensional peacekeeping” as distinct; it defines “multidimensional operations” as those involving police, refugee, humanitarian, electoral, and human rights components beyond those included in traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. It further distinguishes multidimensional operations from the more extensive “transitional administration” described in the next section.

Multidimensional operations work, in part, by providing a neutral arbiter and information to facilitate cooperation on cease-fires and toward post-conflict reconstruction. For example, in discussing how post-conflict elections can facilitate civil war termination, Lyons notes the role of outside actors in constructing effective interim institutions

that “encouraged transparency, confidence building, and a sense of security” in El Salvador and Mozambique.⁴⁰ In contrast to traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, however, multidimensional operations, in particular, create peace (1) by alleviating some of the underlying structural tensions that caused the conflict and (2) by changing the incentives of the parties to the conflict so that the gains to peace and demobilization outweigh the gains to war. Poverty alleviation and economic development programs, for example, might alleviate structural tensions, increasing the overall size of the pie — so that, hopefully, sides will fight less over their shares. Demobilization programs give former soldiers financial and other incentives to disarm and may help to integrate them into an economy so that they have more of a stake in a stable political-economic environment. Political and rule of law reforms improve the institutional channels through which citizens can participate in a governing system and promote change without violence.

As the Brahimi report suggests, there is certainly a great deal of wisdom to this broad approach. However, as noted earlier, the key weakness is that the relationships between poverty, institutional weakness, rule of law, etc., and violent conflict are unspecified. Thus, multidimensional operations are not well “targeted” to groups or individuals likely to instigate conflict. Targeting is especially important when resources are scarce. Further, there tends to be little thought to priorities, sequencing, or timing, which omission is dangerous because all good things may not go together. Economic development and institutional change, even when it occurs, is often a slow process, and in some cases — for example, if macroeconomic stabilization is part of the program — hardships at the outset may be pronounced. Some reforms may be so arduous in the short run that they trigger widespread discontent. In order to improve multidimensional operations, programs

should be targeted based on transparent arguments about specifically what will work to promote peace and why. That is, what additional incentives to peace does each program give to belligerents? What additional leverage does it give UN missions? Further, in designing programs, long-run potential benefits need to be balanced with short run costs. On this last point, the Brahimi report's recommendation that funding be allocated for quick impact projects is particularly valuable.

TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Exemplified by missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, and Cambodia, "transitional administration" — sometimes called peace building and reconstruction — is a multidimensional operation, but it is unique in the degree to which the UN is involved in building domestic structures. In Rotberg's words, "peace building" is a "new post-colonial model of temporary tutelage or trusteeship."⁴¹ In addition to the degree and length of involvement of UN personnel, transitional administrations are built on a new assertion of authority within the domestic sphere. In traditional peacekeeping missions, the parties to the conflict, having signed a cease-fire, call in the UN to observe the peace. On each side of the border, each state retains sovereign authority over its territory and the UN respects its right to non-intervention. In intrastate wars, the UN has launched enforcement missions with or without the agreement of the parties to the conflict and sometimes played a less "explicit" role as interim authority. Writing of UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia, for example, Clarke notes that:

The nonexistence of the state or situations in which the normal functioning of the state is impaired through civil war or other human-created disaster change the relationship between the intervening force and the community it is empowered to assist. There

*being no legally sanctioned authorities or state structures to provide legitimate consent, the actions of the international force are governed exclusively by the United Nations, normally authorized by a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.*⁴²

Transitional administration missions go a step further in recognizing that within the state there may not be legitimate political authority to give that consent and explicitly building the role of interim authority into their mandates.

Civil wars may stem from a variety of causes, including security dilemmas and conflicts over resources, but, in many cases, lack of authority makes it possible for these causes to create conflict. In essence, one might think of East Timor in 1999 as a "stateless" society, one in which the so-called "state" did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Lacking a state, actors (militias, social movements, etc.) within the territory were somewhat akin to states in the international system. States within the international system act within a state of anarchy. Waltz and other scholars of international relations contend that this structural condition causes war: "Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness."⁴³

The UN's role in transitional administration thus is to act as a transitional authority and to assist in the construction of a new legitimate domestic authority. As a representative of the political authority of the international community, the UN has a unique, potentially neutral identity to assert. Great powers, regional hegemonies, and regional organizations more often may have, or be perceived to have, specific interests in the operation. ECOWAS's intervention in Sierra

Leone is a case in point. ECOWAS was first on the scene, its soldiers perhaps best informed and prepared to deal with the conflict, and it was motivated by possible spillover affects within the region, but the Nigerian-led force was widely accused of pursuing its own economic interests. By comparison, the UN, as a representative body of all states in the international community, potentially can act as truly neutral authority. As Chopra points out, transitional administration (or, in his terms, “peace maintenance”) is the opposite of colonialism, a unilateral enterprise. Transitional administration is conducted by a collectively accountable body acting as a joint interim authority to direct resources *into* the “administered” nation or territory.⁴⁴

In reality, UN-led transitional administrations, like other historic forms of trusteeship or tutelage, may not always work for the people of the intervened-in state. UN missions may be driven by the concerns of the members of the Security Council, by troop-contributing countries, or by personnel in the field. These interests may have huge effects on the operation of a transitional administration and may be at odds with the interests of the people of the intervened-in state. Thus, not only because of its high costs, UN transitional administration should be considered carefully and as a last resort. Further, citizens of some countries may be especially apt to view UN transitional administration negatively because of historical precedents or other factors. Transitional administration may be ill-advised in those countries, whatever the causes of the conflict.

Five Elements of Successful Peace Operations

In more specific terms, successful peace operations — whether peacekeeping, peace enforcement, multidimensional, or transitional administration — need to get at least five related elements right: (1) the decision to intervene; (2) mandates; (3) impartiality and local legitimacy; (4) command and force composition; and (5) financing.

TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE?

Although wars stem from a variety of causes, it is reasonable to assume that all are at least somewhat due to insecurity and lack of information, the aggressive intentions of at least one side, economic and institutional factors, or lack of effective authority. Thus, some type of UN peace operation hypothetically should be able to contribute to peace and support humanitarian action in most conflicts. The more complicated issue is assessing what type of UN intervention can facilitate the creation of peace, what resources are necessary, and whether, given the available resources, a UN intervention will be effective. This assessment should involve detailed analysis by country experts about the causes of a conflict, the potential response to UN intervention (for example, as opposed to intervention by another organization), potential responsiveness to different strategies (diplomatic, military, economic, and political), and the military and political strengths and vulnerabilities of the parties to a conflict. As suggested by the Brahimi report, it also should involve a realistic, prior assessment of the resources available to a proposed mission.

A number of observers have criticized the UN for planning based on best case scenarios; clearly, in these analyses worst case scenarios should be taken into account. If the local population distrusts the UN or is strongly opposed to outside intervention, UN peace operations may be ill-advised. If belligerents

enjoy significant local support, are well-funded and well-armed, and the physical environment is conducive to guerrilla action, the risks and costs of peace enforcement may be tremendous, financially and in terms of loss of life. Realistically, the political will for such operations may be insufficient.

Intervention does not necessarily need to be designed to create or enforce peace *throughout* a country. In some cases, more limited (and perhaps cheaper) interventions may be both feasible and highly effective in alleviating suffering. The UN may consider sheltering civilians from violence in certain areas inside a country or, as it often does, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees outside that country. Such operations have had mixed success. Even though limited interventions may be cheaper, they do require some commitment in order to be effective, a point highlighted by the UN's experience in six Bosnian-held enclaves. In 1993, the Security Council designated "safe areas" in these enclaves, but did not deploy enough troops to protect them.

To complicate further the issue of whether to intervene, costs change over the life of a conflict. At the earliest stages, before fighting has broken out and the sides become entrenched, parties may be amenable to diplomatic intervention or international assistance. Thus, intervention is more likely to be relatively low cost and low risk. In order to capture the advantages of operating at this first stage, the UN needs improved early warning and response mechanisms. More frequent use of fact-finding missions, as recommended by the Brahimi report, is only part of a solution. Even in countries that have had a UN presence, UN personnel have failed to notice or act upon signs of conflict. In East Timor, for example, the outbreak of hostilities in 1999 caught planners unaware, and a new operation, UNTAET, had quickly to be designed. In Rwanda, as pointed out earlier, UNAMIR personnel in the field warned UN

headquarters of the impending genocide, but the Security Council failed to act.

Although operating in the early stages of conflict may be preferable, it is not always possible. A variety of difficult to forecast events might trigger hostilities, and even "rapid" deployment might be too slow.⁴⁵ Further, if motivated by aggressive, predatory objectives, parties even in the earliest stages of conflict may not be amenable to negotiations — particularly if they think that they will win the fight.

Once violence has broken out, parties will be less likely to respond to lower cost, lower risk interventions. One option is to wait until a stalemate is achieved, when lower cost peacekeeping may again be effective. In the meantime, the parties may have committed egregious abuses. Another reason not to wait is that fighting without a stalemate may continue for an indefinite amount of time if outside support, internal resources (such as Sierra Leone's diamond fields), or other factors make it possible. Thus, the UN's "optimal" policy response may change over time for the same conflict, and constant monitoring and assessment is essential.

MANDATES AND MISSION AUTHORIZATION

The essential basis of any mission is its mandate. Mandates are based on the authority of the Security Council and, as Pirnie and Simons note, define "what is expected from the parties and what the peace force is expected to accomplish."⁴⁶ Operationally, good mandates are "to do" lists, not wish lists; they explicitly and realistically define what will be done and in what time frame, clarifying the rules of engagement. They are based on a clear understanding of a conflict and provide a practical basis upon which the international community and the people of the intervened-in state can assess a mission's progress, success, and failure.

Missions that are most successful — such as UNTAG in Namibia — take mandates as such. As Howard describes, each of the four components of the UNTAG mission took its mandate as an operational starting point, rather than an idealistic goal. Mandates that are most successful are based on detailed knowledge and analysis of a conflict, the strength and incentives of the parties, UN resources (military and civilian personnel and financing) available for the operation, and the speed with which results can reasonably be expected. Although UNTAC in Cambodia is generally considered a success overall, some early weaknesses stemmed from an inadequately designed mandate. Howard argues that the mandate was not appropriate to the context of the Cambodian civil war, for example, addressing all five parties as equals when four were on unequal footing and the State of Cambodia retained administrative control of most of the country.⁴⁷

A mandate must be continuously reviewed and readjusted to respond to the changing characteristics of a conflict. UNAMIR in Rwanda is a classic example of mandate failure. When General Romeo Dallaire warned UN headquarters of the impending genocide on January 11, 1994, and requested permission to conduct raids to capture the arms that would be used in the massacres, he was told that “it wasn’t in [his] mandate.”⁴⁸ UNAMIR was originally deployed to police a political settlement, but when the situation on the ground changed dramatically, UN personnel were bound by UNAMIR’s mandate and unable to pursue the new objective of securing the lives of Rwandans.⁴⁹

Rwanda underscores the importance of the Brahimi report’s recommendation that the Secretariat must tell the Security Council “what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear,” although the report does not recommend any specific measures to insure that this will happen.⁵⁰ Rwanda also highlights the

importance of improving communications between headquarters and the field that are emphasized in other studies. With regard to mission authorization, the Brahimi report’s recommendation that the Security Council should not authorize missions until the Secretary-General has secured commitments of troops and mission support from member states clearly responds to a problem experienced by missions in the past, but does not address the root of the problem and may create new difficulties. If authorization is held up until commitments are secured, the already slow UN response to crises will be even slower. Eventually, some system of mandatory commitments will need to be implemented so that states have less leeway in shirking or postponing their contributions and thus endangering the efficacy of missions.

IMPARTIALITY AND LOCAL LEGITIMACY

Local legitimacy is closely related to the challenge of maintaining impartiality while enforcing or building peace. The Somali case illustrates this lesson well. UNISOM II lost legitimacy and the illusion of impartiality when it hunted down Mohamed Farah Aideed. Yet, how should the UN have responded to Aideed’s ambush of Pakistani soldiers in June 1993?⁵¹ If the mission’s mandate is to enforce peace, the mission may need to focus more on some aggressive parties than on other non-aggressive parties. Further, failing to respond to direct attacks — as the UN did in Bosnia — might place other personnel stationed in the country and around the world in jeopardy.⁵²

Local legitimacy also is tied closely to the related issue of mandates. A mandate is needed to provide the mission with legitimacy “as an activity properly undertaken on behalf on the international community *and the people of the intervened-in state.*”⁵³ As Clapham argues, “the welfare of the peoples of the intervened-in state, and of the immediate

region whose own security is affected by conflict — the peacekept, in other words — provides the ultimate justification for any intervention. That the intervention should secure the backing of these people is central to the moral, as well as the political, mandate of the operation.”⁵⁴

Securing and interpreting local legitimacy are central dilemmas of peace enforcement missions and transitional administrations in weak and failed states. Peace enforcement missions in most cases cannot rely on decisions by representative institutions, and transitional administration is needed precisely because the state lacks the authority and legitimacy to lend local backing. Different mandates have addressed these problems in slightly different ways. In 1992 and 1993, Cambodia was the first of a new brand of peace building missions. The Paris Agreements gave the UN “extraordinary power” during the transitional period, in particular granting two new civilian duties: controlling and supervising the civil administration (the “Civil Administration Component” of UNTAC) and organizing and monitoring elections as a first step to liberal democracy (the “Electoral Component”).⁵⁵ In Cambodia, like Eastern Slavonia in 1996–1998 and Kosovo since 1999, the state (Cambodia, Croatia, and Serbia) was the recognized sovereign.⁵⁶ In East Timor, however, sovereignty “passed to the UN independently of any competing authority.”⁵⁷ As Ishizuka describes, UNTAET was “the first operation in which the UN totally took over all of the departments of the Government of East Timor: finance, justice, infrastructure, economic and social affairs.”⁵⁸ As in Cambodia, UNTAET’s mandate was “extremely wide,” but as Cotton says, “unlike UNTAC ... the legitimacy for the operation stemmed not from the consent of the East Timorese people but from the provisions of the UN Charter.”⁵⁹

UN experience with peace operations offers no hard and fast rules with regard to local

legitimacy and impartiality. As Clarke and Herbst note with respect to Somalia: “the precept of neutrality and noninterference — developed for peacekeeping operations where the UN usually arrived after the fighting was over and where no one had any real incentive to target the ‘blue helmets’ — was of little use.”⁶⁰

UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAG in Namibia, and UNTAET in East Timor offer three insights. First, by serving as the civil administration and monitoring elections, UNTAC “helped to create new actors on the Cambodian political scene.”⁶¹ Although some sectors questioned UNTAC’s neutrality with respect to different political parties, it nevertheless was designed to support an impartial mechanism through which all Cambodians could choose their leaders.⁶² In Somalia, by contrast, the UN missions were not designed to effect a transition. The hunt for Aideed thus realistically was perceived as nothing more than the UN taking sides, not as part of a program to transform the power bases of Somali society.⁶³ With a Cambodian- or Timorese-type mandate, Somali groups might have perceived the UN response to Aideed’s attack differently.

Second, UNTAG’s performance in Namibia shows the value of wise leadership, particularly in terms of effective communication with the local population about mission objectives and progress. Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari had ongoing relationships with all parties. Forty-two district and regional offices facilitated interactions with the local population. An informational component gave radio and news programs in local languages.⁶⁴ Along related lines, Howard argues that the main factor in UNTAG’s success was its ability to function as a “learning organization” on the ground. The Brahimi report incorporates some of these issues in its recommendations concerning quick impact projects and public information.

Third, the operations of UNTAET suggest that the effects of different forms of sovereign authority in UN transitional administrations (e.g., the Cambodian versus the East Timorese mandate) should be further explored. In East Timor, the UN exercised sovereign authority and was in the peculiar — and perhaps easily abused — position of not tying its legitimacy to the domestic community. Chopra, who served as the head of UNTAET's Office of District Administration, has been a harsh critic of the East Timor operation. His criticisms that the mission was authoritarian, worked against decentralization, and failed to work with Timorese partners, much less prepare them for leadership and self-administration, strike at the problem of local legitimacy and may be related to the way in which sovereign authority was held.⁶⁵

FORCE COMPOSITION AND CONTROL

In order to achieve its mandate, the military force of an operation needs to be appropriately configured and equipped. Force size, composition, and control are particularly important in peace enforcement operations where a force faces combat. The difficulty of launching operations with diverse peace operations contingents is driven home by the example of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. Troops were lightly armed and, as in many UN peace enforcement operations, had little experience working together. Faced with RUF aggression, troops “gave up weapons, uniforms, and even armed personnel carriers ... without a fight.”⁶⁶ After May 2000, there was a major dispute within UNAMSIL. In October 2000, after the leaking of a document by the Indian UNAMSIL commander charging that the Nigerian army was staying in Sierra Leone to take advantage of benefits from illegal diamond mining, the Indian and Jordanian contingents declared their intentions to withdraw within four months.⁶⁷

The issue of force composition is closely related to the command and control of mili-

tary operations. The UN can maintain control of an entire operation (e.g., ONUC in the Congo) or relinquish control to an agent (e.g., UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina). It can accept control from an agent (e.g., MNF to UNMIH in Haiti) or relinquish control of combat operations to an agent while maintaining control of other operations (e.g., U.S. combat control in UNOSOM II in Somalia; NATO and UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia).⁶⁸ If the UN is to maintain control of operations, there is a clear need for the formation of standing battalions, or at least of joint training and exercises by troops likely to be serving together under UN auspices in the future. The Brahimi report's recommendation that member states enter into partnerships within the context of UNSAS to form rapidly deployable brigade-size forces is a starting point.

Relinquishing control of military operations to an agent has a number of potential advantages. In particular, it allows for more rapid deployment because troops are already organized and, perhaps, already located in the region. For example, five days after the Security Council authorized a multinational force for East Timor (Resolution 1296) on September 15, 1999, the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) began to deploy in East Timor. Nine thousand troops deployed within three weeks (eventually there were 11,500 troops before INTERFET withdrew in February 2000). The Security Council did not even approve UNTAET's mandate until a month after INTERFET began deployment. In addition, control by a single country or other organization may facilitate more effective operations because the troops have experience working together.

It also is possible that these advantages of control by a single agent apply in non-combat operations. Drawing on the lessons of East Timor, Chopra concludes that the “UN's internal bureaucracy is too rigid for dynamic

operational environments, and blocks the necessary psychological and organisational shift from managing missions to leading countries. ... [P]erhaps coalition missions led by single countries may be more effective for temporary government.”⁶⁹

However, relinquishing control of operations has the major drawback that the agent’s interests may differ from those of the UN. Moreover, even if the agent faithfully pursues the UN mandate, its “identity” as a national or regional actor is different from the UN’s multinational identity. Thus, the reaction of local populations to its actions may be different if the mission fails clearly to communicate its mandate.

The fact that developing countries generally are the largest troop contributors to peace operations raises further issues related to force composition. One issue is moral in that citizens of developed countries are increasingly footing the bill and watching the action from afar, while citizens of developing countries put their lives on the line.⁷⁰ Others are more practical, related to the resources and training of troops, equipment, and how reimbursements are given (promptly? bilaterally to countries or multilaterally to organizations? etc.).⁷¹

FINANCING

Since the number of peace operations is increasing, missions are becoming more complex and expensive, and states seem to be less willing to pay up, it is not surprising that peace operations are hampered by insufficient and tardy funds. Yet, peace operations have been an important component of the UN’s work for half a century, and financing mechanisms have long been inadequate. In the current system, UN peace operations are financed through ad hoc mechanisms. Some modest observer missions are paid for out of the regular UN budget. Other larger missions are funded through mission-specific special accounts. Thus, there is no clear mechanism

through which planners can expect to finance an operation and count on contributions. This uncertainty hinders effective planning and means time wasted in ad hoc negotiations. Ideally, the UN will develop an explicit mechanism or a standing fund in order to eliminate this uncertainty.

The financing of peace operations has undergone two fundamental reforms since UNTSO was first placed on the regular UN budget in 1948. In 1963, the General Assembly agreed on a distinctive methodology for financing operations, giving more responsibility to Security Council members with greater ability to pay. Ten years later, the UN approved ad hoc arrangements for applying for peacekeeping expenses, giving discounts to member states that fell into the developing and least developed categories. Assessments not apportioned to these countries were divided among the member states of the Security Council. Thus, the U.S.’s share came to about 31 percent — that is, 25 percent plus 6 percent. In 2000, at the U.S.’s urging, that scale was adjusted and the U.S.’s assessment reduced, while the U.S. Congress set aside \$926 million for payment of arrears. In all, the UN is still owed approximately \$2 billion from other countries, with little prospect of collecting all of those arrears.⁷²

Broadly, there are three ways to address financial problems: increase revenues, cut costs, or manage money better. A standing fund might fall partly into the third category, but probably also will need to be supported by increased revenues. Recently, most UN and outside proposals concerning the financing of peace operations have concentrated entirely on increasing revenues. The Brahimi report, by contrast, focuses on greater flexibility and early access to funds by the Secretary-General.

Diehl and PharoahKhan present a useful overview of financing proposals, which they separate into three groups. The first group, proposals that advocate incremental change,

includes a hodge-podge of instruments to punish members for not paying their dues (late payment charges, modification and application of Article 19); to make it easier for them to do so (changing payment dates); to change the assessment schedule; to increase the Working Capital Fund; to allow the UN to borrow or sell bonds; and to create a revolving peace fund (e.g., Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 proposal). Only the last of these directly addresses peacekeeping financing.

A second set of proposals dealing with international taxes (e.g., a Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions; an international commons tax; and a transnational activities tax) address broader, longer term solutions that would make the UN less reliant on member contributions. A third group of "new programs" directly addresses the financing of peacekeeping. These range from a UN Security Insurance Agency from which member states could take out insurance against conflict to a more promising proposal for a Single Peace Fund independent of the overall UN budget (raised in various forms by the Ford Foundation and Boutros-Ghali).⁷³

The fact that discussion of financing UN peacekeeping has focused on increasing revenues by no means indicates that methods cannot be found to cut costs further and to improve financial management. If purely to allay the concerns of member states, the UN should continue thoroughly and openly to analyze options along these lines. Indeed, substantial progress has been made on this front. For instance, the UN budget has not increased at all in real terms since 1994. As Atwood pointed out: "The Secretary-General has recognized the need to adapt. Impressive steps have been taken to reduce waste and improve accountability, coordination and the effective delivery of services."⁷⁴

Conclusion

The Brahimi report represents an important contribution to work on peace operations. It is by no means the final word. Much of the value of the Brahimi report lies precisely in how it has stimulated dialogue on peace operations within and outside the UN. Hopefully, this dialogue eventually will inform the debate about the Afghan crisis and other future conflicts. This report builds on some of the discussions sparked by the Brahimi report to define and clarify the differences between four types of operations — peacekeeping, peace enforcement, multidimensional operations, and transitional administration — and has described five elements of successful operations gleaned from UN experience.

The UN's four broad options in Afghanistan are precisely the four types of peace operations defined in this report, but there are multitudinous choices to make in designing any mission. A successful mission must be crafted by skilled practitioners attuned to subtle changes in the field and to political realities in New York, Washington, and elsewhere.

¹ Central News Section, Department of Public Information, United Nations, “UN ‘Not Seeking’ Nation-Building Role in Afghanistan, Brahimi Says,” 17 October 2001.

² UN News Centre, “Brahimi Lays Out Plan for Political Transition in Afghanistan,” 13 November 2001.

³ See United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, August 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations (hereafter “Brahimi report”).

⁴ Much of the literature on peacekeeping discusses these operations together as “second-generation,” “third-generation,” or even “fourth-generation” peacekeeping.

⁵ UN Charter, as quoted in Brahimi report, para. 4.

⁶ Lessons Learned Unit, United Nations, “Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned from Recent Experience,” n.d., <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm>.

⁷ Although the lack of cooperation among the members of the Security Council severely hampered the UN’s collective security mechanisms during this period, the “Uniting for Peace” resolution passed during the Korean War set a precedent allowing the General Assembly to act in a crisis in place of a deadlocked Security Council. This precedent allowed for the establishment of UNEF I. All acronyms are spelled out in Table 1.

⁸ A. Betts Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London, 1994), 13.

⁹ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, 17.

¹⁰ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, 18.

¹¹ Jarat Chopra (ed.), *The Politics of Peace-Maintenance* (Boulder, 1998), 4-5.

¹² Chopra, *Peace-Maintenance*, 2.

¹³ See, e.g., Hong Kong AFP in English, 4 May 1993, 1415 GMT, as printed in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, “AFP Details Attack on UN Peacekeepers,” 5 May 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-085.

¹⁴ In November 1992, prominent Hutu Dr. Leon Mugusera told Hutus to send the Tutsis “back to the Ethiopia” via the rivers. In 1993, the extremist radio station Radio Mille Collines began exhorting Hutus to attack Tutsis. As early as November 1993, Lt. Marc Ness of UNAMIR reported that “a meeting chaired by President Habyarimana on

November 5 at the Hotel Rebero decided ‘to distribute grenades, machetes and other weapons to the Interahamwe and to CDR young people. The objective is to kill Tutsis and other Rwandans who are in the cities and who do not support them. The distribution the weapons has already begun’,” Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, March 1999, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-01.htm>, 2, and <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-05.htm>, 6.) On January 11, 1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, sent a telegram to the UN which predicted the genocide and requested authorization to respond. Dallaire’s informant “had been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali for purposes, the informant believed, of their extermination.” Dallaire stated that he would confiscate arms caches within 36 hours, and requested authorization to provide asylum to the informant and his family. In response, UN senior military advisor Major General Maurice Baril refused to authorize Dallaire’s actions. He further ordered Dallaire to inform Habyarimana and the MRND of the informant’s information. Boutros-Ghali did not immediately take the January 11th telegram to the Security Council for consideration. Dallaire made a number of unsuccessful appeals from January until April 1994. (Holly Burkhalter, “Testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Physicians for Human Rights, before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations,” 5 May 1998, <http://www.africapolicy.org/docs98/rwan9805.1.htm>, 6.)

¹⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 , Genocide in Rwanda*, 15 December 1999, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm.

¹⁶ Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 2001), <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm>, section I.

¹⁷ Department of State, *Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25)*, 22 February 1996, 15, as quoted in Sarah Sewall, “U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations,” Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper 01-3, February 2001, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/w_papers.shtml, 12.

¹⁸ Michael E. Brown, “Introduction,” in Brown

(ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 1-33.

¹⁹ V. Page Fortna, "The Peacekeeping Puzzle: Causal Mechanism and Empirical Effects," 19 January 2000, unpublished paper, 46.

²⁰ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, XCIV (2000), 779-801.

²¹ Marrack Goulding, "The United Nations and Conflict in Africa since the Cold War," *African Affairs*, XCVIII (1999), 5.

²² See Fortna, "Peacekeeping Puzzle," 24-25.

²³ United States Institute of Peace, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Washington, DC, 13 February 2001), USIP Special Report, 1; Brahimi report, para. 7, and International Peace Academy and Center for International Cooperation, New York University, "Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi report on UN Peace Operations," report of regional meetings, February–March 2001, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Singapore, and London, April 2001, http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Publications_html.

²⁴ David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?" *Global Governance*, VII (2001), 11.

²⁵ The members of the panel were J. Brian Atwood (United States), Ambassador Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago), Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), Richard Monk (United Kingdom), General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany), Hisako Shimura (Japan), Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation), General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland).

²⁶ Brahimi report, para. 4.

²⁷ Brahimi report, viii.

²⁸ See USIP, *Peacekeeping*, 1.

²⁹ Brahimi report, para. 49.

³⁰ Brahimi report, para. 50.

³¹ Summarized from Brahimi report, "Summary of Recommendations."

³² See Jack Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly (eds.), *Behavior, Society, and Nu-*

clear War (New York, 1989), I, 209-333.

³³ See Brown, "Introduction."

³⁴ Robert I. Rotberg, "Peacekeeping and the Effective Prevention of War," in Rotberg, et al., *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa* (Washington, DC, 2000), 12.

³⁵ Fortna, "Peacekeeping Puzzle," 7. Fortna is one of the few scholars who have examined the causal mechanisms through which peace operations work.

³⁶ Fortna, "Peacekeeping Puzzle," 9.

³⁷ See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 58-84.

³⁸ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, XXXV (1993), 27-47.

³⁹ Lise Morjé Howard, "Learning to Keep the Peace? United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Civil Wars," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, Fall 2001, 1.

⁴⁰ Terrence Lyons, "Transforming the Structures of War: Postconflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Collapsed States," paper prepared for the third meeting of World Peace Foundation Failed States Project, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, June 2001, 35.

⁴¹ Rotberg, "Peacekeeping," 12.

⁴² Walter Clarke, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," in Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, 1997), 10.

⁴³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, 1954), 160.

⁴⁴ Chopra, *Peace-Maintenance*, 9-10.

⁴⁵ As Greenhill points out "it would take even the best equipped and most capable nation about a month to field a force of 25-30,000 in the middle of central Africa and any vaguely comparable, alternative force, significantly longer." Kelly M. Greenhill, "On Intervention to Deter Deadly Conflict: A Cautionary Prospective Analysis," *Breakthroughs*, X (2001), 42.

⁴⁶ Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues* (Santa Monica, CA, 1996), 51.

⁴⁷ Howard, "Learning," 201.

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- 48 CBC Radio, "General Romeo Dallaire: A Man of Arms and Honor," transcript of interview with Dallaire by Michael Engirt, 3 July 2000, <http://www.radio.cbc.ca/programs/thismorning/features/dallairetrans.html>.
- 49 Christopher Clapham, "Peacekeeping and the Peacekept: Developing Mandates for Potential Interveners," in Rotberg, et al., *Peacekeeping*, 35.
- 50 Brahimi report, "Summary of Recommendations."
- 51 Clarke and Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," in Clarke and Herbst (eds.), *Learning from Somalia*, 247-248.
- 52 Clarke and Herbst, "Somalia," 248.
- 53 Clapham, "Peacekeeping," 34, italics mine.
- 54 Clapham, "Peacekeeping," 42.
- 55 Michael Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder, 1995), 27, 28.
- 56 Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom in East Timor," *Survival*, XLII (2000), 29.
- 57 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom," 29.
- 58 Katsumi Ishizuka, "UNRAET: Some Current Issues," *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, XXIX (2000), 5.
- 59 James Cotton, "The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, XXII (2000), 9.
- 60 Clarke and Herbst, "Somalia," 248.
- 61 Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping*, 86.
- 62 See, e.g., "The Name Dropping Game," *Cambodia Times* (Phnom Penh), 3-9 May 1993, as reprinted in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, "Commentary Questions UNTAC's Neutrality in Campaigns," 6 May 1993, FBIS-EAS-93-086.
- 63 Clarke and Herbst, "Somalia," 248.
- 64 Howard, "Learning."
- 65 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom," 27-39.
- 66 Stefan Lovgren, "On the Brink, Again: Will Peacekeepers Be Able to Hold Back Sierra Leone's Rebels?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 22 May 2000, 37.
- 67 William Reno, "The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone," *Current History*, C (2001), 223.
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- 68 Pirnie and Simons, *Critical Operational Issues*, 7 ("Figure 6.1 — Options for Control of Forces").
- 69 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom," 35.
- 70 See Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York, 2000).
- 71 See Happyton M. Bonyongwe, "Employing African Forces in Peace Operations in Africa," in Rotberg, et al., *Peacekeeping*, 91.
- 72 Summarized from comments at the International Crisis Group and World Peace Foundation Conference, "UN Peace Operations and Peace Building," United Nations, New York, 29 November 2001.
- 73 Paul F. Diehl and Elijah Pharoah Khan, "Financing UN Peacekeeping: A Review and Assessment of Proposals," *Policy Studies Review*, XVII (2000), 71-104.
- 74 J. Brian Atwood, "Real Reform at the United Nations," *UN Chronicle*, XXXVII (2000), 26-27.

Table I: UN Peace Operations Since 1948⁷⁵

ACRONYM	MISSION	STARTED	ENDED	REGION
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)	June, 1948	ongoing	Middle East
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January, 1949	ongoing	Asia
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East)	November, 1956	June, 1967	Middle East
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June, 1958	December, 1958	Middle East
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July, 1960	June, 1964	Africa
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)	October, 1962	April, 1995	Asia
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July, 1963	September, 1964	Middle East
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus	March, 1964	ongoing	Europe
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May, 1965	October, 1966	Americas
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September, 1965	March, 1966	Asia
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East)	October, 1973	July, 1979	Middle East
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (Golan Heights)	June, 1974	ongoing	Middle East
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March, 1978	ongoing	Middle East
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May, 1988	March, 1990	Asia
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August, 1988	February, 1991	Middle East
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January, 1989	May, 1991	Africa
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)	April, 1989	March, 1990	Africa
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November, 1989	January, 1992	Americas
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April, 1991	ongoing	Middle East

UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	May, 1991	February, 1995	Africa
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July, 1991	April, 1995	Americas
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April, 1991	ongoing	Africa
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October, 1991	March, 1992	Asia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)	March, 1992	December, 1995	Europe
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March, 1992	September, 1993	Asia
UNOSOM I	United Nations Observer Mission in Somalia I	April, 1992	March, 1993	Africa
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December, 1992	December, 1994	Africa
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March, 1993	March, 1995	Africa
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda	June, 1993	September, 1994	Africa
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August, 1993	ongoing	Europe
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September, 1993	September, 1997	Africa
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September, 1993	June, 1996	Americas
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October, 1993	March, 1996	Africa
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May, 1994	June, 1994	Africa
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December, 1994	May, 2000	Asia
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February, 1995	June, 1997	Africa
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	March, 1995	January, 1996	Europe
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)	March, 1995	February, 1999	Europe
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December, 1995	ongoing	Europe
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January, 1996	January, 1998	Europe

UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	January, 1996	ongoing	Europe
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July, 1996	July, 1997	Americas
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January, 1997	May, 1997	Americas
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June, 1997	February, 1999	Africa
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August, 1997	November, 1997	Americas
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December, 1997	March, 2000	Americas
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia)	January, 1998	October, 1998	Europe
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic	April, 1998	February, 2000	Africa
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July, 1998	October, 1999	Africa
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June, 1999	ongoing	Europe
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October, 1999	ongoing	Africa
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October, 1999	ongoing	Asia
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	December, 1999	ongoing	Africa
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July, 2000	ongoing	Africa

⁷⁵ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York, 1996, 3rd ed.), and information on current and completed peacekeeping operations available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home_bottom.htm.

Appendix I: The Brahimi Report — Summary of Recommendations⁷⁶

1. **Preventive action:** The Panel endorses the Secretary-General's recommendations with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and supports a more integrated response to crises by conflict prevention and development organizations. It supports more frequent use of fact-finding missions.
2. **Peace-building:** A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be used for quick impact projects. The use of civilian police, human rights experts, and others should reflect increased focus on rule of law institutions and respect for human rights. Legislative bodies should consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programs into assessed budgets for the first phase of an operation. The ECPS should recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN in peace building.
3. **Peacekeeping:** UN peacekeepers, once deployed, must be able to carry out their mandates and defend themselves and the mission with robust rules of engagement.
4. **Mandates:** Before the Security Council agrees to implement a cease-fire or peace agreement, the Council should assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions with regard to human rights standards, tasks, and timelines. Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations, especially with regard to chain of command and "unity of effort." The Security Council should not authorize missions with sizeable troop components until the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and mission support from member states. The Secretariat must tell the Security Council "what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear" when formulating mandates.
5. **Information and strategic analysis:** The Secretary-General should establish an ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) to support the information and analysis needs of all ECPS members. EISAS should be administered by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
6. **Transitional civil administration:** The Secretary-General should invite a panel of international legal experts to evaluate whether developing an interim criminal code would be useful and feasible.
7. **Determining deployment timelines:** "Rapid and effective deployment capacities" should mean full deployment for traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.
8. **Mission leadership:** The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders. The first step should be to compile a comprehensive list of leaders. A mission's entire leadership should be assembled at Headquarters "as early as possible" to participate in the planning process, be briefed on the situation, and meet with colleagues.
9. **Military personnel:** Member states should be encouraged to enter into partnerships within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) to form several

brigade-size forces with rapid and effective deployment capacities. The Secretary-General should have the authority to formally canvass member states participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation. The Secretariat should send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor prior to deployment. A revolving on-call list of about 100 military officers should be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice to create mission headquarters for new operations with DPKO planners.

10. **Civilian police personnel:** Member states should establish a national pool of civilian police officers, judicial, penal, human rights, and other relevant specialists to be ready for deployment to UN operations; enter into regional training partnerships; and designate a single point of contact with the UN. A revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts should be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice.
11. **Civilian specialists:** The Secretariat should establish a Internet/Intranet-based list of civilians available to deploy on short notice, and field missions should be delegated authority to recruit candidates from this list. The UN should try to attract the most highly qualified candidates by revising conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff. DPKO should create a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations.
12. **Public information:** Mission budgets should devote additional resources to public information, associated personnel, and information technology.
13. **Logistics support and expenditure management:** The Secretariat should review procurement procedures and policies and prepare a strategy for rapid and effective mission deployment. The General Assembly should approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, to be routinely replenished with funding from the operations that drew on them. Once it becomes clear that an operation is likely, the Secretary-General should be given the authority to draw up to \$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution. The Secretariat should review policies and procedures governing financial management for field missions in order to provide greater flexibility, and increase their level of procurement authority from \$200,000 to as high as \$1 million.
14. **Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations:** The majority of Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial program budget. While the next regular budget submission is prepared, the Secretary-General should request an emergency increase to the Support Account to fund immediate recruitment of additional DPKO and other personnel.
15. **Mission planning and support:** Integrated Mission Task Forces should be the first point of contact for mission-specific planning and support and have temporary line authority over seconded personnel.
16. **Other structural adjustments in DPKO:** The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured so that the Civilian Police Unit is out of the military reporting chain. The DPKO Military Adviser's Office should be restructured so that it corresponds to the structure of military field headquarters. A new DPKO unit should be established on criminal law issues. For a two-year trial period, the Under-Secretary-General for Management

should delegate authority for peacekeeping-related functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

17. The Lessons Learned Unit should be enhanced. The UN should consider increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three to function as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.
18. Operational support for public information: A new unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established.
19. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs: If the Secretariat's effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA works well, regular budgetary support for this unit should be revisited. Regular budget resources for the Electoral Assistance Division should be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) should provide procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all smaller, non-military field missions in order to relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA.
20. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be enhanced, with funding from the regular budget and mission budgets.
21. Peace operations and the information age: A "responsibility centre" within EISAS should oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations. Peace operations should make more extensive use of technology like geographic information systems.

⁷⁶ Condensed from Brahimi report, "Summary of Recommendations."

Postscript: UN Operations and Peace Building

*A summary of the discussions at the meeting at the United Nations, New York
29 November 2001*

Since the release of the Brahimi report in 2000, the UN has been involved in a process of implementing recommendations and improving its capacity for conducting peace operations. In November, the International Crisis Group and the World Peace Foundation convened a day-long conference at the United Nations to discuss UN peace operations and peace building, focusing on options for Afghanistan. It also continued a World Peace Foundation meeting in May at Harvard University specifically on the impact of the Brahimi Report on peace operations. Participants at the November meeting included over eighty representatives of member states, high-ranking UN officials, NGO leaders, academics, and the press. With the Bonn talks on Afghanistan in the immediate background, the discussions in New York centered on the UN's capacity for conducting peace operations, the lessons of the Brahimi report for resolving the conflict and post-conflict issues, and the ever-present problem of financing.

The participants agreed broadly that some form of peacekeeping force was needed in Afghanistan, focused, in the short term, on providing security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, maintaining stability in major urban areas, and preventing terrorist attacks from being launched from inside the country. In the medium term, the UN faced the major challenge of assisting in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Successfully accomplishing these objectives would require UN and outside agencies to work together as never before, approaching humanitarian, political, and security affairs in an integrated manner, with clear commitments and follow-through on financing, particularly over the long term.

There was substantive debate with regard to more specific objectives and the configuration of the security force. While some participants advocated state building, others pushed for a more modest approach. While some focused on the immediate need for foreign troops to provide security on the ground, many envisioned a heavy reliance on indigenous forces and a sending of a multinational force to Afghanistan only after the establishment of a settlement and with the consent of the new Afghani government.

The meeting's three conclusions on Brahimi and four on Afghanistan are summarized below:

BRAHIMI REPORT IMPLEMENTATION

1. UN's Capacity for Peace Operations

Participants at the New York meeting agreed that the process of implementing the Brahimi recommendations was well underway and thus that the UN's capacity for peace building had improved, although there remained considerable work to be done in the areas of logistics and staffing. "The first message of the Brahimi report," as one participant noted, "was to convince all of us that peace operations [were] not a temporary aberration. After fifty years, it was time to look at them as a core activity of the UN and treat them in a systematic fashion. The second was that a successful peace operation require[d] strong cooperation between the Secretary General, Security Council, troop contributing countries, and others... What has been remarkable [over the past fifteen months] is that a consensus has developed in the membership for strengthening the capacity of the Secretariat to support peacekeeping." The Secretariat, in turn, had undertaken a variety of "quantitative" and "qualitative" improvements. The

first and second tranches of new posts recommended by Brahimi were being funded, and the Secretariat had sought to make the organization more proactive, improve communications between headquarters and the field, encourage greater integration among agencies, and otherwise show the member states that the resources that they send to the UN would be used in a professional manner. Many participants also applauded the Security Council's and Secretariat's new willingness and ability to say "no" to unrealistic demands, recognizing the gap between what the UN is able to do and what it is often commissioned to do.

On the other hand, highlighting many of the issues touched on in the body of this report, participants pointed to problems left unresolved by the Brahimi recommendations. In particular, many of the farthest-reaching proposals concerning information gathering and analysis had not been accepted by member states, to the detriment of the UN's ability to prepare for conflicts adequately. Many expressed the need to find a way supported by the member states to provide better real time information to the UN. In addition, some participants bemoaned the lack of organizational learning within the UN and the need to draw more effectively upon lessons learned.

Participants further stressed that over the last decade, the number of nations willing and able to provide troops to peacekeeping operations has narrowed. Today, therefore, there is enormous strain placed on a few countries to supply troops. Representatives of these countries pointed out that they would be unable to continue to contribute if reimbursements for previous involvements remained slow to arrive.

2. Clarifying Peace Building

As discussed earlier in this report, the failure of the Security Council to provide clear mandates for potential missions has undermined

their success. Clear mandates and rules of engagement were essential. Some participants in New York pointed out that this failure was partially due to confusion over the meaning of peace building. For instance, while some participants used "peace building" to refer to "post-conflict peace building" — discussed in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992) — which was targeted at addressing the root causes of a conflict, others understood it to be the narrower concept of "peace building" discussed in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Brahimi report. In defining better mandates and rules of engagement, the Security Council must clarify this "gray zone" between traditional peace keeping and nation building.

In addition, past experience with post-conflict peace building led to three conclusions. First, the peace building concept relates primarily to internal conflicts. Second, it is a rather intrusive concept that therefore may not be agreeable to countries sensitive regarding their sovereignty. Third, for that reason, the shelf life of a UN mission on the ground is very short. The UN should therefore include as much peace building as it can in settlements that it helps warring parties to conclude and, as quickly as possible, engage local capacities for peace to give local societies ownership of reforms.

3. Financing

Peacekeeping always has been a significant part of the UN's work. Yet, "it has been standing for many years on a bed of sand," and the time was ripe for bold reforms. The 1973 peacekeeping formula provides for a certain amount of funds to be available in a given year, but often the crises that occur exhaust these funds. Then there is no guarantee of funding what comes next. Further, in terms of the improving peace operations' capability in the future, financial reforms will be essential for the implementation of the key recommendations included in the Brahimi report,

like improving rapid deployment capabilities. As one participant noted: “There is not a ghost of a chance that the UN could field anything that quickly without positioning resources on a pre-need basis.” Thus, in terms of finances, the UN is at a “point of demarcation.” Either we follow through now, or we fail. Going only a little way produces disaster.

In addition to offering specific recommendations with regard to Afghanistan, participants recommended, in general, looking more seriously at the cost side — not so much at cutting staff as often discussed, but at deploying staff more effectively. As one participant summarized: “As an ex-member of government, I am horrified not that there are too many people, but that these people are not in the right places and that staff are not adequately trained.”

Lastly, echoing a common refrain, many participants argued that the international community should hold accountable member-states that renege on their financial responsibilities.

AFGHANISTAN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Need for an Integrated Approach

A central theme of the Brahimi report was the need for an integrated approach to peace operations in terms of interagency cooperation, the coordination of different project areas, and better, more coordinated planning at headquarters and in the field. Given the wide-ranging challenges in Afghanistan, it is clear that the UN will need to work together within itself and with outside agencies on a scale that it has never reached before in order to address humanitarian, security, and political concerns.

The most pressing need on the ground, NGO representatives pointed out, in particular, was for humanitarian relief. However, lack of security makes it impossible for aid organizations to bring humanitarian assistance to the people who need it. The type of

security force available was going to depend, in turn, UN officials pointed out, on the political settlement negotiated in Bonn. Along these lines, officials reported that, since September 11, one of the most difficult challenges in the UN has been to calibrate the expectations of the member states. Major players have discussed peace operations without any regard to the security situation, and nation building without any regard to how Afghans would react to international intervention.

The UN has been trying to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan since 1988, and almost nothing had been achieved before September 11. Thus, no one should assume that after the conflict is over, Afghans will agree among themselves. Once a final settlement is achieved, there remains a serious risk that hostilities will resume, the Northern Alliance will split, and perhaps 30 percent of the Taliban will resume guerrilla activities. Thus, even over the longer term when attention is focused on reconstruction and development, security concerns likely will continue to be significant.

It was clear that the climate of uncertainty in Afghanistan hindered effective planning. Many officials were wary of discussing even the outlines of a potential mission until a political settlement was achieved and the new Afghan government requested UN assistance. Others stressed the importance of contingency planning. In terms of addressing the specific causes of the Afghan conflict, participants pointed out that both internal and international causes should be addressed in the long run; any sustainable settlement would need to address the outside players — potential spoilers — fighting a war by proxy on the ground in Afghanistan, as well as the more commonly discussed internal causes.

Finally, there was tension between those who advocated a more modest, practical approach stressing “lowering expectations

and trying to get a more realistic assessment of what is possible” and those who pushed for a more ambitious stance. One participant from this second group argued: “If the UN cannot be ambitious and have great vision, I do not know who can be. Therefore, despite all the problems, if we do not aim high, we will go nowhere at all.”

2. The Peacekeeping Force

Participants agreed that after a final settlement in Afghanistan is achieved, a peacekeeping force should be deployed in order to secure the settlement. Since it is likely that hostilities in Afghanistan would continue in some parts of the country, a peacekeeping force would need to be strong enough to discourage parties from renegeing on the peace agreement. The three broad options were those set out by UN envoy Brahimi — UN blue helmets, a multinational force authorized under chapter VII, and an all-Afghan force. It was clear in late November that the most likely policy would be a hybrid solution with a multinational force in major urban areas and Afghan forces elsewhere. UN officials, in particular, tended to favor the hybrid solution, relying, as much as possible, on indigenous structures; and “leaving a light footprint.” Other participants voiced strong reservations about the ability of an all-Afghan force to keep the peace and to remain impartial. Some regional experts argued that the system of tribal justice was no longer workable, if it ever was, and questioned the wisdom of relying on warlords. Others argued that relying on an all-Afghan force was “putting the cart before the horse;” if Afghans could cooperate to provide a security force, an outside security force would not be needed in the first place. They argued that the international community should look at local structures, but not necessarily the ones under discussion. In practical terms, many stressed the importance of conditional incentives — carrots and sticks — to encourage

good behavior and the cooperation of local, often-shady, tribal leaders.

Where the capabilities of local forces were not sufficient, a multinational force should be deployed. Participants argued that, in comparison to a force of blue helmets, a multinational detachment would have the advantage of being more coherent; contributors would pay the costs. Although troops from different countries were on the ground in Afghanistan already, a true multinational force, some participants pointed out, meant decision making would be dispersed and not rest solely with the U.S. The option of sending UN blue helmets received the shortest shrift, although some participants questioned why it had been ruled out so quickly.

3. Financing

Two main recommendations emerged from the discussions. First, there was a particular need for long-term financial commitments and coordination among UN agencies and the World Bank for financing reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. It was likely that resources would not be forthcoming once the crisis were over unless long-term arrangements were made. There was a real risk of duplication of effort by numerous participating agencies with overlapping mandates. One specific proposal was the creation of an exceptional financial mechanism, modeled loosely after UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), to establish a reconstruction agency and create a centralized system of distribution and a point of contact for donors.

Second, representatives of donor countries stressed the need for observable results and for greater donor involvement in the decision-making process. As one participant noted, donor countries are often reluctant to spend money on causes because they are not convinced that the agreements made will stick. They are skeptical of the prospects of peace building, and therefore the best way is

to involve them at an early stage in the process, as a peace deal is being made. There is nothing more irritating from a donor's perspective than to be told, after the fact: we have made a deal, write a check. To help build a strong and continuing donor base for Afghanistan, donors must be brought into the process immediately and met with by senior policy makers on a regular basis.

One specific proposal was to establish a program to give small loans and grants to women, following the example of similar programs in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Although not a comprehensive solution, such a program would create a sense of momentum on the ground.

4. Justice and the Rule of Law

Aside from discussion about Afghan security forces, questions of justice and the rule of law were left largely for future debate. However, participants highlighted three broad recommendations. First, along the lines of the Brahimi report, a central task in Afghanistan would be to help build the internal legal system and support police reform. Second, in order to support economic development, civil law (for instance, concerning property rights) would need to be strengthened. Third, the question of impunity and whether an international tribunal would be necessary, although not on the international agenda at the moment, would eventually need to be addressed.

On the cusp of victory in Afghanistan, the WPF-ICG conference directed the UN to its toughest challenge, sustaining the peace and supervising a significant level of post-conflict reconstruction — all without direct responsibility for a transitional administration.

MEETING I: PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE BUILDING: BUILDING ON THE BRAHIMI REPORT—NEXT STEPS

Meeting sponsored by the World Peace Foundation and the WPF Program on Intrastate Conflict, Kennedy School of Government

Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA

4–5 May 2001

Conference Participants

- J. Brian Atwood, *Citizens Energy, member of the Brahimi Commission, co-chair*
- Robert I. Rotberg, *World Peace Foundation/Kennedy School of Government, co-chair*
- Iqbal Riza, *UN*
- Richard Ullman, *World Peace Foundation/Princeton University*
- Esko Aho, *Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government*
- Eric Berman, *Independent Consultant*
- Michael Blackmore, *Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs*
- Lincoln Bloomfield, *World Peace Foundation/Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
- Derek Boothby, *UN*
- Lewis Bumgardner, *U.S. Naval War College*
- Richard Dotson, *Balkans Task Force, U.S. Department of Defense*
- Yves Doutriaux, *Permanent Mission of France to the UN*
- Michel Duval, *Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN*
- Stewart Eldon, *Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN*
- Shepard Forman, *New York University*
- V. Page Fortna, *Columbia University*
- Sir Marrack Goulding, *former Under Secretary-General, UN/ St. Antony's College, Oxford*
- Colin Granderson, *Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN, member of the Brahimi Commission*
- John Hirsch, *International Peace Academy*
- Cameron Hume, *U.S. State Department*
- Swanee Hunt, *Women and Public Policy Program, Kennedy School of Government*
- Michael Ignatieff, *Carr Center, Kennedy School of Government*
- Ian Johnstone, *Tufts University*
- Raili Lahnalampi, *UN*
- David Last, *Canadian Royal Military*
- Jeff Laurenti, *United Nations Association of the USA*
- Sarah Mendelson, *Tufts University*
- Jonathan Moore, *Kennedy School of Government*
- William Nash, *Council on Foreign Relations*
- Robert Orr, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*

- Samantha Power, *Carr Center, Kennedy School of Government*
- John Reppert, *Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government*
- Indar Rikhye, *Institute of World Affairs*
- James Schear, *National Defense University*
- Mark Schneider, *International Crisis Group*
- Yashvardhan Sinha, *Permanent Mission of India to the UN*
- Brooke Smith-Windsor, *Canadian Department of Defense*
- Nancy Soderberg, *International Crisis Group*
- Donald Steinberg, *Policy and Planning, U.S. State Department*
- Nina Tannenwald, *Brown University*
- Esa Tarvainen, *Ministry of Defense, Finland*
- Kimberly Zisk, *Columbia University*

MEETING II: UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND PEACE BUILDING

Meeting sponsored by the Mission of Jamaica, the International Crisis Group, the World Peace Foundation, and the WPF Program on Intrastate Conflict, Kennedy School of Government

United Nations, New York

November 29, 2001

- Robert I. Rotberg, *World Peace Foundation/WPF Program on Intrastate Conflict, Kennedy School of Government, co-chair*
- Nancy Soderberg, *International Crisis Group, co-chair*
- Samina Ahmed, *International Crisis Group*
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- Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, *Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the UN*
- Joseph Connor, *Under Secretary-General for Management*
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- Gerard Corr, *Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN*
- Barbara Crossette, *The New York Times*
- James Cunningham, *Permanent Mission of the USA to the UN*
- Don Daniel, *National Intelligence Council*

- Jonathan Dean, *Union of Concerned Scientists*
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