

# SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK

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In this country, we have the most precious possession of all: freedom. With free minds, free enterprise, free markets, and free trade, there are no limits to what men and women and nations can accomplish. But the fulfillment of the American dream was never meant to end at our own borders. Our great nation was never meant to subsist as an island of liberty in a world of oppression.

Once it was an article of faith that the United States should avoid entangling alliances, that we could live in splendid isolation, removed from the world by geography and inclination. But we lost our innocence on the battlefields of two world wars. No nation is an island, nor is human freedom divisible.

In 1945, the United States led the way in disarming and establishing the United Nations to maintain peace through law and diplomacy. But the Soviet Union responded by launching an indirect war of subversive aggression to help pro-Soviet groups seize power in Eastern Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, Korea, and Indochina. In 1947, President Truman appealed for political, economic, and military support to help friendly governments defend themselves. The Republicans in Congress gave full support to this bipartisan policy of containing Communist expansion which became known as the Truman Doctrine. In 1948, the Rio Treaty established the collective security alliance for this hemisphere; and in 1949, we put our signature to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

## THE U.S. ROLE IN NATO

The strength and cohesion of the Atlantic alliance is fundamental to the security of Europe and the United States, and to the maintenance of a stable peace. Our pledge to the European members of the alliance rests upon the solidarity that exists among us. It has prevailed over controversy. It has weathered the storms of those inevitable differences of policy that will always arise within an alliance of free and sovereign states.

The United States assumed the obligation to come to the defense of Western Europe, not out of a sense of altruism, but because we understood that our defense of Europe was a forward defense of the United States. And we know

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that Europe could not stand, nor the United States long endure, if we were divided.

But the world has not remained static since NATO was founded 40 years ago. Without question, the most profound change has been the growth of Soviet military power, and the loss of our former superiority. Today, more than ever before, we must pull together with our allies to devote the spiritual and material resources necessary to meet that threat.

Yet here we run into difficulty. And that is what I want to speak to you about tonight: How, in the face of threats of passivity and controversy, the United States can and must grasp the lead, to keep our alliance strong and our people free.

From time to time, we have quarrels with our allies. Their relative contributions to NATO defenses have not kept pace with their economic growth. In many instances, they have been slow to acknowledge the reality of Soviet expansion, slow to acknowledge that the Soviet Union pursues a global strategy. The public pronouncements of even the strongest U.S. supporters in Europe still carry the echoes of detente rhetoric and the constraints of domestic neutralist sentiment.

That's why many in the United States question whether our investment in the alliance is worth what we get in return. When, they ask, will the allies contribute their fair share?

Even more difficult for Americans to understand is the historical amnesia that seems to have gripped certain European intellectuals. This was epitomized by the Oxford Union debate between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and British Socialist E.P. Thompson, which centered on the resolution, "There is no moral difference between the United States and the Soviet Union." The very fact that free Englishmen would entertain such a proposition is a shocking commentary on how much some in the West have lost touch with their own values.

No wonder some in America have argued that NATO, as our foremost alliance, may be slowly dying.

Well, I strongly disagree. The Europe of Chamberlain surely was not dead — but it was profoundly mistaken about the threats to its future. In the 1920s, the British and French were deeply divided over the likelihood of a German military revival. Most of the British simply thought the French were paranoid. Thank God there was a Churchill then — as I am convinced there are Churchills among us now, men and women on both sides of the Atlantic who see clearly the dangers before us and what must be done.

Now some in America today say the only way to awaken Europe to the threat is for America to throw fate to the wind and withdraw our troops, a sort of shock therapy approach to alliance policy. Well, I don't agree. Sometimes we are so blinded by day-to-day disputes, we lose sight of the most important truth of the last 40 years: NATO works. Sometimes, we forget

that we are engaged in a marathon, not a sprint, and we cannot win that marathon by undermining the most successful coalition for peace in the history of the world.

Yes, changes are sorely needed, and yes, they are long overdue. But keeping Europe at peace and free is unbelievably important to the freedom of our own children. And as far as I'm concerned, preserving our children's future of peace and freedom is job number one.

We can make those changes. We can use the tools of our Western heritage — the strength of truth and rational persuasion — to draw together our vast moral and material resources to counter the challenge of Soviet totalitarianism.

In February, I met with Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Thatcher, and other senior government leaders in Bonn, Paris, and London. Repeatedly, they told me that anti-Americanism in Europe is more a creature of the media than a feature of mainstream European life. German Foreign Minister Genscher — certainly no hardliner — remarked to me, "Were it not for the American commitment, we in Germany know we would not be a frontline state; we would be a behind-the-line state — on the wrong side."

The principal objective of Soviet strategy for four decades has been to split the NATO alliance at mid-Atlantic. The Soviets want a Western Europe separated from the United States; they want a United States increasingly isolated; and they want to pluck the fruit of Europe's economic and technical resources, free of Co-Com restrictions and American constraints.

In my opinion, withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe would only be playing into the Soviets' hands. We would be exacerbating European nightmares of neo-isolationism and a new Fortress America, in which we essentially leave Europe to go it alone.

It is no coincidence that European anxieties and neutralism peaked when the U.S. deterrent declined. Sometimes the greater the danger, the greater the tendency to discount it. The more overwhelming Soviet power has become, the more some in Europe have bent over backwards to ascribe peaceful intentions to the Kremlin and deny the threat. That is the peace of appeasement; that is the peace of dishonor; that is the peace of surrender, which the United States cannot and must not ever accept.

Our choices in NATO are not simply stay in or get out. We have a third option: make NATO better. But first, we'd better be honest and admit that we are partly responsible for the problem. We talk of our accomplishments of the past five years, as though we've achieved phenomenal progress, sweeping away 15 years of neglect with the blink of an eye. The truth is, we haven't.

Isn't it about time we confront the real problems and take actions to correct them?

Because ladies and gentlemen, something is very wrong when so many in the State Department still act as though diplomacy is not the handmaiden of foreign policy, but the *master* of foreign policy. Something is very wrong when

we condemn K.A.L. [Korean Air Lines], condemn the murder of Major Nicholson, but then resume cultural exchanges as though it were business as usual. Something is very wrong when we have cold, hard proof the Soviets are violating treaty after treaty, but then we cut our defenses and conduct arms control negotiations as though it were business as usual; and when a satellite like Nicaragua refuses to honor its solemn pledges of peace and democracy, but we are prepared to accept new, unenforceable pledges as though it were business as usual.

And yes, something is very wrong when the Soviets pirate our most precious secrets and vital technology but we carry on East-West trade as though it were business as usual; or when Soviet troops practice chemical warfare against innocent civilians in Afghanistan, and our State Department seeks a paper peace as though it were business as usual.

If we behave as though all is well, why should Europe worry? Indeed, why should America worry?

We need to own up to our responsibilities. The suggestion that Europe is not doing its fair share on defense, not facing the harsh reality of Soviet imperialism, somehow implies that the United States is. Well, let's look at the facts.

#### THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET

In late February, President Reagan appealed to the nation for support in securing necessary resources for defense. As he said, "Each generation has to live with the challenges history delivers. And we can't cope with these challenges by evasion."

Yet judging from the defense budget Congress enacted last year, and the budget resolution that just last week cleared the House, evasion is precisely what Congress is practicing.

When President Reagan took office, he began the difficult task of rebuilding defenses weakened by over a decade of declining funding and widespread neglect. But it's hard to get off to a running start when you're flat on your back. Just when President Reagan is helping America get to stand again, some in Congress would knock us back down on our knees.

After four years of modest increases, real defense spending was cut last year by 6 percent. If the House Democrats have their way, defense will be cut another 6 percent this year, to levels below those requested by President Carter. So much for our defense buildup.

Now, Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is proposing that we should cut research programs by one-third, and select major weapons programs for cancellation, in order to fund current operations and maintenance. And he suggests that we consider pulling back from some of

our commitments in the world, and adopting a definition of our security interest more in keeping with scarcer defense resources.

These proposals sound all too familiar. Shortchanging R&D and weapons investment, pulling back from commitments, will not only repeat the mistakes of the 1970s, not only shift the burden to future generations, but expose the United States once again to all the dangers of isolationism, writ anew.

Our recent military increases have occurred during the period of greatest economic expansion in the postwar era. Yet as a result of last year's defense budget reductions, and cuts that will come this year, we have taken two steps backward toward the previous pattern of costly neglect. How will future generations judge us, if we fail to meet our essential defense requirements during a time of unparalleled prosperity?

Brezhnev once boasted that "a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985 we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to." Thanks to Ronald Reagan, the Soviets may have fallen short of that mark, but they've given no sign of abandoning Brezhnev's goal.

While the deficit is a concern, it surely cannot take precedence over all national policy objectives. We gain nothing by short-term budget savings, if we lose the momentum of our historic turn-around in the military balance and forfeit our foreign policy goals.

Together with our NATO allies, we are pledged to a *minimum* yearly increase of 3 percent in defense spending. Last year, we fell short of that mark; this year, we will be lucky if we come up to a freeze. If we cannot meet even this modest target, how can we complain if our West European allies fall short? We don't need more excuses for a reduced defense effort in Europe — we need a greater effort.

#### WESTERN COOPERATION

Jean Francois Revel's monumental book, *How Democracies Perish*, is regarded by some as a pillar of pessimism, warning that democracy may prove to be a brief parenthesis in history. But the real pessimists are those who accept the decline of the West as inevitable, and who concern themselves only with managing day-to-day affairs so that our decline becomes as comfortable as possible. Cutting defense spending fits neatly with that management mentality.

Revel is in fact the optimist, for he believes that we can take our future into our own hands. All that is lacking is the application of will, the will to see the world as it is, and the will to act — together — upon that knowledge.

In recent years, Western cooperation has proved strong on many fronts. Despite an enormous Soviet propaganda offensive, we have begun the process of modernizing NATO's nuclear deterrent forces with the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] in Europe.

Having won this first battle, we must not give away our gains at the negotiating table. Here again, the Soviet Union is endeavoring to exploit potential trans-Atlantic differences, pushing artificial tradeoffs between strategic limitations and Intermediate Nuclear Forces.

And may I say the United States does not help its cause when it indulges in excessively idealistic rhetoric. Some U.S. spokesmen have outlined as our ultimate arms control goal the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which our European friends find deeply unsettling. To them, this can only mean exposing Western Europe to overwhelming Soviet conventional power. They live with the truth of Churchill's chilling observation, that the Soviet Union would have overrun Europe long ago were it not for nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States.

#### SDI AND THE ALLIANCE

Yet this brings us to what the American Conference of Catholic Bishops has termed the moral dilemma of our age: that in order to protect our country, our allies and our values, we must be able to threaten destruction and loss of life on a massive scale.

In one of his most visionary acts, President Reagan has proposed the world's largest research program — the Strategic Defense Initiative — to learn whether or not it is technically and economically feasible to shift the moral basis for preserving peace from nuclear retaliation to defense. But not less important is the president's offer of cooperation with allied nations to participate in the research program. The president's offer gives allied nations, for the first time, an opportunity to help change the course of history by lifting the nuclear sword of Damocles from the citizens of the world.

To date, we have concluded agreements with England, Germany, and Israel on SDI joint research. Italy and Japan have also expressed interest. The French government is encouraging private participation by French companies, and the new conservative assembly under Jacques Chirac appears sympathetic to even closer cooperation. I believe that the United States should move aggressively to ensure effective allied participation in the SDI program. The benefits would far exceed the contribution of technological innovation from the laboratories of our allies.

Strategic defense offers the single greatest hope for reinvigorating our nuclear deterrent, and strengthening security and the peace. And allied participation can strengthen the unity of the alliance by directing efforts toward a common purpose: preserving peace without resort to nuclear retaliation.

I see the technological community emerging on both sides of the Atlantic as the next wave of the future. A closer integration of our defense efforts heralds a new era of stunning technological achievement for our alliance, drawing on the best minds and talents our countries together have to offer.

The broad scope of SDI technology, covering as it does almost every dimension of modern science and engineering, will serve to raise the technical level of the alliance benefitting both economic development and military security. You don't need to be a visionary to see that the path of economic development in the next century will be paved with technology crucial to our SDI program — telecommunications, materials, signal processing, propulsion, space vehicles and transportation, and more. And the technological "spin-offs" of the SDI program will contribute to the cohesion of the alliance.

Equally significant are the spin-off technologies applicable to conventional military forces as well. These technologies can dramatically improve military performance and render obsolete the current Soviet numerical advantage in tanks, artillery, tactical aircraft, and infantry — the raw material of Soviet military power in Europe.

In fact, near-term application of SDI technologies is most promising in anti-tactical ballistic missile roles. Before the end of the decade, the Soviet Union will have enough non-nuclear ballistic missiles to target all of NATO's key nuclear and conventional military assets. NATO strategy currently calls for defenses against the full range of Soviet threats — except for ballistic missiles.

As German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner has pointed out, a nuclear missiles defense for NATO Europe would help move NATO away from a strategy of nuclear retaliation toward a defense based on denial, in which the Soviets would know that a conventional attack on Europe has no chance of success.

Ironically, the allies were initially critical of SDI, seeing it as a shield over America, that would leave Europe unprotected. But the most technologically mature aspects of SDI are those which would allow early anti-tactical ballistic missile deployment in NATO Europe, with deployment in the United States to follow. Along with my colleagues Jim Courter and Duncan Hunter, I will be supporting an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill this year that would direct near-term development of missile defenses for Europe.

Of course, until now, all the talk has been about SDI as a pure research program. Bring up the subject of deployment, and suddenly Pentagon and State Department officials get shy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I don't want to see us just research and study and probe and delay. I want to field the systems necessary to protect America and our allies. I want to see SDI move from the drawing boards to the launching platforms. I want to see America *deploy* strategic defense — and the sooner, the better.

Well, what is holding us up? So far as I can determine, the real obstacles aren't technological, although certain avenues of inquiry will remain pure research for years to come. But we don't have to wait until the most elaborate

and comprehensive systems are ready. We can start with the simplest, most technologically mature designs, and build upon that base for the future.

No, the real obstacle to an ambitious testing and deployment schedule for SDI is not technology; it's the ABM Treaty.

#### SDI AND THE ABM TREATY

According to State Department lawyers, the ABM Treaty permits a broad range of SDI-related testing. However, in order to placate arms control enthusiasts here and in Europe, the administration has said that we will limit SDI testing and development to conform to a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We said this with full knowledge that the Soviets have deployed the final link in a battle management radar system at Krasnoyarsk. And they are on the verge of a breakout capability to field a nationwide strategic defense system — in blatant violation of that same treaty.

Clinging to a narrow ABM Treaty interpretation entails grave implications for the success of SDI. We must have realistic testing to know what we are doing right and what isn't working. If we limit testing, we risk wasting money on systems that will not be deployable. We'll also greatly extend the length of time required to reach a deployment decision, because of misallocated resources.

While constraining our own testing, we've given a green light to the Soviets to go out and test, and test again and again. We've said that such testing is perfectly legal under the treaty — even though we know it is unverifiable. So what's to prevent the Soviet Union from pushing full speed ahead with their SDI program? Indeed, our SDI effort should really be called the Strategic Defense *Response*. The Soviet effort has been ongoing for nearly two decades. They are spending as much on strategic defensive systems each year as they devote to their strategic offensive buildup, while we can barely get congressional approval to get our research program underway.

#### REASSESSING OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

I am deeply troubled by the glaring and growing double standard in arms control. The Soviets are violating the ABM Treaty, in a manner that carries grave implications for the integrity of our deterrent. Yet we scrupulously adhere to the most narrow interpretation of that treaty with all the attendant constraints on our defenses.

This double standard extends to the SALT agreements as well. In three comprehensive reports, President Reagan has documented numerous Soviet violations of the SALT I and SALT II agreements and other arms control pacts. Ronald Reagan is the first president in history to make this information available to the public, despite the fact that a number of these violations have been known to the U.S. government for many years.



Truth, in itself, is rarely sufficient to make men act. We must decide whether to continue to observe agreements the Soviets are violating. In his statements, President Reagan has rejected any such double standard in arms control. And yet, just this month, the decision was made to cut up another two Poseidon submarines in order to comply with the terms of SALT II.

Here is a treaty that was never ratified, that was rejected as unequal, unverifiable, and fatally flawed, that by its terms expired in December of last year, and that the Soviets are flagrantly violating — and yet we continue to honor its provisions.

Now I know that some argue that it's a good idea to keep within the terms of the SALT II treaty in order to advance the arms control process. Paul Nitze, one of the most respected critics of the SALT II agreement, answered this point in 1979. "To be for the concept of arms control," he argued, "is not necessarily to be for a specific agreement, in particular to be for SALT II. To favor the institution of marriage is not to wish to be married to the Wicked Witch of the West."

Considering how we have been clinging to the SALT II treaty, one has to wonder how many times the house has to fall on the Wicked Witch of SALT II before it finally dies. As we go about cutting up Poseidon submarines, Soviet arms control violations mount and their military buildup continues unabated.

If we don't do something about the Soviets' disregard of their obligations, arms control will self-destruct. And our security will be jeopardized in the interim.

Albert Einstein once observed, "perfection of means and confusion of goals seems to characterize our age." With our preoccupation over the legal intricacies of arms control, we are in danger of confusing our goals: security and strategic stability.

The Reagan administration is due to report to Congress on how the U.S. should respond to Soviet violations. In addition to accelerating specific defense programs, I believe that, first, we should declare unequivocally that the United States shall no longer be bound by the provisions of SALT II.

Secondly, I believe that we should structure our SDI program to achieve the earliest possible deployment of strategic defenses. At a minimum, we should not hold ourselves to a stricter interpretation of the ABM Treaty than we demand of the Soviets. If the treaty needs to be renegotiated, then let's reopen negotiations. And if it needs to be ended, then let us end it, and move on with meeting our defense requirements.

It is my profound hope that our NATO allies will also undertake a serious reassessment of the Soviet record of non-compliance, its meaning for NATO security and arms control policy, and especially what should be done in response. If the West lacks the courage to exact penalties for clear violations of arms control agreements, we become accomplices in a deliberate and

historical sham that serves only as a cover for the Soviets to gain unilateral advantage.

#### CONCLUSION

Recalling the events of the Washington Naval Arms Control Conference of 1922, Paul Johnson observes, "History shows us the truly amazing extent to which intelligent, well-informed and resolute men, in the pursuit of economy or in an altruistic passion for disarmament, will delude themselves about realities." In defense spending, in arms control endeavors, in our dealings with the Soviets, there is no earthly reason why we should repeat the mistakes of the past.

I have deep faith in the ability of the American people to meet our challenges, and reach beyond them. We are the philosophical heirs of Aristotle, who believed that everything in the world is moved by an urge to become something greater than it is. As a people, we are moved by an urge to reach for the best within us. De Toqueville saw Americans as restless, never satisfied, always pushing for more, taking risks, moving on. The essential vigor, optimism, and self-confidence of American society is precisely what we must communicate to our sister democracies in Europe.