A Bird with One Broken Wing: The Security of Women and States

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An Honors Thesis for the Department of International Relations

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Acknowledgments

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Abstract

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This thesis aims to find the relationship between violence against women and violence among international states. This question is based upon the assumption that those who represent states at war are also the very men that interact with women on the grass-roots level. Are states that have higher rates of gender-based violence more war-prone? Do these states also experience sexual violence during wartime? By finding the relationship between these two levels, we can reveal the underlying causes of violence against women, both at home and away at war. Finally, I end with the implications of these findings and policy recommendations moving forward.

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Chapter 1

The Security of Women and International Security: an Introduction

"Violence against women is perhaps the most shameful human rights violation. And it is perhaps the most pervasive. It knows no boundaries of geography, culture or wealth. As long as it continues, we cannot claim to be making real progress towards equality, development and peace." Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1999)

We live in a world in which women are familiar with violence. In a pathbreaking book, Hudson and her colleagues report an important finding: gender equality is the best predictor of a state's peacefulness[1]. In other words, the more peaceful states also exhibit more equitable societies, or viewing it the other way around, the states that seem most equitable are also most peaceful. It is this relationship that forms the first core question of this thesis: what is the nature of the relationship between domestic gender-based violence and a state's behavior regarding conflict? Given that gender-based violence and international violence appear to be interrelated, we might ask why scholars have ignored the link between the two until recently.

One reason may be that the two concepts inhabit very separate spheres of thought in the average person's mind. When one thinks of war today, s/he may envision a soldier in uniform, tanks and guns, or even drones. Rarely does one think of the rape of large numbers of women as an integral part of international and civil war. Ironically, war and gender are imagined to be worlds apart, while they may be closely related. If war is conflict between peoples, it should not be surprising that it would mirror the norms and values that each society holds. Thus, it is simply

erroneous to assume that war cannot tell us something about the nature of our society, or that the fabric of our society cannot tell us something about how we fight wars. To be sure, the relationship between the two remains murky: we do not yet know if it is war that influences our treatment of women, or if our treatment of women influences how we fight war. Nonetheless, it is a subject both urgent moral concern and growing scholarly interest.

As time unfolds, scholars are finding more and more ways in which women are affected directly and indirectly by conflict. As we ask more questions about these effects, few definitive answers have been found. However, there are some theories that are too robust to ignore. For one, we know that women are hugely hurt by conflict. Poverty, disease, lack of resources and direct violence during conflict all affect women disproportionally. We also know that conflict is often fought by men, who represent their group's culture, values and norms. Fortunately, we are becoming more aware of the need to examine security studies with a gender-sensitive lens. Researchers have recently begun to study the relationship between gender equality, the security of women, and both interstate and intrastate conflict. The conceptualization and measurement of women's security and gender equality varies among scholars. In this study, I focus on violence perpetrated against women for several reasons. First, gender-based violence is as universal a phenomenon as one can possibly find. The history of violence against women can be traced back to the beginnings of mankind. It is also found across the world; even if it presents itself differently in every culture, it is found nonetheless. Second, the harms of violence perpetrated against women do not exclusively affect women. For example, boys who grow up in homes where their mothers are battered will come to know a world where that is familiar and normal. Similarly, war is fought among peoples; thus violence and violence against women are already

so intertwined, particularly if we consider how war is fought. Third, there is something uniquely immoral about violence. It is the only discriminatory act perpetrated against women that cannot be argued to be culturally or morally acceptable. Granted, the attitudes surrounding violence vary. In some places, it is considered justifiable for a husband to beat his wife. However, violence is the only act that seems to disregard any concept of consent and/or desire on the part of the woman. I differentiate violence against women from other acts such as female genital mutilation for this exact reason: sometimes, women seek the latter as a means to achieve a set of standards she believes in. However, the universality of violence allows me to compare the acts across cultures and attitudes, regardless of the form it takes. Lastly, violence in general can most easily escalate the quickest into more intense and harsher discrimination against women, meriting its urgent consideration.

The field of international relations, notably the relevant theoretical and conceptual arguments regarding inter/intrastate conflict, should not be limited to aspects such as ethnic differences, economics, or type of government. My aim is to reexamine the relationship between the security of women domestically and a state's foreign policy using a more nuanced version of the data and a longitudinal approach, that is, by examining levels of gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts. Second, I also ask if the magnitude of gender-based violence prior to a conflict is correlated with the frequency of wartime sexual violence during the conflict. Does a society that is often violent towards women breed warriors that more often use rape as a war-tactic? Third, after examining the strength of the relationship revealed in the two questions above, I seek to understand the "causal story" that underlies the correlations. Specifically, I

assess the plausibility of competing causal explanations, ranging from evolutionary biology to social structures and norms.

Finally, after studying the relationship between the security of women and the violent aggressiveness of states, I ask what we can do about what we currently know. How can we change and improve a state's policy in order to prevent or end gender-based violence and/or war? For example, will implementing policies that punish domestic abuse more severely decrease the likelihood of going to war? Using the data that has been compiled, the answers to these types of questions are literally matters of life and death.

In the following chapters, this thesis will set out to find the link between gender-based violence and a state's war-proneness by collecting data for a number of states and the frequency of the different types of violent acts perpetrated against its women, particularly physical and sexual violence. A state's war-proneness will be measured by various factors including nuclear and heavy weapons, number of conflicts fought, and intensity of conflict. The data will be a compilation of gender-based violence statistics collected from a range of sources. Due to scarce data on the issue, I will be specifically examining the time period of 1989-2010, in terms of both indicators. Then, looking back at other aspects of society during peaks of high gender-based violence, such as level of wealth inequality, and after reading narratives of several perpetrators of gender-based violence and rape during war, I will endeavor to find a causal account of why these acts occur, and why a relationship is formed. I will list and analyze the competing theories that aim to explain the violence and then advise which theory seems to be most accurate. Finally,

given all the data that has been collected, I will consider and list possible policy changes that can alleviate violence against women and/or put an end to war.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

On the fourth of September of 1995, feminists gathered from all over the world in Beijing, China for UNESCO's fourth world conference on women. It thereafter released the "Statement on Women's Contribution to a Culture of Peace," describing what women bring to the table regarding their "distinctive experiences, competence, and perspectives" with the goal of bringing more peace to the world at the start of the new millennia. UNESCO recognized that gender equality and world development, which includes peace or the lack of war, is "inextricably linked." Cited many times after it was released, the statement vocalized that there "can be no lasting peace without development and no sustainable development without full equality between men and women." Thus, we have the beginning of a ongoing search of more details and relationships concerning the link between gender equality and peace. The statement also establishes that this relationship must be studied from the grassroots level: "To combat war as the ultimate expression of the culture of violence, we must address issues such as violence against women in the home, acts and reflexes of aggression and intolerance in everyday life, the banalization of violence in the media, the implicit glorification of war in the teaching of history, trafficking in arms and in drugs, recourse to terrorism and the denial of fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms.[2]" It should not be surprising that certain societal values can be attributed to causes and factors concerning a state's foreign policy decisions. In fact, nearly a decade later, David Sobek, M. Rodwan Abouharb, and Christopher Ingram set out to find the relationship between respect for human rights and a more peaceful foreign policy in their article

"The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad." They test their theory that governments that respect human rights will generate relatively peaceful interactions with other states by studying contentions on pairs of all states from 1980 to 2001. They find a strong correlation: joint respect for human rights decreases the probability of conflict between the two states. This link still reigns positive even after controlling for regime type and other important correlates of international conflicts.[3] They provide the normative explanation:

> *"The normative approach argues that the values of nonviolent and noncoercive conflict resolution serve as the basis for negotiations when disagreements occur at the international level (Dixon 1994). This norm of nonviolent conflict resolution additionally constrains democratic leaders because their public abhors the use of violence (Morgan and Campbell 1991). When democracies interact in the international system these norms are signaled to one another, generating interactions based upon the domestic norms of bargaining and peaceful resolution of disputes."*

Thus the internal conditions and policies of a state can be directly associated with that state's foreign policy decisions, more importantly, the decision to go to war. Therefore, we can expect there to be a direct relationship between the treatment of women, as we are considering women's human rights, more specifically, gender-based violence, and a state's war-proneness. Similarly, if the source of foreign policy decisions lay at the grassroots level, soldiers that compose armed forces will bring societal values to war, consequently bringing with them norms pertaining to violence perpetrated against women. In other words, if the men that compose society are active participators in acts of gender-based violence in the home, are also those that compose armed forces, we will most probably see the use of violent acts against women during conflicts, notably rape as a weapon of war. The causes, consequences and related case studies of this phenomenon are covered extensively in academic research and will be described below. This literature review will proceed by detailing the work pertaining to the four main questions of the project: the

relationship between gender-based violence and war-proneness, the relationship between gender-based violence and rape used as a weapon of war, the backstory of these relationships (if they indeed exist), and possible policy changes that can help aid in combatting conflict and preventing gender-based violence.

Gender Equality and Armed Conflict

In The Status of Women in Preindustrial Societies (1978), Martin King Whyte gives us an overview of a cross-cultural anthropological research project attempting to explain why the status of women varies. He establishes 18 hypotheses and the factors involved in order to test them. These hypotheses relate women's status to several variables, including subsistence, postmarital residence, family organization, centralized political structures, solidarity, and what concerns us most in this literature review: warfare. The two hypotheses he provides pertaining to frequent conflict oppose each other.

Hypothesis 2a: Women will have lower status in cultures with constant warfare than in other cultures.

Hypothesis 2b: Women will have higher status in cultures with constant warfare than in other cultures.

The reasoning behind the first hypothesis (2a) is that societies that are at war constantly will breed male warriors who are violent and aggressive, out of necessity. Women, because of the burdens of pregnancy and nursing, cannot be associated with warfare. Thus, warfare will require women to raise sons who will eventually dominate their wives absolutely, as a result, lowering the status of women in society. The opposite prediction (hypothesis 2b) can be made where warfare is so common, that men are so involved in fighting that they cannot control the

lives of women, consequently leaving women to have more status and influence in society. The results are unexpected; Whyte finds a strong association between frequent warfare and "higher domestic authority of women, somewhat more ritualized solidarity among them and perhaps more value placed on their lives." However, since the study only uses one independent variable (frequent conflict), there is no opportunity to examine patterns across different indicators regarding women's status. The study also cannot be applied to modern nation states, as the correlations only apply to preindustrial societies. The research and questions is groundbreaking nonetheless, and leads the way for others in the future. Furthermore, because Whyte's predictions did not end up being supported, he gives no logical explanation for his findings. He informs us that "we are left with a puzzle."[4] Fortunately, other researchers and scholars followed his footsteps and set out to uncover more of this puzzle, which, at the time, was virgin territory.

Three years later, in 1981, Professor Peggy Sanday examines female-male power roles in 150 tribal societies across different cultures in her 10 years worth of research presented in her book Female Power and Male Dominance. Sanday lists five factors that one can look for to determine the level of aggression towards women: expectation that males should be tough, brave, or aggressive, the presence of men's houses or specific places where only men may congregate, frequent fighting or wife beating, institutionalization or regular occurrence of rape, and raiding other groups for wives. Two of these elements involve direct gender-based violence. She further explains, later in the book, that these factors are also evidence of a male-dominated society, and when such societies are put under stress, the result is "endemic warfare and chronic hunger." Sanday then cites another scholar, Marvin Harris, who posits that a cycle of violence exists, as male supremacist institutions arise as a "by-product of warfare, of the male monopoly over weapons, and of the use of sex for the nurturance of aggressive male personalities.[5]" Thus, as

men develop their dominance by perpetrating violence against women, which in turn also leads to higher frequency of warfare, they also reinforce the sources that legitimize the gender-based violence to begin with. Her data confirm that societies where sexes are unequal also have the highest rates of endemic war. Overall, Sanday provides extensive research on the basic questions regarding male and female powers and a theoretical perspective pertaining to her data. She establishes a link between warfare and the asymmetry of the sexes, contradicting her predecessor, and paving the way for newer and more substantial research in the field.

Incorporating more complex details into the study of gender and social organization, Burton Pasternak, Carol Ember and Melvin Ember, explore ethnographic accounts and cross-cultural studies with a special focus on family and marriage in Sex, Gender, and Kinship. They examine relationships between men and women in different social situations, such as marriage, divorce, and division of labor. They also investigate social groups beyond the family and how they vary from one another. There are two developments in their work that pertains to this project. First, upon citing Whyte's work on the link between warfare and women's status, Pasternak, Ember and Ember postulate that we should focus instead on the type of warfare (civil, interstate, ethnic, etc.), as that dictates where the men will be in the society. Second, they find that "societies that have violent methods of conflict resolution within communities, physical punishment of criminals, higher frequencies of warfare, and cruelty toward enemies generally also have more wife-beating.[6]" This establishes that there is indeed a correlation between warfare and gender-based violence. However, in this case, according to Pasternak et al, the relationship described here goes the opposite direction than predicted; this study indicates that gender-based violence is the effect of frequent warfare, instead of frequent warfare resulting in high rates of gender-based violence. Although Pasternak et al venture to find more answers pertaining to

relationships between the sexes, the answers in their work uncovering the mystery of Whyte's "puzzle" are insufficient. No attempt is made to find the effect of warfare on the status of women but we can keep in mind the type of conflict in order to better assess the situation. Furthermore, this project endeavors to find the relationship between warfare and gender-based violence, which has a much broader definition than merely wife-beating. However, the work of Pasternak et al is invaluable and we can now build upon it.

Almost three decades after Whyte's work was published, Mary Caprioli sets out to find the link between gender inequality and internal conflict in "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict." We can observe here that Caprioli and Erik Melander, whose work will be described below, took the advice of Pasternak et al. and started to study the link between gender equality and the type of warfare, instead of only the frequency of warfare. Caprioli examines the relationship between gender equality and internal conflict, whereas Melander examines intrastate conflict. Both use the definition of conflict that PRIO/Uppsala provides with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year. In her study, Caprioli hypothesizes that states with more gender equality will have lower levels of internal conflict. She measures gender equality using the World Bank's measurement of fertility rate and percent women in the labor force. Her controls include polity type, transitional polities, GDP per capita, average GDP per capita growth rate, prior domestic conflict, minorities at risk and peace years. The results confirm her hypothesis; gender equality, as defined above, increases the likelihood that a state will experience internal conflict.[7] Nevertheless, we are still unsure of the direction of causality, as the causal arrow could go both ways. Gender equality could be either the cause of effect of frequent and intense warfare, or both. The work of Caprioli, however unprecedented and innovative it may be, still does not define gender equality in terms of gender-

based violence, and does not use a longitudinal approach when studying this relationship. Caprioli nonetheless shows that this relationship is not one that should be ignored or underestimated, and requires further study.

Erik Melander, taking on what Caprioli left out, studies gender equality and intrastate armed conflict in democracies. Gender equality, as defined by Melander, is measured by a dichotomous indicator whether the highest leader of the state is female, the percentage of women in parliament, and the female-to-male higher education ratio. As stated above, he uses the same definition of conflict, which is armed force between two parties, one being a governing state, that results in at least 25 battle deaths per year. He then gives two theoretical reasons for why there would be a positive correlation: first, the essentialist argument that women are more averse to war, so involving more women in decision-making processes should decrease the likelihood of war; second, the constructivist argument that claims that societies that more equitable towards women are more equitable in general to a broader range of its population, in effect decreasing the likelihood of war with other groups. Upon testing his six hypotheses, he finds that that the higher the percentage of women in parliament and female-to-male higher education ratio, the lower the levels of intrastate armed conflict generally is. He also finds that the more democratic a state is, the higher the chance of a pacifying effect of female representation in parliament tends to be.[8] Thus we have a very clear relationship between some more elements of gender equality and warfare, still not using gender-based violence. However, the link between (some aspects of) gender equality and the frequency of two different types of conflict is established thanks to the work of Caprioli and Melander. My research will hopefully shed more light on the backstory of the factors that may go into gender equality (as defined by gender-based violence) and its correlation with conflict.

One of the most important and extensive works done pertaining to this project, Sex and World Peace, was written by Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett uncover much of the puzzle that was described by Whyte more than three decades earlier. Probably the most immense amount of data gathered by any project of its kind, Sex and World Peace is a compilation of various elements that chronicle the micro-level treatment of women and their relationship to macro-level state peacefulness. What relates to this section is Hudson et al.'s work on the "physical security of women" and its link to the security of a state. The physical security of women is measured by the rate of domestic violence, rape, marital rape and the murder of women. They define the security of a state using three factors: the Global Peace Index (GPI), which is based on 24 indicators, the States of Concern to the International Community (SOCIC), and Relations with Neighbors (RN). Hudson et al predict that as women's physical security increases in a state, so will the GPI, SOCIC and RN. They also predict that women's physical security should also be a better predictor of a state's security than other indicators such as level of democracy, level of wealth (GDP), or Islamic civilization. Using the WomanSTATS database, the results confirm their hypotheses and finally demonstrate to the world that there is a clear and defined link between violence against women and a state's war-proneness.[9] My research is very tied to the study found in Hudson et al's work; however, there are some changes and improvements that can be made. First, as we will unveil below, this project will deal with violence against women during conflicts, which is not treated by Sex and World Peace. Second, my definition of the "physical security of women" will attempt to be broadened to allow for a range of different cultural activities that may involve violence against women. Third and perhaps most important, this thesis will venture to find longitudinal data in order to more accurately measure the relationship between the security of women and the

security of a state. Hudson et al plays an essential role in not only my research, but in proving to the world that to protect women is to ultimately protect the world.

Finally, and most recently, Åsa Ekvall develops the findings of Hudson et al, with a closer look to norms and attitudes associated with gender equality and conflict. She puts forth five hypotheses:

H1 The higher the level of political and socioeconomic gender equality in a country, the less likely it is that it will experience an intrastate armed conflict.

H2 The higher the level of political and socioeconomic gender equality in a country, the more peaceful the country is in general.

H3 The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the less likely it is that there will be an armed conflict.

H4 The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the more peaceful it will be in general.

H5 The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the higher the level of political ad socioeconomic equality.

We can see the logical reasoning that develops from the first hypothesis to the last. Using data from the GGGI in 2008, the Uppsala Conflict Data Base (UCDB), the World Values Survey (WVS), and the same GPI used by Hudson et al, all of the hypotheses are confirmed, with a slightly weaker correlation regarding hypothesis 5.[10] The possible explanations for these findings will be explained later on, however, once again, we are faced with another angle to view this relationship between gender equality or the treatment of women and the frequency of armed conflict. What makes Ekvall's work unique is that she also examines the perception of gender equality along with the actual political and socioeconomic gender equality to better assess

attitudes and norms. This thesis will build upon her work when considering policy changes ad improvements. For now however, we should keep in mind that Ekvall's work is the most recent study on the link between gender equality and warfare, and one of much discussion and debate that is still present today.

Violence Against Women Before and During Armed Conflict

In order to understand the relationship between gender-based violence and violence perpetrated against women during conflict, we must first assess the motivations behind it. Although there are no studies that specifically postulate whether societies that inhabit men who are particularly violent towards women will also use violence towards women in wartime, there is extensive research that investigates rape used as a weapon of war and related case studies.

In 1998, Cynthia Enloe, in "All the Men Are in the Militia, All the Women Are Victims," tells the story of an ordinary Serb before, during and after the Bosnian War. This man, Borislav Herak, a nonentity before the war, was then one of the most recognized faces that invoked terror and anxiety in both the Serb and Bosnian peoples. He was tried for his crimes against humanity, which included mass rape and murder. The interesting element about this narrative is that Borislav was not characterized as particularly violent before the conflict had begun.[11] From what we know, he had never raped a women before the conflict and there were no records of his ever having vented his personal frustrations on a woman. This begs the question: what changed Borislav? Is the stress of war so intense that it can change men into monsters?

Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovik rejects this concept in "War and Violence Against Women." Nikolic-Ristanovik examines two forms of violence against women using the war in the former Yugoslavia: sexual violence related to torture and killing of women by soldiers during the war,

and domestic violence perpetrated by civilians in wartime. She uses interviews with refugees and cases reported to the Belgrade SOS hotline in order to collect her data. She asserts that men "have been raping and otherwise sexually abusing women throughout history, in times of peace as well as in war. In wars men only continue to do what they did before but in a more mindless and indiscriminate war and with more 'comprehension' and 'excuses' for their behavior." This directly refutes the implications put forth in the narrative told by Enloe two years later. If Nikolic-Ristanovik's claim is correct, then my prediction that more violent societies will also have higher rates of gender-based violence during war will be accurate. War, it seems, is a disruption to social norms, allowing for less inhibitions and regulations concerning violence. Nikolic-Ristanovik later attributes domestic violence and violence against women during wartime to the permeation of violence in every aspect of society, such as the media and stressed veterans. She argues that some factors that can set the foundation for higher rates of violence against women are the plethora of accessible weapons, stress from war, financial difficulties, and refugee status.[12] Thus, different stresses can cause men to become mass murderers and rapists, like in the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, Borislav Herak. In order to better prevent and/or end this violence, we must examine these conditions thoroughly, which we will return to in the next section.

Citing Nikolic-Ristanovik's work and many others, Jennifer Turpin suggests that there is a very real connection between gendered violence at the micro and macro levels, which "calls for an inquiry into the gendered dynamics of power from the household to the international arena." Turpin invokes the research done on the subject in "Many Faces," and affirms that during wartime, there is an increase in the number of sons who commit violence against their mothers, an increase in the number of non-gendered assaults involving weapons, an increase in violence in

marriages where the husband and wife's ethnicity differ, an increase in alcohol consumption among men returning from combat, and an increase in wife battering and rape in conditions of economic decline or refugee status.[13] Therefore, one can infer that the violence committed during wartime is contagious, confirming the link between violence before and during war.

This concept is returned to a decade later, and confirmed by Jennifer Lansford and Kenneth Dodge in "Cultural Norms for Adult Corporal Punishment of Children and Societal Rates of Endorsement and Use of Violence." In their study, they predict that societal rates of corporal punishment of children can predict societal levels of violence, using "culture" as the unit of analysis. Lansford and Dodge use data retrieved from anthropological records that include 186 cultures, varying in language, economy, political organization, descent and historical time. They measure the frequency and harshness of corporal punishment of children, inculcation of aggression in children, warfare, interpersonal violence among adults, and demographic, socioeconomic, and parenting covariates. Their results find that a higher and more intense rate of corporal punishment is directly related to higher rates of aggression in children, warfare, and interpersonal violence, after controlling for demographic, socioeconomic and parenting confounds.[14] These relationships imply that violence is indeed "contagious" insofar that violence on the micro level can predict and influence violence on the macro level. One can also infer that wartime is no exception. If violence against children or women can predict rates of warfare, this can also go the other way around; societies with high rates of war can predict high rates of gender-based violence, as we observed in the last section. Thus, violence anywhere only breeds more violence, whether at micro or macro levels of society. So we can expect that violence against women before war can result in higher rates of violence perpetrated against women

during war. This is based on the idea that if men treat their “own” women violently, they would do much worse not only during wartime, but also to enemy women.

In Women and War, Joyce Kaufman and Kristen Williams reveal what has long been invisible in the study of international relations and security: gender. They investigate the roles of women and how they respond to conflict before, during and after war and further argue that conceptions of gender are deeply intertwined with the way international relations is framed. In their work, Kaufman and Williams cite Mary Caprioli and Kimberly Douglass who, in "Nation Building and Women: The Effect of Intervention on Women's Agency," state: "Violence against women is related to broader cultural norms permissive of gendered violence, which escalates during conflict." After the conflict ends, the "heightened level of violence often becomes the new norm post-conflict."[15] This indicates that the relationship between the two may go both ways; gender-based violence may give way to more violence against women during war, which then in effect reinforces that norm after the conflict has ended. However, there is still more to discover in terms of a broader-ranged study which can also gather longitudinal data in order to better assess the relationship between the two and more accurately measure the difference in intensity of the violence.

Similarly, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern conducted interviews with soldiers in the Congo (DRC) who were perpetrators of sexual violence against women. Baaz and Stern challenge much of the literature that understands sexual violence as separate from other violence in war, and analyze the interconnections between issues involving gender and war in their very recent book, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?. They find that with the outbreak of war, such gender-based violence became normalized in the communities. Sexual violence perpetrated by civilians additionally increased during the conflict.[16] Like Nikolic-Ristanovic stated earlier,

social norms only continue into conflict, except with less restraint and more "excuses." It is these "excuses" and the reasoning that others have come up with that we will cover in the next section.

The "Why" Story

The first step required to explain violence against women in and outside of war is to recognize that it has everything to do with power. We live in a society that unevenly distributes power, most of the time allocating it to men. Second, we must recall that conflict and violence are not only interconnected, but they are both gendered activities as well. Caroline Moser in her "The Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict," offers an operational framework that allows us to improve solutions to conflict by incorporating women, thereby distributing power slightly more evenly.[17] Using her framework and in effect incorporating a gendered lens to conceptions regarding war and peace, we can see the related individual, interpersonal, institutional, and structural levels affected by conflict, thus providing us with the required tools to identify underlying factors that can be linked to potential solutions. She urges us to consider gender in disciplines that may seem unrelated. So upon taking Moser's advice and integrating gender into our understanding of conflict and violence, we should be able to get a glimpse of the underlying story behind violence against women and consequently get closer to finding viable solutions.

In "Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective," Barbara Smuts offers a biological reasoning behind rape, or what she terms sexual coercion, and its effects on the social system. She puts forth five hypotheses. First, she posits that male aggression towards women will increase when female alliances are weak. Second, wife beating will increase when females lack support from their natural kin. Third, male aggression towards women will increase when

male alliances are particularly important and well developed. Finally, women are more vulnerable to male aggression as male control of resources increase.[18] Thus, we have a few social elements that we may not have thought of as contributing to violence against women. Not surprisingly, as men collect to form coalitions and strong bonds, they come to have more power to institutionalize practices and concepts that favor men. Separating women from the only biological allies they have, according to Smuts, makes them weaker and unable to gather to form similar groups. When men have access and control resources, they have more leverage on how society functions.

Indeed, if society were more willing to live in a more equitable world, women's groups would have no trouble forming to gain lost power. In fact, Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner found in their study that those (men and women) who were in favor of gender equality were more averse to force as a policy instrument. Those that are willing to live in a more equitable society are also less likely to use aggression and violence to solve their problems. Those who are against violence are also those in favor of gender equality, which implies that those that support violence as a policy tool also would reject any policy change for more equitable relations.

In fact, using state-produced propaganda that endorsed violence as an acceptable tool to resolve conflict, Turpin finds, resulted in an increase in violence against women. She also finds that in wartime, there is a huge influx of weapons into society that are not controlled or limited to battlefield use. Additionally, soldiers coming home are "frustrated, nervous, intolerant and aggressive," resulting in more lashing out against the weak in society, which so happen to be women. Smuts' idea about controlling resources could also be applied here, as weapons are supplies used for warring. It would be reasonable then, that those who had most access to weapons, would also use them to violate women.

Joshua Goldstein, who has aided tremendously in the field of women and war, offers his own story of what is really going on regarding gender and the war system. First, he tests explanations involving biological gender differences that may explain the gendering of war: men's genes program them for violence; testosterone makes men more aggressive than women; men are bigger and stronger than women; men's brains are adapted for long-distance mobility and for aggression; and women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude participation in war. Goldstein finds that there is some empirical evidence for all five statements, but only in terms of average differences between genders, not categorically. Next, Goldstein explores structures of groups and relations between them, leading to more tested hypotheses: "male bonding" is important to the conduct of war; men operate better than women in hierarchies (like armies); men see intergroup relations, as between the two sides in a war, differently from women; and childhood gender segregation leads to later segregation in combat forces. The gender segregation theory came out with the most empirical support in this round of tests. However, Goldstein combines the two sets and remarks that none are empirically significant enough as to be able to adequately explain the exclusion of women in war. Combining the two sets, the most supported theories are: men's greater average size and strength; men's subtle brain adaptation for rough-and-tumble play, aggression and spatial skills; men's somewhat different orientation towards competitive hierarchies; and the tendency to segregate by gender in childhood, reinforcing differences between gendered childhood cultures. The problem with these theories however, as Goldstein recognizes, is that they do not offer a multi-causal explanation, since any two statements may overlap each other. The two hypotheses that would clearly isolate women's suitability for war would be that men's aggression were caused by testosterone levels,

or that "aggressive genes" existed on the Y chromosome, neither resulting in any empirical evidence in Goldstein's work.

Goldstein also discusses how the war system is inherently gendered and uses gender as a tool to function as a "central component of masculinity." He tests some theories that have been floating around in the field. First, societies breed hardened men suitable for war by framing war as a "test of manhood." Second, masculine war roles depends on feminine roles in the war system, such as mothers and sweethearts. Third, women are averse to war and actively oppose it, consequently associating peace movements with femininity. Women also symbolize, according to Goldstein, a dominated group and thus cannot be included in the armed ranks of dominators. He concludes that causality runs both ways between war and gender. He attributes the two main causes of gendering war to small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength and roughness and cultural molding of tough, brave men who feminize enemies in dominating them.[19] The latter includes socialization before and during wartime to produce “hyper-masculine” men who are more inclined to dominate women using violence.

Similarly, Susanne Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza-Lopez in "Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action," states "limited research suggests that cultures which limit women's access to resources (economic, political, social) and decision-making power, and which characterize women as inferior to men, treat women as property and accept domestic violence as a norm, are more prone to repression and violent conflict in the public arena.[20]" Like Smuts, Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez recognize a very strong link between violence against women and access to resources. They also use the angle that Tessler et al used, looking at attitudes towards norms instead of only actions.

Kaufman and Williams explain that the nature of warfare is changing, now affecting more civilians, and targeting women more than ever before. They attribute the general act of rape as a weapon of war to the intent to humiliate and dishonor, citing Bangladesh as an example. They then give some other motivations that are linked to specific conflicts. For example, rape as a weapon of war was used in Guatemala and Peru with the intent of repression and the spread of fear and terror across the peoples. In Somalia and Sudan, it was used to define the "other" and dominate and humiliate the men who were not able to protect their women. In the Congo, rape as a weapon of war was framed to be because of masculine "needs," confirming Goldstein's hypotheses about the gendering of the war system. Kaufman and Williams also cite the example of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where rape was used to impregnate the "other" and end their familial ancestry.[21] So why does rape as a weapon of war happen? For Kaufman and Williams, it depends on the conflict. Looking upon the causes of war with a gendered lens, however, may offer a response.

The literature on the subject of why rape is used as a weapon of war is extensive. However, it seems that the study of the link between gender-based violence is so new, that researchers have just recently found a possible link, and so have not yet started to explain why it could be there. The current research that covers the first main question of this project (the relationship between the security of women and war-proneness of a state), particularly the works of Hudson, Ekvall, Melander and Caprioli, do not give sufficient explanations of the underlying factors that may explain their data. As for the second main question (the link between high rates of gender-based violence outside of war and high rates of violence against women used as a weapon of war), the literature makes clear that violence breeds violence, but, with the exception of Goldstein, does not use Moser's suggestions on using a gendered lens. We are left with some

explanations of why some of the violence occurs in some areas at certain times, however, not why it ever occurs at all. These explanations are vital in responding to a more important question, which also happens to be the fourth research question in this project: What do we do about it? This will be covered later on in the thesis, after discussion of the data.

Chapter 3

Methodology and Definitions

In this section, I review the research questions that underlie this study, , the theoretical framework on which they are based, the definitions that may be contended with, and the type of data collected to analyze each research question.

Questions and Correlations

1. What is the relationship between the security of women in a particular state (and consequently, gender equality) and a state's war-proneness?
2. What is the relationship between the security of women and wartime sexual violence against women committed by a particular state's male soldiers?
3. Potential follow-up question: What is the relationship between a state's war-proneness and it propensity to engage in wartime sexual violence?
4. Why would domestic gender-based violence increase with the onset of war? What are the existing explanations of these phenomena, and which are most reasonable?

Definitions

Gender equality will be defined as equal power relations between the sexes, best distinguished by the equal freedom from fear of violence. I argue that violence against women (also known as gender-based violence, or for the purposes of this paper, security of women) is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which has led to domination over and discrimination against women and to the prevention of the full

advancement of women. Furthermore, violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. I will be measuring the freedom from fear of violence by examining the rates of gender-based violence defined below. This logic presupposes that if it is more common to be violated, women, in general, will feel more fear of violence. Conversely, if gender-based violence occurrences are low, I will infer that women will feel more secure in their environment, overall. I will also be studying gender-based violence because of its universality in most, if not all, societies.

Gender-based violence will be defined as a breach of physical space by using unwanted physical force, including but not limited to, murder, homicide, rape, marital rape, domestic violence, sexual assault, kicking, slapping, punching, dragging, choking, burning. These acts are usually committed by men against women in the public or private sphere. Other violent acts, such as female-genital mutilation, will not be studied in this thesis, as the act is commonly performed by other women, and sometimes with consent. Charlotte Watts and Cathy Zimmerman have similarly not included several important forms of violence against women, including elder female abuse, dowry deaths, acid throwing, and female genital mutilation. Unfortunately, due to the lack of comprehensive and consistent data, I will be narrowing the definition of gender-based violence to physical assault and sexual assault.

For the wartime sexual violence indicator, I will be following the definition used by the International Criminal Court (ICC). I define sexual violence as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and forced sterilization/abortion. Following Elisabeth Wood (2009), I will also include sexual mutilation and sexual torture. This definition (unlike the one above) does not exclude the existence of female perpetrators and male victims, both of which are observed in the data. However, the majority of victims are female and the majority of

perpetrators are male. I focus on violations that involve direct force and/or physical violence. Acts that do not go beyond verbal sexual harassment, abuse or threats, including sexualized insults, forced nudity, or verbal humiliation are excluded.

A state's war-proneness will be defined by the frequency of inter or intra state conflict (counted separately but equally) and the intensity of warfare, defined by the number of battle deaths. I will be counting both civil and interstate wars because I am not concerned about the cause of war, but the willingness of the state to engage in armed violent conflict. I will be using the definition of Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) of armed conflict: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" The reason behind the choice of the lower number of battle-related deaths (25 deaths) as opposed to the typical thousand deaths is to be more inclusive to conflicts that would otherwise not be included but can still inform us greatly on this subject. For example, the war for the independence of Bangladesh, that is known to have largely included wartime rape, would not have been included if we were to only study conflict with at least one thousand battle deaths.

Theoretical Framework

In order to find whether a correlation between the rate of gender-based violence and a state's war proneness exists, I will be studying the number and intensity of conflicts that all independent states have engaged in and comparing that to each state's physical and sexual assault statistics. I will be studying all existing states (for which there is sufficient data) and their

respective number of conflicts for all available years and their rates of gender-based violence, then plotting the coded data points (the unit of analysis being an independent state) for both on a scatter diagram, to eventually analyze whether a correlation exists.

One must first establish a probable cause in order to then advance further in developing a deeper and more concrete connection. There are many different hypotheses pointing to reasons why the two variables may be connected. Some scholars will equate gender equality to whether there is a female leader, or the percentage of female officials in government, and claim that the higher percentage of women in office may lead to a more peaceful foreign policy. Other scholars have proven that societies who are more violent towards women are more violent overall, leading to the connection to a more violent state in its foreign relations. There is substantial evidence linking gender inequality and insecurity of states. I explained in the introduction why I am studying violence against women in particular as a means to measure gender equality. Therefore, it should not be a large leap to claim that violence against women would also be an indicator for state-sponsored violence.

The second question asked whether there is a correlation between the security of women outside of war and wartime sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers. The assumption here is that soldiers are a representative sample of the society in which they belong, and would therefore bring the norms and values (gender equality or lack thereof) into war. I hypothesize that societies with higher rates of gender-based violence will also have more intense rates of wartime sexual violence. I also predict that wartime sexual violence will be higher than peacetime levels, as wartime militarizes and heightens the violent behavior that could have been invisible before the conflict.

There are many reasons and explanations that exist of these possible correlations. I will categorize and detail each one and outline their strengths and weaknesses and critically analyze each of their viability.

Data & Sources

Dependent Variable	**Variable/Measure**	**Number of Countries Data Available**	**Years Available**	**Source/Dataset**
War Proneness	Frequency of Conflict; Battle toll average/aggregate of conflicts	All States that existed at the time	Most of the 19th, 20th and 21st century is available.	UCDP/PRIO dataset for conflict, conflict years, battle deaths
Sexual Violence in War	SVAC Dataset builds on the definition used by the International Criminal Court, and includes (1) rape, (2) sexual slavery, (3) forced prostitution, (4) forced pregnancy, and (5) forced sterilization/abortion. I also include (6) sexual mutilation, and (7) sexual torture.	All States that engaged in an armed conflict	All conflict years since 1989	Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset produced by Ragnhild Nordås and Dara Kay Cohen
Independent Variables				
"Security of Women" Variables	Physical Assault, and Sexual Assault	89/81 countries respectively	Mostly starting from late 1990s-2010 but there is some data from as early as 1980.	UN, DHS survey data, the UNECE and WHO multi country surveys

Quality of Data

There is a very limited amount of data regarding the security of women. I have found mainly two types of data: first, data reported to officials, and second, survey data collected from international organizations. I have chosen to use survey data for a number of reasons. First, the UNECE Statistical Database or the United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 1990 - 2002, compiled from national official sources, is inconsistent and excludes many countries. The data for some countries are more realistic than others and there are many countries with many gaps in the yearly data available. Second, there are many hurdles that prevent women from reporting crimes, especially sexually related crimes, to officials. Survey data is more reliable proven by the fact that the numbers are higher and there are fewer gaps in the data available. However, both sources of data are scarce and could definitely be improved. The dataset that I have compiled includes data from UN Women's "Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country," Measure DHS+ "Profiling Domestic Violence: A Multi-Country Study," and WHO's multi-country studies on violence. I will be using decade averages for each state from 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2010. I will then plot the averages for each indicator of Security of Women (physical assault, sexual assault, etc.) along with each state's code for war-proneness on separate scatter diagrams. In sum, there will be a separate spreadsheet for each indicator measuring Security of Women.

The second research question addresses the correlation described above and its relationship with sexual violence perpetrated during war. I will use the same data used as gender-based violence above and instead of plotting them alongside war-proneness, using the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset produced by Ragnhild Nordås and Dara Kay Cohen to examine whether those states also have a high use of sexual violence during armed conflict.

The SVAC dataset codes sexual violence during war on a 3-point scale, 3 being massive and 0 being no reported incidents. They use three different sources, resulting in three different codes for each year that each state is/was in conflict. Because sexual violence will always be underreported regardless of the source or circumstances, I will be taking the average of the highest score for each year, as that will be the closest representation to reality. However, a limitation of the SVAC dataset is that it only includes conflicts that occur after 1989. Therefore, I will only be using the security of women data from 1990-2000 and 2000-2010, excluding the 1980-1990, as the SVAC dataset starts at 1989. However, this may inform us more due to an increase in the awareness of violence against women, reporting and finding data on the issue is more accessible and accurate. Moreover, as recent research has indicated, there has also been an increase in the targeting of civilians during armed conflicts, particularly women. Assuming this is the case, it would be more practical and relevant to study more recent changes and potential phenomena as they are still occurring. Third and finally, the more recent data is most likely the most reliable data and would potentially work better in telling us the relationship between the two variables.

For my third research question, I will be combining qualitative and quantitative methods to find a response. Question three asks why, in a particular state, sexual violence and gender-based violence would increase with the onset of war, or why they may be intertwined to begin with. I will be comparing the validity of competing hypotheses to best ascertain the appropriate explanation. For some of these hypotheses, I will be using quantitative data to test the theory. For example, the hypothesis that rates of gender-based violence rises because of an environment of overall lawlessness could be tested by examining crime statistics of the time. Similarly, the hypothesis that sexual violence is used as a method of ethnic cleansing could be checked by

studying rates of pregnancies during the time. However, other hypotheses such as the theory that rape as a weapon of war is used as a way to "steal women" will be tested using more qualitative methods and narratives.

The answers to all the questions above will lead to a section of analysis. This section will outline the implications of the findings and where we can go moving forward, using the knowledge that we will then have.

Chapter 4

Differences from Past Research

In this section, I compare my research and methodology from other similar works outlined in the literature review.

The research that is closest to this thesis is the work of Hudson et al., in their book, *Sex and World Peace*. They examine three principal measures as the dependent variables. First, the Global Peace Index (GPI), based on 24 indicators, includes measures such as "perceived criminality in society," "jailed population," and "UN peace-keeping funding" along with many others. As important as these may be in measuring the "security" of states, these measures are not appropriate measures when analyzing a state's war-proneness because they do not measure the aggressiveness of a state as a whole, nor the likelihood of the state engaging in an armed conflict. A large jailed population, for example, could imply two things. It could mean that the judicial system is very strict or efficient, but it could also mean that the population disregards the law more often. Neither of these explain why a state would go to war more often. Second, they investigate a general measure of the "behavioral deviancy" in light of international norms, also known as the "States of Concern to the International Community." The SOCIC score is presented on a 5 point ordinal scale ranging from states that almost never violate any international norms, especially in terms of use of force, to those states that frequently violate international political and economic norms on top their egregious violation of use-of-force norms. As this may change with time, and also seems quite subjective, I will be excluding this measure from my research. Third, they analyze one of the GPI indicators, namely, "Relations with Neighbors," which seems

more appropriate but also gives some states an advantage. This 5-point ordinal measure is coded by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and seeks to capture how strained or how peaceful interstate relations are between nations with contiguous borders. However, states with little to no borders (islands, etc.) will be at an advantage, as they will have less interaction with other states. Moreover, this measure does not take into account the broad and historical context that comes into play with neighboring states. If one state separated from its neighbor, the relations between those two states will be tenser than two states that have been separate for decades. This tension does not dictate the war-proneness of a state. My research aims to find a more concrete way to measure a state's war-proneness by focusing solely on war and its physical effects (death tolls). If, for example, a state is very war-prone, it will likely also have many conflicts with neighbors. However, states that have conflicts with neighbors do not necessarily go to war more often.

As for the independent variable, "security of women," to compensate for many missing values, comparability and longitudinally, Hudson et al created a multi-variable scale in which they measured violence against women on a scale from 1-5. This is a laudatory attempt at facing the challenge of finding data on the issue. However, they weigh certain acts of violence more than others in this scale. For example, a state that may have lower rates of violence perpetrated but not a law that specifically targets marital rape will be scored lower than a state that may have higher rates of violence but has a law on marital rape. Similarly, there is also some uneven weighing involved with states that have honor killings and/or femicides. Unfortunately, this scale is not consistent and reliable when it comes to comparing states and rates of gender-based violence. Moreover, Hudson et al even advise that they did not focus on statistical data, but instead focused on reports and used narratives to put the situation in context. Furthermore, using laws and the enforcement of laws when comparing states becomes irrelevant and murky, as the

legislative system in all states function differently. For example, one state may not have a law against femicide because of its rare occurrence, or the culture finds the practice taboo. This does not mean that women in this state are not as secure as in another state with the existing laws. Also, the existence of laws may not necessarily translate into the enforcement of these laws. Furthermore, the enforcement of law is difficult to measure, especially to foreigners. Although I will be sacrificing some credibility in order to analyze only data found on gender-based violence, it will be more reliable and objective if I allow the numbers to speak for themselves. That said, qualitative data could compensate for the problem of under-reporting.

In summary, whereas Hudson and her colleagues measured the "security" of states, I will specifically examine a state's war-proneness. Regarding the "security of women," I will analyze the only universal harm to women – violence, compromising the lack of data for a more concrete and consistent method of measuring the condition of women around the world.

Other studies, such as the studies of Melander and Caprioli, mentioned in the previous chapter, are also examining different issues. Although we are all studying gender equality, the indicators used by both Melander and Caprioli do not take into context the cultural differences of women around the world. For example, Caprioli defines gender equality using fertility rate and percent women in the labor force. These two indicators, although thoughtful in that these statistics are more accurate and accessible, universalize the priorities of women everywhere. By measuring the percent women in the labor force, Caprioli makes assumptions about the economic and social environment of the states she studies. If, for example, women do not have to work out of the home, or simply do not prioritize it, that society should not be deemed unequal. The history of women in labor positions in this country ironically traces its history back to the World Wars, and the necessity of more bodies in the workplace. Considering the source of our

experiences in the United States, although the percent of women in the labor force could tell us about women's economic independence, it does not inform us on the overall status of women in any state. Instead, I use gender-based violence as the indicator of an unequal society, as it is much more difficult to argue that women consent to violence than a lack of presence in the workplace.

The same can be said about fertility rate. There are two issues that arise with this indicator. First, the lack of resources and wealth of each state may hinder the use of contraception. In many states, only higher class individuals may access contraceptive methods, and the majority of the country are left without. This indicator, then, cannot tell us about the status of women, as the state should not be expected to allocate resources to contraceptive methods when it struggles to feed its people, even though controlling fertility could, in a way, allow a state to make sure it can feed its people. Second, the cultural expectation of birthing and raising children is different in many states. In many cultures, the role of the mother is sacred; women who birth more children are praised and put on a pedestal. Caprioli, by choosing fertility rate as an indicator, is imposing Western ideals of motherhood and values to states that may not prioritize the same way. By doing so, cultures where motherhood is admired, are punished and deemed inadequate for women.

Melander similarly chooses indicators such as percentage of women in parliament and female-to-male higher education ratios. Again, if women play a different role in society, where higher education is not prioritized or necessary, there is no reason why that society cannot attain gender equality. To dictate how women should lead their lives if they would like to live in an equal world is unfair. Although one would think that the higher percentage of women leaders would result in gender equality, Melander makes the assumption that a higher percentage of

women in Parliament would result in a better representation of women at all. He also assumes that states that do not have a Parliament can never attain gender equality. Melander and other scholars should not dictate how women should lead their lives in an “equitable” society. On the other hand, my research looks at how women are treated by men. Not only do these indicators rely on spurious assumptions, they also demonstrate the implications about the way this subject has been studied in the common discourse.

My research builds on the previous studies but adds an element of statistical analysis that has not been given adequate attention thus far. I have compiled a dataset that uses every state, for which data is available, as the unit of analysis and the respective statistics available on physical and sexual violence against women for every five years from 1985-2010. I have chosen to use two types of violence universally exercised all over the world against women. Other than the problem of the categorizing itself, these indicators do not imply or assume any particular culture difference and are based on the concrete fact that violence is usually not consented. I have created two sheets, separated by type of violence, along side the list of states, the data on that type of violence, how many conflicts that state has engaged in, the sum of battle death tolls, the number of years that state has been in conflict since 1989, and the state's highest rating for sexual violence in wartime (using the SVAC dataset). The dataset also includes basic information on that state such as population, GDP, birth rate, death rate and literacy rate.

Chapter 4

Problems with Data

Since July 2011, there are 195 independent sovereign states in the world (including disputed independent Taiwan), plus about 60 dependent areas, and five disputed territories, like Kosovo. UN Women compiled prevalence data on violence against women, using Demographic and Health Surveys and a variety of statistical services and sources. This compilation of all available data included a maximum of 86 countries, not even half of the world's independent states. Within this dataset, there are 14 places for data on each country, including recent abuses, intimate partner/non-partner abuse, forced first sex, and abuse during pregnancy. Data on 10 countries have 1 or 2 figures in total, of the 14 possible figures. All other "datasets" I have used to compile the data in the spreadsheets are even more spurious and contain even more gaps. As this dataset is the largest multi-country compilation on violence against women available, this quality of data is representative of the rest of the sources for data out there, and also sheds light on potential improvements for future collection of this type of data.

The countries not included in the original UN Women Violence against Women Prevalence Dataset are listed below:

Afghanistan	Burkina Faso	Fiji	Iraq	Martinique	Palestinian Territories	Sri Lanka	Western Sahara
Algeria	Burundi	French Guiana	Israel	Mauritania	Panama	Sudan	Yemen
Andorra	Cayman Islands	French Polynesia	Jamaica	Mauritius	Papua New Guinea	Suriname	

Angola	Central African Republic	French Southern Territories	Kazakhstan	Mayotte	Pitcairn Islands	Swaziland	
Anguilla	Chad	Gabon	North Korea	Micronesia	Portugal	Syria	
Antartica	Christmas Island	Gambia	Kosovo	Moldova	Puerto Rico	Taiwan	
Argentina	Cocos Islands	Gibraltar	Lao	Monaco	Qatar	Tibet	
Aruba	Comoros	Great Britain	Latvia	Mongolia	Reunion Island	Togo	
Bahamas	Congo	Greece	Lebanon	Montenegro	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Trinidad and Tobago	
Bahrain	Cook Islands	Greenland	Lesotho	Myanmar	Saint Lucia	Tunisia	
Belarus	Croatia	Grenada	Libya	Nauru	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Turkmenistan	
Belgium	Cuba	Guadeloupe	Liechtenstein	Nepal	San Marino	Turks and Caicos Island	
Belize	Cyprus	Guam	Luxembourg	Netherlands Antilles	Saudi Arabia	Tuvalu	
Benin	Djibouti	Guinea	Macau	New Caledonia	Senegal	United Arab Emirates	
Bermuda	Dominica	Guinea-Bissau	Macedonia	Niger	Seychelles	Uruguay	
Bhutan	Equatorial Guinea	Guyana	Madagascar	Niue	Sierra Leone	Uzbekistan	
Bosnia	Eritrea	Holy See	Malaysia	Northern Mariana	Singapore	Vanuatu	
Botswana	Estonia	Hungary	Mali	Oman	Slovenia	Venezuela	
Brunei Darussalam	Falkland Islands	Iceland	Malta	Pakistan	Somalia	Virgin Islands	
Bulgaria	Faroe Islands	Iran	Marshall Islands	Palau	South Sudan	Wallis and Futuna Islands	

Many of these states are small island states or young and developing states. However, there is also a significant portion of these states that are larger, older states. Highlighted in yellow above are states that are also very high in battle deaths, years in conflict, or number of conflicts. To study the correlation between security of women and the security of a state, these states' data is essential.

Now that I have covered the potential weakness and limitations of the most reliable data available, I will now explain my choice in using this type of data. The data I have chosen to use are percentages of women who have experienced some sort of violence (physical or sexual) in their lifetime. Other sources of data included crime statistics and police reports that indicated rates per 100,000 women or number of women who experienced violence. These reports, in some countries, only represent 2% of women who actually report crimes. Therefore, the rates represented in other datasets were extremely low. For example, one dataset reported that only 8 women were sexually assaulted of the possible 383,000 women in the population at the time. Even in the United States, in the last five years, according to the Department of Justice, only about a third of sexual assaults are ever reported, and factoring in unreported rapes, only 2% of rapists will ever serve a day in prison.[22] These flaws with the criminal justice system all over the world influence the data and statistics surrounding the issue. When data demonstrates very high rates/percentages of women who experience violence, there is no way to know whether this is laudatory (for indicating true statistics) or terrifying (for the women living in that state). For example, one report indicates that 82% of women in Nepal experience physical violence at some point during their lives. In contrast, there are extremely low statistics that are obviously untrue. France reports one year that only 2.5% of women experience physical violence in their lifetimes.

Another report, 5 year later, indicates that the statistic is actually 44%. These inconsistencies are not unique to France. India also displays physical assault statistics all over the map, varying from 75% to 22% to 40% in a span of 15 years. Hence, the data has its flaws, but we can examine them using averages and rankings to get a better picture of the relative situation of women in each state.

Finally, the categories of violence chosen are limiting and non-inclusive. The categories of violence that women face are much more extensive than just physical and sexual violence. The original multi-country prevalence data from UN Women included intimate and non-partner physical and sexual assault only. Very few other sources included emotional and psychological violence as well. Country specific sources sometimes included FGM data. The only categories uniform across the board was physical and sexual violence, which led me to only include those in my dataset. However, dowry deaths, acid attacks, widow burning, homicide, sexual harassment, and others should be included for future collection. This can potentially be done if, instead of international organizations collecting the data, grass-roots domestic campaigns are responsible for creating their own methodology and collecting their own unique set of data on the issue. The consequences of the limited categorizing is the invalidation of forms of violence that are not physical or sexual violence, which leads to thousands, if not millions of women, without any way to report the crimes committed against them.

All in all, the data I chose to use is far from perfect. The gaps in the data, the lack of sources on more than half the countries in the world, the lack of reporting, and the limiting categorical nature of the data all contribute to systemic flaws in this research. Nonetheless, there

is still ample room for learning from this data. I will proceed in the next chapters in attempting to uncover some answers from the statistics I have collected.

Chapter 6

Empirical Results: The Relationship between The Security of Women and a State's War-proneness

In this chapter, I examine the evidence for the relationship between the security of women, as measured by physical and sexual assault statistics, and a state's war-proneness, as measured by number of conflicts, battle death tolls, and years engaged in conflict. Even with the limitations of the data and underreporting trends, the data demonstrate that of 10 women, 3 will experience physical assault in their lifetimes and 2 women will face sexual assault. Averaging over every five years, we find that 21-44% of women will face physical assault and 16-24% of women sexual assault. Sexual assault, in general, seems to be less prevalent throughout the data. This is most likely due to the taboos surrounding sex and the very personal nature of the crime leading to fewer reports. Nonetheless, these measures of the incidence of physical and sexual assault show the universality of these crimes committed against women. I proceed next to present my analysis of the data, beginning with an examination of the physical assault statistics, followed by sexual assault, indicators of war-proneness, and finally the relationships among these measures.

Physical Violence Prevalence Data

Because the dataset includes data points from 96 states, I find it more helpful to look at a more select list of countries to gain an understanding of relative rankings. By looking at the extremes of the spectrum, that is, the most violent and peaceful states, one can shed light on any

trends that may be present in the data. That said, this data is the most extensive cross-country compilation that exists so far. Table 6.1 displays relative data on physical assaults for all years combined. That is, it shows states with the highest ranked prevalence of physical assault all over the world in the period of 1989-2010 (above 50% of women reporting physical assault in their lifetime):

Table 6.1 Highest Rankings of States in Incidence of Physical Assault

Nepal	82	Uganda	60
India	75	Japan	59
Mexico	67	Turkey	58
Ecuador	67	Costa Rica	54
Papua New Guinea	67	Cameroon	53
Democratic Republic of Congo	64	Afghanistan	52
Peru	61	Nicaragua	52
Tanzania	60	United States	52
Sri Lanka	60	Czech Republic	51
North Korea	60		

Many of these countries are plagued with war and poverty. However, others, such as the United States and Turkey, are somewhat surprising. With the exception of five (Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Tanzania, Japan and North Korea), each of these states has also engaged in at least one armed conflict in the period between 1989-2010. In contrast, the list presented below in Table 6.2 displays the states with the least prevalent accounts of physical violence (below 10% of women experiencing it in their lifetime). When examining the table, however, we must keep in mind that these lower numbers do not necessarily translate to a safer state for women, as the collection of this data is imperfect in many places.

Table 6.2 States with Least Prevalent Incidence of Physical Assault (1989-2010)

Philippines	10
Uruguay	10
Paraguay	10
Singapore	9
Armenia	9
Guatemala	9
Albania	8
Australia	8
Georgia	7
France	3

One would expect, if my hypothesis is correct, that these states would be more peaceful, but surprisingly six of the ten have engaged in armed conflict. That being said, the number of conflicts and severity of battle deaths in the related conflicts are significantly lower than in the list of states that rank highest in physical assaults. This suggests that a closer examination of the states that do engaged in conflict will show that states with more frequent or intense conflicts will also be more dangerous places for women, even if states with low prevalence statistics have also engaged in conflicts. Some of these states are very poor countries, namely Armenia, Albania and Georgia. Others have GDPs in the trillions (Australia and France). With the global average at around 30%, however, these results probably tell us where there is a need for more to improve this kind of data collection, or places where women are reporting less than average. Specifically, the list suggests that there is much improvement required going forward on data collection, considering both developing and developed countries reporting very low prevalence figures.

Before moving onto sexual assault, it may be interesting to note the historical trends in the incidence of physical assault from 1990-2010 (see Figure 6.1). The data in the figure originates from my dataset, as I calculated the average reported prevalence of physical assault for

every state for which data was available for each year. The data around 1990 indicates very high rates of physical assault against women. This could either be accurately depicting the situation of women, or it could be the result of a lack of reporting by women. The data then declines until 2000 and then increases slightly, staying within four percentage points until 2010. The increase could be due to more awareness of the issue and more agencies and organizations starting to collect data. This is represented in my own dataset, where the most data exists for the years 2005-2010.

Figure 6.1 Average Reported Physical Assault, all states in dataset included



What is interesting to note is the upwards-facing slope above between 2000 and 2010, when looking at physical assault and then a contrasting downward facing slope if we compare to wartime sexual violence during the same time period (see Figure 6.2). The Figure is based on the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, measuring wartime sexual violence ranking

states from 0 to 3 (most massive incidents). The downward curve after 2000 depicting physical assault prevalence seems to curve up around the same time when the one depicting wartime sexual violence curves down. This would mean that in times with low physical violence statistics, women experience high amounts of sexual violence in wartime. This could be a result of the many conflicts around the time, or simply a lack of awareness on the issues. Unfortunately, with the limited available data, one cannot prove a significant relationship between the two, let alone claim that it is causal. However, it is interesting to note the similar (opposite) trends reported. Recall that different scholars have used different indicators to measure global rankings of gender inequality and violence. This further conveys that depending on the measure selected, researchers will obtain very different graphs and figures when studying theoretically the same "issue." Though speculative, it is worth noting that the trends portraying a rise in wartime sexual violence and sexual assault outside of conflict could be explained by the rise in global awareness and activism on women's issues in the 1990's, especially at the United Nations, demonstrated by the quote by Kofi Annan, which this thesis began with: "Violence against women is perhaps the most shameful human rights violation. And it is perhaps the most pervasive. It knows no boundaries of geography, culture or wealth. As long as it continues, we cannot claim to be making real progress towards equality, development and peace."

Sexual Violence Prevalence Data

Figure 6.2 Average Reported Wartime Rape Level, SVAC dataset



Above, I examined physical assault data and ended with a potential relationship with wartime sexual violence. I now proceed to the second measurement of the security of women: sexual assault statistics. This type of data was more difficult to compile, as it was difficult to find multi-country studies on the subject. Moreover, there are fewer data points that were specific to sexual violence, so that the trends and patterns we observe may not be as accurate as those that physical violence demonstrate. Nonetheless, with the available data, Table 6.3 below lists states with an extremely high incidence of sexual assault, defined as 40% or more of women reporting a sexual assault:

Table 6.3 Highest Ranked States with Sexual Violence Statistics

Bosnia	76	Peru	47
Myanmar	75	Kiribati	46
Ethiopia	68	Netherlands	45
Denmark	52	Mexico	44
Turkey	52	France	44
Bangladesh	50	Ukraine	44
Guatemala	49	Tajikistan	43
Finland	47	Costa Rica	41

First, note that there are some familiar states. Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Turkey all appeared on the top Physical Assault list discussed above. Second, there are surprisingly a few Nordic states on this list: Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. These may be attributed to more recent data becoming available, which should potentially result in our lauding those states for aiming to improve the data collection process. In other words, the Nordic states could be closest to representing reality with their data, or they could simply be dangerous places for women. The top two, Bosnia and Myanmar (Burma), both have been plagued by conflict and are both actually known to have high rates of wartime sexual violence. Of the 16 listed above, half (8 states) ranked 1 or more on the SVAC dataset, indicating some incidents of wartime sexual violence. This should not be surprising, as the soldiers perpetrating the violence are also presumably the husbands and civilians perpetrating the same crime outside of war. Third, note which states are not on this list. One in particular comes to mind, as we commonly think of the Democratic Republic of Congo as the "rape capital of the world." Unfortunately, data on the DRC seems to be either flawed or missing, as the highest percentage of women facing sexual assault in their lifetimes is reported to be 35%, much lower than we would expect.

The DRC is not the only state that may be reporting inaccurate data. The minuscule percentages on sexual violence reported by some states can be explained by the same problems that arise with the lower physical assault data. However, as stated above, not only do taboos related to sex prevent women from reporting such crimes, they also influence states in producing and publishing the data as well. The following states have reported the least (less than 5%) incidents of sexual violence, that is, less than 5% of women report experiencing sexual violence in their lifetimes:

Table 6.4 States with Least Prevalent Accounts of Sexual Violence

Slovakia	2	United Kingdom	3.8
Cambodia	2.7	Georgia	3.9
Albania	2.9	Moldova	4
Azerbaijan	2.9	Finland[1]	4.3
Romania	3.1	South Africa	4.4
Armenia	3.3	France	5
East Timor	3.4	Sri Lanka	5
Cape Verde	3.6	Vietnam	5

Some of these states' statistics may be accurate; however, some are definitely not. Six of these sixteen states have ranked 1 or more in the SVAC dataset. In particular, Cambodia and Georgia both experienced massive incidents (more than 1,000 reports) of sexual violence during conflict. This behavior is unlikely to have completely subsided as soon as the conflicts ended. Thus, there could have been more of a push for improving the data after this statistic was reported, or there could have been a shift in behavior, which seems less likely.

Over time, the historical trend of average reported sexual assault seems to mirror that of wartime sexual violence (see Figure 6.3 below) In 1990, it starts out at 18% percent of women experiencing sexual assault during their lifetimes, then increases up to about 25% in 2000, then declines once again. However, the difference here that we did not see in the Physical Assault trends is the slight increase in prevalence as we get closer to the present. This may be due to the increased awareness on the issue, especially in places with high media coverage or those under international pressures.

Figure 6.3 Average Reported Sexual Assault, all states in dataset included

[1] It is also interesting to note that Finland is also on this list, as it was previously on the top Physical Assault list.



The two line graphs, the first depicting a peak in wartime sexual violence and the second depicting a peak in sexual assault statistics, seem to suggest that there may be a correlation between sexual violence committed within societies and by their combatants in war. This could be attributed to the atmosphere of the society normalizing this sort of behavior, making the act an inconsequential task that men have become accustomed to before even becoming a soldier. If potential soldiers come from a society that condones the propensity to attack women, then it is not surprising that this would not change when in conflict, where societal inhibitions and taboos disintegrate. The potential reasons and causes of this increased sexual violence will be discussed in a later chapter. For now, I proceed to examining the war-proneness of states.

The War-proneness of States

For this dependent variable, I used three indicators to measure a state's likelihood of engaging in armed conflict. The first is the number of conflicts each state has engaged in as an active side. Below are the top five states and the number of conflicts each engaged in during the period 1989-2010. In other words, Table 6.5 indicates a ranking of the most war-prone states, in terms of number of conflicts engaged in.

Table 6.5 States that Engaged in the Most Conflicts (1989-2010)

Country	Number of Conflicts
India	12
Myanmar	10
Ethiopia	7
Russia	6
Nigeria	4

The top three, Myanmar, India, and Ethiopia have all appeared in the top Physical and Sexual Assault lists. These areas are violent regions; men, women and children are all in danger. However, war-prone states that allow men to violate women outside of war would then be in the habit of violating women internationally.

Second, I used battle deaths to measure the intensity of violence perpetrated by each state. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset provides three different estimates for battle related deaths: a low estimate, a high estimate, and a "best" estimate. Below, I have selected the top ten states that engaged in conflict that took the most lives, according to the dataset's "best" estimate.

Table 6.6 States with Highest Battle-Related Deaths in Conflict (1989-2010)

Ethiopia
Afghanistan

Eritrea
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Iraq
Angola
Turkey
Somalia

Again, some of these states look familiar. Ethiopia, Afghanistan, India and Turkey were all listed near the top for Physical and Sexual Assault. This could mean that in societies where the loss of life is not valued as much as others, the value of a woman's life may also suffer. In other words, societies that are particularly violent domestically are also particularly violent internationally.

Because the previous two indicators on war may not be sufficient, I also analyzed the number of years each state was engaged in war. Out of the possible 22 years between 1989-2010, these states were ranked the highest in how long they were engaged in armed conflict.

Table 6.7 States with Longest Time Engaged in Conflict (1989-2010)

Sudan	22
Israel	22
Myanmar	22
India	22
Colombia	22
Philippines	22
Turkey	22
Afghanistan	21
Uganda	21
Ethiopia	21

Many of these states look familiar. Myanmar, India, Turkey, Afghanistan, Uganda and Ethiopia have all appeared on the highest rankings for physical or sexual assault statistics. No data on gender-based violence is provided for Sudan, and Israel and Columbia are also responsible for up to 33% and 41% of women facing physical assault in their lifetimes, respectively. Thus, we can still claim that states that have accustomed to violence in general have also been accustomed to perpetrate violence against women outside of conflict overall.

Relationships among Variables

The data presented above suggest that there may be a link between the most war-prone states and the most dangerous places for women. But the link is only suggestive. In this section, I provide a more thorough analysis of the relationship between the security of women and the war-proneness of states.

Because there are so many states and variables in the dataset, I will instead look at groups of states that ranked highest in certain indicators. In Table 6.8 below, I selected the highest 5-8 states in the Physical Assault dataset for every 5 years. Because it is rare for states to put out consistent data for every year or five years, many of these states do not appear in all the lists, giving us the opportunity to explore different states during different times. Table 6.8 contains columns for every five years and the states with the highest prevalence for physical violence. Examining these states, note how many of these states engaged in at least one armed conflict during the studied period (at the bottom of each column Table 6.8). For example, in 1990, 5 of the 5 states that indicated the highest physical assault statistics also engaged in a conflict during 1989-2010. In 2010, however, only 6/7 states with the highest statistics in physical assault engaged in a conflict during the indicated time period. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program

(UCDP) defines an armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year.

Table 6.8 Highest Ranked Physical Assault Prevalence and Engagement in Conflict

1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
India*	Nepal*	Peru*	Mexico*	Democratic Republic of Congo*
Ecuador*	Tanzania	Turkey*	Cameroon*	Korea, North
Papua New Guinea*	Sri Lanka*	United States*	Afghanistan*	Uganda*
Mexico*	Ecuador*	Bangladesh*	Czech Republic	Afghanistan*
Sri Lanka*	Papua New Guinea*	Colombia*	Ethiopia*	Papua New Guinea*
			Australia*	Bosnia*
			Mozambique*	Bangladesh*
			Egypt*	
5/5 States	**4/5 States**	**5/5 States**	**7/8 States**	**6/7 States**

Shown above, indicated with a star (*), one can see that many (if not all) of the states that reported the highest accounts of physical violence against women during peacetime also engaged in conflict. At least 80% (or 4/5) of states that have the highest physical assault statistics are also war-prone in the period of 1989-2010. Now I will proceed to examining the sexual assault statistics in the same fashion.

Table 6.9 Highest Ranked Sexual Assault Prevalence and Engagement in Conflict

1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Guatemala*	Mexico*	Myanmar*	Bosnia*	Ethiopia*
Netherlands	Nepal*	Turkey*	Myanmar*	Denmark
New Zealand	Zimbabwe	Bangladesh*	Ethiopia*	Finland

United Kingdom*	Indonesia*	Peru*	Mexico*	Kiribati
Colombia*	Nicaragua*	Azerbaijan*	Tajikistan*	Netherlands
3/5 States	**4/5 States**	**5/5 States**	**5/5 States**	**1/5 States**

Note that in 2010, only 1/5 of the states that are ranked highest in sexual assault prevalence, have also engaged in conflict. As described above, 3/5 of these states are Nordic countries, and this could be explained by recent attempts at improving the data collection process. With the exception of the 2010 sexual assault statistics, the data in Table 6.9 demonstrate that those states with the highest tendency to be violent towards women also have engaged in conflict in the last two decades (mirroring the same trend above with physical violence data). However, there remain many unanswered questions within the data. Some states, such as France and India, present inconsistent data, with large jumps between data points. Others, such as East Timor, Azerbaijan, Peru, Turkey, and Sri Lanka all report gender-based violence statistics that have been dwindling over the years, unlike other states that have been steadily increasing over the years, because of increased awareness on the issue.

In this chapter, I analyzed the relationship between gender-based violence and a state's war-proneness. In particular, I explored the states at the highest and lowest ends of relative gender-based violence statistics, together with the measures of their war-proneness. Despite questions about data quality, it is notable that my findings largely confirm the findings of several important scholarly works. Specifically, just as Caprioli, Hudson and Melander find that gender equality is correlated with armed conflict (civil and interstate), I find that those states that are most dangerous for women, (they are states in which women are more likely to be physically or sexually assaulted), are also states that engaged in conflict more often or more

violently. Moreover, this congruence of findings occurs even though the measures employed in my analysis are different from those in other studies. In other words, similar findings are emerging in multiple datasets that define gender equality, the security of women, and war-proneness differently, but all studies finding a correlation nonetheless. This is an important finding in a field that has been plagued by data quality issues. By replicating the findings of other studies using alternative datasets, we increase the confidence that the relationships are not the artifact of any single study. In the next chapter, I explore the relationship between the security of women outside of war and the prevalence sexual violence committed by states in wartime.

Chapter 7

Empirical Results: The Relationship between the Security of Women and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between the security of women and the prevalence of sexual violence in armed conflicts. First, I will revisit the ranked lists of security of women that I examined in the last chapter. Employing the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, I ask if societies with high gender-based violence statistics also perpetrate higher levels of sexual violence in armed conflict. I then analyze the relationship the other way around. That is, I examine the gender-based violence statistics of the states with the highest instances of sexual violence in wartime. Finally, I ask whether there is a relationship between states with high war-proneness and the prevalence of wartime sexual violence and vice versa.

Gender-Based Violence and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

To begin with, I examine the same highest ranked list of states in physical assault prevalence, but this time alongside the highest incidence of wartime sexual violence (see Table 7.1). Recall that my measure of wartime sexual violence is taken from Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås' recently created dataset defining sexual violence as (1) rape, (2) sexual slavery, (3) forced prostitution, (4) forced pregnancy, (5) forced sterilization/abortion, (6) sexual mutilation, and (7) sexual torture. They code prevalence according to an ordinal scale (3 coding as "massive," 2 as "common," and 1 as "some"). Those states that indicate "N/A" are states that

did not engage in armed conflict from 1989-2010 and therefore cannot provide data on wartime sexual violence.

Table 7.1 Highest Ranked Physical Assault Prevalence and Wartime Sexual Violence

Country	**Physical Assault**	**SVAC**	**Country**	**Physical Assault**	**SVAC**
Nepal	82	2	Uganda	59.9	2
India	75	2	Japan	59	N/A
Mexico	67	1	Turkey	58	2
Ecuador	67	1	Costa Rica	54	N/A
Papua New Guinea	67	1	Cameroon	52.5	0
Democratic Republic of Congo	63.7	3	Afghanistan	52.4	3
Peru	61	2	Nicaragua	52	1
Tanzania	60	N/A	United States	51.9	1
Sri Lanka	60	3	Czech Republic	51	N/A
North Korea	60	N/A			

Thirteen of the nineteen states above have demonstrated at least some amount of wartime sexual violence. Of those that have engaged in conflict (excluding those with "N/A"), all but one have perpetrated wartime sexual violence. This indicates that 93% of states that have both engaged in conflict and also rank toward the top on physical assault statistics are states that have perpetrated some level of sexual violence during armed conflict. If we include those that have not engaged in conflict, 68% of states with the highest peacetime physical assault statistics have engaged wartime sexual violence. Thus, as I observed in the previous chapter, states with high prevalence of peacetime physical violence against women are also states that often use sexual violence in wartime. To go even further, Table 7.2 demonstrates that the lowest ranked states on

physical assault statistics either have not engaged in conflict, or when they do, do not score above a "1" in the SVAC dataset.

Table 7.2 Lowest Ranked Physical Assault Prevalence and Wartime Sexual Violence (1989-2010)

Country	Physical Assault	SVAC
Philippines	10	1
Uruguay	10	N/A
Paraguay	10	0
Singapore	9.2	N/A
Armenia	8.9	N/A
Guatemala	8.6	1
Albania	8.2	N/A
Australia	8	1
Georgia	6.9	1
France	2.5	N/A

This not only further demonstrates the relationship between low gender-based violence statistics and low war-proneness; it also indicates a pattern of low sexual violence in armed conflict when conflict engagement does occur. Even when these states do engage in conflict, only isolated occurrences of wartime sexual violence are observed. Table 7.3 portrays a similar trend, but instead of physical violence, the table displays highly prevalent sexual violence within societies alongside wartime sexual violence.

Table 7.3 Highest Ranked Sexual Assault Prevalence w/ Highest Wartime Sexual Violence

Country	Sexual Violence	SVAC	Country	Sexual Violence	SVAC
Bosnia	75.9	3	Peru	47	2
Myanmar	75	2	Kiribati	46.4	N/A
Ethiopia	68	2	Netherlands	45	N/A
Denmark	52	N/A	Mexico	44	1
Turkey	51.9	2	France	44	N/A
Bangladesh	49.7	0	Ukraine	44	N/A
Guatemala	49	1	Tajikistan	42.5	3
Finland	47	N/A	Costa Rica	41	N/A

Because of the high assault statistics of the Nordic countries, many of the states above indicate "N/A," and thus do not fit the pattern. However, for the states that do, it is noteworthy that many have experienced massive, if not common, occurrences of wartime sexual violence. Looking at the top five and excluding Denmark, all of the other states (Bosnia, Myanmar, Ethiopia and Turkey) have experienced extremely high rates of wartime sexual violence. Looking at the top nine, only two of the states have not engaged in armed conflict, all others have engaged in conflict, and only one of the remaining states did not experience any wartime sexual violence. Table 7.4 indicates a similar pattern, viewed from the other side; women in states that with a low ranking on sexual assault statistics rarely, if ever, experience sexual violence in wartime, with some exceptions.

Table 7.4 Lowest Ranked Sexual Assault Prevalence w/ Highest Wartime Sexual Violence

Country	Sexual Violence	SVAC	Country	Sexual Violence	SVAC
Slovakia	2	N/A	United Kingdom	3.8	1

Cambodia	2.7	3	Georgia	3.9	2
Albania	2.9	N/A	Moldova	4	0
Azerbaijan	2.9	1	Finland	4.3	N/A
Romania	3.1	0	South Africa	4.4	N/A
Armenia	3.3	N/A	France	5	N/A
East Timor	3.4	N/A	Sri Lanka	5	3
Cape Verde	3.6	N/A	Vietnam	5	N/A

With the exceptions of Cambodia, Georgia and Sri Lanka, those that seem to have more accurate sexual assault data confirm the trend of low likelihood of SVAC. The three exceptions (Cambodia, Georgia, and Sri Lanka) shed light on which states may not be collecting accurate data on the issue, or the taboos that accompany sexual violence in general.

Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and Gender-Based Violence

I will now examine the same relationship from the other direction. That is, instead of looking at the highest security of women statistics alongside the SVAC rankings, I will now examine states with the highest (3) ranking in the wartime sexual violence dataset alongside their physical and sexual assault statistics. Table 7.3 displays the average physical assault prevalence and the average sexual assault prevalence for all countries that scored a 3 on the SVAC dataset.

Table 7.5 States that Coded (3) in SVAC and Gender-Based Violence Statistics

Country	**Physical Assault**	**Sexual Assault**	**Country**	**Physical Assault**	**Sexual Assault**
Afghanistan	44.9	19.8	Nigeria	29.35	7
Bosnia-Herzegovina	39	58.9	Rwanda	30.7	12.9
Burundi	N/A	N/A	Serbia	22.8	20.2
Cambodia	18.5	6.3	Sierra Leone	N/A	N/A
Central African Republic	N/A	N/A	Sri Lanka	43.6	18.5

Congo	N/A	N/A	Sudan	N/A	N/A
Democratic Republic of Congo	63.7	25.7	Tajikistan	36.1	42.5
Indonesia	11	22	Uzbekistan	N/A	N/A
Liberia	44	17.6			

Of the seventeen states listed above, it is interesting to note that six of the states are missing data ("N/A"). Thus, one can assume that the problem of physical and sexual violence outside of war is not a priority, or that they lack the resources to collect and administer data. Those that do provide data indicate very high numbers of physical and/or sexual assault statistics. For example, in the DRC, where sexual violence in armed conflict is rampant, the situation outside of war for women is just as dangerous: almost two-thirds of women will experience physical violence, and a quarter of women will experience sexual violence in their lifetimes. Similarly, in Tajikistan, more than 4 out of 10 women will experience sexual violence in their lifetimes. These data demonstrate that war is not the only dangerous time for women in these countries; they are at danger within their societies outside of war as well.

Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and War-Proneness

I now proceed to discuss the follow-up question stated in Chapter 3: What is the relationship between a state's war-proneness and its propensity to engage in wartime sexual violence? There is a plausible reason to think that the relationship is positive. That is, states that are more prone to engage in conflict are also more likely to engage in wartime sexual violence. This is most likely due to the fact that soldiers may have more stress and aggression to release after being at war frequently or for a longer period of time. Another reason may also be that the longer and more frequent conflict is, the more “normal” it is to take out the aggression in

whichever means are deemed desirable. In other words, the longer men find themselves in a rule-less environment, the easier it is to free themselves of any societal inhibitions. Goldstein concurs that war results in the disintegration of societal rules and norms[2]. To confirm this relationship, I have constructed graphics that depict the relationship between the average SVAC data scores for each of the three indicators of war-proneness: battle related deaths, number of conflicts, and years spent engaged in conflict. This data includes all armed conflicts engaged in from 1989-2010. Previously, I have only discussed data for which gender-based violence statistics were available. However, to get a more accurate and holistic response to the above question, I have created another dataset with only war-proneness indicators and the highest level of SVAC for each state.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the level of wartime sexual violence for each category of the sum of the best estimate of battle related deaths. That is, all countries with less than 1,000 battle deaths had an average of less than .75 on the SVAC scale (0-3), whereas states with the highest category of battle death sums resulted in the highest average in SVAC coding.

Figure 7.1 Average SVAC and Battle Deaths

[2] Goldstein, Joshua S. 2003. *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge University Press.



The relationship is positive. That is, states that experienced high levels of battle deaths also engage in high levels of sexual violence during war. The violence of war is not confined to the battlefield. With the exception of 20,000-40,000 battle deaths, we see an almost steady rise in the level of wartime sexual violence as the sum of battle deaths also increases. All states with a large number of battle-related deaths have also experienced the highest level of sexual violence in armed conflict. Thus, the loss in life and increase in wartime sexual violence in war almost go hand in hand. Second, the second level (score of 2) of the SVAC dataset indicates significantly higher numbers in battle-related deaths consistently, whereas those with massive amounts are more extreme and varied. Although not seen on the graph, two outliers exist. First, with a battle-related loss of more than 100,000 lives, Afghanistan experienced the highest level of SVAC as well. The other outlier on the first level is Eritrea, with a high number in battle-related deaths, but only a (1) coded for SVAC. We would almost expect a higher level of wartime sexual

violence, given the high number of casualties. However, women constituted 30 per cent of the national liberation army during the liberation movement in the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. As this became more and more prevalent, the female guerrilla soldier was a common appearance to the population. This, although speculative, also could have prevented a higher level of wartime sexual violence against women, as females are less likely to perpetrate these crimes and male soldiers may feel uncomfortable as well, in their presence.

Figure 7.2 confirms this trend, depicting sexual violence in armed conflict by the number of conflicts each state engaged in from 1989-2010. Similar to the previous graph, states with common occurrences of wartime sexual violence (2) also engaged in more conflicts that those with zero to isolated occurrences. Viewing it from the other way around, those that engaged in more wars, also perpetrated sexual violence with at least (2) or above. However, there seems to be a cut-off at 3 conflicts. That is, any state that engages in more than 3 conflicts from 1989-2010 was also a state where women experience common to massive levels of sexual violence in conflict. This may be because so many states have coincidentally engaged in exactly 3 conflicts. Either way, this confirms my theory described above: states that engage in more violence internationally will also either wreak havoc on the civilian women in that state or produce soldiers that will perpetrate wartime sexual violence elsewhere.

Figure 7.2 Average SVAC and Number of Conflicts



Finally, with a stronger correlation confirmed with battle-deaths, one could expect that the longer states engage in conflict (consequently adding to the sum in loss of lives), the more rampant sexual violence will be. This is mostly confirmed by Figure 7.3, with the exception of four states that had isolated incidents of sexual violence but also high number of years engaged in conflict: Israel, Philippines, Algeria and Iran. Many of these states have not been involved in active fighting for all the years indicated in the graph, but enough to merit falling under "armed conflict" because of the prerequisite of 25 battle deaths per year. Excluding those, we see a steady rise in states with higher numbers of years spent at war that have also experienced common to massive occurrences of sexual violence. This confirms the theory that the longer a state spends actively fighting a war, the more likely that state will also perpetrate higher accounts of sexual violence.

Figure 7.3 Average SVAC and Years Engaged in Conflict



In summary, the data confirms the correlations described above. First, states that present a higher risk for physical and sexual assault for women also present a higher risk for women during wartime. Second, the states that have committed the highest levels of sexual violence during conflict also have significantly high numbers of gender-based violence statistics. Lastly, for all three indicators of war-proneness, especially battle-related death sums and years spent in conflict, states also had high occurrences of wartime sexual violence. In the next chapter, I will discuss a number of explanations for the correlations described above.

Chapter 8

Understanding and Explaining Wartime Sexual Violence

The intersection of gender equality (as defined in this thesis) and violence has manifested itself almost seamlessly in the phenomenon of wartime sexual violence. Looking back to episodes such as the rape of the Sabine women dating back to around 750 BC, it is surprising how little attention the issue has received until recently. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have become an expected and unfortunate part of war. However, as demonstrated by the data described in this thesis, this phenomenon does not occur or is not reported in every conflict. Therefore, one can no longer claim that the issue is an "inevitable" aspect of warring, insofar as there have been wars that scored a “0” on the SVAC dataset. In this chapter, I discuss the underlying explanations of this issue that directly relate to my research. I proceed by dividing the different contesting theories into "theses" that appear in the scholarly literature and analyzing each separately, according to the evidence found in my thesis. Finally, I compare and contrast them and conclude which sheds most light on the issue, given the conclusions drawn from the previous data analysis chapters.

Thesis 1: Men, and particularly, soldiers, are influenced by “irresistible biological imperatives.[23]"

This "sexual urge" or "biological determinism" argument takes on many different forms, varying in how much biology influences a man's decision to perpetrate sexual violence. For example, Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer trace the history of rape through evolutionary biology, arguing that the urge to rape is either an adaptation of humans or a by-product of an

adaptation.[24] They also argue that rapists are in fact motivated by sexual desire. Some argue that war only brings out these urges and intensifies them so that men do not feel as "hindered"[25] to perpetrate these crimes. One can also argue that the length of time away from women and partners also intensifies the sexual urge, and with the aggressive nature of conflict, allows men to find a release in rape.

Evaluation

Nevertheless, this thesis has been thoroughly contested in recent years for two reasons. First, the science that the thesis is based on is spurious and misunderstood. Second, and more importantly the variation, as seen in my own research, disproves any idea that all men are influenced by a biological motivation. In other words, because wartime sexual violence does not happen in every conflict and varies in its intensity when it does occur, there can be no biological pattern to explain the actions. Moreover, although unaddressed in this thesis, the fact that there are female perpetrators of sexual violence and male victims of it demonstrates that the biological determinism argument is flawed. That said, there might be questions on the relationship between the length of the conflict and the resulting sexual desire of soldiers, as I found that states that engage in conflict for longer periods of time also experience sexual violence in armed conflict more intensely. On the other hand, there are also states with lower levels of gender-based violence and lower levels of sexual violence in wartime. However, these controversial theories also find their support in the universality of this phenomenon. Because rape and sexual violence extends throughout all times and spaces, biologists have reason to believe that the urge to rape can be related to human behavior. However, one must interject that massive incidents of rape are not individual processes; they are the result of collective action. Moreover, although rape and

sexual violence is a common phenomenon, occurring throughout space and time, biology cannot yet explain why it happens only sometimes. In the previous chapter, I showed that massive and sexual violence in armed conflict only occur 16% of all active conflict years. Thus, this begs the question: what makes one man more likely to rape than another? Nevertheless, there is a lack of scholarly consensus on this issue and this thesis does not come close to being sufficient to explain this phenomenon and my research rejects it. This brings us to thesis 2.

Thesis 2: The "spiral of violence" in conflict and aggressive environments incites violence against women and in particular, rape.

The context of warring results in many men feeling mistreated, humiliated, exhausted and victimized. Violence becomes normalized and is no longer felt to be a societal taboo. It thus becomes easier to engage in violent acts. This argument is based on the concept that it is war that specifically incites this type of violence against women. Therefore, one must ask: what is it about war that allows for these acts?

First, social norms that exist outside and before war break down during conflict. The training of soldiers emphasizes certain characteristics that are "required" to be not only an effective solider, but also one that is more likely to perpetrate violence against women. The atmosphere of violence and aggression results in a "moral disengagement" of those surrounded by it. This disengagement translates into less compassion and consideration of the harms and effects of one's actions. The soldier feels victimized, and as more and more violence is perpetrated against him or his peers, he feels he is justified in committing more violence against the other side. One also loses sense of the individual; the soldier does not rape because he desires to do so, but because his comrades and superiors collectively decide that this is acceptable,

whether it is directly decided or not. Another element of the combat training that has harmful effects may be mob mentality. In combat training, one learns to let go of any sense of individuality for the purpose of effectiveness as a team. If one or more soldiers feel the urge to rape, then more will follow, as that is more "effective" when acting collectively. The strict adherence to a hierarchy also attributes to this type of violence. All it takes to perpetrate violence against women is for one superior official to do so. What follows is the acceptance of this act and its transformation into a norm or rule. This, on top of the masculine culture of the army, will only reinforce the concept that this act confirms a soldier's masculinity.

Another element of combat training which influences soldier behavior later in conflict is male bonding. Cynthia Cockburn describes this mechanism as a means to both rape and the decision not to: "It is well understood, not only by academics researching militaries, but by those who train and command soldiers, that male bonding is an important social mechanism in building a strong and effective fighting force. The men must identify each other as equals, gain their sense of self from the respect their comrades accord them, and in turn achieve viability in dangerous situations from being able to identify with and trust the soldiers of their unit.[26]" This is absolutely essential in the self-identification and process of becoming a soldier. This respect accorded to them, depending on the group mentality, could be a result of joining the mass rape of women, or not. Judith Antonelli compares battlefield rapists to gang rapists, claiming that mob mentality is responsible for individuals joining in the perpetration of sexual violence in conflict[27]. Joining other male soldiers in the perpetration of these crimes is an extension of the male bonding that has been occurring throughout the war. To reject the offer to join is not only disloyal to the others, but it is also to isolate one's self, a detrimental move for a collective unit. Finally, the last element of how war and the spiral of violence incite the perpetration of violence

against women is the lack of social order at times of conflict. Because the only "order" soldiers now adhere to is the military, any other social rules or norms are temporarily "forgotten." Crime rates increase as conflict intensifies. Even those at home feel justified in bending the rules in order to survive. This also applies to the interaction between man and woman, as it no longer seems necessary to play by the rules regarding courtship and sexual desire. This could be attributed to the concept that men who risk their lives and protect women also deserve to have them and use them as they please. It could also be the other way around - that society neglects to question and criticize this act during wartime, so the soldier feels no hesitation to act as he pleases.

Evaluation

The “spiral of violence” argument can be measured by how “normal” violence becomes in a state. This might be attributed to the number of deaths that have been related to the conflict, the duration of the conflicts, or the number of times the state has engaged in conflict. The basis of this assumption relies on soldiers feeling accustomed to a “time of war,” erasing the inhibitions he may have about committing more violence. As we observed in the previous chapter, the states that have had more than 20,000 battle deaths (with one exception) have resulted in an SVAC ranking of at least 2. Thus, after adjusting to an atmosphere where 20,000 lives have been lost, rape becomes more prevalent in conflict. Similarly, states that have engaged in more than 3 conflicts have also scored an average of 2 or more on the SVAC dataset. Therefore, we can observe that soldiers in states that have been at war more often in such a small time window continue acting as violent soldiers, perpetrating wartime sexual violence commonly. Third, we also observed that any state that engaged in conflict for more than ten years has also engaged in

wartime sexual violence, ranking 1 and above. This also confirms the theory that a soldier in conflict for longer maintains the moral disengagement that allows him to use sexual violence as a type of release in the aggressive and rule-less environment that is war, or as a means for revenge and punishment for frequent and costly war.

Thesis 3: The society outside of war influences the presence of sexual violence in armed conflict.

Another theory is that the potentiality of wartime sexual violence begins before the onset of conflict. In other words, men in sexist and violent societies bring those norms and ideology with them to the war. Jonathan Gottschall describes this "feminist theory" in terms of power: "That is, rape in war, like rape in peace, is identified not as a crime of sexual passion but as a crime motivated by the desire of a man to exert dominance over a woman.[28]" This directly opposes the biological determinism argument, as it disregards any excuse that is "libidinal in nature." Men from violent societies become soldiers and simply continue to do what they know: to oppress women. In a way, this is also a "pressure cooker" theory. However, here it is not the sexual urges that build up, but the misogyny they hold within. Part of this involves the masculine nature of the military, but the hatred of femininity is argued to begin long before: "The Croatian journalist Ines Sabali, for example, drew attention to atrocities of a quasi-ritualistic nature centered on the femininity of the body: cases in which a woman's breasts were cut off, her stomach was slashed open or her vagina torn apart with a weapon or military tool after she had been raped. Only a hatred of femininity as such can account for that specific kind of violence. But this contempt of women also exists in peacetime and manifests itself, inter alia, in the socially accepted pornography that displays and aestheticizes the physical violence of men against women in peacetime. Based on this hatred which is ingrained in the Western cultural

unconscious, war also becomes, according to Pohl, 'an adventure where fantasies of destruction unconsciously directed against women are encouraged and acted out,' brought to the surface in times of crisis and war when the concepts of order begin to crumble.[29]" Many elements are introduced here. First, the broad definition of sexual violence is introduced, negating the idea that sexual violence is motivated by biological urges for reproduction. Second, the fact that rape exists outside of war, in peacetime also explains the norm in wartime.

Evaluation

This explanation, namely, that society outside of war influences conflict behavior, is the basis behind this thesis, as it articulates the causal mechanism underlying the correlation I have set out to establish. I began the thesis by asking whether gender-based violence within societies is related to a state-s war-proneness, assuming that men comprising the army are also men that perpetrate violence against women “at home.” Thus, this thesis is supported by my research, insofar as states that engage in high levels of violence internationally are also dangerous places for women. I have also shown that states with low physical assault statistics, rarely, if ever, engage in conflict or perpetrate wartime sexual violence when they do. This is also confirmed by other scholars, such as Caprioli, Melander, and Hudson et al described earlier. In other words, similar findings are emerging in multiple datasets, defining gender equality, the security of women, and war-proneness differently, but all studies finding a correlation nonetheless. Although difficult to prove, the thesis that claims that society in fact dictates whether sexual violence in conflict will be perpetrated is one for which there is some evidence, and also gives us hope that this issue is not inevitable and cant be resolved.

Summary

In this chapter, I discussed different rationales and motivations that were related to my research behind the issue of sexual violence during conflict. The first "explanation", biological determinism, is not only insufficient to explain the phenomenon, but is also not yet understood thoroughly in order to conclusively claim anything. That is, the biology behind this theory is murky, and there are still questions to be answered on the variability of those who perpetrate the atrocities, and why those who choose not to, abstain from it. Second, the spiral of violence argument seems to be coherent and sheds much light, even confirming the content of the interviews of soldiers themselves. Something about war, in other words, drives soldiers to (occasionally) rape women. That is, the intensity and length of conflicts can enlighten us on the relationships studied in this thesis. Third, the potentiality of rape in wartime begins before the onset of conflict. Men do not learn to rape only as soldiers; this phenomenon exists well outside of war as well. Gender equality, seemingly unrelated to conflict, is intertwined with the way conflict is fought. The support for this in this thesis is the positive correlations found in Chapter 6. There is truth to each of these theses, and they all combine to create a more holistic viewing of the issue within the context of each conflict and how each society chooses to fight it. In the next chapter, I will move onto what this can translate to, in terms of implications and policy recommendations moving forward.

Chapter 9

Summary and Direct Policy Recommendations

Summary

This thesis explored the relationship between the security of women in a state and a state's war-proneness. It also contextualized wartime sexual violence and its relationship among the other variables. In particular, I explored the states at the highest and lowest ends of relative gender-based violence statistics, notably physical and sexual assault, together with the measures of their war-proneness. Despite questions about data quality, my findings largely confirm the findings of several important scholarly works before me. Specifically, just as Caprioli, Hudson and Melander find that gender equality is linked to armed conflict (civil and interstate), I find that those states that are most dangerous for women are also states that engaged in more frequent and costly conflicts.

With regards to wartime sexual violence, states that present a higher risk for physical and sexual assault for women also present a higher risk for women during wartime. Similarly, the states that have committed the highest levels of sexual violence during armed conflict also have significantly high numbers of gender-based violence statistics. Lastly, for all three indicators of war-proneness, number of conflicts and in particular, battle-related death sums and duration conflict, soldiers in those states perpetrate wartime sexual violence more commonly.

After reviewing the trends found in my research, I then examined the resulting implications and explanations that were exposed by my thesis. First, the explanation that biology determines wartime sexual violence is murky, and does not explain the variability of those who

perpetrate the atrocities. Second, the spiral of violence argument seems to be coherent and sheds much light, even confirming the content of the interviews of soldiers themselves. Something about war, in other words, drives soldiers to (occasionally) rape women. That is, my research shows that the duration, frequency and costliness of conflict can attribute to the perpetration of these crimes against women. Third, the potentiality of rape in wartime begins before the onset of conflict. Men do not learn to rape only as soldiers; this phenomenon exists well outside of war as well. Gender equality, then, as defined in this thesis, seemingly unrelated to conflict, is intertwined with the way conflict is fought. The support for this in this thesis is the positive correlations described above. There is truth to each of these theses, and they all combine to create a more comprehensive understanding of war and how it is fought alongside how women are affected in the meantime.

Throughout this thesis, we have observed that although gender-based violence and wartime sexual violence are common across different cultures and times, they are by no means as common or severe in every instance. Thus, we can assume that there are ways in which we can ameliorate the situation for women in different contexts by taking actions to prevent and treat these issues. Some of the following recommendations are based on the data found in my research and others are solutions presented by reports and scholars in the field. I do not claim that these recommendations will guarantee a safer place for women all over the world, but in this chapter, I present some first steps to advancing to make that world a reality.

Collection of Data

If I, and the other scholars in the field have learned anything on the subject, it is that the data that accounts for the prevalence of violence against women is scarce, at the very least. The lack of comprehensive data has hindered a systematic analysis of this issue. More research can help advance the understanding of patterns, causes, and consequences of domestic and international violence against women. Both scholars and policymakers can make use of these data to select cases, to design robust studies, to test new and existing hypotheses, and to develop evidence-based policy solutions.

Not only do more studies need to be done, but the reports that exist need to be improved. Instead of an international organization collecting data cross-nationally, each state should step up to present their own data originating from surveys, rape crisis centers, and other grass-roots campaigns that accurately depict the situation for women. Cultural practices, such as acid throwing, honor killings, and dowry deaths, should also be addressed and measured. It is important that women in each culture are responsible for collecting this data, as they know best whether the data accurately depicts their security. These women will also be more sensitive when creating the categories of violence that they experience in their cultures. A problem with the international organizations' reports was the limitations in the data collection. For example, most reports indicated only two (rarely three) forms of violence: physical assault and sexual assault. This is far from being the only two types of violence experiences around the world. As we improve the data collection on this matter, we will hopefully become more adept at being sensitive to different forms of trauma. Research should also be done on the efficiency of different methodologies. Are Indian women, for example, more likely to open up and speak freely about their trauma to an outside Western interviewer, or to a fellow Indian woman? There should also be mechanisms in place to support grass-roots attempts at aiding women who have faced abuse,

whether it is a rape crisis center or a hotline or a social worker. Research should also be done to find consistent and longitudinal data on the reports of gender-based violence, at least in a number of states. The benefits of doing so would allow scholars to find trends and relationships with other factors involved. Originally, this thesis set out to trace violence against women data over each year in order to test whether the prevalence increased as the state got closer to conflict. Unfortunately, this data simply does not exist. I compiled data from a variety of different sources, compromising consistency for the sake of more information. The collection of comprehensive, accurate, and robust data is the first step to spreading awareness and convincing the public and policymakers to act to prevent and treat these issues.

Cultural Changes

Second, each culture must adapt and change so that it does not produce men who abuse their wives or soldiers that rape in wartime. It is not just the men, however, who are at fault. The society around these men is also to blame for allowing these crimes to be perpetrated. The Enliven project, using data from the U.S. Department of Justice, created this graph to depict the proportion of reported rapes, false accusations, and convictions of rapists.

Of 1000 rapists, only 100 rapes are reported. Only 2 of the 1000 are falsely accused. 20 rapists faced trial, and what is worse, a minute percentage ever faced punishment: 10/1000 rapists ever saw a day in jail. Thus, it is not enough to encourage harsher punishments for these crimes, as most of the perpetrators will not even be tried, let alone face jail time. Similarly, considering wartime sexual violence, international courts must recognize and enforce the laws against these crimes and punish its perpetrators. The other problem here is the small proportion of women who report the rapes to begin with. There is also the limitation that comes along with the definition of rape. In the United States, until 2012, the federal definition of rape was limited to penetration of a vagina by a penis. That is, all rapists would have to be men, and all victims women. This demonstrates the mentality of policymakers and the public on the issue. In sum, in order to create a safer world for women, men who hurt women (or other men) must be held accountable for their actions.

Cultures must also tackle the taboo of sex and victimization. In order to solve this problem, women must be able to speak freely of the violence they have endured. There must be an end to the shame that often accompanies sexual crimes and the victim-blaming culture surrounding survivors. Moreover, this combat against cultural norms must pervade all aspects of society. The media must depict a society that shames men who violate women in different forms, and not normalize violence by showing it on the screen often. The first step to tackling this problem is awareness. The public must become aware of the different ways abuse occurs so that friends and family can recognize symptoms and effects of abuse when they see it. We must also recognize the harms of violence against women on society. If policymakers and the public see the economic, cultural, and political costs that are results of this problem, they are more likely to act upon them. For example, if women's situation in society suffers, there may be (as this thesis shows) more violence internationally. The WHO Multi-country report on violence against issue also recommends that we enlist "social, political, religious and other leaders in speaking out against violence against women." Hudson also recommends that we tap the social power of female leaders and celebrities such as the First Lady in progressing this campaign. At the very least, abused women can not function as highly as they would in a society that does not support them. They cannot excel at jobs, participate politically, and use up potential economic resources that would otherwise go unused had they not been violated. Shaming tactics, such as billboards calling out perpetrators of violence, could be a way to portray that this crime is unacceptable. Other tactics may include publicizing the sentencing of perpetrators facing jail time, to demonstrate that one must be held responsible for this type of crime. Other tactics, although indirect, may also help alleviate this problem, such as Goldstein's argument against childhood

sex segregation.[30] Recall that research on this issue is minimal, so another element worthy of study and analysis is the cultural changes necessary to prevent violence against women.

Military Changes

Changes within the military structure are also necessary in order to advance the situation of women all over the world. The masculine nature of the military has contributed to the continuation of wartime sexual violence all over the world. Breaking down the masculinization of the army may be too ambitious for the short-term. In the meantime, however, we can work within the structure that exists to create positive change. For example, making sure that superior officials caught committing violent crimes against women are punished by either losing their posts or being shamed is necessary to make the point to inferior personnel. Moreover, integrating more women into the army in large number may also create the critical mass necessary to neutralize the masculine nature that allows these crimes to occur. As we observed in this thesis, with more than 30% of the Eritrean Liberation Front consisting of women, this army was not found to have committed high incidences of wartime sexual violence. I must add however, that adding women into military forces must include higher up commanding positions in order to make any difference. Even so, we have seen in the U.S. military recently that the integration of female soldiers only made them more vulnerable to violence from their peers. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the opposite was true, as the army continued to commit high numbers of sexual violence despite the large proportion of women in the military. Women's integration into the military, therefore, is not sufficient in creating the change necessary to "feminize" the military structure. Education and training should also be required as part of the orientation of becoming a soldier.

Although clichéd, sensitivity training should address violence against women in particular as something separate and independent of their functions as soldiers.

We have also observed that state forces are more often reported to perpetrate rape than insurgent actors. This finding must result in efforts to hold states accountable for violations by their representatives or within their borders. Matthew Krain's work shows that states can be effectively named and shamed, and recent international campaigns have aimed to do just that.[31] In other words, not only do the individual commanders and military personnel need to be held responsible, but the state and its reputation must be criticized as well. A commander that has been proven to have committed such atrocious crimes must be taken out of command. Otherwise, this conveys the message to his inferiors that this crime is not as important as another, such as treason. Another tactic to depict the importance and tragedy of this crime can be to translate and conflate the effects of the crime to something that the military prioritizes even more, whether it is treason or efficiency.

Questions for Future Research

As any scholarly research, many more questions were uncovered than answers. For example, the outliers in the data presented in my research call into question other patterns that could be studied further. Specifically, Eritrea, which experienced a much higher number of battle-deaths, surprisingly did not experience, as far as we know, the expectedly high level of wartime sexual violence. Upon asking why this may be the case, Goldstein's argument about the exclusion of women in military forces is supported by the fact that the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front included a large number of female guerrilla soldiers. Many questions arise in regards to female combatants and how they are treated and/or influence the military "machine."

There are other elements such as pornography, alcohol, and drugs that also might influence soldiers' decision to commit these atrocities. Christopher Horwood explores the use and influence of alcohol in war historically: "The use of alcohol prior to battle has a long history. According to historical records, British forces during the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme were given generous amounts of brandy, the suggestion being that alcohol or other stimulants limit fear while the increased adrenaline caused by battle removes the detrimental physical aspects of subsequent drunkenness."[32] The anonymous author of A Woman in Berlin, upon describing stores of alcohol left behind by the Nazis stated that 'if they just thought about it for two minutes they'd realize that liquor greatly intensifies the sexual urge. I'm convinced that if the Russians hadn't found so much alcohol all over, half as many rapes would have taken place.[33]"

Societal factors, such as sex segregation, could also be studied further to find patterns and trends about war-prone societies. Goldstein argues that sex segregation in childhood also heavily influences the power dichotomy of the sexes in wartime.[34] In different cultures, the play styles and themes of the groups of boys functions to instill war-like characteristics such as play-fighting, dominances, heroic themes and war scripts. These can be studied alongside the treatment of women and how wars are fought.

Lastly, gender equality and the type of conflict could be studied further as well. Melander and Caprioli both started this journey examining inter and intrastate conflict. However, more research can be done taking into account different indicators for gender equality and different categorizations of conflict (i.e. ethnic, religious, etc.).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed possible changes that can be made to make the world safer for women, within the context of my research on violence against women and wartime sexual violence. These recommendations should be taken holistically, and not one in particular would be enough to eradicate the violence. It should be tackled by all elements of society. These recommendations should be taken by policymakers, journalists, fathers, friends, teachers, directors, and supporters of survivors in helping create the changes needed to help advance society. Each culture, however, will be different in the steps required to get there. After we obtain a more solid understanding of the issue through improving research, then we can implement the changes that are described above, including integrating female commanders into the army and supporting centers and clinics designed to help women heal from their trauma and many more.

This thesis has confirmed a connection between the security of states and the security of women within them. A world that abuses half of its population then could never succeed. The matters I have discussed and the solutions I have provided are just first (or second) steps on the journey to fixing the “broken wing” that prevents us from soaring.

Endnotes

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