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THE FOUNDATION OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
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OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
A HISTORY OF THE OSMANLIS UP TO
THE DEATH OF BAYEZID I
(1300-1403)
BY
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Four years of residence in the Ottoman Empire, chiefly in Constantinople, during the most disastrous period of its decline, have led me to investigate its origin. This book is written because I feel that the result of my research brings a new point of view to the student of the twentieth-century problems of the Near East, as well as to those who are interested in fourteenth-century Europe. If we study the past, it is to understand the present and to prepare for the future.

I plead guilty to many footnotes. Much of my text is controversial in character, and the subject-matter is so little known that the general reader would hardly be able to form judgements without a constant—but I trust not wearisome—reference to authorities.

The risk that I run of incurring criticism from Oriental philologists on the ground of nomenclature is very great. I ask their indulgence. Will they not take into consideration the fact that there is no accepted standard among English-speaking scholars for the transliteration of Turkish and Slavic names? Wherever possible, I have adopted the spelling in general usage in the Near East, and in English standard lexicons and encyclopaedias. When a general usage cannot be determined, I have frequently been at a loss.

There was the effort to be as consistent in spelling as sources and authorities would permit. But where
consistency was lacking in originals, a consistent transliteration sometimes presented difficulties with which I was incompetent to cope. Even a philologist, with a system, would be puzzled when he found his sources conflicting with each other in spelling, and—as is often the case—with themselves. And if a philologist thinks that he can establish his system by transliterating the *spoken* word, let him travel from Constantinople to Cairo overland, and he will have a bewildering collection of variants before he reaches his journey’s end. I was not long in Turkey before I learned that *Osman* and *Othman* were both correct. It depended merely upon whether you were in Constantinople or Konia! After you had decided to accept the pronunciation of the capital, you were told that Konia is the Tours of Turkey.

My acknowledgements to kind friends are many. I am grateful for the year-in and year-out patience and willingness of the officials of the Bibliothèque Nationale during long periods of constant demand upon their time and attention. Professors John De Witt, D.D., LL.D., of Princeton Theological Seminary, Duncan B. Macdonald, Ph.D., of Hartford Theological Seminary, and Edward P. Cheyney, Ph.D., LL.D., of the University of Pennsylvania, have read portions of the manuscript, and have made important and helpful suggestions. The whole manuscript has been read by Professors Talcott Williams, LL.D., of Columbia University, and R. M. McElroy, Ph.D., of Princeton University, who have not hesitated to give many hours to discussion and criticism of the theory that the book presents.

Above all, I am indebted for practical aid and
encouragement in research and in writing, from the inception of the idea of the book until the manuscript went to press, to my wife, with her Bryn Mawr insistence upon accuracy of detail and care for form of narrative, and to Alexander Souter, D.Litt., Regius Professor of Humanity in Aberdeen University, my two comrades in research through a succession of happy years in the rue de Richelieu, rue Servandoni, and rue du Montparnasse of the queen city of the world.

H. A. G.

Paris,
September 1, 1915.
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CHAPTER I

OSMAN

A NEW RACE APPEARS IN HISTORY

I

The traveller who desires to penetrate Asia Minor by railway may start either from Smyrna or from Constantinople. The Constantinople terminus of the Anatolian Railway is at Haïdar Pasha, on the Asiatic shore, where the Bosphorus opens into the Sea of Marmora. Three hours along the Gulf of Ismidt, past the Princes' Islands, brings one to Ismidt, the ancient Nicomedia, eastern capital of the Roman Empire under Diocletian. It is at the very end of the gulf. From Ismidt, the railway crosses a fertile plain, coasts the western shore of Lake Sabandja, and enters the valley of the Sangarius as far as Lefké. Here it turns southward, and mounts rapidly the course of the Kara Su, a tributary of the Sangarius, through the picturesque town of Biledjik, to a plateau, at the north-western end of which is Eski Sheïr, seven hours distant from Ismidt. Eski Sheïr is the ancient Dorylaeum. It was here that Godfrey de Bouillon in 1097 won from the Turks the victory that opened for his Crusaders the way through Asia Minor.

From Eski Sheïr there are two railway lines. One, running eastward, has its terminus at Angora, the ancient Ancyra, after thirteen hours of rather slow running. The other, the main line, runs south to Afion Kara Hissar, where the line from Smyrna joins it, and then south-west to Konia, the ancient Iconium, which is the western terminus of the new Bagdad Railway. The time from Eski Sheïr to Konia is fifteen hours.
From Lefké or from Mekedjé, near the junction of the Kara Su and the Sangarius, one can drive in four hours west to Isnik (ancient Nicaea), or in twelve hours to Brusa, which lies at the foot of Keshish Dagh (Mount Olympus). Between Lefké and Eski Sheîr, where the railway begins to mount above the river-bed of the Kara Su, is Biledjik. Between Eski Sheîr and Biledjik is Sugut. West from Eski Sheîr, six hours on horse across one low mountain range, lies Inoenu. South from Eski Sheîr, a day by carriage, is Kutayia. There is a short branch line of the Anatolian Railway to Kutayia from Alayund, two and a half hours beyond Eski Sheîr on the way to Konia.

If one will read the above paragraphs with a map before him, he will readily see that this country, the extreme north-western corner of Asia Minor, corresponds roughly to the borderland between the Roman provinces of Phrygia Epictetus and Bithynia, and is near to Constantinople. Eski Sheîr, Sugut, and Biledjik are close to Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia. Owing to the convenient waterways furnished by the Gulfs of Mudania and Ismidt, Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia have always been within a day's sail of Constantinople, even in the periods of primitive navigation. From the hills behind Eski Sheîr, Mount Olympus is the commanding landmark of the western horizon. From Constantinople, Mount Olympus is easily distinguishable even in dull weather.

It was this country, adjacent to Constantinople, and separated from the rest of Asia Minor by rugged mountain ranges and the dreary, treeless plateau stretching eastward towards the Salt Desert, which gave birth to the people who, a century after their appearance, were to inherit the Byzantine Empire and to place their sovereigns upon the throne of the Caesars.
II

At the end of the thirteenth century, Asia Minor, so long
the battleground between the Khalifs and the Byzantines,
almost entirely abandoned by the latter for a brief time to
the Seljuk emperors of Rum, who had their seat at Konia,
then again disturbed by the invasion of the Crusaders from
the west and the Mongols from the east, was left to itself.
The Byzantines, despite (or perhaps because of!) their
re-establishment at Constantinople, were too weak to make
any serious attempt to recover what they had lost to the
Seljuk Turks. The Mongols of the horde of Djenghiz Khan
had destroyed the independence of the Sultanate of Konia,
and had established their authority in that city. But they
made no real effort to bring under their dominion the
districts north-west and west of Konia to which they had
logically fallen heir.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, we find two
Christian kingdoms, Trebizond and Little Armenia, or Cilicia,
at the north-eastern and south-eastern extremities of the
peninsula. In the north-western corner, the Byzantines
retained Philadelphia, Brusa, Nicaea, Nicomedia, and the
districts in which these cities were located—a narrow strip
along the Hellespont, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus. Asia Minor, without even a semblance of centralized
authority, was to him who could gain and who could hold.

Had there been in Asia Minor in the latter half of the
thirteenth century a predominant element, with an historical
past and with a strong leader, we might have seen a revival
of the sultanate of Konia. Or we might have seen a revival
of Hellenism, a grafting, perhaps, on fresh stock, which
would have put new foundations under the Byzantine
Empire by a reconquest of the Asiatic themes. But the
Mongols and the Crusaders had done their work too well.
The Latins at Constantinople, and the Mongols in Persia
and Mesopotamia, had removed any possibility of a revival of either Arab Moslem or Greek Christian traditions.

Sixty years of Latin rule at Constantinople, and in the lower portion of the Balkan peninsula, had demonstrated the futility of any further effort on the part of western Europe to inherit the Eastern Roman Empire. The Mongols, the strongest cohesive military power at that time in the world, had not been won to Christianity, and thus inspired with a desire to re-establish for themselves the succession of the Caesars in the Levant. The Italians, imbued with the city ideal which had been so fatal to the ancient Greeks, and divided into factions in their cities, were beginning a bitter struggle for commercial supremacy in the East that was to lose its vital importance from the discoveries of Vasco da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan, and to render them impotent before the Osmanlis after centuries of mis-directed energy and useless sacrifice. The last great crusade had passed by Asia Minor to spend itself in a losing fight against the one remaining Moslem power.

As in other critical periods of history, then, an entirely new people, with an entirely new line of sovereigns, must work out its destiny in this abandoned country, or—to state what actually did happen—must come, with a strength and prestige gained in Europe, to subdue it and to possess it.

From the eighth to the thirteenth centuries a number of new ethnic elements had entered Asia Minor. Except along the range of the Taurus and in the valleys of rivers which emptied into the Aegaean Sea, the Greek element,

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1 The Keraites, a tribe of large numbers, established on the frontier of China, were Christians in the early times: Resheddin, Quatremère edition, i. 93. The Council of Lyons sent missionaries to Mongols in the reign of Innocent IV, 1245. For account of missions to Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries see Howorth, i. 68 f., 189-92; ii. 183 n.; iii. 72-5, 278-81, 348-55, 576-80: also documents of the Ming period, trans. by Hirth, p. 65.
or more specifically, the Hellenic organization of imperial institutions, had gone back to the coast cities from which it had originally come. The progress of Moslem conquest, after driving before it into Asia Minor the more zealous and militant Armenian and Syrian Christians, had brought a considerable immigration, partly Syrian, partly Arab, and varying in faith. The earlier Turks, who came largely by way of Persia, with a period of settlement in that country, belonged to the great Seljuk movement. They were nominally Moslems, and very quickly became an indigenous element, because they had settled themselves permanently in every place that had been opened up to Turkish immigration by the Seljuk armies. So firmly rooted did they become that, when the fortunes of war allotted again temporarily some of the places which they inhabited to the Crusaders and to the Nicaean Byzantines, they did not dream of moving out. This was the best country they had ever seen and they had no intention of leaving it. When the Osmanlis captured Brusa and Nicaea, they found many Moslems who had been there for three generations. Simple-minded, tolerant of others, totally unconscious of the privileges as well as of the obligations of an organized society, the Turks of the earlier immigration neither opposed nor aided in the political changes which have so frequently been the lot of Asia Minor since their coming. This holds true of the Anatolian Turks of the present day, and will be so as long as they remain illiterate and uninstructed.

In the first quarter of the thirteenth century there was another great migration towards Asia Minor, towards rather than into the peninsula, because it partly scattered itself in the mountains of Armenia and partly turned southward, going over the Taurus and Amanus ranges into Cilicia and Syria. Some got as far as Egypt. The earlier Seljuk invasion had been that of settlers following a victorious army. This invasion was that of refugees fleeing before
a terrible foe. For Djenghiz Khan and his Mongol horde had come out of central Asia, and all who could, even the bravest, fled before him. The lesson had been quickly learned that to resist him meant certain death. Because it was a migration of families, with all their worldly possessions, and because they had to hurry and did not know where they were going, the great bulk of them did not advance far.¹

Most of the bands, after settling for some years in the mountains of Armenia and in the upper valley of the Euphrates, were tempted by the death of Djenghiz Khan to return home. The steep mountains and narrow valleys of Rum had dissuaded them from trying for better luck farther west. It was too much up hill and down dale for their cattle.² The resolute and adventurous pushed on into Asia Minor, although in doing so they must have lost or have left behind most of their women and children and flocks. For they were small warrior bands, bent upon enlisting in the army of Alaeddin Kaï Kobad, the last illustrious sultan of the Konia Seljuk line—illustrious because he had not yet met the Mongols and was looked upon by the fugitives as a possible saviour and avenger. Even if they had not the intention of putting themselves under the protection of Alaeddin when they set their faces westward, they must needs have come into contact with him. For of the two roads into Asia Minor from Armenia, the upper one lay through Sivas and Angora, and the lower through Caesarea, Akseraï, and Konia. Whichever route they took would lead them through the Seljuk dominions.

It is doubtful if Alaeddin viewed the appearance of these

¹ I have witnessed a similar migration, when the Bulgarians broke into Thrace in October 1912. The progress of the fleeing Turks, even on the plains, was painfully slow, and the mortality was frightful.
² Neshri (Nöldeke's translation), in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, xiii. 190.
fighting bands with any other emotion than that of alarm. In spite of their undoubted skill as fighters, the Seljuk Sultan did not dare to enroll many of them in his army. If he were defeated in battle, or if he should die, he knew well that such vigorous mercenaries might upset his line. He could rely upon their fidelity neither against the Kharesmians with whom he was at that time fighting (many of them were from that Sultan’s country), nor against the Mongols with whom he must soon measure his strength. So he followed the policy dictated by prudence. Resisting the temptation of using them in his own army, he granted to their leaders as fiefs districts on the frontiers of his rapidly diminishing empire which were hardly his own to give, where they would have to work out their own salvation by mastering local anarchy in their respective ‘grants’, or, like the Israelites of Canaan, fight for what had been allotted to them, against the Byzantine Emperors of Nicaea.

Under these circumstances, the tribe of destiny would be that which occupied the grant nearest Constantinople and the remnant of the Byzantine Empire. The Turkish tribe which settled on the borders of Bithynia, either by the direction and with the permission of Alaeddin Kai Kobad, or independently of the Seljuks of Konia, was that whose first historic chief was Osman, the father of the Osmanlis.

With the other Turkish tribes, which succeeded in establishing independent emirates, the Osmanlis did not come into contact until the reign of Orkhan. So it is unnecessary to trace their fortunes here.

III

There are no Ottoman sources to which the historian may go for the origin of the Ottoman people and royal house,

1 Seaddedin, Casa Ottomana (Bratutti trans.), i. 6.
2 Neshri, xiii. 190.  
3 See Appendix B for these emirates.
or for their history during the fourteenth century. They have no written records of the period before the capture of Constantinople.¹ Their earliest historians date from the end of the fifteenth century, and the two writers to whom they give greatest weight wrote at the end of the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth century.² From the point of view, then, of recording historical facts, one hesitates in our day to follow the example of von Hammer, by setting forth at length, after a scientific collation, the legends which the simple-minded Osmanlis have always accepted without question. The Byzantines give us nothing worthy of credence about the origin of the Osmanlis, for the reason that they had no means of getting authoritative information. As for the early European writers, their testimony is valuable only as a reflection of the idea which Christendom had of the Osmanlis when they were becoming a menace to European civilization.³

On the other hand, these legends are not to be ignored, as they have been by the latest authoritative writer on Ottoman history.⁴ Where authenticated facts are lacking, traditions must be examined and carefully weighed. This is essential when we are considering the origins of a people. For no race has ever recorded its birth. The beginnings of a people are so insignificant that they remain unnoticed in general history until the attention of others is attracted to them by their own achievements.

¹ There is a collection of State papers in Persian, Arabic and Turkish, Feridun (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. turc, 79), which contains some letters and decrees of the earliest sultans, but there is no proof of the authenticity of these documents.
² Neshri and Idris, end fifteenth century; Seadeddin, end sixteenth century; Hadji Khalifa, seventeenth century. See Bibliography.
³ In the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, I have examined, as far as I know, all the books concerning Turkey printed before 1600. See list in Bibliography.
⁴ Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (in the Geschichte der europäischen Staaten), published 1908–13, preface and i. 152–3.
Who were the people that took upon themselves the name of Osman, their chief, and whom we must, from the moment of their very first encounters with the Byzantines, clearly distinguish from the other groups of Anatolian Turks that had gathered around other leaders? Did they, at the beginning of Osman’s career, have any distinct national consciousness? Did they have any past? Did they start the foundation of a state with a definite goal before them? Was there any other cause for their amazing growth and success than the mere fact that they had the most fortunate geographical position, on the confines of a decaying empire?

With the purpose, then, of suggesting an answer to some of these questions, and paving the way for an answer to the others later on, what the Osmanlis accept concerning their origin and their history before 1300 must be set forth and examined.¹

In the year of the Hegira 616,² 'because there was no more rest to be found in all Persia' for the Turks who had been forced out of the Khorassan ³ by the approach of Djenghiz Khan, 'all the wandering Turks, fifty thousand

¹ Up to the death of Ertogrul (1288), I follow Neshri, ZDMG., xiii. 188–98, unless otherwise specified. Direct quotation is indicated by quotation marks.
² A.D. 1219. Evliya effendi, i. 27, gives a.h. 600; Seaddedin and Hadji Khalfa, a.h. 619; Drechsler, Chron. Saracenorum, a.h. 610.
³ Or Kharesm? Schéfer, in preface to his translation of Riza Kouly’s embassy to Kharesm, Bibl. de l’École des langues viv. orientales, 1re série, vol. iii, says that Kharesm in part was identical with Khorassan. But Shehabeddin, trans. by Quatremère in Notices et Extraits, xiii. 289, declares that Kharesm is a country distinct from Khorassan. Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, MS. fr., Bibl. Nat., Paris, nouv. ac., no. 888, p. 813, supports this opinion. The very fact that these writers are so careful to make this assertion shows, however, that there was much confusion as to these terms. According to Vambéry, Kharesm is still in Djugatay Turkish, the diplomatic and political name for the modern Khanate of Khiva. Howorth, History of Mongols, ii. 78, says that the Turkish tribes remained in these countries after the Mongol conquest. Is this the Organa or Urgheuz of Marco Polo?
families, followed their leader, Soleiman Shah, and set out for Rum. Then was Alaeddin I, son of Kaï Kosrew, the builder of Konia, entered upon the rule of Rum. These fifty thousand nomad families journeyed several years in the neighbourhood of Erzerum and Erzindjian, changing from winter to summer quarters and plundering the unbelievers who lived there. But finally Soleiman Shah marched again towards his homeland, with the intention of passing through the district of Aleppo. As they came to the neighbourhood of Djaber, they wanted to venture across the Euphrates. Soleiman Shah drove his horse into the river to seek a ford. The bank was rocky, so the horse slipped and fell into the river with Soleiman Shah. His end was regarded as a warning (decision) of destiny: it appeared to be the command of God. A part of these Turks remained to dwell there. There was a division among the followers of Soleiman Shah. Some of them, who now carry the name of Turcomans of Syria, went into the wilderness. Others went towards Rum, and became ancestors of the nomad tribes who still wander in Rum.

Soleiman Shah at his death left four sons: Sonkur tigin, Gundogdu, Ertogrul, the champion of the faith, and Dundar. Some of the Turks followed these four brothers, turned themselves again in the direction of Rum, and came to the source of the Euphrates. While Ertogrul and Dundar remained there with about four hundred nomad families, the two other brothers turned back again to their home. Ertogrul marched farther into Rum, and settled near Angora at the foot of Karadjadagh. From there he wandered to Sultan Oejoenu.

1 Hussein Hezarfenn, ii. 287, and Chalcocondylas (Patr. Graec., Migne, vol clix). 21, call the father of Ertogrul Oguzalp. For critical discussion see Appendix A.

2 This title is invariably given by Neshri to every ruler in the direct line of Osman, just as he calls the Christian opponents of the Osmanlis unbelievers.

3 Probably Sultan Inoenu, anticipating the later name of this district
Neshri now tells a story which is repeated by later Ottoman historians as a fact. Neshri says that he heard this story from a 'trustworthy' man, who had heard it from the stirrup-holder of Orkhan, who, in turn, had heard it from his father and his grandfather. This is worthy of mention, for it is one of the very few instances where an Oriental historian has taken the trouble to connect his facts with what might be termed an original source:

'As Ertogrul, with about four hundred men, was marching into Rum, Sultan Alaeddin¹ was engaged in a fight with some of his enemies. As they came near, they found that the Tartars were on the point of beating Sultan Alaeddin. Now Ertogrul had several hundred excellent companions with him. He spoke to them: “Friends, we come straight upon a battle. We carry swords at our side. To flee like women and resume our journey is not manly. We must help one of the two. Shall we aid those who are winning or those who are losing?” Then they said unto him, “It will be difficult to aid the losers. Our people are weak in number, and the victors are strong!” Ertogrul replied, “This is not the speech of bold men. The manly part is to aid the vanquished. The prophet says that he shall come to the helpless in time of need. Were man to make a thousand pilgrimages, he finds not the reward that comes to him when at the right moment he turns aside affliction from the helpless!” Thereupon Ertogrul and his followers immediately grasped their swords, and fell upon the Tartars . . . and drove them in flight. When the Sultan saw this he came to meet Ertogrul, who dismounted, and kissed the Sultan’s hand. Whereupon Alaeddin gave him a splendid robe of honour and many gifts for his companions. Then gave he to the people of Ertogrul a country by name Sugut

¹ Sagredo, the Italian historian, whose work was greatly esteemed by Gibbon, makes the curious error of calling Alaeddin 'Lord of Aleppo and Damascus'.
for winter and the mountain range of Dumanij for summer residence. From this decides one rightly that the champion of the faith, Osman, was born at Sugut. Then was Karadja Hissar, like Biledjik, not yet captured, but was subject to Sultan Alaeddin. These were three districts.'

Some time later, Ertogrul, acting as commander of the advance-guard of Alaeddin’s army, defeated a force of Greeks and their Tartar mercenaries, in a three days’ battle, and pursued them as far as the Hellespont. Ertogrul's force consisted of four hundred and forty-four horsemen, which he commanded in person. After this battle Alaeddin bestowed upon Ertogrul as fief the district of Eski Sheîr, comprising Sugut on the north, and Karadja Hissar on the south, of Eski Sheîr. Karadja Hissar was reported captured after an elaborate siege and assault by Ertogrul when he first came into the country. But it is again mentioned as one of the first conquests of Osman from the Christians after his father’s death. None of the Ottoman historians records any progress of conquest during the long years of Ertogrul’s peaceable existence. When he died, in 1288, Osman was thirty years old. He gave to his son less than the Ottoman historians claim was his actual grant from Alaeddin I. If their own records of Osman’s conquests after 1289 are correct, we must believe that his tribe possessed only Sugut and a portion of the mountain range lying directly west. When Ertogrul died, they had no other village—not even a small mountain castle.

IV

After Ertogrul’s death there was an amazing change. Osman and his villagers began to attack their neighbours,

1 A great mountain situated between Kutayia and Brusa': Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1975; 'The paths up this mountain are so difficult that one on foot has a thousand pains to reach the top': ibid., fol. 1850.

2 Rasmussen, Annales Islamici, p. 41, confuses this city with Kutayia, and gives its capture by Ertogrul under date of 1285.
extend their boundaries, and form a state. We cannot go on to a consideration of these events without mentioning some traditions of this period which furnish us with a clue to the explanation of this sudden change of a very small pastoral tribe, leading a harmless sleepy existence in the valley of the Kara Su, into a warlike, aggressive, fighting people.

Osman once passed the night in the home of a pious Moslem. Before he went to sleep his host entered the room, and placed on a shelf a book, of which Osman asked the title. 'It is the Koran,' he responded. 'What is its object?' again asked Osman. 'The Koran,' his host explained, 'is the word of God, given to the world through his prophet Mohammed.' Osman took the book and began to read. He remained standing, and read all night. Towards morning he fell asleep exhausted. An angel appeared to him, and said, 'Since thou hast read my eternal word with so great respect, thy children and the children of thy children shall be honoured from generation to generation.'

In Itburnu, a village not far from Eski Sheîr, and also not far from Sugut, lived a Moslem cadi, who dispensed justice and legal advice to those of his faith in that neighbourhood. He had a daughter, Malkhatun, whose hand was demanded in marriage by Osman. But the sheik Edebali, for a period of two years, persisted in refusing his consent to this union. Finally, Osman, when sleeping one night in the home of Edebali, had a dream.

He saw himself lying beside the sheik. A moon arose

1 Thus in Ali and Neshri. Seadeddin attributes this dream to Ertogrul. But the confusion between Ertogrul and Osman is marked in all the Ottoman historians.

2 The Ottoman historians give as reason for the refusal the social difference between his daughter and the 'young prince'. This is an excellent illustration of how, writing in the zenith of Ottoman prosperity, the historians lost their sense of proportion or were actually compelled to write in flattering terms of the founder of their royal house.
out of the breast of Edebali, and, when it had become full, descended and hid itself in his breast. Then from his own loins there began to arise a tree which, as it grew, became greener and more beautiful, and covered with the shadow of its branches the whole world. Beneath the tree he saw four mountain ranges, the Caucasus, the Atlas, the Taurus, and the Balkans. From the roots of the tree issued forth the Tigris, the Euphrates, the Nile, and the Danube, covered with vessels like the sea. The fields were full of harvests, and the mountains were crowned with thick forests. In the valleys everywhere were cities, whose golden domes were invariably surmounted by a crescent, and from whose countless minarets sounded forth the call to prayer, that mingled itself with the chattering of birds upon the branches of the tree. The leaves of the tree began to lengthen out into swordblades. Then came a wind that pointed the leaves towards the city of Constantinople, which, ‘situated at the junction of two seas and of two continents, seemed like a diamond mounted between two sapphires and two emeralds, and appeared thus to form the precious stone of the ring of a vast dominion which embraced the entire world.’ As Osman was putting on the ring he awoke.¹

When this dream was told to Edebali, he interpreted it as a sign from God that he should give his daughter to Osman in order that these wonderful things might be brought about for the glory of the true faith. So the marriage was arranged.²

¹ Hammer, i. 67, in relating this dream, has transcribed with fidelity and felicity the Persian poetry of Idris.
² Leunclavius, Pandectes, p. 113, following Ali, attributes the moon dream to Ertogrul, and places it at Konia. Boecker, Commentarius de rebus turcicis, pp. 104–5, following Chalcocondylas, does likewise, but relates the Koran dream of Osman. Seadeddin, p. 11, makes the dream distinctly religious, and while not mentioning the love story or Malkhatun by name, infers that Osman receives intimation of his marriage with Edebali’s daughter only through Edebali’s interpretation of the dream. This failure to mention Malkhatun is all the more significant when we see
That Osman and his people were good Moslems themselves, and of Moslem ancestry, is not questioned by the Ottoman and Byzantine writers, and seems to have been accepted as a matter of fact by the European historians who have written upon the history of the Ottoman Empire. But it seems very clear that Osman and his tribe, when they settled at Sugut, must have been pagans. There is no direct mention, in any historical record, of the conversion to Islam of the tribes from the Khorassan and other transoxanian regions which, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, appeared on the confines of Asia Minor. The earlier Turkish invaders entered the country only after they had already for generations been in contact with Arabic Islam. Although they displayed no great knowledge of or zeal for their religion and were free from the fanaticism of the Saracens, the Seljuks were certainly Moslems.

But the Turks of the later immigration, from whom Osman sprang, had never come to any great extent under the influence of Islam, even though they had settled for some generations on the frontiers of Persia. If we accept the testimony of the Osmanlis themselves concerning their descent from Soleiman Shah, who had left Mahan with fifty thousand families, we have a clear indication of their being non-Moslems from Neshri's account of the dispersion of this horde after the death of Soleiman Shah. He says that some were ancestors of the Syrian Turcomans and others of all the wandering tribes in Rum—the habitual nomads of his later how much attention Seadeddin gives to Nilufer. Evliya effendi, ii. 19, says that through the marriage of Osman to Malkhatun, the Ottoman sultans became descendants of the Prophet!

1 I should except from this statement Rambaud, who, in Hist. générale, iii. 822-4, states that the conversion of the Osmanlis to Islam took place during the chieftainship of Osman. The general character of the work to which he was contributing, and the limits of space, did not allow him to give any reasons in support of this position. Vanell, Histoire de l'Empire ottoman, p. 357, says that Ertogrul was a pagan until he became converted through reading the Koran.
own day. The testimony of travellers from the twelfth century onwards is overwhelming in support of the pagan character of these tribes.¹

The various Turkish tribes which entered Asia Minor at the same time as that of Osman, and had penetrated into the western part of the peninsula, soon found themselves in a Moslem atmosphere. They were few in number. Nothing was more natural for them than to adopt the faith of their Seljuk kinsmen. This they did, for exactly the same reason that the Bulgarians, although they had originally a tendency towards Islam, adopted Christianity.² It was so natural that it passed without comment. These Turks were primarily warriors, indifferent to deep religious feeling and conviction. So they could take on a new faith—if we can say that they ever had a faith before—without any trouble or without any noise being made over it. Between 800 and 1000 the Seljuks changed their religion three times.³ At the sack of Mosul, in 1286, the Turks and Turcomans made no distinction between Moslem and Christian, massacring the men and carrying off the women of both sects alike.⁴

The tractability of the Turks, as of the Tartars and Mongols, in the matter of religion was noted by every traveller, and was so well known in western Europe that strenuous efforts were made by the popes at various times from Djenghiz Khan to Gazan Khan to bring these Asiatic hordes into the Christian fold. A united Christendom, even a united Rome, might have seen its missionary work crowned with success.

¹ From personal acquaintance with them, I can testify that these nomads (Yuruks) have remained up to the twentieth century with only the most vague idea of Mohammed and with no idea at all of the Koran and the ritual observances of Islam.


³ Cf. Cahun’s masterly contribution to Hist. générale, ii. 887.

⁴ Abul Faradj, Chronicon Syr., pp. 606-8.
Of the village and castle chieftains with whom Osman at the beginning of his career lived on friendly terms, almost every one was a Christian. His lot was cast with them. He was cut off from the decaying Seljuk dominion of Konia. He had practically no intercourse with the other Turkish emirs of Asia Minor. His only serious foes were the Mongols, pagans like himself, who had, at the very year of his birth, given what seemed a death-blow to Islam in destroying the Khalifate at Bagdad in 1258, and who were, when Osman began his active career, plotting with the Franks of the Holy Land to aid them against the Egyptian sultanate—the last strong bulwark of Islam.

We see, then, the tremendous importance of these dreams of Osman, of his meeting with Edebali, and of his marriage with Malkhatun. We cannot regard these events in any other light than as recording, in a truly Oriental way, his conversion to Islam. The interpretation of the dream of the Holy Book strikes one immediately. Except in Seadeddin, the religious significance of the moon and tree dream is overshadowed by the romance of Osman and Malkhatun. Let us give to sheik Edebali his proper place in history as the great missionary of Islam, who found for his faith in its hour of dire need a race of swordbearers worthy of the task of reconstituting the Khalifate and of spreading once more the name of Mohammed in three continents.

It was the conversion of Osman and his tribe which gave birth to the Osmanli people, because it welded into one race the various elements living in the north-western corner of Asia Minor. The new faith gave them a raison d'être. This conversion, and not the disappearance of the Seljuks of Konia, is the explanation of the activity of Osman after

1 The Ottoman historians mention none, either of friendship or enmity, during the entire life of Osman.
2 The improbable connexion between Ertogrul and Osman and the Seljuk sovereigns of Konia has been accepted without question by European
1290, as in sharp contrast with the preceding fifty years\(^1\) of easy, slothful existence at Sugut.

Ertogrul and Osman, village chieftain at Sugut, had lived the life of a simple, pastoral folk, with no ambition beyond the horizon of their little village. No record exists of any battle fought, of any conquest made. Turks had already made their appearance in raids against the coast cities of Asia Minor, upon the islands of the Aegean Sea, and even in the Balkan peninsula. But they were not the Turks of Osman. Until the students of the later Byzantine Empire, and of the Italian commercial cities in their relations with the Levant, make a clear distinction between Turk and Osmanli, there will always be confusion upon this point. Ertogrul had about four hundred fighting men.\(^2\) There is no reason to believe that Osman had more. His relations with his neighbours were those of perfect amity.\(^3\) There is no question of believer and unbeliever.

Suddenly we find Osman attacking his neighbours and capturing their castles. During the decade from 1290 to 1300 he extends his boundaries until he comes into contact

historians, on the strength of the assertions of the Ottoman historians. This is curious, because the evidence against this connexion is overwhelming. The Seljuk Empire of Rum lost its independence at the battle of Erzindjian, 1244 (cf. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce dans le Levant*, i. 534). Neshri himself confesses that after this date 'now remained only the bare name of the Seljuk Kings': *ZDMG.*, xiii. 195. In view of the established facts of history, it is astonishing that European historians should have up to this time perpetuated, and given their sanction to, a fiction which was invented for the purpose of helping Mohammed II to incorporate Karamania in his empire! The limits of a footnote forbidding the adequate discussion of this question and the citation of the authorities, I must refer my readers to Appendix A.


\(^2\) All the Ottoman historians agree upon this number.

\(^3\) 'The unbelievers and believers of that land honoured Ertogrul and his son': Neshri, p. 197. That Christians lived everywhere without molestation in the midst of non-converted Turkish tribes is asserted by Heyd, ii. 65.
the Byzantines. His four hundred warriors grow to four thousand. We begin to hear of a people called, not Turks, but Osmanlis, after a leader whose own name first appears at the same time as that of his people.\(^1\) They are foes of Greeks and Tartars alike. They are definitely allied to Islam. They possess a missionary spirit and a desire to proselytize such as one always finds in new converts. Their unity among themselves, and their distinctively different character from that of the other Turks of Asia Minor, becomes, during the first sixty years of the fourteenth century, so marked that Europe is forced to recognize them as a nation. Being more in the presence of Europe than the other groups of Asia Minor, the Europeans begin to call them simply Turks, and to take them as representing all the Turks of Anatolia.

But they had never called themselves Turks until they got the habit of doing so through the influence of European education upon their higher classes, and because of the awakening since 1789 of the sentiment of nationality among the subject Christian races. Mouradjea d’Ohsson, who understood the Osmanlis better than any other European writer of his day, wrote in 1785: ‘The Osmanlis employ the term “Turk” in referring to a coarse and brutal man. According to the Osmanlis, the word Turk belongs only to the peoples of the Turkestan and to those vagabond hordes who lead a stagnant life in the deserts of the Khorassan. All the peoples submitted to the Empire are designated under the name “Osmanlis”, and they do not understand why they are called Turks by Europeans. As they attach to this word the idea of the most marked insult, no foreigner in the Empire ever allows himself to use it in speaking to them.’\(^2\)

\(^1\) It is altogether likely that Osman received his name at the time of his conversion. Is it not significant that his father, his brothers, his son even, as well as most of his warriors, had purely pagan Turkish names?

\(^2\) Tableau de l’Empire ottoman, iv. 373.
Nor were the Osmanlis, until the reign of Bayezid, one hundred years later, the strongest military and political factor in Asia Minor. The Turkish emirates of Sarukhan, of Kermian, and especially of Karaman, could match the Osmanlis in extent of territory and ability to defend it. We shall see later how the Osmanlis conquered their Anatolian neighbours by a prestige won in Europe and by soldiers gathered in Europe. One of the principal tasks of this book is to correct the fundamental misconception of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, which has persisted to this day. It seems to be a pretty generally accepted idea that the Osmanlis were a Turkish Moslem race, who invaded Asia Minor, and, having established themselves there, pushed on into Europe and overthrew the Byzantine Empire. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Osmanlis were masters of the whole Balkan peninsula before they had subjugated Asia Minor as far as Konia!

Osman and his people have no history until they come in contact with the Byzantines. The Ottoman chroniclers, and the Byzantine and European historians who have followed them, give at some length the early conquests of Osman. But the accounts are fantastical, obscure, and frequently contradictory. It is the story of a village chieftain, who succeeded in imposing his authority upon his neighbours over an increasingly wider area, until a small state was formed. But it is not the same story as that of the other emirs who built up independent states in the old Seljuk provinces. For Osman founded his principality in territory contiguous to Constantinople, and by attacking

1 See Appendix B.

2 During the late war with the Balkan allies, the newspapers of the world spoke of ‘driving the Turks back to Asia, where they belong’, and of the re-establishment of the Ottoman capital at Brusa or Konia.
and conquering the last fragments of the Byzantine possessions along and in the hinterland of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. Osman's opponents were all Christians. Had he attacked his Turkish neighbours first, had he gone south and east instead of north and west, in building up his state, there would never have been a new race born to change the history of the world.

It is impossible to state with any degree of certitude the conquests of Osman before 1300. The record of village warfare, with its names of localities which even the most celebrated Ottoman geographer could not, three centuries later, identify, is of no importance whatever. The extent of Osman's principality, when he and his people first appear in history, was very insignificant. In 1300 he had succeeded in submitting to his authority a part of ancient Phrygia Epictetus and Bithynia, whose four corners were: south-east, Eski Sheîr; south-west, the eastern end of Mount Olympus; north-east, the junction of the Kara Su and the Sangarius; north-west, Yeni Sheîr. In 1299 Osman took up his residence in Yeni Sheîr. This was the outpost of his principality, in a position of extreme importance, about half-way between Brusa and Nicaea. In sixty years the tribe of Osman had advanced sixty miles from Eski Sheîr, the old city, to Yeni Sheîr, the new city. They held

1 See Armain's translation of the *Djihannuma* (Mirror of the World), a universal geography by Hadji Khalfa, in the Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS., fonds français, nouv. ac., nos. 888–9. The section on Asia Minor, although written in some detail, does not contain many of the names which we find in the Ottoman historians. I wish to register a protest against inflicting on students and readers of history lists of names that can have no possible meaning to them. I have omitted from this work the names of places and persons upon which I can get no light.

2 Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1917, makes an error in giving the distance from Brusa to Yeni Sheîr as two days. I have driven from Brusa to Nicaea in one day of not fast going. Yeni Sheîr is on the main road between these cities, six hours from Brusa and four hours from Nicaea.

3 The early European historians make the wildest statements about Osman's field of action. Many of them call Ottomanjik, a place four
undisputed sway only in the valley of the Kara Su,¹ and their important villages and castles, Biledjik,² Itburnu, Inoenu, Sugut, Ainegoel,³ Karadjia Hissar,⁴ Yundhissar, and
days or five north-east of Eski Sheir, his first conquest: Cuspius (Antwerp ed., 1541), p. 6; Spandugino, in Sansovino, p. 143; Egnatius, p. 28. Cf. Hadji Khalifa, op. cit., fol. 1789. But this place was not captured by the Osmanlis until the reign of Bayezid: Evliya, op. cit., ii. 95. Paulo Giovio, an Italian historian greatly esteemed in his day, puts among the notable conquests of Osman the city and district of Sivas, as does also Rabbi Joseph, in his famous Chronicles, Eng. trans. of Biallobotzky, ii. 505. Donado da Lezze, Historia Turchesca, Rumanian edition of Ursu, pp. 4 and 5, makes him conqueror of Rum, province of Sivas, Phoenicia, ‘et altri luoghi’! Cuspius, De Turcarum Origine, quotes Donado da Lezze almost literally. Richer, De Rebus Turcarum, written for the information of Francis I of France, says, p. 11: ‘Circiter 1300, Ottomanus impune invitus omnibus summam imperii, quod ante partitum tenebant factiosi magistratus, occupavit, sesquae Asiae minoris sive Anatoliae imperatorem nominare sit aggressus. Syvam, quae eadem cum Sebasto est, expugnavit, et oppida ad Euxinum positae non pauca cepit.’ (The italics are mine.) Hussein Hezarfenn, one of the Ottoman historians whose work has been most widely read and quoted in Europe, says of Ertogrul, who never saw the sea, ‘He equipped several ships, with which he made a raid into the Aegaean Sea, pillaged the islands, descended upon Greece, penetrated up to the Peloponnesus, and returned to his home (the little village of Sugut!) laden down with wealth and followed by a great army composed of experienced warriors of all sorts of nations whom the renown of his bravery and his good fortune attracted to his service: which increased so greatly his reputation in Asia that Sultan Alaeddin even found it to his advantage to cultivate him’: trans. of Petits de la Croix, ii. 288-9.

¹ I am not sure that I am justified in using the expression ‘undisputed sway’ even for this small territory. Pachymeres, IV. 30, pp. 345-7, speaks of a certain Soleiman pasha, who was threatening Nicomedia in 1303; and V. 23, p. 427, of Alisur retiring to the Sangarius after Roger had relieved Philadelphia in 1307.

² Probably the first conquest of Osman. This city, on the Kara Su, is still a thriving place. Its situation is most picturesque. The author of the Arabic History of the Kurds (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. of Ducaurroy, fol. 151 r⁰, 152 r⁰) makes Biledjik the city granted to Ertogrul by Alaeddin, and declares that he captured Sugut (Sukidjeh) from the ‘infidels of Tekkur’.

³ Angelcoma of the Byzantines.

⁴ The only conquest of Osman not in the direction of Byzantium. Hadji Khalifa, op. cit., fol. 1851.
Yar Hissar,\(^1\) were all within a day's journey of each other.

In 1301, twelve years after Osman began to form his state, he fought his first battle, and came into direct contact with the Byzantine Empire. At Baphaeon,\(^2\) near Nicomedia, the heterarch Muzalon, with 2,000 men, attempted to check a raid the Osmanlis were making into the fertile valley whose products contributed so greatly to the well-being of Nicomedia. It was midsummer, just before the gathering of the harvests.\(^3\) In a pitched battle, the unarmoured horsemen of Osman charged so speedily and so impetuously that they broke through the heavy line of their opponents, and the Greek commander's retreat was covered only by the opportune arrival of Slavic mercenaries.\(^4\) The Osmanlis were too few in number to follow up this victory. It is hardly probable that they made any attack on Nicomedia.\(^5\) But they laid waste all the districts into which they dared to venture.

VI

At this same time the emirs whose possessions bordered on the Aegaean Sea began to press hard upon the Greek coast cities and those few cities of the interior, such as Magnesia, Philadelphia, and Sardes, which still acknowledged the

\(^{1}\) 'Situated between Yeni Sheir, Brusa, and Ainegoel. They count one day from Yeni Sheir to Yar Hissar by the road which goes to Kutayia': Hadji Khalfa, fol. 1917.

\(^{2}\) The Ottomans name this place Kuyun Hissar. See Schéfer edition of Spandugino, p. 16 n.

\(^{3}\) Pachymeres, IV. 25, p. 327, says the battle was fought July 27. Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, i. 157, is in error in placing date June 27; Hammer, i. 190, and Jorga both give year 1301. Muralt, Chronographie Byzantine, ii. 480, has this battle under 1302.

\(^{4}\) Pach., IV. 25, p. 335.

\(^{5}\) Cantemir, Rumanian ed., i. 20, seems to infer that Osman attacked Nicomedia after this battle. He is certainly wrong in stating that Osman captured Kutayia. See pp. 274, 292–3.
authority of Byzantium. In the spring of 1302, Michael IX Palaeologos came to Asia Minor to take command of the Slavic mercenaries. At first the Turks were in consternation, if we can believe Pachymeres, but when they saw the unwillingness of Michael to fight, they grew bold, and compelled the Emperor to take refuge in Magnesia. Michael's unwillingness was not due to lack of courage, but because he could not rely upon his Slavs. As true mercenaries, they were fighting for pay, and there was no gold to give them. Michael's father, the old Emperor Andronicus II, had not sent him any money. In Constantinople the Venetians were threatening to depose Andronicus; the almost annual ecclesiastical quarrels, which form so large and wearisome and disastrous a place in the last century and a half of Byzantine history, were embarrassing him; and the treasury was empty. Even if there had been money to send, it would have been a perilous undertaking, for the Turkish pirates were swarming in the Sea of Marmora, and had even seized the Princes' Islands, which are within sight of the Imperial City.

When they saw that neither pay nor booty was forthcoming, and that they were engaged in a hopeless struggle, the mercenaries forced Michael to allow them to return to Europe. This was the last genuine personal effort on the part of a successor of the Caesars to save the Asiatic themes. It ended in ignominious failure. Not one battle had been fought. The withdrawal of the Slavs was followed by an exodus of Greeks to the Aegean coast, and from there to Europe. Pachymeres claims that this exodus was general. But we cannot accept the testimony of Pachymeres as altogether trustworthy on this point. Many Greeks, for reasons which are set forth later, remained in the coast districts of Asia Minor, and they did not leave, to any noticeable extent, the territory in which Osman was operating. The Turks, however, made a raid into all the islands
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along the Aegean littoral, and crossed over into Thrace, where for two years the fields could not be cultivated.¹

At this critical moment, had there been any united action on the part of the Turkish emirs, Constantinople would probably have fallen an easy prey to their armies and to their fleets. But each emir was acting for himself, and was as much an enemy of his Turkish rivals as he was of the Byzantine emperors. There is no instance in which any two of them joined forces, and acted together. Throughout the fourteenth century the armies defending the Byzantine Empire contained almost as many Turks as those attacking it.

To the east and to the west Andronicus II, utterly unable to defend himself, looked for aid. From this time on to the fall of Constantinople the history of the Byzantine Empire becomes what the history of the Ottoman Empire has been during the last hundred years. It is the story of an uninterrupted succession of bitter internal quarrels, of attacks by former vassals upon the immediate frontiers of its shrunken territory, of subtle undermining by hostile colonies of foreigners whose one thought was commercial gain, and of intermittent, and in almost all cases selfishly inspired, efforts of western Europe to put off the fatal day.

In the east, Andronicus expected much of Ghazan Khan. Were not the Turks of Asia Minor vassals of the Mongol overlord? Andronicus sent envoys to Ghazan to offer him the hand of a young princess who passed at Constantinople as his natural daughter. Ghazan received them cordially, accepted the proffered marriage alliance, and promised to exercise a pressure upon the Turks of western Asia Minor.²

¹ Pach., V. 9; Gregoras, VII, i, p. 214.
² Pach., in Stritter, Memoriae Populorum, iii. 1086–7; D’Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols, iv. 315. Andronicus made a second appeal in 1308, and gave his own sister, Marie, who is known to later Mongol historians as ‘Despina Khatun’, to Mohammed Khodabendah Khan, after Khodabendah’s conversion to Islam: ibid., iv. 536; Hertzberg, Geschichte der Byzantiner und des Osmanischen Reiches, p. 461.
This promise, however, was not followed by any serious action. The Mongols were never more than mere raiders in Asia Minor. Before this marriage could be consummated, Ghazan Khan died. The young princess was offered to and accepted by his successor. It was a useless sacrifice. For in this first decade of the fourteenth century the long struggle between Christian and Moslem to win the Mongols ended, temporarily at least, in the conversion of the Khans to Islam.

From the west, Andronicus received aid of the most disastrous sort. When Ferdinand of Aragon made peace with Charles d'Anjou, King of Sicily, in 1302, he got rid of his troublesome mercenaries by sending them to serve the Byzantine Empire. Roger de Flor, typical soldier of fortune, who could not be matched in his generation for daring, insolence, rapacity, cruelty, and Achillean belief in his own invulnerability, arrived at Constantinople with eight thousand Catalans and Almogavares, the former heavy-armed plainsmen and mariners, the latter light-armed mountaineers of northern Spain. They were true prototypes of the soldiers of Alva and Cortes. Roger was made Grand Duke, and married to Princess Marie, niece of Andronicus.

Almost immediately after their arrival, the Catalans became engaged in such bloody conflicts with the Genoese of Galata, and robbed and murdered the Greeks with such alacrity, that Andronicus hastened to turn them loose in Asia. Roger established himself in the peninsula of Cyzicus. Here his Catalans fell immediately to plundering the inhabitants of the country, who soon found that they had passed from Scylla to Charybdis, and carried heartrending tales of lust and greed and massacre to Constantinople.

1 I can find no justification for Howorth’s statement, ‘This alliance seems to have had a restraining influence upon the Turks’, in his History of the Mongols, iii. 464.

2 See Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, vi. 318, where the date of this momentous event is given as ‘vers 1305’.

3 Pach., V. 14, pp. 399-400; 21, pp. 410, 417.
Greek general who was doing anything noteworthy against the Turks was relieved of his spoils of war by Roger.

In 1305, by a swift march to the relief of Philadelphia, which was being besieged by Alisur, prince of Karamania, Roger and his Catalans showed what they could do, if they would. The Turks were compelled to raise the siege. Roger pursued them to the source of the Sangarius.\(^1\) But, on the way, the Catalans deprived their Greek allies of any portion of the rich spoils, and massacred the Slavic mercenaries who dared to argue with them.\(^2\) Gregoras says, probably with reason, that Roger could have reconquered the whole of Asia Minor for the Byzantines.\(^3\) But that country seemed to attract him as little as it had attracted the Mongols. He was no Crusader, glad and eager to undergo the terrible hardships which military operations among mountains and on arid plateaus demanded. There was no motive to make the effort worth while. So he left the Turks to themselves and went to Gallipoli, where he let it be known that the Catalans were preparing an expedition to repeat the Fourth Crusade.

In fear for his life as well as for his throne, Andronicus sent an envoy to offer Roger the 'government of the Orient', general command of all the troops in Asia, and twenty thousand pieces of gold. For full measure he added enough wheat to nourish the Catalans for a year. The 'government of the Orient' was as empty and meaningless a gift as the supposed 'grants' of the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin to the Turkish nomad chieftains. The only troops who could go into Asia and accomplish anything were already under Roger's command. But the gold, which might have worked a charm, was left behind, as the envoy was afraid to bring it. Roger scorned the emperor's offer. Ten days later he repented, and accepted from Emperor Andronicus thirty

\(^1\) Pach., V. 23, pp. 426–8; Greg., VII. 3, p. 221.
\(^2\) Pach., V. 21, p. 423; Greg., loc. cit.
\(^3\) Greg., loc. cit. Cf. Muralt, after Latin authorities, ii. 487.
thousand pieces of gold, one hundred thousand measures of wheat, and the title of Caesar. In return for these princely gifts he had only to promise to lead three thousand men against the Turks.

But a host of Spaniards, long before the discovery of America, were already in search of 'El Dorado'. They poured into Gallipoli on every merchant ship from the West, and made the Byzantines begin to fear Roger more than they feared the Turks. The remedy was getting to be worse than the evil! Before leaving for his campaign, Roger rashly went to Adrianople to pay his respects to the young Emperor Michael IX, who was holding his court there. On the threshold of Michael's bedchamber, like the Duke of Guise at Blois, he was stabbed to death. A massacre of his attendants followed.

A train of evils fell upon Macedonia and Thrace as a result of the assassination of Roger de Flor. Michael soon had reason to regret this ill-advised deed. Not only did the Catalans, in their first access of fury, avenge the death of their great leader and their comrades by unspeakable cruelties and by the destruction of every village which they came upon, not only did they defeat the young emperor in open battle and almost capture him as he fled from the field, but they invited over from Asia Minor into Macedonia all the Turks who could be induced to come.

At Gallipoli the Catalans tried to form a state. It failed owing to dissensions among their leaders. Their raids into Thrace had so ruined that country that they themselves began to starve. So they started upon an odyssey into Macedonia, where the common soldiers, wearied of the civil strife engendered by their leaders, who were continually ordering them to cut each other's throats, decided to make an end of these costly personal jealousies. They killed the nobles who led them, and marched south into Thessaly. Gauthier de la Brienne committed the imprudence of seeking
their aid in Athens. In 1310 they killed Brienne, set up in Athens a military democracy, and started to revive the Peloponnesian Wars.¹

The further fortunes of the Grand Catalan Company do not come within the limits of our work. Roger and the Catalans, for that matter, were never in direct contact with the Osmanlis. But it was necessary to give a brief statement of their services to the Byzantine Empire in order that we might have a proper appreciation of their services to the Ottoman Empire. When they withdrew into Thessaly they had left the Turks behind them in Thrace and Macedonia. To the unhappy emperor who had received them nine years before as saviours of the Empire, this was their legacy.

Owing to the adroit leadership of their chief, Halil, and to the impotence of Michael, whose Slavic mercenaries had deserted him and withdrawn into Bulgaria, these Turks were soon able to throw Macedonia and Thrace into so great anarchy that communication by land between Salonika and the capital was no longer safe.² And yet Halil had only eighteen hundred men under his command! In 1311, shortly after the Catalans had left, Halil concluded with Andronicus and Michael an agreement by which he and his companions in arms were to have a safe-conduct and free passage across the Hellespont. But the Greeks, in violation of one of the most important points of this arrangement, attempted to take from the Turks their booty. Halil, instead of quitting European soil, sent for reinforcements. The imperial army suffered a decisive defeat, and Michael fled, having abandoned his personal baggage. In insolent

¹ Pachymeres, Books V, VI, and VII; Gregoras, Book VII, passim, and Phrantzes, Book I; Moncada, Expedicion de los Catalanos; Muntaner, in Bibliothek des lit. Vereins zu Stuttgart, vol. viii. For their later adventures there is an excellent account in Finlay, History of Greece, iv. 146-56.
² Andronicus wrote to his empress, urging her not to try to return to Constantinople from Salonika by land: Pach., VII. 12, p. 586; Chalcondylas (ed. Bonn), I, p. 19.
triumph, Halil adorned himself with the imperial insignia. All the region around the Hellespont and the Gulf of Saros remained for three years without cultivation. So desperate did the situation become that Michael was compelled to seek aid of the Genoese and the Serbians. In 1314 the Turks of Halil were entrapped near Gallipoli and massacred. But at what a price! The Serbians, whose co-operation had won the day for the Greeks, saw eastern Macedonia and the open sea. They liked it. New troubles began to brew for the Byzantines.

There were other long-standing troubles threatening from abroad. In the East, the Mongols had overrun southern Russia, and were as great a nightmare to Andronicus as the Goths had formerly been to Valens. The rulers of Constantinople did not hesitate to purchase security on the Black Sea by truces, which were sealed with the sacrifice of purple-born princesses to pagan harems, and by humble protestations of friendship to khans who treated the imperial ambassadors as the envoys of a vassal.

In the West, another sword of Damocles was hanging over the emperors of Byzantium. We must remember that the Greeks had been in possession of their capital again only since 1260, and that the heirs of the Frankish emperors still cherished the dream of a Latin re-establishment at Constantinople. In 1305, on the very day Clement V mounted the papal throne, Philippe le Bel of France discussed with Charles de Valois the question of retaking Constantinople.

2 'The emperor of Constantinople fears the anger of the Khan of Kapdjak and is eager to disarm him by protestations of submission and efforts to obtain a continuance of the truce. Things have always been on this footing since the children of Djenghiz Khan began to reign in this country': Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fol. 70 r°.
3 Ducange, Hist. de Constantinople sous les Emp. Français, map section, p. 46.
The following year Clement V exhorted the Venetians to co-operate in the conquest of the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{1} Because they had grievances against Andronicus which had already almost brought them to an open rupture,\textsuperscript{2} the Venetians readily lent ear to the Pope's project. A treaty of alliance was concluded between Venice and Charles de Valois, who had the powerful backing of the King of France.\textsuperscript{3} In 1307 Clement V wrote to Charles II of Naples urging him to reconquer Constantinople.\textsuperscript{4} But the Pope's interest was soon diverted by the project of a crusade to support Armenia and Cyprus against the Egyptians.\textsuperscript{5} Philippe le Bel turned his attention to the spoliation of the Knights Templars and to the important ecclesiastical questions arising out of the movement to rehabilitate the memory of the unfortunate Boniface VIII.

Until the death of Philippe le Bel, in 1314, however, Andronicus and Michael always felt that there might at any moment be a repetition of the Fourth Crusade. In seeking the reasons for the almost unhampered progress of Osman against Nicomedia, Nicaea, and Brusa, it must not be forgotten that the Byzantine emperors did not have even the moral support of Christendom in their losing fight.

VII

During this first decade of the fourteenth century, the Byzantines had lost control of practically all the Aegaean

\textsuperscript{1} Ducange, \textit{Hist. de Constantinople sous les Emp. Français}, map section, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{2} The Venetians were jealous of the growing power of Genoa and the hostility shown to Venetian merchants at Constantinople. See Appendix B. Also Heyd, \textit{Handelsgeschichte des Mittelalters}, i. 366.
\textsuperscript{3} Ducange, ibid., p. 57; Buchon, \textit{Collection des chroniques nat. fr.}, p. lv.
\textsuperscript{4} Muralt, \textit{Chronographie Byzantine}, ii. 493, no. 21, n.
\textsuperscript{5} A rabble without arms actually arrived at Marseilles. The ships were prevented from leaving Brindisi by a storm. Cf. Iacomo Bosio, \textit{Della Historia della Religione}, ii. 1. At the very moment this effort to start a crusade was ending in dismal failure, the two kings on whose behalf it was planned were engaged in a bitter quarrel! Clement V, \textit{Epistola Comm.} vii. 773-4, 787.
Sea, and had to struggle for a passage through the Sea of
Marmora. After the recent Balkan War, the Sublime Porte
presented a memorandum to the Powers, in which it was
stated that the possession of Rhodes, Lesbos, and Chios was
absolutely essential to a maintenance of Ottoman power in
Asia Minor. History, from the time of the ancient Persian
wars to the present day, confirms this point of view. So,
before taking up the progress of Osman's conquests, it is
important to note that during the years of Osman's conflict
with the Byzantines Chios and Rhodes passed out of their
hands.

In 1303 Roger de Flor had prepared the way for the Turks
in Chios by sacking the island. What he did not destroy
or carry off fell to the Turks when they raided the island
the following year. 'Andronicus saw that he was no longer
able to defend Chios against the Turks because of the
cowardice of his governors. The Turks already considered
themselves masters of Asia Minor and the majority of the
islands.' So he made Benedetto of Phocaea lord of Chios,
and the island was lost to the Byzantines. The Giustiniani
family kept Chios until the Ottoman conquest.

The emir of Menteshe invaded Rhodes about 1300. But
he did not succeed in entirely conquering it. For ten years
Greek and Turk struggled for the mastery of this gateway
to the Aegean Sea. Then suddenly an outside foe arrived
and made the double conquest of Christian and Moslem
alike. The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, driven from
the Holy Land by the Egyptian conquest, had tired of their
refuge in Cyprus. After vainly endeavouring to negotiate
with Constantinople for the transfer of the proprietary rights
of the island to their order, they attacked and conquered

1 Les Giustiniani, Dynastes de Chios, Vlasto's French translation of
Hopf's great monograph, p. 8.
2 Mas-Latrie, Histoire de Chypre, ii. 602.
3 Mas-Latrie, op. et loc. cit. ; Heyd, French edition, i. 537.
Rhodes with the encouragement of Philippe le Bel and the Pope. This great event, equally disastrous to Turk and Greek, happened on August 15, 1310. For more than two centuries they were able to maintain at Rhodes a citadel and outpost of Christianity in a part of the world which was rapidly becoming *in partibus infidelium*.

The emir of Menteshe made a strenuous effort to recapture Rhodes. The Hospitallers, attacked before they had time to repair and strengthen the fortifications of the island, were saved only by the timely arrival and heroism of Amadeus of Savoy. This is said to be the origin of the arms of Savoy, which are perpetuated on the flag of modern Italy, and of the motto of the sovereigns of Piedmont—FER T, *Fortitudo Eius Rhodium Tenuit*. The historians of Rhodes, as well as the chroniclers of the House of Savoy, declare that Osman was the leader of the Turks who attacked Rhodes in 1310 or 1311, and that he was instigated by the Genoese.

**VIII**

But while Osman was, in the minds of these and other later historians, supposed to be attacking Rhodes and

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1 A splendid field for historical research, which, as far as I know, has never yet been touched, is the compilation, from the Vatican records, of the dates for the extinction of the dioceses of the early Christian world in Africa and Asia. When did the bishops of these dioceses begin to be appointed and consecrated *in partibus*?


3 See Bosio, ii. 37 f., and Vertot, i. 101 f. With a view to glorifying the Order, and also the Duke of Savoy, this fiction has been fabricated and perpetuated. Even such a serious work as that of Muralt gives, upon the strength of Raynaldus, who merely quotes Bosio, Osman as leader of this attack upon Rhodes: see *Chronographie Byzantine*, ii. 507. During the recent war between Italy and Turkey, when it was a question of Rhodes, more than one leading Italian newspaper revived this story of the founder of the Italian royal house defeating the founder of the Ottoman royal house. There is, of course, no foundation whatever for the statement.

4 So Clement V evidently believed. See his letter to the Genoese in *Epistola Comm.* vii. 10.
making himself master of Asia Minor, he stayed within the narrow limits of his little principality, from which he never issued forth, as far as we know, during his circumscribed career. For he had, within a day’s journey of his residence, the imperial cities of Brusa and Nicaea, whose walls were far too strong for the infant Osmanlis. A little more to the north-west, in a position of unrivalled strategic importance, defending the logical waterway to Constantinople from the valley of the Sangarius, lay Nicomedia.

After the battle of Kuyun Hissar (Baphaeon) we hear nothing of Osman until 1308. This year is memorable for several events of great importance. The first of these is the capture of Ak Hissar, the fortress guarding the place where the Sangarius finishes its descent and enters the plain behind Nicomedia. This was the last barrier opposing the progress of the Osmanlis through the narrow peninsula which stretches out between the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Black Sea to form the extreme north-western corner of Asia. Owing to the terrible misfortunes which had fallen upon the Byzantines through the Catalans, no effort seems to have been made to use Nicomedia as a base of operations for defending this peninsula. So before the year was out the Osmanlis appeared for the first time on the Bosphorus. In the years following the fall of Ak Hissar the Osmanlis slowly but thoroughly extended their authority until they were in possession of the harbours and fortresses of the Black Sea littoral between the mouth of the Sangarius and the Bosphorus.

In the same year Kalolimni, an island of the Marmora, which lies near the mouth of the Gulf of Mudania, was

1 That the Sangarius used to run into the Gulf of Nicomedia instead of into the Black Sea is the opinion of many geographers, ancient as well as modern. There have been a number of projects to connect the Sangarius, Lake Sabandja, and the Gulf of Nicomedia by canals that would give a deep waterway across the plain and prevent the frequent overflooding which has always been a source of loss to cultivators in that region.
occupied by Kara Ali. By this the water-route from Bri
to Constantinople, and one of the two routes from Nicaea to
Constantinople, were obstructed. Kalolimni has the honour
of being the first Ottoman island and the only one captured
during the chieftainship of Osman. The investment of
Brusa from the land side now began. So alarmed was the
commandant that he sent Osman a ‘gift’ of money to
purchase peace, thus inaugurating the humiliating precedent
which the mightiest emperors and kings of Christendom
came in time to follow.

It was in 1308, also, that Osman captured Tricocca, which cut off the communication by land between Nicaea and Nicomedia. While he was engaged in dealing with Nicaea and Brusa, a danger threatened Osman from the east. A horde of Tartars was hovering along the confines of his state. Some of them sacked Karadja Hissar at the time of the fair, and were prevented from marching on Eski Sheîr only by the timely arrival of Orkhan, who defeated them through the superiority of his cavalry. Instead of massacring his prisoners, Orkhan, as was the invariable custom of his father with the Greeks, offered the raiders Islam and Ottoman nationality. It was in this way that the Osmanlis increased in numbers.

After 1308 the energies of the Osmanlis seem to have been directed against Nicaea and Brusa. The fall of Brusa is the only other event recorded during the lifetime of

1 Idris, quoted by Hammer, i. 192.
2 Brusa is three hours by carriage from its port on the southern side of the Gulf of Mudania, or one hour by narrow-gauge railway. One can reach Nicaea either from the Gulf of Mudania or that of Nicomedia.
3 Pach., VII. 18, pp. 597–9.
4 Pach., VII. 25, p. 620. The Turks call this castle Hodjahissar.
5 Ibid., loc. cit. But Pachymeres puts the number of these Tartars as 30,000, which must be at least a tenfold exaggeration.
6 Seadeddin, translation Brattuti, p. 27. Bratutti, whose transcription of Turkish names is often unintelligible to me, calls Karadja Hissar ‘Codgia’.
Osman. Just when and how Brusa fell cannot be stated with precision. We shall find the same difficulty later in connexion with the fall of Nicaea and Nicomedia. The Turkish traditions, as Seadeddin gathered them, state that Osman besieged Brusa with a great army in 1317. He erected a fortress near Kaplidja, and put his nephew, Ak Timur, in charge of it. A second fortress, either erected by Osman or captured by him, was put in care of Balaban, 'his most faithful follower.' Kaplidja, now known as Tchekirdje, celebrated for its hot baths,1 is on a ridge not more than a mile from the citadel of Brusa. It commands the approach from the port of Brusa, not far from where the road must cross the river. Traditional remains of the second fortress are still to be seen on a foothill of Mount Olympus, about two miles south-east of the citadel.

Of the actual fall of Brusa there is no definite statement in Seadeddin except that the city surrendered to Orkhan, who brought the news to his dying father. As Osman died in 1326, there is a gap of nine years to be accounted for between the investment of the city and its capture. To one who has studied the contour of this country and the nearness of the two fortresses to the citadel of Brusa it is clear either that Brusa was surrounded or fell very soon after the Osmanlis settled garrisons at the gates of the city, or that some *modus vivendi* was arranged between the Osmanlis and the local garrison during those years. A decade has been the conventional period for legendary sieges since Homer sang of Troy.

From the Byzantine contemporary writers one gains the impression, which is probably a correct one, that Brusa was simply abandoned to the Osmanlis. There was no assault,

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1 Ibn Batutah, *Voyages*, ii. 320, speaks of buildings which must have been erected at these baths by Orkhan within the decade following the capture of Brusa. Earlier buildings, according to him, were constructed 'by a Turcoman king': ibid., p. 318. Tchekirdje is still a favourite resort for foreigners as well as for natives.
and no bitter struggle outside the walls of the city.\(^1\) The Greek commander, discouraged by the apparent inability or unwillingness\(^2\) of the emperors to come to his relief, surrendered the city. Deeply disgusted, as he had every reason to be, Evrenos became a Moslem, and cast his fortunes with the Osmanlis. Many of the leading Greeks followed his example. For, while the people of Brusa through long years were straining every nerve to preserve their city and to maintain the honour of Byzantium in Asia, the elder Andronicus and his grandson, Andronicus III, were engaged in trying to destroy each other. It was a sordid civil strife with no redeeming feature. Neither emperor had the slightest conception of patriotism or of personal honour or of the sacredness of family ties. From this time onward the Palaeologi put themselves on record as one of the most iniquitous families that have ever disgraced the kingly office. When Constantine, one hundred and twenty-seven years later, fell with the walls of his city, his death was a striking illustration of the wrath of God upon the fourth generation of those who had hated and despised Him.

In the same year that Brusa fell, and with the same fate imminent for Nicaea and Nicomedia, young Andronicus celebrated with great pomp his wedding. The Hippodrome, in sight of Mount Olympus, was the scene of a gay tournament in which young Andronicus distinguished himself by breaking more lances than any of his courtiers. From his imperial throne, the elder Andronicus looked on, and turned over in his head various schemes for making his grandson’s bride a widow. After the wedding festivities, while Andronicus was taking his bride to Demotika, he was set upon by a band of roving Turks, at whose hands he and Cantacuzenos both received wounds. When he reached Demotika, he learned that his grandfather was preparing

\(^1\) Cantacuzenos and Gregoras.  
\(^2\) Greg., IX. 2, p. 401.
another war against him. Is it any wonder that the Greeks of Asia Minor were not averse to becoming Moslems and helping in the founding of a new nation to inherit Constantinople? There is one more charge which must be recorded against the elder Andronicus. When a crusade for the stemming of the Moslem invasion was planned by Marino Sanudo, Andronicus not only refused to co-operate, but he would not even consent to interrupt his friendly relations with the Sultan of Egypt.

IX

Osman spent his life in endeavouring to capture the three Byzantine cities which were all within a day's journey of his birthplace. When we consider how near he was at the very beginning of the struggle, and how weak and demoralized the Byzantines had become, we realize that we have to do with no impetuous invasion of an Asiatic race, sweeping before it and destroying an effete civilization. It is the birth of a new race that we are recording—a race formed by the fusion of elements already existing at the place of birth. The political unity of the Byzantine Empire had been destroyed by enemies from without and from within. The social unity, which had been secured by the one bond of a common religion that imposed upon the people its standards and dominated every phase of their life, was disappearing. For when the Eastern Church lost its spiritual life, it lost its hold on the Levantine Christians, who were centuries ahead of the West in intellectual development. The time for its reformation had come and passed without a Savonarola, a Luther, or a Calvin. Nor was there any

1 Cant., I. 42, pp. 204-6, 208; Greg., VIII. 15, p. 384; Greg., IX, c. 1, pp. 390-2, says it was the young Andronicus who first planned to break again with his grandfather. However that may be, the impression among the Greeks in Asia Minor who were endeavouring to hold back the enemies of the empire must have been the same!

2 Greg., IX. 1, p. 392.
Loyola to fight for the ancient faith. The Church was unable to absorb the pagan invaders, as primitive Latin Christianity had done, by an irresistible moral superiority.¹

The appeal of Islam was greater than that of Christianity. Pagan and Christian alike, then, in their conversion to a new, fresh faith, joined in the formation of a new race. This is the story of Osman and of the people who took his name.²

The legends which inevitably surround the founders of nations have buried the personality of Osman, and make an estimate of his character difficult. We must reject entirely the appreciations of the Ottoman historians. None has yet arisen of his own people who has attempted to separate the small measure of truth from the mass of fiction that obscures the real man in the founder of the Ottoman Empire. He is represented by the same writers as a powerful prince and as a simple peasant; as the master of Asia Minor and as the village chieftain fighting for very existence with his neighbours a few miles away; as reading the Koran and as illiterate; as the cruel and imperious murderer of his uncle Dundar for opposing a plan of campaign in his council of war and as the merciful, clement conqueror; as the Moslem fanatic who ordered the mutilation of dying infidels on the battlefield and as the wise ruler who dispensed justice to Moslem and Christian with no distinction of creed; as

¹ In the volume on ‘L'Ancien Régime’ in Taine's *Origines de la France contemporaine*, pp. 3–6, there is a wonderful analysis of the effect of early Latin Christianity upon the pagan mind. The Greek Church of the fourteenth century could produce no such impression.

² From the earliest Ottoman times to the present day religion and nationality have not been divorced. Osmanli and Moslem were synonymous terms, just as to-day in the Balkan peninsula, where the Ottoman Empire was really founded, Turk and Moslem are synonymous terms. When once this is understood, the student and traveller is freed from his preconceived notion that the ‘Turks’, as that expression is to-day understood in Turkey, are an Asiatic race, who have held the country as conquering invaders.
depositing his treasures of gold and silver in the castle of a neighbour and as leaving at his death only a robe, a salt-cellar, a spoon, and a few sheep.

In the absence of contemporary evidence and of unconflicting tradition, we must form our judgement of Osman wholly upon what he accomplished. He certainly was not the son of a prince. He did not become in his day more than the ruler of a very small domain. He did not compass within his lifetime the task at his very threshold—the subjection of the three imperial cities. It was certainly not by astounding successes on the battlefield that he made people flock to him and form around him the nucleus of a state. And this state, although it did not come enough in contact with the outside world to have money of its own, grew steadily year after year. The way his state was formed was the assurance of its permanence and of its great future. It is also an indication of the real greatness of the man who formed it.

Osman was founder of one of the greatest empires the world has ever known, of a people unique in history through the blending of wild Asiatic blood with the oldest as well as the newest European stock, of a royal family which claims the distinction of six hundred years of uninterrupted male succession. When we place these results over against the limited field in which he worked, and acknowledge our lack of any outstanding deeds in Osman's life by which these results can be explained, we find ourselves in the

1 Jorga, i. 162, is mistaken in saying, "überall wurden die Goldmünzen Osmans gern angenommen." Hadji Khalfa says that Osman struck no money. Also Colonel Djevad bey, Histoire militaire de l'Empire ottoman, i. 95. Save several silver pieces, which are not proven genuine, of the collection of Abbé Sestini (Salaberry, Hist. de l'Emp. ott., iv. 193), I can find record in numismatic collections of no money of Osman. For discussion of this question see Hammer, i. 117, who cites several Ottoman historians against coinage before Orkhan, and Toderini, Historia della letteratura ottomana, French trans., iii. 183.
presence of a combination of a character and a cause which reminds us of William of Orange and England.

Osman was a man of compelling personality, whom men loved to serve, even when their own ability matched or was superior to his. The families of the Michaelogli and Marcozogli were founded by Christian companions of Osman, who became Moslem only after long association with him. Michael, Marco, and other leaders, including Osman's own son, made for themselves more distinguished military careers than Osman. But they always worked for their leader. Their harmony and loyalty is in striking contrast to that of the Byzantine and Catalan captains. Osman was great enough to use masterful men. He never needed to assert his superiority, as mediocre men always love to do, by getting rid of possible rivals and surrounding himself with lesser stars. He was able to hold himself, as well as others, in check. He was patient and he was thorough. We know the founder by his foundation.

Then there was the cause. The giants of the forward march of Islam were dead. The tide had seemed to turn. Pagans ruled in Asia. Africa was asleep. In 1309 the Faithful in Spain were receiving their first serious reverse. Osman brought to his new religion the simple faith and the fresh enthusiasm of the neophyte. He was a reincarnation of his great namesake and the other early Khalifs. The prayer which Seadeddin puts in Osman's mouth illustrates his character:

O Lord, make upright my thoughts and just my designs. Exalt the faith and the Religion, and destroy those who rise up against it. Scatter the hosts of the enemy, and bring to confusion evil men. Make my sword the lantern of Thy holy faith, and the guiding torch of my warriors. Give unto me a glorious name, and victory against mine adversaries.
Watch me with Thine eyes, and show me the way of Thy holy will.

Make me a true observer of the laws of Mohammed, and sustain me in the shock of battle.

Osman was a fanatic, if by fanatic is meant one who is stirred with religious zeal and makes his religion the first and prime object in his life. But he was not intolerant, nor were his immediate successors. Had he started to persecute Christians, the Greek Church would have taken a new lease of life, and Osman could not have gained the converts who made possible the Ottoman race.

Attila, Djenghiz Khan, Timur, the greatest conquerors of the stock from which Osman came, utilized a race already made. They were leaders of a united people. In spite of their dazzling exploits, they were mere raiders, and their empires were the territories of an unassimilated path of conquest. Osman’s work was more enduring than theirs, more far-reaching in its results. For he was building in silence while they were destroying with a blast of trumpets. We may place him with them, perhaps above them, for which of them gave his name to a people?
CHAPTER II

ORKHAN

A NEW NATION IS FORMED AND COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE WESTERN WORLD

I

The greatest inheritance that a father can leave to his son is uncompleted work, especially if the work present difficulties of a formidable character, which must be met and overcome immediately. No man is born great. No man has greatness thrust upon him. History recognizes only the category of achievement. Facing an unfinished task is the best spur.

Osman died at the moment of the surrender of Brusa. He left to Orkhan the inheritance of Nicaea and Nicomedia unconquered; a state without laws, coinage, and definite boundaries; a people just beginning to awaken to a national consciousness; and hostile neighbours far more powerful than himself. Orkhan found himself without seaport, ships, or sailors. His fighting men were regarded among his Turkish rivals as poor material for an army. Even the chieftainship of the Osmanlis had not come to him by mere right of birth. He had been chosen because of his ability

1 Appendix B, on the Emirates of Asia Minor during the Fourteenth Century, contains the identification and description of these neighbours.
2 See Shehabeddin, Paris MS., 139 v°, which is cited in part on p. 70.
3 The chieftainship among the Turks was elective rather than hereditary. The Armenian Haython, who had excellent opportunities for observing their customs at this period, wrote: 'Puisque les Tures pristrent la seigneure de Turquie, ilz ordonnerent un seigneur entre eux, lequel ilz appelerent le Soudan'; MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds français, 2810, fol. 230 v°. Hussein Hezarfenn says (ii. 287-9) that Ertogrul succeeded
to lead and to attract men. Now that Brusa had fallen into the hands of the Osmanlis, more was demanded in their emir than personal charm and daring in battle. He must establish his right to the chieftainship by making a viable state. This could be done only by the addition of Nicaea and Nicomedia to his dominions, and by the transformation of his followers into a nation.

Nowhere are the Ottoman historians more unsatisfactory than in their accounts of the reign of Orkhan. They fail to describe—much less to explain—the evolution of their race during these thirty-five years from a heterogeneous band of adventurers into a nation. Several of the Ottoman historians write so admirably of later periods that we must attribute this failure as much to their lack of sources of information as to their inability to measure up to the demands of the modern mind which never asks how without adding why. The re-writing of history in the twentieth century is not actuated by belief in superior ability. Our new and wider point of view is gained from the advantage we have had in securing and comparing sources which were inaccessible to those who have gone before us. If, in this chapter, Byzantine sources are largely used, it is because we are writing the history of a people who built their nation directly upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire, and because the Byzantine sources are contemporary; while the earliest Ottoman historians wrote more than a century later than this period.¹

The reign of Orkhan is divided into two parts by the events of the year 1344. From 1326 to 1344 he was occupied in subduing the territory of which he had been tentative his father by election and, in turn, manoeuvred to secure the election of Osman. Evliya effendi, i. 27, declares that Osman was elected chief. This is also stated by Barletius, in Lonicerus, vol. ii, fol. 231-2; Spandugino; Cantemir (Rumanian ed.), i. 19; and Vanell, p. 359. Cf. Chalcondylas (ed. Migne), col. 24.

¹ For dates see Bibliography.
master at the death of Osman, in forming his nation, and in organizing his army. From 1344 until his death in 1360, his energies were bent chiefly upon getting a foothold in Macedonia and Thrace.

II

The first task which imposed itself upon Orkhan was the subjection of Nicaea and Nicomedia. Just as the walls of Brusa had defied him to the end, those of Nicomedia and Nicaea were equally impregnable to the kind of army he could assemble. Whether it was that neither Byzantine nor Turk nor Slav nor Bulgarian were of the stock who would spend themselves scaling walls and battering down gates, or that the weapons of those days were more favourable for the purpose of defence than of assault, cannot be determined. But the curious fact remains that during this century there are few instances of cities taken by storm. Captures were effected for the most part by capitulation or by treachery.

Complete investment and consequent threatened starvation did not occur in the case of Brusa. Nor did Nicaea and Nicomedia surrender from starvation. This is the place, rather than at the end of the last chapter, to give two of the long list of reasons for surrender which Neshri puts into the mouth of the commandant and the leading citizens of Brusa.¹ For they state equally plainly and convincingly the case of Nicaea and Nicomedia.

The economic reason was that the inhabitants saw the Osmanlis settling themselves in all the country round about the three cities, and undisturbed in their permanent occupation of these regions by any aggressive movement from Constantinople. Nicomedia, although advantageously located for commerce, was not a port of call on the great trade

route. It depended for its well-being upon an unrestricted communication with the interior. Brusa and Nicaea were manufacturing cities, whose prosperity was due to the use of raw materials produced in the vicinity, and to the ability to market the manufactured products. While food was still procurable, trade and business languished. When the Greeks saw that the Osmanlis had come in their midst to remain, and were not mere raiders like the Seljuk Turks, they realized that the alternative to submission was ruin.

The moral reason I have already touched upon in relation to Brusa. If there had been any hope of relief from the intolerable economic conditions under which they were living, the Nicaeans and Nicomedians might have resisted indefinitely, and maintained a gallant struggle for love of God and country. Their successful resistance, continued through many weary years, is a remarkable testimony to their religious zeal and to their patriotism. It was not until they felt themselves deserted by their brothers of blood and religion that they finally yielded. The Osmanlis did not prevail over them in battle. Their walls were not stormed. Their gates held fast. They were not starved out. They were abandoned by the Byzantines. So they became Osmanlis.

III

To understand the how and why of the fall of these cities and of the mingling of victor and vanquished in one race, we must review the history of the Byzantines during the years immediately following the death of Osman.

The loss of Brusa did not cause any cessation in the suicidal strife between Andronicus and his grandson. After the brilliant marriage festivities of which we have already spoken, young Andronicus took his bride to Demotika, where, in the summer of 1327, he planned to surprise and
oust his grandfather. He was not content to wait for the old man’s death. Nor was he deterred from reopening the civil war by the thought of the imminent danger of the Byzantine cities in Bithynia. Old Andronicus, informed of his grandson’s intention, forbade his entrance to the capital, and negotiated with the Serbs to attack him from the rear. This was a deliberate invitation to the Serbs, who were rapidly becoming dangerous enemies of the Empire, to enter Byzantine territory.

The appeal of young Andronicus to be allowed to come to Constantinople to justify himself was answered by an imperial rescript ordering the Patriarch to ‘strike out the rebel’s name from public prayers’. The Patriarch refused. More than that, His Holiness threatened to unfrock any priest who would obey the imperial command. Old Andronicus had the Patriarch deposed by a packed synod of his creatures, and thrown into prison.

War broke out. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Constantinople, young Andronicus besieged the army of his grandfather and the Serbs in Serres. They did not care to risk a battle, so he marched on Salonika, which he captured through the connivance of its inhabitants. Macedonia and Thrace, with the exception of two or three fortresses, fell into his hands without a struggle.

Stephen, Kral of Serbia, now turned a deaf ear to the old emperor's reiterated appeals for further aid. In his desperation, old Andronicus called in the Bulgarians, to

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1 Gregoras, IX. 1, pp. 390-2. But Cantacuzenos, I. 42, pp. 208-15, maintains that young Andronicus heard that his grandfather was preparing a coup before he thought of taking any action himself.
2 Cant., I. 44, pp. 215–16; Greg., IX. 1, p. 392; Phrantzes, I. 6, p. 35.
3 Cant., I. 4–5, pp. 216–23; Greg., IX. 1, p. 396.
7 Cant., I. 55, pp. 277, 281–2; Greg., IX. 4, p. 414.
whom he would have betrayed Constantinople, had not young Andronicus appeared in time to anticipate this culminating infamy of the older Palaeologos. A Venetian fleet, which was besieging the city, retired, because its commander did not want to appear to take sides either for or against the younger emperor. Friends inside left a gate open. Young Andronicus entered and appeared suddenly at the palace. The Patriarch was re-established. Old Andronicus was deposed and imprisoned.\(^1\)

The old man, after having become, as Gregoras charitably puts it, ‘blind through tears’,\(^2\) retired to a monastery, and died there in great poverty.\(^3\) Like many others of the Palaeologi, Andronicus II had no redeeming trait of character, no single good deed to his credit. Stranger to every natural affection, he died as he had lived, hating his own flesh and blood, striving to ruin his country, mocking God by the very monk’s garb that he wore.

The first care of young Andronicus, after ridding himself of his grandfather and rival, was to march on Adrianople, where, according to Cantacuzenos, he forced Michael Asan of Bulgaria to make peace by the display of his ‘fine army’.\(^4\) Either the Bulgarians were very weak at this time, or the ‘fine army’ of Andronicus III melted away quickly. For in the spring of the following year, 1329, Andronicus had to ‘gather hastily’\(^5\) an army, when for the first time he felt it his duty to go to the aid of beleaguered Nicaea. He crossed the Bosphorus, and joined the battle with the Osmanlis at Pelecanon, now Maltepe, on the north

1 Cant., I. 55–II. 1, pp. 277–312; Greg., IX. 4–8, pp. 411–32; Phr. I. 6, p. 35.
2 IX. 8, p. 431.
3 Cant., II. 28, p. 473; Greg., IX. 14, p. 461, and X. 1, p. 474.
4 II. 3, p. 324.
5 Cantacuzenos uses this same expression concerning the collecting of the army with which Andronicus III repelled an invasion of seventy Turkish vessels in the autumn of the same year. Cf. II. 13, p. 390.
shore of the gulf of Nicomedia, a few miles from Chalcedon, the modern Haïdar Pasha.

The battle of Pelecanon is passed over in silence by the Ottoman historians as too insignificant to mention. But it is of the utmost importance in showing why the Nicaeans surrendered their city to Orkhan. Cantacuzenos, who took part in this battle, gives a long story in which the result of the battle he is compelled to record belies all that goes before it. The Byzantines, according to Cantacuzenos, were eminently successful in repelling the attacks of the Osmanlis. On all sides the Greeks won, and killed hundreds of their opponents, while their own losses were slight. After inflicting this defeat upon Orkhan, Andronicus proposed, at nightfall, that the army withdraw to Constantinople! Some of his ardent warriors continued, however, to engage the enemy. Andronicus, surprised with only a few followers around him, was wounded, and escaped capture only by a hasty retreat. He was carried in a litter to Scutari, where he did not wait for news of his army. A caïque conveyed him safely home. Thus the successors of the Caesars abandoned Asia for ever.

Old Andronicus, in his hour of humiliation, did not hesitate to strike one more blow against his country. Spies of his in the army spread the rumour that the young emperor was dead. The imperial troops fled. They abandoned all their baggage, and were massacred by the Osmanlis, who hunted them down in the hills from which the fugitives could see the dome of St. Sophia.¹

When we contrast the long story of the civil war between Andronicus and his grandfather, the armies gathered, the money expended, the energy displayed with this one pitiful

¹ I have gathered the account of this battle from Cant., II. 6–8, pp. 341–60; Greg., IX. 9, pp. 433–5; Phr., I. 7, pp. 36–7; Chalcocondylas (ed. Migne), I. 11, col. 32. It is interesting to note how much space Cantacuzenos gives in contrast to the brevity of the other writers.
attempt to aid the three great cities of Bithynia, there is no need for further speculation as to why these cities fell into the hands of the Osmanlis. No wearers of the imperial purple had ever made a more dismal showing: old Andronicus plotting to demoralize the army of his country by false rumours, and young Andronicus making such rumours possible by being the first to flee from the field after receiving a slight wound. It is no wonder that Cantacuzenos records that after this battle Nicaea fell into the hands of the Osmanlis.\(^1\) It is altogether natural, too, that the inhabitants of Nicaea should refuse, as those of Brusa had done, to profit by the terms of the capitulation, and leave for Constantinople.\(^2\) Their trades, silk-weaving and pottery, were dependent upon local materials, which they could not get elsewhere. There had been nothing to inspire in them that devotion to a faith which made the Huguenots long afterwards leave all without hesitation after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

Hadji Khalifa says that in the seventeenth century the walls of Nicaea were entirely ruined.\(^3\) The condition of these walls to-day (for they have not been repaired in modern times) contradicts this statement. It has been the claim of the Osmanlis that Nicaea was reduced by fighting. If this were true the walls must have suffered. It is also the common belief\(^4\) that Nicaea, at the time of the Ottoman conquest, and for some time after, was a prosperous city.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) II, c. 8, 363. Seaddeddin, Neshri, and Idris agree with Gregoras, IX. 13, p. 458, in putting the fall of Nicaea in 1330 or 1331. Gregoras euphemistically says the city was 'pillaged by the Turks'. But Leunclavius, on the authority of Ali, gives A.H. 734, which would be 1333 or 1334.

\(^2\) Phr., I. 7.

\(^3\) In Djihannuma, Paris MS., fol. 1934.

\(^4\) When I was in Nicaea in 1913, the imam of the Yeshil Djami told me that there were seventy thousand houses at the time of the Ottoman conquest. This is the local tradition.

\(^5\) Hammer, i. 146, makes this claim.
But Ibn Batutah, who visited Nicaea within five or six years after its change of ownership, wrote that its walls were intact, that the sole entrance to the city was by a road built up like a bridge and so narrow that horsemen could not pass on it, and that the walls were surrounded by a wide deep moat filled with water. One had to reach the gate by a pont-levis, which was in working order and used at the time of his visit. The city itself was in ruins and occupied only by a small number of men in the service of Orkhan. He was told that Orkhan had besieged the city ten years, and Osman before him twenty years. As the famous traveller was an honoured guest in the palace of Orkhan, where Orkhan’s wife was living at the time, and where the emir himself came for a few days during the forty days which Ibn Batutah spent in Nicaea, his testimony is certainly worthy of credence.¹

That Nicaea, while preserving its admirable fortifications, should have decreased so rapidly in importance and population during the seventy years between the return of the Byzantine emperors to Constantinople and the Ottoman occupation, is explainable only by three suppositions: that a majority of the inhabitants had died off, that they had emigrated, or that they had gradually joined their fortunes with the people of Osman. We find in Byzantine annals no record of a disastrous plague or of a large emigration of potters and porcelain workers and weavers to the capital or elsewhere from Nicaea. There was little fighting. The Osmanlis had not yet learned to massacre. What are we to believe, then, concerning the large population of this so recently flourishing city?

It is hardly a conjecture to affirm that the Nicaeans must have cast their fortunes with that steadily growing band whose firm conviction, forced upon them against their will

¹ Ibn Batutah, ii. 322–3. For discussion of the value of Ibn Batutah's testimony see Appendix B and Bibliography.
and in violence to centuries-old traditions and sentiments, was that the old structure of society could not be repaired, and that there must be an entirely new building upon the old foundation. This conviction did not come suddenly or to all at once. It was a gradual dawning and awakening which caused the ranks of the Osmanlis to become greater every year. Before the end of Orkhan’s reign the nucleus of Asiatic adventurers which had gathered around Osman in the little village of Sugut had grown to half a million. It could not have been by natural increase. It could not have been by the flocking in of nomads from the East. Orkhan was cut off from contact with the Asiatic hinterland. His rivals of Karaman, Satalia, Aidin, and Sarukhan would have attracted adventurers from the outside before himself. Orkhan formed his nation out of the elements on the ground. These were mostly Greek. Nicaea is but an illustration of the way in which the new race was born and the new nation formed.

This conviction that no good could come from Constantinople went farther than a transference of allegiance from the Palaeologi to the family of Osman. Mohammed was substituted for Christ. What a momentous significance there is in the records of the Greek Orthodox Church that in 1339 and again in 1340 the Patriarch sent an impassioned appeal to the Nicaeans that they should not abjure the Christian faith! At that very moment when the ecclesiastics of Constantinople were espousing the rival claims of unworthy aspirants to the imperial purple and were anathematizing each other in supporting trivial theological arguments, Christians were adopting the new Credo: 'I believe in one God, and Mohammed is his prophet!' in the city of the Nicene Creed.

We may place the surrender of Nicomedia in 1337 or

1338. This was the last Byzantine possession in the Ottoman corner of Asia Minor. The fall of Aidos and Semendria on the hills behind Scutari had opened the way to the Bosphorus. Yalova, renowned for its baths, and Hereke, where Constantine the Great died, gave the Osmanlis undisputed control of the entrance to the Gulf of Nicomedia and secure possession of the city where Diocletian had made a new capital for the Roman Empire.

IV

Orkhan had now accomplished the first part of the great task left unfinished by Osman. But, before he could proceed to the establishment of laws for his new state, it was necessary for him to consolidate and strengthen his position in relation to his formidable neighbours. Dangers threatened from the east and from the south. In 1327 Timurtash, a son of Choban, who was Mongol governor of Rum, pushed his raids as far as the Mediterranean, which the Mongol arms had not hitherto reached. He fought in turn Greeks and Turks. Fortunately for Orkhan, the emir of Kermian, whose capital was Kutayia, had appeared so unpromising to the eyes of Timurtash that the Mongols had not come

1 There is no way of establishing the date of the fall of Nicomedia. The Ottoman historians report that it was added to the dominions of Orkhan in 1326, the year of his accession and of the fall of Brusa. It is best here to follow the unanimous testimony of the Byzantine sources, which is in accord with the natural inference that Nicomedia fell some time after Nicaea: Greg., XI. 6, p. 545; Phr., I. 8, p. 38. Hammer cannot disregard the testimony of Gregoras here. He ingenuously suggests that the city might have been lost by the Osmanlis, and recaptured. Cantacuzenos (II. 24, p. 446, and 26, p. 459) says that Andronicus III went twice to the aid of Nicomedia in 1331, but he does not record the loss of either Brusa or Nicomedia. In the collection of Feridun, Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. anc. fonds turc 79, there is a diploma appointing Soleiman governor of Nicomedia in 1332, but the authenticity of the earlier pieces in this collection is open to grave suspicion (cf. Bibliography).

2 Howorth, iii. 613.
northward. But they were an ever imminent source of danger to the emirs of Asia Minor, and to Orkhan among them, until 1335, when the death of Bahadur Khan, just the year before the birth of Timur, caused the disintegration of the Mongol power in western Asia.¹

The Mongol menace had contributed to the undisturbed operations of Orkhan against the Byzantines. Immediately upon its removal he was threatened by the other Turkish emirs. It was a critical moment for Orkhan, whose territories had not yet reached the proportions of a large state, like those of Omar of Aïdin and Mohammed of Sarukhan. Singly they might have crushed Orkhan. United they certainly would have done so. But here again the Byzantines contributed to their own downfall.

In 1329, at Phocaea, Andronicus had conducted his first negotiations with the emirs of Aïdin and Sarukhan.² This unsuccessful attempt to embroil the Anatolian emirs with each other was a pitiful confession of weakness on the part of Andronicus. It did no harm to Orkhan. But it called the attention of these emirs to the impotence of Andronicus, and led to a series of petty raids in Macedonia and Thrace. Emboldened by the ease of initial successes, Mohammed of Sarukhan in 1333 led in person an expedition of seventy-five ships against the Macedonian coast. Andronicus was too weak to oppose his landing.³ In the same year Turkish pirates seized for a short time Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora, only a few hours' sail from Constantinople.⁴ The following year the emperor was compelled to put an army in the field to save Salonika from the Turks.⁵

¹ Canale, i. 215.
² Not an actual defensive alliance against Orkhan, as Schlumberger, Numismatique de l'Orient latin, p. 480, supposes. See Cant., II. 13, pp. 388–90; Phr., I. 8, p. 37.
³ Cant., II. 28, pp. 470–3.
⁴ Ibid., 22, p. 435.
⁵ Ibid., 25, pp. 455–6.
These attentions from his proposed allies did not prevent Andronicus from seeking aid in the same quarters in 1336 when he was besieging the Genoese of Phocaea. Mohammed sent twenty-four ships, numerous troops, and all the provisions necessary to sustain the imperial army. The net gain to Andronicus from this expedition was the empty acknowledgement from Cattaneo of Phocaea, who was not afraid of Andronicus but did not want to be bothered by him and his Turkish allies, that he would hold as a 'fief of the empire' what Andronicus, even with the help of the Turks, could not take from him!¹

This momentary diversion of the attention and energies of his neighbours was most propitious for Orkhan. Andronicus had rendered him good service. It gave to Orkhan an opportunity of enlarging and rounding out his dominions without incurring opposition that would not only have prevented him from carrying out his schemes but might also have destroyed him. Orkhan had been waiting for this moment. In 1333, the Turcoman emir of Mysia had died. His younger son had taken refuge with Orkhan, and promised in return for aid in dispossessing his brother to surrender to the Osmanlis Balikesri and three other border cities. Orkhan could not act immediately. He contented himself with advising the elder brother to divide his dominions with Tursun. Tursun went to negotiate in person, and was killed by his brother. This was shortly before the expedition to Phocaea. Orkhan was now ready. He put in the field an expedition, ostensibly to punish the assassination of his protégé Tursun, and was so successful that he forced the emir of Karasi to give up Pergamos and go into exile in Brusa.² In another expedition, which probably occurred in

¹ Cant. II., 29–30, pp. 480–4; Greg., XI. 2, p. 530.
² Hammer, quoting Ashikpashazadé, i. 150–1.
1337 at the earliest,\(^1\) Orkhan added Mikhalitsch, Ulubad, and Kermasti to his dominions. He was now virtually master of Mysia.

This was the extent of Orkhan’s conquests in Asia Minor. It is necessary to emphasize this point, owing to the erroneous idea which has so long been accepted and which has found its way into many modern writers.\(^2\) No corroboration can be found for the statement of Cantacuzenos that Soleimian captured Angora from the Tartars in 1354.\(^3\) Aside from this, neither Byzantines nor Osmanlis report any further conquests of Orkhan in Asia Minor. From the fact

\(^1\) Mordtmann, in *ZDMG.* (1911), lxv. 105, basing his statement, like Hammer, on Ashikpashazadedé, Vatican MS., fol. 33, gives A.H. 735, 737, or 740. The earliest of these dates is precluded by the testimony of Ibn Batutah, who found these places still independent about A.H. 735. A.H. 737 might be possible, if we decide that Orkhan accomplished everything during the one expedition against Pergama. Mordtmann, still quoting Ashikpashazadedé, says that these three cities were held by relatives of the Palaeologi. If this be true, it goes to prove that there must have existed all along in the reigns of Osman and Orkhan quasi-friendly relations between Moslem and Christian. There was certainly no religious fanaticism during this period of Ottoman history.

\(^2\) ‘Les Osmanlis avaient étendu leur domination en Asie Mineure et absorbé les états dont l’indépendance avait jusqu’alors empêché l’unité politique de l’Empire musulman!’ Delaville-Leroulx, *France en Orient au XIV\textdegree\* siècle, i. 118. ‘Osmans Sohn Orkhan Kleinasiyen unterworfen hatte’: Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Türken*, p. 16. ‘Orkan s’impadroni di quasi tutta la Natolia’ : Alberi, in preface (viii) to series III, vol. i, of *Relazione Ven. Amb.* One of the earliest western historians gives Orkhan’s ambition as ‘solus cupiens in minore Asia regnare’: Cervarius, p. 5. Even Hammer, i. 150, is considerably ahead of time in saying, in one of his chapters on Orkhan, ‘Les hordes ottomanes se précipitèrent du haut de l’Olympe comme une avalanche, franchissant montagnes et vallées, ajoutant à leurs possessions les neuf royaumes nés des débris de l’Empire seljukide, inondant Asie Mineure depuis l’Olympe jusqu’au Taurus.’ Hammer does not mean to give this wrong impression, but one has to read very closely not to get it. See discussion of this error in Appendix B.

\(^3\) Cant., IV. 37, p. 284. Is it on the strength of this evident error of a Greek writer that Evliya effendi, ii. 229, says ‘Orkhan captured Angora from the Prince of Kutayia of the Kermian family’? Hussein Hezarfenn, following Chalcocondylas, is an example of an Ottoman historian basing his statements on a Greek authority.
that there is a complete silence as to their fate, it is reason-
able to suppose that the Osmanlis during the last decade of
Orkhan’s reign destroyed the independence of several
little states of which Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin report
the existence between 1334 and 1349. But these were all
in a general sense either included in Mysia (Karasi) or in
the territory which Orkhan is popularly supposed to have
inherited from Osman.

After the Mysian expedition and the fall of Nicomedia,
Orkhan may be regarded as the acknowledged sovereign of
a definite state. We have good contemporary testimony
to his character, his power and his reputation at this period
just before he became an active factor in deciding the
destinies of the Byzantine Empire.

Ibn Batutah calls him the ‘lord of Brusa, son of Osman
the Little, powerful and rich among the Turcoman kings,
in treasures, cities and soldiers’. He never ceased making
the tour of the hundred castles he possessed. In each
of these he would pass several days to repair them and
inspect their situation. It was common report that he
never spent a whole month in a city, not even in Brusa.
He was all the time fighting and besieging the infidels. It
was his indomitable energy which seems to have impressed
the traveller from Morocco. The absolute lack of slothful,
indifferent acquiescence in the will of God of these latter-
day Turkish converts was naturally a source of continual
surprise to this doctor of Islam, fresh from his observation

1 For the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin see Appendix B, p. 279.
Mas-Latric, Trésor de Chronologie, col. 1796, after careful collation of
Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, comes to the conclusion that Orkhan added
the emirates of Balikesri, Marmara, Akbara, Kaouia, Keredek, Kul Hissar,
and Thingizlu to his state between 1349 and 1360. This, too, is discussed
in Appendix B.

2 Marmara, for example, is given by the Ottoman historians as a conquest
made by Osman. See Hammer, i. 89. But it is mentioned as an inde-
pendent principality by Shehabeddin, in Notices et Extraits des MSS. de la
Bibl. du roi, xiii. 358, 366
of races who had been for hundreds of years in the faith of Mohammed.¹

Shehabeddin is less complimentary. He says: 'Orkhan has under his domination fifty cities and a still larger number of castles. His army consists of 40,000 horsemen, and an almost innumerable host of foot-soldiers. But these troops are not warlike, and their number is more formidable in appearance than in reality. This prince shows himself very pacific in regard to his neighbours, and always ready to help his allies. However, he is engaged in continual wars and is always at odds with many enemies. If he gains little from these struggles, it is because his soldiers do not serve him well, his subjects are not well disposed towards him, and several of his neighbours live in open hostility to him. I am told that the Osmanlis are treacherous men, whose hearts know only hatred and whose heads are filled with base thoughts.'² In another place Shehabeddin records that Orkhan has in the field 25,000 horsemen who are fighting daily the prince of Constantinople. 'The Greek emperor is eager to buy the goodwill of Orkhan by paying him a monthly tribute.' Orkhan sends expeditions into Europe, 'where waves of blood flow'.³

V

The first Ottoman legislation, and the organization of the army, is attributed by tradition to Orkhan's brother, Alaeddin, rather than to the emir himself. The story goes that Alaeddin was a man of peace, and did not engage in war.⁴ He refused to accept the generous offer of Orkhan

¹ Ibn Batutah, ii. 321–2.
² Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe 2325, fol. 139 v°–140 r°.
³ Ibid., fol. 125 v°.
⁴ Hammer, i. 110–11, says that Alaeddin, 'stranger to the profession of arms, occupied himself solely with the cares of state', but on p. 133 he has Alaeddin commanding the troops in battle while Orkhan watches from the top of a hill!
to share the states of Osman, when their father died. Not only would he not accept a division of the chieftainship, but he also refused to share the personal possessions of Osman. Then Orkhan said, 'Since you will not rule, be my vizier, and bear the burdens of the organization of the state.' Thus was created the office of Grand Vizier, which has played so important a part in Ottoman history.¹

In the various lists, which were compiled at a much later date, Alaeddin is given as the first Grand Vizier. That this office, in its accepted form, was created during the reign of Orkhan is altogether improbable. The story of the affectionate relationship between Orkhan and Alaeddin, and the sharing of duties by them, is, like the story of Ertogrul's receiving the promise after reading the Koran, a reminiscence of patriarchal days. The dream with its promise harks back to Jacob and the ladder.² The relation between Orkhan and Alaeddin reminds one too strongly of Moses and Aaron to be accepted without reserve. One has only to turn to the twentieth Sura of the Koran to find the connexion and the suggestion: 'And Moses answered, Lord, give me a vizier of my family, Aaron, my brother. Gird up my loins by him, and make him my colleague in the business: that we may praise thee greatly, and remember thee often; for thou regardest us.'³

What a contrast between this idyllic story of Orkhan and Alaeddin, and the killing of Yakub by Bayezid on the battlefield of Kossova fifty years later!

Alaeddin was also the first Osmanli to receive the title of pasha. He is always spoken of as Alaeddin pasha. This same title was conferred on Soleiman, the eldest son of Orkhan. The oldest son of Murad proving a traitor, and

¹ For the derivation of vizier, with the double meaning of burden-bearer and the one who aids, see Ibn Khaldun, Prolegomena, in Notices et Extraits, xx. 4.
² Gen. xxviii. 11–18.
³ Sale's translation, c. 20, verse 30, p. 234.
there being no other son mature enough, Murad transferred the title to Kara Khalil. This word, which came from the Persian, was thus early deflected by the Ottoman sovereigns from its original significance, the title of the eldest son of the ruler.1 It soon came to be bestowed upon high military and civil dignitaries. Similarly, the rank of vizier passed immediately out of the imperial family.

That Alaeddin could have accomplished the work attributed to him by the Ottoman historians, the making of laws and the organization of the army, is impossible for three reasons. The time for this great work was too short and not a propitious period: Alaeddin died seven years after his father, in 1333,2 before Orkhan was firmly established in his sovereignty; the statement is incompatible with what we know of the character of Orkhan; finally, the organization of the state and of the army must have been the result of a slow development through many years, and its perfection belongs to the middle or latter part of Orkhan’s career, years after Alaeddin pasha’s death.

The whole scheme of an Islamic state is theocratic. Its laws, its customs are founded directly upon the Koran and the interpretation of the Koran by the early ‘fathers’ of Mohammedanism. There is no civil law as distinct from ecclesiastical law.3 The judges and the lawyers belong to

1 Col. Djevad bey, p. 20, n. 2. Col. Djevad claims that von Hammer’s derivation of the word ‘pasha’ from the Persian is wrong. But he gives no reason which would satisfy the philologist when he asserts that this word is essentially Turkish. Nor does he attempt to explain its original meaning. ‘Pasha’ is probably a shortened form of ‘padishah’. See Century Dictionary, v. 4228.

2 According to the biographer of Brusa, cited by Hammer, i. 146, n. 4.

3 I do not understand what Hammer means when he says, i. 116, that the Kanunnamé must be taken in the sense of political rather than ecclesiastical law. The two cannot be separated in Islam. Or, perhaps, it is better to say that there is no political law. The very word Kanun was taken from the Greeks, was used by them for ecclesiastical law, and its adoption by the Osmanlis (at a much later period than Orkhan) serves to emphasize the fact that there was no other kind of law conceivable.
the clergy. Orkhan's problem was exceedingly difficult. Whether they were Turkish converts or Greek renegades, the Osmanlis were all on common ground in their entire ignorance of the art of building a Moslem state. It is idle to speculate upon the early legislation of the Osmanlis, for there are no records. But it is probable that the Osmanlis did not at this early time make any attempt to establish a body of laws in conformity with the Koran. Where the Sheri'at (the sacred law) was understood, and where it was applicable to local conditions, it was naturally used. But, side by side with the sacred Moslem law, existed the old Byzantine code. This was used by the Osmanlis until they were firmly seated in Constantinople. Only then did they acquire a complete system of Moslem canon law. It is within the scope of a work covering a later period than that included in this volume to point out the strong Byzantine and moderate Turkish influences in the Kanunname of Mohammed the Conqueror.

VI

For dealing with Ottoman subjects and with those who might be conquered in war, certain principles were, however, adopted by the Osmanlis in the time of Orkhan. The foremost of these was complete religious toleration. This made possible, to a large measure it explains, the development of the Osmanlis into a powerful empire.

The propagation of Islam by the sword under the early Khalifs, the sudden and unparalleled spread of the new religion from the Arabian desert to Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain, until the hordes of the invaders were than the law of the Church. The word *Kawâv* had of course other meanings, but in its collective legal sense it seems to have stood only for rules or laws that had to do with things ecclesiastical or religious. See the various meanings of this word in A. Souter's *Text and Canon of the New Testament* (London, 1913), pp. 154–5.
stopped by Charles Martel at Tours, the terrible ravages of the Moslem corsairs in the Mediterranean—here were the sources of the deep impression of fanaticism and cruelty that the rise of Islam and the followers of Mohammed had made upon an equally fanatical and cruel Europe. That the recrudescence of the Islamic movement under the Osmanlis was represented in the same colours by the early European writers is explicable when we consider their lack of unbiased information and their confusion of the Osmanlis with the Asiatic conquerors, such as Attila and the Huns, Djenghiz Khan and the Mongols, Timur and the Tartars. We must take into account, too, the fact that these historians wrote at a time when the Osmanlis were beginning to be perverted by fanatical Arab influences, and were a real menace to the peace of Europe. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, 'the Turk' was a monster of iniquity and cruelty, from whom even the distant English in the security of their island home prayed to be delivered.¹ The recent history of the Ottoman Empire has unfortunately contributed much to keep alive this impression.

In spite of the accumulated evidence which on the surface points to a contrary conclusion, the Osmanli is not and never has been a religious fanatic like the Arab Moslem.² He is not by nature zealous or enthusiastic, nor is he by nature cruel. Docile, tractable, gentle, in a word, lovable—

¹ This petition is in the Litany of the Prayer Book of Edward VI. Cf. Schaff, Church History, iv. 151.
² I do not mean to assert that religious feeling has played no part in the massacres of our own day. But these massacres were arranged by the government, who incited the Moslems to attack their Christian neighbours, inflaming the ignorant mind more by an appeal to racial hatred, to loot, to lust, than to defence of the sacred faith. In the Armenian massacres it was represented to the ignorant village Moslem that the Armenians were plotting to set up an independent government or to betray the fatherland to some European power. I was in Adana during the terrible massacre of 1909, and make this statement from personal experience and observation.
this is the verdict of the traveller who has had an opportunity of knowing that portion of the Moslem population of the Ottoman Empire which is popularly called Turkish. Other influences of their religion than hatred for the Christian have prevented the Osmanlis from winning and keeping a place among the civilized peoples of the world. Whatever one may claim in abstract theory for the Koran and the whole body of Moslem teaching, its practical concrete results have been ignorance, stagnation, immorality, subserviency of womanhood, indifference, paralysis of the will, absence of incentive to altruism. These are the causes of the irremediable decay of every Mohammedan empire, of every Mohammedan people.

The government and the ruling classes of the Ottoman Empire are negatively rather than positively evil. There is nothing inherently bad about the Osmanli. He is inert, and has thus failed to reach the standards set by the progress of civilization. He lacks ideals, and has thus shocked the enlightened conscience of the modern world. By the law of the survival of the fittest, he has been cast aside.

But when we compare the early Osmanlis with the Byzantines and with the other elements in the Balkan peninsula, it is the Osmanlis who must be pronounced the fittest. They were fresh, enthusiastic, uncontaminated, energetic. They had ideals: they had a goal. As it is with the individual, so it is with the nation. Ideals are lost when the goal is reached. Decay sets in when the struggle for existence ceases.

Pressed on the one side by his Turkish neighbours and on the other by the danger of including in his dominions a large and unassimilated mass of Christians, Orkhan was wise enough to desist from any attempt at forcible conversion. But some modus vivendi had to be arranged. A mere raider would have massacred and destroyed, and
the empire he built would not have outlived the century of its birth. Orkhan was neither raider nor invader. He lived in the country of his father and of his grandfather. Many of his lieutenants—certainly his ablest ones—were descendants of the oldest stock in Asia Minor. His nation, if it was to be a nation, depended upon at least a partial assimilation of the Byzantines. As his dominions increased, it became clear that there had to be some distinction between Moslem and Christian other than a profession of faith. He must devise some reward, which would be so attractive that the Christians, especially the higher classes among them, would change their faith in order to secure its benefits. This was the problem.

Orkhan solved this problem by establishing a system of rewards for military service, and then by restricting military service to Moslems. He divided the land he had conquered among his faithful warriors, and let it be known that in future conquests a large portion of the territory won, outside of the cities, would be bestowed upon soldiers who took part in his campaigns. These lands were to be held as military fiefs. The only obligation was that of military service, which could be performed either by actually putting into the field a number of men in proportion to the land held or by paying a sum sufficient to replace the quota by hired troops. So far this was but an adaptation of the European feudal system. But it was superior to the European system in that the holdings were small and that there was through two centuries an ever-present opportunity of winning new holdings.

Except in Albania and Bosnia, where the old nobility were to preserve their lands by conversion to Islam, there were no local traditions to prevent such a scheme by necessitating the dispossession of former great landowners. The

1 Michail Koëzé, Marco, and Evrenos were Greeks. Cf. Leunclavius, Pandectes, p. 125.
Seljuks, the Crusaders, and the Mongols in Asia Minor, the Catalans, the Bulgarians, the Serbians and the civil wars between the emperors in Macedonia and Thrace, the hangers-on of the Fourth Crusade in Thessaly, Greece, and the Aegean Islands, had made so clean a sweep of the old aristocracy, attached to the soil, that Orkhan's idea was feasible. Through these small holdings and through the rapid increase of conquered territory, the Ottoman sultans were able, almost from the beginning, to exercise an absolute sovereignty over their expanding dominions, and to prevent the rise of a class of nobles. The Ottoman Empire has never known an hereditary nobility. In the later conquests, the Sublime Porte sometimes granted life rights of governorship, with a tacit understanding that the succession should go to the son, to local chieftains or to large landowners. But these concessions were in regions never fully conquered, and remote from Constantinople. Those to whom these privileges were given had no part in the central government and no rank outside of their immediate locality.

In place of military service, every adult Christian paid a special head-tax, to be used for the support of the army. The Christian was exempt from military service; the Mussulman was exempt from taxes. This head-tax was heavy, and so gauged as to keep the Christian, unless he lived in a city, in economic dependence upon the Moslem landowner. As a general rule, during the first century and a half of Ottoman conquest, those who held to the old faith went to the cities and large towns. The Moslem thus became, without any attempt at forcible conversion or need to massacre, the undisputed possessor of the country districts.

Aside from the onerous head-tax, there were grave

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1 Up to the time of the Tanzimat, in 1849, Christians were called *raias*. The original meaning of *raia* was a flock, and was not a term of contempt, but a recognition of the fact that Christians were a taxable asset to the nation, at so much per head.
inequalities for the Christian in matters of law and in intermarriage. After the fall of Constantinople, Mohammed the Conqueror gave the Christians a large measure of self-government by putting them in millets (nations) under the headship of the ecclesiastical authorities. But the inequality in the matter of intermarriage has never been done away with. A Moslem may marry a Christian woman, but a Christian is forbidden to marry a Mohammedan woman. In the earliest days, when there was neither racial nor religious antipathy and Christian and Moslem lived in close social intercourse, this law was a powerful proselytizing agency. It furnished a temptation to a change of faith which, whenever it arose, was far stronger than the temptation of lands, of power, of economic independence, or of civil equality.

The moment one professed Islam he became an Osmanli. Religion has always been the test of nationality in the Ottoman Empire. The Osmanlis increased from the thousands to the millions, in Macedonia, in Thrace, and in Asia Minor. Ancestry was quickly forgotten in the midst of ever-changing conditions and the founding of a new social order. It is still a characteristic of the Osmanli that he has no surname. The most widely-read English writer of the seventeenth century on the 'Turks' emphasized the mixture of blood in the Osmanli, when he wrote: 'At present the blood of the Turks is so mixed with that of all sorts of Languages

1 In western Asia Minor, in Macedonia and Thrace, up to the present day the convert to Islam, no matter of what race, is immediately classified before the law as a Turk. When the Sublime Porte, after the reoccupation of Adrianople in the summer of 1913, laid a memorial before the Powers, it was claimed that the large majority of the population of the vilayet of Thrace was 'Turkish'. This word had absolutely no racial significance. Every Mohammedan in Thrace, no matter what his race or language, would be considered a Turk. The Young Turks, when they established the Constitution in 1908, tried to revive the word 'Osmanli' as a term including all Ottoman subjects. But they not only failed to convince the nation—they failed to convince themselves—that a Christian could really be an Osmanli, with the full rights and privileges enjoyed by the Moslems.
and Nations, that none of them can derive his Lineage from the ancient blood of the Saracens.'

A majority of the Byzantines whom Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid conquered must have become Osmanlis. Once the change of religion was made, the development of the new race was not difficult. There was much in common between the Turk of Asia Minor and the Byzantine. An Armenian contemporary wrote of them as if they were alike. The Greeks did not take to heart the new régime, for the fiscal evils of the Byzantine system reconciled them in advance to a change. Nothing could be worse than that which they had suffered.

Of course, the love of woman, the desire for adventure, hope of economic independence through rewards of land and removal of onerous taxes, disgust with the Byzantine administration and with the lack of support from their rulers and ecclesiastical authorities—these influences did not cause the conversion of all the Christians. In the cities, where the inequality and the inconvenience of remaining true to the old faith was minimized, and where Christianity has always been able to make itself felt and heard, there

1 Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 148. For confusion of the name 'Turk' with 'Saracen' by early western writers, see Chronique latine de Guillamme de Nangis, Géraud ed., i. 46, 86–8; Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche, Beaune and d'Arbaumont ed., i. 22–5, iv. 83; Gilles le Muisit, Lemaitre ed., p. 196. The mistake of Ricaut is common with many of the fifteenth- to seventeenth-century writers on the Crusades.

2 Matthew of Edessa (Urfa), fol. 8 of MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arménien, No. 95, quoted in Notices et Extraits, ix, 1ère partie, p. 281, speaks of 'les calamités que des peuples barbares et corrompus, tels que les Turcs et les Grecs, leurs semblables, ont causées'.

3 This was true even of the conquest of Constantinople, which caused much more dismay and regret in Europe than among the Greeks. See the remarkable letter of Francis Fielphus to Mohammed II in Bibl. de l'École des langues vivantes orientales, série 3, xii. 63–6, 211–14.

4 Cf. Rambaud in Hist. Générale, ii. 816.

5 In Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonika, and the lesser coast cities of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in many of the cities of the interior, one feels the atmosphere of Sabbath rest much more on a Sunday than on a Friday.
was no great temptation to a change of religion. After the Osmanlis became stronger, and entered into the aggressive period of conquest, they resorted to other means to swell their numbers. The institution of the Janissaries, and the permission to enslave those whom they conquered, gave the Osmanlis more potent and immediately pressing arguments.

From the completion of the conquest of Bithynia by Orkhan, the Osmanlis can be called a distinct race with a national consciousness and a desire for expansion. They can be distinguished from the Turks of the emirates of Asia Minor and from the Byzantines. The Turk did not absorb the Greek, nor did the Greek absorb the Turk. Both had taken a new religion, and if the Turkish language was adopted, it was rather the customs and laws of the Byzantines which prevailed until the influence of the Arabs, enhanced as it was with the prestige of centuries of Islam, gained the ascendancy over Turkish and Byzantine tradition alike. But this did not occur until the Osmanlis invaded Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

It must be remembered that the Greeks were not the only element added to the Turkish stock. The adoption of the Turkish language by the Osmanlis was due not only to the fact that from the beginning it was the military and governmental language, but to its being the simplest and most vigorous medium of communication for the different peoples who became Osmanlis.

Calling the Osmanlis Turks, and regarding them as invaders upon the soil of Europe, is an historical error which has persisted so long that the Osmanlis themselves have fallen into it! They have always distinguished themselves from the Turks. This is proved by their own use of that word to describe a people as different from themselves as were the Greeks. Evliya effendi spoke of the 'harsh language of the Turks', and said of Turbeli Koılık, which
was conquered by Osman in 1312, 'Though its inhabitants are Turks, it is a sweet town.'

Hadji Khalifa regarded the Turks as synonymous with the Tartars, and an altogether foreign race.

Whether their tolerance was actuated by policy, by genuine kindly feeling, or by indifference, the fact cannot be gainsaid that the Osmanlis were the first nation in modern history to lay down the principle of religious freedom as the corner-stone in the building up of their nation. During the centuries that bear the stain of unremitting persecution of the Jew and the responsibility for official support of the Inquisition, Christian and Moslem lived together in harmony under the rule of the Osmanlis. This was generally, though not universally, the case throughout the fourteenth century in the Turkish emirates of Asia Minor.

VII

The army of Osman consisted entirely of volunteer horsemen, who were called akindjis. They wore no specified uniform. But they were superb riders and moved together 'like a wall'—an expression that has come down to the present day in Ottoman military drills. When Osman planned a campaign, he sent criers into the villages to proclaim that 'whoever wanted to fight' should be at a certain place on a certain day.

Orkhan was the organizer of the Ottoman army. He and

1 Evliya effendi, ii. 241.
2 In the Djihannuma, p. 951.
3 In a popular Anatolian love-song, there is the line, 'Benim sevdimim din var iman yok', 'She whom I love has religion, but not a bit of faith', which illustrates the lack of deep religious feeling in the Osmanli. In this he is like the Greek, and different from the Slav, the Persian and Arab. See Kúnos, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, liii. 237.
4 At Balikesri the sultan Dambur told Ibn Batutah that 'the men follow the religion of their king': ii. 317. Here was the principle of cuius regio eius religio two centuries before Augsburg!
5 Col. Djevad bey, pp. 18-19.
his successor Murad laid the foundations of a military power which was without rival for two centuries. Although there is no ground for the claim of many historians that the Osmanlis were a hundred years ahead of Europe in organizing a standing army, they were certainly pioneers in the complete organization of an army on a permanent war footing. Orkhan understood well the principle _qui se laisse payer se laisse commander_ thirty years before Charles V of France.

His irregular infantry (azabs) were placed in the front when battle was engaged. It made little difference how many of these were killed, or whether they made a good show. They served to draw the first fire of the enemy. When the enemy’s energy was exhausted or when he was led to pursue the fleeing azabs, thinking the victory his, he came upon the second line, which consisted of paid, disciplined troops. These were accustomed to fighting together, were acquainted with their leaders’ commands and strategy, and had a tremendous advantage over the usual mercenaries of the period in that they served a cause to which their lives were devoted and a sovereign whose interests were identical with their own. Whether this was due to training begun in the days of adolescence, or to the knowledge that bravery would be rewarded not by booty alone (always an uncertain quantity which the ordinary mercenary invariably begins to think of securing before his fighting work is really accomplished), but by promotion in the service and substantial gifts of land, the result was the same.

The corps of salaried soldiers were called Kapu-Kali Odjaks, and their service was centred in the person of their sovereign. They were supposed to be continually ‘at the

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1 Edward III of England had created a sort of obligatory military service. His organized infantry took part in the Battle of Crécy, 1346. Lavisse-Rambaud, _Histoire générale_, iii. 76.

2 Halil Ganem, i. 39.
door of the Sultan's tent'. The Sultan paid them regularly and personally. They served him regularly and personally. When they went into the field with a commander other than the Sultan, the commander was regarded, during the term of his commission, as in the place of the Sultan.¹ There came to be seven of these odjaks: the janissaries, the adjami-oghlular (novices), the topjis (field-artillerymen), the djebedjis (smiths), the toparabadjis (artillery and munition drivers), the khumbaradjis (siege-artillerymen), and the sakkas (water-carriers).² It is impossible to state just when these distinctive corps arose, but they are the logical development of Orkhan's Eulufeli, the year-in and year-out soldiery who followed arms as a definite profession and enjoyed a regular salary fixed by law.

The akindjis, cavalry scouts and yet more than that, served as an advance-guard, and opened up the country to be conquered. The greatest dangers and the richest rewards fell to them. They were recruited from among the holders of military fiefs (timarets). Guides (tchaousches) and regular paid corps of cavalry (spahis) completed the organization.

It may be that Orkhan had learned a valuable lesson from his observation of the Catalans and of the early Turkish invaders in Europe. For he arranged his organization in such a way that the army would depend directly upon him, and not upon subordinates who might be led to put their personal interests above those of their chief. With the exception of the akindjis, whose loyalty was secured by their fiefs, there were no irregular bands raised and led by adventurers. Unity was the first striking characteristic of the Ottoman army.

¹ This still holds. In October 1912, on the Seraskerat Square in Constantinople, I saw Sultan Mehmed V give over the command of the army for the Balkan War to Nazim pasha.
² Col. Djevad bey, p. 18.
The second characteristic was readiness. We have already seen how Andronicus III 'gathered in haste' the army which he tried to oppose to the Osmanlis. Lack of time for preparation is the excuse for many a Byzantine disaster. An early and competent traveller wrote that the Osmanlis knew beforehand just when the Christian armies were coming and where they could be met to the best advantage. For they were always on a war footing, and their tchaousches and spies knew how and where to lead. 'They can start suddenly, and a hundred Christian soldiers would make more noise than ten thousand Osmanlis. When the drum is sounded they put themselves immediately in march, never breaking step, never stopping till the word is given. Lightly armed, in one night they travel as far as their Christian adversaries in three days.'

VIII

The fall of Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia did not cause alarm in Europe. The rise of the Osmanlis had scarcely been noticed, even by the Byzantines! The Turkish pirates in the Aegean, who had no connexion whatever with the Osmanlis, were becoming, however, a menace to the commerce of the Venetians and Genoese and to the sovereignty of the remaining Latin princes of Achaia and of the islands. In one of Marino Sanudo's letters we find the following significant passage: 'Marco Gradenigo, writing to me from Negropont (Euboea) on September eighteenth, 1328, declares that unless some remedy be found against the Turks, who

2 This statement needs especial emphasis, as many historians have followed Chalcocondylas and Bosio in attributing the corsair fleets to Osman and Orkhan. An instance of a careful modern historian making this error is found in Romanin, Historia documentata di Venezia, iii. 147, where he says, 'La lega . . . per raffrenare l'ognor crescente potenza ottomana.'
have marvellously increased in numbers, Negropont and all the islands of the Archipelago will be infallibly lost.'

In 1327 Andronicus II wrote to Pope John XXII, calling his attention to the Turks as a danger to Christendom, and appealing for aid. Nothing was done at this time. The Byzantines were schismatics, and France at least was more intent upon a recovery of the Holy Land than upon checking the advance of the Moslem corsairs.

Andronicus III, in 1333, followed the example of his grandfather by making another overture to John XXII. He did not scruple to dangle before the Pope the bait of a reunion of the Churches. The same year Venice urged Cyprus and Rhodes to join in a coalition against the Turks.

The only practical outcome of the efforts of the popes, the Venetian senate, and the Byzantine emperors to raise a crusade during the reign of Orkhan was the capture of Smyrna, in October 1344. Omar bey, emir of Aidin, had been caught napping. Smyrna remained in possession of the Knights of Rhodes until it was taken by Timur in 1403.

The futile agitation in Europe against the reawakening

1 In Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, ii. 313.
2 This letter, from the manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, is published in Bibl. de l'École des Chartes (1906), lxvii. 587. Other documents on this mission, ibid. (1892), liii. 254–7.
3 See papers of H. Lot in Bibl. de l'École des Chartes, 4e série (1859), v. 503–9, and (1875) xxxvi. 588–600. Also Bosio, ii. 58.
4 Raynal dus, Ann. 1334, pp. 17–19. As the repetition of all the negotiations in connexion with papal attempts for crusades cannot be included in the text of my book, I refer the reader to the section on papal negotiations in the Chronological Tables.
5 Deliberation of Senate, November 18, 1333, in Misti, XVI, fol. 40.
7 For relations of Rhodes with Smyrna from 1347 onwards, see Bosio, passim, but especially ii. 80 and 118–19.
of Islam did not in any way hurt Orkhan. On the contrary it helped him greatly. Just as the petty conflict of Andronicus III with Phocaea in 1336 had diverted Orkhan's powerful southern neighbours, this interference of the Pope, and the activity of Rhodes and Venice, contributed to the prosperity and growth of the Osmanlis by striking a blow at his most dangerous rivals, the Emirs of Sarukhan, Aidin, and Hamid. After 1340 Orkhan was ready to extend his dominion into Europe. He did not have long to wait.

IX

Orkhan had one rival whose goal was similar to his own. Stephen Dushan, kral of Serbia, was openly aspiring to the imperial throne. Byzantium had no more formidable enemy than this warrior king, who in twenty-five years led thirteen campaigns against the Greeks. The memory of his ephemeral empire has been cherished by the Serbians to this day. In their folk-lore Stephen Dushan and his deeds are immortalized. The halo of romance still surrounds the man and his conquests. It is in vain that historical science has demonstrated the purely temporary character of Stephen's conquests. It is in vain that he has been divested of the glamour of the chronicles and songs, and pictured in conformity with fact. To the Serbian peasant he is Saint Stephen, the glorious Czar, who brought the Serbian Empire to its zenith. All the cities in which this adventurer and raider set foot are claimed in the twentieth century as a legitimate part of 'Greater Serbia'. Men have engaged in a bloody war and have died for this fiction.  

1 Serbian chronicles, quoted by von Kállay, Geschichte der Serben, i. 66.  
2 In the fratricidal war of July 1913, the ignorant Serbian peasants really believed that they were fighting to take from the Bulgarians 'the sacred soil of the fatherland', as their newspapers and addresses to the soldiers called Macedonia. The name of St. Stephen was invoked when they went into battle.
Stephen Dushan demands our attention because he is the one man who could have anticipated the Osmanlis in winning the inheritance of the Caesars. A statement of his career is necessary before we take up the narration of the events which led to the invasion of the Balkan peninsula by the Osmanlis.

Stephen came into prominence in 1330 during the war which his father, Urosh, made upon Bulgaria. Czar Michael had repudiated the Serbian princess Anna in order to marry a sister of Andronicus III. The Bulgarians were badly beaten. Stephen received for his brilliant part in the campaign the province of Zenta. Although he was only twenty-three, his ambition to rule was already awakened. Dissatisfied, he demanded a half of his father's possessions. Urosh refused. Stephen marched against him, dethroned him, and imprisoned him. According to some authorities, he had Urosh killed.\(^1\) Whether he actually ordered the assassination or not, he profited by the crime.

During the first decade of his reign, Stephen gathered a majority of the Serbian-speaking peoples under his rule, pushed down to the Dalmatian coast, and asserted Serbian supremacy over a large portion of the territory which his race had hitherto contested with the Bulgarians. His appearance on the Adriatic led to a nominal alliance with Venice.\(^2\) In 1340 he began the invasion of lower Macedonia. When the valley of the Vardar was conquered, he attacked Serres. This city fell into his possession. He now considered himself ready for the advance on Constantinople.

\(^1\) Orbini, \textit{Il Regno degli Slavi}, p. 259, gives a circumstantial account of the assassination. He says that Stephen gave the order to men who strangled the old king in his cell at midnight. This does not prevent Orbini from saying later of Stephen 'fu huomo molto pio'! Borschgrave, p. 266, is not certain of Stephen's connivance.

\(^2\) J. Schafarik, \textit{Elenchus actorum spectantium ad historiam Serborum}, XXV–XXVII.
Drunk with success, he crowned himself at Serres \(^1\) 'King by the grace of God of Serbia, of Albania, and of the maritime region, prince of the Bulgarian empire, and master of almost all the Roman empire'. \(^2\) A few months later he changed the title to 'emperor and autocrat of Serbia and Romania'. \(^3\)

The relations between Stephen and Venice during the period between 1345 and 1350 show how easily an alliance between the Serbians and the Venetians might have been concluded. It was a critical time for Orkhan. Had Stephen Dushan, with the help of the Venetians, attacked Constantinople before 1350, the Osmanlis would have lost their goal. After his coronation, the 'Roman emperor' sent an embassy to Venice to secure the Senate's aid for the definite purpose of acquiring Constantinople. \(^4\) In 1347 the Senate, in response to a second overture, congratulated Stephen on having been crowned 'emperor of Constantinople', but regretted the impossibility of aiding him. There was a truce between Venice and the Byzantine Empire, and they were at that moment engaged in a war with Zara. \(^5\) However, like typical merchants, they consented to sell arms to Stephen. \(^6\)

In January 1348 the Senate congratulated Stephen upon his exploits, \(^7\) and later in the same year granted him three, then four, galleys. \(^8\) This seems to be the extent of the help

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\(^1\) I find no documentary authority for the often repeated statement that this coronation took place at Skoplje (Uskub or Scopia). At the time of the recent Balkan War, the Serbians, in order to preserve their friendly relations with Greece, supported the Uskub theory. But see Ljubić, *Monumenta spectantia ad hist. Slavorum meridionalium*, ii. 278, 279, 326; *Commemorialia*, IV; *Secreta Rog.*, A. 33.

\(^2\) 'Stephanus, D. G. Serviae . . . Albaniae, maritimae regionis rex, Bulgariae imperii princeps et fere totius imperii Romaniae dominus': Ljubić, ii. 278.

\(^3\) Ibid., ii. 326.

\(^4\) Ibid., loc. cit.

\(^5\) *Secr. Rog.*, A. 33.

\(^6\) *Misti*, xxiv. 12.

\(^7\) Ibid., xxiv. 110.

\(^8\) *Secr. Rog.*, II, B. 4; *Misti*, xxiv. 103.
rendered by Venice to Stephen Dushan. The success of Stephen in subjugating Thessaly, and his progress farther south until, in 1349, the Serbian flags waved on the mainland opposite the Venetian castle of Ptelion in Euboea, alarmed the Venetians. The Senate complained of the piracy of the Serbians in the Aegaean, and tried to re-establish peace between Serbians and Greeks. Stephen became more insistent and the Senate more reluctant. On April 13, 1350, the Senate considered several demands made upon them by an envoy of 'Stephen Dushan, emperor of Serbia and Romania, despot of Arta and count of Wallachia'. Among them were Venetian citizenship for himself, his wife and his son, a conference with the Doge at Ragusa, and substantial aid for the attack upon Constantinople, 'when he shall have conquered the ten parts of Romania outside of Constantinople.' The chart of citizenship was accorded. But he was informed that the Doge never left Venice during his tenure of office, and that there was a treaty of friendship with the Byzantines which prevented Venice from joining in an attempt to capture the imperial city.

Convinced that he could expect no substantial assistance from Venice, Stephen planned to work the old trick of the Byzantine emperors. The Serbians were already excommunicated by the Greek Orthodox Church. Stephen negotiated with the Pope for the return of the Serbians into the Roman fold.

When war arose between Venice and Genoa, Stephen sent envoys to Orkhan to propose a union of the Serbian and Ottoman armies for a campaign against Constantinople. The

2 Commem. iv. 172.
3 Misti, xxvi. 16-22; Commem. iv. 157.
4 MS. Vatican 3765, quoted by Raynaldus, ann. 1347, XXX.
marriage of his daughter to Orkhan’s son was to seal the alliance. Orkhan accepted this proposal. An embassy was immediately sent to Stephen to arrange the details of the alliance. But Cantacuzenos determined to prevent this change of Orkhan’s allegiance by a most drastic measure. He did not fear the anger of Orkhan as greatly as he feared a union between Orkhan and Dushan. The Ottoman envoys were ambushed. Some were killed. Those who escaped, together with the presents destined for Stephen, were taken to Demotika.¹

Neither Stephen nor Orkhan tried to reopen the negotiations. They realized that their ambitions were too nearly identical to permit a harmonious agreement as to a division of the spoils. Macedonia was as hard to divide in the fourteenth century as it is in the twentieth. After 1351 Stephen watched to see what effect the war between Venice and Genoa was going to have upon his fortunes. He also intrigued, as Orkhan was doing, in the civil war of the Byzantines. These were his Capuan days. They were fatal to the fame of Stephen—outside of the Serbian folk-lore! The first expedition of Orkhan’s son Soleiman, in 1353, so alarmed Stephen that he tried to become reconciled to the Orthodox Church. He sent an embassy to Constantinople, but the patriarch refused his blessing until Stephen had renounced the title of emperor and his conquests east of the Vardar.² Stephen could not do this. Nor could he wait longer. If he did not strike quickly, the Osmanlis would be in his path. He took what was now a gambler’s chance. With eighty thousand men he started for Constantinople. Death claimed him on the second day of the march.³ The Serbian Empire did not outlive its founder.

¹ Fiorinsky, p. 207.
³ Cant., IV. 43, p. 315; Greg., XXVII. 50, p. 557; von Kállay, i. 69.
X

The public life of John Cantacuzenos was contemporary almost to the year with that of Stephen Dushan. He was associated with Andronicus III in the capacity of grand chancellor and confidential adviser throughout the decade which saw the loss of Nicaea and Nicomedia. Shortly after he had succeeded in deposing his grandfather, Andronicus III was taken with a violent fever. His crime-stained mind could not rid itself of the idea that he was going to die, even after he had become convalescent. He solicited Cantacuzenos to assume the imperial purple. He wanted to abdicate and take monk's orders. A drink from a miraculous spring gave him a new grip on life. For eleven years he lived on, in every crisis irresolute, in every disaster unkingly, bending always before the stronger will of Cantacuzenos. In 1341, at the early age of forty-five, his worthless life ended. His legacy to the Empress Anna and his child heir was the guardianship of his 'friend and counsellor, John Cantacuzenos'. The grand chancellor accepted the regency with alacrity.

Three months after the death of Andronicus III, Cantacuzenos crowned himself emperor at Demotika. He put the imperial crown also upon the head of his wife Irene, a Bulgarian princess. Neither in Constantinople nor in Adrianople were the pretensions of Cantacuzenos admitted. The widow of Andronicus, Anna of Savoy, refused to acknowledge the usurper. In Adrianople the inhabitants called in both Bulgarians and Turks to defend them against Cantacuzenos. The Bulgarian Czar took sides secretly against his son-in-law.

1 Cant., II. 9, pp. 363-70; Greg., XII. 3, p. 582; Ducas, p. 6.
2 Cant., II. 1, pp. 14-18; 40, p. 560; and III. 4, p. 91; Greg., IX. 11, pp. 566-8; XII. 2, p. 576.
The year 1342 saw the Byzantines engaged in another terrible civil war. The self-appointed emperor did not hesitate to go to Pristina and offer to Stephen Dushan Macedonia as far as Serres in exchange for Serbian aid against the Palaeologi.\(^1\)

When the Serbian assistance proved unsatisfactory, Cantacuzenos called in the Turks of Aïdin. Omar, with 83 ships and 29,000 soldiers, came to his aid, but, because of the severe cold, returned to Asia before anything could be accomplished.\(^2\) He came back in the spring of 1343 with 290 vessels and helped Cantacuzenos to enter Salonika. In the fall of this year Cantacuzenos led his Turkish mercenaries into Thrace. Anna appealed in vain to Venice to exercise a pressure upon the Turks and Serbians, so that they would no longer support her rival.\(^3\) In desperation she gave Alexander of Bulgaria nine strongholds in the Rhodope Mountains in exchange for a few thousand soldiers. She resorted also to bribing the Turks in Cantacuzenos’s service, and made overtures to Orkhan.

The crusade of 1344 against the Turks of Aïdin, which resulted in the capture of Smyrna, prevented Cantacuzenos from continuing to receive substantial aid from Omar, who died four years later in an attempt to win back Smyrna.\(^4\) Stephen Dushan, as we have already seen, was laying claim to the Byzantine throne himself. Cantacuzenos could turn only to the Osmanlis.

It was in January 1345 that Cantacuzenos made his infamous proposal to Orkhan. In exchange for six thousand

\(^1\) Cantacuzenos tries to make out that this was a justifiable arrangement, as this district had already been conquered by Stephen Dushan. But Ducas, 6, p. 26, and 8, p. 30, declares that Cantacuzenos sacrificed the empire to the Serbians.


\(^3\) Misti, xxi. 35.

\(^4\) Greg., XVI. 6, pp. 834–5; Ducas, 7, p. 29; Clement VI, Epp. Secr. vii. 99. "\(\alpha\mu\upsilon\) is either 'Emir' or 'Omar'"
soldiers he was to give his daughter Theodora to the Ottoman emir.\(^1\) Orkhan now turned a deaf ear to the appeals of Anna. This was a better offer. The Osmanlis crossed into Europe. With their help Cantacuzenos got possession of all the coast cities of the Black Sea except Sozopolis, besieged Constantinople, ravaged the neighbourhood of the capital, and won Adrianople.\(^2\)

It was only by threatening to change to the side of the Palaeologoi that Orkhan secured the fulfilment of the bargain. In May 1346 Theodora became his bride.\(^3\) A few days later, while Cantacuzenos was besieging the capital with the soldiers for whom he had paid so dearly, the beleaguered city was awakened by an ominous event. The eastern portion of the Church of St. Sophia had fallen.\(^4\)

Throughout the year 1346 Constantinople was invested by Cantacuzenos and his mercenaries. The aristocratic party was almost openly championing the cause of the usurper, while Anna relied upon the democratic party and the Genoese. As for the clergy, they and the bulk of the population were more interested in the ecclesiastical trial of Barlaam for the Bogomile heresy \(^5\) than in the civil war. In February 1347, while the Synod was in the act of condemning Barlaam, and Anna was confined to her bed with a serious illness, partisans of Cantacuzenos left the Golden Gate open. The ‘faithful friend and counsellor’ of Andronicus III entered without opposition. The garrison had been bribed, and prevented the Genoese from coming to the rescue of the empress. She yielded only when the palace of the Blachernae was attacked.

Anna agreed to recognize Cantacuzenos and Irene as

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\(^1\) Cant., III. 31, p. 498; Ducas 9, pp. 33–4; Chalc., I, p. 24.
\(^3\) Cant., III. 95, pp. 585–9; Greg., XV. 5, pp. 762–3; Ducas, 9, p. 35.
\(^4\) Greg., XV. 2, p. 749.
\(^5\) For the action against Barlaam spoken of here, see Muralt, ii. 575, No. 17; p. 576, No. 22; p. 578, No. 37.
co-rulers, and to a union of the families by the betrothal of Helen, daughter of Cantacuzenos, to the young John Palaeologos. John, who was fifteen, protested against marrying the thirteen-year-old Helen. His mother overruled his objections. In May the marriage took place in the church of the Blachernae, as St. Sophia was still in ruins. This ceremony was followed by the coronation of the two emperors, John Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos, and the three empresses, Anna, Irene, and Helen.¹ Five rulers for the remnant of the Byzantine Empire! At that very moment in France, the Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin emperors of Constantinople, was planning with the Pope to drive out both Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos.²

Orkhan was well satisfied with this entering wedge. He was now son-in-law of one emperor and brother-in-law of the other. His wife Theodora was granddaughter of the Bulgarian Czar. He had open to him also a marriage alliance with Stephen Dushan. The gods were first making mad.

Cantacuzenos was compelled immediately to seek aid again of Orkhan. While he had been expending his energies against Constantinople, Stephen Dushan had made great strides in Macedonia. At Scutari, where Orkhan had come to congratulate his father-in-law upon the happy issue of the struggle for the imperial purple, Cantacuzenos asked for six thousand Osmanlis to dislodge the Serbians from the coast cities of Macedonia. Orkhan sent the soldiers willingly. He must, however, have given them secret instructions, for after having taken immense booty they returned to Nicomedia without having captured for Cantacuzenos a single one of the cities held by Stephen.³

¹ Cant., III. 98, p. 604, to IV. 4, p. 29; Greg., XV. 9, p. 781, to 11, p. 791; Ducas, 9, p. 37, to 10, p. 38.
² Cant., IV. 1, p. 12, to 2, p. 19.
³ Cant., IV. 4, p. 30; 5, p. 32; 20, p. 147.
XI

It is impossible to believe that Cantacuzenos from this time onwards did not realize the danger to which he had exposed the state and the noose into which he had put his neck. The papal archives and the writings of Cantacuzenos himself reveal the fact that as early as 1347 Cantacuzenos had appealed to the Pope to unite the western princes in a crusade against the Osmanlis,¹ that these negotiations were renewed in 1349² and 1350,³ and that in 1353 a last definite appeal was made to Clement by Cantacuzenos for relief against those whom he had invited into Europe to fight his battles.⁴

The five years between 1348 and 1353 gave rise to three events which were fatal to the Byzantine Empire. They made possible the permanent foothold of the Osmanlis in Europe. A man’s own efforts and a man’s ability are not the sole factors in his success. Work and genius avail nothing where opportunity is lacking. Circumstances over which he has no control contribute largely to the making of a man. Orkhan, at this culminating stage of his career, when he was ready to lead his people into the promised land, was aided by the ‘black death’, the war between Venice and Genoa, and the conflict between John Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos.

The ‘black death’ was first heard of in the Euxine ports. It reached Constantinople in 1347, and spread to Europe the following year. In Italy it was universal, and lasted three years. From 15 to 20 per cent. of the total population died.⁵ In the maritime cities that had been in close contact with the East, the duration of the epidemic was longer and

¹ Cant., IV. 9, pp. 53–7.
² Raynaldus, ann. 1349, XXXI.
⁴ Cant., IV. 13, p. 85.
⁵ Marco Guazzo, Cronica, p. 269; Stella, Annales Genuenses, in Muratorii, xvii, col. 1090.
the mortality higher. The moral and economic effect was
great throughout Europe. Men looked with horror upon
this inexplicable malady, which struck down every fifth
person. It gave no warning. There were few recoveries.
For years after the last case was recorded there was nervous
fear of its return. Communications with the Levant had
been partially cut off.¹ Full intercourse was not resumed
until after Orkhan and the Osmanlis were rooted in Maced-
onia and Thrace. Orkhan had no crusade to fear as long
as there lingered in the minds of the European peoples the
memory of this scourge. The bravest and most adventurous
were unwilling to fight the angel of death.

Plagues continued to visit the coast cities of the Balkan
peninsula and Asia Minor from time to time during the
rest of the fourteenth and the first thirty years of the
fifteenth century. Between 1348 and 1431, nine great
plagues are recorded.² These dates coincide with the most
aggressive period of Ottoman conquest. As the city popula-
tion was very largely Greek and Christian, we cannot
over-estimate the importance of these epidemics. They were
a valuable auxiliary in enabling the Osmanlis to advance
and assimilate without formidable opposition.

The 'black death' had hardly run its course in Italy
when the commercial rivalries of Genoa and Venice cul-
minated in a bitter war, that lasted for two years, with
varying fortunes, until the battle of Lojera in 1353 broke
the sea-power of Genoa. After five centuries of independence
the Genoese were compelled to put themselves under the

¹ MS. Vatican 2040, cited by Muralt, ii. 618; Petrarch, Epp. fam.
vii. 7. For historical and medical importance of the black death, see
Hecker, Der schwarze Tod im 14ten Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1832). MSS.
Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds latin 8369–70, contain an interesting contemporary
account, mostly in hexameter verse, by Symon de Cavino, a Paris
physician.

² Breve Chronicon at end of Ducas, cited by Finlay, History of Greece,
iv. 409 n.
protection of Milan. The hatred engendered by this struggle is revealed in the archives of the two republics. They left unturned no stone to destroy each other. The history of Venice and Genoa during the fourteenth century reads like that of Sparta and Athens. The scene of the conflict is the same: the motive, the spirit, and the result are identical. Venice gained no material advantage from the war. She had long been alive to the menace of the Osmanlis.\(^1\) She had been warned by Petrarch of the certain danger which a war with Genoa would entail, whether its outcome were favourable or unfavourable.\(^2\)

The Ottoman and Byzantine historians are silent concerning the relations of the Osmanlis with the Genoese during this war. That the Genoese asked for and received aid from Orkhan is certain. There had been a convention beforehand between the Osmanlis and the Genoese of Pera.\(^3\) Both against the Greeks and against the Venetians the assistance of Orkhan must have been substantial.\(^4\) It was remembered with gratitude forty years later.\(^5\)

The triumphal entry into Constantinople and the sanction of the Church upon his imperial office did not end the

\(^1\) In 1340 Venice had refused a loan of ships and money to Edward III of England on the ground that she needed all her resources ‘to guard against the Turkish danger about to become universal’: Wiel, p. 204.

\(^2\) On March 17, 1351, Petrarch addressed from Padua to Doge Andrea Dandolo a letter of remonstrance and warning against engaging in a war with Genoa. This letter is quoted in Hazlitt, iii. 122.

\(^3\) The Genoese archives contain a treaty between the Byzantine Empire and Genoa, dated May 6, 1352, which says: ‘debbono eziandio riteneri per valide e ferme le convenzioni e la pace stipulata dai genovesi con Orcan bey.’ Belgrano, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, xiii. 124.

\(^4\) The Signory of Genoa, writing to the Podesta of Pera, March 21, 1356, said: ‘Nobis, vobis ac omnibus ianuenibus est notorium et manifestum quantum bonum et gratias habuimus a domino Orchano amirato Turchie ad destructionem et mortem tam venetorum quam grecorum tempore guerre nostre’: ibid., p. 127.

\(^5\) In the treaty of 1387 with Murad, the Genoese said: ‘quam inter recolendam memoriam magnifici domini Orchani patris sui ex una parte et illustrem Commune Ianue ex altera’: ibid., p. 147.
troubles of Cantacuzenos. The first to turn against him was his own son Matthew, who also wanted to be emperor. Cantacuzenos appeased him for a time by giving him a portion of Thrace. Then the Genoese of Pera, dissatisfied with the lowering of the customs tariff to other nations, burned the Greek galleys and arsenals, and attacked Constantinople. Cantacuzenos had to leave a sick-bed at Demotika to hurry to save the city. The Greek fleet was destroyed by the Genoese. The army of Cantacuzenos failed in an attack upon Galata. Peace was concluded only when the unhappy emperor agreed to sell more land on the Golden Horn to the Genoese, and restore them in the customs tariffs to their former place as 'most favoured nation'.

In 1349 Cantacuzenos called again upon Orkhan to send soldiers to him in Europe. Twenty thousand Ottoman cavaliers, under the command of Matthew, marched against Salonika, which was on the point of giving itself to Stephen Dushan. Cantacuzenos, with the young emperor John, went by sea. Orkhan, as on the last occasion, secretly worked against his father-in-law. After Cantacuzenos had already sailed, he recalled the horsemen who were with Matthew. It was fortunate for Cantacuzenos that he met at Amphipolis a Turkish fleet which was about to land a force of raiders to ravage the country, and persuaded the commander to join with him in a demonstration against Salonika. Otherwise the expedition would have been a fiasco. As it was, Salonika surrendered. The army of Cantacuzenos ascended the Vardar as far as Uskub, which was reoccupied.

It would be too wearisome to go into all the details of the civil war between Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos. Involved in it are the intrigues of Stephen Dushan of Serbia

1 Cant., IV. 11, pp. 68-77; Greg., XVI. 6, p. 835, to XVII. 7, p. 865.
2 Cant., IV. 16-17, pp. 104-5, 108-11, 114-30; 19, pp. 133-5; 22, p. 156; Greg., XVI. 1, p. 795; XVIII. 2, p. 876. Phr., I. 9, p. 40, gives this as the time Cantacuzenos married his daughter to Orkhan.
and Alexander of Bulgaria, and the attitude of Venice and Genoa. At first it seemed as if Cantacuzenos would be crushed. The partisans of Palaeologos besieged Matthew in the citadel of Adrianople. The Genoese of Galata, in spite of the strong Venetian fleet whose co-operation, however, with the Greeks was lukewarm,\(^1\) compelled Cantacuzenos to cede Silivria and Heraclea, besides increasing their Galata lands.\(^2\) In the fall of 1352 the Venetians and Bulgarians declared openly for Palaeologos.\(^3\)

In desperation Cantacuzenos fell back for the last time upon the Osmanlis. He robbed the churches of the capital to pay Orkhan for twenty thousand soldiers, and promised him a fortress in the Thracian Chersonese.\(^4\) With this help he recaptured Adrianople, and relieved Matthew, who was still holding the citadel. The Serbians were beaten by Orkhan’s eldest son, Soleiman, near Demotika. All of Thrace and most of Macedonia returned to the allegiance of Cantacuzenos.\(^5\)

In 1353 Cantacuzenos seemed to have recovered all the lost ground, and to be at the height of his fortunes. John Palaeologos, abandoned by his partisans, was in exile at Tenedos. An attempt to win back Constantinople by intrigue failed. Cantacuzenos, now practically sole ruler, felt that it was time to establish a new imperial line. He had Matthew proclaimed co-emperor.\(^6\) In his prosperity he

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1 Cant., IV. 30, pp. 218–20; Greg., XXVI. 19, p. 86, and 22, p. 88. For explanation of action of Venetian admiral, Pisani, see histories of Daru and Romanin.

2 Villani, *Historia Venetiana* (Muratori), xiv. 200; Canale, *Nuova istoria di Genova*, i. 222.


6 Cant., IV. 34, pp. 250–3; 36, p. 266; Greg., XXVIII. 19, p. 188.
forgot about Orkhan, who had put him where he was, he forgot that he had invited the Osmanlis into Europe and had shown them the fertile valleys of Macedonia and Thrace, that their fighting men had passed along the military roads of the empire under the command of himself and his son, that he had mustered Ottoman armies under the walls of Salonika, of Adrianople, of Demotika, and even of Constantinople.

XII

The Ottoman historians place the first invasion of European territory by the Osmanlis in the year of the Hegira 758 (1356), and state that Soleiman crossed the Hellespont one moonlight night with three hundred warriors, and seized the castle of Tzympe, between Gallipoli and the Aegean Sea end of the strait. It is represented as a romantic adventure, prompted by a dream in which Soleiman saw the moonbeams make a tempting path for him from Asia into Europe. The earlier western historians give a variety of dates. Some ascribe the first crossing to Murad. Several claim that the Osmanlis were transported by two small Genoese merchant ships, and that there were sixty thousand of them! The Genoese received a ducat per head. All the calamities of the 'Turks' were brought upon Europe by the avarice of the Genoese.

1 About two hours on horse from Gallipoli.
2 Seadeddin, i. 58–63.
3 Gilbert Cousin, Opera, i. 399 (evidently copying Drechsler), and Egnatius, de Origine Turcarum (Paris, 1539), p. 29, give date A. D. 1363. But do they not follow Phr., I. 26, p. 80 ?
4 Donado de Lezze, p. 7, and Paolo Giovio, both ardent Venetians, and Rabbi Joseph, i. 245, give the names of these vessels, though differently. Nicolas de Nicolay, who passed through the Hellespont in 1551, says that this story of the Genoese was a tradition of the locality. He locates the castle of Tzympe a few miles from the Aegean end of the strait! Les quatre livres des navigations (1587 ed.), p. 58. Sauli, Della Colonia Genovese in Galata, ii. 44–5, vigorously defends the Genoese against this calumny.
We can reject these stories without hesitation, just as we can reject the date which the Ottoman historians give.\(^1\) The Osmanlis had been fighting in Europe since 1345. They had come over in large numbers on different occasions. There is nothing mysterious or romantic about their first foothold in Europe. In 1352 Cantacuzenos had promised to Orkhan a fortress in the Thracian Chersonese. Tzympe may have been given to Soleiman, or it was taken by him when the promise of Cantacuzenos was not fulfilled. He did not have to cross secretly from Asia. The Ottoman soldiers were already at home in Europe, and Soleiman had been their leader in several expeditions.

Shortly after the occupation of Tzympe, one of those earthquakes which occur so often in the Thracian Chersonese destroyed a portion of the walls of Gallipoli. This was Soleiman’s opportunity. He occupied the city, repaired the breaches, and called over from Bithynia the first colony of Osmanlis. Other colonies followed rapidly, as the soldiers of Soleiman took Malgara, Bulaİr (the key of the peninsula),\(^2\) and the European littoral of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. The advance-guard of the Osmanlis appeared within a few miles of Constantinople; and ‘conducted themselves as masters’.\(^3\) This colonization was so quickly and easily effected that one is led to believe that these colonists were for the most part renegade Greeks returning to their former homes.

Cantacuzenos now reaped the full harvest of his policy. The patriarch Callixtus refused to consecrate Matthew. He reproached Cantacuzenos for having delivered Christians


\(^{2}\) This place figured in the recent Balkan War. It was here that the Osmanlis stationed their army for the defence of the Dardanelles.

\(^{3}\) Greg., XXIX. 26, p. 241.
into the hands of the infidels, and accused him of having given to Orkhan the money sent by a Russian prince for the restoration of St. Sophia.\(^1\) Compelled to flee for his life to the Genoese in Galata, the patriarch decided to declare for Palaeologos. When Cantacuzenos chose a new patriarch, Philotheus, who consented as price of office to consecrate Matthew, Callixtus excommunicated him. Philotheus returned the compliment. Then Callixtus sailed for Tenedos to join John Palaeologos.\(^2\)

Cantacuzenos, feeling the precariousness of his position at Constantinople just at the moment when he thought he had triumphed over every obstacle to his ambition, bitterly reproached Orkhan for not having kept faith with him. He offered to buy back Tzympe for ten thousand ducats, and asked Orkhan to order the Osmanlis to leave Gallipoli. Orkhan accepted the ransom for Tzympe, knowing well that he could reoccupy this fortress when he wanted to.\(^3\) As for Gallipoli, he declared that he could not give back what God had given him. Was it not the will of God rather than force of arms that had opened the gates of Gallipoli to him? Cantacuzenos sought an interview with his son-in-law, for he thought that gold might induce the Osmanlis to withdraw. A meeting was arranged in the Gulf of Nicomedia. When the emperor arrived at the rendezvous, a messenger from Orkhan reported that his master was ill and could not come.\(^4\) No way was left open for further negotiations. The rupture was complete.

After his return to Constantinople, Cantacuzenos sent envoys to the Serbians and to the Bulgarians to urge a defensive alliance of the Balkan Christians. They answered,

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2 Cant., IV. 37, pp. 270-2; 38, p. 276; Greg., XXIX. 17-18, pp. 234-6; 49, p. 257.
3 At least, Cantacuzenos, IV. 38, p. 276, claims that he ransomed Tzympe.
4 Cant., IV. 38, p. 283.
'Defend yourself as best you can.' A second embassy met with the response from Czar Alexander: 'Three years ago I remonstrated with you for your unholy alliances with the Turks. Now that the storm has broken, let the Byzantines weather it. If the Turks come against us, we shall know how to defend ourselves.'

The indignation of the Greeks against the man who had sacrificed them to his inordinate ambition reached the breaking-point in November 1354. The inhabitants of Constantinople declared for John Palaeologos. Cantacuzenos was forced to barricade himself in his palace. Protected by Catalans and other mercenaries, he tried to temporize. He offered to abdicate if Matthew were allowed to retain the title of emperor with the governorship of Adrianople and the Rhodope district. Encouraged by a lull in the storm of popular feeling, he had the audacity to make an 'appeal to patriotism', as he himself put it. He urged the people to support him in an expedition to retake the provinces conquered by the Serbians and the Osmanlis. This exhibition of effrontery was greeted with cries of scorn. Cantacuzenos was publicly accused of wishing to deliver Constantinople to Orkhan. A second revolution forced his abdication. He became a monk. Irene took the veil.

John Palaeologos returned from exile, and restored Callixtus to the patriarchal throne. It took several years of fighting and negotiating to compel Matthew's abdication. Not until 1358 did John V become undisputed ruler of the remnant of the empire in Macedonia and Thrace. But the mischief was done. The Osmanlis had put their foot as settlers on European soil.

1 Rumanian Chronicle, cited by Gregorović, Relations of Serbia with her Neighbouring States, principally in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, Kazan, 1859, in an appendix.


3 Cant., IV. 49, pp. 358–60.
Cantacuzenos lived for thirty years in the monastery of Mistra, near old Sparta. It was long enough for him to see the irreparable injury that his ambition had caused to his country, and to realize how he had destroyed the people to rule over whom he had sacrificed every higher and nobler instinct. Cantacuzenos had a fair trial before the bar of posterity. For many long years, far removed from the turmoil of the world, were spent in the building up of his brief of justification. He left a history of his life and times. So he pleads for himself. But even if we did not have the testimony of Gregoras, and of the archives of the Italian cities and of the Vatican, to supplement the story of Cantacuzenos, he would stand condemned by his own record of facts.

Cantacuzenos had far more natural ability than Andronicus II and Andronicus III. During the long and arduous struggle to satisfy his personal ambition, he showed himself a keen, courageous, resourceful leader. At the beginning of his career he was in a position of commanding influence. His country was facing a crisis which would have called forth the best and noblest in one who loved his race, his religion, and his fatherland. But John Cantacuzenos loved only himself. The legacy of the widow and helpless child of the friend who had trusted and honoured him gave to Cantacuzenos the opportunity for developing true greatness in the fulfilment of that highest of missions—a sacred trust. But Cantacuzenos saw only the opportunity for taking advantage of a dead man’s faith.

To say that Cantacuzenos was the cause of the downfall of the Byzantine Empire would be to ignore other forces working to the same end, and to put too great an emphasis upon the power of an individual human will to shape the destinies of the world. However, in the stage of world history, leaders of men are the personification of causes. We group everything around them. The character and acts
of Cantacuzenos reveal the fatal weakness in the Balkan peninsula of his day. The Ottoman conquest was possible because there was no consciousness of religious or racial commonweal. How could this larger devotion, this larger sense of duty and obligation, be expected in men who were not influenced, much less constrained, by ties of blood and personal friendship?

XIII

Cantacuzenos ceased to be a factor in Byzantine affairs in 1355. But the Greeks could not rid themselves as easily of Orkhan. The Osmanlis had come to stay.

It is impossible to establish with any degree of certainty the conquests of Soleiman pasha in the hinterland of the Gulf of Saros and of the Sea of Marmora. But we know that he captured Demotika, and cut off Constantinople from Adrianople by occupying Tchorlu. If these important places were retaken by the Byzantines after the premature death of Soleiman, it was only for a brief time. At the beginning of the reign of Murad the Osmanlis were firmly ensconced along the coasts of Thrace, and had made some permanent progress into the interior.

There was a sudden and full awakening on the part of the Greeks to the knowledge that the Ottoman invasion of 1354 was an irreparable disaster. A year before Soleiman pasha settled his Moslem colonies in the Thracic Chersonese, the inhabitants of Philadelphia had felt themselves so completely abandoned by their emperors that they had appealed directly to the Pope for aid, promising to return to the Roman communion. At the approach of the Osmanlis in

1 Tchorlu was the head-quarters of the Ottoman General Staff during the first month of the Balkan War. After the battle of LuléBurgas, it became the head-quarters of the Bulgarians. From here the attack upon the defences of Constantinople was directed.

2 Muralt, ii. 640, No. 10, n.
Thrace, the country population had fled to Constantinople, abandoning everything. Those who had money to emigrate elsewhere did so immediately. They had no hope of a change in the fortunes of their country.¹

The annalists of the Byzantine Empire record no heroic, bitter resistance to the army of Soleiman pasha. There was no mayor of the palace, no Joan, to revive the confidence of the people in their rulers, or to replace the family that had proved its unfitness. The Greeks had feared Cantacuzenos, and had attributed their hopeless condition to his alliance with the Osmanlis. But they could not have greater confidence in John Palaeologos. For he made no effort, not even in the smallest way, to demonstrate that he was different from his weak and disloyal forbears.

The Byzantines feared also the intrigues of the Genoese, who were as persistent in their efforts to undermine the integrity of the Byzantine Empire, as are the foreigners to-day engaged in commerce in the Levant to weaken and destroy the authority of the Ottoman Empire.² The banishment of Cantacuzenos could not save them from the Osmanlis. Palaeologos could not save them. They could not save themselves. The only way which occurred to them of preventing the Ottoman conquest was to give themselves to some Christian power. There were actually plans on foot to offer the remnant of the empire to Venice, to Hungary, even to Serbia!³

In France, during the fourteenth century, the Turks were not regarded as a permanent factor in the Near East. Western Asia Minor was not called 'Turquie' or 'Turque-

¹ Greg., XXIX. 34, pp. 224–6.
² During the five years following the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908, I lived, and travelled extensively, in the Ottoman Empire. Rarely did I meet a foreigner engaged in business there who had the slightest sympathy with the Osmanlis in their aspirations or in their successive crushing misfortunes. This is not a criticism, but merely the record of a fact.
³ Schafarik, CVII.
manie', but 'the land which the Turks hold'. There was no such illusion among the Italians. They accustomed themselves very rapidly to the idea that the Osmanlis, if not the Turkish tribes, were in Asia Minor and the Aegaean to stay.

The immigration across the Hellespont in 1354 was not looked upon by those who were acquainted with the weakness and impotence of the Byzantines as a raid or as a temporary affair. For several years the Genoese had thought it to their advantage to seek the friendship of Orkhan. In 1355 two far-sighted Venetians wrote the whole truth to the Senate. They did not mince matters. Matteo Venier, baily at Constantinople, warned the Senate in the strongest terms about the menace of Ottoman aggrandizement. Marino Falieri went farther. He pointed out that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably become the booty of the Osmanlis, and urged his countrymen to get ahead of them. Prophetic words and daring suggestion. Had Venice at this time had a Dandolo of the stamp of the intrepid blind Doge who diverted the Fourth Crusade to wreak his vengeance upon his mutilators, Islam might have been kept out of Europe.

When John Palaeologos resumed the throne of his fathers, he found himself as much at the mercy of Orkhan as Cantacuzenos had been. His dependence is revealed in the story of Halil. Halil, son of Orkhan and Theodora, was captured by pirates in 1357, and taken to Phocaea. Orkhan held his brother-in-law responsible for this kidnapping, and called upon him to rescue his nephew. In February 1358, while the Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha were advancing in Thrace,

1 The expression 'la terre que les Tures tiennent' is always used to designate Asia Minor in the opinion which the council of the French King Philippe de Valois gave concerning the route to be followed in the abortive crusade of 1332. See Archives Nationales, Paris, P. 2289, pp. 711-12.
2 See p. 97, and notes 3 and 4 on that page.
3 Quoted from the Cancelleria Secreta by Romanin, iv. 232.
4 This letter is reproduced by Jireček, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 309.
we see John V, at the behest of Orkhan, spending what strength and energy he had in the siege of Phocaea. Later, when he went back to Constantinople, Orkhan peremptorily ordered him to return to direct in person the siege. John started out, and met his fleet, which had become anxious about his absence and had given up the siege. He could not persuade the galleys to turn back with him. So he wrote to Orkhan begging to be excused from continuing an undertaking beyond his power to carry through successfully.

Orkhan was inflexible. He had now become the overlord of the Byzantine emperor. In March 1359 the successor of Constantine went as a vassal to meet his Ottoman suzerain at Scutari. He appeased the wrath of Orkhan only by agreeing to pay a half of Halil's ransom, and by signing a treaty of peace that was a virtual acceptance of the new status quo in Thrace. The peace was to be sealed by the betrothal of his ten-year-old daughter to Halil. It was as errand boy of Orkhan that John V made one more trip to Phocaea, paid one hundred thousand pieces of gold for Halil, and brought him to Nicaea. There the betrothal of the Christian princess to her Moslem cousin was celebrated by splendid fêtes.¹

John Cantacuzenos introduced the Osmanlis into Europe. John Palaeologos accepted their presence in Thrace without a struggle. There is little choice between these two Johns.

XIV

Orkhan died at the end of this memorable decade.² If to Osman is given the honour of being father of a new people, the greater honour of founding the nation must be

¹ Greg., XXXVII. 52, p. 558; 59-63, pp. 561-3; 67-9, pp. 565-6; XXXVI. 6-8, pp. 504-9; Cant., IV. 44, p. 320.
² The generally accepted date of Orkhan's death is 1359 or 1360, following Ottoman sources. But Jireček, a careful and able scholar, p. 321, n. 10, is inclined to accept March 1362. There is great confusion about this period. I think that the Ottoman date is undoubtedly correct here.
ascribed to Orkhan. Few men have accomplished a greater work and seen more sweeping changes in two generations. According to popular legend, Orkhan won his spurs as a warrior, and a bride to boot, at the capture of Biledjik, when he was twelve years old. His life was spent in fighting and in making permanent the results of his fighting. He was as simple in his tastes as his father had been. At Nicaea he distributed soup and bread to the poor with his own hands.

There seems to be no basis for the characterization of Orkhan which the early western historians handed down to posterity. He was neither vicious nor cruel nor deceitful. His three striking characteristics were those which mark all men who have accomplished a great work in history, oneness of purpose, inexhaustible energy, and an unlimited capacity for detail. He began life as a village lad of an obscure tribe. After a public career of sixty years he died, the brother-in-law of the emperor of Byzantium, the friend and ally of Genoa, and potentially master of Thrace. The purpose of his life is summed up in the sentence we find upon his coins: ‘May God cause to endure the empire of Orkhan, son of Osman.’

1 'Der eigentliche Begründer der osmanischen Macht war Orchan,’ Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ii. 151.
2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 254.
CHAPTER III

MURAD

THE OSMANLIS LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN EMPIRE IN EUROPE

The use of Ottoman mercenaries in the Byzantine civil wars was fatal to the Empire. From the very fact that they were Osmanlis and mercenaries, the auxiliaries of Cantacuzenos were dangerous allies for a man who claimed to be fighting for his fatherland. The fertile valleys which Bulgarian and Serbian had so long disputed with Greek fired the imagination of these ambitious adventurers. The conquest of Macedonia and Thrace seemed to them as feasible as it was worth while. For they had a revelation of the weakness of the Balkan peoples that could have come to them in no other way. It was as if Cantacuzenos had said to Orkhan and his followers: Here is our country. You see how rich it is. You see how we hate each other, race striving with race, faction with faction. We have no patriotism. We have no rulers or leaders actuated by other than purely selfish motives. Our religion means no more to us than does our fatherland. Here are our military roads. We give you the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the easiest routes, of learning the best methods of provisioning. We initiate you into the art of besieging our cities and our strongholds. Under our guidance, you discover the vulnerable places in the walls of our fortresses.

Murad had not enjoyed training in leadership and responsibility to fit him for his sudden accession to the chieftainship of the Osmanlis. He had been overshadowed by the heir apparent, and never dreamed of ruling. Soleiman
pasha, brilliant captain and idol of the army, would not have brooked a rival in popular favour. When Orkhan died, two months after the fatal fall of his eldest son at Bulaîr, Murad was elevated to the emirship before he had had time to adjust himself to his new fortunes. But he could not pause to get his bearings. The army was on the march. The conquest of Thrace had already been started.

Osman and Orkhan were able to build up a race and a nation without notice and, consequently, without hindrance. For their little corner of Asia Minor had been abandoned by the Byzantines. Since the days when Nicaea became the capital of the empire; after the Latin conquest of Constantinople, its commercial relations with Europe were interrupted. None knew or cared about the rise of the Osmanlis until they appeared in Thrace. Orkhan had assured himself of his inheritance by patient waiting. Of Murad immediate action was demanded.

The actual European conquests of Orkhan, outside of the Thracian Chersonese, had been negligible. But Europe was excited over the capture of Gallipoli. Murad had little to fear from a union of the indigenous Balkan elements. Greek and Serbian and Bulgarian hate each other far worse than they hate the Osmanli. This fact of history, demonstrated so forcibly by the events of the year 1913, was known and appreciated at its full value by the earliest of the Ottoman conquerors. There was, however, just cause for apprehension of the intervention of Hungary in conjunction with the Serbians, or of Venice in conjunction with the Byzantines. Murad's success depended upon his ability to gain an immediate and vital foothold in the Balkan peninsula.

This foothold was obtained in the epoch-making campaign of 1360-1. Astounding success attended the initial efforts of Murad. If he were not himself a trained and seasoned warrior, he had a precious legacy of generals in whom he could put implicit trust. Realizing his own
inexperience, he created Kara Khalil Tchenderli vizier, and allowed himself to be guided by the judgement of this tried friend and servant of his grandfather and his father. To Lalashahin, companion of Soleiman in the capture of Tzympe, was given the title of beylerbey, and chief command of the army in Thrace. Adrianople was the goal. To Evrenos bey Murad entrusted a second army, whose mission was to prevent an attack from the Serbians in the west.¹

Tchorlu was the first objective point, because its capture would protect the rear of the army operating against Adrianople. This city, only forty-six miles from Constantinople, offered a stubborn resistance, and had to be taken by assault. The commandant was decapitated, the garrison massacred, and the walls razed.² The Osmanlis saw to it that the fate of the defenders of Tchorlu was heralded far and wide, so that it might serve as a lesson to other cities before which their armies appeared. Evrenos bey, pushing forward on the left, occupied Demotika,³ and then Gumuldjina. This operation gave to the Osmanlis control of the basin of the Maritza River, and removed the danger of a Serbian attack. A column on the right moved up the coast of the Black Sea and captured Kirk Kilisse, a position of extreme strategic importance in preventing a possible Bulgarian attempt to relieve Adrianople by bringing an army through the mountainous country between the river and the sea.⁴

After the capture of Tchorlu, Murad advanced to Lule Burgas on the north bank of the Ergene, where he effected a junction with the armies of Evrenos and Lalashahin. The decisive battle was fought between Bunar Hissar and Eski Baba, to which point the defenders of Adrianople had

¹ Seaddeddin, i. 80.
² Seaddeddin, i. 82; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 19.
³ But Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 672, who is followed by Leunclavius, says that Demotika was abandoned to Orkhan in November 1361.
⁴ Cf. marginal note in Barberini MS. of Pachymeres, cited by Muralt, ii. 663, No. 9.
advanced. The Byzantines and Bulgarians were defeated. The Greek commandant of Adrianople, with a portion of his army, managed to flee down the Maritza to Enos. It is one of the remarkable coincidences of history that the Osmanlis should have won the first battle which opened up to them their glorious future in Europe in exactly the same place that was to witness five hundred and fifty years later their last desperate stand in the Balkan peninsula.

Deserted by their commandant, and overwhelmed by the disaster of Eski Baba, the inhabitants of Adrianople opened their gates to the Osmanlis. Murad installed Lalashahin in Adrianople, and took up his own head-quarters in Demotika, where he built a palace and a mosque. Lalashahin, before settling down in Adrianople, carried his victorious arms up the valley of the Maritza as far as Philippopolis, which he fortified strongly. A stone bridge was built across the river. The occupation of Philippopolis not only gave to the Osmanlis an advantageous base of operations against the Bulgarians, but also brought them the most fruitful source of revenue they had yet enjoyed. It enabled them to levy taxes upon the rice-growing industry. Bulgarians and Serbians were both dependent upon the harvests of the rice fields around Philippopolis.

In fifteen months the Osmanlis had become masters of the principal strategic points in Thrace. This great campaign, undertaken and carried through under the spur of necessity, was an auspicious beginning for the reign of Murad and for

1 Seadeddin, i. 84–5; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 22.
2 All the Ottoman historians.
4 Muklis Abderrahman Efendy, quoted by Schéfer, in his edition of Bertrand de la Broquière, p. 170, n. 3.
5 Seadeddin, i. 89; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 52.
the supremacy of the Osmanlis in the Balkan peninsula. Europe was suffering from another visitation of the Black Death.\(^1\) The Balkan nations were completely demoralized. So unpopular was John Palaeologos in his own capital that Murad contemplated entering into a conspiracy with some Byzantine traitors to have John assassinated and complete the conquest of the empire.\(^2\) If he did enter fully into this plot, it was as fortunate for him that the undertaking failed as it was for the Bulgarians in 1912 that their columns did not pierce the lines of Ottoman defence at Tchataldja.

For the disaster that follows a too extended and too rapid subjugation of unassimilated masses is as sudden as it is irreparable. Durable empire-building is governed by a law of homogeneity.

The Osmanlis were still a race of limited numbers, and at the beginning of their existence as a nation. The process of assimilating the racial elements in conquered territories, begun by Osman when he first left the village of Sugut, could not be arrested; for the existence of the Ottoman state depended upon its continuance. The Greek of Bithynia had lived with Turk and Moslem for two centuries, and had found him a good neighbour. There was neither racial antipathy nor abhorrence of the religion of Mohammed to overcome. Nor had there been the hatred and dread of the conquered on the one side and the arrogance of the conqueror on the other. The Anatolian Greeks had been accustomed for generations to the economic and political conditions that finally caused the majority of them to cast their fortunes with the rising star of the Osmanlis.

The problem of assimilating the Christians, who formed the total population of the Balkan peninsula, was a new one.\(^3\)

1 Villani tells of its terrible ravages in 1360 'ricominciata in diversi paesi del mondo', Muratori, xiv. 653, 688–90, 727.
2 Ibid., pp. 649–50. He declares that Murad had been 'molte volte tentato di vincere Constantinopoli'.
Here were huge and compact masses of Christians, who had 
\checkmark\ come suddenly under the yoke of the Osmanlis in the first 
two years of Murad’s reign. They did not know their new 
\checkmark\ masters. They did not know Islam. Benevolent assimilation 
by voluntary conversion seemed no longer possible. A radical 
change in the attitude of the Osmanlis towards the question 
of religion was demanded. Wholesale massacre was imprac-
ticable, for the Osmanlis had no reserve of colonists to call 
upon to replace the indigenous elements. Their position 
was still too precarious to allow them to draw freely from 
their adherents in the corner of Asia Minor under their 
dominion. To win the Macedonians and Thracians by 
forcible conversion was not feasible. It required the 
expenditure of all his military resources for Murad to hold 
what he had conquered. He could not add police duty to 
his already superhuman burden. Even had he thought of 
this method of conversion, he would have been deterred 
by the nightmare of a crusade.

Murad and his counsellors solved the problem of assimila-
tion by sanctioning the reduction of captives to slavery, and 
by creating the corps of janissaries.

A law was promulgated which gave to the Osmanli 
soldier absolute right to the possession of prisoners, unless 
they consented to profess and practise Islam. Prisoners 
were regarded as booty. They could be kept for domestic 
or agricultural labour, or sold in the open market, subject 
to the government’s equity of one in five. The disgrace, 
even more than the hardships, of slavery was so keenly felt 
by the Greeks\(^1\) that many for whom there was no other way 
preferred a change of religion to loss of freedom. The right 
to make slaves of prisoners was efficacious in providing 
wives and concubines for the conquerors, who were practically 
without women of their own. The widows of the fallen, 
and the daughters of Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians,

\(^1\) Cf. Finlay, iv. 45, 169.
became the instruments of increasing the Ottoman race. In the hundred years from Murad I to Mohammed II, the Osmanlis became in blood the most cosmopolitan and vigorous race the world had known since the days of the Greeks and Romans. Greek, Turkish, Serbien, Bulgarien, Albanian, Armenien, Wallachian, Hungarian, German, Italian, Russian, Tartar, Mongol, Circassian, Georgian, Persian, Syrian, and Arabian—this was the ancestry of the Osmanlis who, under Soleiman the Magnificent, made the whole world tremble. In richness of blood the only parallel to the Osmanlis in modern times is the present population of the United States and Canada.

But this indirect method of conversion as an alternative to slavery did not immediately increase the masculine element among the Osmanlis. In a city taken by assault the more virile portion of the male population was killed off, and those who remained were able to buy life and freedom. Male slaves were an embarrassment to the ever-moving armies of Murad. Ransom money was welcomed by the captors. In many cities the inhabitants surrendered without a struggle, and were secured in their freedom by the terms of capitulation. In rural districts the threat of slavery was little felt. The Osmanlis had neither time nor strength to put out the drag-net. Everywhere in the Balkans refuge in the mountains is easy. Then, too, the loss of cultivators would have made the highly prized timarets worthless, and would have caused a famine in foodstuffs or a diminution of taxes on harvests. Another means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Christians had to be devised.

The famous corps of the janissaries was, according to the Ottoman historians, a creation of Orkhan.1 As a bodyguard

1 Seaddedin, i. 42. Hammer, i. 384–5, n. viii, says that Ottoman historians are unanimous in this assertion as against Byzantine sources. Col. Djevad bey, the modern Ottoman authority on military history, is disappointing and unconvincing in his discussion of this question. On
of slaves, cut off from their families and educated and trained to serve nearest the person of the sovereign, the janissaries may have originated with Orkhan. If so, it was but the adoption of the idea already put into practice by the sovereigns of Egypt in the organization of the Mamelukes. But as an agency of forcible conversion by the incorporation of Christian youths in the Ottoman army, there is no evidence of its existence before Murad. In fact, historians are agreed that the janissaries were recruited only from the Christian population in Europe. So Orkhan could hardly have conceived this scheme. The problem of which it was a solution did not arise until after Orkhan’s death.

That the corps of the janissaries was an agency for forcible conversion, and was not created in order to increase the strength and efficiency of the Ottoman army, is proved by the records we have of the number of janissaries in the early days of Ottoman history. Murad and Bayezid are represented as having a thousand or less janissaries. In the p. 25 he gives 726 (1326) for the date, and on p. 78 730 (1329). He cites no sources, for there are none, and has to admit, p. 54, that Murad I made the laws for the janissaries. Among early European historians there is much divergency. Spandugino, p. 185, attributes their origin to Osman, and the name from the village of Sar: they are ‘the young men of Sar’. Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 357, also attributes to Osman. Reineccius, influencing the Latin editor of Chalcocondylas (see ed. Migne, p. 26, n. 11), makes Osman the founder, and derives the name from ‘Januae’: they are the custodes corporis. Leuncel., Pandectes, p. 129, discusses these theories without coming to any conclusion. Giovio, Geuffraeus, and Nicolay, p. 83, attribute origin to Murad II. Certainly it was not earlier than his day that the janissaries attracted attention in Europe. D’Ohsson, vii. 311, asserts that there was no definite organization until Mohammed II. Mignot, i. 119–20, is in favour of the theory that Murad I created this corps.

1 Seignobos, in Hist. générale, ii. 334.

2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 251, says that Anatolian Christians were exempt to give time to recuperate ‘after the exhausting struggles of generations’. But exhausting struggles had been no less frequent and no less severe in the Balkan peninsula. Gibbon’s suggestion, that the levies were made in Europe because Moslem and Christian Anatolians were not apt for war, shows how completely the great English historian missed the raison d’être of the janissaries.
confusion of the ten years of civil strife among the sons of Bayezid, the janissaries played no part. There were only twelve hundred janissaries in the time of Mohammed the Conqueror, and twelve thousand when the Ottoman Empire was at its zenith under Soleiman the Magnificent. But Mahmud II counted one hundred and forty thousand in his army. These figures show that this most celebrated of Ottoman military organizations did not become a powerful factor until the period of decadence. The janissaries were not, as has been commonly represented, the principal element of the Osmanlis’ fighting strength in the wars of conquest of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Their great rôle in Ottoman history was that of maintainers and defenders of conquests already made. In organizing the janissaries, Murad was certainly influenced by the desire of forming a bodyguard on whose loyalty and devotion he could rely implicitly. But his principal purpose was to emasculate the Christian elements in Macedonia and Thrace, which were too fanatical or too ignorant to see of their own accord that self-interest should lead them to renounce their nationality and their religion.

Murad’s law of drafting (devchurmé) provided that in each conquered district in Europe the privilege of exemption from military service through the payment of the capitation tax (kharadj) should be denied to Christian youths. The Osmanlis reserved the right to select at discretion Christian boys, who were taken from home and kindred and brought up in the Mohammedan religion. They were trained for service as the Sultan’s bodyguard. They depended directly upon the sovereign, who paid them according to a definite scale. Their insignia were the pot and the spoon, and their officers received names which symbolized the functions of the camp kitchen.

1 Hammer, i. 126.  
2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 90.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid., pp. 55–6; Ducas, p. 16; Leuncl., Annales, p. 34; Ricaut, pp. 358–9.
One is compelled to dissent from the consensus of opinion of European historians on the organization of the janissaries. Their scathing criticisms are best summed up in the words of a French historian: 'It is the most fearful tribute of human flesh that has ever been levied by victors upon the vanquished. . . . It justifies the execration of which the Osmanlis have been the object on the part of Europeans during centuries. Let us add that, by this strange mode of recruiting, the Osmanlis have found, at the same time, the means of taking away from the Christian populations their most virile element, and of doubling their troops without putting arms into the hands of the conquered.'

The actual number of janissaries under arms refutes the latter part of this criticism, when it is applied to any one of the Ottoman sovereigns of the period of conquest. As for putting arms into the hands of the conquered, we shall see that both Murad and Bayezid availed themselves of the services in war of their Christian subjects, led by their own princes. The tearing away of boys from their homes, and the loss of their Christian heritage, is a shock to humanitarian and religious sensibilities. But we must judge the Osmanlis of Murad and Bayezid by the Christians of their own century. When we compare the methods of conquest of the Osmanlis with those of the Spaniards against the Moors, of the English against the French and Scotch, of the Italians against each other, we must concede that Murad devised a humane, clever, and highly successful scheme in the institution of the janissaries.

The ignorant Balkan peasantry—especially the Slavic elements—prized their sons far more highly than their daughters. Recruiting for the army was a greater blow to them than recruiting for the harem. It was the strong, sturdy son who was chosen. This touched the pocket-book as well as the heart-strings. The Anatolian Greek, especially

1 Lavallée, i. 190-1.
of the cities, had been deterred from becoming a Moslem more by a lack of eagerness to assume military obligations than by a zeal for his ancestral faith. The Macedonian Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian regarded the bearing of arms as a natural obligation. Fighting was a part of living. Better the faith of Mohammed, then, than the loss of the son’s help with the harvest. That there were wholesale conversions to Islam as a result of the threat to apply the law of devchurme is a logical inference from the fact that Murad never mustered more than a thousand janissaries.

III

The Byzantine Empire did not recover, even temporarily, from the effect of Murad’s first campaign in Europe. The fall of Demotika and Adrianople, followed so closely by that of Philippopolis, removed within eighteen months the last hope of retrieving the fortunes of the empire. There were still many places remaining to the Byzantines in Thrace. But the surrender of the fortresses in the valleys of the Ergene and the Maritza had destroyed the military prestige of the Byzantines, and foreshadowed the speedy subjugation of the whole country. The loss of the revenues of Thrace and of the great plain south of the main Balkan range reduced the imperial treasury to dependence upon the port duties and city taxes of Salonika and Constantinople. For ninety years the shadow of the empire remained. But whatever power, whatever influence was left to the successors of Constantine, it was rather in western Europe than in the Balkan peninsula. The impress of one thousand and thirty years of continuous existence from the renaming of old Byzantium to the fall of Adrianople was too deep to vanish in a few years. The decay had been going on for centuries. The final extinction would of necessity take several generations.

The complete abasement of the Byzantines is revealed
in the treaty that John V Palaeologos was compelled to conclude with Murad shortly after the capture of Philippopolis. In the fall of 1362 or the spring of 1363, John bound himself to refrain from any attempt to win back what he had lost in Thrace, either by a separate attack or by joining the Serbs or other enemies of the Osmanlis. In addition he promised to aid Murad against his Anatolian enemies, the Turkish emirs.\(^1\)

After this treaty was signed, Murad withdrew to Brusa in order to provide for the organization of the new possessions that had come to him by a successful expedition against Angora. His letters, written at this time to announce to his Anatolian neighbours and to the Moslem princes of Asia the victories in Thrace, show clearly that he did not yet feel himself strong enough to assume the position of overlord to the other great emirs of Asia Minor. While he was in Brusa, in the spring of 1363, an event happened which led Murad to make the momentous decision that shaped the destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The first coalition against the Osmanlis was formed in Europe.

IV

After the fall of Philippopolis, the Greek commandant had succeeded in escaping, and took refuge with Kral Urosh V of Serbia.\(^2\) He pointed out to Urosh most eloquently the paucity of numbers of the Osmanlis, their insecure position, and the danger that would overwhelm the Serbs if they waited until the Osmanlis were firmly grounded in Thrace. Urged by Pope Urban V, the princes of Wallachia and Bosnia, together with King Louis of Hungary, joined the Serbs in upper Macedonia. Under the guidance of the Greek refugee, they started on a swift

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\(^2\) Seadeddin, i. 91.
march to win back Adrianople. It was an expedition undertaken as a crusade. The allies mustered at least twenty thousand.

Lalashahin had hardly more than twelve thousand men under his command, and a portion of these were scattered in the captured cities. Murad, who had started to return to Thrace as soon as he had heard the news, was detained by the necessity of capturing a fortress on the Sea of Marmora, near Cyzicus, which was in the hands of a turbulent band of second-generation Catalans, whom he feared to leave behind him.\footnote{This colony was at Bigha. See Appendix B, p. 301.} They were suspected of plotting with his southern rivals to organize a movement against his Anatolian possessions.

If the Greeks had had the power or the will to co-operate with the crusaders, the Ottoman domination in Thrace would have ended even more suddenly than it had begun. But they made no move. In fact, one of the Byzantine historians charges John Palaeologos with aiding the Osmanlis!\footnote{Phr., I. 26, p. 80.} Lalashahin was able to draw from the garrisons of the recently occupied cities, and to send forward to meet the crusaders some ten thousand men under Hadji Ilbeki. It was the intention of Lalashahin to have this army act wholly on the defensive. If only Hadji Ilbeki could prevent their passing the Maritza, they would be turned southward towards Enos. By that time he felt sure that he could rely upon one of three things happening: dissensions would arise among the crusaders, the Greeks would be alarmed by the Serbian approach to Enos and the sea and attack the crusaders, or Murad would have time to bring his army across the Dardanelles. The one purpose of Lalashahin was to prevent the invasion of Thrace and the investment of Adrianople.

But Hadji Ilbeki did better than keep the crusaders from
crossing the river. They had already crossed, and had celebrated the unopposed passage of the Maritza by an evening of feasting. Hadji Ilbeki surprised them as they were sleeping in a drunken stupor. Without hesitation he fell upon them like a Gideon. Seized with panic, the crusaders were driven back into the river. Those who escaped massacre and drowning fled precipitately. There was no attempt to rally. In the little town of Mariazell, on the northern frontier of Styria near the foot of the Semmering Alps, there stands a votive church built by Louis out of gratitude to the Virgin for having saved him from death in this battle.

Lalashahin, instead of rewarding the daring of his lieutenant, which had saved the Osmanlis from an irreparable disaster, was consumed with jealous fury. His only thought when he received the news was that Hadji Ilbeki had robbed him of the glory of so great a victory. He had his too successful subordinate poisoned.

The sudden and complete collapse of the first crusade organized against the Osmanlis did not give to Murad any false sense of security. He saw in the successful meeting of this danger, which had threatened to destroy him, not the opportunity for exultation and for the relaxation of effort, but the spur for straining still further every nerve to learn and profit by the lesson. The battle of the Maritza was a warning to Murad. The danger would be renewed, and renewed soon. It was now for him to make the choice

1 Katona, x. 393.
2 Chalc., I, p. 30, and the chronicle of Rabbi Joseph, i. 240, confuse this battle with that of Cernomen, near the same place and with the same result, in 1370. But there were certainly two distinct battles. Louis of Hungary took part in the first, as is shown by the date recorded at Mariazell and by a diploma in Fejér, Cod. Dipl. Hung., 9e partie, vii. 212. Cf. Aschbach, Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds, 1. 87. The account in Vambéry's Hungary, Story of Nations Series, p. 171, is wholly wrong.
3 Seadeddin, i. 94.
between remaining an Asiatic emir and becoming a European sovereign, between endeavouring to impose first his authority on the other emirs of Asia Minor and the conquest of the Balkan peninsula. Were the Osmanlis to be on the offensive in Europe or in Asia?

Murad decided to build his empire in the Balkan peninsula. It was not that he coveted less the mountains and valleys of Asia Minor. It was not that his ambitions failed to extend to the Taurus. But he had the vision to realize that the Ottoman race could not subjugate the Turkish elements in Asia Minor by a gradual assimilation of those elements alone. The race had to grow, as it began, by the incorporation of the various Christian elements, which alone possessed the finesse, the knowledge of government, the organizing capacity necessary to cope with the problems of facing Europe and inheriting the Byzantine Empire. From Europe, Asia Minor and more could be conquered: from Asia, no portion of Europe could be conquered.

The Osmanlis do not possess written records of the reign of Murad. There is no source to which we can go to read what Murad thought or what others of his day thought or said that he thought. But we know his mind from his actions. There is no cause for doubt on this point. After the first campaign in Thrace, Murad had returned to Brusa, and dated his letters from there. He began to plan an aggressive campaign against his neighbours. But after the battle of the Maritza, he abandoned Brusa for Demotika, and three years later, in 1366, Adrianople became the first real capital of the Ottoman Empire.

In spite of all that has been written about the unique position of Brusa in Ottoman history, it is no more to the Osmanlis than is Saint-Denis to the French or Winchester to the English. The Osmanlis have never really been at home in Constantinople. Historically and architecturally speaking, they have been under the shadow of a greater past.
Adrianople, although always a city of importance since the days of Hadrian, reached its greatest splendour and glory under the Ottoman sultans. Here were planned, and from here started, the expeditions westward and eastward, which increased in strength, in efficiency, and in inspiring terror as the circle gradually widened, until the star and crescent appeared under the walls of Vienna and Cairo, on the shores of Italy and in the heart of Persia. No student of Ottoman annals can fail to support the contention of the Sublime Porte after the last Balkan war, that Adrianople is to the Osmanlis their sacred city. From Lalashahin to Shukri pasha, the proudest and most precious memories of the Osmanlis are in Adrianople, whose great mosque, still awe-inspiring and altogether admirable in its decay, is typical both of what has been and what is.

The decision of Murad was accepted by his successors. Even after the capture of Constantinople, many an Ottoman sultan felt more at home in Adrianople than in the imperial city. For more than a century the Osmanlis directed their energies almost exclusively to European conquests. Whatever they accomplished in Asia was the indirect result of their stupendous successes in Europe. From first to last, the extension of Ottoman sovereignty over the Moslems of Asia was by means of a soldiery gathered and war-hardened in Europe, themselves Christian or of Christian ancestry, in whose veins ran the blood of Greek and Roman, of Goth and Hun, of Albanian and Slav.

V

In 1365, Murad received from the outside world the first acknowledgement of his commanding position as heir apparent of the Byzantine Empire. It was an overture from the flourishing republic of Ragusa, on the Dalmatian coast, for a treaty guaranteeing freedom of trade in the Ottoman dominions to the merchants of Ragusa. In return for
unrestricted commercial privileges, the republic offered to pay a large sum annually, which the givers called a grant, but which was invariably accepted by the recipients as tribute.\textsuperscript{1} However it may have been at the beginning, the grant soon became tribute, for after some years the existence of Ragusa depended upon purchasing the benevolence of the Ottoman sultans. As the helplessness of the Ragusans increased, the tribute became larger. If we except the convention between the Genoese and Orkhan, of whose provisions and character we know nothing, the Ragusan commercial treaty is the first of the long series of treaties by which European cities and nations purchased the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire and to sail the high seas. Since in most cases the Osmanlis pledged themselves to nothing except to refrain from robbing merchants or from preventing their trading, the gifts exacted were nothing less than blackmail. After the sea-power of the Osmanlis had been broken, the Barbary corsairs inherited the privileges of this system which had been started in so small a way by the Ragusans.

Murad could not write. When the treaty with Ragusa was brought for his signature, he put his hand in the ink and made the impression of his fingers upon the paper. This is the origin of the \textit{tughra}, which has ever since been the official signature of the house of Osman.\textsuperscript{2}

VI

When Murad was settling himself in Adrianople, and laying plans for the conquest of Macedonia and Bulgaria,

\textsuperscript{1} Miltitz, ii. 1\textsuperscript{ère} partie, 166.

\textsuperscript{2} Col. Djevad bey, p. 97, n. 1; Engel, Geschichte Rag., p. 141; Hammer, i. 231, 405. But this was also Timur’s ordinary method of signing ordinances: cf. Shereffeddin, iv. 55. The document, with the marks of Murad’s hand, is preserved in the museum of the Communal Palace at Ragusa.
he was menaced by a new crusade. Despite its futile ending, or better, for that very reason, the expedition of Amadeo of Savoy in 1366 commands our attention. For it furnishes, as does the expedition of Admiral Boucicaut from Genoa in 1399, a striking illustration of how easily the growing Ottoman power might have been crushed by a resolute body of crusaders with a single aim, and of how impossible it was to secure that oneness of purpose, owing to the ingrained animosity of the East and West, of the Greek and Catholic Churches.

In 1361, when Lorenzo Celsi was elevated to the dogeship of Venice, the Senate had made overtures to John Palaeologos for an alliance against Murad.1 This plan was frustrated by the successes of the Osmanlis in Thrace. The Venetians held back, and allowed John to suffer the humiliation of signing the treaty that made him a vassal of Murad. In the crusade that ended in the disaster of the Maritza, the Venetian participation was half-hearted, and it proved valueless. The Venetians were not even on hand to prevent Murad from crossing the Dardanelles. In fact, there is every reason to believe that they now began to look upon the Osmanlis as a valuable tool in checkmating the ambition of Louis of Hungary to inherit the shortlived empire of Stephen Dushan.2

When he saw that Murad had come into Thrace to stay, and that there was no hope from the Venetians, John Palaeologos turned to the Hungarians. He made a secret visit to Buda to enlist the aid of Louis, and made the usual promise that the Byzantines would return to the Roman fold.3 On his return he passed through the principality of Sisman, who had just inherited the lower portion of Bulgaria. Sisman, either at the suggestion of Andronicus Palaeologos, who wanted to succeed his father, or in the hope of winning

1 Villani, x. 30.  
2 Cf. Hazlitt, iii. 216.  
favour with Murad, detained the emperor in the fortress of Nicopolis on the Danube.  

Amadeo VI of Savoy was one of the princes who had taken the cross from Pope Urban V at Avignon on Holy Friday, 1363, for the crusade that never materialized. The receipt of a letter from Louis of Hungary, informing him of the imprisonment of his cousin (John’s mother was a princess of Savoy), and pointing out the rapid spread of Ottoman power, caused Amadeo to yield to the Pope’s continued and urgent solicitations. With some fifteen hundred soldiers, he embarked for the East on fifteen galleys. After a stop at Negropont and Mitylene to get reinforcements, Amadeo entered the Hellespont, and captured Gallipoli without difficulty. The Osmanlis fled by night, abandoning the fortress.

But the Savoyards made no attempt to follow up this victory, or even to keep Gallipoli. Instead of attacking the infidels, they sailed into the Black Sea, and started a vigorous campaign against the Bulgarians. Sozopolis and Burgas were captured, and several other important fortresses to the north. The bravery of the crusaders was rivalled only by their cruelty. Their bloodlust made such an impression upon the Bulgarians that they wanted nothing to do with Franks bearing the cross. When the Savoyards laid siege to Varna, Sisman gave up his prisoner to save the city.

John Palaeologos was borne back triumphantly to Constantinople. But friction soon arose. When Amadeo urged

1 ‘Il le print por prisonnyer, et le destint a cause de ce que le roy de Bourgarye sy sestoi accorde et alyez secretement avecques le turc’: *Chroniques de Savoye*, col. 300.


3 Cibrario, *Storia di Savoya*, iii. 193. But I have followed closely the account of the expedition as given in the anonymous French chronicle, cols. 299–319, in *Monumenta Historiae Patriae*, Turin, 1840, vol. i. There is a modern book by Datta. Cf. also Delaville le Roulx, i. 148 f.
upon his kinsman the necessity of paying the price of his rescue and of the continued support of the crusaders by fulfilling his promise to return to the Roman Church, he met with stubborn refusal on the part of emperor and patriarch alike. In wild rage, Amadeo withdrew to Pera, and began to fight the Greeks by sea and land. The Constantinopolitans were so frightened that 'they did not dare to show their head out of doors'. Pressed on all sides by Osmanli and Bulgarian, as well as by his deliverers, the wretched John saw no other way out than to promise openly to abjure his errors and swear allegiance to the Pope.

Having wrung this promise from those whom he had come to defend, Amadeo sailed away to Rome, where he reported to the Pope in full consistory 'how at his request the emperor of Constantinople and his people desired to submit to the obedience and belief of the Holy Roman Church in hope that the Church would aid them against the infidels who were too strongly oppressing them'.

Urban and the cardinals listened without great interest to the Count of Savoy's recital of his success in preparing the ground for a reunion of the churches. The story was getting to be an old one. John's overture was received with suspicion. Urban had got the same promise in the spring of 1366 in a letter from Louis, which reported the interview John had sought at Buda.¹ To the envoy of Louis, who had arrived in Avignon just as Urban was starting for Rome, the Pope gave a letter commanding the King of Hungary to put off his crusade until the union of the churches was actually accomplished.²

VII

What lay behind the eagerness of Urban, at the beginning of his reign, to revive the crusades? Was he burning with holy zeal to recover the sepulchre of Christ from the hands

of the Moslems? Was his heart set on protecting Cyprus and Rhodes? Had he determined to leave no stone unturned to protect the Byzantines and other eastern Christians from the encroachment and persecution of Murad? His letters indicate that his chief interest was the recovery of the lost power and glory of the papacy. There is the same revelation in the letters of his immediate successor, Gregory XI. These two popes had no catholic vision. They tried to keep their position as arbiters between France and England and Spain at Avignon, and at the same time to inherit the temporal power of the decaying Holy Roman Empire by circumventing the Visconti of Milan. The great schism in the Western Church, which so aided Murad and Bayezid in laying solidly the foundations of an empire in Europe, was the outcome of the short-sighted and purely selfish policy of these two popes. How far from the truth it is to represent them as courageously, whole-heartedly, and persistently endeavouring to awaken the interest and attention of Europe in the peril from the East!

The fall of Adrianople and of Philippopolis should have been a warning to Urban. He read in it, however, not a glorious opportunity to demonstrate the solidarity of Christendom by driving the Moslems out of Europe and rescuing fellow Christians from apostasy, slavery, and death, but an occasion to force the schismatic Greeks to return to the Roman communion. Of the popes of the fourteenth century, Urban had the greatest chance to prove himself a worthy champion of Christ and civilization. For it was during his reign that the Osmanlis began their conquests and their proselytizing in Europe. At the beginning they could easily have been checked. But it never occurred to Urban that there was a common interest of Christendom higher than and outside of the Roman Church.

The fault lay not wholly with Urban and with Gregory. They reflected the spirit of their age. But it does no credit
to their personal character nor to the high position which they held to say that they were the victims, rather than the masters, of the prevailing bigotry and ignorance of their generation. In the fourteenth century, the West had already begun to try to impose its commerce, its customs, its laws, and its religion upon the East. There was not, nor has there ever been since, a sympathetic ‘give and take’ between Occident and Orient. In a mint, if the coin when stamped does not correspond exactly to the mould, it is rejected. Similarly the West, when it tries to put every eastern people through its mould and finds no exact correspondence, rejects. Hence, on the one side, the scorn of the ‘I am better than thou’: on the other side, a hatred born not only of fear and of conviction of inferiority, but of a sense of injustice which is none the less vital from a knowledge that the wrong is not, and will not be, righted.

Amadeo of Savoy, uncivilized, fanatical through ignorance, the fertile breeding-ground of fanaticism, true and unchanged descendant of the Fourth Crusaders, was a prophetic figure at Constantinople in 1366. He represented the only possible type of deliverer for Byzantium. But deliverance on his terms the Greeks would not accept. Death or Islam were preferable. And who can blame them? Two years before Amadeo’s expedition, the Greeks of Crete had risen in rebellion against their Venetian overlords because an attempt had been made to impose upon them the Latin faith and rites.\(^1\) When they were hunted down and massacred for refusing to worship after the western fashion, not only Pope Urban, but also Petrarch, wrote to the Doge congratulating him upon his valiant and successful efforts to save the Church of Christ in Crete!\(^2\)

In a letter to Pope Urban, Petrarch spoke with approval of the policy of using the Ottoman menace to stamp out the

\(^1\) Greg., XXV. 17, p. 41.
\(^2\) Urban V, Epp. secr. ii. 230; Petrarch, Senilia, iv. 2.
Eastern heresy. ‘The Osmanlis are merely enemies,’ he wrote, ‘but the schismatic Greeks are worse than enemies. The Osmanlis hate us less, for they fear us less. The Greeks, however, both fear and hate us with all their soul.’ These words of Petrarch epitomize the feeling between the Eastern and Western Churches during his own day, and, if what one can see with his own eyes in Jerusalem and elsewhere is a fair example, up to the twentieth century. If the European nations regarded the adherents of the Orthodox Church (the term Greek in its religious sense must be taken to include all the Balkan races) as ‘worse than enemies’, that is, than the Osmanlis, it is equally true that the Osmanlis found from 1350 to 1500 that the hatred of the Balkan races for the Latin Church was their most potent ally, not only in the actual conquest, but in reconciling the conquered to their fate. One does not want to detract from the genius of the early Ottoman sovereigns and from the reputation for superb fighting ability so honestly won by the Ottoman armies. But it must not be forgotten that each separate race in the Balkans preferred the rule of the Osmanlis to that of their neighbours, and that the one point in which the Balkan races were of the same mind was that Ottoman domination was preferable to that of the Hungarians and the Italians. For every crusade was a scheme for religious propaganda and territorial aggrandizement, in


2 In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, and in the Church of the Holy Nativity, Bethlehem, anarchy—even bloodshed—is prevented only by the constant vigilance of the Ottoman military authorities. If one asks the Latin and Greek priests in Jerusalem, they will admit without shame that this statement is true.
just the same spirit as in modern times the nations of Europe have exploited the misery of Ottoman Christians for the purpose of securing concessions.

In spite of the fact that John Palaeologos was informed by the Patriarch Philotheus that a mixed council of clergy and government officials, presided over by the empress, had been held in June 1376, and had decided against the reunion of the churches, John persisted in his negotiations with the Pope. Urban did all that he could to facilitate the visit of the Byzantine emperor to Rome. But at the same time he was writing to the Venetians and to the Dalmatian cities to protect the Catholics of Cattaro against the Serbian and Albanian heretics, and was encouraging Louis in his suicidal campaign against the Bulgarians.

In 1369, John Palaeologos left the government of Constantinople to his elder son Andronicus, and set out for Rome, where, on October eighteenth, he made his profession of faith in the presence of four cardinals, and confirmed it by a golden bull. The next morning, at St. Peter's, he formally abjured the errors of the Orthodox Church before the high altar, with his hands in those of the Pope. The Pope accepted him as a 'son of the Church', promised that he should be relieved of the Turk, and gave him letters earnestly recommending his cause to the princes of Christendom.

Urban V was quick to use the prestige which he believed the adhesion of John Palaeologos had given him. He

1 Miklositch-Müller, Acta et diplomata graeca, CLXXXIV.
2 Epistolae secretae, vi. 1-10.
3 Ibid., vi. 3.
4 The date of this visit is certain from the formal act of abjuration, which is given in full in Raynaldus, ann. 1369, XI. Ducas, c. 11, and Chalc., I, p. 25, are in error in placing this voyage later. Berger de Xivrey, Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions, xix, 2e partie, p. 35, suggests that the Byzantine historians have confused this voyage with that of Manuel, thirty years later.
5 Epp. secr., viii. 37, 38, 80.
announced broadcast the happy consummation of his efforts, stating that the Byzantine emperor had done homage to the Vicar of Christ in St. Peter's. But letters sent during the same winter to the Greek clergy, urging them to accept the action of their emperor, and other letters from his secret correspondence of this year, indicate how little faith he had in the Emperor's sincerity or ability to fulfil his promises. Was the abjuration in St. Peter's a farce, in which Emperor and Pope allowed themselves to trifle with holy things, each for the sake of his immediate advantage?

John had hoped that his adhesion to the Roman Church would bring to him grants of money, ships, and men from the Latin princes, and that an army would rally around him to fight the Osmanlis. But not only did he return from France 'with empty hands', but he was detained at Venice because of debts owing to merchants. In vain he begged Andronicus to send the money for his release. The son who had four years before been charged with being party to his father's imprisonment in Bulgaria was no more filial at this humiliating crisis. He answered that there was no money in the treasury, and that he could get nothing from the clergy. But his younger son, Manuel, brought from Salonika the ransom.

John Palaeologos returned to his capital poorer than when he left. He brought no help from Europe, and he had bound himself publicly by oath to an obligation which he had known he could not fulfil. He had broken faith with Murad, who during these years had been growing more and more powerful. There was nothing for him to do but to make himself tributary to Murad in order that he might enjoy 'up to the

1 By an encyclical: *Epp. secr.*, viii. 4. Cf. also his letters to the doges of Venice and Genoa, ibid., p. 24.
2 Ibid., viii. 55.
3 Phr., I. 22, pp. 52–3; Chalc., I, pp. 50–1; Morosini, p. 13.
end of his life ' his last possessions in peace.\textsuperscript{1} Three years later, in 1373, when his ambassador John Lascaris failed in a second attempt to get aid from the Western princes,\textsuperscript{2} the Byzantine emperor recognized Murad as his suzerain, promised to do military service in person in Murad's army, and gave to him his son Manuel as hostage.\textsuperscript{3}

Urban died a few months after John's visit to Rome. Gregory XI, who succeeded him in December 1370, had little hope of carrying on further negotiations with the Eastern Church; for the Greek ecclesiastics were stubborn in their determination to maintain the absolute independence of the patriarchate. The Genoese and Venetians were fighting bitterly in Cyprus. In 1371, Gregory made a strong appeal to France, England, Venice, and Flanders to co-operate with Genoa in saving the last Christians of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{4}

There was no response.

That Gregory realized clearly the peril to Christendom in the advance of Murad's armies is shown in two remarkable letters written to Louis of Hungary in May and November 1372. His words were prophetic. He urged Louis to resist the Osmanlis before they advanced farther into Europe. They had already entered Serbia. He trembled to think what would happen if they pushed through Albania and secured a port on the Adriatic. Unless Louis entered without delay into an alliance with his Christian neighbours, how could he protect his own kingdom and all Christendom from the Mohammedan peril.\textsuperscript{5} Seconding this warning to the King of Hungary, the Pope commanded the Hungarian and Slavic archbishops to preach the crusade in Hungary, Poland, and the Dalmatian cities. Everywhere special boxes

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Phr., I. 11, p. 46.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Gregory XI, \textit{Epp. secr.} iii. 36, 58.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Chalc., I, pp. 51–2.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Raynaldus, ann. 1371, VIII.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} \textit{Epp. secr.}, ii. 32, 87. Similar letter to Louis in December 1375, ibid. v. 46. Other letters reprinted in Fejér, 9\textsuperscript{e} partie, iv. 583–4; v. 54–6; vi. 155–6.
\end{itemize}
were placed in the churches for collecting funds. A tithe was levied on the monasteries and abbeys of Hungary and Dalmatia. Louis, with five of his most powerful nobles, took the cross, and swore to the Pope that he would put an army in the field within a year. Louis asked Venice for triremes, but when the Venetians found that he intended them to be a donation for 'the common cause', they found that they could not build them. Padua declined an invitation to guarantee the cost of construction. The Hungarians did not fulfill their promises. In fact, there is no evidence that they made any effort to acquit themselves of their oath.

When John Palaeologos made a last desperate appeal to the Pope, before he entered into his third and final compact with Murad, Gregory, in receiving the imperial envoy, burst into tears, and promised that he would save Constantinople, if only the Byzantine emperor would cause his people to renounce their heresies and return to the Roman Church. In 1375, he wrote once more to Louis to inform him that Constantinople was in danger of capture from Murad. Letters in the same year to Edward of England pictured the Ottoman advance and the peril of Christendom, urged a general war against the Osmanlis, and asked for a subsidy to provide galleys 'to prevent the crossing into Europe of more Turks, because Constantinople is in imminent danger'.

The letters of Gregory XI to the Christian princes prove conclusively that the full import of Murad's early successes was understood by the Pope and was impressed upon both secular and ecclesiastical authorities throughout Europe.

But both John and Gregory lost heart. Neither was able to fulfil the compact made in Rome. Gregory could not unite Christendom to relieve the Byzantines. John could not persuade the Byzantines to renounce, as he had done, the 'Greek heresies'. So, as we have seen, he became

1 Bernino, pp. 15-20.  
2 Fejér, 9e partie, iv. 427-8.  
3 Ibid., v. 52-3.  
Murad's vassal. The Pope, involved in the quarrel of Emperor Charles IV and the Duke of Bavaria with the Marquis of Brandenburg, and anxious over the outcome, for the papacy, of the continual unrest in the Italian cities, returned from Avignon to Rome in 1378. He died a few months later. The struggle arising from the election of Gregory's successor gave birth to the 'Great Schism'. This left Murad a free hand in subjugating the Balkan peninsula.

VIII

The sources of information for the movements from the outside for the relief of the Balkan Christians, and for the religious and political quarrels of the Byzantines, are so numerous and so detailed that one is embarrassed by too much material. Many interesting facts cannot even be mentioned. But when we come to the beginning of the Ottoman conquest in Europe under Murad and Bayezid, we find ourselves in the midst of what an eminent Slavic historian has called 'the most obscure and difficult period of South-Slavic history'. The chroniclers, whether they be Slavic, Rumanian, or Ottoman, are so contradictory and so lacking in explicit statement that we cannot speak with certainty of the sequence of events. The Byzantine chroniclers, verbose to the point of weariness in detailing petty and trifling quarrels and happenings, are almost silent concerning the momentous events that marked the ruin of their empire. It is difficult to unravel the twisted skeins, and find a thread to carry the story of the conquest from 1366 to 1389. When it is impossible to choose between contradictory records, the geography of the field of action,

1 On December 12, 1374, Gregory XI wrote to John from Avignon, predicting that his 'alliance with Murad' would bring about the destruction of the empire: Epistolae secretae, iv. 68.
2 Raynaldus, ann. 1378, XIX.
3 Jireček, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 317.
with which one can gain a first-hand knowledge, must be the final factor in determining the sequence of conquest between the adoption of Adrianople by Murad as his capital and the downfall of the Serbians at Kossova.

The occupation of Adrianople and Philippopolis was as severe a blow to the Bulgarians as to the Byzantines. In spite of the fact, however, that Greek and Bulgarian had a common interest in driving the Osmanli from Thrace, or at the very least in checking his advance, there was no move made at this time for an alliance. On the contrary, even when the Osmanlis were engaged in the Thracian campaign, war arose between John V and Alexander. The Byzantines captured Anchiale, and tried desperately to take Mesembria by assault.\(^1\) The Greek patriarch wrote to Czar Alexander, reminding him of the sacredness of harmony and the necessity of accord at that critical moment, but the letter was not backed by the good faith and good will of the Byzantine emperor. Neither John nor Alexander attempted to give assistance to the Serbian and Hungarian crusade that ended so disastrously on the banks of the Maritza.

The conquest of Bulgaria up to the main Balkan range imposed itself upon Murad as a corollary to the Ottoman dominion in Thrace, and the undisturbed possession of Adrianople and Philippopolis. For the Bulgarians, through centuries of varying fortunes, had grown accustomed to fighting for the right to live in Thrace. Often had they been beaten back to the Balkans, and as often pressed forward again to the Ergene. To win and lose Adrianople and other Thracian cities was old history with them. They always came back. Between 1362 and 1365, Murad had experience with Bulgarian persistence and tenacity of purpose. They were masters again of Kirk Kilisse, Midia, Bunar Hissar, and Viza when Murad made his change of

\(^1\) Cant. IV, 50, pp. 362-3.
capital from Brusa to Adrianople. Yamboli had been strongly fortified by Alexander. Bulgaria seemed as formidable and as forbidding to Murad's dream of empire as the emirates of Asia Minor.

Fortune again favoured the Osmanlis. Czar Alexander died in 1365, leaving three heirs. To John Sisman fell middle and southern Bulgaria from the Danube to the Rhodope Mountains and the Bulgarian pretensions in Thrace. Old Tarnovo was his capital. Stracimir inherited western Bulgaria, with Widin for capital, and the Bulgarian pretensions to the valley of the Vardar and western Macedonia. (The Bulgarian remnant of eastern Macedonia was in the hands of an independent Bulgarian prince, Constantine, whose stronghold was Kustendil.) Dobrotich became master of the Dobrudja and the upper Black Sea coast, where Bulgarian, Cuman and Alan lived together with hardly any distinguishing characteristics.

The division of Bulgaria, at the moment when union was essential, proved fatal. The sons of Alexander never joined to face the common danger. So marked was the division of Alexander's kingdom that thirty years after the conquest the conquered territories were known as 'the three Bulgarias'.

Stracimir, jealous because Sisman seemed to have received the lion's share of Alexander's inheritance, did not hesitate to make overtures to Murad, offering to co-operate with the Osmanlis against his brother and to share the portion of Sisman with them. Before any agreement could be made, however, Stracimir found himself face to face with a terrible danger in the west, which soon caused him to forget both Sisman and Murad. Louis of Hungary had interpreted his

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1 Although Engel says 1353, others 1356, and the Rumanian chronicle 1371, there can be no question that 1365 is the correct date; for both Byzantine and Ottoman historians speak of Alexander as Bulgarian Czar in 1364, and do not mention him later, while Sisman and his brothers come immediately into prominence.

2 Schiltberger, Neumann ed., p. 93.

3 Orbini, pp. 472-3.
crusader's commission as an authorization to 'make war against the heretics'. It was a pretext to get possession of Widin, which was essential to his ambitious project of adding Serbia to his kingdom. He attacked the Bulgarians on the ground that they were enemies of the Church and must be forced to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. Widin was captured and Stracimir imprisoned. Stracimir's dominions were flooded with Franciscan missionaries, who were backed by a brutal soldiery in their proselytizing efforts. Two hundred thousand Bulgarians abjured the orthodox heresy, and were re-baptized in the Latin rite. This forcible conversion, which was purely a political matter, was as objectionable to the Bulgarians as to the Cretans. They hated 'with a perfect hatred' the Franciscans whom Pope Urban had sent, and the cause for which they stood.

At the first opportunity, the Bulgarians of the west called in Sisman and Vadislav of Wallachia. The Hungarians were driven out of Widin and the Franciscans in the city massacred. Louis was powerful enough to wreak terrible vengeance. In 1370, Widin fell once more into his hands. The Bulgarians of the western Balkans were subjected to such a relentless persecution that they welcomed the Moslem conquest to secure freedom of worship. Urban had incited Louis to this war, and had congratulated him upon his laudable zeal in converting the heretics.

We have already spoken of the punishment that came to Sisman as a result of the detention of John Palaeologos. The Italian crusaders on the Black Sea coast were as powerful an aid to Murad's empire-building as were the Hungarian crusaders on the western frontier. The successors of Louis reaped the bitter fruits of his insane policy. Louis and Amadeo of Savoy contributed in no little measure to

1 Bonfinius, II. 10.  
2 Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ii. 152.  
3 Wadding, Annales minorum, ann. 1369, XI.  
4 Epp. secr., VI. 131, 136.
make possible the conquests of Murad. When Amadeo withdrew from Bulgaria, he left the cities he had captured to the Greeks. Sisman was compelled to expend his energy in recapturing them. But Murad had already anticipated him in the important fortress of Sozopolis, which commanded the entrance to the port of Burgas.¹

Shortly after the Ottoman occupation of Sozopolis, the Bulgarians were everywhere dispossessed in Thrace, and the capture of Yamboli ² forced Sisman to follow the example of John Palaeologos. He became a vassal of Murad. His sister Mara entered Murad’s harem, but with the stipulation that she be allowed to retain her Christian faith. Murad gladly gave his new ally and brother-in-law a strong Ottoman army to co-operate in the attack upon the Hungarians. The Osmanlis helped in driving Louis out of Widin. Sisman, like Cantacuzenos, first guided the Osmanlis through the heart of his country. It was under the leadership of Sisman that they saw the Danube, their river of destiny. When Sisman, even with the help of the Osmanlis and Wallachians, could not gain possession of Stracimir’s inheritance, he returned to Tarnovo. There he learned that Lalashahin was planning an expedition westward, which seemed to be intended against Sofia.

Sisman now realized that his position was critical and that the fate of Bulgaria was at stake. In the early spring of 1371, he hurried into the Rilo Mountains and sent out an appeal to the Serbian kral who was at that time ruling in eastern Macedonia. Then he went to the relief of Ishtiman, which was already menaced by the Osmanlis. Failing in this effort, Sisman fell back to Samakov, where he was joined by the Serbs. Lalashahin led his army from Ishtiman into the valley of the Isker. The two kralis joined

¹ Called Ishebol by the Ottoman historians.
² By the second division of the Ottoman army under Timurtash. Murad himself had captured Sozopolis. Cf. Jireček, p 326.
battle with him in the plain of Samakov. The Ottoman victory was decisive. The Serbians and Bulgarians fled into the recesses of Musalla, the highest mountain in the Balkan peninsula, and of Popova Shapka. Sisman disappeared after the battle. The way to Sofia was open. All Bulgaria lay at the feet of the conqueror. It is from the battle of Samakov that we must date the destruction of an independent Bulgaria.

But Murad was not yet ready to follow up this decisive victory. The only immediate result of the battle of Samakov was the submission of Constantine, Bulgarian prince of Kustendil, in the upper valley of the Struma. After the fall of Samakov, his position was untenable. Constantine hurried to Murad’s camp, and did homage to the conqueror. Murad gave back to him as vassal his principality. With the wisdom that marked every successive step of his progress in Europe, Murad refrained from advancing beyond Samakov. He ordered Lalashahin to lead the army into Macedonia, and to join Evrenos in the advance towards the Vardar.

IX

The dramatic death of Stephen Dushan, in 1355, just as he was starting upon the expedition against Constantinople for which his whole life had been a preparation, is recorded in the previous chapter. Stephen’s son was so unfit to inherit the aspirations and carry on the work of his father that he was called in derision by his people Nejaki,
the weakling. The nobles and generals of Stephen Nejaki ignored him. Each man seized what territory he could hold and defend against his neighbour. There was anarchy in Macedonia and Serbia. The dissolution of Stephen Dushan’s conquests resulted in a bloody and destructive civil war between cities and factions. The dowager Czarina managed to preserve a semblance of prestige, if not of authority, at Serres. But the ‘empire’ was no more. As local rulers, Serbians stayed in the principal cities of Macedonia. There was undoubtedly a Serbian element in the village population. Many villagers, however, who acknowledged the overlordship of Stephen’s warriors and other Serbian nobles, did not know then, any more than they know now, to what race they themselves belonged. This has always been the Macedonian problem.

The defeat of the crusaders on the banks of the Maritza in 1363 had been a defensive battle on the part of the Osmanlis. There was no attempt to invade Macedonia. While Murad was occupied in the subjugation of Thrace and of southern Bulgaria, several efforts were made by the Byzantines to come to an understanding with the Serbians. In 1364, the patriarch Callixtus went to Serres to see Stephen’s widow, who had retired to a convent. His purpose was to form an alliance. Soon after reaching Serres, Callixtus succumbed to the hardships of the journey. His effort came to nothing. That Stephen’s son still held to the pretensions of his father and had no intention of treating with the Byzantines, is demonstrated by a bull, dated from Pristina in 1365, in which he calls himself ‘emperor of the Servians and of the Greeks’.

1 von Kállay, Geschichte der Serben, i. 152.
2 Ibid., i. 152–9; Jireček, op. cit., 319–20; Ljubić, Monumenta spect. ad hist. Slav. merid., iv. 189.
3 Cant. IV., 50, pp. 360–2; Müller, Chron. Byz., under 1364.
4 Miklositch, Acta Serbica, CLIII.
Stephen Urosh, the ‘weakling’, died in 1367.¹ Uglesia, who usurped the kralship of Serres and shared the ‘empire’ of Stephen Dushan with his brothers and fellow adventurers, Vukasin and Goiko,² sent an embassy to the patriarch Philotheos declaring that he would annul the bull of 1352, by which Dushan had created an autocephalous Serbian Church,³ and would cause all the Serbians to return to the Orthodox allegiance.⁴ After three years of negotiation, precious time wasted with trifling formalities, the reconciliation and union of the Serbian and Greek Churches was effected.⁵ But, if we are to believe the authorities of Orbini, Uglesia, while he was negotiating with the Greeks of Constantinople, had levied tribute upon the Greeks of Salonika, and would have made himself master of Salonika, had not his untimely death prevented the consummation of the great Serbian dream.⁶

At the time of the reconciliation with the Orthodox Church, Uglesia had completed a plan of united action with his two brothers to oppose the Ottoman invasion of Macedonia.⁷ Uglesia had been informed that a great army was gathered in Adrianople, which awaited the return of Murad from Bulgaria to commence its march. Four weeks after the negotiations with the Byzantines had been successfully concluded, in the early summer of 1371, the Serbian army reached the Maritza at Cernomen,⁸ between Adrianople and

¹ Ibid., CLX.
² Sons of a poor Dalmatian nobleman: Ducange, Familiae Byz. viii. 294.
³ At Ipek, with an independent patriarch: Engel, Geschichte von Serbien, p. 279.
⁵ Ibid., CLX; ibid., fol. 286.
⁶ Orbini, p. 275.
⁸ Now called Cermen or Tchirman.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Svilengrad. This battle has been confused with the earlier battle of 1363, and it is impossible to separate the accounts of the two actions. The Osmanlis were again victorious. Uglesa and Goiko were drowned in the Maritza. Vukasin escaped from the field of battle only to be killed by his servant for the gold chain he wore around his neck.

The battle of Cernomen lost Macedonia to the Serbians. The three princes were killed. Most of the Serbian adventurers who had been the companions of Stephen Dushan, and who had profited by his Macedonian conquests, disappeared. The Osmanlis had no opposition in penetrating to the valley of the Vardar.

The monk Isaias of Serres has left a graphic contemporary picture of the Ottoman invasion of Macedonia. Like the birds of Heaven, the Ishmaelites spread themselves over the land, and never ceased murdering the inhabitants or carrying them off into slavery. The country was empty of men, of cattle, and of the fruits of the fields. There was no prince or leader: there was no redeemer or saviour among the people. All faded away before the fear of the Ishmaelites, and even the brave hearts of heroic men were transformed into weak hearts of women. Rightly were the dead envied by the living.

The invasion of Macedonia in 1371–2 was as rapid and decisive a campaign as the invasion of Thrace had been ten years before. Kavalla, Drama and Serres were occupied by Khaireddin and Evrenos. Drama and Serres were colo-

1 Svilengrad, now the frontier station of Bulgaria, was known from 1361 to 1913 as Mustapha Pasha. Before the recent Balkan war, it was the frontier railway station of Turkey.

2 But there were certainly two distinct battles here, in 1363 and in 1371. See p. 124, n. 2, above.

3 Ducange, op. cit., p. 294; Bialloblotsky's translation of Rabbi Joseph, i. 240; Klaič, p. 199; Jireček, pp. 329–30. Zinkeisen, i. 224, confuses this battle with the one fought in 1363.

4 In Miklosich, Chrestomathia palaeoslav., p. 77.

5 Phr., i. 26, p. 80, gives the capture of these cities in the same campaign.
nized, their churches converted into mosques, and they soon became the residence of the owners of the timarets granted in eastern Macedonia. These two cities have always been the strongholds of the Mohammedan element in Macedonia, and the residence of the great Moslem landowners. The cities and villages in the valleys of the Mesta and the Struma acknowledged Murad as sovereign, and submitted without resistance to Ottoman laws and Ottoman taxation. Wherever it was safe to do so, Murad seized the lands, and appointed Ottoman governors. In districts where pacification would have proved a difficult task, he allowed Serbian chiefs to rule as his vassals.

With the same impetuosity that had carried them to the foothills of the Rhodope Mountains after the capture of Adrianople, the Osmanlis crossed the Vardar in 1372, and pushed their arms into Old Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, and even to the mountains of Dalmatia, from which they could see the Adriatic. Other adventurous bands, eager to attract the attention, the commendation, and the rewards of Murad, followed the footsteps of the Catalans, traversed Thessaly, and appeared in the plains of Attica.

Murad destroyed the Macedonian empire of Stephen Dushan without great effort. The Serbians remaining east of the Vardar, nobles and peasants, became Ottoman subjects. In upper Serbia, they rallied round one of their as that in which Monastir was acquired, with 1386 as date. But the Serbian chronicles are so explicit here that we can follow them without hesitation, especially as they are seconded by the Ottoman historians. Cf. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i. 229.

1 Pope Gregory XI, writing to Louis of Hungary, May 14, 1372, informed him that the Osmanlis had conquered some parts of Greece, 'subactis quibusdam magnatibus Rasciae, tum in eis dominantibus'. Rascia was Servia. Theiner, Monumenta Hungarica, ii. 115.

2 Gregory XI, Epp. secr. ii. 32-3.

3 According to Amilhau and Jireček, who rely on Reynaldus, ann. 1364, XXVIII, this first invasion of the Greek peninsula took place in 1363. But the Turks referred to in that year, probably of the perennial corsair type, could not have been Osmanlis. They were from Aidin or Sarukhan.
number, Lazar Gresljanovitch, whom they formally elected as successor of the Serbian kings. But Lazar was so weak that he did not take the title of emperor (tzar) or of king (kral), but called himself merely prince (knez). To secure the existence of his kingdom or principality, he sought peace with Murad, and, following the example of the Byzantine and Bulgarian rulers, became vassal and tributary of the Ottoman emir.

Before the end of the year 1372, it was recognized that the Osmanlis had come into the Balkans to stay. The conquest of Macedonia east of the Vardar, following so closely upon the subjugation of southern Bulgaria and the completion of the Thracian conquest, gave to Murad a preponderant position in the Balkan peninsula. The Byzantine emperor and the Bulgarian and Serbian princes were his tributaries. Wallachia, Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, Attica and the Peloponnesus were now on the confines of the Ottoman Empire, and menaced by Ottoman invasion.

In Europe, Murad was credited with having the intention of invading Hungary. It was reported that he had made an alliance with the Tartars of Russia to attack Hungary. The Tartars were to cross the Carpathians by way of Moldavia into Transylvania, while Murad was to work his way up the valley of the Danube. Murad may have dreamed of such a project, just as he had thought of making a supreme effort to enter Constantinople after his first Thracian campaign. But, if he did, he was deterred by the same well-grounded fear of moving too fast. Ten years before he had refrained from committing a fatal error. He would continue to make haste slowly. The early Osmanlis were not raiders.

1 Klaic, Geschichte Bosniens, p. 200.
2 Hammer, i. 242, 409, places the first relations of Lazar with Murad after the fall of Nish, which he erroneously puts in 1376. See below, p. 161, n. 3.
3 Gregory XI, Epp. secr. iii. 42.
They were empire-builders. They succeeded because they never forgot that their greatest problem was that of assimilation. When they extended their conquests beyond the area of possible assimilation, the period of decay automatically commenced.

The decade following the Macedonian campaign of 1371–2 was spent in ottomanizing southern Bulgaria and eastern Macedonia, in completing the assimilation of Thrace, in reorganizing the army, and in a rearrangement of the system of distributing the timarrets or military fiefs. Royal domains were created, and lands were set aside for the support of the mosques and other religious institutions in the form of inalienable endowments (vakufs).

The only move of Murad against the Hungarians was to send five thousand archers, upon the request of the Senate, to help the Venetians in their war against Louis.¹

After the Macedonian campaign, Murad turned his attention once more to Byzantium. John, when he returned from his unsuccessful trip to Rome, placated Murad by sending his third son, Theodore, to serve in the Ottoman army. In 1373, John, passing over Andronicus, raised Manuel to the imperial purple as co-emperor. The disloyalty of his eldest son in the question of the emperor’s ransom from his Venetian creditors made it natural that John should have selected Manuel to rule with him.

John was not wrong in his estimate of the character of Andronicus. The disappointed prince entered into a conspiracy with Saoudji, son of Murad, who had been entrusted with the command of the Thracian army while his father was occupied in Anatolia. John and Manuel, according to some accounts, were also in the field with Murad. So the moment was propitious. The two sons raised the standard of revolt against their fathers.² Murad, who hated his own

¹ June 15, 1373: Andrea Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 176.
² Ducas, 12, pp. 43–4; Phr., I. 11, pp. 49–50.
son and feared him, crossed immediately into Thrace. The army which was supporting the cause of the young princes abandoned them, and the rebels fled to shut themselves up in Demotika.¹

Faced with starvation, the inhabitants of Demotika opened the gates of their city to Murad. He exacted a most atrocious vengeance. The garrison were bound hand and foot and thrown into the river. The young Osmanlis and Greeks who had been led astray by the princes, were put to death. Wherever possible Murad compelled fathers to act as executioners of their sons. He set the example by tearing out Saoudji’s eyes, and then cutting off his head.²

It has been generally written that Murad intended that the same punishment should be meted out to Andronicus. For the sake of appearances, he did order John Palaeologos to have his son’s eyes put out. But there was no order for execution. John Palaeologos consented to the blinding of Andronicus and of his grandson and namesake, who was only five years old.³ The operation was not successfully performed. Both Andronicus and his son, even if temporarily blinded, recovered their eyesight. Some have explained this by stating that they were healed by a Genoese physician.⁴ There is recorded a beautiful story that Andronicus owed the restoration of his sight to the empress, his mother, who visited him daily in the tower of Anemas and was prodigal in her efforts to heal him. He was in despair for some months, until one day he saw a lizard climbing on a wall.⁵

² Letter just cited; Chalc., I, pp. 44–5; Phr., I. 12, p. 51. Saoudji is called Kontouz by Ducas, Mosis by Phrantzes, and Saouzis by Chalcocondylas. I cannot find the reading Siaous which Hammer, i. 412, and n. lix, attributes to Chalcocondylas.
³ Chalc., I, p. 46; II, p. 69; Phr., I. 12, p. 51; Duc., 12, p. 44.
⁴ Canale, ii. 16.
⁵ Clavijo de Gonzáles, 15 v° and 16 r°.
If Murad had really desired the death or total blindness of Andronicus, he could easily have secured this result. While punishing his own son, however, he saw to it that Andronicus escaped the consequences of the same crime. Here we have a revelation of the far-sightedness and cold-bloodedness of Murad. He killed his own son, because he feared his rivalry. He spared the son of John Palaeologos in order to perpetuate the rivalry between the emperor and his son. To have killed or incapacitated Andronicus would have been from his view-point an act of folly rather than of justice; for Andronicus, brilliant, adventurous, magnetic, was at the same time a worthy exemplar of the name he bore, a name that stood for the acme of unscrupulous conduct and contempt for ties of blood. Murad had only to wait, and history would repeat itself. Internal dissensions in the family of the Palaeologi had made the fortunes of Orkhan. Murad had no intention of getting rid of Andronicus, in whom he saw the means of still further enmeshing the Byzantine emperors.¹

The Byzantine historians record for the year 1374 another event, which illustrates the power of Murad over John Palaeologos. Manuel, who had resumed the government of Salonika, tried to induce the inhabitants of Serres to recover their liberty by massacring the Ottoman garrison and the Ottoman colonists. Serres, in spite of its prominent place in recent Serbian history, was regarded by the Byzantines (as it still is by the Greeks of to-day) as a city of their compatriots. We have no means of establishing the grounds upon which Manuel believed it possible to restore the Byzantine authority in the country between the Struma and the Vardar. The sequel indicates that it was a wild and unfounded hope of a desperate man, and shows how thoroughly in two years the Osmanlis had become masters of the situation in Macedonia.

¹ So Phrantzes thinks, I. 12, p. 51: ταύτην ὀμότητα καὶ ἀπανθρωπίαν ὁ Ἀμουράτης ἐποίησεν ἅνε εἰς τὰ πάντα καλῶς πολιτευόμενος.
Murad, warned in time of the project, sent Khairreddin pasha with a large army to Serres. The Greeks implicated in the plot were promptly executed, and Khairreddin moved against Salonika. At the approach of the army, Manuel fled by sea to Constantinople. John Palaeologus was so frightened that he did not dare to receive in the imperial city the beloved son whom he had raised to the dignity of co-emperorship. Manuel then went to Lesbos, whose Genoese lord was his uncle by marriage. But the fear of Murad had reached the Aegean Sea. The fugitive was turned away. Staking all upon the issue, Manuel went to Brusa and threw himself at Murad's feet. The time was not yet ripe to destroy the Palaeologi. Murad pardoned Manuel, and sent him back to Constantinople. It was only after Manuel had presented a letter from Murad, confirming the fact that forgiveness had been granted, that the emperor of Byzantium dared to receive his son and heir within the walls of Constantinople.

Pressed by the Venetians, John made in 1375 the mistake of giving them, in exchange for three thousand ducats and the jewels which had been pledged for his debts after the visit to Rome, the island of Tenedos. The strategic importance of Tenedos was so vital that the Genoese could not allow this island to fall into the hands of their rivals. It is an axiom as old as history that who holds Tenedos controls the entrance and exit to the Dardanelles. Until the Black Sea dries up and the wheat-fields of Russia fail to yield, there will be a 'question of the Straits'.

The news of this grant to Venice meant but one thing to the Genoese. There was feverish activity at Genoa. A fleet was manned, ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining

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1 Chalc., I, pp. 46-7; Phr., I. 11, pp. 47-9.
2 Romanin, iii. 255. This project, according to Cicogna, Istoria di Venezia, vi. 95, was first broached to John at the time of his visit to Venice in 1370.
the Levant colonies against the Turks. Pope Gregory XI allowed the archbishop of Genoa to raise enormous sums by questionable means for equipping and increasing the fleet. Instead of using this fleet to free the Aegean and the Black Sea from the ever-increasing Turkish pirates, or to attack the Osmanlis, the Genoese admiral sailed to Constantinople. Aided by the Genoese of Galata and by Bayezid, Andronicus had escaped from the tower of Anemas. When the fleet arrived from Genoa, he gave to its admiral a golden bull, awarding Tenedos to Genoa. To Murad he offered his sister in exchange for help. The old story was repeated. After a month’s siege, Andronicus, by the aid of his Ottoman and Genoese supporters, entered Constantinople. His father and his two brothers, Manuel and Theodore, were imprisoned in the Tower of Anemas, where he and his son had been shut up for two years. The foresight of Murad in regard to Andronicus was justified.

While Andronicus was besieging Constantinople, John V managed to send word to the inhabitants of Tenedos to resist the Genoese and give themselves to the Venetians. If this were not possible, they were to abandon the island to the Turks rather than allow the Genoese to occupy it.

After a year’s imprisonment, the emperor, through the wife of his jailer, succeeded in perfecting with Venetians residing in Constantinople a plan of escape. But its execution was deferred when John discovered that his sons, who were confined to separate rooms, could not be included in the rescue. Later, the efforts of the Venetians were renewed upon the solemn promise that Tenedos should revert to Venice. The plot was discovered. The Venetians, availing themselves of the lucky chance that a Venetian fleet had

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1 Raynaldus, ann. 1376, XXIII.  
2 Epp. secr., vi. 236.  
3 Ducas, 12, p. 45.  
4 Caresino, in Muratori, xii.  
5 Ducas, 12, p. 45; Chalc., II, p. 63; and Phr., I. 13, p. 54, say that Bayezid had given him 1,000 men, and had often advised him to have his father and brothers assassinated. Cf. Muralt, ii. 706.  
6 Sauli, ii. 57.
just arrived in the Golden Horn from the Black Sea, fled from Constantinople, abandoning John Palaeologos to his fate.\(^1\) Andronicus IV was solemnly crowned in St. Sophia sole emperor of Byzantium.

After two more years of imprisonment,\(^2\) John and his sons succeeded in escaping in June 1379. They got across the Bosphorus, and took refuge with Bayezid, who was again watching the course of events at Scutari. Murad, still playing the game of pitting father against son, drove a hard bargain. Andronicus must be pardoned once more, and given the government of several cities, probably including Salonika.\(^3\) John and Manuel, as a price for freedom and restoration to the imperial throne, agreed to pay an annual tribute of thirty thousand pieces of gold, furnish a contingent of twelve thousand soldiers to the Ottoman army, and surrender to the Osmanlis Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in Asia.\(^4\) When the Philadelphians refused to assent to this shameful transaction, John and Manuel joined the Ottoman army and fought against their last Christian subjects in Asia to force upon them the Moslem yoke.\(^5\)

Thus did Murad hold to the lips of John Palaeologos the cup of humiliation, nay, more, of degradation, until he drained the last bitter dregs. We do not need to pass judgement upon John and Manuel. It is sufficient to say that they drank and did not die!

The question of Tenedos brought Venice and Genoa into their most bitter conflict of the century. The Visconti of Milan were allied to the Venetians, while the Hungarians attacked them by land.\(^6\) After initial successes, the great

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1 Quirino, *Vita di Zeno*, cited by Muralt, ii. 707, Nos. 6-9.
2 Ducas, 12, p. 45.
3 The fortunes of Salonika at this period are obscure. See p. 231, below.
4 Chalc., II, p. 63; Phr., I. 13, pp. 55-6.
5 Chalc., II, p. 64. But Ducas, 4, p. 19, says that Bayezid captured this city.
6 Bonfinius, II. 10; Sanudo, *Vite de’ Duchi*, in Muratori, xxii, col. 680.
Venetian admiral Pisani was beaten decisively in 1379. The Genoese captured Chioggia, and held Venice at bay in her own lagoons. It was the timely arrival of Charles Zeno and the fleet from the Levant that saved the Adriatic republic. In 1381, peace was made through the intermediary of Count Amadeo of Savoy, on condition that the Senate surrendered Tenedos to Amadeo, who guaranteed to demolish the fortress within two years. It was also a stipulation of the treaty of Turin that Andronicus IV be recognized as heir to John V. Did the influence of Murad reach as far as the peace negotiations in the capital of far-off Savoy? The Count of Savoy fulfilled his promise. In 1383, the fortifications of Tenedos were rased, and the inhabitants of the island removed to Crete and Negropont.

The war over Tenedos had kept open the Straits, but it helped Murad in an inestimable degree to tighten the grip of the Osmanlis upon Thrace and Macedonia. The Italian republics thought no more of driving the Osmanlis out of Europe. From now on until they themselves see their possessions wrested from them and their commerce in the Levant ruined by the successors of Murad, the Venetians and Genoese are suitors for favours at the door of the tent of the Moslem conqueror.

XI

While the struggle between the Palaeologi and the Venetian war with Genoa and Hungary were strengthening Murad’s position in Europe, he began to turn his attention, for the first time since the expedition against Angora at the beginning of his reign, to the expansion of Ottoman authority in Asia Minor. The antipathy of the South Slavs for the Hungarians,

1 An excellent brief account of this war is found in Wiel’s *Story of Venice*, pp. 227–37.
2 The Genoese forced John V to make peace with Andronicus in November 1382: Sauli, ii. 260.
3 Cicogna, op. cit., vi. 97; Romanin, iii. 301.
the anarchy among the Serbians, the lack of leadership among the Bulgarians, and the civil strife in the Byzantine imperial family made the period from 1376 to 1381 peculiarly appropriate for initiating a movement against the emirates on the confines of his own state. Murad felt for the moment secure in Macedonia and Thrace. The inhabitants of the conquered countries could do nothing. There were no prospects of a crusade. Through the rapid increase of the Ottoman race during the first fifteen years in Europe, and through the vassalage of the Christian princes, which compelled them to furnish contingents for war, Murad now had money and soldiers to confront his nearer Anatolian rivals.

In 1360, after the capture of Angora and the defeat of the Galatian village chiefs,¹ Murad did not lose his head. He was wise enough to fear an attack on Kermian. Now he had only to threaten, thanks to the prestige and actual power he had gained in Europe. The emir of Kermian was too prudent to risk a war with the son of the rival whom he had despised. In order to preserve his independence and at the same time his pride, he agreed to give his daughter in marriage to Bayezid. The territories which Murad coveted, and was ready to try to take by force, went with her as her marriage portion. It was a munificent dot. The western and northern part of Kermian became Ottoman. The most important city in the new territory was Kutayia, the ancient Cotýaeum, a strategic point of great value. Its remarkable citadel of countless towers is still standing.

The marriage of the emir of Kermian's daughter to Bayezid was celebrated at Brusa with much splendour. For the first time we hear of the Osmanlis interested in matters of court and luxury. The simple warriors, who had known nothing but the village council and the camp fire, were becoming accustomed to the more formal and more complex life of the Greek cities. With every victory and every

¹ Hadji Khalfa, Džihannuma, fol. 1852; Evliya effendi, ii. 229.
extension of sovereignty, with every addition to the army and to the body of civilian officials, the distance between the sovereign and his people was widened. The ceremonial evolved by the Ottoman court was that of Byzantium; the customs of the higher classes, who were just beginning to realize their self-made rank, were Byzantine, even to the veiling of women. The Osmanlis had not yet come into touch with the Arabs or Egyptians. If they received anything from the Persians, it was by way of Constantinople.

The Ottoman occupation of Kutayia was a grave blow to the security of the emirates of Tekke and Hamid. The emir of Hamid saw the hopelessness of a struggle. He compounded with his pride by ‘selling’ to Murad, in 1377, the territory between Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. Several cities, including Sparta and Kara-Agatch, became Ottoman, but most important of all, Ak Sheïr, which brought the Osmanlis to the frontier of Karamania.

1 The testimony of Ibn Batutah, who travelled extensively among the Turks in Anatolia, southern Russia, and elsewhere between 1325 and 1340, is conclusive on this point. ‘Whenever we stopped in a house of this country (Anatolia), our neighbours of both sexes took care of us: the women were not veiled . . . ’: ii. 256. ‘I was witness of a remarkable thing, that is, of the consideration which the women enjoy among the Turks: they hold, in fact, a rank more elevated than that of the men . . . As for the women of the lower classes, I have seen them also. One of them will be, for example, in a cart drawn by horses. Near her will be three or four young girls. . . . The windows of the cart will be open and you can see the women’s faces: for the women of the Turks are not veiled. . . . Often the woman is accompanied by her husband, whom whoever sees him takes for one of her servants’: ii. 377–9. No student can have any doubt whatever upon the position of Turkish women during the fourteenth century. As among all vigorous peoples, the women of the Osmanlis held a high place, and were never secluded. It was not until Murad II that even the sovereign had a harem. The Moslem conception of the inferiority of women was not prevalent among the Osmanlis until after the reign of Soleiman the Magnificent. Immediately it became prevalent, the race began its decline.

So universal did veiling become in the seventeenth century that it was adopted by Christian and Jewish women in Turkey as well. See Père Febre, Théâtre de la Turquie (1682), pp. 164–5. Père Febre spoke from personal experience ‘dans la plupart des lieux de la Turquie’.
The purchase of this important territory extended the Ottoman state south to the border of Tekke. In 1378, Murad made his only conquest by arms from a rival emir in Asia. He invaded Tekke, and annexed the districts at the south and south-west of the lake region. But he did not cross the mountains to the Mediterranean, so the emir of Tekke still retained Adalia, and Alaya was undisturbed.

For three years Murad devoted his energies to the pacification and assimilation of these slices of Kermian, Hamid and Tekke. But none of the three principalities had been extinguished. And Sarukhan, Aidin and Menteshe were untouched. There was still much to be accomplished in western Asia Minor. But Murad preferred to return to Adrianople. He would increase his power and prestige in Europe, recruit his armies in the Balkans, and then come once more into Anatolia.

XII

To assure to the Osmanlis their preponderant position in the Balkan peninsula, the possession of three cities was necessary. The capture of Sofia meant the extension of Ottoman sovereignty over Bulgaria to the Danube. Nish was the key to Serbia. Monastir was indispensable, if the Osmanlis intended to be more than raiders west of the Vardar.

In 1380, Murad ordered the advance to the Vardar. Istip was captured, and colonized in the same thorough way as had been done at Drama and Serres. A large army under Timurtash crossed the Vardar, took Monastir by assault through the marshes, and pushed north to Prilep.¹ Monastir and Prilep became frontier fortresses of the empire. The conquest of Macedonia was now complete. These cities were excellent bases of operation against the Albanians to the west and the Epirotes to the south-west.

During the reign of Murad, the Osmanlis did not attempt

¹ Hadji Khalfa, *Rumeli*, p. 96.
a subjugation of Albania and Epirus. They were, however, invited into these countries by native princes.

Thomas, despot of Janina, used Ottoman mercenaries against the Souliotes in 1382. They were, however, invited into these countries by native princes. Thomas, despot of Janina, used Ottoman mercenaries against the Souliotes in 1382. Two years later, after the assassination of Thomas, the Albanians besieged Janina with Ottoman aid. The civil war that arose around the widow of Thomas prepared the way for the Osmanlis to extend their rule to the Gulf of Arta.

In 1385, Khaireddin pasha, who had occupied Okrida, the ancient ecclesiastical seat of the Bulgarians, a day's journey west of Monastir, was invited by Charles Thopia, lord of Durazzo, to aid him in his war against Balsa, the most powerful Frankish prince of Albania. Khaireddin was glad of the opportunity afforded by this overture. He crossed the mountains to Elbasan, and then turned southward to meet Balsa. The first battle of the Osmanlis in Albania was fought in the salt-wastes of Savra, on the left bank of the river Devol. The Osmanlis faced fighting men who were fully their equals in courage, in resourcefulness, in strength, and in willingness to engage in a hand-to-hand struggle to death. The issue was long in doubt, and the victory costly. Balsa and his ally and guest, Ivanitch, son of kral Vukasin, were killed. The Osmanlis gained one important result from this battle. Albanian renegades joined their army in great numbers. From that day to this the Albanian element in the Ottoman army, especially among its officers, has been a source of strength which cannot be over-estimated.

It is doubtful if the Osmanlis withdrew from Albania, even temporarily, after the battle of Savra; for in 1388 the princess of Valona (Avlona) was so hard pressed by the Osmanlis that she put her domains under the protection of Venice.

1 Historia epirotica, Bonn ed., p. 228.  
2 Ibid., pp. 230-1.  
3 Ducange, viii. 292.  
5 Misti, XL. 154.
The plain in which four tributaries join the Isker is the very heart of the Balkan peninsula, almost equidistant from the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Sea. Here the three great ranges of the West Balkan, the Central Balkan, and the Rhodope Mountains converge, and three important rivers find their source. The Struma flows south through Macedonia, the Isker north-east through a canyon of the Balkans into the Danube, and the Nisava north-west into the Morava. In the middle of the southern border of this plain, under the shadow of a lofty mountain, lies Sofia.

The way to Sofia had been opened by the battle of Samakov. But its occupation was not the next logical step to Murad until the valleys of the Vardar and the Struma had been conquered. The occupation of Sofia was a temptation splendidly resisted in 1371. In 1381 it was a necessity. For it opened the path to trans-Balkan Bulgaria and to Serbia, and Murad was now ready to extend his conquest to the Danube by way of the Isker and the Morava.

The Slavic chronicles are silent concerning the fall of Sofia. From the late Ottoman accounts, it would seem that the city was intermittently besieged for several years. Then a young Osmanli, who had entered the city as refugee, and had become the confidant and falconer of its commandant, betrayed him. He urged his master in a chase some distance in front of his followers, and fell upon him in a mountain gorge. The commandant was bound to his horse, and taken a prisoner to Ishtiman. Indje Balaban, son of the general of

1 See below, p. 203.
Osman who had besieged Brusa for ten years, brought his army from Philippopolis, and paraded the commandant, garrotted, under the walls of Sofia. The Bulgarians, discouraged and despairing of aid, surrendered. We can be certain neither of the name of the Bulgarian commandant nor of the date of the surrender. But it was probably in 1385. Bulgaria up to the main Balkan range was now Ottoman territory.

The fall of Nish, in the summer of 1386, marked the next extension of Murad's empire. The Serbians did not yield

1 Silvestre de Sacy, in Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript., vii. 327–34. But the commandant could hardly have been carried by his falconer in such a fashion as far as Philippopolis. The Ottoman historians probably forgot that Ishtiman, at the mouth of the pass, on the road to Philippopolis from Sofia, contained an Ottoman garrison.

2 According to the anonymous Ein gantz neu Reysebuch von Prag auss biss gen Constantinopel, Nürnberg, 1622, p. 33, Sofia was captured in 1362. Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 51, with whom Schéfer, ed. Bertrand de la Broquière, p. 202 n., seems to agree by citing, says Sofia capitulated in 780 (1378). Seadeddin, i. 125, is followed by Hammer, i. 250, Klaić, p. 237, and others in fixing the date as 1382. But these same authorities give 1375 and 1376 for Nish, which is altogether impossible. Phr., i. 26, p. 80, seems to place the capture of Sofia for 1385. This is the most reasonable date. It is consistent both with the topography of the places in question and with Murad's methods of campaigning, as exemplified by all his conquests, to place the taking of Sofia close to the end of his reign, and within a year or two before the capture of Nish. To corroborate this date, letters in the collection of Peridun can be cited. Indje Balaban's letter to Murad, announcing the acquisition of Sofia, is not dated. But immediately after it is the response of Murad, in which he gives to Indje Balaban for life the government of the new province, and states that he is sending him a fine horse and robes of honour because of his success. This letter is dated from Adrianople in the middle of the month of Redjeb, 788, which corresponds to 1386 in our era. These letters are in MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, pp. 31–2.

3 Nish, from its geographical position, could not have fallen in 1375, as Chalcocondyles says. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i. 250, show an amazing nonchalance in transporting the Osmanlis from Kavalla, Drama, and Serres in the course of this one year, 1375. Engel, Geschichte von Serbien, p. 341, who, according to Hammer, 'deceives himself by thirteen years in placing the capture of Nish in 1388', is eleven years nearer the truth than Hammer! Strumitza, from a diploma delivered in the name
without a struggle, as the Bulgarians had done. Nish was taken by assault. Lazar secured peace only by increasing the amount of his tribute and adding one thousand cavaliers to his contingent in the Ottoman army.¹

Nish was sixteen days by carriage from Constantinople. Murad was now master of four-fifths of the great Roman highway from Belgrade to the Bosphorus; for Tchorlu, Demotika, Adrianople, Philippopolis, Ishtiman, Sofia, and Nish were in his hands. Nish was also the point where the road from Belgrade to Salonika turned southward. Practically all but the last day’s journey of the road across the Balkan peninsula from Constantinople to Durazzo on the Adriatic was Ottoman territory. In Asia Minor, Murad held the ancient highway from Constantinople to Trebizond as far as Angora, and the road which the pilgrims and Crusaders, Jerusalem-bent, had travelled as far as Ak Sheîr. From Angora to Nish took twenty-five days; from Constantinople to Durazzo seventeen days.² Twenty-five years before, when Murad came to the chieftainship of the Osmanlis, the Ottoman dominions could have been traversed in any direction in three days.

XIII

The treaty concluded between the Byzantines and Genoese in 1386 affords a striking illustration of Murad’s power after the Nish campaign. This treaty, whose text has been preserved, was signed by John and Andronicus Palaeologos, the podesta of Pera, and the Genoese ambassador. John Palaeo-

¹ Von Kállay, i. 106.
² For distances between cities in the Balkan peninsula, see Jireček’s important and interesting work, Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Konstantinopel und die Balkanpässe, p. 122. Jireček, for time of transit, depends upon Hadji Khalfa.
logos bound himself to live in peace with his son Andronicus, and to move his army against all the enemies of Genoa 'except Morat bey and his Turks'. The Genoese in turn promised to defend Constantinople 'against all enemies of whatever nationality except the said Morat bey and his Turks, who acted according to the will of the said Morat bey'! Throughout the treaty, Murad is carefully excepted on both sides.1

Genoa made a formal treaty with Murad in 1385. Favours were granted to the Osmanlis who did business in Pera, in return for liberty to Genoese merchants to reside and conduct business in the states of Murad. The treaty recalls the friendship of the Genoese for Orkhan, and speaks of Murad as 'the magnificent and powerful lord of lords, Moratibei, grand admiral 2 and lord of the admirals of Turchie'.3 But in the very next year Genoa secretly joined an offensive league with Cyprus, Scio (Chios) and Mytilene 'against that Turk, son of unrighteousness and evil, and also of the Holy Cross Morat bey, and his sect, who are attempting so grievously to attack the Christian race'.4

In the first year of Murad's reign, the Venetian energy had become so sapped by prosperity and luxury that the Senate passed a sumptuary law.5 The recent triumph over

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1 Text in Sauli, ii. 260–8.
2 armiratus or amiratus, then amiralus, of which we have made admiral, originally had nothing whatever to do with the sea. It is a corruption of emir.
3 'Magnificus et potens dominus, dominus Moratibei, magnus armiratus et dominus armiratorum Turchie': the whole text is reproduced from the Genoese archives by Belgrano, in Atti della Società Ligure di Storia, xiii. 146–9, and by Silvestre de Sacy, in Notices et Extraits, xi. 58–61. Cf. Canale, ii. 59.
4 'Contra illum Turcum filium iniquitatis et nequiciae, ac Sancte Crucis inimicum, Moratum bey et eius sectam, cristianum genus sic graviter invadere conantes.' The text of this treaty is also in Belgrano, ibid., xiii. 953–65.
5 Text in Romanin, iii. 386–9. There was an earlier law of similar nature enacted in 1334.
Genoa had given them a belief in their invincibility. Their self-sufficiency, and the growing disinclination to lay aside the pen and ledger for the sword and shield, were alarming symptoms of decay. The lesson of the Genoese at Chioggia was needed to teach the Venetians that the struggle for existence never ceases.

In spite of their vital interest in the development of the Levant, and the power that their wealth gave them in a generation when fighting strength could be purchased so easily, Venice made no effort to oppose the progress of Ottoman conquest. On the contrary, in 1368, long before an invasion of Albania was imminent, the Senate negotiated with the Osmanlis for the redemption of Scutari. This project was again taken up in 1384, in a tentative way, during negotiations to fix the customs-duities of Venetian merchant-vessels. Following the example of Ragusa and Genoa, Venice concluded, in 1388, a commercial treaty with Murad.

The traffic of the Italian republics with the Moslems had been denounced by Gregory X in 1272, by Boniface VIII in 1299, by Urban V in 1366, and by Gregory XI in 1372. In vain the popes exhorted; in vain they threatened interdict and excommunication; in vain they held up to execration the abominable slave traffic. Trade interests alone decided the policies of the maritime cities. Their citizens never hesitated to cut each other's throats for the opportunity of selling goods. To them the crusades were a purely commercial proposition. More than once the archives of Venice reveal the approval of the Senate upon the action of merchants who warned Moslem princes of the crusaders’

1 Cf. Delaville Leroulx, i. 159–60.  
2 Romanin, iii. 331.  
3 Bullarum, III, part 2, pp. 4, 92, 338; Urban V, Epp. secr. iii. 25, iv. 256; Gregory XI, Epp. secr. ii. 32–3, v. 88–9, 311; Philippe de Mézeray, p. 19; Raynaldu, ann. 1372, XXIX. In 1425 Martin V repeated the anathema against those who sold Christian slaves to the Turks: Bullarum, III, part 2, p. 454.
intentions. Guillaume d'Adam declared with reason that
the Saracens maintained their supremacy in the Holy Land
and Egypt through the support of the traders, who furnished
them with Christian slaves to keep up their armies. Genoa
passed laws in 1315 and in 1340 against the slave traffic of
the Black Sea, but these laws were never enforced.

Venice and Genoa turned a deaf ear to papal remonstrances
and to papal appeals for aid in crusades against the Osmanlis.
For the sake of preserving their commerce, they flattered
Murad, and aided him, indirectly at least, to subjugate the
Christians of the Levant. Their children of the third and
fourth generation paid to the descendants of Murad the
penalty of their greed. They lost their commerce in trying
to save it.

XIV

It was not until 1387 that Murad believed himself strong
enough to measure arms with Karamania. His son-in-law,
Alaeddin, whose name is reminiscent of the earlier glory of
Konia, was emir of the most powerful state in Anatolia.
The Ottoman historians have represented Alaeddin’s re-
sistance of the encroachment of the Osmanlis, and his
defiance of Murad, as rebellion, and have been blindly fol-
lowed in this by most of the European historians. Such
a conception of the conflict between the Osmanlis and the
Karamanlis is far from the truth. There is no record of
when and how Karamania had become subject to Murad.
In fact, up to 1387, Murad had not yet extended his
sovereignty over all of Tekke and Hamid, the states which
bordered Karamania on the west.

1 MS., Bibl. de Bâle, A I, 28, fols. 232–54, cited by Delaville Leroulx,
i. 70, n. 2. Adam’s project was a revival of Sanudo’s attempt to ruin
Moslem trading.

2 Monumenta historiae patriae, i. 320; iii. 336, 371.

3 In 1432 Bertrand de la Broquière met at Damascus one of these
Genoese of Kaffa, who sold slaves to the Sultan of Egypt: Voyage, Schéfer
ed., p. 68.
Neither Alaeddin himself nor his predecessors had ever acknowledged the suzerainty of the house of Osman. From the standpoint of the Karamanians, the Ottoman emir was not even *primus inter pares* of the Turkish princes in Anatolia. Osman had probably not been known by name to the founder of the house of Karaman. Orkhan never came into direct contact with the Karamanlis. Murad, at the beginning of his reign, had indirectly gained an advantage over the emir of Karaman in the successful issue of his expedition against the Phrygian chiefs and the capture of Angora. Fifteen years later his accessions of territory in Kermian, Hamid, and Tekke brought him into rivalry with Alaeddin. But it was the prestige and power gained by Murad in European conquests that made him a rival to be reckoned with. The first acknowledgement of his growing strength was the marriage alliance between the houses of these two emirs. Alaeddin, however, did not by this marriage constitute himself a vassal of his father-in-law. The letters of Murad to Alaeddin in the collection of Feridun are couched in terms of equality.

Murad rallied his army at Kutayia for the first great Ottoman campaign in Asia. He could not muster enough Osmanlis to undertake so formidable a feat as the invasion of Karamania, and had to rely upon large contingents of Greeks and Serbians, who were sent to him, in accordance with their conventions, by his vassals, the emperor John and the kral Lazar. The Balkan soldiers, under the command of Bayezid, formed the left wing of the Ottoman army.

Battle was joined in the great plain before Konia, which has so often been the scene of Ottoman triumphs and reverses. The Ottoman historians declare that Alaeddin was defeated, largely through the bravery of Timurtash, and represent the battle of Konia as a decisive victory, which 'put down the rebellion'. According to them, Alaeddin

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sued for peace'. Murad 'forgave' him, because he was moved by the tearful pleadings of his daughter, Alaeddin's wife.¹

But the net result of the costly expedition was the reconciliation of the two emirs. The only result recorded by the Ottoman historians is that Alaeddin kissed Murad's hands! Murad withdrew to Kutayia without annexing any portion of the Karamanian emirate, without booty, and without promise either of tribute or military contingents for the European wars. Had Murad actually accomplished more than merely holding his own in the battle of Konia, the campaign would not have ended so profitlessly. Granting the Ottoman victory, Murad's conduct after the battle is inconsistent with his whole life and character. We are compelled to discard the story of a decisive victory. It must be that Murad, who had been able to reduce to vassalage the Byzantines, the Bulgarians, and the Serbians, found himself unable, even with the help of his European allies, to break the power of this rival Anatolian emir.

XV

During the Karamanian campaign, Murad adopted the policy of treating non-combatants in a friendly fashion. Strict orders were given to refrain from violence and looting. Murad hoped to win the Karamanlis by kindness, and to pave the way for a later assimilation. It was the first campaign undertaken against fellow Moslems. The Serbian contingent, who cared nothing for the success of this policy, and who claimed that they had been promised booty in return for their services, did not obey the order. A number of them were summarily executed.²

¹ Seadeddin, i. 130–2, draws here upon Idris and Neshri, and has been followed by all the Ottoman historians down to the present day.
² Col. Djevad, pp. 62–3. He speaks of Alaeddin bey 'ayant levé l'étendard de la révolte', and calls the punishment of the Serbians in this campaign the chief cause of Kossova.
When the survivors returned to their homes in the spring of 1388, they complained bitterly of the way they had been treated, and declared that service in the Ottoman army, for the Christian all risk and no gain, was nothing less than a slavery leading to death. This discontent gave Lazar the opportunity for which he had long been looking. He decided to profit by the resentment of the Serbians against Murad,¹ and make a supreme effort to free Serbia from the menace of the Ottoman yoke, which had grown very real since the capture of Nish.

The Slavs of upper Serbia and of Bosnia realized the imminence of an Ottoman invasion, and they were now ready—or at least they appeared to be ready—to rally around Lazar. Up to this time the Serbians had never recognized Lazar as the leader of the race.

The pan-Serbian alliance was made possible by the adhesion of Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia. He had come into prominence after the battle of Cernomen as a supporter of Lazar against the sons of Vukasin and other Serbian chieftains who were dissatisfied with the election of Lazar. But in return for his aid, he got under his control a large part of upper Serbia, including Milesevo, which was the burial-place of St. Sava, apostle to the Serbians. In 1376, he crowned himself ‘king of Bosnia and Serbia’ on the tomb of St. Sava, placing upon his head the two crowns, and changing his name to Stephen. Neither Louis of Hungary nor Lazar was consulted by Tvrtko, and he took no measures to secure their assent to his pretensions. After his coronation, he conquered Cattaro, and fought successfully with Balza of Albania.²

In 1383 Tvrtko had become so powerful on the Dalmatian coast that the Senate recognized him as ‘king of Serbia,

¹ Chalc., I, p. 53; Phr., I. 26, p. 81.
² Up to 1383, in outlining the career of Tvrtko, I have followed Klaić, pp. 201–3.
Bosnia and the Riviera', and bestowed upon him the privilege of Venetian citizenship.\(^1\) It was evidently the intention of Venice to favour Tvrtko as an opponent to Louis of Hungary, who had himself taken in 1382 the title of 'king of Serbia, Dalmatia and Bulgaria'.\(^2\) Venice lost her grip upon or interest in the east coast of the Adriatic for a few years immediately following the treaty of Turin. We have already seen how in 1384 the Senate professed a willingness to treat with the Osmanlis on the basis of giving up Scutari. In 1385 they became indifferent to currying further the favour of Tvrtko, and sent an embassy to press him for the payment of money due to Venice.\(^3\) Tvrtko continued to consolidate his position on the Dalmatian coast, until the capture of Nish influenced him to aid Lazar against the Osmanlis.

It was not a moment too soon. An Ottoman army had already crossed the Vardar and was marching forward for the invasion of Bosnia. Thirty thousand Serbians and Bosnians under the command of Tvrtko and Lazar met the invading army at Plochnik, in the valley of the Toplika. Of twenty thousand Osmanlis scarcely one-fifth escaped death or captivity.\(^4\) The Bosnians successfully opposed two other Ottoman armies at Rudnik and Biletchia.\(^5\)

A delirium of joy spread through the Slavic population of the Balkans at the news of the battle of Plochnik. The uninterrupted chain of thirty years of Ottoman victories had been broken. The slavery and horror of military service with the Osmanlis, price of their vassalage, so vividly depicted by the survivors of the Karamanian campaign, had made the Slavs desperate. This victory, following closely upon the moral revolt against the Osmanlis, gave them hope.

\(^{1}\) Schaffarik, *Acta archivii Venetii, &c.*, CXLI.
\(^{2}\) In a letter of April 1, published in Ljubić, iv. 185-6.
\(^{3}\) Misti, xxxix. 113.
\(^{4}\) Klaić, p. 237; Jireček, p. 341. But von Kállay, i. 166, attributes this victory to George Kastriota of Albania.
\(^{5}\) Orbini, p. 361.
The South Slavs are like children in the extremes of their emotions. Tears to laughter—laughter to tears: easily despairing, as easily hopeful, and from as little cause. The slightest reverse brings distrust in their ability to cope with forces that have once successfully opposed them. Slight success brings overwhelming confidence, and leads to colossal mistakes of judgement. With this trait of character is coupled an intuitive distrust of one’s neighbour, of the disinterestedness of his motives, and an intuitive resentment of ‘the other fellow’ doing something better than you do it. This makes impossible solidarity and esprit de corps. The South Slavic character explains the series of events which brought the Serbians to their final and irretrievable disaster.

Around Lazar the Serbian nobles rallied as they had never rallied before. Kral Tvrtko of Bosnia, George Kastriota of Albania, and the minor princes of Albania and Serbia joined in an alliance against the Osmanlis. The two remaining successors of Alexander of Bulgaria, Sisman and Ivanko, son of Dobrotich, threw off their allegiance to Murad, and promised contingents for the common struggle. The prince of Wallachia assured Lazar of the co-operation of the Rumanians.

Venice, fearing lest Murad fall upon the Peloponnesus to seek vengeance for the defeat of Plochnik, tried to form a league of all the Greek and Frankish lords in the Morea and central Greece.¹ As far as one can judge from the records, the effort of Venice was an intention rather than an action. It did not get beyond the paper stage. The Senate gave to the Slavic alliance no encouragement more substantial than words. On the other hand, some of the border nobles of the Hungarian banats, of their own volition, informed Lazar of their intention to co-operate in an offensive movement against the Osmanlis.

¹ Hopf, in Ersch-Gruber, Allgemeine Enycyl., lxxxvi. 49.
Murad did not set his army in motion against the Serbians immediately after the disaster at Plochnik. There was none of that feverish haste which had characterized his movements when he received the news of the Serbian and Hungarian crusade in 1363. For while the victory had aroused in the Balkan Christians a determination that they must drive the Osmanlis out of Europe, and a feeling that they could accomplish this end, its immediate result had been merely to repel the projected Ottoman invasion of Bosnia. Ali pasha disposed of sufficient forces to hold the conquests that had already been made. Murad had come to know the people with whom he was dealing. It was not so much to recruit his own army as to give the allies time to fall out with each other that Murad remained in Asia during the early months of 1388. To strike in the first flush of enthusiasm and buoyant hope would have brought him face to face with a united enemy. If he waited, he knew from past experience with the Balkan princes that the poison of jealousy would permeate the ranks of his ostensibly united enemies. The Osmanlis never made a mistake of judgement in dealing with Balkan alliances until the autumn of 1912.

Far from planning an offensive movement against the Serbians, Murad allowed Evrenos of Yanitza to lead a band of Ottoman mercenaries into the Morea, at the invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support the authority of the Byzantine Empire against the Frankish barons. ¹ At the same time he ordered Ali pasha to cross the Balkans into northern Bulgaria.

Ali pasha started from Adrianople in the spring of 1388 with thirty thousand men to complete the conquest of

¹ *Chronique de Morée*, p. 516. Evrenos is called Branezis. This is not the Evrenos heretofore mentioned, but another Christian renegade, of Macedonia. Cf. Finlay, iv. 233 n.
Bulgaria. He crossed the Balkans by the pass north of Aïtos, which has ever since been called by the Osmanlis Nadir Derbend from the neighbouring town of Nadirkeuy. Provdia was taken by surprise in the night. Shuman and the villages around it were next conquered. After an unsuccessful attack upon Varna, the Osmanlis retraced their steps through Provadia and Shuman, following the line of the modern railway from Varna to Sofia. Tarnovo, the ancient capital of Bulgaria, capitulated after a short struggle.

Sisman withdrew to the Danube through the valley of the Osma, and shut himself up in the fortress of Nicopolis. Owing to the ease of provisioning from the river side, it was impossible to starve him out. Ali pasha was compelled to call upon Murad, who had just crossed over from Asia to Thrace. When Murad arrived before Nicopolis, Sisman sued for peace. The conditions of Murad, that he pay the tribute due from the previous year and allow an Ottoman garrison to occupy the fortress of Drpter as gage of future good conduct, were gladly accepted.

No sooner had Murad started southward than Sisman decided upon a final desperate resistance. He refused to give up Drpter. But he had forgotten that Ali pasha was master of Shuman and the route to Varna. The Osmanlis took Drpter by storm. Many villages along the Danube between Rustuk and Nicopolis fell into the hands of the Osmanlis. Ali pasha besieged Sisman for a second time in Nicopolis. The revelation of his own weakness and of the strength of the Osmanlis was a crushing blow to Sisman. He surrendered without conditions, and was taken, with his wife and children, to Murad’s camp. For reasons which the chroniclers do not indicate, Sisman was able to secure forgiveness and restoration to his former position as vassal prince of Bulgaria. But the Osmanlis were now installed in north-central Bulgaria up to the Danube River. Shuman

1 Jireček, *Die Heerstrasse*, &c., p. 147.
and Nicopolis were Ottoman fortresses. Sisman had been rendered impotent to give effective aid in the great alliance.¹

XVII

Not all the Christians were loyal to the cause of Balkan freedom. In their conquest of the Balkan peninsula, it is remarkable that the Osmanlis never fought a battle without the help of allies of the faith and blood of those whom they were putting under the Moslem yoke. At the beginning of this chapter, it has been shown that there is no historical basis for the assertion that the Osmanlis conquered the Balkan states by the use of the janissaries. But they did have Christian aid of a far more powerful kind than the janissaries could have given them. The old fiction of the janissaries won for the Balkan people the sympathies of western Europe. The truth concerning the Christian aid which the Moslem conquerors received alienates rather than wins our sympathies.

When, in the spring of 1389, Murad found himself ready to exact vengeance for Plochnik, and started from Bulgaria on his punitive expedition, he was joined by Constantine of Kustendil, by the Serbian Dragash, to whom he had given Serres as fief, and even by the sons of Vukasín, the Serbian kral who had been killed in 1371 at Cernomen.² Balsa, prince of Zenta (upper Albania), postponed his march to join the allies, and entered secretly into correspondence with Murad through a Serbian nobleman in the Ottoman camp. Lazar knew of this treachery. He knew also that some of his own lieutenants had in all probability arranged to sell him out to the Ottoman emir.³

¹ Leunclavius (1611 Frankfort ed.), pp. 268–76. Jireček, Geschichte der Bulgaren, pp. 341–2, points out that Seadeddin and Leunclavius, whom Zinkeisen, i. 252–5, follows, are in error in representing the Bulgarians as wholly subdued in 1388.
² Mijatovitch, from Serbian sources, p. 13.
³ Ibid., pp. 16–17.
Kossovapol, the plain of the blackbirds, is the name given to the valley of the Sitniksa River (an upper tributary of the Morava) west of Pristina and south of Mitrovitza. Here the decisive battle for Serbian independence was fought on June 20, 1389.

Serbian chronicles state that Murad had enjoined upon his soldiers that they should neither destroy nor sack the rich castles, villages, and cities of this region after the battle. Only four castles in all were destroyed. This command shows that Murad was confident of the outcome. He was fighting for the possession of this country, for the wealth and the prestige that it would give him. He had no intention of destroying what he knew would be his to enjoy, nor did he desire to alienate the Serbian peasantry by unnecessary harshness. Here, as elsewhere, new Osmanlis rather than Ottoman subjects were the desiderata: they could be won only by kindness. Since the clemency of the Osmanlis in dealing with the vanquished after the battle is frankly recorded by the Serbians themselves, we cannot doubt that the wise and far-seeing provisions of the conqueror were carried out.

Of Kossova much has been written. It was the culminating event in that legendary period of Serbian history which had begun fifty years before with the exploits of Stephen Dushan. Lazar, Serbian chieftain with no long line of

1 The railway between Mitrovitza and Skoplje (before the Balkan War Uskub) passes through the plain of Kossova. When this railway is connected through the former Sandjak of Novi Bazar with the Austrian (?) railways in Bosnia, Kossovapol will be on one of the great transcontinental routes.

2 The date June 15 is fixed by the Serbian chronicles and songs and by unbroken tradition. Also by Tvrtko’s letter to Florence. But Tvrtko, in another letter to the inhabitants of Trau in Dalmatia, gives June 20 (Pray, Annales, ii. 90). Seadeddin stands alone in placing the death of Murad on the 4th Ramazan (August 27). The other Ottoman historians, as well as Chalcoondylas, Ducas, and the anonymous Hist. Epirot., speak of these events occurring ‘in the springtime’.

3 Chron. of Abbey of Tronoška, section 54, p. 84, and Chron. of Pek, p. 53: cited by Mijatovitch, p. 12 n.
royal ancestors behind him, with no great weight of authority among his contemporaries, who began his career by craven submission to Murad and, after eighteen years in which no deed to his credit is recorded, survived a crushing defeat to be executed on the field of battle—this is the Charlemagne of Serbian poetry. On the anniversary of Kossova, the Serbs pray for his soul. As a saint, he gets many more candles at his shrine than his namesake of Bethany who was raised from the dead. Such is legend in history. But what amazes one is the curious fact that the very folksongs that glorify Saint Lazar and lament Kossova reveal a frank and true picture of the events, and prove how little warrant there is for the legend!

The Serbians despaired of their cause before the battle. The enormous number of the enemy dismayed them. Rumours of treachery were current in the allied camp. Their lack of courage, and the spirit of distrust of each other’s good faith, is strikingly voiced in the oration of Lazar at a banquet the evening before the battle. He pleaded for a courage and confidence which he himself did not feel. He openly accused his son-in-law, Milosh Obravitch, of treason. Gloom and hopelessness had settled over the Serbian camp, reflected from leaders to the common soldiery. The battle was already lost. For victory is never won by those who feel that they are going to lose.

The battle was begun by the Osmanlis. Murad sent forward an advance guard of two thousand archers. The allies responded with a charge in which the left wing of the

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1 'Sans arrêter, pendant quinze jours pleins,
J'ai cheminé le long des hordes turques,
Sans en trouver ni la fin ni le nombre.'—A. d’Avril, p. 36.
2 Orbini, pp. 314–15. See also the Serbian songs about Kossova, which are accessible in the form of a continuous narrative in French by Adolphe d’Avril, and in English by Mme Mijatovitch, based on the composite poems of Stoyan Novakovich and A. Pavich.
3 Solakzdé, cited by Col. Djevad bey, p. 196. The bow was used as an offensive arm by the Osmanlis until the middle of Murad II’s reign.
Ottoman army was broken through by Lazar. For a while the issue seemed in doubt. Bayezid held out against the impetuosity of the Serbians, but the Osmanlis made no attempt to take the offensive. At this critical juncture, when the battle was by no means decided, Vuk Brankovitch, another son-in-law of Lazar, quietly withdrew from the field with twelve thousand men. This desertion, which had probably been arranged for with Murad, so weakened the Serbians that they broke and fled. Lazar and many of his leading noblemen, and thousands of his soldiers, were taken prisoners. It was not a fight to the bitter end.  

Murad won the battle of Kossova at the cost of his own life. From the story which Clavijo de Gonzáles heard fifteen years later, one might infer that Murad was killed in the course of the battle, and that the fighting was renewed around his body. It was then that Bayezid cut down Lazar with his own sword. Pray declared that the two sovereigns were mortally wounded in a personal combat. The Ottoman historians believed that Murad met his death when walking across the field after the battle. A wounded Serbian soldier, who was believed to be dead, rose with a supreme effort to his knees and thrust his sword into Murad as he passed.

According to the Serbian songs, whose testimony the Byzantine historians corroborate, and whose story has been followed by some Osmanlis as well, Murad was assassinated after the battle, or perhaps while the battle was in progress, by Milosh Obravitch. Stung by the unjust accusation of treason in the speech of Lazar on the eve of the battle,

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1 Seadeddin, i. 147-52; Chalc., I, p. 53; Ducas, 3, pp. 15-16; Hist. Epir., p. 234; the Serbian chants; Boninecontrius, col. 52; and the modern writers, Hertzberg, pp. 503-7; Jireček, pp. 342-4; Fessler, ii. 254; von Kállay, i. 166; Klaic, pp. 236-40. Most illuminating of all is Rački, in Croatian, in Jugoslov. Akademie, iii. 92 f.

2 Clavijo de Gonzáles, fol. 27 r°.

3 Annales, ii. 186.

4 This speech, from the chronicle of Monk Pahomye, is given in Mijatovitch, p. 17.
Milosh determined to prove his loyalty beyond any question. He got through the Ottoman ranks as a deserter, of whom there must have been many on that fatal day. His claim of high rank, which was attested by his princely bearing, secured for him an audience with Murad. When he was face to face with the emir, he plunged his dagger into the destroyer of his country's liberties. It is a commentary on the Serbian character that this questionable act has been held up to posterity as the most saintly and heroic deed of national history.

In the seventeenth century it was believed, and this belief has been reproduced as a fact by some modern writers on the Ottoman Empire, that the custom of holding a foreign ambassador's arms when he entered the presence of the sultan, originated from a regulation to prevent the recurrence of such a crime. Like many other Ottoman customs, however, this consistorial ceremony is found among the usages of the Byzantine court, and has persisted in some oriental courts to the present day. It has been explained on the ground that 'a stranger before the sovereign is so overwhelmed by the effulgence of his rays that he cannot stand without support'.

The statements of the numbers engaged in the battle of Kossova are so conflicting that it is impossible to determine how many men took part in the action, or which side was the stronger. The Serbian folksongs dwell upon the tremendous number of the enemy, while the Ottoman historians report that the Osmanlis mustered so few in comparison with the reported strength of the Serbians that there was serious question before the battle of the advisability of taking so great a risk as to engage a foe whose numerical advantage

1 Busbecq, English ed., i. 153; cf. Ricaut, ed. of 1682, p. 159.
2 Const. Porphyr., i. 394, 396, 405.
3 Howorth, ii. 796, commenting on Stoddard's audience with the Emir of Bukhara.
was so marked. Including the prisoners, who were massacred when Murad’s death was learned by the soldiers, the Serbians calculated their loss at seventy-seven thousand killed, while only twelve thousand of the Osmanlis fell. One important fact we do know. The loss of life during the battle and subsequent massacre on the part of the Serbian nobility was so great that the nation, for the third time within thirty years, found itself without leaders.

Tvrtko hurried away from Kossova so fast that he did not realize how overwhelming had been the defeat. In fact, when he learned of the death of Murad, he wrote to Florence announcing the glorious victory won under his leadership, and the death of the arch enemy of Christendom. The Florentines, therefore, celebrated the news of Kossova with a Te Deum in the cathedral. Either this perverted account also reached France, or too great significance was placed upon the death of Murad, for Charles VI went to Notre Dame to render thanks to God in all solemnity for what had happened at Kossova! The Serbians themselves were not deceived. To them, Kossova was the death-knell to independence. The Hungarians, also, awoke immediately to a sense of the danger that threatened them.

XVIII

For thirty years Murad had guided the destinies of the Osmanlis with a political sagacity surpassed by no statesman of his age. It is only because we know so much more of Mohammed the Conqueror and of Soleiman the Magnificent that Murad has never received his proper place as the most remarkable and most successful statesman and warrior of the house of Osman. When we measure the difficulties which confronted him, the problems which he solved,

1 Text in Mon. spect. hist. Slav. Merid., i. 528-9.
2 Chronique du Religieux de St.-Denis (ed. Bellaguet), ii. 391.
and the results of his reign, against the deeds of his more dazzling successors, we see how easily he stands with them, if not above them. The transformation effected in his lifetime is one of the most wonderful records in all history. His conquests were to endure for five centuries, until the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878: some of them have survived the cataclysm of the recent Balkan wars.

His energy and zeal for fighting, so like his father's, and yet put to the test of being extended over a field of action far wider than his father ever dreamed of, did not flag. He never had a disagreement with any of his generals or administrators. His system of conquest and of government, unsupported by tradition or the background of a gradual growth, fitted every condition for which it had been framed. His treatment of the Greeks showed superb skill in estimating their character. Although an infidel and enemy of Christ in the eyes of the Byzantine ecclesiastics, he handled them so much better than the popes that he won their sympathies. No more striking proof of his complete success in a problem of assimilation, at once racial as well as religious, can be found than the letter of the Orthodox patriarch written to Pope Urban VI in 1385, in which it is stated that Murad left to the Church entire liberty of action. In the records of the Greek patriarchate from 1360 to 1389, one does not find a single instance of complaint received of ill treatment of the priesthood by the Osmanlis.

Osman gathered around him a race, Orkhan created a state, but it was Murad who founded the empire.

2 As far as such records are accessible in the great collection of Miklositch and Müller. The statement of Ducas, 23, p. 137, about the persecutions of Christians by Murad, is without any foundation.
CHAPTER IV

BAYEZID

THE OSPMANLIS INHERIT THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

I

The death of Murad was immediately avenged upon the battle-field by the execution of the prisoners of noble birth. Practically all the Serbian aristocracy that had remained loyal to Lazar and the national cause perished.

In the midst of this bloody work, Bayezid sent servants to seek out his brother Yakub, who had distinguished himself during the battle, and was being acclaimed by his soldiers. Yakub was taken to Bayezid’s tent, and strangled with a bowstring.¹ The new emir justified this crime by a verse conveniently found for him by his theologians in the Koran: ‘So often as they return to sedition, they shall be subverted therein; and if they depart not from you, and offer you peace and restrain their hands from warring against you, take them and kill them wheresoever ye find them.’² They declared that the temptation to treason and revolt was always present in the brothers of the ruler, and that murder was better than sedition. These doctors of the law might better have pointed out to Bayezid the admonition of the Prophet: ‘But his soul suffered him to slay his brother, and he slew him: wherefore he became of the number of those who perish.’³ For the abominable practice of removing

¹ Phr., I. 26, p. 82; Chalc., I, p. 59; Duc., 3, p. 16; also the Ottoman historians.
² Sura IV, verse 94 (Sale trans., p. 64).
³ Sura V, verse 53 (ibid., p. 77).
possible rival claimants by assassination, thus begun on the field of Kossova, was elevated to the dignity of a law by Mohammed II, and has been until our own times a blot upon the house of Osman.

Bayezid, however, was only following the example of Christian princes of his own century. Pedro of Castille killed his brother Don Fadrique; Andronicus III Comnenos of Trebizond, killed his two brothers, Michael and George; and Andronicus III Palaeologos assassinated his brother when his father was dying.

An order was issued from the battle-field of Kossova to the Kadi of Brusa, enjoining him to keep secret the death of Murad, and to appear to be occupied only with public rejoicing for the victory ' won from the Hungarians '. With this order, Bayezid forwarded the bodies of his father and brother for secret burial at Brusa.

Agents of the Italian cities came to seek Bayezid after the battle to congratulate him, and to ask for the confirmation of the commercial privileges granted by Murad. Bayezid showed himself proud and distant. He declared that after he had conquered Hungary he would ride so far that he would come to Rome and there give his horse oats to eat upon the altar of St. Peter's. A change of attitude towards Europe is strikingly revealed in this boast. Murad, in spite of crusades projected against him, had been careful not to draw upon himself the attention, much less the ill-will, of the western Christian princes. He was aggressive, but never any more so than he needed to be for the moment at hand:

1 Hammer, iii. 302-4. Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, iii. 831, is mistaken in attributing this law to Bayezid.
2 Ruled 1350 to 1369.
3 In 1330. Panaretos, p. 7.
4 In 1320 at Salonika: Greg., VII. 13, p. 271.
and he was never aggressively Mohammedan. Bayezid, from the very beginning of his reign, took no pains to conceal his enmity to Christendom, and his desire to pose as the champion of Islam. He sought alliances with the Sultan of Egypt and other Moslem rulers, and placed the utmost importance upon the extension of Ottoman sovereignty in Asia Minor.

II

After the bloodthirst of Kossova had been satisfied and his father's death avenged, Bayezid was eager to enter into friendly relations with Stephen Bulcovitz, son and heir of Lazar. He felt that the Serbians had learned their lesson, and that they would be more helpful to him as allies than as crushed and sullen foes. He needed their aid in the Anatolian campaign which he was contemplating, and they were essential to the safety of his European possessions as a buffer against the Hungarians, who he knew would take the opportunity of his absence in Asia to move down the Danube. So he treated Stephen and the surviving Serbians with great kindness. Stephen received all the privileges that had belonged to his father. The Serbians were assured of an equitable share of the booty in the campaigns in which they would engage. On the other hand, Stephen agreed to allow Bayezid an annual tribute, secured by the revenues of the silver mines, to command a contingent in person in the Ottoman army, and to give his sister to the Ottoman emir. Kossova was forgiven on both sides.

Bayezid took Despina, daughter of Lazar, as wife by a formal marriage act, which was read in the mosque of Aladja


2 Vuk Brankovitch, as the reward of his treason, received half of Lazar's inheritance, however, with Pristina as capital. His family continued as Ottoman vassals, with varying fortunes, for a hundred years.

3 Ducas, 4, p. 6.
Hissar, near Krutchevatz, at the foot of Mount Lastrebatz, twenty miles north-west of Nish.\(^1\) This was the last marriage ever contracted by a sovereign of the house of Osman.\(^2\) It sealed an alliance that proved very advantageous to Bayezid. Throughout his life he was devoted to Despina, and his brother-in-law Stephen in turn was a devoted and steadfast friend. The Serbians were faithful allies to the Osmanlis, and fought with them at Nicopolis and Angora. On his side, Bayezid kept the allegiance of the Serbians by giving them opportunities for winning booty in the raids against the Albanians, Dalmatians, and Hungarians, and by favouring the Orthodox Church. When we see how complacently and cheerfully the Serbians—except the poets—took upon themselves the Ottoman yoke, we must believe that Kossova was regarded as a terrible calamity only by the generations of after centuries, who found the Ottoman rule harder than it had been for their ancestors.

Bayezid placed a strong Ottoman colony in Uskub, and settled Moslems in the country between Uskub and Nish.\(^3\) There were probably many also who saw that conversion was to their advantage. However that may be, Bayezid never had any trouble from the Serbians during his reign.

Stephen Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, did not consider Kossova a defeat. Seeing that his great enemy Murad and his great rival Lazar had found death on the battle-field, and that the

\(^1\) Kantitz, *Serbien*, pp. 254 f.

\(^2\) Busbequius was informed at Constantinople that marriage had been abolished in the Ottoman royal family because Bayezid took to heart the disgrace of Despina by Timur. But Ricaut, p. 296, thinks that it was because of dowry expense and the desire of the Ottoman sovereigns to keep free from family alliances. Naturally, the difference of religion in time prevented the Osmanlis from finding brides for their sovereigns among the European royal families. If they married among their subjects, there was always fear of intrigues in the wife’s family. At a time when family alliances meant so much in Europe, the Ottoman Empire suffered greatly from this disability.

\(^3\) Seaddedin, i. 158.
Osmanlis did not follow up their victory, this view-point was natural. After Kossova, Tvrtko increased in power and prestige. He called himself king of Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Like Stephen Dushan, he was planning 'for great things' when he died in March, 1391, after a reign of thirty-eight years.¹

Shortly before his death, Tvrtko had successfully resisted an Ottoman invasion with the help of a Hungarian army sent to him by Sigismund. His successor, Stephen Dabitcha, however, departed from this wise policy. He quarrelled with the Hungarians, and played into Bayezid's hand by opposing Sigismund in his final effort to stem the tide of Ottoman invasion. The Bosnians paid to the full the penalty of their king's folly. In 1398, Bosnia was invaded by a great army of Osmanlis and Serbians, who 'destroyed almost all the country and led away the people into slavery'.² In spite of the sweeping assertion of the chronicler, this must have been only a raid. For, from 1398 to 1415, the Bosnians, still independent, were fighting with Ragusa and Hungary. In 1415, they voluntarily allied themselves with the Osmanlis, and repeated the same old story of the other Balkan races. Mohammed I was called in to help them against the Hungarians.³ The Osmanlis came, and they remained.

III

In the second year of his reign, after he had arranged a suitable status quo with the Serbians of upper Macedonia, Bayezid began that policy of aggrandizement in Asia Minor which led finally to his downfall. His first encroachment

¹ Klaic, p. 248. I think Romanin, iii. 331, has confused Stephen Bulcovitch with Stephen Tvrtko. For it is difficult to understand what he means by the 'pace vergognosa' with Venice.
² Old Servian chronicle, quoted by Klaic, p. 271: 'quasi totaliter destruxerunt Bosniam et populum abduxerunt.'
³ Klaic, pp. 324–5.
was against Isa bey of Aïdin. Isa was too weak to oppose Bayezid single-handed. Instead of seeking to ally the independent emirs against the Osmanlis, Isa thought he could save himself with less risk by becoming a vassal of Bayezid. He was compelled to give up Ayasoluk, and make Tyra his capital. Bayezid almost immediately broke faith with Isa, and exiled him to Brusa or Nicaea, where he died. His two sons, Isa and Omar, managed to escape to the court of Timur, who was rapidly becoming the most powerful Moslem ruler in Asia.

The occupation of Ephesus aroused momentarily Bayezid's ambition to take possession of Smyrna. In 1391, he did in fact make some efforts to overpower the garrison, which was greatly weakened by pestilence. Later he occupied the passes around Smyrna to prevent the entrance of provisions. But Smyrna, like Constantinople, could not be starved out so long as the Osmanlis were not masters of the sea. Bayezid never pressed this mild form of siege to a definite assault. His hands were too full elsewhere. An unsuccessful assault against Smyrna would have destroyed his prestige in the new territory of Aïdin, which was not any too securely his by the suppression of its ruling family. Perhaps, also, he realized that Smyrna, more than any other place in the Levant except Rhodes, had become the city of promise to the Roman Church. He did not want to stir up an active resistance on the part of the chevaliers of Rhodes, for they might easily be induced to lend aid to the emirs whom he was destroying.

Sarukhan and Menteshe, during the reign of Murad, had lost the most virile element of their population in corsair

1 Accounts differ as to the place. There is some doubt as to whether the independence of Aïdin was totally destroyed before the restoration of Isa's sons by Timur. Cf. Schlumberger, p. 484; Mas-Latrie, Trésor de Chronologie, col. 1800. Hammer, i. 300, cites no authorities for his statements about this usurpation.

2 Bosio, ii. 143.

3 Ibid., ii. 148.
expeditions. The Turks of whom one reads as the roving and raiding adventurers in the Aegaean and Mediterranean during the fourteenth century were largely from these emirates. Decades of outgo without a corresponding income in fighting men so depleted the maritime emirates that they were not in a position to withstand Bayezid as they had done his father and grandfather. Their population was seafaring, and their princes were traders rather than warriors. When the armies of Bayezid invaded Sarukhan and Menteshe, the two emirs attempted no resistance. They took refuge with Bayezid, emir of Kastemuni, and abandoned their emirates to the Osmanlis.¹

The result of the acquisition of Sarukhan, Aidin, and Menteshe was the immediate appearance of the Osmanlis upon the Aegaean Sea. This is the beginning of the Ottoman naval power, which did not, however, have any development during the reign of Bayezid. The first Ottoman naval expedition started out in the late autumn of 1390. Sixty vessels made a descent upon Chios, and devastated the island. Negropont (Euboea) and the coast of Attica suffered the ravages of the raiders.² Bayezid now forbade the exportation of grain from Asia to Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, and Rhodes. But he was hardly yet in a position to enforce this embargo.

The Christians of the Aegaean islands and of the eastern Mediterranean soon learned that a new design, which had before been lacking, animated the Turkish expeditions. It was the desire not so much for booty as for the permanent possession of land. Everywhere they went, the Osmanlis went as settlers. They fought for homes and wives.

In the south, Bayezid took Adalia, the last city of the

¹ There is the same dearth of information about the details of the destruction of the power of the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe as there is about Aidin. Hammer says simply, 'Les principautés de S. et M. furent incorporées à l'empire ottoman,' i. 300. He gives no authorities.
² Ducas, 13, p. 47.
emir of Tekke. It was in 1391 that the Osmanlis won this seaport, their first on the Mediterranean. If we except the southern ports of the Peloponnesus, a whole century passed before they added another on the Mediterranean.

Following up the pretext furnished him by a complaint against Alaeddin from his vassal, the emir of Hamid, Bayezid determined to measure his forces against the Karamanlis. As had been the case in the previous similar expeditions under his father, four years before, Bayezid called out the levies of his European Christian vassals. Among those who responded to the call was Manuel Palaeologos, who passed the winter of 1390–91 in the Ottoman camp at Angora. There he wrote his famous dialogues on the Christian religion, purporting to be discussions with a Moslem professor of theology.1

Bayezid invaded Karamania, and laid siege to Konia. Alaeddin, who had fled to the Taurus Mountains to escape being shut up in the city, saw soon that Konia could hold out against Bayezid for an indefinite period. The Ottoman emir was far from his base of supplies, and nervous about what was happening in Europe. So, when Alaeddin asked for terms of peace, Bayezid agreed to withdraw from Konia, if Alaeddin would formally cede to him the north-western corner of his dominions, including the cities of Aksheir and Akserai, which were already in the hands of the Osmanlis.2 Bayezid left Timurtash as governor of the new acquisitions, and returned to Adrianople.


2 Seadeddin, i. 163. In Hammer, i. 301, in the sentence 'quoique, depuis la paix renouvelée avec lui par Orkhan, les deux nations eussent continuellement vécu dans des relations de sincère amitié', is not Murad meant instead of Orkhan?
While Bayezid was occupied in Bulgaria, in 1392, in his first defensive campaign against Sigismund, Alaeddin decided upon a supreme effort to wrest from Bayezid the hegemony of Asia Minor. He reoccupied the ceded cities, and attacked by surprise the Ottoman army in Kermian. Timurtash was taken prisoner. One column of the Karamanlis set out for Angora, and the other for Brusa.

Bayezid earned for himself the nickname yildirim (thunderbolt) by the rapidity with which he transported his army into Anatolia. Fresh from a victory over the Hungarians, supported by the trained and hardened soldiery of his Christian vassals, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Wallachians, his sudden appearance at Brusa caused Alaeddin to try once more to treat with the rival who was rapidly becoming more powerful than himself. He released Timurtash, and suggested a return to the status quo of the previous year.

Bayezid was not only convinced that a decisive struggle was now advisable: he was also quick to see that for the first time the advantage was all on the side of the Osmanlis. Instead of meeting the enemy in the heart of his own country, after a long journey across wind-swept plateaux where food was scarce, it was the enemy this time who had made the journey and was far from home. Defeated, there would be no retreat possible for Alaeddin.

With characteristic celerity, Bayezid sent forward an army under Timurtash. Battle was joined in the plain of Ak Tchaï (the white river). One cannot determine the exact location, but it was probably in Kermian not far from Kutayia, for that is where the two retreating columns of the Karamanlis would naturally have formed a junction. Alaeddin and his sons Ali and Mahommed were taken prisoners. When Alaeddin was brought before him, Timurtash could not

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1 Evliya effendi, ii. 21, tells how Bayezid passed seven times in one year from Anatolia to Wallachia.
restrain his anger until Bayezid arrived. He remembered only that the one defeat of his long and brilliant career had been administered by Alaeddin. Its disgrace, and his feeling towards the emir of Karamania, was in no way palliated by the fact that Alaeddin had voluntarily released him. Timurtash ordered the prisoner to be hanged. When Bayezid arrived, his brother-in-law was dead. He was overjoyed that his rival had been removed so conveniently, and without any responsibility falling upon himself.

Karamania lay open before the invaders. The Osmanlis occupied Ak Seraî, Konia, and Laranda. There was no organized resistance. But it is a curious disregard of facts to record, as most historians have done,¹ that the result of this campaign was the permanent incorporation of Karamania in the Ottoman Empire.² The battle of Ak Tchaî had been decisive only to the extent that thereafter the Osmanlis, and not the Karamanlis, were to be the dominant race in Asia Minor. Konia and other eastern Karamanian cities were occupied by the Osmanlis after the battle because their ruler had been killed and his sons taken into captivity. Had Alaeddin escaped from the field, he might have organized a successful resistance to the Ottoman invaders. Bayezid conquered Karamania by the battle of Ak Tchaî no more than Napoleon conquered Prussia by Jena or von Moltke France by Sedan. To enter and occupy for

¹ In matters relating to the progress of Ottoman conquest in Asia Minor, French, German, and British writers have been content to repeat, without critical comment, what they have culled from Leunclavius or the translations of Seadeddin. In many cases, they have gone back no farther than Hammer, and have transcribed, often literally, Hammer’s words. Hammer himself, in this early period of Ottoman history, in spite of his attainments as an orientalist, has relied mainly on Leunclavius, and on Bratutti’s Italian translation of Seadeddin.

² ‘La principauté fut pour toujours réunie à l’empire,’ Hammer, i. 308. In speaking of this second campaign, Hammer starts by saying, ‘Le prince de Karamanie avait de nouveau levé l’étendard de la révolte’. This is hardly the expression to use for the action of an independent prince. Alaeddin had never made himself the vassal of the Ottoman emirs.
a while the capital of a country does not mean that the country is 'incorporated' in the domains of the successful invader. The immediate restoration of the Karamanian dynasty after the advent of Timur proves how superficial had been the Ottoman occupation. While they were no longer able to be a political factor in western Asia Minor, the Karamanlis continued until after the fall of Constantinople—for seventy years after the battle of Ak Tchaï—to defy successfully the efforts of the Osmanlis to destroy their independence and amalgamate them.¹

Burhaneddin, who had set up for himself a principality north-east of Karamania along the Halys River, which included Caesarea and Sivas, was the next rival on the east to be attacked. Burhaneddin is reported to have had twenty to thirty thousand followers.² This seems to be an exaggeration, for we read that he did not resist the Ottoman invasion. At the approach of Bayezid, he retired into the mountains of Armenia near Kharpoot. Here he was either killed by Kara Yuluk, founder of the famous White Sheep dynasty, or put to death by order of Bayezid.³ His emirate was shared by Bayezid and Kara Yuluk, the Ottoman emir taking Tokat, Caesarea, and Sivas. There is no certainty as to the date of this expedition. From the events which followed, it most probably took place in 1395, the year before Nicopolis.⁴

¹ Striking testimony to the later power of the Karamanlis is given by Bertrand de la Broquière, who visited the court of Ibrahim with the Cypriote ambassador in 1443: cf. Schéfer's edition of his voyage, pp. 108–20. See Appendix B below, where the relations of the Osmanlis with the emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century are discussed in detail, with fuller citation of authorities.
² Howorth, iii. 749.
³ Sherefeddin, iii. 256, who is the only contemporary authority, says that Bayezid put him to death. This was one of the charges made by Timur against Bayezid.
⁴ The earliest possible date could be 1393. Perhaps the Osmanlis first appeared near Sivas at this time. But Bayezid would hardly have under-
Kastamuni, practically coterminous with the Roman province of Paphlagonia, stood between the Ottoman possessions and the Black Sea. In the campaign of 1393, Samsun and the cities of the interior between Samsun and Angora, were captured by the Osmanlis. When the Ottoman army advanced to attack Kastamuni, Bayezid offered to allow the emir to become his vassal, if he would surrender to him the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe. Whether the lesser Bayezid was unwilling to violate the laws of hospitality, or put little faith in the promises of the conqueror after the fate which had overtaken the emir of Aidin, it is impossible to say. He and his guests fled to the court of Timur. The occupation of Sinope gave the Osmanlis an excellent port on the south coast of the Black Sea.

Bayezid was now master of the greater part of Anatolia, but master only in name. He had not assimilated these conquests. As later events proved, the inhabitants of these territories were still loyal to their former rulers.

IV

After his return from the first Anatolian campaign, Bayezid ordered a general advance along the northern and north-western frontiers. One band invaded Bosnia, but did not make much headway. Three bands entered Hungary, and initiated the system of rapid raiding that in time reached as far as Germany, and made the ‘Turks’ the nightmare of Slavic, Teutonic, and Italian Europe. The first battle on Hungarian soil was fought at Nagy-Olosz, in Syrmia, not far from Karlovitz, where three centuries later the Osmanlis signed the death-warrant of their Weltpolitik.

The Danube was crossed also near Silistria. Before the taken so long and perilous an expedition before his position was secure in Karamania. Sherefeddin gives the more likely date 1395, while Ibn-Hedjir places the death of Burhaneddin in 1396.
terrible akindjis could penetrate far into his country, the hospodar Mircea surrendered, or was made prisoner. After a short exile at Brusa, he regained his liberty by consenting to the payment of a tribute of three thousand ducats, thirty horses, and twenty falcons. He agreed to help Bayezid against the Hungarians, who had long been asserting a sovereignty over Wallachia, and in return Bayezid promised to settle no Moslems and build no mosques north of the Danube. In the first Hungarian invasion, Bayezid received more valuable aid from the Wallachians than from his janissaries. There were no better fighters in the Balkan peninsula than these descendants of the soldiers of Trajan. The interference of Sigismund prevented an Ottoman invasion of Moldavia, whose hospodars remained altogether independent of the Osmanlis until the reign of Mohammed the Conqueror.

When Louis of Hungary died, he left two daughters. The younger, Hedwig, was chosen as queen of Poland by the Polish nobles. Her marriage with Jagello of Lithuania, who was converted to Christianity and baptized under the name of Ladislas, definitely separated the crowns of Poland and Hungary, and had a far-reaching influence upon the subsequent fortunes of the Osmanlis. The crown of Hungary fell to Mary, whose succession was questioned by Charles of Durazzo, king of Naples, the nearest male heir. His invasion of Dalmatia, in 1385, brought into Hungary Sigismund, second son of Charles IV of Luxemburg, the German

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1 So d’Ohsson fils, vii. 442, says, but gives date 1390. Hammer more correctly puts it in 1391. Xénopol, in his authoritative and carefully documented history, gives a little different account of Mircea’s early relations with Bayezid, and attributes to Mircea a larger influence in the calculations of Murad than he deserves. But the exposition of Mircea’s policy in relation to Poland, Hungary, and the Osmanlis, as given by Xénopol, cannot be overlooked or disregarded by the student of this period.

Emperor. For Sigismund was betrothed to Mary, but had been slow to take upon himself the rôle of bridegroom, owing to his disappointment over Hedwig's election by the Poles. Now he entered into the struggle for the Hungarian crown. In 1387, it was placed upon his head. The union between Poland and Hungary was broken, but the fortunes of Hungary and Bohemia, to which throne Sigismund succeeded by blood, were joined in a way that has never been broken to the present time. The outside connexions of the new Hungarian king were a most important factor in the growth of the Ottoman Empire. A strong and vigorous king, whose sole interest lay in the crown of Hungary, might have prevented the spread of the Osmanlis. In fact, after Bayezid's death, he might easily have destroyed the Ottoman power in Europe. But Sigismund, called in 1411 to the larger rôle of Holy Roman Emperor, became engrossed in the Hussite controversy and the Church councils to end the great schism. While retaining the crown of Hungary, he allowed the Osmanlis to make the preparations which were to end in the Moslem subjugation of that kingdom.

In the early days, when Sigismund's interests lay in his newly-acquired Hungarian crown, he was alive to the menace of the Osmanlis. He sent a message to Bayezid, demanding by what right he was interfering with Bulgaria, which was a country under Hungarian protection. Bayezid made no response to the address of the king's ambassador. He merely pointed to the weapons hanging in his tent, and gave a sign that the audience was over.

Sigismund understood, and accepted the challenge. In 1392, he invaded Bulgaria, won an initial battle from the Osmanlis, who would have been annihilated had it not been for their new allies, the Wallachians, and, after a long siege, took Nicopolis on the Danube. By this time Bayezid

1 Phr., i. 13–14, pp. 58–9, and 26, p. 82; Bonfinius, iii. 2; Chron. Anon. de St.-Denis; Chron. of Drechsler; Campana, fol. 8 (but gives 1736 N
was able to send a large army into Bulgaria. When Sigismund realized how numerous were the forces coming against him, he saw that his victory bade fair to be nothing more than the acquisition of a prison. Before the Osmanlis could surround him, he wisely abandoned Nicopolis. The retreat became a rout. It was on the return from this expedition that Sigismund met Elisabeth Morsinay, in the county of Hunyadi. From their union was born the great champion, who, while his imperial father was engrossed in theological disputes and the complex interests of the empire, battled bravely against Mohammed I and Murad II.

The expedition of 1392 demonstrated to Sigismund that Bayezid was a foe worthy of a European ruler, that he must be checked if Hungary were to be saved, and that the Hungarians could not again take the offensive against the Osmanlis without aid from western Europe. For the pretensions of Louis to the overlordship of the Balkan States, and the heartless propaganda of the Catholic faith, thinly disguising Louis’s inordinate ambitions, had turned the Balkan peoples against Hungary and ‘crusaders’ from the west. They chose rather to stand on the side of their Moslem enslavers.

Sigismund’s invasion of Bulgaria determined Bayezid to put an end to the arrangement concluded just before Kossova between Murad and Sisman. Bulgaria, like Thrace and Macedonia, was to be an integral part of the empire, and to become converted to Islam and ottomanized, in so far as that was possible. For Sisman, who had re-established himself in his old capital, was too uncertain an ally to be trusted date 1393). Leuncl., Annales, p. 51, following Ottoman sources, speaks only of Sigismund’s defeat. This earlier victory and the disastrous retreat are mentioned also in several of the French chronicles which relate the expedition of 1396.

1 Engel, Gesch. von Ungarn, ii. 368, who draws on all the earlier Hungarian authorities.
in the event of another Hungarian invasion. In the spring of 1393, an army under Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s oldest son, to whom this was the first command, surrounded Tarnovo. The bulk of Soleiman’s army was composed of Macedonian Christians and renegades of the first generation. In the spring of 1393, an army under Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s oldest son, to whom this was the first command, surrounded Tarnovo. The bulk of Soleiman’s army was composed of Macedonian Christians and renegades of the first generation. In midsummer, after a three months’ siege, Tarnovo was taken by storm from the side of the old castle, which is still, in part, standing. The inhabitants who escaped fire and sword were carried into captivity in Anatolia. Among them was the patriarch Euthymius.

This was the end of the independence of Bulgaria and of the national church. The loss of the church was a more serious blow than the loss of independence. For the Bulgarian nationality suffered an eclipse of centuries. Under the laws of Mohammed the Conqueror for the ‘self-government’ of the Christian elements of the empire, the Bulgarians were included in the Greek millet (nation). Enemy to every influence, every movement that tended to lessen its temporal power, the Greek patriarchate of Phanar never wearied in its endeavours, and never witheld its approval of the foulest means, to stamp out the Bulgarian national spirit. One cannot visit the old monastery of Rilo without realizing that the Bulgarian sufferings have been more acute from Christian priests than from Moslem governors. One cannot follow the trail of unending persecution in the mute witness of unchurched communities from Monastir to the Black Sea through Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia, and to the Danube, through Bulgarian Serbia and trans-Rhodopian Moesia, without sympathizing with the Bulgarian aspirations of 1913, and without comprehending the wild rage

1 Russian source cited by Muralt, vol. ii, No. 10 n.
3 Jireček, Gesch. der Bulgaren, pp. 347-9, gives Slavic sources for this date, and quotes Camblak’s graphic description of the terrible sacking of the city, the massacre, and the destruction of the churches.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

and hatred that drove an ordinarily clear-headed and impassive people into the second Balkan war.¹

When Tirnovo fell, Sisman was not found in his palace. His fate was a mystery even when Schiltberger went through Bulgaria with the crusaders three years later. Schiltberger believed that he died in captivity.² His son, Alexander, became a Moslem to save his life, and was given the governorship of Samsun.³ He was killed fighting under the Ottoman flag, in 1420, in the rebellion of Dédé-Sultan. The royal family of Bulgaria had no other heirs.

Silistria, Nicopolis, Widin, and the other Danube fortresses were strongly garrisoned and fortified.⁴ By conversion and immigration the Moslem population was cultivated, and grew rapidly on this northern frontier of the empire.

V

The battle of Kossova did not immediately affect Constantinople. Bayezid was intent upon arranging the new status quo in Serbia. After he had assured himself that Sigismund was not ready to attack him, he passed over into Asia Minor. There he devoted all his energies to the destruction of the Turkish emirates.

¹ In Czech, the word jazyk signifies language as well as nation (cf. Lützow, Life and Times of Master John Hus, p. 239). This illustrates the Slavic conception of nationality, and explains in a nutshell the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan problems. To the Slav, there can be no other test of nationality. The Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, carried on through the church and the schools, has been the resurrection of the nation through the language. The Greeks have used the Orthodox Church to combat and stifle this movement. They claim as Greeks all members of the Orthodox Church, while the Bulgarians claim that Bulgarophones, even if not attached to the exarchate, belong to the Bulgarian nation.


³ Schiltberger, op. et loc. cit.

⁴ These cities, or rather, their fortresses, were captured and evacuated several times by the Osmanlis, especially Widin.
The old family feud of the Palaeologi continued.¹ In April 1390, John, the son of Andronicus, entered Constantinople, and set himself up as emperor in opposition to his grandfather and uncle. But upon Manuel’s return from Asia in September, he was compelled to flee.² The obligations of Manuel as Ottoman vassal were stronger than the exigencies of his precarious position at Constantinople. Although his father was in an enfeebled condition and the danger of a return of his nephew was very real, Manuel left again in November to follow Bayezid in the war against Karamania.

We have a striking record from Manuel’s own pen of his humiliation. Proper food was too dear for the purse of the heir of Constantine the Great. He was on the verge of starvation. In sharp contrast to his own wretchedness, he describes the barbaric splendour of the court of Bayezid, and the feasting in which he was too insignificant to have a share. The Osmanlis treated him with studied insolence and contempt.³

While Bayezid was in Karamania, the old emperor repaired the walls of his capital. Churches were torn down in order to rebuild the towers on either side of the Golden

¹ Hammer, at the beginning of the reign of Bayezid, i. 295–7, relates the history of the quarrel between Andronicus and his father and Manuel, the rescue from the Tower of Anemas, &c., as if these events happened in 1389 and 1390, and gives the capture of Philadelphia for 1391. He has been led astray here by the story of Ducas, and by the fact that the Byzantine historians speak of Bayezid instead of Murad in connexion with the negotiations for restoration. By the internal evidence in the Byzantine historians themselves, the chronology of this period cannot be decided. But, by reading Phrantzes and Chalcocondylas in the light of Quirino, the continuation of Dandolo, and the archives of the colony of Pera, and also by piecing out the length of time of these events and matching them with Bayezid’s occupations during the first two years of his reign, it is not difficult to decide to place the Andronicus versus John and Manuel struggles just before the Chioggia war. At any rate, Andronicus died ten years before the date Hammer gives to these events!

² Poem cited by Muralt, ii. 738, No. 1.

Gate. They were given an ornate appearance to disguise the purpose of their having been repaired. Bayezid, in- formed through his couriers, sent word to John that the towers must be rased without delay, or Manuel would lose his eyes. The old emperor made haste to obey. Before the demolition was finished, he died in the arms of Eudoxia Comnena, whom he had taken for his mistress after having asked her hand for his son. Gout and debauchery rather than grief and humiliation ended his ignoble life; for he was only sixty-one, and, like his father and grandfather, had never opposed the Osmanlis with enough energy to under- mine his constitution.  

When Manuel, in the spring of 1391, returned to Brusa, he learned of his father's death, and of the threat that had been made concerning himself. Escaping in the night, he fled to Constantinople.

An ultimatum soon followed from Bayezid. Beyond the acknowledgement of vassalage and the payment of an in- creased tribute, Bayezid demanded the establishment of a kadi in Constantinople to judge the Moslem inhabi- tants. Upon the heels of his messenger came the Ottoman army. The Greeks of southern Thrace who had remained Christian were exterminated or carried off into slavery in Asia. Like locusts, the Osmanlis swarmed in all directions, and no village missed their notice up to the very walls of Constantinople.  

The first Ottoman siege of Constantinople began.

The close investment of the city ended after seven months. Bayezid, needing his army in Bulgaria to oppose Sigismund, consented to lift the siege on still harder conditions than had first been imposed. Manuel authorized the establishment

1 John V Palaeologos was of those who, in the words of Bernino (p. 9), 'consumavasi vanamente il tempo più in dolersi delle calamità che in repararle'.

2 Ducas, 13, pp. 25–49 passim; Chalc., II, pp. 66, 81–2.
of a Mohammedan tribunal in the Sirkedji quarter, and to
give seven hundred houses within the city walls to Moslem
settlers. Half of Galata, from the Genoese Tower to the
Sweet Waters, was ceded to Bayezid, who placed there a
garrison of six thousand. The tribute was once more in-
creased, and the Ottoman treasury was allowed a tithe on the
vineyards and vegetable gardens outside of the city. 1 From
the minarets of two mosques, the call to prayer echoed over
the imperial city, which, from this time, began to be called
by the Osmanlis Istambul. 2 This was the city of promise.

From 1391 until the advent of Timur, Constantinople was
blockaded on the land side. 3 The Galata garrison and the
posts at Kutchuk and Buyuk Tchekmedje were always alert
to bully and harass travellers and provision sellers.

The Grand Vizier, Ali pasha, used the grandson and name-
sake of John V Palaeologos to make trouble for Manuel.
It was in his blood to become the willing tool of the Osmanlis.
In 1393, Ali pasha tried to get the inhabitants of the city

1 Evliya effendi, i. 29-30; ii. 21, who repeats the persistent Ottoman
tradition of his day, that is also found in Hadji Khalifa and Nazmi Zadé.
Cf. the Genoese accounts of Pera in Jorga’s scholarly Notes à servir, &c.
i. 42. According to Schéfer, in his edition of Bertrandon de la Broquière,
p. 165, there was a provision that slaves escaping to Constantinople should
be given back, but we cannot be sure that this stipulation was made under
Bayezid I. The date of the installation of the cadi, &c., is open to question.
Some authorities place it after Nicopolis.

2 Shehabeddin, fol. 72 r°, writes Istanbul; Sherefeddin, iv. 37, is tran-
scribed by Petits de la Croix Istanbul; Arabshah, p. 124, transcribed by
Vattier Estanbol. Wylie, i. 156, n. 2, gives the time-worn popular deriva-
tion from δε την πάλων; also Telfer, in his edition of Schiltberger, p. 119.
Why go so far afield? Istanbul is a natural contraction of Constantinople.
As the Greeks pronounced this long word, the syllables stan and pol bore
the stress, and were naturally put together for a shortened form. As for
the initial I, which has troubled the philologists, its explanation is easy
to one who knows the Osmanlis. They cannot to this day pronounce an
initial St without putting I before it.

3 Neshri, trans. Noldke, ZDMG., xv. 345; Seadeddin, i. 189;
Saguntinus, p. 187; Drechsler, p. 228, says: ‘octo annos vexatur et
obsidetur.’
to depose Manuel in order that John, as heir of the older son of the late emperor, might take the place which was rightfully his.¹ Two years later John actually attacked the city with Ottoman troops, but was repulsed.²

The overtures of Manuel for aid and money from Christian princes were received with little enthusiasm. On account of the schism in the Latin Church, Manuel could look for no papal support. Venice refused his offer to sell Lemnos.³ The time had passed when the Senate set even the slightest monetary value upon a Byzantine deed of sale to an Aegean island.

In 1395, at Serres, Bayezid held his first court as heir of the Caesars. He summoned before him Manuel and Theodore and John, the son of Andronicus. Theodore, who had been ruling in the Morea (Peloponnesus), sole remaining Byzantine theme, was charged with having encroached upon the rights of the lord of Monembasia. The few remaining Serbian princes were also present. Bayezid contemplated ridding himself altogether of the Byzantine imperial family. In fact, he ordered the death of all the Palaeologi. Ali pasha succeeded in putting off the execution long enough for Bayezid to change his mind. The sentence was revoked, but warning was given by cutting off the hands and putting out the eyes of several Byzantine dignitaries. The Palaeologi, and Constantinople, had been saved only by the intervention of a creature of Bayezid's, who did not want to see the imperial family perish and the imperial city fall because these ghosts of princes were a source of revenue to him!

The peril at Serres had been so real that the Byzantine and Serbian princes plotted immediately to throw off the Ottoman yoke, and swore to each other that they would never again answer a summons from Bayezid. The compact was sealed by the marriage of Irene, daughter of Constantine

Dragash, to Manuel. But Dragash died shortly after the marriage, and Vuk Brankovitch died three years later. They were the last of the Serbians of Dushan’s following in Macedonia. The disaster of Nicopolis soon crushed the hopes of the conspirators.

VI

Urban VI, the first Roman pope of the Great Schism, did practically nothing against the Osmanlis. He sent, in 1388, two armed galleys for the defence of Constantinople, and issued letters broadcast promising indulgences to all who would take part in a crusade. But he did not work for a league of the states which recognized him. His successor, Boniface IX, whose reign covered the same period as that of Bayezid, was too occupied in combating the Angevin party in Naples, and in trying to preserve intact the papal states and cities, to pay much attention to the Ottoman menace.

In 1391, Boniface urged George Stracimir, who called himself king of Rascia (Serbia), to conquer Durazzo from the ‘schismatics’, and commanded the Catholic archbishop of Antivari to prevent the Christians of Macedonia and Dalmatia from allying themselves with the Osmanlis. Idle words these were, revealing at once the short-sighted policy

1 Chalc. II, pp. 80–1; Phr., I. 13, pp. 57–8; 26, p. 82.
2 Miklositch, Acta Serbica, CCIV. Hammer, i. 341, calls this Constantine ‘fils de Twarko’, meaning Stephen Tvrtko, I suppose. But I cannot find that the Bosnian king had such a son, or any reason, if he had, why this son should have been at Serres.
3 Ibid., CCXXIII. For the later kings of the dynasty which Vuk founded, see Picot’s careful article in Columna lui Traianu, new ser., Jan.–Feb. 1883, p. 64 f.
4 Epp. cur., ii. 64.
5 Epp. cur., ii. 103–4. Urban VI in 1387 had written a letter from Lucca inciting the Frankish princes to a war against ‘schismatics’ in Achaia.
of Boniface and his bigotry. For the Osmanlis, in the spring of 1393, were threatening Durazzo.¹ With warring Christian sects, their success was certain.

In Greece the interference of the Latin popes was becoming more and more bitterly resented. Ecclesiastics and laymen alike resented proselytizing and the invariable introduction of a bargaining clause in every appeal for western aid. In March 1393, Dorotheus, metropolitan of Athens and exarch of Greece, who had been justly charged by the Duke of Athens with wanting to introduce into his duchy the Osmanlis, was a fugitive at Constantinople. Tried on the charge brought against him by the Duke, a synod of eight bishops acquitted him.² This action was indicative of the feeling throughout the Eastern Church,—better the Osmanlis than the Franks with their Catholic missionaries. Even the changed attitude of Bayezid towards Christianity did little to modify this sentiment.

Although France was supporting the Avignon papacy, Boniface wrote in 1394 to Charles VI, asking him to help Sigismund or at least to allow his subjects to fight under the Hungarian standards.³ In the course of the same year he twice ordered a crusade to be preached.⁴ This was, however, rather an attempt to take under his wing, and give sanction to, a secular movement to help Hungary than an initiative which had originated the movement. For most of Sigismund’s allies were adherents of the other papacy.

At Avignon, Benedict XIII, a Spaniard, mounted the throne in 1394. His influence with the Duke of Burgundy, who dominated the insane French king, was almost as negligible as that of his Roman rival.

¹ See r. Cons. Rog., iii, E 74.  
² Miklositch-Müller, Acta Graeca, CCCCXXXV.  
³ Chalc., II, p. 75; Duc., 13, p. 73.  
⁴ Chalc., loc. cit.; Epp. cur., ii. 300-1, 311; iii. 261.
Philippe de Mézières, who had taken up the work of Marino Sanudo, and gave his life to the promotion of a crusade, left Cyprus in 1378, and settled in Paris, where he preached and wrote impassioned appeals to Christendom to rescue the Holy Sepulchre. His ‘Order of the Passion’, which was to furnish a race of fighters against the Moslem holders of Jerusalem, had replaced the celibate vow of the earlier orders by a vow of marital fidelity, so that ‘defenders of the Holy Sepulchre’ might be propagated, and trained from infancy for their mission. The whole idea of Philippe de Mézières was an anachronism. The age of the crusades had passed. After 1390 the new order fell into oblivion. Like Marino Sanudo, Philippe de Mézières had actually contributed to the aggrandizement of the Osmanlis; for he turned the minds of those who were moved by his appeals from the real menace of Islam to a quixotic and wholly useless dream. The crusades had only emphasized the axiom of history that Syria, including Palestine, must be held either through Mesopotamia or through Egypt.

Against the Osmanlis as against the Moslems of the Holy Land, the Church was no longer able to move Europe. The Nicopolis crusade was undertaken and carried through by secular agencies. It had neither religious motive nor religious backing.

The interest of Hungary in checking the progress of Ottoman conquest was hardly second to that of Venice and Genoa. To the two Italian republics, who had not hesitated to stake their very existence a decade before upon the mastery of the Aegaean Sea and the free passage of the Dardanelles, one would suppose that the battle of Kossova would have been a salutary warning, and that they would have seen the necessity of opposing the Osmanlis to the full extent of their

1 Cf. Jorga, in Bibl. de l’École des Chartes, 2e série, 110e fascic.; Molinier, MSS. de P. de Mézières, in Arch. de l’Orient Latin, i. 335–64; Del. Leroulx, i. 201–8.
resources. The archives of these cities, however, during the entire reign of Bayezid, reveal a record of double-dealing and insincere diplomacy which was as futile and disastrous as it was shameful.

Immediately upon hearing the news of Kossova, the Venetian Senate sent to Andrea Bembo, who had been negotiating with Murad, a letter instructing him as to the course he should follow in view of the death of Murad. He was to seek out the son who had survived, or, if both sons were alive, to be very cautious until one son had killed or defeated the other. In the meantime, he was to make overtures to both, telling each one, without letting the other know, that the Senate 'had heard of the death of his father, and on that account had great sorrow. For we have always regarded him as a most particular friend, and we loved him and his state. Likewise we have heard of his happy elevation to the power and lordship of his country, concerning which we have been very happy, because, in like manner as we have sincerely loved the father, we love and are disposed to love the son and his dominion, and to regard him as a particular friend.' Then Bembo was to speak of the commercial privileges desired by the Senate, and to disclaim the action of the Venetian admiral, Pietro Zeno, who had attacked the galleys of Murad.¹

Immediately upon hearing which son had become the successor of Murad, the Senate sent Francesco Quirini to Bayezid with gifts to secure the renewal of the commercial treaty concluded several years before with Murad. Bayezid

¹ 'Nostra dominatio audiverat de morte ipsius dom. Morati, de qua maximam displicentiam habuerat, quia semper eum habuimus in singularissimam amicum, et dileximus eum et statum suum. Similiter audivimus de felici creatione sua ad imperium et dominium ipsius patris sui, de quo nos fuerimus valde letati, quia sicut sincere dileximus patrem, ita diligimus et diligere dispositi sumus filium et suum dominium et habere ipsum in singulararem amicum'. . . &c.: Misti, xli. 24, reprinted in full in Ljubič, iv. 269-70.
readily offered to protect Venetian commerce, but he gave no guarantee.\(^1\)

The appearance of the Osmanlis on the Aegaean Sea, and their sacking of Chios, Negropont,\(^2\) and Attica, greatly alarmed the Senate. Fear was expressed for the safety of the Venetian fortresses in Negropont and Crete.\(^3\) All garrisons were ordered, provisioned, and reinforced.\(^4\) In 1393, forgetting their sincere love for Bayezid, the Senate decided to treat with Sigismund for an offensive alliance against the Osmanlis.\(^5\) So it cannot be believed that the Venetians did not see the growing danger.

In September of the next year they responded favourably, although vaguely, to a letter in which Sigismund notified them that in the coming springtime he would 'go against the Turks to their loss and destruction'.\(^6\) But when, in May 1396, a Hungarian embassy arrived in Venice to announce the readiness for a forward movement, and to secure the promised aid, Venice pledged herself only to the extent of four galleys, and that on condition that Rhodes, Chios, and Mytilene would co-operate with the Venetians.\(^7\) A high-sounding letter was sent to Tommaso Monicego, ordering him to move against the Osmanlis 'for the preservation of the city of Constantinople and for the honour of the republic'.\(^8\) Too weak and too inexperienced to withstand the hardened mariners of Italy, the Osmanlis disappeared from the sea for the moment. Their navy was only six years old, and could not yet match itself against the ghiaours. Monicego fought no battle, for there was no

\(^1\) Ibid., xlii. 58–9; the treaty is in Commem., viii. 150. Cf. Romanin, iii. 330.
\(^2\) Euboea is called Negropont, the Peloponnesus Morea, Lesbos Mytilene, while Crete is frequently called Candia and Chios Scio, in mediaeval and modern times.
\(^3\) Misti, xlii. 55.
\(^4\) Ibid., xliii. 156.
\(^6\) 'Ire contra dictos Turchos ad damnum et destructionem suam': ibid., p. 94, cited in Ljubić, iv. 335–6.
\(^7\) Misti, lxiv. 140.
\(^8\) Ibid., lxiv. 156.
enemy to oppose him. But he made no effort to hinder the passage of the Osmanlis from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia. The sincerity of the naval co-operation in the Nicopolis crusade is open to the gravest suspicion.¹

While the Senate was putting off Sigismund with assurances and promises that never materialized, they continued to treat with Bayezid and Manuel. In September 1394, the Osmanlis appeared in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana, and seized Venetian subjects there. The danger to Durazzo was imminent, for the Osmanlis were now masters of the valley of the Drin. When the Senate deliberated on measures for securing the release of the prisoners and for the defence of Durazzo, they decided to make representations rather than threats to Bayezid.² He naturally paid no attention to the Venetians. They did not intend to apply force, so he continued the subjugation of Albania and Greece.

To Manuel the Senate wrote a letter in 1394, recommending him 'to trust in God, to trust in the measures which the Christian princes would know how to take, to write to the pope and to these (the Christian princes), promoting a general alliance'.³ But one finds in the deliberations of the Senate no speech or motion or letter from which one could infer that they themselves had any hope whatever of the efficacy of the procedure suggested to Manuel. In fact, within six months, in spite of the imminence of the Hungarian offensive campaign that was to 'drive the Turks out of Europe', the Senate actually decided to send ambas-

¹ We must reject the statement of Morosini, MS. Wiener Bibl., fol. 135 r°, that Bayezid 'entered in arms in the Strait of Romania with so many galleys that one could not navigate in the strait', and doubt the opinion that Monicego, with his forty-four Venetian and Genoese galleys, had to force the Bosphorus, and contributed powerfully 'a la destrucion del dito Turcho'.

² Misti, xliii. 29.

³ Ibid., xliii. 5: 'confidasse in Dio, confidasse nei provedimenti che saprebbero à fare i principi christiani, scrivesse al Papa e a questi promovendo una lega generale'.


sadors to Bayezid to urge upon him the advisability of an accord with the Byzantine emperor. It was only because the crusade of Sigismund was already launched, and they realized the uselessness of it, that they gave up this questionable démarche, and discussed measures for the safety of the Venetian fleet, and for preventing Constantinople from falling into Bayezid’s hands without coming into any open rupture with the Osmanlis. Did Venice, while ostensibly co-operating with the crusaders, fear that a victory at Nicopolis would bring about the hegemony of Hungary in the Balkan peninsula, and secretly wish for the success of the Osmanlis?

As for Genoa, no other policy was considered than that of outbidding Venice for Bayezid’s favour. Fulsome congratulations upon his succession were sent to Bayezid. In the autumn of 1390, a Genoese embassy appeared at Adrianople to remind Bayezid of the traditional friendship of the Consulta for his father and grandfather. Their assurances were backed up by valuable gifts. While cultivating the friendship of the Osmanlis, the Consulta levied a compulsory tax upon all the communes where they could enforce their authority for the purpose of increasing the Genoese fleets in the Aegean Sea and at Constantinople. A watchful eye was kept on the Venetians and the Osmanlis. Neither Sigismund nor Manuel received real aid from Genoa.

For the necessary outside support and assistance in the crusade which appeared to him indispensable for the safety of Hungary, Sigismund had to look elsewhere than to the divided papacy, and to the republics of Venice and Genoa. Whether Sigismund’s fears of the ability of the Osmanlis to destroy Hungary were well founded is open to question. But there is no doubt that his activity prevented the capture of Constantinople in the early years of the reign of Bayezid.

1 Ibid., xliv. 108. 2 Ibid., xliv. 128. 3 Belgrano, pp. 152–3. 4 Lib. iurium, ann. 1392, fol. 474, in Turin archives, printed in Bibl. de l’École des Chartes (1857), 4e série, iii. 451–2.
VII

As early as 1384, the French Court was aware of the remarkable progress of the Ottoman conquest. The character and ambitions of Murad were presented to the boy-king Charles VI in a striking way. He was told that Murad, in a dream, had seen Apollon, one of his false gods, who offered him a crown of gold before which were prostrated thirteen princes of the Occident.¹ This childhood impression was revived in 1391, when Charles was at the zenith of his emancipation under the Marmousets. He received an embassy of pilgrims from the Holy Land, who brought news of a defeat they had experienced while fighting with the King of Hungary 'against the Turks of Lamorat Baxin'. When Charles asked them about the genealogy and antecedents of the prince, whose name they confused with that of his father, they knew nothing of him except that he was 'a vassal of the King of Persia'.

But of his character and ambitions they made a statement which we are justified in quoting, because it throws light upon the notions prevailing in the minds of the French aristocracy who went to their death at Nicopolis. 'He was', said the pilgrims, 'a man of wisdom and discretion, who feared God according to the superstitious traditions of the Turks . . . humane towards the conquered, because he oppressed them very little with exactions, and did not expel them from their lands so long as they were willing to promise allegiance under an annual tribute, however small. He kept his promises, and permitted them to live under their own laws. . . . His seal was so respected in his army that whoever saw it fell upon his knees. He had interpreters and spies in Europe to instruct him about the kings and their policies.

¹ Religieux de St.-Denis, ed. Bellaguet, i. 319-21.
He told the pilgrims that he would come to France after he had finished with Austria. ¹

The chronicler from whom this report is taken added that Charles was much excited by this threat. He was anxious to make peace with England, in order that he could accept the challenge of Bayezid, and go to fight him in single combat at the head of his army. But Charles, in the following year, so completely lost his mental balance that he could no longer maintain any personal power, and fell under the influence of the princes of the lilies. But his sympathies remained steadfastly attached to every scheme for fighting the Osmanlis.

In the spring of 1395, the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, uncles of the king, who had for the moment all the power of the French crown in their hands, received at Lyons ambassadors from Sigismund, who came to demand aid against the Osmanlis. Philip of Burgundy was greatly interested in this mission. It is extremely improbable that he had any interest whatever in the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, the aggrandizement of Hungary, or even the preservation of Constantinople from Moslem sacrilege. But, since Flanders, Artois, and the county of Burgundy had come to him through his wife on the death of Louis le Mâle, Philip had begun to dream of establishing a new kingdom in Europe. It was the dream which was to plunge France into the most bitter of her civil wars, to call forth Jeanne d’Arc from the seclusion of Domrémy, and end in the death of his great-grandson under the walls of Nancy.

Philip had every reason in the world to aid the project of Sigismund. Apart from the fact that his immediate hold over the insane king, Charles VI, would be strengthened by the absence from France of the energetic scions of noble

¹ Chronicorum Karoli Sexti, ed. Bellaguet, i. 709–11. The relations of the ambassadors of Sigismund with the Duke of Burgundy and with Charles VI are found in Religieux de Saint-Denis.
families, who, if successful in the struggle against Bayezid, might push on to the Holy Land and find permanent interests—or a grave—there, Sigismund was well worth cultivating. The elder brother of the king of Hungary, Wenceslaus, was Roman emperor, but insecure in his position. At that very moment, Wenceslaus was negotiating with Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti to create him Duke of Milan in exchange for his support.\(^1\) Galeazzo was the father-in-law of Louis of Orleans, younger brother of the French king, and Philip's formidable rival. The future of the Valois of Burgundy demanded an entente with the German imperial family. As this could not be concluded with Wenceslaus, and as Wenceslaus might at any moment be deposed, it was policy for Philip of Burgundy to come into close contact with Sigismund, whose future in Bohemia and in the empire Philip foresaw. At the very least, by lending aid to Sigismund, Philip had an excellent chance of getting Luxemburg, which was essential to the consolidation of the new Burgundy in the Netherlands.

As earnest of the aid which would be forthcoming the following year, the Duke of Burgundy allowed the Comte d'Eu to proceed immediately to Hungary with some nobles and six hundred horsemen.\(^2\) After the Hungarian envoys had gone through the formality of an audience with the king at Paris, they returned to Sigismund bearing a letter in which Philip promised substantial aid in cavaliers and mercenaries, under the command of his own elder son, Jean Valois, Comte de Nevers.

\(^1\) On September 13, 1395, in the presence of ambassadors from all parts of Christendom, and also 'del gran Turco, del Re de' Tartari, del gran Soldano, del gran Tamerlano e di molti altri Principi infedeli e ribelli alla Fede christiana', who were treated like Christians and lodged at the expense of 'il Signore di Milano', Galeazzo was solemnly raised to ducal rank and invested with the Duchy of Milan by Wenceslaus: Andrea Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 820.

\(^2\) Mémoires de Madame de Lussan, iii. 5.
From England, the Netherlands, Savoy, Lombardy, and all parts of Germany, Sigismund received assurances that the cream of chivalry would flock to his standards, and that he could rely upon Europe to back him in the expedition which was to drive Bayezid out of Europe.

VIII

The crusade which ended in the disaster of Nicopolis is one of the most interesting events of the close of the Middle Ages, not only by reason of the historical importance of those who took part in it, but also because it was the last great international enterprise of feudal chivalry. It is the end of an epoch in the history of Europe. So widespread was the interest in Sigismund's call to arms against the Osmanlis that there came to meet him at Buda in the spring of 1396 not only the French volunteers, but also scions of noble families from England, Scotland, Flanders, Lombardy, Savoy, Bohemia, and all parts of Germany and Austria. The English war in Normandy had ceased, Milan was supreme in northern Italy, and for the moment there was peace in the Holy Roman Empire. It was a favourable time to attract adventurers to unknown lands.

This expedition furnishes the most absorbing pages in the last portion of Froissart; it is mentioned in more or less detail in a number of other French, Italian, German, and Latin chronicles. Several participants have left graphic accounts of the gathering of the chevaliers, the march down the Danube, the battle and its aftermath of massacre, the captivity and ransom of the prisoners. The archives of Dijon and Lille tell the cost of the fitting out of the French contingent and of the ransom of the prisoners. For this

1 The references to Froissart which follow are given from vol. xv of Kervyn de Lettenhove's edition, and the references to Schiltberger from the English translation in the Hakluyt Society series, vol. Iviii, unless otherwise specified.
crowning event in Bayezid’s career, we have more source material than for any episode of Ottoman history until the fall of Constantinople.1

The French chevaliers numbered about a thousand. They were accompanied by six or seven thousand attendants and mercenaries. They gathered at Dijon, under the command of Jean de Nevers, the oldest son of Duke Philip of Burgundy, and grandson of King John, who had been captured in the battle of Poitiers. He was only twenty-two, and had just won his knighthood. The fact, though, that he was heir to Burgundy, and a prince of the royal blood, gave him the command. Philip charged the Sieur de Coucy, one of the boldest and most experienced warriors in France, to have an eye on the boy, and to guide the expedition with his counsel.2

Prominent among the French chevaliers were Philippe d’Artois, Constable of France, Henri and Philippe de Bar, cousins of the king, the Sieur de Coucy, Guillaume de la Trémouille, Jacques Bourbon de Vienne, admiral of France and prince of the royal blood, Boucicaut, marshal of France, the Sieur de Saint-Pol, and three Flemish princes who were the brothers of Jean de Nevers’s mother. The heir to the duchy of Bavaria was anxious to join the French chevaliers, but was restrained by the wise words of Duke Albert: ‘William, since you have the desire to travel and go to Hungary and Turkey, and carry arms against people and countries which have never done anything to us, and you have no reason for going there, except the vainglory of this world, let John of Burgundy and our cousins of France do

1 See the sources and references for Nicopolis grouped in the classified bibliography. Although the citations in the text of my narrative are mostly from Froissart and Schiltberger, all chronicles and contemporary sources available have been used in the preparation of this section, especially Bellaguet’s edition of Religieux de Saint-Denis, ii. 425–30, 483–522 (Bellaguet’s notes, however, on these sections are very disappointing).
2 Froissart, pp. 218, 221, 223.
their enterprises, and you do yours, and go into Friesland and conquer our inheritance . . . and in doing this I shall help you.'

The chevaliers travelled through Germany and Bohemia, and were hospitably received by the Duke of Austria. 'On the way they spoke of Amorath-Bacquin and admired little his power.' When they reached 'a city called Buda, the king made them a great reception and good cheer, and indeed he ought to have done so, for they had come far to see him and bear arms for him.' At Buda they found the other chevaliers who had responded to the invitation of Sigismund, among whom were the Bastard of Savoy, Frederick of Hohenzollern, grand prior of the Teutonic Order, Philibert de Naillac, grand master of Rhodes, with a contingent of chevaliers of Saint-John, the Elector Palatine, and John, Burgrave of Nürnberg, ancestor of the House

1 Ibid., pp. 227–8, 230, 394–8. A complete list of the chevaliers, compiled from sources, is found in Buchon, and, in much more complete and accurate form, in Delaville Leroux, ii. 78–86.

2 Froissart, and other earlier writers, have several ways of designating Bayezid. Froissart calls him Amorath-Baquin (p. 216), Amorath (p. 226), le roy Basaach, dit l'Amourath-Bacquin (p. 230), l'Amourath-Bacquin many times, and l'Amourath three times in one paragraph (p. 311). Chroniclers and writers of the fifteenth century were continually confusing Bayezid with Murad (cf. Cuspinianus, Secundinus, Sylvius Aeneas, Donado da Lezze, Paolo Giovio, et al.). From the different ways Froissart designates Bayezid, it is very clear that he is not mixing him with Murad, but that by 'dit l'Amourath-Bacquin' he means 'l'emir-pacha'. The fact that he uses the definite article so frequently and says several times 'l'Amourath' is proof positive of this. His transcription of the title emir, and that of many other western writers, led later historians to think the chroniclers meant Murad! It is merely a coincidence that the words are so similar. Froissart, however, would be capable of mistaking Murad for Bayezid. On p. 216 he calls Sigismund Henry, and on p. 334 Louis! Olivier de la Marche (éd. Beaune et d'Arbuthnot), i. 83–4, speaks twice of 'Lamourath-baby'. Here, too, there is not a confusion of Murad and Bayezid. He, like Froissart, means to say 'l'amiral-pacha'. On 'amiral' for 'emir' see above, p. 163, n. 2.

3 Froissart, pp. 230–1, 242.

4 Donado da Lezze, p. 9.
of Brandenburg.\textsuperscript{1} A scholarly biographer of Henry IV of England has recorded that he, as Count of Lancaster, was one of the participants in the Nicopolis expedition.\textsuperscript{2} This error has found its way into one, at least, of our most reliable modern historians.\textsuperscript{3} Although the successor of Richard II was not, as a matter of fact, at Nicopolis,\textsuperscript{4} the blood of the Nicopolis crusaders is in the veins of the British royal house, as in that of practically every ruling family of Europe.

Sigismund claimed to have been assured by Bayezid that the Osmanlis would invade Hungary in the spring of 1396. When there were no signs of an Ottoman invasion, the crusaders decided that, as Bayezid did not come to seek them, they had best take advantage of the summer months to go and find the arch-enemy of Christendom.\textsuperscript{5} Arrangements had been made with Mircea, voïevode of Wallachia, to break with the Osmanlis and join the coalition. Manuel, who had been invited to co-operate with the invaders, prepared secretly to declare against Bayezid.\textsuperscript{6}

According to the chronicles, the invasion of Bulgaria was rather a picnic than a serious military operation. This was

\textsuperscript{1} Leunclavius, \textit{Hist. Musul. Turc.}, preface, p. 14, speaks of how grateful Sigismund was later for the services rendered to him personally by the Burgrave in the Nicopolis campaign, and that the friendship formed then led to the later advancement of the house of Brandenburg.

\textsuperscript{2} Wylie, i. 6, 158, quoting Ducas, 13, and \textit{Venetian State Papers} (Brown), i. 85. Ducas knew nothing of Nicopolis, while the Venetian reference is based on a misapprehension.

\textsuperscript{3} Lavisse, \textit{Histoire de France}, iv. 311: 'on l'avait vu à la bataille de Nicopoli sur les bords de la Baltique avec les chevaliers teutoniques.' Lavisse has evidently mixed up the Nicopolis expedition with the earlier Prussian one in which Henry did take part. His statement on the same page that Henry IV took part in the Bouicaut expedition is another error.

\textsuperscript{4} Conclusive proof of the whereabouts of Henry in the summer of 1396 is found in the letter 'escript ... le xx\textsuperscript{e} jour d'augst'. This letter is in Arch. Nat., Paris, J. 644: 35\textsuperscript{11}. For the expeditions in which Henry \textit{did} take part, when he was Henry of Derby, see vol. lii of the Camden Society, edited by Lucy Toulmin Smith, London, 1894, 4to.

\textsuperscript{5} Froissart, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{6} Phr., I. 14, p. 59; Bonfinius, III. 2.
true, at least, for the western chevaliers, who had brought with them wine and women in plenty. Their baggage contained all the luxuries to which they were accustomed at home. The French auxiliaries travelled from Buda to the Danube by way of Transylvania and Wallachia, crossing the Carpathians through the pass between Brassó (Karlstadt) and Sinaia.

The Hungarians, following the Danube, spread out into Serbia, pillaging and murdering the inoffensive Christian population more thoroughly than Ottoman akindjis would have done. In spite of a lack of opposition, they persisted in acting as if they were in the enemy’s country. Widin surrendered without a struggle, and Orsova after five days. In September, the armies joined before the fortress of Nicopolis, whose surrender to the Osmanlis three years before had marked the disappearance of Bulgarian independence. They were destined to go no farther.

For sixteen days Sigismund and his allies encamped in front of Nicopolis without giving assault. They had no

1 Engel, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 468. According to the authority who has made the most exhaustive study of the Nicopolis expedition, Sigismund disposed of 120,000 men in all, including the western allies: Kiss, in A Nikápolyi űlkozeti, p. 266. Kiss’s estimate is corroborated by the Crónica Dolfína, which says that Sigismund had one hundred thousand men under arms in 1394. Sanuto quotes this in Muratori, xxii, col. 762. Cf. also Hungarian Nat. Archives, Dipl. 8201, 8212, 8214, 8493, 8541.

2 Schiltberger, p. 2.

3 Bruun, in his Geographische Anmerkungen zum Reisebuch von Schiltberger (Sitz.-Ber. k. Bay. Akademie, 1869, ii. 271), tried to prove that the battle was fought, not at Nicopolis on the Danube, but near the ancient Nicopolis of Trajan’s foundation. But in his notes to the English translation of Schilt., Hakluyt, iviii. 108–9, he assents to the contention which Kanitz makes in Donau-Bulgarien, ii. 58–70, that the battle was near Nicopolis-on-the-Danube. An examination of the chronicles corroborates Kanitz’s hypothesis over against the ingenuous argument of Jireček. Some historians have been so unmindful of geographical considerations as to put the battle at the ancient Nicopolis ad Haemum, of which Ortellius, p. 225, speaks.

4 Schiltberger, p. 2.
idea of the whereabouts of Bayezid. It was believed among the French (whose ignorance of geography and of distances equalled ours of modern times) that Bayezid was in Egypt, gathering a great army of all the Moslem world to oppose the triumphant march of the crusaders. One reads in Froissart that Bayezid was 'in Cairo in Babylonia [sic] with the sultan to get men', that he left the sultan there and rallied his forces at Alexandria and Damascus, that 'under the command and prayers of the khalif of Bagdad and Asia Minor', whose mandate went forth 'to Persia, to Media, and to Tarsus', Bayezid received a 'mass of Saracens and miscreants', and that in his army were 'people of Tartary, Persia, Media, Syria, Alexandria, and of many far-off countries of the miscreants'.

Sigismund made a speech to the chevaliers from western and central Europe, in which he declared: 'Let him come or not come, in the summer which will return, if it pleases God, we shall get through the kingdom of Armenia and shall pass the Bras Saint-George and shall go into Syria and shall get from the Saracens the gates of Jaffa and Beirut and several other [cities] to go down into Syria, and we shall go to conquer the city of Jerusalem and all the Holy Land. And if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, and there will be no going away without the battle, in God's pleasure.' Froissart naively adds immediately after his report of this speech: 'But it turned out very much in another way.'

It certainly did. Bayezid, who had been directing the siege of Constantinople, knew no more about the khalif and the sultan and the 'far-off countries of the miscreants' than did Froissart. Neither he nor his ancestors had ever had dealings with the Moslem princes of Asia. Persians,

1 Froissart, pp. 251, 262–3, 310, 329. 'Miscreant', of course, in its original sense.
2 Ibid., p. 310.
‘Saracens’ and Egyptians were lacking in his army. He gathered together his trained warriors, called upon his Christian vassals for their quotas, and set forth over the well-known route to the Danube. From several recent campaigns, he and his soldiers were thoroughly familiar with the country through which they passed, and in which the people were less afraid of him than they were of the Christians who had come to deliver them. When, after two weeks’ march, he pitched his camp near Nicopolis, he was simply returning to a place where twice before the Ottoman arms had been victorious.

Sigismund was dismayed at the prompt appearance of Bayezid with an army which was reported to him in numbers varying from one hundred and twenty thousand to two hundred thousand. In spite of his brave words to the chevaliers, Sigismund knew the worth of the Osmanlis as fighting-men, and that they could not be brushed aside by a few impetuous cavalry charges. So he begged Jean de Nevers and his companions to consult with him, and to formulate a definite plan of action. He suggested, and won over to this opinion the Sieur de Coucy, who was the most experienced warrior among the chevaliers, that a reconnaissance be made first of all to determine Bayezid’s position and intentions. Then, if Bayezid was actually moving to the attack, or on the point of moving, it would be the part of wisdom for the westerners to allow the foot-soldiers of Hungary and the Wallachians to sustain the first attack. The valiant horsemen and western mercenaries should form a second line, whether it be in attack or defence.

The chevaliers were furious at this suggestion. Philippe d’Artois, Comte d’Eu and Grand Constable of France, who knew Sigismund best from longer association with him, suspected him of an attempt to rob the chevaliers of the glory of defeating Bayezid. ‘Yes, yes,’ he cried, ‘the king of Hungary wants to have the flower of the day and the honour.
We have the advance-guard, and already has he given it to us. So he wants to take it away from us and have the first battle. Whoever believes in this, I shall not.’ Then turning to the chevalier who carried his banner, he called out, ‘Forward banner, in the name of God and of Saint George, for they will see me to-day a good chevalier’. This action was contagious. Without knowing where the enemy was, without thinking where or how far they were going, without waiting to agree upon a concerted action with the bulk of their army, the French, German, and English noblemen rushed forward to make the last charge of European chivalry against the followers of Mohammed.

The outposts of Bayezid, taken by surprise, were cut down. The Osmanlis who surrendered were massacred without mercy. Imagining that they were winning a great victory, and that they were breaking through the only obstacle between them and the Holy Sepulchre, the chevaliers rode to death and disgrace. In the picturesque language of Rabbi Joseph, ‘they said “Aha! aha!”’. But their joy was quickly gone, for the horsemen of Bayezid and his hosts and chariots came against them, in battle array, like the moon when she is new.’

The chevaliers had put all their strength of man and horse into the charge. Their swords ran blood. They thought the day was theirs, when suddenly they found themselves confronting the army of Bayezid. As was his invariable custom, Bayezid had sent out to meet the attack of the chevaliers, when he heard that they had com-

1 Ibid., pp. 311–17; Relig. de St.-Denis, pp. 490–7. Schiltberger, p. 3, attributes this initiative to Jean de Nevers, whom, like many other writers on Nicopolis, he calls, by anticipation, Duke of Burgundy. Cf. Donado da Lezze, p. 9, who says: ‘Il signor Carlo, prima Duca di Borgogna.’ Also Morosini, p. 6. Sigismund is frequently spoken of as German emperor at the time of Nicopolis. Cf. Chalc., ed. Migne, col. 76: ήγουμένου Σιγισ- 

2 Rabbi Joseph, i. 252.
menced the battle, his worthless untrained levies to be cut down by the enemy and exhaust their strength. With deliberation he drew his trusted divisions in battle array in an advantageous position, which he had ample time to choose. His soldiers were intact and fresh. The Ottoman bowmen aimed their arrows at the horses of the chevaliers. Unhorsed and quickly surrounded by sixty thousand soldiers, there was nothing for the proudest warriors in Europe to do but surrender to the foe whom they had despised.

As far as the chevaliers were concerned, the battle was over in three hours. Jacques Bourbon, admiral of France, lay on the field with the banner of Notre-Dame clasped tightly in his hands. Guy de la Trémouille, Philippe de Bar, and others of the noblest blood of France, Flanders, Bavaria, and Savoy were killed in the charge. But the greater part of the high-born auxiliaries of Sigismund were prisoners in the camp of Bayezid. So handsomely were they accoutred that the Osmanlis believed them all to be princes of the Occident, and saved them for Bayezid to determine their fate.¹

When Sigismund learned that the chevaliers had disregarded his advice, and had already ridden forth to find the army of Bayezid, he was greatly worried, for he knew the tactics of Bayezid, and feared the worst. He said to the grand master of Rhodes, 'We shall lose the day through the great pride and folly of these French: if they had only believed me, we had forces in plenty to fight our enemies'.²

From a comparison of the chronicles, one does not get a clear idea of what happened after the failure of the assault of the chevaliers. A battle in which the bulk of the forces

¹ Froissart, pp. 313–16; Relig. de St.-Denis, pp. 490 f.; Rabbi Joseph, p. 253; Schiltberger, p. 3; Seadeddin, i. 184; Neshri, in ZDMG., xv. 345–8. Cf. authorities cited in Bibliography.

² Froissart, p. 317. Hermann de Cilly and the Burgrave of Nürnberg are said by some authorities to have thrown themselves in front of Sigismund, and to have saved him and carried him off to the boat.
on either side were engaged undoubtedly followed. But it is impossible to state whether Sigismund followed up the way opened for him through the Ottoman lines by the French charge, or whether the Hungarians and their auxiliaries were on the defensive. Froissart and Morosini infer that Sigismund did not attempt to fight after the failure of the chevaliers, and it was believed in western Europe that the disaster of Nicopolis was due to the failure of Sigismund to support the chevaliers rather than to their own folly. The Hungarians and their king were bitterly denounced by the French survivors.\(^1\) On the other hand, Schiltberger, who took part in the battle, declares that the king of Hungary was advancing in force, and that Bayezid was preparing to retreat, when the Osmanlis received sudden and substantial support from the kral of Serbia.\(^2\)

The Serbians were so completely under Ottoman control after the battle of Kossova, that they made no attempt to throw off the yoke of Bayezid.\(^3\) In Asia Minor as in the Balkan peninsula, against the Karamanians and Tartars as against the crusaders, at Nicopolis as at Angora, the Serbian auxiliaries were faithful supporters of Bayezid. Nicopolis was certainly won with the aid of the Christians of the Balkan peninsula. It was not only the Serbian reinforcements which won the day for the Osmanlis. As soon as

\(^1\) The bitterness against and contempt for the Hungarians is expressed in the following verses:

\begin{verbatim}
' Nichopoly, cite de payennie,
   Au temps la ou li sieges fut grans,
   Fut delaisses par orgueil et folie;
   Car les Hongres qui furent sur les champs
   Avec leur roy, fuitis et recrane,
   Leur roy meisme enmainent par puissance,
   Sans assembler.'
\end{verbatim}

*Œuvres inédites d'Eustache des Champs*, ed. Tarbé, 1849, i. 166.

\(^2\) Schiltberger calls him ‘der hertzog auss der Sirifey, der genant despot’: *Bibl. des Lit. Vereins* (Tübingen), clxxii. 4.

Mircea of Wallachia saw how the battle was going, he quickly withdrew from the field, and got his forces across the Danube before the panic started.

Whether the action of Mircea was actuated by treasonable motives or not is open to debate. He may have honestly believed that it was a case of *sauve qui peut*. If so, his action was not more reprehensible than that of Sigismund himself. The future Holy Roman Emperor, who was to play so important a part in the history of Europe during the early decades of the fifteenth century, forgot his bold words of the previous week: ‘And if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, and there will be no going away without the battle, in God’s pleasure.’ Sigismund and the grand master of Rhodes hurried to the Danube, got away in a small boat,¹ and boarded one of the galleys of Monicego, the Venetian admiral. Abandoning his army and his allies to their fate, the king of Hungary sailed for home. He had the shame, if he felt it at all, when passing through the Dardanelles, of seeing the chevaliers and other prisoners of Nicopolis paraded before his eyes. One of these prisoners wrote: ‘The Osmanlis took us out of the tower of Gallipoli, and led us to the sea, and one after the other they abused the king of Hungary as he passed, and mocked him, and called to him to come out of the boat and deliver his people: and this they did to make fun of him, and skirmished a long time with each other on the sea. But they did not do him any harm, and so he went away.’²

Sigismund went to Modon, and then back to Hungary. This was the king who had boasted that he would not only

¹ Belonging to the grand master of Rhodes: Froissart, p. 317. But Morosini, p. 15, and others, say that he went directly on board Monicego’s galley. It is a pity that Hammer, in his description of the battle of Nicopolis, relied so much on such an unreliable third-hand authority as Abbé Vertot. Skentklláray, *A dunai hajóhadak történéje*, says that Jean de Vienne commanded the galleys.

² Schiltberger, p. 6.
turn the Osmanlis out of Europe, but that he had enough lances to support the sky, should it fall upon his army.\(^1\) Although his manhood had been put to the test, and had been found wanting, he was saved to play a great, if unenviable, part in the closing events of the Middle Ages.\(^2\)

After Sigismund’s escape, his great army, which was to redeem the Holy Sepulchre, fled before the Osmanlis. Those who were not killed, or drowned in the Danube, retreated through Wallachia. Froissart describes graphically the hardships of the French, German, English, Scotch, Bohemian, and Flemish crusaders in their painful march across the Carpathian Mountains. The chevaliers could secure a bare subsistence. Their pages and men-at-arms were stripped of their clothes and beaten by the peasants. It was not until they got into western Hungary that they felt themselves safe.\(^3\)

On the day following the battle of Nicopolis, Bayezid rode from his camp to inspect the battle-field.\(^4\) Orders had been given that the bodies of the nobles who had fallen be put in a place apart from the common dead, so that the identity of those who had lost their lives might be ascertained. An especial search for the body of Sigismund was ordered. The Hungarian king was not among the captives: it did not

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\(^1\) Bonfinius, one of the earliest Hungarian historians, recorded that Sigismund had boasted that he would not only turn the Osmanlis out of Europe, but also that with the army under his command, if the sky fell, it could be held up on their lances: *Decades*, ii. 403.

\(^2\) ‘Sigismund was cruel and sensual, perjured and frivolous, rapacious and dissolute, fierce and pusillanimous, a byword and object of horror to the Bohemians, hated and despised by the Germans, a warning to all rulers. His companion, John XXIII, lewd and murderous, a simonist and an infidel, was a true comrade for Sigismund in all evil deeds’ : Dr. Flajshans, in *Mistr Jan Hus* : quotation translated by Count Lützow, *John Hus and his Times*, pp. 137–8.

\(^3\) Froissart, pp. 330–1.

\(^4\) But not until he ‘regracioit les dieux et les déesses selon la loy où il croit et que les paiens croient’ : Froissart, p. 321. The ignorance among the western chroniclers of everything pertaining to the Osmanlis—or the wider circle of Mohammedan peoples—was appalling.
occur to Bayezid that he had fled. When Bayezid saw how heavy had been his casualties, and learned the story of the massacre of prisoners by the chevaliers after they had ridden through the Ottoman outposts, he could not control his anger. A general massacre of the prisoners was ordered.

Only because Bayezid hoped for a great ransom for the grandson of the French king was Jean de Nevers saved. There was in the suite of the Comte de Nevers a Picard chevalier who knew a little Turkish. Through him Jean was able to communicate with Bayezid, and to save twenty-four chevaliers who would bring heavy ransom. Among these were the Comte d’Eu, the Comte de la Marche, the Sieur de Coucy, Henri de Bar, and Boucicaut. But they were all forced to stand beside Bayezid and watch the massacre of their companions.

Because of his youth, for none under twenty years was killed, Schiltberger was spared to leave a description of this terrible massacre. 'Then I saw the lord Hannsen Greiff, who was a noble of Bavaria, and four others, bound with the same cord. When he saw the great revenge that was taking place, he cried with a loud voice, and consoled the horse-and foot-soldiers who were standing there to die. "Stand firm", he said, "when our blood this day is spilt for the Christian faith, and we by God's help shall become the children of Heaven." He knelt, and was beheaded together with his companions. Blood was spilled from morning until vespers, and when the king's counsellors saw that so much blood was spilled and that still it did not stop, they rose and fell upon their knees before the king, and entreated him for the sake of God that he would forget his rage, that he might not draw down upon himself the vengeance of God, as enough blood was already spilled. He consented, and ordered that they should stop, and that the rest of the people should be brought together, and from them he took his share, and left the rest to his people who had made them prisoners. The
people that were killed on that day were reckoned at ten thousand men.\(^1\)

So ended the last crusade.

IX

Immediately after the battle, Bayezid sent part of his army across the Danube to hunt down the fugitives and to punish Mirea. This force was defeated by the Wallachians in the plain of Rovine, and withdrew into Bulgaria.\(^2\)

Other columns mounted the Danube through the Iron Gates, retaking on the way the fortresses captured by the crusaders, and made a raid into Styria. Everywhere the akindjis carried fire and death. The country was laid waste. Peterwardein was burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians were carried off into slavery in Macedonia and Anatolia.\(^3\)

This invasion of Hungary made a deep impression upon the Slavic and Teutonic races, who believed that it was the beginning of a Moslem conquest of central Europe. The flagellants and the dancing processions of the plague days of 1348 and 1359 were revived. For a moment, even the Venetian Senate feared that Bayezid had led in person his army into Hungary, and was engaged in an aggressive movement that might bring the Osmanlis to the head of the Adriatic.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Schiltberger, p. 5. Cf. Froissart, pp. 322–8; Relig. de St.-Denis; Chronique de Boucicaut; Chronique des 4 premiers Valois, éd. Luce, p. 326; and the other chronicles and secondary authorities given in Bibliography.

\(^2\) Xénopol, in Hist. générale, iii. 882, whose writings furnish the most reliable and most accessible data for Rumanian history, allows his patriotism to get the better of his judgement when he writes that this unimportant skirmish was a complete defeat inflicted upon Bayezid, and that 'le Sultan court jusqu'à Adrianople'! Xénopol makes no attempt to explain the battle of Nicopolis, and Mireea's action in and after the battle.

\(^3\) Schiltberger, p. 6. Chalc., II, pp. 76–80, who exaggerates the raid to the point of saying that Bayezid reached the environs of Buda.

But Bayezid was not carried away by the ease of his victory. He let well enough alone. For the moment, he had absorbing interests in the ransom of his prisoners, the developments in the Greek peninsula, the question of Constantinople, and the temptation to licentious pleasures that had come to him with success.

X

Bayezid announced his victory from the battle-field to the Kadi of Brusa, and later, from Adrianople, to the Moslem princes of Asia.\(^1\) To the Sultan of Egypt and other rulers he sent gifts of prisoners to corroborate his letters.\(^2\)

The intercession of Jean de Nevers had saved the more illustrious of the surviving French chevaliers. They were taken to Brusa. While not treated royally, they were allowed to hunt, and were given opportunities to see the grandeur of Bayezid.\(^3\) But they were not kept together long. For some months, the heir to the Duchy of Burgundy was separated from his companions, and could talk with them only by the special permission of Bayezid. Some of them were sent to Mikhalitch, where Philippe d'Artois, grand marshal of France, died.\(^4\) Enguerran de Coucy, worn out with anxiety for his family and the disgrace that had come

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\(^2\) Schiltberger, p. 7, who would have been chosen himself for Egypt but for the fact that he had been wounded.

\(^3\) Froissart, p. 341; Rabbi Joseph, p. 254.

\(^4\) Froissart, p. 345. In xvi. 40, Froissart makes a mistake in saying that the body of the Comte d'Eu was ‘en ung sarcus rapporté en France et ensevely en l'eglise Saint-Laurent d'Eu, et là gist moult hounourablement’. The tomb in St. Laurent is merely a memorial. Philippe was buried in the chapel of a monastery in Galata, where, seven years later, Clavijo, fol. 17 v°, saw his burial-spot, but unmarked. His tomb is described by Bulladius, who saw it in 1647, in his notes to Bonn ed. of Ducas, p. 560. Cf. Mordtmann, *Beiträge zur osmanischen Epigraphik*, I, in ZDMG. (1911), lxv. 103.
to him at the close of his brilliant career, soon followed the Comte d’Artois to the grave.

In the meantime, Jacques Helly was sent by Bayezid to Paris to communicate to the Duke of Burgundy and the other relatives of the captives the conditions for their ransom—two hundred thousand pieces of gold, delivered to Bayezid at Brusa. Froissart describes the feeling aroused at Paris by the first news of the disaster. The stories of the survivors were not believed, and the bearers of bad news narrowly escaped hanging or drowning. An order of the king’s council forbade any man to mention Nicopolis. The anxiety of the families of the chevaliers was not set at rest until Jacques Helly reached Paris on Christmas night, three months after the battle. Only then was it known who had been saved for ransom. What was joy to some was a crushing blow to others. Not since the battle of Poitiers had such a calamity come to the noble families of France. There was great lamentation throughout the kingdom. Chief among the mourners was the Duchess of Burgundy, who had lost her three brothers, and whose son was in the hands of Bayezid.¹

While Jacques Helly was in France, Marshal Boucicaut was given permission to go to Constantinople to try to raise the ransom. He spent the Lenten season of 1397 there without success.² The Duke of Burgundy resorted to every expedient to raise the enormous sum demanded by Bayezid. For the ransom of his son ‘great taxes were laid upon all the kingdom, and a large amount of money was gathered and transported to Turkey, which was a great and irreparable loss’.³ It was not forgotten for many years. A decade later it was used as one of the indictments against the Duc d’Orléans,

¹ Froissart, xv. 329, 332, 342 f., 355–8; xvi. 16.
² Godefroy, Hist. de Boucicaut (1620 ed.), i. 16; Ducas, p. 52.
³ Chronique d’Enguerran de Monstrelet (ed. Douet d’Arcq), i. 332–3; Froissart, xvi. 57–9.
who met his death through the man he had helped to ransom.  
When, a year after the battle of Nicopolis, the money was at last delivered to Bayezid through the intermediation of Gattilusio of Mytilene and the Genoese, Venetian, and Cypriote merchants who traded with the Osmanlis, Bayezid gave the chevaliers their liberty. To the Comte de Nevers, he said: ‘John, I know well and am informed that you are in your country a great lord. You are young, and, in the future, I hope you will be able to recover, with your courage, from the shame of this misfortune which has come to you in your first knightly enterprise, and that, in the desire of getting rid of the reproach and recovering your honour, you will assemble your power to come against me and give me battle. If I were afraid of that, and wanted to, before your release I would make you swear upon your faith and religion that you would never bear arms against me, nor those who are in your company here. But no: neither upon you nor any other of those here will I impose this oath, because I desire, when you will have returned to your home and will have leisure, that you assemble your power and come against me. You will find me always ready to meet you and your people on the field of battle. And what I say to you, you can say in like manner to those to whom you will have the pleasure of speaking about it, because for this purpose was I born, to carry arms and always to conquer what is ahead of me.’

It is not true, however, as one would suppose and as Froissart records, that ‘these lofty words were always
remembered by Jean de Nevers and his companions so long as they lived. The French chevaliers went to Rhodes, and then home by way of the Adriatic. The Comte de Nevers took to himself a title which he had not earned, unless one confuses folly with valour. To the end of his days, he was known as Jean sans Peur. He never burned with a desire to wipe out the disgrace of Nicopolis, but spent his whole life as a factional leader in the civil wars of France. After a career which continued as ingloriously as it had begun, he was stabbed to death on the Bridge of Montereau in 1420—tardy vengeance for his own openly acknowledged instigation of the murder of the Duc d’Orléans.

XI

There is recorded the capture of Thebes by the Turks in 1363, and the surrender of Patras in Thessaly to the Osmanlis in 1381. The first Ottoman army, however, to enter Greece went to the Morea in 1388, upon the invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support his waning power as despot against the indigenous Greeks and the Frankish lords. The Osmanlis under Evrenos carried devastation everywhere they went, and did little to help Theodore. They were soon recalled by Murad to co-operate in the Kossova campaign. When Theodore was hard pressed, in 1391, by Amadeo of Savoy and the Venetians, he turned again to the Osmanlis. Once more Evrenos came to the Morea, and helped to destroy the coast towns.

1 Raynaldus, ann. 1364, No. XXVIII. Jireček, Gesch. der Bulg., p. 323, says that at this time ‘Osmanen erschienen in Attika’. He has mistaken roving Turkish corsairs of Sarukhan or Aidin for the Osmanlis. It must have been these Turks who attacked Thebes.
2 For the deliverance of the grand master of Rhodes, Jean Ferdinand d’Hérédia: Ducange, viii. 296.
3 Chron. Breve at end of Ducas, p. 516.
After the famous council of Ottoman vassals at Serres, in 1395, Theodore, who was one of the princes summoned by Bayezid to Serres, was compelled to sign the cession of Argos and Monembasia to the Osmanlis. He was then thrown into prison, and Bayezid contemplated having him assassinated. But before the cities could be delivered to the Ottoman emissaries, Theodore escaped, and declared the cession null and void. The first impulse of Bayezid was to send an army upon the heels of Theodore. This punitive expedition was postponed on account of the activity of Sigismund, and the necessity of defending the northern frontiers against the Hungarians.

In the spring of 1397, while Bayezid was superintending the construction of a mosque at Karaferia in Macedonia, he received a visit from the Greek bishop of Salona, who laid before him a formal accusation of adultery, sorcery, and oppression against Helena Cantacuzenos, who had been ruling the Duchy of Salona with her paramour after the death of her husband, Louis Fadrique. The bishop invited Bayezid to enter Greece, depicting to him the wonderful hunting he would have in a country full of game.

The promise of good sport with the falcon was not needed. It had long been Bayezid’s intention to extend his sovereignty into the Greek peninsula. He had against Theodore not only the old count from Serres, but also the complicity of the Morean despot in the Nicopolis crusade. At the head of his army, he set out upon the first Ottoman invasion of Greece. In Thessaly, Larissa, Pharsala, and other strongholds surrendered without striking a blow. For thirty years the Greeks of Thessaly had felt that the Ottoman conquest

2 Muralt, under 1395 and 1397, gives the same expedition. From internal evidence of Byzantine historians, one might put the Morean expeditions in either or both of these years. But cf. Chron. Breve, p. 516, and the silence of the Ottoman historians on an expedition in 1395.
3 Chalc., II, p. 67; Seadeddin, i. 192.
was inevitable. When Bayezid crossed the pass of Thermopylae without opposition, Helena hurried to meet him. She offered her principality, her daughter, and herself to the conqueror. Bayezid did not want the duchess. She was set at liberty immediately. But the beautiful granddaughter of John Cantacuzenos was sent to his harem. The duchy of Salona, in which was the shrine of Apollo, with all of Phocis, Doris, and Locris, was added to Thessaly, and made an Ottoman province.  

Bayezid by this time had tired of the campaign. He felt an irresistible call to return to the pleasures of the court. His military interests were beginning more and more to be centred upon an extension of his power in Asia Minor—the policy that was soon to prove his undoing. But there remained Theodore and the Morea to be dealt with. He left Yakub and Evrenos, with an army of fifty thousand, in charge of the invasion of the Peloponnesus.

Yakub struck south to Coron and Modon. The environs of Modon were pillaged and burned. He defeated Theodore at Megalopolis, and forced him to become a tributary of the Osmanlis. In the meantime, Evrenos had held in check the papal mercenaries at Corinth, and had then taken Argos by assault, with a terrible loss of life, and a booty of fourteen thousand male captives. Because the Venetians could so easily reinforce and reprovision it from the sea, the siege of Nauplia was abandoned. The two commanders, when October came, gave their soldiers licence to pillage wherever they could as a reward for their services, and afterwards withdrew to Macedonia.  

The population of the historic city of Argos was deported into Anatolia, and Moslem colonies settled in the north-eastern corner of the Peloponnesus. This was part of the general plan of Bayezid after Nicopolis. His successes in

1 Chalc., II, p. 67; Seadeddin, i. 192.
Asia Minor had made possible, for the first time, a movement of an unmixed Turkish element from Anatolia into the Balkan peninsula. While these colonists were arriving in Argos, there was a similar immigration to Adrianople, Eski Zagora, Philippopolis, and Sofia.¹

Bayezid is credited by the Ottoman chroniclers with the capture of the two great cities of Hellenism, Athens and Salonika. Nowhere else than in the Ottoman historians can one find a record of the acquisition of Athens in 1397 by the Osmanlis. If it were true, one would certainly find this event in the Venetian archives, for Venice was particularly interested in Athens at this time.² Had the Osmanlis entered Athens, would they have restored it to the Acciaijoli family? The fate of Argos in the same campaign makes this unlikely. Athens remained in Christian hands until after the fall of Constantinople.³

As for Salonika, one finds authority for its capture by the Osmanlis after the attempt of Manuel to retake Serres,⁴ after a four years’ siege, in 1387,⁵ and in 1391 by Bayezid himself.⁶ But since there is neither record nor explanation of how the city returned to the Byzantines, even the temporary occupation of so rich and important a maritime city, and so strongly defended,⁷ during the reigns of Murad and of Bayezid, is hardly possible. For in 1403 Salonika was sold by the Byzantines to the Venetians,⁸ and was not captured by the Osmanlis until 1430.

¹ Seadeddin, i. 193. ² The Venetians seized Athens in 1395, and sent Antonio Contareno to act as governor. ³ Hammer describes the capture of Athens in 1397 in i. 350, and again in 1456 in iii. 51. ⁴ Gibbon and Hammer follow Chalcoocondylas in this error. Cf. Berger de Xivrey, in Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr., vol. xix, partie 2, pp. 29–30. ⁵ Seadeddin, i. 180. ⁶ Ducas, 13, p. 50; Chalc., II, p. 59; Idris. ⁷ The land walls of Salonika, still standing, are eloquent proof of the difficulty which confronted their assailants before the days of cannon. ⁸ Phr., I. 17, p. 64.
Even if we cannot give to Bayezid the honour of the acquisition of Athens and Salonika, or of the conquest of the Morea, his campaign of 1397 was the beginning of the subjugation of Greece. Important districts had been added to the empire, and a permanent foothold gained in the Morea. The maritime character of the peninsula, however, made impracticable its complete conquest, until the Osmanlis were able to hold their own against the Italians and Greeks upon the sea.

XII

The blockade of Constantinople, in spite of all the concessions that Manuel had made to Bayezid,¹ had become an active and pressing siege before the Nicopolis expedition. In 1394, Bayezid had given orders from Adrianople to pursue the siege vigorously.² But it was not until the spring of 1396 that Bayezid contemplated seriously the taking of the city by assault. He was diverted by the coming of the crusaders to Nicopolis. After Sigismund and his allies had been defeated, Bayezid returned to Constantinople and called upon Manuel to surrender the city.

The Constantinopolitans, stunned by the disaster which had attended the Christian arms on the Danube, urged Manuel to yield, in order that they might be free from the calamities that would follow a successful assault. But Manuel had been cheered by the arrival of six hundred chevaliers and a small gift of money from France. He resisted his people, and gave no answer to Bayezid.³ He married his eldest son John to the daughter of the Russian prince Vassili, whose dowry was in gold pieces.⁴ An in-

¹ See p. 199. There is serious difference of opinion as to just when these concessions were made.
³ Ducas, 14, p. 53; Canale, ii. 62. Leunclavius, Annales, p. 52, puts this in 1391/2.
⁴ Karamzin (Russian ed. of 1819), v. 164.
ventory was made of the treasures of St. Sophia. Through the Patriarch, Manuel tried to get the Russian and Polish Christians interested in the fate of the seat of orthodoxy.

From Europe came the usual promises of aid. It is a merciful dispensation of Providence that men ground their hopes upon desires rather than upon realities. Manuel was merely human when he continued to receive strength and inspiration from what experience should have taught him were will-o’-the-wisps. Henry of Lancaster was projecting a new crusade; but his energies were very soon directed towards a crown rather than a cross. The Duc d’Orléans, in response to a letter from Manuel to King Charles VI, answered for his insane brother by promising to come in person to the relief of Constantinople. Almost immediately afterwards he accepted rich presents from Bayezid.

Venice, in 1397, urged Manuel and the Genoese of Pera, ‘for the honour of Christianity’ and because the alternative ‘would be to the peril and shame of Christianity’, not to treat with Bayezid. This advice was weakened by a saving clause at the end of the letter to the effect that, if the Constantinopolitans and Perotes did treat with Bayezid, they should include Venice, for ‘it would be too risky for the Venetians to be at war alone with the Turks’. Although Venice sent ten galleys to Constantinople, and Genoa five galleys, the republics followed consistently their policy of flattering Bayezid, and trying to make him believe that their dispositions towards him were altogether friendly.

At the time that he summoned Manuel to deliver Constantinople, Bayezid fortified the gulf of Nicomedia, and built

1 Miklositch-Müller, *Acta Graeca*, DCXXXVI.
2 Ibid., DXIV, DXV, DXVI.
3 Froissart, xvi. 132–3.
4 Religieux de Saint-Denis, ii. 559–62, 564.
5 *Secreta Consilii Rogatorum*, E iii. 138, 146, printed in Ljubić, iv. 404.
6 Ibid., p. 137.
at Scutari the castle called Guzel Hissar.\footnote{1} About the same time, the castle of Anatoli Hissar was built at the mouth of the Sweet Waters of Asia, the narrowest point on the Bosphorus. When Clavijo passed through the Bosphorus, in 1403, he spoke of this castle as strongly built and strongly fortified, in prophetic contrast to the ruined Byzantine fortress directly opposite on the European shore.\footnote{2}

Perhaps it was because of the advice of Ali Pasha, who told him that the taking of Constantinople would bring upon him a really effective European intervention, or because he preferred to expend his energies in the Greek peninsula and in Asia Minor, that Bayezid did not carry out his threat to Manuel. These are the common explanations of the failure to follow up the victory of Nicopolis with the extinction of the Byzantine Empire.\footnote{3} As far as the Greeks were concerned, the inheritance of the Caesars was his. He had successfully defended against Europe what he had won. Constantinople could have been taken by assault. In fact, from his spies within the city, Bayezid knew that the inhabitants were favourable to surrender, and would probably force the hand of Manuel, if the Osmanlis made a show of beginning the assault. Bayezid must have been deterred from this enterprise, however, by the realization of his inability to hold the city without having the mastery of the sea.

\footnote{1} Ducas, 14, p. 53; Chalc, II, p. 80; Sherefeeddin, iv. 38.
\footnote{2} 'El Guirol castello de Grecia está despoblado y destruydo y el dela Turquia está poblado': Seville ed., 1582, fol. 17 v°. Busbecq, i. 131, wrote: 'stand two castles opposite each other, one in Europe and the other in Asia... The former was held by the Turks a long time before the attack on Constantinople.' Busbecq was, of course, misinformed, as Rumeli Hissar was built in 1452. It is still standing in excellent preservation. Anatoli Hissar, of which only one tower remains intact, was built between 1392 and 1397. There is no way of determining the exact date. But Saladin, in Manuel de l'Art Musulman, i. 482, displays his usual inaccuracy concerning facts of Ottoman history, when he gives 1420 as the date for Anatoli Hissar.
\footnote{3} Phr., I. 14, p. 60; Chalc., II, p. 83; Ducas, 14, p. 53.
One of Bayezid's chief claims to greatness as a statesman is the way in which he handled Venice and Genoa. At any time during his reign, the Italian republics could have cut him off from Asia if he were in Europe, or from Europe if he were in Asia. Bayezid was master of most of the Balkan peninsula and of half of Anatolia; but he did not control the path from one portion of his empire to the other. Since he had come to the throne, Genoa had fallen under the influence of France. There was a strong anti-Ottoman sentiment in the Venetian Senate, which at any instant might crystallize into open hostility. Europe was for the moment stirred over the fate of the Nicopolis crusaders. Bayezid knew that this was not the time to take Constantinople.

Then, too, after the great victories of Kossova and Nicopolis, and his successful campaign against Karamania, Bayezid allowed himself to succumb to the insidious temptations that assail the warrior when he passes from the tent to the palace. It was not astonishing that the pleasures of the table and of the harem proved irresistible to him. Bayezid, who had the best qualities of his age, allowed himself to become debauched by indulgence in shameful and unspeakable vices. His brilliant mental and physical qualities began to suffer the inevitable eclipse. His example was contagious. For, as the Osmanlis say, 'the fish begins to corrupt at the head'.

XIII

In April 1398, and again in March 1399, Boniface IX ordered to be preached throughout Christendom a crusade for the defence of Constantinople. His appeals fell on deaf ears. Wenceslaus was approaching the end of his power in the empire, Richard of England was fighting for his

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2 Epp., v. 26, 99, 293–5.
throne, Florence was in a struggle with the Visconti, the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Orleans were disputing the regency in France. Only Venice and Genoa were vitally interested in the fate of Constantinople. Because Genoa had put itself under the guardianship of the Duke of Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, and son-in-law of Duke Giovanni Visconti of Milan, the interests of her Pera colony demanded some attention from the powerful Valois and Visconti families. This made possible the sole response to the appeals of Manuel and the Pope, the expedition of Marshal Boucicaut.

In the summer of 1399, a force of ten thousand Osmanlis, after coming into more or less open conflict with the Genoese off Galata, attempted to enter Constantinople. The defenders were few; for the inhabitants, as at the time of the final siege in 1453, were more likely to be found in the bazaars than on the city walls. They had little desire to prolong a condition which was paralysing their business activities. Clavijo, who visited Constantinople four years later, was informed that the attack failed only because of the lack of skill and energy shown by the Osmanlis. Until they had cannon to help them, the Osmanlis never displayed fighting ability in an assault upon fortifications. At this critical moment, aid arrived from Europe.

Boucicaut was the only one of the prisoners of Nicopolis that accepted the challenge of Bayezid. He did not forget the biting words of the audience at Brusa at the time of their release. On June 26, 1399, with four ships and two armed galleys, he set sail from Aiguesmortes. His force of twelve hundred chevaliers and foot-soldiers had much more cohesion and experience than the volunteers who gathered round Jean de Nevers at Dijon three years before. He was joined at Tenedos by several Genoese and Venetian galleys. After a

1 Edition of Seville, 1582, fol. 16 v°-17 r°.
victory in the Dardanelles over seventeen Ottoman galleys, the first recorded naval combat of the Osmanlis, Boucicaut reached Constantinople 'just in time to save the city'. He was received with great joy by Manuel, and given the rank of Grand Constable.¹

For several weeks, Boucicaut and his followers spread terror among the Osmanlis in the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Bosphorus. The Ottoman sailors, no match for the Provençals and Italians, took to cover. An assault on Nicomedia failed, but the fearless marshal made several raids into the interior,² and against the Ottoman settlements on the shores of the Marmora and gulfs of Nicomedia and Mudania. His one notable success was against Riva, near the Black Sea entrance of the Bosphorus, on the Asiatic shore.³ After the castle had been stormed, and the garrison put to the sword, Boucicaut attained the objective of his raid. In the mouth of the river Riva, from which the town takes its name, were hidden the Ottoman galleys and smaller vessels, which had taken refuge there when Boucicaut first appeared in the Golden Horn. All the Ottoman shipping was destroyed by fire.

In order to remove the danger to which Constantinople was subjected by the presence of John Palaeologos, son of Andronicus, at Silivria, constantly intriguing with the Osmanlis, Boucicaut urged Manuel to become reconciled

¹ My account of this expedition is taken from MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds fr., No. 11432, Livre des faicts du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut. For printed editions, see Bibliography.
² The chronicler makes the most astonishing assertions as to these raids, saying that the chevaliers reached Ak-Seraï! He evidently had no idea of local geography. I have been unable to identify several of the places mentioned.
³ I have walked in one day from Riva to a point on the Bosphorus not many miles above Constantinople. When one reads the history of the Osmanlis in the country of their origin, the fact that from the very beginning of their history they were practically within sight of the imperial city is vividly impressed upon one.
with his nephew. He went himself—it was less than a day's sail—to fetch John to Constantinople.\(^1\)

This intervention of Boucicaut in the quarrels of the Palaeologi was more helpful than his military aid. The expeditions in the neighbourhood accomplished little against Bayezid. The chronicler of Boucicaut would have been astonished had he known that Bayezid considered the exploits of Boucicaut's chevaliers and sailors of too little importance to notice. Bayezid cared only that the Italian republics did not come out openly against him, and lend to the crusaders the powerful and decisive aid which they could have given. The enterprise of Boucicaut demonstrated, however, the impotence of the Osmanlis on sea, and how easily a united effort of Christendom, or of Venice and Genoa alone, could have limited the activities of Bayezid to either Europe or Asia.

When John had been installed as co-emperor, Boucicaut pointed out to Manuel that his force was exhausted, and that he would have to return to France to find recruits. According to some authorities, this action was due to the inability or unwillingness of Manuel to pay the adventurers of Boucicaut for their services in his behalf.\(^2\) Men of their kidney were not fighting for fun or for a cause, and there was no booty to be had from Ottoman sailors and fishermen. Before he left Constantinople, Boucicaut secured the consent of Venice, Genoa, and the chevaliers of Rhodes to his suggestion that Manuel do homage to Charles VI for his empire. This honour

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\(^1\) The Byzantine historians give little attention to Boucicaut, and are in contradiction with his chronicler on this point. Phr., 15, p. 61, says that John, who had been in the court of Bayezid, fled to his uncle because he had been slandered to Bayezid, and was afraid for his life; and Chalc., II, p. 84, that it was John who commanded the 10,000 Osmanlis against the city, and that Manuel shared the throne with him in order to save the city. Muralt, ii. 762, is a year in advance of the actual date.

\(^2\) Chron. de Saint-Denis and Juvenal d'Ursins. But these are really the same source, according to Lacabane, Bibl. de l'École des Chartes, ii. 62.
the advisers of the French monarch refused to accept. They did not want the king of France bound by the obligation of protecting a vassal whose position was so precarious.

Boucicaut did not return. His restless energy found outlet later in Cyprus, where, as French governor of Genoa, he forced the Cypriotes to raise the siege of Famagusta, and in pillaging the Syrian ports, where his adventurers did far more damage to the Italian merchants than to the Saracens. Even had he returned to Constantinople, and with the highest motives personally, his followers would certainly have done the Constantinopolitans more harm than good, as had been the case with the Catalans, and, when money was not forthcoming, have ended by being in open conflict with those of whom they were posing as the defenders.

XIV

It was a bitter humiliation for Manuel to share the imperial throne with the nephew whom he hated and distrusted. With him, the case of John was one of 'like father, like son', and certainly John had never given the emperor any cause to think that he was more patriotic, more loyal than Andronicus. But there was a strong party in the city in favour of John, and his association in governing Constantinople would remove the pretext of righting a wrong, which Bayezid had so skilfully used to interfere in the politics of what was now no more than a city empire.

When France refused to receive him as a vassal, Manuel decided upon a voyage in person to solicit the intervention of Europe. In spite of his misgivings, he felt that this was the only way of salvation left. His own sons were too young to raise to the purple, and Theodore had his hands full in the Morea. There was nothing to do but to leave the government in John's care.

1 Foglieta and Stella, in Muralt, ii. 778, No. 61.
On December 10, 1399, Manuel embarked on a Venetian galley to make his supreme appeal to Europe. He stopped at Modon to leave the empress and his sons with Theodore. The despot of the Morea was opposed to the project. He told the emperor how the chevaliers of Rhodes, in conjunction with the Pope, were trying to get possession of the last theme of the empire, and that this scheme would have been successful had it not been for the Greek hatred and fear of the Catholic Church. He declared that Manuel, like their father, was embarking upon a hopeless voyage. Not only that, but he would run a risk of losing his empire entirely by leaving it in charge of John, who was more friendly to Bayezid and the Osmanlis than to his own family and race.¹

Manuel would listen to no remonstrances, to no arguments. He said that his position was like that of Esther before she went in to the king: ‘If I perish, I perish.’ With that optimism which was one of his most redeeming traits, Manuel bade farewell to his family, and set out for Venice.

In the only city of Europe that could rival his own capital in splendour, he received a reception worthy of the cause for which he had come. The Senate, as usual, promised much. But they had by this time become thoroughly won over to the policy of *quod vi armorum potest fieri, fiat arte et sagacitate*, to quote the words of a contemporary record in their archives.² At Padua, Vicenza, and Milan, Manuel received an imperial ovation. Giovanni Visconti, shocked at the wretched appearance of the emperor's suite, gave him money to be used for apparel fitting to the successor of Constantine and his companions.³

There was no attempt to arrange a conference with

¹ Chalc., II, pp. 83–4; Ducas, 14, pp. 54–6. For Rhodes and the Pope in the Morea, Phr., I. 16, p. 63; Bosio, ii. 154.
² September 10, 1400, in Misti, xlv. 33.
³ Livre des faicts, fol. 53 r⁰–55 r⁰, and Wylie, pp. 159–65. Wylie has collated admirably the sources on Manuel's visit.
Boniface IX. Manuel, at this stage of his career, could not play the hypocrite so easily as his father had done. In fact, his orthodoxy was beyond suspicion. He did not hesitate in Paris to celebrate high mass according to the eastern rite, and never allowed the reunion of the churches to be the basis of his solicitations. In 1399, Boniface IX wrote a long burning letter to the Bishop of Chalcedon, his nuncio in Hungary, ordering him to preach and cause to be preached a crusade against the Osmanlis for the relief of Constantinople.¹ In 1400, he had ordered a crusade, with increase of indulgences.² But, when the Byzantine Emperor came to Italy, Boniface seemed to be more interested in the Kingdom of Naples than in the Kingdom of God.

From contemporary records, the reception of Manuel Palaeologos in France and in England was all that the proudest and most important sovereign of Christendom could wish for. This shadow of an emperor, who ten years before had been a retainer at the court of Bayezid too insignificant to be bidden to the emir's table, and who was not even undisputed ruler of a single city, was treated by Charles VI and Henry IV as if he actually held the dominions entrusted by Constantine to his successors. This was especially true in England, where barons and peasants, in spite of the crusades, were still uncouth and ignorant. To them the East stood for a superior civilization, to which they must bow. There was a glamour in the name of Constantinople and in Manuel's imperial title. Perhaps, even if they had realized the straits to which Manuel was reduced, it would have been the same; for it was not to the intrinsic worth or power of the man, but to the ten centuries of glory which he represented, that they did homage. The cry of Ave Imperator had outlived the empire.

Manuel did not appreciate this. Because his optimism

¹ Text is published in Theiner, ii. 170–2.
² Epp., v. 300–2; vi. 92.
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could not grasp the difference between what costs and what does not cost, he allowed himself to be cradled with false hopes for two years.

Henry IV had personally great sympathy with the mission of Manuel; for in Africa he had borne arms against the Moslems with the cross upon his breast, and, until he succeeded Richard II, it had always been his dream to lead a crusade. He understood the peril of Constantinople, and in a letter from Westminster, in January, 1401, he called the attention of the Archbishop of Canterbury to the necessity of helping Manuel, in order that Constantinople might not be lost, and authorized a collection in all the churches of his realm. But Henry was not secure upon his throne. In France, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans were still struggling for the power that the insane king was unable to wield.

Manuel waited two years in western Europe. While he was making his heart sick with deferred hope, the great events that were to change the personal fortune of Bayezid, if not that of his family and his race, were shaping themselves in the East. It was a Moslem prince who was to afford a respite to Constantinople.

After Manuel left for the west, only the small force of chevaliers under Châteaumorand, who had remained behind from the crusaders of Boucicaut, saved Constantinople. The inhabitants of the city were so hungry that they slipped over the walls by cords, and surrendered themselves to the Osmanlis. John did nothing. There was no money in the imperial treasury. The crusaders got their

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1 Cum Dom. summus Pontifex advertens quod perfidus ille Baysetus Princeps Turchorum, manu potenti et brachio extento in Christianum Populum maxima feritate extitit debachatus ad Exterminium Civitatis Constantinopolitanae et universitatis Populi Christiani nisi eius nephanda propositio resistatur, omnes et singulos qui, pro Liberatione et Subsidione Manuelis Imp. Cnpi et dictae Civitatis suae, Manus adiutrices porrexerint . . . etc.: Rymer, vol. iii, part 4, pp. 195-6.
own provisions by raids on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, and by intercepting galleys. After the shock of the fall of Sivas, Bayezid realized that he must expend the best of his force and energy in solidifying his conquests in Europe and Asia, and in raising a larger army to combat Timur, if he threatened again to invade Anatolia.

Although the siege was not pushed with vigour, the city was on the point of yielding. The miserable John made a treaty to give up the city, should Bayezid beat Timur. Even the patriarch Matthew was supposed to have an understanding with Bayezid to retain his position if the city were taken. In a proclamation, which vividly depicted the misery of the city, afflicted by six years of siege and famine, Matthew urged the inhabitants to repent of their crimes, and defended himself from the charge of having treated with Bayezid.

Not only against Constantinople was Bayezid preparing the final blow. In the Morea, the Greeks feared for the safety of Modon, where Manuel had left his family. Since 1399, the Venetian Senate had been alarmed by the gradual Ottoman conquest of Albania, and finally for the safety of Corfu, because the Osmanlis had appeared in force in the Adriatic.

In the early spring of 1402, Ottoman activities ceased in the Balkan peninsula, and every soldier that could be mustered—Christian as well as Moslem—was hurried into Asia Minor; for a greater than Djenghiz Khan was marching westward.

XV

When the Tartars first saw iron, and their strongest warriors failed to bend it, they thought there must be a

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1 Clavijo, who visited Constantinople the following year, reports this, fol. 7 v°.
2 Miklositch-Müller, Acta, DCXXVI.
3 Strikingly shown in letter of April 20, 1402: Canc. Seer., i. 58.
4 Misti, xlv. 19–23, 25–6, 29–30, 35, 87; xlvi. 37. Several of these are published in Ljubić, iv. 579, 590.
substance under the surface. So they called it *timur*, which means something stuffed or filled.\(^1\) It soon became a custom to name their great leaders Timur. But even among primitive peoples the qualities of leadership have not necessarily included purely physical strength. Many Samsons among the Tartars received the distinction of being called Iron. None of them made an indelible mark upon the history of the world, save the great Timur, who had his left arm and left leg partially paralysed.\(^2\) At the height of his career, when his hordes marched against Bagdad, he was too weak to sit upon a horse, and was carried in a litter.\(^3\)

Timur claimed descent from the grand vizier of Djagataï, son and successor of Djenghiz Khan. He came to the throne of Khorassan, with residence at Samarkand, in 1369. In thirty years, while Murad and Bayezid were winning an empire in the Balkan peninsula, Timur became master of the greater part of the Moslem world. Persia, Armenia, the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the steppes between the Caspian and Black Seas, Russia from the Volga to the Don and Dnieper, Mesopotamia, the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and western and northern India was his path of conquest.

After he had captured Sivas, Bayezid had not been able to curb the altogether natural impulse that led him into the valley of the Euphrates. In his way stood Kara-Yussuf, a Turcoman prince of Kharput, who was to be, after Timur's death, the founder of the famous dynasty of the Black

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1 Knoelle, in *Journal R. A. S.* (1822), xiv. 125; Nöldeke, in *ZDMG.* (1859), xiii. 185, n. 6.

2 'Toutesfoiz il a la main senestre et pie senestre comme impotent et ne s'en puet aider, car il a les nerfs coppez': Dominican Friar, p. 463. 'Infirmus, ut dicitur, a cingulo infra': Stella, in Muratori, vol. xvii, col. 1194. Cf. Sherefeddin, i. 55, 381. The English corruption Tamerlane is from Timurlenk, the latter syllable signifying lameness.

3 Sherefeddin, ii. 222.
In 1399, Bayezid had put his son Soleiman, assisted by several of his ablest generals, in charge of an advance movement to the east. Sivas was the base of operations.

Kara-Yussuf, who had a claim upon Timur's protection because he had guided him on his first expedition into Armenia, appealed to the Tartar court. Before Timur could remonstrate, Kara-Yussuf was captured by the Osmanlis. When Timur learned this, his anger was for the first time directed specifically against Bayezid. There were old complaints against Bayezid. The refugee emirs had not lived at his court for years without impressing upon Timur their woes and the injustice that had been done to them. But Timur was busy with other plans and other conquests. Bayezid's former activities had not directly touched him.

In his memoirs, Timur records that he tried first to bring Bayezid to reason. 'I wrote to him a letter of which this is the substance: Praise to God, master of heaven and earth, who has submitted to my authority several of the seven climates and who has allowed the potentates and masters of the world to bend their neck under my yoke. God have mercy upon his humble servant, who knows the limits which are prescribed for him and who does not cross them by a single step. All the world knows your origin, and it is not fitting for a man of your extraction to advance the foot of pride; for you will be able to throw yourself into the abyss of affliction and of misfortune: resist the suggestions of miserable counsellors... Refrain from opening to confusion and to evils the door of your empire. Send me Kara-Yussuf: if not, by the coming together of our two armies all that is hidden under the veil of destiny will be uncovered to you.'

1 There is an excellent account of the dynasties of the Black and White Sheep, with list, following Mirkhand, in Teixera, ii. 24-30, 69-70. For the later activities of Kara-Yussuf, Teixera, ii. 355; de Guignes, iii. 302.

2 Langlès translation, p. 260.
Instead of paying attention to this letter, Bayezid deliberately committed another overt act by summoning Taharten, emir of Erzindjian, whom he knew to be a vassal of Timur, to appear at the Ottoman court, bringing his treasures with him! When Timur again remonstrated with Bayezid and reminded him of his duty 'gently and like a friend', Bayezid responded by summoning Timur to appear before him, and threatening to deprive him of his harem if he refused to come. In order to express his contempt for the Tartar conqueror, Bayezid placed his own name first in letters of gold, and Timur's name underneath in small black letters.¹

Why Bayezid took this tack in dealing with Timur is inexplicable. It is impossible to believe that he underrated the power of Timur. One can only suppose that his informants and advisers, to whom Timur alluded in the first warning to Bayezid, urged upon the Ottoman emir the improbability of a Tartar invasion of Asia Minor; for, even after the terrible lesson of 1400, when Bayezid had two years of respite, he took no steps to placate Timur or to prepare adequately against an invasion. He went on blindly to his doom, and displayed none of the consummate diplomatic and military skill that had made the first eight years of his reign among the most brilliant of all Ottoman history.

When Timur saw that Bayezid would not even treat with him, he took the field immediately. Soleiman sent an appeal to Bayezid, who was in Thessaly.² There was no response. With feverish haste, Soleiman attempted to put into condition the defences of Sivas, whose strong walls had been admirably constructed by the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin Kaikobad

¹ Ibid., pp. 258-62; Shereffeddin, iii. 255-62; Clavijo de Gonzáles, fol. 25 r°-26 r°.
² Chalcocondylas and Raynaldus are wrong in calling him Ertogrul, and in stating that he was killed in the subsequent siege. Shereffeddin, iii. 267, calls him Mustafa, and Schiltberger, p. 18, Mohammed. That it was Soleiman is proved by the agreement of the Ottoman historians with Arabshah, p. 124, and with Clavijo, fol. 26 r°, whose 'Musulman Tehelebi' is Soleiman.
one hundred and sixty years before. He then went boldly forth to meet the Tartars, but, when he realized that his twenty thousand horsemen could not hold their own against Timur, he withdrew to the north-west, abandoning the city to its fate.

It took Timur eighteen days of incessant attack to weaken the defences of Sivas. The walls were sapped, and piles driven under them, which were smeared with pitch and set on fire. Only after several of the towers had fallen did the garrison agree to surrender upon Timur's promise that their lives should be spared and the whole city preserved. As far as the Moslems were concerned, this promise was partially fulfilled. They were allowed to pay for their freedom. The city, however, was pillaged and burned, and its Christian inhabitants were sold into slavery. Three or four thousand Armenian horsemen, who had been bravest and most stubborn in the defence, were buried alive in the moats.

The destruction of Sivas was in August, 1400. The conduct of Timur after this victory lends colour to the supposition that it was not at all in his mind to subdue Asia Minor and overthrow the Ottoman Empire. He had come not to conquer, but merely to give Bayezid a salutary lesson. Instead of continuing his westward march, Timur withdrew to the Euphrates, and spent the next eighteen months in the

1 Hadji Khalfa, Dijhannuma, vol. ii, fol. 1776.
2 Clavijo, fol. 26 r°; Arabshah, p. 125.
3 Clavijo, fol. 26 v°–27 r°; Arabshah, p. 125; Sherefeddin, iii. 267–9; Dominican Friar, p. 264; Schiltberger, p. 18. Schiltberger says 21 days, and 5,000 horsemen buried, and 9,000 virgins carried off by the Tartars.
4 It is impossible to understand why Muralt, with all the authorities he had at hand, places the taking of Sivas in 1395: Chronographie Byzantine, ii. 753, No. 26. The contemporary authorities cited above establish the date. Cf. also letter from Crete, in Jorga, Notes à servir, &c., i. 106, n. 3. There is a full discussion of the proper dating of the Ottoman aggression against Sivas, Caesarea, and Erzindjian, and the probability of two Ottoman campaigns, one before and one after Nicopolis, in Bruun's note to the Hakluyt edition of Schiltberger, pp. 121–2.
famous campaigns that ended in the destruction of Damascus and Bagdad.

XVI

In the winter of 1401–2, fresh from his triumphs in Syria and Mesopotamia, Timur paused for several months on the confines of Asia Minor. He had not yet made up his mind to attack Bayezid.

Through a Dominican friar, who had been trying to convert him, he wrote to Charles VI of France, whom he believed to be the most powerful king of the Occident, making to him a proposal for sharing the world, such as no European sovereign had put before him again until Alexander met Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit. There was also an exchange of gifts and embassies with Genoa. The Genoese ambassador pointed out to Timur the necessity of destroying Bayezid. When the Tartar embassy went to Pera, the standard of Timur was flown in its honour from the Galata tower. Even the distant king of Castile had two ambassadors in the camp of Timur, who were privileged to witness the battle of Angora from the Tartar side.

The fall of Sivas was the first set-back of Bayezid’s career. It came to him as a heavy blow, if we are to believe the Ottoman chroniclers. But it did not result in spurring him on to immediate military and diplomatic effort, as such a calamity would certainly have done in the early days of his reign. He had become a voluptuary, debauched mentally and physically. His pride and self-confidence had increased in inverse ratio to his ability to make good his arrogant assumptions.

1 The letters exchanged between Charles VI and Timur are preserved in the French archives. The Turkish text of these letters, with Latin translation, is published by Charrière, introd., i. 118–19.
2 Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1194.
3 ‘En la qual batalla se acaescieron Payo de Soto Mayor e Hernan Sanchez de Palaçuelos Embaxadores’ : Clavijo, fol. 1 r°, col. 2.
Negotiations were reopened between the two great sovereigns of Islam. The letters became more menacing on the part of Timur and more insulting on the part of Bayezid. Timur’s earlier admiration for Bayezid as champion of the Prophet against the infidels, and his earlier reluctance to make war against a nation of his own faith, had disappeared in the course of his last conquests. The fire at Damascus was one indication of Timur’s religious indifference: his willingness to treat with Christian Europe was another. At last determined to humble Bayezid, Timur brought his huge army into camp near Sivas. He did not, however, definitely decide upon the invasion of Ottoman territory until he heard that Bayezid was starting for Tokat.

To strike at Bayezid directly was impracticable, owing to the hardships that his large army would encounter in traversing the thickly wooded and mountainous country between him and the region in which his spies reported the Ottoman army to be. He followed the valley of the Halys to Caesarea. By keeping to the water-courses his army was enabled to live off the land. It was just harvest time, and the soldiers gathered in all the grain in the valley of the Halys and its tributaries. It took six days to get to Caesarea, and four days more to reach Kirsehir. In the meantime, the advance guard of the Osmanlis had fallen back from Tokat and Amassia to Angora. By a reconnaissance from Kirsehir, Timur learned that the bulk of the Ottoman forces were at Angora. Three days more brought him to the Ottoman outposts.


2 Sherefeddin, iv. 1–6. For description of route from Sivas to Angora, Hadji Khalifa, Djihanuma, ii. fols. 1803–4. Timur’s own account of his march and the battle of Angora is very brief: ‘Je pris moi-même le chemin d’Ancouriah. Bayezid, suivi de 400,000 hommes, tant cavaliers
There was no further parley. Timur saw in Bayezid an enemy that must be crushed. He had every confidence in his star. Bayezid had hardly recovered from the awakening which came when he realized that Timur was actually marching against him. His resourcefulness, his coolness, his marvellous judgement had left him. His soldiers were exhausted by forced marches in the hot midsummer sun, for it was the last week of July.¹ He could have withdrawn for several days to the mountains to recuperate, and let Timur do the seeking. Then Timur would have expended his strength in an attack upon Angora under the broiling sun. Timur could not have left Angora uncaptured behind him, or have moved westward in pursuit of the Osmanlis without waiting to replenish his food supply. But Bayezid, eager and lacking in self-control, as men sometimes are from the presentiment of disaster rather than the confidence of success, decided upon an immediate battle. This was just what Timur wanted.

Bayezid's second mistake was in putting his Tartar allies in the first line. He did this in accordance with the established Ottoman tactics, that the enemy be allowed to expend his strength upon the untrained rabble, and to reach the second line exhausted. But he had not taken into consideration the fact that these Tartars were kin to his enemy,

¹ A great deal has been written about the date of Angora, but all authorities agree in putting it between July 20 and July 28, 1402. Cf. Art de vérifier les Dates, i. 193; Silvestre de Sacy, in Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions, vi. 488–95; Moranville, in Bibl. de l'École des Chartes, iv. 437–8. A few early western writers have given 1397 and 1403, while Petits de la Croix, in his French translation of Sherefeddin, is a decade too late in all his dates. The latter part of July 1402 is fixed by all contemporary authorities on this battle. Abu'l-Mahasin, in his history of the reign of the Egyptian sultan Barkok, states that the greater part of Bayezid's army perished by thirst before his capture.
and could easiest desert when placed in front.\(^1\) A third mistake was in taking the offensive rather than waiting for Timur to attack;\(^2\) for Bayezid had the advantage in being able to choose his position. From Nicopolis to Plevna, Tchataldja and Gallipoli, the Osmanlis have always shown their fighting qualities best in a defensive action.

There was nothing the matter with Bayezid’s army. Like the empire he had been building, it was composed of all the Moslem and Christian elements of Asia Minor and the Balkan peninsula. With the exception of the Tartars, they were loyal to Bayezid, and had become accustomed to fighting together with a discipline and bravery fully equal to, if not superior to, that of Timur’s veteran warriors from central Asia. The right wing was under Stephen Lazarevitch, brother-in-law and faithful friend of Bayezid. In addition to Serbian horsemen, Stephen’s command contained the other European contingents, Moslem as well as Christian.\(^3\) In the left wing were the troops of Anatolia, led by Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s eldest son. The emir himself was in the centre, surrounded by his janissaries and his three sons, Mustafa, Isa, and Musa. To Mohammed, whose reliability and judgement Bayezid esteemed second only to Soleiman’s among his sons, was entrusted the rear guard.\(^4\)

Elephants were used on both sides. Timur’s first line threw balls of Greek fire into the midst of the archers who were covering the Ottoman advance. The desertion of the

\(^1\) On the nationality of the Tartars who betrayed Bayezid at Angora, see the latter part of the note of Bruun on the ‘White Tartars’, in the Hakluyt ed. of Schiltberger, pp. 114–17.

\(^2\) From the account of the Dominican Friar, pp. 458–9, it seems clear that Bayezid was the aggressor until after Soleiman’s command had been cut to pieces.

\(^3\) Sherefeddin, iv. 8–12; Dominican Friar, p. 458.

\(^4\) Afterwards Mohammed I. Many western writers have confused him with his nickname of Kiritchelebi (Girigilibi in Rabbi Joseph, i. 257, and a variety of spellings in other early writers), and made him thus his own father, to account for the later Sultan Mohammed.
Tartar auxiliaries, who formed a quarter or more of Bayezid's total strength, decided the battle before the fighting really started. When Bayezid saw that he could not prevent the Tartars from going over to Timur, he ordered the left wing to advance to the attack.

Fifteen thousand men fell in a vain effort to pierce the Tartar lines. The slaughter was so great that Soleiman was unable to rally his forces. When they broke and fled, the offensive movement of the Osmanlis was at an end. Bayezid, now on the defensive, was driven back step by step. His retreat was cut off. With his bodyguard and the refugees from other battalions, he made a gallant fight upon a small hill, holding off the enemy for hours. Long after nightfall, when the main forces of Timur's army, who had been pursuing the Osmanlis, returned to the scene of victory, they learned that the Ottoman sovereign was still fighting on the hill. There was no more hope for Bayezid. The last of the defenders were overwhelmed. 'The Thunderbolt continued to wield a heavy battle-ax. As a starving wolf scatters a flock of sheep, he scattered the enemy. Each blow of his redoubtable ax struck in such a way that there was no need of a second blow.' At last, as he tried to

1 In this battle I have used Shereffeddin, Arabshah, Dominican Friar, in Bibli. de l'École des Chartes, iv. 437-68, Schiltberger, Clavijo, and the invaluable letters in Marino Sanuto, Muratori, xxii. 794-7. The authorities for Angora and Timur are classified in the bibliography below.

2 Shereffeddin, iv. 15, says the carnage in this battle was seven times greater than in any of Timur's previous victories. The Dominican Friar, p. 459, puts the Ottoman losses at 40,000.

3 Schiltberger, p. 21, says that he retreated to this hill with 1,000 horsemen. Hammer is in error in saying that Bayezid 'resisted like a hero at the head of his ten thousand janissaries with whom he had occupied the slope of a hill': ii. 91. There were never as many as ten thousand janissaries enrolled in the Ottoman army until a century after Bayezid's death. See above, p. 119. In oriental historians numbers are almost invariably exaggerated at least tenfold.

4 Solak-zadé, p. 63. Shereffeddin and Arabshah bear witness to Bayezid's personal courage.
withdraw over the hill, he was overpowered, his hands were bound behind his back, and he was sent to Timur’s tent.

With Bayezid, his son Musa and several of his highest officials, one of whom was Timurtash, were taken prisoners. Mustafa disappeared. Soleiman, Mohammed, and Isa succeeded in escaping.

The battle of Angora is memorable in Ottoman annals as the only crushing defeat experienced by the Osmanlis in the first three centuries of their history, and as the one instance where a sovereign of the house of Osman has been captured. But it cannot be placed among the memorable conflicts that have changed the course of history; for it did not affect the fortunes of the nation that won or of the nation that lost. It was not like Kossova and Nicopolis.

XVII

Bayezid was brought before his conqueror at midnight, when Timur was seeking relaxation from the strain of the combat in his favourite game of chess with his son, Shah-Rokh. Bayezid had lost nothing of his haughty spirit, and did not try to win the good graces of Timur. He was never more the sovereign than in this moment of humiliation. So impressed was Timur with the manner and bearing of his prisoner, that he accorded him every honour due to his rank.

But this spirit of generosity quickly passed. Whether it was because Bayezid tried to escape or that Timur feared an attempt at rescue as he marched farther into Ottoman territory, Timur’s attitude soon changed. To break Bayezid’s spirit he began to mock him and treat him with

1 The Ottoman historians explain the capture of Bayezid by the fact that he was unhorsed. Some say that he was mounted on an inexperienced horse. A great deal was written about the battle of Angora at a much later date, but, as in describing the battles of Kossova and Nicopolis, I have limited myself to contemporary sources.

2 Mustafa’s fate was never cleared up. Mohammed and Isa fled naked, according to the Dominican Friar, p. 459.
contempt. He ordered him to be put in chains at night, and to be carried on the march in a litter with bars, which was nothing less than a cage. At Brusa, Bayezid’s harem

1 I am unable to agree with Alberi, Rel. Ven. Ambasc., 3rd ser., vol. i, preface viii., ‘Secondo migliori testimonianze deve rigettarsi per falsa la tradizione’, and Bruun, Notes to Hakluyt ed. of Schiltberger, p. 21 n., ‘We are forced to conclude, after Hammer’s searching inquiries, that there is no truth whatever in the story of Bayezid having been confined by Timur in an iron cage’. Hammer’s arguments, ii. 96–101, do not seem to me at all convincing. From the philological point of view, they have been refuted by Weil, Gesch. der Chalifen, ii. 92. From the historical point of view, there is just as strong evidence for as against the litter with bars, which could hardly have been any different from a cage. If one argues that Timur did not subject his prisoner to this indignity, and advances that the cage was really nothing more than a closed litter, such as was used for ladies of the imperial harem, he is merely substituting one indignity for another. From the character of Bayezid, one would infer that the humiliation of being shut up like a lion in a cage would have been less than that of being put into a harem litter like a woman, for whom the conqueror had contempt rather than fear. There is no mention of the iron cage in Schiltberger, Clavijo, and the Dominican Friar. But their silence signifies nothing. They are excellent witnesses for the battle of Angora itself, but knew little or nothing of what happened in Asia Minor after Angora. One might just as well argue from Schiltberger’s silence that Timur did not capture Smyrna! Nor does Sherefeddin mention the humiliation of Bayezid, and the iron cage. But the story is given in Arabshah, p. 210, who must be reckoned with as a contemporary source. If, as de Salaberry, iv. 200–1, claims, the iron cage story was inserted in Arabshah by his Ottoman editor and translator, Nazmi-zadé, it only goes to show that the careful Ottoman students of his time believed the story. The Ottoman historians, who are without exception too late to be regarded as sources, and who had reasons for making the degradation of the Ottoman sovereign as slight as possible, show their knowledge of the early and contemporary character of this record by trying to controvert it, and prove that Bayezid was carried on a litter rather than in a cage, e.g. Seaddeddin, i. 230. That the common tradition among the Osmanlis, outside of the court chroniclers who were compelled to uphold at all costs the dignity of the house of Osman, was in favour of the cage story is proved conclusively by Ali Muhieddin, Migne ed., col. 507, who is earlier than Seaddeddin, and by Evliya effendi, i. 29–30; ii. 21–22, who gives the story just as we find it in Arabshah and the western writers. Sagredo, who follows Spandugino, vigorously defends the cage story as opposed to the litter of the Ottoman court chroniclers, and says that Bayezid died from striking his head against the bars of his cage, pp. 25–6. In Lonicerus, fol. 12 v°, is a picture of the cage. It is mentioned by Guazzo, fol. 275 v°;
was taken from him. It has been recorded that Timur went so far as to use his unfortunate rival as a footstool for mounting his horse and at the table, and that Bayezid was compelled to witness the degradation of his wife, the Serbian princess Despina, who in a state of nudity served the Tartar conqueror with wine at his feasts.¹

This disgraceful treatment, coupled with the fact that his sons made no attempt to bring another army to fight for their father's freedom or even to ransom him, at last broke the spirit of Bayezid. For nine months he had been held up to ridicule in the Tartar army. He had seen his harem violated. He had seen Timur pass with ease from one portion of the Ottoman possessions in Asia to another. Smyrna, which he had never been able to attack, fell before the Tartars. The Turkish emirs whom he had dispossessed were settled again in their states. When Bayezid learned that he was to be taken to Konia, and then to Samarkand, his mind gave way. He died of apoplexy at Ak Sheir.² Timur allowed Musa to take his father's body to Brusa for burial.³ He had by this time lost interest in the Osmanlis and Asia Minor, and was dreaming of new fields of conquest.

Donato da Lezze, p. 10; Paolo Giovio; Geuffry, p. 283; Campana, fol. 8 v°; Egnatius, p. 30; Rabbi Joseph, i. 256; Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 791; Bonincontrius, col. 88; Formanti; and Timur's early western biographer, Perondino, p. 31, who, fifty years before Seadeddin, wrote that Timur compelled Bayezid's wife Despina to wait nude upon him and his guests at table. The story is also found in Ducas, chapter 26.

¹ Perondino, p. 31; Sagredo, p. 26; Campana, fol. 8 v°; Raynaldus and Spandugino; Lettres d'un Solitaire turc, i. 106-7. Exposure of women was a common symbol of conquest among the Mongols. It was a formal ceremony at the sack of Pekin and Djenghis Khan's sack of Samarkand.

² Many authorities declare that Bayezid committed suicide by striking his head against the bars of his cage, being unable to support the sight of his wife's disgrace. The humiliation to which Despina was subjected was often given in later times by the Osmanlis themselves as a reason why the house of Osman does not contract marriages. See above, p. 183, and note.

³ Sherefeddin, iv. 65-7; Chalc., III, pp. 162-5; Duc., 17, pp. 77-8; Phr., I. 26, p. 85; and the Ottoman historians.
Bayezid died a victim not 'to his destiny', as the Ottoman historians put it, but to his vices, and to his abandonment of the policy of his predecessors, that assimilation should keep pace with territorial aggrandizement. There never need have been an Angora. Timur had no inclination to invade the Ottoman dominions. Bayezid goaded him into it. Even if the test of an Angora had been necessary, Bayezid would have sustained it and weathered the Tartar storm, had he been the same man he was at Nicopolis. In facing a Tartar invasion, the advantage was all on Bayezid's side. He failed because his mental and physical faculties, which rivalled, if they did not surpass, those of any man of his age, had become impaired by a life of debauchery.

XVIII

After the victory at Angora, the Tartar hordes swept across Asia Minor. Timur sent his grandson, Mohammed-Sultan, in pursuit of Soleiman, who succeeded in escaping from Brusa just as the Tartar horsemen arrived at the gates of the city. The Tartars stabled their horses in the mosques, while the city was ransacked for its treasures and its young girls. Fire followed pillage. The sons of Alaeddin of Karamania were set free, and Bayezid's wives and daughters, with one exception, were sent to Timur, who had established his residence at Kutayia.

In the search for Soleiman, of whose movements he was in ignorance, Mohammed-Sultan sent soldiers north to Gemlik and Nicaea, and west to Mikhalitch and Karasi. These cities were pillaged, and their inhabitants reduced to slavery.

1 The Dominican Friar says that the Jews of Brusa sent a delegation of rabbis to inform Mohammed-Sultan that their religion was the same as his. He answered that their law was a good one, and that they should assemble all their people in the chief synagogue. He promised that no harm would come to them. When the Tartars entered the city, they sealed fast the doors of this synagogue, and set fire to it.
When Mohammed-Sultan learned that Soleiman had escaped to Europe, he sent an embassy to him demanding unconditional surrender. There was no reply. The question of invading Europe was referred to Timur. In the meantime, the advance guard of the Tartars devastated the country which was the cradle of the Ottoman race, while their commander celebrated at Yeni Sheir his marriage to the eldest daughter of Bayezid. Thus were united the families of Timur and his vanquished foe.¹

Mohammed-Sultan went into winter quarters at Magnesia.² Timur left Kutayia in charge of Shah-Rokh, and moved on to Ephesus. He recalled the columns which had been devastating western Asia Minor, and concentrated his forces against Smyrna. What Bayezid had been unable to accomplish in seven years, Timur did in two weeks.³ The assault of Smyrna was carried on with unceasing energy, and every possible measure was taken to bring it to a speedy conclusion. The walls were undermined, and bridges built out over the water in order that an attack might be made from the side of the sea. When the fortress which crowns the hill behind the city was entered from the land side, the chevaliers of Rhodes fought their way down to their galleys. With lance and sword and oar they beat off the despairing inhabitants who would have swamped their boats. All except a thousand succeeded in escaping. These were decapitated, and of their heads Timur built a pyramid to commemorate his victory.⁴

Timur returned to Ephesus. As he approached the city, children came out to meet him, singing songs to appease

² Seadeddin, i. 235.
³ Sherefeddin, iv. 47, 52.
⁴ Accounts of the capture of Smyrna: Sherefeddin, iv. 47-53; Chalc., III, p. 161; Duc., 18, p. 78; Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1949; Arabshah, ii. 24. For date, see M. de Ste. Croix, in Acad. des Inscriptions, 2e série, ii. 566, 569.
his wrath. 'What is this noise?' he asked. When his attendants told him, he ordered his horsemen to ride over the children. They were trampled to death.\(^1\)

Smyrna fell in December, 1402. Timur spent the rest of the winter in Ephesus. He destroyed the work of Bayezid in Asia Minor by restoring to the deposed emirs or their heirs the emirates of Karamania, Tekke, Menteshe, Sarukhan, Aïdin, Kastemuni, and Erzindjian. When he saw that the sons of Bayezid were ready to quarrel about the succession of their father, he began to treat with Isa, Musa and Mohammed, encouraging in each the hope of recognition as sole heir. To Soleiman he sent a diploma, investing him with the Ottoman possessions in Europe as Tartar vassal.\(^2\)

Timur enjoyed the position he had won of arbiter of the destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The princes of Europe were now seeking his favour more insistently than before Angora. Henry IV of England wrote to him most cordially, and expressed the hope that he would be converted and become the champion of Christianity.\(^3\)

Manuel Palaeologus, who had learned from the Venetian Senate the news of Bayezid's defeat at Angora, hurried home from Europe.\(^4\) He banished John to Lemnos, expelled the Ottoman colonists from Constantinople, and closed their tribunal.\(^5\) To Timur he sent an embassy offering to acknowledge his suzerainty, and expressing his willingness to pay to him the tribute that had been given to Bayezid.

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2 Ducas, 18, p. 79.

3 'Would that the day might dawn in which your Highness would profess the religion of Christ, and stand up in power as the champion of the Christian Church against the enemies of the cross.' In the London archives, however, this passage, while legible, is cancelled. So it may not have gone in the copy of the letter sent to Timur. Cf. Wylie's *Henry IV*, i. 316 and n. 4.

4 *Misti*, xlvi. 47.

5 Ducas, 18, p. 78; Phr., i, 15, p. 62.
But when Timur responded with an order to prepare a fleet to help the Tartar hordes to pass into Europe, Manuel was seized with panic. Smyrna had just fallen, and he felt that a similar fate was now reserved for Constantinople. An ambassador was sent to Rome and Venice to implore the immediate aid of the Vatican and the Senate.¹

Timur, however, had become tired of Asia Minor and the western campaign. He had no constructive policy. He never attempted to organize his conquests into a world empire. Like the earlier conquerors of his race, Timur was a raider. Satiety came with destruction and victory, that is, satiety for the particular conquest in which he was engaged. So he turned his back on Constantinople and the glittering possibilities of a European invasion. He wanted to return to Samarkand to enjoy the fruits of his victories. Perhaps his character was only the reflection of that of his followers.

The march had hardly started when Bayezid died at Ak Sheîr, in March, 1403. From this moment Timur forgot all about the Osmanlis. After a brief sojourn at Konia, he left Asia Minor. Within two years he died of fever while on his way to conquer China.²

XIX

After Angora the Ottoman army could have been annihilated; for Timur sent his victorious Tartars hot upon the heels of the refugees. Not only did they follow Soleiman to the Sea of Marmora, and the divisions which had retreated to the Bosphorus, but they pursued closely the main body of

¹ Phr., loc. cit.; Innocent VII, Epp., i. 212–13.
² Wylie, i. 321, says Timur died February 19, 1405, on authority of Schiltberger. But this date is in Bruun's note, p. 133, and not in Schiltberger's narrative. According to Clavijo, fol. 57 r°, Timur died November 18, 1404, while Arabshah, p. 248, says '17 Sagban, 807', which would be in February 1405. For his abandonment of Asia Minor, Chalc., III, p. 182; Duc., 17, p. 76; Sherefeddin, iv. 88–95.
the army, which, to the number of possibly forty thousand, had fled along the customary line of march to the Dardanelles. There Greeks and Latins vied in helping the refugees to cross. A Venetian eye-witness of the crossing of the Bosphorus wrote that the Venetians in good faith offered to join with the Genoese in refusing to transport the Osmanlis who were crowded upon the Asiatic shore. But the Genoese started secretly to ferry them over to Europe, with the aid of the Greeks. Then the Venetians, fearing to lose favour with the Osmanlis, started in to help. This testimony is corroborated by Clavijo, who visited Constantinople in the following year. He adds that Timur was disgusted with the way the Greeks and Latins failed to co-operate with him in destroying the Ottoman army.

The astonishing fact is then clearly demonstrated that Greeks, Venetians, and Genoese made no effort to take advantage of their great opportunity. Nor did they, during the ten years of civil war that followed the death of Bayezid, make any move, in concert or separately, to drive the Osmanlis out of Europe. When it was not yet certain what Timur would do in regard to Asia Minor, or even whether he would invade Europe, the Venetians and Genoese established with Soleiman at Adrianople the same friendly relations that they had been so careful to maintain

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1 Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1195.
2 Sanuto, in Muratori, xxi. 791, quoting an eye-witness.
3 Gerardo Sagredo, quoted by Sanuto, ibid., p. 796. He admits that this action was foolish and ruinous.
4 'El Emperador de Constantinopola e los Genoueses de la ciudad do Pera, en lugar de tener lo que con el Tamurbec auian puesto, dexaron passar los Turcos de la Grecia en la Turquia e desque fuera vencido aqueste Turco passaauan ellos mismos a los Turcos con sus fustes de la Turquia en la Grecia de los que venian fuyendo, e por esta ocasion tenia mala voluntad el Tamurbec a los Christianos de que se fallaron mal los de sa tierra.' Clavijo, fols. 26 v°–27 r°.
5 'Qui s'ensuivra Dieu le sache. Témir Bey tout seul scet son propos et non aulbre qui vive': Dominican Friar, p. 459.
with his father, and fought each other in the Bosphorus. Pope Boniface was straining every nerve to help Ladislas of Sicily to win the crown of Hungary against Sigismund, who, alone of the princes of Europe, had his hands been free, might have contested the Balkan peninsula with the warring factions of the Osmanlis.

The decade of civil war among the sons of Bayezid passed without interference from the outside world, and without a single uprising on the part of the subjugated Balkan Christians. The house of Osman, although divided against itself, did stand. In 1413, Mohammed I, triumphing over his brothers, became sole sovereign of the Osmanlis. The crisis was over, and the career of conquest, interrupted for the moment by Timur, was resumed.

Nicopolis had proved that the Osmanlis could hold against Europe what they had won. Angora had proved that they were too firmly rooted in the Balkan peninsula and in north-western Asia Minor, as an indigenous race and as a nation, to be destroyed by the misfortunes of their dynasty. Since the test of possession is ability to hold, in foul weather as well as in fair, who can deny that the Osmanlis under Bayezid had inherited the Byzantine Empire?

1 Epp., vii. 144-60.
APPENDIX A

TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OSMANLIS AND THEIR EMPIRE

What has been said in this book on the origin of Ottoman power and the foundation of the empire is so different from statements which have found acceptance up to this time, that I am under the obligation to justify my position by a more technical discussion, and by a fuller citation of authorities, than has been given in Chapter I. I shall deal with these misconceptions singly.

1. That Osman was a Prince of Illustrious Birth.

Chalcocondylas is responsible for the first and widest diffusion of this error in western Europe. He claims that Osman is the great-grandson of Duzalp, 'chief of the Oghuzes'; grandson of Oguzalp, who, aspiring to succeed his father, reached 'in a brief time the highest fame in Asia'; and son of Ertogrul, who, in 1298,1 with his fleet, devastated the Peloponnesus, Euboea, and Attika.2 Closely allied to the account of Chalcocondylas is that of Hussein Hedarfenn.3 According to Ali Muhieddin,4 Seadeddin,5

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1 The dates given under the Latin columns in Chalcocondylas are almost invariably wrong and are responsible for much of the confusion of European historians in the matter of chronology. Chalcocondylas himself is full of mistakes, and knew very little about the history of Byzantium and the Osmanlis in the fourteenth century. But he is not as bad as his Latin translator, whom the historians have followed. In order to trace some of the errors, I collated the Greek text of Chalcocondylas with the Latin translation through the first two books of his history, which cover the period 1300–1403. The glosses and the inexact translations are many. For example of glosses, in I. c. 4 B, 'quos Tartaros nominant' after Scythiis; I. c. 7 C, 'Orthogulus adhibitus in colloquium', at beginning of third sentence; I. c. 10 C, 'ex tribus, Orchanes nomine', after 'filius eius natu minimus'; I. c. 12 C, 'circiter viginti duo' in the sentence 'Orchanes cum regnasset annos mortem obit'. For a very unfaithful translation compare Latin with Greek original in I. c. 27, the end of A and beginning of B. In I. c. 28 C ἔξι τρίτην καὶ τρία χρόνια is translated 'triginta septem!'. The letters cited refer to column position in Migne edition.

2 Chalcocondylas (in Migne), I. 6, p. 22.


5 Bratutti trans., i. 4.
and Hadji Khalfa, the grandfather of Osman was Soleiman Shah, prince or bey of Mahan in the Khorassan, who was compelled to leave his country at the approach of Djenghiz Khan, and lived seven years in Armenia. As he was returning home, he was drowned in the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Ertogrul and Dundar, turned back into Asia Minor, and were, through the kindness of the Seljuk Sultan, Alaeddin I, given a residence near Angora, and, later, on the confines of Bithynia. Neshri places the time of residence in Armenia as 170 years, and declares that Soleiman Shah was leader of 50,000 families. Practically all of the European historians who have written later than the publication in Europe of Chalconondylas, Ali and Seadeeddin have followed closely these authorities.

The western writers, whose works appeared before the translation and publication of the eastern historians, or who followed earlier western authorities, are either vague or uncertain concerning the parentage of Osman, or give an entirely different story of the rise of his family. He is supposed to be the son of a Tartar shepherd, called Zich, who rises to fame at the court of Alaeddin I by defeating in single combat a Greek cavalier that had killed many of the favourites of the Seljuk Sultan. According to others, who give nearly the same story, the name of Osman’s father is the madman Delis, a shepherd. For his success in killing the Greek, the Sultan rewards him with the castle of

1 Chronological Tables, Italian trans. of Carli Rinaldo.
2 Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, xiii, 188–9.
3 For editions, translators and dates of publication, see Bibliography.
4 Egnatius, cited by Cuspinianus, 12, says: ‘Ottomanus obscurus loco et parentibus agraris natus’. Nicolaus Euboicus, Saguntinus Episcopus, Sylvius Aeneas, and Andreas a Laeuna say that Osman, of obscure beginnings, arose through oppressing neighbours, Moslem as well as Christian. Ab. Ottellius says, ‘Tam Graecis quam Turcis repugnantibus’, cited by Leunclavius, Pandectes, 99. Bosio, ii. 37, declares, ‘Osman first came out of Persia’. Similar vagueness in Haeniger; Guiffroi, 266; Sagredo; Manutio, 3; Cuspinianus, 11, 42; Barletius, in Lonicerus, iii. folios 231–2; Vanell, 356; Cervarius; Richer, 11.
5 De Sacy, in Notices et Extraits, xi, 56, foot-note 1, in his discussion of the text of a treaty between Genoese of Kaffa and Janko, Lord of Solkat, where this word also occurs, suggests that it is an altered form of ‘sheik’.
6 Formanti: Donado da Lazzæ, 4; Paulo Giovio, Ven. ed. of 1541, 3; Vertot, ii. 97; Rabbi Joseph, ii. 503; Guazzo, 257 v°; Ortellius in Leunclavius, Pandectes, 99; Lonicerus, 10; Spandugino, 182–4. Also Evliya effendi, i. 27.
Ottomanzich, which is often confused with Sugut, and is claimed to be the origin of Osman's name.\(^1\) By another story, which is asserted to be the invention of Mohammed II, who thus wanted to legitimatize in the eyes of the world his claim to the throne of the Caesars, Osman is the descendant of a certain Isaac Comnenus, a member of the imperial Byzantine family, who fled to the court of the Seljuks of Konia, and became a Moslem.\(^2\)

In this, as in the discussion of other misconceptions which follow, we are not at all justified in throwing out categorically the testimony of the early western writers every time that they conflict with the eastern authorities, or in ignoring them entirely, as Hammer, Zinkeisen, and Jorga have done. We must remember that Chalcocondylas and all the Ottoman historians are very late, that they cite no sources upon which to base their assertions or inferences, and that they write with the intention to please, and under the necessity of pleasing, the Ottoman court, at a time when its rulers had become so powerful that they could not brook the recording of an humble origin for their royal house. The extravagant descriptions of Seadeddin, for example, when he speaks of Osman's court, and his expressions such as 'laying his petition humbly at the feet of his royal master', &c., seem much out of place in a narrative about primitive and exceedingly plain and simple people. The western writers claim to have sources for information which are as early and as good as those of Ali and Seadeddin. Some of them certainly had.\(^3\) We cannot claim for these writers that their stories be accepted as fact. But we can claim that they be accepted as an honest reflection of late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century opinion concerning the founder of the Ottoman royal house—opinion derived from stories which were current in Constantinople at that time, and which, for

\(^1\) Formanti; Donado da Lezze, 4; Cuspianus, 48; ibid., Ant. ed., 6; Spandugino, in Sansovino (ed. 1654), 243; Egnatius, 28. Also travels of Busbecq, Eng. ed., i. 137, and the Ottoman Evliya, ii. 95.

\(^2\) This story in full in Formanti, 2–3; Vertot, ii. 97–8; Spandugino, 183. Leunclavius, in Pandectes, 103, says that Nicetas Choniates mentions such a renegade Comnenus, but calls him Isaac.

\(^3\) The author of *Tractatus de ritibus*, who was a slave captured by Murad II, for example. Also Spandugino, a native of Constantinople, and relative of the Cantacuzenos and Notaras families. Also Donado da Lezze. See the prefaces of editions of Charles Schéfer, of Spandugino; and of Professor Ursu, of Donado da Lezze.
lack of definite history, were circulated among the Osmanlis themselves up to a very much later period.¹

The later western historians have taken, without critical examination, the Ottoman accounts of the origin of their royal family, as they have of the relationship with the Seljuks of Konia, practically at their face value. But it is not hard to prove a good case against the Ottoman historians.

The story of Soleiman Shah, prince of Mahan and leader of 50,000 families, living and ruling in the neighbourhood of Erzerum between 1224 and 1232, is very easy to disprove. The name of Mahan is often given to two cities, Dinewer and Nehawend.² It is rather the designation of a plain in which these two cities lay. In 1229, Sultan Djelaleddin, after his defeat by the Mongols at Mughan, passed the winter in the plain of Mahan. A certain Izzeddin was lord of the fortress there. He had been rebellious some years before, but was now serving Djelaleddin devoutly.³ In the history of Djelaleddin, I find absolutely no mention of a Soleiman Shah in connexion with Mahan or any other place in that region. With 50,000 families, Soleiman Shah would have been a factor in Armenia between 1224 and 1232. For that is precisely the time when Djelaleddin, Sultan of Kharesm, his logical suzerain or his enemy, was struggling with the Seljuks of Konia in that very region! In 1229, Djelaleddin was at Erzindjian, and ravaged the whole country.⁴ At the same time, a cousin of Alaeddin I, a very powerful ruler, Rokneddin, was lord of Erzerum, and was strong enough to be at enmity at the same time with Djelaleddin's invading army and with Alaeddin of Konia.⁵ Other Arabic historians, and the Seljuk historian of this period, confirm the history of Mohammed-en-Nesawi in its leading points, but they, no more than the historian of Djelaleddin, make any mention whatever of a Soleiman Shah, or of an Ertogrul.⁶ Nor is Soleiman Shah and his family mentioned

¹ Evliya effendi, a learned member of the Moslem Ulema of Constantinople, who travelled widely in the seventeenth century in the Ottoman Empire, is continually making statements which show that he had a very hazy notion of early Ottoman history. This is true also of Hadji Khalifa, the famous bibliographer, in his Djahannuma, a work which I have tested and found incomplete and unreliable both in its geographical and historical information about the region which gave birth to Osman and his tribe.

⁴ Ibid., 394. ⁵ Ibid., 209, 328.
⁶ Shehabeddin, 230–9, 263–72, 289–91, in describing Khorassan, Armenia,
in any of the Arabic genealogies prior to the seventeenth century, although these exist in great numbers.\(^1\) There is only one Ottoman genealogy prior to the tables of Hadji Khalfa.\(^2\)

The best authority on the western Turks, the late Léon Cahun, conservator of the Mazarine Library in Paris, declares that the Turkish tribes of the time of the purported Soleiman Shah and Ertogrul had no family ties. They knew no rank other than that of a man higher up in the army. In inheritance, the younger son got the land, and the older sons the movable possessions of the father. There were no family names; there are none to this day. The Turks who came into Asia Minor were without name or family. They wandered far and sold their services to get established family ties.\(^3\)

There is one more testimony concerning the humble origin of the Ottoman royal house. The different historians of the relations between Timur and Bayezid I all speak of the taunt flung by Timur at Bayezid concerning the Ottoman ruler’s lack of royal ancestors.\(^4\) Bayezid never made any response to this taunt, and confined his boasting, which was by no means of a modest sort, to his own and his father’s achievements, and to his power as a European ruler.

We cannot establish the ancestry of Osman. It is altogether probable that he had none of note, but was what Americans would call ‘a self-made man’.

and the strife between Djelaleddin and Alaeddin, makes no mention of Soleiman Shah or Ertogrul, or of a formidable invasion such as 50,000 families, under one ruler, would certainly have been regarded. Nor is there mention of the 50,000 and their leader in Ibn-Bibi, Seljuk chronicler of this period.

\(^1\) Hadji Khalfa, in index of his Bibliography, iii. folios 133-5, speaks of more than sixty Arabic genealogies known to him, but in his chronological tables he cites none of them for early Ottoman genealogy.

\(^2\) Dourar-al-Othman, ‘the precious pearls touching the original source of the Ottoman house’, by Ibn Ali Mohammed-al-Biwy. No date or indication of contents. Hadji Khalfa in Dictionnaire bibliographique, Paris MS., i. folio 867.

\(^3\) Introduction à l’histoire d’Asie : Turcs et Mongols, passim.

\(^4\) There is a letter of this sort to Bayezid, quoted in Timur’s Institutes. Also a letter, given by Sherefeddin, iii. 259-63, near the beginning of which he says: ‘But you whose true origin ends in a Turcoman sailor, as all the world knows.’
2. That Osman began his career as a vassal of Alaeddin III, Sultan of Iconium, upon whose death, in or about 1300, Osman and nine other Turkish princes divided the inheritance of the Seljucides; that Osman proved more powerful than the other princes, and founded an empire upon the ruins of the Seljuicide Empire.

When I call this statement, in its entirety, a misconception, I realize that I am attacking the idea of the founding of the Ottoman Empire which has been voiced by the most eminent historians and has an accepted and unquestioned place in textbooks and encyclopaedias, and in general histories.

In a French translation of Chalcocondylas, published in 1662, under the woodcut of Osman, we find these four lines:

'De simple Capitaine en des Pays déserts,
Prés du grand Saladin la Fortune m'attire;
Et là de ses débris je fonde cet Empire,
Qui menace aujourd'hui d'engloutir l'Univers.'

I quote this verse because it seems to me to express concisely the commonly accepted idea of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, as I find it written everywhere. Hammer, whose eighteen volumes contain a wealth of material upon the Ottoman Empire not elsewhere to be found, and who shows remarkable erudition as well as care and critical powers, perpetuates the tales about Ertogrul and Osman and the court of Konia. He makes the categorical statement, 'The empire of the Seljuks broke up, and on its ruins arose that of Osman.' Creasy has popularized the opinion of Hammer in the English-speaking world. Lane-Poole, who has written the only general history of the Ottoman Empire in English in our generation, has tacitly accepted the common tradition. Zinkeisen and Jorga, the only later historians whose names can be coupled for scholarly work with that of Hammer, are most unsatisfactory in their failure to take up critically the Ottoman traditions of the early days of the

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1 'L'empire des Seljucides s'écroula, et sur ses ruines surgit celui d'Osman,' Hammer, i. 83.
2 i. 7-13.
3 In the Story of the Nations Series. This book does not do credit to the name of the great scholar whom Orientalists and numismatists universally honour.
Empire. Leunclavius, the sole writer in Western Europe before Hammer, whose work might be called 'scientific', discusses exhaustively and compares critically all authorities existing at his time (1590) on most minute points of early Ottoman history, but is almost silent on the grave inconsistencies and contradictions arising from the question of the relation between the Osmanlis and the Seljuks of Konia. There is the same silence in Cantemir and his translators. The latest Ottoman historian says: 'Osman's military and political career naturally divides itself into two parts, that in which he was vassal of Alaeddin, and that in which he became sultan.' An Oriental whose work has enjoyed great vogue in France declares: 'Osman pursued through every obstacle the realization of his plan, which consisted in founding upon the ruins of the Seljuk Empire a great, free, and independent state.'

I find one German scholar who, briefly touching upon the foundation of Osman's power, rejects or ignores the connexion with the Seljuks of Konia; but he goes further afield, and makes the astonishing statement that Osman conquered Bagdad, allowed the Khalifs only spiritual power, called himself Sultan, and became master of the Moslem world, thereby connecting the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia with the Mameluke conquest of Egypt, and attributing it all to Osman!

If we had good ground for rejecting the princeely origin of Osman, our justification for impugning and discarding the connexion of Osman with the Seljuks of Konia is stronger still.

Kâî Kobad Alaeddin, the only Sultan to whom the name of

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1 In the Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Werk 15 (1840–63) and Werk 37 (1908–13).
2 Leunclavius, Pandectes. This work will be found in all large libraries, because it is reprinted in volume 159 of Migne's Patrologia Graecae Latine, 715–922.
3 For translations of Cantemir, see Bibliography. The Rumanian translator, Dr. Hodosiu, has reprinted the notes of the various editors of Cantemir, which makes his edition the most valuable.
4 Youssouf Fehmi, Histoire de la Turquie, Paris, 1908, p. 11.
6 'Osman verband sich mit der Leibwache in Bagdad, eroberte die Stadt, setzte sich auf den Thron, wodurch er der Beherrscher aller Muhammedaner wurde, und liess dem Chalifen nur die nichts bedeutende geistliche Oberhoheit in Bagdad; er nannte sich Sultan, d. h. Herrscher, und starb 729 (1328 n. Chr.).' Prof. F. Wüstenfeld, Geschichte der Türken, &c., Leipzig, 1899, pp. 15–16.
Alaeddin is given by common consent,¹ died in 1236.² He was succeeded by Kaī Khosrew II, Giazzeddin, or Ghizatheddin, who was Sultan at the time of the great Mongol invasion of Asia Minor. In the spring of 1243, Erzerum was sacked without having received any help from Konia. Some months only after this event did Kaī Khosrew move. He was defeated at Mughan, near Erzindjian, in a decisive battle,³ and fled to Angora, abandoning his baggage. Erzindjian fell next. Then Kai Khosrew withdrew to Sivas, and from that city sent an embassy to the Mongols, making his submission and promising an annual tribute of four hundred thousand pieces of silver. The Mongol armies penetrated as far as Smyrna. Everywhere submission was complete, although no effort was made to provide a new government for the conquered regions in the western part of the peninsula. The Emperor of Trebizond became a vassal of the Mongols.⁴

The battle of Mughan cost the Seljuk Empire its independence.⁵ After 1246, when Kaī Khosrew died, the situation of the Seljuks of Konia is depicted by Shehabeddin in these words: ‘The princes of the family of Seljuk kept only the title of sovereign, without having any authority or any power. There was left to them only that which concerned their own person and their houses, the insignia of royalty, and sufficient money for expenses of an indispensable necessity. The power belonged to Tartar governors, who managed everything without opposition. It was in the name of the princes of the family of Djenghiz Khan that

¹ Reineccius thought that this name must be common to all the Sultans of Konia. It does not appear for others than Kai Kobad II in the Arabic genealogies. Leuncelavius is so confused by the discrepancy here that he concludes that the Ottoman historians must have given the name indiscriminately to all the Sultans! (Pandectes, 106). Hadji KHALFA, Djihan-numa, folio 1790, speaking of Amassia, says that its fortress was repaired by ‘Sultan Alaeddin the Seljucide’. It is typically Ottoman to be vague about names as well as about dates. Hadji Khalfa frequently speaks of an Ottoman Sultan, whose name is duplicated, without any following ordinal. There is often no clue in the context to identify the Sultan to whom he refers.

² As the year of the Hegira began in June in 1240, there is the alternative of reckoning the Christian era a year later during the middle period of this century. But I have not thought necessary to indicate this alternative each time.

³ Villani, book VI, c. 32, in Muratori, xiii, col. 175, describes this battle; also Vie de Saint Louis, by Le Nain de Tillemont (ed. Gaulle), iii. 4.

⁴ Abulfeda ; Howorth, iii. 47.

⁵ This is the opinion of two of the ablest modern scholars, Heyd, i. 534, and Sarre, p. 41.
the public prayer was made, and that gold and silver money was struck.1 When the dynasty of the Seljucides had arrived at the last degree of weakness . . . races of Turks seized a large part of these countries. . . . The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of the prince of Kermian.2 There is not a word of any possible Ottoman supremacy even in his own day, fifty years later. Every source on the latter half of the thirteenth century which I have consulted corroborates the testimony of Shehabeddin.3 I have space to give only a few of the facts which I have gathered concerning the fortunes of the Sultans of Konia during the period 1246–1300, when Ertogrul and Osman are pictured by the Ottoman historians, and by the European historians who have followed them, as basking in the sunshine of Seljuk imperial favour.

After the death of Kaï Khosrew, the empire was divided between his three sons, who, however, seemed to rule in common as vassals of the Mongols, for their names were asserted to appear together on coins in 1249.4 During the decade after the conquest, the Mongols overran western Asia Minor. We read that Sultan Rokneddin went with the Mongol general, Baïchu, into winter quarters in Bithynia,5 and that Baïchu received orders from Khulagu Khan in 1257 to pillage the entire Seljuk dominions. In 1264, Abulfeda gives Rum, with its capital as Konia, among the provinces ruled by Khulagu.6 Bibars, Sultan of Egypt, succeeded in occupying Konia for a brief time in 1276.7 In 1278, Abaka Khan opened negotiations with Haython, king of Little Armenia, with the view of making him Sultan of Rum. In 1282,

1 I can find no record of coins to controvert this statement. Lane-Poole, Mohammedan Coins in the Bodleian Library, 41, gives only one coin of the Bodleian collection after 641 of the Hegira, and to this he assigns the date a.h. 663 with a question mark.
3 The lists of coins in I. Ghalií Edhem’s Monnaies turcomanes also bear eloquent testimony to the disappearance of Seljuk vassal dynasties during this period.
4 I have not heard of such a coin existing to-day, but make the statement on the strength of Abulfaradj, Chronicon Syr., 527–8.
5 Abulfaradj, ibid., 542–3; Howorth, iii. 69.
6 Abulfeda, v. 15–16, under date of a.h. 662. Villani (in Muratori, xiii), VII. c. 40, column 261–2, describes how Abaka Khan chased the Saracens (sic) from ‘Turchia’, and also the ‘Re d’Ermiàia’, who ‘lasciò a Tartari la Turchia’.
7 Huart, Souvenirs de voyage, 164, speaks of the battle, but does not mention occupation of Konia.
Bibars, writing to Ahmed Khan, says: 'At this moment Konghuratai' (a Mongol general) 'is in the land of Rum, which is subject to you and pays you taxes.' 1 In 1283, Ghizatheddin, who was ruling with the merest semblance of royalty in Konia, was deposed by Ahmed Khan, exiled to Erzindjian, and replaced by Masud. There was anarchy everywhere in Asia Minor at this time. 2

The distinguished French Orientalist, M. Huart, who studied in Konia itself the inscriptions of the Seljuk Sultans, could find nothing after this period to indicate that the two final sultans who followed Ghizatheddin were more than playthings of the Mongols. 3

The testimony of Marco Polo is most precious to us here. When he passed through this country in 1271 he says that Konia, Sivas, Caesarea and many other cities of 'Turquemanie' were subject to the Tartars, who imposed their rule there. 4 It was his impression that the Turcomans were subject to local rulers, and responded to no central authority.

The last days of the Seljuks are most obscure. Masud ruled until 1296, when he was deposed by Ahmed Khan. For two years there was no ruler. Whether Firamurs ever ruled is a matter of doubt. 5 The last Sultan is generally given as Kaï Kobad, who remained Sultan for four or ten years. 6 However, there was no Sultan actually ruling as sovereign in Konia either in 1290 or in 1300. Neither Masud nor Kaï Kobad could have

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1 Abulfaradj, Chronicon Arab., 365-7; d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols, ii. 570-80; Howorth, iii. 295.
2 Howorth, iii. 315.
3 Konia, Ville des Derviches tourneurs, 177.
4 'Ils sont souspost au Tartar de Levant, qui y met sa seigneurie.' Edition of Pauthier, 37.
5 Hadji Khalfa naïvely solves this doubt by rolling Masud and Kaï Kobad into one and the same person. Dijhannuma, folio 1752 bis.
6 There is no way of reaching certainty on this point. Rasmussen, Annales Islamici, pp. 34-8, reflects the confusion which attended the scholar of the early nineteenth century who wanted to make a chronological table of the later Seljuk Sultans. The two best modern tables are to be found in Sarre and Huart, scholars who became interested in the Seljuk problem through their archaeological travels in Asia Minor. The best account of the Seljuks is that of Houtsma in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is to be regretted that Professor Houtsma has not published the French translation of Ibn Bibi, which he promised in his introduction to the 4th volume of the Leyden series of Seljuk texts. Three years ago, Professor Sir William Ramsay, who knows Konia better than any European scholar, told me that he felt there was rich reward for the research student in the Seljuk period. The history of the Seljuks of Konia has yet to be written.
given Osman feudal rights or a charter of independence. There was no dissolution of the Seljuk Empire in 1307. In all except mere name, it had become extinct before Osman was born.

The Mongol conquerors never extended their political system to western Asia Minor. But, from 1246 to 1278, the Anatolians, Moslem and Christian alike, were in constant terror of the Mongol hordes. After 1276, the Mongols were too occupied with the Mamelukes of Egypt, and with the dissensions arising in the eastern part of their great empire, to pay much attention to the remote Turkish tribes of Rum. During the last quarter of the thirteenth century, there was no change in the status quo of the Seljuks at Konia that affected in any way the fortunes of these tribes. We can explain their rise into independent principalities, not by the disappearance of the Seljuk Sultans, but by the diversion of Mongol energy to other quarters.

Among early western writers there was great divergency of opinion about the number of the ‘Seljuk heirs’. I have found them represented as one, three, four, five, and seven. Pachymeres, if we can trust the text of the Bonn edition, is the earliest writer to mention the traditional number of ten. When the Seljuk Empire fell before the Mongols, it had no heirs in Asia Minor. During the latter half of the thirteenth century and the first quarter of the fourteenth century (1250-1325) an innumerable number of village chieftains endeavoured to form states. There were many more than ten. The states which existed at the beginning of the reign of Orkhan I have put into another appendix.

There is no record of Osman having attacked his Turkish neighbours. The testimony of the best Ottoman authorities is categorical on this point. Orkhan extended his father’s

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1 Osman was the sole heir according to Boecker: also Donado da Lezze, 4.
2 ‘Osman, Karaman, and Assam. Karaman retired to Syria and Assam to Persia. The house of Osman always persecuted the descendants of these two latter.’ Geuffroi, 267. Also Cuspinianus, 11, and Haeniger.
3 Spandugino, Lonicerus, and Egnatius.
4 Mignot, 33.
5 Tractatus de moribus; Vanell, i. 351-2; Sagredo; Cervarius; Cuspinianus, 46.
6 The historian must use the Bonn editions with caution. There are frequent glosses in the Latin translations of Byzantine texts. See foot-note on p. 263.
7 Pachymeres, ii. 589.
8 See Appendix B, which is really a continuation of this argument.
dominions very little to the south: not at all towards the east. Murad's activities in Asia Minor were the least successful part of his career, and were by no means permanent. Sherefeddin Ali, whom we may regard as the best contemporary source for the end of the fourteenth century, states explicitly: 'Bayezid reduced under his dominion a large portion of the country of Rum, that is to say, the provinces of Aïdin, of Menteshe, of Kermian and of Karamania, a thing which his ancestors had never been able to bring to an end.'

In view of the facts of the case, it is strange that the idea of Osman as the powerful heir of the Seljuks, who mastered the other aspirants to that honour, has had such a long lease of life through centuries. Many of the early writers made Osman master of all Asia Minor. It is commonly recorded that he captured Sivas. One writer placed in that city his capital. Another credited him with the capture of Konia. Misinformation of this sort was given to Charles VI of France by returning pilgrims, and, a century and a quarter later, to Frances I. The early idea of the Osmanlis as an Asiatic people, of large numbers, who conquered Asia Minor and then overthrew the Byzantine Empire, has persisted to this day. One of the sanest Ottoman writers of modern times, who has brought wide knowledge and judgement to bear upon the history of the Ottoman army, is led astray by this misconception. He says, 'It was the Arabic and Persian states that the Ottoman Empire had to fight before

1 Vie de Timour, iii. 255.
2 'Osman possessed all Anatolia, which he called Osmania: he came to be called Lord of Asia Minor,' Formanti, 4; 'Osman made himself master of all Anatolia without any difficulty,' Spandugino; 'Osman seized Cappadocia, Galatia, and Bithynia,' Cuspianus, 10; 'master of Syria as well as of Asia Minor,' Donado da Lesze, 5.
3 Formanti; Geuffroy; Donado; Cuspianus; Giovio Paulo; Richer; Guazzo, 257 vo.
4 Rabbi Joseph, ii. 505.
5 Mignot, 33.
6 Chronique de Saint-Denis (Ed. Soc. Hist. de France), i. 319, 709.
7 Richer, whom I have already quoted in Chapter I.
8 'Cette nation nombreuse, pleine de confiance dans ses forces, et brûlant du désir de soumettre à sa domination toute la chrétienté, avait quitté les confins de Perse,' Chronique de Saint-Denis, i. 709.
any other'. So it is natural that he should be puzzled by finding in the military museum at Constantinople early Ottoman weapons on Byzantine and European models. He explains this by saying that these weapons were not used by the Osmanlis, but must have been captured, for the Osmanlis, naturally, would use Persian and Arabic models!

But Colonel Djevad is not more in error than the two greatest French authorities on Ottoman architecture. Saladin, in his summary of Ottoman history, instructs his readers as follows: 'Alaeddin III, conquered by the Mongols, abandoned the sovereignty to Osman. . . . When the Osmanlis penetrated into Anatolia. . . . in proportion to the extension westward of the Ottoman Empire, we shall see the influence of Byzantine architecture increase. . . . Little by little, as the Turks approached Constantinople, this impregnation of the influence of Byzantium had an increasingly greater importance in the development of Ottoman art.' This misconception of the origin of the Osmanlis leads him to state: 'It is then indispensable to study the Seljuk monuments of Konia, which have necessarily served as models to the first Ottoman monuments.' From his premisses, Saladin has argued rightly. But his historical facts are wrong. Even if they were not, his conclusion could still be proved wrong. The refutation of his statement exists in the two earliest Ottoman buildings, the school and the kitchen for the poor at Nicaea, the date of whose construction Seaddeddin places in 1331. Both of these are typically Byzantine. In Brusa there is no Ottoman building of the Seljuk type which can be proved to have been constructed prior to Mohammed I (1413–21). Parvillée, to whom the whole world owes a debt of gratitude for his able reconstruction of the

1 Col. Djevad bey, 192–3.
3 Ibid., 437. On p. 479, Saladin makes another curious statement to the effect that in 1300 the Osmanlis employed architects who had fortified the Seljuk strongholds. I have never been able to find in my reading or from observation of Ottoman constructions any authority for such an assertion.
4 i. 50. The medressé is, as Seaddeddin says, to the right after you enter the Yeni Sheir gate. The imaret is near the Yeshil Djami, which is the oldest Ottoman mosque extant, dating from 1378. The imam of the Yeshil Djami told me that the imaret was built by Osman's wife, Malkhatun. According to Seaddeddin, however, Malkhatun died before Osman!
5 Parvillée, p. 6, says that the Oulou-Djami, which is attributed to Murad I in Brusa by popular consent, was not finished until the reign of Mahomet I.
precious historic monuments of Brusa, starts his scholarly work on Ottoman architecture in the fifteenth century with these words: 'Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Seljuk Empire disappeared. On its ruins arose that of Osman.' He not only follows Hammer: he uses his very words!\(^1\) From the historical point of view, I maintain that the Byzantine influence was an indissoluble factor in the evolution of Ottoman architecture from the very beginning. In this I am supported, from the expert architect's point of view, by the two German authorities on this subject.\(^2\) The Seljuk, Arab, and Persian influences entered in at a considerably later period.

There exists in tradition and in law an intimate connexion between the House of Osman and the Grand Tchelebi of Konia. This has been pointed to as a confirmation of the hypothesis that the Ottoman sovereigns derived their authority originally from the Seljuks of Rum. I do not deny the force of tradition. In the absence of early records, the beginning of this connexion must remain a moot question. But the evidence from outside sources makes reasonable my doubt as to the existence of this connexion before the reign of Mohammed I or Murad I.

There are two other arguments which might be adduced in this appendix, the questions of Osman's title as an independent ruler, and of the chieftainship as an elective office among the Turkish tribes. But both of these have already been discussed in the text and the foot-notes of the chapter on Orkhan.

\(^1\) Cf. preface of Parvillée; and Hammer, i. 83.
APPENDIX B

THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

In order to support the contention of this book, that the Ottoman Empire was founded (in the durable sense of that word) upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire as it existed at the time of Osman (1300), and gained its power and prestige in the Balkan peninsula rather than in Asia Minor, there must be set forth, as far as it is possible to do so within the limits of an appendix, an exposé of the extent and power of the other emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century. Such a review is useful, not only to prove the argument, but also to enable the reader to follow intelligently the development of Ottoman power; for there are difficulties attendant upon the writing and the reading of a history where the geographical names are unfamiliar. The writer is faced with the dilemma of making his work meaningless or uninteresting: meaningless if he fails to enlighten his readers as to the places and peoples whom he mentions; uninteresting if he interrupts his narrative with technical, encyclopaedic explanations.

A special map accompanies this appendix. The list of emirates contains after each name a number in brackets, which refers to the map. As in almost all cases the geographical limits are vague, the general position only of each emirate can be given. To put in definite boundary lines would be mere conjecture. Then, too, at different times during the fourteenth century, independent emirates overlapped each other. Sometimes they were confined to single cities or villages.

In preparing this appendix, I am indebted to several modern scholars whose work is most suggestive. But I believe that this

1 Mas-Latrie, Trésor de Chronologie, and papers on commercial relationship between Cyprus and Asia Minor in Bibl. de l’École des Chartes; Lane-Poole, ‘Successors of the Seljuks in Asia Minor,’ Journ. Royal Asiatic Soc., 1882, new series, xiv. 773–80 (Lane-Poole did not avail himself of the precious indications in Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin, but trusted altogether to Gibb’s translation of Seaddeddin’s unreliable chronology. Seaddeddin did not have access to as good source-material as Lane-Poole himself!); Clément Huart, ‘Épigraphie arabe d’Asie Mineure,’ Revue sémitique, 1894–5.
THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR IN THE 14TH CENTURY

THE FIGURES REFER TO PARAGRAPHS IN APPENDIX B
is the first attempt to compare the Asiatic possessions of Osman, Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid with those of their Turkish rivals for the purpose of illustrating the slow growth of the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor, and the first time that contemporary sources have been drawn upon for this purpose.

From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, we are able to reconstruct the political status of Asia Minor, in a general way, from the narratives of pilgrims and the experiences of the Crusaders. From the beginning of the fifteenth century on to the present day, we have a wealth of sources for the history of Asia Minor in the writings of European travellers, which are valuable not only for their geographical indications and their observations on the life of the people, but also for their testimony in corroborating or disproving the statements of Oriental historians, who are so often lacking in precision and verisimilitude. For the fourteenth century, however, reliable European sources are lacking.

This lacuna is filled by the travel records of two Moslems of more than ordinary intelligence and powers of observation.

The long-lost manuscript of the travels of Ibn-Batutah was one of those important finds that made the French occupation of Algeria so memorable an event in the annals of the advancement of learning. Its translation into French in 1843 made accessible for the first time a contemporary source of the highest value for the political and social life of the whole Moslem world during the first half of the fourteenth century. For Ibn Batutah travelled from his home in Morocco to the confines of China. He lived a while in each country that he visited, and wrote from the sympathetic and understanding point of view of a member of the Moslem clergy. Ibn Batutah visited Asia Minor between 1330 and 1340.1

Shehabeddin was an Arabic writer from Damascus,2 who died in 1349. He wrote a voluminous work of twenty volumes, called

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1 Muralt, in the bibliography of his Chronographie Byzantine, puts Ibn Batutah at 1320. There can be no doubt about this being an error, for when Ibn Batutah visited the Ottoman domains, Orkhan was ruling, and Nicaea had been captured. I put 1340 as latter limit, because Ibn Batutah speaks of some places captured by Orkhan before 1340 as being still independent.

2 Quatremère, in Notices et Extraits, xiii. 152–3, cannot reach a definite conclusion as to whether Shehabeddin is from Damascus, Marash, or Morocco. But I find that Hadji Khalfa, Dict. Bibl., Paris MS., fol. 1832, under no. 10874, records him as a 'writer of Damascus'.

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Footpaths of the Eyes in the Kingdoms of Different Countries.\(^1\) He was a contemporary of Ibn Batutah. Shehabeddin did not enjoy the advantage of visiting personally the many emirates of western Asia Minor, as did Ibn Batutah; but he states that he has based his record of these countries upon the eye-witness information furnished to him by word of mouth by Sheik Haïdar of Sir Hissar.\(^2\) The agreement between Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin on the state of affairs in Asia Minor during the first half of the fourteenth century is so general that one can claim for their statements, which are, in large part, the basis of this appendix, most substantial grounding.

The other sources are the Byzantine historians, the chronicler of the Catalans, the Catalan Map of 1375,\(^3\) the annalist of Trebizond, the points of contact with the Cypriotes, the chevaliers of Rhodes, the Italian traders, the Osmanlis and the Mongols and Tartars. For a few of the emirates there are coins extant. Inscriptions on public edifices, such as mosques, pious foundations, baths and fountains, are unfortunately lacking, not only for the history of the Turkish emirates but for the Osmanlis as well.\(^4\)

In the list that follows, twenty-six of the emirates existed during the reign of Orkhan, between the years 1330 and 1350. They are mentioned either by Ibn Batutah or by Shehabeddin, in most cases by both, as independent in their day. The others are either earlier or later than Orkhan’s reign, and comprise a portion of earlier emirates, from which they had become detached. After the Turkish emirates, given alphabetically, are placed the non-Turkish independent states in Asia Minor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adalia</th>
<th>see Satalia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adana (1)</td>
<td>Akserâ (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afion Kara Hissar: see</td>
<td>Aksheîr (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karasar</td>
<td>Alaîa (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aidin (2)</td>
<td>Altoluogo: see Ayasoluk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akbara (3)</td>
<td>Angora (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akridur (4)</td>
<td>Armenia: see Little Armenia (44)</td>
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</tbody>
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\(^{1}\) Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe 2325. For Quatremère trans. see Bibliography.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., fol. 123 vo.
\(^{3}\) Notices et Extraits, xiv, partie 2, to face p. 77.
\(^{4}\) See discussion of source-material in Bibliography.
Arzendjian: see Erzindjian
Attaleia: see Satalia
Ayasoluk (9)
Balikesri (10)
Berkeri (Birgui, Berki): see Aïdin
Borlu (11)
Brusa (12)
Caesarea (13)
Cilicia: see Little Armenia (44)
and Adana (1)
Daouas: see Tawas
Denizli (14)
Djanik: see Kaouia
Egherdir: see Akridur
Ephesus: see Ayasoluk
Erzindjian (15)
Fukeh (16)
Germian: see Kermian
Gul Hissar (17)
Guzel Hissar: see Aïdin
Halik (Halicarnassus): see Fukeh
Hamid (18)
Iakshi (19)
Ionia: see Aïdin
Kaiseriyia: see Caesarea
Kandelore: see Alaïa
Kaouia (20)
Karamania (21)
Karasar (22)
Karasi (23)
Kastemuni (24)
Keredeh (25)
Kermasti (26)
Kermian (27)
Konia: see Karamania
Kul Hissar: see Gul Hissar
Kutayia: see Kermian
Ladik (Laodicea): see Denizli
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Limnia (28)
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Urubad (Lopadion) (43)
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Phocaea (46)
Smyrna (47)
Byzantine possessions (48)
Cypriote possessions (49)
Mongol and Tartar possessions (50)
Rhodian possessions (51)
Egyptian possessions (52)
Catalan possessions (53)
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The material that can be gathered about these Turkish emirates, the two independent Christian states, and the spheres of influence of outside Christian and Moslem states in Asia Minor in the fourteenth century, would make a book in itself. In this appendix I desire to give only enough to indicate the relative strength and vitality of each state. It must be borne in mind that my object is not to write the history of these emirates, or of Asia Minor as a whole, during the fourteenth century, but to demonstrate how little of Asia Minor was really incorporated in the Ottoman possessions at the time that, and during the thirty years after, the capital of the new empire was established in Adrianople.

Adana (I)

In the Taurus Mountains, on the northern limits of Lesser Armenia, and to the south-east of Karamania, the Turcoman tribes through whom Marco Polo passed seemed to him to enjoy an independent existence. Up to the time of Murad I, they formed no state, but between 1373 and 1375 the family of Ramazan took the chieftainship. When the Mamelukes destroyed the Armenian kingdom (1375), the Ben-Ramazan dynasty established itself at Adana, on the Sarus, in the fertile Cilician plain.1 The Ben-Ramazan emirs managed to keep from being absorbed either by the Karamanians or the Egyptians. After the complete subjugation of Karamania by the Osmanlis, they submitted to Selim I about 1510, under the stipulation, however, that the emir, Piri pasha, should hold office for life as vali of Adana and Sis. Sis was frequently coupled with Adana in the title of the Ben-Ramazan.

1 If one asks why Adana and Marash are included in this résumé, it must be remembered that these are regions which might legitimately be included in Asia Minor as a portion of the latter Konia Seljuk dominions which we are discussing. In the division of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, Cilicia is given under Diocesis Oriens rather than under Diocesis Asiana with the rest of Asia Minor. To regard Cilicia as belonging to Syria was common up to the days of Mehemet Ali. Ibn Khalidun, Notices et Extraits, xix. 1ère partie, p. 143, speaks of Adana as being ‘at the extremity of Syria’, while Cilicia is included in Syria in Abdul Ali Bakri’s description of Africa, Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe no. 2218, p. 103. Both the Latin and Orthodox Churches made Cilicia depend ecclesiastically upon Antioch: cf. Le Quien, Oriens Christianus, ii. col. 869, iii. col. 1181. But, in modern times, we have come to regard this region as a portion of Asia Minor.
Aïdin (2)

Aïdin comprised the greater part of Ionia, with a portion of Lydia, if we take its boundaries to be those of the present vilayet of the same name. It comprised, at the time of its greatest extent, Smyrna, Ephesus, and Tralles. Smyrna was captured by the crusaders in 1344. Ephesus was at times independent under the name of Ayasoluk. Tralles, called Guzel Hissar, and sometimes also Birgui or Berki, was the capital of Aïdin in the time of Orkhan. Later, Ayasoluk, and, last of all, Tira, were the successive capitals.

The emirate was founded by Aïdin, a contemporary of Osman, who was succeeded by his son Mohammed about 1330. Ibn Batutah regarded Mohammed as a very powerful prince, who was especially strong on the sea. His eldest son, Omar, who succeeded him in 1341, met death in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Smyrna in 1348. His relations with Cantacuzenos are given in the chapter on Orkhan. Isaac, fourth of the line, reigned from 1348, until he was dispossessed by Bayezid in 1390. He died in exile at Nicaea. His sons, Isaac II and Omar II, were placed again on the throne in 1403. The line of Aïdin became extinct soon after. A usurper, Djuneid, Ottoman governor of Smyrna, managed to keep the power until he was assassinated in 1425. It was not until then that Aïdin definitely passed into the hands of the Osmanlis.

After the death of Aïdin, the founder of the dynasty, the territory of the emirate seems to have suffered some diminution, aside from the loss of Smyrna. One of the sons, Soleiman, married a daughter of Orkhan, while another, Khidr, ruled independently at Ayasoluk, which was lost for a time to Rhodes twenty years later. Under Omar, the Turks of Aïdin were very active in the Aegean Sea, and made large invasions of Thrace and Macedonia in 1333 and 1334. They co-operated with the Genoese of Phocaea against the Greeks and the Osmanlis, and were at times allied with the emirates of Sarukhan and Menteshe, with whom they are frequently mixed by the Byzantine historians. The western historians almost invariably gave credit to the Osmanlis for the maritime exploits of these emirates during the fourteenth century.¹

¹ Shehabeddin, 339, 369; Ibn Batutah, ii. 295–310; Cant. ii. 28;
Akbara (3)

At some time before 1340, a certain Demir Khan, son of Karasai, emir of Pergama, ruled in Akbara, whose location is given by Shehabeddin as 'south of Brusa and Sinope, and north of Mount Kasis'. This emirate was probably destroyed by Orkhan in the expedition of 1339–40. It was a region along the borders of Mysia and Phrygia, which had been able to resist the encroachments of Kermian owing to the mountainous character of the country.

Akridur (4)

This city was at the south end of the lake of the same name (to-day called Egherdir), and was within the limits of the emirate of Hamid. But, like Nazlu, it had frequently a wholly independent existence, and both Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, as well as other writers, mention its emirs as if independent of the emir of Hamid, and these rulers are given from the families of Tekke and Hamid. The Osmanlis first reached the northern end of Lake Egherdir in 1379, and incorporated Akridur about 1390.

Akseraî (5)

This is the ancient Archelaïs, and is three days north-east of Konia on the road to Kaïsariya (Caesarea). In the time of Ibn Batutah, it was one of the most beautiful and most solidly built cities of Asia Minor, and was ruled by the emir Artin, possibly an Armenian, who was vassal of the Mongol ruler of Persia. Later, Ak Seraî was incorporated in Karamania, to which it belonged at the time that the Osmanlis, under Bayezid, first entered it.

Aksheir (6)

Aksheir, between Kutayia and Konia, belonged alternately to Kermian and Karamania—perhaps at times it recognized the suzerainty of the emir of Hamid. Its position made it a border

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1 Shehabeddin, 365.
2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 267. Shehabeddin, 360, gives Akridur under Hamid.
3 Ibn Batutah, ii. 285.
city, prey to the changing fortunes of the Osmanlis and Karamanlis for thirty years. In 1377, when Murad compelled the emir of Hamid to sell a portion of his dominions, he regarded Aksheir as having been in Hamid. It was, however, at that time practically independent, using the rival pretensions of the emirs to the east, west, and south as a means of preserving a precarious autonomy.¹

**Alaia (7)**

This city was sometimes called Kandelore, a corruption of its ancient name Coracesium. Its fortunate position at the east side of the Gulf of Adalia enabled it to play an important part in the commercial history of the eastern Mediterranean for a century and a half. In the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin, Yussuf, brother of the emir of Karamania, was its ruler. During the fourteenth century Alaia was more or less dependent upon Karamania, but sometimes upon Tekke. For many years it paid tribute to Cyprus, and negotiated its affairs independently of both Karamania and Tekke. In 1444 its prince, Latif, meditated a raid upon Cyprus, from which he was deterred only by the defeat of the Egyptians before Rhodes. In 1450 Latif concluded a treaty of peace with the Cypriotes through the medium of Rhodes. His successor, Arslan bey, got help from Cyprus against Mohammed II. Alaia was subdued by the Osmanlis only n 1472.²

**Angora (8)**

The history of Angora during the first half of the fourteenth century is obscure. It depended upon none of the emirates which arose after the break-up of the Seljuk Empire of Konia. Throughout Phrygia there were small village chieftains, such as Osman had been at Sugut. Angora may have acknowledged Kermian for a short period, but the proprietors of that region resisted the efforts of Karamania to incorporate them. The fortress of Angora was captured at the beginning of the reign of Murad, but it was not until Bayezid broke the power of Kermian


² Bosio, ii. 221-2, 237-8; Mas-Latrie, *Hist. de Chypre*, iii. 175, 335. Cf. authorities for Karamania, Tekke, and Satalia, and *Bibl. de l’École des Chartes*, 2° série, i. 326, 328, 498, 505; ii. 138-41.
and Karamania that the country round about the city became ottomanized.¹

**AYASOLUK (9)**

This is the Ottoman corruption of Altoluogo, the Genoese name for the Byzantine Theologos (ἀγιος θεολόγος—St. John) which occupied nearly the same site as the ancient Ephesus. This city has caused much confusion to writers. It was captured from the Greeks by Sasan, who ruled there as its first Turkish emir in 1308.² Later it seems to have fallen into the hands of Aidin, and became the principal commercial city of his flourishing emirate. The emir's coins were for a time struck there, but later when Guzel Hissar (Tralles) was capital of Aidin, Ayasoluk was practically independent under a younger brother of Mohammed, and uncle of Omar. In 1365 the chevaliers of Rhodes had evidently made a serious attempt to cut into the hinterland of Aidin from Smyrna, for they struck coins at Ayasoluk. Its later history is that of Aidin and Palatchia. Timur directed the operations against Smyrna from Ephesus in December 1402.³

**BALIKESRI (10)**

This city is to the south-west of Brusa, on the road to Pergama. It would naturally be included in the emirate of Karasi, but had an independent sovereign, Demir-Khan, when Ibn Batutah visited it. It was annexed by the Osmanlis after the deposition of the emir of Balikesri. The exact date of this acquisition cannot be determined.⁴

**BORLU (11)**

An inland district south-west of Kastemuni and north of Angora, possibly the same as Boli, where Ali, a son of Soleiman padishah,


³ How does Schlumberger reconcile the continuance of Ayasoluk, or Ephesus, as capital of Aidin with the Rhodian conquest? Cf. Wood, *Discoveries at Ephesus*, pp. 12, 183, for coins which prove that the chevaliers held the city in 1365. Cf. Palatchia, for treaty made by Venice with an independent prince here in 1403. Ibn Batutah states expressly that Guzel Hissar, or Birgui, was the capital of Aidin.

⁴ Ibn Batutah, ii. 317. Evliya effendi, ii. 19, distinguishes between Balikesri and Karasi in his enumeration of the conquests of Orkhan.
of Kastemuni and Sinope, ruled as independent sovereign between 1330 and 1340.¹

**Brusa (12)**

The descriptions of Orkhan’s realm, which to Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin was the emirate of Brusa, as it was seen through the eyes of his contemporaries, have been cited in the text of this book. Until the end of the reign of Murad, the Ottoman possessions were small enough to be distinguished under the name of Brusa, where the Osmanlis established an emirate at the death of Osman.

**Caesarea (13)**

This important city, in the east of Asia Minor, on the confines of Armenia, was during the first half of the fourteenth century under the control of the Mongols, and, for a very few years, acknowledged the overlordship of Karamania. But, for the thirty years coincident with the reign of Murad, it had emirs of its own, as had Tokat and Sivas. For we know that Burhaneddin, through whose misfortunes Bayezid became involved with Timur, had been kadi of the emir of Caesarea, on whose death he divided ‘with two other emirs’ his dominions. Caesarea fell into the power of the Osmanlis between 1392 and 1398.²

**Denizli (14)**

This emirate was on the site of Laodicea on the Lycus, and was called Ladik by the Arabs, and Denizli, or Denizlu, by the Turks. Mount Cadmus and Hieropolis were also within its limits. It was at the upper end of the Maeander Valley, bounded on the west and north by Aidin, and on the south by Menteshe and Tawas. In the fourteenth century, the city of its emir was probably on the Maeander and not on the Lycus. Shehabeddin compared the gardens of Ladik, or Denizli, to those of Damascus. No higher praise could have come from his lips. We know nothing of its later history. About 1350 it was probably absorbed by Aidin or Menteshe.³

¹ Ibn Batutah, ii. 340.
² Sherefeddin, iii. 256 ; Howorth, iii. 749.
³ Shehabeddin, 338, 358, 366 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 275, 277 ; Reclus, Géog. univ., ix. 633, 645 ; Baedeker, Kleinasien, 2. Aufl., 390. Mas-Latrie, Trésor de Chronologie, makes an error in extending the northern boundary of Denizli, which he calls Thingizlu, to the emirate of Marmora.
ERZINDJIAN (15)

Erzindjian, like Erzerum, was subject to the Mongols in the early part of the reign of Orkhan. There was a prince named Ainabey ruling there in 1348, however, who, with two generals of Alaeddin, attacked Trebizond.\(^1\) Coins were struck in the name of Alaeddin of Karamania in Erzindjian in the decade following 1350. But coins of Mohammed Artin, emir of Erzindjian, were struck there about 1360.\(^2\) Bayezid pushed his conquests a day beyond Erzindjian to the castle of Kemath. He did not, however, conquer Erzindjian; for we have its emir, a vassal of Timur, appealing to his overlord for aid, when Bayezid summoned him to appear at Angora, bringing the treasures of his dependencies with him. His authority extended to and included Erzerum about 1400.\(^3\)

FUKEH (16)

Ibn Batutah calls this country Milas. There were in fact two cities, Fukeh and Milas, under one sovereign at the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin. As Milas was near the site of Halicarnassus, or on that site, and was sometimes called Halik, the geographical position of this emirate, on the coast opposite Cos, is immediately grasped. It was dependent, in a certain sense, upon Menteshe, and was later absorbed by Menteshe. Orkhan was the emir about 1330. Some years later, Shehabeddin estimated that the emir of Fukeh had fifty cities and ten thousand horsemen. The last vestige of the independence of Fukeh was destroyed by the Rhodians with whom they were continually in conflict, and who got a foothold on the mainland and built a castle at Halik in 1399.\(^4\)

GUL HISAR (17)

At the time of Ibn Batutah, Mohammed Tchelebi, brother of the emir of Akridur, was established here on the border of Pamphylia and Caria, between Satalia and the Maeander River.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Panaretos, 13.
\(^2\) Lane-Poole, *Mohammedan Coins in British Museum*, 21–4, 35; ibid., *Mohammedan Coins in Bodleian Library*, 12.
\(^3\) Hadji Khalifa, *Djihannuma*, fol. 1119; Sherefeddin, iii. 257.
\(^4\) Ibn Batutah, ii. 279; Shehabeddin, 370; Bosio, ii. 4.
\(^5\) Ibn Batutah, ii. 270.
The fact that in such a position an independent prince could maintain himself as late as 1330—perhaps later—demonstrates that the emirates of Tekke, Menteshe, and Hamid must have been of very slow growth, like that of Brusa, and that these Turkish emirs who were rivals of the house of Osman evolved slowly, just as the Osmanlis did. The fiction of a tenfold division of the Seljuk dominions becomes very apparent when we consider the position of Gul Hissar (often called Kul Hissar), Alaş, Tawas, and Fukeh—to cite instances only from the south-western corner of Asia Minor.

**Hamid (18)**

This emirate, of very late development in comparison with those of Sarukhan and Aidin, was formed by the absorption of a number of little states—each hardly more than a village. The emir of Hamid started by incorporating Akridur and Nazlu. During the last decade of the reign of Orkhan, Hamid grew rapidly, until it extended from Akşeyr to the western end of the Taurus. It was entirely an inland emirate, and had little chance of resisting the Osmanlis under Murad. The last emir willed his dominions to Murad in 1381, but the country had to be conquered step by step. Bayezid made it an Ottoman province in 1391.¹

**Iakshi (19)**

A small emirate north-west of Sarukhan, on the sea-coast opposite Mitylene. It is mentioned only by Shehabeddin, and for the purpose of fixing the boundaries of Sarukhan.²

**Kaouïa (20)**

This is the modern Djanik, on the Black Sea between Samsun and Sinope. It had an independent line of four emirs, and probably maintained its independence until after the Ottoman conquest of Kastemuni.³

**Karamania (21)**

Until after the campaign of 1386, Karamania was a more powerful emirate in Asia Minor than that of the Osmanlis. The

¹ Ibn Batutah, ii. 267; Hammer, xvii. 98; Sarre, 21. See also under Akridur, and Nazlu. ² Shehabeddin, 339. ³ Shehabeddin, 363; Ibn Batutah, ii. 326–9; Hammer, xvii. 99.
Karamanlis were the actual successors of the Seljuks, and maintained themselves in Konia. While the Osmanlis were confined to a very small corner of Anatolia, the Karamanian dominions extended from the Euphrates and the Amanus to the Gulf of Adalia, on both slopes of the Taurus. Except in the maritime emirates of the Aegaean Sea, the Karamanlis and their emir were the great power in the peninsula of Asia Minor. Their independence was not broken by Bayezid, for they recovered their former glory after the intervention of Timur, and successfully withstood Mohammed I, Murad II, and Mohammed II. As in the latter half of the fourteenth century, the Karamanian emirs of the first half of the fifteenth century were allied by marriage with the house of Osman, but refused to do homage to the Ottoman sovereigns.1

Limits of space prevent mentioning here the many grounds upon which the Karamanians were able to and did keep their independence in the face of both Constantinople and Cairo. It was only at the end of the fifteenth century that we find the fiction of the Karamanian vassalage to the Osmanlis and of the connexion between the Seljuks and the Osmanlis appearing in the Ottoman chronicles, which on this count are, as I have pointed out elsewhere, wholly unreliable. It is astonishing that their version of the rise of the Osmanlis in Asia Minor has been accepted for so many centuries by western historians.2

**KARASAR (22)**

An abbreviation of Kara Hissar. This is probably the modern Afion Kara Hissar, a picturesque town between Eski Sheir and Konia on southern limit of the emirate of Kermian, of which its

1 'Ledit Karaman haitoit fort le Grant Ture, dont il eust la soeur.' Bertrand de la Broquiére, Schéfer ed., 120. Bertrand visited the court of the emir of Konia in 1443 with a Cypriote ambassadour.

2 In time of Osman and Orkhan, Nicolay, 148–9; Howorth, iii. 428; Byzantine historians in Stritter, iii. 1092; Anon., *Hist. de Géorgie*, i. 642; Shehabeddin, 346, 375; Ibn Batutah, ii. 284 (calls them emirs of Larena); Hammer, i. 262 fol.; Rasmussen, 110; Feridun letters, Bibl. Nat., fonds ture, no. 79, p. 1. In time of Murad and Bayezid, Feridun letters, ibid., pp. 18–20, 30, 33–4, and references in text of this book. For fifteenth century, from re-establishment by Timur, Sherefeddin, iv. 33; Bertrandon de la Broquiére, 118–20; Mas-Latrie, *Hist. de Chypre*, iii. 3; Bibl. de l'École des Chartes, 2e série, i. 326, 510; ii. 138; Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 962. For coins, Lane-Poole, *Bodleian Collection*, 12; *British Museum*, 21–6. The power of Karamania in the fifteenth century will be discussed in a later volume.
prince was a vassal. Its importance was in its location at the junction point of the roads from the north-west and west into Karamania.

**Karasi (23)**

The emirate which lay between the possessions of Orkhan and Sarukhan was called, after the founder of its dynasty, Karasi. Its capital was Pergama. There is a discrepancy between the accounts of Shehbeddin and Ibn Batutah, the forming making Pergama subject to Balikesri, and the latter giving Balikesri as independent. Ottoman historians make Balikesri the northern-most city of the emirate of Karasi. The limits of Karasi, outside of the immediate vicinity of Pergama, cannot be determined. There were several small independent emirates in the hinterland of the lower end of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. The emir of Karasi was an ally of Aïdin and Sarukhan in the first coalition formed to combat the growing power of the Osmanlis. Karasi was the first emirate to be destroyed by the Osmanlis, and the only one of importance incorporated under Orkhan. This was because it lay nearest to the Ottoman emirate.

**Kastemuni (24)**

This emirate, at its zenith, comprised practically all of the ancient Roman province of Paphlagonia. It was formed by Ali Omar bey, who started as lord of the inland city of Kastemuni, and whose son Abdullah, in the lifetime of Osman, drove Ghazi Tchelebi from Sinope. The emirate had many vicissitudes and changes in dynasty. In the time of Ibn Batutah, Soleiman padishah was the sovereign, and had extended his rule from Heraclea on the Black Sea coast almost to Trebizond. His son Ali ruled at Borlu, and another son Ibrahim Shah, who succeeded Soleiman, contested Samsun with the emperor of Trebizond. Ibrahim was the younger son, and was designated as his successor by Soleiman. Under the third dynasty of Kastemuni, the ben-Isfendiar, the emirate was at the height of its power. Its fleets swept the Black Sea, and did much harm to the Greeks of Trebizond and the Genoese of Kaffa. Kauïa was absorbed, and its eastern boundaries included Osmandjik. The emirs of Menteshe and Aïdin took refuge here, and the refusal of the emir of Kaste-

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muni, Bayezid, to give them up, led to the invasion of 1392. Bayezid and the fugitive princes fled to Timur, who restored them after the battle of Angora. Isfendiar, son of Bayezid, managed to retain Sinope, and a large portion of the interior, for thirty years. He was father-in-law of the Ottoman sultan, Murad II. When Clavijo visited Sinope in 1404 Isfendiar had forty thousand men to put in the field against the Osmanlis. It was not until after the fall of Constantinople that Kastemuni finally lost its independence. As the history of this emirate is involved with that of Sinope, see also below under Sinope.

Kerdeh (25)

This was a small emirate, sometimes called also Kerdeleh, between Kastemuni and Boli, which was absorbed by the Osmanlis in the latter part of the reign of Orkhan. It was already in danger of Ottoman aggression when Ibn Batutah visited it on his way from Brusa to Kastemuni.

Kermasti (26)

On the Adranos River, one day south of Mikhalitch, and two days west of Brusa, this city was conquered by Orkhan in his first campaign after the fall of Nicomedia.

Kermian (27)

Kermian, or Guermian, took its name from a Turcoman chief who held Kutayia about 1300. It was the earliest definite emirate which arose in western Asia Minor after the dissolution of the Seljuk Empire. Shehabeddin wrote: 'Turkish tribes seized the greater part of the Seljuk possessions. The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of the emir of Kermian.' The great fortress which still crowns the hill of Kutayia is supposed to have been erected by Kermian. Kermian's son Ali became master of all of Phrygia, possibly at one time including Angora in his emirate. Orkhan wrote to Ali as equal to equal, and gave him

1 Shehabeddin, 361; Ibn Batutah, ii. 343-7; Bibli. de l'École des Chartes, 2e série, i. 325; Hammer, i. 80, 309-11; Clavijo, 20 v°.
2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 339.
3 Ashikpashazadé, Vatican MS., 33.
4 Hadji Khalfa, Djihanmuma, 617, 1807-9. It is curious that Hadji Khalfa does not mention the famous potteries of Kutayia.
the title of 'emir of Anatolia'. Ali had forty thousand horsemen and seven hundred castles and villages. He was the equal of the emir of Karamania and more powerful than Orkhan.

Kermian was the first of the larger emirates to feel the change which the successes in the Balkan peninsula had made in the fortune of the Osmanlis. A granddaughter of the older Ali, and great-granddaughter of Kermian, was married to Bayezid, and Murad compelled the emir of Kermian to cede the northwestern portion of his estates as his daughter's dot. When Bayezid made his first campaign against Karamania he annexed the remainder of Kermian. The emir, his brother-in-law Yakub, fled to Timur, and was restored. The Osmanlis definitely incorporated Kermian in their empire in the second decade of the fifteenth century.  

**LIMNIA (28)**

A small emirate in the mountains between Trebizond and Erzindjian, whose emir, Tasheddin, married the daughter of the emperor of Trebizond in 1379. In 1386, Tasheddin could put an army of twelve thousand men into the field. There were several other very small Turkish emirates around Trebizond. Not enough, however, is known of them to make it worth while to mention them.

**MARASH (29)**

An independent emirate was established here after the fall of the Lusignans in Cilicia, which was also known by the name of the founder of the dynasty, Sulkadir. It maintained its independence against the Karamanians, Egyptians, and Osmanlis until 1515, when its last prince fell in a battle with Selim.

**MARMORA (30)**

An emirate on the borders of the Sea of Marmora, between Cyzicus and the Dardanelles, which had struggles and alliances

2 Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe no. 583, fol. 144 r°-v°; Ibn Batutah, ii. 270-1; Hammer, ii. 133, xvii. 98; Schéfer, preface to his edition of Bertrand de la Broquière, lix. For expedition of Bayezid against, Phr. i. 26, p. 82; Ducas, 18-19; Chalc. ii, pp. 64-6.
3 Panaretos, 49, 52.
4 Hammer, v. 28.
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with the Catalans, Byzantines, and Turks of Balikesri. It became a vassal state of Karasi, and was ruled from Pergama. After the destruction of Karasi, its territory was shared by the Catalans of Bigha and by Orkhan.¹

MENTESHE (31)

Like Hamid, Menteshe was of late formation. The chief who gave his name to this emirate was a contemporary of Orkhan, and was sometimes known by the same name. He was allied by marriage to Soleiman, son of Aïdin, through whom he gained the former possessions of Aïdin south of the Maeander River. The emirate probably started at Mughla, and did not have much importance until it had absorbed Tawas and most of Fukeh. The emir of Menteshe possessed great influence during the latter part of Orkhan’s reign and the reign of Murad, and, like Aïdin and Sarukhan, the Turks of Menteshe, through their trading, were more in contact with the outside world than were the Osmanlis. Their port, known to the Venetians as Palatchia, was the ancient Miletus. The emirate of Menteshe suffered decline in the latter days of Murad’s reign through the Venetian usurpation at Palatchia. At the time of Bayezid’s invasion, the emir fled to Sinope and then to Timur. The emirate was restored by Timur, and was not definitely incorporated in the Ottoman empire until the reign of Murad II.² (See Fukeh, Palatchia, and Tawas.)

MIKHALITCH (32)

This was one day west of Brusa and a day south of Mudania. After the fall of Brusa, Turkish or Byzantine rulers maintained themselves in Mikhalitch until the expedition of Orkhan against Karasi. After that it became Ottoman.³ Some of the prisoners held for ransom after Nicopolis were detained in Mikhalitch, and one of the most illustrious of them died there.⁴

¹ Shehabeddin, 358, 366. In speaking of the propinquity of Denizli and Marmora, one wonders if Mas-Latrie has not confused the Scamander and Maeander rivers. Both of these rivers are called Menderes in Turkish.
² Its last emir died without issue in 1425. M. de Ste. Croix, in Acad. des Inscriptions, nouv. série, ii. 569-75; Hammer, i. 300-1, xvii. 98; Ducas, 18, p. 79; Lane-Poole, Coins in British Museum, 33-4.
³ Mordtmann, in Zeitschrift d. m. G., lxv (1911), p. 105.
⁴ See above, p. 225.
Nazlu (33)

This was a small emirate east of Denizli, which was absorbed by Hamid about 1350.¹

Nicaea (34)

Shehabeddin says that Nicaea was the centre of an emirate whose ruler possessed eight cities, thirty fortresses and an army of eight thousand horsemen. The emir was Ali, a brother and neighbour of Sarukhan. I have been unable to identify this place.²

Palatchia (35)

Like Ayasoluk in relation to Aidin, Palatchia, the ancient Miletus, in relation to Menteshe was at times independent, and at times the capital and seaport of the emirate. Clavijo confused Palatchia with Ayasoluk, and claimed that Timur summered (he means wintered) there. In another place he speaks of having travelled with a brother of Alamanoglu, brother of the emir of Altoluogo and Palatchia.³ When Menteshe had his capital at Mughla, there was undoubtedly another emir at Palatchia, who might also have been the man spoken of above as emir of Fukeh. But there can be no certainty on this point. Venice, from 1345 to 1405—and later—was interested in Palatchia, and had a consul and large commercial interests there. Different negotiations and treaties, in which the Osmanlis do not figure, attest the interest of Venice, and the independence—at least from the Osmanlis—of Palatchia throughout the fourteenth century.⁴ Cyprus and Rhodes at times tried to get the supremacy of Palatchia.⁵

Sarukhan (36)

Sarukhan was throughout the fourteenth century an emirate of far more importance than its rather restricted territory would seem to indicate. This was largely on account of the high qualities of its rulers and the daring of its sailors. It extended from the Gulf of Smyrna on the south to the Aegean coast

¹ Shehabeddin, 360.
² Shehabeddin, 367.
³ Clavijo, fol. 6 v⁰, 60 v⁰.
opposite Mitylene on the north, and was wedged in between Aïdin and Karasî. The hinterland was indefinite, and did not matter much as the Turks of Sarukhan were first and last mariners. They were the most important factor in the triple alliance against Orkhan in 1329 and 1336. After the Ottoman occupation of Pergama, and the disappearance of Karasî, they held the Osmanlis back for a hundred years (with the exception of the few years of Bayezid’s invasion). They were frequently in alliance with the Genoese of Phocaea and the Byzantines, and hired out as mercenaries and for transporting troops and food to Christian and Moslem alike. The long lease of life which Philadelphia enjoyed as a city of the Byzantine Empire is witness of their friendly relations with the Greeks throughout the reigns of Osman, Orkhan, and Murad.¹ Magnesia was capital of this emirate. It was not destroyed until Smyrna fell into the hands of the Osmanlis in 1425.²

Satalia (37)

Satalia is listed as an emirate separately from Tekke for the same reason that Ayasoluk is given separately from Aïdin, Palatchia separately from Menteshe, and Sinope separately from Kastemuni. It began and ended as a separate and independent emirate, with its own lord. Its history is treated below under Tekke. The modern name of Satalia is Adalia, from Attaleia, and gives its name to the gulf on the southern coast of Asia Minor. Nicolay has confused Satalia with Ayas, the ancient Issos.³

Sinope (38)

An emirate was founded about 1307 in Sinope by the last descendant of the Seljuks of Rum, who was known as Ghazi

¹ The currency of Byzantine money among the maritime emirates of Asia Minor demonstrates this. See Makrisi, ⁷, and Stickel, in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, viii. 837–9.
² Shehabeddin, 339, 360, 368–9; Ibn Batutah, ii. 313; Commemor., ii. 231; Greg. xi. 2, p. 530; xv. 5, p. 763; Cant. ii. 29–30, pp. 480–4; iii. 96, pp. 591–6; Ducas, 18, p. 79; Hadji Khalifa, Djihannuma, fol. 1820; for relations of Genoese and Byzantines with, Sauli, i. 256–7; for coins, Schlumberger, 479–81; Lane-Poole, Bodleian, 12; British Museum, 31–2.
³ ‘ Aussi y est Satalie, située en rivages maritimes de Cilicie: d’où a prins son nom le Goulphe de Satalie, anciennement appelé Issa: et a présent la Iasse et en cet endroit Alexandre vainquit Daire … ’ Nicolay, 148. This passage, which shows Adalia confused with Adana, would have helped Bruun in his note on p. 123 of the Hakluyt edition of Schlitberger.
Tchelebi who in 1313, in co-operation with the Greeks of Trebizond, attacked Kaffa. But in 1318 we find the Turks of Sinope burning almost all of the city of Trebizond, and in 1323 massacring the Genoese colony in their own city. Soon after this the emir of Kastemuni conquered Sinope. The Turks of Sinope were to the Black Sea what those of Sarukhan were to the Aegaean. In 1361 they nearly captured Kaffa. Their later history is that of Kastemuni.

Sivas (39)

The history of Sivas between the time of the Mongol withdrawal and the aggression of the Osmanlis is not known. But that it must have had independent princes can be inferred from the story of how Kadi Burhaneddin came to rule there (cf. above under Caesarea). Its disastrous conquest by the Osmanlis, and then by Timur, has been told in the chapter on Bayezid’s reign.

Tawas (40)

This was a maritime emirate extending east into Lycia and west as far as the mainland opposite Rhodes. It was the only one of the early emirates to possess islands. Its pirates were true descendants of those whom Pompey opposed, and were continually in conflict with the Rhodians and Cypriotes. Tawas was absorbed by Tekke and Menteshe, but not before 1340.

Tekke (41)

Tekke grew up into a powerful emirate in Pamphylia and Lycia. Its expansion to the north was stopped by the Taurus, and to the west by Alaia and Karamania. Tawas, which it later absorbed, Menteshe, Rhodes, and Cyprus were its other great rivals. Its history is centred around the city of Adalia, then

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1 In Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. fonds turc no. 62, there is a marginal note in Armand’s handwriting which terminates thus: ‘La dynastie des Seljuks de Rum finit en la personne de Kaï Kobad, fils de Feramorg, fils de Kaï Kaous le 14e qui aye regné qui fut exterminé lui et toute sa race par Gazankhan.’ This view was taken by several Orientalists of Armand’s day, but there is good authority for Ghazi Tchelebi’s ancestry.
2 Fallmerayer, Originalberichte, ii. 15, 319; Stella, cited by Muralt, ii. 533; Ibn Batutah, ii. 343.
3 Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 663.
4 Shehabeddin, 359; Ibn Batutah, ii. 277.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

called Satalia, in which there were merchants of the larger Italian cities. Adalia was taken from the emirs of Tekke in 1361, but they regained it when the Genoese were threatening Famagusta in 1373. The Osmanlis, under Murad, crossed the Taurus by way of Sparta, into Tekke, but failed to capture Adalia. It remained independent until 1450.¹

TOKAT (42)

This city was either under the Mongols or independent throughout the fourteenth century. Its fortunes were similar to those of Caesarea and Sivas.

ULUBAD (43)

This city, between Bithynia and Mysia, was conquered by Osman, and then lost. It came again into the power of the Osmanlis in Orkhan’s campaign of 1339. A relative or ally of Andronicus III lived there.²

INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN STATES

There were two Christian states in Asia Minor during the fourteenth century.

LITTLE ARMENIA (44), so called to distinguish it from the classical Armenia of the upper Euphrates valley and the mountains between Asia Minor and the Azerbaidjan, was a portion of Cilicia in the south-eastern corner of Anatolia, south of the Taurus mountains. A dynasty of Armenian kings, who had successfully held off the Seljuks of Konia, and had maintained its position in the fourteenth century by siding with the Mongols and Tartars against the Egyptians, was overthrown between 1360 and 1374 in three invasions by the Egyptians, who made Tarsus their frontier fortress.³ Ahmed ben Ramazan, however, in

¹ Shehbeddin, 371; Ibn Batutah, 258–9, 265; Bustron, Chronique de Chypre, 296; Mas-Latrie, Trésor, col. 1802; Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv, col. 662; Urban V, Epp. secr., i. 161; Rasmussen, 45; Schiltberger, 19. (I cannot agree with Bruun that Adana is meant, for there is no reason to believe that the Osmanlis crossed the Taurus into Cilicia for more than one hundred years after the events Schiltberger was describing. See above, p. 296, n. 3.)
² See note for Mikhalitch.
³ Weil, iv. 504–624; Heyd, passim under Tarsus, Lajazzo, Adana, and Alexandretta; Mas-Latrie, Bibl. de l’École des Chartes, vi. 310–11; Le Nain de Tillemont (éd. Gaulle), iii. 9; iv. 459; Abulfaradj, Chron. Syr., 572; Bertrandon de la Broquiére (éd. Schéfer), introd., lv. 90–1.
1379 established a Turkish emirate at Adana, which survived throughout the fifteenth century. The Osmanlis were masters of a portion of Hungary before their power was felt in Cilicia.

Trebizond (45), in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula, in the country where Mithridates in his kingdom of Pontus had defied the Romans, came into no contact with the Osmanlis during the century. Nor was it the object of aggression on the part of Timur. It resisted successfully, with its Greek and Laze population, on land and sea, the attacks of the Turks of its hinterland and of Sinope.

TERRITORIES DEPENDING ON OUTSIDE STATES

At the mouth of the Gulf of Smyrna, on the northern promontory, was the Genoese self-governing colony of Phocaea (46), of which much has been said in the chapter on the reign of Orkhan. Phocaea had many vicissitudes, but maintained its independence as a Latin colony throughout the fourteenth century, and knew how to turn aside the possible aggression of Timur. It was never even temporarily dependent upon the Osmanlis.

Smyrna (47) was wrested from the emir of Aïdin by the crusaders of 1344, and, for the rest of the fourteenth century was a Christian city, independent of the Osmanlis and the Turkish emirs alike. It was Timur who brought it again under Moslem control. But it did not pass to the Osmanlis for many years after this reconquest.

The Byzantines, after they had been driven out of Bithynia and Mysia, managed to maintain Philadelphia (48), through their friendship with Sarukhan, until the end of Murad’s reign.

The Cypriotes (49) exercised a powerful influence in the southern portions of Asia Minor throughout the fourteenth century. As we have seen, they held Adalia for some years. In 1360, the emirs of southern Anatolia were so divided and opposed to each other, and needed so greatly the help of Cyprus against

1 Finlay, iv. 386–92; Panaretos, passim.
2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 314; Cant. ii. 13, pp. 388–90; Phr. i. 8, p. 37; Greg. xi. 9, p. 554; Sauli, i. 256–7. See also in text of this book under Orkhan.
The Karamanians, whom they feared much more than the Osmanlis, that they became for many years tributary to Cyprus. The Cypriotes were also interested in Cilicia.

In 1327, the year after Osman’s death, the power of the Mongols (50) reached for a few years the Mediterranean. After Bahadur Khan’s death, in 1335, the Mongol Empire was divided up. Suzerainty in Asia Minor fell to the Sultan of Irak (Persia), who, until Timur’s coming, fought with the Karamanians for some of the most important cities of eastern Anatolia. When Ibn Batutah went through the peninsula, Erzerum, Erzindjian, Sivas, Caesarea, Amassia, Nigdeh, and Ak Seraî were ‘cities of the Sultan’.2

The chevaliers of Rhodes (51) did not come into Asia Minor until 1310, when they won from the Turks and Greeks the island which was to give them their most commonly used name. They were continually in conflict with Tawas, Alaia, Adalia, Tekke, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Aidin. But they never came into contact with the Osmanlis until after the fall of Constantinople. On the mainland, the chevaliers helped to take Smyrna in 1344, and defended it against the Turks for sixty years. They wrested Ayasoluk from Aidin for a while about 1365. Several times they gained a foothold in Fukeh and Menteshe, and in the last year of the century established a fortress at Halik (Halicarnassus).3

The Mamelukes of Egypt (52) were not only interested in Cilicia, and held that country from 1360 to 1379, and at other times, but also invaded Karamania on different occasions. They reached Konia at the end of the thirteenth century, the beginning of the fifteenth century, and again, under Ibrahim pasha, twice in the third decade of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Murad I, the Egyptians called Cilicia up to the Taurus Bab-el-Mulk, the Royal Gateway. Konia was entered

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1 Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 650, under spring of 1360, says: ‘E per tante guerre e divisioni de’ Turchi gli paesi loro erano rotti e in grande tribulazione. E per questa cagione i Greci havieno minore persecuzione da loro. E più ciò fu materia al Re di Cipro di fare l’impresa sopra loro con onore e vittoria grande.’ Mas-Latrie, in Bibl. de l’École des Chartes, 2e série, ii. 122–3, says that the Karamanian army was defeated before Gorhigos in 1361, and that Cyprus, then at the height of its power, was able to impose tribute on the emirs of Asia Minor.

2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 288–95.

3 See above under Smyrna, Aidin, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Tawas. Also in text of book, p. 44.
by an Egyptian Sultan in 1418. The Karamanians of that day, who, according to the Ottoman historians, were vassals of the Osmanlis, had no interest in or fear of Mohammed I. They were engaged in a civil war which led to Egyptian intervention.¹ If Konia and the rest of Karamania was under the Osmanlis, why was there not Ottoman intervention in the quarrel between Mohammed and Ali for the Karamanian throne?

Last of all, the Catalans (53), whose history is given in the chapter on Osman, did not all leave Asia Minor with the 'Grand Company'. Throughout the reign of Orkhan the principality established at Cyzicus left its traces in the Marmora and Dardanelles coast and hinterland. Nothing more strikingly illustrates the lack of Ottoman activity in Asia Minor during Orkhan's day, even at the very threshold of Bithynia, than the fact that he left the Catalans in possession of Bigha at his death. Murad, in 1363, although his presence was urgently needed on the Maritza to defend his new conquest of Adrianople against a Serbian invasion, was compelled to delay for months to eject the Catalans from Bigha.²

CONCLUSION

Orkhan's emirate, then, was but one of more than thirty independent states which existed in Asia Minor during the decade from 1330 to 1340. During his lifetime, and the lifetime of his father Osman, the other better-known emirates had been slowly forming by the absorption of small independent villages and cities. Although several of the emirates that have been given above were ephemeral, and some of them duplicated practically the same territory at different periods in the fourteenth century, others, such as Aïdin, Kermian, Karamania, Sarukhan, and Tekke, were far more powerful in Asia Minor than Orkhan or than Murad. That Bayezid had not crushed the life out of the larger emirates is proved by the ease with which they were revived by Timur, and by their survival during the first half of the fifteenth century. Karamania, for one, remained powerful and flourishing long after the political life of the Balkan states had become extinct. Karamania demanded one hundred years of strenuous effort on the part of the conquerors of the Byzantine Empire before it

¹ Cf. Weil, iv. passim. ² See above, p. 123.
could be subjugated. The Osmanlis crossed the Balkans more than a century before they crossed the Taurus.

This exposé was written in order to show:
1. That Osman fell heir to no part of the Seljuk dominions;
2. That the Seljuks had many more heirs than the traditional ten;
3. That Osman and Orkhan carved their state out of the remnants of the Byzantine possessions along the upper end of the Sea of Marmora and in the Valley of the Sangarius—a very small portion indeed of Asia Minor;
4. That Murad, the wonderful conqueror of the Balkan peninsula, was only one of several rulers in Asia Minor, and not the most powerful of these, and that there were large portions of Asia Minor with which neither he nor his successor Bayezid came into contact at all;
5. That neither Bayezid, with his tremendous prestige in Europe, nor his brilliant successors of the fifteenth century, gained undisputed possession of Asia Minor. The Osmanlis were not masters of Asia Minor until long after their inheritance of the Byzantine Empire was regarded in Europe as a fait accompli.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES

I. Approximate Dates in the Legendary Period.
II. Important Events in the First Century of Ottoman History.
III. Progress of Ottoman Congress under the First Four Sovereigns.
IV. Comparative Table of Rulers.
V. The Fourteenth Century in Byzantine History.
VI. Relations between Venice and Genoa and the Levant from 1300 to 1403.
VII. The Popes and the Moslem Menace in the Fourteenth Century.

I. THE LEGENDARY PERIOD

1219 — Soleiman Shah, with 50,000 nomad Turkish families, settles in neighbourhood of Erzindjian.
1224 — Soleiman Shah is drowned in the Euphrates. Ertogrul and Dundar, two of his sons, settle near Angora.
1230–40 — Ertogrul establishes himself in the valley of the Kara Su, north-west of Kutayia.
1259 — Osman is born at Sugut.
1289 — Ertogrul dies.
   Osman captures Karadja Hissar and Biledjik.
1290 — Osman kills his uncle Dundar.
1290–9 — Osman, having extended his possessions westward, founds an emirate, and takes up his residence at Yeni Sheir.

II. IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE FIRST CENTURY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY

1299 — Osman, Turkish emir in the valley of the Kara Su, makes Yeni Sheir, between Brusa and Nicaea, his residence.
1301 — Osman defeats the Byzantine heterarch Muzalon at Baphaeon, near Nicomedia.
1308 — Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, is occupied.
   Ak Hissar and Tricocca are captured.
1317 — Investment of Brusa begins.
1326 — Brusa surrenders. Osman hears the news on his death-bed at Yeni Sheir.
1329 — Byzantines under Andronicus III are defeated at Pelecanon (Maltepê).
Nicaea surrenders.
1333 — Alaeddin pasha, brother of Orkhan and first vizier, dies. Death of Bahadur Khan removes the Mongol menace.
1337 or 1338 — Nicomedia surrenders.
1338 — Karasi, first of the Turkish emirates to be absorbed, is incorporated in Orkhan's state.
c. 1338 — Osmanlis reach the Bosphorus at Haïdar Pasha.
1343 — Empress Anna makes overtures to Orkhan for aid against Cantacuzenos.
1345 — Orkhan accepts proposal of alliance with Cantacuzenos.
First Osmanlis cross to Europe to fight for Cantacuzenos against Anna.
1346 — Orkhan marries Theodora, granddaughter of the Bulgarian czar and daughter of Cantacuzenos, who is besieging Constantinople with Ottoman aid.
1348 — The 'Black Death' ravages Europe.
1349 — Cantacuzenos calls again upon Orkhan for aid. Twenty thousand Ottoman horsemen are sent to help in preventing Salonika from falling into Serbian hands.
c. 1351 — First convention between Orkhan and the Genoese.
1353 — Soleiman pasha, Orkhan's elder son, in response to the third appeal of Cantacuzenos for Ottoman aid, brings an army into Thrace, helps in the recapture of Adrianople, and defeats the Serbs at Demotika. For this aid, a fortress on the European shore of the Dardanelles, probably Tzympe, is given to Orkhan.
1354 — An earthquake, which damaged the walls of Gallipoli, enables the Osmanlis of Soleiman pasha to capture the city. Orkhan refuses to give up Gallipoli, breaks with Cantacuzenos, and orders the Osmanlis in the Hellespont to extend their conquest in the direction of Constantinople.
c. 1357 — Demotika and Tchorlu are captured for the first time by the Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha.

1358 — Soleiman pasha dies from the fall of a horse at Bulaîr.

1359 — Orkhan dies, and is succeeded by Murad.

1360-1 — Conquest of Thrace.

1361 — Second serious ‘Black Death’ plague in Europe.

c. 1362 — Murad creates corps of ‘janissaries’.

1362 (1363) — John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize Murad’s conquests in Thrace, and to give him military aid against the Turkish emirs of Asia Minor.

1363 — Serbian and Hungarian crusaders are defeated on the banks of the Maritza.

Murad takes up his residence in Demotika.

1365 — Ragusa makes commercial treaty with Osmanlis, promising tribute.

1366 — Adrianople becomes the first capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Amadeo of Savoy’s crusade; captures Gallipoli, but soon abandons it again.

1369 — Capture of Yamboli forces Sisman of Bulgaria to become, like the Byzantine Emperor, a vassal of Murad.

1371 — Battle of Samakov gives the Osmanlis control of the passes into the Plain of Sofia.

Battle of Cernomen opens up Macedonia to the Ottoman conquest.

1372 — Moslem colonization of Macedonia, at Drama, Kavalla, Serres, and Veles, gives the Osmanlis a position of preponderance in the Balkan peninsula.

1373 — John Palaeologos, failing to receive aid from the West, becomes Ottoman vassal.

1374 — Unsuccessful conspiracy of Manuel to recover Serres causes Ottoman siege of Salonika.

1379 — John and Manuel agree to increase their tribute of gold and soldiers, and to surrender Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in Asia, for Ottoman aid in ousting Andronicus IV from Constantinople.

1384 — Osmanlis aid Thomas in besieging Janina.

1736 —
1385 — First Ottoman invasion of Albania.
    Battle of Savra destroys Balsa’s power.
    Osmanlis occupy Sofia.

1386 — Osmanlis capture Croia and Scutari, but return these
    fortresses to prince of Zenta.
    The fall of Nish makes Lazar of Serbia Ottoman
    vassal.

1387 — Genoa concludes formal treaty with Murad.
    Murad, with army containing Greek, Serbian and
    Bulgarian contingents, defeats Alaeddin of Kara-
    mania at Konia, but has to withdraw without
    tangible results.

1388 — Venice concludes commercial treaty with Murad.

1388 — Osmanlis are defeated by Serbians and Bosnians at
    Plochnik, thus preventing invasion of Bosnia.
    League of Serbians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Wallach-
    ians, and Albanians formed against the Osmanlis.
    First Ottoman army enters Greece upon invitation
    of Theodore Palaeologos to fight against the Franks.

1389 — Osmanlis destroy Serbian independence at Kossova.
    Murad is assassinated on the battle-field. Bayezid
    succeeds to the throne, and has his brother Yakub
    strangled.

    BAYEZID (1389-1403).

1387 — Bayezid marries sister of Stephen, son of Lazar, and
    makes Serbians his allies.

1390 — First Ottoman naval expedition makes raid on Chios,
    Negropont, and Attika.
    First Ottoman raids into Hungary.

1391 — Second invasion of Karamania, followed by siege
    of Konia, results in cession by Alaeddin of north-
    western portion of Karamania.
    First Ottoman siege of Constantinople.

1392 — First defensive campaign against Sigismund is fought
    in Bulgaria. Hearing that Timurtash had been
    defeated by Karamanlis, Bayezid transports army
    to Asia, and destroys Alaeddin’s army at Ak Tchaï.
    The Osmanlis are now the dominant race in Asia
    Minor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1394</td>
<td>Osmanlis first appear in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1395</td>
<td>Bayezid summons Ottoman vassals to his court at Serres. Ottoman siege of Constantinople becomes pressing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1396</td>
<td>Crusade of Western chivalry, co-operating with Sigismund of Hungary, meets with disaster at Nicopolis in Bulgaria. Ottoman invaders of Wallachia are defeated at Rovine, but in raids into Hungary Peterwardein is burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians carried off into captivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>First Ottoman invasion of Greece. In the Peloponnnesus, Argos is taken by assault. After defeat at Megalopolis, Theodore becomes Ottoman vassal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397–9</td>
<td>Movement of Moslem Anatolian population into the Balkan peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1398</td>
<td>Osmanlis and Serbians make destructive raid on Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Timur captures and destroys Sivas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1402</td>
<td>Timur defeats and makes prisoner Bayezid at Angora, overruns Asia Minor, occupies Brusa, and takes Smyrna from the Christians by storm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1403</td>
<td>Timur withdraws to Samarkand. Bayezid, still a prisoner, dies on the homeward march at Ak Sheîr. His sons dispute the succession.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. PROGRESS OF OTTOMAN CONQUEST UNDER THE FIRST FOUR SOVEREIGNS

**Osman (1299–1326)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1299</td>
<td>Osman, local chieftain at Sugut, has extended his conquests from the valley of the Kara Su westward to Yeni Sheîr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1308</td>
<td>Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, becomes first Ottoman maritime possession. Ak Hissar, at the entrance to plain of Nicomedia, and Tricocea, which ensured land communication between Nicaea and Nicomedia, are captured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1308–16 — Sovereignty is extended over the peninsula between the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Black Sea, almost up to the Bosphorus.

1317 — Fortresses are erected near gates of Brusa.

1326 — Brusa surrenders.

**Orkhan (1326–59)**

1329 — Occupies Nicaea.

1330–8 — Conquest of shores of Gulf of Nicomedia up to Scutari on the Bosphorus.

1334–8 — Conquest of emirate of Karasi.

1337–8 — Occupies Nicomedia.

C. 1339 — Acquires Mikhalitch, Ulubad, and Kermasti.

1353 — Cantacuzenos cedes fortress on European shore of Hellespont.

1354 — Gallipoli is occupied.

1354–8 — The Osmanlis occupy the Thracian, Chersonese, and the European shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. Demotika is captured, and Constantinople cut off from Adrianople by the occupation of Tchorlu.

**Murad (1359–89)**

1360 — Captures Angora and suppresses independence of village chieftains between Eski Sheir and Angora.

1360–1 — Conquers Thrace from the Maritza River to the Black Sea, including Adrianople.

1361 — Lalashahin captures Philippopolis.

C. 1362 — Creation of the corps of janissaries.

1362 or 1363 — John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize Murad’s conquest of Thrace, and to give him military aid against the emirs of Asia Minor.

1366–9 — Conquest of Maritza Valley up to the Rhodope Mountains, and of Bulgaria, up to the main Balkan range.

1370–1 — Occupies the fortresses and passes in the Rhodope and Rilo ranges.

1371–2 — Conquers Macedonia up to the Vardar River.

C. 1376 — Portion of emirate of Kermian, including Kutayia, is annexed as dot of the emir’s daughter, in marriage arranged with Bayezid.
1377 — Emir of Hamid sells to Murad territories between Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. The acquisition of Ak Sheīr brings the Osmanlis to the frontier of Karamania.

1378 — Conquers Tekke, except Adalia and Alaya.

1380 — Conquers Macedonia, west of the Vardar. Prilep and Monastir become Ottoman frontier fortresses.

1385 — Occupies Okhrida. Plain of Sofia and upper valley of the Struma River are conquered.

1386 — Valleys of the Morava and Nisava are conquered, and Nish falls.

1388 — Invasion of northern Bulgaria reduces Sisman to more humiliating vassalage. The Osmanlis retain the fortresses of Shuman and Nicopolis.

Bayezid (1389–1403)

1391 — Captures Adalia, first Ottoman seaport on the Mediterranean. Ak Sheīr and Ak Seraī ceded by Karamania.

1393 — Bulgaria, to the Danube, becomes Ottoman territory.

1393–5 — Conquers Samsun, Caesarea, and Sivas, and annexes emirate of Kastemuni.

1397 — Conquers Thessaly, Doris, Locris, and the northeastern corner of the Peloponnesus.

1398–9 — Gradually occupies Southern Albania and a part of Epirus.

IV. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF RULERS

Byzantine Empire 1

Andronicus II (the Old), 1282–1328.
Michael IX (co-emperor), 1295–1320.

Andronicus III (the Young), 1328–41,
by whose second wife, Anna of Savoy, was born

1 The ordinals following the names of Byzantine emperors are a cause of confusion, as there is no universal agreement as to the method of numbering. Some historians count by sovereigns of the same family bearing a particular name (i.e. John I Palaeologos and John II Palaeologos), while others number by the imperial line as a whole (i.e. John V Palaeologos, John VI Cantacuzenos, John VII Palaeologos). I have used the second system.
John V, 1341–91,
whose three sons were:
ANDRONICUS IV (co-emperor), 1355–?
MANUEL II, 1391–1425.
Theodore, despot of the Morea, 1359–.
The son of Andronicus IV was
JOHN VII (co-emperor), 1399–1403.

The Cantacuzeni

John VI, regent, 1341–7,
co-emperor, 1347–55,
two of whose daughters married Orkhan and John V,
and whose son was
MATTHEW, co-emperor, 1355–6.

Hungary

Louis the Great, 1342–82 (King of Poland, 1370–82).
His two daughters were:
Hedwig, to whom fell the crown of Poland, and who married
Jagello of Lithuania, who became King of Poland under the
Christian name of Ladislas V.
Mary, to whom fell the crown of Hungary, 1382–92.
Mary married
Sigismund of Luxemburg in 1386, who became sole ruler of
Hungary after Mary's death, and, later, Holy Roman
Emperor.

Holy Roman Empire

House of Luxemburg

Charles IV (I as King of Bohemia), 1355–78.
His two sons were:
Wenceslaus, who succeeded to the imperial crown on the death
of his father and was deposed in 1400;
and Sigismund, King of Hungary, who was elected emperor
in 1410.

France

Philippe IV, le Bel, 1285–1314, and his sons
Louis X, Philippe V, and Charles IV, last of the Capetians,
1314–28.
Philippe VI Valois, 1328–50.
Jean, 1350–64.
Charles VI, 1380–1422.
Philippe de Bourgogne, son of King Jean, and father of Jean de Nevers, and Louis d’Orléans, second son of Charles V, were vying with each other for the control of their insane nephew and brother, Charles VI, during the reign of Bayezid.

England

Edward I, 1270–1307.
Edward II, 1307–27.
Edward III, 1327–77
(took the title of King of France in 1339).
Deposed in 1399, and succeeded by
Henry IV (of Lancaster).

V. The Fourteenth Century in Byzantine History

1300 — The emir of Menteshe invades Rhodes.
1301 — First Byzantine defeat at hands of Osmanlis at Baphacon.
1302 — Michael IX takes command of Slavic mercenaries in Asia Minor: they force him to allow their return to Europe.
Roger de Flor arrives at Constantinople with eight thousand Catalans, and is married to a niece of Andronicus.
1303 — Catalans sack the island of Chios.
1305 — Death of Ghazan Khan frustrates Byzantine hopes of a Mongol attack upon the emirs of Asia Minor.
Catalans compel the emir of Karamania to lift the siege of Philadelphia, but quarrel with Greeks and Slavic mercenaries. Roger exacts title of ‘Caesar’ from Andronicus, and is later assassinated by Michael IX at Adrianople.
1306–9 — Catalan ‘Grand Company’ forms state at Gallipoli.
1310 — Catalans leave for Greece, and set up military democracy in Athens.
The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem capture Rhodes.
1311 — The emir of Menteshe fails in attempt to recapture Rhodes.
1311–14 — Turkish freebooter Halil defies the Emperor in the Thracian Chersonese, and is finally defeated with the help of the Serbians.

1317 — Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomaedia begin to be menaced.

1326 — Brusa falls. Andronicus III, on his wedding trip from Constantinople to Demotika, is set upon and wounded by raiding Turks.

1327–8 — Andronicus III plots to oust his grandfather, who, in turn, invites Serbians to attack young Andronicus in the rear; young Andronicus besieges army of his grandfather and Serbians at Serres, and captures Salonika. Old Andronicus calls upon Bulgarians, but before their aid arrives, young Andronicus succeeds in entering Constantinople and deposing his grandfather.

1329 — Andronicus III is defeated at Pelecanon by Orkhan in an attempt to relieve Nicaea. Nicaea surrenders.

Andronicus III, at Phocaea, tries to incite emirs of Aidin and Sarukhan to attack Orkhan.

1333 — Turks of Sarukhan make a raid on Macedonia, while their vessels enter the Sea of Marmora and seize Rodosto.

1334 — Andronicus is compelled to send army to save Salonika from raiding Turks.

1336 — Andronicus asks Turkish emirs to help him in siege of Genoese at Phocaea.

1337 or 1338 — Nicomedia and the last Byzantine possessions in north-western corner of Asia Minor are conquered by the Osmanlis.

1340 — Stephen Dushan crosses the Vardar, captures Serres, and crowns himself there as 'master of almost all the Roman Empire'.

1341 — After death of Andronicus III, Catacuzenos crowns himself at Demotika.

1342 — Civil war between Catacuzenos and widow and son of Andronicus III, during which both sides make overtures to Osmanlis, Serbians, and Bulgarians.

1345 — Catacuzenos receives aid from Orkhan, and pays for it by marrying his daughter to the Ottoman emir.
1349 — Cantacuzenos calls Osmanlis into Europe again to save Salonika from the Serbians.
1349–53 — Civil war between Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos. Palaeologos flees to Tenedos.
1353 — The Osmanlis, who had been helping Cantacuzenos against Palaeologos, capture Gallipoli, and invade Thrace.
1354 — Cantacuzenos, having vainly appealed to the Pope, Venice, Bulgaria, and Serbia to aid him against the Osmanlis, is deposed by popular revolution in Constantinople, and becomes a monk. John Palaeologos recalled from exile.
1355 — Dushan dies on his way to attack Constantinople.
1354–8 — Palaeologos succeeds finally in subduing Cantacuzenos' son Matthew.
1358 — While Osmanlis are advancing in Thrace, John V, at command of Orkhan, is besieging Phocaea.
1361 — Adrianople and Philippopolis captured by the Osmanlis.
1363 — John V signs treaty of vassalage to Murad.
1366 — John V journeys to Buda to enlist aid of Louis of Hungary, and on return journey is made prisoner by Sisman in Bulgaria.
1373 — John V, seeing that his visit to Rome and his appeals to western princes are of no avail, recognizes Murad as his suzerain, promises to do military service in Murad's army, and gives his son Manuel as hostage. Thrace and Macedonia are practically lost, and the Byzantine Empire has become merely the city state of Constantinople.
1374 — As the result of a rebellion undertaken by Andronicus together with the son of Murad against the two fathers, John V consents to deprive his son Andronicus of his sight, and shuts him up in the Tower of Anemas.
1375–89 — Civil war between John and Manuel and Andronicus,
in which Venice, Genoa, and Osmanlis play a decisive part. John and Manuel purchase Ottoman aid at the price of giving up Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in Asia Minor.

1391 — Manuel, serving as vassal in Ottoman army, is threatened with loss of eyes, if Emperor John does not demolish the towers on the walls of Constantinople, which he has rebuilt. He obeys and dies soon after. Manuel escapes from Brusa upon learning of his father's death. His flight is followed by the first Ottoman siege of Constantinople.

1396 — Bayezid contemplates taking Constantinople by assault, but is deterred by arrival of crusaders in Hungary.

1397 — Siege of Constantinople is renewed, after Nicopolis.

1399 — Crusade of Boucicaut helps Byzantines temporarily.

1400–2 — Manuel, having made peace with his nephew John, sails for Italy and spends two years in fruitless endeavour to get aid from western princes.

1401 — John makes treaty to give up Constantinople, if Bayezid should win from Timur.

1402 — After Bayezid's defeat at Angora, Manuel returns to Constantinople.

John is banished to Lemnos, and Ottoman colonists expelled from Constantinople. Overtures are made to Timur.

1403 — Manuel recognizes Soleiman as successor of Bayezid, and renews treaty with him.

VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN VENICE AND GENOA AND THE LEVANT FROM 1300 TO 1403

1328 — Venetian sovereignty of Negropont is menaced by Turkish pirates.

1344 — Venice aids Cyprus and Rhodes in the capture of Smyrna.

1345–50 — Dushan negotiates frequently with Venice for aid in capturing Constantinople.
1351–3 — War between Venice and Genoa. Sea power of Genoa is broken at battle of Lojera. Genoese are assisted by Orkhan.

1355 — Matteo Venier and Marino Faleri warn the Senate that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably become the booty of the Osmanlis, unless Venice gets ahead of them.

1361 — Venetian Senate make overtures to John V for alliance against Murad, but withdraw when they see the rapid success of Murad’s campaign in Thrace.

1370–1 — Venice and Greece are engaged in a struggle for economic supremacy in Cyprus.

1375 — John V gives Tenedos to the Venetians. The Genoese come into conflict with the Venetians over economic privileges at Constantinople.

1379–81 — Venice and Genoa go to war over the question of Tenedos and the Byzantine succession to the throne. In the Peace of Turin, it is provided that Tenedos remain unfortified, and that Andronicus IV be recognized the heir to John V.

1386 — Genoese make treaty with Byzantines.

1387 — Genoese make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.

1388 — Venetians make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.

1389 — Venice and Genoa renew treaties with Bayezid.

1393 — Venice decides to treat with Sigismund of Hungary for defensive alliance against Osmanlis.

1396 — Venetian aid in Nicopolis crusade is half-hearted.

1397 — Venice urges Genoese of Pera not to treat with Bayezid, and makes accord with Genoa to aid Byzantines.

1401 — Venice and Genoa engaged in another sea struggle for supremacy in the Levant.

1402 — Both Venetians and Genoese aid Osmanlis, fleeing from Timur after Angora, to cross into Europe. They renew their treaties with Osmanlis, recognizing Soleiman as Bayezid’s successor.
VII. THE POPES AND THE MOSLEM MENACE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

1306 — Clement V exhorts the Venetians to co-operate with Charles de Valois in the reconquest of Constantinople.

1307 — Clement V urges Charles II of Naples to re-conquer Constantinople, but his interest is diverted by a project of a crusade to support Cyprus and Cilician Armenia against the Egyptians.

1309 — Papal court transferred from Rome to Avignon.

1310 — Clement V encourages Knights of St. John to drive both Greeks and Turks out of Rhodes.

1327 — John XXII does not respond to appeal of Andronicus II to aid Byzantium against the Turks.

1333 — Similar unsuccessful overture is made by Andronicus III.

1334 — Papal effort to form crusade against Turks results in the capture of Smyrna.

1347 — Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin Emperors, makes agreement with Clement VI to conquer Constantinople. At the same time appeals are received at Rome from Cantacuzenos for union of western princes against Osmanlis.

1349, 1350, 1353 — Cantacuzenos makes three more overtures to Clement VI and Innocent VI.

1352 — Inhabitants of Philadelphia appeal to Pope for aid, promising return to Roman communion.

1363 — Urban V on Holy Friday gives the cross to several princes of the Occident.

1366 — Urged by Urban, Amadeo of Savoy sails for the crusade against the Osmanlis. He spends his efforts in releasing John V from the Bulgarians, and abandons the Byzantines when they refuse to return to the Roman Church. Urban writes to Louis of Hungary to put off his crusade until the union of the Churches is accomplished. Urban V denounces the traffic of the Italian Republics with Moslems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1369</td>
<td>Emperor John V, at Rome, abjures errors of Orthodox Church, and receives from Pope letters, recommending that Christian princes come to his aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1371</td>
<td>Gregory XI makes appeal to Christian nations to co-operate with Genoa in saving the last Christians of the Holy Land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1372</td>
<td>Gregory urges Louis of Hungary to resist the Osmanlis before they advance farther into Europe, and orders a crusade to be preached in Hungary, Poland, and Dalmatia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>Gregory, receiving the last envoy from John V, bursts into tears, and says that he will save Constantinople, if only the Byzantine Emperor will cause his people to renounce their heresies and return to the Roman Church.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>The Great Schism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1388</td>
<td>Urban VI sends two armed galleys for the defence of Constantinople, but is unsuccessful in raising crusade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1391</td>
<td>Boniface IX stirs up trouble between Latin and Greek Christians in the Balkan peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1398 and 1399</td>
<td>Boniface IX orders crusade to be preached throughout Christendom for the defence of Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1399</td>
<td>Boucicaut, the only one to respond, goes to the aid of Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1402</td>
<td>Smyrna is lost to Timur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1403</td>
<td>The strife between rival Popes, Benedict XIII and Boniface IX, makes impossible a papal effort to take advantage of the civil strife between the sons of Bayezid, after Timur's abandonment of his conquests in Asia Minor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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I. CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE

The Classified Bibliography contains only the names of authors. Following the classification, the books and editions are given in detail under the authors' names in alphabetical order.

I shall be grateful for corrections and amplifications. The work on this bibliography has been done largely in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and I have been handicapped by the lack of a complete catalogue.

No attempt whatever has been made to follow a definite system of spelling of Oriental and Slavic names, for arbitrary changes in spelling on my part would confuse the reader who desires to find in a library catalogue the authors given. I have retained the spelling (except in rare instances where there were divergencies in different editions of the same book) of the author's name as given by himself or by his editor or publisher. As far as the letter 'G', I have made the spelling conform to that of the General Catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale. Beyond 'G', there is, as yet, no norm.

Bibliographers of Printed Books.
Apponyi; Auboyneau; Boecler; Chevalier; Dherbelot de Molainville; Eichhorn; Fabricius; Fevret; Fitzclarence; Fraehn; Franke; Hadji Khalfa; Halle; Houtsma et al.; Oesterly; Omont; Pogodin; Potthast; Welter; Zenker.

Bibliographers of Oriental MSS.
Ahlwardt; Ali Hilmi; Apponyi; Auboyneau; Blochet; Browne; Cusa; De Goeje; De Jong; Derenbourg; Dorn; Dozy; Fevret; Flügel; Hadji Khalfa; Karamianz; Lampros; Pertsch; Rieu; Rosen; Schéfer; Slane; Smirnow; Sprenger; Welter.

Numismatists.
Blau; Djevdet; Engel; Friedländer; Ghalib; Karabacek; Lane-Poole; Lavoix; Makrisi; Pinder; Schlumberger; Serrure; Stickel.
Chronographers.
Aladdin Ali; Arabantinos; Assemanus; Hadji Khalifa; Knaus; Loeb; Mas Latrie; Mullach; Müller; Muralt; Rasmussen; Strzygowski; Wüstenfeld; Chronicon Breve (in Ducas).

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OTTOMAN: Feridun, Collection of.

The authenticity of the documents in this collection cannot be definitely established.

BYZANTINE: Dieterich; Miklositch; Müller; Predelli; Sathas.

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VENETIAN: Alberi; Brown; Fejér; Jorga; Ljubić; Makusev; Miklositch; Minotto; Müller; Noiret; Noradoungian; Predelli; Racki; Romanin; Rymer; Safaršik; Sathas; Testa; Thomas.

PAPAL (Avignon and Rome): Baluze; Bosquet; Dudik; Jorga; Romanin; Theiner; Werunski.

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GENOISE (including Pera Colony): Belgrano; Jorga; Miklositch; Müller; Noradoungian; Olivieri; Predelli; Testa.

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ENGLISH: Rymer.

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BYZANTINE: Cantacuzenos; Nicephoros Gregoras; Pachymeres; Panaretos (for Trebizond).

Catalan: Moncada; Muntaner. (See also Frenzel.)

French: Enguerran de Monstrelet; Eustache des Champs; Froissart; Gilles; Marche; Nangis; Ursins; Wavrin; Anon.: Cronicorum Karoli Sexti; Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis; Chronique des quatre premiers Valois; Livre des faicts de Jean le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut; Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis (serviteur de Gui de Blois). (See also under the Editors: Bellaguet; Géraud; Godefroy; Kervyn de Lettenhove; Lacabane; Lemaître.)

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Derbend Namé.

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Khalifa; Hezarfenn, Hussein; Ibn Ali Mohammed Al-Biwy; Idris, Mevlana (of Bitlis); Kheirullah; Kourbaddinmakky; Mohammed Ferid bey; Moukhlis Abderrahman; Mustafa; Nedim; Neshri; Nichandji pasha Mehmet; Said; Seaddedin; Tahir-Zade; Anon. *Mira-ari-tarikh*.

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Déprémesy, Charles. Editor of Mirkhound’s *Hist. of Sultans of Kharesm*; and French trans. of Khondemir and Ibn Batutah.


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DELAIVILLE LEROULX, J. La France en Orient au xiv\textsuperscript{e} si\`ele. Paris, 1868. 2 vols. 8vo.

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DERENBOURG, HARTWIG. Les manuscrits arabes de l’Escurial. Paris, 1884. (Uncompleted.)


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DIETERICI, FRIEDRICH HEINRICH. Chrestomathie ottomane, précédée de tableaux grammaticaux et suivie d’un glossaire turco-français. Berlin, 1854, 8vo.


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1 and 2 are reprinted in vol. elix of Migne's Patrologia Graeca, Paris, 1866, pp. 572–922.

3. Historiae Musulmanae Turcorum de monumentis ipsorum escriptae libri XVIII. Frankfort, 1591, fol.

Von Hammer, in his monumental work, is far more indebted to Leunclavius than to any other previous writer for the earlier part of his history.


LEVÉC, Fr. Die Einfälle der Türken in Krain und Istrien. Laybach, 1891, 8vo.

For songs on Nicopolis defeat.


LOEB, ISIDORE. *Tables du calendrier juif depuis l’ère chrét. jusqu’au XXXᵉ siècle.* Paris, 1886, 4to.

LONGNON, JEAN. Editor of anon. *Chronique de Morée.*

LONICERUS, PHILIPPUS. *Chronicorum Turcicorum, in quibus Turcorum origo, principes, imperatores, bella, praelia, caedes, victoriae, reique military ratio . . . exponuntur.* Frankfort, 1578, fol.

Ibid., 1584. 2 vols. 8vo.

Contains reprint of Giorgievitz, Aventinus, *et al.*

LOT, H. 1. ‘Projets de croisade sous Ch. le Bel et sous Philippe de Valois.’ *Bibl. de l’École des Chartes,* 4ᵉ série (1859), v. 503–9.

2. ‘Essai d’intervention de Ch. le Bel en faveur des Chrétiens d’Orient.’ Ibid. (1875), xxxvi. 588–600.

LUCE, SIMÉON. Editor of Froissart, and of *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois.*

LÜDEMANN, W. VON. *Geschichte Griechenlands und der Türkei.* Dresden, 1827. 4 vols. 12mo.


MACRIDES, GEORGES. French trans. of Col. Djevad bey.

MAÉLATH, COUNT J. *Geschichte der Magyaren.* Regensburg, 1852–3. 5 vols. 8vo.


MAKUSEV, W. 1. *Italianskie archivy i chranjaschtschiessja w nich materiały alja slavanskoi istorii.* (Italian archives and chronicles, and the materials in them for Slavic history.) Moscow, 1870–72, 4 vols. 8vo. (Vols. xvi–xix of *Sapiski imperat. akad. nauk.*)

2. Also contributed to *Monumenta hist. Slav. merid.*

MANAVINO. Italian trans. of Lonicerus.

MANGER, SAMUEL HENRY. Latin trans. of Arabshah.

MANUTIO, ANTONIO (?). *Viaggi fatti da Venezia alla Tana... et in C/poli ; con la descritione... di Città, Luoghi, etc.* Contains, fol. 120–58, *Libri tre delle cose de' Turchi*. Venice, 1543, 12mo.


MARKHAM, Clements R. English trans. of Clavijo.

MARS DEN, WILLIAM. English trans. of Marco Polo.


4. Various papers on the commercial relations between Cyprus and Asia Minor in the 14th cent., in the *Bibl. de l’École des Chartes*.

I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to 3 and 4 of Comte de Mas Latrie in my study of the emirates of Asia Minor.


MAURER, CASPAR. *Ungarische Chronica oder Beschreibung von allen ungarischen christlichen Königen, wie auch Kriegs-Empörungen, Schlachten, etc. ... mit den Türcken (1390–1661)*. Nürnberg, 1664, 12mo.


Menavino was brought up as a slave-page in the serail of Bayezid II.

MERSCHMID, D. G. German trans. of Abul-Ghazi.


MÉZIÈRES, PHILIPPE DE. *Epistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le
fait de la desconfiture (Nicopolis). In Kervyn de Lettenhove’s ed. of Froissart, xvi. 444–523.

See Appendix BB in Wylie’s History of Henry IV, iv. 323–6; also Bibl. de l’École des Chartes for 1873, and Académie des Inscriptions, xvi. 491 and xvii. 219; and under A. Molinier and P. Paris below. Title of citizen of Venice given June 22, 1365, recorded in Commemoriali, vol. vii, fol. 47 v°.


This is a translation, following Pavitch in general lines.


Miles, Colonel. English trans. of Abul Ghazi.

Miller, E. Edited and trans., in collab. with Sathas, the chronicle of Macairas.


2. The History of the Ismaelians of Persia has been trans. into French by Jourdain.

3. A Latin trans. of the History of the Seljucides was published at Giessen, 1837.

4. The Persian text of the Hist. of the Sultans of the Kharesm was edited by Défrémery, Paris, 1842, 8vo.


Molinier, A. MSS. de P. de Mézières, in Archives de l’Orient latin, i. 335-64 (Paris, 1883), or, separately, Genoa, 1881, 8vo.

Moncada, Juan de. Expedicion de los Catalanes y Aragones contra Turcos y Griegos. Madrid, 1885, la. 8vo. Barcelona, 1842, la. 8vo. Also in Tesoro de autores illustres, vol. iii, and Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. xxi.

Moniferratos, Antonios. Διπλωματικα 'Ενέργειαι Μανωνήλ β’ Παλαιολόγου ἐν Εὐρώπῃ καὶ Ἀσίᾳ. Athens, 1913, 8vo.

Monstrelet. See Enguerran de Monstrelet.

Montalbanus, Johannes Baptistia. De Turcarum moribus commentarius. Leyden, 1643, 32mo. Ibid., 1654, 16mo. This work was first published more than a century earlier in the De origine, &c., of Cuspinianus.


Reprint, in full, of the memoir of the Dominican Friar who brought letter of Timur to Charles VI, after MSS. in Bibl. Nat., fonds fr. 5624 and 12201. Text of this letter is reprinted and commented upon by A. I. Silvestre de Sacy in Acad. des Inscriptions (1822), vi. 470-522. Together with Clavijo and Schiltberger, the Dominican Friar gives contemporary evidence of highest value for the battle of Angora.


Moris, M. French trans. of Diez’s German rendering of Sidi Ali.

Mostras, C. Dictionnaire géographique de l’Empire ottoman. St. Petersburg, 1873, la. 8vo.

Moukhlis Abderrahman. Enis ou Moussamirin. Schéfer MS., quoted by him in Bertrandon de la Broquière, p. 170, n. 3, for the first Ottoman operations around Adrianople.

Mullach, A. Conjecturen. Berlin, 1852. (Corrects narrative of Ducas.)

Muller, G. Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’ Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’ anno 1531. Florence, 1879, 4to.


2. ‘Über einige byzantinische Urkunden von 1324-1405.’ In vol. vii of Sitzungsberichte, &c.


There is a wealth of erudition and research in this work. The bibliography, however, is very unsatisfactory, and one is frequently puzzled in verifying important references. Muralt confuses Arabshah with Sherefeddin, puts Ibn Batutah at 1320, and Shehabeddin at 1331.

MURATORI, LUDOVICO ANTONIO, editor. *Rerum Italicarum Scriptore.* Milan, 1732–51. 28 vols., la. fol. (For Florentine writers see Tartini.)

A new edition of Muratori, including Tartini, has just been completed by a body of Italian scholars, working at Rome under the direction of Vittorio Fiorini.

MUSTAFA IBN MOHAMMED KHOSREU-ZADE (Mevlana). Turkish trans. of Koutbaddinmakky.

NANGIS, GUILLAUME DE. *Chronique latine de 1113 à 1300.* Paris, 1843, 8vo.

NAUHANN, EDMUND. *Vom goldenen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat.* Munich and Leipzig, 1893, 8vo.

NAZMI ZADÉ. Turkish trans. of Arabshah.

NEDIM. *Munedjem-Bachi.* Ottoman Hist. up to Mohammed IV. In 3 vols.


Against the hypothesis.


NICEPHOROS GREGORAS. See under Byzantine Historians.


NIEBUHR, B. G. Editor of *Corpus Script. Hist. Byzantinae.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOIRET, Hippolyte. Documents inédits pour servir à l'hist. de la domination vénitienne en Crète de 1380 à 1485, tirés des Arch. vén. Paris, 1892, 8vo.

NOLDEKE, Th. German trans. of portions of Neshri.


In Turkey there are no Archives d'état before the 17th cent. From 1307 to 1534 in this volume the editor merely refers to other books. His compilation is of no value until 1535 for furnishing source material for Ottoman History.

NORBERG, Matthias. Latin trans. of Hadji Khalfa's Djihannuma.

NOVAKOVITCH, Stojan. Kosova, Srbske narodne pjesme o boju na Kosova. Belgrade, 1871, 8vo; also Agram, 1872, and Belgrade, 1876.

Attempt to bring fragments of folksong into one narrative of battle of Kossova.


This work, interrupted by the Revolution and the author's death, was completed, after d'Ohsson's notes, by his son Charles. Vols. v–vii appeared in 1824.


OKSZA, Théodore d'. Editor and French trans. of Konstantynowicz.

OLIVIERI, A. Carte e chronache manoscritte per la storia genovese esistenti nella bibl. della R. Università ligure. Genoa, 1855, 8vo.


ORBINI, Dom Mauro. Il Regno degli Slavi, hoggi correttamente detti Schiavoni. Pesaro, 1601, fol.

ORTELLIUS, Abrahamus. 1. Synonymia Geographica.... Antwerp, 1578, 4to.


3. Thesaurus geographicus... nomina, &c. Antwerp, 1587, fol.

PACHYMERES. See under Byzantine Historians, p. 367.

PAGANO, C. Delle imprese e del dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia. Genoa, 1846, 8vo.


C. B. Hase, in Notices et Extraits, vol. viii, 2e partie, pp. 309–82, gives interesting critical account of this MS., with Greek text and Latin trans, 1736.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

of first two dialogues. The dialogues were with a Moslem Hodja, probably in 1390, when Man. Pal. was serving in the Ottoman army at Angora. Most valuable description of Bayezid's court and eloquent testimony to the humiliation of the Byzantine imperial family.

For other works of M. Palaeologos, see Migne, Patrologia Graeca, clvi. 82–580.

Panaretos, Michael. Περὶ τῶν τῆς Τραπεζούντως βασιλέων τῶν Μεγάλων Κομητῶν. Chronological account of Trebizond (1204–1386), with a continuation to 1424.

Edited by J. F. Tafel, in the Opuscula of Eustathios of Thessalonika, pp. 362–70, Frankfort, 1832, 4to. Also by Fallmerayer, in Abhandlung der k. Bayerischen Akad. der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1844, 8vo.


It was Parvilleé who, under Ahmed Vewfik pasha, restored the monuments of Brusa.

Pauthier, M. G. Editor of Marco Polo.

Pavitch, A. Narodne Pjesme o boju na Kosova, 1389. In Mem. of the Acad. of Sciences and Arts of Agram. Agram, 1877, 8vo.

A critical essay on the national songs of the Servians, followed by a narrative in verse, combining the songs which deal with Kossova.


2. French trans. of Hussein Hezarfenn.


4. French trans. of Sherefeddin's hist. of Timur.


Eulogy of Ottoman sultans in verse.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Phrantzes, George. See under Byz. Historians.

Picot, Émile. 1. Editor and French trans. of Urechi’s Rumanian chronicle.


Pindler, M. Collab. with Friedländer in numismatic work.

Pocock, Edward. Editor and English translator of Abulfaradji.

Podesta, Jo. Baptista. 1. Trans. from the Turkish De gestis Tamerlanis.


A trans. from diff. MSS. of Ali. But Bratutti’s trans. of Seaddeddin has been used for interpolations and corrections or additions.

Poogodin, P. Übersicht der Quellen zur Geschichte der Belagerung von Byzanz durch die Türken. Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction, St. Petersburgh, August 1889.

Pol, Marco. See Marco Polo.


Possinus, Petrus, S. J. Notes to Pachymeres.

Postansque, A. De libro secretorum fidelium crucis. (For Marino Sanudo.) Montpellier, 1854, 8vo.


This Latin text differs from 1, so I have listed it as a separate work.


Vol. ii. 1647–1735 contains a very suggestive (but not thorough) Quellenkunde für die Geschichte der europäischen Staaten während des Mittelalters.

Potvin, Charles. Editor of Ghilebert de Lannoy.


Predelli, Riccardo. 1. (In collaboration with Thomas.) Diplo-
matarium Veneto-Levantinum, sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, Graecas atque Levantinas illustrantia a 1300 ad 1454. Venice, 1880, 1899. 2 vols. 4to.


QuATREMÈRE, ÉTIENNE. French trans. of Shehabeddin, Makrisi, and Reshideddin (unfinished). Editor of the Prolegomena of Ibn Kathaldun.

Rački, FRANCIS. Documenta historiae Croaticae periodum antiquam illustrantia. Agram, 1877.

RAIČ. Hist. variorum Slavorum, imprimis Bulgarorum, Chrobatorum et Serborum. Buda, 1823.


Notice on two documents: 1. Latin text of project of treaty between Pope, Cyprus, Venice, and Rhodes, of which Mas Latrie, Hist. de Chypre, ii. 217, published the text after Commemoriali, vols. iv and v. 2. Unpublished Provençal text of letter which set forth in detail difficulties of getting this treaty signed, from MS. in Arch. des Bouches-du-Rhône, Fonds de Malte, liasse 86.


Ramsay, Sir W. M. Historical Geography of Asia Minor, with 5 maps. London, 1890, la. 8vo.

Ramus, Johannes (Goesanus). De Rebus Turcicis libri tres. Louvain, 1553, 12mo. The first book of the three is by Secundinus.

Ranke, LEOPOLD VON. History of Servia and the Servian Revolution. Trans. by Mrs. A. Keen. London, 1858, 16mo.

First chapter contains an illuminating résumé of relations between Byzantium and Serbia in middle of 14th cent.


There have been so many editions, abridgements, and translations of the Annales that I have given my references to this work under the year, so that any edition might be consulted.

RaynAUD, GASTON. Editor of Froissart, and, with Michelant, of the Jerusalem Itineraries.
RAYNAUD, Furcy. French trans. of Heyd's Levantehandelsge-
schichte.
REINAUD, J. T. French trans. of Abulfeda.
REINCECIUS, Reiner. Editor of Helmoldus and Arnold of Lübeck.
REISKES, Jo. Jacob. Latin trans. of Abulfeda and Chronological
Tables of Hadji Khalifa; editor of Drechsler.
RENNELL, J. Treatise of the Comparative Geography of Western Asia.
RESHIDEDDIN, Fadhl Allah. Djami ut Tevarikh. Hist. of the
Mongols of Persia. Quatremère trans. into French the first part,
Paris, 1836, la. fol. Erdmann trans. into German the review of
the various tribes of Asia at accession of Djenghiz Khan, with
account of their origin. Kasan, 1841. In his German life of
Timur, pp. 172–84, Erdmann practically repeats this portion
verbatim.
The earlier portion of Abul-Ghazi is practically an abridgement of Reshid.
REUSNER, Nicholas. Epistolarum Turcicarum variorum et diver-
sorum authorum libri XIV. Frankfort, 1598–9. 4 vols. 4to.
'Re quis Epistolae de rebus Turcieis summorum pontificum, impera-
torurn, regum, principum... ad nostra tempora leguntur.'
REZ, Peter von. Lament for defeat of Nicopolis, in Liliencron.
RICAUT, Paul. A History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire
containing the Political maxims of the Turks, their religion, &c.
French trans. by Briot. Amsterdam, 1678, 16mo; 1696, sm. 8vo,
with 16 engravings. Italian trans. by Costi Belli. 2nd ed. Venice,
1673, 4to.
RICHER, Christopher. De rebus Turcarum ad Franciscum Gallorum
regem Christianissimum. Paris, 1540, 8vo. (Liber I. De origine
Turcarum et Ottomanni imperio. Liber III. De Tamerlanis et
Parthi rebus gestis.)
RICOLDUS. See my note to Anon. De ritu et moribus Turcarum.
3. Catalogue of Turkish MSS. in the British Museum. London,
1888.
RODD, Sir Rennell. The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicles of
2 vols. 8vo.
Excellent map of mediaeval Greece.
10 vols. 8vo.
For attempts of Venice in 14th cent. to league Christians against the
Turks, vols. iii and iv.
RONCIÈRE. Editor, in collab. with Dorez, of fragments of Marino
Sanudo.


The notes are in Servian, but with Latin translation.


Sagredo, Giovanni. Memorie istoriche de’ monarchi ottomani. Venice, 1676, fol.; 1688, 4to.

The first of modern writers who, though acquainted with Ottoman ‘sources’, deliberately prefers to follow the Byzantine writers who were contemporary.

Sagundino, Nicholas. See Secundinus.


Salcon, Nicolas. French trans. of Hayton.


Sanginetti, B. R. French trans., in collab. with Ch. Défrémery, of Ibn Batutah.


2. Historia universale dell’ origine et imperio de’ Turchi, nella quale si contengono la origine, etc., de’ Turchi. Venice, 1654. 2 vols., la. 8vo.

A collection of various writers on the Ottoman Empire.

Sanuto, Marino (Torsello). 1. Memorial to King of France urging crusade, 1321. Written in French. In Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, ii. 5.

2. Letters published by Dorez and Roncière in Bibl. de l’École des Chartes (1895), lvi. 34–44.


I have given the younger Sanuto's work here, because he is so often confused with the elder.


3. Edited and trans., in collab. with Miller, the Cyprus chronicle of Macairas.


The valuable information in these volumes is practically without dates, and there is no index.

Schaffarak, Janko. See Safarik, Ivan.

Schéfer, Charles. French trans. of portion of Ibn Bibi. Editor, with copious notes, of Bertrand de la Broquière, Spandugino, and a portion of Geoffraeus. His collection of oriental MSS. has recently enriched the Bibliothèque Nationale. The catalogue of his library, published in 1903 by H. Welter, Paris, is an addition to the bibliography of Oriental history, geography, and philology.


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE


Schulz, C. G. Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs. Leipzig, 1772, 8vo.


Schwicker, J. H. German trans. of Kállay.

Seadeddin, Mohammed Ben Hassan (Khodja Effendi). Tajul-Tevarikh. The Crown of Histories. Constantinople, 1862. 2 vols. 4to. Of this most celebrated Ottoman historian, whose chronicle covers from the origin of the family, there are translations as follows:


Hammer uses this translation.


This is an anon. trans. of Caoursin’s Historia Rhodi and Seadeddin’s recital of the siege of Rhodes under Mohammed II.


Zinkeisen used this translation. But Jorga, i. 150, n. 1, is in error in believing that Zinkeisen had access to complete trans. This has been lacking since 18th cent. The whole comment of Jorga is confusing. He mixes Seadeddin with Neshri, and follows Zenker’s erroneous statement that Leunclavius’s Annali is a trans. of Seadeddin.

6. The story of the capture of Constantinople by Mohammed has been translated into French by Garcin de Tassy, Paris, 1826, and by Michaud, in his Bibl. des Croisades, vol. iii; into English by Gibb, Glasgow, 1879; and, in part, into German by Krause, Die Eroberungen von Konstantinopel im XIII. und XV. Jahrhundert, Halle, 1870, 8vo.

Seaman, William. English translator of portion of Seadeddin. Secundinus, Nicolaus. Liber de familia Autumnarum ad Eneam,
Senarum episcopum. Fol. 133–41 of MS. Latin 414 of K. Bibl., Munich. Published as Liber I in Johannes Ramus, which see.

This letter, written to Aenaces Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, from Naples, is one of the first western accounts of the Osmanlis. In the title-page of 'De rebus Turcieis', printed 1553, Secundinus is called 'vetustissimo autore'.


Seiff, J. Reisen in der asiatischen Türkei. Leipzig, 1875.


This is a trans., into Latin, then Italian, of Du Verdier. Some bibliographers have treated this as an original work.


Quatremère in discussing whether S. is from Damascus, Marash or Morocco, has overlooked Hadji Khalfa, Lex. Bibl., no. 10874, fol. 1832, who unhesitatingly calls him 'écritain de Damas'.


Muralt, in the bibliography of his Chronographie byzantine, has fallen into the error of identifying Sherefeddin with Arabshah.

Shireeddin. See Dorn.

Sidrouss, S. Les Patriarcats dans l'Empire Ottoman et spécialement en Égypte. Paris, 1907, la. 8vo.


SOLAKZADE. Hist. Ott. Emp. from beginning to Soleiman II, in 1 vol.


Excellent for erudite display of bibliographical knowledge, but Schéfer’s comments on chronicle are disappointing, and his chronology is inaccurate.

SPIEGEL. See Jo. Gaudier.

SPRENGER, A. See Fitzclarence, George.

SREZNAVSKI, L. Russian trans. of Clavijo.


STEWARD, Aubrey. English trans. of portion of Secreta fidelium crucis of Marino Sanuto (Torsello).


Numerous writers have gone to Stritter, and quoted from him, in citing Byzantine writers of 13th and 14th cent.


SZALAY, Ladislas. Geschichte Ungarns. Trans. from Hungarian by Heinrich Wögerer. Buda-Pest, 1866–9. 3 vols. 8vo.

SzigAVyi, Alexander. Editor of A Magyar Nemzet Története.


3. Editor of Panaretos.


TAHIR-ZADE, AHMED AGA. Tarikh-aga. Constantinople, 1876.


TARDE, P. Editor of Eustache Deschamps.


TAUBER, Nicholas von. German trans. of Geuffraeus.


Texeira follows Mirkhond.


Contains papal letters for our period.

Thomas, A. *Les lettres à la cour des papes... 1290-1423.* Rome, 1884, 8vo. Also in Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, vols. ii and iv.

Thomas, G. M. 1. Collab. with Tafel in compilation of Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte.


Thurocz, Johann. *Illustrissima Hungariae regum chronica.* In Schandtner, i. 39-291.

Thury, Joseph. Hungarian trans. of Neshri.

Tindal, N. English trans. of Cantemir.


Toderini was chaplain to the Bailie of Venice at Constantinople from 1779 to 1785. In historical points he follows Cantemir pretty closely. Of the Ottoman historians he seems to know only Seadeddin and Hadji Khalfa.


2. Editor of 1877 edition of Finlay.
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

TUDELLE, Benjamin de. In Bergeron.
TYCHSEN, O. G. Latin trans. of Makrisi.


USU, I. Editor, with Rumanian notes, of Donado da Lezze.

VAMBÉRY, Hermann. 1. Alt-osmanische Sprachstudien. Leyden, 1901, 8vo.

VANEL. Abrégé nouveau de l'histoire gén. des Turcs... depuis leur établissement jusqu'à présent. Avec les Portraits des Empereurs ottomans tiréz sur les meilleurs originaux. Paris, 1689. 3 vols. 12mo.

VAN Gaver, Jules. Collab. with Jouannin.


VIGÉNAIRE, Blaise de. French trans. of Chalciocondylas.


Villani died of the plague in 1348.

VILLANI, Matteo, and his son Filippo. Historia ab 1348 ad 1365. A continuation of the Historia universalis. (Also in Italian.) Muratori, xiv. 1–770.

A most valuable contemporary record for first conquests of Murad I in Europe.


VLASTO, E.-A. Trans. into French portion of Hopf which relates to Giustiniani family of Chios.

VULLERS, J. A. Latin trans. of Mirkhond.


WENZEL, G. Monumenta Hungariae historica. Buda-Pest, 1876, 8vo.

WERUNSKI, E. Excerpta ex registris Clementis VI et Innocentii VI... (541 documents from 1342 to 1360). Innsbruck, 1885, 8vo.

Wirth, A. Geschichte der Türken. 2nd ed. Stuttgart, 1913, 12mo.

Wögerer, H. German trans. of Szalay.


Wright, J. Editor of Mandeville.


This is reproduced in Mas Latrie’s Trésor de Chronologie, &c., pp. 549-622.


Wuttke, Heinrich. Editor of German trans. of P. J. Safařík.


Yahia, Nasreddin. See Ibn Bibi.

Yale, H. English trans. of Marco Polo.


pp. 178-81 contain exposé of Bosno-Serbo-Croatian relations at time of Ottoman conquest.


Compiled in haphazard fashion: very incomplete: most important works are omitted: in giving translations Seaddedin is confused with Ali.


Jorga’s recent work is 37 in the same series.

Zollikofer, Lucas. German trans. of Pedro Mexia.

Zotenberg, H. French trans. of Jean of Nikiou.
ANONYMOUS

Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitan i (1315-1402). In Miklositch and Müller, Acta et diplomata, vol. i.


Contemporary account of Amadeo's expedition to the Levant.


La Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon. Ed. by P. P. Chazaud, Paris, 1876, 8vo.


See also Rodd, Sir Rennell, Schmitt, John, and Morel-Fatio, A.


Nicopolis expedition, ii. 425-30, 483-532.

Chronique des quatre premiers Valois. (1327-93.) Edited by S. Luce. Paris, 1861, 8vo.


The Dominican Friar's Account of Timur. See Moranvillé, Henri, and Silvestre de Sacy, A. I.


La Généalogie du Grand-Turc (Lyon ed.). See Gycaud.


Memoirs of Timur. Supposed to be an autobiography in Dja gatai Turkish, MS. of which was discovered in the Yemen.

1. Persian trans. by Abu Halib Hussein. The text was edited by Professor White, and publ. by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1783, with a trans. into English by Major Davy. A second English trans. was made by Charles Stewart, under title Mul fuza t timi ry or autobiographical memoirs of the Moghul emp. Timur. London, 1830, 4to.
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*Mira-ari tarikh Osmani.* (Ottoman history.) Constantinople, 1876, 8vo.

*Monumenta Pisana.* In Muratori, xv. 973–1088.

*Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis par un serviteur de Gui de Blois.* The two MSS. in the Library of the Duc d’Arenbourg and the Ashburnham collection are published by Kervyn de Lettenhove, in his edition of Froissart, xv. 439–508; xvi. 413–43.

*Series Imperatorum Turricorum.* In Foglietta, *de Originibus.*

*Tractatus de ritu et moribus Turcarum.* Cologne, c. 1488; Wittenberg, with preface by Martin Luther, 1530; German trans. by Sebastian Franck, without place, 1530; augmented edition of Franck’s trans., Berlin, 1590. The same work under title *Tractatus de ritu, moribus et multiplicatione nequitiae Turcarum,* Paris, 1514, 8vo.

By a Christian slave under Murad II. Rambaud, *Hist. gén.,* iii. 867, cites an edition of Paris, 1509, 4to, which he attributes to Ricoldus. But I do not find this name in other editions.

SERBIAN CHRONICLES


BYZANTINE HISTORIANS


3. *Patrologia Graecia.* Ed. by Migne. Paris, 1857–66, 161 vols. 4to. The writers who deal with the 14th cent. are:


VENETIAN ARCHIVES

Original MS. collections referred to in my book:

The Commemoriali have been edited by Riccardo Predelli. See also Thomas.

II. Misti (Deliberationes mixtae). ‘Continentes res terrestres et maritimas.’ 1293–1440. First 14 volumes (1293–1331) were burned in 1574 or 1577, but indices have been preserved in the Rubricarii. 60 vols. fol. xv–xxxii, 1332–67; xxxiii–xli, 1368–88; xlili–xlil, 1389–1413. Rubricarii. Indices of the Misti. 4 vols. i, 1293–1368 (32 registers); ii, 1368–89 (9 registers); iii, 1389–1413 (9 registers).

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V. Liber Albus. Treaties, privileges, &c., with the Levant (principally for commerce) up to 1348.

VI. Libri Secretorum Consilii Rogatorum, commonly called ‘Cons. Rog.’. A continuation of the Secreti from April 10, 1401, to Feb. 26, 1476. These volumes bear Arabic numerals, not letters. There are 27 registers, of which no. I contains the Anatolian campaign of Timur and the downfall of Bayezid.

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