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The Foundation Report

2002-2003

WORLD
PEACE
FOUNDATION

FOUNDED 1910

THE WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

The World Peace Foundation was created in 1910 by the imagination and fortune of Edwin Ginn, the Boston publisher, to encourage international peace and cooperation. The Foundation seeks to advance the cause of world peace through study, analysis, and the advocacy of wise action. As an operating, not a grant-giving foundation, it provides financial support only for projects which it has initiated itself.

Edwin Ginn shared the hope of many of his contemporaries that permanent peace could be achieved. That dream was denied by the outbreak of World War I, but the Foundation has continued ever since to attempt to overcome obstacles to international peace and cooperation, drawing for its funding on the endowment bequeathed by the founder. In its early years, the Foundation focused its attention on building the peacekeeping capacity of the League of Nations, and then on the development of world order through the United Nations. The Foundation established and nurtured the premier scholarly journal in its field, *International Organization*.

Since 1993, the Foundation has examined the causes and cures of intrastate conflict. The peace of the world in these decades has been disturbed primarily by outbreaks of vicious ethnic, religious, linguistic, and intercommunal antagonism within divided countries. The episodes of brutal ethnic cleansing that convulsed Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo are but the best known and most devastating of a rash of such attempts to oust rivals across the globe. Few places are immune from some variant of this internecine warfare, whether the immediate battles are over religion, language, appearance, or color differences. Thus, the Foundation is active in and studies the problems of Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan, and has worked in and studied the prospects for democracy in Burma and Haiti. It has sponsored research on the role of non-governmental organizations in preventing conflict in ethnically divided societies. It has engaged in feasibility studies regarding the reduction of conflict in Africa by the creation of African crisis response forces. It has analyzed the use of preventive diplomacy in resolving ethnic and other intercommunal conflicts. Its work on truth commissions demonstrates how that method of post-conflict justice-seeking can help prevent future internal conflicts. The Foundation has examined how the United Nations should manage its peace building responsibilities.

Intercommunal conflict often becomes civil war and, in some cases, leads to failed states. The Foundation has actively researched the causes of state failure, and how best to reinvigorate and manage the resuscitation of wounded states.

Contributing to widespread killings in intercommunal conflicts, civil wars, and imploding states is the easy availability of small arms and other light weapons. For this reason, the Foundation engaged in a long-term examination of the small arms problem, and how its licit and illicit trade should be addressed. The Foundation has also analyzed the connection between conflict diamonds and civil war.

Part of the task of the Foundation is to resolve conflicts as well as to study them. The Foundation's work in Congo, Cyprus, Burma, Sri Lanka, Haiti, the Sudan, Zimbabwe, and all of Africa has resolution of conflict as its goal. The Foundation has sponsored a detailed study of negotiating the end of deadly conflict within and between states. It is also engaged in an analysis of the successes and failures of African leadership.

THE FOUNDATION

REPORT

2002–2003

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If anything is to be accomplished in this world, someone must do something. Someone must put his hand to the work, or furnish the funds for other hands…Moral influence is good, but if that is our sole reliance, this cause [of peace] will not be advanced. Until…moral influence is quickened into action, little will be accomplished.

Edwin Ginn's words 100 years ago are still apt. Addressing the thirteenth International Peace Congress, the founder of what was to become the World Peace Foundation worried out loud about the increasing rush toward war in Europe, about the (unnecessary) dreadnoughts that Germany and Britain were building, about the dangers of American imperialism and American attacks on Filipino resisters, and about how to build an enduring movement for peace in the United States. Ginn, as early as 1897 and throughout the early years of the twentieth century, was a tireless advocate (along with Andrew Carnegie and many others, even President Taft) of the compulsory arbitration of disputes between nations, of a league of nations, of a world court, and of a world police force to enforce the decisions of a world court. As a hard-headed businessman, he viewed war as enormously wasteful of human and material resources. War was an impermissible drag on governmental budgets better devoted to education, health, and welfare.

This Foundation has failed, so far, to create the more peaceful world that Ginn envisaged and worked so hard to achieve. Instead, the peace of the world is more shattered than ever by the rise of terror on a scale and with a ferocity and a reach never previously known, by Washington's hegemonic preemptive response to terror and to the monstrosity of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and by the continuation of civil wars across the failed and failing states of the developing world. Ginn would be dismayed and discouraged.

Two years ago, in our biennial Report, we wrote that the forces of terror were everywhere and anywhere, always taking advantage of the civil liberties and political and economic largesse of nations that follow democratic procedures and espouse progressive values. We did not anticipate the rapid conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the troubled and greatly flawed rebuilding experiences in both countries. We did not then know how superbly staged wars could be succeeded so thoroughly by ineptly and inadequately arranged peace efforts, and how the process of reconstruction in Iraq would so dramatically fail to win the hearts and minds of so many of those who had been freed from Saddam Hussein's baleful yoke. Nor could we have predicted that vanquishing the Taliban would not lead ineluctably to the extirpation of al Qaeda and the capture of Osama bin Laden. Amid an atmosphere of unremitting terror, the maintenance of world peace thus continues to be no less complex than in former eras.

With Libya coming in from the cold, the wars of western Africa may in 2004 become less well-financed and therefore more tractable to resolution.

Since our last Report, peace building has been accomplished in Sierra Leone and Liberia; both states seem ready for reconsolidation and resuscitation. Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is fragile, but nearly all foreign legions have withdrawn, and the tripartite government in that country is newly functional. As this is written, we await a final elaboration and signing of the peace agreement in the Sudan, war-ravaged for more than twenty years, and further talks about a durable peace in Sri Lanka, where war has occurred for an equally long period.

Cyprus remains separated, with the prospect of the southern two-thirds of the island joining the European Union in May 2004, and the northern portion of the island, with its unrecognized administration, remaining outside Europe and in limbo. There are further negotiations within Burundi, but that internecine conflict continued unresolved in early 2004. So are the separatist wars at both ends of the Indonesian archipelago, the narcotics wars of Colombia, the internal conflict in Nepal, the hostilities in Chechnya, and many additional locally violent battles. Moreover, southern Somalis are still attacking each other and keeping that ex-state collapsed. Al Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah loyalists in eastern Africa, Yemen and the remainder of the Arabian peninsula, and Southeast Asia from Malaysia through the Philippines and Indonesia, are poised further to destabilize their increasingly tense and dangerous locales.

Peacefully preventing or reducing conflict in and beyond these kinds of troubled states has been an object of the Foundation for more than a decade. So has the Foundation been concerned with the elimination of the underlying causes of state failure and collapse, intrastate antagonism, and ethnic and religious disharmonies of the kinds that so often engender terror. The Foundation consequently continues its enduring attention to conflict prevention and conflict resolution, both in general and with regard to particular civil wars and civil hostilities. The Foundation also seeks to create conditions and policy frameworks conducive to intercommunal understanding, to peacemaking and peace building globally, and to direct study and action in theaters of violence.

For all of these reasons, the phenomenon of state failure, and the place of state weakness and state failure in providing hospitable terrain for terror and terrorists, have been of critical concern to the Foundation. During 2003 and 2004, the results of our large project on the nature of state failure appeared in two books: *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Brookings, 2003) and *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, 2004), and in articles in *Foreign Affairs* and the *Washington Quarterly.* Those publications explain why nation-states fail, and set out a continuum of state efficacy from strength through collapse, with endangered states possibly progressing from weak through failing to failed, with collapse as the end position reached now by Somalia and formerly by Liberia, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Tajikistan. Together with our separate but complementary work on UN Peace Operations and Peacekeeping, our books and articles also suggest how best to prevent failure and to reconstruct those high risk states that ultimately do not sustain themselves.

Closely related to and contributing to the weakness and failure of states is poor national governance. In 2002, and continuing through two meetings in 2003, and with additional writing and a meeting in early 2004, the Foundation focused its attention on how best to measure qualities of governance in the developing world and, equally, on how to improve the poor levels of governance that afflict so much of the developing world. The goal of this governance project is a) to create an intellectually acceptable framework for the study of governance in the developing world and, b) to propose a governance ranking method that will do for governance what Transparency International's rating system has done for corruption: to take governance out of the closet and to improve the manner in which most citizens of the developing world are governed.

One of the least well-governed countries in the second half of the twentieth century, and simultaneously one of the most important, was Nigeria. As by far the most populous nation in Africa and, along with South Africa, as the linchpin of Africa's hopes for prosperity and freedom, Nigeria's future is important to all Africans, and indeed to the U.S. because of the large quantities of oil which Nigeria exports. Following a meeting at the end of 2002, the Foundation prepared a book, *Crafting the New Nigeria: Strengthening the Nation*, which should be published in 2004.

The vicious wars of the twenty-first century, and internal violence in conflicted nations such as Nigeria (Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo, and the Sudan, among others), are greatly fueled by the availability of small arms and light weapons—the lethal implements of choice in most outbreaks of intra-state carnage. An awareness of the role of small arms in the destructive conflicts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia led us to investigate the resource bases that fuel civil conflict, especially diamonds and timber.

The Foundation previously examined how to employ methods of preventive diplomacy and early warning to forestall conflict. It worked directly with the military establishments of Africa to develop and evaluate early action crisis response capabilities. It has analyzed how best to negotiate the conclusion of deadly intrastate conflicts. It continues to be engaged directly, too with the resolution of long-standing intrastate belligerencies through dialogue and mediation, not least in Cyprus.

Another enduring and closely related concern in this century and the last has been transitional justice and post-conflict administration. The Foundation's research and publication on the truth commission endeavor, its close attention to specific cases of failure and trauma, and its work with and about the UN are mutually reinforcing and interlocking. Since 1993, in various ways with which Ginn would have resonated, the Foundation has sought to understand the root causes and the underlying complexities of the world's internal wars, and to reduce their number, severity, and duration.

Ginn, the visionary Boston publisher who became a firm champion of peace at the end of the nineteenth century, more than a decade before he established the Foundation in 1910, believed that lasting peace was achievable through rational means, especially by educating Americans about the wastefulness of war, and by undertaking systematic research on the causes

(and folly) of conflict between and within nations. Ginn and similarly minded persons of his era were ahead of their time, and still are. His and their practical idealism, and the search for solutions to the vexing problems that cause antagonism and violent hostilities within and between nation-states, still motivate the energies and resources of the Foundation.

The Foundation focuses on eliminating those political, social, and economic conditions that provide encouragement to war. It continues its preference for rigorous analyses of acute challenges to world order and of seeking to foster improved national and international policy making by drawing informed conclusions and recommendations from careful study. The Foundation specializes in constructively brokering dialogues between opposing communities, no matter how long and bitterly estranged, and in developing useful methods of contributing to effective and sustainable conflict resolution. In these many ways, the Foundation seeks world peace in keeping with the spirit of Ginn's ambitious bequest.

II. PROMOTING PEACE WITHIN A TROUBLED AND TERRORIZED WORLD

Since 1993, the Foundation has focused most of its energies on diagnosing the etiology of intrastate conflict, on developing theory that addresses and practical methods of preventing such conflict, on mediating and resolving individual conflicts within states, and on coping with the consequences of the global emergencies which arise out of or are intrinsic to the contemporary wave of internecine hostilities. Twenty-three major projects were completed between 1994 and early 2002. Several more were at various stages of initiation or completion as this Report went to press in early 2004. From 1994 to early 2004, the Foundation published seventeen books and thirty-one reports. (Full listings appear at the back of this Report.) From 2001 to 2003, the Foundation engaged in the following activities:

Preventing Nation-State Failure
Beginning in 1998, the Foundation sought to develop effective methods to prevent nation-state failure. Its investigation into the nature and causes of failing and failed nation-states proceeded as a collective endeavor, ultimately with thirty authors focusing in their initial and much revised papers (and at three meetings at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in 1999, 2000, and 2001) on various explanations for, indicators of, and factors contributing to the failure of states in the modern world; second, on contemporary cases of state failure, near failure, and failure and recovery; and, third, on how both to prevent failure and recover from failure.

The final product appeared in the two books and two articles already mentioned. Both, especially the second, differentiated between strong and weak states in the modern world and offered a clear way (especially in the first chapter of the second book) of distinguishing between failing, failed,

and collapsed nation-states. The contents of the Princeton book analyzed why states fail and how they may best be resuscitated (and by whom). The Brookings book contained a number of relevant empirical examples of collapse, failure, and weakness. Several of its chapters showed how one time collapsed nation-states were rebuilt, and how the provision of security is the most essential of all post-conflict peace building necessities.

Reuniting the Island of Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus became independent from Britain in 1960, but intrastate conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots soon became widespread, leading to a UN peacekeeping mission (United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]), from 1964). From mid-1974, after a coup d'état in the Greek-speaking south and the landing of troops from Turkey in the Turkish-speaking north, the island became partitioned de facto. Approximately 18 percent of the island's total population and about 37 percent of the land of the island was thereafter situated north of the UN-monitored line that bisected the island, the remainder in the south. Over the years that separation became more complete, especially after various UN-brokered settlement attempts failed. Meanwhile, as the separation intensified, the economy of the south prospered and the economy of the north, tied as it was Turkish mainland inflation, suffered significantly. By 2003, the south to north economic disparity per capita was about 6 to 1.

In 1998, the Foundation turned its attentions to the problem of a Cyprus divided. The Foundation sought to determine if a resolution of this seemingly intractable conflict were possible and, if so, how. After a conference held at the University of New Hampshire in 1998 and the publication of *Cyprus 2000: Divided or Federal?* (Cambridge, MA, 1998), a report and edited transcript by Robert I. Rotberg and Ericka A. Albaugh, and after consultations at the UN, in Cyprus, and in Washington and London, the Foundation was encouraged to initiate an exercise in Track II diplomacy.

Track II methods seek to improve the existing atmosphere for change by developing yes-able propositions and building trust between erstwhile antagonistic communities and their representatives. Ideally, too, Track II initiatives generate a set of ideas usable whenever an existing conflict, especially one of very long-standing, is ripe for settlement.

Those ideas might address the political and economic structure of a settlement, suggest a range of confidence building measures, and/or provide a detailed blueprint for adoption by Track I negotiators. Sometimes, too, a successful Track II endeavor can help strengthen existing societal movements toward change.

In 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Foundation's Cyprus Study Group—as it came to be called—formally met six times, and held several informal partial meetings. Several members of the Group were involved in a Foundation- and Kokkalis Program-sponsored additional meeting on the Cyprus problem at Ditchley Park in Britain. Three spoke on a panel in Jerusalem. All of the fourteen Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members of the Group began their participation as private citizens, albeit with an intimate awareness of the politi-

cal landscape. Diana Chigas, then of the Conflict Management Group, and Louise Diamond, then of the Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, joined the Foundation's president in facilitating the formal and informal meetings.

As the Cyprus Study Group was holding its sixth meeting in 2001, so the leaders of Greek-speaking Cyprus and Turkish-speaking Cyprus were commencing their own face-to-face negotiations with greater bonhomie and expressions of positive amity than had occurred for many years. Those negotiations continued well into 2003, and were focused upon the same kinds of critical issues that were discussed by the Cyprus Study Group during its own several meetings. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his final, elaborately detailed "Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem," in February 2003, it embodied the sense of many of the solutions to the outstanding problems of Cyprus' reunification that had been discussed by the Study Group. Some terminology was similar, and the overall approach of the Secretary-General was consonant with the conclusions of the Study Group. But saying so much is not intended to imply more than that the UN negotiating team, and the two Cypriot negotiating principals, were well aware of the fruits of the work of the Study Group. Common approaches to well recognized problems surprised no one, especially since, by 2002-2003, many of the advances which the Study Group had made were common knowledge and in the domain of public opinion.

President Rauf Denktash of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of North Cyprus refused to agree to the Annan Plan. At the same time, plans were made for the Republic of Cyprus' accession to the European Union, and its entrance into the Union in May 2004. Because of Denktash's rejection of the Annan Plan and the prospective running out of the reunification clock in 2004, the Foundation, assisted by the Kokkalis Program, organized a meeting in September 2003 where Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greek and Turkish officials, and the principal negotiators from the United Nations, the EU, the U.S., and Britain gathered at the Kennedy School to discuss what could be done to improve the island's future prospects. The results of that meeting are summarized in Robert I. Rotberg, *Cyprus After Annan: Next Steps Toward a Solution*, WPF Report 37 (Cambridge, MA, 2003).

The participants in the meeting in September were hoping that the parliamentary elections in late December 2003 in northern Cyprus would be decisive. In the event, the parties supporting Denktash's rejectionist posture and those favoring the revived, pro-Annan Plan, each won 25 seats. As this report was being prepared for the press, Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of the largest opposition faction and a participant in the Foundation's 1998 meeting, was forming a government and attempting to wrest control over the negotiating process from Denktash.

Measuring Governance

Nation-states fail in part because their governments perform poorly. That is, they provide too few of the required political goods: security, a functioning legal system, the capacity for strong economic performance, education, health, an empowered civil society, and others that signify high quality governance. In

order to obtain a consensus on what were those goods, and how they contribute to the delivery of government services—governance—the Foundation convened two meetings at the Kennedy School of Government in 2003. Participating were scholars of government, governance, and sovereignty; creators and managers of existing attempts to provide good governance measurement systems; official users of the outputs of such measuring systems; and purveyors of analogous developing world measurement methods.

Emerging from the second of the two meetings, and embodying both the argument for more precise definitions of governance and for new measuring schemes, was Marie Besançon, *Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement,* WPF Report 36 (Cambridge, MA, 2003). That Report also contained a description of the fifty-one existing data sets that contain information relevant to answering the question: "How Best to Measure Governance in the Developing World." Three newspaper articles by Robert Rotberg from 2002 are also relevant: "A Yardstick for the Best and Worst of Africa," *Financial Times* (November 25, 2002); "Rating Africa," *Boston Globe* (December 2, 2002); and "Ranking African Governance," *Financial Mail* (December 13, 2002).

Attempting to find an acceptable way by which to measure the amount of good governance in each country, and thus ranking developing world countries from high to low in terms of governance, arguably would encourage the lower-ranked nation-states to improve their methods of governance. Transparency International's rankings of nation-states according to their perceived levels of corruption has brought the corruption issue out of the closet and contributed to greater attention to the problem of corruption globally. What is needed is a similar spotlight on governance, again with the intent of encouraging countries to improve their methods of delivering political goods to citizens.

Ranking nation-states according to how well they govern is thus a goal of the Foundation's continuing endeavors on this subject. One part of that work at the initial meeting, and in 2004, will focus on the extent to which non-subjective or only partially subjective measures can be created to measure governance. Objective measures will reduce the carping from target governments; measuring devices that rely on perceptions, or subjectivity, are always open to charges of bias.

African Leadership

This project is premised on the proposition that political leadership in Africa is weaker than it should be and needs to be. It further asserts that future African leaders can learn from the examples of Asia, Europe, and the Americas about how to strengthen their own ability to guide small and large countries in order to benefit citizens rather than themselves or ruling cliques. It suggests that conflict and civil war (which provide reservoirs for terror) stem from bad leadership and leadership mistakes. It seeks to strengthen the capacity of future African leaders to be responsible, honest, and wise—to avoid future leadership debacles like those presided over by Presidents Moi, Mobutu, Mugabe, Siad Barre, and Idi Amin. Conflict can be reduced in Africa if more broad-minded leaders of integrity are in charge.

The project involves the participation of a set of a dozen or more present and former African heads of state and present and past cabinet ministers in deciding what is to be done about the problems of African leadership and how best, in their minds, to build capacity for better leadership and better governance in Africa.

In 2003, the group met first at the Kennedy School and then in Botswana. It intended to hold a third meeting in early 2004 in Kenya or Uganda.

During its first two meetings, the group decided that it could exert a positive influence if it created a sensible Code of African Leadership. That Code was ready in draft as this Report went to press. The Code incorporates a set of best practice principles and is intended to provide standards of conduct for elected leaders.

The group believed that it should form itself into a Council of African Leadership to be a resource and advocacy body for best practices. Its members intend to advise leaders or civil society groups that seek its help. They also believe that international organizations will turn to the Council for advice and recommendations, as over the crisis in Zimbabwe or similar examples of dysfunctional leadership.

The group's members were very serious about capacity building. They believed that they could devise a training program for new elected officials that will prepare them to lead effectively and responsibly, and socialize groups of younger leaders year after year in the arts of good governance, thus bringing about a sustainable amelioration of African ills.

The fourth strand of the leaders' work was the setting of standards for good governance in Africa, in addition to good leadership. There was talk of an experimental ranking system.

The group expected to finalize the Code of African Leadership and announce the Council of African Leaders at its meeting in Kenya in March. It also expected to agree upon a capacity building program and a curriculum. It will discuss the governance and rankings question. Its members are hardheaded, practical, and not politically correct. They are seized of the crisis in African leadership, and they are determined (however idealistically) to show that there exists a set of African leaders (former and present) who care about positive leadership, and who want to reclaim Africa from those who have led it astray.

Nigeria

Nigeria is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and a supplier of 7 percent of U.S. petroleum imports. It is and has been a largely dysfunctional polity, with a steady record of brutal dictatorship throughout large periods of its post-independent existence. Since the restoration of democracy in 1999, and the re-election in 2003 of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria is poised to achieve its vast potential as the western linchpin of Africa. Can it do so? If so, how?

In order to provide answers to those questions, the Foundation invited Nigerian scholars and practitioners, and American and British scholars and

practitioners, to meet in Cambridge, Mass., at the end of 2002. A large number of papers on controversial subjects were presented, especially four presentations that were the basis for a public Kennedy School Forum on women's rights and shari'a law, "After the Riots: Islamic Law and the Future of Nigeria." The discussions on the problems of Nigeria were summarized by Deborah West, *Governing Nigeria: Continuing Issues after the Elections*, WPF Report 35 (Cambridge, MA, 2003). The papers, much revised, became the basis for an edited book, *Crafting the New Nigeria: Strengthening the Nation*, which is with a publisher.

The Palestine/Israel Conflict

Is there a narrative capable of bridging, reconciling, and embracing the two vigorously competing narratives of Palestinians and Israelis from before 1948, but also incorporating the signal events of 1948, 1967, 1973, and 2001? At the first of two meetings in 2003, scholars and writers from Palestine, Israel, Britain, and the U.S. argued about whether bridging narratives were useful and/or possible, whether the different myths were responses to or antecedents of the current conflict, and about the essential facts and reconstructions of the challenging events in their common and intertwined lives. A report on the heated first meeting of the group is contained in Deborah West, *Myth and Narrative in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, WPF Report 34 (Cambridge, MA, 2003). A book, *History's Double Helix: The Intertwined Narratives of Israeli and Palestinian Conflict*, is being written as a result of the discussions held at an authors' meeting in late 2003.

UN Peacekeeping

How should the United Nations reform its overall approach to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace maintenance, and peace building—even state-building? In two meetings at the Kennedy School (May 2001) and the UN (November 2001, co-sponsored by the International Crisis Group and the Permanent Mission of Jamaica), three current UN Under-Secretary Generals, two former UN Under-Secretary Generals, several UN Assistant Secretary Generals, several members of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Commission), other senior UN officials, an array of Permanent Representatives to the UN from the G7 and other leading nations, practitioners, academics, and journalists evaluated the reforms recommended by the Brahimi Commission and discussed the extent to which those reforms should and could be implemented.

At its second meeting, with Afghanistan (and the examples of East Timor, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Namibia) very much in mind, the participants examined how well (and how poorly) the UN was (and was not) prepared to assume serious peace creation and post-conflict reconstruction responsibilities. Given the financial weaknesses of the UN generally, and the UN's peace operations capabilities more specifically, UN officials impressed the second meeting with how improvised and limited the response of the UN could be to civil wars as devastating as Afghanistan's. Despite the partial implementation of the Brahimi Report's recommendations—especially the

strengthening of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations—the UN was more fully prepared to broker peace through good offices (as Lakhdar Brahimi in fact did in Bonn with victorious assembled Afghan notables and warlords) than to make or keep peace in a troubled zone. Moreover, stretched as the UN continued to be from Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Kosovo to East Timor, it was poorly placed even to assume peacekeeping obligations in Kabul or to organize the entire rebuilding operation that became essential in post-conflict Afghanistan.

Without a rapid reaction force of its own, or even national battalions ready to be dispatched to a UN-commanded operation, the UN bureaucracy remains severely handicapped by its need to secure a mandate from the Security Council on a basis that may or may not be timely, and by the necessity for the UN then to beg both for financial support and for willing contributors of officers and troops to any peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. As the failures in Rwanda and, initially, in Sierra Leone, suggest and the Brahimi Report underlined, the UN's capacity to act is seriously weakened by these and many other structural deficiencies.

Few subjects are as compelling and as frustrating as reforming UN peace operations. The peace of the world clearly demands a UN with greater capacity to make and sustain peace within and across countries. How to provide that capacity practically and effectively continues to be the concern of the Foundation. Rachel Gisselquist's report, , *To Rid the Scourge of War: UN Peacekeeping Operations and Today's Crises*, WPF Report 31 (Cambridge, MA, 2002) discusses these issues (and the content of both meetings) at length.

The WPF Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution

The WPF Program was established in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, on July 1, 1999, as a result of an association between the Foundation, the Center, and the School. The Program analyzes the causes of ethnic, religious, and other intercommunal conflict, and seeks to identify practical ways to prevent and limit such conflict. It has been intimately involved with the large-scale attempt to identity why some kinds of nation states fail and collapse, and how world order should react to the phenomenon of state failure. The Program has attempted to re-frame state building as a policy option and imperative, examined the relationship between resource flows and civil war, studied the consequences of the global proliferation of small arms, researched peace building and peace enforcement capabilities in Africa, and critiqued the appropriate role of truth commissions in strengthening conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Robert I. Rotberg, President of the Foundation, is also Director of the WPF Program. More information about the Program can be found at: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/?program=WPF.

The Program's email address is: conflict@harvard.edu.

Fellowships

The Program on Intrastate Conflict, in conjunction with the International Security Program, both in the Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government, jointly offer each year a limited number of pre- and post-doctoral research fellowships to promising scholars who are writing dissertations or books on questions of conflict, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution of interest to both Programs.

Since 2001–2002, this joint fellowship endeavor has welcomed sixteen fellows working on such topics as peacebuilding strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, group demands as bargaining positions in East Central Europe, normative change and disarmament, how refugee crises lead to the spread of civil war, and the role of norms and principled ideas in international relations theory and practice. The fellows have come from universities in the U.S., Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland, and have carried passports from Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, and the Netherlands. In addition, three of the fellows have been visiting faculty from institutions abroad. After their fellowship years, many have accepted appointments at colleges and universities in the U.S., or in Britain, Canada, or Hungary. Several have won major prizes, and they are widely published.

The Foundation itself additionally welcomes a handful of very select visiting faculty researchers and pre- and postdoctoral scholars as colleagues. Since 2001-2002, there have been six such fellows. They have written dissertations, books, articles, and reports on subjects as diverse as measuring governance, electoral systems, and conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia.

III. THE WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE

The World Peace Foundation has an unusual name, ambitious goals, a special style of operation, and an unexpected history. It begins with Edward Ginn, who, like his friend and contemporary Andrew Carnegie, dreamed of world peace and established the Foundation as the vehicle with which to realize his dreams.

The Formative Years

Ginn was born on February 14, 1838 on a rocky hillside farm in North Orland, Maine, in what he called blessed poverty. (A full-length biography of Ginn is being prepared.) He worked as a cook in a logging camp, sailed as a hand on a Grand Banks fishing schooner, and taught school. In 1862, he graduated from Tufts College, despite failing eyesight and near penury. After graduating, he sold schoolbooks successfully, and developed a gift for marketing. Ginn & Co., the firm that he founded in Boston in 1868, became the leading textbook publisher in the United States.

Influenced by Edward Everett Hale, pastor of Boston's South Congregational Church, peace champion, and noted orator, Ginn began attending conferences on international arbitration at Lake Mohonk in 1897, and soon became dedicated to the cause and the possibility of world peace. He gave his first address to the conference in 1901, and became an active member of the American Peace Society, serving as a director from 1901 to 1903 and as vice president from 1903 until his death. These were active years for the American peace movement. Its 1903 petition to the Massachusetts legislature to request that Congress authorize the U.S. President to establish a regular international congress was later taken up by the Interparliamentary Union of 1904, which urged President Theodore K. Roosevelt to call a second Hague Peace Conference. In 1904, Secretary of State John Hay sent out a circular proposing just that, but international events and protocol delayed the Conference until 1907, when Czar Nicolas II formally convened it.

In 1903, Ginn announced that he would issue books and pamphlets on peace. He recruited Edwin D. Mead, with Hale the co-founder of the *New England Magazine,* and a noted reformer in his own right, to edit books and pamphlets on peace, some by Immanuel Kant and Leo Tolstoy. Ginn also published reports on the two Hague conferences, and various treatises on peaceful dispute resolution.

Ginn also began donating funds to support a peace conference and a variety of organizations active in seeking peace rather than war. These efforts at public education for peace were continued throughout the first years of the century. In mid-1910, he founded the International School of Peace in Boston in order to educate "the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destruction of war and of preparation for war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man...." The School was not

really a teaching establishment. Instead, it employed a planning staff to map out strategies to influence mass opinion in favor of peace.

The School was converted into the World Peace Foundation at the end of 1910, shortly after Carnegie had created the Carnegie Endowment on International Peace. Trustees of the Foundation initially included Dean Sarah L. Arnold of Simmons College, President William Herbert Perry Faunce of Brown University, President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard University, and President Joseph Swain of Swarthmore College.

When Ginn, who died in early 1914, bequeathed a third of the income from his estate to support the Foundation, he defined what lasting peace would entail: It would occur when "the nations shall so far cooperate in the settlement of controversies by the substitution of peace methods for those of war as to constitute an International Supreme Court, an International Executive, an International Police Force, or something substantially equivalent thereto...and an International Parliament." Ginn welcomed disarmament, but did not himself believe that nations would willingly lay down their weapons without some substitute like his police force.

For ninety-four years, the Foundation that Ginn created has endeavored to act in accord with the spirit of his original design. During Ginn's lifetime, however, the Foundation initially had an evangelical intent: "It will be the aim of the workers in our Foundation," Ginn wrote in 1911, "to go into the field and impart to various circles their own enthusiasm and sense of responsibility." And so they did, lobbying Washington and sending advocates to schools, colleges, National Grange chapters, local chambers of commerce, and so on. Ginn and his followers opposed the U.S.' intervention in Mexico's revolution and wanted schools to cease glorifying war in their curricula. New textbooks were planned.

The Foundation produced short and long pamphlets in profusion during its earlier years. John W. Foster wrote *War Not Inevitable* (1911) and President William Howard Taft produced *The Dawn of World Peace* in the same year. William C. Gannett wrote *International Good-Will As a Substitute for Armies and Navies* (1912) and Edwin D. Mead authored *Heroes of Peace* in the same year. Later in 1912, Charles F. Dole wrote *The Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine*.

Lecturing, lobbying, and pamphleteering continued to preoccupy a very busy Foundation until the onset of World War I took the steam out of peacemaking. For a few years the Foundation reprinted official documents, and sought a new direction. That direction, promoted by President Lowell, led the Foundation to put its resources behind the promotion of a post-war League of Nations capable of policing aggression. The Foundation appropriated funds to support the League to Enforce the Peace, an advocacy group with that goal as its mission.

After the war, in the wake of the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the Foundation became the exclusive American distributor of the publications of the League of Nations (which the United States had refused to join), the World Court, and the International Labor Organization. It published the *Yearbook of the League of Nations*. The Foundation further

helped to develop an American League of Nations Association, and lobbied unsuccessfully for the ratification of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Harvard Professor Manley O. Hudson, a Foundation Trustee, published most of his books, including *The World Court, 1922-1929* (1929), and articles on the Court, under the auspices of the Foundation. Philip Jessup wrote *American Neutrality and International Police* (1928) and *The United States and the World Court* (1929) for the Foundation. The Foundation also sponsored studies of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Paris Peace Pact, China (1927), Nicaragua and the United States (1927), and U.S. investments in Latin America (1929).

The 1930s

During the early 1930s, the Foundation published Kenneth Colegrove, *International Control of Aviation*; Warren Kelchner, *Latin American Relations with the League of Nations*; William Henry Chamberlin, *The Soviet Planned Economic Order*, and Denys Myers, *World Disarmament*. J. B. Condliffe wrote the significant *China Today* (1932). Two Foundation-sponsored books were responsible for shifting American policy toward the Caribbean: *Haiti under American Control,* by Arthur C. Millspaugh, and *The United States and the Caribbean Area*, by Dana Gardner Munro. In addition, the Foundation published sixteen pamphlets on subjects such as Nazism and colonialism.

In 1938, the Foundation initiated the publication of the annual *Documents on American Foreign Relations*; the Council on Foreign Relations assumed responsibility for *Documents* in 1952.

Most of all, during the 1930s, the Foundation eschewed pacifism, fought isolationism, and favored military preparedness for the United States. In 1939, the Trustees sought to halt the flow of munitions to Japan "so long as the invasion of China continues."

World War II and After

Leland Goodrich, a leading scholar of international organization, directed the Foundation from 1942 to 1946. He focused the Foundation on the rebuilding of the post-war world, recruiting a committee of leading university scholars to produce reports on such trenchant issues as the "Post-War Treatment of Japan," and "Post-War Relations with the Soviet Union." Goodrich, along with several subsequent trustees of the Foundation, was a member of the secretariat of the San Francisco conference which created the United Nations. In 1946, the Foundation published the first definitive work on the UN—*Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*. A year later, it established *International Organization* (IO), ever since the leading scholarly journal in this area. Many special issues of IO, including one on transnational relations (edited by Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane) in 1971, and another on Canada and the United States (edited by Nye and Alfred O. Hero) in 1974, followed the changing interests of the Foundation. (In the early 1990s, with IO well-established, the Foundation wished the editors of IO well, and gave the journal its independence.)

In the wake of World War II, the Foundation supported analytical surveys of Soviet Russia and the Far East, and a study of the effects of air bombing. It prepared short booklets on the United States' relations with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Eastern Europe, and the Netherlands. It investigated collective security and economic policy. *Negotiating with the Russians* (1951), analyzed the difficulties that had been and would be experienced during the Cold War.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Foundation focused on key issues of international concern, as well as on problems of multilateral peacemaking. The Foundation sponsored the writing of a noteworthy early treatment of Africa by Rupert Emerson and Norman Padelford and a central examination of the Arab-Israeli dispute, oil, and petrodollars by Jacob C. Hurewitz (1976). Lawrence Finkelstein edited *The United States and International Organization: The Changing Setting* (1969). The Foundation also actively explored Franco-American relations, building upon the book, *Diversity of Worlds* (1957), that Raymond Aron and August Heckscher had organized and edited for the Foundation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Foundation sponsored several meetings at which leading French and American leaders discussed the foreign policy issues which threatened to divide their nations.

From 1954 to 1983, the Foundation's activities were directed indefatigably by Alfred O. Hero. Born and raised near New Orleans (he was reluctantly to leave the Foundation to manage a family plantation in southern Louisiana), Hero encouraged the Foundation's focus on relations with France, but was particularly responsible for an extensive program of Canadian studies (and Canada-U.S. and Quebec-U.S. relations) in cooperation with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Centre Québecois des Relations Internationales.

The 1980s and early 1990s

During this decade, the Foundation sought to influence the debate on how the West should respond to apartheid in South Africa, co-sponsored several dialogues across the racial and political divides in South Africa, analyzed whether and how Namibia should and could achieve independence and what the consequences of that independence would be, examined how change for the better could be accelerated in Mozambique and Angola, scrutinized Soviet interests in southern Africa and asked how big power and regional power conflict could be reduced throughout the region, and proposed a set of guidelines for United States policy toward all of Africa during the 1990s. Six books on related aspects of African politics, economics, security, health, and peacekeeping emerged from these activities, as did a wealth of informal contacts, a variety of newspaper opinion pieces, and—finally—policy changes which in some cases took years to come to fruition.

Richard J. Bloomfield, the executive director of the Foundation from 1983 to 1992, and during his previous U.S. ambassadorial career an influential participant in the making of U.S. policy toward Latin America, organized a pathbreaking review of the status of Puerto Rico, subtitled *The Search for a National Policy* (1985). Jorge Dominguez, Robert Pastor, and R. Delisle

Worrell edited *Democracy in the Caribbean* (1993), another important book with the same regional focus. Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton edited *Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S-Latin American Security Relationship* (1990), as a part of the Foundation's concern for issues affecting United States and Latin American policy. Dominguez and Marc Lindenberg edited *Democratic Transitions in Central America* (1997). It featured the analyses, reflections, and recollections of persons who directly shaped the political processes that transformed Central America in the 1970s and 1980s from military to democratic rule.

During the same period, the Foundation also sponsored Rosemarie Rogers, *Guests Come to Stay: The Effects of European Labor Migration on Sending and Receiving Countries* (1985), and Thomas G. Weiss, *Collective Security in a Changing World* (1993). In that last edited book, Ernst B. Haas and other authors attempted to forecast the shape of the new world order. Two years before, Weiss and Meryl Kessler, *Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, had concentrated on a particularly vexing set of actual and potential conflicts, and on how to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to handle them. John Holmes edited *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean* (1995), which focused on problems and options for U.S. policy in and around the Mediterranean basin. He and his Maghrebi and southern European collaborators examined the future of the region as insiders worried about the medium- and long-term implications of Muslim fundamentalism, weakening economies, trans-border migrations, and much more.

Holmes, former senior associate of the Foundation and, earlier, a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Europe, also argued in *The U.S. and Europe after the Cold War: A New Alliance?* (1997) that the end of the Cold War removed the original compelling reason for a strong trans-Atlantic relationship, but still left the United States and the nations of Western Europe in need of each other. Holmes asserted that a new U.S.-European relationship would have to be founded on a basis other than the presence on European soil of substantial numbers of U.S. soldiers. That relationship would, moreover, have to take account of the increasing integration of Europe and would have to be more equal than in the past.

1990s to 2001

The Media and Humanitarian Crises

The Foundation's project on the role of the media in improving policy responses during complex humanitarian emergencies led to a wide-ranging meeting in late 1994. The conferees concluded that close cooperation between international relief agencies and the media was essential to prevent and contain the many humanitarian emergencies that threatened to overwhelm the world's logistical and emotional capacity to assist and to care in the post-Cold War period.

The project's participants agreed that future Bosnias, Rwandas, and Somalias could be avoided if there were more and better-targeted information-sharing between the media and relief agencies.

Although public opinion too often reflected the latest capsule summaries of distant conflicts as they were portrayed on television, that same public opinion, well-informed or not, influenced decision-making in Washington and other capitals.

In an oversimplified sense, television images of starving Somali forced the U.S. to send humanitarian assistance and military personnel to reimpose order, and equally dramatic images of Somali attacks on American soldiers compelled Washington to withdraw. The challenge was to harness that dramatic power for understanding complexity and presenting nuances, not to decry it.

The media, if their efforts could be focused and sustained by collaboration with humanitarians, could decisively alter both public attitudes and the actions of policy makers. It should thus be possible to augment the strength of the international humanitarian safety net protecting the suffering, the project concluded.

Those and other results of the meeting were discussed in *The Media, Humanitarian Crises, and Policy-Making*, WPF Report 7 (1995). Revised chapters, including one by Andrew G. Natsios, later USAID administrator, arising out of the conclave and its far-ranging dialogue were published in Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1996). The Thomas G. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University co-sponsored this project.

NGOs, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy

In early 1995, about forty-five leaders of non-governmental organizations, academics, journalists, and other practitioners convened at Harvard University to examine how local and international NGOs working in troubled states could effectively sound the bells of early warning and thus contribute to preventive diplomacy in areas like Sri Lanka, Rwanda, and the Sudan. Emily MacFarquar, Martha A. Chen, and Robert I. Rotberg, *Non-Governmental Organizations, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy*, WPF Report 9 (Cambridge, MA, 1995), summarized the discussions of the meeting. Subsequently, with several chapters deriving from papers presented at the meeting and a number written afresh, appeared Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1996).

The book's conclusion assessed the role of NGOs in early warning and early action, reporting that early warning was neither as easy nor as obvious as it sounded. Nor was preventive diplomacy straightforward. Preventive action, preferably early, was essential, but such action was more easily described than achieved. The role of NGOs in raising the tocsin of alarm in situations of incipient intrastate conflict, especially in ethnically divided societies, was generally problematic, contextually specific and determined, and fraught with unanticipated obstacles and tactical traps.

The Reconstruction of Haiti

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, restored to office in 1994 by the intervention of the United States, was in 1996 about to leave the presidency. Given the belated arrival of democracy in Haiti in 1991, and its intrinsic weakness in a country dominated by dictators for 190 years, the Foundation joined the Haitian Studies Association of the United States and the University of Puerto Rico in organizing a project to suggest how Haiti's democratic, economic, and social future could be enhanced and Aristide's initial successes sustained. The project also asked how larger powers (especially the United States) could contribute to the fruitful development of Haiti.

In order to discuss those and other questions, a large meeting was held in 1996 in western Puerto Rico. It was attended by many Haitian government officials, Haitian-American scholars and advocates, diplomats from Washington, Puerto Rican academics and writers, and mainland U.S. scholars and journalists.

The results of the Haiti meeting were summarized in Jennifer McCoy, *Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction* (WPF Reports 10 & 11, the second being a translation into French, with a Kreyol summary). Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Haiti: Renewed: Political and Economic Futures* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1997), included chapters emanating from the conference, and newer studies.

The Foundation's contemporaneous work on Haiti also appeared in Rotberg, *Haiti's Turmoil: Politics and Policy under Aristide and Clinton,* WPF Report 32 (Cambridge, MA, 2003).

Funds for Peacekeeping: Reforming the United Nations System

With the goal, among others, of funding ever more numerous United Nations' peace support operations, in 1996 the Foundation sponsored (along with the Thomas S. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University) a study of the United Nations system, and how it could be pruned of obsolete and ineffective organizations in order to save relatively significant sums of money. Professor Leon Gordenker wrote that study, which was reviewed at meetings at Brown University and the United Nations, and released to the press in late 1996 at the United Nations as WPF Report 12, *The UN Tangle: Policy Formation, Reform, and Reorganization* (Cambridge, MA, 1996).

Gordenker's study suggested that the United Nations could cut its regular budgetary costs by half (and devote those funds to peacekeeping) if it pruned its system of obsolescent, inefficient, redundant, wasteful, and corrupt branches. The Report provides many illustrative examples of intergovernmental treaty organizations (like the International Labor Organization), interorganizational entities (like the Global Environmental Facility), and many more that soak up funds, sometimes solely in order to keep an outdated bureaucratic bloat in business.

Gordenker acknowledged the very great difficulty of reforming the UN, particularly since the UN system had grown programmatically and functionally since 1946, but without apparent design. There was a formlessness which "even the sloppiest spider would reject," he wrote. Nevertheless, relieving the UN of nodes which duplicate the work of other sections, or overlap in jurisdiction, would be

start. So would the elimination of those bodies which are widely judged to be inefficient, ineffective, or produce work of poor quality.

Removing the Military Yoke in Burma

Burma had little experience with democracy before nationalists led by General Aung San wrested the country back from Britain in 1948. In 1962, a military junta gained power and established one of the world's more brutal, isolated, and autarkic regimes. Student-led riots in 1988 led to a free election in 1990. The forces of democracy, led by Aung San's daughter Aung San Suu Kyi, won 82 percent of the seats in the legislative assembly, but the junta clung determinedly to power, and did so into 2004.

The Foundation's project on Burma had two goals: to examine how that country might be assisted to assure its democratic future and economic growth and prosperity, and to suggest how Western and Asian powers ought to regard and then to deal with Burma's future. The United States and the European Union have condemned Burma's junta, and instituted sanctions. But without the cooperation of the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan, and China, sanctions (and embargoes) will remain cosmetic. What should and could be done?

The Foundation-sponsored Burma meeting took place in late 1996, at Harvard University, sponsored by the Foundation and the Harvard Institute for International Development. It provided an opportunity to craft policy responses capable of advancing the cause of democracy and economic development in that troubled and complex Southeast Asian state. The context of such policy responses was hardly auspicious. Burma's 45 million people were desperately poor, with an estimated average annual per capita GDP of about $200 (although the illicit drugs trade and currency disparities might boost that amount). They were oppressed by the military dictatorship which continued to harass Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and arrest her supporters well into 2004.

The participants in the Burma meeting were tentative in their conclusions. But they were surprisingly hopeful about the likelihood of a non-confrontational transition from military to democratic rule. Yet that transition, however accomplished, would still leave enormous problems. The National League for Democracy and Suu Kyi would have to manage (perhaps in a Chilean manner) the retreating military. They would inherit a Burma which has suffered more than three decades of disinvestment, not least in the human resources domain. The country's educational and health deficits are very large. So are its infrastructure needs. There is a vast illegal drugs trade, with its great potential for corruption and exploitation.

Associated with that trade are ethnic-based insurgencies. About 35–40 percent of Burmese are non-Burmans, and many ethnic antagonisms smolder despite recent accommodations with the government. A transition to democratic rule in Burma, most participants agreed, was in 1996 thus not an end in and of itself, but a means to the achievement of a better future for all Burmese. David I. Steinberg wrote *Burma: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction*, WPF Report 15 (Cambridge, MA, 1997). The Foundation subsequently published a book: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka, the serendipitous isle off India's southeast coast, is still savaged by civil war. Although Sri Lanka was largely peaceful during British colonial times, after independence, in 1948, the majority Sinhala intensified patterns of state-sanctioned discrimination against the minority Tamils. Since the fanatical Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam began battling the government in 1984, more than 65,000 Tamils have died, and thousands more have been internally displaced.

The Foundation and the Centre for Ethnic Studies in Sri Lanka jointly sponsored a large, well-attended meeting in late 1997 at Harvard University to seek answers to the problems besetting the island, and to try to propose possible solutions. The political culture, the bases for ethnic and religious conflict, the economy, and the military situation of the country were all examined and discussed at length. Attempts to negotiate sustainable solutions were also analyzed, but with little hope of any immediate breakthrough. *Sri Lanka's Civil War and Prospects for Post-Conflict Resolution* by Lisa M. Kois, Dana Francis, and Robert I. Rotberg, was published as WPF Report 18 (Cambridge, MA, 1998). A book, edited by Rotberg, *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation* (Washington, DC) was published in late 1999.

Creating Peace in Sri Lanka contains a series of interrelated chapters by Sri Lankan, British, and American authorities on the war and its aftermath. They discuss how to end the war and how the island nation can heal its physical and psychic wounds. The book suggests that third-party mediating intervention is essential, and that any resulting peace can only be sustained by intensive attention to serious political devolution and societal reconstruction. The book is about peace, how to achieve it and keep it, even in societies as fractured as Sri Lanka. It is also a tough-minded book, not one written by Pollyannas: the myriad problems of Sri Lanka are viewed through uncompromising lenses of realism.

In 2002, the vicious conflict continued unabated. Indeed, contributing author Neelan Tiruchelvam, a Tamil moderate, was killed in July 1999 by a suicide bomber before he could add several paragraphs to his chapter entitled, "Devolution and the Elusive Quest for Peace." Tiruchelvam's untimely death underscored the urgency for *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka*.

The book concluded that, however it is arrived at, Sri Lanka needs a peace that recognizes and appreciates Tamil culture and traditions. Ethnic fairness and justice must be the moral basis for whatever new social contract can be constructed out of the wasteland of war. Fairness and justice can provide the normative framework for a new egalitarian system in which all ethnic groups are treated equally and equally valued. In 2004, a Norwegian brokered mediation seemed about to produce that result.

Negotiating and Mediating the End of Deadly Conflict

How do UN officials and others charged with bringing about halts to hostilities accomplish their objectives? Given the plethora of intrastate conflicts in the modern age, what are the lessons for ending future conflicts that can be learned from successful and partially successful efforts in the recent past? In 1997, the Foundation invited a series of leading practitioners—persons who had negotiated or mediated the cessation of one or more civil wars—to explain what they had done and how they had operated, and what lessons they drew from their own crisis experiences. They shared their lessons with academic experts (most of whom had also negotiated internationally) of the theory of negotiation and mediation.

The mediators and their academic colleagues suggested that although every negotiation or mediation is unique, there were universal lessons that could be drawn. Listen to both sides. Understand people's fears and concerns. Create opportunities for the parties to know each other away from the negotiating table.

Other lessons suggested by the conference participants included:

- International forces and external events can propel combatants in an internal conflict toward resolution.
- The threat of forceful intervention assists negotiators.
- So long as either side in a conflict believes that it can win militarily, it is difficult to reach a negotiated settlement.
- It is important to involve all parties, even extremists, in talks.
- Manipulated and coerced agreements are bound to fail.
- Most negotiations take a long time, and mediators have to be prepared to stay for the duration.
- Although conflicts are often seen as clear-cut battles between two opposing sides, there is often as much dissension among the members of each side as there is between the two sides.

The transcript of the interactive discussion that resulted—one of the rare occasions when practitioners and professors actually talked together—was edited by Dana Francis and published as WPF Report 19 (Cambridge, MA, 1998). Its explanatory title is: *Mediating Deadly Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel/ Palestine, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka*. Contributors included: Eileen F. Babbitt, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Herman J. Cohen, Diego Cordovez, Roger Fisher, Donna Hicks, James O.C. Jonah, Herbert C. Kelman, Brian S. Mandell, Robert A. Pastor, Robert I. Rotberg, Lawrence Susskind, Peter J. de Vos, William Weisberg, and Howard E. Wolpe.

Truth Commissions and Transitional and Restorative Justice

The Foundation's *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton, 2000), edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, marked the completion of the second phase of its project on transitional justice and conflict prevention. Earlier, the Foundation had co-sponsored (with the Harvard Law School's Program on Human Right's and the Kennedy School's Program on Eth-

ics in the Professions) *Truth Commissions: A Comparative Assessment* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), edited by Henry Steiner—a transcript of a seminal meeting on the efficacy and utility of the truth commission method.

Creating a truth commission can assist nation-states to make a transition from post-conflict trauma to fundamental good governance. By providing a dispassionate and comparatively stable means to bind the wounds of recent or deep-seated injury, the truth commission method enables a country otherwise focused on retribution and condemnation to move forward under a conditional framework of restorative or transitional justice.

A truth commission is not a panacea. It may or may not prove an instrument of reconciliation. But it can function as a tool to reunite (or bring together) warring parties and losers and winners. A well-deployed truth commission can help a new government focus its main efforts on governing an entire country rather than on punishing the losers. It also allows the winners to gain satisfaction that their exertions have not been in vain. Yet, because a truth commission moves along with stately speed, that satisfaction (and any dissatisfaction on the side of the losers) can be achieved only gradually and with some measure of harmony.

A truth commission neither achieves complete truth nor perfect justice. What a truth commission process can best do is to help victims and their kin answer particular questions in a definitive or close to definitive manner. This aggregation of individual resolutions approximates a collective truth for a broader society. For many, the restorative justice supplied by a truth commission hearing and adjudication enables victims and their kin to move forward even without the full claims of justice being met. Societally, restorative justice permits the past to be put more securely to rest, and allows a new nation to move forward without the major task of mounting a full course of retributive justice. There is an assumption—worth discussing—that newly forged post-conflict societies do well not to review old wounds at all, and certainly not through prosecutorial methods if and when a truth commission approach is available.

There are many models of truth commission. All hearings could be held in public or in private. Results could be published in full or not at all. Truth commissions can be limited in chronological purview. They can even be morphed into historical clarification commissions. They can consciously be "reconciliation" commissions, or not. They can confine their scrutiny to particular injustices, i.e. disappearances or specific massacres. They can be led by host country nationals only, by outsiders, or by a mixture. They can operate under local mandates or UN mandates. Among the two dozen completed truth commissions there are positive and negative models.

Since the publication of the Foundation's book, articles reflecting its approach have appeared in newspapers and magazines in Mexico City and Sao Paulo. Truth commissions or historical clarification commissions are underway or being considered in Cambodia, Cyprus, East Timor, Kosovo, Mexico, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. The Foundation sponsored or participated in meetings at the Kennedy School, Harvard University, and in the U.S. on the subject of transitional justice. The general issue remains of substantial and continuing concern to the Foundation.

Diamonds in Peace and War: Reforms and Results

Rough diamonds are a rebel's best friend—and a potential fuel for and cause of civil war. Although 95 percent of the world's $7 billion a year trade in rough diamonds—gemstones and industrial abrasives—stems from countries at peace with themselves, notably Botswana, Canada, Namibia, and South Africa, the other 5 percent was inextricably intertwined with war. Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone were and are the producers of contested diamonds. In those bitterly divided territories, where anti-government insurgencies have flourished from 1975 (Angola), 1991 (Sierra Leone), and 1996 (the DRC), control over alluvial diamond sources has provided steady funding for arms purchases, corruption, civil conflict, mayhem, and atrocities.

Each of those civil wars continued in early 2002, but at reduced intensities thanks to external peacemaking, UN-invoked sanctions, war fatigue, and the reassertion in two of three cases of greater governmental authority in the diamondiferous regions of their territories. Another contributing factor results from the efforts of the world's main diamond producers to eliminate the cancer of conflict diamonds. Absent an attempt effectively to separate conflict (blood) diamonds from stones mined in conditions of peace, all diamonds—luxury products and discretionary purchases—might be lumped together and subjected to protests, demonstrations of consumer displeasure, and outright boycotts.

In early 2000, spurred to action by these realities and by the outcry of a coalition of non-governmental organizations, De Beers Ltd., which produces 50 percent of the world's diamonds and controls 65 percent of the world's trade in diamonds, and the main exporting and importing countries, began meeting together with NGO leaders to craft a protocol that came to be known as the Kimberly Process. As Ingrid Tamm's report of this project makes evident, *Diamonds in Peace and War: Severing the Conflict-Diamond Connection*, WPF Report 30 (Cambridge, MA, 2002), the Process eventually produced an agreed upon method of making the trade in conflict diamonds more costly and cumbersome than the trade in peaceful diamonds. Proper diamonds are supposed to travel from mine or alluvial field to sorting house to cutting and polishing center and on to jewelry manufacturers and jewelers only with passport-like documentation. Conflict diamonds are beyond the pale; they will have no authorized documentation. Although enforcement of this new regime is not yet fully assured, and although there are still further regulations to be considered by the United Nations General Assembly and by the Kimberley Process members, substantial progress has been made in limiting the current and ultimate impact of conflict diamonds. As a result, diamonds are expected to fuel ongoing and future civil wars only with immense difficulty.

A meeting of diamond producers and importers, NGO leaders, U.S. officials, Congressional legislative staff (responsible for the Diamond Trade and Protection Act that passed the House late in 2001 and was intended to lend strong support to the Kimberley Process), academics, and journalists was convened in October 2001 at the Kennedy School to bring all of the con-

cerned parties together in a neutral atmosphere, review the Kimberley Process proceedings and prospective U.S. legislation, and assist in differentiating conflict from peaceful diamonds. Sponsored by the Foundation, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Project on Justice in Times of Transition (the last two part of the Kennedy School), the meeting gave added legitimacy and urgency to an ongoing concern. It also followed and linked directly to the Foundation's continuing project on the trade in small arms and its direct influence on civil conflict around the globe.

The Scourge of Small Arms

Small arms and light weapons—assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, shoulder-fired rockets, and other weapons capable of being carried by individual soldiers—are the instruments of combat most commonly employed in the terrible small wars of the post Cold War era. Ethnic and internal conflicts depend on a relentless tide of small arms and their easy availability in an international environment that tolerates violence, waves of human suffering, and deaths too numerous to count.

Fatalities caused by intrastate conflict, overwhelmingly those of innocent civilians, number more than 10 million since the early 1990s. Eighty percent are women and children. Another 5 million are internally displaced as a result of these same wars and the lethality of small arms.

Small arms are portable, easily manufactured and readily procured, and increasingly affordable. They are manufactured both in the developed and the developing world, sold legitimately to armies and police forces, and oft abandoned or declared surplus. Ammunition is relatively inexpensive.

The global trade in these weapons and ammunition may be worth more than $7 billion a year. Diffusion from manufacturing sources through government-to-government transfers and sales, from private suppliers to governments or private merchants abroad, from governments covertly to distant insurgents, through theft from official arsenals, and by black market trafficking and gun running, is steady and easy. Exact numbers of small arms manufactured are not known. The flow of legal transfers is poorly documented. So, obviously, is the illegal trade. It flourishes, but how many arms move, and to whom, are closely guarded secrets.

In collaboration with the Fund for Peace, the Foundation convened three meetings in 1999 and another in late 2000, all in Washington, DC, to examine how feasible it was to reduce the flow of small arms to zones of combat, and by what means. A list of recommendations, and the research and other considerations from which those recommendations emerged, are analyzed in Michael Klare and Robert I. Rotberg, *The Scourge of Small Arms*, WPF Report 23 (Cambridge, MA, 1999). The Foundation's work later fed into and paralleled discussions at the United Nations in 2001 on a treaty to regulate the proliferation of small arms. It also provided an additional basis for the Foundation's approach to conflict diamonds.

War and Peace in Southern Africa

In 1994, with the establishment of a free and independent South Africa, the entire southern African region emerged at last from the cauldron of apartheid. But the consequent unparalleled opportunities for growth and regeneration brought with them critical challenges and unexpected stresses and strains. The Foundation had attempted in the 1970s and 1980s to bring black and white South Africans together for meaningful dialogue. It had sponsored several projects, and published a number of relevant studies (see the complete list at the end of this Report). Examining the tensions of the post-apartheid order, in South Africa as well as its surrounding region, seemed necessary. The Foundation did so together with its long-time partner, the South African Institute of International Affairs, and a new partner, the South African Institute for Security Studies.

War and Peace in Southern Africa focused on the interrelationships among and the roles of the following factors in the peaceful development of southern Africa: regional trade, migration, crime, drugs trafficking, policing methods, demobilization of armies, and regional peacekeeping—thus encapsulating in one meeting many of the themes of Foundation activities. A large conference was held in Johannesburg in 1996. Participants came both from Washington and Pretoria, and from Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), and elsewhere in southern Africa. In addition to senior government and international officials, academics and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean contributed to the written and oral product of the conference. The American participants included a former big city police commissioner, a former deputy attorney general, and an assistant secretary of state. The southern Africans included military, police, and drug enforcement officials, diplomats, journalists, businessmen, and journalists. WPF Report 13, by Greg Mills, was entitled *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade* (Cambridge, MA, 1996). A book of the same title, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Greg Mills, was published in Washington, DC, by the Brookings Institution Press in 1998.

Peace Enforcement in Africa

Modern Africa is engulfed in war. Nearly all of those wars are within states, where rivalries that play themselves out ethnically have been the curse of Africa since independence in the 1960s. How to prevent such intrastate conflict was the concern of this project. Specifically, it focused on conflict prevention through intervention and peace enforcement by African commanded sub-regional crisis response forces. Africans can respond appropriately to their own crises and need not rely on outside inter-positioning between combatants. Africans can, the project concludes, take charge of reducing their own intrastate warfare.

Since future Congos and Rwandas are unlikely to be rare, and since Burundi is a continuing calamity, an overriding issue for both Africa and the West has been how to restore and keep the peace. The motives for doing so are obvious: to save lives and boost the possibility of economic development; and to achieve a greater than present prosperity for Africans and Africa. The

absence of civil war would encourage national and continental opportunities for growth. Human and economic potentials would be unlocked after years, if not decades (in some cases), of destruction.

Africa's problems are primarily of the pre-cease fire kind. How to persuade or compel warring parties to lay down their arms and resolve conflicts peacefully is the overriding question. Thus, if a rapid reaction force of African soldiers could be created to create the peace, and to minimize the spread of hostilities, fewer lives would be lost and fewer internecine antagonisms would transform themselves into all-out civil wars. At least that is the hypothesis that motivated the World Peace Foundation, to explore how an African-controlled force could be used to prevent conflict and strengthen the pursuit of peace on the continent.

Do Africans want to keep their own peace by developing a peace intervention and peace enforcement capacity? If the strong recent responses to these and similar questions by a prime minister, about twenty ministers of defense, and about thirty chiefs of staff and their deputies, are at all representative, then the answer to each question clearly is in the affirmative. During the course of three large meetings (1997–1999) in the United States, Malawi, and Tanzania, military and political leaders from as many as fifteen African states appeared ready to embrace the notion that collective African controlled peace intervention methods were desirable, even possible. Western financial and other support would be essential. Western direct logistical assistance would be critical. Those who attended the three meetings also decided that Africa was a continent of sub-regions, and that the crisis response forces should be organized roughly along sub-regional lines. That is, instead of a single, continental army of questionable quality, there should be four or five sub-regional crisis reaction forces, each with its own mandate, derived from the nations that it would serve.

There was broad agreement about the utility of such forces. Raising them through secondments from existing operational military units would not be difficult. Choosing commanders would not prove a stumbling block; indeed, the African military leaders at the Foundation-sponsored meetings were sanguine about battalions from disparate countries working easily together for the common cause of sub-regional peace. The problem was not technical or professional. It was distinctly political.

The purpose of convening three successive meetings of African ministers of defense and chiefs of staff, together with officers, diplomats, and scholars from Europe and America, was to solve both the technical problems and answer the relevant political questions. The first meeting, at Harvard University, evaluated existing Western initiatives, found them wanting in terms of conflict prevention and serious peace enforcement, and emphasized the need for African ownership of conflict prevention in Africa and any forcible kinds of intervention for peace. Jeffrey Herbst's report of that meeting, *Securing Peace in Africa: An Analysis of Peacekeeping & Peace Enforcement Potential*, WPF Report 17 (Cambridge, MA, 1998) underscored the difficulties. He suggested that traditional peacekeeping was irrelevant to Africa. Instead, peace enforcement of the kind anticipated by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter was needed to

deter bloodshed in a country that was "at war with itself." Ending hostilities—not reinforcing an existing peace—was and would be the object in Africa.

The second meeting in this series took place at the invitation of and with the co-sponsorship of the Ministry of Defense of Malawi. Along the shores of Lake Malawi, ministers of defense, chiefs of staff, and former military leaders from Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, and virtually all the members of SADC, bar South Africa and Congo, decided that crisis response forces, organized sub-regionally, were a good idea. Unlike Herbst, they believed that they could assume primary responsibility for preventing their own internal wars. Properly trained and equipped African fire brigades, funded and assisted by the West, could greatly improve Africa's ability to reduce intrastate conflict and civilian deaths. Military and diplomatic officials from Britain, Denmark, France, Canada, and the United States, at the meeting in Malawi, welcomed these decisions and promised to back the creation and support the operations of sub-regional crisis response forces. Those warm words went beyond existing and continuing cooperation with African armies. Dana Francis' report of the Malawi meeting, *Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement? Conflict Intervention in Africa*, WPF Report 21 (Cambridge, MA, 1998) summarized its accomplishments and emphasized the large extent to which answering the key political questions had been gently avoided.

The third conference was held in the middle of a national park in western Tanzania, in 1999. Nearly seventy participants represented the countries of the Malawi conclave, plus Namibia, Nigeria, and Norway (which had also been represented at the initial session at Harvard). This time, although assumptions about what could be accomplished militarily through crisis response forces remained positive, doubts about the ability of African political leaders to resolve the critical political issues were articulated even more forcefully and candidly than at the previous meeting. Robert I. Rotberg and Ericka A. Albaugh, *Preventing Conflict in Africa: Possibilities of Peace Enforcement*, WPF Report 24 (Cambridge, MA, 1999), presented those arguments in full. A book, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention*, with chapters by Happyton Bonyongwe, Christopher Clapham, Herbst, Steven Metz, Rotberg, and others was published in late 2000.

Resolving Civil War in the Sudan

The Sudan is Africa's largest country by area. It has been convulsed by internal war since 1983, with episodes of civil conflict even earlier, and has a long history of enmity between the Arabized and ruling north and the indigenous and traditionally oppressed African south. Yoked together by Anglo-Egyptian reconquest in 1898 and from national independence in 1954, neither half of the Sudan has ever been happy with the other. The north has always been relatively much more developed, the largely neglected south remaining poorer, less well-educated, and insufficiently provided with social services.

Simmering discontent in the south, intensified by pronounced religious, linguistic, and racial differences, erupted into war after deposits of petroleum

were discovered in the south. The fortunes of the Sudan People's Liberation Army—the dominant anti-government force in the south—have fluctuated wildly since 1983, depending largely on the economic and political vicissitudes of the northern ruling cadre and on the south's varying levels of support from neighboring countries.

At the beginning of 2002, the war between south and north had entered a comparatively quiet phase. The official Sudanese government had purged its most Islamist elements and pledged support for the U.S. campaign against terrorism. The government had also begun to welcome and cooperate with U.S.-initiated peace brokering initiatives. A cease-fire, leading to a peaceful rearrangement of the Sudan, seemed much more likely than at any time since 1983. Ultimately, we wrote in 2002, a sustainable peace in the Sudan would depend upon a fair distribution of proceeds from the petroleum being pumped from a district that the north had in recent years carved out of the south. Early in January 2004, after nearly a half year of negotiations between northern and southern Sudanese leaders along the shores of Lake Naivasha in Kenya, both sides agreed to divide present and future oil revenues. Earlier they had resolved a number of other issues. As this Report went to press, an overall peace agreement hinged on exactly how power would be shared in the future Sudan and how hostilities would be ended in three still troubled areas within the Sudan but somewhat removed from the main north-south battle zone.

The Foundation convened two meetings in Washington, DC in 2000 to discuss conflict resolution in the Sudan with U.S. and European officials, diplomats and former diplomats with experience in the Sudan, academic and journalistic specialists, and NGO and church representatives. Rachel Gisselquist produced *Sudan: Policy Options Amid Civil War,* WPF Report 26 (Cambridge, MA, 2000), to which Deborah Weinberg added a postscript. Both reports sum up spirited debate and disagreement. The report and postscript concluded that (1) the situation in the Sudan had not changed materially in the last year; (2) the peace process was off track and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had outlived its usefulness; and (3) a new peace process was necessary in order for any progress to be made.

WPF Report 26 further highlighted a dozen policy options for the U.S. in two broad categories. The two categories were either to engage the government of the Sudan in order to achieve a sustainable negotiated end to the civil war and begin redevelopment and reconstruction of the country (which was subsequently done), or to focus all efforts on strengthening the southern forces so that they could successfully oppose those of the north.

In terms of engaging the government, the report suggested that the U.S.:

1. Encourage and support IGAD's negotiating efforts.
2. Follow a posture of critical engagement and assist active negotiations.
3. Provide assistance to civil society even-handedly in both the north and the south.
4. Concert U.S. policies with the EU.

Those four policies were subsequently embraced by U.S. diplomatic effort.

In terms of disengaging from the north and engaging only with the south, which a minority of participants favored, the report suggested that the U.S.:

1. Avoid reengaging with the Sudan as a whole.
2. Tilt decisively to the south and help the SPLM war effort.
3. Find ways to emphasize the unity of the southern Sudan's while engaging with the north.
4. Assist the National Democratic Alliance.
5. Focus civil society building efforts exclusively on the south.
6. Encourage and provide incentives for a unification of southern forces.
7. Encourage a series of local cease fires.
8. Discourage northern/international petroleum exploration, refining, and export.

Those policies were largely discouraged during the 2003–2004 negotiations, mediated by the Government of Kenya.

Peace and War in Failing Zimbabwe

The Foundation and the South African Institute of International Affairs convened a large and well-attended meeting in late 2001 in Johannesburg to bring together Zimbabweans from opposed political parties and South African policymakers, business-men, academics, and journalists. Also participating in the meeting were locally accredited diplomats from a range of nations and three leading American analysts of Zimbabwe's turmoil. As a developing polity that had slipped considerably in all economic rankings (from comfortable to dire), as an illiberal democracy that had lapsed into despotism at the hands of an aging tyrant, and as a once strong African state that was imploding by the day, Zimbabwe provided a laboratory case of man-made failure. It desperately required conflict resolution. It also exemplified the weakness of African leadership, an emerging theme of Foundation activity.

As the report of the meeting by Moeletsi Mbeki, Greg Mills, and Fred Phaswana, *Zimbabwe Before and After the Elections: a Concerned Assessment,* WPF Report 28 (Johannesburg, 2001) makes clear, Zimbabwe's ruling party and the challenging opposition party perceived political and economic realities very differently. Although President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa subsequently spoke out against the errors of President Robert Mugabe's procedures and his damaging violations of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, at the meeting itself two influential South African cabinet ministers were defensive and hesitant. Corporate leaders, the Americans, and all but ruling party Zimbabweans predictably deplored Zimbabwe's self-inflicted wounds, but also expressed alarm at what allowing Zimbabwe to descend into anti-democratic behavior and economic free fall meant and would mean for the sustainable development of good governance and economic prosperity in southern Africa and all of sub-Saharan Africa. Already the rand had plunged against the U.S. dollar (and was to depreciate further into early 2004), foreign investment into southern Africa had largely ceased, and Zimbabweans (and Zambians)

were facing serious food shortages thanks entirely to mismanagement and corruption in Zimbabwe. The Foundation was poised, along with many other concerned outside organizations, to assist Zimbabwe's transition back to democratic rule and sensible economic planning.

Despite all of the Foundation's myriad efforts, however, as this Report went to press in early 2004, Mbeki still dithered, Mugabe was still in power, and Zimbabweans were increasingly hungry, poor, unemployed, beleaguered, and bereft. Inflation had soared over 700 percent per annum by the end of 2003 and the World Food Program reported that fully half of all Zimbabweans could go hungry in early 2004. In late 2003, Zimbabwe was also pushed out of the Commonwealth.

Puerto Rico

In 1983, the Foundation focused on how the U.S. could best rule its largest dependency. In 1985 it issued a widely noted book, *Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy* (Boulder, 1985) which dealt with the options available to Puerto Ricans and the U.S. government. In 2000, those same options were still on the table: the existing commonwealth associated status, statehood, or independence. The Clinton administration and the Republican-dominated Congress were unsure about the future of Puerto Rico, a possible issue in the then upcoming presidential elections. A referendum in Puerto Rico (1998) and the outcome of elections in the commonwealth had demonstrated the lack of popular support for independence, but had otherwise given comfort both to those who advocated statehood and those who favored an enhanced version of the current associated status.

The Puerto Ricans who joined U.S. officials and former officials and American academics in Washington in 2000 to discuss once again how Puerto Rico should be governed comprised politicians, businessmen, lawyers, and economists from all tendencies and persuasions. Several had participated in the 1983 meeting and a few had even been close to the decisions made when Puerto Rico originally opted for association as a commonwealth in 1952.

Rachel Gisselquist's report of the meeting, *The Challenge of Puerto Rico: Resolving Status Issues*, WPF Report 27 (Cambridge, MA, 2000), includes an edited summary of the positions advanced by the participants. The meeting began with a discussion of the controversial topic of Vieques, which, as one participant noted, was a microcosm of the problem of Puerto Rico because it embraced the question of what Puerto Ricans themselves wanted for their territory. The meeting also examined historical facts and fictions about national identity, U.S. legislation and status, current political realities in both Puerto Rico and the U.S., and economic options.

Due to the complexity of the ties between Puerto Rico and the U.S., the participants debated at length how to address the issue of Puerto Rico's status—past, present, and future. Although Puerto Rico is considered a "commonwealth," the term does not denote a specific, distinct political status. Some Puerto Ricans argued that changing the relationship to a "free association" would improve U.S.-Puerto Rican relations, but some participants noted that both terms were equally ambiguous and although the latter

might be preferred, it would not in fact resolve the status issue. Regardless of terminology, the three options needing to be addressed were separation, association, and integration.

The group ultimately agreed that a consensus on resolving the Puerto Rican issue might prove possible. However, there was much work to be done on both sides in shaping a resolution of the issue that would reasonably satisfy both Puerto Rico and the U.S. In 2004, ahead of another election, President Bush convened a new White House task force to advise anew on the Puerto Rican question.

World Faiths Development Dialogue

At the behest of the Aga Khan Foundation, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the World Bank, the Foundation organized a research program and a set of meetings in 2001 to explore the premise that faith networks could assist international lending agencies and bilateral donors effectively to address questions of peace, development, and poverty alleviation in the world's poorest countries.

The research program produced papers on twelve countries (from Albania to Uganda) which explored the project's governing premise. The Foundation then convened a series of meetings at the Kennedy School of world experts respectively on African religions, Buddhism, Orthodox Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Each meeting investigated the different approaches of each faith to peace making, economic development, and poverty alleviation. Each meeting also attempted to ascertain how the methods of organization and governance of each faith would or would not mesh with the approach of the Dialogue, and with the proposed Center for Faiths Development.

The underlying conclusion of the meetings was that the faiths were largely decentralized and non-hierarchical in their governance, that the Dialogue and the putative Center would only with difficulty find nodes of complementarity within each faith structure, and that each faith had its own schisms and internal disagreements with which to contend. As peace and development cooperators and/or contributors, the various faiths were not expected to be strong or effective.

The Foundation and Its Partners

In recent years the Foundation and its associated Program on Intrastate Conflict have jointly sponsored projects and activities with the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, the Center for Business and Government, the Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East Central Europe, the International Security Program of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Project on Justice in Times of Transition, and the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, all in the Kennedy School of Government, and with the International Crisis Group, and the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Additional financial support for the work of the Foundation during the 2002–2003 period came from BP, Shell International Ltd., the United nations Office for Project Services, USAID, and, at the Kennedy School, the Carr Center for Human Rights, the Center for Public Leadership, and the Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East Central Europe.

The Foundation, its trustees, its officers, and the participants in all of the projects during these recent years are grateful for the generous backing and significant collegial support of its collaborators and the foundations and agencies which helped this Foundation to mount the many initiatives reported here and in earlier such biennial reports. We very much value the intellectual and financial assistance that has been received. We are further pleased to share so many interests and projects with programs and their leaders within the Kennedy School and Harvard University.

The Endowment

Edwin Ginn created both the World Peace Foundation and the Ginn Trust. Returns on the corpus of the Ginn Trust provide nearly two-thirds of the annual income of the Foundation. On December 31, 2003, the Ginn Trust was worth more than $9 million. The remainder of the Foundation's annual income derives from an endowment of nearly $7 million, which the Foundation itself invests in order to support its programs. The Foundation also receives program and project support from U.S. and foreign foundations and institutions. It gratefully accepts bequests and other gifts to support the study and further advance of world peace. The financial affairs of the Foundation are audited annually.

Board of Trustees

Richard H. Ullman, David K. E. Bruce Professor of International Affairs, Emeritus, at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, has chaired the Foundation's Board of Trustees since 1995. Philip Khoury, Dean of Social Sciences and Humanities at MIT, became Vice-Chair in 2001.

Trustees elected to the board since 1995 include Catherine Henn, until 2001 Vice-President of Corporate and Legal Affairs for the *Boston Globe*; Stephanie Bell-Rose, President of the Goldman Sachs Foundation; Professor Kenneth Oye, former Director of MIT's Center for International Studies; Thomas O'Reilly, Chief Financial Officer, Sager Electronics; Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Prince-

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The Office and Staff

Since 1999, the World Peace Foundation has been housed at 124 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, MA. In 2001, Elisa Pepe became Program Manager, joining Deborah West, Program Coordinator.

The Foundation's Web Site

Information about the World Peace Foundation can be located at
www.worldpeacefoundation.org.

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(second term)	1999–
Peter D. Bell	1987–

Donald F. McHenry	1987–1994
Frederick G. P. Thorne	1987–
Brian Urquhart	1987–1989
Judith K. Keenan	1988–2002
Catherine E.C. Henn	1995–
Stephanie Bell-Rose	1996–2001
Kenneth A. Oye	1996–
Thomas O'Reilly	1998–
Anne-Marie Slaughter	1998–
J. Brian Atwood	1999–
Philip S. Khoury	1999–
John Shattuck	2001–
Paul Van Slambrouck	2001–