

# ‘HISTORY OBLIGES’

THE REAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND  
GERMAN AID FLOWS  
IN THE CASE OF NAMIBIA

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

**Submitted by Esther Schüring**

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Under the advisement of Professor Peter Uvin

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THE FLETCHER SCHOOL

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Esther Schüring

## Preface

This study has been a very interesting experience for me in many regards. It has enabled me to delve into my own country's past and discover a chapter of history that is largely ignored by the German school curriculum and that has not attracted a great deal of media attention. It has exposed me to a very unique aid relationship between Germany and Namibia whose extent was unknown to me and still is to a majority of the German public. Since no previous studies were conducted on the underlying motives behind aid in this particular case, the testing of various aid variables that could have motivated German aid flows to Namibia was a real discovery journey for me. I was amazed to see the impact of rather understudied and less well established variables on German motivations. I'm grateful for this experience and I want to thank all the people who have made this study possible.

I am grateful for excellent feedback on various drafts from Professor Peter Uvin who guided me throughout my thesis. I want to thank Erik Boonstoppel for his substantial critique and rigorous editing and Maria Reff for her input concerning language and structure. I am also very grateful for insights and comments from Dr. Wolfgang Maier (country representative of the Konrad Adenauer foundation in Namibia) Hans Büttner (SPD-delegate of the German Bundestag and specialist on Southern Africa), Dieter Bückmann (coordinator of a youth exchange program between the Protestant congregation in Drevenack (Germany) with a partner church in Namibia) and from the many survey participants who took their time to fill out the questionnaire. Many thanks for the great cooperation and research help to the magazines *Der Stern* and *Der Spiegel*, to the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, the OECD, the Namibian embassy in Germany, the Bremen state government and Professor Manfred Hinz who allowed me to use his background paper. I also would like to extend my acknowledgments to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation which has supported me throughout my studies and provided me with the great opportunity to study at the Fletcher School. Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents for their patience and continuous support throughout my academic career, in particular my mom, who helped coordinate the entire survey for me in Germany and my brother for his great encouragement.

## Executive Summary

This study explains the exceptional donor position that Germany assumes in Namibia. Contrary to the predominant discourse on aid allocation literature, this study finds that classic motives such as *need*, *economic potential*, *strategic interest in military terms*, *democracy* and *region* do not factor in as strongly in Namibia's case. Germany's aid flows are largely a result of two variables, (1) *moral obligation*, a largely understudied variable and (2) *cultural similarity*, a variable not often applied in the German context due to the removed colonial presence. Moral obligation is mainly a product of German-Namibian colonial history - the 'genocide' that the emperor's troops executed in 1904-07, - reinforced by the largely contested German aid flows to Namibia during South African occupation. The recognition of colonial wrongdoings by German politicians, coupled with external pressure have turned moral obligation into the most decisive variable in the German-Namibian aid relationship. Whereas internal pressure has been almost non-existent, external pressure has been exerted continuously and successfully by the Namibian government and by the Herero. Worried about its reputation and costly reparations, the German government appears to have used its generous aid flows in an attempt to silence these pressure sources. The second most influential variable, the cultural similarity to the 20,000 Namibia Germans, has political as well as sentimental roots: German politicians have cared and continue to do so for their constituency in Namibia and in no other country, the German language and traditions play such a significant role as in Namibia. Next to these two prevalent variables, a third variable has increasingly gained more momentum. Although not one of the predominant determinants of German aid flows, the *socio-political strategic interest* of the German government to placate potential tensions arising from the land reform issue has guaranteed that aid continues to flow. This variable is a combination of moral obligation (land reform as colonial legacy) and cultural similarity (concern about the well-being of the Namibia Germans).

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## I. Introduction

“German rule in Africa – a footnote in history?”<sup>1</sup> This question was asked on the occasion of the 100-year commemoration of the founding of the German colonial empire on the African continent. Even now, 20 years later, nobody seems to have taken the trouble to make a paragraph, let alone a chapter, out of this footnote and the ordinary German citizen has difficulties remembering that Germany even made an appearance on this ‘forgotten continent.’ The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) states that the relatively short time of the German colonial empire of 30 years has conveyed the impression to many Germans that formal colonial rule is a rather insignificant episode in their history.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, out of sight, out of mind? Not quite so. There is one former colony with which Germany not only cherishes historical ties but a liaison of a quite different nature: an exceptional foreign aid relationship that connects the two countries. Namibia has been Germany’s greatest aid recipient in relative terms and Germany proved Namibia’s greatest donor over quite a number of years, in particular after Namibia’s independence. The central question arises of course as to why such a tiny footnote in history actually has provoked such an enormous willingness on the part of the German government to pour money into it.

This study thus examines which motives have driven German aid policy in the case of Namibia. It demonstrates that the aid flows to Namibia have been primarily motivated by a combination of the following factors. The primary motor has been *Germany’s moral obligation* to pay off its historical guilt for colonial wrongdoings and its controversial aid regime in the pre-independence period. These obligations have emerged predominantly through *external pressure* exerted by the Namibian government and the Herero. Secondly, the *strong cultural affinity to the Namibia Germans* has played a decisive role in Germany’s aid calculations. Last but not least, a *strategic interest* to prevent an escalation of land reform that could potentially hurt the Namibia Germans has more recently come into play and has helped to maintain this unique aid relationship.

The second chapter establishes a theoretical framework to filter out which motives could have potentially driven German aid policy in the case of Namibia and which methodology is most apt to test the motives’ validity. Consequently, we consult the literature on the driving factors behind aid calculations and examine how factors have evolved over time and how time-resistant they have proven. We furthermore look into how different scholars have bundled these motives to analyze countries’ aid motives and which methodologies they have employed to test them. Based on this exposure to different ways of bundling and testing various motives and their effectiveness, we can then make a selection of variables that are most applicable in the Namibia case and select a methodology that is best adjusted to our case study.

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<sup>1</sup> Helga & Ludwig Helbig, “Die Vergangenheit bewältigen. Die deutsche Verantwortung für Namibia,” *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika* 6 (1984): 3.

Chapter III provides a statistical analysis to verify Namibia and Germany's special aid relationship. It captures the Official Development Aid (ODA) that has flown from Germany to Namibia in absolute, in per capita and in relative terms during the 16-year focus period, 1985 – 2001. This timeframe has been determined primarily by the restrictions of available data. This analysis enables us to understand how Namibia scores compared to all other African countries when measuring the absolute magnitude of aid flows, the per capita aid, and when looking into how much of the total ODA of all those recipients originates from Germany. As a last step, the statistical analysis examines which donor position Germany assumes in all of the African countries and assesses the importance of Germany's role in Namibia.

The study then proceeds with a historical analysis' in chapter IV that transports the reader back into colonial times. It elucidates how and why German colonial rule started in 1884 in what used to be called South West Africa (SWA), what impact German rule had on its colony SWA and how its colonial rule ended. Special attention is paid to the period of the Herero and Nama rebellion from 1904-1907, one of the bloodiest chapters in German colonial rule and to the question of whether the German 'war of annihilation' against the Herero can be classified as a genocide or not.

Next, the study offers a historical analysis of post-WWII German 'Namibia policy', dealing with the course that the West German government as well as the East German government took prior to German reunification in 1990 and the 'Namibia policy' that has been pursued thereafter. The primary focus is on the multiple ties that have grown between Namibia and Germany and on the controversial aid behavior on the West German side that defied UN resolutions and elicited a great deal of international criticism, especially from the SWAPO (South West African People's Organization). Essentially, chapter IV situates the current aid relationship between the two countries in its historical context, uncovers the appalling as well as positive points in the relations between those two nations and allows for the first preliminary conclusions about what motives might play into Germany's foreign aid calculation for Namibia.

As a next step in chapter V, this study tests the applicability of six different motives in Namibia's case that we have identified in chapter II. Drawing primarily on data from the World Development Indicators, the study determines the significance of the three harder variables, (1) humanitarian need measured in monetary as well as in non-monetary terms, (2) the strategic importance of Namibia in a military but also socio-political sense and the (3) economic potential measured by the level of trade Namibia has with Germany, German foreign direct investment, Namibia's GDP growth etc. The testing of the three softer variables, (4) the democratic nature and the civil as well as political liberties in the country, (5) the cultural similarity expressed in educational, traditional and linguistic terms as well as (6) the regional predilection of a donor, involves a more thorough literature search, complemented by statistical data and information gathered in interviews. Although still incomplete, this analysis brings us a step closer to putting the pieces of the foreign aid puzzle together.

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<sup>2</sup> Jürgen Zimmerer, "Rassenkrieg gegen die Herero. Südwestafrika 1904-1908. Der erste deutsche Völkermord," *SZ*,

Chapter VI introduces the missing element to the aid puzzle that has hardly been tested in any explanatory analysis and that is referred to by Sogge as one of the neglected motives: moral obligation. This chapter examines whether aid is used as reparations to pay off the colonial guilt and the controversial behavior of the West German government prior to Namibia's independence that was largely regarded as pro-South African and therefore as anti-Namibian. Since moral obligation usually does not translate naturally into aid transfers unless there is a source of pressure involved that reminds the German government of its wrongdoing or that can potentially harm the German government in case of inaction, this chapter takes a closer look at the potential internal as well as external sources of pressure.

Concerning internal pressure, the study addresses the constituencies in Germany that have the potential to exert pressure on the German government, which comprise the Namibian Diaspora in Germany and potential pressure groups formed by German citizens who, alerted by the media or other information sources, are shocked about the country's wrongdoings in the past. The knowledge, interest and influence of the ordinary citizen will be established with the help of a survey that has been conducted in Germany with different groups in society and also in different regions. This survey does not claim to be representative by any means, but given the time constraints, it is an interesting snapshot of the opinions of different German individuals. Investigating potential external pressure groups, this chapter scrutinizes whether the German government has been pressurized by its European neighbors or other Western powers to redeem the damage and whether the Namibian government or the Herero themselves have undertaken any action to exert pressure on Germany.

Finally, the conclusion in chapter VII summarizes the main findings and provides the reader with an answer to the original question presented, revealing a unique code of motives to unlock the Namibian aid puzzle.

## II. Motives behind foreign aid – a literature review

Aid motives are usually mixed<sup>3</sup>, donor-specific<sup>4</sup> and have changed over time<sup>5</sup> - a combination that has attracted many researchers who are eager to solve the ‘foreign aid puzzle’ as Schraeder et al. call it. This chapter introduces the range of motives that are potential driving forces in our case study and elaborates a methodology that will be used in Chapters V and VI to verify the significance of these variables. This methodology is based on Hjertholm and White’s statement that an accurate analysis necessitates a methodology that establishes “viable hypotheses relating aid flows to the observed characteristics of recipient countries, and an empirical verification exercise [...]”<sup>6</sup> Consequently, we first look at how different motives and methodologies to detect motives have evolved over time. Based on how other authors have bundled these aid motives, we then determine which variables are relevant in the Namibia case and which can be excluded.<sup>7</sup> Drawing on the different methodologies that have been used and discarded by scholars, we conclude with the methodology that proves most viable in our case.

### II.1 Aid motives over time – a conceptual and methodological journey

McGillivray divides studies on aid allocation into three different categories: (1) the explanatory studies, geared at explaining aid allocation patterns, (2) the descriptive studies, attempting to describe or evaluate donor allocative performance and (3) the prescriptive studies which prescribe a certain allocation of aid based on normative criteria.<sup>8</sup> Since we are interested in *explaining* Germany’s real aid motives, explanatory studies are most relevant. Given that this study focuses on the bilateral aid of Germany to Namibia, this literature review is restricted to the motives of bilateral donors. As Alesina and Dollar illustrate “most authors find that the determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid are quite different and one cannot explain the two together.”<sup>9</sup> Relying on explanatory studies of bilateral donors, we first must familiarize ourselves with the debate on need vs. strategic interests as driving forces. This debate has occupied many authors in this field from its onset, and continues even today. Secondly, in the following sections, we look into which variables and methodologies were introduced as the debate progressed and whether these variables have proven resistant over time.

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<sup>3</sup> David Sogge, *Give and take: what's the matter with foreign aid?* (Dhaka: University Press, 2002), 41.

<sup>4</sup> Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, *Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why? NBER Working Paper No. w6612*, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), 1.

<sup>5</sup> See for instance Hjertholm & White and Bertlemy & Tichit.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Hjertholm & Howard White, *Survey of Foreign Aid: History, Trends and Allocation. Discussion Papers 00-04* (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2000), 46.

<sup>7</sup> This establishes the “a priori validity of the hypotheses” as McGillivray and White call it.

<sup>8</sup> Marc McGillivray, *Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses of Aid Allocation. Approaches, Issues and Consequences, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2003/21* (Helsinki: The World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Alesina & Dollar, 5

## II.1.1 Need vs. strategic interests

Berthélemy and Tichit declare the mid-1950s as the official starting point of interest in and research of aid allocation motives. They mention Behrmann as the first representative in the field but emphasize that McKinlay and Little were the first ones who professionalized the field by introducing econometric tools in the 1970s. In between, research relied on rather anecdotal analysis and on simple empirical observation.<sup>10</sup> McKinlay and Little as well as Maizels and Nissanke's work, characterized by McGillivray as "the most influential, widely-cited studies,"<sup>11</sup> is based on the 'recipient need' and 'donor interest' (RN-DI) modeling approach which has dominated the literature from the late 1970s onward. This approach looks separately at recipient needs (RN) and donor interests (DI) by estimating two regression models of aid allocation. The two-model approach reflects quite precisely the predominantly bipolar discourse on aid allocations from that time with one side assuming an altruistic perspective on the part of the donor (RN model) and the other side stressing donors' interest in foreign policy objectives and economic self-interest (DI models).<sup>12</sup> This bipolar discourse has, however, not been equally balanced: as evidenced by the literature, the altruistic side has been largely underrepresented and often discarded as the less important element.

McKinlay<sup>13</sup>, McKinlay and Little, Maizels and Nissanke,<sup>14</sup> Sumberg and Sogge make a strong case for the prevalence of donor interests by emphasizing the minor role of humanitarian motives. McKinlay and Little see no reason to believe that humanitarian concerns have motivated US aid policy in any way and Maizels and Nissanke conclude that the foreign economic and political stance of the donor and the security interests are the sole motor behind aid flows.<sup>15</sup> McKinlay rejects a humanitarian interpretation on the basis that aid flows usually do not match need. He emphasizes the importance of the control or leverage element to aid – a contemporary form of imperialism - and that the act of giving aid to poorer countries can be grounded in strategic interests, as many donors like to retain bilateral control.<sup>16</sup> Sumberg, on the search for the humanitarian obligation in states' aid regimes, also comes to the conclusion that self-interest prevails and supercedes duty-bound aid.<sup>17</sup> Sogge cites Schraeder et al.'s study to demonstrate that their research

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<sup>10</sup> Jean-Claude Berthélemy & Ariane Tichit, *Bilateral Donors' Aid Allocation Decisions. A Three-dimensional Panel Analysis*, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002/123 (Helsinki: The World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2002), 1.

<sup>11</sup> Marc McGillivray, *Modelling Aid Allocation Issues, Approaches and Results*, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2003/49 (Helsinki: The World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2003), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Hjertholm and White, 45/46.

<sup>13</sup> R. D. McKinlay, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970," *Comparative Political Studies* 11 (1979), 447.

<sup>14</sup> Cited in McGillivray & White, 14/15

<sup>15</sup> Cited in McGillivray, 1.

<sup>16</sup> McKinlay, 412.

<sup>17</sup> Theodore A. Sumberg, *Foreign aid as moral obligation?* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), 60.

“pour[s] cold water on the notion that humanitarianism drives foreign aid”<sup>18</sup> and confirms that ideology and commercial advantages, thus donor interests, are the primary motives.

The following findings by authors furthermore emphasize the centrality of donor interests, which exist in various forms, ranging from commercial to strategic interests (security and historical/political ties). Berthélemy and Tichet’s research reflects the importance of commercial interests, measured by the volume of bilateral trade. They allege that it is for instance an important criterion for smaller donors to prioritize aid to their trading partners since they cannot provide aid to everybody.<sup>19</sup> Berthélemy and Tichet also elaborate on the significance of strategic interests, which they measure in terms of strategically important, political allies. They find out that for the aid allocation policies of France, United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal as well as of the US with respect to Egypt, historical-political ties are the decisive factor.<sup>20</sup> Edgren as well as Burnside and Dollar<sup>21</sup> come to these conclusions, too. Edgren detects that “foreign policy objectives had such an impact on aid flows that more funds went to strategically important countries (Israel, Egypt) than to the least developed recipients.”<sup>22</sup> Alesina and Dollar also find considerable evidence for political and strategic motives dictating donor behavior. Based on their regression analysis, they allege that “an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.”<sup>23</sup> Although these arguments give us the impression that there is broad agreement about the importance of donor interests, there are also authors who favor the RN side of the debate.

David Lumsdaine for instance, based on his historical and statistical evidence<sup>24</sup>, concludes that donor economic and political interests have mattered less than donors’ humanitarian convictions and their belief that peace and prosperity is only sustainable within a just international order.<sup>25</sup> He argues against economic interests being the prevailing factor by referring to the fact that countries with the highest investment as a percentage of GNP, Switzerland and Britain, had rather moderate aid programs and that net aid was greater than net investment.<sup>26</sup> Concerning the political interest of donor countries, Lumsdaine concludes that cultural ties are vague bonds, only apply to a minority of countries and that those who cherish them are

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<sup>18</sup> Sogge, 43.

<sup>19</sup> Berthélemy & Tichet, 21.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Craig Burnside & David Dollar, *Aid Policies & Growth*. Policy Research Working Paper 1777 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 32.

<sup>22</sup> Gus Edgren, “Aid is an Unreliable Joystick,” *Development and Change* 33 (2) (2002): 261.

<sup>23</sup> Alesina & Dollar, 1.

<sup>24</sup> Alesina and Dollar criticize Lumsdaine for only presenting simple correlations, so that interactions and the relative magnitude of the effects of different explanatory variables cannot be studied. (Alesina & Dollar, 4).

<sup>25</sup> David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 115. Lumsdaine argues that the humanitarian drive behind aid “found support in the domestic political arrangements and religious and moral traditions of the West.”

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 105.

rather small donors anyhow.<sup>27</sup> Trumbull and Wall's finding that ODA allocations are determined by recipients' needs, when need is expressed by infant mortality and political-civil rights instead of income levels,<sup>28</sup> supports Lumsdaine's emphasis on humanitarian motives.

McGillivray does not argue for the significant role of need directly but he emphasizes that scholars have commonly underestimated the function of need due to a methodological flaw. As a result of the nature of the RN-DI models, 'need' and 'donor interest' variables had never been introduced in the same model, potentially biasing the studies as McGillivray laments.<sup>29</sup> McGillivray's discovery led to the development of so-called 'hybrid' models<sup>30</sup> that include all determinants in one model. Trumbull and Wall point to a further previous methodological error that has contributed to the overshadowing of need variables. They claim that previous models are basically irrelevant and non applicable because none of them have controlled for recipient-specific variables, such as the recipients' colonial histories, their strategic value to donors, or their geographic location.<sup>31</sup> The discussion about whether need or donor interests factor in stronger continues and has been enriched over the years by the introduction of new variables.

## **II.1.2 New variables entering the aid discourse**

As time progressed, new methodologies were developed to incorporate the complex reality of aid motives and in reaction to changing development paradigms, new variables were introduced as well. Though not exhaustive, this study elaborates on 'ideology', 'good policy', 'democracy', 'population and middle income bias', 'inertia, past investments and the bandwagon effect', 'moral obligation', 'cultural similarity' and 'region' – variables that have been used by various authors to describe donor behavior.

### ***Ideology***

At the height of the cold war, ideology was assumed to be one of the main determinants of foreign aid and the African recipient map was divided along capitalist and socialist lines, as Schraeder et al. point out.<sup>32</sup> Whereas one might naturally question the importance of ideology after the cold war, Lumsdaine even questions ideology's significance during the cold war.<sup>33</sup> He does not deny that anticommunist considerations played a role in the American aid regime but he negates that they gave the impetus. If ideology has such a high status, why then, Lumsdaine argues, did the Soviet Union and East European

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<sup>27</sup> Lumsdaine, 108/109.

<sup>28</sup> William N. Trumbull & Howard J. Wall, "Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with Panel Data," *Economic Journal* 104 (1994): 877.

<sup>29</sup> McGillivray, *Modelling Aid Allocation*, 12.

<sup>30</sup> For more information, either McGillivray (*Modelling Aid Allocation*) or Berthélemy & Tichit

<sup>31</sup> Trumbull & Wall, 881.

<sup>32</sup> Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook & Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics* 50.2 (1998): 298.

<sup>33</sup> Lumsdaine, 109.

countries not make better use of it and why was the US not the leader in the foreign aid regime?<sup>34</sup> As chapter IV demonstrates, the political discourse in Germany lets us conclude that ideological considerations were not as irrelevant during the cold war as Lumsdaine claims them to be.

### ***Washington consensus & good policy***

In the 1980s, the Washington consensus<sup>35</sup>, the conviction by the Washington institutions that developing countries' problems could be solved through structural reforms such as trade liberalization, fiscal discipline, privatization as well as financial liberalization and regulation, dominated the discourse. Emmerij claims that this Washington consensus dictated aid policies to a great extent by coupling aid with economic policy reform.<sup>36</sup> Studies by Alesina and Dollar as well as Berthélemy and Tichit demonstrate the increased interest in the topic but their studies refute that 'good policies' have had a significant impact on donor behavior.<sup>37</sup> Berthélemy and Tichit ascertain that when controlling for the correlation between donors' friends and aid flows, donors do reward good fiscal, monetary and trade policy. However, the allocation of money to donors' friends, regardless of what policy those friends have implemented, supercedes policy interests in their analysis.<sup>38</sup> One of the greatest challenges with this variable is moreover that it can be easily confounded with need and the analysis might thus not be conclusive. For instance, the lack of good policy could also motivate donors to give aid because there is a great need for countries to improve.<sup>39</sup>

### ***Good governance***

In the 1990s, aid priorities diversified again with the new concept of human development and Amartya Sen's development as freedom. As Emmerij states, "democracy, freedom, human rights became new priorities on top of all the others"<sup>40</sup> and the term 'good governance' entered the aid allocation discourse. On the basis of results from a recent survey of 10 donors, McGillivray shows that donors have become more selective and pay closer attention to governance, program implementation and absorptive capacity, essentially "broader developmental concerns," as he summarizes them.<sup>41</sup> To what degree these criteria really reflect developmental concerns and not just purely donor interest remains debatable but they do demonstrate the importance attached to 'good governance.' Studies by Alesina and Dollar as well as Berthélemy and Tichit furthermore highlight the significance of 'good governance'. Berthélemy and Tichit

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<sup>34</sup> Lumsdaine, 109.

<sup>35</sup> For more information on the Washington consensus: <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Louis Emmerij, "Aid as a Flight Forward," *Development and Change* 33 (2) (2002): 252.

<sup>37</sup> Evidence for multilateral donors intent to reward 'good policy' is probably greater since development aid predominantly consists of loans.

<sup>38</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 28

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Emmerij, 253.

<sup>41</sup> Marc McGillivray, *Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations. Summary Paper prepared for the Joint OECD DAC/Development Centre Experts' Seminar* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2003), 6.

demonstrate that civil liberty and political freedom are positively correlated with aid flows<sup>42</sup> and Alesina and Dollar establish through a time series that donors award countries' democratization efforts.<sup>43</sup> Again, we experience the same problem with this variable as with economic policy – the lack of democracy might very well be an expression of developmental need. On top of this, Berthélemy and Tichit demur that good governance might just be a result of population size instead of government efforts because according to them, there is less fractionalization in smaller countries. We thus have to be careful in our observations whether it is government attempts and the political system or the population size that explains aid flows.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Population bias & middle income bias***

As Trumbull and Wall, Burnside and Dollar, Berthélemy and Trichet and many others have discovered in their analyses, per capita aid is much higher for countries with small populations. Trumbull and Wall explain this phenomenon by the fact that “donors prefer to spend their limited ODA budgets where they can have their greatest impact per person.”<sup>45</sup> This phenomenon is called population bias. It assumes that effectiveness of aid increases with a declining population size and it results in a per capita aid distribution that is not necessarily based on need criteria as Berthélemy and Trichet show: “conversely, some of the smallest and least poor developing countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia receive high levels of assistance per capita.”<sup>46</sup> We will consequently pay particular attention to the population bias in chapter III, where we elaborate on the significance of German aid flows to Namibia. The middle-income bias describes “the tendency for aid to rise with per capita income, only falling after some relatively high threshold.”<sup>47</sup> Again, this bias can be explained by donors' interest in maximizing the effectiveness of their aid flows or by their desire to create export markets in potentially prosperous countries.

### ***Inertia, past investments and bandwagon effect***

Donors might not always put as much thought into their aid calculations as we assume: calculations can simply be based on previous decisions, a long period of support or based on other countries' choices. Hjertholm and White and McGillivray and White mention inertia, the inert behavior of bureaucratic structures in aid agencies, as an important factor in aid allocations. This means that donors do not react to particular changes in recipients' behavior or need; they just continue with their financial support because downward adjustments “may put a strain on donor-recipient relations and co-operation,” as Hjertholm and

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<sup>42</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 21. The US and Australia are exceptional supporters of democracy; they give a democracy bonus 5 and 7.5 times, respectively, higher than for the average donor.

<sup>43</sup> Alesina & Dollar, 20.

<sup>44</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 6.

<sup>45</sup> Trumbull & Wall, 876.

<sup>46</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 6.

<sup>47</sup> Marc McGillivray & Howard White, *Explanatory Studies of Aid Allocation Among Developing Countries: A Critical Survey. ISS Working Paper No. 148* (The Hague: The Institute of Social Studies, 1993), 16.

White conclude.<sup>48</sup> A slightly different but comparable type of inertia is the behavior of the Nordic countries described by Edgren. They also uncouple their aid flows from change in need or behavior and continue supporting “even the worst-performing African partner countries in view of all the material resources and ‘social capital’ that have been invested in the relationship.”<sup>49</sup> Hjertholm and White elucidate the meaning of the bandwagon effect, the tendency of donors to channel their aid to countries that receive aid from other donors.<sup>50</sup> This interrelationship of donor behavior is also stressed by Trumbull and Wall.<sup>51</sup>

### ***Cultural Similarity***

This is one of the criteria that spark off debates. Schraeder et al., limiting their research to the African continent, describe that resulting from colonial times “every African country is overlaid in varying degrees by the national culture of the former metropole, in such areas as educational structure, legal system, and, perhaps most important, national language.”<sup>52</sup> They regard this cultural similarity as an important bond between former colonizer and colony and take France and its generous support for *la francophonie* (greater speaking French community) as an example.<sup>53</sup> Lumsdaine, however, considers the concept of cultural ties a weak one because he cannot see any definite benefits of such a friendship.<sup>54</sup>

### ***Regional aspects***

Given that countries usually have regional ties of geographical, historical, or religious nature, there is stronger interest in trading and forming security alliances within these regional units as Schraeder et al. state. They conclude that these particular characteristics make it interesting for a donor to invest in the economy or the stability of the entire region, rather than just in one member of it. Odén et al. arrive at the same conclusion in their study on Southern Africa as Schraeder et al.<sup>55</sup>

### ***Moral obligation***

Moral obligation in aid allocations is scarce. They do not surface in the economic literature and Sogge, Opeskin and Gasper, who mention them as a potential motive of donors in their papers, do not make a strong case for their actual applicability in reality. Sogge refers to countries’ obligations to compensate for suffering and damage in a particular country as a forgotten motive. Opeskin approaches moral obligation

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<sup>48</sup> Hjertholm & White, 49.

<sup>49</sup> Edgren, 262.

<sup>50</sup> Hjertholm & White, 50.

<sup>51</sup> Trumbull & Wall, 877.

<sup>52</sup> Schraeder et al., 305.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 317.

<sup>54</sup> Lumsdaine, 82. The only benefits Lumsdaine considers viable are military bases, increased trade, votes in international forums or formal alliance. However based on the results of his research that “there were not important bases or alliances involved in most of the strongest colonial links”, he rejects this notion.

<sup>55</sup> Bertil Odén et al., *Namibia and external resources : the case of Swedish development assistance* (Uppsala : Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), 13.

more from a prescriptive perspective and talks in detail about the difficulties for corrective justice to become an actual driving factor.<sup>56</sup> The questions he poses as to who is to bear responsibility, who is entitled to claim compensation and how far one must go back in liquidating past wrongs<sup>57</sup> demonstrate that moral obligation is still not an established aid determinant. As Chapter VI shows, these questions still dominate the German political discourse and are likely to persist in the future. Gasper provides us with a spectrum of obligations that helps us visualize the different degrees of perceived obligations as well as the different kinds of obligations such as distributive as well as corrective obligations.<sup>58</sup> Gasper's conclusion that most donors view "aid as charity not obligation"<sup>59</sup> and the fact that he does not list an example of a donor for which an obligation exists to provide aid in the same manner as intra-nationally, are certainly indicators that obligations are an uncommon motive. Chapter VI, however, demonstrates that historical obligations can play a significant role when they are coupled with other variables, such as pressure.

This multitude of factors already hints at the difficulty to design a model that is comprehensive enough but accurate and manageable at the same time. Moreover, there are variables like cultural similarity that are difficult to quantify. Hjertholm confirms this difficulty by referring to Grilli and Riess's finding that the "declining role of colonial ties and (political) factors" is the only reason "for the generally better explanatory power of the adopted model over time."<sup>60</sup> Schraeder et al. overcome this obstacle by combining "the general empirical and the more regional-focused case study literatures [...] to offer a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis."<sup>61</sup> This approach seems to be considerate of the complexity of motives behind aid flows and the uniqueness for every country but it does also justice to economists' interests in overall trends. Before we get to the package of variables and the methodology that we will use in the Namibia case, we want to see whether the end of the cold war has provoked a different prioritization of variables or has even made some variables obsolete as many authors claim. This will be helpful in bundling the most relevant variables for Namibia together.

### **II.1.3 Cold war shift?**

Even though there is a large body of literature characterizing the cold war as an important turning point in aid policy,<sup>62</sup> McGillivray, Berthélemy and Tichit as well as Hjertholm and White all claim that the change was less drastic than heralded. McGillivray for instance denies that the end of the cold war has really paved

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<sup>56</sup> B.R. Opeskin, "The Moral Foundations of Foreign Aid," *World Development* 24(1) (1996): 26/27. Opeskin mentions for instance subjectivity in proving a claim for corrective justice on the recipient's part and worries about deleterious effects on international relations on the part of the donor as obstacles in the process.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>58</sup> D. Gasper, *Ethics and the conduct of international development aid : charity and obligation, Working papers series no. 297* (The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, 1999), 7/8.

<sup>59</sup> Gasper, 9.

<sup>60</sup> Hjertholm, 47.

<sup>61</sup> Schraeder et al., 267.

<sup>62</sup> McGillivray, *Modelling Aid Allocation*, 1.

the path for countries to now pursue freer developmental or humanitarian as opposed to political, strategic, commercial criteria.<sup>63</sup> As shown before, McGillivray asserted that humanitarian interests were often underestimated during the cold war due to flawed methodology.

Berthélemy and Tichit claim that donor interests have endured the end of the cold war but that they have just taken on a different form: “while in the 1980s it was based on politics and history, it is influenced more by donors’ pragmatic considerations about commercial interests.”<sup>64</sup> Though showing that political attitudes of the recipients played a lesser role after the cold war and recognition for good economic policies in the 1990s was stepped up compared to the 1980s, Berthélemy and Tichit still emphasize that the “major outcome of the end of the cold war has been the strong decline in aid commitments of bilateral donors.”<sup>65</sup>

Hjertholm and White accentuate that those changes that happened were not the ones that had been envisioned before. Whereas the magnitude of aid flows declined, governance took on a more important role and the number of recipients rose due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.<sup>66</sup> Summing up, we can say that the end of the cold war has resulted in less ideology, more good governance but no change in the proportion between need and donor interests.

## **II.2 Bundling aid**

“Assigning a single motivation to the aid regime would be absurd. Aid’s motives are always mixed.”<sup>67</sup> This remark by Sogge clarifies that after having been exposed to all the different motives, we now have to proceed to bundle them. We therefore take a look at different aggregates of motives that have been designed and tested by other scholars and we then adapt them to the particular time and circumstances in Namibia.

Many authors have recently devised typologies of the most prevalent determinants behind aid allocation. McGillivray claims that in most studies, “humanitarian, commercial, political and strategic motives are typically identified.”<sup>68</sup> Alesina and Dollar declare that it has generally been agreed upon that poverty, strategic interests, colonial history, trade, political institutions of the recipients play an important role.<sup>69</sup> Sogge distinguishes between strategic socio-political motives, mercantile motives and humanitarian and ethical motives and refers to short term vs. long-term considerations for each category.<sup>70</sup> Schraeder et al. elaborate on six different determinants for their case studies on the US, Japan, Sweden and France:

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<sup>63</sup> McGillivray, *Modelling Aid Allocation*, 1.

<sup>64</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 19.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>66</sup> Hjertholm & White, 14.

<sup>67</sup> Sogge, 41.

<sup>68</sup> McGillivray, *Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses of Aid Allocation*, 1.

<sup>69</sup> Alesina & White, 5.

<sup>70</sup> Sogge, 41/42.

humanitarian need, strategic importance, economic potential, cultural similarity, ideological stance and region.<sup>71</sup>

### *Chosen variables*

We base the Namibia case study primarily on the typology by Schraeder et al., complemented by one of Sogge's propositions. Schraeder et al.'s list not only provides the most exhaustive one but is also based on a carefully chosen methodology, bridging individual case studies and more general aid patterns.<sup>72</sup> Schraeder et al.'s first three variables, *humanitarian need*, *strategic importance* and *economic potential* are well established in the classic empirical foreign aid literature and must be included in our analysis. Since Schraeder only refers to military strategic importance, we complement this section by Sogge's *political/social understanding of strategic interest*.<sup>73</sup> Next to the economic potential of the country, the section on Namibia's economy in chapter V also reflects on *good economic policy*, thus incorporating the 'Washington consensus' variable.

Despite the fact that Germany's colonial rule ended in 1915 in SWA, we also include the variable *cultural similarity* because there is still a German community of 20,000 currently living in Namibia, practicing the German language and culture. The determinant *region* will also be tested because Namibia is part of a region that is economically and politically well connected and comprises countries that Germany has also strong ties with such as South Africa. Ideology is the only factor that we will not consider out of Schraeder et al.'s variable list because the bipolar landscape of this world is melting and as the previous sections on ideology and the changes after the cold war have shown, ideology has lost its significance in aid prioritization. Nevertheless, we include a factor that resembles ideology and falls under the relatively new 'good governance' category *democracy/civil and political liberties*. We thereby acknowledge the continued importance of a shared political conviction and pay tribute to the fact that Namibia has often been presented as the showcase African country in terms of a working democracy. All of the aforementioned variables, which have been selected out of the bulk of aid motives at disposal, are tested in chapter V.

Even though moral obligation in terms of corrective vs. distributive justice does not seem to play such a significant role in the literature on aid allocations, we esteem that they play the key role in our case study. The historical analysis in chapter IV builds the basis for an explanation of German aid allocations based on moral obligation and chapter VI analyzes to what degree moral obligation has really motivated German aid

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<sup>71</sup> Schraeder et al., 297.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 305. Schraeder et al. relied on the classic empirical foreign aid literature while also consulting the case study literature and findings of regional specialists to come up with the right mix of variables.

<sup>73</sup> Sogge, 41. Some short term motives concerning strategic socio-political motives that Sogge mentions are to "reward and keep a client 'on side' politically," to "defuse public protest and insurrection" and "to reward or retain constituencies" at home. In the longer run, Sogge lists countries' interest to "gain regular access and loyalty of leadership in the receiving country," and to "stabilize positive and stem adverse trends as well as to consolidate support at home."

policy. After having summarized all the variables that we will use in our case study, we now turn to the variables that will be excluded and to the rationale behind it.

### ***Omitted variables***

The ‘population as well as the middle income bias’ intuitively seem to apply in Namibia’s case, a country with a relatively small population of 1.83 million,<sup>74</sup> that is a high African scorer in GDP terms (see chapter V) and that assumes a particular aid recipient status as chapter III proves. However, chapter III also manifests that the ‘population bias’ is not a variable that is satisfactory in explaining the special aid status of Namibia and we therefore refrain from testing it again in chapter V. The ‘middle income bias’ is automatically confirmed or rejected by the testing of the variable ‘need’ so we do not have to consider it separately. The statistical analysis in chapter III demonstrates that aid flows in Namibia have not been equally distributed over the past years thus disqualifying inertia as criterion in this case. Since German foreign aid officially started in 1990 when Namibia acquired independence and Germany lost its former colony as early as in 1915, it is difficult to reason that German aid flows are based on prior investments in the country. In addition, given that Germany has been Namibia’s first donor over the past years, the bandwagon effect does not apply in our case either.

In sum, the individualized bundle of motives for Namibia comprises (1) humanitarian need, (2) the strategic importance of Namibia in a military and socio-political sense, (3) economic potential and economic policy (4) the country’s democratic nature and civil as well as political liberties, (5) cultural similarity, (6) the regional predilection of a donor, and (7) moral obligation.

## **II.3 Methodology – testing Namibia’s aid bundle**

“Discussions of what motives actually drive aid frequently get clouded by talk about what *should* drive it,”<sup>75</sup> as Sogge phrases it. A good methodology is therefore a key requirement in discerning a country’s real motives behind aid. Most of the studies discussed in the previous sections relied on regression analysis to dissect aid motives. Since this paper is a case study and not an attempt to detect Germany’s general aid behavior, we cannot use regression analysis for our purpose. Furthermore, the viability of regression analysis remains questionable to a certain degree. Even though the regression analyses of other authors have facilitated the discovery of the right variable mix for Namibia, the different and conflicting results that authors have arrived at do not market the quality of regression analysis in variable testing. Regression analysis has been perfected over time but there are still many problems unsolved.<sup>76</sup> Hjertholm and White for instance lament that “the complex interplay of determinants is rarely sufficiently appreciated and

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<sup>74</sup> *EIU Country Profile 2003. Namibia*, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003), 4.

<sup>75</sup> Sogge, 42.

accounted for,”<sup>77</sup> and Alesina and Dollar claim “there is virtually no solid evidence on the relative importance of different variables.”<sup>78</sup> This study does not express the relative importance of factors in percentage terms, rather it provides the reader with a solid understanding of the interplay of determinants and of which motives play a prioritized role in German aid policy with respect to Namibia.

Another problem posed by regression analysis or quantitative research in general is the difficulty of finding reliable proxies for recipient-specific variables such as colonial history or moral obligation. This study demonstrates that a more profound historical analysis is indispensable. The historical analysis in chapter IV makes clear that a summary of the historical episode in one variable would have led to an oversimplification. This would have prevented us from filtering out that the most important motive in German aid policy is a product of its common past with Namibia. The study also emphasizes that some motives like moral obligation are not necessarily measurable, visible phenomena. Moral obligation rather emerges through political discourse, action, the attitude and knowledge of the population and the activism of outside forces. Consequently, this study analyzes political discourse and action and bases its judgment on the findings of a survey that has been conducted with different groups in German society. Given the nature of this study and the problems associated with quantitative measures, the study employs quantitative measures only for a few variables and predominantly relies on qualitative data.

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<sup>76</sup> For an extensive criticism on regression analyses in the aid allocation literature, see McGillivray and White.

<sup>77</sup> Hjertholm & White, 51.

<sup>78</sup> Alesina & Dollar, 5.

### III. Statistical analysis of German aid flows to Namibia

“The worldwide highest per capita aid from Germany to Namibia is no coincidence,” announced German President Roman Herzog in 1998.<sup>79</sup> Many German politicians like Herzog have proudly stated in their speeches that Germany supports Namibia exceptionally, that Namibia is the biggest recipient of German aid in per capita terms and that Germany has acquired the rank of the greatest donor in Namibia. In order to see if these statements are purely political rhetoric or can be validated by evidence, we analyze the Official Development Aid (ODA) that has flown from Germany to Namibia over the 16-year period, 1985 – 2001. For this purpose, statistics were mainly retrieved from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development<sup>80</sup> with the exception of data on the population, which was drawn from the World Development Indicators<sup>81</sup>. The data available for our analysis is restricted to the 16-year period. This might be explained by the fact that data prior to 1985 was difficult to capture for political reasons. Before Namibia was on the road to independence, which it acquired in 1990, ODA to Namibia was criticized by the international community as an official legitimization of the South African occupation of Namibia. Since there was no Namibian representation, all ODA had to be channeled through the South African government. Consequently, the countries that did not refrain from giving ODA to Namibia during this time period were most-likely not interested in having these official aid flows documented in any official records. Due to the fact that ODA remained limited during the pre-independence period and countries like Germany relied more heavily on unofficial channels like NGOs, the period from 1985-2001 and in particular from 1990-2001 will be more telling anyhow.

We use different measures of aid flows to test the significance of the German-Namibian aid relationship. We scrutinize absolute and per capita aid as well as aid in relative terms and finish by examining Germany’s donor position. For each measure, we reflect on Namibia’s position and discuss the measure’s credibility and shortcomings.

#### III.1 ODA in absolute terms

We start our analysis with absolute numbers because they are helpful in getting a first orientation of where a country ranks in terms of aid magnitude as a recipient of German ODA.

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<sup>79</sup> “Deutschland. Bundespräsident Herzog in Namibia und Südafrika,” *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 42726, March 3, 1998.

<sup>80</sup> *Aid statistics OECD* (accessed September 15, 2003); available from [http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en\\_2649\\_34447\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34447_1_1_1_1_1_1,00.html).

For this study aid disbursements rather than commitments were chosen. Even though commitments reflect the actual amount that donors promised and consequently represent donor intent, disbursements take into consideration aid provided in reaction to disasters or unplanned events that were not budgeted in advance. For future research, it would be interesting to do a comparative study between disbursements and commitments.

<sup>81</sup> *World Development Indicators* (accessed September 15, 2003); available from [http://publications.worldbank.org/ecommerce/catalog/product?item\\_id=631625](http://publications.worldbank.org/ecommerce/catalog/product?item_id=631625).

<b>ODA in absolute terms (in USD million), averaged over the years 1985-2001 -The top 30 recipients of German ODA in Africa-</b>			
<b>Mean in \$</b>		<b>Mean in \$</b>	
1 Egypt	222.82	16 South Africa	31.28
2 Zambia	63.57	17 Rwanda	29.94
3 Tanzania	61.39	18 Benin	29.37
4 Ethiopia	58.24	19 Cote d'Ivoire	28.01
5 Kenya	53.28	20 Uganda	27.89
6 Mozambique	52.07	21 Senegal	25.23
7 Cameroon	39.75	22 Niger	24.99
8 Ghana	39.37	23 Namibia	21.73
9 Congo	38.92	24 Madagascar	21.50
10 Morocco	38.25	25 Guinea	19.74
11 Mali	37.14	26 Togo	19.56
12 Burkina Faso	34.54	27 Chad	16.62
13 Zimbabwe	34.19	28 Somalia	16.59
14 Sudan	33.12	29 Burundi	16.00
15 Malawi	32.89	30 Mauritania	15.64

overall ranking greatly but highlights the change of aid patterns after Namibia's independence, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter IV. Another interesting fact we can retrieve from the tables is that another German colony, Tanzania, ranks really high as Germany's third aid recipient over the entire period and 5<sup>th</sup> recipient over the shorter time period.

However, absolute numbers only reveal one part of the story. First of all, they do not take into account the population size at all, a factor that governments usually do consider. Secondly, they tend to magnify the impact that humanitarian emergencies, economic crisis and natural disasters have on aid flows. More precisely, in the case of a crisis when all other donors increase their ODA and nothing changes in relative terms, a ranking of German aid in absolute terms might mislead us to believe that Germany's contribution has increased by significant amounts over time and that Germany has acquired a more important donor position. We will therefore turn to two different measures that attempt to control for these misperceptions: per capita ODA and ODA in relative terms.

### **III.2 ODA in per capita terms**

Even though governments might not prioritize aid according to precisely calculated per capita aid flows, the measure of 'per capita aid' pays tribute to the significant factor 'population size' in aid determinations. By

Looking at the table on ODA in absolute terms, averaged over the years 1985-2001, we can assert that Namibia's ranking in average terms is not extraordinary. It receives about 25% more aid than the median country of 16.6 USD million but out of 54 countries on the African continent, it only scores 23<sup>rd</sup> when we compare the averaged amount of aid flows from Germany over the 16 year period and it scores 20<sup>th</sup> when we average the aid flows over the post-independence period. Comparing the two different periods, we can observe an increase in averaged aid of almost 30%. This does not change Namibia's

<b>ODA in absolute terms (in USD million), averaged over the years 1990-2001 -The top 30 recipients of German ODA in Africa</b>			
<b>Mean in \$</b>		<b>Mean in \$</b>	
1 Egypt	253.83	16 Rwanda	32.66
2 Zambia	76.00	17 South Africa	31.28
3 Ethiopia	68.91	18 Benin	30.72
4 Mozambique	66.13	19 Morocco	29.18
5 Tanzania	65.47	20 Namibia	28.94
6 Kenya	55.33	21 Senegal	28.34
7 Ghana	44.88	22 Niger	25.19
8 Cameroon	43.35	23 Sudan	24.06
9 Mali	39.04	24 Madagascar	23.27
10 Congo	37.78	25 Chad	19.24
11 Burkina Faso	36.63	26 Guinea	18.88
12 Malawi	35.69	27 Togo	18.38
13 Uganda	33.53	28 Burundi	16.15
14 Zimbabwe	33.43	29 Nigeria	15.64
15 Cote d'Ivoire	33.43	30 Angola	13.45

<b>ODA in per capita terms,</b> Averaged over the years 1985-2001 <b>- The top 10 countries of German ODA in Africa-</b> Mean in \$	
1 Cape Verde	22.65
2 Namibia	13.84
3 Botswana	10.11
4 Mauritania	7.44
5 Zambia	7.31
6 Seychelles	6.53
7 Benin	5.76
8 Lesotho	5.57
9 Togo	5.27
10 Gambia	4.90

averaging out the per capita aid that African countries received from Germany, Namibia comes in second after Cape Verde, which runs counter to the statements by German politicians that Namibia is Germany's greatest per-capita recipient. Can we thus refute these statements? We could argue in favor of the German politicians that this mean expresses an average that smoothes out very low levels of per capita aid before the 1990s, when it was difficult for Namibia to have access to funds due to political reasons. However, even if we only consider the period from 1990 – 2001, Namibia's per capita mean changes from \$13.84 to \$18.13 but Namibia still ranks second.

On top of this, the table on population size depicts that all of these high scoring countries (marked in green) have fairly low population sizes, meaning that countries with a smaller population seem to benefit proportionally more than very populous countries.<sup>82</sup> Although countries such as Benin and Zambia do not follow this pattern, it can be concluded that the relatively high per capita aid in Namibia's case might result from the low population size, the population bias that we introduced in chapter II. Thus, any argument

<b>Ranking of countries according to their population size (in thousands)</b> Averaged over the years 1985-2001			
1 St. Helena	6.07	17 Congo, Rep.	2484.59
2 Seychelles	73.06	18 Liberia	2689.35
3 Sao Tome	128.12	19 CAR	3191.18
4 Cape Verde	383.59	20 Eritrea	3784.89
5 Equatorial Guinea	389.88	21 Togo	3887.59
6 Comoros	484.12	22 Sierra Leone	4382.24
7 Djibouti	529.41	23 Libya	4806.76
8 Swaziland	864.29	24 Benin	5193.59
9 Gambia	1026.29	25 Burundi	5877.82
10 Guinea Bissau	1043.82	26 Guinea	6253.29
11 Mauritius	1104.88	27 Chad	6294.06
12 Gabon	1107.00	28 Rwanda	7193.12
13 Botswana	1367.71	29 Somalia	7741.06
14 Namibia	1491.76	30 Senegal	8029.65
15 Lesotho	1858.88	31 Tunisia	8575.71
16 Mauritania	2201.71	32 Zambia	8636.82

highlighting the special aid relationship between Germany and Namibia based solely on per capita aid flows might lead to false conclusions. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that not all the countries were rewarded for their low population size and considering the fact that per capita flows to Namibia are more than four times higher than the average per capita aid of 3.43, we cannot dismiss the German-Namibian aid relations as insignificant.


The trend of per capita ODA<sup>83</sup> over the 16 year time period reveals another interesting aspect of German aid flows to Namibia. The two peaks when per capita aid increased coincided with official visits of chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Roman Herzog the year before. The 'special relationship' between the two countries was stressed and eventually confirmed with an increase in per capita aid for the next year.

<sup>82</sup> This phenomenon, the small country bias, has been studied and confirmed by many authors such as Dowling and Hiemenz (1985), Isenman (1976) and Karunaratne (1980) (cited in Hjertholm & White, 49).

<sup>83</sup> Which is fairly similar to the trend of absolute aid flows, given that the population size has not changed significantly over time.

**Decisive moments in German/Namibian relations?**

- September 14-15, 1995 - Chancellor Kohl visits Namibia
- March 4-8, 1998 – President Herzog visits Namibia
- September 1, 2001- Foreign minister Fischer participates in the world conference against the racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia



Foreign minister Joschka Fischer participated in the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which was hosted in September 2001 in Durban, South Africa, where he made an attempt to apologize in very general terms for all colonial wrongdoings committed by the German government. Even if Fischer avoided addressing the Namibian ‘genocide’ at the conference explicitly, as discussed in chapter VI, the simple mentioning of colonial wrongdoings might have pushed up per capita aid in the year 2002 again.

**III.3 ODA in relative terms**

We now turn to a measure that includes population size considerations and eliminates the population bias effect. ODA in relative terms expresses how much of the Total ODA that Namibia received originated from Germany. This number controls for external shocks that might cause *all* countries to increase their development aid. The table on ODA in relative terms shows that Namibia has by far and consistently over time received most of Germany’s ODA. This means that no other country has received more German aid in proportion to its total ODA than Namibia. Also noteworthy is that two other German colonies can also be found in the top 10 recipient countries of relative ODA: Togo and Cameroon.

<b>ODA in relative terms</b> (German ODA as a % of total ODA) Averaged over the years 1985-2001 -The top ten countries of German ODA in Africa-	
1 Namibia	19%
2 Benin	14%
3 Botswana	13%
4 Togo	13%
5 Libya	13%
6 Congo	11%
7 Lesotho	10%
8 Zimbabwe	10%
9 Cameroon	10%
10 Zambia	10%

<b>Ranking of the five greatest recipients</b> of German ODA in Africa over the 16 year time period.																	
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Namibia	2	6	2	1	10	20	20	5	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	2	2
Benin	3	1	3	3	12	14	13	4	5	4	2	25	17	4	8	9	12
Botswana	5	8	9	17	18	7	2	3	6	9	10	16	29	7	3	1	1
Togo	7	13	4	9	4	5	6	1	4	8	31	11	24	15	6	4	3
Libya	1	33	12	31	48	47	46	21	2	5	4	7	3	1	1	10	4

The ranking of the five greatest recipients of German aid in relative terms discloses that Namibia's high position on the scale from 1 (highest) to 54 (lowest) has been impressively steady over time. The lowest it ever ranks is 20, which is still above the bottom rank of the other four top aid recipients. No other country out of the top 5 even comes close to occupying as many first and second ranks as Namibia. Germany must have had a strong interest in maintaining a good and long-lasting aid relationship with Namibia. In conclusion, based on Namibia's steady and high amounts of ODA in relative terms, we can consider Germany's aid flows to Namibia as very special.

### **III.4 Germany as the greatest donor**

Even though ODA in relative terms already controls for a great deal of misperceptions, we still need to establish that Germany has a special donor status when compared to other donors. In case Namibia receives the same share of ODA from two or three other major donors, German-Namibian donor relations certainly do not lose their significance but they do lose their exceptional status. Conversely, Germany might be the most important donor in another country, even though its share of ODA might be relatively small in comparison with Namibia due to the presence of many donors. Unfortunately, due to data limitations – data is only available for the 2000-2001 period - only the most recent top ten donor charts of gross ODA for all the African countries can serve as basis for our analysis and they moreover do not differentiate between multilateral and bilateral donors.<sup>84</sup> Since Germany is not the first donor in any of the 54 countries, we will direct our attention to the four countries in which Germany is the second donor.

<b>Top 10 Donors of gross ODA (2000-2001 average) (USD million)</b>							
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>ODA in \$</b>	<b>Botswana</b>	<b>ODA in \$</b>	<b>Libya</b>	<b>ODA in \$</b>	<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>ODA in \$</b>
1 EC	39	1 Japan	10.3	1 Italy	5.3	1 France	125
2 Germany	22	2 Germany	6.1	2 Germany	1.5	2 Germany	49
3 Sweden	15	3 EC	5.6	3 France	1.1	3 SAF & ESAF (IMF)	44
4 United States	12	4 United Kingdom	3.6	4 UNTA	1	4 EC	44
5 Finland	7	5 Norway	3.2	5 UNHCR	0.9	5 IDA	37
6 Norway	5	6 Arab Agencies	2.9	6 Japan	0.2	6 Austria	31
7 Japan	4	7 Netherlands	1.5	7 Spain	0.1	7 Japan	29
8 United Kingdom	4	8 UNHCR	1.2	8 Austria	0.1	8 Netherlands	29
9 Netherlands	4	9 United States	1.2	9 Netherlands	0.1	9 Belgium	21
10Luxembourg	4	10UNTA	1.1	10UNDP	0	10Italy	14

The table on the top 10 donors of gross ODA shows that Germany is the second donor (the donor contributing the second greatest amount of aid) in two of its former colonies, Namibia and Cameroon as well as in two other countries, Botswana and Libya. By examining the first donor (the donor contributing the most aid) as well as the financial gap between first and second donor, we can come to the conclusion that Germany plays the most important role in Namibia. First of all, Germany is one of the main

contributors to the EU, the first donor of Namibia, and secondly, Germany would come in first if we were to compare only bilateral donors. In Botswana, Libya and Cameroon, another bilateral donor scores higher and for Libya and Cameroon, aid flows are significantly greater from the first than from the second donor.

Drawing on all the findings of the different analyses, we can conclude that German politicians might exaggerate slightly in stressing the special aid relationship that Germany maintains with Namibia by referring to per capita aid flows.<sup>85</sup> However, characterizing Germany as an exceptional donor for Namibia is certainly not an overstatement when we consider in addition the relative aid position and Germany's extraordinary donor status in Namibia. Having established the quite unique aid relationship between Namibia and Germany, we will proceed to analyze what drives the German government to establish and maintain such a special relationship in the following chapters.

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<sup>84</sup> A time series would have been more informative because it would have displayed the variations in donor relationships.

<sup>85</sup> First of all Cape Verde is Germany's greatest per capita ODA recipient and secondly, the population bias tends to distort the results.

## IV. Historical Analysis

The German Embassy in Namibia states on its website that “based on the special close relations existing between the Federal Republic of Germany and Namibia, Germany is the country’s most important development aid partner.”<sup>86</sup> In order to understand Germany’s exceptional donor position with respect to Namibia, we have to examine the nature of the Namibian-German relationship and reveal how this relationship has evolved over time. Using the past to discover the present aid motives is not only an intuitive concept, but is gradually being institutionalized by economists as an indispensable tool in estimating aid allocation criteria.<sup>87</sup> Following Trumbull and Wall’s argumentation<sup>88</sup>, variables like the ‘colonial past’ very often build the foundation for an aid relationship. Trumbull and Wall lament that these variables are often disregarded, their impact on other aid relevant variables such as economic, cultural and political ties is ignored and scholars draw false conclusions. Consequently, a historical flashback to colonial times, to the West as well as East German ‘Namibia policy’ after WWII and the after-independence relationship between the two countries will ensure that these effects do not go unnoticed.

### IV.1 German colonial rule in Namibia

#### IV.1.1 Brief outline

Characterized by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*<sup>89</sup>, as the ‘dark chapter of German colonial history’,<sup>90</sup> Germany’s rule in Namibia from 1884 – 1914 is certainly not an episode in German history that merits any glorification. This section on German colonial rule is divided into three phases, following historian Gesine Krüger’s structure in her book *Coming to terms with war & historical consciousness*: (1) 1884-1890 – Germany’s first hesitant steps, (2) 1893-1907 - Germany’s colonial policy radicalizes, (3) 1907-1914 – South West gains foothold for a limited period.

#### 1. 1884 – 1890 – Germany’s first hesitant steps

Germany’s colonial rule started with an ambitious merchant from Bremen, Adold Lüderitz, who envisioned a prosperous future on this new territory.<sup>91</sup> Lüderitz bought a large strip of land along the South West

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<sup>86</sup> *Development Cooperation*, (accessed August 22, 03); available from <http://german-embassy-windhoek.org/html/development.htm>.

<sup>87</sup> See for instance Alberto & Alesina (1998); Trumbull & Wall.

<sup>88</sup> Trumbull Wall, 876/877.

<sup>89</sup> The *FAZ* is one of Germany’s most respectable and internationally renowned newspapers.

<sup>90</sup> “That’s the dark chapter of German colonial history, disproving the cliché that the Germans were “hard but fair” (Reiner Schauer, “Der Wind hat Sand über die Tränen geweht. Namibia und seine Beziehungen zu Deutschland,” *FAZ*, no. 34, February 10, 2000, R12.)

<sup>91</sup> The numerous German missionaries who lived in South West Africa since the beginning of the 19th century could be characterized as the pioneers of colonialism because they had not only supported German rule but also actively

African coast from the Nama chief Frederick, an acquisition that has been largely identified as fraudulent.<sup>92</sup> In 1884, Lüderitz acquired the tutelage of the chancellor of the German empire, Bismarck, for his possessions in SWA and on August 7, 1884 the German flag was officially hoisted. Critics who regarded SWA as a ‘deserted sand box’<sup>93</sup> and had only limited understanding for Lüderitz’s inquisitive journey to South West proved to be right in the end: Lüderitz went bankrupt, the Colonial society took over and for the first time, Bismarck sent a commissioner to protect German interests. Bismarck was not supportive of any German colonial rule and even asserted that during his tenure there would be no German colony.<sup>94</sup> However, whether due to the overall German Zeitgeist as the *SZ*<sup>95</sup> claims<sup>96</sup> or due to worries about German prestige, he gave in. The fact that the Herero, one of the larger tribes who signed the protective treaties with Germany, terminated some of these contracts in 1888 and even expelled the commissioner Heinrich Göring demonstrates that German colonial rule was still in a phase of infancy.<sup>97</sup>

## 2. 1893 – 1907- Germany’s colonial policy radicalizes

This time is primarily characterized by Theodor Leutwein’s ‘divide et impera’ policy and Trotha’s annihilation policy. Leutwein was the captain of South West from 1894 – 1898 and the governor from 1898 – 1905 and his ‘divide et impera’ policy played a very important role in enlarging German territory. Leutwein intentioned and succeeded in producing conflicts, accentuating contrasts among the tribes and reinforcing the power positions of the Herero and Nama chiefs.<sup>98</sup> In this way and with the cooperation of the Catholic Rhenish mission, the Germans managed to enlarge and restructure their territory. The previously deserted territory slowly received more attention and attracted a number of new settlers.

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sought military protection from the Prussian German as well as the British government as early as 1868. Still, the German flag predominantly followed economic interests and not the requests of the missionaries. (Helbig, 3).

<sup>92</sup> First of all, from a legal perspective, Lüderitz only acquired the right to use the land but not a title to possess the land because this was unheard of in tribal law. Secondly, alcoholics were deliberately used to persuade the Nama chief Frederick and thirdly, Lüderitz demarcated the region in Geographic miles instead of the English mile, which enlarged the region by five times. (Henning Melber, “Ein Bremer Kaufmann und die Folgen. Die Landgeschäfte des Adolf Lüderitz und die Proklamation „Deutsch-Südwestafrikas“. Eine ideologiekritische Dokumentation, “ *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika* 6 (1984): 6).

<sup>93</sup> Thomas Morlang, “Teure und öde Sandbüchse. Die Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1884 bis 1914,“ *FAZ*, no. 119, May 25, 2002, 8.

<sup>94</sup> Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein. Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 – 1907* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 30.

Bismarck was worried about the foreign policy, administrative and financial strains that a formal acquisition of territory would have posed for the state. (Udo Kaulich, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Südwestafrika (1884-1914). Eine Gesamtdarstellung*, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003).)

<sup>95</sup> The *SZ* is another German newspaper of good reputation whose coverage predominantly extends to the Southern part of Germany as the title suggests.

<sup>96</sup> Bernd Lüderitz, “Reduktion auf das Prinzip der Macht,” *SZ*, no. 181, August 8, 1998, 11.

<sup>97</sup> The fact that the German post was only staffed with two German government officials and badly equipped as the *FAZ* reports, support the fact that the colonial rule only existed on paper for the first years and was not well established. (Morlang, 8)

<sup>98</sup> The chief Samuel Maherero for instance received a yearly salary of 2000 Mark in exchange for the Herero land that was left at the disposal of the Germans. (Annelie Haspel, *Kontinuität oder Wandel? Das besondere Verhältnis von Deutschen zu Namibia* (Hamburg: Kovac, 1996), 106.)

Probably envisioning new economic opportunities and interested in participating in the imperialist race for new land, the government now took over the administration of the colony that had been previously governed by the Colonial Society.

The Herero and other tribes<sup>99</sup> had to bear the consequences of the awakened colonial spirit. Not only did they have to cope with the robbery of their own land but also with new plagues: cattle disease, malaria, grasshopper plague and a period of drought deprived the Herero of their assets, most importantly their cattle and forced them into a status of dependency. In addition, German settlers, inspired by the colonial office's plan to establish a meat export sector, made it common practice to simply take away cattle from the indigenous population without justification.<sup>100</sup> One of the side effects of this land and cattle robbery and the aforementioned natural plagues was that the indigenous population was forced into wage labor as a means of survival, which created even more dependency.

The expansion of the German settlement and the deprivation of the African tribes did not remain unanswered: in 1904 first the Herero and later during the year, the Nama uprising began - a big surprise to the Germans who answered in return with what the magazine *Der Spiegel*<sup>101</sup> calls the 'Colonial Final Solution.'<sup>102</sup> The German answer, General von Trotha's annihilation policy decimated the Herero by approximately 80% from c. 80,000 down to 15,130 and the Nama by 50% from originally 20,000 to 9,781.<sup>103</sup> The Herero were officially defeated at the battle of Waterberg, whereas the Nama continued fighting until March 1907 when the German General Staff declared the end of Martial Law.

### **3. 1907 – 1914 - South West gains foothold for a limited period**

The economic development of the colony progressed and was propelled by the profitable breeding of Karakul sheep (often referred to as the black diamond) and the discovery and exploitation of diamonds and copper in 1912. This led to the first positive balance of trade in South West since the German government was established there. The Germans enlarged the infrastructure, more Germans were enticed to find their fortune in the colony and from 1908 on, the white population increased by more than 1000 a year.<sup>104</sup> Despite the new economic opportunities, further subsidies from Germany were imperative, leading Kaulich

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<sup>99</sup> The Ovambo can be more or less left out of consideration here because they remained outside of the German sphere of influence throughout the era of German colonial rule" (Horst Drechsler, *Aufstände in Südwest-Afrika. Der Kampf der Herero und Nama 1904 bis 1907 gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1984): 7.)

<sup>100</sup> "Jeder nimmt zehn Schwarze mit ins Grab," *Der Spiegel* 45, November 1, 1976, 140. By 1904, the entire assets of the German settlers were estimated to amount to 20 million DM, of which the cattle by itself made up 14 million.

<sup>101</sup> *Der Spiegel* is a sophisticated leftist magazine known in Germany for its investigative nature.

<sup>102</sup> "Jeder nimmt zehn Schwarze mit ins Grab," *Der Spiegel* 45, November 1, 1976, 143. The 'Final Solution' (Endlösung) was coined during WWII and refers to the Holocaust of the Jews. The magazine obviously wanted to draw the parallel between the two historical episodes. A parallel that is also accentuated by the 'Informationsdienst,' (Helbig, 3) who takes stock of the uprisings in the following way: (1) In Namibia, the Germans initiated the first genocide, (2) They erected concentration camps, (3) 30 years before Hitler, 'Herrenmenschum' was practiced, (4) The indigenous population was pushed into an oppressive system that could be transformed smoothly by the South African white government into its apartheid system.

<sup>103</sup> Drechsler, 139/140. As we will see later, these numbers are still highly debated.

as well as Brenke to conclude that the colonial South West was not paying off in any way for the Germans.<sup>105</sup> Before the dream of an economically prosperous colony could materialize, the brief German colonial episode came to an end. After WWI, Germany lost all its colonies; it gave up all claims to the colonies in the treaty of Versailles. The South-African Union took over power and the number of Germans shrank from 13.000 in 1913 to c. 8000.

Fraud, suppression, economic exploitation and colonial wars are certainly not phenomena that neither were only inherent in German colonial rule nor were they considered outrageous at the height of imperialism. It was a time where colonial rule was referred to as the ‘White Man’s Burden’ by Rudyard Kipling in 1899, a mission that would spread ‘civilization’ and be beneficial to the indigenous. Why then can we consider this episode as unique and relevant for the repertoire of motives that Germany is driven by? The following section will elaborate on what made German colonial rule stand out and what might warrant the allegation that moral obligation plays a dominant role in German aid policy vis-à-vis Namibia.

#### **IV.1.2 The Herero and Nama uprising 1904-1907 – a closer view**

Out of the entire colonial period, the Herero and Nama uprising from 1904-1907 and the consequent ‘enslaving’ of the surviving Herero and other tribes merit particular attention because they illustrate best the connection between history and aid motives. This section throws more light on the causes, the course and the consequences of the uprising, thereby focusing predominantly on the Herero uprising. The Herero uprising not only started the colonial war but it was also answered by German warfare tactics that are now largely contested. They have stirred up a debate on whether the Germans actually initiated a genocide - a relatively young but very important debate that is closely related to the Namibian aid puzzle.

##### **IV.1.2.1 Causes of the uprising**

The uprisings were not a spontaneous reaction to a recently passed law or one particular injustice; many causes had accumulated over time that triggered off both uprisings. As mentioned before, natural plagues destroyed a large part of the Herero’s cattle. In 1897, the majority of the herds were destroyed within less than half a year. Vaccinations were available but had to be purchased with pastureland from the Germans. Further factors that Haspel and Drechsler identify as the main causes that brought about the Herero uprising

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<sup>104</sup> Morlang, 8.

<sup>105</sup> Kaulich, 432 & 567 & Gabriele Brenke, “Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt,” in: *Aus Politik & Zeitgeschichte* 8 (1990): 25.

Kaulich states that due to the contra productive and contradictory German policy during the first two decennia of colonial rule, the colony demanded state support in practically all areas after the turn of the century. Independence of the colony or an advantage of any sort were not feasible. The colony was neither a promising export market for German products nor an important delivery country of needed imports. Brenke supports Kaulich’s observation by stressing that even though important capital groups like the German Colonial Society for South West Africa, the

were (1) the legal vacuum in which the Herero found themselves<sup>106</sup>, (2) unfair business practices that forced the Herero to take out credits that had to be redeemed with their cattle, (3) the construction of a railroad line through the area where the Herero settled<sup>107</sup>, (4) the incidences of rape by Germans of the Herero women and (5) fear and humiliation.<sup>108</sup>

Even though the Nama tribes did not initially join the Herero rebellion, they had similar causes.<sup>109</sup> They faced the uncertainty about the borders of their land, land robbery, the legal vacuum and they were vulnerable to German mistreatment. The ultimate motivation, however, for the Nama must have been to strike before the Germans had a chance to.<sup>110</sup> Considering that there was a growing German hostility vis-à-vis all indigenous tribes in Namibia and an escalating fear of falling victim to future rebellions, this move was well anticipated by the Nama.

#### **IV.1.2.2 The uprising**

Even though Krüger and Drechsler<sup>111</sup> allege that it was not an ad-hoc but a carefully planned action by the Herero, the uprising on January 12, 1904 came certainly as a big surprise for the mission and Leutwein.<sup>112</sup> More than 100 German settlers and soldiers were initially killed in this surprise attack that was followed by a war of desperation on the side of the Herero. Although the Germans were at a disadvantage concerning climate and orientation in the territory, the Herero had no machine guns at their disposal, were badly equipped and inferior in terms of manpower. Whereas Herero decided to spare women, children and even some of the missionaries, the Germans took little mercy. Lothar von Trotha's order not to show any consideration for children and women<sup>113</sup> was indeed moderated later on by the appeal to his soldiers not to shoot women and children dead but to only scare them away. However, the cruelty behind this order

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Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, the Metallbank and the Metallurgische Gesellschaft A.G. established themselves in South West Africa, the economic importance of the colony remained insignificant.

<sup>106</sup> There were no laws protecting the Herero against arbitrary action on the German side, which ranged from 'paternal care' such as whipping to murder. These actions were hardly ever brought up in court, light sentences were passed for the Germans and African witnesses were often not esteemed credible. (Drechsler, 52).

<sup>107</sup> As Drechsler points out that: "The Otavigesellschaft, the company which was financing the undertaking, demanded that the Herero cede not only the land directly required for the construction of the railway, but also a 20-kilometre-wide strip on either side of the track plus all water rights within this area." (Drechsler, 52) On top of these concessions, the Herero had to anticipate another wave of German settlers through the new railroad connection.

<sup>108</sup> Haspel, 110.

<sup>109</sup> The Nama uprising is not as well covered in literature as the Herero. Probably because the Herero stroke first, they suffered a lot more casualties than the Nama and their uprising culminated into the 'genocide.'

<sup>110</sup> Helgard Patemann, *Lernbuch Namibia. Ein Lese- und Arbeitsbuch*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1985) 118/119.

<sup>111</sup> Krüger, 49 and Drechsler, 61.

<sup>112</sup> Leutwein was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by General Lothar von Trotha on 11 June 1904. Both pursued the same aims but opted for different means. Whereas Leutwein showed concern for the future of the colony and was worried about the people and cattle, the country's most productive force, Trotha was primarily a soldier, solely pursuing his goal of quelling the uprisings by any means. (Drechsler, 75/76)

<sup>113</sup> Von Trotha ordered the genocide of the Herero: "The Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns. Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or

remains since the only place where women and children could flee to was the Omaheke desert where they faced death of thirst and starvation.<sup>114</sup> Even if the allegedly decisive battle at the Waterberg mid August 1904 was more a demonstration of pitiful rather than glorious German war command, von Trotha managed to encircle tens of thousands of Herero whose only escape route led them into the desert and therefore directly into death. Consequently, the annihilation of the Herero was not executed at the battle of Waterberg but “was due to the militarily unjustifiable measures taken by von Trotha after the fighting in the Waterberg” as Drechsler describes it.<sup>115</sup> In October 1904 von Trotha proclaimed that every Herero had to leave the country: the waterless desert Omaheke was sealed off by a 250 km long cordon,<sup>116</sup> fleeing Herero were persecuted and all the water holes were blocked.

The Herero who remained in the country were expropriated and put into concentration camps in which they were condemned to heavy labor such as the construction of the railroad.<sup>117</sup> Women and children were not spared. Herero who were esteemed dangerous were also deported to other German colonies such as Togo and Cameroon with the goal of ‘social engineering,’<sup>118</sup> i.e. to break their determination and bring them to heel. This policy had grave consequences for the indigenous tribes. The same destiny awaited the Nama tribes who fought against German troops till March 31, 1907 with a clever guerilla tactic that helped the 1000 to 2000 fighters to defend themselves against the 15.000 person strong German troops.<sup>119</sup>

#### **IV.1.2.3 Consequences**

Even though the testimonies of the British government’s blue book, which is often cited as a proof for the exceptionally cruel warfare of the Germans<sup>120</sup>, have probably embroidered some of the war scenes and the initial uprising by the Herero was also a brutal intervention<sup>121</sup>, the behavior of the German troops, settlers and even missionaries is difficult to excuse. While 2000 Germans lost their lives in the war, thousands of indigenous people died during the fights, in the concentration camps or during the deportation to other German colonies on the African continent.<sup>122</sup> No exact numbers are known but most scholars have

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unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women and children. I shall drive them back to their people – otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them.” (Drechsler, 85)

<sup>114</sup> Gunter Spraul, “Der “Völkermord” an den Herero. Untersuchungen zu einer neuen Kontinuitätsthese,” *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 12 (1988): 724.

<sup>115</sup> Drechsler, 79.

<sup>116</sup> Haspel, 111.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 114

<sup>118</sup> Krüger, 24.

<sup>119</sup> Patemann, 120.

<sup>120</sup> “The German authorities replied with a “White Book” published in 1919 that accused the “Blue Book” of being propaganda, full of falsehoods, and mainly designed to prevent the return of her colonies to Germany. (Kurt Jonassohn & Karin Solveig Björnson, *Genocide and gross human rights violations in comparative perspective* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 74.)

<sup>121</sup> Spraul, 722. However, it should not be forgotten that some historical sources testify that the pogrom mood of the German settlers was partly caused by the cruelty of the Herero.

<sup>122</sup> “Aufräumen, aufhängen, niederknallen...,” *Der Spiegel* 13, March 25, 1985, 141.

estimated, as previously shown, that c. 80% of the Herero, 50% of the Nama and 1/3 of the Bergdamara who were mistaken for the Herero by the Germans paid with their lives.<sup>123</sup>

Although von Trotha was relieved from office in 1905 and the Rhenish mission received the permission to create refugee camps, the majority of the indigenous people found death rather than refuge in these camps. These camps were predominantly collection points for forced labor convicts as Krüger states.<sup>124</sup> The files in the central state archive in Potsdam on the mortality of so called internment camps from October 1904 till March 1904 support Zeller's conclusion that the South West African concentration camps were not normal internment camps.<sup>125</sup> The files show that c. 45.2% of the prisoners died<sup>126</sup> and Zeller's photo documents portray humiliating situations.<sup>127</sup> The deportation policy took a heavy toll as well: for instance, the insufficient rations caused 50 of the 120 South West Africans that were stationed in Togo to die.<sup>128</sup>

Deputy governor Tecklenburg expressed the general attitude of this time: "The more the Herero tribe feels the consequences of the uprising, the less they will strive for repeating another one."<sup>129</sup> Not even the Rhenish Mission succeeded in giving a more humane touch to the spirit of this time and in easing the consequences of the uprising. The mission offered the German government its services to restore peace, advocated for the eradication of the death penalty, tried to stop von Trotha's confiscation policy and also took care of the prisoners in the concentration camps.<sup>130</sup> Nevertheless, its attempts were very diplomatic and cautious and ultimately failed.

The war officially ended March 31, 1907; yet, the last prisoners were released a year later, only to be subject to a new rigid and all encompassing control system.<sup>131</sup> The Germans obliged the entire population of SWA to wear tin marks at all times and to carry passports when leaving their district.<sup>132</sup> Additionally, South West Africans without any employment could be recruited for forced labor and further edicts

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<sup>123</sup> Haspel, 114; Drechsler, 139/40; Helmut Bley, *Namibia under German Rule*, Studien zur afrikanischen Geschichte 5 (Hamburg: LIT, 1996), 150/151.

<sup>124</sup> Krüger, 25.

<sup>125</sup> Joachim Zeller, "Wie Vieh wurden hunderte zu Tode getrieben und wie Vieh begraben." *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 49, no 3 (2001): 242.

<sup>126</sup> Cited in Drechsler, 213.

<sup>127</sup> Zeller gives the reader an impression of the conditions that were prevalent in the concentration camps: he describes that in the concentration camp in Swakopmund 30-50 people had to share one room, regardless of age and gender; every day they had to work hard till they collapsed, food was below minimal nutritional standard, clothing was insufficient and during bad times approximately 30 people died per day due to disastrous hygienic conditions and raging sicknesses. (Zeller, 227.) Women were sometimes harnessed like oxen to pull heavy loads and in the case of exhaustion they were beaten up. (Zeller, 235.)

<sup>128</sup> Krüger, 138. Unfortunately, books and articles usually gave examples rather than a complete overview in numbers.

<sup>129</sup> Zeller, 128.

<sup>130</sup> Krüger, 146

<sup>131</sup> Zimmerer. *Rassenkrieg gegen die Herero*.

<sup>132</sup> Krüger, 142. The edicts were in particular harsh for the Herero, not only in a material sense. Sundermeier characterizes the seizure of land as a loss of socio-political identity of the community and that the deprivation of cattle actually meant deprivation of spiritual identity (Cited in Manfred O. Hinz, *Realitäten, Traumata, Perspektiven (1904-2004): Der Hererokrieg – Hundert Jahre danach*. Internationale Konferenz Bremen 18. bis 21. November 2004. Anmerkungen zum Hintergrund, (Windhoek: 2003), 10.) Cattle played an important role in the spiritual life of the Herero; cattle connects the Herero to their ancestors and without the cattle, this connection is interrupted.

determined that no African was allowed to own land or cattle.<sup>133</sup> Additional control mechanisms ranged from medical research such as checking the health status, predominantly of women, often using force, to the search of private houses, the imposition of post censorship and even the regulation of family names.<sup>134</sup> When successful pregnancies among Herero women declined, the women were accused of organizing a ‘birth strike’ – sexually transmitted diseases and the bad social conditions were not considered as sufficient reasons.<sup>135</sup> Concluding with Bley’s words, the Herero faced a situation that “denied them even the minimum personal, social, or economic self-determination.”<sup>136</sup>

#### **IV.1.2.4 Genocide or not – does it really matter?**

Only in recent times has the German answer to the Herero rebellion been viewed in a critical light and many debates concerning the legitimacy of this answer have surfaced. Horst Drechsler, an East German historian, raised for the first time the question in his dissertation in 1964 whether the war against the Herero was a genocide. His argumentation was supported by Western scholars such as the historian Helmut Bley. For a country that has been stigmatized by its Nazi history and is still trying hard to come to terms with the genocide it initiated, this investigation is not just an academic exercise but an uncomfortable and sensitive inquiry as the defensive reactions of some scholars such as Fröschle portray: “the war against the indigenous people from 1904 to 1908 was a normal colonial war, not a genocide. In case the German government pays reparations for this historical event, then, as a matter of consistency, all colonial powers of this world would have to pay reparations for colonial wars dating back a long time.”<sup>137</sup>

Before Drechsler’s research, the academic discourse circled around the atrocities experienced by the German soldiers. Spraul cites several encyclopedia which present the colonial history in the perspective of the courageous German soldiers: in Gebhardt’s ‘*Guide of German History*’ honor was paid to the achievement of German soldiers to defeat the major forces of the rebellions; Daten-Ploetz characterized the German endeavors as pacification efforts; the ‘*Guide of German Military History*’ mentions that in order to quell the uprising that was about to endanger the reputation of the German empire and the white man, it was necessary to employ effective military means.<sup>138</sup> Drechsler’s research represents the beginning of a new academic discourse that has engaged historians, political scientists as well as other scholars. Drechsler has not only stimulated debate but also controversy and numerous arguments have been made to either defend or defeat the ‘genocide’ thesis.

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<sup>133</sup> Basil Davidson, “Völkermord in der Wüste. Deutsche Südwestafrikapolitik 1904-1907,” *Pogrom* 6, no. 38 (1975): 39.

<sup>134</sup> Krüger, 142.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>136</sup> Bley, 151.

<sup>137</sup> Hartmut Fröschle, “Ein normaler Kolonialkrieg, kein Genozid,” *FAZ*, no. 262, November 11, 2002, 11.

<sup>138</sup> Spraul, 714.

One of the common arguments used to negate the genocide thesis argues that the word ‘annihilation’ had a different connotation during the time of the German empire, referring to a total military defeat and not to genocide.<sup>139</sup> On a similar note, historian Klaus Lorenz introduces the term ‘Omaheke-legend,’ to express his conviction that the dying of many thousand Herero in the Omaheke desert did not constitute a genocide but rather an example of colonial warfare of the European colonial power during the age of imperialism.<sup>140</sup> Nordbruch argues against a genocide by referring to the fact that Trotha had not met his war goals at the battle of Waterberg and that Trotha’s proclamation also represented a protective mechanism against the unpredictable behavior of the Herero.<sup>141</sup> Huber counters against the ‘genocide-thesis’ that no definite numbers of the Herero who died or disappeared are known.<sup>142</sup>

Since there are a lot of uncertainties surrounding this time period, in particular concerning the number of surviving Herero, Brigitte Lau, characterized by Hinz as the most prominent representative of relativization, warns against a mystification of this time period.<sup>143</sup> Relativists further argue according to Hinz that the ‘annihilation order’ was modified to exclude women and therefore not intended to ‘annihilate.’ They feel that the literature in favor of a genocide is produced by Marxists or thesis-hungry young - and therefore not trustworthy – academics and that the Herero had consciously chosen their own decay and had not been chased by the German troops into the Omaheke as Schneider-Waterberg mentions.<sup>144</sup> In a less radical way, Spraul questions whether the indifference and acquiescence of the German government at that time suffice to justify the introduction of the criminalizing notion “genocide” and whether the term ‘genocide’ would not be inflated in this way.<sup>145</sup>

Drechsler, Bley, Marx, Zimmerer, Möhle, Krüger, Bauman and many others would certainly dismiss Spraul’s concern as unwarranted. Even international scholars such as Jonassohn and Solveig Björnson who have been engaged in comparative genocide analysis leave no doubt that the Herero war entered as the first genocide of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>146</sup> They remark cynically “[...] the reunited Germany has made the denial of the Holocaust a criminal offence, while the denial of the genocide in SWA seems to remain official policy.”<sup>147</sup> On the national level, Marx criticizes Frösche’s argument that historians had attested the different meaning of ‘annihilation’ in the colonial context, stressing that it is widely acknowledged in the

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<sup>139</sup> See for instance Sudbolt (1975), Poewe (1985) who have been characterized as the most prominent ‘denial-authors’ by Jonassohn and Solveig Björnson, 78-79.

<sup>140</sup> Jochen Bölsche, “Die Peitsche des Bändigers,” *Der Spiegel* 3, January 12, 2004.

<sup>141</sup> Claus Nordbruch, *Der Hereroaufstand von 1904* (Stegen am Ammersee: Kurt Vowinkel Verlag, 2002): 115-117.

<sup>142</sup> Hansjörg Huber, “Keine eindeutige Verbrecherrolle,” *SZ*, no. 299, December 29, 1995, 9. According to Huber, 40.000 Herero, the offspring of those Herero who successfully crossed the desert into Botswana, returned to Namibia from Botswana in 1992, demonstrating that many Herero survived the way through the desert.

<sup>143</sup> Lau warns historians to jump to foregone conclusions. She remarks critically the lack of exact and reliable information, relativizes the meaning of the ‘annihilation’ order and argues that there was no way that the desert could have been completely sealed off. (Brigitte Lau, “Uncertain certainties: The Herero-German war of 1904,” in *History and Historiography. 4 essays in reprint*, ed. Annemarie Heywood (Windhoek: Discourse/MSORP, 1995), 43-49.)

<sup>144</sup> Hinz, 11.

<sup>145</sup> Spraul, 726.

<sup>146</sup> Jonassohn & Solveig Björnson, 72.

field of historical research that a genocide had taken place.<sup>148</sup> Zimmerer argues that von Trotha's order to exterminate all the Herero and the fact that the army followed his order unequivocally constitutes two central elements that define a genocide: the intention and the execution.<sup>149</sup> Möhle agrees with Zimmerer and stresses in an *ARD Tagesschau* interview on January 12, 2004 that "this was genocide because there was a *written* order by von Trotha, calling for the annihilation of the Herero tribe." Krüger furthermore argues that the colonial war was not waged out of military but political reasons: according to military motives the war should have ended after Waterberg but the Germans were obviously reluctant to pardon the enemy and no honor code seemed to apply.<sup>150</sup>

Zimmerer questions the viability of contesting the genocide on the basis of numbers as Huber and Lau attempt: "Scientific definitions as well as the UN convention on genocide<sup>151</sup> agree that a genocide is not constituted by the achievement of the *corpus delicti* but by the beginning of an action that has the intention to destroy 'a national, ethnic, racial or religious group' partially or completely."<sup>152</sup> The Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman would subscribe to this line of argument. He reasons that the 'usual' genocide is rarely intentioned to be a complete annihilation of a societal group. Aim and object of the organized violence is to destroy the relative autonomy and the capacity to live of the targeted group.<sup>153</sup>

It is probably realistic to assume that these two camps will not reach an agreement in the nearby future. However, will a definite answer to this dispute really make a difference? An article in the *SZ* concludes that this is not even of utmost importance because "the historic debate changes nothing about the catastrophic consequences of the genocide or colonial war for the Herero."<sup>154</sup> However, whereas the classification as 'genocide' might not make the past undone, it could possibly affect the future. Besides doing justice to the victims and their families, the term 'genocide' might help the Herero to exert more pressure on the German government, which will do anything to acquit itself of this reputation, in particular given its past. We can thus draw two conclusions from this debate. First of all, while the applicability of the term 'genocide' might be debatable, the injustice and unnecessary cruelty on the part of the German is

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<sup>147</sup> Jonassohn & Solweig Björnson, 78.

<sup>148</sup> Christoph Marx, "Kolonialapologetisches Sperrfeuer," *FAZ*, no. 273, November 23, 2002, 42.

<sup>149</sup> Jürgen Zimmerer, "Krieg, KZ und Völkermord in Südwestafrika. Der erste deutsche Genozid," in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Der Kolonialkrieg (1904-1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen*, ed. Jürgen Zimmerer & Joachim Zeller (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2003), 53.

<sup>150</sup> Krüger, 65.

<sup>151</sup> *Article 2, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocides* (accessed February 20, 2004); available from [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p\\_genoci.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm): In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

<sup>152</sup> Zimmerer, "Rassenkrieg gegen die Herero."

<sup>153</sup> Krüger, 67-68.

<sup>154</sup> Arne Perras, "Vernichtender Feldzug. Kaiserliche Truppen in Deutsch-Südwest gingen erbarmungslos gegen die Herero vor," *SZ*, no. 198, August 29, 2001, 10.

certainly not. As well be elaborated in chapter VI, the German governments has acknowledged the wrongdoings and has made efforts to compensate them. Secondly, the entire debate nevertheless matters because a public dialogue on the sensitive topic ‘genocide’ could serve as a reminder for the German government to renew its commitments in the future.

## **IV.2 Germany’s ‘Namibia policy’ from a historical perspective**

Even though Germany had to renounce its rights and claims as a colonial power after WWI, the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the former German Democratic Republic engaged in a very active Namibia policy that did not cease with the German reunification and Namibia’s independence in 1990. This section illuminates how West Germany’s worry about the well-being of the Namibia Germans and how their prosperous economic ties with South Africa have again strained its relationship with Namibia. This controversial behavior not only demonstrates Germany’s primary aid motives at that time but it might also explain why moral obligation could possibly be the motor behind aid today. East Germany’s mission of transforming Namibia into a communist role model never materialized but the strong cultural ties between the two countries might still be meaningful in terms of current aid motives. Lastly, Germany’s ‘Namibia-policy’ after independence and reunification gives us an insight into whether these changes have also produced new motives.

### **IV.2.1 West Germany’s relations with Namibia & its controversies**

West Germany went through various stages in its foreign relations with Namibia that differed in prioritization and controversy.

#### ***Namibia in the shadow of South Africa***

In the post war period after WWII, Germany maintained no official direct relations with Namibia and even indirect relations were of no major importance.<sup>155</sup> As Kühl and Brenke state, economic interests prevailed during that time and Germany was interested in maintaining balanced and friendly bilateral relations with South Africa for economic reasons, in order to fight against communism and to push for the sole recognition of West Germany as the German representative on the continent. Germany acknowledged South Africa’s responsibility for Namibia<sup>156</sup>, which by that time had proceeded to annex Namibia and to grant parliamentary representation to the white population.

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<sup>155</sup> Germany financed the Higher German Private School in Windhoek with approximately 3-4 million every year and UNHCR and UNDP received financial aid from Germany as well but this amounted merely to a couple of 100.000 over the course of the years according to Kühl (Holger Kühl. “Der Rechtliche Rahmen der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Deutschlands zu Namibia,” (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 1992), 137.)

<sup>156</sup> The cultural treaty that Germany and South Africa signed expressly included South West Africa (Bundesgesetzblatt, Jg. 1964, Teil II, 16).

Germany was not unaffected by the decolonization move in the 60s and officially joined the UN Security Council in condemning the South African apartheid regime in 1963. However, state secretary Willi Brandt's remark in 1968 demonstrates where German priorities lay: "trade and politics should not be coupled unless there is necessity. Germany as an export reliant country will certainly foster economic ties even with politically controversial states"<sup>157</sup> This attitude started to become particularly controversial when UN resolution 276 was passed that strictly prohibited any dealings with the South African government over matters concerning Namibia and that therefore demanded of Germany to uncouple trade and politics.<sup>158</sup>

***New changes: Germany's admission to the UN & new accents in the Namibia policy***

UN membership modified Germany's Namibia policy. With the beginning of UN membership in 1973, Germany dealt with Namibia more intensively again. The journal *Pogrom* assumes that this renewed commitment can mainly be explained by the pressure that the UN exerted on Germany to resume relations with Namibia.<sup>159</sup> When Germany was elected in 1977 as one of the non-permanent members of the SC council, it was very eager to organize the 'Namibia initiative' together with France, Great Britain, Canada and the US. Known as the Western Contact Group, these countries launched a joint diplomatic effort to facilitate an internationally acceptable transition to independence. Whether Germany's primary motive was really to bring about 'Namibia's independence' or merely to secure the future of the German-speaking minority in Namibia as well as its economic interests in Southern Africa as Brenke suggests,<sup>160</sup> remains debatable. Despite UN membership and new accents in the Namibia policy, Germany's 'Namibia policy' continued to be criticized up to the year of Namibia's independence because of the politicized development aid that Germany provided through unofficial channels to the former colony.

***Controversy around German development aid during the South-African occupation***

There was no question that official development aid out of state channels was declared taboo before South West had gained independence<sup>161</sup> because this would have contested all the resolutions and decisions passed by the UN as well as a advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 of the International Court of Justice

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<sup>157</sup> Cited in Kühl, 135.

<sup>158</sup> The Spiegel cites one violation of this UN resolution: despite the economic embargo, the 'Frankfurter uranium company,' subsidized by Bonn, secured a 15% option on the stocks of the Rössing mine. ("Jeder nimmt zehn Schwarze mit ins Grab," *Der Spiegel* 45, November 1, 1976, 145.) This accusation was contested by parliamentary Dr. Holz (SPD), alleging that the German government was not trading uranium and that an offer had been made by the South African government to deliver uranium from South African mines but this offer had been directed to the private sector. (Davidson, 42.)

<sup>159</sup> It reports for instance that in August 1973, a UN delegation visited Germany and in response, the German Secretary of State commented in a communiqué that Germany would pay special attention to Namibia due to multiple historical reasons. (Siegfried Groth, "Namibia – quo vadis? Die Deutschen sind mitverantwortlich," *pogrom* 6, no. 38 (1975): 41.)

<sup>160</sup> Brenke, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt," 27.

<sup>161</sup> Haspel, 197.

(ICJ).<sup>162</sup> Nevertheless, the fact that the German government still supported German schools in South Africa and Namibia with up to 10 Million DM every year<sup>163</sup> and sport teams<sup>164</sup> questions the German government's true intentions to abstain from all official aid. Even more telling, a great deal of development aid from the German department of development (BMZ) reached the former colony through NGOs. Even though the department declared in 1978 that only church groups would benefit from these exceptional government grants, political foundations, mostly from the right wing parties such as the Hans-Seidel foundation, obtained state funding as well, in particular after the government change in 1982.<sup>165</sup> Brenke says that 74 million flowed to Namibia from 1978 to 1985 for various aims such as the education of refugees, social political education, scholarships for non-whites to attend universities, research activities, the building of farm schools and small clinics etc.<sup>166</sup> And the magazine *Vereinte Nationen* talks about a 100 million DM program in 1987 that was devised for the following four years and that did not explicitly exclude the cooperation with Namibian half-state agencies.<sup>167</sup>

Despite all this aid, a generous gesture at first sight, Germany was accused of inaction and lack of solidarity with the population of South West and lack of support of the 'real representative' of the Namibian population, the SWAPO.<sup>168</sup> It was criticized for being the only country holding on to its consulate and for being hesitant to revoke the cultural treaty with South Africa that included Namibia as

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<sup>162</sup> *Advisory Opinion of the ICJ of 21 June 1971* (accessed January 22, 2003); available from [www.un.org](http://www.un.org): The Court was of opinion, by 11 votes to 4, (2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.

<sup>163</sup> In Namibia, the following German schools or departments were financially supported: die deutsche Höhere Privatschule Windhoek, die deutsche Privatschule Karibib, die deutschen Staatsschulen Windhoek, Swakopmund, Otjiwarongo and Tsumeb as well as the German departments at the schools of Grootfontein, Lüderitzbucht, Okahandja, Omaruru und Walfischbucht. The Deutsche Höhere Privatschule Windhoek with yearly 4 million DM and the Privatschule Karibib with c. 500.000 yearly received most of the support. (*Im Brennpunkt: Namibia und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika, 1987), 155-156.)

<sup>164</sup> Sport contacts with West Germany exceeded by far any other international sport exchange with Namibia. (*Im Brennpunkt*, 148)

<sup>165</sup> Henning Melber, "Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention: Hilfsmaßnahmen für ein neokoloniales Namibia," *Peripherie* 7, no. 25/26 (1987): 62. In 1985, the following NGOs benefited from a 10.28 million state grant: Catholic development agency (Katholische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe), Protestant development agency (Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe), Friedrich-Naumann Foundation (foundation of the liberal party FDP), Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Otto-Benecke-Foundation, umbrella organization of German craftsmanship (Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks), Hanns-Seidel Foundation (foundation of the conservative Christian social party CSU), German sports federation (Deutscher Sportbund), Johanniter Unfallhilfe, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (foundation of the Christian democratic party CDU) (Melber, "Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention," 64/65.)

<sup>166</sup> Brenke, *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Namibia-Konflikt*, 155.

<sup>167</sup> Henning Melber, "Bonns Namibia-Politik. Resolution 435, Kontaktgruppe und besondere Verantwortung: eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme", *Vereinte Nationen* 35 (1987): 49.

<sup>168</sup> The SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization, was founded, along with a number of other groups, as a liberation organization to fight for Namibian independence from the South African oppressor. After the International Court of Justice declared South African occupation illegal in 1971, the UN gave recognition to SWAPO as the sole representative for the Namibian people. When Namibia gained its independence in 1990, SWAPO became the dominant political party, headed by Sam Nujoma who was elected as Namibia's first and thus far only President.

well.<sup>169</sup> Why did German generosity turn into such a controversy and what did the Germans aim to achieve with their aid?

Haspel suggests that the aid to the NGOs, official or not, clearly violated the UN resolutions and the opinion that was issued by the ICJ because this sort of aid was released after arrangements with the illegal South African administration.<sup>170</sup> She proposes that German development aid functioned as a cover up for South African policy, legitimizing South African proceedings under the pretext of development aid.<sup>171</sup> She even calls German development aid an act of suppression.<sup>172</sup> Winfried Baßmann laments in *Im Brennpunkt* that the German subsidies for the different German schools have contributed to the inequality and oppression in the cultural as well as political area.<sup>173</sup> An article in *Der Spiegel* in 1978 demonstrated that despite generous subsidies from Germany, the German school in Windhoek for instance only admitted white students and was considered by the black students as an epitome of German cultural imperialism.<sup>174</sup>

Germany's motivations for continuing to provide aid despite international criticism are manifold. The magazine *Vereinte Nationen* reports that the government was apparently willing to spend a great deal of money on its historical responsibility.<sup>175</sup> Haspel explains this phenomenon by the immense influence that the South West lobby exerted on German politics at that time. The South West lobby was a consortium of conservative German interest groups<sup>176</sup>, worried about the social and economic privileges of the German clientele in Namibia and about the 'Marxist threats' they saw coming with the rise of the SWAPO.<sup>177</sup>

German politicians certainly presented different motivations for development aid to Namibia. There are delegates such as Rumpf (development expert of the FDP) for instance who did not see any violation of UN resolutions in the provision of aid through non-governmental levels, regardless of whether the responsible organization upheld friendly, unfriendly or no relationship with the interim government.<sup>178</sup> Secretary of State Genscher and chancellor Kohl both stated in 1986 that development aid for Namibia through the non-governmental level is necessary and appropriate.<sup>179</sup> The secretary of development, Klein argued in an interview with *Der Spiegel* in 1988 that it was better to help the people in Namibia right now instead of

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<sup>169</sup> Melber, "Bonns Namibia-Politik," 47.

<sup>170</sup> Haspel, 198.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 206.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 207. Haspel criticizes that although officially declared as partners in the development cooperation, the black majority of the population is degraded to minor aid recipients in a colonial way.

<sup>173</sup> *Im Brennpunkt*, 158.

<sup>174</sup> „Afrika-Politik. Genschers Schwenk," *Der Spiegel* 46, November 13, 1978, 36.

<sup>175</sup> Melber, "Bonns Namibia-Politik," 49.

<sup>176</sup> Members of this lobby were among others The German-South African Agency (DSAG), the Africa Development Fund (an affiliate of the DSAG), the German SWA/Namibia Association (an affiliate of the DSAG), the "Christians for partnership instead of violence", "The Protestant Auxiliary Association in Germany", the German Namibia Foundation, the Development Fund Africa, the International Agency for Human Rights and the German Africa Foundation. (Haspel, 190).

<sup>177</sup> Haspel, 200.

<sup>178</sup> Melber, "Bonns Namibia-Politik," 48.

<sup>179</sup> Melber, "Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention," 60.

punishing them for being illegally occupied by South Africa.<sup>180</sup> Klein's predecessor Warnke was convinced that pre-independence development aid was justified because Namibia itself was incapable of solving its own problems and the indigenous population needed to be prepared for the independence period.<sup>181</sup> Theo Waigel, a CSU politician legitimized official aid in an interview with the press service of the Namibia Information Office in Bonn in 1985 by stressing the economic benefits for the Namibians as well as his concerns about the ability of the SWAPO to govern the country.<sup>182</sup>

Some German politicians even went a step further and frankly supported the current South African interim government in Namibia. Those people felt that even a German solo in Windhoek was justified and that the interim government should be supported so that Namibian independence could be prepared for properly.<sup>183</sup> The economic interests of the German industry lobby certainly did not prove irrelevant in this matter either. *The Spiegel* writes in 1978<sup>184</sup> that the West German industry would certainly be hurt by economic sanctions against South Africa: not only was South Africa a favorite investment paradise for German investors but also an important source of resources, beyond all chrome.

Namibia obtained its independence in 1990 – whether it was in spite of or because of German intervention remains a debatable question. German aid flows appear to have catered more for Germany's own economic interests and its concern for the Namibia Germans than for the well-being and independence strive of the Namibians themselves. The SWAPO was particularly disappointed with Germany's 'Namibia policy' and condemned it in harsh words,<sup>185</sup> creating another moral obligation for future Germany to make up for.

After the independence plan was introduced, the German government's stance was to adhere to strict neutrality and to support Namibia financially and technically. Political leaders from the competing parties were invited to come to Bonn, Bonn contributed a generous 60 Million DM to cover the costs of UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) and the German Parliament confirmed during the spring of 1989 the special responsibility that Germany has for Namibia.<sup>186</sup> Harald Ganns, first German ambassador to Namibia, characterizes the decision of the German Parliament in 1989 to call on the German government to establish and maintain very close and trustful relationships with Namibia,<sup>187</sup> as revolutionary: "Where else

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<sup>180</sup> "Hilfe bedarf gewisser Voraussetzungen," *Der Spiegel* 1, January 4, 1988, 35.

<sup>181</sup> "Entwicklungshilfe sofort oder später?" *Internationales Afrikaforum* 4/1986, 22. Jahrgang, 387.

<sup>182</sup> "The question is posed whether one helps to set up a healthy economy right now or one waits till a non free system in which the well-known socialist mismanagement reigns, asks for millions in Bonn in order to prevent people dying from hunger." (Melber, "Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention," 59)

<sup>183</sup> Melber, "Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention," 60.

<sup>184</sup> "Genscher in der Namibia-Klemme," *Der Spiegel* 40, October 2, 1978, 16.

<sup>185</sup> SWAPO's leader Sam Nujamo was not particularly pleased about Germany's 'Namibia policy'. He declared two days before his meeting with Genscher in 1989 that his party had not fought against the South-African occupation in order to be subject now to a 'neo-colonial role of the German Republic.' (Brenke, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt," 28.)

<sup>186</sup> Brenke, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt," 31.

<sup>187</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, *Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Auswärtigen Ausschusses* (3. Ausschuß), 11. Wahlperiode, 1989, Drucksache 11/4205, January 30, 1989.

can we find that the German Parliament has dealt so extensively with a single country in Sub-Saharan Africa?”<sup>188</sup>

#### IV.2.2 East Germany’s relations with Namibia – on the way to a communist future?

Less known but equally active was East Germany in formulating its own ‘Namibia policy’. Whereas West Germany’s relations were predominantly marked by tensions with the SWAPO before Namibia’s independence, the East German Socialist Party SED and the SWAPO stayed in regular contact and official visits were common. Ganns asserts that the SWAPO had chosen for a ‘marriage based on love’ with East Germany and for a ‘marriage based on necessity’ with West Germany.<sup>189</sup> Schleicher distinguishes three phases in the cooperation between SWA and East Germany.<sup>190</sup>

During the first phase from 1960-77 political cooperation grew, East Germany offered apprenticeships for young South West Africans and sent paramilitary and military supplies to SWA. The second phase from 1977/78 – 1981/81 was coined by a strong official relationship between the two parties SED and SWAPO, by increased humanitarian support and new military supplies as well as medical staff and teachers from East Germany for the SWAPO camps. On October 13, 1978, an official representation of the SWAPO was opened up in East Berlin<sup>191</sup> and East Germany declared its solidarity with the liberation movement of the SWAPO.<sup>192</sup> Reassured by the strong party cooperation, SWAPO leader Nujoma asked SED chef Honecker to accommodate, feed and clothe children from SWAPO refugee camps.<sup>193</sup> In 1979, the first 80 Namibian children arrived with their teachers and the repatriation lists from 1990 contain names of almost 420 children that immigrated to East Germany in the 80s.<sup>194</sup> The first goal was to care for them till they were well fed and healthy. The children then learned the German language, went to school and were prepared for their envisioned future role as the leading elite in a liberated Namibia.<sup>195</sup> Even though many of those children returned disoriented and torn between two cultures, and the communist future they were promised never came true, these children helped strengthen the ties between the reunified Germany and Namibia.

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<sup>188</sup> Harald Ganns, “Der Anfang war schwer... Die ersten Jahre der deutschen diplomatischen Präsenz in Namibia,” in *Vom Schutzgebiet bis Namibia 2000*, ed. Hess, Klaus A. & Klaus J. Becker (Göttingen, Windhoek: Hess, 2002), 86.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>190</sup> Hans-Georg Schleicher, “DDR-Solidarität mit dem Befreiungskampf. Ein besonderes Kapitel deutsch-namibischer Beziehungen,” in *Vom Schutzgebiet bis Namibia 2000*, ed. Hess, Klaus A. & Klaus J. Becker (Göttingen, Windhoek: Hess, 2002), 94/95.

<sup>191</sup> “Namibia. Swapo. Südafrika. Deutsche Demokratische Republik. Swapo-Vertretung in der DDR eröffnet; Rede Nujomas zur Lage,” *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 22171, November 8, 1978.

<sup>192</sup> February 18, 1979, Erich Honecker, East Germany’s head of state, met with Nujoma, assuring him that East Germany would continue to advocate for Namibia’s independence and that it would strengthen its support for the SWAPO. (“Deutsche Demokratische Republik,” *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 22468, March 27, 1979)

<sup>193</sup> Constance Kenna, ed., *Die „DDR-Kinder“ von Namibia. Heimkehrer in ein fremdes Land*, (Göttingen, Windhoek: Klaus Hess Verlag, 1999), 18.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 26

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

The third phase from 1982-89/90 was characterized by East Germany's political assistance and consultancy in strategic questions and in preparing for the first elections and Namibia's independence. Given this close relationship between the two countries, it is no coincidence, as Schleicher states, that President Nujoma asked for a reunion with his old friends from East Germany when he was visiting Germany in 1996. Nujoma characterized this evening as the highlight of his visit in Germany,<sup>196</sup> demonstrating once more the intensity of relations between East Germany and SWA.

#### IV.2.3 Namibia and a reunified Germany

With Namibia's independence and Germany's reunification, Germany resumed direct and official relations with Namibia and two development cooperation treaties were negotiated that guaranteed Namibia German support on the scale of 100 Million DM.<sup>197</sup> In this way, Germany became Namibia's greatest bilateral donor and as the previous chapter has shown, it has largely maintained this position.

In 1995, there could have potentially been a turning point because, as the *FAZ* reports, Namibia was drifting away from democratic concepts towards a 'one-party' state. Whereas Denmark closed its embassy and wanted to cancel its development aid by 1997 and Switzerland also considered closing its general consulate the following year, Germany as Namibia's greatest donor continued and the envisioned cuts were prevented by a timely visit of Kohl to Namibia.<sup>198</sup> Germany proved surprisingly persistent in its intention to support Namibia financially. President Roman Herzog confirmed this attitude on an official visit to Namibia and South Africa when he told the Namibian government: "The German Parliament commissioned the German government to extent bilateral relations with Namibia substantially. We will pursue this goal even in fiscally difficult times [...]."<sup>199</sup> Aid flows even continued in 2002 when the Namibian government decided against the continuation of decentralization efforts, Germany's prioritization in the development cooperation.<sup>200</sup>

The current German government just renewed its commitment towards Namibia on the occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> commemoration of the Herero and Nama uprising and the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the decision of the German Parliament to remain a close partner of Namibia.<sup>201</sup> It reconfirmed that Namibia had not only received more than half a billion Euro after independence from Germany through public and private aid

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<sup>196</sup> Schleicher, 99.

<sup>197</sup> Kühl, 139.

<sup>198</sup> Robert von Lucius, "Rostflecken auf der weißen Weste. Namibia ist kein Modell mehr für Demokratie in Afrika," *FAZ*, no. 228, September 30, 1995, 14.

<sup>199</sup> "Deutschland. Bundespräsident Herzog in Namibia und Südafrika," *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 42726, March 3, 1998.

<sup>200</sup> Sabine Horvath & Birgit Strube-Edelmann, *Die ,besonderen' Beziehungen zwischen Namibia und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ausarbeitung des wissenschaftlichen Dienstes des Deutschen Bundestages* (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2004), 6.

<sup>201</sup> *Erklärung des Auswärtigen Amtes zum 100. Jahrestag des Beginns der Herero- und der Nama-Aufstände, Pressemitteilung 11.1.2004* (accessed January 12, 2000); available from [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe\\_archiv?archiv\\_id=5242](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=5242).

channels but that the German-Namibian relations have continued to represent a focal point in Germany's foreign and development policy.

This chapter has situated Germany's position as Namibia's greatest donor in the historical context. It has depicted how the relationship between the two countries has developed over time from a short but bloody colonial intermezzo to a controversial period of German acceptance and potentially even support of the South African occupying power to the recent phase of independence and continued ODA.

Germany's aid flows have been very consistent over time and partly controversial. They have largely followed economic interests as well as concerns for the Namibia Germans in the case of West Germany and cultural as well as ideological interests in East Germany's case. Concerning aid motives after independence, the dive into Namibia and Germany's common history has provided us with a very valuable insight: there are enough historical episodes from the colonial regime to the contested aid regime before independence that justify moral obligation being the major propeller behind foreign aid. In the next chapters we scrutinize whether the historical analysis has guided us into the right direction in terms of aid motives.

## V. Key pieces of the foreign aid puzzle

As Becker in the magazine, *Information Center 3<sup>rd</sup> World*, states: “Namibia is not just any country. 74 years after the end of colonial rule in German SWA, a wide ranging network between Germans and their favorite colony exists from family ties to economic relations to ‘friendly’ contacts to German politicians and organizations.”<sup>202</sup> There is thus a great potential for various motives that might determine the magnitude of aid flows to Namibia. However, this chapter will demonstrate that many of the often mentioned factors matter only marginally in the Germany Namibia case. In order to prove the hypothesis that cultural similarity, strategic importance in socio-political terms and above all, moral obligation are the main factors driving German aid to Namibia, we now test the types of motives that have been drawn from studies by Sogge and Schraeder et al. and examine to what degree they are applicable in the Germany/Namibia case. The following factors are included: (1) humanitarian need, (2) the strategic importance of Namibia in a military and socio-political sense, (3) economic potential and economic policy (4) the country’s democratic nature and civil as well as political liberties, (5) cultural similarity, (6) the regional predilection of a donor.

### V.1 Humanitarian need

When asked why developing countries receive aid, many people intuitively answer that the ‘need’ of these countries is greatest or that they are financially supported so that they can meet future development needs. In the survey that was conducted with German high school students, university students, teachers and employees on Germany aid policy and German/Namibian relationship,<sup>203</sup> humanitarian as well as development aid was listed as the primary reason behind German aid policy. Of those who gave an answer, 31% reported that aid was given to a particular country based on a recent disaster and 26% said that aid was accorded to a country based on poverty. Since both categories fall under the umbrella ‘need’, we can conclude that more than half of the people esteemed need to be the driving factor. The following analysis will show whether the majority of the interviewees were on the right track.

Questionnaire: What is the primary reason behind German aid policy? Top 5 reasons	
31%	Disaster - famine, flood, civil strife etc.
26%	Need - poverty, bad education & health system etc.
10%	Economic importance
7%	Colonial past - responsibility, reparations
4%	Partnerships/friendly relationship
4%	Degree to which the recipient country is known

It is beyond the scope of this paper to take all of the different factors that characterize ‘need’ into consideration. However in order to pay tribute to the various dimensions of need, we will focus on one

<sup>202</sup> Heike Becker, “Namibia und die Deutschen,” *Blätter des iz3w*, no. 156 (1989): 8.

<sup>203</sup> A total of 340 people were interviewed, of which 164 were high school students, 53 university students, 79 employees and 44 teachers. The average age was 29, with 163 people being younger than 20, 58 between 20-29, 21 between 30-39, 28 between 40-49, 47 between 50-59, 13 between 60-69, 7 between 70-79 and 2 older than 80. The youngest interviewee was 13, the oldest 87; 154 of the interviewees were male, 186 female.

monetary and three non-monetary variables as proxies that are drawn from the literature on aid motives and will be discussed in more detail in each section.

### V.1.1 In monetary terms

GDP per capita terms is “the most straightforward indicator of beneficiary needs” as Berthélemy & Tichit claim.<sup>205</sup> The per capita level here is measured in constant 1995 US\$ to control for inflation<sup>206</sup> and averaged over the years 1985-2002 in order to match the time period that is used for the aid flows. According to this measure, there is no reason to believe that the primary reason behind German aid flows to Namibia is ‘need’. Out of 52 African countries<sup>207</sup>, for which data was available, Namibia is the country with the 6<sup>th</sup> highest GDP per capita, almost six times higher than the median, showing that Namibia is one of the richest countries on the African continent in per capita terms. Even if we compare Namibia to other former colonies<sup>208</sup> that thus also share historical ties with Germany, no convincing

<b>GDP per capita (constant 1995 US\$)</b> averaged over the years 1985-2002 <sup>204</sup>			
1 Ethiopia	104.40	27 Zambia	441.57
2 Malawi	153.87	28 Mauritania	468.89
3 Mozambique	154.18	29 Lesotho	483.32
4 Eritrea	155.66	30 Comoros	484.89
5 Congo, Dem. Rep.	166.62	31 Guinea	558.14
6 Burundi	176.21	32 Angola	564.20
7 Tanzania	185.00	33 Senegal	569.63
8 Guinea-Bissau	220.64	34 Zimbabwe	624.35
9 Burkina Faso	220.74	35 Equatorial Guinea	685.64
10 Niger	221.63	36 Cameroon	736.31
11 Chad	227.14	37 Cote d'Ivoire	772.58
12 Sierra Leone	239.56	39 Congo, Rep.	870.99
13 Nigeria	249.41	40 Djibouti	975.91
14 Liberia	251.68	41 Egypt, Arab Rep.	1036.29
15 Madagascar	252.37	42 Cape Verde	1253.33
16 Sudan	261.94	43 Morocco	1321.27
17 Mali	264.75	44 Swaziland	1452.11
18 Rwanda	272.67	45 Algeria	1609.40
19 Uganda	286.10	46 Tunisia	2049.17
20 Kenya	338.53	47 Namibia	2179.12
21 Central African Rep.	348.96	48 Botswana	3189.24
22 Togo	349.85	49 Mauritius	3271.50
23 Sao Tome & Principe	353.14	50 South Africa	4024.40
24 Gambia, The	363.33	51 Gabon	4525.18
25 Ghana	371.56	52 Seychelles	6291.19
26 Benin	378.96		

case can be made that Germany’s aid flows to Namibia are based on humanitarian need: all of the former colonies are worse off in terms of GDP per capita and receive relatively less per capita and relative aid.

If German aid was truly motivated by ‘need’, we would expect Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique to enjoy preferential status. That Germany is not completely oblivious to ‘need’ is shown by the absolute magnitude of ODA that flows to these countries. Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique are fourth, fourteenth and sixth largest recipients of ODA in absolute terms, respectively. But the analyses of relative and per capita ODA as well as donor relations on the other hand do not portray an exceptional recipient-donor relationship between Germany and the three countries.

<sup>204</sup> Source: World Development Indicators.

<sup>205</sup> Berthélemy & Tichit, 3.

<sup>206</sup> The measure PPP per capita terms would have been more precise but it was only available for a limited number of countries.

<sup>207</sup> Data for Libya, Mayotte, Reunion and St. Helena was unavailable.

<sup>208</sup> Highlighted in rosé: Burundi, Cameroon, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo.

Although we have not found any compelling evidence that shows humanitarian concern in the aid relationship with Namibia, we have to be careful not to jump to conclusions too quickly. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia, Theo-Ben Gurirab, for instance critically comments at the launch of the 2003 UNDP global human development report in July 2003 that “we have continued to make a case in favour of Namibia securing a Least Developed Country status. Our GDP per capita income figures are blatantly misleading.<sup>210</sup> Namibia is not a high-income country. That characterisation masks alarming income disparities.”<sup>211</sup> It is therefore questionable whether per capita income can really serve as an indicator of ‘need’ in a country that is known for its large income inequality. Therefore, we will now turn to non-monetary measures that are unrelated to high- income disparity.

### V.1.2 In non-monetary terms

To estimate need in non-monetary terms, following Trumbull and Wall as well as Schraeder et al., we use average life expectancy of the target countries’ population, the infant mortality rate and the malnutrition prevalence of children under five as proxies for humanitarian need.<sup>212</sup> These three measurements show the precariousness of the situation people live in and therefore shed light on the different degrees of need in various countries. Looking at the life expectancy at birth, again averaged over the years

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) averaged over the years 1985-2002 <sup>209</sup>			
1 Sierra Leone	36.41	28 Mauritania	49.79
2 Rwanda	40.91	29 Togo	49.90
3 Malawi	41.88	30 Lesotho	50.33
4 Burundi	43.18	31 Senegal	50.71
5 Mozambique	43.26	32 Gambia, The	50.78
6 Guinea-Bissau	43.39	33 Congo, Rep.	51.24
7 Ethiopia	43.49	34 Kenya	51.71
8 Mali	43.57	35 Swaziland	51.89
9 Zambia	43.73	36 Cameroon	51.97
10 Uganda	44.59	37 Gabon	52.11
11 Somalia	44.73	38 Benin	52.29
12 Burkina Faso	44.81	39 Namibia	52.50
13 Guinea	44.82	40 Madagascar	53.57
14 Niger	45.17	41 Sudan	54.56
15 Central African Rep.	45.36	42 South Africa	54.73
16 Angola	45.76	43 Ghana	57.03
17 Liberia	47.05	44 Comoros	57.93
18 Djibouti	47.08	45 Sao Tome & Principe	63.73
19 Chad	47.14	46 Egypt, Arab Rep.	64.86
20 Tanzania	47.39	47 Morocco	65.26
21 Zimbabwe	47.74	48 Cape Verde	66.78
22 Cote d'Ivoire	47.92	49 Algeria	68.50
23 Nigeria	48.00	50 Libya	69.56
24 Congo, Dem. Rep.	48.29	51 Mauritius	70.38
25 Botswana	48.41	52 Tunisia	70.71
26 Equatorial Guinea	48.81	53 Seychelles	71.16
27 Eritrea	49.63		

<sup>209</sup> Source: World Development Indicators. Data for Mayotte, Reunion and St. Helena was unavailable.

<sup>210</sup> Both German newspapers testify that this misperception can be confirmed by data. The FAZ reports that “The average yearly income of a white person amounts to more than 28.000 DM, whereas the poorest Namibians have to live on less than 130DM per year. (“Sind Weiße in Afrika Ausländer?” FAZ, no. 97, April 26, 2000, 2) The SZ, going back even further in time, informs that in 1995, at a Namibia conference, it was announced that more than half of the population only had a yearly income below 100 dollars. Five of the population controlled almost \_ of the resources of Namibia and half of the consumption went to seven % of the richest people. (“Fünf Jahre Unabhängigkeit. Krasse Gegensätze wischen Arm und Reich,” SZ, no. 271, November 24, 1995, 10.)

<sup>211</sup> Statement by the right honourable Theo-Ben Gurirab, MP, Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia at the launch of the 2003 UNDP Global Human Development Report in July 2003 (accessed January 25, 2004); available from [http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2003/July/week3/goals\\_rpt.htm](http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2003/July/week3/goals_rpt.htm).

<sup>212</sup> In assessing need, Trumbull and Wall use infant mortality as a proxy for physical well-being (Trumbull & Wall, 879.). Schraeder et al operationalized need in their study by what they refer to as “two widely adopted measures: (1) the average life expectancy of the target country's population; and (2) the daily caloric intake of that population.” (Schraeder et al, 302.)

1985 – 2002, we can see that it provides a different picture of Namibia’s need: Namibia moves up from being number 47 on the list of the neediest to number 39. However, this upward adjustment still does not justify us to conclude that need is a major motive in the German/Namibian aid relationship, in particular since life expectancy in Namibia is still 3 years above the median. This time, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Malawi are at the top of the list. However, they do not show up in Germany’s top ten of aid recipients. As previously discussed, Malawi scores 14<sup>th</sup> in absolute aid terms but does not acquire a high rank in any of the

<b>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) averaged over the years 1985-2002<sup>213</sup></b>					
1	Sierra Leone	183.70	26	Uganda	92.35
2	Niger	177.28	27	Cameroon	91.88
3	Angola	164.85	28	Senegal	89.18
4	Mali	149.53	29	Swaziland	87.28
5	Malawi	134.78	30	Eritrea	85.43
6	Mozambique	134.04	31	Togo	84.83
7	Guinea	133.73	32	Congo, Rep.	82.40
8	Somalia	133.00	33	Comoros	79.35
9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	128.33	34	Sudan	72.38
10	Ethiopia	124.58	35	Kenya	70.83
11	Mauritania	119.80	36	Ghana	68.63
12	Chad	118.48	37	Sao Tome & Principe	65.71
13	Central African Rep.	115.60	38	Egypt, Arab Rep.	63.35
14	Burundi	114.20	39	Namibia	63.08
15	Burkina Faso	114.18	40	Zimbabwe	62.73
16	Djibouti	113.45	41	Gabon	60.80
17	Nigeria	112.60	42	Morocco	57.80
18	Rwanda	110.45	43	Botswana	57.40
19	Zambia	108.60	44	South Africa	50.86
20	Benin	106.45	45	Algeria	46.98
21	Tanzania	102.45	46	Cape Verde	39.98
22	Gambia, The	101.83	47	Tunisia	31.25
23	Cote d'Ivoire	101.57	48	Libya	25.46
24	Lesotho	98.93	49	Mauritius	20.04
25	Madagascar	95.95	50	Seychelles	13.75

median rate. Again, Sierra Leone comes out as neediest, followed by two new countries: Niger and Angola. Both countries score really low as ODA receiving countries in all possible terms, reinforcing the point that Germany’s development aid policy is probably not heavily driven by humanitarian need motives, at least not by non-monetary needs.

The malnutrition prevalence among children up to five years, averaged over the years 1985-2002 gives more reason to believe that Namibia belongs to the

other aid categories. Sierra Leone is not a great beneficiary of German ODA in any terms. Rwanda is more privileged (Number 11 in per capita, 14 in relative and 17 in absolute terms) but never makes it to the top 10.

The infant mortality rate ranking draws a similar picture. Namibia again ranks 39 using this indicator, placing it approximately 1/3 below the

<b>Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) - averaged over the years 1985-2002<sup>214</sup></b>					
1	Ethiopia	47.35	26	Central African Rep.	23.20
2	Niger	45.40	27	Comoros	23.10
3	Eritrea	42.35	28	Togo	22.90
4	Burundi	41.25	29	Sudan	22.45
5	Madagascar	40.05	30	Kenya	22.40
6	Nigeria	35.03	31	Gambia, The	21.60
7	Congo, Dem. Rep.	34.40	32	Senegal	21.22
8	Mauritania	34.20	33	Djibouti	20.55
9	Chad	33.93	34	Mauritius	19.40
10	Burkina Faso	33.50	35	Cote d'Ivoire	19.13
11	Angola	30.30	36	Cameroon	18.65
12	Tanzania	29.63	37	Lesotho	17.80
13	Benin	29.07	38	Sao Tome & Principe	16.60
14	Mali	28.75	39	Cape Verde	16.15
15	Guinea	28.10	40	Botswana	15.10
16	Malawi	27.50	41	Zimbabwe	13.00
17	Sierra Leone	27.50	42	Gabon	12.00
18	Ghana	27.40	43	Egypt, Arab Rep.	11.49
19	Rwanda	26.90	44	Morocco	10.80
20	Mozambique	26.55	45	Swaziland	10.00
21	Namibia	26.20	46	Algeria	9.28
22	Somalia	26.00	47	South Africa	9.20
23	Zambia	24.35	48	Tunisia	6.78
24	Congo, Rep.	23.90	49	Seychelles	5.70
25	Uganda	23.83	50	Libya	4.70

<sup>213</sup> Source: World Development Indicators. Data for Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mayotte, Reunion, St. Helena was unavailable.

<sup>214</sup> Source: World Development Indicators. Data for Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mayotte, Reunion, St. Helena was unavailable.

needier countries in Africa. This indicator moves it up to the 21<sup>st</sup> place on the list - three percentage points below the median and therefore draws a totally different picture than the GDP per capita ranking. Now for the first time, Namibia is not ahead all of the other former German colonies: Togo and Cameroon are better off. Even though Namibia belongs to the needier countries according to this measure, it is still difficult to conclude that need was the decisive factor in German aid policy. In terms of malnutrition, Ethiopia, Niger and Eritrea are the neediest countries and all of them do not show privileged aid-recipient positions.

Based on this analysis, we can definitely say that need can take on many dimensions and produce different results accordingly. We can also assert that even in non-monetary terms, there is no conclusive evidence for need to be *the* primary motivation behind German aid.

## V.2 Strategic importance

We now turn to the analysis of strategic importance that comprises the better measurable military (Schraeder et al.) as well as the less tangible socio-political side (Sogge).

### V.2.1 In military terms

The fear of terrorism has enhanced the significance of military alliances around the world.

On a recent trip to Africa, Chancellor Schröder stressed the importance of forming a security alliance with Kenya in order to fight terrorism.<sup>215</sup>

Yet with respect to counter-terrorism concerns,

Namibia has not received any heightened attention. In this respect, countries in North and East Africa seem to be more often referred to as potential breeding grounds for terrorist actions as for instance the magazine of the German forces illustrates.<sup>216</sup>

Even when we measure the strategic importance of the military as Schraeder et al. propose<sup>217</sup> in terms of military personnel (% of labor force) and military expenditure (% of GDP), there is no strong evidence that Namibia plays an exceptional role. Concerning military personnel, Namibia scores 14 out of 49 African countries, which is almost 4 times higher than the median of 0.25 but given Namibia's population size, this number represents no gigantic army. As the online encyclopedia Nationmaster states: "With a small army

**Military - facts**  
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wa.html#Military>  
**Manpower - availability:** males age 15-49: 459,474 (2003 est.) ↑, 416,529 (2000 est.)  
**Manpower - fit for military service:** males age 15-49: 274,015 (2003 est.) ↑, 248,581 (2000 est.)  
**Expenditures – in\$:** \$73.1 million (FY02) ↓, \$90 million (FY97/98)  
**Expenditures - % of GDP:** 2.4% (FY02) ↓, 2.6% (FY97/98)

<sup>215</sup> *Kenia, ein Hoffnungsträger in Ostafrika* (accessed February 2, 2004); available from

[http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews-11635.591511/artikel/Kenia\\_ein-Hoffnungstraeger-in.htm](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews-11635.591511/artikel/Kenia_ein-Hoffnungstraeger-in.htm)

<sup>216</sup> *Spuren des Terrors* (accessed February 2, 2004); available from

[http://www.bundeswehr.de/service/y\\_magazin/Y03\\_03\\_Artikel3.php](http://www.bundeswehr.de/service/y_magazin/Y03_03_Artikel3.php) The magazine of the German forces identified the commanding structure in North Africa that reach out to Mauritania, Somalia, Algeria, Egypt and in particular Morocco as a highly explosive mixture and danger in the future.

<sup>217</sup> Schraeder et al, 303.

<b>Military personnel</b> (% of total labor force) - averaged over years 1989-1999 <sup>1</sup>	
1 Libya	6.16
2 Eritrea	4.31
3 Angola	2.25
4 Egypt, Arab Rep.	2.11
5 Morocco	1.97
6 Guinea-Bissau	1.82
7 Gabon	1.55
8 Somalia	1.53
9 Algeria	1.51
10 Mauritania	1.35
11 Chad	1.23
12 Botswana	1.12
13 Tunisia	1.10
14 Namibia	1.07
15 Swaziland	1.02
16 Congo, Rep.	0.99
17 Zimbabwe	0.85
18 Cape Verde	0.84
19 Sudan	0.80
20 Rwanda	0.80

and a fragile economy, the Namibian Government's principal foreign policy concern is developing strengthened ties within the Southern African region,"<sup>219</sup> pointing towards the fact that Namibia is seeking more collaboration and protection under the stronger regional umbrella, rather than rearming itself to become a strong military candidate. In terms of military expenditure, Namibia is number 17 out of 47 African countries and again has an almost 1/3 higher expenditure than the median country, which is certainly not insignificant but also not extraordinary.

Namibia has entered, according to Nationmaster, into defense cooperation with several governments, including the United States for military education, training and

<b>Military expenditure</b> (% of GDP) – averaged over years 1988-2001 <sup>218</sup>	
1 Eritrea	21.01
2 Angola	14.03
3 Liberia	13.55
4 Ethiopia	5.74
5 Zimbabwe	5.52
6 Djibouti	5.51
7 Burundi	4.87
8 Mozambique	4.71
9 Morocco	4.29
10 Rwanda	3.97
11 Seychelles	3.81
12 Botswana	3.76
13 Egypt, Arab Rep.	3.30
14 Togo	3.13
15 Mauritania	3.11
16 Lesotho	3.10
17 Namibia	2.91
18 Algeria	2.70
19 South Africa	2.49
20 Sudan	2.35

fisheries programs etc. but the website of the German Department of Defense does not mention any particular alliance between Germany and Namibia.<sup>220</sup> Delegate Hans Büttner, Namibia expert of the SPD, confirms as well that there is neither a military cooperation between the two countries, nor a particular strategic interest in military terms on the German side. Therefore, we can conclude that military strategic interests have not played a significant role in the German-Namibian case.

## V.2.2 In socio-political terms

Following Sogge's typology, socio-political motives can be reflected in measures by the government to defuse public protest and insurrection abroad as well as in measures to consolidate political support of voters at home.

### V.2.2.1 Precautionary measures to defuse public protest and insurrection abroad

Land reform is one of the salient and most emotive issues right now in Namibia. It is an issue that has gained new momentum in the past years. Yet, discontent and public indignation about the unequal land distribution have surfaced increasingly from Namibia's independence on. Even though the government has

<sup>218</sup> Source: World Development Indicators.

<sup>219</sup> *Military of Namibia* (accessed January 20, 2004); available from <http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Military-of-Namibia>.

<sup>220</sup> Namibia is only mentioned in the context of the plane crash between a US Air Force C-141, and a German military cargo plane that took place off the coast of Namibia in 1997. See <http://www.verteidigungsministerium.de> for Namibia coverage.

officially confirmed that the current redistribution strategy based on the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” principle will stay in place and that there will be no second Zimbabwe in Southern Africa<sup>221</sup>, more radical voices have become louder over time and the government has used this issue as a pressure tool, as Maier remarks.<sup>222</sup> The *FAZ* reported in 2001 for instance that a SWAPO delegate threatened that the land crisis in Zimbabwe could reach Namibia as well.

The *FAZ* informed that farmers had received threats in anonymous letters and that demands had been uttered that absent farmers – predominantly Germans – should be forced to sell their land through high taxes.<sup>223</sup> The ‘Germans’ are one of the target groups because they own c. one third of the big farms and there are c. 400 Germans who live abroad and do not cultivate their farms anymore.<sup>224</sup> In particular, the absent landowners have provoked a great deal of hostility because they are regarded as taking away valuable farmland from land-deprived black farmers. Consequently, it seems likely that the German government has an interest in calming down the tension and sparing the population of German origin (c. 20,000) the same destiny that the white population in Zimbabwe endured. It might feel in particular responsible for quelling the land conflict because the unequal distribution of land is still one of Germany’s colonial legacies. Hinz even goes so far as to claim that the success or failure of a continued peaceful development of Namibia is inevitably linked to the land reform issue.<sup>225</sup> We could thus also conclude that the German government is in general worried about potential future instability in Namibia and the destabilizing consequences that this could have for the entire region.

### **V.2.2.2 Consolidation of political support of voters**

Sogge lists the consolidation of political support of voters as a domestic aim. German politicians might be interested in pursuing this strategic aim in Namibia because c. 20 000 Namibians of German origin still reside there and a considerable number still has German or dual citizenship.<sup>226</sup> There are many gestures and favors to the German Namibians that demonstrate the importance German politicians have attached to this constituency. Secretary of State Genscher for instance worked hard to achieve and maintain good standing among the Namibian Germans despite his rather unpopular ‘Namibia-policy’: he established good relations with the interest group of the German speaking Namibians in 1977 and granted them the possibility to

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<sup>221</sup> *EIU country profile 2003. Namibia*, 7

<sup>222</sup> *Deutsche und Herero: eine unbeendete Geschichte* (accessed April 30, 2004); available from [http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/8/1/year-2004/dokument\\_id-3923/index.html](http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/8/1/year-2004/dokument_id-3923/index.html). Maier states that the delicate land issue has served as a perfect instrument for the Namibian government in the political game and that the Namibian government masters this game extremely well, in particular now with worldwide attention.

<sup>223</sup> Robert von Lucius, “Radikalere Landreform gefordert. Folgt Namibia dem “Vorbild“ Zimbabwe?” *FAZ*, no. 3, January 4, 2001, 5.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> Hinz, 7/8.

<sup>226</sup> Schmidt-Lauber demonstrates that at the time of her research, when there was still no Namibian citizenship, c. 7000 German Namibians had the German and 1500 had the German as well as the South African citizenship; the

acquire German nationality abroad without ever having lived in Germany.<sup>227</sup> Even though commitment to the Namibia Germans was more intense for the right wing parties, the social democratic party SPD also wanted to demonstrate that the statement by von Löwis: “The Germans in Namibia are a quantité négligeable for the SPD”<sup>228</sup> did not hold and that not only Franz Josef Strauß and his CSU were speaking for the Germans in Namibia.<sup>229</sup>

Politicians also made particular requests upon the German as well as Namibian government on behalf of the Germans in Namibia. CSU delegate Sieghard Rost for instance made demands on the Bavarian Parliament to promote the German language and culture in Namibia through exchange programs for students and teachers.<sup>230</sup> Chancellor Kohl asked for President Nujoma’s support in securing the German language and culture as an important integral part of Namibia.<sup>231</sup> Herzog advocated for the German language during his visit as well and petitioned the Namibian government to permit an education in one’s native language till the 7<sup>th</sup> instead of the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade.<sup>232</sup> Financial aid could have therefore served to push these little petitions and requests through in Namibia and to make the Namibian government more acquiescent.

In conclusion, even though the constituency in Namibia is not large and certainly not all are politically active, German politicians have continued to show interest in the German-Namibian community. This might be due to the fact that some of the Namibia Germans have retained their German citizenship and are able to impact the political landscape in Germany. It might also be influenced by German politicians’ interests to preserve the German culture in Namibia – an argument that we will return to later in the section on cultural similarity.

### **V.3 Economic potential & policy**

In 1995, the *SZ* concluded that “in theory, this country is very unimportant for Germany because its economy does not really yield much profit.”<sup>233</sup> We will now examine whether Namibia has really been such an unattractive economic partner for Germany by taking a look at the economic structure, its advantages and deficiencies, at economic policy, at the particular incentives for German investors and at the degree of

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remaining possessed only the South African citizenship. (Brigitta Schmidt-Lauber, “Die abhängigen Herren: Deutsche Identität in Namibia,” *Interethnische Beziehungen & Kulturwandel* 9 (1993): 90.)

<sup>227</sup> Brenke, “Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt,” 29.

German citizenship was very popular because it guaranteed the Namibia Germans an unlimited stay in Germany for educational purposes, the possibility to emigrate to Germany and entitled the Namibia Germans to a pension and to the right to participate in elections. (Schmidt-Lauber, 90)

<sup>228</sup> Henning of Menar von Löwis, *Bonn und Namibia. Die Position der Bundestagsparteien in der Namibia-Frage* (Bonn: Deutsche Afrika Stiftung, 1981): 14.

<sup>229</sup> “Afrika-Politik. Ein Schritt voraus,” *Der Spiegel* 46, November 13, 1978, 36.

<sup>230</sup> “Personalien. Sieghard Rost,” *Der Spiegel* 36, September 1, 1989, 270.

<sup>231</sup> “Kohl: Deutsch ist eine Sprache der Zukunft,” *FAZ*, no. 216, September 16, 1995, 1.

<sup>232</sup> “Herzog: Deutsch schützen und pflegen. Leichte Irritationen um muttersprachlichen Unterricht in Namibia,” *FAZ*, no. 55, March 6, 1998, 10.

<sup>233</sup> “An Minister Spranger überreicht. Namibia präsentiert Wunschliste,” *SZ*, no. 214, September 16, 1995, 10.

German engagement in the Namibian economy when compared to other African countries. This inquiry will give us a hint as to how much economic interests have motivated development aid.

### V.3.1 Namibia's economic attractiveness

Foreign investment usually does not come naturally; it has to be attracted and cultivated. Investors care for instance about the infrastructure of a country and about favorable economic policy such as investment incentives, a low degree of government intervention in the economy, overall political stability and low prevalence of corruption in a country. So what kind of situation does the investor face in Namibia?

#### **The investment incentive regime** EIU, p. 28

##### **Foreign Investment Act (1990)**

All sectors of the economy are open to foreign investors; no local participation requirement; full protection of investment; free repatriation of profits subject to Common Monetary Area rules.

##### **Manufacturing incentives (1993)**

Apply to new and existing manufacturers; 50% corporate tax abatement for five years (effective rate 17.5%), phased out over ten years; export promotion costs are 125-175% tax deductible; direct production wages and training costs are 125% tax deductible.

##### **Export incentives (1994)**

Up to 80% of profits accruing from exports of manufactured goods, except meat and fish products, are tax-exempt (effective rate 7%).

##### **Export-processing zones (1995)**

Corporate tax at 0% for an indefinite period; exemption from indirect taxes and import duties on goods and inputs for exports outside the Southern African Customs Union; conditional reimbursement of up to 75% of export processing zone training costs; guaranteed currency conversion through an eventual offshore banking regime.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country profile compliments Namibia on its well-developed and maintained transport infrastructure<sup>234</sup> and praises Namibia's telecommunication system as one of the most modern and efficient in Africa.<sup>235</sup> Furthermore, as the extensive investment incentive regime demonstrates, the government is very eager to attract foreign investors and is willing to invest a great deal of money in it. The government not only offers tax privileges but also solicits investors through an advantageous labor legislation such as a prohibition of labor strikes and beneficial credits.<sup>236</sup>

Investors can also be reassured that the times of arbitrary government intervention are over and that the Namibian government is anxious to

promote growth "by facilitating foreign direct investment in priority sectors such as natural resource value added, non-traditional manufacturing and tourism through partnerships with the private sector and the creation of attractive legislative and fiscal environments."<sup>237</sup> The government furthermore supports privatization, withdraws from public enterprises and has also liberalized the goods and financial markets.<sup>238</sup>

<sup>234</sup> EIU country profile 2003. Namibia, 21. "Namibia's network of over 5,000 km of tarred and 27,000 km of gravel roads is generally well maintained, and its rail, harbour and air services are efficiently operated. The economy is therefore largely free from transport bottlenecks."

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>236</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., ed., *Investitionsführer Südliches Afrika*, (Frankfurt am Main: Boschen Offsetdruck GmbH, 2000), 170.

<sup>237</sup> EIU country profile 2003. Namibia, 27.

<sup>238</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., 175.

Overall, Namibia is a country characterized by political stability. Namibia has been criticized for deviating from its democratic path and marching towards a centralized one-party system,<sup>239</sup> but it has not experienced any coups, military uprisings and stages of complete chaos and arbitrariness. Although there might be increased tension in the future concerning the land reform issue, the government until now has managed to channel anger and frustration surrounding the land distribution and it has found constitutional answers such as the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” principle.

With regards to corruption, the rating by Transparency International’s corruption perception index of 4.7 is certainly not very positive on a scale from 10 = highly clean to 0 = highly corrupt.<sup>241</sup> Placing Namibia in the world and African context, we can observe that corruption is definitely a problem but a problem that is prevalent in most countries. Compared to the rest of the

<b>Corruption Perceptions Index 2003<sup>240</sup></b>			
	<b>Africa Rank</b>	<b>World Rank</b>	<b>CPI score</b>
Botswana	1	30	5.7
Tunisia	2	39	4.9
<b>Namibia</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>4.7</b>
South Africa	4	48	4.4
Egypt	5	70	3.3
Ghana	6	70	3.3
Morocco	7	70	3.3
Senegal	8	76	3.2
Mali	9	78	3
Malawi	10	83	2.8
Mozambique	11	86	2.7
Algeria	12	88	2.6
Madagascar	13	88	2.6
Ethiopia	14	92	2.5
Gambia	15	92	2.5
Tanzania	16	92	2.5
Zambia	17	92	2.5
Zimbabwe	18	106	2.3
Sierra Leone	19	113	2.2
Uganda	20	113	2.2
Cote d'Ivoire	21	118	2.1
Libya	22	118	2.1
Kenya	23	122	1.9
Cameroon	24	124	1.8
Angola	25	124	1.8
Nigeria	26	132	1.4

world, Namibia scores 41 out of 133 countries that were included with one being the best and 133 the worst. Given that only 38 countries actually make it above the “5”-hurdle, Namibia’s rating is not that catastrophic. In addition, within the African context, Namibia’s situation is relatively promising: only Botswana and Tunisia can top Namibia’s performance. However, it remains to be seen whether the government will do anything to tackle corruption. The EIU profile utters its doubts and remarks critically that “the blurring of the distinction

between party and government has hampered the rooting out of corruption, which has become prevalent at both senior and junior levels.<sup>242</sup> In conclusion, investors interested in the African continent, might thus be particularly drawn to countries like Namibia.

There are nevertheless two factors that might still discourage investors: either significant constraints or a lack of investment opportunities. Regarding the former, the EIU country profile identifies inadequate

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., 170. President Nujoma managed for instance to change the constitutional provisions on the length of the presidential term in order to run for President again.

<sup>240</sup> Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index* (accessed January 20, 2004); available from [http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases\\_archive/2003/dnld/cpi2003.pressrelease.en.pdf](http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/dnld/cpi2003.pressrelease.en.pdf).

<sup>241</sup> The Corruption Perception Index score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts. For more information, see <http://www.transparency.org>.


<sup>242</sup> EIU *country profile 2003. Namibia*, 13. The National Assembly passed a long-promised anticorruption bill at the end of April 2003, but it has yet to be approved by the National Council, which rejected a similar bill at the end of 2002.

labor skills and high transport costs as major hindrances.<sup>243</sup> In addition, the small domestic market and a shortage of skilled personnel in the underdeveloped manufacturing sector<sup>244</sup> represent further constraints for foreign investors interested in manufacturing. The high HIV/AIDS rate in Namibia was 22.5% in 2001 alone, and the society is predicted to get much younger over the next years.<sup>245</sup> This raises worries about skill transfer and significant fall out rates in the labor market.<sup>246</sup>

Investment opportunities are mixed. Namibia has a very dominant primary sector (c. 25% of GDP), an underdeveloped industrial sector that imports a great deal of machinery and knowledge and offers many

GDP per capita growth (annual %) - averaged over the years 1985-2002 <sup>247</sup>			
1 Equatorial Guinea	10.32	27 Malawi	0.60
2 Mauritius	4.81	28 Namibia	0.45
3 Botswana	4.31	29 Kenya	0.14
4 Mozambique	4.21	30 Angola	-0.06
5 Eritrea	3.70	31 Guinea-Bissau	-0.14
6 Sudan	2.76	32 Gambia, The	-0.30
7 Cape Verde	2.71	33 South Africa	-0.40
8 Lesotho	2.62	34 Algeria	-0.45
9 Uganda	2.45	35 Sao Tome & Principe	-0.55
10 Tunisia	2.28	36 Niger	-0.59
11 Swaziland	2.14	37 Zimbabwe	-0.67
12 Egypt, Arab Rep.	2.13	38 Central African Rep.	-0.70
13 Burkina Faso	1.94	39 Togo	-0.71
14 Morocco	1.64	40 Gabon	
15 Ghana	1.61	41 Cote d'Ivoire	
16 Chad	1.55	42 Comoros	
17 Somalia	1.53	43 Burundi	
18 Seychelles	1.44	44 Zambia	
19 Guinea	1.40	45 Madagascar	
20 Tanzania	0.88	46 Cameroon	
21 Benin	0.88	47 Congo, Rep.	
22 Mauritania	0.83	48 Liberia	
23 Nigeria	0.81	49 Sierra Leone	
24 Mali	0.79	50 Djibouti	
25 Senegal	0.75	51 Congo, Dem. Rep.	
26 Ethiopia	0.75	52 Libya	

incentives to foreign investors and finally, an advanced service sector (c. 55% of GDP).<sup>248</sup> With regard to the service sector, the investment guide states that Namibia's banking system, its communication media, the power supply system as well as air and road connections are exemplary<sup>249</sup> and might thus offer either lucrative investment opportunities or build a solid foundation for investments in other sectors.



actually detect a downward trend starting in 1992 after an initial upswing from 1989 onwards. Namibia's

<sup>243</sup> EIU country profile 2003. Namibia, 27. One of the bigger foreign corporations in Namibia, Ramatex, is having to undertake extensive training of all its local workers.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 40/41.

<sup>245</sup> "According to the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 22.5% of the population were infected with HIV at end-2001 and 13,000 people died from AIDS in 2000. It is estimated that by 2021 AIDS will cut average life expectancy to 47 years for males and 54 years for females, from 59 years and 66 years respectively in 2001." (EIU country profile 2003. Namibia, 20.)

<sup>246</sup> For further information, see: <http://www.unaids.org/EN/geographical+area/by+country/namibia.asp>.

<sup>247</sup> Source: World Development Indicators. Data for Mayotte, Reunion, Rwanda and St. Helena is unavailable.

<sup>248</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., 171.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.


<sup>250</sup> Growth rates alone are not decisive in attracting investors but they are a part of the overall picture of the viability of the economy that an investor will take into consideration.

<sup>251</sup> Source: World Development Indicators. Data for Mayotte, Reunion, Rwanda and St. Helena is unavailable.

per capita growth rate has fluctuated around 1% over the past eight years. Consequently, based on GDP per capita rates, we cannot classify Namibia as an investment paradise. Since GDP per capita does not translate one to one into investment potential, we will now look at the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows.<sup>252</sup>

<b>Foreign Direct Investment inflows,</b> in individual countries (millions of dollars) averaged over the years 1997-2001 <sup>253</sup>		
1	South Africa	2684.24
2	Egypt	1323.38
3	Angola	1198.92
4	Nigeria	1126.08
5	Morocco	1024.2
6	Algeria	580.4
7	Tunisia	533.3
8	Sudan	361.12
9	Côte d'Ivoire	351.9
10	Uganda	218.14
11	Mozambique	215.12
12	Lesotho	186.4
13	Tanzania	186.12
14	Ethiopia	154.68
15	Zambia	152.36
16	Zimbabwe	133.4
17	Senegal	119.3
18	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>104.98</b>
19	Mauritius	81.04
20	Ghana	80.86

Not surprisingly, South Africa is heading the list of FDI inflows by far. The next country on the list, Egypt, only receives half as many inflows as South Africa. Namibia is number 18 out of 53 countries, which again is neither a bad nor an impressive performance. It is almost two times above the median of 54.12 but it merely reaches 1/26 of South Africa's FDI inflows. Taking a look at Namibia's individual chart<sup>254</sup>, we can see that FDI went down in 2001. Again, it is difficult to find any convincing evidence that Namibia has successfully lobbied for foreign investors over the years.



Nevertheless, the International Monetary Fund Article IV consultation last year predicted positive short-term economic prospects for Namibia with peace in Angola, increasing access to foreign markets and new mining development. There might thus be a chance that foreign investment will increase again over the next years but it is difficult to see how economic motivations would have played a large role in Germany's foreign aid calculation over the past 16 years.

<sup>252</sup> The German investment guide for Southern Africa for instance lists this information among other data for this region in order to give the reader an overview of investment opportunities.

<sup>253</sup> Foreign Direct Investment Database, UNCTAD (accessed February 4, 2004); available from <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923&lang=1>.

<sup>254</sup> Source: Foreign Direct Investment Database, UNCTAD

### V.3.2 German interests and engagement

German politicians have had the tendency to put a great deal of emphasis on German/Namibian economic relations. Kohl applauded during his visit in Namibia in 1995 in particular the positive economic relations between the two countries and stated that Germany is Namibia's second most important trade partner.<sup>255</sup> Herzog, on an official visit in Namibia, mentioned that he would like to draw the attention of the German public and business world towards the solid foundation that Namibia has created for foreign investors and trade. He moreover stressed the crucial role that the Namibia Germans play in drawing more investors to Namibia.<sup>256</sup> Besides the general advantages for investors, what justifies the excitement of both politicians?

The investment guide on Southern Africa concludes that one of the advantages for German investors is that especially in the economic field, the German language is still widely used.<sup>257</sup> On top of this, Germany and Namibia have signed important treaties in the past, with the intention to foster trade. They signed a double tax treaty on December 2, 1993<sup>258</sup> as well as a treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments on January 21, 1997.<sup>259</sup> In addition, Germany is one of the three countries - the other two being Switzerland and the US - with which Namibia has signed a bilateral investment treaty, securing foreign investments against political risks.<sup>260</sup> This is very special given that bilateral trade treaties with the Western world are very rare in Southern Africa.<sup>261</sup> One of the sectors that might be of particular interest to German investors is tourism. Both, the investment guide<sup>262</sup> as well as the magazine *Geo*<sup>263</sup> have characterized tourism as one of the most promising sectors in Namibia. Since Namibia is one of the most attractive vacation destinations for Germans in Africa, German investors could exploit this opportunity. The German state department confirms that "greater investment interest has been directed to the tourism sector."

However, the website of the state department also states: "The extensive investments from Germany that had been hoped for after independence have not yet taken place."<sup>264</sup> In spite of all the beneficial investment conditions and the encouragement by Germany's politicians, German/Namibian trade relations are rather modest. Drawing on the information provided by the investment guide and the information

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<sup>255</sup> "Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Helmut Kohl in Südafrika und Namibia," *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 40332, September 11, 1995.

<sup>256</sup> "Deutschland. Bundespräsident Herzog in Namibia und Südafrika," *Archiv der Gegenwart: die weltweite Dokumentation für Politik & Wirtschaft* 42726, March 3, 1998.

<sup>257</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., 174.

<sup>258</sup> Bundessteuerblatt Jahrgang 1994 Teil I, no. 15, 673, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1994 Teil II, 1262.

<sup>259</sup> Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1997 Teil II, no. 4, 186.

<sup>260</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., 188.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. The Seychelles are the only Southern African country that has signed a bilateral trade agreement with a Western nation, France.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>263</sup> Jürgen Petschull, "Namibia – Land der guten Hoffnung," *GEO* 6 (1994): 73. A study of the European Community predicted an increase in visitors from 200.000 to 600.000 in the next 10 years for Namibia due to Namibia's 'geographic and environmental attractiveness', the 'political stability' and the 'good infrastructure.'

<sup>264</sup> *Beziehungen zwischen Namibia und Deutschland* (accessed February 4, 2004); available from [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/laenderinfos/laender/laender\\_ausgabe.html?land\\_id=118#2](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe.html?land_id=118#2).

Germany as export partner (% of export to Germany)					
1 Liberia	54.80%	1st position	14 Uganda	7.50%	3rd position
2 Sierra Leone	28.10%	2nd position	15 Sao Tome	7.50%	4th position
3 Burundi	20.20%	2nd position	16 Gambia	7.30%	5th position
4 Comoros	19.40%	2nd position	17 Ghana	6.60%	4th position
5 Eritrea	16.70%	2nd position	18 Congo, Rep.	6.60%	5th position
6 Rwanda	14.60%	2nd position	19 Mozambique	6.20%	3rd position
7 Libya	14.10%	2nd position	20 Madagascar	5.90%	4th position
8 Chad	13.60%	2nd position	21 Morocco	5.80%	4th position
9 Malawi	13.60%	2nd position	22 Zimbabwe	5.40%	3rd position
10 Tunisia	11.50%	3rd position	23 Cote d'Ivoire	5.40%	4th position
11 Mauritania	10.90%	4th position	24 Mali	5.00%	5th position
12 South Africa	9.00%	3rd position	25 Guinea	5.00%	9th position
13 Ethiopia	7.60%	3rd position	26 Tanzania	4.80%	7th position

Germany as import partner (% of import from Germany)					
1 Sierra Leone	25.00%	1st position	14 Chad	5.50%	3rd position
2 Liberia	15.60%	3rd position	15 Sudan	5.50%	3rd position
3 South Africa	15.40%	1st position	16 Morocco	5.50%	4th position
4 Sao Tome & Principe	10.10%	2nd position	17 Senegal	5.40%	5th position
5 Libya	9.80%	2nd position	18 Togo	5.30%	4th position
6 Tunisia	8.90%	3rd position	19 Cameroon	5.30%	5th position
7 Rwanda	8.40%	2nd position	20 Mauritania	5.20%	5th position
8 Egypt	7.90%	2nd position	21 Ghana	4.70%	7th position
9 Congo, Dem. Rep.	7.30%	5th position	22 CAR	4.30%	4th position
10 Eritrea	7.20%	3rd position	23 Ethiopia	4.10%	5th position
11 Nigeria	6.80%	5th position	24 Mali	4.00%	4th position
12 Algeria	6.60%	4th position	25 Reunion	3.00%	3rd position
13 Cape Verde	5.70%	3rd position			

### Namibia's trade partners in 1998

(CIA World Factbook 2003)

**Export Namibia:** South Africa 81%, US 4%  
Germany 2%

**Import Namibia:** UK 43%, South Africa 26%,  
Spain 14%, France 8%, Japan

The statistics from the CIA world factbook 2003 support the image of trade apathy between Germany and Namibia. Taking a closer look at Germany's export and import partners, we have to realize that Namibia is neither listed on the export nor on the import list. This can be easily explained by the fact that the EU and the US were listed as Namibia's trade partners for 2001 in the CIA world factbook, from which the data is retrieved. Thus, it is difficult to decipher which share went and came from Germany. A look back to the year 1998, where the next data originates from, helps us to position Germany as a trade partner. This data shows that Germany only played a minor role as an export partner for Namibia but no role at all as an import partner. The weak import relationship is particularly telling because the magnitude of imports is often considered a good proxy for economic interest as Schraeder et al state.<sup>267</sup>

obtained from the trade statistics, we are led to conclude that German investors must have never followed Herzog's advice. The investment guide on Southern Africa mentions that 'despite the historical ties, trade between Namibia and Germany stagnates on a very low level.'<sup>265</sup> The magazine *Der Spiegel* illuminates that the Namibian Germans were furthermore not the economically powerful or influential group as Herzog had presented them: "the Germans were pushed out of the industrial sector by the English and Buren. Germans were concentrated mostly in the middle-class economy, such as the hotel, retail and brewery industry."<sup>266</sup>

<sup>265</sup> Institut für Management-, Markt- und Medieninformationen GmbH et al., 174.

<sup>266</sup> "Jeder nimmt zehn Schwarze mit ins Grab," *Der Spiegel* 45, November 1, 1976, 135.

<sup>267</sup> Schraeder et al, 303.

Despite the fact that the Namibia is not an unattractive place for German investors based on the investment treaties, the language, the excellent infrastructure and the many other advantages that investors enjoy in Namibia, the data on trade relations makes it difficult to uphold that economic interests play a dominant role in Germany's aid allocations.

#### **V.4 Democratic nature & civil and political liberties**

“The main prerequisite for me to invest German tax money somewhere is that this money promises at least a certain minimal effect,” said secretary of development Klein in a Spiegel Interview.<sup>268</sup> Klein voices a concern that has become one of the key themes in today's aid regime. Good governance, accountability, professionalism and no corruption are the magic words that many donors take as prerequisite for foreign aid.<sup>269</sup> In this way, donors want to prevent that their aid is used for the wrong purposes and potentially against the real beneficiaries, the citizens. So, how do we know that aid reaches its final destination and is put to the best use? The World Bank lists civil and political liberties as one potential performance indicator of ‘good governance.’<sup>270</sup> Assuming that in a democracy people have institutionalized channels through which they can hold their government accountable and ensure that aid reaches the right beneficiaries, we will also look at the democratic institution rating. Based on these measures and supplementary information on Namibia's democratic stance, we can then decide whether these considerations played a role in Germany's aid policy.

We will first start with a general introduction of Namibia's democratic nature and then compare this to other African countries with help of the aforementioned measures. Namibia has an exemplary constitution that the EIU Profile describes as “the lynch pin of Namibia's multiparty democratic system.”<sup>271</sup> Constitutional safeguards such as fundamental human rights, an uncensored press, and the proscription of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and the death penalty furthermore protect democracy.<sup>272</sup> In addition, the magazine *Der Spiegel*, compliments the Namibian constitution on the required institution of an ombudsman serving as a guardian against corruption and attempted takeovers by the powerful elites. On top of this, Namibia is praised for having an independent judiciary, the backbone of a functioning

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<sup>268</sup> “Hilfe bedarf gewisser Voraussetzungen,” *Der Spiegel* 1, January 4, 1988, 38.

<sup>269</sup> See for instance the ‘good governance’ discourse within the World Bank and the OECD, the most prominent fora for development discourse. ‘Governance’ is listed as one of the ‘hot topics’ on the website of the World Bank and there is abundant information on the topic on the website of the World Bank as well as of the OECD. See the following links for more information: <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/index.cfm>, [http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en\\_2649\\_37405\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_37405\\_00.html](http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_37405_1_1_1_1_37405_00.html).

<sup>270</sup> *Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality* (accessed February 5, 2004); available from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm#WDR97>.

<sup>271</sup> *EIU country profile 2003. Namibia*, 10.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*

democracy as many critics say.<sup>273</sup> Maier emphasizes that Namibia is a country with exemplary character, “where the constitution is more or less adhered to, which is not common on the African continent.”<sup>274</sup>

However, the same constitution also accords wide-ranging and one could argue, too extensive powers to the executive.<sup>276</sup> The President has the power to appoint the chief justice and senior judges, as well as permanent secretaries.<sup>277</sup> He can also proclaim a state of emergency without any reference to parliament<sup>278</sup> In that case, “some entrenched human rights, including limiting on how long detainees can be held without trial, are suspended. There are some entrenched clauses guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms “that cannot be amended without invalidating the entire constitution.”<sup>279</sup> Yet, considering the

Freedom Rating 2003 – Political Rights, Civil Liberties & Status <sup>275</sup>							
PRCL Status			PRCL Status				
1 Benin	2	2	F	28 Seychelles	3	3	PF
2 Botswana	2	2	F	29 Sierra Leone	4	3	PF
3 Cape Verde	1	1	F	30 Tanzania	4	3	PF
4 Ghana	2	2	F	31 Uganda	5	4	PF
5 Lesotho	2	3	F	32 Zambia	4	4	PF
6 Mali	2	2	F	33 Algeria	6	5	NF
7 Mauritius	1	2	F	34 Angola	6	5	NF
<b>8 Namibia</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>F</b>	35 Cameroon	6	6	NF
9 Sao Tome & Principe	2	2	F	36 Central African Rep.	7	5	NF
10 Senegal	2	3	F	37 Chad	6	5	NF
11 South Africa	1	2	F	38 Congo (Kinshasa)	6	6	NF
12 Burkina Faso	4	4	PF	39 Cote d'Ivoire	6	5	NF
13 Burundi	5	5	PF	40 Egypt	6	6	NF
14 Comoros	5	4	PF	41 Equatorial Guinea	7	6	NF
15 Congo (Brazzaville)	5	4	PF	42 Eritrea	7	6	NF
16 Djibouti	5	5	PF	43 Guinea	6	5	NF
17 Ethiopia	5	5	PF	44 Liberia	6	6	NF
18 Gabon	5	4	PF	45 Libya	7	7	NF
19 Gambia, The	4	4	PF	46 Mauritania	6	5	NF
20 Guinea-Bissau	6	4	PF	47 Rwanda	6	5	NF
21 Kenya	3	3	PF	48 Somalia	6	7	NF
22 Madagascar	3	3	PF	49 Sudan	7	7	NF
23 Malawi	3	4	PF	50 Swaziland	7	5	NF
24 Morocco	5	5	PF	51 Togo	6	5	NF
25 Mozambique	3	4	PF	52 Tunisia	6	5	NF
26 Niger	4	4	PF	53 Zimbabwe	6	6	NF
27 Nigeria	4	4	PF				

recent change of the constitution to allow President Nujoma a third term, the consolidation of power in one person and the melting of party and government, resulting in little resistance from the legislature for the President’s actions, it remains uncertain whether the government will refrain from unconstitutional acts or whether it cares about invalidating the constitution.

In order to assess Namibia’s democratic status truthfully within its context, we will now compare it to other African countries based on the Freedom Rating 2003, conducted by a NGO called Freedom House<sup>280</sup>

<sup>273</sup> Policy IV Project of the University of Maryland (accessed February 5, 2004); available from <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Nam1.htm>.

<sup>274</sup> Wolfgang Maier, email from March 29, 2004 on the reasons why Germany accords Namibia preferential treatment in aid.

<sup>275</sup> Freedom in the World Country Ratings 2003 (accessed February 5, 2004); available from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls>.

<sup>276</sup> EIU country profile 2003. Namibia, 10.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> The World Bank states that The Freedom House indexes of political freedoms and civil liberties were used in cross-country research long before any of the other listed evaluative indicators on its website.

<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm>. Freedom House elaborates on its website on the

and the Democratic Institution Rating, conducted by the Polity IV Project of the University of Maryland.<sup>281</sup> In the freedom rating, Namibia demonstrates a convincing performance. It is one out of 11 African countries characterized as free (F) and on a scale from 1 (highest degree of freedom) and 7 (lowest), it scores 2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties. It has the lowest rating within its group but that does not reverse the fact that it is classified as a ‘free country’.

Democratic institutions rating 1999			
1	Botswana	9	22 Burkina Faso
2	South Africa	9	23 Togo
3	Malati	7	24 Kenya
4	Benin	6	25 Algeria
5	Madagascar	6	26 Chad
6	Namibia	6	27 Burundi
7	CAR	6	28 Angola
8	Mozambique	6	29 Rwanda
9	Guineau-Bissau	5	30 Gabon
10	Niger	4	31 Cameroon
11	Sierra-Leone	4	32 Gambia
12	Mali	4	33 Mauritania
13	Nigeria	4	34 Zimbabwe
14	Ghana	2	35 Morocco
15	Zambia	1	36 Egypt
16	Ethiopia	1	37 Congo, Dem. Rep.
17	Liberia	0	38 Cote d'Ivoire
18	Uganda	-1	39 Libya
19	Tanzania	-1	40 Sudan
20	Guineau-Bissau	-1	41 Somalia
21	Senegal	-1	

Concerning the democratic institutions rating of 1999, ranking countries from 10 (democratic) to -10 (autocratic), Namibia comes out as a medium democratic country (6) that scores relatively well compared to other African countries. Botswana and South Africa are way ahead of all other African countries, followed by Malawi that receives a 7.

Consequently, the two rankings paint a rather positive picture of Namibia’s democratic status and we could conclude that Namibia’s democratic standing has contributed to Germany’s generosity. However, recalling that Germany continued to support Namibia generously during the times when democracy seemed endangered, other countries pulled out and the media massively criticized Namibia’s development, the argument that democracy is a decisive factor, is

weakened. Moreover looking at the democratic status of the other countries that Germany supports financially, we do not find any conclusive evidence that Germany favors democratic countries. Whereas the top three aid recipients in per capita terms, Cape Verde, Namibia and Botswana, as well as the top three recipients in relative terms, Namibia, Benin and Botswana, are all free and democratic countries, other highly ranked aid recipients can be characterized as nonfree and part of them almost autocratic. Egypt as a non-free, undemocratic (practically autocratic) country fares as the number one aid recipient of absolute aid, followed by partly free and on the verge to autocracy Zambia, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya. Number 4 and 5 on the relative as well as on the per capita aid list are other nonfree and undemocratic countries such as Togo, Libya, Mauritania and Zambia. On top of this, Germany is the second greatest donor in Libya, a country that received the worst rating in both surveys.

determination of the freedom rating: Individual countries are evaluated based on a checklist of questions on political rights and civil liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For more details, see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>.

<sup>281</sup> The democratic institutional ranking is based on a variety of variables, such as the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, regulation as well as competitiveness of regulation. For more information, visit <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm#data>.

In conclusion, Namibia's largely democratic status has certainly facilitated its aid relationship with Germany and might have avoided potential resistance. However, it is not clear, based on Germany's other relationships and its interest to hold on to Namibia as one of its greatest beneficiaries even during troublesome times, that a less democratic standing would have reduced the amount of aid flowing to Namibia.

## V.5 Cultural Similarity - German vestiges in Namibia

While John F. Kennedy said "Ich bin ein Berliner," Josef Strauss (CDU) proclaimed in Windhoek: "I'm a South West African. Southwest is part of our inheritance, of our feeling."<sup>282</sup> The magazine *Vereinte Nationen* describes this feeling and Strauss' reaction as follows: "they trigger the notion of a German civilizing mission of past days," and it therefore concludes that "the presence of the community in Namibia has always been a decisive factor in the Namibia-policy in Germany."<sup>283</sup> We now examine whether the presence of the German community in Namibia has also been a crucial factor in Germany's aid policy. What kind of cultural ties have survived the time of South African occupation, interim rule and Namibian government? Has Germany as Schraeder et al. would ask left its mark on the legal and education system as well as on the language? Are these ties strong enough to motivate the German government to favor Namibia over other countries?

German tourists flock to Namibia for a simple reason: they can find a little bit of Germany on the African continent; being far away but feeling nevertheless at home. The magazine *Stern* for instance still characterized Lüderitzbucht, Germany's first settlement in colonial time, as "a piece Germany on a

<b>Ethnicities in Namibia</b>	
CIA world factbook	
Black	87.5%
White	6%
Mixed	6.5%
Ovambo	50%
Kavango	9%
Herero	7%
Damara	7%
Nama	5%
Caprivian	4%
Bushmen	3%
Baster	2%
Tswana	0.5%
Of the white population: Haspel, p. 44/45	
Africaans	60%
German	25%
English	15%

different planet with German street names, familiar enamel signs, timbered decorations, turrets and wrought iron fences."<sup>284</sup>

The newspaper *FAZ* wrote in 1995: "Nowhere is the German heritage so present as in Swakopmund. Next to the Germany architecture, the strikingly many rules and regulations, the German cuisine and the good streets is the German language that reminds in particular of the German past."<sup>285</sup> Many traditions have thus been successfully imported: the Oktoberfest as well as carnival, the many bowling clubs, the German coffee time with a piece of cake and many more. As the *FAZ* states: "Germans abroad usually cherish traditional forms of the German clubs

<sup>282</sup> Cited in Becker, "Namibia und die Deutschen," 10.

<sup>283</sup> Melber, "Bonns Namibia-Politik," 46.

<sup>284</sup> Wolfgang Metzner & Obie Oberholzer, "Ein Stück Deutschland...," *Stern* 16, April 11, 2001, 102.

<sup>285</sup> Carola Kaps, "Faustball ist interessanter als der deutsche Kanzler. Swakopmund vor dem Besuch Helmut Kohls," *FAZ*, no. 207, September 6, 1995, 111.

and societies and they can always be recognized by their bakeries, butcheries and breweries – Namibia is no exception in this regard.”<sup>286</sup> One can even find kids in Namibia with a large cornet, filled with sweets on their first day of school – a German tradition that nowhere else could be implanted except for Austria.<sup>287</sup>

In terms of the legal system, we cannot see any affinity between Germany and Namibia. Since Germany was the first colonial power but was followed by South Africa, a great deal of South African structures supplanted the previous ones. When Namibia acquired independence in 1990, it inherited the South African legal system, a common law system similar to the British system.<sup>288</sup>

Concerning the education system, the German population in Namibia has probably left its traces in terms of foreign languages offered at schools but the structure of the education system does not resemble the German system. The primary school is two years longer in Namibia and the secondary education is divided up into two segments, in junior and senior secondary, while in Germany there are three different schools catering for students’ education levels. Namibia’s overall education is shorter by a year and the grading system is different as well.<sup>289</sup> However, as mentioned before, the German government has financially supported many schools that follow the German curriculum and teach German as first language. In this way, the Namibia Germans have preserved a little educational enclave.

The German language is a similar phenomenon: it is visible, the primary means of communication for the Namibia Germans but it only plays a secondary role nationwide as Becker explains in the magazine *Informationsdienst*.<sup>290</sup> The German language is cultivated through private and public schools, a German newspaper and a weekly magazine as well as a German radio program<sup>291</sup> but the long time of non-recognition of the German language by the administrative structures has caused the German language to withdraw from the public arena. It could only be maintained within little reservations as Kleinz calls them, such as family, circle of friends, (German) school, church and (German) clubs.<sup>292</sup>

What makes this German language and education enclave so special and worthy to be financed? The magazine *Der Spiegel* would answer this question by pointing out that “it is the only country abroad where German is spoken as a national language – not only by the Namibia Germans but also by Herero and Ovambo.”<sup>293</sup> Consequently, it is a phenomenon that remains unmatched in the world and therefore might be

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<sup>286</sup> Wilhelm Bleek, “Holzofenbrot, Wurst und Bier. Über auslandsdeutsche, Selbstwertgefühl und Integration,” *FAZ*, no. 234, October 9, 1995, 12.

<sup>287</sup> One of the biggest producers still exports c. 300 of these cornets to Namibia every year. (Ricarda Schlosshan, “Großmütter sind die besten Kunden der Schultüten Hersteller.“ *FAZ*, no. 196, August 26, 1995, 11.)

<sup>288</sup> *The Namibian Legal System* (accessed February 4, 2004); available from [http://faculty.cua.edu/fischer/ComparativeLaw2002/Namibia\\_Legal\\_System.html](http://faculty.cua.edu/fischer/ComparativeLaw2002/Namibia_Legal_System.html).

<sup>289</sup> For more information, see <http://www.unesco.org/iau/cd-data/na.rtf>.

<sup>290</sup> Ute-Helene Becker, “Nation durch Sprache – eine Herausforderung für Namibia. Sprachpolitik zwischen Unterdrückung und Befreiung,” in: *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika* 6 (1984): 11.

<sup>291</sup> “Kohl in Windhuk eingetroffen,” *FAZ*, no. 215, September 15, 1995, 3.

<sup>292</sup> Nobert Kleinz, *Deutsche Sprache im Kontakt in Südwestafrika. Der heutige Gebrauch der Sprachen Deutsch, Afrikaans und Englisch in Namibia*, Deutsche Sprache in Europa und Übersee. Berichte und Forschungen 9 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1984), 295/296.

<sup>293</sup> “Die Stunde kommt, da man dich braucht,” *Der Spiegel* 37, September 7, 1981, 147.

worth preserving. The weekly magazine for the German book trade furthermore highlights that these German ‘reservations’ have put in a lot of efforts and still have a great interest to cultivate the German language: “Windhoek is a very special place for German books. Here you can find the greatest German group in the region, German schools and media, functioning German bookstores and a great interest in everything that gets written in the Republic of Germany.”<sup>294</sup> Those efforts according to Brigitta Schmidt Lauber result from the fact that while the Namibia Germans have increasingly defined themselves as an independent element from the mother country, they have cherished the German cultural heritage<sup>295</sup> and “held onto what they esteemed to be German traditions and German attributes.”<sup>296</sup> As previously elaborated, the German government has rewarded these efforts with lobbyism on behalf of the German Namibians as well as with an aid policy that is geared towards minimizing tensions and preserving the culture – foreign aid for the “little German brother” in South West and for a bit of nostalgia on the Western side.

## V.6 Region

Last but not least, Namibia’s aid recipient position could at least partially be explained by its regional location. Germany might look for a common policy for Southern Africa, promoting regional trade as well as regional security and other regional ties. Odén et al. emphasize a regional perspective because according to their study, it is likely that investors have the entire South African region in mind when deciding where to invest.<sup>297</sup> We will therefore test whether German aid policy has favored the Southern African region by comparing the median relative, absolute and per capita ODA flows to Africa’s five region from Germany: (1) Central Africa, (2) East and Horn of Africa, (3) Northern Africa, (4) Southern Africa, and (5) Western Africa.<sup>298</sup>

<b>Regional prioritization</b> (determined by the median of ODA)					
<b>ODA (absolute in USD million)</b>		<b>ODA (relative)</b>		<b>ODA (per capita)</b>	
1 East & Horn of Africa	30.51	1 Central Africa	8.0%	1 Southern Africa	3.38
2 Southern Africa	21.5	2 Southern Africa	7%	2 Western Africa	3.21
3 Western Africa	19.56	3 Western Africa	7%	3 Central Africa	2.83
4 Central Africa	16	4 East & Horn of Africa	6%	4 East & Horn of Africa	1.81
5 Northern Africa	5.27	5 Northern Africa	6%	5 Northern Africa	0.18

<sup>294</sup> Gabriele Prein, “Auf der Reise durch das südliche Afrika,” *Börsenblatt: Wochenmagazin für den deutschen Buchhandel* 160, no 66 (1993): 12.

<sup>295</sup> Schmidt-Lauber, 87.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>297</sup> Odén et al., 13.

<sup>298</sup> The division of countries into regions follows the scheme that can be found on the website of the University of Stanford. *Regions* (accessed February 4, 2004); available from <http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/guide3.html>.

Depending on the nature of ODA, the regional rankings differ. In terms of absolute ODA, the region East and Horn of Africa scores way ahead of the other regions. Regarding relative ODA, Central Africa comes in first and only when measured in per capita ODA do we see Southern Africa leading. We could certainly make the argument that for reasons previously discussed, ODA in relative and per capita terms is more telling and Southern Africa with a second position in relative ODA and the first in per capita ODA, therefore takes the overall lead. It is however still difficult to detect a strong regional preference in this chart pattern.

Moreover, looking at the origin of the top 10 ODA recipients for each category complicates the case even further. The top 10 ‘absolute ODA’- recipients cover the entire continent almost evenly with Eastern Africa having only one more recipient. The top 10 ‘relative ODA’- recipients also come from all regions

Origin of top 10 'absolute ODA' – recipients	
1	Egypt Northern Africa
2	Zambia Southern Africa
3	Tanzania Eastern Africa
4	Ethiopia Eastern Africa
5	Kenya Eastern Africa
6	Mozambique Southern Africa
7	Cameroon Central Africa
8	Ghana Western Africa
9	Congo Central Africa
10	Morocco Northern Africa

Origin of top 10 'relative ODA'- recipients	
1	Namibia Southern Africa
2	Benin Western Africa
3	Botswana Southern Africa
4	Togo Western Africa
5	Libya Northern Africa
6	Congo Central Africa
7	Lesotho Southern Africa
8	Zimbabwe Southern Africa
9	Cameroon Central Africa
10	Zambia Eastern Africa

Origin of top 10 'per capita ODA'- recipients	
1	Cape Verde Western Africa
2	Namibia Southern Africa
3	Botswana Southern Africa
4	Mauritania Western Africa
5	Zambia Southern Africa
6	Seychelles Southern Africa
7	Benin Western Africa
8	Lesotho Southern Africa
9	Togo Western Africa
10	Gambia Western Africa

but Southern Africa dominates. The top 10 ‘per capita ODA’- recipients are all evenly divided between Western and Southern Africa. In conclusion, we see that South Africa is the region that is most often found among the top 10 recipients. Nevertheless, this correlation is not equally strong and evident in every scenario and differences between the regions rather appear minimal. Therefore, regional predilection might have played into the aid allocation process but it was certainly not a decisive factor.

Having tested the impact of these six variables on Germany’s aid formula in the Namibian case, we can conclude that humanitarian need, economic interests, democracy and civil as well as political liberties and Namibia’s regional location do not seem to have factored in significantly. The variables that appear most applicable are strategic interest, at least the socio political side of it, and cultural similarity. Both variables are interconnected in the Namibia case and reinforce each other. Since the German government is genuinely interested in the Namibia Germans as a constituency or as an enclave of German culture on the African continent that is worth preserving, German politicians have gotten engaged in Namibian politics on the behalf of the Namibia Germans. Foreign aid might have served as a means of exerting pressure on the Namibian government to help maintain German traditions; it might have also functioned as a way of placating the Namibian government not to create a second Zimbabwe. Yet, even nostalgia is not powerful

enough to explain Germany's extraordinary and consistent donor position in Namibia. The German population hardly knows anything about this 'footnote in history' as we will see in chapter VI and it is difficult to reason that politicians' passion for the 'little brother' in Namibia can go as far as crowning it as the most important aid recipient on the African continent.

## **VI. Moral obligation**

When Waller scrutinized the German-Namibian aid relationship, he came to the conclusion that “history obliges.”<sup>299</sup> This chapter examines to what extent this conclusion holds true and Germany still senses an obligation to provide aid dating back to its common past with Namibia. In Chapter IV we discussed two time periods, the colonial regime and West Germany’s Namibia-policy prior to Namibia’s independence, as two important periods that have set the stage for moral obligation to play a role. The focus of this chapter will be predominantly on the colonial regime, which has had a greater and longer-lasting impact on German-Namibian relations. It is unlikely that the Namibian government would have the same bargaining position if it could only reproach the German government of its controversial aid regime. The section on external pressure by the Namibian government will nevertheless demonstrate that Germany’s contestable aid regime has also played a role and still presents an interesting trump for the Namibian government in aid negotiations.

This chapter thus reveals first the degree to which the German government recognizes colonial wrongdoings. Secondly, it introduces the different functions that aid can play in a morality driven context, i.e. whether for instance the German government tries to come to terms with its colonial wrongdoings in Namibia through aid or whether it simply tries to delete this part of history with a yearly paycheck. Thirdly, it looks for pressure sources or other motives that have obliged Germany to act since obligations are not a natural consequence of recognition and self-critical reflection.

### **VI.1 Recognition of colonial wrongdoings**

In order to determine the degree to which the German government recognizes colonial wrongdoings, we now determine what kind of ‘special responsibility’ the German government senses for whom and whether it has acknowledged and apologized for colonial wrongdoings.

#### **VI.1.1 Germany’s ‘special responsibility’**

Germany’s ‘special responsibility’ - newspaper articles and politicians love to use this rather vague, all-encompassing term. In most articles and speeches, this term remains undefined and the reader or listener learns little about the nature and the addressee of this ‘special responsibility’.

Elucidating the nature of this ‘special responsibility,’ the parliamentary parties CDU/CSU and FDP explained in 1989 that the term refers to (1) Germany’s increased engagement in the UN contact group, in particular, to realize and implement UN resolution 435, to (2) Germany’s status as colonial power till the

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<sup>299</sup>Peter P. Waller, “Namibia: Wirtschaftspotential und Entwicklungsperspektiven,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte – Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament* B8190 (1990): 13.

end of WW2 and to (3) the minority of Germans and Namibians of German origin in Namibia.<sup>300</sup> The magazine *Vereinte Nationen* declares that there are two potential groups to whom this ‘special responsibility’ applies: “the obligation to care for the Namibian Germans and the obligation of reparations vis-à-vis the colonized majority.”<sup>301</sup> Brenke shares this view and announces that Germany’s responsibility is grounded in the colonial past as well as in the interest in the 20,000 Namibia Germans.<sup>302</sup> Maier highlights as well that Germany senses a double responsibility towards Namibia. There are groups in the German public who still sympathize with the Namibia Germans and there is the past that engages Germany and that is still very present in Namibia as the land reform issue exemplifies.<sup>303</sup> Next to this rather balanced perspective, we find many advocates who draw the picture of a one-sided responsibility towards the Namibia Germans.

Jäger (CDU/CSU) proclaims for instance: “we advocate for the realization of human rights for all inhabitants of this country, regardless of color, of nationality and tribe identity. However, we are particularly concerned about the destiny of the German ethnic group.”<sup>304</sup> Chancellor Schmidt (SPD), when being tested on his knowledge about Namibia, did not seem to remember much but he did remember, “that Germany feels an obligation towards Namibia because of the 20.000 Germans who are still residing in the country.”<sup>305</sup> It did not seem to occur to him that anyone else could be meant by Germany’s ‘special responsibility’. The magazine *Die politische Meinung* also demonstrates that the obligation vis-à-vis the Germans is strongest: “Germany feels a special engagement towards Namibia because Namibia is the only country in Africa that has been shaped by Germany to a large extent: from the German welcome sign at the airport to the townscape.”<sup>306</sup> The SWAPO representative for North and West Europe in 1980 states that ‘who’ is actually meant by this ‘special responsibility’ and ‘who’ should be meant by it are two different stories: “Special responsibility for the German governments signifies responsibility for the people of German origin. However, in order to take on the real responsibility that has grown out of the common past, Germany would have to support the Namibian independence strive.”<sup>307</sup>

Given the variety of interpretations, it remains difficult to determine with certainty who is included by this ‘special responsibility.’ Most politicians and magazines have left no doubt that it refers to the Namibia Germans, a result that confirms our findings in Chapter V, where we highlighted the important role of cultural similarity. We have less conclusive evidence concerning the African Namibians but since even the parliamentary parties CDU/CSU and FDP publicly proclaim a ‘special responsibility’ towards Namibia

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<sup>300</sup> Horvath & Strube-Edelmann, 2.

<sup>301</sup> Melber, “Bonns Namibia-Politik,” 46.

<sup>302</sup> Brenke, “Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt,” 24.

<sup>303</sup> Maier.

<sup>304</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, 197. *Sitzung Bonn*, 8. Wahlperiode, January 18., 1980.

<sup>305</sup> Helbig, 4.

<sup>306</sup> Achim Remde, “Schwerer Start. Die Unabhängigkeit Namibias und das deutsche Engagement,” in: *Die politische Meinung* 34, no. 244 (1989): 43.

<sup>307</sup> Becker, “Namibia und die Deutschen,” 10/11.

resulting from Germany's colonial role, it would be premature to discard the link between 'special responsibility' and African Namibians.

### VI.1.2 Degree of acknowledgement of past wrongdoings

Given that Germany's 'special responsibility' does not unequivocally refer to its responsibility as a former colonial power, we want to find out with more certainty whether Germany at least acknowledges the committed atrocities during colonial rule. Since moral obligation is a product of acknowledgement, this will tell us something about the degree to which Germany actually feels obliged to pay for its past.

The magazine *The Spiegel* claims that "this phase of German policy never made it to the front page in Germany for decades;" however, statements by politicians demonstrate that this chapter has evoked a sense of sensitivity and also guilt. The statement by the German secretary of Development Egon Bahr for instance: "we are now dealing with a decolonization process of a region that stirs up a lot of German emotions. Nothing will cause as much turmoil as Namibia,"<sup>308</sup> demonstrates that Namibia was not a completely forgotten chapter of German history in government archives.

The official visits to Namibia by German politicians show a curve of increasing sensitivity. Back in 1983, President Carstens still congratulated the city Lüderitz on its 100 year anniversary and the German ambassador to the Republic of South Africa, Carl Lahusen, solemnly stated that "the founding of the city resembled the beginning of a very close relationship of the territory with Germany [...],"<sup>309</sup> a message that must have been perceived by most victims as pure derision and by no means tactful. With chancellor Kohl in 1995, the period of repression started: the nostalgia slowly faded or was not considered politically correct anymore. Still, no active effort was made to acknowledge the past. Kohl was still opposed to any encounter with the Herero during his visit, which sparked off demonstrations by the Herero.<sup>310</sup>

Secretary of State Herzog's official visit in 1998 marked the beginning of a new period of reserved acknowledgement. Herzog decided to deviate from the official schedule for his visit and talked with the Herero. He argued, rather vaguely again, that he had never denied Germany's special responsibility towards Namibia but he refused a formal apology on the grounds that the injustice was committed by a different generation, that there was no international law protecting the Herero when the Herero war took place and that an apology would merely resemble empty words.<sup>311</sup> Herzog was not the only person rejecting an official apology in 1998; the opposition ran across party lines: the speaker on foreign affairs of the SPD

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<sup>308</sup> „Jeder nimmt zehn Schwarze mit ins Grab,“ 133.

<sup>309</sup> Cited in *100 Jahre deutscher Kolonialismus* (Teil 1: Namibias Kolonialisierung und Kolonialtraditionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am Beispiel Bremens). Demokratische Erziehung, Unterrichtseinheiten für Schule und Jugendbildung (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1984), 62.

<sup>310</sup> Robert von Lucius, "Entschuldigung für "historisches Unrecht"? Herero-Massaker und Kolonialunrecht/Deutschlands Vergangenheit in Afrika," *FAZ*, no. 77, April 1, 1998, 6.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

Verheugen disapproved of a formal apology, claiming that the Federal Republic of Germany did not represent the continuation of the former empire.<sup>312</sup>

Yet, there were also critics who voiced their disapproval, even if only moderately. The entrepreneur Castell-Castell regretted that President Herzog did not continue his path of apology that he had started in Poland, believing that forgiveness was the only way to reach reconciliation. Contrary to Herzog's opinion, he was of opinion that one could ask for forgiveness in the name of one's ancestors and of people who one identified with.<sup>313</sup> Other critics countered the 'absence of international law' argument by clarifying that Jewish victims had managed to receive compensation despite the absence of a legal foundation.<sup>314</sup>

With Joschka Fischer at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001, the 'time of open acknowledgement and regret with no consequences' started. Fischer, progressive and full of initiative, stated at the World Conference on September 1, 2001 that: "We have to start with the past at this conference. Past injustice cannot be undone. However, acknowledging guilt, assuming responsibility and facing up to the historical obligations can at least return the stolen dignity to the victims and their offspring. I would like to do this here and now for the Federal Republic of Germany."

Some people enthusiastically interpreted Fischer's words as an unofficial apology. This was however a little too premature. First of all, Fischer's 'apology' was very general. He does not mention any names in his speech, does not explicitly apologize for the 'genocide' in Namibia and talks instead about European colonialism, enslaving of human beings, the annihilation of entire civilizations and the mass murder of Rwandans and Burundians as well as the holocaust – a generic apology for the misery on earth. Secondly, the lack of specificity actually saved Fischer. When Fischer found these consoling words at the conference, the fact that the Herero had filed suit against the German government, which will be discussed in more detail in a later section, was still unknown. That's why Fischer expressed his deepest sympathy for the dark chapter of German colonial history during his last visit in Namibia in November but made sure not to state anything that could be interpreted as an official apology.<sup>315</sup>

Similarly, the German ambassador in Namibia, Wolfgang Massing, just recently at the 100-year commemoration of the Herero uprising, expressed his sorrow about the way the Germans quelled the Herero uprising. He stated that history could not be reversed but that "we can return the dignity and honor to the descendants."<sup>316</sup> Obviously Massing did not esteem that an official apology was necessary for this process. However, at least the equestrian monument in Windhoek, commemorating the brave German soldiers during colonial times has obtained a counterpart: a little memorial plaque that honors the Herero

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<sup>312</sup> Lucius, "Entschuldigung für "historisches Unrecht"?", 6.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Harald Stutte, "Des Kaisers blutiges Erbe," *ARD Tagesschau*, January 12, 2004.

<sup>316</sup> "Mahnung zur Versöhnung bei Gedenkfeiern für Herero-Aufstand," *dpa*, January 12, 2004.

warriors who died in the battle at Waterberg. As the newspaper *SZ* states: “no official apology but at least a little bow, a little bit respect for the almost annihilated population of the Herero.”

We can conclude that the German government has definitely acknowledged the colonial wrongdoings of the past. Many German politicians have openly confessed past injustices and have demonstrated that they are not indifferent to these wrongdoings. Yet, we are left to wonder why the German curve of sensitivity does not cumulate into an official apology. We therefore proceed now to examine what difference an official apology could make and why German politicians are so hesitant to do it. In a broader context, we furthermore analyze how moral obligation has played out in the German case, meaning whether it has pushed Germany to come to terms with the past or whether it has actually allowed the former colonial power to silence the past with a yearly paycheck.

## **VI.2 Foreign aid – a means of coming to terms with or avoiding one’s past?**

### **VI.2.1 The merits and dangers of an official apology**

Helbig says in the *Informationsdienst* that an apology is a small word with great effect: “An apology can have far-reaching effects. It can be a trigger for a process that allows *all* participants in the process to come to terms with the past.” An official apology could thus not only motivate the Germans to make an effort to digest the past but would also allow the Herero to close this chapter of their past.<sup>317</sup> Ulrich Delius, Africa expert of the “Society for endangered populations”, states that it is not a matter of opening old sores or setting off colonial debt but that an apology would allow both countries to come to terms with their past.

Coming to terms in a constructive way is according to Becker a challenge but also an opportunity.<sup>318</sup> For author Janntje Böhlke-Itzen, an apology offers the opportunity to start “a new chapter of political conversations between the two governments and to initiate a process of reparations for the victims.”<sup>319</sup> She does not even regard an apology as a challenge, at least not as an insurmountable one. According to her, in a time when European parliaments start to acknowledge the Armenian genocide and exert pressure on the Turkish government, it would be more than correct for the German government to take action.<sup>320</sup>

The reason why the German government has not formally apologized, despite the positive side effect of being able to come to terms with its past, is multifold. First of all, as Becker says, “coming to terms with the past is painful, especially if one regards the colonial past not as a *fait accompli* but as a task for the present and future.”<sup>321</sup> It is particularly painful for a country that has put in a lot of effort to restore its international reputation and to cast aside the stigma of its Nazi past. As Becker elaborates, “it would mean

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<sup>317</sup> Helbig, 4.

<sup>318</sup> Becker, “Namibia und die Deutschen,” 8.

<sup>319</sup> Norman Paech, “Die vergessenen Leiden der Hereros,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 12, 2004. The excerpt that appears in Paech’s article is taken from Böhlke-Itzen’s book “Kolonialschuld und Entschädigung - Der deutsche Völkermord an den Hereros 1904-1907” which will come out soon.

<sup>320</sup> Paech, “Die vergessenen Leiden der Hereros.”

<sup>321</sup> Becker, “Namibia und die Deutschen,” 11.

being confronted with the German mentality of white superiority, Prussian Hurrah-patriotism and brutal waging of war<sup>322</sup> – all attributes that a country would like to consider part of the past. Moreover, an official apology for Germany’s colonial past in Namibia would once again emphasize that “the thesis of an unfortunate mishap that Nazi-Germany purportedly represented is untrue.”<sup>323</sup>

Secondly, as the *FAZ* states: “The fear of claims of compensation has often discouraged governments from apologizing.”<sup>324</sup> Words cannot only be meaningful but also very expensive. Joschka Fischer has learned this in office pretty quickly. During his last visit in Windhoek last fall he expressed unmistakably that he would not say anything that would be relevant for compensation – he could not have stated it more explicitly.<sup>325</sup> Instead he said that Germany accepts its responsibility for colonial times but that it would not turn into a ‘hostage of its own past’.<sup>326</sup> Since that moment, the German government has trained itself in ‘language acrobatics’ as the *ARD Tagesschau* calls it,<sup>327</sup> meaning that any word creation is accepted to describe the past as long as the magic word ‘apology’ never leaves anybody’s lips.

Friedrich Ische and Günter Markert do not regard an apology as a danger per se but they sympathize with the government’s decision for different reasons. Ische argues in his letter to the editor that at some point of time a line has to be drawn under episodes of the past. A right to claim apologies for deeds for which a country is not responsible any more could set off an avalanche of claims: “If you take the matter further, France could demand an apology for Caesar’s line of action against Vercingetorix. Everything turns into history. You can only apologize for deeds for which you are partly responsible.”<sup>328</sup> Markert debates that if all the former colonial powers were that conscientious and “were to apologize for their atrocities and to pay compensation, every day of the year would be a day of apology and payday.”<sup>329</sup>

**Apologies – a word of controversies** – Lucius, *FAZ* 1.4.1998, 6

- Civil groups urged President Havel to take back his apology for the expulsion of more than three Million Germans out of the former Czechoslovakia
- At a an official state visit, the Dutch Queen did not apologize for the Dutch war crimes
- The English monarchy refused to apologize for the injustice of the colonial years
- New Zealand as well as Australia decided to compensate the Maori and Aborigines with money or land but never apologized for the murdering of those tribes.

These reactions also demonstrate Germans’ sensitivities when it comes to apologies and being singled out as the nation that has committed a serious wrongdoing. As indicated in the textbox, Germany is not the only country that has difficulties with this consequential word. Can we expect Germany to follow New Zealand’s

and Australia’s example of sending a regular paycheck rather than a “sorry” note? The following section on

<sup>322</sup> Becker, “Namibia und die Deutschen,” 11.

<sup>323</sup> Helbig, 4.

<sup>324</sup> Lucius, “Entschuldigung für “historisches Unrecht”?” 6.

<sup>325</sup> Bölsche.

<sup>326</sup> Michael Bitala. “Die Qualen eines vergessenen Volkes,“ *SZ*, January 10, 2004

<sup>327</sup> Stutte.

<sup>328</sup> Friedrich Ische, “Historie wie der Burenkrieg,“ *FAZ*, no. 71, March 25, 1998, 10.

<sup>329</sup> Günter Markert, “Die Opfer des Aufstandes,“ *FAZ*, no. 71, March 25, 1998, 10.

reparations elucidates the reaction of German politicians to this answer and the conclusions we can draw from this.

## **VI.2.2 Foreign aid as reparations**

“Our development policy is not aimed at reparations,”<sup>330</sup> stated Jürgen Warnke, secretary of development, in *Peripherie* in 1987. Burkhard Port of the German ministry of development and secretary of state Herzog both agree with Warnke and explain why this is not the case. They both view Namibia’s preferential treatment in Germany’s aid policy as a sufficient step to close this chapter of the past. Both promote a policy of development aid in exchange for entitlement to reparations. Herzog says openly: “The Herero are not entitled to any compensation. Besides, Namibia receives more development aid in relation to its population size than any other country.”<sup>331</sup>

This almost sounds like a phenomenon that we have just encountered in the previous section on the recognition of colonial wrongdoings: an acknowledgement without apology resembles the aid flows that are meant to console but not to repair. While the German government is anxious not to have its foreign aid appear as reparations, it wants it to serve as reparations at the same time. Being afraid that the word “reparations” just like the word “apologize” might turn out to be very costly and open up a new can of worms, the German government prefers to pay off its guilt silently, disguised as development aid. Maybe this is also the reason why the German government declared in 2000 that due to the unclear definition of ‘special responsibility’, it wanted to change this term into ‘special relations.’<sup>332</sup> The German government apparently tries to circumvent any terminology that evokes the notion of unpaid dues. This strategy is obviously not an attempt to come to terms with one’s past as Melber remarks<sup>333</sup>, but to make the past, the pangs of conscience and the perceived moral obligation and the public pressure disappear. Undeniably, it is still a strategy that is driven by moral obligation. If the German government were indifferent, we would not observe such heated discussions on whether to apologize or not and such sensitive, almost defensive, reactions concerning this chapter of the past.

## **VI.3 The final push – pressure sources**

### **VI.3.1 Morality as a single driving factor**

Governments acting on moral grounds are a rarely seen phenomenon. Morality is usually accompanied by pressure or other reasons that make the moral route worth pursuing. If the German government were only

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<sup>330</sup> Cited in Melber, “Bundesdeutsche Entwicklungspolitik als Intervention,” 57.

<sup>331</sup> “Staatsbesuch des Bundespräsidenten. Herzog will Deutsch in Namibia stärken,” *SZ*, no. 55, March 7, 1998, 8.

<sup>332</sup> Horvath & Strube-Edelmann, 2.

<sup>333</sup> Henning Melbert, “Wir haben überhaupt nicht über Reparationen gesprochen. Die namibisch-deutschen Beziehungen: Verdrängung oder Versöhnung?” in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, ed. Zimmerer Jürgen & Joachim Zeller (Berlin: CH Links Verlag, 2003): 223/223.

driven by morality, we would expect Germany's other former colonies to benefit to a similar extent. Timm states that "in the relatively brief history of the German colonial empire, there were several uprisings in almost all colonies."<sup>334</sup> Based on casualties and cruelties committed during colonial rule, Tanzania in particular should have been one of Germany's greatest aid recipients. Tanzania is Germany's third aid recipient in absolute terms but Germany does not play a special donor role as is shown by Tanzania's insignificant per-capita and relative aid performance and Germany's secondary donor position as number 9.

The Hehe in former German East Africa resisted German rule for a very long time before the turn of the century. It is unknown how many people exactly fell victim to the innumerable punitive expeditions and retaliatory measures of the Germans but "according to missionary Alfons Adams the number of people killed in action, starved to death or hanged goes into the thousands."<sup>335</sup> Another uprising, the notorious and bloody Maji-Maji uprising took place after the turn of the century in 1905/1906 in Tanzania.<sup>336</sup> The German answer to this rebellion was brutal: "Tens of thousands were killed in fighting or massacres. An even larger number of people starved to death."<sup>337</sup> Estimations of casualties go into the 120,000<sup>338</sup> or even 300,000.<sup>339</sup>

The reasons why Tanzania does not receive the same attention as Namibia despite a similar pattern of German intervention in both countries could be explained by several factors. As quoted in the *MGCM*, Kuhn reasons that despite more casualties in East Africa, "the Herero & Nama uprisings are better covered and studied because only a few white settlers got involved and were hurt, killed or affected by the Maji Maji rebellion."<sup>340</sup> Moreover, as the *SZ* explains, the Maji Maji was not a tribe of its own but comprised the militia of young warriors from several ethnic groups of the Kivu. This probably makes it also more difficult to act as an organized pressure group on the German government like the Herero do as we will later on discover in this chapter. This example shows that the need to pay off colonial guilt usually only comes paired with pressure from inside or outside interest groups.

### **VI.3.2 Internal pressure for reparations**

There are three potential groups that could be interested in seeing the German government getting more actively engaged in paying for its colonial debt. First of all, the Namibians living in Germany could have a stake in exerting pressure on the German government. Secondly, the German population or German interest groups might also have an interest in digesting and closing this chapter of history and therefore represent

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<sup>334</sup> Uwe Timm, "Für 35 Jahre einen „Platz an der Sonne.“ Die Legende von den tüchtigen Deutschen in ihren Kolonien," in *Afrika und der deutsche Kolonialismus. Zivilisierung zwischen Schnapshandel und Bibelstunde*, ed. Nestvogel, R. & R. Tezlaff (Hamburg: Reimer, 1987), 73.

<sup>335</sup> Thomas Morlang, "Sie haben es so gewollt," *Die Zeit*, no. 32, July 30, 1998.

<sup>336</sup> Michael Birnbaum, "Das Leid der "Unverwundbaren," *SZ*, no. 25, January 31, 1998, 8. "Maji" means water and medicine men told the warriors that by sprinkling themselves with a magic water that they would become invulnerable to the fire arms of the German troops.

<sup>337</sup> Jonassohn & Solveig Björnson, 249.

<sup>338</sup> Michael Birnbaum, "Das Leid der "Unverwundbaren," *SZ*, no. 25, January 31, 1998, 8.

<sup>339</sup> Jonassohn & Solveig Björnson, 249.

<sup>340</sup> Jürgen Heuchling, "Rezension: Flammen über Deutschost." *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 58, no.1 (1999), 52.

Namibia's interests. Thirdly, there are the Namibia Germans with German citizenship who could try to lobby for reparations to have their own safety guaranteed. Since we discussed the causes and role of the Namibia Germans in German aid policy in chapter V, we will now focus on the other two constituencies.

### VI.3.2.1 Namibian Diaspora in Germany

Researching the internet, only one Namibian organization could be found that is founded by Namibians in Germany: the Namibia cultural association in Aachen. Even with the help of the Namibian embassy in Germany and Bengo (Consultancy for private agencies in the development cooperation field)<sup>341</sup>, a more exhaustive list of organization of Namibian organizations could not be established. Organizations such as the German-Namibian organization, the German-Namibian development agency, Help for Namibia, German-Namibian development trust etc. are German-Namibian cooperations that foster the relationship between the two countries through exchange programs, information brochures and little projects. Their target group is the German population and it is unlikely that these organizations would take on the functions of a Namibian Diaspora and advocate on behalf of the Namibian government for ODA.

The Namibian cultural association stays therefore the only organization for Namibian by Namibians in Germany that could be detected. There are about 25 active members in the Namibian cultural association and the association has just organized a colonial exhibition that will be circulating through Germany. The website states the exhibition's goals: "We pursue the goal to sensitize the awareness of the German public

Namibian citizens in Germany from 1993-2003	
Federal Statistical Office Wiesbaden, 2004	
Year	Number
1993	130
1994	158
1995	205
1996	262
1997	269
1998	273
1999	327
2000	345
2001	405
2002	436
2003	409

about colonialism and Namibia's current challenges and thereby want to reach a higher acceptance of the engagement in terms of development politics."<sup>342</sup> This awareness raising is particularly crucial, according to the cultural association, because German colonialism in Namibia represents a time period that has become forgotten. This exhibition invites in particular the politicians and other people with 'multiplier functions' in society.

Despite the good intentions of this association, it remains uncertain how much influence such a small association can actually exert. Even though the effectiveness of an interest group cannot be measured by its size, the association needs at least well established channels and contacts to operate efficiently and make its voice heard. Given its moderate size and the relatively small number of Namibians who have resided in Germany over the past ten years, as illustrated by the table on Namibian citizens in Germany, it is doubtful that the Namibian Diaspora has this capacity in Germany.

<sup>341</sup> *German NGOs in the development field. Country index* (accessed April 20, 2004); available from <http://www.paritaet.org/bengo/index.htm>.

<sup>342</sup> *Colonial exhibition* (accessed March 15, 2004); available from <http://www.namibiakvev.de>.

### VI.3.2.2 German population as pressure group: silence, protest or ignorance?

The German colonial rule is often described as a chapter that has been forgotten, repressed or covered up by the notion of a nostalgic colonial romantic.<sup>343</sup> One starts to wonder whether the injustice committed during colonial rule and the controversial Namibia policy after WWII have never sparked off any protests by the German population. Going back in time, we can find some action, mainly during the time of the Apartheid regime and of South African occupation, led by religious groups. In 1975 for instance, the working group of the Protestant Youth and the alliance of the German Catholic Youth organized a Namibia week. The critical assessment of the German colonial and mission-history was one of the major themes on the agenda, next to the complete condemnation of the apartheid system and the importance of economic, political, cultural and church relations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Namibia.<sup>344</sup> Most other religious activism concentrated on South Africa as the occupying power and as the country of racism. On the occasion of the 20<sup>th</sup> protestant church day in 1983, a South Africa day was organized where South Africa's line of action was repudiated, critically discussed and where Germans could show solidarity with Namibia. In 1978, the protestant women group in Germany asked everybody to join the boycott of all South African products.<sup>345</sup>

However after Namibia gained its independence, critical voices seemed to fade. Why has there been so little protest and little pressure on the German government? Is this a result of ignorance or merely conscientious silence? We thus want to find out how much Germans know about this time period, how well and critically they are informed by the media and other information sources and whether this 'dark chapter' is covered in school.

#### *Awareness – a snapshot of what Germans know about Namibia*

The collective consciousness of the holocaust is strong and omnipresent in German institutions such as the school system, the media, scholarly debates and memories. The collective consciousness of the 'genocide' in Namibia, on the contrary, is almost non-existing or difficult to find, states the *Tagesspiegel*.<sup>346</sup> "If anything is present in the collective consciousness, it is most definitely not the genocide like behavior of the troops of the emperor but rather a 'South West nostalgia,'" describes Becker,<sup>347</sup> a point that Timm

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<sup>343</sup> See for instance Jürgen Zimmerer, "Wir müssen jetzt krassen Terrorismus üben," *FAZ*, no. 355, November 2, 2002, 37.

<sup>344</sup> Georg Krämer, *Namibia-Woche. Menschenrechte außer Kraft. Auswertung*. (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Evangelischen Jugend in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westberlin e.V. (AE) und Bund der Deutschen Katholischen Jugend (BDKJ), 1977), 7.

<sup>345</sup> Patemann, 257/258.

<sup>346</sup> *Tagesspiegel* - 10.01.2004

<sup>347</sup> Becker, "Namibia und die Deutschen," 11.

makes as well.<sup>348</sup> According to Becker, the former German colony has been a peripheral subject in the German discourse with no particular solidarity groups or periodicals supporting its causes.<sup>349</sup>

<b>Questionnaire: Do Namibia and Germany have a special relationship? Top 5 answers</b>	
43%	I don't know
30%	Yes because of the colonial history
8%	Yes because Germany gives development aid
4%	No
3%	Yes because of the German traditions still present in Namibia
3%	Yes because of partnerships between schools, congregations etc.

The survey, conducted with students, teachers and employees in 2003 demonstrates that Germans are neither completely ignorant nor very

knowledgeable about this part of German history. When asked whether Germany and Namibia have a special relationship, the majority, 43% of the participants, did not know. Most people who said yes and gave a reason stated that the two countries are linked through colonial history (30%) or that Germany gives development aid to Namibia (8%).<sup>350</sup> 30% of people who are aware of the colonial past are not a great number even if it reflects that this chapter of history is not completely unknown.<sup>351</sup> Only 2% of the interviewees mentioned the Herero murder in their answers, which highlights the fact that even though the colonial past might not be completely forgotten, the 'genocide' is unknown. We can conclude that these numbers do not hint at a very conscious German population.

<b>Questionnaire: What connects Namibia, Togo and Cameroon?</b>	
53%	They were all former colonies
19%	They all export valuable resources to Germany
19%	No statement
6%	They are still under German control
4%	They have fought on Germany's side during WWII

Looking at the answers to the question that asked people about the connection between Namibia, Togo and Cameroon, we can draw a similar picture. Even though the four possible answers

were given, almost 50% got the answer wrong. The fact that 19% did not check off anything reveals insecurity and how little this part of history is internalized. The fact that still numerous people and these were not only the high school students<sup>352</sup>, replied that these countries are still under German control or fought on Germany's side during WWII is astonishing and demonstrates that there is an educational deficit.

The answers to the next question on Namibia's role in Germany's development policy show that although Germans might

<b>Questionnaire: What for a status would you accord Namibia in Germany's development policy?</b>	
31%	Relatively small
29%	Average
19%	No statement
10%	Insignificant
9%	Great
1%	Extraordinary

<sup>348</sup> Timm, 68.

<sup>349</sup> Becker, "Namibia und die Deutschen," 11.

<sup>350</sup> People did not only refer to the financial aspects of aid. They for instance stated that there are many German NGOs or that Germany works through NGOs in Namibia.

<sup>351</sup> We also have to acknowledge that c. half of the interviewees were high school students who might not read the newspaper regularly and who might not have been exposed to it yet.

<sup>352</sup> 78% high school students, 22% others.


be aware that Namibia is a former German colony, they are not aware of Namibia's importance in Germany's aid policy. The majority of interviewees, 31%, answered that Germany only plays a relatively small role, followed by 29% who stated that its role is average. Only 9% alleged that Namibia assumes a great status and merely 1% accords Namibia an extraordinary status.

Concluding that Germans are not completely oblivious to the fact that Namibia is a former colony but are for the most part not well informed about this time period, we now examine the reasons behind this knowledge gap.

### News coverage & scholarly debate

In terms of news coverage, we can say that Namibia did make an appearance in the news, at least in some of Germany's most notable magazines and newspapers.<sup>353</sup> It was only possible to trace back articles to the 70s from the magazine *Der Spiegel* (1974-1999) and *Der Stern* (1974 – 1994) due to their kind assistance. The newspapers *FAZ* and *SZ* were accessible on CD Rom from 1993 – 2002 (*FAZ*) and 1994 - 2001 and the

weekly magazine *Die Zeit* was accessible from 1995-2001.<sup>354</sup>



As the first graph on the coverage in magazines shows, the magazines *Der Spiegel* and *Der Stern* covered the subject matter regularly over the course of the 20 years. The magazine *Die Zeit* is not depicted in the graph because only two articles in 2001 could be found. With the exception of 1978<sup>355</sup>, Namibia never

made it to more than one or two articles per year. This number is not negligible given that they are only weekly magazines but it is rather little, considering that Namibia was sometimes only briefly mentioned in a column. Namibia only made it once to the title page in *Der Spiegel* in 1978 with “South West Africa - the Germans have to leave” and 17 pages were dedicated to the topic. From 1994 to 1999 for *Der Spiegel* and


<sup>353</sup> The selection was based on my own knowledge of the German print media scene and on availability of sources.

<sup>354</sup> I searched the databases for articles that were related to the topics that are covered in this study, i.e. Germany's colonial role, Germany's Namibia policy, Germany's interest in Namibia, Germany's development policy with respect to Namibia, the Herero war and the Herero suit etc. Unfortunately, the 100 year commemoration of the Herero uprising, a decisive day in German/Namibian history, took place after my research phase and most databases are only updated on a yearly basis. On this occasion, many newspapers have decided to publish articles and even radio and TV productions have been numerous. Those publications and emissions could not be traced in their entity; however, the German/Namibian society has assembled a nice collection of all the media pieces on the commemoration. See the news recollection at <http://www.dngev.de/>.

<sup>355</sup> In 1978, UN Resolution 435 was passed that established a United Nations Transition Assistance Group for the purpose of ensuring Namibia's independence through free elections. See <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/80/IMG/NR036880.pdf>. South Africa officially agreed to free elections but then resorted to fraudulent measures to guarantee the victory of its candidate.

from 1994 to 2003 for the Stern, however, no articles in the magazines could be found on the topic in the available databases.<sup>356</sup> Only on the occasion of the 100-year commemoration do we find news coverage, at least in *Der Spiegel* 03/2004.

Concerning newspapers coverage, we can see that particularly the *FAZ* reported on Namibia-related subjects a little more frequently. Most articles were published during the year of Kohl's visit (1995), during



Herzog's visit (1998), in the year where the land reform question (2000) and the Herero suit against the German government and German companies (2001) unfolded. Since the *FAZ* is a very sophisticated, analytical national newspaper that is not frequented by the majority of German readers, the *SZ* as a regional newspaper that is still profound but gives an easier read, probably

indicates better how often the broad German public was exposed to topics related to this study.

Questionnaire: Which source of knowledge told you most about Namibia?	
34%	Media
28%	I never hear anything about Namibia
18%	School
8%	Family/relatives
8%	Books
2%	Profession
2%	Other source

The *SZ* definitely covers articles of concern less frequently and given that it is a daily newspaper, we can say that opportunities for the readers to inform themselves were rare. The results of the questionnaire demonstrate, however, that the media is still the source of knowledge that has informed the interviewees the most.<sup>357</sup> Since not only coverage but content matters when trying to find out

whether the German public is *well* informed about the subject, we will now turn to the coverage quality.

The newspapers as well as weekly magazines covered the official visits of German politicians to Namibia, the dispute on the term 'genocide' and now the 100-year commemoration of the Herero uprising in more detail and in a critical voice. Most articles did not hesitate to spare the German government any criticism and mockery. During the South African occupation for instance, politicians, accused of hindering Namibia's independence, had to defend their positions ardently; Herzog's 'apology' explanation was torn apart by the media<sup>358</sup>; Fischer's good intentions at the World Conference against Racism, Racial

<sup>356</sup> This might partly be due to the database or possibly because the magazines thought that there was no single issue that deserved the more comprehensive coverage of a weekly magazine.

<sup>357</sup> Even though the information provided was probably truthful, many interviewees stated that they did not know anything about Namibia and that they are best informed through the media at the same time, meaning that they had probably spotted Namibia in one of the headlines or had heard the name in the news before but never informed themselves about the issue in more detail.

<sup>358</sup> See for instance, *Die Zeit* putting Herzog's behavior into its own words: "Ask for forgiveness now? Pay again? Does not Germany as first donor in Namibia pay already enough indulgence? Bad luck, chiefs! Every past has to come

Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance were ridiculed<sup>359</sup> and on the occasion of the commemoration, many journalists reminded the German population and foremost the German politicians of their successful Namibia policy of repression.

Most of the articles from political magazines such as ‘APUZ’ (*‘From politics and contemporary history’*), ‘Die politische Meinung’ (*‘The political opinion’*) dealt with Germany’s Namibia policy in the pre-independence period. Historical magazines such as the ‘*magazine for historical science*’ as well as development-related publications such as *Pogrom, Peripherie, Iz3w* etc. reflect more thoroughly on the colonial times and some follow Germany’s ‘Namibia-policy’ till Namibia’s independence. Uncritical and glorifying articles as appeared in the magazine *Stern* in 2001 do happen but remain the exception: “‘German-South West.’ Today either forgotten or ostracized as an imperialist sin. However, this silenced epoch is worth being rediscovered: a fascinating piece of history full of adventurers who left with arrogance and the desire to explore but also with the readiness to make sacrifices.”<sup>360</sup>

Despite the predominantly critical news coverage, most interviewees did not seem to have retained much: 40% answered that they did not know anything about Namibia, 10% recalled geographic information and 8%

Questionnaire: What do you know about Namibia? Top 5 answers	
40%	Nothing
16%	Problem-related information: AIDS, racism, land reform
10%	Geographic information such as climate, landscape
9%	Information on Namibia's past
8%	Poverty, status as developing country

answered rather generally that Namibia is a poor or developing country. Only 16% mentioned a more pressing issue such as AIDS or growing racism and only 9% reflected briefly on Namibia’s history. Namibia obviously did not get the media attention that would have drummed Namibia-related issues into the interviewees’ heads.

The discourse in literature changed quite significantly over time. After WWI, nonfiction books, stories, novels, photo albums and sometimes even poems transferred the readers back to the good old times, portraying the German in South West as a diligent, order loving man, who was interested in the well-being of the ‘negro’<sup>361</sup> Now, the nostalgia has vanished and more critical research has followed. Hinz stresses that the topic “100 years after” slowly gains a foothold in Germany and that historical science has actively gotten engaged.<sup>362</sup> The magazine *Der Spiegel* supports Hinz’s statement and points to the fact that “a new generation of historians and authors is about to rediscover and digest a half forgotten, half romanticized era between 1884 and 1918.”<sup>363</sup>

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to an end. Why should we care about the crimes of our grandfathers?” (“Pech gehabt,” *Die Zeit*, no. 12, March 12, 1998.)

<sup>359</sup> See for instance Stutte.

<sup>360</sup> Metzner & Oberholzer, 104.

<sup>361</sup> Timm, 67.

<sup>362</sup> Hinz, 6.

<sup>363</sup> Bölsche.

The new critical and challenging literature on Namibia that has recently been shelved at the German

**New literature leaping up in 2003/2004 –**

new titles in the German national library in Frankfurt:

<http://dbf-opac.ddb.de/>

- Nordbruch, Claus (2004): Genocide of the Herero in German South West Africa?
- Bühler, Andreas Heinrich (2003): The Nama uprising against German colonial rule in Namibia from 1904 till 1913
- Kaulich, Udo (2003): The history of the former colony German-South-West Africa (1984-1914)
- Keil, Thomas (2003): The postcolonial literature in Namibia (1920-2000)
- Kreuzkamp, Dieter (2003): Tracing back in Namibia: on a discovery journey
- Seyfried, Gerhard (2003): Herero: novel
- Zimmerer, Jürgen and Joachim Zeller (2003): Genocide in German South West Africa: the colonial war (1904-1908) in Namibia and its consequences

national library in Frankfurt definitely marks a new beginning. In no other years so many books have been published on the genocide, German rule and postcolonial discovery than in 2003. Another book that will appear soon is “Colonial guilt and reparations – The German genocide of the Herero” by Janntje Böhlke-Itzen – a book that would have been very insightful for this thesis.

Conferences either have been organized or are in the process of being organized in order to commemorate and come to terms with this chapter of the past.<sup>364</sup> Manfred Hinz for instance conceptualizes an international conference in

Bremen from November 18 to 21, 2004 on “Realities, traumas and perspectives (1904-2004): The Herero war – 100 years after.” Hinz refers in his background paper to another conference, organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation on “Colonial heritage, colonial traumas and reparations” on June 27-28, 2003.<sup>365</sup> According to Hinz, an initiative from Cologne (Rautenstrauch museum and DFG Africa Special Research Field of the university) is also on its way. Hinz aims at having the conference bring together Namibian and German scholars and possibly also politicians that will build onto the body of research and will therefore open up new perspectives for an informed dialogue between the German and Namibian government.<sup>366</sup>

Whether the increased attention in the media as well as in academia will actually oblige the otherwise reluctant government to join the discussion table remains to be seen. Based on our analysis so far, it seems rather doubtful.

### ***Namibia and the colonial past in the school curriculum***


In order to gauge how well Namibia and the colonial past is covered in German schools, we will rely on the results of the survey conducted with high school students, university students and teachers. Whereas the WWII and the holocaust basically dominate the school curriculum<sup>367</sup>, the colonial past is just a minor

<sup>364</sup> Due to time constraints, this section only refers to the conferences that are mentioned by Hinz in his background paper, assuming that since he is organizing a conference on this theme, he is well informed on other conferences scheduled during the year.


<sup>365</sup> Hinz, 8.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>367</sup> This statement is based on my own educational experience; a comparative study, testing students on the holocaust and the Namibian genocide would definitely be interesting.



episode. Based on the survey<sup>368</sup>, we get the impression that Namibia is not a very thoroughly studied subject in school. 64% of all high school students interviewed



and 79% of all university students claimed to not have studied Namibia in school. 21% of all university and 33% of all high school students studied Namibia little or too little.<sup>369</sup>

When we test the knowledge of these students who crossed off that they studied Namibia in whatever depth, 44% state voluntarily that they do not know anything about the country. We can thus assume that Namibia was probably covered marginally in these classes. This result is reconfirmed by the survey with the university students. Those who studied Namibia in school, usually reported to have covered the subject in their history-A level, a course destined to specialize students in a particular subject.

Questionnaire: Who covered Namibia?	
84%	Teachers who did not cover Namibia
16%	Teachers who covered Namibia
43%	Teachers with the right combination but did not cover Namibia

The majority of teachers interviewed,<sup>370</sup>84%, did not cover Namibia in school. Of those teachers, teaching a subject in which students

had indicated to have studied Namibia<sup>371</sup> (right combination), 43% did not cover it. The predominant reason why they did not cover any Namibia related topics in class was that they felt it was not relevant in their subject area (42%). The second reason was that Namibia was not prescribed by the

Questionnaire: Reasons by teachers with the right combination why they did not cover Namibia	
42%	Not relevant in their subjects
37%	Not prescribed by the curriculum
11%	General covering of the subject
11%	Time issues

<sup>368</sup> Since school politics is in the hand of the German states, policies and curricula might differ. This survey only covers high school students from North Rhine Westfalia (NRW) and Lower Saxony (LS) and university students who graduated from High School in NRW, LS, Bremen, Hesse, Bavaria, Rhineland Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Mecklenburg Western Pommerania and Saxony-Anhalt and a German school in Argentina.

<sup>369</sup> A little and too little have to be counted as the same category. Too little is more a judgmental question and aimed at finding out how many students, who studied it, would have liked to know more about it.

<sup>370</sup> Teachers were interviewed from NRW, LS and Bremen.

<sup>371</sup> University Students: History (58%), Geography (42%); High School Students: Geography (48%), Social Science (29%), Politics (8%), German (5%), History (5%), Religion (5%), PE (2%).

curriculum (37%). Even some teachers who studied Namibia with their students stated that either nothing was required by the curriculum or that Namibia was just supposed to be listed as an example rather than as an independent subject matter. Regardless of whether they had covered Namibia or not, 80% of all teachers answered that nothing had been prescribed by the curriculum, 2% responded that there was no curriculum for this subject, 5% were not sure and 2% regarded it as an aspect of a broader topic. Only 7% asserted

Questionnaire: Was anything prescribed by the curriculum?	
80%	Nothing
7%	Yes - colonialism and its consequences/effects today; development politics
5%	Maybe in relation to the subject area of development politics/potentially 'area of unspoiled nature'
2%	Only little, it is a small aspect of a broader subject
2%	There is no curriculum for this subject; subject is given by the textbook

that Namibia was prescribed in the context of colonialism or development politics, reflecting that this topic has not been a priority on the German curriculum.

Based on the results of the survey we get the impression that the school system has not contributed much to creating a collective consciousness that Timm and some journalists have characterized as lost or non-existent. We now take a look at the school material that could be found in the German National library to find out more about the quality.

The quality of educational material on this topic ranges from very critical to ignorant. Patemann's *handbook of Namibia* from 1985 is very critical and deals extensively with German rule in South West on more than 100 pages filled with primary sources, articles, quotations, illustrations and pictures. The textbook *100 years colonialism* takes a similarly critical approach: it accuses German officials of disguising rather than condemning colonialist traditions<sup>372</sup> and tries to present an accurate version of history. The study questions it proposes are critical and provocative. Students are for instance asked to discuss what the loss of land meant for the African tribes.<sup>373</sup> The book on *Southern Africa in school* on the other side has only a small part on Namibia (8 pages compared to 46 pages on South Africa) and this part totally blends out materials on the 'colonial past', the 'Herero uprising' and the 'genocide'.<sup>374</sup> This is certainly only an extract of the textbooks that are currently available and a more thorough research would be necessary to determine the *overall* quality.

Based on this snapshot of German knowledge and awareness, we cannot detect any signs letting us conclude that the Germans interviewed could serve as an advocacy group for the Namibian cause. Some people had heard that Namibia was a former German colony but only a handful of people went into detail.

<sup>372</sup> *100 Jahre deutscher Kolonialismus*, 3/4.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>374</sup> Weltmission, Evangelisches Missionwerk im Bereich der BRD, ed., *Südafrika im Unterricht. Übersicht und kritische Bewertung von Unterrichtsmaterialien, Büchern, Filmen, Dia-Serien und Spielen zu Südafrika, Namibia und Zimbabwe*, (1978).

The majority of interviewees did not know anything about Namibia, did not know whether the two countries had a special relationship, did not study it in school and a large group even stated that they had never heard anything about it. The people, who thought that Namibia was the primary beneficiary of German aid either assumed that need was the primary driving force or they gave no reason, probably assuming that due to the nature of the previous questions, Namibia must be an important country. Again, the majority thought that Namibia only played a relatively small role in German development policy. This survey has conveyed the impression that the German government does not foster an open dialogue about Germany's wrongdoings in the past through its information policy. Only in secluded circles such as professional magazines or in academic discussions or conferences does the discussion about this forgotten chapter of German history gain more momentum. It is however unlikely that these debates will trigger off public protest and that the German government will feel obliged in any way to adjust its aid policy accordingly.

### **VI.3.3 External pressure for reparations**

Contrary to the almost non-existent internal pressure, external pressure has been persistent over time. Which external actor has been most effective in keeping the German government on its toes? There are three potential candidates that could have helped to remind Germany of its obligations: either the Namibian government, the Herero as a subgroup or Germany's neighboring and other Western countries. While we scrutinize the first two candidates more closely, we discard the third candidate. Germany certainly has nothing to fear from its other Western countries that helped to carve up the African continent. Accusing Germany would mean that they had to make reparations and revisit the past as well – a procedure that not only Germany tries to avoid.

#### **VI.3.3.1 Pressure from the Namibian government**

The Namibian government has been predominantly interested in regular aid flows as indirect compensation for the pre-independence period and the long-term effects of German colonial rule. Their main focus seems to be on the pre-independence period because West Germany's controversial financial support, its ties to South Africa and its hesitant acknowledgement of the SWAPO as representative of the people<sup>375</sup> stirred up a great deal of hostility.<sup>376</sup> Moreover, the long-term consequences of colonial rule such as the unequal distribution of land, the unequal income distribution<sup>377</sup>, racial tensions etc. have also concerned the Namibian government and have proven helpful in pleading for continued development aid.

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<sup>375</sup> The CDU/CSU regarded the SWAPO as a communist terror organization for instance. For more information on parties' attitude vis-à-vis the SWAPO, see Löwis, 30.

<sup>376</sup> See Nujoma's quote in Brenke, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Namibia-Konflikt," 28, mentioned in Chapter IV.

<sup>377</sup> *EIU Country Profile 2003, Namibia*, 26.

Even though the Namibian government likes to remind Germany at regular intervals of its ‘special responsibility’ that keeps aid flowing, it has expressed no particular intentions to support the Herero in their efforts to claim reparations from the German government. The Herero tribe has filed suit against the German government as will be discussed in more detail later on. This discretion might have various explanations. First of all, as editor in chief for the German publication *Allgemeinen Zeitung* in Windhoek explains in the *ARD Tagesschau*: President Sam Nujoma sees the special relationship with Germany endangered by this suit and does not support reparations up in the billions for just a few minorities in the country in the first place.”<sup>378</sup> Ulrich Delius, Africa expert of the ‘Society for endangered populations’ reasons in an interview that the lack of interest of the government could be explained by the fact that the Herero were not a constituency of the former liberation movement SWAPO.<sup>379</sup> In addition, not only would the government begrudge the Herero potential reparations, they would also fear that “compensations could possibly mean that the land holding of the biggest population group, the Ovambo, would be transferred to the Herero.”<sup>380</sup>

In conclusion, we can assume that as long as Germany maintains this ‘friendly’ and generous aid relationship, it has no moral lessons and hostility to fear from the Namibian government. Germany’s tactic of silencing potential pressure groups with generous aid has worked for the Namibian government.

### **VI.3.3.2 Pressure from the Herero**

In order to examine how much pressure the German government can expect and has already received from the Herero, we first look into whether the Herero uprising still plays a role in the Herero culture and to what extent it has shaped the Herero identity. We then examine what kind of actions the Herero have undertaken up till now to put pressure on the German government.

#### ***The Herero uprising – forgotten chapter or part of self-definition***

Although the Germany’s colonial past is too distanced for anyone to get upset about<sup>381</sup> and the genocide has apparently disappeared from the collective memory of the Germans, “it represents a very important reference point for the Herero and Nama in their history that they celebrate every year (August 26) with parades,” as Zimmerer states.<sup>382</sup> The fact that this day represents the greatest public ritual in Namibia<sup>383</sup>,

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<sup>378</sup> Stutte.

<sup>379</sup> Frank Grubitzsch, “Schwieriges Gedenken an den Hereroaufstand,” *Sächsische Zeitung*, January 10, 2004.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

<sup>381</sup> “Aufräumen, aufhängen, niederknallen...,” 138.

<sup>382</sup> Zimmerer, “Wir müssen jetzt krassen Terrorismus üben,” 37.

<sup>383</sup> Krüger, 9. Krüger describes this ritual in detail: the men are dressed in former military uniforms and the women wear red Victorian dresses. Every year they hold a commemoration ceremony at the graves of the old Herero chiefs and the Priests recall the past, the sorrows, needs and the strong bond among the Herero.

shows how much importance the Herero and Nama attach to it. Krüger explains that no other event in Namibia's history has been so deeply rooted in historiography and collective memory.<sup>384</sup>

Just like the journalist of the *Tagesspiegel* Kanzler, we might wonder why this event is so anchored in the Herero culture and identity, particularly since the majority of the Herero who live today were born after the war.<sup>385</sup> Special advisor to Kuaima Riruako, Mburumba Kerina elucidates that the main consequence of this war, poverty due to the land and cattle robbery, is still very present today.<sup>386</sup> On top of this, this part of history has been passed on from generation to generation in oral tradition and “has thus been burned into the hearts and way of thinking of the Herero.”<sup>387</sup> For Ganns, the Herero have not been able to forget because of the continued presence of the German settlers in Namibia.<sup>388</sup> Hinz reasons that the Herero war is still so omnipresent today because the population of the Herero has still not recovered from the trauma it experienced.<sup>389</sup> The Herero still have not managed to forget because according to their perception, the past 100 years have contributed nothing toward resolving the crime.<sup>390</sup> Maier agrees with Hinz and explains that, contrary to our linear comprehension of history allowing us to close a certain chapter of the past, the Herero cannot move on without a real reconciliation between them and the descendants of the former colonial power.<sup>391</sup>

Given that the past has still been so present and shaped the identity for the majority of the Herero and has forged a strong bond between the Herero, we could expect a strong and unified effort of the Herero to put pressure on the German government.

### ***Actions undertaken to claim justice***

Already in 1990 when Namibia became independent and Germany reunified, Herero Chief Riruako determined that the time had come for the Germans to make a concerted effort to erase the black spots of their past.<sup>392</sup> Since no efforts by the German government were made that qualified as satisfactory on the part of the Herero, the Herero proceeded to take action in 1998. Herero chief Riruako attempted to put the German government on trial at the ICJ but the ICJ rejected the opening of a lawsuit on the basis that only states are parties to the ICJ.<sup>393</sup> This however did not stop the Herero People's Reparations Corporation, headed by Riruako, who then on September 19, 2001 filed suit at the district court of Columbia (US)

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<sup>384</sup> Krüger, 9.

<sup>385</sup> Sven-Eric Kanzler, “Das Trauma ist heute noch zu spüren - Die Herero erwarten von Berlin eine Wiedergutmachung,” *Tagesspiegel*, January 12, 2004.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

<sup>387</sup> Kanzler, “Das Trauma ist heute noch zu spüren.”

<sup>388</sup> Ganns, 88.

<sup>389</sup> Hinz, 2.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>391</sup> *Deutsche und Herero: eine unbeendete Geschichte*, 5/6.

<sup>392</sup> “Namibia. Vom anderen Stern,” *Der Spiegel* 30, July 23, 1990, 110.

<sup>393</sup> “Herero-Klage in Den Haag abgewiesen. Neun Verfahren afrikanischer Staaten anhängig,” *FAZ*, no. 211, September 11, 1999, 7.

against German corporations that had been active in the former German colony such as the Deutsche Bank, Terex (as the successor of Orenstein-Koppel Co) and the German Africa line (as the successor of the Woermann Line). Short time afterwards, the Federal Republic of Germany was sued as the legal successor of the German empire.<sup>394</sup> All together, almost 4 billion dollars are at stake.<sup>395</sup>

The determination of the Herero to claim justice is demonstrated by the fact that they do not seem to get discouraged by any legal defeat. When the ICJ as well as the district court in the District of Columbia declared that it was incompetent and could not pursue matters further, the accusers were willing to welcome Herero with US citizenship on their team to create a reference to the US and hand in the claim at a national court in New York.<sup>396</sup> Not even the forecast that ‘lawyers agree to a large extent that those accusations have no foundations that warrants entitlements,<sup>397</sup> deters the Herero. They continue to stand firm despite the many obstacles they are facing like the competence of the court, the immunity of a country as defendant and the limitation of time.<sup>398</sup> Even though not all Herero stand solidly behind Riruako and not everybody regards Riruako as the Paramount chief of the Herero, the majority of the Herero supports the purpose of this legal intervention. They view the suit as a means of coming to terms with the past and of regaining dignity and honor.<sup>399</sup> There is thus a consensus that the German government has not paid its dues.

How can we explain such a determination of the Herero to continue? First of all, whereas German newspapers perceive the claim for reparations as a “sword of Damocles, pending over the process of reconciliation,”<sup>400</sup> the Herero think that there will be no reconciliation ever without reparations.<sup>401</sup> Secondly, the accusations have received increased media attention, stirred up debates and thereby reminded the German government of the destiny of the Herero. Michael Bitala from the *SZ* even claims that these accusations have motivated secretary of state Fischer to guarantee more foreign aid in the future.<sup>402</sup> The Herero could thus even garner success without winning the case. Alerting the German government and enticing it to not only continue its current financial support but to pay more attention to the Herero would be a triumph in any case. Knowing Germany’s strategy and its interest in preventing an escalation of this matter and in avoiding high reparations that would not only be costly but also precedent-setting for other tribes, foreign aid flows to Namibia will not cease for the years to come.

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<sup>394</sup> Paech. The following accusations were brought forward: (1) Instigation and implementation of a racial war against the Herero, (2) Instigation and implementation of a implicit and explicit genocide and annihilation campaign against the Herero (3) Brutalizing and Enslaving of the Herero and systematic employment of forced labor, (4) Systematic and forceful humiliation of the Herero women as prisoners and (5) Systemic destruction of the Herero culture.

<sup>395</sup> Hinz, 3.

<sup>396</sup> Paech.

<sup>397</sup> Grubitzsch.

<sup>398</sup> Paech.

<sup>399</sup> Hinz, 14.

<sup>400</sup> “Die langen Schatten kolonialer Vergangenheit,” *Deutschland Funk*, January 10, 2004.

<sup>401</sup> Herero Chief Riruako left no doubt about his determination: “The Germans had to deal with the holocaust of the Jewish, the Sinti and Roma. Now, they will have to face up to the genocide of the Herero.” (Bölsche.)

<sup>402</sup> Bitala.

In conclusion, we can say that moral obligation, mainly a product of Germany's colonial regime and reinforced by the controversial aid regime in the pre-independence period, has accompanied the German government until today. The sensitive reactions in debates on the 'genocide', on the need of an official apology and on compensation for colonial wrongdoings have shown that the German politicians are not only aware of the common past with Namibia but more importantly, that they are not indifferent to it. Although they have refused to apologize officially, German politicians have largely recognized colonial wrongdoings, which represents a preliminary condition for moral obligation to be influential in aid allocation. Due to external pressure, moral obligation has taken on a decisive role in determining German aid flows to Namibia. Contrary to external pressure, internal pressure has been largely absent: there is no discernable Namibian Diaspora and the ordinary citizen in Germany is left in the dark. External pressure has been successfully exerted by two groups: the Namibian government and the Herero. The Namibian government has been more concerned with West Germany's controversial aid regime and the long term effects of colonial rule than with the genocide of the Herero per se. It has regularly reminded the German government of its 'special responsibility' towards the Namibian population. This subtle pressure has definitely guaranteed continuity in German aid relations with Namibia. At the same time, this aid relationship has also been satisfactory for Germany, which has preferred foreign aid to more costly, precedent-setting and debate-stirring reparations. The 'aid rather than reparations' policy has worked less well for the Herero. The Herero have sued the German government and now openly claim reparations. This has probably reinforced the motivations of secretary of state Fischer to renew generous commitments for the years to come. Whether Germany succeeds in silencing the debate surrounding the trial by future aid flows or whether it is forced to deal with the 'genocide' more intensively, remains to be seen.

## VII. Conclusion

This study has testified that contrary to public perception, Germany maintains an exceptional aid relationship with its former colony, Namibia. Our statistical analysis has shown that Namibia is not only a very significant per capita aid recipient, which might be less surprising given its small population size, but that Germany donates most in relative terms on the African continent to Namibia. In addition, Germany is Namibia's most important bilateral donor, even in absolute terms.

Whereas other studies in their attempt to explain aid allocation behavior have accorded a crucial role to variables such as *economic potential*, *ideology* or *good governance*, *the integration of a country into a regional context* and *military strategic interest*, this study has demonstrated that these variables are not decisive in the Namibia case. The fact that Namibia is a stable, democratic country, embedded in an attractive regional context and endowed with an economic potential, has probably facilitated the aid relationship but it has not been the driving factor behind aid. Militarily, Namibia is not one of Germany's partners in the anti-terrorism campaign and on top of this, is not a country that has significant military resources at its disposal. Even the variable *need*, largely contested but nevertheless supported by some aid allocation authors, does not dominate Germany's aid allocation behavior. The 'non-monetary' proxies for need illustrate that due to prevailing inequality, Namibia is needier than is commonly assumed and than its GDP per capita portrays. However, it still does not belong to the 'neediest' countries on the African continent and Germany's overall aid allocation pattern attests that not necessarily the countries with the greatest need rank highest on Germany's aid list.

With the classic variables not succeeding in explaining the German-Namibian relationship, we studied the impact of two further variables, one not often applied in the German case and the other largely ignored in the aid allocation discourse. The first variable, cultural similarity, belongs to the variables that have entered the aid allocation discourse more recently. It has been studied by various scholars, usually summarized by a dummy variable for the colonial past in econometric analysis. Since Germany's colonial past is distanced and all of its former colonies were taken over after WWII by another colonial power, Germany is usually either not considered as a colonial power in these studies or the impact is measured as low. Constraining the analysis of aid allocation motives in our case study to Namibia, the only former African colony with a German settlement, the variable 'cultural similarity' turned out to be a decisive factor. This cultural affinity can be explained by the interests of German politicians in gaining the Namibian constituency over the past years and by the sentimental value that they attach to Namibia. Namibia is the only country with such a strong German bastion of 20,000 citizens of German origin where the German culture and language are preserved.

The second variable, moral obligation, has determined aid flows to an even greater extent. Germany's moral obligation is mainly a product of its colonial past - the 'genocide' of the Herero, - reinforced by its

controversial pre-independence ‘Namibia policy.’ Although the German government has until now refused to apologize, fearing costly claims for compensation, it has officially acknowledged its colonial wrongdoings in the past. This recognition has set the basis for moral obligation to play a role. Since governments seldom act in a purely altruistic manner, pressure has been crucial for moral obligation to function as one of the primary motives in the Namibia case. Internal pressure has not been influential: the Namibian Diaspora is too small to carry much political weight and the German population is neither aware of the special German-Namibian relationship nor of its underlying factors. External pressure, in contrast, has been a key factor: the Namibian government has regularly reminded the German government of its past aberrations and the Herero has even put the German government and three German companies on trial. Worried about its reputation and costly reparations, the German government appears to have used its generous aid flows in an attempt to silence these pressure sources.

Combining the variables moral obligation and cultural similarity, we obtain a third motive that has gained importance over time in Germany’s aid regime: the socio-political strategic interest of the German government to prevent an escalation of the current land reform issue. Such an escalation could stir up a great deal of hostility between the ‘white settlers’ and the indigenous population of Namibia and lead to instability within the region. This socio-political strategic interest, the softer and less often used counterpart to military strategic interest, is linked to cultural similarity and moral obligation because (1) the land reform issue is one of the colonial legacies and (2) it could potentially harm the Namibia Germans for whom the German government feels a ‘special responsibility.’

In conclusion, we can state that the mix of moral obligation, cultural similarity and socio-political strategic interest have, in decreasing order of importance, determined German aid policy to the greatest extent. Consequently, this case study has not only corroborated the initial hypothesis made in chapter I but it also provides an argument to include moral obligation as a variable in future research on aid allocation.

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