ty of law professors to find dubious points of logic or concept is not itself surprising. And it must be remembered that even though the Executive Branch has won for the moment, Constitutional vagueness and the conduct of foreign relations will not end. The burden of seeking Senatorial advice and consent or formal Congressional support for a treaty denunciation is not unduly onerous once it is conceived that the Executive Branch has no monopoly on wisdom and that in practice the requirement of consultation is likely to defuse situations of potential confrontation. Indeed, had there been the kind of consultation in this case that Judge Gasch noted had been practiced in many previous situations without bringing legal powers of the Congress and the President into confrontation, it seems likely that this entire fuss could have been avoided. And if the feelings in the Senate or the Congress as a whole are sufficiently inflamed over the issues of policy involved in an initiative by the President to denounce a treaty, it would seem advisable from any but the most rigid and authoritarian point of view to reconsider the policy and see if some accommodation can be worked out through normal political processes.

Trends in Economic Samizdat

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The collection of unofficial writings in the U.S.S.R. known as *samizdat,* although widely publicized in the West, is seldom seriously analyzed. This is particularly true of *samizdat* documents pertaining to the Soviet economy, which — if only on the basis of sheer volume — warrant some kind of systematic evaluation. A survey of these writings reveals that economic *samizdat,* like *samizdat* in general, is quite diverse. It ranges from expressions of small group grievances, such as those of environmentalists, to broad critiques of the Soviet economy as a whole. Some *samizdat* documents seek merely to report the true state of the Soviet economy; others go further and propose reforms. Several authors cite statistics; some rely on Western writings; while others resort to emotional ploys. Although the primary sociological and political message of these statements is a common dissatisfaction with the

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Soviet economic situation, in the past two years there has been a discernible shift of focus in the unofficial economic writings — from the presentation of ambitious overviews of the economy to the enunciation of specific grievances.

Though some writings fit into more than one of these divisions, we will examine several broad categories of economic *samizdat.* These are: documents assessing the Soviet economy as a whole; documents relating to workers' rights; and documents dealing with invalids' rights. Some are full-length books; some are short typewritten broadsheets or petitions; others form part of larger works, such as the economic sections in books by well-known dissidents like Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, Andrei Amalrik and Alexandr Solzhenitsyn.

Of the documents that examine the Soviet economy as a whole, a number seek primarily to expose its inefficiencies and weaknesses. Their authors frequently resort to statistical arguments. A. Babushkin (a pseudonym), in an article entitled "On the Results of the Fulfillment of the Eighth Five-Year Plan . . ." (dated 1971), provides heavy doses of statistical information to demonstrate that the objectives of the plan (1966-1970) were not met. A. Vasiley (a pseudonym for Alexandr Bolonkin, Doctor of Technical Services), uses the same method in attempting to prove that the Soviet working class is destitute. His article, "A Comparison of the Living Standards of Workers in Russia, the Soviet Union, and Capitalist Countries" (1971), presents a highly uncomplimentary picture of the Soviet economy. A. Goltsov and S. Ozerov (pseudonyms) also rely heavily on statistics in an article called "The Distribution of National Income in the U.S.S.R." (1971), in which they describe the militarization and gross inefficiency of the Soviet economy.

These documents not only present what they consider to be the truth, but they also seek to expose the methods of manipulating it that are practiced in the U.S.S.R. Goltsov and Ozerov criticize what they say is the Soviet leadership's misrepresentation of "the Chinese threat," contending that it is a way of perpetuating the most massive military build-up in human history. Babushkin is more explicit. He lists the most common methods of manipulating economic data, methods that range from concealing production goals to changing the plan in mid-course, thereby bringing the official version of Soviet economic performance into question.

The proposed reforms, many of which make little allowance for economic realities, cover a broad spectrum. Others are relatively realistic. One of the most modest plans presents democratization of the economy as the first step towards democratic socialism. The advocates of this approach — Andrei Sakharov (a former physicist), Valerii Turchin (former head of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International) and Roy Medvedev (a dissident historian) — seek a judicious balance between the plan and the market. A scientific approach, to which the Soviet leadership pays lip service, requires the completely free flow of information. Sakharov's increased skepticism about socialism has since set him apart

from Medvedev, but both remain exponents of political and economic democratization.

Outright capitalism has its proponents, too. Mikhail Rudenko (a Ukrainian), in his "Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev" (1975), appeals to the Communist Party General Secretary for a return to the New Economic Plan and an economic reform based on capitalism. The underground All-Union Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People considers government ownership of the means of production to be incompatible with democratic freedoms. The group's reform package stresses minimal government, profits and increased consumer sovereignty. A. Burzhuademov (a pseudonym meaning bourgeois) goes even further. His book, *Notes on a Growing Ideology* (1974), lauds the traits that he considers typical of a bourgeois life style — realism, respect for the law and dislike for revolution. He also promotes the profit motive and the intense competition that he admits is spawned by it, rejecting in the process the American economist John Kenneth Galbraith's assertion that market relations merely perpetuate large, monopolistic firms. The free market, owing to its technological dynamism, can provide the material benefits promised by communism.

Another group of critics attacks the modern industrial system as a whole. In his essays "The Economic System of the East and the West" (1973) and "Contemporary Socio-Economic Systems and Their Prospects" (1974), M.S. Agursky, an Israel-based emigré whose father was an American communist, categorically rejects industrialization because of the capitalist mentality it breeds. His solution, which revolves around respect for nature, resembles the critiques of Westerners like Lewis Mumford and E. F. Schumacher. Agursky's belief in light industry, economic decentralization, and wiser use of resources is at once both anticapitalist and antisocialist; socialism as currently practiced inevitably leads to destructive and wasteful large-scale resource exploitation.

This concern for the ecological balance recurs in economic *samizdat.* The most detailed treatment to appear so far is Boris Komarov's book *The Destruction of Nature* (1978). This Soviet ecological specialist's study reads like the statement of an American environmental lobby. Air and water pollution, lax enforcement of antipollution laws and wanton extermination of animals are all criticized. The culprit here, however, is the Soviet economy, which, in spite of its theoretically superior central planning, refuses to factor ecological damage into its policies. The author emphasizes the difficulty of reversing adverse ecological trends. This thorough study persistently equates respect for the environment with the survival of modern civilization.

Respect for nature is also linked in places to the survival of Russian traditions. A. Levitin-Krasnov's (an Orthodox Christian who emigrated to the West in 1974) essay "The Earth Is Our Pillar" (1974) equates the spiritual rebirth of the Russian people with a return to the soil. Under his scheme the people's en-

thusiasm for work will be rekindled once a decentralized, rural economic order is proclaimed. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, in his *Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union* (1973), criticizes the contemporary economic order even more categorically. He considers industrialization a Western development that was foisted on the otherwise organic Russian order. And as the source of the problem — i.e., Western-inspired industrialization — can be identified, so can the solution: development of the Russian North and the resurrection of small- and medium-sized cities. Such an arrangement, one that preserves the old Russian way of life, will promote the conservation of resources that Solzhenitsyn considers so necessary.

Despite the authors' obvious antagonism toward many aspects of Soviet life and economic practices, the simplicity and extremism that characterize many of the writings bear a distinctly Soviet stamp. Consider the picture that emerges from the comparisons of living standards in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: the Soviet Union seems to be a land of unrelieved backwardness and privation while the United States appears to be a land of unqualified material abundance. The need constantly to compare the economic performance of the U.S.S.R. with that of the United States is typically Soviet. So, too, is the tendency to present information in a series of stark contrasts. A. Vasilev carries this practice to an extreme by claiming that 99 percent of the Soviet population is beggardly by American standards.

The same sort of extremism is evident in denunciations of the U.S.S.R. as a state-capitalist system. Many writers, including A. Babushkin, S. Zorin and M. Agursky condemn the economy on this basis. The ruling elite and the power it wields — power that is, claims Zorin, far in excess of that enjoyed by any capitalist firm — are constantly attacked. L. Ladov (pseudonym), for instance, in his "Brief Notes on the Contemporary Crisis" (1972), describes the Soviet leaders as a group of "drunken degenerates" lacking any contact with the people. But almost no mention is made of the state-capitalist elements that characterize most Western economies. The West is presented as a land of pure and unalloyed free enterprise. The problem is not ignorance; many authors of economic *samizdat* often reveal a sophisticated understanding of the intricacies of the Western economies. Rather, they emphasize differences whenever possible so as to minimize ambiguity. In its polemical and one-sided character, this selective version is simply the counterpart to official Soviet half-truths. Most *samizdat* authors seem to feel that fire must be fought with fire.

Much of the hard data is equally faulty. Errors and gaps pervade the statistics that the authors present in support of their claims. This is partly due to their dependence on Soviet sources for much of their data, but also to a tendency to accept automatically information that contradicts the official Soviet picture.

But other errors appear in these writings that are clearly due to the carelessness and shortcomings of the authors. A. Babushkin confuses the wage

fund with the average wage.[1] Ilya Glumov, in a piece entitled "The Leninist Test" (1972), argues that the United States and the Soviet Union have comparable resource bases. He then down-plays the destruction that the U.S.S.R. suffered during World War II in analyzing American and Soviet postwar economic development. America, claims Glumov, experienced analogous destruction in the Vietnam War and in several periods of recession. Such gross errors and simplistic theories, which crop up frequently, suggest that most economic *samizdat* is not the work of professional economists but instead the product of dissatisfied laymen and intellectuals.

Such is the variety — and frequently incongruity — of the documents that treat the Soviet economy as a whole. Other *samizdat* documents propose various combinations of these and other reforms. But not all writings that qualify as economic *samizdat* are so broad or theoretical. For instance, those pertaining to the struggle for workers' rights have a narrower focus and more particular objectives. Their authors clamor for free trade unions, the right to strike, improved working conditions and more paid holidays. Most of these proclamations, reflecting the authors' more limited educational background and the specific character of their complaints, are brief and to the point. They tend to focus more on components of the economic system than on the economy as a whole. Some are basically petitions aimed at world opinion, such as "An Open Letter to the World Public about the Actual Situation of a Blue Collar Worker on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the U.S.S.R." (1977), which lists names of victims of official reprisals. Among its signers is V. Klebonov, arrested for trying to organize an independent trade union, who has become an underground hero of sorts. Others, such as Leonid Sergi's "Appeal to the Chairman of the American Federation of Labor" and "Open Letter to George Meany" detail the inferior working conditions prevalent in the U.S.S.R. and ask for the public support of American labor. Many documents complain of official indifference to workers' grievances and the inadequacy of legal remedies.

If the goals of the workers' movement are few and limited, the number of potential beneficiaries is great. This is not true of the invalids, whose statements also fall under the rubric of economic *samizdat.*[2] Headed by Yuri Kiselev (a Moscow designer crippled since he was 17) and Valerii Fefelov, the invalid movement, acting through the Action Group for the Defense of Invalids' Rights in the U.S.S.R., has since 1977 produced a large number of documents that catalog invalids' grievances. The statements are specific and

1. *See* RL 29/73, "Notes on *Samizdat* Dealing with Economics," Radio Liberty Resarch, 29 January 1973.

2. For a detailed analysis of the invalids' movement and the documents relating to it, *see* RL 127/79, "A Movement in Defense of Invalids' Rights in the U.S.S.R.," Radio Liberty Research, 20 April 1979.

unsparing. In a 1978 statement "On the Situation of Invalids in the U.S.S.R." (which traces the invalid movement back to 1956, when a demonstration was held before the headquarters of the Central Committee), as well as in other recent writings, Kiselev attacks the Soviet pension system for its discrimination against disabled persons, the shortage of special facilities for invalids, the lack of accessible transportation, and the scarcity of necessities such as reading materials and artificial limbs. The authors occasionally compare the Soviet and American approaches to the problem as a way of underscoring the U.S.S.R.'s laxity.

Such statements represent a change in focus. Whereas most early *samizdat* writings examined the economy as a whole from an overall philosophical perspective, the bulk of unofficial economic writings since 1977 has addressed the grievances of particular groups, specifically workers and invalids. The trend is away from philosophical rambling and broad overviews and toward the legal and institutional resolution of specific grievances. In one respect, this has diminished the radicalism of the statements; the emphasis is on amending specific flaws rather than on criticizing overall patterns and general deficiencies. This sort of measured protest, however, ultimately threatens the authorities more since it suggests organized, disciplined, broad-based dissent.

In the case of the workers' and invalids' movements, as with earlier documents, it is not economists who are writing economic *samizdat*. This highlights the fact that neither economic reform, workers' rights, nor Soviet planning practices are restricted to the professional economist's domain. But it also suggests that, although the frequent use of pseudonyms makes it difficult to ascertain exactly who is involved, those most concerned about the Soviet economy's deficiencies are for the most part persons poorly versed in the technicalities of economics. Therein lie the shortcomings of these documents — their statistical errors, their theoretical extremes, and their simplistic analyses. But their frequent artlessness and unevenness, insofar as they point to grassroots dissatisfaction with the economic situation, are their most compelling traits. The widespread dissatisfaction that it conveys is economic *samizdat's* primary sociological and political message.