

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING AS A  
MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR POLITICAL CRISIS:**

A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

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
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## MAP OF SOMALIA



Source: <http://www.tsunamis.com/tsunami-hazardous-waste-somalia.html>

## THESIS QUESTION

The post-World War II period saw a number of African countries fight for their independence from their colonial masters. Soon after the colonial masters were gone, different groups turned against each other for control of power and resources. This turned out to be a spiral of violence and counter violence that would pitch rival tribes and clans against each other through the years. In a period of seven years; from 1990-97, Africa witnessed 16 wars. Of these 16, 14 were intrastate conflicts, e.g. in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara, and the Republic of Congo, and only 2 were interstate conflicts.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the hopes ushered in by the post-cold war new world order proclaimed by President George H. Bush, the period from 1990 saw the UN deploy 32 peacekeeping missions in the world, and 13 of these were in Africa<sup>2</sup> and one of these African countries was Somalia. The UN international peacekeeping missions have had their own success and failure stories, but this thesis paper does not look at all the missions employed by UN but surveys only the missions operated in Somalia from 1992 to 2011.

In a period of two years, from April 1992- May 1994, Somalia had the presence of all peace missions: from the traditional peacekeeping to full enforcement. Since the collapse of the State of Somalia on January 26, 1991 after the ouster of President Siad Barre by the alliance of Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aideed's forces, the United Nations/African Union

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<sup>1</sup> Dr Debay Tadesse. Peacekeeping successes and failures in Africa, *Institute for security studies (ISS)*, April 29, 2009, found at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SHIG-7RKFTA?OpenDocument> (accessed on Nov 5, 2010)

<sup>2</sup> Dr Debay Tadesse. Peacekeeping successes and failures in Africa, in <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SHIG-7RKFTA?OpenDocument>

authorized and deployed four peacekeeping missions in the country; namely: UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOMI), Unified Taskforce (UNITAF), UNOSOMII, and AMISOM (2007 - ). All of these have never delivered the people from their misery nor restored peace and security in the horn of Africa.

The question this thesis seeks to answer is this: *why haven't the three peacekeeping operations and one enforcement mission been able to restore peace in Somalia? The thesis explores whether peacekeeping was a relevant strategic response to political crisis in Somalia.*

The thesis is subdivided into sections which will explore the historical background of Somalia political crisis; second section looks at interventions in the country; the third section presents the discussions of the missions, and finally, section four presents the conclusion and recommendations.

## CHAPTER ONE

### ***CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING***

#### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **HISTORY OF PEACEKEEPING**

In the year 1945, the great powers met with a host of other smaller nations in San Francisco and drafted what others consider today a “world constitution”; the Charter of the United Nations.

The United Nations itself was established for a number of purposes, fundamental among which were; “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and...maintain international peace and security... take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”<sup>3</sup>

To achieve this, the charter mandated the Security Council to monitor and execute measures to maintain international peace and security by suppressing the threat and breach of the peace and acts of aggression. Chapter VI and VII mandates the Security Council to take all measures for this purpose. Chapter VI of the Charter addresses pacific measures for dispute settlement, and in the events that all arbitration and other peaceful measures have failed, chapter VI ½ and chapter VII mandates have been employed by the UN Security Council to establish robust peacekeeping and direct enforcement missions with complex mandates, given the power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

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<sup>3</sup> Preamble opening statement of the UN Charter

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken... to maintain or restore international peace and security.”<sup>4</sup>

The United Nations has employed, as stated earlier, 63 peace operations since its establishment in 1945. Although the term “peacekeeping” is not mentioned directly in the charter, the UN SC has employed these provisions in the spirit of the UN Charter purposes as enshrined in Chapter VI and VII of the charter, to maintain international peace and security.

## **DEFINITION, PRINCIPLES, AND TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING**

### **Definition of Peacekeeping**

The term *Peacekeeping* is defined by the UN guidelines on peacekeeping as “a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.”<sup>5</sup>

The concept of peacekeeping developed over a period of time. Initially used to refer to “a technique used by the United Nations to interpose military and civilian personnel between the warring countries or communities to stop the fighting...to create an atmosphere in which fruitful negotiations for lasting peace can be held”<sup>6</sup>, Peacekeeping has now been categorized into generations; from a purely traditional cold-war-type to the current complex multidimensional

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<sup>4</sup> UN charter article 39

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1995, “General Guidelines to Peacekeeping Operations”, NY, p.5, found at: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5SYHEK/\\$file/un-peacekeeping-1995.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5SYHEK/$file/un-peacekeeping-1995.pdf?openelement) (accessed: December 21, 2010)

<sup>6</sup>“History of UN Peacekeeping”, found at: <http://nobelpeacekeepers.tripod.com/id4.html> (accessed: December 12, 2010)

and complex peacekeeping that has multiple tasks and threats to face day by day, given the changing security atmosphere.

### ***Generations of Peacekeeping:***

**The first generation of peacekeeping:** was the cold war era peacekeeping. It comprises two elements; first, maintenance of cease-fires and separation of forces; and secondly, deployment for prevention of fighting. The purpose of the former was the maintenance of ceasefire agreements through separating the two warring parties from direct contacts with each other. This is the famously known traditional peacekeeping that often saw a combination of unarmed and lightly armed UN military personnel deployed to ease up tensions between two warring parties. This peacekeeping type was largely in the environment of inter-state conflicts. This type of peacekeeping does “monitor cease-fires and by their presence enable combatants to pull back to a safe distance from each other, where passions may cool and an atmosphere conducive to negotiations may be created.”<sup>7</sup> Examples of this peacekeeping were the armistice mission “to monitor the armistice between Israel and its neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, in 1949<sup>8</sup>; and the 1974 small UN mission in the Golan Heights to monitor ceasefire between Israel and Syria.

Preventive deployment is done to prevent the outbreak of fighting between the parties. Through its interposition and establishment of a de-militarized zone, the mission acts as confidence builder to reduce the risk of miscalculations from the warring parties parties, a common cause of escalation of conflict among parties. It helps in analyzing the security condition and tension between the parties so as to enable the UN Security Council to consider better alternatives to

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<sup>7</sup> General Guidelines, p.9

<sup>8</sup> “The 1949 Armistice Agreements”, in *Wikipedia*, found at:  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1949\\_Armistice\\_Agreements](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1949_Armistice_Agreements)

handle the crisis. A good case here was the mission deployed in Macedonia, which successfully helped avoid escalation<sup>9</sup>. The first generation peacekeeping is purely consent-based, and any withdrawal of consent also means an end to the mission.

### **Second Generation peacekeeping**

This is also known as multidimensional or complex peacekeeping operations. This generation of peacekeeping emerged in the post-cold war period. The security environment that the UNSC faced had become more complicated and unpredictable. This generation was developed to address multiple tasks and objectives. It deals for instance with monitoring comprehensive agreements, monitoring elections, do security sector reform, strengthen the judiciary, disarmament, and a wider range of administrative functions<sup>10</sup>. With multiple tasks in its hands, this mission becomes very complicated and expensive to run. An example was the UN Mission in El Salvador and UNOSOMII in Somalia (will be discussed at length in the next pages).

### **Robust Peacekeeping**

It is a grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It is authorized by the UNSC in situations where consent of both parties may not be viable or reliable. Because it operates in a situation of great risk, it uses force beyond merely self-defense. Such is the case with ISAF mission in Afghanistan which was established with the purpose of providing security in Kabul area but has been extensively involved in combat operations with al Qaeda and the Taleban.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> History of Peacekeeping, op.cit

<sup>10</sup> ibid

<sup>11</sup> International Security Assistance Taskforce, in *Wikipedia*, found at:  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International\\_Security\\_Assistance\\_Force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force) (accessed: December 10, 2010)

## **International Transnational Administration**

This mission is established with a broader task, to include the governance of the country. In societies where there is no government, a United Nations Transnational Administration is established to lay the foundations for the independent state to be run by its own people. The UN governs the country while providing training of the local staff to take over the total governance of their country. The mission's work is to establish the structures of governance in which the national leadership can work. Two such missions have been established in Kosovo, that is, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)<sup>12</sup> and East Timor, that is, the UN Transnational Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)<sup>13</sup>, both established in 1999.

## ***PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS***

### **Principles**

The Capstone doctrine a.k.a UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (2008) presents three key principles and three additional principles of peacekeeping as conditions *sine qua non* for success:

Consent of the parties: peacekeeping mission is deployed with the consent of all or major parties to the conflict. The entire mission's life depends on success, at least for traditional and multinational peacekeeping. According to the doctrine, consent of the main parties provides United Nations peacekeeping operations with necessary freedom of action, both political and physical; to carry out this mandated tasks."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> UNMIK fact sheet, found at: [http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact\\_Sheet\\_July\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_July_2008.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, in *Wikipedia*, found at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Nations\\_Transitional\\_Administration\\_in\\_East\\_Timor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Transitional_Administration_in_East_Timor) (accessed: December 10, 2010)

<sup>14</sup> Capstone Doctrine, p.32

1. **Impartiality:** A peacekeeping mission must treat all parties equally, without favor or prejudice, but not necessarily neutral in the events that one party betrays the terms of agreement. Consent depends on this impartial treatment of all parties and gives the sense that the mission is reliable and dependable. “impartiality requires the PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preference for any faction or group over another...[it] applies to the belligerents or parties to the dispute, not to possible spoilers (e.g., terrorists, criminals, or other hostile elements outside the peace process)”<sup>15</sup>

1. **Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.** The UN peacekeeping mission should use force only in self-defense and in defense of the mission’s mandate.<sup>16</sup>

Three other important success factors are:

2. **Legitimacy:** The UN mission gets its legitimacy only if authorized by the UN Security Council, not acting ultra vires, to address issues that affect the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. **Credibility:** The mission must present itself as strong enough to meet the set objectives and protect those whose protection they serve. A strong mission able to show spoilers its unwavering commitment and strength will deter any act of subversion against the mission’s objectives.

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<sup>15</sup> Capstone Doctrine, p.33, found at:

[http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf) (accessed: December 13, 2010).

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p.31

4. **Promotion of national ownership.** The mission should have at the very bottom of its mission an exit strategy that focuses on empowering the nationals of the state they work in to be able to take control of the political, judicial, and security affairs of their nation. Peacekeeping serves the purpose of providing an environment for political solution, not vice versa.<sup>17</sup>

In considering the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission, it is important that these principles and the key issues associated with them be properly handled. Given the changing environment in which peacekeepers operate today, and given the “situations of high political tension, or in contexts where regional or national support is lacking, prevention, mediation, peace building and conflict-sensitive development activities may be more effective...Successful crisis management rests on choosing the right tools and bringing them together in ways that maximize their respective strengths”<sup>18</sup>

### **Determinants of Mission Success**

Together with the principles outlined above, among the “key conditions for the success ... are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy”<sup>19</sup>

An intervention force or mission’s success has some key phases:

First phase which is intervention at the escalatory stage is the initial stabilization of a war torn society. The initial stabilization consists of rapid deployment, control of key installations and access points, and deploying adequately in critical areas. This involves the provision of adequate

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.33

<sup>18</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”, United Nations: New York, p.9

<sup>19</sup> Brahimi, p.1

security that is pre-requisite for the performance of other tasks, including humanitarian support services. A weak first phase affects the mission's credibility and ability to perform latter phases of the operation.

Second phase, that is, the stabilization is the recreation of local institutions for governance. Because political conflicts tear down the internal governance structures of the state, the stabilization stage should reestablish key governance, security and judicial sectors in order to restore normalcy to the country, but also as an exit strategy.

The third phase which is also the de-escalation stage consists in the strengthening of those institutions to the point where rapid economic growth and sustained social development can take place.<sup>20</sup> This economic transformation and broader peace building process sets the stage for the mission's reduction in its footprint in that particular country and set the stage for withdrawal.

According to Brahimi report, for the mission to face these challenges, key capabilities must be present. He highlights key critical challenges that often lead to mission failure, that is, when the mission is:

- Undermanned and underfunded
- Based on unrealistic best-case assumptions
- Faced with dwindling and sluggish commitment from troop contributors.

The reality, however, is that there is no one factor and no one principle that can act unilaterally to produce success in peacekeeping. Several factors work together in different proportions to affect a mission's work. These factors are not to be taken from the perspective of causation. Several

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<sup>20</sup> Brahimi report, Ibid, p.8

external and internal elements and factors, known and unknown, play their roles in context to influence the direction of a peace mission. Some of these factors include the following:

A mission is judged successful by the extent to which it has met the tasks of its mandate. A mission is usually judged successful if it met the objectives of the mandates and vice versa. One of the criticisms of UN peacekeeping and enforcement mandates over the last many years is that “[t]he activities and methods used by the UN force is always completely and absolutely constrained by the scope of its mandate, its resources and demands of international law.”<sup>21</sup>

How an exit strategy has been met. Peacekeeping missions are not judged successful simply because they have ended the conflict, but by how much they have achieved the transition into national transformation through sustainable peace building. Too often, there are mistakes of judging the missions from the angle of military victory. Unfortunately, “the concepts of victory or defeat, which are military terms, however, are inappropriate to peacekeeping operations”<sup>22</sup>

Practitioners are more bent towards evaluating peacekeeping on the basis of how they end the conflict or how they keep the peace agreement. According to Druckman and Stern, “specific accomplishments of the mission such as the number of people fed, disasters avoided, and cease-fires achieved is useful but leaves open the question of just how many accomplishments are needed to qualify as successful.”<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Barbara O’Dwyer, *What are the Necessary Conditions for Successful Peacekeeping?*, p.7, found at: [www.1325australia.org.au/textdocuments/Conditions%20for%20peacekeeping.pdf](http://www.1325australia.org.au/textdocuments/Conditions%20for%20peacekeeping.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> Barbara O’Dwyer, p.6

<sup>23</sup> Danel Druckman and Paul Stern, in “Perspectives on evaluating peacekeeping missions”, found in the *International Journal of Peace Studies*, located at: [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4\\_1/druckman.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4_1/druckman.htm)

Durch is quoted by Druckman and Stern, for his emphasis that peacekeeping success should also be evaluated in light of “whether they contribute to containing conflict and its underlying causes.”<sup>24</sup>

Evaluating peacekeeping is itself a problematic effort. We cannot know what would have happened if the mission was not taken. While comparison and control groups may be employed in scientific evaluations, the environments in which peacekeepers work in different countries are so different that comparing the various peacekeeping missions in this manner is neither possible nor appropriate since their operational contexts are also very different. However, in the case of Somalia, the situations on the ground then provided a baseline for evaluating the missions at least imperfectly.

Judging the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission also depends on the perspectives of the evaluator. The question of what we mean by success or failure is different from the perspectives of a practitioner and the intellectual. According to Diehl, a holistic approach to any evaluation of peacekeeping success or failures needs the “clarification about whose perspective peacekeeping success is to be judged, the relation between indicators of macro-level conflict resolution and the performance of the peacekeeping forces, opportunity and other costs of missions, a standard or baseline against which to judge mission success, and a clearer definition of the contextual factors that define the environment in which peacekeepers operate.”<sup>25</sup> Success of peacekeeping should be looked at from a larger context of peace building and the commitment to conflict

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<sup>24</sup> *ibid*

<sup>25</sup> Diehl, quoted by Danel Druckman and Paul Stern, in “Perspectives on evaluating peacekeeping missions”, found in the *International Journal of Peace Studies*, located at:  
[http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4\\_1/druckman.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol4_1/druckman.htm)

transformation.<sup>26</sup> This thesis approach tries to explore the missions in Somalia from the angle of how they have achieved their mandated tasks and objectives and how they contributed to larger stability of the country.

### **Data Sources**

The thesis bases entirely on secondary data. The data was collected from literature review and online resources related to the subject under study.

### **Scope of the study**

This thesis surveys the three UN/AU authored interventions in Somalia between the period of April 1992 to May 1995, and then the ongoing AMISOM from 2006 to 2010. It explores how effective these missions have been in restoring Somalia to peace.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid

## CHAPTER TWO

### ***HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA'S POLITICAL CRISIS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS***

#### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Ethiopia in the west, Kenya in the South, Djibouti in the north east and Eritrea in the North West, and the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean in the north east and east respectively.

The history of Somalia spans as far back as 2000 years ago. But its most recent political history that bears strongly on its current situation was the consequence of the colonial period that saw Somalia, as were other African societies, partitioned by the European colonial masters. Somalia was divided by three colonial powers; Britain, Italy, and France in the late 1880s. In the same period, Ethiopia's emperor fought Italy over control of Ogaden region of western Somalia, which was then officially given to Ethiopia by allied nations in 1948. It would later be the key contentious issue of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.<sup>27</sup>

Somalia attained its independence on July 1, 1960 under the leadership of president Aden Abdulle Osman<sup>28</sup>, who later in 1967 he lost the elections to Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated by General Mohamed Farah Aideed in 1969, whose subsequent ruthless authoritarian and sectarian rule did alienate many Somali clans from the benefits of the state.

To establish his power grip over traditional allegiance to clan leadership, Siad Barre introduced brutal Marxist dictatorship in the country, through institutionalizing attempts directed towards

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<sup>27</sup> "History of Somalia", in Wikipedia, found at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Somalia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Somalia)

<sup>28</sup> Nina J. Fitzgerald, 2002, *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography*, Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,: New York. P.1

“promoting the supremacy of party and nation as opposed to the local clan loyalties which are a strong feature of Somali culture.”<sup>29</sup> Despite Barre’s ruthlessness, he found favor and support from the cold war powers. The cold war period saw increased interest on Somalia by the two super powers of the time; Soviet Union and the United States due to “its proximity to Middle East and Persian Gulf”<sup>30</sup> which had become another significant area of interest of great powers after Iranian revolution of 1979. Supporting a strong Barre regime militarily and economically guaranteed the United States a monitoring presence over the Middle East. But as the cold war ended, this interest drastically diminished, at a time when Barre’s regime was facing increasing internal and external pressures and threats. Somalia had accumulated much ammunition from the cold war opportunities, many of which landed into the hand of the opponents, making the lawlessness that followed extremely lethal. Barre’s administration of ruthlessness and his 1977 attempts to recover Ogaden region from Ethiopia put him at odds with Ethiopian leadership, who reacted by supporting a host of many other domestic opponents of Siad Barre. Barre’s government fell on January 26, 1991 following intense pressures from General Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The departure of Siad Barre was no guarantee peace would return to the country but instead marked the beginning of statelessness and mayhem for the horn of African nation and its people in the years that followed since the warlords, themselves plummeted into countless fights with each other over control of resources, including pasture and water. Matters for the ordinary civilian was aggravated by the scorching retreating tactics employed by Barre, which destroyed

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<sup>29</sup> “History of Somalia”, found at *History of the World* in <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20> (accessed December 26, 2010)

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*

agricultural produce and displaced agricultural communities, a trend that would later become the order of misery in Somalia, and created the infamous “triangle of death.”<sup>31</sup>

## ***FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SOMALIA***

### **FIRST UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM I)**

Due to the withdrawal tactics employed by Barre and the ongoing conflicts, Somali farmers could not plant engage in their normal agricultural activities. This was exacerbated by the systematic looting employed by the warlords and their members as a way of weakening other warlords, who used their arms to cut food supply from the people as well as looting of food relief from aid agencies to finance their extensive patronage system.<sup>32</sup>

In June 1991, five months after Siad Barre’s ouster, the United Somali Congress (USC) elected Farah Aideed as its leader. This angered Ali Mahdi and his faction alliance, and in July same year, the Djibouti conference of six factions elected Ali Mahdi the president of Somalia. Power dispute between the two major parties sparked the beginning of years of long counter claims to presidency and the resultant aggravation of human suffering.

With pictures of desperation from a series of untold human suffering and famine reaching global media, Javier Perez, the then outgoing U.N Secretary General took immediate steps to initiate a negotiated settlement between the two main parties by sending his Under Secretary General James Jonah to help negotiate a peaceful settlement between Ali and Aideed but the two had extreme suspicion of each other. Boutros Ghali made concerted efforts towards a negotiated settlement. Aideed and Ali were invited by Boutros Ghali to New York to talk, and the two reached an agreement, which was signed back in Somalia in February 1992. The deal never

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<sup>31</sup> Catherine Besteman, *Violent politics and the politics of violence: the dissolution of Somali Nation State*, Colby College. P.4

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html>

stood for any long time as expected. Besides, Aideed believed that any negotiations by the international community would betray his zero-sum goal. “Aideed was militarily stronger than Ali Mahdi. His forces were much more experienced and possessed many heavy weapons...Aideed believed that he could defeat Ali Mahdi’s forces within several weeks, so he had little incentive to cooperate with U.N mediated efforts.”<sup>33</sup>

Because of the insecurity and increasing conflict, massive famine and malnutrition occurred in Somalia in 1992, which affected over 4.5 million, with 300,000 dead by November 1992, and 1.5 million at immediate risk,<sup>34</sup> leaving 60% of the country’s infrastructure basically on hold.<sup>35</sup> With conscience shocking pictures featuring in world media, the UN had nothing but to act.

**Fig. 2 Some pictures from Somalia (1992)**



*Source: Hope survival*

*Source: Barbados Free Press*

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<sup>33</sup> Behsahel, 24.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid*

<sup>35</sup> UN, “Somalia: UNOSOMI, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

This conflict not only ravaged the life of the Somali people, but also threatened the security of neighboring states, such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Due to the multifaceted threats of the conflict, its threats to human security, regional security and stability, and following the emerging difficulties for the UN and other agencies to deliver humanitarian services to the suffering Somali people, the United Nations Security Council, on April 24, 1992<sup>36</sup> passed resolution 751, following the appeal of the then Secretary General Bloutrous Boutrous Ghali, establishing a peacekeeping mission, the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Its mandate was “to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu signed between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs”<sup>37</sup> and later expanded to include protection of humanitarian convoys, personnel, equipment, supplies, and distribution centers throughout Somalia.<sup>38</sup> The mission initially comprised only fifty (50) armed Pakistani troops but was immediately expanded to 500 troops and 100 logistical personnel.<sup>39</sup> The situation in Somalia turned out to be extremely volatile for the mission’s capacity to handle, prompting the UN to increase the mission capacity to 3,500 security personnel and 719 logistical supply personnel. Aideed reacted by blocking the troops at Mogadishu airport since he saw the forces as a ploy by the UN to protect his arch rival Ali Mahdi. Hostilities increased not only from Aideed

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<sup>36</sup> UNSC res. 751

<sup>37</sup> UN Department of public information, found at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> (accessed on December 28, 2010)

<sup>38</sup> *ibid*

<sup>39</sup> Michael J. Kelly, p.66

but also from other faction leaders against UNOSOM personnel leading to the death of 8 military personnel.<sup>40</sup>

The parties to the ceasefire did not respect the terms of agreement but continued to fight and interrupt humanitarian service delivery and often loot, harass, attack aid agencies and their supplies. UNOSOM I could not get aid delivered to the suffering people of Somalia at a time when over 3000 Somalis dying per day.<sup>41</sup>

UNOSOMI failed before it could even make its presence felt by the people. Employing a typical traditional peacekeeping to solve multiple security challenges in complete anarchy was bound to fail. Somalia proved a lot more complicated than expected. While the ceasefire agreement on which UNOSOMI was established was between the two major parties of Aideed and Ali, it did not take into consideration the reality that Siad Barre and his followers was still a solid force in the country, with a host of other clan and faction leaders who were determined to use the prevailing chaos to consolidate their power base. It can be said that UNOSOM was established in an environment of distrust and suspicion from both the major and minor parties, whose interests were in power and resource control. The UN was seen as an obstacle to this quest of power and resource acquisition. Aideed had broken the terms of the ceasefire several times and the agreement negotiated by Boutros Ghali at the UN headquarters in New York. Aideed never believed in the UN and any agreement that put him on equal terms with Ali. These two were absolutely mutually exclusive so much so that anything accepted by Ali was opposed by Aideed.

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<sup>40</sup> Mike Blakeley, "Somalia" in <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/costs/chap04.pdf>

<sup>41</sup> *ibid*

## **OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF**

Because UNOSOMI had been a victim of hostility itself, given its traditional-type mission mandate, events on the ground hindered its work and needed rescue themselves. In October 1992, both Aideed and Ali withdrew their consent to the mission when the UN decided to expand the mission personnel to over 3000 personnel. This worsened the insecurity and access to the suffering people in the interiors became impossible. Basing on this challenge, the UNSC passed resolution 767 authorizing operation provide relief, directed and controlled by the United States CENTCOM, to carryout airlifting of food into the interior during the period between August 15 1992 and February 28, 1993 working hand in hand with the overwhelmed UNOSOMI personnel. It started by forming the Humanitarian Assistance Surveillance Team (HAST) that would operate between Kenya (where foodstuff would be airlifted) and Somalia where many famine stricken Somalis were located. This team provided strategic information for the Joint Task Force (JTF) to design airlift strategy. CENTCOM deployed four C-141 and eight C-150 aircrafts to airlift food from Mombasa and Wajiri in Kenya to Somalia. The aircrafts delivered 150 metric tons of food per day and a total of 28,000 metric tons of food in its entire operational period.

While Operation Provide Relief was ongoing, both Aideed and Ali intensified their fighting and attack on the humanitarian agencies and also interfered with the work of the mission Operation Provide Relief. To prevent the worsening humanitarian crisis and stop the militia activities, United States President George H. Bush decided to bring the United States on board, to lead an enforcement mission, the Unified Taskforce (UNITAF)

## UNIFIED TASKFORCE (UNITAF) AND THE ROLE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

UN Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the UN charter mandate passed resolution 794 (1992), established an enforcement mission; United Taskforce (December 3, 1992 – May 4, 1993), with the mandate to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”<sup>42</sup> Among the mission’s key tasks were “to secure major population centers and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed”<sup>43</sup> and disarm the warring factions. The first deployment in Mogadishu happened on December 8, 1992. UNITAF consisted of 38,300 strong, 25,800 of whom were from US CENTCOM. Other forces in UNITAF came from Australia, Greece, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia, UAE, and Zimbabwe. United States alone had 24,300 troops.

**Fig.3 UNITAF Deployment Phases**



**Fig.4 Humanitarian Relief Sectors**



Source: <http://maat0214.egloos.com/1649815>

Source: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol3/v3c24be.htm>

<sup>42</sup> UNSC resolution 794 (art.10), found in <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>43</sup> UN, “Somalia: UNOSOMI, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

UNITAF began its operation by taking control of key entry points such as airports and coastal port facilities, installations, and later expanded to create humanitarian centers across the hard-hit regions. The mission divided southern Somalia into Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) and assigned them as areas of responsibilities for the sub-divisions of the mission. The mission commander, Lt. General R. Johnston of the US Marine Corps, liaised effectively with the SRSG and UNOSOM I to avoid confusion and maintain clear command responsibilities between the mission and the UNOSOM I leadership.<sup>44</sup> UNITAF came with super military power, with tanks and other military hardware that had recently then been used to destroy Saddam Hussein's military in Kuwait during the gulf war. It's leadership began straight by sending a strong signal to faction leaders and warring parties that any provocation would be dealt a big blow, given the mission's capabilities which would ultimately outmatch and destroy any contender.

Among the early foundations of UNITAF's success was the fact that it communicated effectively its rules of engagement (ROE) to the warring parties; the four NOs, namely: No "technical" should be seen in Mogadishu streets or risk destruction; No banditry; No roadblocks; and No visible weapons. Aideed tried to test these rules of engagement on a few occasions and suffered serious damages. Accompanying these ROE, UNITAF employed direct diplomacy to make it clear to the parties its impartial resolve to punish whoever crossed its path. The mission also employed public media communication strategy to counter claims from the factions. Aideed for instance had resorted to use of propaganda by spreading false information that UNITAF and his SLN party was in mutual agreement. This propaganda was successfully defeated by UNITAF Radio and regular conferences and diplomatic outreaches. With a combination of diplomacy,

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<sup>44</sup> Michael J. Kelly, 1999, *Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework*, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, pp14-15.

backed up by a strong military presence, and cautious implementation of its mandate, UNITAF did relatively succeed in its mission.

**Why UNITAF is considered a successful mission:**

According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “[s]tudies that look at the cost and effectiveness of various policy options to reduce the incidence and duration of civil wars find the post-conflict military intervention to be highly cost-effective, in fact, the most cost-effective policy examined.”<sup>45</sup> Although this claims are true in terms of duration with regards to UNITAF, the mission cost about \$1.5 billion (initially estimated at \$750 million) while UNOSOMII in its over two years activities took about \$1.64 billion. While this thesis does not particularly look at financial costs of the peace operation missions with regards to Paul and Anke’s propositions, the question of duration of time is very significant in peace operation. How long should a peacekeeping mission take in a given country to be both effective and not appear to be an external occupying force, is critical at the planning stages of the mission.

UNITAF’s success in Somalia is much attributed to the consistency of the mandate and the time period the mission took to fulfill its tasks. Within the six months period of its operation, it was able to fulfill its mission mandate. It provided a secure environment which enabled Operation Provide Relief (OPM), the UN and other NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and rescue the starving Somali people, supplying 28,000 metric tons of food and other humanitarian needs and, averted one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s. Additional reasons that could probably explain why UNITAF was successful included the following:

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<sup>45</sup> Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, “Copenhagen Challenge Paper,” April 23, 2004

***Clear and achievable mandate:***

UNITAF commander kept clear on the path of the mandate given it, but operationalized them in the light of the situations at hand, and thus prevented possible early derailment of its work. While the mission was so expansive, the mission took carefully what it considered would not lead to escalation of the already critical situation.

***Adequate military capability***

UNITAF presented itself as a very credible force from the very initial deployment. It had far more complicated and superior technical and other military hardware than all the factions combined could threaten. Those who attempted to provoke the mission forces were dealt a big blow. Because of its stringent ROE and powerful presence, Aideed and other factions withdrew and hid their technical from Mogadishu, the contentious area, hence providing a secure and peaceful environment for the aid agencies to reach out to the population in need.

***Good command and communication structure:***

UNITAF established a good internal and external command structure. Its internal command and control structure established independent areas of responsibilities among the different unit commanders, with all of them reporting to an overall general commander. Externally, UNITAF commander built a good link with UNOSOM I staff to support a coordinated implementation of the mandate. By establishing a clear communication channel within the structure and by dividing the troubled areas into sectors and assigning responsibilities over these areas, UNITAF was able to avert major failures usually caused by confusing and conflicting communication, command and control. Besides, UNITAF diplomatic wing had established a direct personal and friendly relationship with the faction leadership, which made communication and intelligence gathering much easier

### ***Avoided confrontational disarmament***

UNITAF did not get involved in forceful disarmament of the armed groups as a precondition for securing the country. Although Boutros Ghali had emphasized on disarmament as a necessity for long term security and nation building, President Bush had made it clear that UNITAF would not get involved in a more complicated mission of nation building, which would have necessitated doing many things, including disarmament and Security Sector Reform. Because it presented no immediate threat to the power base of the faction leaders, there was very minimal confrontation between UNITAF and the Somali faction leaders.

These reasons, coupled with constant diplomatic outreach to the clan and faction leaders, and the use of its radio to reach out directly to the population to diffuse propaganda, made the mission very successful to the extent that the UN wouldn't wish its closure.

### **CRITIQUE OF UNITAF**

While UNITAF is celebrated as a model enforcement mission that saw coercive diplomacy at its best, it has been held responsible for the crisis that UNOSOMII would later find itself in. Among the criticisms against UNITAF are the following:

#### ***Postponed than solved security problem:***

Despite its record six months achievements, UNITAF's successes must be looked at from a holistic perspective. According to Ramesh and Albrecht (2001), "the desire to bring interminable conflict to a quick end...can override the need to ensure that terms of the settlement are honorable, just, and likely to endure. The requirements for sustainable peace are different from those of Band-Aid or firefighting response."<sup>46</sup> In the early days of the mission establishment,

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<sup>46</sup> Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Albrecht Sabel, 2001, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, UN University Press: Tokyo, p.19

UNSG Boutros Ghali had hoped that UNITAF would take disarmament as a key condition necessary for the establishment of secure environment for the successful delivery of humanitarian supplies to the suffering people of Somalia and for eventual nation building. He thought that with the warlords still in possession of their ammunitions, sustainable security would be nowhere. President Bush on the other hand decided that American forces would not involve themselves in disarmament. As a result, the warlords and their militia were simply set on hibernation to await reactivation at the end of the mission's six-month deadline.

While the 4-Nos ROE ordered by UNTAF succeeded in avoiding violence in Mogadishu, Aideed simply hid his "technical" and prepared for the right time as he counted the numbered days of UNITAF. Did UNITAF have the capacity to disarm the factions? Its power certainly gave it the ability to enforce disarmament. What is not clear is whether it would have successfully disarmed the warlords, but one thing is clear; it had the capacity that defeated a powerful Saddam Hussein, and the Somali warlords were nowhere closer to Saddam's abilities. The presence of UNITAF and its strong military power sent a clear signal to these warlords from the onset. Ali Mahdi surrendered a good portion of its weapons to UNITAF. General Aideed himself, in fear of this firepower, withdrew his "technical" as far away as possible from UNITAF who had declared Mogadishu streets a no-go area for "technical". All faction leaders were afraid of the force capacity and would have very less likely been able to seriously oppose or resist disarmament. UNITAF would have most likely done a successful disarmament of Aideed (the main actor at the time) and built a good foundation on which peace and security in Somalia would be built. Historical data show that "between 1960 and 1990 Somalia spent an average of 20, 45 per cent of its budget on the military and had an average of eight soldiers per 1 000 population, well above

the regional average of 3, 4 soldiers per 1 000 population. The military expanded from 5 000 troops in 1960 to 165 000 in 1990.”<sup>47</sup>

If a long term secure environment was to be created, disarmament should have been central, as the Secretary General had proposed, and nation building would have probably been much easier. It was, however, also a difficult position for President Bush to make a decision given the fact that he had only a few days in office before Clinton would be sworn in office come January 20, 1993. Thus far, UNITAF did a great tremendous job but also did succeed in pausing/postponing a critical problem that would later bring UNOSOMII down on its knees.

If a long term humanitarian and security environment was to be put in place, Winrich Kuhne suggests that disarmament is inevitable. To him, “progress in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and progress in the peace process are highly interdependent”<sup>48</sup> UNITAF’s acclaimed success falls short of the necessity of this integral approach to political crisis. UNITAF mainly treated more the symptoms of the conflict and less of the roots causes. Critics hold that UNITAF did not integrally handle this problem because it “had a limited purpose and did not intend to stay in Somalia for long. Integrated peace support operations should be planned to extend over a sufficient period of time to permit a realistic impact to be made.”<sup>49</sup> Without addressing the essence of the problem, UNITAF is criticized for delivering a cosmetic solution to the problem than the required sustainable security that Somalia desperately needed at the time. UNITAF’s failure to confront the dangerous warlords could have been

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<sup>47</sup> Solomon A. Derso, 2008, research seminar report, titled: *Somalia: the quest for peacemaking and peacekeeping*, P.11, found at: [http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link\\_id=3&slink\\_id=8168&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link_id=3&slink_id=8168&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3) (accessed November 25, 2010)

<sup>48</sup> Winrich Kuhne, *Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Work*, p.364, found at: [http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4\\_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF](http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF) (accessed: November 23, 2010)

<sup>49</sup> [http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link\\_id=3&slink\\_id=8168&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link_id=3&slink_id=8168&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3)

responsible for their later obstinacy to UNOSOM II, a trend that extends to challenge the current AMISOM.

In summary, while UNITAF is considered successful in the terms of preventing violent conflict in Mogadishu, true security was indeed too far from being achieved. It is a cliché to say, but the reality of peace is far from absence of fighting, and “positive peace can be achieved only by addressing atrocities, administering justice and confronting the underlying causes of conflict. An holistic approach to the quest for peace, which incorporates both military and diplomatic efforts as well as peace-building initiatives, is required.”<sup>50</sup> To reiterate the need for a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, South Korea’s representative, Kim Sam-Hoon in his presentation on UN peacekeeping and the Brahimi report, reiterated that “Peacekeeping should be viewed in the context of a continuum of crisis management, extending from prevention of conflicts through conflict management and actual peacekeeping.”<sup>51</sup>

## **UNOSOM II**

On March 26, 1993, as UNITAF days drew closer, UNSC acting under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, passed resolution 814 authorizing the establishment of a second UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) as a multidimensional peacekeeping mission to replace UNITAF. Not only did it absorb UNITAF’s entire mandate, it also added several other mandates.

Its mandate included the following tasks:

- Monitoring the respect of agreements and cessation of hostilities,
- preventing resumption of violence,
- controlling heavy weapons of the factional and militia groups,

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<sup>50</sup> Solomon A. Dersso, *op. cit.*, p.17

<sup>51</sup> Press release of the 10<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the fourth Committee, 58<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly meeting, October 17, 2003, found at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaspd267.doc.htm> (accessed: December 12, 2010)

- disarmament of unauthorized ammunitions;
- securing and protecting all ports, airports, security and humanitarian installations of the UN and partner agencies
- demining Somalia
- Oversee the return of refugees and IDPS, among other tasks.<sup>52</sup>

The mission was built on best-case scenario; that UNITAF had already built the security on which UNOSOM could expand.<sup>53</sup> UNOSOM began its mission implementation with full commitment. It did some early success cases in its voluntary disarmament efforts in Mogadishu, but this would be a short-lived success. It also tried very much to work towards nation building through country-wide elections of leadership at the grassroots. These elections were supposed to handle all tribes equally, and the elections did successfully bring many of the once insignificant clan individuals to position of leadership.

However, while mission was established on a best case assumption, it did not achieve most of what it had hoped to. A bigger problem was internal to the mission that was being designed to bite and chew more than what it could realistically chew. In the words of Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, a key initial and essential challenges to UNOSOM II was that: “the early May change of command [from UNITAF to UNOSOM II] marked the transformation of the force from one dominated by a superpower with more than 20,000 troops of its own on the ground to one led by a weak organization of many small contingents, the largest being 4,000 Pakistanis still waiting

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<sup>52</sup> UN department of public information, “United Nations Operation in Somalia II”, found at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm> (accessed December 15, 2010)

<sup>53</sup> Robert Bauman, Lawrence A. Yates, with Versalle F. Washington, 2003, *“My Clan Against the World”: U.S and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth: Kansas, p.99

for a portion of their equipment.”<sup>54</sup> UNOSOM found itself with such a huge and overarching mandate yet its military and personnel capability wouldn’t match the mandate. With a mandate more than doubling what UNITAF originally had (which it did not fully carry out), UNOSOM had only 28,000 troops drawn from over 20 countries, and its military hardware capacity below average.

While it begun operation on the assumptions that the security created by UNITAF would remain stable, its nightmare began with implementation of a key military mission goal; “to conduct military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation.”<sup>55</sup> This expansive mission that had a dream of building a nation in the shortest time possible also implied direct confrontation with those parties that stayed away from UNITAF and were left untouched. UNOSOM exposed itself to an overwhelming pressure and made for itself a number of enemies; small and big. Its expansionist agenda meant that the limited resources and personnel at its disposal would be scattered to various parts of Somalia, which eventually exposed the Mogadishu to insecurity. Aideed and Ali’s forces would soon move to take positions for control of Mogadishu in the military vacuum that UNITAF’s departure and UNOSOM’s deployments to Somalia’s interior left.

Among the mission’s critical challenges included the following:

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p.99-100

<sup>55</sup> Bauman, p.101

### ***Intelligence incapacity***

UNOSOM II was faced with the crisis of intelligence gathering with regards to the happenings in Mogadishu. There was no easy way to obtain clear information about the activities of Gen. Aideed, his SNA group, and other factions. UNITAF had gone with their intelligence system, that is, CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE). This was worsened by the poor communication and control structure with the US troops, hence, “no good understanding and sharing of intelligence information between U.S and UN forces, and further complicated by the lack of personal relationship between UNOSOM and the local faction leadership as was the case with UNITAF.<sup>56</sup> To make matters worse for UNOSOM, the indigenous employees in the mission provided all intelligence information to Aideed in time so much so that he prepared well in advance to attack or counter UNOSOM’s operations.

### ***Aideed – UN relationship***

Aideed distrusted the UN, whom he accused for supporting his archrival Ali Mahdi. Besides, Aideed and Boutros Ghali were enemies right from the time of Siad Barre, since Barre was supported by Boutros Ghali during the liberation struggle in Somalia when Boutros was still deputy Egypt’s foreign minister. As long as the UN was represented by Boutros Ghali, Aideed considered it hostile to his interests, and believed UN’s interest was in legitimizing Ali’s claim to Somalia’s presidency.

### ***Opposition to nation building***

While the leadership of UNOSOM II emphasized nation building as a key component of nation building, its approach to nation building failed to consider the political context and the

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p.104

foundations of power and allegiance. Its approach failed to realize at the beginning that nation building undermined the power of the factions and warlords, and was considered hostile to the long established Somali cultural order. Handling this issue needed a better strategy build on the life of the Somali people than on a purely western understanding of the concept of democratic governance. A democratic council as propounded by UNOSOM was opposed and regarded an imposed governance structure from the west. Somali communities have thrived more on allegiance to *clanism* rather than *statism* for many years. In such a nation where the clan counts more than the state, it was very probably unwise decision for the UN to push for representative democracy before understanding the political life of the people. The failed UN led peace conference of May 1993, which was vehemently opposed by Aideed who saw it as blocking his right to political leadership of Somalia, is evidence that U.N's attempt to establish a nation of equal weight of all peoples and clans threatened the power of the landlords.

### ***Overambitious and uncoordinated disarmament efforts***

On June 5, 1993, UNOSOM II decided to carry out a forceful inspection of Aideed's weapons store. Aideed rejected this inspection and warned the mission against the plan but UN insisted and sent the Pakistani troops to inspect the weapons store to make sure no prohibited arms were hidden by Aideed. A big mistake that UNOSOM did was its forceful inspection of Aideed's Radio Mogadishu on the suspicion that Aideed's own anti-UN Radio Mogadishu was a secret store of prohibited weapons. This move incensed public outrage against the forces by informing Mogadishu residents that the UN was closing the radio. The consequence was a mass of enraged crowd and militia ambush that attacked the peacekeepers on their way out, leaving 23 Pakistani peacekeepers dead, 56 wounded, and six abducted. This uncalculated move was not

communicated to the American Quick Reaction Force, but that one mistake sparked a series of violent fights with both UN and American soldiers in the days and months that followed.

Following the events of June 6, UNSC passed resolution 837 authorizing the apprehension and punishment of those responsible for the killing of the 23 peacekeepers.<sup>57</sup> This turned out to be the infamous “resolution get Aideed” and his Somali National Alliance that set the stage for outright war and mission creep. The entire mission immediately diverted from its core mandate to focus on capturing Aideed. As the UN’s Boutros Ghali put pressure on UNOSOM to bring Aideed to justice, President Bill Clinton expressed his concerns over the move and instead called for a negotiated settlement instead of hunting for Aideed. UNOSOM’s commander, General Bir appears to have shared same feelings with Boutros. In his cable to the US admiral Howe, Bir expressed his concerns: “it is felt that negotiations without complementary military action would not have the positive effect needed to bring about factional reconciliation and foster the city for future disarmament operations.”<sup>58</sup>

### ***The dark day of the black hawk incidence***

Unfortunately the insistence on military justice against Aideed was one of the greatest error made by the mission’s leadership. Its entire original mission was halted and instead it appears the entire mission to become a man hunting mission.

As indicated in the previous paragraph, President Bill Clinton had appealed for negotiated settlement to the Aideed-UNOSOM crisis, but his information was not communicated to CENTCOM that controlled the Horn of Africa Quick Reaction Force and the Rangers. On

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<sup>57</sup> UNSC resolution 837(1993), p.2, found at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>58</sup> Lt. General Bir, code cable to Admiral Howe, subject: Concept of Operations in Mogadishu, 16 July, 1993.

August 22, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed Taskforce Rangers in Somalia to enforce resolution 837. On September 25, a US helicopter was brought down by insurgents as it monitored the situation in Mogadishu killing three crew members. Insurgents later killed additional soldiers during the rescue mission.

The game changer happened on the night of October 3 to October 4, 1993 at Mogadishu press hotel. Some inaccurate intelligence information had indicated that the fugitive Aideed was holding a meeting with his SNA officials at the press club hotel. The information was sent to US rangers who acted with speed and stormed the hotel. Aideed was not in but six of his lieutenants and several fighters were arrested. Unfortunately the rangers were surrounded by SNA and the violent Mogadishu population as they stormed out the press hotel. Coincidentally two US UH-60 helicopters (black hawk) had been brought down by rocket propelled grenades during the October 3, 92 fierce battle of Mogadishu. The Rangers' attempts to rescue their friends who were brought down in the helicopter attack were in turn surrounded and blocked by a host of militia and the larger Mogadishu population (men, women, and children) who randomly shot at the them 18 rangers were killed and about 83 wounded while 300 Somalis perished, but Aideed not arrested. To quench their anger, the Mogadishu residents bound, dragged and desecrated the body of one ranger, an ugly scene relayed live to the world media. The anger that this barbaric act by the Somali people generated in the US towards the administration forced President Clinton to immediately announce the withdrawal of all U.S forces by March 31, 1994, and the withdrawal was completed on March 25, 1994.

In Mogadishu, celebrations of the injury inflicted on the rangers sowed the seeds of invincibility in the life and spirit of the militias who increasingly became more arrogant towards the United

Nations. Because of the dangerous nature of Somalia, many troop contributors withdrew their troops and despite pleas from Boutros Ghali for more troops, no single country was willing to contribute forces for UNOSOM. With only 7,956 troops remaining, without additional commitments for more troops, and without the support of the United States forces, UNOSOM II became a costly ineffective undertaking, and was finally withdrawn on March 28, 1995. Far from delivering peace, the mission itself has been calling for liberation from the UN.

In summary, UNOSOM II can be said to be a victim of its own over ambition, incapacity, and lack clearly planned and managed military and political strategies. Its lack of coordination and unclear chain of command with the US CENTCOM and other international and national agencies made it difficult to build a working relationship with its partners. It was thence not surprising that many agencies distrusted UNOSOM's ability to provide security and its entire agenda, and therefore opted to provide their own security by hiring the service of the local militia groups. As Michael Baumann summarizes it; "the entire mission floundered due to an inadequate understanding of the cultural, social, and political context in which it took place. The normal logic of military operations...the delicately nuanced intricacies of peace operations did not apply in Somalia. In particular, there was a failure to appreciate the depth of clan loyalties and the repercussions of making Aideed the focal point of the mission."<sup>59</sup>

The failure and withdrawal of UNOSOM II marked the end of direct UN and US interventions in Somalia. Several local and regional efforts towards a negotiated settlement were carried out but with mixed outcomes but none were effective in bringing Somalia back to its lost statehood until the 2004 Nairobi Conference when the Somali Transitional Federal Charter that established the

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<sup>59</sup> Baumann, p.121

Transitional Federal Government and its Institutions was adopted, leading to the election of the president and the members of parliament which is the current leadership in Somalia. Somaliland and Puntland have since then declared independence as autonomous regions of Somalia.

### ***AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)***

#### **BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION**

In February 2004, the government of Kenya in collaboration with Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in a conference on Somalia sitting in Nairobi, Kenya oversaw the conclusion of a two-year peace process aimed at restoring the state of Somalia. The Transitional Federal Charter, which provided for the establishment of the Transitional Federal institutions (legislative and executive branches of government) which eventually culminated into the election of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the interim president, to lead the five-year arrangement<sup>60</sup>. The TFG was however, still operating from exile in Nairobi because the powerful faction militias in Mogadishu wouldn't accept any one government. Meanwhile from February to May 2006, a loose alliance of religious clerics, business men and faction militias formed an alliance which later became the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to fight the clan warlords. They fought and defeated the faction leaders and warlords of Mogadishu under their umbrella group, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).<sup>61</sup>

ICU run Somalia under strict Sharia law from May – December 2006 until a combination of TFG and Ethiopian forces toppled it on December 28, 2006.<sup>62</sup> However, despite the brutal sharia-based administration run by ICU, Ethiopia's presence in Somalia was unwelcome by the

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<sup>60</sup> Stephanie Hanson, and Eben Kaplan, "Somalia's Transitional Federal Government", *Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2008*, found at: [http://www.cfr.org/publication/12475/somalias\\_transitional\\_government.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/12475/somalias_transitional_government.html) (accessed on December 28, 2010)

<sup>61</sup> Angel Rabasa, 2009, *Radical Islam in East Africa*, Rand Corporation: California. p.58

<sup>62</sup> "War in Somalia", in *Wikipedia*, found at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War\\_in\\_Somalia\\_\(2006%E2%80%932009\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Somalia_(2006%E2%80%932009)) (accessed: December 27, 2010)



But as matter of fact, four years have gone and yet there are no signs the UN is taking over, or that a safe and secure environment has been created.

### **MANDATE AND TASK**

AMISOM was mandated “to conduct PSO in Somalia for a limited period of 6 months to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the UN”<sup>67</sup>. In the mind of its founders, it was thought that AMISOM would follow in the footsteps of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMIS) which later became a hybrid mission named the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)<sup>68</sup>. Unfortunately for AMISOM, Somalia proved itself a nightmare to the UN in the period 1992-95 so much so that getting UN forces to the country, given the security conditions, has proven extremely difficult each passing day.

The mission’s mandate has a number of tasks, including:

- “Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders
- Provide protection to TFIs & key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions
- Assist in the implementation of the NSSP
- Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts
- Monitor the security situation in areas of operation
- Facilitate humanitarian ops incl repatriation of refugees and IDPs

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> UNAMID Background, found at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml> (accessed: December 31, 2010)

- Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, incl[uding] self defence.’’<sup>69</sup>

The force’s military personnel total was expected to be 8,000 troops, and these were expected from from a number of African Union member states. Unlike UNITAF that went into Somalia with 38,000 troops with full military hardware, and unlike UNOSOM that had up to 28,000 troops, AMISOM’s promised 8,000 were still nowhere as deployment began. It was Uganda that gave a face to the mission by providing a battalion. Other countries that pledged troops, including Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, did not send troops.

As Uganda prepared to deploy its forces, Islamic militants in Somalia warned against any foreign troops’ deployment at the risk of outright war. On March 5, 2007, not afraid of these threats, the first batch of 370 UPDF/AMISOM forces arrived in Mogadishu, and was welcomed at the airport by heavy gunfire and motor explosions.<sup>70</sup>

## **DEPLOYMENT PHASES**

AMISOM’s operational strategy/plan has four phases: Stabilization and control of Mogadishu, expansion to rest of Somalia, consolidation, and finally, consolidation and exit.

The first phase involves deployment into Mogadishu, taking control of key installations and entry points of Mogadishu airport and seaport. This involved the establishment of the mission’s headquarters, deployment of the military, police, and civilian staffs. With Mogadishu under control and secure, and the government fully operational, phase two would commence. Phase


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<sup>69</sup> AMISOM Mission Mandate and Tasks, found at: [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM\\_Mandat\\_Tasks.htm](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Mandat_Tasks.htm) (accessed: December 31, 2010)  
<sup>70</sup> Emmy Allio and Agencies. “Bombs explode as UPDF arrives in Somalia” in *The New Vision* (Kampala)Ⓜ, March 6, 2007Ⓜ. found at: [http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2007/03/uganda\\_bombs\\_ex.html](http://www.worldproutassembly.org/archives/2007/03/uganda_bombs_ex.html) (as on October 5, 2009)

two would involve expansion of the mission tasks outside Mogadishu to the countryside to extend the administrative power and base of the TFG. With this effected, phase three would involve consolidation of the mission and empowering the TFIs to effectively run their country, provide their security, resettle their returning citizens, etc. With the government fully functional, the final stage would be a de-escalatory phase would see the mission downsize and redeploy, and exit from Somalia.

Unfortunately, although the year 2010 saw the mission achieve some key gains from the militia elements, the mission is still far from even achieving the first phase of its objectives. The TFG barely controls Mogadishu and both the TFG and AMISOM are yet struggling to keep alive.

**Fig.5 AMISOM deployment phases**



*SOURCE: Somalia: "The Intervention Dilemma", Institute for Security Studies Africa, Policy Brief Nr. 40, August 2010. p.4*

In its deployment stage, the forces began by taking immediate control of Mogadishu airport and Mogadishu sea port. As deployment of more Ugandan troops kept on track, the mission extended its spheres of operation, but with the primary focus on the presidential palace at Mogadishu. The life and breath of the TFG has since then depended entirely on AMISOM's support and many do believe that "were it not for AMISOM, Al-Shabaab would have overrun all of Somalia by now"<sup>71</sup> while others take this thinking to a higher level. According to Wetangula, Somalia's problems and the TFG's situation is not just the "lack of troops or initiatives, but the lack of the will of the international community...if the Transitional Federal Government was to collapse, Al-Shabaab would attempt to destroy all non-Muslims in the country"<sup>72</sup>

### **MANDATE VS. CAPACITY CRISIS**

Just like UNOSOM II, AMISOM has been given to bite more than it can chew. The mission's mandate was supposed to completely encompass nation building but the "how" to implement this building was not there. In the same shoes that UNITAF and UNOSOM II wore, AMISOM found itself with an extensive mandate that included disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) but how far this could be done remained more of an idea than a reality. While flagging off his UPDF troops to Somalia, Ugandan leader, President Yoweri Museveni, an ardent supporter for intervention in Somalia realized the difficult tasks ahead: "We are not going to disarm the Somali militias because if we empower the Somali people, it will be up to them to decide whether it is necessary to disarm...We are not going to Somalia to impose peace on the Somali people, but to help empower them to rebuild their state and help them to rebuild their

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<sup>71</sup> Moses Wetang'ula, Kenyan minister of foreign affairs, IBID

<sup>72</sup> ibid

army. That is our line of responsibility."<sup>73</sup>This was reminiscent of the Boutros Ghali vs. Bush discussions over UNITAF in 1992. If this was an impossible task as was with UNOSOM II, it clearly shows that the drafters of the mandate and resolution have no touch with the reality on the grounds of Somalia in which the mission operates.

Without the capability to disarm, the mission found itself in a dilemma: disarm? It has no capacity! Avoid disarmament? There are too many weapons in the hands of the Somali people. According to Tarcisio, in his presentation to the UN GA 10<sup>th</sup> committee meeting, "disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [is] of crucial importance because, if left unattended or incomplete, it could constitute a source of instability"<sup>74</sup>

If AMISOM cannot do disarmament, then what sort of a secure environment is it going to establish for the UN to take over? Somali factions and warlords have been at war with each other for far too long, with each warlord owning unknown quantities of military ammunitions. Disarming the population would be a significant necessity if there should indeed be any peace at all before even talking about keeping or non-imposition of peace as Museveni does suggest! Disarmament of Somali factions was one of the greatest expectations the former Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed's incapacitated government had expected from IGASOM and later AMISOM. According to former Somali government spokesman Hussein Mahmoud Mohammed, killings would continue unless AU troops led the disarmament process<sup>75</sup>.

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73 IRIN News. AU mission will not impose peace. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/03/mil-070301-irin02.htm> (accessed October 23, 2009 )

<sup>74</sup> Press release, 10<sup>th</sup> UN GA 10<sup>th</sup> committee meeting, op.cit

<sup>75</sup> BBC, "Ugandan Troops not Peacemakers", found at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6409167.stm> (accessed: December 31, 2010)

## **MANDATES VS PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINES**

From the beginning years of UN peacekeeping operations, three key principles have prevailed and have stood the test of time in various peacekeeping missions globally. According to Capstone doctrine, the three key principles are:

Deployment of AMISOM under these three conditions, given the environment in which it was being sent, has had several implications on the life and success of the mission. Somalia is the world's longest failed state. As if this wasn't enough, it is considered a terrorist haven just like Afghanistan. To enter therein, AMISOM went as a multidimensional peacekeeping under a chapter VII mandate, but with a capacity of a traditional observer mission, to keep a peace that never was. Going by an earlier definition, peacekeeping presupposes that two parties have signed or intend to an agreement, that they have ceased all hostilities and are ready to build foundations for sustainable peace. Peacekeepers then would come in to help monitor the implementation of the peace process, with the consent of the conflicting parties.

With AMISOM headed to a stateless country of multiple landlords and a government that controls only its court yard, whose consent would the mission have to seek? And what sort of impartiality would it exercise given the asymmetry of forces and intentions among these factions? Unfortunately for AMISOM, the former transitional government of President Abdullahi Yusuf, who requested the deployment of IGASOM and later AMISOM, was not installed in office by the people of Somalia but by the military might from Ethiopia after a group of infamous individuals met in a foreign country (Kenya) and elected a president for the people of Somalia. Coming to Somalia upon the request of one party meant that AMISOM as a force that was taking over from the unpopular Ethiopian forces was already perceived as partisan by other parties to the conflict. Considered a next of kin to Ethiopia forces, AMISOM's credibility

to the locals and tribal factions suffered a significant blow, who considered it a party to the conflict. Although strategic consent was granted by the TFG, and its legitimacy hinged on the authority of its authors; AU and UNSC acting under chapter VII, this consent meant nothing to forces like al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam whose interests AMISOM threatened and therefore considered a foreign interference, rendering it a “missio-non-grata”

Even before its departure from Kampala in 2007, AMISOM was warned against stepping foot on Somali soil but these threats were taken as inconsequential intimidation. Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali had passed a warning to AMISOM: "We are sending our clear warning to the neighboring countries ... send your troops to our holy soil if you need to take them back inside coffins."<sup>76</sup>

If AMISOM was to operate under the traditional principles of peacekeeping, these warning were sufficient to inform decision makers that AMISOM was an unwelcome guest to Somalia. Its insistence on going to, given the threat level necessitated proper strategic and contingency planning on how to react to the threats it should become real without setting a belligerent tone on the go. After all, the Brahimi report of 2000 had warned that no deployment must be done unless personnel and resource capacity is met. Yet here is a force of 370 troops deployed to a country where they were vehemently unwelcome! Yet despite the warnings, the ill armed AMISOM peacekeeping forces headed to their nightmare in Somalia with the hope that the world will follow them with necessary human and logistical resources for the mission and soon handover to a 20,000 almighty UN peacekeepers.

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<sup>76</sup> *World Military Forum* “Somalia Islamists warn against foreign intervention”, found at: <http://www.armybase.us/2009/06/somalia-islamists-warn-against-foreign-intervention/> (accessed: October 12, 2010)

Although the guide to peace keeping maintains that “by its nature, a PO force capable of conducting PEO must be employed in PO when there is no general consent or when there is uncertainty regarding consent,”<sup>77</sup> and that “Consent and impartiality, like the non-use of force in traditional peace-keeping, are just as difficult to uphold in conflicts where there are no clear geographical front lines and where the warring parties do not divide neatly into two hostile camps,” it is even more serious that the mission should demonstrate adequate capacity and credibility if it is absolutely determined to face the threats from its opponents.

### **AMISOM deployment and lessons learned**

I do believe that it was a big mistake made by the executors of the AU Peace and Security Council decisions to send in a peacekeeping mission to face the known and the unknowns without the required capacity, especially given that Somalia’s history with the UN remains very clear to date. It was like sending a child to class with either a pen or paper and not both! I agree with Sarjoh Bah in his word of caution to AU: “the African Union's Peace and Security Council should avoid authorizing complex peace operations without a firm commitment of troops, equipment and financing. While the AU is keen to deal with conflicts on the continent, its action should be guided by existing best practice, from its own operations as well as those of others”<sup>78</sup> It seems to me that the deployment of AMISOM was a show-off more than a real seriously meditated decision. Although Mahiga, while testifying to the UNSC about the need for urgent deployment of UN missions reiterates that “[e]xperience in Somalia has shown that the more delayed or inadequate the response is, the more complex the crisis becomes [and that] [w]e have

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<sup>77</sup> US peace operations guide, page vii

<sup>78</sup> Sarjoh A. Bah. The Broader Horn: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum, in *Annual review of Global peace operations*, 2009. p 28

to act in a comprehensive manner to address these complex challenges,"<sup>79</sup> experience from the same Somalia has shown that unprepared hurried response has been very catastrophic. Indeed if there is anything to learn from AMISOM's deployment, is that: "Hurried deployment without operational plans and management structures in place subjects a peace mission to unnecessary challenges and lessens its impact...troops were deployed before the planning and management unit was established."<sup>80</sup> To make matters even worse for hurried unplanned deployment, there were no adequate strategies and contingency planning in place to handle the critical internal socio-political-economic and historical and other external known and un known factors that complicate the dynamics of Somalia's crisis. "[A]realistic effort for peace in Somalia must take these factors into account... attempts to impose western solutions to the Somali crisis...have not succeeded and are not likely to succeed without a formidable political space within which such solutions can thrive."<sup>81</sup> All these boil to one thing for a peacekeeping mission that finds itself in the position of AMISOM, must do adequate planning and anticipate how to respond to surprises before deployment is done. Otherwise, if a mission must be deployed following the traditional pattern, then it is important that "a peacekeeping force has to find the peace before keeping it"<sup>82</sup>, and if it cannot find it, it should be capable of finding it.

It is important that the EU and UN should (as it is) become more involved in working together with AU to employ an integrated strategy to handle with prudent judgment, the military and civil dimensions of the country's politics. It cannot go without mentioning and constantly reminding decision makers handling conflicts with foggy faces like in Somalia that "[g]ood understanding

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<sup>79</sup> <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-89DL4C?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=som>

<sup>80</sup> Solomon A. Derso, op. cit. p.17

<sup>81</sup> ibid

<sup>82</sup> Dersso, op.cit

of the local context of conflict and the factors that drive the opposition, as well as the reasons for opposition to and attacks on peacekeepers is essential [keeping in mind that any] response to such opposition and attacks should be adequately informed by a constant analysis of the local situation based on accurate information.”<sup>83</sup>

## **AU AND THE CHALLENGE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

### ***Institutional crisis***

AMISOM raises not only a problem of the conflict resolution challenges in intractable conflicts, but for AU, it raises a serious question of its continent-wide security strategies and the capacity to achieve these strategies. Should AU authorize a mission it is unable to shoulder responsibility for? Do AU Peace and Security Council have the ability to ensure implementation of its decisions? AMISOM experience does show signs of internal cracks and regional rather than continental dedication to the missions. It can be said that “the debacle surrounding AMISOM and the failure to achieve a limited force strength of even 8 000 personnel showed that despite important changes having been achieved under the AU, the organization still suffered from many of the same institutional and political limitations as its predecessor, the OAU.”<sup>84</sup> There also appears to be a disconnect with regards to regional organizations within the AU to come together for a continent-wide as opposed to regional commitment. ECOWAS is more dedicated to west African affairs than African affairs, as are IGAD/EAC, SADC, etc organizations dedicated to their own specific regions. In the events that followed July 11 Kampala bombings, several military leaders from these different organizations met in Addis Ababa and designed a joint military strategy to respond to al-Shabaab, but their political leaders took a different direction,

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid

<sup>84</sup> [http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link\\_id=3&slink\\_id=8168&link\\_type=12&slink\\_type=13&tmpl\\_id=3](http://www.apsta-africa.org/pdf/APSTASemReport09.pdf?link_id=3&slink_id=8168&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3)

claiming lack of funds while others blamed lack of troops to contribute to AMISOM. If AU is to be a reliable player in its own security agenda, it should desist from a dependency syndrome on the international community and get serious to mobilize its own resources to support its missions. AU alone cannot do it but a serious commitment from the body will be a key foundation on which external support can be built. “Common interests and shared objectives could give intervention a more acceptable face...[but this must not simply be a] “fire-brigade approach”<sup>85</sup>

However, AU is not only a history of failures. African Union has been quiet successful in some of its mission undertakings. Among these are; African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) which did help prevent the fragile country from crushing. A similar success, al beit with serious logistical limitations, was AU mission in Somalia to oversee the Darfur situation before becoming a hybrid mission with the UN. It was able to alleviate massive human suffering and contain the violence.<sup>86</sup>

### **EXTERNAL FACTORS IN SOMALIA AND AMISOM’S WOES**

Despite its hardships, AMISOM is not only failures. It has managed to keep the TFG protected despite the countless threats it faces by the day. According to Refugee International, “[T]oday the presence of AMISOM soldiers is all that is preventing militant groups from ejecting the government from the Somali capital, Mogadishu. In spite of the critical nature of their task, and

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<sup>85</sup> Press release of the 10<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Fourth Committee of UN 58<sup>th</sup> General Assembly.  
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaspd267.doc.htm>

<sup>86</sup> *Dr Debay Tadesse*. Peacekeeping successes and failures in Africa, in  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SHIG-7RKFTA?OpenDocument>

the broad international interest in keeping the TFG in place, AMISOM forces have been chronically starved for troops and resources"<sup>87</sup>

AMISOM's dilemma is, however, not just a weakness of the AU or the complications of Somalia, but also a general problem in the peacekeeping institutions. Operating a mission under a fixed doctrine in a highly fluid globalized world exposes peacekeeping like AMISOM to serious challenges and affects their relevance. "[T]hese challenges illustrate many gaps existing in the peacekeeping system...unclear mandate, overly complex or insufficient to address the real issues on the ground...poor living and operating conditions...insufficient staff and resources to do the work."<sup>88</sup>

Today's security problems are so intricate that treating them with the same old medicine makes the sickness even worse. It is not just how well written the mandates are that matter but how they can be effectively translated into desirable outcomes. As Refugee International puts it,, "AMISOM is called a peacekeeping force, but the truth is there was never any peace to keep. Far from "keeping the peace" AMISOM soldiers fight every day to keep Somalia's government (and themselves) alive."<sup>89</sup>

## **THE ROLE OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS**

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Seyoum Mesfin summarizes his fears concerning the influence of the external elements in Somalia:

“Somalia is being hijacked by foreign fighters who have no inhibition in proclaiming that their agenda has nothing to do with Somalia. Theirs is an ambition that goes well beyond Somalia, and

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87 Erin Weir: "Somalia: Tragedy Highlights Peacekeeping Challenges", September 25, 2009. Found at: <http://www.refintl.org/blog/somalia-tragedy-highlights-peacekeeping-challenges> (accessed on October 28, 2009)

88 Ibid

89 Ibid

they say it out loud and clear... Today in Somalia, there is greater coordination and cooperation among those who assist the extremists than among those who profess support for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia...No one who knows Somalia well believes that al-Shabaab is popular in Somalia. Whatever gains they have made is a function of their brutality and the support they have from without."<sup>90</sup>

Not only are the al-Shabaab to blame for Somalia's crisis; there are a host of many other external forces that play different roles and the sum total of these roles is what we see recurrent in Somalia; a continuously bleeding country. I discuss three of such external factors: Ethiopia and Eritrea factor; Terrorism factor, and United States' factor.

#### **ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA FACTOR**

While Brahimi report states that "United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a consistent record of success in peacekeeping or peace building in situations of intrastate/transnational conflict,"<sup>91</sup> the greater problem for AMISOM, however, is that the spoilers anticipated by Brahimi and his team did not correspond to the many types AMISOM had to face. AMISOM faced, among other external forces, two hardened enemies; Ethiopia and Eritrea whose wars would be executed in Somalia. Facing these types of spoilers was beyond what AMISOM was prepared for or able to.

In the late 2006, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and removed by force of arm the government of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Ethiopia considered UIC a hostile government, mostly because of its cooperation with Eritrea and because of its war against Ethiopia in mid to late

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<sup>90</sup> *Taipei Times*. "Ethiopia warns situation is worsening in Somalia." September 28, 2009. found at: <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/09/28/2003454639>

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p.4

2006 in boarder dispute, and its attempts to make Somalia repossess Ogaden region that has been the epicenter of Ethiopia-Somalia fights for many years. Ethiopia succeeded in forcing UIC out of power and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its president. Despite this achievement, Somalia's political map has never been stable. The presence of Ethiopian soldiers in Somalia created such a strong animosity that did not remain focused on Ethiopia but became a bitter hatred against all foreign military presence in the country whatever their intentions. Ethiopia's presence, while was intended to usher in peace for the TFG turned the Somali majority against their government, and so the best available option for AU was to ask Ethiopia to withdraw, which it did on Tuesday January 13, 2009 and massively celebrated by the Somali people. While it was hoped that AMISOM's replacement of Ethiopia would decrease the magnitude of animosity towards foreign intervention, AMISOM became the substitute recipient of this hatred.

AMISOM found itself trapped in the middle of a proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. From the very beginning of the mission activities, Eritrea did immediately send warning to AMISOM troop contributing countries (Uganda and Burundi) serious consequences should it continue to stay in Somalia. On March 10, 2007, after Uganda's initial deployment, Eritrea's information minister sounded this warning to Uganda: "We believe the government of Uganda must rectify its error and pull out from Somalia, otherwise the situation will become increasingly dangerous. It will not only worsen, but will become a war between the Somali people and external forces. That will have dire consequences for the whole region."<sup>92</sup>

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92 "Eritrean minister warns of war over Ugandan troops in Somalia", March 10, 2007  
[Http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Eritrean\\_minister\\_warns\\_of\\_war\\_over\\_Ugandan\\_troops\\_in\\_Somalia](http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Eritrean_minister_warns_of_war_over_Ugandan_troops_in_Somalia) (as on November 24, '09)

Since May 1998, Eritrea and Ethiopia have been at quarrels over their unresolved boarder dispute. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established to resolve this conflict but failed to bring the two nations to agreement. Eritrea later withdrew its consent for the mission and so it was closed down. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of training Somali militants and then using these militants through Somalia to destabilize its territory, a reason why Ethiopia acted to topple the UIC government. Eritrea on the other hand sees Ugandan forces as threat, regarding them as collaborators with Ethiopia to support its enemies. As a result, any pro-Ethiopia or pro-Eritrean government in Somalia would be unacceptable to Eritrea and Ethiopia respectively. It is in this situation that AMISOM forces not only find themselves trying to defend the Somali Transitional federal Government of president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, but also to survive in this larger conflict frontline, trying to keep a peace that never was. President Ahmed himself accuses Eritrea of arming hardline Islamists fighting to oust his government. He made these accusations: “We know for sure that the majority of the weapons in the hands of the insurgents are coming from Eritrea...Eritrea is very much involved here... We know that Eritrean officers come here and bring money in cash...Since there is a war and tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea needs a place where Ethiopian opposition groups could be trained.”<sup>93</sup> These are issues that AMISOM has to grapple with on a daily basis, and which force is there that can handle all the critical internal problems with these messy regional issues at the same time?

### ***ERITREA’S ROLE***

Eritrea is accused of using Somalia for its own national agenda. It has for long supported Somalia’s insurgents with arms and finances, as well as training ground. What makes matters

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93 By Emmanuel Goujon (AFP) – May 27, 2009 “Somalia president accuses Eritrea of arming Islamists” found at: [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5id4HnpFXI5KhuPJZCBbZ\\_tsBHwVw](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5id4HnpFXI5KhuPJZCBbZ_tsBHwVw) (accessed on October 28, 2009)

worse is that despite the appeals for a united action for Somalia's peace, there are still fresh allegations of Eritrea's continued support for the enemies President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and his TFG government. While attending the 15<sup>th</sup> AU Heads of Government's meeting held in Kampala in July 2010, President Ahmed "officially accused Eritrea of supporting Al-Shabaab terrorists financially and logistically. He pointed out that Eritrea was at the forefront of support for the terrorists financially, through training and the provision of logistical support."<sup>94</sup> This was a similar allegation made by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton in her visit to Africa in August, 2009, when she made it clear that "Eritrea was supplying weapons to al-Shabaab and described the Eritrean action as a serious threat to regional stability in the Horn"<sup>95</sup>

This concern was also re-echoed by the African Institute of Security Studies, citing the March 2010 report of the UN Monitoring group, that: "Eritrea has provided significant and sustained political, financial and material support, including arms, ammunition and training, to armed opposition groups in Somalia since at least 2007...as an attempt to counter Ethiopian influence in the region, especially because it perceives the TFG as a proxy for the Ethiopian Government"<sup>96</sup>

These challenges are certainly beyond AMISOM's ability to handle since the spoilers in this category are more complicated than the traditional concept of spoilers envisaged in the peacekeeping doctrine of use of force. How can a peacekeeping mission with a poorly armed, internally threatened 7000 troops face such spoilers as Eritrea and Ethiopia? According to the UN Monitoring Group, "[t]o counter such conflict supporting neighbours, a peace operation will

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<sup>94</sup> ISS, "Peace and Security Council Report No. 16, November 2010", found at: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-8AVMDU/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-8AVMDU/$File/full_report.pdf) ACCESSED ON NOV 5, 2010, P.14

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, p.15

<sup>96</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), annex to S/2010/91, 10 Mar. 2010, p.22

require the active political, logistical and/or military support of one or more great powers, or of major regional powers. The tougher the operation, the more important such backing becomes”<sup>97</sup>This is where the UN, AU, US and EU’s role and pressure on the two countries are highly necessary.

### **TERRORISM FACTOR**

Every day that passes by, AMISOM face increased hostility from Somali Islamists. It has so far lost 63+ of its personnel to explosions and several suicide attacks in Somalia since its first deployment.<sup>98</sup> Terrorism is not a new reality to Somalia and it must have not come as a surprise to AMISOM that they are targeted by terrorists. The mission faces a whole cohort of dangerous non-state actors, some directly linked to al Qaeda terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden has had a history of involvement in the horn of Africa nation. This history began in 1992 when bin Laden established his secret operations and business deals in Sudan Khartoum. But “[w]ithin months, bin Laden had deployed cadres of operatives into the Horn of Africa in an effort to spread Salafism and the doctrine of Jihad.”<sup>99</sup> Somalia provides such an ideal location in the region for terrorists’ training and hiding bases. Although its location doesn't equal the mountainous terrains of Afghanistan, and although Somali warlords were neither so much united under common point of trust nor a central Islamic fundamentalists ideology, “Al-Qa'ida believed that Somalia would provide another safe haven for their operations, allow them

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<sup>97</sup> ibid

<sup>98</sup> “African Union Mission in Somalia”, found at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African\\_Union\\_Mission\\_to\\_Somalia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Union_Mission_to_Somalia) (accessed: January 1, 2011)

<sup>99</sup> Harmony Project. 2007. *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*. The Combatting Terrorism Center at Westpoint. New York. p..5

to target the U.S in both Somalia and the Arab peninsula and provide a steady flow of recruits.”

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Although by 1996 bin Laden appeared to have headed to a friendlier Afghanistan, the seeds of his jihadism had been successfully planted in this country united under one Islamic faith, and so was able to get some committed disciples, whose interests were not just in Islam and hatred for the US, but also for selfish political interests now that al Qaeda could be a force whose support considered rewarding. There are debates as to what extent Osama and his al Qaeda have been or are still interested in Somalia. Some security experts believe that Somalia was not key to al Qaeda given its unfriendly geography and unpredictable warlords and faction leaders, but his 11.4 minutes video released in March 2009, titled *Fight on, Champions of Somalia*, Osama bin laden appears very much behind his disciples in Somalia. He urges his disciples to "fight and dethrone President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who [Osama claims] is paid by the enemies of al-Qaida's cause."<sup>101</sup> These champions of Somalia indeed metamorphosed into the hardliner al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in 2007 as the most prominent and radical of these disciples and seasoned AMISOM/TFG enemies.

On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda terrorists simultaneously attacked two US embassies in east Africa; Nairobi and Dar-es-salaam, causing the death of 81 people and wounding as many as 1,600. These attacks were believed to have been masterminded by Osama Bin laden with operational base in Somalia. This attack redefined American approach to Somalia since its withdrawal in 1994. Since then, the United States did employ the use of targeted missile attacks against key terrorists' leadership in the country. Although many were eliminated in these attacks, terrorism

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100 Ibid

101 VOA news of March 19, 2009. "New Bin Laden tape calls for president's ouster" found at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2009/03/sec-090319-voa01.htm> (accessed October 28, 2009)

in Somalia wasn't about to end. The expulsion of UIC from power in 2006 laid a foundation for a more radicalized form of terrorism as the youth groups of the Union resorted to alliance with al Qaeda to fight the US and its supported TFG.

In 2008, the US listed al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorists organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act<sup>102</sup>. Rather than bring fear among the group members, this categorization instead brought a sense of pride to al-Shabaab members. Sheikh Muktar Robow, the then Al Shabab leader, expressed pride in this new family of terrorists; "Al-Shabab feels honored to be included on the list. We are good Muslims and the Americans are infidels. We are on the right path"<sup>103</sup>

On May 1, 2008, US targeted and destroyed a house in which Al-Shabab leaders were meeting, killing some of its members including Aden Hashi Ayro who was al-Qaeda's military commander in Somalia, and Sheikh Muhyadin Omar, a senior al Shabaab commander. The two had played tremendous roles in planning coordinating several acts of terror in east Africa.<sup>104</sup> On September 14, 2009, the US launched a missile attack against key terrorist leaders in Mogadishu, killing among others, the notorious Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan who was the leader of Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Following this incidence, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, called on the Somali population to carry out a retaliatory suicide attacks against AMISOM<sup>105</sup>, and on September 17 2009, al-Shabaab carried out separate suicide attacks against AMISOM, killing 17 peacekeepers including the deputy force commander. Al-Shabaab did not only attack

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<sup>102</sup> US Department of State, "Foreign terrorists organizations", found at:

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (accessed: November 10, 2010)

<sup>103</sup> Mary Harper, Profile: Somalia's Islamic 'lads'. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7307521.stm> (Friday, March 21, 2008) as at October 28, 2009.

<sup>104</sup> [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia\\_al\\_qaeda\\_and\\_al\\_shabab](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somalia_al_qaeda_and_al_shabab) (accessed October 28, 2009)

<sup>105</sup> Alshahid, "Sheikh Aweys supports suicide attacks for the first time", found at: <http://english.alshahid.net/archives/1722> (accessed December 30, 2010)

AMISOM and TFG as part of its anti-US war, but also began expanding its reach beyond continental Africa. According to New York Times, Australian police “claim they had foiled a suicide plot by Al-Shabaab supporters to storm a Sydney military base and kill as many soldiers as possible.”<sup>106</sup> On November 26, 2009, eight Somali men were arrested in Minneapolis, led by one Mohamud Said Umar, believed to have recruited and trained fellow immigrants as well as U.S citizens, ready to go to Somalia to fight for terrorists. According to the federal court charge, some of them had attended terrorist training of varying skills and also received real military style tactics, skills and indoctrination in "anti-Ethiopian, anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-Western beliefs."<sup>107</sup>

### **JULY 11 BOMBINGS IN KAMPALA AND EXPORTATION OF TERRORISM**

*Events leading to the attacks in Uganda:* On October 22, 2009 al-Shabaab terrorists pitched their base in Mogadishu market and used this base among the population to attack AMISOM troops. AMISOM responded in self-defense, which unfortunately caused the death of 50 civilians who were caught up in the cross-fire. Al Shabaab had successfully used civilian shields in order to soil the AMISOM’s image as the murderer of civilians, and so win the hearts and mind of the people as well as to broaden its recruitment base. Basing on this incidence, Al Shabaab commander Sheikh Ali Mohamed Hussein immediately sounded a serious note to Uganda and Burundi: “If our people are killed today, they will see a loud cry over Kampala and

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106 Rory Callinan, "The Somali Connection: A Terrorism Crackdown in Australia" in The Times. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1914644,00.html> August 5, 2009.

107 US citizens promised 'fun', recruited by terrorists. [http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=2&objectid=10611801&pnum=0](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10611801&pnum=0) (accessed November 28 2009)

Bujumbura...[they] will have their share of crying, as our people have cried...We will avenge our people.”<sup>108</sup>

True to their word, on July 11, 2010, while Ugandans gathered at various locations to watch the final game of the world cup, Somali terrorists effected their plans through two suicide bomb attacks that hit an Ethiopian restaurant (this author was seated about six meters from the blast locus) and at a rugby club (Kyadondo rugby club) that hosted thousands of football fans. Over 74 people were killed and over 70 injured<sup>109</sup>. Al Shabaab later claimed responsibility and expressed satisfaction with what happened: “We have reached our objective. We killed many Christians in the enemy capital”<sup>110</sup>, declared an unnamed al Shabaab official. Additional praise of the suicide bombers came from Sheik Ali Mohamud Rage, al-Shabaab’s spokesman: “Al-Shabab was behind the two blasts in Uganda [he declared.] We thank the mujahideens that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen.”<sup>111</sup>The bombings in Kampala were not something surprising. The country was warned in time but its leadership considered it simply a bad joke and thought al-Shabaab would have no capacity to do what they had promised. This attack just confirmed how lethal the terrorists had become! The bombs were believed to have been made locally in Kampala by al-Shabaab members, with local materials readily available. Besides, al-Shabaab even employed the support of Ugandans to plan and execute the plan.

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<sup>108</sup> Mohammed Ibrahim. “Islamists in Somalia threaten other nations”, in the New York Times. October 23, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/world/africa/24somalia.html> (as on October 25, 2009)

<sup>109</sup> BBC, July 12, 2010. found at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10593771>, (accessed December 30, 2010)

<sup>110</sup> “July 2010 Kampala attacks”, found in *Wikipedia*, found at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July\\_2010\\_Kampala\\_attacks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2010_Kampala_attacks) (accessed: December 28, 2010)

<sup>111</sup> AlJazeera, “Al-Shabaab claims Uganda Bombings”, found at: <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520826984.html> (accessed: December 27, 2010)

## UNITED STATES' FACTOR

As mentioned in the previous pages, the US has been active in Somalia's crisis for a long time. The first phase was during the turbulent period of 1992-94, and later from 1998 following the attacks on its embassies in eastern Africa. The post 9/11 saw the US declare global war on terrorism and Somalia was no exception to this. However, the US counterterrorism strategy caused more wounds than it healed in the horn of Africa. This has two dimensions with a consequence on Somali peace: Ethiopia-Eritrea relation and the approach towards Somali "terrorists". According to Bah, the Ethiopia – Eritrea crisis is exacerbated by the US' counterterrorism posture in the region.<sup>112</sup> Bah maintains that "the convergence of US and Ethiopian interests on the counterterrorism issues fostered Washington's support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia...this in turn affirmed Eritrea's feeling of US bias in favor of Ethiopia."<sup>113</sup> This, coupled with the US's inclusion of Eritrea as a terrorist country, sent Eritrea on the negative side of the isle. This even increased its support for anti-Ethiopia and anti-TFG elements in Somalia, perhaps as a self-defense option from US-Ethiopia aggression, thereby hindering any prospect for Ethiopia-Eritrea collaboration to build peace for Somali. Recent reports indicate that Ethiopia also continues its meddling in Somali affairs. On November 22, 2009, "[H]undreds of Ethiopian troops reportedly arrived in Yeed District, Bakool region, with heavy and light weapons, including armoured vehicles."<sup>114</sup> A similar claim was reported in Gedo region on November 20, 2009.

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112 Sarjoh Bah. "Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum", in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009*. p.26

113 Ibid

114 International Institute for Strategic studies,

[http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp\\_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=198&YearID=1144](http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=198&YearID=1144) (accessed November 27, 2009)

There have also been cases of US meddling in the AMISOM's operations, including allegations that the US in collaboration with Ugandan defense forces, was selling guns to Somalia's TFG, with the Ugandan government forces reportedly receiving \$10 million from the US government for arming the TFG forces.<sup>115</sup> Although this was a good attempt to empower TFG forces to adequately fight their enemies, the manner in which it was done betrayed the mission's impartiality. More so, the UN had not yet lifted the arms embargo on Somalia, making the act some sort of arms trafficking. On his part, Uganda's land Forces Commander, General katumba Wamala, put the responsibility to Washington DC: "The only thing we have done is to be the link to pass those weapons to TFG because the Americans cannot be on the ground to do this themselves."<sup>116</sup>

According to Capstone doctrine, if a UN peacekeeping is to be successful, it should always try to maintain the consent of the parties: "The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground."<sup>117</sup> Although AMISOM was considered an unwelcome guest in Somalia, the way it carried its business amidst opposition would have perhaps changed the perceptions of average Somali people towards it if it established itself as a purely impartial force with its own skin rather than as a grandchild of the US and Ethiopia. Unfortunately, its activities, including such gun deals and the presumed 'marriage' between the infamous TFG and AMISOM clearly put it at a disadvantage as a peacekeeping mission.

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<sup>115</sup> *Somali Press*. "Somlia: UPDF sells guns to its enemies". July 16, 2008. found at: <http://www.somalipress.com/news/2008-jul-16/somlia-updf-sells-guns-its-enemies.html>

<sup>116</sup> Tabu Butagira. "U.S. Pays Uganda to Arm Somali Fighters" in *The Irish Anti-War Movement*. July 9, 2009. found at: <http://irishantiwar.org/node/538> (accessed on november 29, 2009)The Irish Anti-War Movement

<sup>117</sup> Capstone Doctrine, p.36

Looking from just a few of the external intricacies that AMISOM had to face, it becomes clearer to this extent, why AMISOM still remains locked in half of Mogadishu for the last three-to four years. One thing remains certain, that is; AMISOM lacks the ability to handle all these complex external factors that combine in varying proportions to make Somalia what it is.

## **CALL FOR CHANGE OF MANDATE AND ITS IMPLICATION**

### ***SECURITY SITUATION***

Since its establishment with a robust mandate, AMISOM has succeeded in its consistency to protect the transitional government, the ports, and presidential palace. It operates in a hostile environment, and “[t]he overall security situation in Somalia remains highly volatile and unpredictable. Armed group elements continue to launch stand-off attacks against the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, where armed clashes, roadside bombs, and individual killings perpetuate a particularly hostile environment”<sup>118</sup>

While one of the missions mandate tasks was to ensure that there is a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Somali people, this mission has been hampered to a great deal by the security situation in the country, which has drastically limited the ability of UN and other aid agencies’ efforts to reach out to the suffering Somali people that flee the fighting among the warlords and rival clerics in southern and central Somalia. “On 28 February, Al-Shabaab called for the “termination of all WFP operations inside Somalia”. On 1 March and 7 April, respectively, the World Food Programme (WFP) compounds in Buale and Wajid were occupied by Al-Shabaab.”<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> IBID

<sup>119</sup> IBID, P.3

According to Uganda's defense minister Dr. Crispus Kiyonga, "The African Union (AU) has reviewed the mandate of UPDF in Somalia and allowed the Ugandan forces to attack the Al-Shabaab militants."<sup>120</sup> This is a great move for the troops for their own security and the security of the Somali people. However, taking this authority recklessly could lead Uganda to direct war with various Somali sectors. Kiyonga claims that AMISOM forces "would have made much more progress if the mandate was more facilitating...the army just sits where they are in their detachments even when they have information that insurgents are just two kilometers away,...They [UPDF] cannot attack them. We wait for insurgents to shoot first and we respond."<sup>121</sup> If AMISOM starts this war, then it must be ready for a sustained war as did UNOSOMII. Its lack of personnel and logistical resources must be able to match this task, something currently doubtful.

Some African countries have been calling for a change of mandate and a greater involvement of the international community on this international problem. Nigeria's foreign minister, Ojo Maduekwe took the campaign right to the United Nations headquarters. He expressed concern that "the challenge in Somali should not be viewed as an African challenge, but rather a global challenge... the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region, hence the need to review the mandate of the peacekeeping mission to a more effective one."<sup>122</sup>

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120 Gerald Bareebe. "AU gives UPDF mandate to attack Somali militants" in *The Daily Monitor*. September 5, 2009. Found at: [http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/AU\\_gives\\_UPDF\\_mandate\\_to\\_attack\\_Somali\\_militants\\_90858.shtml](http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/AU_gives_UPDF_mandate_to_attack_Somali_militants_90858.shtml) (accessed on September 30, 2009)

121 Ibid

122 Hiirian Online. "Nigeria seeks change in AMISOM mandate." September 26, 2009. found at: [http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/nigeria\\_seeks\\_change\\_in\\_amisom\\_mandate.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/Sept/nigeria_seeks_change_in_amisom_mandate.aspx) (as on October 24, 2009)

However, mandate change alone is not enough. With expanded mandate comes the need for capacity enhancement, need for better strategy and planning.

If the world united to address this problem as is the united effort in Afghanistan, probably things would change. The entire community has to get involved in this crisis.

### **IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENFORCEMENT MANDATE**

With such insecurity, there have been calls for a change of mandate from peacekeeping to outright enforcement. However, as discussed in the previous pages, any such calls for outright military enforcement should learn from UNOSOM II's experiences. Military enforcement needs such a presence as did UNITAF or even more. Who will provide these equipment and the funds? Without sure military, logistical and personnel capacity, a call for mandate may be so farfetched and out of touch with the reality of a divided international community and African Union on how to respond to Somalia. The prospects of UN and US military action are not so easy to hope for given their experiences in 1993-4. This is even worsened by the fact that the level of violence increases with perceived and actual composition of the intervening forces. The more the United States is perceived as dominant, the higher the level of violence as they are perceived as imperialists and occupiers.

While African states look towards the UN for blessings and authorization of an enforcement mandate, experiences in Somalia and beyond show that “[t]he question of UN backing for an intervention does not seem to impact on the terrorist response.”<sup>123</sup> Military interventions have on a number of occasions built hatred for the UN and resulted into catastrophic consequences. Besides, “there are some indications that the use of extensive force by intervening armies will

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<sup>123</sup> Peace operations and international terrorism, page 11

result in more lethal terrorist responses.”<sup>124</sup> In the previous pages, I indicated that attempts by AMISOM to respond aggressively to the September 16, 2009 attacks from Mogadishu market led to massive civilian casualties, which the insurgents used to buttress support from the population and incense hatred against AMISOM, leading to a suicide blast that killed several peacekeepers including the deputy force commander.<sup>125</sup> This is true especially where “*the intervening forces might be seen to be responsible* for atrocities that occur during the conflict, if failing to prevent them...This may instigate victimized groups to seek revenge by staging terrorist attacks against the intervening countries”<sup>126</sup>

The UN is considered by al Shabaab and other Somali Islamists, including Aided in the 1990s, as illegitimate. “Although the overall level of political dissatisfaction over an international intervention does not necessarily translate into terrorism, the lack of perceived legitimacy may play a role in mobilizing ideological or affected groups to violent action”<sup>127</sup>

There is a belief that “*The level of force* used by the intervention armies appears to be a factor in the shaping of violent responses such as terrorist campaigns. It is reasonable to assume that a high-intensity military intervention risks producing a stronger terrorist response than a classic peacekeeping mission.” But what does ISAF and AMISOM challenges tell us?

On the other hand, it is also true that “*casualty averseness* of nations participating in a low-intensity peacekeeping mission is... likely to be higher than that of nations involved in a war-like scenario. This may make them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as terrorists might conceive

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<sup>124</sup> ibid

<sup>125</sup> Daily Monitor, September 17, 2009.

<sup>126</sup> ibid, p14

<sup>127</sup> ibid

that they are easily deterred.”<sup>128</sup> Terrorists have exactly achieved this goal with regard to African countries who had pledged to send troops to Somalia.

Geographical proximity and terrorism spill over: The proximity of Uganda and Burundi to the conflict-theatre of Somalia made it very easy for terrorism spill-over to take place. AU member states defaulted their military commitment for fear of this spill-over due to proximity.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *ibid*

<sup>129</sup> *ibid*

## CHAPTER THREE

### ***THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEKEEPING IN SOMALIA***

This thesis objective was centered on one major issue area: evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping as a response strategy to political crisis in Somalia. Three UN peacekeeping operations, one UN sanctioned peace enforcement mission and one unilateral invasion by Ethiopia.

In evaluating whether the peacekeeping missions or military intervention deployed in Somalia were effective response strategies to solve political crises in the country, the question we want to ask is: what makes a successful intervention mission? According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, a successful intervention must consist of three important phases which are well planned and constantly reevaluated:

First phase should involve a serious effort towards initial stabilization of a war torn society.

Second phase should involve recreation of local institutions for governance, and

Third phase is to build sustainable exit strategy through strengthening of those institutions to the capacity where rapid economic growth and sustained social development can take place<sup>130</sup>

To achieve these phases, there must be adequate capacity; equipment, logistical, personnel and financial capacity. This capacity should not be based on unrealistic best-case assumptions. And in the events that the worst cases prove worse, there must be a united effort to face the worse than some countries backing off from the task.

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid, p.8

Answering the question of whether peacekeeping was an effective response strategy was based on the mandates of the missions and the degree to which these mission mandates were fulfilled.

In his presentation on UN peacekeeping and the Brahimi report, South Korea's representative Kim Sam-Hoon reiterated the importance of defining a realistic and achievable mandate backed by adequate resources, and emphasized that peacekeeping missions "should be viewed in the context of a continuum of crisis management, extending from prevention of conflicts through conflict management and actual peacekeeping."<sup>131</sup>

A look at the two completed peacekeeping missions (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II), the facts indicate that none of them lived up to the purposes for which they were created. UNOSOM I went into Somalia as a traditional peacekeeping mission to handle a traditional role; to monitor compliance with the ceasefire. It failed to carry its mandate because the condition on the ground reflected an agreement of inconvenience on the part of a main actor, General Aideed, whose interest was zero sum. As indicated in previous paragraphs, UN appeared to Aideed as a supporter of Ali Mahdi who had declared himself president of Somalia. The agreement entered into by Aideed and Ali in February 1992 was not in good faith and will, and neither did it consider the reality that several other warlords took the power vacuum and the conflict between the two major enemies, to consolidate their own position. These attacked UNOSOM I on the roads and looted humanitarian supplies which they used to leverage their power. Thus far, UNOSOM I was deployed in haste without serious background and situational analysis. That the mission's capacity to operate was impeded as early as August 1992, forcing the UN to request CENTCOM Military to lead airlifting of humanitarian supplies was a revelation that traditional

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<sup>131</sup> Kim Sang-Hoon, quoted in <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/gaspd267.doc.htm> (accessed: December 10, 2010)

peacekeeping is irrelevant in societies without clearly defined power structures and undefined sources of threats. It is therefore reasonable, basing on the mission's life to conclude that UNOSOM I was never an effective response strategy to political crisis in Somalia from the period of April 1992 to August 1992. While traditional peacekeeping was thought to “help prevent further bloodshed in circumstances where a dispute appears intractable and may facilitate confidence building measures between belligerents”<sup>132</sup>, Somalia showed a different story. Instead of encouraging long term solution to a political problem, it gave chances to the opposing elements to solidify their positions, and what followed was the impossibility for the mission to function.

UNOSOM II. In the previous pages, I indicated that UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, a military enforcement mission led by the United States CENTCOM. UNOSOM II went to Somalia with the best case expectations. The assumption in the minds of UNOSOM planners was that the security provided by UNITAF was going to be long term. In the previous pages, I also presented that Aideed, the key player and most powerful of Mogadishu warlord, simply put his war on hold for fear of UNITAF. He was waiting for a chance to face off with a weaker UN mission, UNOSOM II, which he had personal hatred for. If his hatred was to have no dangerous consequences on the mission, UNOSOM II should have presented itself stronger than UNITAF or at least possessing similar capabilities as did UNITAF. I also noted that UNOSOM II went in with far bigger mission mandate than UNITAF despite its lack of matching capacity. Its best case projection of the security condition and tasks ahead misled it to delve into the very heart of the fire; attempts to immediately enforce disarmament. Its attempt to impose security and its laws without mastering the security condition led to disaster.

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<sup>132</sup> Alex J. bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, 2004. *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Polity press: Cambridge. P.109

In his assessment of UNOSOMII's mission, Ramesh (2001) stated thus: "If there is no effective government in power, then attempts by the United Nations to impose its own law and order can provoke fierce backlash from armed bandits...there was a blundering of the line between combatants and civilians because irregular forces emerged, like fish in the ocean, with the local population."<sup>133</sup> Sending a peace mission on nation building in a failed state like Somalia, to do disarmament where all factions feel secure without the protection of their arms, led to two serious issues: need for long term commitment which would be regarded as an occupation. Secondly, there was no way UNOSOMII could be perceived as neutral by all parties, since it basically targeted Aideed in its disarmament agenda. Feeling threatened in this lawless society led Aideed to take the action it did.

In his October 14, 1994, the Secretary General is reported to have affirmed the failure of UNOSOMII to achieve the robust mandate, stating clearly "that national reconciliation had not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area. Security had been progressively deteriorating, especially in Mogadishu, and the Somali leaders had not carried out commitments entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify. The protracted political impasse had created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure in Somalia, leaving the United Nations with no foundation to build on."<sup>134</sup> In his conclusion regarding the best way forward for Somalia, Boutros Boutros Ghali,

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<sup>133</sup> Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Alkbrecht Scnabel, *United Nations Peacekeeping operations: ad hoc missions, permanent engagement*. UN University Press: Tokyo, p.15

<sup>134</sup> UN department of public information document: "Somalia – UNOSOM II", found at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm> (accessed: January 2, 2011)

once an avid promoter of UN intervention, had come to terms that “only the Somalis themselves could establish a viable and acceptable peace. The international community could only help in that process, but such assistance could not be sustained indefinitely.”<sup>135</sup> UNOSOM had tried to force a democratic process in the country through its council elections that was rejected by the powerful warlords. Its peace and reconciliation conference in Ethiopia also ended in the conference room and never reached the grounds of Somalia since the majority of the Somalis were not parties to the solution. With the withdrawal of UNOSOMII on March 1995, Somalia did not necessarily descend into hell. The hardened enemies reached a solution they felt was necessary for their country. Before the face of UNOSOMII who had tried long in vain, Ali and Aideed signed an agreement on February 21, 1995 to among other things; “promotion of national reconciliation and a peaceful settlement and power-sharing, to seek presidency through democratic elections, resolve disputes through dialogue and peaceful means building a common approach to tackle problems. The agreement also resolved on confinement of "technicals" to designated and prohibited open carrying of arms in the streets of Mogadishu... It culminated in the removal of roadblocks and the reopening of the main markets, and the opening of seaport for commercial activities which came to effect on March 9, 1995. Thus far, Somalia did run its affairs relatively peacefully thereafter until the war on terror that began in 1998 ushered in a new dimension to the crisis.

Drawing from the above aspects of the mission, it is clear that UNOSOMII was not at all effective in ushering peace and stability in the region, leave alone failure to build the nation that UN had hoped would soon be incorporated into the community of nations. To one critic, the mission creep was responsible for this failure of the mission. This included the major change in

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<sup>135</sup> ibid

the mission from peacekeeping to peacemaking, by over reacting towards nation building through its catastrophic disarmament agenda. As a result, “[w]hat had started as a humanitarian mission by president Bush had metamorphosed into a humiliating and tragic defeat”<sup>136</sup>.

## AMISOM

This thesis does not evaluate AMISOM’s future, but look at its mandate achievements up to January 2011. Just like UNOSOMII, AMISOM got one of the most robust mandates. While it was established as a multidimensional and complex chapter VII mandate, its actual presence on the grounds of Somalia proved impossible to immediately realize any of its expectations.

AMISOM went to Somalia with the mandate, as presented in the previous pages, to support dialogue and reconciliation between TFG and various key Somali groups by providing security where the government can peacefully negotiate. It was also to support and strengthen Somali national security plan and build a strong an all-inclusive national security forces, and also oversee that a secure environment for humanitarian assistance is in place.<sup>137</sup> A look at AMISOM’s presence brings one point clear; despite its logistical constraints and increased attacks from radical Islamists, “the mission continued to provide security to the TFG and strategic locations such as the national airport and the seaport, thereby ensuring the continued flow of much needed humanitarian assistance.”<sup>138</sup> It is difficult, given the strength of its enemies to imagine the continued existence of the TFG in Mogadishu without AMISOM’s presence and dedicated support.

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<sup>136</sup> Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, 2005, *The United Nations: International Organizations and World Politics*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Thomson Learning, Inc.: California. P.224

<sup>137</sup> Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operation 2009*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: Colorado, p.125.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid

Under AMISOM's watch, several peace accords have been entered into by the TFG and its opponents, such as the August 19, 2008 Djibouti peace and reconciliation agreement signed between ARS and TFG for 90-days cessation of hostilities, which unfortunately crumbles as a result of fragmentation within both parties.<sup>139</sup> The most recent achievement was the March 15, 2010 power sharing agreement between TFG and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a<sup>140</sup>.

Despite these achievements, Somalia is far from political crisis. AMISOM has been limited by failure among the parties to establish a national unity government. AMISOM has not been able to provide a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 2008, humanitarian access was impeded for a number of humanitarian agencies to function<sup>141</sup>. A number of humanitarian and UN agencies have been killed and their offices and warehouses taken by al-Shabaab and other militias.<sup>142</sup>

With regard to training Somali national security forces, progress has been made to some extent. On December 14, 2010, Somali prime minister commissioned 1000 EU sponsored, Uganda-trained Somali forces ready to support the TFG<sup>143</sup>. Further such training have. AMISOM has also tried to win hearts and minds among the Somali people. AMISOM hospital now treats Somali people both from natural causes and emergencies occurring from gun wounds. It also employs the use of AMISOM radio to interact with the population. Despite attacks in Kampala, AMISOM appears to be committed to the Somali cause and kept on course unlike US and UN troops who withdrew when conditions had worsened. President Museveni recently

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid

<sup>140</sup> "Transitional Government signs agreement with Ahlu Sunna", in *AMISOM Bulletin*, issue 3, March 31, 2010.

<sup>141</sup> Annual Review, op. cit, p.127

<sup>142</sup> US department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; "2009 Human Reports: Somalia", March 11, 2010, found at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135976.htm> (accessed: January 2, 2011)

<sup>143</sup> John Njoroge, "1000 TFG Somali soldiers passed out at Bihanga military training school", in *Daily Monitor*, Wednesday December 15, 2010, found at: <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1073108/-/ck022oz/-/index.html> (accessed January 3, 2011).

commissioned for deployment 1,800 of the 4,000 additional troops he pledged to send to Somalia<sup>144</sup>. With these efforts, AMISOM appears to be winning hearts and minds of the Somali population and according to AU's Ambassador Diarre, "we cannot and we will not give up. We will not idly stand by and watch the people of Somalia continue to suffer... This time around, failure is not an option. We will persevere until the job is done."<sup>145</sup>

The above examples and efforts seem to suggest that AMISOM, despite its harsh environment, has to some significant extent been able to meet some of the tasks of its mandate. Does this then lend credence that peacekeeping has begun to show signs of effectiveness in resolving political crisis? Not necessarily. AMISOM's resolve and success, if time will prove, will be judged on the dedication of two countries to face the hell of Somalia to defend their pan-Africanist commitments than as a success of AU or UN in general. The UN, US, and EU have been very instrumental in supporting the mission with resources and logistics than have fellow AU states, even those who have the capacity such as Nigeria and South Africa.

However, notwithstanding the above successes, AMISOM is still faced with serious security threats that hinder its operation. While TFG now controls more than half of Mogadishu, expansion of TFG authority has been very hard. AMISOM still lacks the wherewithal to face terrorists head-on. Even though all resources were availed to it, the institutional constraints of peacekeeping doctrine would still be a great hindrance. Modern peacekeeping has not moved from its age-long emphasis on doctrine. A bigger problem here, is the crisis management approach which as James N. Rosenau (2005) indicates, "is the inclination to see what one wants to see, to interpret new data in such a way that they appear to conform to the main outlines of

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<sup>144</sup> Milton Olupot, "UPDF sends 4,000 more troops to Somalia", in *New Vision*, December 23, 2010, found at: <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/741991> (accessed: January 3, 2011)

<sup>145</sup> *ibid*

one's theory"<sup>146</sup>. The problem of the AU is to look at security conditions in Somalia in the light of simple intra-state conflict paradigm of their experience. The kind of rebels in Somalia is so different from the kinds of rebellion AMIS encountered in Somalia or those the UN met in Liberia with known hierarchical, horizontal leadership structure. Somali terrorists as indeed many other terror groups, "authority is undergoing disaggregation...[exercised] through horizontal networks rather than hierarchical chain of command, and in so doing, have the capacity to challenge states and generate widespread consequences."<sup>147</sup>

In addition to this change in structure of authority, the nature of confrontation has also changed. While traditional war was fought in the battle field, AMISOM came to realize a different warfare they were not trained to face; suicide and roadside bombs. Whether or not it was not in the combat plan of the UN missions to face these, but "the readiness of suicide bombers to destroy themselves on behalf of their cause brought home to many people the immediacy, randomness, and pervasiveness of terrorism"<sup>148</sup> and the need for quick adaptation and preparation to adapt to the ever-changing nature of combat because "today's threats may be much difficult to handle precisely because force and power have become much more diffuse...[and] have not only altered the meaning of security, but they have also given rise to new conceptions of combat."<sup>149</sup>

AS OF MAY 2010, effort was still being made by the UN planning team in 'assisting the African Union in developing AMISOM mission implementation plans, which are critical for the effective fulfillment of the mandate of AMISOM"<sup>150</sup> This is inconsistent with the stern recommendation

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<sup>146</sup> James N. Rosenau, "Turbulence and Terrorism", in *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition*, by: Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (eds.), State University of New York press: Albany, p.222.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, p.225

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p.226

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p.227

<sup>150</sup> Ibid

presented to the UN by the Brahimi report which required that no UN peacekeeping missions should be deployed unless they possess the required capacity and capability to face the mandate tasks ahead of them.<sup>151</sup>

In summary, the end of 2010 left Africa still a peacekeeping mission facing hardened and determined al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. It is still struggling to defend the weak and much divided TFG whose area of control depends on AMISOM presence.

However, much as terrorism is the greatest threat to AMISOM, the history of events in Somalia is more complex than just today's terrorist groups scattered in the country. The US and UN failed at a time when al-Shabaab and other terror elements were not as active as today. AMISOM finds itself a successor or a victim of several acts in the history of that country.

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<sup>151</sup> Brahimi report, October 2000, found at: [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/55\\_507e.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/55_507e.pdf) (accessed: December 24, 2010)

## CHAPTER FOUR

### *CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS*

#### **CONCLUSION**

By way of conclusion, it is a fact well known from the series of interventions, that Somalia poses a very complicated problem, not only for Africa, but for the global war on terrorism. While AMISOM's image is reflective of previous failures in the region, there is nonetheless an opportunity to change the course of events. Peacekeeping missions have been employed in different conflict situations and have attained different success levels. Somalia's peacekeeping missions have not been able keep the peace because there was no peace to keep, and they could not provide peace because it was too expensive to buy. Basing on the above discussion, it is the finding of this thesis that peacekeeping missions employed in Somalia in 1992, 1993, and 2007 have not achieved their intended objectives. UNOSOM I ended in frustrations because it had failed to understand the nature of political relationships and dynamics in the country and ended up being as much a victim as its intended beneficiaries, becoming the prey of and serving the interest of the warring parties, factions, and the aggrandizing warlords.

UNITAF, which was an enforcement mission, succeeded to a great extent with regards to its minimum mandate. It did provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the emaciated population at a time when millions were at the brink of death. However, its failure to disarm the Somali warlords at a time when it had the capacity, laid a foundation of obstinacy and condescending mindset towards future missions.

UNOSOM II was a mission that did bite more than it could chew. It took upon itself more tasks than did UNITAF despite having a smaller capability than UNITAF. It lacked coordination with

US CENTCOM and was distrusted even by their fellow UN agencies and other agencies in Somalia who did not connect on many issues, including matters of security strategy. Its miscalculations with the disarmament and nation building projections brought it directly into battle with those whose power base it threatened. The signature event of June 1993 that left 24 Pakistani troops dead and the October 1993 mistakes that brought the US Rangers to their death was one of the greatest mission creeps of the UN mission that brought it on its knees and left UNOSOM II more of a caricature mission that itself had to be liberated from the country.

I also discussed on AMISOM and the enormous challenges it does faces each day. AMISOM falls in the same basket of UNOSOM II. Its overambitious mandate outweighs its capacity several folds despite operating in an extremely hostile environment that has spilled-over acts and threats of terror to the troop contributing countries' Capitals. Suffering massive lack of resources and troops, AMISOM's presence remains in Mogadishu protecting the president and key installations and its presence has very minimal consequence for the common people who continue suffering harsh draconian al-Shabaab laws and forceful conscription of children into the ranks.

By far, peacekeeping missions have failed in Somalia. Their failures cannot be attributed to one particular reason, but what is clear is that their response failed to take Somalia in its proper and complex context. My conclusion does make a generalization that peacekeeping missions cannot succeed in situations of multiple complex states, like Somalia, but that the approaches that were employed was rigidly hell-bent on institutional doctrines, that made their response quiet more mechanical than fluid and contextual to Somalia's circumstances. It is on this basis that I present

below some recommendations that may help in whatever way, the dialogue among policy makers as they plan the next action for Somalia.

## **SOME SUGGESTIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **What next for AMISOM?**

It is now coming to four years since AMISOM troops first set foot into Somalia. A lot has happened since then. A change of government leadership from Yusuf to Sheikh Sharif; several deaths have been reported and the humanitarian situation is nowhere improving. Al-Shabaab and other groups have started recruiting children forcefully from their parents while girls are increasingly facing the risk of sexual enslavement from both TFG and terrorist elements. According to Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, al-Shabaab has begun a campaign demanding parents to surrender some of their children to fight.<sup>152</sup> I have indicated that despite its sufferings, AMISOM has been able to help the TFG to keep the journey of governance. There are no signs that Ugandan troops may withdraw from Somalia due to the increased security conditions.

According AMISON force commander, the force has not only protected the TFG and key installations, but also expanded into winning hearts and minds: “We have a very good relationship with them. We share our food, water and medicines with the local population. For instance, over 60,000 people - Somali civilians - have received free treatment at the AMISOM health centre and many more continue to come to us and we are glad to share the few resources

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<sup>152</sup> IRIN, “Somalia: Children facing the worst, says UN”, at: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90977>, accessed on November 5, 2010

we have.”<sup>153</sup> However, he also expressed his concerns about the possibility and adequacy of the purely military solution: “we need to be clear about our mandate: contrary to what some may think or say, we are not here to fight. We are here to help create a conducive environment for dialogue among Somalis. We are here to support all peace-loving Somalis to reconcile and forge a way forward. There is no military solution to this conflict; only a political solution, that is, dialogue and negotiations can achieve a lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia. Somalis must sit around a table and resolve their differences. The solution will not come from without; it will only come from Somalis themselves.”<sup>154</sup>

As AMISON continues its journey, a few recommendations may be adduced from the previous findings and discussions:

#### **Renewed commitment and building capacity of African Union**

The Kampala bombings exposed African Union to the reality and challenges of its overambitious security dreams. The AMISOM that was backed by African nations had reached a very challenging and critical moment in its life. The mourning in Uganda coincided with the African Union summit in Kampala that same month. President Museveni, the host president put the change of AMISOM’s mandate as a major agenda for the summit, hoping to use that critical time to win the support of member states, who have for many years been very lukewarm to AMISOM commitment, to support the change of AMISOM mandate from defensive to offensive type (enforcement) mandate. Museveni had promised on July 12 at Kyadondo rugby club to arrest those responsible for the suicide bombings: “We shall get them and make sure that the Law of Moses [a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye] is applied to them...we shall look for them

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<sup>153</sup> ibid

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, february amison bulletin

wherever they are and get them.”<sup>155</sup> At the summit, Museveni did not mince words in condemning terrorism and their Middle East supporters and financiers, declaring it a form of colonialism through terrorism: “Let them go back to Asia and the Middle East where I understand many of them come from. As for some of the local Somali people that allow themselves to be used in this shameful way, our Somali brothers and sisters have the answer. I personally, reject this new form of colonialism – through terrorism.”<sup>156</sup>

Unfortunately the meeting that followed, far from expressing usual sympathies, failed to agree upon an enforcement mandate, and instead in their usual pledges, resolved that AMISOM would be supported to increase its ability to patrol the coast of Mogadishu and increase logistical support. They also expressed commitment to the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF) to meet current and future troop deficiency. A few other states pledged more troops, including Algeria, none of whom has fulfilled the promise to date. Botswana on the other hand withdrew its initial pledge for troops citing lack of extra personnel to contribute to the mission. Botswana’s foreign Minister Phandu Skelemani is reported to have stated thus: We have to protect our wildlife rather than send troops to Somalia... Poachers are killing our wildlife which is our revenue (earner), therefore members of the Botswana Defence Force have been deployed in anti-poaching units as well as fighting Foot and Mouth Disease with other national duties they are now engaged in”<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Rodney Muhumuza, Risdal Kasasira, and Sheila Naturinda, “Museveni owns victims”, in *Daily Monitor*, July 13, 2010.

<sup>156</sup> President’s speech on AU opening, found at: <http://www.mofa.go.ug/index.php/news/171-presidents-speech-on-au-opening> (accessed: November 26, 2010)

<sup>157</sup> Wene Owino, “Botswana will not send troops to Somalia”, in *Saturday Nation*, Tuesday August 3, 2010, found at: <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Botswana%20will%20not%20send%20troops%20to%20Somalia/-/1066/970266/-/n5j459/-/index.html> (accessed: November 17, 2010)

The summit recognized the difficulty in authorizing an enforcement mandate, such as: the lack of adequate financial and military resources. African military chiefs who had met at Addis Ababa prior to the summit, presented the plan of action and the costs involved; a whopping minimum of \$3million per month. They also recognized the difficulty of dealing with Somalia which has become an international problem, as well as fighting an invisible enemy scattered within the population. Despite the pains and additional threats against Uganda, no one African State but Uganda and Burundi, made a sound commitment to the mission, and no binding decision on the matter of AMISOM was reached at the summit.

These kinds of responses from African leaders reveal some deeper problems and fears: states now fear that their troop contributions to AMISOM will expose them to similar threats as Uganda. Many states have no capacity to monitor and control terrorist infiltration due to their lack of resources and expertise for both external and internal intelligence gathering. Rather than threaten their national security and stability and import terrorism, leaving Somalia to the benevolence of well-wishers may be their best alternative. Uganda had thought it was able to neutralize the threat or prevent it by registering Somalia refugees in Uganda and eliciting their cooperation to report possible radicals' infiltration, weren't helpful.<sup>158</sup> This is a situation states will not want to get involved in. Uganda and Burundi may unfortunately continue along this perilous journey alone, since the UN is nowhere closer to taking over the mission from AU due to the still perilous security condition.

Learning from what AMISOM found itself in, it is all the more relevant today that the Brahimi report's advice be considered with seriousness: "the Secretariat must not apply best-case

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158 Isaac Imaka, "Citizens Somalis distance themselves from Al Shabab", in *The Daily Monitor*, October 26, 2009. found at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910261188.html>

planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst case behavior...mandates should specify an operation's authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers.”<sup>159</sup> Although the UNSC is empowered to take actions within the charter provision to maintain international peace and security, this mandate does not happen miraculously but needs coordination of many other critical issue areas, such as military contribution, police, money, transport, etc. it is important that any planning in the future should involve “[telling] the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation.”<sup>160</sup>

### **Building AU capacity**

As part of strengthening the UN's employment of chapter VIII of the UN charter to involve regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, it is very important that these regional organizations are empowered to be able to properly assess the threat, properly plan, carefully execute and manage their security plan. There has been a proliferation of activities through regional organizations that very little care is taken to address internal issues within these organizations. African Union, despite its good will to contribute towards peace and security, remains very weak logistically. Although Brahimi report emphasizes on pre-deployment capacity building, recent evidence as of May 2010, show that “[t]he [UN Planning] team is still just assisting the African Union in developing AMISOM mission implementation

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<sup>159</sup> Brahimi report.

<sup>160</sup> *ibid*

plans, which are critical for the effective fulfillment of the mandate of AMISOM”<sup>161</sup> long after AMISOM had already been overwhelmed. One reality that AU has to live with is the fact that “[n]o AU member country has the capacity to conduct large-scale expeditionary operations. The African Union’s efforts therefore tend to be even more dependent upon U.S. and European support than those of the United Nations...[and] While AU interventions may be more acceptable to the host countries concerned than ones headed by the UN, NATO or the EU, this is probably for the wrong reason, the receiving government opting for the weaker presence.”<sup>162</sup> AU has neither a strong continental military nor a well-established and capable security institutions and apparatus enough to coordinate its missions effectively.

AMISOM’s most critical challenges can largely be attributed to lack of cooperation from its owners, the African Union States. Originally planned for 8.000 strong troops, AMISOM has for four years not reached the target military personnel capacity, which currently stand at 7.000 troops, all of them Ugandan and Burundi troops as of December 2010. With these few troops, there is no AMISOM can cope up with the daily risks from the ever increasing radical extremists and terrorists, and still carry out its peacekeeping mandate. Before the attacks on Uganda, Ugandan minister of foreign affairs, Henry Okello Oryem, had indicated his country’s frustration with its counterparts and expressed intention of withdrawing Ugandan forces if they could not be availed new troops and resources. According him, withdrawal would be the only better alternative for his country: “Uganda is going to consider withdrawing its troops from Somalia and it will do so as soon as possible after weighing the risks on the ground...We have been waiting for other countries like Nigeria and Ghana to send troops but they have not done so...Our

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<sup>161</sup> IBID

<sup>162</sup> Ibid,p4

army experts are on the ground to establish the risk of our troops staying there and we shall withdraw once the risks are too high.”<sup>163</sup> Oryem is absolutely right on the matter especially given the environment of the mission. In this terrorist’s era, it would be very suicidal to let troops sit and wait for the enemy determined to massacre them. This was the experience of UNOC where “many Blue Helmets lost their life because they had not been either withdrawn or sufficiently reinforced in time, but remained in indefensible, exposed positions.”<sup>164</sup>

This far, it is clear that unless African states fully come on board, AMISOM will remain a Uganda-Burundi affair as long as danger persists, and will be claimed by many should it emerge successful.

### **Reduce overdependence on United States**

All eyes are fixed on the United States as a fix-it all in the global security dilemma, the Somali chaos inclusive. Over the years, the US has acted in response to these global demands albeit not necessarily always successfully. Since the bombing of its embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, and since the declaration of global war on terror, the United States has launched a number of air strikes against terrorists in Somalia. In its counterterrorism strategy, the US also systematically isolated Eritrea and strengthened its support for Ethiopia. Despite all these efforts, not much has been achieved. According to Michael Gordon, one of the reasons for the United States’ failure to impact on Somalia is its 'aggregation' policy. To him, the Somali incursion demonstrated a U.S. military posture preoccupied with short-term GWOT (Global War On Terror) objectives. As in North Africa, this policy outcome was driven largely by a flawed

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<sup>163</sup> Uganda mulls Somalia pullout as Ethiopian forces depart, in The Daily Monitor, January 5, 2009.  
[http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/africa/Uganda\\_mulls\\_Somalia\\_pullout\\_as\\_Ethiopian\\_forces\\_depart\\_77732.shtml](http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/africa/Uganda_mulls_Somalia_pullout_as_Ethiopian_forces_depart_77732.shtml)

<sup>164</sup> [http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4\\_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF](http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF)

analysis of local conditions in Somalia.<sup>165</sup> For a positive impact, African Union and Arab States must commit their personnel and resources to handling the Somali issue. Relying on U.S, given the strong anti-US sentiments in the country/region will mean that any leadership perceived as ally of US is considered an enemy. US should be involved but from logistical point of view and less directly if some confidence in the government is to be build.

Rebuilding the failed state of Somalia, as Sarjoh notes, will be very difficult and will call for patience and determination of will and consistency of action. “If implementation of the CPA was difficult, efforts to restore stability to Somalia and to rebuild the world's longest-running failed state will be even more challenging”<sup>166</sup>

The mission mandate needs be reexamined to make it realistic and achievable. A piecemeal mandate should be adopted instead of an extensive to increase effectiveness so that the tasks assigned to the mission don't exceed its capacity. A mission facing terrorism and direct confrontation from militants must be capable of the task and able to inflict a powerful lesson to its enemies. The level of confrontation between AMISOM and its enemies has reached a greater magnitude so much so that applying the principles of peacekeeping in the mandate assigned it appears to be simply an international joke. As Gowan and Johnstone put it, “both UN and non-UN peace operations could increasingly face violent opposition from terrorist groups even if their mandates are not explicitly counter-terrorist...[the mission] must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers: they must have bigger and better equipped forces able to pose a credible deterrent threat in contrast to the non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional

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165 Robert G. Berschinski. AFRICOM's Dilemma: The “Global war on terrorism,” “capacity building,” humanitarianism, and the future of U.S. security policy in Africa. Strategic Studies Institute. November 2007. p. 44. found at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=827> (accessed on November 20, 2009)

166 Sarjoh Bah p.24

peacekeeping,”<sup>167</sup> something that AMISOM miserably fell short of. A mission to such a place as Somalia required a powerful and debilitating presence to send a strong signal to spoilers as did UNITAF in 1992. Gowan and Johnstone further explain and ask a critical question: “if peace operations are coming to resemble counter-insurgency, and if the tool is going to be enlisted more actively in the war on terrorism, then the doctrinal issues are quite different. The line being blurred is not between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but peace enforcement and war. What are US, British, Canadian, and Dutch ISAF troops doing in Afghanistan? Are they engaged in a peace operation?”<sup>168</sup> Traditional peacekeeping doctrines definitely become irrelevant in Somalia just as with Afghanistan. A new or updated mandate, balanced with enough resources, is needed, and certainly a change to a more robust mandate that makes offensive self-defense possible if AMISOM should fight gallantly against their hardened enemies. But projection of power is not all unless its purpose is to provide a conducive environment for the people of Somalia to dialogue and decide on their own destiny. Force, whatever its degree and level, should only be to help make this happen.

### **Address the root causes of Somali crisis**

Critics of interventions in Somalia argue that the approach of focusing only on peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the key tools to handle the issues of Somalia was the reason they failed. According to Tadesse (2009), Somalia’s problem, like in many Africa’s societies, does not need one universally crafted solution. “[A]lthough conflict was, in some cases, prevented through intervention, often the solution imposed was a military solution without addressing the underlying issues of Africa’s conflicts...International players such as the UN, the European

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167 Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone. *New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”*: Coping with Crisis. International Peace Academy, March 2007. p.9

168 Ibid.

Union, and the African Union are paying too much attention to peacekeeping and peace building, while none seems to pay much attention in the origins of the conflict in different parts of Africa such as disputes over either grazing land or seasonal water for pastoral communities.”<sup>169</sup>


Contextualizing Somalia’s case reveals a host of complicated age-long problems that have made Somalia’s internal crisis very intractable. Experts with real and practical knowledge about Somalia; its history, culture, lifestyle, politics, livelihood, etc, should be involved in peacekeeping agenda that also carries with it peace building tasks.

Among some of the most salient root cause of the conflict is the actual and perceived marginalization of the clans. There are four dominant clans and four other smaller clans in Somalia. The two dominant of these eight recognized clans; the Darod and Hiwiye clans, have fought for power and control of national resources, grazing land and water for many years, before and after the ouster of Siad Barre. The trends of violence show that whoever controlled power brought benefits and opportunities to his respective clans at the expense of the others, establishing a vicious circle and culture of violence and revenge. In such a society where allegiance to the clan surpassed allegiance to the state, exclusion of the clans from the political process has been and will remain a critical mistake of any peacekeeping mission or process that neglects that reality. Any unilateral imposition of a central government that has no support in the clans will not stand.

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<sup>169</sup> *Dr Debay Tadesse*. Peacekeeping successes and failures in Africa, in <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SHIG-7RKFTA?OpenDocument>

*Figure: Clan configuration in Somalia.*



SOURCE: *African Holocaust*, at:

<http://www.africanholocaust.net/articles/Somalia%20Money%20and%20Civil%20War.htm>

### **US should readjust its counterterrorism approach**

United States should employ a disaggregation policy instead of its current aggregation counterterrorism approach to the Horn of Africa. This will facilitate the identification, isolation, and action against true al-Qaeda groups while bringing onboard genuine political opponents who might as well be sincerely interested in a peaceful, independent Somali nation. Indiscriminately locking all opponents out of national political platform and processes, and aggregating them as terrorists will not yield any peace anytime for the bleeding country. Besides, the US counterterrorism that made Ethiopia a 'good boy' and Eritrea the 'bad boy' has not helped the peace effort for Somalia. US' counterterrorism approach should consider engagement with Eritrea and bringing the two to negotiate their conflicts so as to stop their usage of Somalia as their battle ground. Aggregating real political players in the terrorists' bracket will only serve to increase more resistance than cooperation. As Sarjoh puts it, US need to adopt a policy that will make "an

effort to reconcile counterterrorism and statebuilding/stabilization objectives.”<sup>170</sup> Terrorists do not have a conventional battlefiled, their battlefields are the market places, offices, mosques and shopping centers. Fighting them needs the involvement and close cooperation of the population, whose hearts must be won through all possible efforts since they have more information about the terrorists than the typical peacekeeper can. According to Robert Berschinki, “while die-hard militants may require conventional counterterrorism work... the true heavy lifting of the global counterinsurgency strategy is achieved through pacification, winning hearts and minds and the denial of sanctuary and external sponsorship.”<sup>171</sup> Involving all positively minded Somali’s in the peace process would deal a heavy blow to al-Shabaab and the radical Hizbul Islam elements since they would then face increased pressure from the international community as well as internal pressure to cooperate or find another sanctuary outside Somalia.

### **Strengthening both political and negotiated settlement alongside military action**

This journey will need a great effort from all major actors, namely; the United States, the AU and EU, in designing a Somali agenda that will start the process of inclusive political negotiations. US leadership in coordinating global effort is highly necessary here given its position in the world, but this doesn’t mean US has magical answers to all global crises. Appointing a special envoy or full time representative for the Horn of Africa region would help kick-start the process that will help heal the bleeding region, especially if done in collaboration with the UN Good Offices. This should also involve other regional actors to join the Somali people to draw a roadmap to their country's peace and stability. Regional governments should play critical roles in these processes; such as Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and definitely Ethiopia and Eritrea. Gone are the days when the UN was the alpha and the omega solution to international

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170 Ibid, p.27

171 Ibid

peace and security. As such, the organization itself needs constant evaluations and readjustments to the speed with which modern warfare has advanced. The undeniable reality that the UN itself needs to be empowered to do what it should do.<sup>172</sup>

Strengthen the AU and other regional Inter Governmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to play key role, especially in the political wing. This calls for a regional strategic framework “that can, over time, reconcile national, regional, and international interests in this regional security complex”<sup>173</sup> Somalia is a complex situation, a situation of a failed state trying to get on its knees. Strengthening regional structures to handle especially the political components is ultimately rewarding. According to Senator Suunu, “there is need to develop a better framework and organizational structure...for addressing failed states around the world, because of the natural implications that this can have for national security...But all of the players in the region have both a responsibility and an interest in addressing this situation in Somalia, they have different roles to play. And, while its true that there are competing interests in the region, I think all of the regional players are affected by lack of security, movement of militias, weapons, financing for terrorism, and the instability that results...there's an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in this effort, but there's also a very real opportunity for regional players to become a more significant part of the solution.”<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Edward Marks, “UN peacekeeping in a post-cold war world”, p.2

<sup>173</sup> A. Sarjoh Bah, p.28, The Broader horn, peacekeeping in a strategic vacuum. In Annual review of Global peace operations 2009.

<sup>174</sup> Sununu, statement at the hearing before the first session of the subcommittee on african affairs of the committee on foreign relations united states senate one hundred tenth congress, “Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counterterrorism Strategy for Somalia”, February 6, 2007. p.5. Available at: [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110\\_senate\\_hearings&docid=f:39987.pdf](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:39987.pdf) (accessed on November 10, 2009).

### **More UN commitment**

In the previous pages, I presented that both the UN and US left Somalia with painful losses in 1995. Notwithstanding these failures, AMISOM force commander, Major Gen. Nathan Mugisha, still believes the multifaceted challenges in Somalia can be better handled with the UN playing a central role. According to him, “United Nations has the most widely accepted legitimacy and the greatest formal authority... Alone among organizations, it can compel its member governments to fund such operations, even requiring contributions from those opposed to the intervention in question...and [has] the most unified command and control arrangements.”<sup>175</sup> As to whether the UN is committed to holding the mantle as it so did in the 1990s has a very minimal possibility, at least in the next few years. However, it is clearer today than ever before, given the experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc, that “[m]ilitary force may be a *necessary* element in peacekeeping, but it is no longer a *sufficient* one. Therefore we need a UN which can integrate political and economic/social policy, and can coordinate political and economic/social programs.”<sup>176</sup>

### **Strengthening Somalia’s military**

There is need for renewed commitment to facilitate and strengthen Somali capacity to deal with their own security, with AMISOM playing a supportive role: AU, UN, EU and other international actors should help AMISOM to train, empower and equip Somali gov't forces. The good sign is that EU defence ministers have been fully supportive of training of Somali soldiers by providing a plan for 100-200 EU soldiers to train some 2,000 Somali security forces in

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<sup>175</sup> *ibid*

<sup>176</sup> UN peacekeeping in a ....(cf notes in amisom folder), p10

Uganda. These troops are important in the stabilization of the country and maintenance of security, albeit still very tenuous.<sup>177</sup>

Building more civilian authority as an exit strategy fully engraved in the SSR should be taken as important in order to soften the militarism employed over the years, to change people's perceptions of power. Current and future planning should take into consideration the reality that: "Without some level of functioning local authority, it is difficult to envisage how a UN peacekeeping mission--once engaged--can withdraw... Modern peacekeeping by the UN, in other words, requires harnessing its "civilian" wagons to its "military" horses."<sup>178</sup>

There have been great signs of hope in Somalia's regions of Puntland and Somaliland that could be embraced and supported. In November 2010, Somaliland and Puntland troops did conduct several successful operations against violent extremist groups in Sanaag Mountains, which had proved difficult to the two semi-autonomous regions of Somalia.<sup>179</sup> These two regions have remained relatively peaceful and run their political activities relatively regularly and peacefully. Puntland has had successful operations in its territory to eliminate terrorist elements from its stronghold Bari region. Its troops successfully dismantled the powerbase of al Shabaab's Mohamed Said Atom, and a key al Qaeda member who has been a critical destabilizing element in northern Somalia. They successfully seized Atom's key logistic hub in the region, seizing several of Atom's vehicles, weapons, and bomb-making materials.

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<sup>177</sup> International Institute for strategic studies.

[http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp\\_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=198&YearID=1144](http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictTimeline.asp?ConflictID=198&YearID=1144) November 17, 2009, (accessed on November 24, 2009)

<sup>178</sup> Ibid, p.11

<sup>179</sup> Ministry of Information, Republic of Somalia. "Somali Government Commends Somaliland and Puntland Initiatives to tackle Violent Extremists in Northern Somalia", at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MDCS-8AWF8V?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=som>, accessed on Nov 5, 2010

Such a united effort could help deny extremists their operational bases in Somalia and make conditions very unfavorable for foreign extremist fighters to operate in the country. This effort deserves support and integration into the strategic planning of operations in the country.

The efforts so far made by Somalia's donors and security partners, in training Somali armed forces, should be extended. This is an essential step towards security stabilization and humanitarian support services. According to the September 2010 Istanbul conference resolution, there is a general realization that the "re-establishment, training, equipping, payment and retention of Somali security forces is vital for the long-term stability of Somalia."<sup>180</sup> Six key areas were considered critical to be worked on, alongside the military empowerment: "telecommunications; transport infrastructure; livestock exports; fisheries, banking and remittances and; alternative energy."<sup>181</sup> These are not simple options to take, but a committed step towards that direction will put the country back on track, but they are all dependent on security stabilization.

### **Somalia's TFG needs to be more accountable**

TFG needs to demonstrate accountability in handling development aid and other multinational support meant for the restoration of Somalia. The experience of Afghanistan, where President Ahmad Karzai has used donor funds to enrich himself and his relatives, turns off prospective donors. Some elements of the TFG have already been accused of selling arms given to support its security system. In 2008 the UN Monitoring Group estimated that as much as 80 per cent of the arms in the Somalia's arms market come from TFG, and that ammunition and other materiel supplied to support the TFG had been diverted for private purposes, to the Somali arms market

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<sup>180</sup> Istanbul Conference Report, p.2 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/FBUO-85QC7L-full\\_report.pdf/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/FBUO-85QC7L-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf)

<sup>181</sup> *ibid*

or to opposition groups, and it is also alleged that members of the TFG security forces have sold their weapons.<sup>182</sup>

### **Supporting current peace processes and reaching out to “terrorists”**

One of the reasons for the failure of UNOSOM II, as already presented above, was “mission creep”. This seems to be one of the critical challenges to AMISOM as they try to expand their offensive against what Museveni calls “terrorists”. If AMISOM should stay on track, and in future mission authorizations for Somalia, care must be taken to avoid this disease of mission creep. Mandates must be consistent with capacity and if need be, mandates should be incrementally implemented and correlated to increase of capacity and changes in the operational circumstances and situations.

International community should support in whatever ways possible, to the positive peace plans between the TFG and other warlords and factions. Such agreements as that which happened between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna signed on March 15, 2010, should be supported by the clan and religious leaders, whose voice count a lot in Somali’s politics. Religious leaders, should in a special way be supported by eminent peace-minded Muslim clerics, towards something like “the formation of an advisory council of religious leaders as a counterweight to Al-Shabaab’s radical doctrine”<sup>183</sup> The entire Somalia could also benefit from the example set by the semi-autonomous, more peaceful region of Somaliland, whose president Farole recently expressed commitment, through decreeing a new provisional constitution “to transform the region’s political system from

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<sup>182</sup> UNSC report, No.120, p.27, found at: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/274](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/274) (accessed: December 23, 2010)

<sup>183</sup> UNSC REPORT 11, MAY 2010. [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-85DTJQ-full\\_report.pdf/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-85DTJQ-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf), P.2

clan to party-based by 2013.”<sup>184</sup> Once the concept of nation as opposed to clan based power center takes root in the life of the Somali people, and once this nation becomes strong enough to provide security for all clans equally and divide resources impartially, Somalia will be able to make progress towards a building a strong, united, and secure State.

Should AMISOM and TFG talk to terrorists? Somalia hosts a number of divided terrorist-like groups torn between them and often at war with one another. These include al-Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a, among others. Although internally divided, some of them, especially al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, are united on one purpose: fighting TFG and foreign forces. Should foreign forces and TFG talk to their sworn enemies? In the thinking of Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni, “the population in Somalia is against the terrorist, they are just imposing themselves. People who don’t care about dying will do anything and therefore they must be paid in their own currency. The interest of Uganda is to ensure total peace in Somalia.”<sup>185</sup> How this “total peace” will be achieved without involving the sons and daughters of Somalia in the opposing side is difficult to comprehend. Any peace that bypasses these various groups risks failure since each of them has a strong constituency behind them. Both Al-Shabaab and Hizbul have a considerable following, whether voluntarily or coercively, from the Somali people who cherish or breathe some peace in their (al-Shabaab/Hizbul) territories.

Building a nation of Somalia that will sustain its peace and security requires that these are reached to and brought on board. I find Rashid Abdi’s position important on this matter: “government must reach out to elements of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (the Mujahideen Youth Movement) that are disenchanted with the influence of foreign jihadists in the group and

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<sup>184</sup> IBID

<sup>185</sup> Uganda Media Center. <http://www.mediacentre.go.ug/details.php?catId=4&item=604> (accessed on September 26, 2009)

the al-Qaeda sympathies among its leadership... The mounting internal divisions within the insurgency have given the TFG, the UN and donors many opportunities to reach out to less hard-line elements”<sup>186</sup>This is particularly important since al-Shabaab itself is basically a movement of brainwashed young Somali citizens, whose future is being destroyed by the selfish clerics whose agenda are not necessarily for the peace of Somalia but for control of territory in which anti-West and anti-Christian propaganda is developed and exported. Reaching these, and offering them the opportunities to pursue their youth dreams without radical manipulations will usher in a new brand of future Somali leadership committed to political rather than military solution to the country’s problems, and Somali can then successfully join a community of nations, united with the world towards progress that globalization ushers in.

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<sup>186</sup> Rashid Abdi, ICG Horn of Africa Analyst, quoted by African Union newsletter, <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AR/index/AMISOM%20BULLETIN-%20JUNE%202010.pdf>, accessed November 6, 2010, page 7.

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