BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essay

THE MORALIST AS GEOPOLITICIAN

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Great statesmen are both more conscious and less conscious of themselves than their lesser counterparts are. They attempt unprecedented heights, and this ambition isolates them, making them feel supreme and alone. Only thereby do they become legendary. "For men become myths," once wrote the young scholar Henry Kissinger, "not by what they know, nor even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they set for themselves." At the same time the very magnitude and complexity of their tasks, and the totality of commitment required to meet them, tend to shrink their Egos. Caught up in the flow of events, they soon recognize the irresistible tug of the subcurrents of History. "The helmsman must guide the boat by using the waves," Chou En-lai was fond of saying; "otherwise it will be submerged by the waves."

This paradoxical combination — of personal assertion and philosophical humility — marked the statesmanship of Henry Kissinger, as it did that of the figures in history he admires. It also characterizes the content of the first volume of his memoirs. His White House Years is a monumental work. In its length, detail, logic, and, somewhat surprisingly, style, it is rivaled among American diplomatic autobiographies by very few accounts. As a sustained argument for a particular point of view in foreign policy it has no equal. Any serious student of American diplomatic history must not only absorb its many lessons but, at all costs, intellectually come to terms with it. So great is its rational force that to read it passively, without doubting factual premises, posing counter-arguments, and questioning values, is to become a "Kissingerian" by default.

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White House Years, even more than the briefer and less revealing *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (1978), is an indispensable insider's guide to a "diplomatic revolution." The story it tells of the main events of the foreign policy of the first Nixon term (1969-1973) — notably the opening to the People’s Republic of China, the conclusion of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and the negotiation of an American troop withdrawal from Vietnam — is a record of a diplomatic volte-face toward the whole communist world. In Nixon’s phrases, an "Era of Confrontation" — the Cold War — gave way to an "Era of Negotiation" — Détente. Through this change the basis was arguably laid for construction of the "new international order."

It is perhaps not surprising, given the ambiguity of the Nixon Administration achievement a decade later, that Dr. Kissinger’s emphasis in *White House Years* is much more on motives, intentions, and purposes — at the level of the individual — than on effects, results, and outcomes — at the larger historical level. His relative inattention to the ultimate consequences of the U.S. government’s actions during the 1969-1973 period is not simple evasiveness on his part (although, no doubt, it is easier for him to recount what was meant to happen than what actually did happen). Kissinger’s book should be read primarily as an expression of his fundamental intellectual outlook, in continuous formation since his undergraduate days at Harvard. Without understanding his philosophical purpose — an unstated, interior purpose — one cannot fully appreciate the intensely personal, almost solipsistic quality of what might otherwise appear to be just a politically motivated best seller.

Kissinger appears to believe, perhaps without fully realizing the selfish and undemocratic implications of doing so, that the significance of a political act lies in its meaning for the actor himself, and only for that person. "The public life of every political figure," he reflects, "is a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance" — that is, to find inner Freedom within external Necessity. If an individual statesman cannot remove the obstacles in his path, he can, through the exercise of "intelligence," "will," and, of even greater personal importance to Kissinger, "character," inwardly transcend them. Merely to perceive the world from such a lofty perspective is to change it. Actual success is not required. Spirit — in the guise of the historical personality — gives life to Matter. As the hero, acting responsibly, obeys his own necessity, the pattern he projects upon the world is not only ra-

3. Ibid., p. 1474.
4. Ibid., p. 1476.
7. Ibid., p. 23.
tional but also a moral one. Such a world order is, it should be noted, using the Kantian terms with which Kissinger himself was well familiar, noumenal, or apprehended purely by thought, rather than phenomenal, or sense-given. To other persons, perhaps many readers of *White House Years*, the coherence and significance Kissinger sees in the international relationships of the United States during the early Nixon Presidency may not always be evident. More importantly, except in Kissinger's heavily philosophical–historical mind, they may not always in fact be there.

In beginning to analyze this statesman's apologia, the reader should ever bear in mind the author's background in European metaphysical thought and his intellectual as well as his political purposes. Addressing the book itself, one may usefully pose three basic questions, which will be answered in succession in the following parts of this essay. First, what did Kissinger initially believe had to be done in American foreign policy when he came to office in 1969, and how did he conceive the task he confronted? Second, through what organizational and diplomatic devices did he perform his task? Third, what did he manage to accomplish in office? In conclusion, following our examination of Kissinger's concepts, methods, and achievements, an attempt will be made to determine the legacy of Kissinger's stewardship as National Security Adviser. How much of his contribution during those years is likely to endure and how much of it should endure.

**Concepts**

When Kissinger was asked by President-elect Nixon in November 1968 what should be the goal of his Administration's diplomacy, Kissinger answered that "the overriding problem" was to free American foreign policy from "its violent historical fluctuations between euphoria and panic" — that is, interventionism and isolationism. These swings between overinvolvement and withdrawal are accentuated by "the illusion that decisions depended largely on the idiosyncracies of decision-makers," who are normally replaced every four or eight years. In order to counteract these destabilizing tendencies (which to the diplomatic historian may seem overdrawn), U.S. policy should be governed, Kissinger argues, by "basic principles of national interest that transcended any particular Administration and would therefore be maintained as Presidents changed."8

Unlike some conservatives who believe that the objects of policy are best left implicit, Kissinger favors a "conceptual" approach toward his ends. The absence of "an integrating conceptual framework," Kissinger explains, produces "the very opposite of freedom of action," for policymakers find

themselves responding, in a reactive way, to special interests.9 A Secretary of State "becomes the captive of his geographic bureaus." A President is "driven excessively by his agencies." Both run the risk of "becoming prisoners of events." However, with the "fixed compass" of a concept of the national interest — to be supplied by the National Security Adviser — American policy might withstand such buffeting.

Upon precisely what "principles of national interest" did Kissinger believe the Nixon Administration's foreign policy should be based? Nowhere in White House Years does he precisely say, thus calling into question his assumption that an explicit articulation of guiding concepts is possible. Regarding the central Vietnam issue, for instance, he refers to no hard-and-fast rule other than "our struggle had been over a principle: that America did not betray its friends."10 This is admirable, of course, but inadequate, for a sound concept of national interest might conceivably require dissociation from old friends. Kissinger's own later diplomacy — his China policy particularly — implied as much.

"National interest" for Kissinger is often less an independent standard, or positive concept, than a kind of residual category — a negative counterfoil for policies that he deems, in a pejorative also favored by Bismarck, "sentimental."11 To conduct foreign policy "unsentimentally" is analytically just not the same thing as having a policy based on an objective, empirically discoverable bedrock of national interest. It may mean little more than being ready to recognize facts, and to adjust to them — in a word, expediency. In any case, as in his attachment to the Shah of Iran, Kissinger was sometimes guilty of the "sentimentalism" he deplores.

To the extent that his notion of "national interest" is defined in White House Years it is defined not intellectually but, as it were, sociologically. What Kissinger really seems to require is less an identifiable concept of national interest than evident general agreement on such a concept. This need for "consensus" to give legitimacy to actions of a government, democratic or autocratic, is a recurrent theme in his writings.12 The spirit of bipartisan, executive-legislative cooperation that had held together American foreign policy since the Second World War seemed to Kissinger by 1969 to have "evaporated." "Too many of our young," he writes, "were in rebellion against the successes of their

9. Ibid., p. 130.
10. Ibid., p. 1387.
fathers, attacking what they claimed to be the overextension of our commit-
mments and mocking the values that had animated the achievements. As a result, an effective diplomacy was becoming less and less possible, especially one that relied on military force. "One lesson of Vietnam," he laments, "was that firm counteractions, necessarily involving sacrifice, could always be under-
mined by domestic divisions if our people believed their governments need-
lessly sought or provoked confrontations."

In an attempt to win greater backing for the Administration's policies, Kissinger assiduously cultivated the "internationalist Establishment." To gain the elder statesmen's support for the Administration's Vietnam policy was dif-
icult. Yet it was acutely necessary, as it was validation for Kissinger that he was on the right road. The motives behind Kissinger's attentiveness to the Establishment are not simple. For him, a man half a generation younger than Nixon, personal association with such members of the internationalist Old Guard as Dean Acheson, John McCloy, and David Bruce had almost filial significance. He found in them, as he did in his long-time sponsor Nelson Rockefeller, social and psychological terra firma. Of greater importance politically, he gained from them a grounding in American national tradition. They were in his eyes "an aristocracy dedicated to the service of this nation on behalf of principles beyond partisanship."

Kissinger's relationship with the veteran ambassador David Bruce illustrates this combination of personal and political reliance. In continuing the Vietnam conflict while holding out for a negotiated settlement (a Kissinger project in which President Nixon, it appears, had little faith), the National Security Ad-
viser rejoiced in having Bruce "as a companion." Kissinger writes: "Few men have had a greater influence on me than David Bruce. On some of my most fateful decisions I instinctively turned to him." Bruce, at the age of seventy-
two and in fragile health, agreed to return to Paris as the U.S. interlocutor with the North Vietnamese. Although Kissinger did not always agree with Bruce, he saw that "any effort to which he was willing to commit himself had a strong presumption of being in the national interest." Intended no doubt simply as a personal tribute to the now-deceased diplomat, Kissinger's statement reveals something deeper: a way in which the "national interest" was for him given content. Rather than a standard independently discoverable by reason, the in-
terests of the United States became most palpable to Kissinger when manifested in the character and statesmanly conduct of members of the American Establishment. Among the "worthies," however, he was always

15. Ibid., p. 65.
16. Ibid., p. 22.
17. Ibid., p. 521.
careful to choose the ones whose company and opinions were worthwhile. Thereby he preserved his essential freedom.\textsuperscript{18}

One cannot entirely reduce Kissinger's understanding of the national interest to his search for a consensus consistent with the instincts of the foreign-policy elite. He had, or seemed to have, distinctive ideas of his own, notably his "geopolitical" ones. Kissinger's repeated use of this technical-sounding word is curious, not just because of its vagueness (characteristic of all hybrid terms) but because ever since the Second World War "geopolitics" has been in dispute among American scholars due to its inevitable association with German Geopolitik. This doctrine, originally of some scientific merit, was developed by Major-General Professor Karl Haushofer and Nazi party propagandists into a higher-order rationale for racial and military expansion.\textsuperscript{19} One would think, in light of Kissinger's personal background and experience, that he would wish to avoid any identification with this discredited Germanic tradition. One senses a perversity in his "geopolitical" rhetoric, a determination to expose the intellectual prejudices of his former liberal academic colleagues (who fare as poorly in his book as some members of the Establishment fare well).

Such aggressiveness would make more sense if Kissinger tried to reconstitute the doctrine. He could attempt to salvage the pure and solid elements in it and to recast them, together with his own thoughts and relevant concepts of earlier American theorists like Alfred Thayer Mahan, in a stronger, more general form. Yet in \textit{White House Years} he makes no real attempt to do so. Given his reliance on "geopolitical," his bare one-line definition of it as indicating "an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium" is disappointing.\textsuperscript{20} On the face of it, a rationalistic, mechanistic "equilibrium" foreign policy has nothing to do with geographical or spatial conditions, which makes one wonder why the prefix "geo" is used. "Realpolitik," a term Kissinger once employs in jest\textsuperscript{21} but which has a longer and more respectable intellectual past, would do as well or better.

Insofar as Kissinger's approach is conceptual, it is based on ideas of traditional balance-of-power realism. However, his realism is adapted to the unprecedented dangers of the atomic age, particularly the new fact of strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{22} The threat of mutual destruction reinforces his Kantian sense of seriousness. "In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is a fundamental moral imperative," as he stated in a later speech. "Without it nothing else we

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{18} Ibid., p. 944.
\bibitem{20} Kissinger, \textit{White House Years}, p. 914.
\bibitem{21} Ibid., p. 182.
\bibitem{22} Ibid., p. 62.
\end{thebibliography}
do or seek can ultimately have meaning." The choice he poses is, in short, that between Detente and Doom.

The post-Hiroshima era, unlike the period following the Congress of Vienna with which Kissinger often contrasts it, requires preventive statesmanship. No longer is it possible, he believes, for leaders to wait à la Castlereagh to "restore" the international equilibrium after it is upset. By the time "deterrence" has failed. Nowadays a defender of the status quo must react to disturbances at once, even pre-emptively.

This can involve the preventive use of force as well as the preventive exercise of diplomacy. As the weapons of the central strategic balance are too powerful to be employed, Kissinger recognizes, the only forces that can be brought into play are those on, or dispatched to, the periphery — such remote places as Vietnam, Chile, and Angola. He tends to perceive "global" issues at stake in every region and locale. His real foreign-policy goal would thus seem to be not so much defense of a permanent American "national interest," an entity conceived of as distinct and separate from that of other nations. It is rather the preservation of total worldwide stability, within nations as well as between them. It is this, essentially, that "geopolitics" means in White House Years.

A vivid example of the Nixon Administration's so-called geopolitical, or global equilibrist, approach is the White House "tilt" in favor of Pakistan (and the People's Republic of China) during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. In one of the few theoretically explicit passages in the book, Kissinger attempts to distinguish this from others that have governed American foreign policy:

There is in America an idealistic tradition that sees foreign policy as a contest between evil and good. There is a pragmatic tradition that seeks to solve "problems" as they arise. There is a legalistic tradition that treats international issues as juridical cases. There is no geopolitical tradition. All the strands of our international experience ran counter to what we were trying to accomplish on the subcontinent in the autumn of 1971. India had much sympathy as the world's most populous democracy; the problem to be "solved" was self-determination for East Pakistan; the "case" should be turned over to the United Nations, as [Secretary of State William P.] Rogers never tired of pointing out. Our geopolitical concerns were given no credence and were attributed to personal pique, anti-Indian bias, callousness toward suffering, or inexplicable immorality.25

What were the "geopolitical concerns" of Nixon and Kissinger during the disputed episode? The controlling consideration was that, "historically, prudence and equilibrium usually suggest siding with the weaker to deter the stronger."26 Alarmed by signs of collusion between India and the Soviet Union, the two men perceived a threat not only to the power balance on the subcontinent — an opportunistic Indian military move to destroy even West Pakistan — but also to the balance of Eurasia as a whole — a Soviet strike against China, already humiliated by its inability to protect its Pakistani ally. An Indian-Soviet triumph, the White House pair imagined, would also shake the equilibrium of other critical regions — e.g., the Middle East, where the radical Arab regimes would be emboldened. Thereby the scales would progressively be tipped in world politics as a whole.

Was this manifold danger real? Some officials of the United States, more knowledgeable about conditions in South Asia, denied that it was.27 Kissinger himself admits that the White House response was based on "conjecture" about the wider consequences of India's assault against Pakistan.28 So intuitive was his reading of the shifting global pattern of forces that his outlook is perhaps less aptly described as "geopolitical," in the sense of focusing on the relation of politics to such objective geographical features as territory, natural resources, and demography, than as what might be called "geopsychological."29 The key expression Kissinger himself uses — in characterizing the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, but indirectly himself as well — is "geopolitical insight."30 Political reality for him must not only be viewed objectively — from the outside, as it were. It must be subjectively penetrated. He writes: "Statesmanship requires above all a sense of nuance and proportion, the ability to perceive the essential among a mass of apparent facts, and an intuition as to which of many equally plausible hypotheses about the future is likely to prove true."31

This insight of Kissinger's was applied most intensively to the Vietnam issue, the discussion of which takes up altogether about one third of this fifteen-hundred page book. For Nixon and Kissinger both it was imperative to disengage from Southeast Asia in deliberate rather than abrupt fashion. Nixon, a Republican moderate with a sense of dependency upon his party's right

26. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 39.
wing, was concerned about appearing to fail to uphold America's "honor." Kissinger, at this point less influenced by partisan considerations, emphasized the need for America's withdrawal to be and, no less important, to be universally seen to be, an "act of policy" — such as de Gaulle's controlled extrication of France from Algeria. By this phrase, freighted with the intellectual heritage of Kant and Clausewitz, Kissinger means a demonstration that the United States government — and he individually — had "mastered events" and "given some purpose" to his country's sacrifices.

For the United States "to abandon a small country to tyranny" simply to gain a respite from its own travails seemed — and seems — to Kissinger not only "profoundly immoral" but also "destructive of our efforts to build a new and ultimately more peaceful pattern of international relations." In every area of foreign policy, success would hinge upon the quality of self-respect the United States manifested in leaving Vietnam. The Atlantic Alliance could not be revitalized, Kissinger asserts, if its governments were "assailed by doubt about American staying power." The Soviet Union could not be moved toward acceptance of mutual restraint "against the backdrop of capitulation in a major war." China would stay closed to Americans if the value of the United States as a counterweight seemed "nullified by a collapse that showed us irrelevant to Asian security." In the Middle East success would depend on convincing Israel of American "reliability" and its adversaries that America was "impervious to threats of military pressure or blackmail." In short, if the Administration were forced suddenly to quit Vietnam the event would in his view have a devastating effect upon the "credibility" of the United States, not only in Southeast Asia but "in every corner of the globe." Friends, neutrals, and enemies alike would be affected. All would value America's word less, on any subject.

This doctrine of "indivisible credibility," as it has been called, is so characteristic of Kissinger's thinking that it deserves to be grouped with the other master concepts of his that have been discussed — "national interest," "consensus," "geopolitics," "equilibrium." To President Nixon, who had a spider-like talent for political complexity but who lacked the intellectual training to express the relationships he perceived in formulae, Kissinger's broad


33. Ibid., p. 1372.

34. Ibid., p. 228.

35. Ibid., p. 1324.

intellectual approach was intriguing. When he hired the Harvard professor—"in an uncharacteristically impulsive way"—he probably thought, as then did Kissinger himself, that he was getting a foreign-policy planner. He got more than he bargained for: an extraordinary political operator.

METHODS

Kissinger's *modus operandi* in power was made possible, and even to some degree necessary, by his chief's intention "to run foreign policy from the White House." Whereas for Nixon—who as a well-traveled former Vice President considered foreign policy his own special forte—this preference for tight, centralized control was based on a belief that the Washington community resented and would frustrate him, for Kissinger it was founded on a more theoretical conviction that "a large bureaucracy, however organized, tends to stifle creativity." Thus their personal interests, Nixon's in exercising his rightful prerogatives and Kissinger's in gaining scope for historic action, coincided.

At Nixon's request, Kissinger drew up a blueprint—National Security Decision Memorandum 2 (NSDM 2)—for the wholesale revamping of the government's foreign-policy coordinating machinery. Kissinger's proposed structure, based on the statutory National Security Council (1947), was intended to combine the regularity of the relatively "formal" Eisenhower system and the flexibility of the "informal" Kennedy and Johnson Administration procedures. The purpose of this synthesis was to give the President a range of real choices—"options"—rather than as during the 1950s treaty-like recommendations laboriously negotiated among numerous departments or, as during the recent Democratic period, idiosyncratic solutions invented on the spur of the moment by talented individuals.

Because Nixon's choice for Secretary of State, William Rogers, a former Attorney General in the Eisenhower Administration, was inexperienced in foreign affairs, the revamped NSC system enabled Kissinger to seize the initiative from the outset. He used the NSC not merely to fulfill its intended function as a clearing-house but to advocate, even initiate, policy. At first he relied heavily

on his personal chairmanship of interdepartmental NSC committees. He used the flow of information partly to educate himself and his unprecedentedly large staff. These regular procedures gave him the data and assurance he needed later to bypass them. "Strange as it may seem," Kissinger ironically notes, "I never negotiated without a major departmental contribution even when the departments did not know what I was doing." In effect, he rebuilt the NSC system in order to wreck it. "The fact remains that the NSC machinery was used more fully before my authority was confirmed, while afterward tactical decisions were increasingly taken outside the system in personal conversations with the President."

More important than any institutional factor in accounting for Kissinger's emergence was his closeness to the President. He describes Richard Nixon as virtually a recluse in his work habits as in his social attitudes. Kissinger's proximity and constant attendance upon him, coupled with his keen perception of his vulnerabilities, blocked the access and influence of others. "A President needs substantive advice, but he also requires emotional succor," Kissinger shrewdly observes. "He must know that his advisors are strong and self-confident, but he must also sense that they have compassion for the isolation and responsibilities of his position and will not willfully add to his psychological burdens."

Kissinger's main rival, Rogers, who, Kissinger says, had been "much the psychologically dominant partner" when he and Nixon had earlier been associated during the Eisenhower Presidency, was too proud to master the dubious arts of court politics and ego massage. His previous superiority made it hard for him to offer Nixon support and also made it difficult for Nixon to accept it. Rogers could not really grasp that his was "the clearly subordinate position," Kissinger says. Even less could he face the possibility that he might have been appointed, at least in part, "because his old friend wanted to reverse roles." Paradoxically, the very previous friendship of Nixon and Rogers was an impediment to their effective collaboration.

These factors meant that Kissinger could increasingly disregard the State Department. He is at pains to point out that the basic pattern for this was set by the President himself, when on 17 February 1969, only four weeks after the Inaugural, he excluded the Secretary of State from his first meeting in the Oval Office with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. With Nixon's approval Kissinger then established and maintained a secret line of communication ("the Channel") with Dobrynin and the Soviet government in Moscow. This

42. Ibid., p. 48.
43. Ibid., p. 31.
44. Ibid., p. 28.
independent conduit was relied upon especially when, during discussion of sensitive matters such as strategic arms limitation, Defense or State Department objections (and leaks) were expected. This apprehension commonly turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In effect, the Nixon White House substituted confidentiality for collegiality.

Appallingly, on occasion the active collusion of foreign governments was sought in order to keep other sections of the American government ignorant. Almost certainly these requests for secrecy and multi-channel dealing aroused suspicion. The most astonishing case of "backchannel" communication and diplomacy was that which facilitated Kissinger's secret exploratory trip to the People's Republic of China in July 1971. Rogers was not told by Nixon until Kissinger was in Islamabad ready to depart for Peking.43 Although planned for months, the trip to China was presented to the Secretary of State as "a last-minute decision" in response to an invitation Kissinger, ostensibly on a mere fact-finding tour, had received while in Pakistan.

Rightly defensive about this deception, Kissinger justifies the concealment as necessary for the Administration to be "in control of the context" of the ultimate revelation of the trip. "To maintain our control over the presentation of the event was synonymous with maintaining control over our policy and its consequences."46 The reasoning, not to mention the purpose, behind this is hardly compelling. How could the effects of such a revolutionary turn in policy carried out without any reference to the bureaucracy, Congress, or public be controlled? Nor is he even consistent: "The shock effect of the reversal of positions would have been inevitable no matter how the trip had been handled (witness the Ping-Pong experience)."47

Did the trip really need to be carried out in this clandestine fashion? That the Chinese did not insist upon secrecy is clear. Kissinger admits: "We learned later that the Chinese were extremely suspicious of our desire for secrecy; perhaps they saw it as a device to allow us to reverse course quickly."48 Kissinger's trip might have been carried out, as was the Nixon "journey for peace" to Peking in February 1972, in the full glare of publicity. But then Nixon, who really wished to be the first American in the Chinese capital,49 might not have chosen Kissinger as the diplomatic forerunner. A State Department official — a senior China expert — would probably have been sent instead.

If at the outset Kissinger usually depended on anonymity, in time he came to depend as much on notoriety. While often disdainful toward the "public rela-

45. Ibid., p. 739.
46. Ibid., p. 762.
47. Ibid., p. 763.
48. Ibid., p. 724.
49. Ibid., p. 734.
tions geniuses” on the White House staff, Kissinger developed a high regard for publicity as an instrument of his policy. At first he was restricted by an understanding he had with Nixon that, as his role was an advisory one, he would not see the press. "Neither of us proved especially farsighted in this regard," he comments with labored understatement. He soon began giving brilliant "background" briefings in explication of Nixon's policies that became the talk of the town. His give-and-take with the press was, as one captivated journalist recalls, a kind of "mating game." Kissinger tried to seduce the correspondents into writing his way, and they "tried" to resist. Following his return from his "Polo I" trip to China, he stepped into the limelight.

In his new phase as a "principal," Kissinger, as before, knew that his effectiveness depended on far more than his personal skills or the authority he derived from the President. He needed to be able to wield real power, including military force. Previous American statesmen, he believed, had mistakenly treated "power" and "diplomacy" as two distinct elements or phases of policy. He is particularly critical of the policy of "containment" which, as executed by Dean Acheson and to some extent John Foster Dulles, caused the United States to mark time diplomatically and thereby fritter away its assets. "Our military and diplomatic position was never more favorable than at the very beginning of the containment policy in the late 1940s. That was the time to attempt a serious discussion on the future of Europe. We lost our opportunity."

Rather than concentrating as Acheson had done on building up "situations of strength" — or platforms for subsequent parleying that ultimately never took place — Kissinger himself attempted to clinch agreement with his adversaries at the very moment when maximum pressure was being applied. This doctrine disposed him to call upon physical force in support of current moves in diplomacy — but often in ways calculated to gain political rather than basic military advantage. He observes, for instance, of the North Vietnamese: "Displays of American strength never failed to be taken seriously by them even as they resisted them," When in July 1972 he met the usually "insolent" Le Duc Tho in Paris following the Administration's decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors and to remove restrictions on air bombardment, he encountered, he says, "a different 'Ducky.'"

50. Ibid., p. 1456.
51. Ibid., p. 15.
55. Ibid., p. 1312.
If Kissinger trusted mainly in the efficacy of the "stick," he did not minimize the attractiveness of the "carrot." Successful negotiation in his view results from the generation of "incentives and penalties of sufficient magnitude to impel decision." In the case of the Soviet Union, the most powerful opponent he had to confront, this twofold method of enforcing decision meant dangling concrete benefits — grain, computers, drilling equipment, and credits — while making clear that Soviet adventurism would be firmly resisted, both directly and through the shipment of arms to the nations in marginal areas threatened by Soviet surrogate forces.

Closely related to Kissinger's "dual track" of conciliation and firmness was his famous method of "linkage." This was not merely a negotiating device. It reflected a basic idea he had begun to work out even as an undergraduate. "Reason discloses objective necessity, the inexorability of causal laws, the linkages which enable man to master his environment," he had written in his senior honors thesis. In *White House Years* he explains the Nixon Administration's more pragmatic application of the term. "In our view," he writes, "linkage existed in two forms: first, when a diplomat deliberately links two separate objectives in a negotiation, using one as leverage on the other; or by virtue of reality, because in an interdependent world the actions of a major power are inevitably related and have consequences beyond the issue or region immediately concerned." What he naturally sought to do in dealing with the Russians was to convert the first form — the arbitrary relationship — into the second — the causal relationship. That is, he would persuade them that "linkage was a reality, not a decision."

Kissinger well realized that for the White House to conduct a "linkage" strategy successfully it had to be able to count on a disciplined Executive branch and a sophisticated and supportive public — that is, on "consensus." The compartmentalized character of the American government and the pluralistic nature of American society made it extremely difficult to deal with the Soviet Union "on a broad front," however. "It was," he admits, "a task complex beyond any previous experience." Individual agencies (e.g., the Commerce Department) and individual interest groups (e.g., grain exporters) insisted that their ties to the Soviet Union had unique importance, and should not be subordinated to an overall strategy. In the view of Secretary of Commerce Maurice

Stans, for example, "trade was a good in itself."61 The alternative to a "linked" diplomacy, maybe more defensible in the long run, was to allow agreements with the Soviet Union to stand or fall individually, "on their merits." This lax method was not sufficient, however, for Kissinger. It lacked complexity, subtlety, and control. "Good policy depends on the patient accumulation of nuances: care has to be taken that individual moves are orchestrated into a coherent strategy."62

Why, ultimately, did Kissinger insist upon his "linkage" method, as well as National Security Staff control, "backchannel" communication, secret negotiation, manipulation of the press, and military coercion? One cannot escape the impression that his effort to integrate all facets of the American relationship with other countries was a reflection, in some measure at least, of his intellectual and psychological need for action, even collective action, to express a single rational purpose. "To ignore the interconnection of events was to undermine the coherence of all policy," he revealingly writes.63 No doubt there was good reason for greater coordination, to make sure that the various initiatives toward the Soviet Union were generally working in the same direction. If diplomatic "linkage" were truly capable of being transformed into historical reality — a structured, self-equilibrating relationship of interdependence with the Soviet Union — then Kissinger's extraordinary methods of control should not have continued to be necessary, however. His achievements should have been capable of standing on their own.

ACHIEVEMENTS

What were these achievements? The larger result of Kissinger's efforts during the first Nixon Administration was a putative foundation for a "new international order," of the superpowers. At the same time a basis was laid, somewhat inadvertently, for a new Western relationship with Egypt and the other Arab states. More calculatedly, a settlement of the war in Vietnam was negotiated. These successes — the larger and the smaller, the global and the regional — are inseparable from one another, especially in Kissinger's view.

The great "structural" result of the early Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy was a new pattern of relations among the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. What this "subtle triangle" involving Washington, Peking, and Moscow consisted of is not so clear as it should be in White House Years. Although described in geometrical terms, it was actually less a structure than a process. Even this is not well explained. "Our relations to

61. Ibid., p. 1134.
62. Ibid., p. 415.
63. Ibid., p. 129.
possible opponents should be such," Kissinger postulates, "... that our options toward both of them were always greater than their options toward each other."64 Does this confusing formulation mean that American-Chinese relations and American-Russian relations should be "closer" than Chinese-Russian relations?65 Or does it mean that the United States should seek "equidistance" from Peking and Moscow?66 Kissinger's likely purpose was to win, by exploiting America's "balancing position" between China and Russia, greater freedom of maneuver. Nonetheless, he warns against assuming that the Chinese and Russians can be "used" against each other. The hostility between the two communist titans must be left to work itself out according to "the dynamic of events."68 What, then, did the Nixon Administration really contribute to the formation and maintenance of the "triangle"? Very little, it would appear. Let us consider the Chinese corner of the figure first.

The Nixon Administration's China policy was based on global "geopolitical" considerations. A reassessment of American military capabilities indicated that the United States could in the future fight a major war in Europe or in Asia, but not in both regions at once. Adjustment was needed. "Declaratory policy" had to be reconciled with "actual policy."69 Thus, in President Nixon's first Foreign Policy Report to Congress (18 February 1970), the White House publicized the reduction of the American global mission to a "one-and-one-half-war" strategy (from a "two-and-one-half-war" strategy). Under this doctrine, the United States would "maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."70 Thus by unmistakable implication the Soviet Union was identified as the main threat. The People's Republic of China was no longer seen as a major danger.

The geographical pattern of the Soviet-Chinese border clashes had convinced Kissinger, contrary to his initial supposition, that the U.S.S.R. was the more belligerent and aggressive of the two communist regimes.71 Equilibrium required that the United States "not stand idly by in case of a Soviet attack on China."72 With Western Europe the only place where the United States could meet Soviet aggression, the Eurasian front would have to be defended by the P.R.C. — thus in need of befriending.

64. Ibid., p. 165.
65. Ibid., p. 712.
66. Ibid., p. 1090.
67. Ibid., p. 192.
68. Ibid., p. 712.
69. Ibid., p. 221.
70. Ibid., p. 222.
71. Ibid., p. 177.
72. Ibid., p. 836.
Was the new China policy, the most dramatic turn described in *White House Years*, basically Nixon's or Kissinger's idea? Even on the evidence somewhat tendentiously presented here, it would seem that the principal historical responsibility or credit lies with the former.73 Nixon, a native Californian with experience during World War II in the Pacific, had been personally very interested in China.74 In an October 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, a frank trial balloon, he had vaguely urged "pulling China back into the world community."75 Kissinger, by contrast, had never given much attention to China. Conceding no intellectual inspiration to Nixon, he does credit him with the indispensable political leadership: "But though I had independently come to the same judgment as Nixon, and though I designed many of the moves, I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own."76

The journeys to Peking themselves — "Polo I" (Kissinger alone in 1971) and "Polo II" (Nixon, Rogers, Kissinger in 1972) — are fascinatingly recounted in *White House Years*. This is in itself an achievement. The places and personalities had for Kissinger almost a storybook quality. Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung were "figures out of history." He was particularly taken with the many-layered Chinese style of negotiation. "Each remark by a Chinese was part of a jigsaw puzzle, even if at first our more literal intelligence did not pick up the design," he writes.77 He and his assistant, Winston Lord, "actually got quite good at it." In the end, the two sides, implicitly understanding one another, handled most matters by agreeing to disagree.

The result was the Shanghai Communiqué (28 February 1972). The most intractable, though not most pressing issue dealt with in it was that of Taiwan. It was finessed by Kissinger's almost too-clever-by-half formulation: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."78 The issue of most immediate concern to the American side was the continuing war in Vietnam. This was treated obliquely through an American promise to reduce U.S. military forces and installations on Taiwan "as the tension in the [Far Eastern] area di-

minishes.""79—a development toward which the help of the Chinese government would be welcomed.

Kissinger enthusiastically celebrates the Shanghai Communiqué as "probably unique" in guiding relations between two great nations without any dispute over its meaning until it was superseded seven years later, in 1979, by the establishment of formal U.S.-P.R.C. diplomatic relations. This is partly because it said so little. Kissinger virtually admits this when he writes: "Its significance lay not only in its words but in the assumptions underlying it." Despite the emphasis of the media, he insists, the Communiqué was not about Taiwan or bilateral matters but about "international order." It brought together two previously hostile nations "to deal across the gulf of ideology with common security concerns."80

Let us now turn to the Soviet corner of the "triangle." In contrast to the rendezvous in Peking in February 1972, the Moscow Summit of May 1972 needed to be judged by conventional standards. As President Nixon himself said when he arrived in the Soviet capital, he wished the meeting to be remembered "for substance rather than atmosphere."81 After the encounter with exotic China, a sense of mystery or romance would have been difficult to generate in any case. The sequence of the summits had the insidious psychological effect, very evident in White House Years, of making American relations with the Soviet Union seem even more prosaic than they were.

Ironically, although Nixon because of his earlier service as Vice President and previous travels to Russia had far more experience in dealing with Soviet leaders than did Kissinger, he relied on his National Security Adviser even more heavily in Moscow than he did in Peking. Nixon's "strong suit," Kissinger observed, was not detailed negotiation but tours d'horizon. Nixon simply refused to master the arcane technicalities of strategic arms limitation, the main item on the agenda in Moscow. Fortunately, Kissinger himself, having made an academic specialty of the subject, felt on home ground—so much so that he virtually dispensed with the services of the regular SALT negotiating team. The U.S. SALT delegation in Helsinki, headed by Gerard C. Smith, was not brought to Moscow until the ceremony of signing the Treaty. Whatever deleterious effect this may have had on the quality of the agreement itself—the essence of which was a trade-off between restrictions on deployment of antiballistic missile systems, in which the United States then had a technical lead, and limitations on offensive-missile capability, in which the Soviet Union possessed a growing advantage—it demoralized able and hard-working officials.82 Moreover, they were persons whose expert voices were sorely needed in

79. Ibid., pp. 1077-78, 1492.
80. Ibid., p. 1086.
81. Ibid., p. 1209.
82. See, Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
defense of the SALT process. Kissinger, while denying that any military advantage was conceded by him that would not also have been made by Smith and his colleagues, nonetheless recognizes a tactical error: "As in China, we paid the price for our administrative practices, being called upon again to placate the group that had been excluded from the consummation of its own negotiations." 83

Besides the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, the major result of the Moscow Summit was a statement of "Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations." This, Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev averred, was even more important than concrete measures of arms limitation. What he sought, and did not get, was an exchange of promises by the United States and the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons against each other. 84 Kissinger also saw some advantage in a declaration of general principles. Although "not a legal contract," it would "establish a standard of conduct by which to judge whether real progress was being made and in the name of which we could resist their violation." For years the United States had been affirming that statesmen "had no higher duty than to reduce the dangers of nuclear war." However, efforts at nuclear control "had to be linked to an end of the constant Soviet pressure against the global balance of power." 85 No more adventurism!

Kissinger's concern, at Moscow as well as beforehand and afterward, focused on two regions especially: the Middle East and Indochina. Although he could not have predicted it, the Moscow Summit evidently "proved the last straw" for Egypt's new leader, Anwar el-Sadat. Within six weeks of the American-Soviet summit, Sadat, a man whose decisiveness Kissinger did not at first reckon with, expelled Soviet military advisers and technicians from his country. By thus discrediting the Soviet Union in the major Arab nation, the Moscow Summit indirectly contributed to "one of the seminal events in recent Middle Eastern history." 86

The Moscow meeting also had an important oblique effect on Vietnam. As it took place despite the Nixon Administration's decision to mine Haiphong harbor (thus endangering Soviet ships), its very occurrence seemed to prove Soviet indifference. "Conscious of its own vulnerabilities," Kissinger hopefully concluded, "the Kremlin therefore cut loose from its obstreperous small ally on the other side of the globe." 87 This made possible "unfettered" U.S. efforts to break Hanoi's resistance. In October 1972 the North Vietnamese delegation in

83. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1242.
84. Ibid., p. 1208.
85. Ibid., p. 1205.
86. Ibid., p. 1248.
87. Ibid., p. 1201.
Paris, having hitherto demanded as a price of peace that the United States itself dismantle the Thieu government in Saigon, agreed that the South Vietnamese rivals could work out a solution among themselves. Kissinger reflects: "Hanoi had finally separated the military and political questions, which I had urged nearly four years earlier as the best way to settle." On 23 January 1973, following the further inducement of the Christmas bombing, a peace agreement was signed. Peace, for some time "at hand," was achieved.

LEGACY

How much of Henry Kissinger's achievement during the 1969-1973 period is durable? How much of it has lasted? How much of it could, at the time, reasonably have been expected to last? The division between the "White House" years and the subsequent "State Department" years is a convenient one for Kissinger, as it enables him in the first volume of his memoirs to put the best possible construction on the results of the early foreign policy of the Nixon Administration. He cannot, however, entirely ignore what happened later.

The China venture, though undeniably a smashing diplomatic breakthrough, was not a secure victory. If either side can be said to have "won," it was probably the Chinese, who gained greater acceptance into the community of nations and recognition of their asserted sphere (including the island of Taiwan). Kissinger claims in White House Years to have had no illusion that the new U.S.-P.R.C. relationship was anything more than "a marriage of convenience" — an impression he certainly did not convey at the time. "Once China becomes strong enough to stand alone," he advises, "it might discard us. A little later it might even turn against us, if its perception of its interest required it." Given the ideological gulf between the United States and the People's Republic, it may have been shortsighted for the United States to make a permanent concession of principle ("One China") partly for the sake of an anticipated temporary diplomatic favor (pressure on North Vietnam).

Was the Shanghai Communiqué truly necessary? Probably not. The actual fact is that there are, and probably will continue to be, two Chinese governments, one of them a former American ally. It is not sentimentalism, but rather realism, to acknowledge this. In any case, the Nixon White House left to its successors the difficult task of drawing the logical conclusion of its conceptual breakthrough: formally recognizing the P.R.C. and de-recognizing the Republic of China. Since this was done in 1979 it has been necessary to invent unofficial ways of recognizing the regime in Taiwan. A more measured initial ap-

88. Ibid., p. 1345.
89. Ibid., pp. 1090-91.
proach to Peking might have established a more durable balance in China policy.

Détente with the Soviet Union, as it was actually negotiated, became problematical in the long run as well. The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, particularly, was vulnerable to criticism because, in provisionally "freezing" missile levels on both sides, it left the United States in a position of numerical inferiority with only 1,700 missile launchers to the Soviet side's 2,400. This fact in itself made the agreement politically difficult to defend. Senator Henry M. Jackson and others were deeply skeptical of the Administration's argument that the "qualitative" superiority of American rockets — tipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) — offset the Soviet Union's "quantitative" superiority. In time, these critics asserted, the Soviet government would "MIRV" its own missiles, many of them considerably more powerful than those of the United States.

One may speculate that the first SALT agreement could have been used to control, even completely ban, the MIRVing of missiles. The American side's desire to exploit its technical advantage in this sphere, however, was too strong to be contained. Had the SALT negotiations been concluded earlier than 1972 a more comprehensive limit on offensive weaponry would perhaps have been possible. The Pentagon would have been required to sacrifice a program that was then only in incubation. Numerous delays in the arms control talks, resulting in part from the wish of Nixon and Kissinger to make a SALT agreement the centerpiece of a Soviet-American summit, may have caused the loss of a historic opportunity to keep the MIRV genie in a bottle, much as the ABM idea was partially contained.

The Middle East diplomacy of the Nixon White House was also faulty and dilatory. President Nixon, suspecting that Kissinger might "lean too much toward Israel," forbade him from participating in efforts to reach a settlement. Kissinger, denied permission to play (and in any case too busy to do so), became obstructive. When the State Department under Secretary Rogers began active peace initiatives in the Middle East, Kissinger protested. He wanted to demonstrate to the Arabs, through continued "stalemate," that a settlement was impossible without the involvement of the United States. In thus blocking State Department action, he may have caused the loss of valuable time during which, as he acknowledges, there was "growing radicalization of the region." There is no denying, however, that when the limited success of an Egyptian-Israeli understanding came — albeit after a recurrence of war in October 1973 — the role of the United States was the predominant one.

90. Ibid., p. 348.
91. Ibid., p. 376.
92. Ibid., p. 373.
With regard to the Vietnam issue, that which dominated all others during
the first Nixon Administration, Kissinger appears in retrospect to have had
more confidence in diplomacy *per se* than was warranted. President Nixon, as
mentioned, was much less certain that the North Vietnamese would honestly
negotiate. He placed his own faith in "Vietnamization" — the regularly phased
withdrawal of American ground forces at the same time as the South Vietnam-
ese military was being equipped for a long-term struggle. By means of Viet-
namization, diplomacy could, if necessary, be dispensed with — "our with-
drawals might gradually even end our involvement *without* agreement with
Hanoi," Kissinger speculates.93

Had the Nixon Administration been concerned only to end the American in-
volve in the Indochina war, Vietnamization might possibly have worked,
allowing the Republic of Vietnam to retain *de facto* control over at least a part
of its territory. Lack of confidence in the staying power of the South Vietnamese
government, however, gave rise to the further objective of *ending the war it-
self*. There was as well the increasingly central consideration of securing the re-
lease of the American POWs. The only recourse the Administration seemed to
have, in forcing the North Vietnamese to the peace table and freeing the
prisoners, was unleashing American air power.

Although Kissinger insists upon the military value of the resulting assaults,
including the controversial Cambodian "incursion," he appears to have
counted even more heavily upon their momentary psychological impacts —
upon Saigon as well as upon Hanoi. The North Vietnamese needed to be in-
timidated into making peace; the South Vietnamese needed to be *emboldened*
to do so. Thus in January 1973 he arranged peace — or a semblance of it.

"I believed then, and I believe now," Kissinger writes, "that the agreement
could have worked."94 In light of his philosophical understanding that our
struggle for power never ceases and his keen perception of the North Vietnam-
ese as hardened revolutionaries, this belief, though perhaps honestly expressed,
is hard to accept. His justification — that the settlement "reflects a true
equilibrium of forces on the ground,"95 makes no allowance for the devastating
psychological impact of the very fact of the peace settlement upon the Saigon
regime. Moreover, the agreement did not require any North Vietnamese with-
drawal from the South. The "implicit threat" of American retaliation to deter
"massive violations" of the peace lacked credibility.

In light of the poor state of the Nixon Administration's relations with Con-
gress, which was then considering measures that would have legislated the
United States out of the war, it is hard to imagine that Kissinger really believed

in the possibility of any kind of action by the United States to enforce peace following a settlement. Kissinger's diplomatically oriented vision of long-term peace in Indochina in retrospect seems quite implausible, however worthy his effort. Perhaps it is because he recognizes this that he rises in fury at the suggestion that all he had really sought in negotiating with the North Vietnamese in Paris was a "decent interval" for an American withdrawal. "We sought not an interval before collapse," he insists, "but lasting peace with honor." His own thinking, however unrealistic, was pure.

Had Kissinger, in sum, merely conducted "a holding action" keeping Peking and Moscow and the rest of the world fascinated while the United States unilaterally disengaged from Vietnam, or had he attempted something more? Philosophically, he expected little. "The statesman's responsibility is to struggle against transitoriness and not to insist that he be paid in the coin of eternity." He perhaps found some consolation in the experience of Mao Tse-tung. "The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world," Kissinger quotes President Nixon as saying to the Chinese leader. "I have not been able to change it," replied Mao. "I have only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Peking." What true changes had Kissinger himself made?

In the realm of theory, he had sought to re-establish American foreign policy on the more permanent basis of a conception of the "national interest." More distinctively, he had sought to implant a modern "geopolitical" tradition in American soil. Although he could not completely overcome the deep-seated bias of the American people against the "balance of power," with its disregard of ideology and sentiment, he did succeed, in a very short time, in impressing upon the nation the relevance of considerations of force in international relations.

There is an emptiness in his notions of "balance," "equilibrium," and the like, however, which suggests that he himself did not find in them founts of inspiration. Though without a well-defined ethical system, Kissinger remained the moralist, a man for whom it was above all imperative to act, alone but responsibly. "There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis," he stated in a later speech. "A policy of pure calculation will be empty of both vision and humanity.""100

In the realm of practice, Kissinger's contribution is surely more original. His practical methods are, however, less imitable; not all of them are even wor-

96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p. 938.
98. Ibid., p. 55.
99. Ibid., p. 1063.
100. Kissinger, "Moral Promise and Practical Needs."
thy of imitation. White House "backchannel" diplomacy, while it made possible impressive new departures, generated as much suspicion as it did confidence. It prevented or delayed action that could, over the long run, be executed only by bureaucracies, technically equipped and supported by legislative mandate. Kissinger's style fundamentally was not compatible with the institutions of American representative government. He does not himself even recommend emulation of it. "Though I did not think so at the time," Kissinger admits, "I have become convinced that a President should make the Secretary of State his principal adviser and use the national security adviser primarily as a senior administrator and coordinator to make certain that each significant point of view is heard." 101 He wrote this, of course, after having himself served as Secretary of State — with a prospect perhaps of one day returning to that position. Although his "second" thought is probably the better one, it is somewhat weakened by his manifest willingness to work the system both ways.

Kissinger's greatness, his purchase upon lasting fame, lies perhaps less in his concepts, in his methods, or in his achievements than it does in the man himself. "He is great," Emerson once observed, "who is what he is from nature, and who never reminds us of others." Kissinger never did. In his Protean variety and unpredictability he was the living disproof of his own conviction that when persons enter high office they merely consume "intellectual capital," never replenish it. 102 On one topic after another — China, Russia, the Middle East, Vietnam — Kissinger acted with a grasp far beyond his initial reach. If his legacy is ambiguous, it is partly because he came to know his subject better than he knew himself.

101. Ibid., p. 30.
102. Ibid., p. 54.


Reviewed by Charles Perry*

This is an excellent book which should have a different title. Rather than Energy and Security, it should more appropriately be called Oil and Security. The central concern of all thirteen essays is not with energy vulnerabilities in general, but with oil supply security in the near term. More specifically, the authors concentrate on the need for effective counters to

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the threat of sudden cut-offs in Persian Gulf supplies, particularly when such cut-offs trigger rapid price increases as in the Iranian shortfall of 1978-79.

Of course, there are several good reasons why the general editors of this volume — David Deese and Joseph Nye of Harvard University — chose this narrower focus, emphasizing oil over other energy sources (nuclear power, for example) which also have important security implications. In the first place, given the slow development of alternative energy supplies among the industrial democracies, oil will remain their primary fuel for at least the next decade. During this period, oil security will be the essential precondition to broader energy security.

Second, throughout this same time frame, the West and Japan will continue to draw most of their oil imports from Persian Gulf producers, who are becoming increasingly vulnerable to domestic turmoil and regional instability. These trends, together with the extension of Soviet influence toward the Gulf, enlarge the possibility of a major oil flow interruption.

Third and finally, in formulating their energy policies, the major industrial nations have generally concentrated on long-term measures for import reduction, rather than on the development of more immediate buffers, such as strategic oil stockpiles, emergency supply enhancement programs, and rapid fuel allocation systems. Given this absence of crisis planning, a potential cut-off of Persian Gulf oil becomes all the more threatening.

Within this particular frame of reference, Energy and Security ably points the way to more effective control of our energy destiny. In encouraging the shift in emphasis from reduction of oil imports to the improvement of measures against disruption, the book’s contributors offer useful guidelines for both national action and international collaboration. More important still, the necessity of integrating energy concerns with foreign and military policy is stressed throughout the book, most effectively in the first essay by Nye and in the concluding chapter by Nye, Deese and Alvin L. Alm.

This book is divided into four major sections. In Part I, which deals with energy as a security problem in general, Thomas Neff describes the structural changes in the international oil market which have contributed to a loss of control by consuming nations over their import sources. He correctly notes that the growth of producer control could complicate emergency oil-sharing procedures even among allies: “In many cases, reallocation of one consumer’s supply to another consumer might violate (or appear to violate) producer/consumer government agreements or destination restrictions, and consumers might well fear that such violations would compromise future access to crude.”

Part II addresses the problems and policies of specific nations which play key roles in the world energy theater. It includes competent analyses of economic and political trends among Persian Gulf producers, as well as of the energy balances in Western Europe, North America, Japan, the communist bloc and oil-importing developing countries (OIDCs). Two essays in particular deserve special note. The first — by Marshall Goldman — offers a thought-provoking analysis of why the Soviet Union and its allies probably will not, in Goldman's opinion, emerge as net importers of oil in the 1980s. His view is that Western analysts have underestimated the ability of the Soviets and the East European countries to develop alternative domestic energies and to improve indigenous oil production with the help of technology transfers from the West. In Goldman's interesting discussion, he perhaps fails to give sufficient attention to the energy security problems attached to West European dependence on Soviet oil supplies, which may in fact increase as a result of such technology transfers.

David Deese's cogent treatment of the financial burden placed on OIDCs and the potential impact of their plight on political and economic stability in key Third World areas adds a special dimension to our understanding of the link between energy and security. He argues vigorously in support of multinational assistance for the development of fossil fuel resources in oil-poor developing countries. Further, Deese advocates the use of international financial mechanisms, preferably under World Bank and IMF auspices, to relieve the staggering oil import bills of OIDCs.

Part III delineates the major components of a more effective US energy security policy. Alm et. al. zero in on specific domestic and international policy tools for coping with oil emergencies. They put forth a compelling case for building up both public and private oil stockpiles which will be used rather than hoarded in times of crisis to hold down prices and ease supply shortages. They also identify areas where broader energy cooperation between the US and its principal allies in Western Europe and Japan could be promoted. Suggested measures include intra-alliance stockpile management and the fostering of spare and surge oil production capacity among friendly countries. Before such initiatives could take root, however, as the authors correctly assert, the United States must set its own "energy house" in order.

In a second essay in this section, Geoffrey Kemp, who currently is serving as principal Middle East Advisor on the National Security Council, elucidates the prospects for, as well as the restraints upon, the use of force to secure Persian Gulf oil. In developing a capacity for Western force projection in this critical arena, Kemp maintains, there is a need for both improved forward logistical facilities and a more potent naval presence. He also argues for closer coordination of US-European arms transfers to key
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producing nations. In so doing, however, Kemp makes clear his contention that local oil kingdoms would do better to develop armies actually willing to fight than to continue buying more sophisticated weapons systems.

As a whole, Energy and Security will be a valuable sourcebook for both the policy analyst and the interested lay person. The latter may have some difficulty with the econometric nature of certain articles, but perseverance in digesting the material will be well worth the effort.

If there is a criticism of this useful manual, it is that it did not quite live up to its title. By concentrating — understandably to be sure — on the role of oil in the short term, the authors pay scant attention to the potential contributions of coal, nuclear power, synthetic fuel and renewable energies to energy security over the long haul. Only by pursuing these alternative energies in combination with the more explicit oil security measures advocated in this book can the United States take the lead, as the concluding chapter (Part IV) suggests it should, in creating "a more stable world economic order, secure in its energy future."²

2. Ibid., p. 423.


Reviewed by MITCHELL REISS*

"I am convinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union." Those words, announced at the opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, Finland on 17 November 1969 by Gerard Smith, the Chief Negotiator of the United States delegation, underlie the basic premise of US SALT policy, which Smith and his colleagues were to pursue over the next two and a half years. In this very readable volume, Smith guides the reader through labyrinthian negotiating sessions with the Soviets, the complex technical jargon of strategic weaponry, and the behind-the-scenes SALT-related machinations in Washington. Doubletalk does more than merely supplement the perspectives previously outlined in John Newhouse's Cold Dawn and Henry Kissinger's White House Years. Smith draws upon his personal ex-

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perience to provide a unique insight into the evolution of the SALT process, from its origins to its culmination in May 1972, when the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms were signed. It is a highly entertaining book for the layman and, with the inclusion of primary documents detailing interagency negotiating proposals, an indispensable tool for the serious student of SALT.

In 1969 there were few, if any, men more qualified than Gerard Smith to test the negotiating waters with the Soviets over the control of nuclear weapons. Smith first worked with the Atomic Energy Commission as special assistant to one of the five commissioners. He was chief political advisor to the US delegation at the first Atoms for Peace Conference in 1955, helped set up the International Atomic Energy Agency, acted as Secretary of State Dulles’s aide at the 1957 London Disarmament Conference, and held a variety of high-ranking government posts before being named Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) by President Nixon. Smith’s colleagues on the US SALT delegation — Philip Farley, Llewellyn Thompson, Paul Nitze, General Royal Allison, and Harold Brown — were similarly well-versed in the lore of strategic weapons.

One of the underlying themes of *Doubletalk* is that the negotiating process is best facilitated by adopting a “methodological collegial approach,” encompassing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and ACDA, rather than a personal approach. Indeed, if one villain emerges from *Doubletalk* it is the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. Smith reports that at times “Kissinger almost single-handedly dealt with one or two Soviet officials unaided by individuals having the special expertise of the departments of the government involved, uninformed by the experience of other minds or the details of continuing past discussions with the Soviets over a period of many months.”

According to Smith, Kissinger’s personal intervention in the SALT negotiating process, either by controlling the flow of information among the various Washington bureaucracies or in “backchannel” discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin or Foreign Minister Gromyko, bypassed the main negotiating team and left a “legacy of confusion” in its wake. Kissinger often contradicted the instructions of the SALT delegation. An example of this “one-man governance” at its worst is Kissinger’s reversal of a position which the US had pressed for almost a year, by cavalierly agreeing not to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles in any final SALT agreement. Additionally, Kissinger’s penchant for extreme secrecy

extended even to American interpreters. Writes Smith in disbelieving horror: "When negotiating in Moscow he relied entirely on Soviet interpreters!" 2

Kissinger compounded these errors during the final negotiations at the Moscow summit in May 1972. Some SALT items had been left open until this point in order to ensure a public relations coup during an election year by having President Nixon formally complete the agreements. These issues included figures on silo dimensions, the designation of an appropriate classification of light and heavy ballistic missiles, and when and what kind of missile launcher must be decommissioned if replaced by a new launcher. Nevertheless, the entire SALT delegation, with its accumulation of two and a half years of day-to-day familiarity with the technical, political and military aspects of the SALT talks, was ordered to remain in Helsinki; Kissinger, in Moscow, worked out the final details with two of his nontechnical aides from the National Security Council.

Smith outlines the road which led to the Moscow summit, and goes into great detail in examining the possibility of obtaining a treaty that would have banned multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Smith concludes that the lack of a MIRV ban was the "major failure" of SALT I and places the blame squarely on American unwillingness to negotiate this subject seriously.

If failure to achieve a MIRV ban represented a lost opportunity, the ABM Treaty was "the great prize of SALT I." Smith explains the way in which US concern that the Soviets might upgrade their anti-aircraft missile system for antiballistic missile purposes influenced the negotiations. He also describes how the United States used the ABM agreement to achieve an interim freeze on offensive weapons.

As might be expected, Smith uses Doubletalk to answer the critics of SALT I. Among the significant achievements of SALT I were Soviet agreement to ban the deployment of future ABM systems and multiple warheads for ABM interceptor missiles; strict restraints on ABM radars; provisions prohibiting the upgrading of anti-aircraft missiles; and an Interim Offensive Agreement for a duration (five years) longer than the Soviets originally proposed. Also, Soviet initiatives, such as counting American forward-based systems as central strategic systems, an agreement concerning "provocative attacks," a pledge of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, and limitation of naval vessels to certain zones, were successfully excluded from the final accords.

Smith further notes the international legal precedent established by Soviet acceptance of national technical means of verification. The SALT process also gave birth to two little publicized agreements: the Ac-
cidents Agreement and the Revised Hot Line Agreement. The Soviet-American Standing Consultative Committee was also a product of SALT I and has fulfilled its purpose by serving as a settlement mechanism for suspected violations of the agreed treaty provisions. Finally, Smith argues that limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty resulted in "considerable savings" for the United States, estimated at $11 to $13 billion.

Given the perspective of time, Smith devotes his final chapter to a discussion of the lessons learned from the first strategic arms limitation talks. Smith reiterates his belief that the primary responsibility for the negotiations should rest with the SALT delegation: "I think a better result would have emerged if under the President's direction the delegates had remained responsible for the entire negotiations." As a corollary, he maintains that technical issues should be left to the appropriate experts and not to the President of the United States. Smith also argues that linking summitry and arms control is not the optimal formula for producing beneficial arms control agreements. He favors both the designation of congressional advisors to the SALT delegation, and frequent consultations with allies on the progress of the talks.

Summarizing the SALT negotiations, Smith observes that "SALT should be pursued for limited purposes to reduce the risks of war and the costs of security. This can be done with advantage to both sides." This is perhaps the major lesson of SALT I. It is a lesson well worth remembering today.

3. Ibid., p. 467.
4. Ibid., p. 454.


Reviewed by Grant Rhode*

Dubbed "River of Friendship" by both Russians and Chinese, the Amur was a symbol of Sino-Soviet harmony following the Chinese decision to "lean to one side" toward the socialist camp in 1950. The deterioration of

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Sino-Soviet relations, especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, transformed this positive border symbol into a negative one. The interpretation of the subsequent border crisis as a signaling device of political change is the central theme of Richard Wich's *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication*.

As the subtitle of the book implies, Wich combines a structural analysis of political change (international systemic change) with a contextual analysis of communication (i.e., a determination of the meaning of certain events as signaling devices in the relations between states). Of the two aspects of the study, the first is treated as a relative "given" and the second is paid more careful analytical attention. Wich himself clearly states the point of his study, and it seems fair to assess the book in relation to this stated purpose: "The ultimate purpose of a study such as this is to heighten appreciation of the dynamics of the signaling process in order to be in a position, conceptually and analytically, to apprehend the early signals of structural change." Following a review of the basic elements of structural change, an evaluation of the methodology and theory of Wich's "signaling" thesis will be undertaken.

According to Wich, "a geologic shift in the international political environment" was taking place during the late 1960s. This began with a transformation of alliance relations following the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the process of destalinization, which shattered the Sino-Soviet axis of the socialist camp. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an equally important shift in adversary relations took place. The major features of this shift, in order of importance, are presented and discussed by Wich as: 1) the Soviet Union as China's primary adversary; 2) Sino-American accommodation; 3) Sino-Japanese reconciliation; 4) Sino-Vietnamese divergence; 5) China's close relations with Romania and Yugoslavia; 6) Sino-Albanian estrangement; and 7) Cuba as a close Soviet ally.

Though the scope of *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics* is limited to the period 1968-1973, Wich's presentation of structural change was borne out in formal diplomatic terms during 1978, a decade after the Czechoslovakian invasion. These diplomatic events included the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship with its anti-hegemony clause in August, the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November, and the announcement in December of Sino-American normalization. The subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack on Vietnam were corollaries to these developments.

The more interesting and controversial part of the study is Wich's examination of signaling as a form of political communication. What is
meant by "signaling"? An example from Wich's analysis will serve to introduce this rather complex idea.

Response to the Czechoslovakian invasion from the socialist bloc was divided. Hanoi, Pyongyang, and Havana regarded the invasion as a justified intervention to squelch revisionist liberalization. Romania, Yugoslavia, and the French and Italian communist parties denounced the invasion. The Chinese had no love for the Dubcek leadership, but were even more repulsed by Soviet interventionist tactics. A Commentator article in the People's Daily on 23 August stated that the "Soviet revisionist renegade clique has long ago degenerated into a gang of social-imperialists," introducing the "social-imperialist" charge subsequently to play such an important role in Chinese rhetoric. August 23rd also happened to be Romanian National Day. Chou En-Lai took this occasion to deliver at the Romanian embassy a scathing denunciation of the Soviet invasion, clearly pointing out its potential implications for Romania. Chou delivered another address at the Vietnamese embassy on 2 September, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's anniversary. In this speech he declared that the Soviet leadership had "long since completely destroyed the socialist camp which once existed." The positive reaction of the Vietnamese to the Soviet intervention had been galling to the Chinese. Chou minced no words with his main message for Vietnamese ears: "It is high time that all those who cherish illusions about Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism woke up." The context of these speeches — the timing in the wake of the Czechoslovakian invasion, the differing responses to this event by Romania and Vietnam, the places and occasions of the speeches — all provide clues to the deeper meaning of the speeches, apart from their content per se. Based on a contextual analysis, Wich explicates the meaning as follows:

Thus, the operative meaning of Peking's statements about social-imperialism and the socialist camp was not to describe or report a state of affairs that had "long since" existed; rather it lay in the act of making these charges, and all that electing to do so implied. The Chinese were signaling something to come, not reporting what had already taken place, and they thereupon proceeded to act in significantly new and demonstrative ways.²

From content analysis alone, the meaning of the Chinese statements would appear to have to do with a Chinese analysis of past Soviet behavior. Using contextual analysis, Wich indicates that something much more may be learned about the direction of Chinese behavior and its implications for change in the international system. Wich then applies the

2. Ibid., p. 62.
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concept of signaling as a form of political communication to the 1969 border clashes, an analysis which constitutes the major part of the book.

*Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics* presents a point of view regarding the outcome of the 1969 border clashes fundamentally different from the point of view presented in earlier American accounts by such analysts as Robinson, Ginsburgs, and Hinton. These earlier accounts basically concur with the Soviet version of victory and subsequent control of Chenpao/Damansky Island in the Ussuri River. Since 1973 the opposing Chinese version of Chinese victory and subsequent control has had a proponent on the British side in Neville Maxwell, who made a visit to the island in the summer of 1973. Wich seems to be the first American writer to take the Chinese account seriously. In fact, he seems to take for granted in his Concluding Propositions the version of post-clash Chinese control. Despite the casual appearance of this assumption, it strikes me as an important turn in the literature on the 1969 clashes at Chenpao/Damansky.

Regardless of the outcome of the clashes, Wich declares that it was the Chinese who wished to make a political issue of the tensions as a warning signal to the Soviets that there could no longer be a socialist camp. Following the 2 March clash, it was officially reported in China that 250 million people by 7 March and 400 million people by 12 March had demonstrated against the Soviet Union in response to the conflict. Moscow began to hint that it was perceiving “geologic changes” by referring to China as a “force hostile to socialist countries.”

Wich carries on a detailed analysis of the signaling process as it developed in the aftermath of the 1969 Chenpao/Damansky clashes, through the events of the Ninth CCP Congress in April, the Moscow International Party Conference in June, and the events of the summer of 1969. The most interesting and detailed of these analyses involves the Moscow Conference.

A number of signals of Sino-Soviet hostility appeared before the Moscow Conference, including the resurfacing of Wang Ming, Mao’s old opponent from the 1930s, who spoke virulently against the Cultural Revolution. A *Kommunist* article stated that “Marxist-Leninists must not relax in their efforts in the struggle against the theory and practice of bellicose Maoism.” The Soviets were relatively successful in maintaining the appearance that the communist mainstream still flowed through Moscow by attracting representatives of seventy-five parties, down only six from the attendance figure at the 1960 Conference. At the 1969 Conference fifty of the parties engaged in anti-Chinese polemic, a


satisfaction to the Soviet party. By comparison, the Czechoslovakian issue was virtually submerged. The opposition to this anti-China clamor was led by Romania's Ceaucescu, giving Romania leverage at the Conference out of proportion to its geopolitical weight. In spite of the opposition voices, Brezhnev was able to report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the Conference was a successful demonstration of socialist solidarity: "The exchange of opinions at the conference convincingly showed that the foreign policy line of the present leadership of the CCP and its splitting policy are encountering a resolute rebuff from the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties." This strong signal by Moscow of its determination to maintain control of the political center of gravity of the communist world provided the setting for the further border clashes which marked the summer of 1969, as China continued to communicate through the mechanism of border conflict signals that it was equally determined to follow its own path.

Wich's work is an important contribution to the study of political communication (especially esoteric communication) in the international political arena. He avoids the simplistic "watch what we do not what we say" type of analysis by suggesting something more like "watch what we do and say in the context of our conception of political reality." Contextual analysis does not serve as a replacement for content analysis, but operates as a higher grade analysis that presumes adequate content analysis.

Wich's study is an illuminating in-depth analysis of a particular case: Sino-Soviet border crisis politics. Wich admits that, although his is a retrospective study, the purpose of contextual analysis is to monitor political communications for early warning signals of political change. Since it is a retrospective study, it begs the question of how effective the analytical tool that he has devised is for forecasting purposes. Hindsight is clearly easier than foresight. He does succeed, however, in his stated goal of heightening appreciation of the dynamics of the signaling process. The task of applying contextual analysis in order to apprehend the early warning signals of political change may now be taken up by other analysts.

As a theoretical work, the book is more suggestive than systematic. There is little effort to place the work within a framework of communications theory other than a brief reference to J. L. Austin's concept of "performatives." Wich's own formulations in the section "Methodological Premises" in the Introduction and in his Concluding Propositions section provide the main theoretical clarifications. One must appreciate that these few pages do not obfuscate the central thrust of his case

5. Ibid., p. 282.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
analysis. However, if one looks at the work as the type of study serving to justify similar studies, further theoretical elaboration would seem to be in order.


Reviewed by Daniel A. Metraux*

The United States entered the Pacific War in 1941 with the goal of severely punishing Japan for its aggression and to destroy forever its capacity to make war and threaten American security. Following Japan's unconditional surrender in August 1945, however, Americans went to Japan as builders who wanted to encourage the development of a democratic and peace-loving Japan. For the next eighty months the United States introduced a variety of social, economic, and political reforms which were to have a profound effect on Japanese society, the political future of East Asia, and the special bond that developed between Japan and the United States over the next four decades.

Historians began to seriously study the Occupation only in the very late 1970s. Currently, several scholars are conducting extensive research projects on this period, and recent conferences on the Occupation have attracted numerous papers from a wide range of scholars. John Curtis Perry's Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan is a skillful synthesis of the recent research on this subject, and the author is the first to attempt a comprehensive study of the role Americans played in the reconstruction of Japan.1 Perry has cast the best of scholarly research in an entertaining style which both pleases and instructs.

Perry's stated focus is "less on what the occupiers did to Japan than on what the experience meant to those individual Americans most intimately involved with it — and to their nation."2 American forces arrived in Japan not knowing what to expect, but they were determined to avoid

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1. Kazuo Kawai's Japan's American Interlude (1960) is the most complete study of the Occupation to date, but it is already very dated. Among the more specialized works to focus upon the Occupation period is Ronald Dore's Land Reform in Japan (1958).

2. Perry, Beneath the Eagle's Wings, p. xvi.
the mistakes of past military occupations elsewhere. The desire to punish was soon replaced by the wish to help construct a new Japan. Japan became a ‘great laboratory’ where an endless stream of economic, political and social reforms was implemented. A new constitution went into force, and American land, educational, legal, and financial reforms were adopted. Perry points out that many of these reforms — most significantly a constitutional provision renouncing the right to go to war and the establishment of equal rights for women — were quite radical even by American standards.

Perry stresses that the Occupation was a joint enterprise, the success of which depended upon the close cooperation of both parties. Many of the reforms ultimately failed, but Perry insists that the Occupation itself succeeded because Americans were magnanimous winners and the Japanese cheerful and acquiescent losers. American ethnocentrism and ignorance caused some problems which were fortunately overcome by Japanese recognition of the good intentions and sincerity of the Americans. The Japanese agreed to pursue American objectives and in general made an honest effort to make the reform measures work, while Americans at times made important compromises to meet Japanese sensibilities.

This degree of cooperation is especially notable in the area of educational reform, where no more than two dozen Americans were responsible for the implementation of sweeping changes in Japan’s educational system that affected one million teachers and eighteen million students. Faithful Japanese compliance was necessary and was received. On the other hand, when the Japanese vigorously protested attempts to romanize their writing system, Americans graciously withdrew this proposal.

Perry discusses the merits of each major reform, but his main concern is with the Americans who tried to implement them. Their successes and failures, personal frustrations and small triumphs are handled in depth. There is a fascinating chapter on General Douglas MacArthur’s crucial role in the Occupation, but the most interesting chapters are those that detail the experiences of the two million American soldiers and civilian personnel who spent from a few days to several years in Japan.

Perry describes how Americans arrived in Japan fearing for their lives. “At best the Americans anticipated sullen noncooperation or widespread bitterness, possibly erupting in periodic riots . . . Sidearms were standard equipment for everyone during the first anxious weeks.”3 Within several weeks of their arrival, however, Americans began to interact in a friendly fashion with many Japanese. At times “the ice was broken by children — runny-nosed

3. Ibid., p. 8.
and obviously undernourished, solemn but quick to smile, uninhibited. A marine lieutenant in the first boat to land at Sasebo, site of one of Japan's largest naval bases, remembers his men fingering their weapons apprehensively, talking as they went in, 'All I want is to kill me a goddam Jap.' Ten minutes after arriving on shore, the Marines were giving chocolate bars to children."

Not all encounters between Americans and Japanese were as cheerful. There were many difficult moments and harsh memories, including those of a Marine general who remarked that he had "dedicated too many Marine cemeteries to be really friendly with the Japanese people." In the long run, however, many Americans developed close relationships with the Japanese and left with a deeper appreciation of Japanese culture.

While Perry succeeds in his endeavor to chronicle the American experience, his view of the Japanese is shallow. His portrait of Japan from a Japanese point of view is not terribly convincing, which robs his work of the balance one might expect. This shortcoming is reflected in his almost total reliance on Western sources. Perry also fails to provide an analysis of the long-term implications of the American reforms for Japanese society. Some discussion of the vast changes that occurred in the social and political structure of Japan would have given the book added depth. Perry does comment on the long-term significance of such specific developments as land reform and the Shoup mission, but, for example, he fails to provide a persuasive argument to support his contention that Japanese society became far more democratic after the Occupation than before.

These criticisms, however, are not meant to imply that there is anything fundamentally wrong with what is really a very good book. Perry, who is currently Visiting Professor of Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Tufts University and is associated with Harvard's Japan Institute, is a careful historian who has produced a useful and interesting study which should be read extensively by the general public. He writes in a clear and incisive manner that makes his work exciting to read. His skillful writing and analytical abilities bring the subject to life. Numerous excellent photographs add to the value of this work. Others have written straightforward accounts of the Occupation, but few have paid as much attention to the role of Americans there and the profound effect the experience had on them.

4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 182.