

Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a New European Order

Edited by Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielonka

Brookfield, Vt.: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1990, 226 pp., including index, \$49.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Janusz Bugajski

After the dissolution of Communist rule, Eastern Europe¹ entered a critical transitional period of political, social, and economic turbulence. Each newly elected government in the region has grappled with the negative legacies of communism, striving for democratic integration and economic productivity while trying to preserve national stability. The collection of essays in *Restructuring Eastern Europe*, edited by Hill and Zielonka, addresses some of these issues. Assembled shortly after the 1989 revolutions, the book demonstrates that any assessment of restructuring in Europe East must take full account of four key dimensions: political development, economic reform, inter-ethnic relations, and international conditions.

The variety of historical traditions in Europe East has reinforced the diversity of political developments during the democratic transition. This has been evident in the degree of governmental stability, the identity of competing parties, the institutionalization of democratic competition, the breadth of reform in the legal system, the depoliticization of the police and military, the elimination of censorship, the involvement of the citizenry in politics, and the legitimacy of new administrations. Clearly some states have moved faster than others on the political front, though each country has held free general elections during the past year.

The Balkan countries have remained at the rear of the democratization process, although pluralism has taken firm root and the Communists are unlikely to stage any dramatic comeback. The dislodging of Communist party controls from each important institution, particularly at local levels, has proved to be a slower and more laborious process in Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania than in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.² Yugoslavia falls somewhere in between, as the differing pace of

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1. This author feels that the current semantic controversy, in which "Eastern Europe" is laden with negative historical and political connotations, could be alleviated by a new term which simply denotes a rough geographical area: "Europe East."
2. For an optimistic account of political change in Eastern Europe see Giuseppe Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1991).

democratic progress among the six constituent republics could contribute to the federation's dissolution.

Power struggles continue both inside and outside of new political structures, taking place either within the formerly dissident elite (as in Poland's fracturing Solidarity), or between the former dissidents and the ex-Communist reformers (seen in Romania's persistent street conflicts). These battles—only partially ideological and programmatic—often result from personal ambitions and interpersonal animosities. Analysts must look beyond theories of democratic transformation and post-totalitarianism, and dig into the biographies of leading political actors. Only then can they decipher why some former dissidents are now accused of crypto-communism by their political rivals, while others are tainted with national chauvinism.

Given these complications, Zielonka's essay on the "assertion of democratic movements" is somewhat misleading. He oversimplifies the division between "occidentalists," who purportedly seek a liberal democracy, and "populists" who are intolerant nationalists. He then proceeds to apply this artificial rubric to the intricacies of post-Communist politics in Europe East. The western media have adopted this formula during the past year, ignoring balance, evidence, and motive. For example, the accusations that Poland's Lech Walesa has strong dictatorial and populist tendencies originates among one Polish political faction which has spent over a decade skillfully cultivating contacts with the western media. Western commentators generally failed to consider that Walesa's strategy was aimed at speeding up the reform process, or that fears of a new political monopoly and growing public disquiet motivated his actions.³

Power struggles may be healthy if they do not imperil the progress of democracy. Competition and even a modest degree of instability may reflect positively on the durability of the post-totalitarian systems. But, as Hill and Zielonka clearly underscore, activists in all parties need to understand that politics is the art of optimal compromise, self-restraint, tolerance, and respect for differences of opinion and approach. It is not, as the Communists indoctrinated the population to believe, a life-and-death struggle for pre-eminence in which opponents are branded as enemies and outcasts. Liberal principles must become as firmly grounded in the psyches of the new politicians as the democratic institutions are embedded in the body of the state, if genuine democracies are to function properly in Europe East.

The pace of economic reform and marketization has also varied significantly throughout Europe East, as shown in a valuable essay by Pekka Sutela. Next to Hungary's program of economic decentralization since the late 1960s, Poland made the first and most profound commitment to dismantling the state-run system. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have trailed somewhat behind, apparently searching for a milder transition, often dubbed as "capitalism with

3. For an assessment of the fracturing of Solidarity see Janusz Bugajski, "Solidarity at the Crossroads," *The World and I* Vol. 5, No. 9 (September 1990).

a human face." But earlier this year, both Budapest and Prague took bold steps to privatize their economies, having realized that half-measures simply prolong the agony of reform. By contrast, the Balkan countries until very recently have proceeded with extreme lethargy toward marketization. They remain hamstrung by the pervasive Communist apparatus, and by the more serious manifestations of political instability which have accompanied the post-Communist transition. Hill and Zielonka's volume indicates that the road to capitalism throughout the region will remain bumpy, and sometimes even meandering; but unlike the "road to socialism," it is the only viable direction for all the European states.

A key economic objective in each country is the creation of a sizeable middle class of productive and imaginative entrepreneurs. Compared to the western states, Europe East started off at a severe historical disadvantage. Centuries of foreign domination and economic underdevelopment were compounded by the deliberate thwarting of private enterprise by decades of Communist central planning. Destroying capitalism certainly proved to be an easier proposition than restoring it. Essential preconditions must now be met for private businesses to flourish, including appropriate legislation, credit availability, tax relief, governmental support, and infrastructural development. Only then can one safely quip that socialism was simply a transitional stage between capitalism and capitalism.

Europe East remains top heavy with intellectuals, some of whom apparently continue to fear western-type political and economic competition in case this jeopardizes the high positions they attained during the revolutions. The umbrella movements which assumed power in Poland and Czechoslovakia have been valuable as united fronts against communism, but some observers argue that they may also be impediments to pluralism, competition, and economic reform. For example, Vaclav Havel's Civic Forum has come under fire for wasting a year by failing to realize far-reaching economic reforms and for eroding a wide reservoir of public confidence.⁴ Even the more ambitious Mazowiecki government in Poland was reproached for moving too slowly with privatization and for not decisively discarding the old Communist *nomenklatura*.

The honeymoon clearly has ended since Hill and Zielonka completed this volume, and all the new governments must implement tough economic policies. Long-term economic success in constructing workable market economies will not imbue any administration with short-term popularity. It may even result in some instability, as sectors of the population remain prone to populist rhetoric and millenarian appeals. This danger may be termed the "Tyminski phenomenon" in reference to Poland's recent presidential elections, when a virtually unknown émigré businessman promised national prosperity without

4. According to public opinion polls released in Prague in late 1990, the overwhelming majority of Czech and Slovak respondents felt that more should have been achieved by the government after the November revolution. The poll was conducted by the Group for Independent Sociological Analysis and was announced on Radio Prague on 8 October 1990.

presenting a viable economic package. Unfortunately, Tyminski defeated the more pragmatic Prime Minister Mazowiecki in the first ballot. Each administration must weather the social storms which accompany the return of capitalism, while at the same time satisfying western creditors and encouraging foreign investors. Likewise, they must paint some picture of the future which neither promises unreachable gains nor bogs down the citizenry in gloom and doom.

Unfortunately, Hill and Zielonka only briefly examine the cultural, religious, and ethnic tensions which will preoccupy some states in addition to the uncertainties of political and economic transition. In the post-Communist and post-Soviet era, nationalism has resurfaced with a vengeance despite claims that inter-ethnic antagonisms had been solved by "scientific socialism." Nationalism has been dismissed out of hand as "reactionary" by liberals and Communists alike; in fact, nationalism can be either constructive or detrimental, depending on its content, context, expression, and objective. It is equally unfair to distinguish between East and West in their encounters with nationalism. Apart from brief periods of occupation—for example by Nazi Germany—Western European nations have been able to develop and express their cultural identities freely. This luxury enabled them to achieve self-confidence sufficient to dispel nagging domestic fears over surrendering national sovereignty to pan-European institutions. By contrast, most of Europe East has only experienced sporadic periods of independence during centuries of foreign occupation which stifled national identities and threatened cultures and languages with extinction. In the past half century, the region also bore the brunt of two variants of totalitarianism which sought to terminate national differences by force or manipulation. Not surprisingly, the current nationalist resurgence is as much an assertion of pride and self-respect as it is a restoration of self-determination and independence.

However, in the ethnic mosaic of Europe East, national self-assertion can easily lead to inter-ethnic competition and conflict. States such as Poland and Hungary seem to have a head start in resolving some of these cleavages, primarily because they are more ethnically homogeneous entities. But in multinational countries such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, cultural, linguistic, religious, and regional differences will continue to fan friction, particularly if economic conditions markedly deteriorate and political decentralization fails to satisfy the republics. Moreover, Romania and Bulgaria define themselves as mono-ethnic states even though both contain large and vibrant minorities aspiring to their own cultural and political identities. These built-in contradictions and the potential for state repression will spark controversies and ignite conflicts even as democracy takes root.

Developments in Europe East also bring into focus unresolved questions about multi-ethnic conflicts for which international institutions seem to have no panacea. A central problem focuses on the distinction, and sometimes the contradiction, between individual civil rights and collective national rights within any single state structure. Not all governments, which may increasingly guarantee the sanctity of the former, will necessarily recognize any deep

commitments to the latter. Government officials and political activists from assorted parties may fear that bestowing privileges and special benefits on local minorities may actually aggravate inter-ethnic relations. They might argue that such policies will breed resentment among the majority population, while arousing unacceptable aspirations for territorial autonomy and separatism among the minorities. As Hill and Zielonka point out, the tyranny of the Communist minority may in such cases give way to the tyranny of the nationalist majority.

Problems seemed simpler in a divided Europe. The collapse of the last Eurasian empire has set in motion unpredictable forces as the newly independent states of Europe East formulate their own foreign policies and security alignments. The cold war in Europe only provided an artificial and increasingly untenable stability, while a fully free "Greater Europe" will present a formidable challenge for each government and for all existing supranational institutions. As each state attempts to establish beneficial bilateral and regional relations, some could find themselves facing distinct disadvantages stemming from unresolved territorial, minority, and economic disputes with their neighbors. Their grievances may garner little international support and might even encounter pronounced international disfavor. Indeed, ostracism from pan-European institutions may be an effective method for applying pressure on repressive or chauvinistic governments to abide by accepted international norms.

The development of numerous integrative institutions will be crucial on all international levels—cultural, economic, political, and military. Overlapping regional and sub-regional organizations (whether Baltic, Carpathian, Danubian, Pentagonal, Alpine, Central European, Balkan, or Black Sea) could become the best guarantee of stability and conflict resolution on the continent. In fact, the more such networks any state can encompass the better; it will then be involved in ties and obligations which will mitigate against both isolationism and expansionism. And of course, despite the creeping counter-revolution now underway in the Soviet Union, Europe will not be totally "whole and free" until all the captive nations in the USSR can determine their own political destiny and join the pan-European institutions as equal partners.

On the surface, there appears to be a fundamental contradiction between developments in Eastern and Western Europe. The EC countries are preparing to surrender substantial economic autonomy and a good measure of political sovereignty after 1992, while the nations of the former Soviet bloc seem to be moving in the opposite direction. In practice, as Egbert Jahn points out in the concluding essay, the processes are not necessarily contradictory. The political order of the future will neither be a European government of united statelets, nor a division into exclusivist and fully sovereign units. Instead, demands for national, regional, and local self-determination in an interdependent world economy will simultaneously generate political decentralization and economic integration. In the long run, Europe East cannot escape this process.

Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights

By Hurst Hannum

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, 503 pp., with bibliography and index, \$44.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Benedict Kingsbury

The relationship between states and ethnic or other non-state groups has been a source of vexing problems in the modern international system. Many dimensions of the issue have been studied, most frequently with emphasis on ethnic, religious, linguistic, and national conflict, or at least on conflicting and apparently irreconcilable claims involving such groups. Hurst Hannum's stimulating new book, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*, is refreshing in that it devotes considerable attention to an analysis of possible solutions.

Hannum adumbrates his central legal theme in the study's conclusion:

A new principle of international law can be discerned in the interstices of contemporary definitions of sovereignty, self-determination, and the human rights of individuals and groups, which will support creative attempts to deal with conflicts over minority and majority rights before they escalate into civil war and demands for secession. This right to autonomy recognizes the right of minority and indigenous communities to exercise meaningful internal self-determination and control over their own affairs in a manner that is not inconsistent with the ultimate sovereignty—as that term is properly understood—of the state (pp. 473–74).

While in this passage Hannum describes "autonomy" as both a "principle" and a "right" in international law, his concern in the present work is not to make a closely-argued juridical case for such characterizations. Rather, his intention is to place his conception of group "autonomy" within the range (or continuum) of individual and group rights presently recognized or sought after in international law. In addition, he demonstrates the strengths, weaknesses, and factual circumstances of many empirical autonomy regimes. In this he makes a notable and very welcome contribution to the surprisingly sparse literature on the subject.

The core of the book, and one of its particular strengths, is a series of case studies from over twenty countries or regions, in which Hannum presents the demands by minorities or regional groups for various forms of autonomy, and

examines state responses to these demands. The author devotes extended treatment to the situations of the Sikhs in North India, the Kurds (in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran), the Saami (or Lapps, of Norway, Finland, and Sweden), as well as the peoples of Hong Kong, the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Each account is well-informed, sensitive, and (as far as a non-specialist can judge) accurate as to the relevant juridical provisions. These nine studies are strikingly useful summaries for those interested in the particular cases or in general issues, and include extensive footnotes with references for further reading. The case studies are presented in a standard format which facilitates comparisons and easy reference.

That seven of the nine major case studies (the Saami and Hong Kong are the exceptions) have been marked by large scale violence or terrorism is acute testimony to the centrality of the subject. While Hannum does point out that more prompt and sagacious implementation of autonomy regimes might have avoided the degeneration into violence in some cases, he does not seek to pass "autonomy" off as a universal panacea, and he recognizes throughout that those claiming autonomy vis-à-vis the state are not *ipso facto* on the side of the angels. The recognition of the political significance—and in some cases of the partial or substantial legitimacy—of state positions provides an element of non-cynical realism not always found in works on human rights. While Hannum makes a case for progressive change, his argument is not that of the radical restructurer seeking to get a foot under the tent of the states-system in order to overturn it. Instead, he might be characterized as a Grotian, pursuing a *via media* between the radical global salvationists (Richard Falk has often been taken as an epitome of this group) and the more extreme practitioners of state-centered realpolitik.¹ Specifically, Hannum balances his philosophical commitment to the proposition that "there is nothing inherently desirable about compromise" (p. 12), with his advocacy of negotiation, flexibility, and accommodation of different interests in establishing autonomy arrangements.

Hannum is well known for his expertise in international human rights law, and his long-standing academic and practical involvement in this field is evident throughout the book. In Part One of his book he provides a valuable overview of the framework of sovereignty, statehood, self-determination, minority rights, indigenous rights, and human rights in international law. He addresses these topics as part of the matrix of relevant approaches and principles, rather than as particular heads of claim or causes of action.

Although Part One deals with general approaches rather than the details of the law and its specific application, a number of Hannum's particular points require comment. As to self-determination, his assertion that recognition of national liberation movements as international actors "is a political rather than a legal statement" (p. 23) goes too far, particularly in relation to the laws of

1. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977); and Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

war (the 1977 Geneva Protocols, for example) and the law of international organizations. Likewise, Hannum's sweeping proposition that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Northern Cameroons* case (1963) decided in effect that "the modalities of self-determination were essentially political questions within the purview of the General Assembly" (p. 45) is open to challenge, particularly in light of the unusual circumstances of that case, and of dicta in the *Western Sahara* case (1975).

Hannum's denial that international practice establishes any right to secession in any circumstances (p. 49) calls for an explanation of the case of Bangladesh, which one commentator has explained as a possible case of *carence de souveraineté*.² More generally, Hannum's very conservative treatment of the *internal* significance of self-determination may undervalue a possible buttress to his argument for a right to autonomy in international law. The potential normative contribution of state practice concerning sub-units of the Soviet Union, and the political changes in Eastern Europe, is considerable, and is already modestly evident in changing rhetoric on self-determination in the UN Human Rights Committee.

With regard to minority rights, Hannum correctly draws attention to the limited scope of the main general treaty provision on the subject, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Some additional illumination has since been provided by the final views of the UN Human Rights Committee in the Lubicon Lake Band case (1990). There the committee indicated that Canada's failure to ensure that the Band had the necessary land and resource base for community survival and for pursuit of fundamental cultural activities such as hunting and fishing could have been a violation of the Article 27 rights concerning culture, although it was held that Canada had already offered to provide an appropriate remedy. Other current initiatives within the United Nations to enhance standard setting and implementation in relation to minorities may eventually augment Article 27, and reduce the strains presently placed on that article by pressure for more expansive interpretation.

Hannum discusses standard setting in relation to indigenous peoples in a useful chapter on this subject. He endorses the view of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations that for the time being it remains possible to function without an accepted definition of "indigenous peoples," analogizing from the "meaningful contributions" (p. 91) made by the right of all peoples to self-determination, notwithstanding the United Nations' inability to adequately define "peoples" or "self-determination." Ellipsis, vagueness, and ambiguity may be optimal in exceptionally difficult situations, but Hannum himself recoils from the exaltation of form over substance which has ensued in the case of the right to self-determination due to lack of specificity as to the rightholders, the duty bearers, and the substance of the right (p. 75).³

2. See James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). Hannum does note the Bangladesh case on a slightly different point on p. 472.

3. On the "semantic blockage" between present formulations of the right of peoples to self-determination and

Whether very high standards of legal protection can be secured in the United Nations for indigenous and tribal peoples in the absence of a functional core definition remains to be seen.

The author's general theme in this work is "society's constant attempts to find an appropriate balance among the interlocking identities of the individual, the group, and the state" (p. 477). Inevitably, the author was constrained to focus on selected aspects of the theme, and this work pays more attention to the relations of group to state and of individual to state than to relations between the group and individuals. While autonomy may well enhance the protection of individual human rights and well-being, this is not necessarily so, and considerable care is required in balancing the interests and aspirations of the group with those of individual members and non-members.

One aspect of the issue of group-individual relations concerns the validity and desirability of "cultural relativism" in the interpretation of international and municipal human rights standards, a topic which has been insufficiently treated in the international law literature. Hannum espouses "tolerance and justice" as fundamental values (p. 477), but does not explicitly address the conundrum of whether he will tolerate intolerance, and if not, why not?⁴ Of at least equal interest is the problem of finding modalities for the satisfactory adjustment of relations between individuals, other sub-units, and groups, particularly in destabilizing contexts of external conflict or rapid cultural change.

Hannum develops earlier work⁵ in elaborating a very helpful list of basic issues addressed in autonomy regimes (pp. 458-68): language; education; access to governmental civil service; access to the police and security services, including the military services; access to social services; land and natural resources; and representative local government structures. In identifying discrete issues and technical means for their possible resolution, Hannum's study feeds into wider work on conflict studies, conflict management, and negotiation and dispute settlement, as well as work on ethnic conflict and human rights. This book will be a popular resource for graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses in several branches of the social sciences as well as in international law and international relations.

the right of states to territorial integrity see David Makinson, "Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a Logician," in *The Rights of Peoples*, ed. James Crawford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 69-92. This useful book appears to have been published too late to be taken into account in Hannum's study.

4. The general issue is discussed briefly at pp. 97-98. For a useful recent work on this issue see Alison Dundes Renteln, *International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990).
5. Including Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 74 (1980): 858.



The Nonsuperpowers and South Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy

By Richard J. Payne

Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990, 314 pp., with endnotes, bibliography, and index, \$39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by John W. Koehring

Significant and dramatic changes have taken place in South Africa in the last year, making it clear that it is not a question of whether apartheid will be abolished, but when and in what manner. The outcome is crucial, not only in terms of the future of race relations in South Africa, but also in terms of the enormous positive influence an intact and expanding South African economy could have on the Southern Africa region, and Africa as a whole.

Richard J. Payne's *The Nonsuperpowers and South Africa* addresses two issues surrounding these changes. First, Payne analyzes the impact of international sanctions on South Africa, and stresses the role of countries other than the United States in those measures. Second, he contends that the United States can and should play an important role in the creation of a post-apartheid South Africa.

While recent changes in South Africa cannot be attributed exclusively to the pressure of the international community opposing apartheid, Payne argues, they did not occur in a vacuum. They took place because of a web of factors, including: the growing costs, inefficiencies, and contradictions of apartheid itself; the perseverance of the black majority; white minority realism; the end of the cold war; increased pressure for pluralism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and less developed countries; and adjustments in world economic and political leadership.

The actions of the international community were not truly significant because of their ineffectiveness, inherent contradictions and inconsistencies, and weaknesses in leadership and coordination. As the most powerful and visible country opposing apartheid, one would have hoped that the United States could have provided the leadership and direction to make anti-apartheid measures more efficacious in collaboration with those countries most able to influence South Africa. That this wasn't the case is due mainly to the inordinate influence of cold war politics and the Soviet Union on US foreign policy, Payne contends. This has, *inter alia*, led to policies that make little sense in

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reality and a "unilateralist bias" (p. xv) that did not take into account the perceptions of what Payne calls the "nonsuperpowers."

Payne defines nonsuperpowers as states lacking the military power of the United States and the Soviet Union. As far as this book and South Africa are concerned, these are states which William Foltz, in his forward, describes as accounting

for the great majority of economic transactions with South Africa and the political attention paid to that country's affairs. These middle and lesser powers . . . form the greatest part of South Africa's relevant external environment and contain the majority of peoples and interests that would be affected by anything that happened in South Africa (p. x).

These countries are: Britain, West Germany, Japan, Israel, Scandinavia, Canada, and the Frontline States of Southern Africa. Payne believes that by concentrating on US actions, "one risks underestimating the durability of white rule and exaggerating American influence" (p. xviii). He contends that to understand how external pressure has not significantly (up to now), but could potentially, influence apartheid and facilitate a non-violent transition, one must analyze and take into account the interests and strategies of the nonsuperpowers.

Because the nonsuperpowers dominate South Africa's external environment, Payne considers each of them, the relationship between their conflicting internal and external interests, and their resultant policy toward South Africa. The analyses include sections on the political, economic, and strategic objectives of their foreign policy and how it is formed, including the influence of public opinion and other forces. In addition, Payne discusses ethnicity and foreign policy, and the role of historical, familial, and cultural ties with South Africa. Further, he addresses the specific economic interests these nations have with South Africa, and of course, their strategies for dealing with apartheid, including sanctions, economic growth, black empowerment, and policies directed toward the Frontline States.

What emerges from these analyses is how the maze of competing internal interests and policies of the nonsuperpowers, when taken as a group, often worked at cross purposes. Thus one country's sanctions are another's opportunity; or, at the very least, these measures are not sufficiently cohesive to realize their potential impact—notwithstanding a common abhorrence of apartheid.

The Frontline States present, perhaps, the most striking contradiction between political rhetoric against apartheid and the reality of interdependence in a region in which they "and South Africa are mutual hostages" (p. 7). Few would deny that "the Frontline States' economic and political destinies are inextricably intertwined with South Africa's" (p. 202). Comprehensive anti-apartheid measures against South Africa would have profound implications for the whole region and, in the case of air-tight economic sanctions, could actually work against two of the most promising non-violent measures, black

empowerment and the strengthening of the Frontline States through the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and other institutions. Regional interdependence is a reality which means that when push comes to shove, economic interests prevail over political considerations—in both directions.

T.B. Millar once said that “all foreign policy is an expression of the national interest.”¹ Payne’s analyses clearly suggest that it is a perception of national interests (whether in terms of economic issues, national defense, or other types of security, tempered by cultural, moral, and other competing considerations) that prevails in shaping policies toward South Africa. That the national interests of countries are different should not be surprising; nor should the fact that the differences lead to contradictions and inconsistencies which prevent anti-apartheid measures from achieving their purpose. Still, Payne’s analyses of nonsuperpower perceptions, interests, and policies are the best part of the book. Payne has provided extremely careful, thoughtful, and well documented insights into the factors which influence the formulation of foreign policy by these nations, which can be useful to anyone dealing with these countries, irrespective of their interest in South Africa. Payne also provides a commentary on basic guidelines for making sanctions work that is noteworthy (pp. 240–241), and the extensive endnotes provide an outstanding reference source.

Having undertaken the analyses of the nonsuperpowers, Payne asserts that the demise of the cold war presents the United States with an opportunity to retool its anti-apartheid policy, with an emphasis on non-violent strategies, to truly facilitate change in South Africa. Although Payne argues that South Africans themselves must provide the impetus for change in that country, he believes that the United States is in a unique position to provide leadership and exert influence by virtue of its progress with racial integration, notwithstanding continuing problems. Why the United States? Because, in his view,

the United States’ historical struggle with questions of race and ethnicity; its ability to deal effectively with diversity and the significant progress it has made in race relations; its deeply-rooted commitment to equality and human dignity as inalienable rights; its system of government which gives citizens a major role in the formulation of foreign policy through Congress; its definition of nationhood that is inclusive of race and ethnicity; and its economic and military power in the global system make it the logical choice for leading international efforts designed to effectuate change in South Africa (p. 237).

To do so, however, because of constraints imposed by domestic considerations and the different interests and policies of the nonsuperpowers, it is

1. T.B. Millar, *Australia's Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, Ltd., 1968), 40.

essential for US policymakers to understand those interests and strategies and take them into account in formulating effective policy. Payne offers ten suggestions: negotiate a unified US position between the branches of government; relate objectives to strategies; work with the allies, i.e., the nonsuperpowers; involve the Soviet Union; talk with the opposition (in South Africa); support regional development; encourage communication with South Africa; try to understand their perception of reality; stop funding UNITA in Angola; and support black empowerment.

The desire to see apartheid dismantled in a non-violent transition to a racially integrated—as well as politically and economically stable—South Africa is so compelling that one reads this book with the expectation that the keystone is there, and within reach. It isn't. Instead, Payne reminds us that Southern Africa is a very complex region, clears away several myths which inhibit an objective, rational approach to the problem, and provides an insightful basis for understanding better the factors which should be taken into account if change is to be usefully facilitated by international anti-apartheid measures.

While one can agree that the demise of the cold war presages changed circumstances and ought to afford an opportunity, the naiveté of the notion that it will be seized is disappointing in the extreme. There seems to be an assumption that the demise of the cold war will create a vacuum in the agenda of the United States and others, and that South Africa will fill that vacuum as a foreign policy issue of paramount importance. The reality is that, short of a turn of events of sufficient magnitude (and I can't imagine what that could be), South Africa and apartheid, however loathsome, cannot compete with Eastern Europe, the restructuring of the Soviet Union, and the Middle East in the wake of the recent Gulf War, to name just a few.

Payne's suggestions to the United States are eminently sensible, almost self-evident, and, for that reason, are not so remarkable. In fact, America has been and is pursuing a number of them—so they are not new, but perhaps better ordered. For example, the United States has contributed to regional development (the United States was instrumental in the conceptual structure and creation of SADCC), black empowerment (USAID has had a program in South Africa for a number of years), and other anti-apartheid efforts. The tough tasks, however, such as negotiating a unified US position and cutting aid to UNITA, would require a level of effort and attention that could only be realized if something propelled South Africa to the top of the foreign policy agenda. That is not the case at present, nor is there any evidence that it is likely to occur in the near future.

Although Richard Payne's perceived opportunity for retooling anti-apartheid strategies is not likely to be taken up as he would wish, those who deal with South Africa would be well advised to heed his insights and suggestions for facilitating South Africa's irreversible path to change. Payne is optimistic about this process: he writes that "it is still possible for South Africans to transform their country into a relatively egalitarian society without experienc-

ing widespread violence and bloodshed" (p. xvi). Both South Africans and those who would facilitate that country's transformation would be wise to bear in mind Plutarch's observation that "perseverance is more prevailing than violence; and many things which cannot be overcome when they are together, yield themselves when taken little by little."²

2. Plutarch, *Lives* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), Sartorius, Section 16.



Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society

By Robert Inglehart

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990, 484 pp., with appendices and index, \$16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Kleopatra Kolokytha

In both science and art, a book's subject matter and its methodology are often more important than its relative merits and demerits—and nothing is more important than its timing. Whether or not a political science study will ignite late-night debates, be cited by fellow social scientists, and taught to future undergraduates depends far less on the scientific rigor employed in the author's quest for data or his depth of analysis, than on his ability to tap social assumptions and anxieties and mirror an epoch.

Contemporary social science is engaged in a fierce debate of which *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* is very much a part, albeit indirectly: the Washington-meets-Hegel, alias "The End of History," debate.¹ This reflects a concern that is part fiction, part fact: fiction, because there seems to be such a thing as a *fin-de-siècle* syndrome to which we have fallen victim; fact, because we need to take stock of the structure and contents of our collective mind, to do some spring cleaning and throw away the notions that no longer seem operative. We must consider what conceptual frameworks—what "isms"—are left to discover, while being terribly afraid that there are none left. Indeed, we are facing a transitional period, a rather confused and confusing state where many of our past systems of reference are no longer applicable, and new ones have not yet crystallized.

This situation is best reflected in the debate over Fukuyama's thesis of the loss of History. But what Fukuyama should really be mourning is the loss of an approach to history and consequently to the world; the Hegelian method is not appropriate, for Hegel can and has been read as defining a process rather than predicting an end. Marxism, however, with its methodological tools, its notions of class, state, and power, has been internalized by Marxists and non-Marxists alike to such an extent that separation from this ideology is not without its traumas. Evidence of this loss does not appear in the collapse of Eastern European regimes, although apparently Washington intellectuals only noticed it during the collapse of Eastern European communism. Instead, Marxian sociology fails to account for the very phenomenon that Inglehart's

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1. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989: 3–18.

book addresses: the rise of a "New Class" and the receding importance of economic determinants in political behavior.

In *Culture Shift*, Ronald Inglehart argues that "advanced industrial societies are undergoing a gradual shift from emphasis on economic and physical security above all, toward greater emphasis on belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life. This shift can be traced to the unprecedented levels of economic and physical security that have generally prevailed in these countries since World War II, and to the emergence of the welfare state" (p. 11). This shift toward "Postmaterialistic values," initially manifested in the student protest movements of the 1960s, is the product of intergenerational change. If the older intellectual class ages and is repopulated by a new generation that enjoys more educational and economic advantages, future politics will be shaped according to their postmaterialism. The author provides an impressive bulk of data drawn primarily from surveys measuring public attitudes, values, and behavior in twelve European countries in order to substantiate a series of propositions that range from the self-evident to the debatable.

Inglehart starts and finishes his argument by emphasizing the importance of cultural factors, as opposed to economic variables. This emphasis is intended to prove his hypothesis that the decline in "Materialistic" and the rise of "Postmaterialistic" values will render obsolete such univariate political models as the Marxist. "Economic factors," he says, "tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree" (p. 248). This does not mean that economic development leads to the "politics of consensus in an age of affluence," as the End of Ideology school proposed. Rather, as economic cleavages become less intense, other types of conflict will arise.

The case for the decline of class-based voting is convincing, as is the growing salience of Postmaterialistic political issues—environmentalist, anti-nuclear, and anti-war movements. This is plainly evidenced by the growth of ecological parties in Western Europe. It is also obvious that the mainstream parties that position themselves on the Left-Right axis—mostly the Communist parties with their working class cult—have not incorporated into their platforms the Postmaterialist agenda and cannot do so without fundamentally changing the nature of their ideological orientation. It is hard to imagine that this would be politically marketable on a large level. Regarding the recent emergence of Western European extreme right parties, Inglehart is ambivalent about their placement on the classic Left-Right axis. Nevertheless, he insightfully remarks that the presence of parties of both the ecologists and the extreme right profoundly destabilizes the traditional party system, as the former cannot be located on a Left-Right axis.

What is far less obvious is the impact these value changes will have on political structures and institutions. We shall not dispute the emergence of a young, well-educated, privileged, "New Class"; this is hardly a novel discovery.² The same applies to the expected instrumentality of this new elite in the

2. See Robert L. Bartley et al., *The New Class* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979).

future political systems by virtue of their presence in the “knowledge industries” and the manager-reliant business sectors.³ However, the effects of the Postmaterialist penetration of elite groups cannot be measured yet, as Inglehart’s reasoning requires a leap of faith that not everybody is prepared to take.

The reason for this misgiving stems not so much from questioning the motives for the New Class’s liberal attitudes and its actual conduct when it becomes part of the power bloc, but rather from a failure of Inglehart’s model to account for the role of other non-party political institutions.

This omission presents no major surprise if one considers the antecedents of the *Culture Shift* argument. By virtue of his assumptions and methodologies, Inglehart very clearly has an eclectic approach, which includes elements of liberal pluralism, behaviorism, and functionalism as developed by Seymour Lipset and Robert Dahl or Gabriel Almond and David Easton. The author explicitly acknowledges this tradition.

Yet for all their merits, the pluralist and the functionalist arguments failed to address structural power inequalities as well as the role of the State as an active participant in the political process. Proponents of the democratic pluralism theory view political outcomes as the result of fair play among equals in the political arena, while functionalists present the State as a “black box” where political inputs—values, motivations, resources, and demands—enter and are distilled into political outputs.

The revival of Marxism in the late 1960s and early 1970s occurred to a large extent as a response to the pluralists’ failure to treat institutionalized power. The “Theory of the State” debate that stemmed from it introduced the concept of the “relative autonomy of the State” in an effort to interpret the function of the Welfare State while subsequent efforts examined the nature and the extent of the State’s involvement in the political process.⁴

By neglecting the role of the State, Inglehart not only invites criticism by State theorists, he also weakens his argument. He posits that the role of the State presents a conceptual problem for the Postmaterialists. They, far more than the traditional Left, regard the State as an agent of oppression and exploitation while being aware that redistributionist policies cannot be carried out without State intervention (p. 304). Inglehart behaves like the Postmaterialists he describes: he knows that the State is necessarily part of the picture, but he does not wish to address it.

One might be convinced that the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy will replace that of Left and Right. The problem is that Left and Right divisions can indeed be seen as anachronistic categories, while the State cannot be regarded in that way. In terms of scope and complexity, we have not yet managed to find a framework that we can put forth as Marxism’s successor. Or perhaps I am being overly nostalgic.

3. See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973); and Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969).

4. See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Skocpol, et al., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Between Qur'an and Crown: The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Arab World

By Tamara Sonn

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 266 pp., with index, \$42.50 cloth.

Reviewed by Jonathan Potter

The recent crisis in the Persian Gulf has spawned much talk of artificially-created borders, of the Arab nation, of Islam as a political catalyst or expedient, and of Western hegemony—issues which all figure prominently in Tamara Sonn's *Between Qur'an and Crown*. As a result, Sonn should add a further chapter to her book once the political reverberations from the current US and UN involvement in the Gulf are more easily discerned.

Sonn writes of the Arab nation and of Islam, as well as emphasizing the insidious influence of foreign powers on Arab affairs. Indeed, as creators of the mainstream Arab polities of which she mostly writes (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and to a lesser degree Lebanon, Jordan, and Occupied Palestine), the European powers earn a place among the players and philosophies ranged by Sonn between Qur'an and Crown. This is because Sonn's book is not just about the relative importance of religious and political practices and moralities; geopolitics is an inevitable intrusion. Indeed the geopolitics of states sharing a religion is the catalyst for her book. Early Islam recognized only one state per religion; how, and indeed whether, individual Islamic polities have managed and meddled philosophically and politically with this dilemma is the book's beginning, end, and all-in-between.

For Western (European) reference, the book contains a summary of European religio-political evolution from Constantine to Rousseau. Similarly, Sonn rapidly recapitulates early Islamic politics, then sweeps more slowly through the periods of the Ummayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman Caliphates, then covers the seminal Muslim philosophers of the last 150 years and the emergence of Arab states and the politics, national and international, of the modern Arab states.

The underlying theme is the source of legitimacy in rule (thus the book's subtitle). Seymour Lipset's definition of legitimacy is as apposite in the Islamic context as in others: legitimacy is the "capacity of a system to engineer and manipulate a belief that existing power institutions are appropriate."¹ Sonn's study correctly lays the emphasis on the leaders', rather than the people's, capacity to influence events and to engineer justifications.

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1. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 77.

In her discussion of the evolution of European states, Sonn stresses the role played by Western secularism in safeguarding the purity of a religion by entrusting it to the people and not the leaders. Calvin and Luther wished for—and encouraged—political legitimacy on grounds other than observation of or justification by religion. In the contemporary Arab world, however, “virtually all leaders rely on Islamic sentiment for what popular support they have.” This is simply because they lack “clearly defined criteria for state legitimacy” (p. 199).

Paradoxically, the criteria Sonn refers to are Islamic, and the historical run-through emphasizes the discussions and dilemmas associated with the practicality of a plurality of Islamic states. The early Ummayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, as much as the Ottoman, suffered from fragmentation. While the religious power understood by traditional Islam rested in Damascus, Baghdad, and Istanbul, political power was frequently dispersed around the empire: Buyyids in tenth century Persia, the Ottomans themselves on the borders of the West in the fourteenth century, Muhammed Ali in Egypt from 1805 onwards, and many more.

As early as the fourteenth century, one thinker, Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), wrote of the distinction which needed to be made between religious and political unity. He died in prison for proposing that “the basis of Islamic unity lay in adherence to Islamic law, not subservience to a single master” (p. 59). In Ibn Taymiyya, Sonn finds the philosophical justification for the later Wahhabi State in the Arabian peninsula, as well as for Egyptian and Syrian nationalism.

Egypt and Syria, as modern states, owe their existence in no small degree to the fragmentation already noted. Sonn traces the origins of an Egyptian nationalism in the late nineteenth century from the belief in the tyranny of the Ottoman Caliphate. The political parties which arose, such as Hizb al-Umma, were paralleled in Syria. Egypt was not considered Arab until this century, she stresses, and thus Egyptian parties and thinkers talked of Egyptians while Syrians talked of Arabs and called for Arab unity. For neither movement was religion a prime concern: Copts were Egyptian, Nestorians and Jews were equal to Arabs.

In the early twentieth Century, the Sharif of Mecca became the alternative to Istanbul as a religious fulcrum because he was an Arab: he was

neither Egyptian nor Syrian nor Iraqi. His leadership was a function of Islamic identity. Only someone of such authority could command the respect of the populace and lead them . . . against the institutionalised religio-political authority. Only a religiously authorised spokesman could lead the people against the old religious order into a new political form, giving assurance that the cherished religious values would be retained in the process. As it had been in Europe, the progression from religio-political authority to secular democracy was a natural corollary to the process of evolving geographically limited states out of a potentially universal empire.

Throughout the process, the values of freedom, equality and justice remained constant. Therefore for Shariff [sic] Hussein to lead the movement for Syrian, Iraqi and even Egyptian independence was natural (p. 111).

The movement failed, and the progression was interrupted by the European involvement in the creation of the modern Arab states after World War I. Only Sa'udi Arabia, carved out and politically integrated by an indigenous leader replacing tribal solidarity with Wahhabi solidarity, "[combines] religious legitimacy with territorial limitation" (p. 214). In the Kingdom, a citizen must not only be a good Muslim but a good Sa'udi Muslim: "this model of national identity automatically limits the political claims made by the Sa'udis, without compromising the universality of Islam" (p. 216).

With other Arab states (Sonn makes no mention of the Gulf, the Maghreb, or Yemen), politics became negative—anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist—and led to pan-Arabism or Ba'th socialism. Clearly, Sonn is impressed with neither movement, and is at her most astute in analyzing them. She is convincing in her assertion that the pan-Arabism of Sati' al-Husri (d. 1928) was anti-European and is now an anachronism in the light of political and economic realities. The contradiction she finds in Arab socialism (whether Gamal Abdul Nasir's or Michel Aflaq's original Ba'thism) is that it required nationalization and national unity (and thus vested interests in power by the state's leadership) while still espousing a pan-Arabism which required the dissolution of imperially-created polities. True Ba'thism ended in 1961 with the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and the resulting particularism of the national leaders who emerged; the present incumbents of Ba'thist regimes are Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Hussein.

The Islamic vacuum caused by the failure of the Sharif's cause, and the avoidance of the issue by the other, more political and Arab, movements, was filled by the Muslim Brotherhood. Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1897) felt Islam to be the bond most able to combat imperialism; Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) added geographic, specifically Egyptian, unity to this. Hassan al-Banna' (d. 1948) founded the Brotherhood with the objective of reviving cultural identity based on Islamic and democratic principles, with religion—not nationalism—as the legitimator of political life.

Sonn is as unimpressed by the philosophical ambiguities of the Brotherhood as she is by Ba'thism and pan-Arabism. She points out, for example, the new and pragmatic approach to the philosophy which has encouraged Jordanian, Sudanese, and Egyptian (until recently) Islamic oppositions to participate in the political and parliamentary processes of their host state.

This, for Sonn, is one of the two main points for the reader to draw from the book: it is now acceptable for Islam to be used in the service of a state, a geographical sub-division of the Islamic nation. The second is that Islam, a religion originally espousing universality and not particularism, is used by leaders as justification for their legitimacy. To support this argument she uses the examples of Libya and Iran, neither Arab in her terms but persuasive

nonetheless. In Libya Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi used Islam to create a coherent nation from the three distinct regions the Allied victors had put together after World War II. As for Iran, Sonn interprets the *fatwā* against Salman Rushdie as Khomeini's attempt to focus public attention on a truly universal Islamic issue once the proclaimed aims of spreading Islam to Jerusalem had fallen before the trenches of Basra.

With this discussion of the Rushdie affair and her analysis of Ibn Taymiyya, Pan-Arabism, Ba'athism, and the Islamic opposition, Sonn is at her most interesting. Much of the rest of the book, however, although by no means pedestrian, is a reordering of known facts. Any reader will benefit from this presentation, despite having to trust occasionally in unsupported assertions in order to follow the argument. In discussing the consequences of the Arab defeat in 1967, for example, the reader is told that they included:

a popular reaction against foreign models, whether these models were considered Western in the limited sense of European capitalism or in the expanded sense that included Socialism and Communism. Both were seen as godless and materialistic. They were judged to be the result of removing religion from politics, which was believed to be the thrust of secularism. And both, it was felt, had to be rejected in favor of a truly Islamic life (p. 163).

This is too important a statement in the context of the book to go uncorroborated.

Inevitably, another criticism of such a sweeping work is that of omission. A discussion of Ibn Khaldun's concept of *'Aṣabiyya* (Arab "esprit de corps") as an element of cohesion in the early Islamic state might have been an illuminating comparison to Sonn's interpretations. Equally, the relative economic underdevelopment of the Arab world compared to Europe is mentioned twice as politically significant today (pp. 159, 188); whether an Islamic or a political nationalism would better serve the people is not a question Sonn leaves space to address.

A more important omission is the questionable wisdom of excluding the Maghreb. It is no accident that Albert Hourani's seminal work on Arabic thought concludes with the contribution of Tunisian and Algerian thinkers and political practitioners.² It is equally of interest to consider how a wholly political state can so quickly find its politics dominated by Islam (as in Algeria) and how a state can justify resisting such intrusions (as in Tunisia) or why a national opposition should so fear the legalization of an Islamic opposition (in Morocco).

Sonn concludes her book by writing that the region is on its way to stability as states become accepted as such. While there may have been no doubt about the truth of this until August 2, 1990, the current situation in the Gulf seems to require further consideration of a number of issues.

2. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

Firstly, she would have to note that the disappearance of a state (however temporarily) was justified to Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on Arab grounds. Saddam Hussein argued, "Before either of you make a decision on Kuwait you should both remember that the Arab nation is one nation, even though it was fragmented as it is now and that the sweeping majority of its sons, rulers and peoples . . . are longing to be one political entity."³

Secondly, she would also have to discuss further the issue of war between Muslims—an area she aptly describes as ideological acrobatics (p. 201). *Jihād* (customarily translated as "Holy War") is used in relation both to internal and inter-state politics; the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat by the Jihad group is an instance of the former. Inheriting a tradition from al-Afghani and from Sayyid al-Qotb (d. 1966), the group named Sadat as an unjust leader since he ruled a state where Muslims could not fulfill their Islamic duties. Khomeini, aware that Islamic law provides for only one Islamic state and therefore forbids war between Muslims, was forced to declare Saddam Hussein a heretic to justify the First Gulf War.

In the Second Gulf War, however, Saddam Hussein did not appear to concur with or need such justifications. He and Baghdad Radio preferred to associate *jihād* with Arabism rather than with religion. On February 25, 1991, (the second day of the Allied ground offensive), the Ba'th National Command announced that "*jihād* is today a definite obligation for every Muslim and Arab. . . . This is the decisive battle for the liberation of all Arabs."⁴ Baghdad Radio followed the next day with: "In your great *jihād* and honourable battle you are responding to the call of Arabism."⁵ Whether this signals the dawn of a new secular period in this age of expediency in the relations between Islamic states requires Sonn's attention.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Sonn might have to consider the impetus given by the current crisis, as well as whatever "New World Order" the United States or the international economy might place upon the states of the world, to attempts at a firmer supra-nationality than has been seen in Islam for many a century. If it is Islam which can prove to be a more cohesive and advantageous force on the world stage for Senegal, Sa'udi Arabia, the Maldives, Malaysia, and the other predominantly Muslim states, then the world could once again see the reappearance of a political Islamic unity. Should this prove an unattainable ideal, it will emphasize the relevance of Sonn's final line, even in areas beyond the Arab heartlands and beyond purely Arab interests: "Only by limiting the crown can the Qur'an remain universal" (p. 228).

3. Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 10 September 1990.

4. FBIS, 26 February 1991.

5. Ibid.



Talking Power: The Politics of Language

Robin Tolmach Lakoff

New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990, xii + 324 pp., including index, \$22.95 cloth.

Reviewed by David Bell

Much of Robin Tolmach Lakoff's previous work in linguistics has been concerned with the role played by gender in syntactic decisions. Such decisions help create differences between men's and women's language which reflect the disparities of power between the sexes. Lakoff's primary concern in *Talking Power: The Politics of Language*, however, is with the wider implications of language, politics, and power.

For Lakoff, "Language is politics, politics assigns power, power governs how people talk and how they are understood" (p. 7). Such is the nature of language, according to Lakoff, whether it be the subtle exercise of political strategies in friendly conversation, the mystification of the professional languages of doctors or lawyers, or "the persuasive blandishments of the political or commercial great communicator" (p. 2). To counteract our manipulation by those who wield "the power inherent in language" (p. 23) we need to learn how such power is assigned and determined through linguistic structure.

In the first part of the book, Lakoff compares the abuses of language within the formal settings of law, psychotherapy, and the university. With regard to the law, Lakoff shows how practitioners exploit ambiguities in the use of "confessions" and in the presentation of evidence of premeditation, and most interestingly with regard to "witherspooning." Witherspooning refers to a provision in capital cases which allows prospective jurors in the pre-trial procedure of jury selection, or *voir dire*, to stand down if they declare unequivocal opposition to the death penalty. However, before the judge makes this ruling the attorney has a chance to show that under certain circumstances the juror might vote for the death penalty. Lakoff argues that because it is in the defense's interest to select jurors with qualms about the death penalty, defense attorneys attempt to shame jurors out of witherspooning by various appeals to moral duty. Lakoff questions whether such manipulation is ethical and suggests that it should be avoided: "Clients and jurors must learn the dangers of mixed genres; know the rules and functions of the discourse they propose to take part in; know how the lines blur, and how to discern improper manipulation at those points" (p. 140).

In the main part of the book Lakoff looks at how membership in different groups and cultures entails different linguistic strategies. First she examines how gender determines distinct styles of speech. Lakoff believes that men have had the "unquestioned power and authority to define male and female roles, to control language use, and to legitimize non-linguistic behavior through that control of language" (p. 199). As a result men's language is the language of hierarchical domination; it is direct, clear, and succinct. Women's language stresses collaboration and consensus; it is indirect, imprecise, and polite. The apparent lack of interest in power expressed by women's language can place women in a dilemma. Women in executive positions that require them to be forceful and assertive must choose between being good women and poor executives or vice versa. The solution, according to Lakoff, is that women must learn how to "code switch"—to use male as well as female speech styles.

Lakoff demonstrates how culture determines linguistic strategies by comparing the rhetorical traditions of ancient Rome and present day American society. In what is the most successful part of the book, Lakoff contrasts Julius Caesar's account of the Gallic wars in *De Bello Gallico* with Oliver North's testimony to Congress during the Iran-Contra investigations. Both use the linguistic device of the third person: Caesar refers to himself throughout his writings as "Caesar" or "he"; North refers to himself as "Ollie North," "this marine lieutenant colonel," and "this American citizen." While North uses the third person to create emotional identification, Caesar seeks detachment. Caesar's third-person reference suggests the dispassionate, objective reportage of a later disinterested historian. "Ultimately, then, Caesar and North are up to the same tricks. . . . They want to justify their basically illegal actions by presenting themselves as decent people concerned with their hearers' best interests; both discourses are devised to convey the message: Trust ME" (p. 252).

In the final part of the book, Lakoff examines the rhetorical style of politicians. She sees Reagan as the master of ambiguity and illustrates her argument with reference to Reagan's reply to a question as to whether he agreed with Jesse Helms's claim that Martin Luther King was a Communist. Reagan replied: "We'll know in about thirty-five years, won't we?" Reagan was apparently referring to the time when FBI wiretaps on King will be unsealed. After an extensive linguistic analysis of Reagan's use of the tag question "won't we?" Lakoff concludes that, despite the apparent ambiguity, the President was indeed implying that King was a Communist.

It might seem that such conclusions could have been reached without recourse to linguistic analysis. Indeed, one problem with Lakoff's type of linguistic approach is the emphasis placed on grammatical features. However, grammar itself does not convey fixed meanings, but may rather take on certain meanings according to the content of the discourse as a whole. Unfortunately, Lakoff does not always provide complete texts and transcripts which would allow us to verify her claims. We have no transcripts of the *voir dire* proceedings to confirm the alleged "shaming" process in witherspooning. In the example of Reagan's alleged use of ambiguity, Lakoff's analysis is concerned with a

newspaper account of what was said in the context of Reagan's later apology to Coretta King, rather than with a transcript of his original remarks.

This lack of empirical evidence weakens Lakoff's analysis and places it at odds with other sociolinguistic approaches, which give greater importance to the broader context of language use. From such a perspective it is clear that questions from the press are "loaded"; responses, if forthcoming, should of necessity be evasive and ambiguous, yet Reagan was notoriously bad at fielding such questions. Rather than displaying a mastery of ambiguity, Reagan in his remarks reveals a feisty readiness to make his views known.

A further problematic element of Lakoff's methodology is her commitment to participant observation: "When the researcher ventures into foreign territory, like the courtroom, it is essential to be engaged, to get a whiff of the adversariality in the air by joining the game, not standing on the surface decorously jotting notes" (p. x). Such engagement can yield devastating insights, as is the case with Lakoff's feminist analysis of male-dominated language, but a commitment to an *a priori* theoretical stance can also obscure more than it can reveal. The power differentials of gender explain only part of what constitutes a woman's language; her membership in and identification with other social categories will exert equally powerful influences on her interactive style.

Worse still is when *a priori* theoretical stances go unarticulated, as in Lakoff's use of the notion of power. Political scientists often assume that so-called realistic concepts like "power" are to be preferred to such value-laden terms as "justice," but both concepts await definition. To say that men have power is to beg the questions: power to do what, when, how, and to whom? Similarly the claim that language has power is predicated on the status of the users of that language and the circumstances in which it is used. For example, only a judge can pronounce a death sentence and only in very specific circumstances.

Furthermore, Lakoff's view of communication as manipulation is too restrictive. Language is not always politics. And when it is, to call it manipulating rather than cajoling, persuading, rebuking, praising, warning, etc., is to miss the very subtleties of interaction that the linguist needs to explain. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that the real manipulators of language are the linguists themselves: Lakoff herself is a consultant to lawyers in *voir dire* proceedings; other linguists train doctors and therapists, and still others tutor politicians.

Finally, the book suffers from a packaging problem. Lakoff's publishers have aimed the book at the popular market, no doubt hoping to duplicate the success of Lakoff's colleague Deborah Tannen. But, whereas Tannen's discussion of men's and women's interactive style has general appeal, Lakoff's book struggles to balance accessibility with scholarship. Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of her methodological approach, Lakoff provides a lively introduction to the link between linguistics and our understanding of the politics of language.

Why Peace Breaks Out: Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective

By Stephen R. Rock

Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989, 232 pp., including index, \$29.95.

Reviewed by David J. Karl

Until very recently, the striking improvement in Soviet-American relations over the last five years generated considerable optimism that this new understanding could be transformed into an enduring pattern of superpower cooperation and accommodation. Such speculation was the inspiration for Stephen Rock's *Why Peace Breaks Out*. Although Rock focuses mainly on the circumstances in which a series of fundamental realignments occurred in world politics at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one, he is clearly convinced that the postwar international order is in eclipse. This passing could establish the possibility for the superpowers to enter into a durable relationship of peace. Rock suggests in the preface that "scholars and policymakers alike may want to begin thinking about how the Soviet-American antagonism, which has dominated international politics for almost half a century, might someday end" (p. ix). This theme resurfaces in the concluding chapter with a broad-brush comparison of the contemporary international situation and the behavior of the great powers in the pre-1914 era.

Rock begins by offering a conceptual framework for elucidating the factors that are conducive to the process of rapprochement between formerly antagonistic states. He dismisses the overly simplistic realist assumption that fluctuations in power distribution in the international system provide a sufficient basis for explaining this type of international behavior. Instead, Rock aims for a more robust explanation, one that gives prominent place to the apparent salience of non-power factors—particularly the effects of economic interchange and ideological and cultural affinities—in determining states' foreign policies.

Rock advances three interconnected hypotheses to account for the emergence of peace between once hostile powers: a condition of peace is mostly likely to develop between states possessing concordant geopolitical objectives, compatible economic interests, and similar societal attributes. The author devotes the bulk of his study to corroborating these hypotheses by comparing four sets of great power bilateral relationships in the critical period from 1895–1914. The friendly ties that developed during this period between the United

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States and Great Britain, and between Britain and France, offer examples of successful rapprochements. Rock provides contrasts to these "positive cases" by analyzing the transformation which occurred in the relations between the United States and Germany, and between Britain and Germany, in which states originally enjoying routinely tranquil relations progressively became abiding rivals.

Rock analyzes each of these cases in separate descriptive chapters that, although relatively short, are nonetheless informative and well researched. On the basis of this inquiry, the author's hypotheses furnish a much stronger understanding of the pattern of state behavior than does pure balance-of-power theory. The strength of his hypotheses, however, seems contingent upon the operation of some catalytic factor (usually in the form of an acute crisis) that is necessary to jolt governments out of an accustomed political routine and into the process of reconciliation.

The book's specific historical instances support the validity of Rock's hypotheses. As exemplified in the chapters on Anglo-American and Anglo-French relations, a combination of parallel geopolitical interests, economic complementarities and interdependencies, and compatible ideological/cultural attributes usually results in peaceful dealings between nations. Conversely, the US-German and Anglo-German cases demonstrate that the absence of these conditions is generally an antecedent for mutual antagonism or the outbreak of war.

It is difficult to dispute such a self-evident proposition, but it hardly represents the level of analysis Rock hopes to deliver to the scholarly discourse on international politics. The book would have benefited from the development of a more elaborate theoretical context, one capable of directing Rock's inquiry beyond its present scope into more fruitful areas of investigation. As it is, a major shortcoming of Rock's thesis is its paucity of precision in defining the causal interconnections operating between each factor (geopolitical, economic, societal). For instance, do all three conditions need to be satisfied for a great power reconciliation to occur? Is one condition relatively more important than the others? Is one a prerequisite for the operation of the others? These questions are never addressed. In the end, Rock presents more of a vague analytical outline imposed upon a list of situational variables, than a well-drawn explanation of the operation and the relative importance of specific causal agents in determining the context of state action.

An equally significant problem arises from Rock's argument that states engage in balancing behavior in response to strategic imperatives rather than on the basis of aggregate power relationships. He is certainly accurate in highlighting the manifold deficiencies of balance-of-power theory, and he conceives his work as following the lead of promising recent efforts in reformulating traditional realist logic into a more robust theory of state interaction. The problem with Rock's endeavor, however, is the alacrity with which he initially discounts the importance that underlying power realities hold, relative to other factors, in determining state behavior, only to conclude later that pressing geopolitical concerns (namely, the fear that German power would be

directed toward overturning the international order) were of major significance in fostering the Anglo-American and Anglo-French rapprochements.

Besides the need to present a stronger conceptual framework for systematic analysis and comparison, Rock's thesis suffers from a narrow evidentiary base. The failure to recognize other relevant cases in the period under examination is troubling, for they provide evidence contrary to his thesis. The French entente with czarist Russia and the British alliance with imperial Japan are examples of the phenomenon Rock wishes to explore, yet in both instances, the effect of one of his hypothesized explanatory factors (cultural homogeneity) was all but nonexistent. Moreover, with respect to the Anglo-American and Anglo-French cases, one wonders whether economic and cultural compatibility would have proven sufficient, either alone or in tandem, to induce rapprochement in the absence of any compelling geopolitical motivation (a point Rock haltingly seems to recognize).

In Rock's defense, whatever the relevance of power or strategic factors in shaping state behavior, they hold little explanatory value in accounting for the general tranquillity that has reigned in Anglo-American and Anglo-French relations for nearly a century. Instead, what seems to shape states' behavior in this context is the emergence of a common adversary. Germany played a catalytic role in forging the Anglo-American and Anglo-French relationships before each of the world wars, while the Soviet Union has supplanted Germany during the cold war years. Although Rock's thesis may be accurate, it still suffers from a lack of solid substantiation.

It can plausibly be argued that the US provision of western security in the postwar years has facilitated the high level of diplomatic and economic cooperation among the advanced industrialized countries. The proposition that the density of economic linkages and ideological and cultural solidarity will render unlikely the development of friction between states may well be grounded on an unwarranted assumption, one that could be put severely to the test in the coming years when the waning of Soviet power diminishes the need for European and Asian governments to cooperate with the United States. The influence Rock wishes to accord non-power variables in shaping the complex patterns of international political behavior still lacks conclusive empirical validation.

Finally, by drawing generalized deductions concerning the contemporary situation from a passed era in world politics, Rock fails to reconcile adequately the basic contextual differences that threaten the relevancy of his exercise. Beyond the effect nuclear weapons have in engendering or perpetuating international hostilities (a subject Rock examines only briefly), a far more profound conundrum lies in whether the basic dynamics of alliance behavior in multipolar and bipolar international systems are so intrinsically dissimilar as to render Rock's intended aim almost unrealizable. Unfortunately, Rock gives no indication that he recognizes how sharply this complication impinges on his endeavor. Had he done so, the theoretical cogency—not to mention relevancy—of this book would have been measurably strengthened. As it is, his observations on the prospects for rapprochement between Washington and

Moscow are insubstantive, consisting of an unfruitful comparison of international political behavior at two very different historical junctures.

In short, this book focuses on an intriguing question, one that has become increasingly relevant with the end of the cold war and the implementation of the European Community's 1992 program. The ongoing transition to a yet undefined post-cold war era in international politics is likely to reawaken many hitherto dormant areas of scholarly activity, particularly those within the integrationist and communitarian research traditions. Although Stephen Rock, through a work of historically informed theorizing, aims at contributing to this activity by stimulating critical thought, *Why Peace Breaks Out* unfortunately falls short of his mark.



Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances: The International Legal Challenge

Edited by Günther Handl and Robert E. Lutz

London and Norwell, Mass.: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1989,
275 pp., including endnotes and index, \$92.50 cloth.

Reviewed by Mark A. Montgomery

The essays in *Transferring Hazardous Technologies and Substances* originated as a panel organized by the International Environmental Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) for the ASIL Annual Meeting in 1985. Together the authors discuss the development of international legal norms in the management of hazardous technologies, products, and substances in the wake of a series of industrial accidents in the 1980s: the poison gas leak at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India; the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union; the chemical explosion in Seveso, Italy; and the pollution of the Rhine after a massive chemical fire in Switzerland. These incidents, along with other less spectacular ones, have illustrated not only that the transboundary transfer of hazardous technologies and substances can present serious dangers to human health and the environment in both developing and developed nations, but that these risks pose a monumental challenge to the international legal order.

Why do hazardous transfers happen in the first place? The various authors suggest a simple answer: it is in the perceived self-interest of both the importer and the exporter of hazardous technologies and products to do so. In a world in which sovereign states develop their own laws regarding the management of hazardous technologies and substances, some nations are less exacting in their environmental and safety standards. Thus some multinational corporations may find it in their economic interest to produce hazardous chemicals in a country in which the laws are less stringent. Or it might be that a firm in an industrialized country finds that it can unload inventories of substances outlawed at home onto a foreign market where the substances are not so tightly controlled. The United States does just this by permitting the export of certain pesticides banned for domestic use. The Chernobyl example illustrates yet another aspect of the problem: an industrial accident resulting from unsafe management and slow emergency response can create health and environmental risks in other countries.

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The legal challenge, as the contributors to this volume see it, revolves around the question of determining who should bear the burden of the risks involved in the transfer of hazardous technologies and substances. What are the responsibilities of the exporting states? Should they be legally required to notify importers of the risks that accompany a proposed transfer? What responsibilities should be borne by the importing states? If a country allows a hazardous technology or substance to enter its borders, where does the responsibility of the exporter end and that of the importer begin? How should the international legal order confront the challenges posed by the transfer of risk?

By taking a look at the evolution of thinking on these questions, the essays in this book present an optimistic view that the trend in international law is toward a more comprehensive legal framework for averting disaster—or at least for distributing risk and responsibility more equitably. Principles such as prior informed consent, codes of conduct for multinational corporations, standards of accident preparedness and response, and international guidelines for environmental impact assessments are gradually becoming accepted international legal norms. Many of the essays trace the history of these developing norms within international organizations.

As a legal history, this volume is a gold mine. The essays are well-written surveys of the current state of international agreements relating to risky transfers of all but nuclear technologies and materials. Thus, Handl and Lutz have put together a “document-oriented” book that is understandably short on drama. Yet the collection does present the reader with a comprehensive overview of what the law says and what it does not.

For example, Lothar Gündling’s chapter on “Prior Notification and Consultation” explains that the principle of requiring exporting states to inform receiving states of the nature of proposed transfers is already accepted by the UN General Assembly, the UN Environment Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the European Community (EC), and has been incorporated into the domestic laws of the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. Gündling carefully traces the development of this principle within and among these organizations. Despite the wide acceptance of the principle, however, only the EC has adopted binding legal instruments obligating states to notify each other of a dangerous transfer. Gündling is optimistic, however, that prior notification and consultation eventually will become enshrined in the international legal order after “lengthy and difficult” negotiations. He believes that international organizations will continue to take the lead in filling conceptual and legal loopholes.

Historical perspective is not the only source of Gündling’s optimism: he also says that there is a moral obligation for nations to bind themselves to the principle of prior notification and consultation. He writes that there are “moral principles calling for cooperation between exporting and importing countries,

such as fundamental solidarity and respect for human dignity" (p. 81) that impel nations to develop binding instruments that embody this norm.

Classical liberal optimism also radiates from Günther Handl's own contribution to this collection. Focusing on accident preparedness and response to industrial accidents, he asserts that there is an increasing "internationalization" of the norm of industrial risk communication. This means that a company should notify people living around a hazardous facility where activities pose a potential danger. In addition, there seems to be a developing legal norm regarding the communication of risk to other countries that may be at risk. Handl also notes with satisfaction that contingency planning for accidents in general, emergency exchanges of information in the event of an industrial accident, as well as transboundary emergency assistance are all on the "international agenda." Handl concludes that, taken together, these trends in hazardous transfers "provide yet another demonstration of the erosion of state sovereignty, the transfer of hitherto national decision-making powers to multi-lateral fora and international institutions, as the inevitable corollary of an increasingly interdependent global community" (p. 128).

The trumpeting of "the end of sovereignty" provokes a lively debate, one that often pops up in the literature on international environmental policy. While norms regarding hazardous transfers are an important item on the international environmental agenda, the fact is that most of these norms have yet to be ensconced in binding international law. The international legal challenge is not so much to forge a consensus on norms as to ensure that transnational actors abide by those norms. To my mind, it is not clear that international organizations by themselves will ever have the authority to do so. State sovereignty is not on its last legs; it is as resilient as ever, even when it comes to environmental issues.

Of course, in order to find workable solutions to environmental problems, the international community must begin by defining a common goal. Norms are the logical place to begin. But norms—even if they are globally accepted—do not guarantee compliance. Moral imperatives must be backed up by some combination of enforcement mechanisms, monitoring systems, and economic incentives that encourage nations, their citizens, and transnational actors to do the "right thing." At this point in the development of international hazardous transfer law, it is unclear how to institute a comprehensive international regulatory program that will adequately reduce the threat of environmental damage and adverse health effects. The norms are fairly well-established, it is true. The question is, where do we go from here? How do we move from widely accepted principles to a safer, cleaner environment?

I do not think that the key will be found in international law alone. Politics and economics must also be factored into any comprehensive solution of international environmental problems. Laws are the outward expression of agreements on how to manage hazardous transfers. But in order to forge a consensus, one must not overstate the importance of moral imperatives. In the absence of world government, workable solutions to international environmental problems must spring from the interrelationships among power

politics, economic costs, and benefits. International environmental agreements that do not account for the political and economic forces that drive hazardous transfers will not lead necessarily to a reduction of pollution or improvements in health and safety. More comprehensive laws in and of themselves are no guarantee of environmental protection.

Of course, the contributors to this book do not ignore politics and economics, and it is understandable that lawyers will tend to emphasize what they know best. And it is true that international legal norms are evolving. Increasing numbers of declarations of principle, codes of conduct, and even binding regulations are being negotiated and promulgated. But I am skeptical that the driving force behind these developments is a moral imperative. The real driving force, I believe, is not nearly so lofty.

Nations are beginning to learn that it is in their rational, egoistic, self-interest to adhere to these developing principles and norms. Redefinition of self-interest in most cases comes before there can be any international agreement on legal norms. Handl himself has said as much in another recent and influential article.¹ In the case of transferring hazardous substances and technologies, both importing and exporting states are learning from experience that the political and economic costs of unregulated transfers are unbearably high. Individual firms, too, are learning that the costs of not implementing certain safeguards to protect the environment can be astronomical.

International consensus about how to regulate transfers of hazardous technologies and substances primarily springs from considerations of old-fashioned economic efficiency. The essays in this volume are extremely helpful in documenting the development of legal norms within international organizations. But they do not address sufficiently the reasons for the wide acceptance of these norms. Moral imperatives may have something to do with it. My suspicion is that regulation of hazardous transfers has more to do with redefinitions of rational self-interest than with assertions of "fundamental human solidarity."

1. "Environmental Protection in Third World Countries: Common Destiny, Common Responsibility," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring 1988): 607.



Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy

Robert D. Schulzinger

New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, 291 pp., including endnotes, bibliography, and index, \$27.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Nick Aretakis

To the extent that his was a highly personalized style of diplomacy, it is not surprising that assessments of Henry Kissinger the diplomat often devolve into judgments on the man himself. In general, these have ranged from the laudatory, as in Bernard and Marvin Kalb's *Kissinger*, to the highly critical, with Seymour Hersh's *The Price of Power* in the vanguard.¹ Robert D. Schulzinger, Professor of History at the University of Colorado, believes that "enough time has elapsed since Henry Kissinger directed American foreign policy . . . to offer fresh perspectives" (p. ix). The result of Schulzinger's research and reflection is *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, a book that is notable for its use of new sources and its coolheaded evaluation of Kissinger, while at the same time being narratively superficial and poorly organized.

Before discussing the commendable aspects of the book, it is necessary to note the drawbacks. In attempting to provide a complete overview of Kissinger's policies, Schulzinger has chosen to use an episodic format, devoting chapters to individual subjects such as détente, Vietnam, or the opening of relations with China, instead of using a strictly chronological approach. By isolating themes and episodes, Schulzinger fails to provide a fully adequate sense of the "grand strategy" approach that Kissinger attempted to apply. For example, in the chapter dealing with the opening to China, Schulzinger spends only two paragraphs in a twenty-six page chapter describing how improved relations with China could aid American strategy in Vietnam by getting the Chinese to exert pressure on the North Vietnamese to be less rigid at the negotiating table.

As far as the narrative structure of the book is concerned, one must come to the conclusion that Schulzinger is writing for a primarily academic audience, already grounded in the basic facts and events of the era. It is often hard to find a narrative string that runs through the book, and the description of certain events is often limited to a discussion of Kissinger's direct effect on them. Again, this seems to be the product of Schulzinger's chosen structure: his concentration on the areas of détente, China, Vietnam, and the Middle

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1. Bernard and Marvin Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974); Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983).

East. While these are obviously the major diplomatic concerns of the Kissinger period, other important foreign policy issues are slighted. For example, the *Ostpolitik* of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is mentioned only twice and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 receives but two pages.

An exception to this rule is Schulzinger's description of events in Chile, culminating with the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973. Even in this instance, however, problems arise. While Schulzinger gives a good description of events from the election of Allende in 1970 to his murder in 1973, he avoids an in-depth discussion of Kissinger's role at the head of the "Forty Committee," which supervises overseas covert operations of the intelligence agencies. While Kissinger "encouraged local CIA operatives to increase the pressure on the Allende government . . . [he] had not taken the lead in evicting Allende . . . [and] regardless of what Kissinger himself did to hasten the downfall of the Societies, he greeted the new government as a model for others in the hemisphere" (pp. 138-40). Surely armed with the instruments of perspective and newly de-classified sources, Schulzinger could have reached a less equivocal conclusion.

As far as the recently declassified portions of the Nixon and Ford papers are concerned, they have been of mixed value. Schulzinger notes in the preface that, not surprisingly, the Ford Library proved more helpful than the Nixon Presidential Materials Project in providing documents. Also, most of the documents pertain to intra-White House politics and attempts at "sign control" or manipulation of information with regard to the media. While expanding our knowledge of some of the political sniping and backbiting that went on, little of the new information provides insight into the foreign policymaking process of either administration.

Among the helpful new sources utilized by Schulzinger are the recently declassified papers of H.R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff until his resignation in May 1973. Through the Haldeman papers, we learn of the concern and resentment harbored by many of Nixon's closest political advisers over the way in which Kissinger sought the spotlight. In 1972, for example, Kissinger gave an interview to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in which he described himself as "the cowboy . . . who rides into the town and does everything by himself" (p. 115), thus virtually writing Nixon out of the foreign policy process. This outraged White House staff members who, worried "that Kissinger might overshadow the President during the [Presidential] campaign" (p. 110), attempted to limit his television and radio exposure. Haldeman took personal pains to ensure this by drafting a memo demanding that the security adviser's schedule "not conflict in any way with the President's calendar" (p. 111).

The Haldeman papers also give us a view of Henry Kissinger the administrative infighter, called by one observer the "complete courtier." Early in the administration, we find Kissinger, quite new to the Nixon team, telling Haldeman, who had been with Nixon for close to a decade, how to "handle" the president. Cabinet members, Kissinger advised, should "talk affirmatively to the President . . . not emote or discourage [or] bring problems to the

President" (p. 43). At the same time, Kissinger would criticize Nixon in interviews, further infuriating the White House staff.

One of the great advantages of the book is Schulzinger's utilization of a wide variety of sources, thus providing a well-rounded portrait of his subject. In addition to Kissinger the policymaker, scrutinized by *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, we see Kissinger the celebrity, lionized by *Ladies Home Journal* and *Harper's Bazaar*. As Schulzinger notes, this notoriety was in large part the result of Kissinger's own efforts, as he carefully cultivated the press and "contrived [an] image as a genius of international relations" (p. 4). Over time, however, these efforts would backfire. As détente with the Soviets unravelled and Vietnam dragged on to an ultimately embarrassing American evacuation, Kissinger's sterling reputation became tarnished and he became a liability for Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential campaign, criticized by both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan for his conduct of foreign policy.

In his assessment of Kissinger's foreign policy, Schulzinger is even-handed and judicious. While noting that the opening of relations with China and engaging in détente with the Soviet Union were truly groundbreaking initiatives, Schulzinger points out that they did not endure until even the end of the Ford administration. He goes so far as to contend that "it is hard to identify a single policy of the Kissinger years that survived intact for a decade" (p. 239). Furthermore, while Kissinger's circumvention of the State Department bureaucracy did allow him to make the opening to China and engage in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, these methods also served to undercut his policies. By failing to institutionalize his initiatives, Kissinger ensured that they would be short-lived. By excluding the permanent State Department bureaucracy from the formulation and execution of his policies, Kissinger created resentments that would ill-serve him when follow-through was necessary. He distrusted State Department professionals and, in turn, they "were reluctant to exert themselves on his behalf" (p. 241). As Schulzinger states, "instead of building a structure, Kissinger created a personality. . . . The performance seemed to matter more than the results" (p. 242).

Measuring Kissinger's accomplishments against the theories of international relations which he espoused, Schulzinger concludes that Kissinger's "record is mixed, with dazzling promises leading to less revolutionary accomplishments" (p. 239). Kissinger did, to an extent, change the way Americans thought about foreign affairs. He argued that the United States had permanent interests and that the United States and the Soviet Union had a "permanent" relationship which should be conducted "realistically." At the same time, however, Kissinger approved of the destabilization of the relatively benign Allende regime in Chile, and as his power waned late in the Ford administration, "he stressed more popular themes about the Soviet danger" (p. 242).

With *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, Robert D. Schulzinger has provided an interesting contribution to the study of Henry Kissinger. Through his objective tone and critical analysis, Schulzinger performs an important service. For the reader who is not well-versed in the rhetorical polemics that surround the career and accomplishments of Henry Kissinger, this book can

serve as a starting point from which to embark upon a more detailed examination of the pertinent literature. With the conclusions of the book serving as a base, the works of Hersh, the Kalbs, and Kissinger himself can be studied with more insight and perception. At the same time, however, the newcomer should not expect to get a complete and well-rounded narrative of this period. The promise of fresh insights due to the availability of newly de-classified sources is only half fulfilled. On the whole, the book is more notable for its balance than for its revelations.



US Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate

By Dario Moreno

Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990, 186 pp., \$19.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Karen A. Krebsbach

Has Central America, the scene of conflicts that have galvanized the US public like few others in modern history, replaced Vietnam as the focus of debate for the future of American foreign policy? Though Dario Moreno's argument in *US Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate* is convincing, it is certain that Central America no longer has Americans' attention since the Persian Gulf crisis erupted last fall.

Indeed, with the thawing of the cold war, the failure of the Nicaraguan revolution, and the opening of Eastern Europe, Central America today does not have the relevance it had between 1976 and 1988, the period discussed in *The Endless Debate*. Yet, the very fact that Central America is no longer pivotal in US foreign policy is one reason why this book is so important now.

Moreno observes that the fractured US policy in Central America during this eight-year period resulted from the application of two consecutive and diametrically opposed policies—that of the Carter administration's "liberal internationalists," who sought to eliminate poverty and underdevelopment in the region, and that of the Reagan administration's "cold warriors," who used the region as a chessboard to play out the East-West conflict.

Not only was the shift in policy between the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan damaging to overall US policy in the region, argues Moreno, but further, each individual policy was an abysmal failure. Moreno, who is an assistant professor of political science at Florida International University, is not content simply to bare the facts of each administration's strategies; he seeks to determine specifically how each policy was constructed, layer by layer. The Nicaraguan revolution and the civil war in El Salvador were obsessions of both administrations and the cornerstone of both presidents' post-cold war foreign policy strategies in the region. But the way each leader made and carried out his policy is the subject of the bulk of Moreno's book.

Moreno's eloquent and balanced argument documents Carter's egalitarian, anti-imperialistic vision for Central America, whose watchwords were democracy, conciliation, and peace, as contrasted with Reagan's macho, imperialistic view, whose watchwords were anti-communism and covert aid. Moreno also

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details the competition among the various factions in each president's State Department policy-making circles, which is particularly enlightening.

Carter, ever mindful of Vietnam, stepped into the Oval Office with a strong desire to change US foreign policy. His agenda included more than simply to "manage the relationship with the Soviets" (p. 20) in the Third World; he wanted to address the core issues that kept these nations members of the Third World: economic underdevelopment, energy problems, population growth, environmental damage, food supplies, nuclear proliferation, and arms transfers. Moreno credits President Carter with understanding the political undercurrents of Central America—at least initially. However, he writes, Carter's policy soon became "incoherent, punctuated with bureaucratic infighting" (p. 11).

Members of Carter's foreign policy team included Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, both of whom had criticized Nixon and Kissinger's single-minded strategy of viewing all foreign policy through the lens of US-Soviet rivalry. Perhaps worse, the differences between Brzezinski the cold warrior and Vance the liberal internationalist would paralyze Carter's policy in Central America. Moreno blames Carter's indecisiveness and lack of foreign policy experience for exacerbating the lack of consensus among his foreign policy advisers; without strong leadership from the top, policymaking in Carter's administration degenerated into "bureaucratic guerrilla warfare" (p. 25).

Still, Moreno praises Carter for negotiating the tricky details of ratifying the Panama Canal treaties, which became a litmus test for his administration's Latin American policy. Carter succeeded largely because he took the treaties on as a personal task, devoting a great amount of his own time to the project. In 1977, for example, the administration spent seven months intensively lobbying Senate members for ratification of the new treaties. Because the Panama Canal was widely seen as "a symbol of American imperialism" (p. 35), the new treaties, which promised an eventual handing over of the operation of the canal to Panama, were essential to proving that the United States was committed to a more egalitarian relationship with the Third World, particularly Latin America.

Carter did not fare so well with Cuba, where he failed in re-establishing diplomatic ties. Vacillation on Cuba prompted a key debate among Carter policymakers as to whether Cuba was a Soviet proxy or an independent Marxist satellite. The debate would rage—and divide analysts—for the rest of Carter's term, evidenced especially in the administration's weak response to Cuban forces in Angola.

Ronald Reagan, Moreno writes, sought to restore what he perceived as America's poor credibility after the Carter years, operating under the rules of a polarized East-West struggle. Moreno gives slightly higher marks to Reagan's policy in El Salvador, but contends that his policy in the region as a whole was ultimately disappointing because of the failed *contra* war against the Ortega government in Nicaragua, an error that would spawn the worst constitutional crisis of his administration—the Iran-*contra* affair. Nevertheless, Moreno applauds Reagan's policy for being ideologically more consistent, and

for including useful programs like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Reagan Doctrine, and the Kissinger Commission study on Central America.

Operating on the belief that Carter's Central American policies had actually destabilized the region, Reagan's policymakers, particularly Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, would argue that developing countries "lacked the political stability to support a peaceful transition to democracy" (p. 87). Rather than encouraging right-wing regimes to democratize their societies to avoid social revolutions, which Carter had done, Abrams discouraged this policy, stating that democratization would weaken those regimes, inviting revolution and, ultimately, more unstable left-wing governments ripe for Soviet domination.

Reagan's El Salvadoran policy was exactly the opposite of the one employed by Carter, who believed that defeating the Marxist guerrillas should be done by first improving human rights, then creating economic reforms, and finally, opening the political process to democratic competition. In contrast, Reagan pushed single-mindedly to end the civil conflict, which only intensified the violence, culminating in a 1981 high of 13,353 killings blamed on the right-wing death squads in that country (p. 95).

In Nicaragua, the US covert war against the Sandinistas escalated throughout 1982, with the original 500-person action team increased to 4,000 persons. In addition, the United States tried to isolate Nicaragua diplomatically from Western Europe and its Central American neighbors, and directly pressured the Sandinistas by conducting large-scale military exercises in Honduras and by stepping up economic pressure against the Sandinistas. The United States pushed the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank virtually to end loans to Nicaragua. Still, none of these steps accomplished Reagan's goals, and the intensification of violence in Nicaragua led to a congressional and public backlash against the administration. A 1982 Gallup poll showed that 75 percent of those Americans polled believed that the US involvement in Nicaragua resembled the Vietnam experience.

Ultimately, according to Moreno, Carter and Reagan actually shared the same objective in Central America: "containment of the forces of radicalism" (p. 88). It was the manner in which each man pursued that goal that differed so remarkably.

One of the differences between the two presidents was in their dramatically different decision-making styles: Carter liked to gather information from his experts and arrive at his own conclusions, which accommodated the varying opinions; Reagan preferred his advisers to take care of the details of his simple anti-Communist policy. Reagan's advisers, who believed Nicaragua was the first pawn in a Soviet plan to surround the US with leftist client states, focused almost exclusively on that country.

One of Moreno's most interesting conclusions is that the "collapse of the containment policy" (p. 13) in both the Carter and Reagan administrations, which he blames for the US government's ultimate policy failure in Central America, did have one positive outcome. He contends that it has produced a

more democratic decision-making apparatus in the United States, drawing in churches, academics, and solidarity groups.

Moreno believes that the collapse of containment in Central America, coupled with the democratization of the foreign policy process, are the main problems now restraining US officials in carrying out today's foreign policy. If that theory is correct, and Moreno's evidence is compelling, does it follow that US foreign policy in Central America during these eight years has become the critical core from which all other US foreign policymaking radiates? This generalization of Moreno's seems a bit far-fetched and parochial.

Certainly the US invasion of Panama in 1989 and the war against Iraq in 1991 are proof that George Bush has not learned from Reagan's or Carter's mistakes in Central America. Moreover, what Moreno's account seems to suggest is that US foreign policy in any particular region of the world is very much a product of its time and place, topped with the distinctive signature of the president then in office. Carter's policy in Central America differed from Reagan's and Bush's mainly because these presidents' personalities were so different.

For example, Carter's commitment to mediation and compromise is indicative of how he ran all aspects of the Oval Office; Reagan was the teflon cowboy in other acts his office undertook; and Bush's military zeal may have more to do with his desire to shake his "wimp" image than it has to do with any long-term foreign policy goals. Still, in the tangled web of the US foreign policy community, it is ironic just how often the foreign policies of American presidents are shaped by backward glances rather than forward-looking vision. For example, the 1989 invasion of Panama reflected a deep-seated US penchant for intervention in Latin America.

Moreno's brief comments on President Bush's initiatives in the region are less astute, probably because insufficient time has passed to assess adequately this president's Central American policy. These remarks, which read more like a hastily written addendum, dilute his compelling observations on the Carter and Reagan administrations.



Islamic Law and Jurisprudence

Edited by Nicholas Heer

Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1990, 234 pp., with index, \$30.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Frank E. Vogel

This volume of eleven articles is the outcome of a 1987 conference in honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Washington where he served for many years as chair of the Department of Near Eastern Studies and as director of the Near Eastern Center of the Jackson School of International Studies. Professor Ziadeh has long been a leader and generous mentor for the few American scholars specializing in Islamic law, especially the even fewer who seek, as he does, to combine professional legal training with Arabic and Islamic studies.

This collection includes articles by Ziadeh and by ten scholars representing the next generation of English-speaking scholars of Islamic law. Fittingly in view of Ziadeh's English legal training, three English lawyers contribute pieces. Of the American contributors, three are lawyers and legal educators, and four are professors of Arabic and Islamic studies.

While the articles are valuable to specialists, and were largely written for them, the book can be recommended to non-specialists seeking basic information on Islamic law. The authors and the editor have worked to keep the articles accessible to the general reader, for example, by reducing the use of transliterated Arabic to a few technical terms, each appropriately defined, and by minimizing footnotes. And, as will appear from discussion below, the articles enjoy a greater degree of interrelationship than is usual in such volumes. As a result, a non-specialist curious to know the state of current research, and willing to make his or her own effort at synthesis, can gain from the volume a useful overview, difficult to attain otherwise, of vital aspects of Islamic law. The book is very well presented, equipped with a useful index, and almost entirely free of typographical errors.

The book is divided into three sections, the first on "Islamic Jurisprudence," meaning legal philosophy, the second on "Islamic Law and the West," and the third on "Islamic Law in Modern Times."

The section on Islamic jurisprudence contains four articles that are uniformly the best, and as a group the most coherent, of all those presented in the volume. Together they show the concern of US scholarship on Islamic law for

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Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) as a topic. This scholarship is showing a new interest in exploring that subject fully, on its own terms, rather than in gleaning incidental data for historical, theological, or political studies, or to support preconceived ideas of Islamic legal practice. This emerging body of work engages first in singling out, and then in relating and synthesizing, aspects of *uṣūl* works that, far from being obscure or hidden, are explicit in them, indeed are their pervasive preoccupations. To say this is not to minimize the difficulty of understanding these aspects, and even of describing them in English, both being steps requiring for success a fundamental comparative insight. Nor is it to denigrate the originality and innovation the work demands. In fact, the conclusions being reached by this group of scholars often question, or even boldly contradict, the accepted wisdom of the last few generations of Western scholars of Islamic law.

For example, the first three of these articles offer emphatic proof that *uṣūl al-fiqh*, in its obsession with the epistemological difficulties of knowing God's transcendent law, does not dictate the eternal fixity and sterile determinism so long assumed to be an essential characteristic of Islamic law. Rather, they argue that *uṣūl* entails instead a broad indeterminacy and a vast preserve of freedom of juristic opinion. That extensive indeterminacy and freedom of thought should be innate to the ideal structure of Islamic law is something that readers of the usual handbooks on Islamic law will find surprising.

Bernard Weiss, in particular, has long been engaged in difficult, painstaking work along these lines, and his efforts continue in this volume. Here, he raises the question of the objectivity of Islamic law, and is led into a subtle exploration, across several topics of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, of the *uṣūl*'s characteristic tension between the outer, manifest, explicit, and exoteric on the one hand, and the inner, hidden, implicit, and esoteric on the other.

In an article somewhat analogous to Weiss's, Wael Hallaq examines a theme common to several doctrines of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, namely, an assertion in various forms that an absolute, virtually *a priori*, certainty as to the truth of a proposition can arise from the experience of numerous concrete vindications of that proposition. The incongruity of such an assertion to the outsider, given the usual philosophical and logical understandings of inductive proof, is used to explore some related doctrines of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, such as *tawātur*, *tawātur bi-al-ma'nā*, *ijmā'*, and doctrines that general legal propositions are knowable to a certainty by induction from Islamic legal rules as a body. The links Hallaq so imaginatively makes here are profound, particularly with reference to *ijmā'* (consensus). Indeed, the issues thus raised, necessarily left unresolved, tend to overwhelm the narrower logical issues about induction by which Hallaq organizes the article.

The third article, by Jeanette Wakin, takes up, instead of a theme pervading *uṣūl al-fiqh*, a single *uṣūl* topic, namely, the rules by which the imperative mood is interpreted. Wakin engages this topic as an example of *uṣūl* argumentation, in order to expose to the uninitiated something of the preoccupations and method of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. In this way, she convincingly makes a

number of points, among them the fundamental one, mentioned above, that, according to the principles of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, Islamic law very rarely attains fixity and certainty.

A fourth article in this section, by Professor Ziadeh himself, takes up a legal concept appearing often in *uṣūl al-fiqh* and in the derived law of *fiqh*, that of *'adālah*, meaning "righteous character," or as Ziadeh calls it, "integrity." Ziadeh examines this concept in two areas of application: the qualification of witnesses, and the criticism of transmitters of reports (*ahādīth*) of the Prophetic *sunna*. In introductory and concluding remarks drawing on Ronald Dworkin, Ziadeh suggests how the doctrine of *'adālah* expresses, and enforces, profound connections between the integrity, in the sense of coherence, of the law itself, and the integrity, as reflected in social approval and standing, of the individuals who play roles in knowing and enforcing the law.

The section entitled "Islamic Law and the West" includes three contributions that seek to draw explicit comparisons between Islamic and Western laws and institutions. Two of these, by John Makdisi and George Makdisi, are carefully argued and documented historical pieces; both argue that the medieval West borrowed from the Islamic world. Here, George Makdisi, a distinguished historian of medieval Islam and author of an extensive study¹ of the origins of the medieval university in Islamic educational institutions, deals with the conceptions of magisterium or doctorate and academic freedom. John Makdisi, a lawyer and scholar of property law as well as of Islamic law, offers persuasive evidence that a legal innovation of twelfth century England, novel disseisin,² the origins of which have puzzled scholars of English history, was a borrowing by Henry II from the Islamically derived practices of Norman Sicily.

The third piece, by David Forte, a scholar of international and comparative law, is one of straightforward comparison. Forte deals with Islamic and medieval English legal mechanisms for the recovery of stolen or lost property.

The four articles in "Islamic Law in Modern Times"—all by lawyers—are united by the theme of the reassertion of Islamic law in the laws of modern state systems in the Muslim world. William Ballantyne shows how this trend has set in even in Arab commercial laws, which previously had been a zone virtually secure for Western-inspired laws and legal concepts.

The next article, by Ian Edge, analyzes the status of one such Western concept, that of decennial liability for defects in construction contracts. Edge shows how, from origins in the French Civil Code, this concept was adapted and extended in Egypt's civil codes and thence spread throughout the Arab world so extensively as to have been called a part of Arab customary law. He also provides insight into the process of Islamic reassertion discussed by

1. George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).

2. An obsolete legal pleading meaning "the wrongful dispossession (by forcible entry or otherwise) of the lands, etc. of another," *Oxford English Dictionary*.

Ballantyne, by showing how this concept, despite being only arguably justifiable under traditional Islamic law, has survived recent Islamic legal scrutiny in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf.

A third article, by Ann Mayer, gives a useful statement of a few of the manifold incongruities between the modern movement to codify Islamic law and the law's fundamental nature as understood mediievally. This is a valuable corrective to the non-specialist's tendency to assume that Islamic law can be meaningfully summed up or even fully exemplified by such codifications.

The final article in this section, by David Pearl, takes the pulse of the Islamic reassertion in the area of family law by examination of the changing legal environment in India and Pakistan with particular reference to issues raised by the Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961.

As a whole, this volume gives much cause for optimism about the future of Islamic studies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In many of the pieces we see independence and creativity coupled with a patient, workmanlike attitude, traits promising future growth in the field. The most encouraging in this respect are the pieces on *uṣūl al-fiqh*, which show a group of American scholars at work on a coherent body of scholarship. Several other pairs of articles also are mutually reinforcing, suggesting consistent standpoints likely to yield enduring insights.

Yet, on the negative side, the articles are examples of how narrow and shallow the foundations of Islamic law scholarship still are in the West. These studies, each marked by the Western scientific discipline of the author, do suggest the immensity of the phenomenon of Islamic law, but only by the accumulation of their tangential approaches. For example, we find that the articles on *uṣūl* omit or mistake lessons from concrete instances in the *fiqh*, the law to which the theory relates and is applied, and vice versa; we find bland references to Islamic "orthodoxy," or to the positions of schools of law as if each school had but one view; we find lawyers' attentions drawn to the Islamic content of the positive laws of modern countries, but not to how Islamic law, as religious law, is or was implemented traditionally; we find comparative observations ventured mostly at the level of detail.

All this reminds us that no traditions of Western scholarship yet exist providing an adequate platform from which to approach this awe-inspiring field directly, and with an authenticity that is, as is essential, simultaneously "Islamic" and "Western." This failure is, on the other hand, not surprising, since the difficulties are immense: Islamic law extends across our disciplines of religion, theology, political and constitutional theory, legal and moral philosophy, and positive law and rules; it reaches across fourteen centuries of history; and it is dauntingly plural, divided into innumerable sects and schools of thought.



Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev

By W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 260 pp., including bibliography, appendixes, and index, \$29.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Bhavna Davé

Mikhail Gorbachev's pronounced emphasis on the continued rapprochement of the East and West, and his concurrent eschewing of ideological conflict, have led scholars to consider the limits of Soviet power. These limits in the traditional cold war context, however, need not suggest a similar weakness in Soviet dealings with the Third World. In this light, *Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev* offers a compelling refutation not only of the claim that Gorbachev's "New Thinking" is a tactical ploy to extract the benefits of cooperation from the West without forswearing its traditional military-strategic objectives, but also to the suggestion that neither pressing domestic concerns nor the "crisis" of socialism imply a Soviet disengagement in the Third World.

W. Raymond Duncan, a scholar of Soviet-Latin American relations, and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, a senior analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, provide a clear, balanced, well-researched, and updated analysis of Gorbachev's new, pragmatic approach toward the Third World. Seeking to dispel perceptions of the Soviet threat held by both policymakers and academics, the authors argue that

clarity in understanding the basic nature of the Soviet threat in the Third World will contribute to our ability to adopt rational and appropriate policies to the USSR and toward regional states and situations (p. 21).

While traditional scholars of Soviet-Third World relations emphasize continuities in Soviet policy,¹ and others caution that the New Thinking may be yet another Thermidor,² Duncan and Ekedahl view Gorbachev's policy initiatives in the Third World as a dramatic shift. This shift, which denotes a reassertion of the underlying pragmatism of Soviet policy, seeks to correct the existing imbalance that had previously favored ideological goals. In addition, the deteriorating economic situation, increased ethnic conflict, and the dissi-

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1. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
2. Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, eds., *The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

pation of ideological fervor collectively explain the reduced Soviet military and economic involvement in the Third World. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has managed to maintain its support and position with old clients at lower cost and risk, which speaks for the success of its new approach.

Part one of the book offers a framework for studying Soviet-Third World relations. Outlining Gorbachev's new security and foreign policy precepts, the authors examine Soviet foreign policy behavior and events in a chronological sequence. *New Thinking* represents a pragmatic adjustment of objectives and assigns a greater priority to national interest and economic development, while renouncing costly ideological and military pursuits. Challenging the prevalent view that the foreign policy decision-making process in the Soviet Union is relatively simple—the Marxist-Leninist ideology operates in an environment that inhibits pluralist tendencies—the authors remind us that ideology has never been a primary determinant of Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism has merely provided a context and framework for policy formation while realism has always constituted its core. This sense of realism is evident in the Soviet readiness to come to terms with its diminished status as a superpower.

In part two, Duncan and Ekedahl summarize Gorbachev's interactions with the Third World. The authors view past Soviet involvement in this area more as a reaction to a world of opportunities presented by regional conflicts, instability, and the emergence of local revolutionary forces against imperial legacies, than as a response to US action. At the same time, Duncan and Ekedahl remind us of the reciprocity of interactions which has allowed several Third World countries to pursue their own foreign policy goals. The Soviet role in aiding the processes of nation-building and socialist consolidation in Angola and Mozambique suggest that the USSR is less inclined to sustain compliant supplicants.

In balance, if the Soviet Union's overall objective in the Third World is to limit US influence, it has been fairly successful in advancing this goal, although at a high cost. The enhanced Soviet presence in various regions of the world over the last two decades, most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, speaks of increasing Soviet involvement. The authors contend that Gorbachev's Third World policy following the withdrawal from Afghanistan reflects a growing consolidation of influence rather than a Soviet setback in the region. Duncan and Ekedahl provide a series of specific regional case studies which document their theory.

In the third section of their book, the authors offer a lucid and comprehensive summary of Soviet-Third World relations until 1990. Duncan and Ekedahl systematically discuss Soviet initiatives in resolving regional crises through politically negotiated elements in the afflicted regions. Afghanistan marked a reversal in Soviet policy toward the Third World because it established the precedent of amicable resolution of a regional crisis. The Soviets succeeded in making a timely exit from Afghanistan while maintaining their credibility by accounting for the mistakes of past leaders. Soviet military withdrawal did not undermine extensive military support to the People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan, thus averting a possible destabilization; rather it established a new model for negotiating regional settlements. Similarly, Soviet efforts to shift the regional political balance in favor of moderates in the Middle East offer potentially successful outcomes. Finally, Soviet pressure played an important role in pushing the Sandinistas to declare elections in February 1990. The waning of Soviet ideological and military activism does not signify that the Soviet leadership has made a political or economic retreat from involvement in the Third World, but rather that it has chosen an alternative approach which accords a prominent role to diplomacy and negotiation.

The weakness of the authors' analysis lies primarily in the unexplained origins of New Thinking. Duncan and Ekedahl do not adequately differentiate this recent approach from the deep-rooted pragmatism of "old" thinking. The authors contend that the reformulation of the Third World agenda draws on "progressive Soviet academic thought of the past thirty years that cautioned against an overzealous approach to the exceedingly complex Third World society" (p. 220). Yet they do not delineate how the revisionist academic thinking became the dominant official policy approach, especially since there is little reference to any past academic writings which may allude to such a revisionist view. The authors draw their material primarily from "policy statements by Soviet and Third World leaders, official communiqués, and relevant press commentaries" (p. 3). The journalistic and policy flavor of the book is evident from the numerous citations from Soviet periodicals and US government documents, although Duncan and Ekedahl also make extensive use of regional sources from the Third World press.

The ideological moderation of Soviet New Thinking is far from palatable to radical allies like Cuba, Nicaragua (until early 1990), and the African National Congress, contradicting the authors' assertion that the USSR's goals in the Third World are converging with those of its allies. These same allies view the double-edged sword of reduced economic and military aid and Soviet rapprochement with its former adversaries as a growing desertion of socialist aims. In many cases, this phenomenon has complicated the prospects for regional peace, as the authors rightly note.

Finally, the authors fail to address the likely Soviet response to enhanced US activism in the Third World, an issue made all the more pertinent with the allied military action in the Persian Gulf. A diminished Soviet threat may induce the United States to adopt a belligerent posture in the Third World. At the same time, if the United States does not respond to Gorbachev's peace offensive with its own vision of *perestroika* on Capitol Hill, will the Soviet Union, with or without Gorbachev, keep itself disengaged? Despite a praiseworthy job of examining the challenges from Soviet domestic forces and the discontent of some Soviet allies, Duncan and Ekedahl remain rather oblivious to the impact of an international environment that may not sustain New Thinking.

Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev represents a breakthrough in the analysis of Soviet-Third World policy by casting Soviet New Thinking in

a trustful light without erring toward credulousness. This is one of the most thorough and lucid contemporary discussions on the subject. While this book may still not convert the skeptics, it will certainly enrich the academic and policy perspectives which remain untainted by the specter of Soviet expansionism.



In Search of Poland: The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity, 1980–1989

Arthur R. Rachwald

Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1990, 149 pp., including notes, bibliography, and index, \$14.95 paper.

Reviewed by Patrice M. Dabrowski

In February of 1991 Poland's new prime minister, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, asked western creditors to forgive an incredible 80 percent of the country's hard-currency debt, currently calculated at \$46 billion. The Group of Seven has hesitated to forgive more than 40 percent, hoping to avoid setting a precedent of easy debt forgiveness in the former East bloc when a debt reduction ceiling of 33 percent had been established for African nations.

But should one equate the debt situation of Poland with that of developing countries? An analysis of how Poland's debt came to be so large, as well as the debt's significance for the advent of pluralism in the East bloc, may help justify the more generous forgiveness that Bielecki has suggested. Arthur Rachwald's *In Search of Poland* provides this analysis. Rachwald reaches two conclusions which support Poland's claims for debt reduction: first, the sanctions the United States imposed on Poland and the Soviet Union after the declaration of martial law undoubtedly contributed to the economic decline of the Soviet empire; and second, US objectives in the region—including the lessening of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe—were served by Poland's economic decline through the 1980s.

Poland incurred its first significant foreign currency debt in the 1970s, when the country began opening its markets to the West after the lackluster economic performance of the 1960s. Credit, licenses, and advanced technology from abroad were intended to enable Poland to produce high-quality goods for export to the West and to raise the nation's standard of living. Yet this was not to be. The incongruity of partial reforms in a centrally planned economy, together with the weakened international economic environment resulting in part from the first oil embargo, conspired to undermine Poland's efforts. The result: an absolute decline in production accompanied by growing queues and scarcer goods at a time when Poles were expecting the bounty believed inherent in the western lifestyle. The emerging Solidarity movement presented its first demands to the Communist regime in August of 1980 against the backdrop of a \$20 billion foreign debt.

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Poland's economic plight in the 1970s resembled that of non-oil-producing less-developed countries. Both encountered the unhappy coincidence of a crisis-laden world economy and domestic difficulties in trying to catch up with the West. Further deterioration of the Polish economy in the 1980s, however, cannot be blamed entirely on flawed economic policy. The superpowers' reaction to the Solidarity movement and the resulting pressures placed on the Communist government aggravated Poland's economic deterioration in the 1980s. After martial law was declared in December 1981, the United States imposed economic sanctions upon both Poland and the Soviet Union with the goal of restoring the degree of pluralism that had emerged during the Solidarity period. After the subsequent delegitimation of the independent trade union, Poland lost most-favored-nation status and other economic privileges accorded it by the United States while Solidarity was alive. And, although the Communist regime did yield concessions to the West over time, the United States was slow to restore those privileges, thus accelerating Poland's economic collapse.

In Search of Poland provides an enlightening account of Poland's plight as a hapless pawn in the game of superpower politics. Culling reports from numerous press and intelligence sources for reactions to the formation of an independent trade union, Rachwald chronicles the evolution of the divergent tactics of the Soviet and American governments and explains the different political and economic responses to developments in Poland. This Rachwald does effectively in the first two parts of the book. However, the third section—"The Socialist State and the Union"—is an unsuccessful attempt to address the effects of Solidarity on the postwar political and economic system of state-socialism. Despite thorough documentation and the topic's pertinence to current affairs, Rachwald's treatment is hurried and superficial. He makes some ambiguous assertions about the relationships of various actors. For example, in speaking of the Catholic Church, Rachwald fails to address the church's lack of cohesiveness, illustrated by the contrast between the accommodating inclinations of the Polish episcopate led by Primate Jozef Glemp, and the more radical views of some parish priests as epitomized by the martyred Father Jerzy Popieluszko.¹

In addition, careless imperfections mar an otherwise promising book. In one instance, Rachwald refers to former Party secretary Gierek as "Sierek" and lists him in the index under both spellings. A similar fate befalls journalist Stefan Bratkowski (Bartkowski [sic]) and even the present pope, then Karol Cardinal Wojtyła (Woytyła [sic]). The use of diacritical marks is also uneven.

1. Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, *Konspira: Solidarity Underground* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and Stanislaw Baranczak, *Breathing Under Water and Other Eastern European Essays* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990) discuss this issue more satisfactorily. The former devotes brief sections to the church's relations with both the underground Solidarity movement and the Communist regime during the martial law period (December 1981–July 1983), while the latter's attention to the Polish church and its leaders is more extensive.

To his credit, the author provides a thorough background of Poland's political and economic decline throughout the 1980s and details the economic "leverage" exerted by both superpowers, particularly by the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev's ideological rigidity obstructed a "Polish solution" to the problems of the region and forced the de facto incorporation of Poland into the Soviet economy. Rachwald also describes at length the economically substantial yet politically uncoordinated American support for Solidarity: unionists, big business, bankers, and the government all disagreed on the appropriate means of assistance. The divergence of these approaches illustrates the "profound political dilemma faced by the West": simply, the United States and Western Europe lacked a comprehensive long-term strategy concerning Eastern Europe (p. 51). Even now, one can question whether this situation has changed significantly. Ultimately, the US decision to apply economic sanctions after martial law sounded the death knell for the Polish economy, depriving the country of the foreign credits upon which it had become reliant in the 1970s.

Analysis of the economic damage incurred by this reform-minded nation during the last decade is vital for understanding the dilemmas it currently faces. *In Search of Poland* is an insightful attempt at explaining the domestic and international consequences of the emergence of Solidarity.



My Traitor's Heart: A South African Exile Returns to Face His Country, His Tribe, and His Conscience

By Rian Malan

New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990, 349 pp., \$19.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Daniel Green

At a time when South Africa appears to have finally found the road to reform, many of its people remain stuck in the psychological swamps of the past. They see much of the world through an analytical lens tinted by the unavoidable distinction of race. Rian Malan exemplifies this type of individual. In *My Traitor's Heart*, he places the political culture of South Africa under a magnifying glass in order to examine in sharp detail the lives and experiences of selected South Africans. Malan's own morbid fascination with race and the atrocities which surround South Africa's racial conflict pervade his entire outlook. His heart-wrenching account of the human wreckage left by this clash attempts to illustrate the unavoidability of race as a distinguishing theme in South Africa's current struggle.

My Traitor's Heart describes the endless horror of South African life, particularly for blacks. The first section of the book, entitled "Life in this Strange Place," is an account of Malan's personal struggle growing up as the son of an established *Afrikaner* family. Two hundred years earlier, the Malans played a key role in the founding of the system of apartheid and its pursuit of racial domination. Although many might challenge Malan's historical account, his interpretation illuminates the basis for his perspective regarding the vital issue of race in the South African struggle.

The book opens with a story of the author's ancestor, Dawid Malan, who eloped in the 1780s with a slave woman, leaving behind the privileged lifestyle he maintained in the white-dominated southern region of the Cape. His escape north across the Great Fish River wrought a profound change in his attitude, however, converting him to a racist ideologue. Malan notes, "All I know is that he was one man when he crossed the river into Africa and another when he reappeared, and that his transformation paralleled the transformation of his entire tribe" (p. 16). Thus the movement north into the "unknown" section of Africa is what transformed the civilized white man into the racist Boer. As Malan describes it, the white man developed a fundamental "law" which to this day remains the key to the *Afrikaner* mentality and to much of South African society: "You have to put the black man down, plant your foot on

his neck and keep him that way forever, lest he spring up and slit your white throat" (p. 18).

The law was a relatively simple one, but its effects on the psyche of all South Africans have been dramatic. Malan focuses on these effects in his second section entitled "Tales of Ordinary Murder," a sequence of detailed narratives which illustrate the human tragedies of race in South African society. The stories in this section range from the black rage of the "Hammerman," a Zulu laborer who murders whites in the middle of the night, to Samuel Mope, a passive Zionist whose thirteen-year-old son is shot dead by a white member of the South African Police. Each violent story describes the physical and psychological destruction of South Africa, where, according to Malan, all atrocities are committed along racial lines. Although the policy of apartheid officially created these racial distinctions, Malan believes they existed long before, from the time whites moved north into the uncharted territory of the "Dark Continent," isolated from the influences of Enlightenment and blinded by the instinct to survive.

Malan does not limit his work to a brief history of racism in South Africa; it is simply a starting point. Beginning with a discussion of the personal psychological paradox which forced him to leave the country, Malan proceeds to illustrate the general plight of the white liberal, based on the problems of race. For him the pressure to acquiesce to one of two polar demands in South African politics became overwhelming. He writes, "I ran because I wouldn't carry a gun for apartheid, and because I wouldn't carry a gun against it" (p. 73). According to this point of view, the choice for South Africans is limited to one of two extremes. Yet the issue is further complicated by Malan's psychological connection to blacks. He writes of his childhood: "It was quite clear, even to a little boy, that blacks were violent and inscrutable, and yet I loved them" (p. 73). Inflicted with what he terms a "paradox," Malan agonizes over both his love for blacks and his fear of them. Unable to resolve this paradox, Malan flees to the United States.

The author extends his analysis to the plight of other white liberals who are able to resolve this paradox through the vision of socialism. Malan writes, "[The] first step on the road to redemption was to convince yourself that South Africa was being torn apart by class struggle, not race war" (p. 137). The second step, he adds, "was to move into alignment with the black working class and its self-proclaimed vanguard, the non-racial, socialist ANC" (p. 179). As Malan sees it, many whites were willing to sacrifice class privilege to rid themselves of the guilt and complicity "that preyed on their minds like a nightmare." In the end, however, Malan believes that the whites who joined the struggle were naive—the conflict remained one of race, not class.

Malan implies that whites have virtually no place in the anti-apartheid movement. He presents stories of white sympathizers who get stoned and even killed when the township barricades start burning and the petrol bombs start flying. For those whites who claim a position in the struggle, Malan asks: "How do you fight apartheid and build a just society if the people you were doing it for stoned you because your skin was white?" (p. 144).

Malan's exclusive focus on race imbues *My Traitor's Heart* with a provocative and sensationalist quality which obscures the depth of South Africa's social problems. The author devotes an entire book to multiple killings and continuous violence with the hope that by the end, the "visionary reader" he refers to in the book's opening sentence will come to see the country as nothing less than "Africa, and the ancient mysteries of race" (p. 79). South African society is reduced to two main ingredients—black and white; or one question—race. Malan's work thus becomes ironically similar to the analysis offered by the very American television journalists he condemns: namely, that South Africa is made up of savages plagued by the intellectual confines of racism. Malan is unable to recognize that the anti-apartheid movement also addresses the issues of repression and human compassion. Such themes are not race-specific, nor are they class-specific; they can encompass any individual who desires to take part in the fight.

Malan overlooks Steven Biko's Black Consciousness (BC) organization, which fought against apartheid on a purely racial platform, but never achieved the level of support obtained by non-racial organizations such as the ANC. Why were more blacks not siding with BC if the struggle is simply a question of race? Are white liberals being manipulated? If this is true, then blacks will surely take revenge on whites at the first possible opportunity, regardless of whether the whites participated in the struggle against apartheid.

This kind of thinking, however, merely enhances whites' fears and supports the myth that Africans are inherently violent. While fear is a significant element in the mind of many whites, Malan's exaggerated treatment of the subject does not serve South Africa, and it certainly does not improve the image of blacks. Thousands of people of all races have risked their lives, been tortured, and died in the struggle for a non-racial South Africa. They have made an important contribution to the changes that are taking place today, which gives them, regardless of color, a standing in the struggle's achievements. This, however, Malan chooses not to portray.

If Malan intended to intoxicate his reader with images of violence and portraits of human degradation, he certainly achieved his goal. But if he intended to impart some understanding of the problems facing South Africa, he failed. *My Traitor's Heart* is filled with vivid descriptions of anger, despair, and trauma; the book takes the reader on a spectacular journey through the bowels of South African society. The sensationalist nature of this work, however, destroys its intellectual utility.

Malan deserves credit for addressing a vital piece of South Africa's reality. People are continually dying in South Africa—an average of twenty people a day, for example, in recent factional fighting. Moreover, South Africans are finding that they must make a choice, not just whether to fight for change at all, but with which group. Such decisions not only pull on the roots of South Africa's historically perverted society, but also tear at the heart of the South African psyche.

Malan succeeds in showing us what life in South Africa looks like to an introspective who is still struggling with the psychological legacies of the

past, and who views his country through the distorting lens of race. However, the value of the book hinges on the mindfulness of the reader. Because of his exclusive focus on race in South Africa's struggle, Malan places many other important aspects of South Africa's current situation in an improper context. For those who can keep that in mind, *My Traitor's Heart* is a valuable book.



A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941–1946

By Randall Bennett Woods

Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1990, 473 pp., with index, endnotes, and bibliography, \$42.50 cloth.

Reviewed by Jamie Bronstein

Decisionmakers in different governments can err in their attempts to preempt each other by failing to take into account the domestic pressures that prevail on other governments. Diplomatic historians can make the same mistake by ignoring the complex domestic forces which influence and even warp a government's international policies. In *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941–1946*, Randall Bennett Woods not only avoids this trap, but also provides an entertaining and scholarly study of Great Britain and the United States in the immediate postwar period.

As the title suggests, Woods argues that the wartime and postwar periods saw a fundamental shift in the power balance of the Anglo-American relationship. His examination of the economic negotiations between Great Britain and the United States pointedly shows that the latter was able to wield an almost embarrassing degree of leverage over the former. Faced with straitened options, Britain came under pressure to accept multilateralism—a multi-sided, internationally managed system of commercial and monetary competition—not only for ideological reasons, but also to ensure continued US aid.

Richard Gardner outlined the implications of this same assertion over thirty years ago in his seminal book on the period, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy*.¹ Where Woods breaks new ground, however, is in his analysis of the pressures which various parts of the American bureaucracy applied to the British concept of multilateralism, thereby straining and almost cracking the Anglo-American bond in pursuit of US self-interest. Woods contends that Britain originally intended for multilateralism to be much more than an economic vision—it was to be a new world order, the British answer to Stalinism.

In practice, America transformed multilateralism despite the power struggles within the Departments of Treasury and State under Roosevelt and Truman. Furthermore, US economic nationalism and an American conception of capitalism allowed aggrandizement to overshadow international cooperation. As multilateralism was transfigured into a selfish system, Woods argues, the United States began a retreat into strategic and diplomatic pragmatism and

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1. Richard Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Cooperation in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).

isolationism which could have been disastrous; he contends that it was only reversed by the need to counter Soviet boldness in Europe. In effect, the cold war salvaged the Anglo-American relationship.

According to Woods, an understanding of postwar multilateralism begins with the fundamental economic paradigm shift in Anglo-American relations, which he identifies as the Lend-Lease Program. In 1941, for the first time in the war, the United States stopped insisting that munitions be supplied to the British on a cash and carry basis. Instead, the United States supplied equipment as a loan, in return for the use of British-owned military bases; without immediate repayment, Lend-Lease placed the American economy on the line. But American negotiators, under less pressure than the beleaguered British to live for the war-torn moment, were already looking to the future. They wanted to link the lend-lease rewards to future benefits in terms of reduced British trade discrimination. Article VII of the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, therefore, was intended to commit Britain to end the economic discrimination which she practiced in her Empire and dominions.

In Britain, the wartime coalition government splintered over the issue of ending discrimination; these divisions would persist into the postwar period. On the right, "empire isolationists" like Leopold Amery and Lord Beaverbrook combined nostalgia with nationalism. Woods describes their arguments through their own words, highlighting their realism. On the left, Labour felt free commercial competition abroad was incompatible with socialism at home. In the middle stood the advocates of multilateralism, led by John Maynard Keynes, who were determined to muddle through to an agreement with the Americans; ultimately, they accomplished this to the detriment of British financial health.

Having set up a backdrop for British response to American initiatives, Woods moves on to the re-emergence of multilateralism in the Atlantic Charter. This document is significant as the only Anglo-American statement of war aims produced during the conflict. It specifically mentioned elimination of economic discrimination as one of the keys to future peace. Once again, Woods claims, Britain was forced to assent to a disagreeable slant on the multilateralist concept, in order to ensure US aid to Europe. The British government still hoped the postwar plan adopted would be Lord Keynes's brainchild rather than a US product. Woods skillfully mixes biography and anecdote with his chronological recapitulation of the negotiations and analysis of the process. American and British economic policy in the 1940's, he argues, was primarily the work of a few high-level men championing specific causes—a clash of titans.

On the British side, Keynes—whom Woods describes here in all his delightful eccentricity—emerged to lead the negotiations. His brainchild was the Clearing Union, a plan which would have provided for free convertibility of currencies through a central international bank, all pegged to a central currency called "bancor." According to Woods, Keynes was able to change the British stance suddenly if he deemed flexibility necessary to salvage his overall plan. His personality was forceful enough to stifle critics on the left

and the right, including the Bank of England. But as we discover later in the story, Keynes's star quality would lead to his undoing. Woods condemns him for concluding the disastrous 1945 Anglo-American Financial Agreement: "Keynes was a creative artist rather than a social scientist or diplomat. . . . In the end the beauty and power of his vision blinded him to the economic if not the political realities of the situation" (p. 361).

Wood's depiction of the development of the American negotiating position is more complex. He portrays Roosevelt as a weak, suggestible president who neglected traditional routes of negotiation in favor of special envoys. In the economic sphere, these included Averell Harriman, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Harry Dexter White, whom he elevated to a kind of unofficial Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. American policies under Roosevelt could therefore be "captured" and changed by the strongest personalities of the hour, within the Department of State, the Treasury, or Congress, or by political circumstances, including looming elections or the presence of other sensitive legislation in Congress.

Woods harbors more respect for Harry Truman's leadership, but notes that the infighting between departments was just as intense during his administration. Still, no matter who had the upper hand within the administration at any given time, according to Woods, the Americans were chiefly distinguished by their failure to listen effectively to the British position: "Each of the principal actors on the United States side decided early on what Britain needed and what the administration could afford politically and financially to give" (p. 353).

According to Woods, by 1943 Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill were convinced that any lasting postwar political arrangement in Europe would have to be backed with American funds. They were therefore more tractable on such important economic questions as the American commitment to full employment, and the US refusal to eliminate its own tariffs alongside the British system of discrimination. The American government, he argues, had begun to see its own flawed version of multilateralism, embodied in the 1945 version of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, as an alternative to implementing domestic reforms.

Writing for the historian as well as the economist, Woods makes few assumptions about his reader's background in economic arcana. In the opening chapters, he provides excellent thumbnail explanations of terms as their use becomes necessary. Later chapters entertain through anecdotes and descriptions of the men who made multilateralism possible—and, at times, impossible. Woods also mines letters, journals, and diaries, such as those of British negotiator Richard Meade of the 1943 delegation. These reminiscences humanize an otherwise abstract debate, recalling the flavor of the negotiations, the excitement these men felt while constructing the new economic order, and the contrast between Old World and New.

Yet as the history progresses, Woods's emphasis on complete documentation occasionally causes his narrative to bog down in exacting recapitulation of political give-and-take on economic programs. The same attention to detail

which makes his argument convincing can also cause the reader to lose track of the larger picture. Despite the heavy going of some of the central chapters, however, Woods's excellent conclusion ties the various threads of his argument into an admirably tight package. He also reminds the reader of the importance of personality in this period's history, by summing up the contributions and fatal flaws of vision in his "cast of characters." The whole work, in showing how close Britain and the United States came to ruining their friendship over economic issues, well illustrates some of the drawbacks democratic systems face when formulating foreign policy.



War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis

By Robert C. North

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 298 pp., with index, \$48.50 cloth.

Reviewed by Robert Charles

In a departure from its traditional practice of naming a "Person of the Year," *Time* magazine designated Endangered Earth as the "Planet of the Year" for 1988. "Now, more than ever, the world needs leaders who can inspire their fellow citizens with a fiery sense of mission, not a nationalistic or military campaign but a universal crusade to save the planet," stated the editors in explaining their precedent-breaking choice.¹ The same readiness for innovation, and a similar sense of need for urgent action, characterize Robert C. North's *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*. Noting that "the 1990s appear to provide us with a historical instant that could be critical for the human species" (p. 262), North, professor emeritus at Stanford University, pursues two objectives in a work that is part theoretical treatise part plea for action on peace and environmental issues.

Acknowledging a debt to general systems theory and cybernetics for his conceptual framework, North synthesizes a wide range of approaches to international relations and world politics in order to address many of today's most pertinent problems, ranging from human destruction of the environment to the continuing threat posed by nuclear war. North offers this work as the fruit of a long scholarly quest for "a set of generic, even universal, *processes* that would be found to function across societies and through time and to encompass social, psychological, technological, economic, political, military, and other phenomena and somehow capture their interplay" (p. ix). Out of these processes North distills "action strategies" which he hopes will eventually "replace war as the ultimate solution for crises within and between nations" (p. 260). His goal is a "win-win world" characterized by "peaceful relations on a global level" using "nonviolent diplomacy as an ultimate solution of international conflicts" and demonstrating that "the state as we know it today might turn out to be part of a violent but relatively fleeting stage in social evolution" (pp. 258-59).

North opens with a four-fold critique of current theoretical approaches to international relations and politics. In the first place, he finds them insufficiently attuned to either processes of change or to what Hedley Bull has called

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1. *Time* Vol. 133, No. 1 (2 January 1989): 30.

“non-historical alternatives.”² In North’s estimation, the dominant existing paradigms (mercantilism, liberalism, Marxism-Leninism, realism, and idealism) tend to “treat state and international systems as *states of being* rather than as *processes of becoming*—except Marxism-Leninism, which presents us with an improbable theory of development, ‘progress,’ and ‘peace’ resulting from bitter conflict” (p. 9). As a corrective, North counters with “process” language suggesting the potential for intentional evolution of beliefs, habits, conditions, and institutions, as well as for the emergence of peaceful relations and environmental responsibility on a global level.

North also criticizes the dominant paradigms for their indifference to the contribution of the social sciences to the study of international relations. In the areas of deterrence, crisis-management, war, de-escalation, and peace, he argues, none of the main theories “systematically or persuasively relates human cognitions, affects, needs, wants, desires, and demands” to questions pertaining to the exercise and distribution of power (p. 9). Accordingly, North draws heavily on anthropology, sociology, psychology, and learning theory in elaborating the forces at work within the various levels of the integrated ecological system that he discerns at the global level.

Third, because of the fragmented state of theory, peace and war issues have been discussed in terms of cold war deterrence strategies and narrowly conceived security studies which overlook emerging issues such as worldwide debt, environmental degradation, and other problems. North maintains that these “islands of theory” have not yet been consolidated into a unified and coherent conceptual framework. His objective, therefore, is “to derive and link together three critical *processes*—*war, peace, and survival*—from a common set of interconnected variables interacting within a unified conceptual framework” (p. 3).

North’s final critique is a moral one. Taking aim at the realist and neo-realist schools, North objects that issues of war and peace have been “reduced to functions of power redistributions—an old idea elegantly remodeled that does not tell us much about the source(s) of power *nor about the responsibility (if any) of human beings in deciding how it is to be used*” (p. 4). In laying out his own approach, North emphasizes that “*individual human beings are the prime actors on all four image levels. . . . Strictly construed, the individual . . . is the sole thinking, feeling, acting system in politics, as contrasted with the state.*” (pp. 10–11). The “action strategies” already noted are evidence of North’s refusal merely to trust either the forces of history or a self-regulating international system for ethical guidance.

North then proposes a framework capable of encompassing existing theories and facilitating the accumulation of additional data. His conceptual synthesis can best be characterized as the integration of general systems theory into an extension of the analytical framework developed by Kenneth Waltz in his

2. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 255–56.

1959 classic, *Man, the State, and War*. It will be recalled that Waltz located explanations for the causes of war in the individual human (first image), the internal structure of states (second image), and the international system of states (third image).³ North, in turn, proposes a fourth image that ignores international borders: "an emerging global system of which the other three images are component parts" (p. 4). Whereas the first three images focus on the nature and interaction of individuals and human collectivities (within and among states), the fourth image "distinguishes between natural and social environments and allows for the systematic investigation of the ways in which they interact." (p. 25). North notes that "for centuries, we proceeded as if we were out to conquer nature. Today, with an increasingly global perspective, we begin to recognize ourselves again as creatures of nature" (p. 185). The "distributions and impacts" of activity in the first three images "operate across national borders and register outside the international system and its formal jurisdictions—reaching into the ocean and its depths, penetrating the atmosphere, and expanding into outer space" (p. 188).

According to North, "only a four-image framework can demonstrate the extent to which war, peace, environmental, and other current problems impinge on each other" (p. 25). The major sections of the book elaborate this framework. North identifies seven processes which furnish the dynamics of the whole system: information and resource processing; demands, capabilities, actions, and linkages; feedback, 'learning,' adaptation, and 'social evolution'; bargaining, leverage, and coalition formation; uneven growth and development; cooperation, coalition formation and unification; and conflict escalations (p. 11).

The author's prescriptions for a peaceful and environmentally responsible world are grounded in a belief that we eventually can evolve our way out of the "security dilemma" which has been a perennial source of war and which has given rise since 1945 to deterrence strategies based on nuclear weapons. He believes traditional security threats have been overtaken by new ones: what endangers human security now are "population pressures, global debt, environmental depletions and toxicities, economic dysfunctions, drugs, AIDS, and other corrosions of a highly interactive, technologically advanced and mobile world society," none of which are "resolvable by fiat or by the exercise of force within or between nations" (pp. 241–42). Noting that the institution of slavery was left behind (though failing to point out how), North asks any basis for believing that in some analogous way we might grow out of our dependence upon state-centered monopolies of violence for the maintenance of 'security'? (p. 240). North argues that change is possible even though "acceptance of non-violent diplomacy as an ultimate solution of international conflicts would seem to require a global-scale transformation in human values, beliefs, ideologies, policies, risk calculations, and habit structures." In the short term North is not optimistic, but he thinks that "sustainable innovations

3. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

in human relationships" could "emerge from trial-and-error adaptation" and "long-term sociopolitical evolution" (p. 259).

To begin the process of change, North calls for systematic action and transformation throughout the entire system. "At the very least, global peace will require a global constitution . . . (possibly a strengthening of the UN Charter and a widening of its franchise) and a four-image-level reliance upon positive reciprocations." Second, he suggests a "step-by-step evolutionary rejection of beliefs, habits, conditions, and institutions that encourage people everywhere to rely upon violence in its many forms." Third, North wishes to strengthen international law and institutions and hopes to see increasing state willingness to pursue open objectives. Changes of this magnitude "will require active initiatives and support from peace-prone institutions outside of government (churches, schools, civic organizations)." Fourth, appropriately designed global regimes in

conflicted issue areas (economic, political, cultural, and environmental) . . . could transcend narrow calculations of national interest and facilitate win-win agreements between states of vastly different capabilities. . . . International regimes are not surrogates for world government . . . [but] the process of regime nesting suggests the possibility, as yet largely unexplored, that it might substitute for power competition and deterrence in the furtherance of strategic and other manifestations of *shared security* (pp. 259-61).

War, Peace, Survival deserves appreciation on a number of points, but it also leaves a series of questions unresolved. First, North's attempts to provide a conceptual synthesis for international relations theory in a period of increasing fragmentation and heterogeneity is in itself both admirable and provocative. A work such as this, which sketches out the contours of a new paradigm, is an important complement to the plethora of competing approaches to understanding world politics.⁴ Second, North's emphasis on non-military threats to human and global security and the interaction between humanity and nature is a welcome corrective to perspectives on international relations that focus primarily and almost exclusively on the security dilemma of inter-state relations. Third, North's attempt to combine theory and practice in a manner which synthesizes both analysis and action strategies is a refreshing alternative for statesmen and interest groups alike. While both the attainability of a peaceful world and the adequacy and clarity of his recommendations are open to honest questioning, North's suggestions, in combination with his process approach and organismic images, do not produce a sense of "paralysis by analysis."

Yet, perhaps ironically, it is this very process approach, this reliance on organismic images and heavy borrowing from the social sciences, that repre-

4. See, for example, James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).

sents the work's greatest weakness. First, is the actual behavior of states toward each other (the third image) clarified by this systems approach, or do the biological metaphors and analogies drawn with the mutual relations of individual citizens of the same state somehow miss the point? For those who question whether general systems theory and the social sciences in general can be directly and fruitfully applied to the study of politics, *War, Peace, Survival* will prove to be somewhat irrelevant or disappointing.

Second, much of international politics revolves around moral dilemmas and difficult choices for states as well as individuals. North's attempt to blend the deterministic flavor of systems theory—which tends to view political systems as running autonomously⁵—with a call for individual and collective action produces a perplexing mix of resignation and exhortation.

Finally, can individuals and states evolve their way out of the security dilemma? One would like to believe, with North, that the problematic relations among sovereign states are solvable via a strengthened United Nations or some other form of world government. This change would do away with an international system made up of sovereign states, thus abolishing war and giving way to concerted global action on threats to human and environmental well-being. Yet the recent war in the Middle East has provided a tragic triple setback to such hope: it was waged to defend the right of a sovereign state to its political independence and territorial integrity; it was fought under a strong United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to expel one state from another; and it has created an ecological and environmental catastrophe of staggering proportions in the Persian Gulf.

North's description of the Middle East is even more poignant now, given the chain of events since August 1990: "The whole region could be viewed as a multidimensional Tragedy of the Planet in which all were at fault and none was to blame—a melancholy charge that could be leveled against many other parts of the planet" (p. 241). Sadly, at the beginning of the 1990s, we seem to be missing our rendezvous with the historical instant that could be critical for the future of humanity and the earth.

5. For an analysis of systems theory see Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), 75.



