

“Who Wants to Migrate in Africa and Why?”

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Section 1: Introduction

Migration has been a fact of life since the genesis of human beings but it looks different in contemporary times. The conception of “migration” is no longer sending the strongest son on a long walk or a lonely ship and waiting for his letter home, possibly never hearing from him again. One family member can migrate and stay in contact with the rest of the family both emotionally and financially, with entire economies of some countries being propped up by remittances. However, the reasons that people migrate are fundamentally familiar. Human beings leave their homes and their home countries in search of new resources, opportunities, knowledge, and experiences or to escape or avoid undesirable circumstances.

Over the past few years, migration has become an increasingly relevant academic and political topic. This international issue is especially prevalent in the African continent, where migrant stocks have increased from 15 million in 2000 to over 25 million in 2017 (Haas 2010). However, these dramatic numbers hide a substantial diversity in the types of migrants. There are two broad, theoretical categories into which migrants can be sorted: low-skilled migrants fleeing poverty and high-skilled migrants looking for opportunities that match their credentials.

Think of the tragic news reports and photos of desperate Libyans being left at sea by the governments of Italy, Spain, and Greece. In this situation, migration is often a necessary, rather than voluntary, action. Their migration decision is perceived as the only solution for their survival, which is why the process is sometimes called “survival migration” (Betts 2010). There is also a competing stereotype of migration: the brain drain. This theory says that the richest and most educated Africans are leaving their home countries in search of better wages or opportunities, usually in Europe, the United States, or Canada. When these rich, educated Africans leave, it holds the development of their home countries, and the entire continent, back.

Both types of migration (survival and brain drain) occur. However, as is common with most popular stereotypes of Africa, it does not capture the depth and scope of the African migration experience. Africa has been significantly changed by new advancements in technology and mobility. Since the 1960 wave of African independence, states have had to rebuild from very little, often with arbitrary borders drawn by colonizers. Migration allows people go where they have an allegiance, to create a new life for themselves either in another African state or in another continent.

This paper was born out of an idea to try to test which hypothesis was ultimately correct. However, rather than irrefutably proving one of these two limiting stereotypes correct, my thesis will examine the question with nuance. I expect that there will be no exact profile of the African who wants to leave their home country. This paper, instead, will examine which demographic characteristics and attitudes have a significant effect on whether or not the person wants to leave their home country. It will use qualitative survey data completed by Afrobarometer to answer the question “Who Wants to Migrate in Africa and Why?” In the context of a changing, ever-more-mobile world, this question and this paper will contribute to existing migration research by showing what types of people have the desire and plans to leave their home countries, by country and region in the African continent.

Using merged survey data from 34 African countries, this paper attempts to further an understanding of who African migrants are by investigating demographic characteristics of individuals determined to migrate. In doing so, I hope to identify the differences in demographics and motivations of migrants by African region. I plan to answer this question by conducting an original econometric analysis of Afrobarometer data to determine whether characteristics such as

age, educational attainment, political ideas, and socio-economic status have an effect on the decision to migrate.

This paper will have several policy implications. In order to better prepare for the various economic and social outcomes of these migration flows, it is imperative that governments understand the root causes of migration, including what pushes (or pulls) people to leave. Switching state identities is a political act. Governments can use their knowledge of what makes people leave to attempt to make people stay, facilitate their leaving, or plan for both or either. Migration has shaped civilization and will continue to do so in new ways as the world changes quickly. Practically, my paper will shed light on a world-changing process from the most exciting developing region of the globe. Academically, I will provide a perspective from the citizens themselves, where most migration economics papers count flows into and out of countries without figuring out *why* people are leaving, in their own words.

The rest of this paper will be presented as follows: Section Two will be a literature review of relevant sources to contextualize my findings. It will also provide background information on the current political, economic and social situations in various African regions. Section Three will describe my data and Section Four will report on my methodology. The data will be from Afrobarometer and my methodology will include running econometric regressions to show which factors (demographics and attitudes) affect people's willingness to migrate. Section Five will report the results. Sections Six will analyze the results and discuss if they are consistent with our hypothesis. Section Seven will conclude.

Section Two: Literature Review

This paper seeks to better understand the reasons behind African individuals' choice to migrate; what factors play a role in their decision-making process. While the nature of my data limits me in the number of different factors I can examine (Afrobarometer only asked 100 questions that I did not choose), a large amount of academic literature already exists on the subject, providing a rich amount of information to better contextualize this study. The purpose of this literature review is to present a summary of the significant research that has already been completed the study of recent African migration, since approximately 1960. I looked for articles that touched on the demographics and motivations of people leaving their home countries. This literature review will segue into background and summary research on a variety of fields relevant to this paper. First, I will explain the most relevant theoretical models of migration. Next, I will explore the history of migration within and from Africa since the period of independence in the 1960's. Then, I will highlight the differences in migration patterns by African region to contextualize the regional data analysis I do later in the paper. Finally, I will touch on the differences between intra and extra continental migration. This section is structured to move from theoretical to historical to current.

Theoretical Models of Migration

Push versus pull factors are a popular way to look at motivations to emigrate. Push factors are any contributors that would cause a person to want to leave their home country (negative conditions there). Pull factors are positive conditions in the country to which they are emigrating. I am mostly engaging with push factors in my data analysis (negative living conditions and experienced violence), but the framework is useful. Push and pull factors are two very broad components of the decision to migrate.

In an important study on 14 OECD countries, Francesco Ortega and Giovanni Peri constructed an experiment evaluating the relative importance of the push and pull factors, defined as domestic and international economic conditions respectively, in migrants' decision to leave. They find migration flows to be generally "exogenous to the economic conditions of the country of destination (pull factor)" (Ortega 2009), indicating a relative importance in push factors relative to pull factors.

In a paper titled "International Migration: a panel data analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows," Anna Maria Mayda uses panel data techniques to evaluate the reasons why people immigrated from OECD countries between 1984 and 1996 (2005). While this falls outside the time frame covered in this paper, it offers a helpful analysis of push versus pull factors for inter-country immigration. Its conclusion is that pull factors, specifically income opportunities in the destination country, significantly increase the size of emigration rates. She also finds that distance is the most significant cost of migration. This seems obvious, but it shows how desperate people must be to make a long journey across countries and continents. It also shows that wealthier, more educated people will have an easier time migrating, which could be a significant contributor to the brain drain (Mayda 2005). The brain drain is the phenomenon where educated individuals leave their home countries for better opportunities elsewhere. Finally, by examining the characteristics of the countries that lead to emigration, Mayda uses econometrics to find that poor institutions are a significant push factor. Both push and pull factors are significant components of an individual's decision to migrate.

A paper called "International Economic Assistance and Migration: The Case of Sub-Saharan Countries" by Filippo Belloc shows that Official Development Assistance (ODA), aid money from wealthy countries to poor countries, increases the amount of emigration from 48

Sub-Saharan African countries (2015). He explains that this is because emigration is largely caused by pull factors. When people are living in poverty rather than desperate poverty, they are pulled to emigration rather than pushed. They see relatively more opportunities in other countries and chase them by investing their very limited capital into the migration process. The ODA increases peoples' income from labor, which allows them to more easily cover the costs of migration and contributes to international socioeconomic networks which serve to show people what they are missing and encourage emigration. This contributes to my paper because it shows how income level influences peoples' decisions to leave their home countries (Belloc 2015).

In addition to the push/pull factor debate in migration studies, two differing stereotypes about migration from Africa have captured scholars' imaginations. They study whether the popular conception of refugee migration or the "brain drain" hypothesis is more correct. Refugee migration is the idea, amplified by Western media, that African migrants are overwhelmingly destitute and desperate, traveling long distances on boat or by foot to reach Europe or North America. Contrastingly, the brain drain hypothesis is that well-educated Africans are leaving their home countries in search of better opportunities and compensation for their educations. The African Development Group wrote a report on the latter phenomenon. Between 1960 and 1989, an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 highly skilled African workers and professionals left for Europe and North America, representing about 30% of Sub-Saharan Africa's highly skilled personnel (Shimeles 2010). Most of this movement by professionals and other highly skilled workers was away from the continent, but a few African nations, like Nigeria and Botswana benefited from the arrival of well-trained Africans from other countries.

According to this report, the brain drain looks very different in the past three decades than from 1960 to 1990. Between 1990 and 2000 alone, emigration to OECD countries by the

highly skilled increased at an annual rate of 2.5%. Emigrations by those with some high school education increased by 6.6%. Right after independence, in the 1960's, the highly educated had great aspirations for their home countries. They wanted to stay and build up the nation. However, after decades of disappointing governance, they are more willing to seek personal gain in other countries. "Governance conditions matter for the rate of skilled emigration from Africa, explaining about 10% of the overall variation with large individual coefficients even after controlling for differences in per capita income levels, time changes, and unobserved country specific effects." (Shimeles 2010). The transition from educated people wanting to stay in their home countries to build them up, to wanting to migrate elsewhere for better opportunities, can be explained by country and time variation in governance conditions. As the government gets worse, educated people are more likely to leave. For typical African countries, poor governance, bad socioeconomic conditions, and political persecutions seem to be strongly correlated with the incidence of skilled emigration.

In conversation with the refugee/brain drain debate, economists Oded Stark and C. Simon Fan theorized about whether the "brain drain" is accompanied by a "brain gain" for the sending countries (2007). They found that, compared to a closed economy, an economy open to migration has higher prospective returns to human capital in the home country in the long run. However, in the short-run, there are negative consequences of high-skilled emigration. There are some individuals who got additional education to migrate, are not able to do so, and end up unemployed in their home countries with skills that are mismatched to the demands of their home country's job market. However, in the long run, the brain drain leads to a brain gain for the home country. As more people are educated, some migrate for better opportunities and some stay in the home country, albeit sometimes unemployed. Over time, a greater percentage of a

country's population ends up getting educated whether or not they actually migrate. This leads to educated individuals who prioritize school in their childrens' lives. The potential for immigration in the lives of parents motivated them to get an education. A proportion of those parents will not end up being able to migrate. However, they still have the education which improves the domestic labor force of the home country and increases intergenerational effects of education (Fan & Stark 2007).

Both the push/pull framework and the refugee vs brain drain hypotheses inform the way that scholars have been thinking about migration, particularly in developing regions such as Africa. Researchers have tried to empirically prove whether migrants are pushed out of their home countries by negative circumstances or are pulled to their destination countries by opportunities in the new place. The conclusion, and the one I find in this paper, is that it is impossible to dissect the extremely personal decision to migrate into an either push or pull framework. People migrate because of a combination of these factors and many more personal motivators. Just like the motivations, the answer to "refugee or brain drain?" is both. It is true that there is a significant refugee crisis out of Africa and between countries, but it is overstated in the popular imagination. The majority of extremely poor people in the continent do not have the financial means to migrate, while educated individuals do. The brain drain has a fairly negative name and connotation, but in fact can be good for the country in the long term and aid development.

History of Migration

The history of migration in Africa since the 1960's, when a lot of countries gained independence, offers helpful context for the current migration landscape. The 2016 paper "African migration: trends, patterns, drivers" by Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Hein De Haas

offers a thorough review of African migration trends since 1960. They found that since the 1980's, there has been an acceleration of Africans emigrating from the continent. This shift has a lot to do with the introduction of the visa from European states. This paper engages a lot with the refugee stereotype and instead finds that increasing migration out of Africa is driven by development and social transformation that increase Africans' ability and autonomy to migrate.

After African independence, migration has increasingly been about urbanization and population transfer from inland, marginal, rural areas to fertile agricultural areas. Over time, however, high-immigration intensity has decreased which reflects a decreasing trend of intra-African migration, calling into question the popular conception of African migration as high and rapidly increasing. Migration intensity is calculated by dividing the number of emigrants from a country by the population of the same country. When the majority of Africa existed under colonial rules, mobility between countries might have been easier than it is today. Colonial rulers did not have a strong incentive to crack down on intra-African migration, especially if two countries were under the same colonial authority. Post-independence, new countries demonstrated and fortified their countries' sovereignty by enforcing strict border controls. Conversely, some migration has occurred as a result of the post-independence period in Africa. Decades of conflict and infrastructural issues in some African countries incentivized migration. The governments of some sending countries encouraged migration as a way to get remittances back to their economies.

Overall, between 1960 and 2000, intra-African migration has shown a declining trend, while extra-continental migration has shown an increasing trend. The increase in extra-continental migration mostly reflects the high emigration intensity from North African countries to Europe given their proximity. East Africa carried the decline in intra-continental migration.

These patterns reflect trends, but overall intra-African migration is still dominant over extra-continental. West Africa is a good example of this trend because it mostly consists of smaller countries in land and population size. Smaller countries have more of a tendency to trade people across borders. From 1960 to 2000, extra-continental emigration from Africa has increased with better technology and mobility. Intra-continental migration has decreased in intensity in relative terms, mostly due to new countries establishing their sovereignty with stricter border controls, but still remains the dominant type of migration (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016).

Differing Trends by African Region

Later in this paper, I will analyze the various types of people who want to leave their home countries by African region. To contextualize that analysis, this section will summarize research that has already been completed on migration trends by region in Africa. Each region is made up of between three (Central Africa) and fifteen (West Africa) countries. Tables 3 and 4 and Chart 1 show how I code the countries into regions consistent with UN divisions. Although there are plenty of nuances and differences between each county within each region, it is helpful to analyze them in a group if only because they are united by a similar geography.

Overall, France is the most common destination country for emigrants from Africa followed by Cote D'Ivoire, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the U.S. The total share of African emigrants living in Western Europe, Canada, the U.S., and Australia is about 37%. This figure is contrary to the notion that the bulk of African emigrants are headed to those countries only. However, these countries account for more than 65% of migrants who leave the continent, as the majority of people who leave their African home country remain in the continent. In particular, since the 1970's, West Africa has dominated as the sub-region with the highest mobility rate due to its coordination of immigration across nation states. East Africa is a destination for refugees

and South Africa has served as the main destination for emigrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. More than 90% of emigrants from North Africa are moving outside of the continent towards Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Each African region has its own set of migration patterns both for sending and receiving migrants (Shimeles 2010).

Joseph Yaro's "Migration in West Africa Patterns" is helpful not only for analysis of West Africa, but because it delves into themes relevant to this entire paper (2009). He summarizes and contextualizes the various types of migration that have been occurring in West Africa from colonial migration, to rural-urban migration, to agricultural migration. Finally, he discusses the brain drain with a specific example. "Since the 1970's, highly skilled migrants, including doctors, paramedical personnel, nurses, teachers, lecturers, engineers, scientists, and technologists moved from Ghana to Nigeria and later to other African countries, Europe, and North America. They were attracted by relatively higher salaries and better prospects of living conditions" (Yaro 2009). He shows that this most recent form of migration in West Africa is by far the most globally-influenced, an indicator of modern times. He says that in order to understand this new migration, we must examine the push and pull factors. Increasingly, West Africans are moving from rural to urban areas and are creating vacuums in their rural communities. Remittances serve as a vital connection between migrants from all over the continent and their family members. Finally, he makes the argument that an underlying theme of all migration is the nature of humankind: "aspirations towards a better and humane life," an idea which is vitally connected to development. Yaro wants to harness the inevitability of migration, especially in this new world, and aim it towards development for the whole continent. His paper

touches on the interests of citizens, economies, and governments in the context of migration as a global force.

Hein de Haas has also devoted significant research to the differences in African migration by region. For historical context he found that in 1960, the most extra-continental migrants lived in France and the United Kingdom. Since then, there has been more diversification in European destination. France and the UK were favored destinations because of their colonial ties to African countries, but since then that “colonial echo” has weakened. Recently, there has been an acceleration and diversification of extra-continental migration from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States and Canada. Migrants from Southern Africa also migrate to America and Oceania in significant numbers. Furthermore, the number of Africans living in Europe, North America, Australia, and India has been increasing. North Africa always has been and still is the most significant region of extra-continental migration due to its proximity to Europe, but the share of extra-continental migrants from West and East Africa is increasing. North and West Africa are the predominant senders of African migrants to Europe, which has the most to do with their proximity and the history of labor recruitment to Francophone countries. Sending regions to the Americas are much more diverse, but South and Central Africa send the fewest people. The United States is becoming an increasingly important destination for extra-continental migration, particularly from West Africa (De Haas 2010). These nuances in migration patterns are in part due to the level of visa restrictiveness in the receiving countries.

Visa restrictiveness is a measure of how easy it is to obtain a travel, working, or permanent visa in the destination countries. It is calculated by computing the percentage of origin countries that need a travel visa to enter a destination country for any given year. There has been a general increase in visa restrictiveness towards African citizens which can be a partial

explanation for the diversification of migration patterns away from colonial patterns. West Africa has become the most open to African migration on average, which seems to be linked to free travel and migration between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries. North Africa has become increasingly visa restrictive for other African nationals from 69% in 1973 to 89% in 2013 (Flahaux & De Haas 2016). This phenomenon could be due to the externalization of European borders in which southern European countries (particularly Italy, Spain, and Greece) set up agreements with North African countries to strongly deter African migrants in Africa from traveling to Europe before they get the chance to do so. East and Central Africa have also become more visa restrictive. African countries overall are more restrictive towards migration from OECD countries just like the OECD countries are restrictive towards them.

Despite the goal of visa restrictiveness, it has been shown that immigration restrictions change the character of migration rather than decreasing the overall volume of migration. There are four relevant substitution effects. The first is *spatial substitution* through the diversion of migration to other countries. The second is *categorical substitution* through a re-orientation toward other legal or illegal channels. The third is *inter-temporal substitution* affecting the timing of migration such as ‘now or never migration’ in the expectation of future tightening of policies. The fourth is *reverse flow substitution* if immigration restrictions also reduce return migration. Spatial substitution is the most compelling hypothesis, diverting migration away from the colonial pattern. (Flahaux & De Haas 2016). The evolution of African migration by region over time has shown that migration is inevitable, and destination countries are almost powerless to stop people from migrating. Policies only serve to change the nature of migration.

Economic Development and Migration

Later in this paper I will analyze how individuals' assessments of their own financial circumstances relates to their desire to migrate. The popular conception of migration is that the destitute are the ones to make the journey. The logic following from this idea is that the poorest countries would have the highest concentration of emigrants. However, the relationship between economic development and migration is more complicated. Because various countries in Africa are at such different levels of economic development, it is relevant to this paper to explore how economic development is related to migration.

Michael Clemens's paper "Does Development Reduce Migration?" explains the inverted U curve of development and uses empirical data to support it. The inverted U concept contradicts conventional wisdom that economic development and migration have a negative linear relationship. Instead, countries can undergo substantial development before beginning to reduce migration rates. As countries begin to develop, citizens (who can cover the costs of migration) are still pulled to other countries that have *more* development, even as their home countries make progress (Clemens 2009). This paper is heavily influenced by his study.

Further studies about the relationship between a country's economic development level and migration intensity contradict conventional wisdom that the most underdeveloped countries have the highest rates of migration. Researchers Hein De Haas and Marie-Laurence Flahaux found that development in poor countries is generally associated with increasing rather than decreasing levels of mobility and migration (2016). Most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration. Poor people usually migrate less often and across shorter distances. Various types of migration are indicators of how far along countries are in the development process. As countries begin to develop, rural to urban migration dramatically increases as there are more job opportunities in

cities. Over time, these cities grow and connect to other cities, increasing cross-country migration. There is a common sequence of increased rural to urban migration, then increased emigration from a country, and eventually the sending country will be wealthy enough to attract more immigrants than the emigrants it loses. Throughout the development process, migration is a hallmark of various stages.

At each stage of the development process, it is important to consider migrants as full human beings instead of numbers in stock flows. The development process typically expands people's access to material resources, social networks, education, media, and knowledge, along with better infrastructure to make the physical truth of migration even easier. Development does not automatically lead to migration unless the people in these countries have a strong desire to migrate. Migration aspirations, in turn, depend on people's life goals which can be influenced by information exposure to Western countries. When development occurs in poor countries, aspirations and capabilities to migrate tend to increase simultaneously. This phenomenon explains the close and somewhat counterintuitive relationship between development and emigration.

For poor countries, this pattern means that marginal, lower-income, and more landlocked countries tend to have lower absolute and relative levels of extra-continental migration. Usually, poor people migrate within Africa. This fact supports the migration transition theory, according to which materially poor populations of the least developed countries have less capabilities to move, and when they do move they do so generally within Africa. Countries with relatively high extracontinental migration are also the countries that are located on the coast, are more urbanized, have a higher GDP per capita, and are more advanced in the demographic transition (lower mortality and lower fertility). However, there are notable exceptions to this rule. Ethiopia

has a very low estimated emigrant intensity and the emigration is mainly directed to North America and Europe rather than another African country (De Haas & Flahaux 2016).

Overall, increased emigration is an indicator that a country is developing. As a country begins the demographic transition process, its citizens move from rural to urban areas as people, jobs, and money become concentrated in cities. As cities and therefore countries get wealthier, citizens have both increased aspirations for migration and travel and more money and resources to do so. Contrary to the narrative of African countries sending their poorest or least educated people to western countries, all evidence suggests that mostly citizens of rich African countries emigrate from the continent and poorer migrants tend to stay in Africa.

The Role of States in Intra vs Extra Continental Migration

States and policies within Africa and in the destination countries also affect whether migrants relocate to a different African country or leave the continent. A majority of African migrants move within the continent. Between 1960 and 2000, there has been a declining trend in intra-African emigration even though it is still the dominant type of emigration. However, since 1960 there has been an increasing trend in extra-continental migration. In 2000, African countries had an average of 2.3% of their citizens living abroad, which is down from 2.8% in 1960 (De Haas & Flahaux 2016). There is a popular stereotype of Africa as a continent “on the move,” but these trends actually reflect a region developing and stabilizing. Declining intra-African migration could be partly explained by the fact that decolonization and newly formed states have created higher barriers to movement. These new countries can be xenophobic against citizens from other African countries, imposing strict immigration restrictions. Both African and European countries have imposed stricter immigration restrictions since the 1960’s. This

development has prompted African emigrants to explore new destinations such in North America, Oceania, and elsewhere.

Theory and descriptive results, as this paper will provide, can be supported by data on migrant flows. The UN reports emigration data by region, but it is not conclusively accurate due to difficulties reporting on migration and the sometimes-illegal nature of it. However, rough data points can provide additional context to this study. As of 2019, North Africa had 12.3 million emigrants and a population of 202 million. Its net migrant stock was -749,400, indicating that there were more emigrants than immigrants. This figure is consistent with other results showing that North Africa sends the most people out of the continent because of its proximity to Europe. Central Africa had 4.4 million emigrants and a population of 169 million. Its net migrant stock was 5,300, which is an almost completely even balance of immigrants and emigrants. East Africa had 12 million emigrants and a population of 433 million. Its net migrant stock was -1.3 million, showing that more people were leaving the region than immigrating to it. West Africa had 10.6 million emigrants and a total population of 381 million. Its net migration stock was -885,000, showing that more people were leaving than immigrating, but not as many as I would have expected, given that West Africa has a lot of emigrants due to its many small, proximate countries. Finally, South Africa had 1.3 million emigrants and a total population of 68 million people. Its net migration stock was 626,000, showing that it was more of a destination country than a sending country, which was also indicated in my research (Global Migration Data Portal).

Intra-continental migration, while the main form of emigration in Africa, has been changed by new policies over the past 50 years. West Africa has the most significant amount of intra-continental migration from inland countries in the region to more populous countries like Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa. Using the visa restrictiveness scale mentioned earlier, it can be

empirically shown that African countries are rather high on the scale. This has been an increasing trend since the late 1980's. In 2013, on average, about 90% of nationals from non-African countries needed a visa to enter African countries, while on average 78% of Africans needed a visa to legally enter another African country (De Haas & Flahaux 2016). African states themselves are fairly closed off to the free movement of people.

The African Development Group did a recent study on intra versus extra continental migration in Africa. They found that emigration from African countries, the proportion of stock of emigrants in total population of the country of origin, is on average the lowest in the world with significant variation across countries. It is estimated that in 2010, the number of people from all countries in the world living in countries other than their birth place would be around 215 million, only 31 million of which are from Africa. Furthermore, in 1990, one out of every five emigrants from Africa was a refugee, and now that number is around one in 10 or 2.3 million refugees out of the total 31 million emigrants (Shimeles 2010). This changed statistic is an indication of increased stability in Africa.

The report goes on in more detail. Countries with a relatively high rate of migration (greater than 10% of the population) are Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Lesotho, and Mali. This phenomenon is probably because they are small countries, perhaps with limited livelihood opportunities or dependence on a specific commodity for trade. According to the bilateral migration data of the World Bank in 2010, out of the 29 million emigrants from African in 2019, around 23% of them are from North Africa and the rest are from Sub-Saharan Africa. Ninety percent of the emigrants from North Africa head to countries outside of Africa.

This movement of Africans outside of the continent has been accelerating over the years, according to the same report. Emigrants from middle income countries tend disproportionately to migrate to destinations outside of Africa, whereas emigrants originating from poorer regions generally remain within the neighboring countries. Poverty in Africa is a strong deterrent of mobility, particularly for OECD countries. This could be problematic for economic inequality between African countries. When people from Africa migrate, they often send remittances back to their home country, supporting its economy. As emigration to OECD countries increases and is mostly captured by middle income countries, middle income countries could become wealthy and poorer countries could remain poor.

The world may be on the cusp of this acceleration. “We may be in the midst of a major emigration surge catalyzed by demographic pressure, faltering economic growth, and the cumulative effects of past migrations through networks established over the years,” (Shimeles 2010). While Africa’s population is growing quickly, Europe’s rate of population growth is steadily declining. Emigrants from Africa to these countries could help to fill labor market gaps. In 2050, nearly all major industrialized nations are expected to experience a significant deficit in their labor force, while poor regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to have a large, young surplus. As more Africans move to OECD countries, they set up communal networks that give following migrants an easier time finding their place in the destination country. This detail highlights an important aspect of the study of migration: it is an entirely personal decision to migrate. The three most important elements in the decision are prospect for a better life, ability to migrate, and familial connections in sending or destination country.

Section 3: Data

Afrobarometer is the world's leading research project on issues that affect ordinary African men and women. It is pan-African, independent, and non-partisan. It is a research institution that regularly conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society in 34 African countries, headquartered in Accra, Ghana. Its main mission is to survey citizens across Africa to ascertain their attitudes towards political, economic, and social issues over time. They develop these surveys and then partner with regional institutions to conduct them. Their technical partners are the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa, the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship, and Public Policy in Africa at the University of Cape Town and the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. To ensure the collection of good quality data, Afrobarometer works with national partners in each of their survey countries. These national partners are responsible for training interviewers before collecting any data. They ensure that interviewers have the right skills and qualifications to perform an Afrobarometer survey. National partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with a randomly selected sample of 1200 or 2400 people. Six rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2015, and Round 7 surveys were carried out in 2016-2018. I will be analyzing Afrobarometer's Round 7 data (Afrobarometer).

Afrobarometer has non-profit partners in all 34 countries. These non-profits have employees and volunteers that conduct the surveys. Between 2016 and 2018, a nationally representative, random, stratified population sample of 1200 adults from each of the 34 countries were interviewed using the survey. A sample of this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of +/-3% at a 95% confidence level. On the day of survey data collection, teams

of four interviewers and one field supervisor travelled together to the survey sample area. The field supervisor was there to ensure the quality control of the data collection. Interviews only proceeded after the respondent had given consent and confidentiality was ensured. These interviews usually lasted an hour and were conducted in the main local languages. The survey had a 96% response rate (Afrobarometer).

Afrobarometer surveys cover 21 topics including conflict and crime, democracy, identity, markets, political participation, poverty, public services, social capital, tolerance, and Pan-Africanism (Afrobarometer). There are two questions asked to respondents that allows this data to answer my research question. The surveyors ask respondents how much, on a scale of 1-5, they want to emigrate from their home countries. They also ask people how much, on a scale of 1-5, they have made plans to emigrate from their home countries (buying plane tickets, applying for a visa, etc.). Both of these questions will be my dependent variables. Demographic questions, such as age, gender, and attitudes one's life, will be my independent variables. I will also use some questions about living conditions (such as whether a person frequently uses the internet) as independent variables to see if these conditions are significantly correlated with the desire to emigrate. I would be interested in how the relationships between these variables change over time, but although Afrobarometer has been conducting surveys since 2001, only the Round 7 (2016-2018) of data collection includes the two questions about migration. There were around 45,000 observations total across all 34 countries and 7,851 people (17%) answered that they had considered emigrating a lot over the past year. Of the same number of people, 6,142 people (14%) answered that they were in the planning stages of emigration. I will use these two groups of people as dependent variables in my analysis.

Summary statistics can be found in Table 1 of the Appendix. I will expand on them here. The mean of the binary variable “male” is almost exactly .5, indicating an even split between male and female respondents. Around 22% of respondents were younger than 25 and 6% of respondents were older, confirming the notion that Africa is an exceedingly young continent. Urban’s mean is .43, showing that a slight majority of respondents come from rural areas. Approximately equal numbers of respondents evaluate their current living conditions as positive and negative for the variables “negative living conditions” and “positive living conditions.” Almost 40% of respondents did not receive a consistent cash income. This high number could capture a substantial amount of work under the table. Around 10% of people receive remittances from family members abroad. Thirteen and 17% of respondents had felt unsafe and experienced violence respectively. Sixty-four percent of respondents were unemployed, which again could indicate a significant amount of informal work. Fifteen percent of respondents had not received any formal schooling and around 9% of respondents went to university. For the dependent variables, 17% of respondents wanted to leave their home countries and 13% of people had plans to leave their home countries. These numbers indicate a substantial amount of people interested in migrating.

Section 4: Methods

My goal for this paper is to understand who wants to and is planning to emigrate from their home country in Africa and why. To do this, I used Afrobarometer's 2018 merged Round 7 data. I created binary variables using the questions of relevance from the 100-question survey. For the dependent variables, I created a binary variable for how much the respondent wanted to leave. If, when asked the question "How much, if at all, have you considered leaving your home country?", the respondent answered "a lot," that binary variable is coded 1. This was true for 7,851 out of 45,823 respondents. I also used a dependent variable called "planstoleave" for people who actively made plans to leave their home country (applying for a visa, etc.). This was true for 6,142 out of 45,823 respondents. For independent variables, I created binary variables for levels of education, gender, how they feel about their economic status, whether they feel safe, their employment status, whether they have access to the internet and electricity, whether they are from an urban or rural area, and whether they receive remittances. Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 1 of the appendix. Table 2 shows how I coded these variables with what the survey asked.

Furthermore, I wanted to examine the differences in demographics and motivations for leaving between different regions in Africa. Using the UN's division of countries in Africa by region, I created binary variables for each of the five African regions (North, South, East, West, and Central). Then, I ran a regression using all of the independent variables. I ran variations of this regression, always using all of the independent variables, but switching the dependent variable (whether they wanted to leave versus if they had plans to leave). Finally, I ran regressions with all of the independent variables and two different dependent variables, for all five regions of Africa and the continent as a whole, using interaction terms to parse out the

different effects of the independent variables by region. Chart 1 shows a map of Africa by UN-determined region.

For both regional and whole-continent analysis, my regressions are in the form of a linear probability model. In this model, the dependent variables are binary. The probability of getting either a 0 or a 1 is determined, at least in part, by some or all of the explanatory variables. All of my independent variable coefficients can be interpreted as percentages more or less likely to get a 1 for the dependent variable. The other traditional model for regressions with binary dependent variables is the logit model. The main difference between these two models is that the logit model's dependent variable is interpreted in log odds. I chose the linear probability model because the results for both models were similar and the linear probability model's results were easier to interpret. For example, for West Africa, the coefficient for being from an urban area on wanting to leave is .0503. This result means that, in West Africa, being from an urban area increases the respondent's chances of wanting to leave their home country by 5.03%. People from urban areas in West Africa are 5.03% more likely to want to leave their home countries than are those from rural areas.

I had two main regressions. Each used the same 15 independent variables interacted with four regional variables (the fifth, North Africa, is excluded as the base group) with two different dependent variables for wanting and planning to leave one's home country. The following is my regression equation, y alternately representing the two dependent variables.

$$y = \beta_0 + X \beta_{WEST} + X \beta_{EAST} + X \beta_{SOUTH} + X \beta_{CENTRAL} + e$$

X is a vector representing the following independent variables: male, old, young, urban, neglivingcond, poslivingcond, nocashincome, receive remittances, feelunsafe, experiencedviolence, someoneleft, unemployed, noschool, university, frequentinternet.

I spent time coding answers from the survey into binary variables. The specific questions asked and the responses I coded can be found in Table 2. I followed the UN definitions of young and old to make young less than 25 years old and old greater than 64 years old. Urban is determined by whether the interviewer codes the place he or she is giving the interview as urban or rural. Negative and positive living conditions comes from a question where the respondents rate how they perceive they live in comparison to others. I coded 1 or 2 out of 5 as having a negative perception of one's living conditions and 4 or 5 as having a positive perception of one's living conditions. The rest of the respondents chose 3, or neutrality. For education, I coded university as having some university education or completing it. I coded it this way because this variable was chosen to examine the brain drain, and I thought having some university education put respondents in a position where they might get more opportunities in another country, consistent with the brain drain hypothesis. The variables "feelunsafe" and "experiencedviolence" are coded 1 if a respondent felt unsafe or experienced violence in one or more of a variety of settings and situations over the past year.

Section 5: Results

To summarize up to this point, my research question was “Who Wants to Migrate in Africa and Why?” I used a continent-wide survey conducted in 34 countries to answer this question. I used 15 demographic independent variables and two dependent variables (wanting and planning to leave one’s home country). The appendix of this paper has charts of the two main regressions (one for each region) using all 15 independent variables and two different dependent variables, in addition to a chart sorting the average probabilities of respondents wanting and planning to leave their home countries by region. The regional regressions were computed with North Africa as the base group and all other coefficients relative to that. For example, in Table 5 Row 1, the coefficient for North Africa is .0682, meaning that men from North Africa are 6.82% more likely to want to leave their home countries than those from other countries. The next column over, West Africa, has a coefficient of -.036, which is interpreted with respect to North Africa ($.0682 - .036 = .0332$); so men from West Africa are 3.2% more likely to want to leave their home countries than those of other groups. Tables 5 and 6 should be interpreted like this for all of the regions. Table 7, to which I will most specifically refer throughout this section, is the regression for the whole continent. Its dependent variables are wanting and planning to leave and it uses all 15 independent variables. The rows in the titles of the variable explanations correspond to the variable’s row in Tables 5, 6, and 7.

Independent Variable Results: Descriptive Statistics

ROW 1 MALE: The variable male, representing the gender of the survey respondent, is consistently significant across dependent variables and regions. Its mean is close to .5, meaning that there’s almost a completely even split between male and female respondents. The variable is almost always significant and positive across both dependent variables and all regions. Men are

consistently more likely to want and plan to leave their home countries than women are. For the whole continent, men are 3.82% more likely to want to leave their home countries than women and 4% more likely to have plans to do so. This result could be because men have fewer familial obligations and have higher earning potential in their destination countries.

ROW 2 OLD: The variable old, representing people over 65 years old, captures the views of 2,887 respondents out of 45,823. Its results can be found in row 2 of Tables 5 and 6. It is negative and significant for the whole continent. Older people are overall 8% less likely to want to leave their home countries and 7% less likely to have plans to leave their home countries than those of other age groups. It is negative and significant for wanting and planning to leave in North Africa. It is positive and significant at the $p < .1$ level for planning to leave in South Africa and wanting to leave in East and South Africa. Overall, being old made respondents less likely to want and plan to leave their home countries. They are likely settled into their home countries and do not have a long professional life to enjoy in their destination countries.

ROW 3 YOUNG: The young binary variable captures the responses of people under the age of 25, or 10,137 respondents out of 45,823. Its results can be found in row 3 of Tables 5 and 6. It is positive and significant for both dependent variables across the whole continent. Being under 25 made respondents 5.5% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 4.3% more likely to have plans to leave their home countries than respondents from other age groups. The variable had a positive and significant effect on wanting to leave in West, East, and Central Africa. It had a positive and significant effect on planning to leave in all regions except for Central Africa. Overall, this variable was one of the most consistently significant. This conclusion makes sense because young people are both more physically capable of leaving and would have a longer life

in their destination country. They are less likely to have any familial or financial obligations in their home countries, making it easier to leave.

ROW 4 URBAN: Urban is a variable coded by the people who give the survey and is determined before the respondent starts talking. It had a positive and significant effect on both dependent variables for the whole continent. Being from an urban area made respondents 3.5% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 2.8% more likely to have plans to leave their home countries compared to those from rural areas. It had a positive and significant effect on wanting to leave in West, East, and Central Africa. It had a positive and significant effect on having plans to leave in West and Central Africa. Overall, this variable was a significant predictor of people wanting to leave their home countries. This result could be because people in cities are sometimes richer, or because they are more likely to know someone who has already left their home country. This is consistent with the theory of population transfer: as countries modernize and become wealthier, more of their population congregates in cities and eventually migration rates increase.

ROW 5 NEGATIVE LIVING CONDITIONS: Negative living conditions is a binary variable coded if respondents answered 1 or 2 out of a possible 5 to the question “In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other citizens of your country?” Its results can be found in row 5 of Tables 5 and 6. In all regressions across both dependent variables for the whole continent and by regions, this variable had a significant, negative effect on wanting and planning to leave your home country. It made respondents 2.6% more likely to want to leave their home country and 1.8% more likely to have plans to leave your home country. This variable was one of the most significant indicators of wanting to migrate. If you think that you are living worse than those around you, you are likely to want to change and improve your conditions.

ROW 6 POSITIVE LIVING CONDITIONS: Positive living conditions is a binary variable coded if respondents answered 4 or 5 out of a possible 5 to the question “In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other citizens of your country?” It was significant and positive at the $p < .05$ level for the whole continent; but was not significant for either dependent variable in any of the regions. It seems that having a negative view of their living standards definitely makes respondents want to leave more; but having a positive view of their living conditions has a weak effect or none at all.

ROW 7 NO CASH INCOME: No cash income is a variable that equals one if the respondent indicated that they do not receive a regular income. Across the whole continent, it made respondents 1.9% more likely both to plan and want to leave their home countries. It was positive and significant for wanting to leave in North Africa and planning to leave in West Africa. It was negative and significant for wanting to leave in Central Africa. Overall, this variable has a weakly positive effect on the likelihood of people wanting to leave their home countries. It makes sense: if you are not receiving any regular income, you might be motivated to try a new place.

ROW 8 RECEIVE REMITTANCES: This variable was coded for people who regularly receive remittances from family members who already left their home countries. This was the case for 4,918 people. It was positive and significant across the whole continent for both wanting and planning to leave. Receiving remittances made respondents 3.9% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 8% more likely to have plans to leave their home countries. The variable is positive and significant for wanting to leave in North and Central Africa, and for planning to leave in North and South Africa. This variable captures the migration motivating factor of having a family member in another country, which makes you more likely to want and

plan to leave. It is easier for people who have family in destination countries to migrate because they already have support in the new country. Additionally, they could be more likely to leave because they have the money necessary to do so from the remittances.

ROW 9 FEEL UNSAFE: This variable captures people who, when asked the question “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood?”, said “many times” or “always.” This was 6,074 out of 45,823 people. For the whole continent, it was only significant and positive for wanting to leave, not planning. Feeling unsafe made respondents 1.5% more likely to want to leave their home countries. It was significant and positive for wanting to leave in every region and for planning to leave in East Africa. This is a logical finding: if you feel unsafe in your home community, you are motivated to find a new one.

ROW 10 EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE: This variable is for people who both feared and experienced violence in any of the settings explained over the past two years. This was 7,725 people out of 45,823. It was positive and significant for planning and wanting to leave for the whole continent. Experiencing violence made all respondents 4.6% more likely to both want and plan to leave their home countries. It was positive and significant for planning and wanting to leave across every region except for planning to leave in South and West Africa. It makes sense that if you experience violence in your home community, you would be more likely to want to leave that community.

ROW 11 SOMEONE LEFT: Someone left is a variable coded yes if during the past three years, either the respondent or someone in their household had gone to live in another country for more than three months. It was 11,330 out of 45,823 respondents. This was one of the most significant indicators of planning and wanting to leave your home country. Across the continent,

it made people 12% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 13.4% more likely to have plans to leave their home countries for respondents of all countries. It was positive and significant for planning to leave your home country in every region and wanting to leave your home country in not and West Africa. In North Africa, someone having left makes you 20% more likely to have plans to leave. Someone having left in your household is a very good indicator of planning and wanting to leave your home country. This fact speaks to how personal and familial the decision to migrate is.

ROW 12 UNEMPLOYED: Unemployed is a binary variable coded if someone, when asked “Do you have a job that pays a cash income?”, answers “No, not looking” or “No, looking.” This captures 29,361 people out of 45,823 respondents. It was positive and significant for planning and wanting to leave for the whole continent. Being unemployed made respondents 2.2% more likely to want to leave and 1.5% more likely to have plans to leave across the whole continent compared to those of other groups. It was positive and weakly significant for wanting to leave in North and South Africa, and for planning to leave in Central Africa. Overall, it is a positive and weakly significant indicator of planning and wanting to leave. This could be because there are too many people, almost three quarters of respondents, who are unemployed to draw a significant line to migration.

ROW 13 NO SCHOOL: No school is a variable coded 1 if respondents indicated that they have no formal schooling. This represents 6,896 respondents out of 45,823. Across the whole continent, it was negative and significant for wanting to leave but not planning to leave. Having no formal schooling made all respondents 3.35% less likely to want to leave their home countries across the whole continent. It was not a significant variable in the regression for planning to leave for any region. It was significant for wanting to leave only in North and South Africa, in

opposite directions. Overall, receiving no formal school was not a significant indicator of whether a person wanted to planned to leave their home country.

ROW 14 UNIVERSITY: University is a variable coded 1 if respondents indicated that they have received some university education or completed university. This represents 3,983 people out of 45,823. The variable was positive and significant across the whole continent for both wanting and planning to leave. Having at least some university education made respondents across the whole continent 1.9% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 4.8% more likely to have plans to leave. The variable was positive and significant for wanting to leave in North, West, and Central Africa. It was positive and significant for planning to leave in West, East, and Central Africa. This result shows that having some university is an indicator of wanting and planning to leave your home country, consistent with the brain drain hypothesis.

ROW 15 FREQUENT INTERNET: This variable is coded 1 if respondents indicate that they use the internet every day or a few times a week. This is 14,189 out of 45,823 people. The variable is positive and significant for both wanting and planning to leave across the whole continent. Frequently using the internet made respondents across the whole continent 7.8% more likely to want to leave their home countries and 6.7% more likely to have plans to leave their home countries. It was positive and significant for wanting to leave in every region and for planning to leave in North, East, and South Africa. This was one of the most consistently significant and positive variables. Frequent internet could be closely linked to wanting and planning to migrate because people have a better idea of how to migrate and what awaits them in a destination country through the internet. This variable could also capture respondents with a higher income and access to more resources, which would be correlated with the financial means to migrate.

MARGINS: This regression produced an estimate of the average predicted probability of “want to leave a lot” and “plans to leave” by region. These effects are computed as the means of “wanting to leave a lot=1” and “planning to leave=1” by region, including the contribution of all of the covariates (all of the independent variables). The results can be found in Table 8. I used this command to see how the regions compared to each other in terms of how much the respondents wanted to leave. The overall rate of “wanting to leave” is higher on average in West, North, and Central Africa relative to East and South Africa. When I ran the margins command for planning to leave, it showed again that North, West, and Central African respondents had a higher average rate of planning to leave than those from East and Central Africa. To confirm these results, I used the bysort command which sorts the regional regressions by the average amount respondents wanted and planned to leave. The results for this command for the two dependent variables can be found in Tables 9 and 10 of the appendix and are consistent with those of the margins command.

Section 6: Discussion

My results gave insight into the types of people that want to and are planning on leaving their home countries. The most consistently significant variables were age, gender, experiencing violence, having a negative conception of one's living standards, someone leaving, and frequent internet use. These results did not point directly to either the refugee or the brain drain hypothesis because both "no school" and "university" were significant in some regions, but not consistently across regions and dependent variables. The most significant variables in my regression showed that migration is an intensely personal and familial decision. Using the most consistently significant variables the prototypical candidate for emigration is a young male who frequently uses the internet, has experienced violence in his community, has a negative conception of his living standards, and has had someone in his household leave the home country and send back remittances. This person would want to migrate because he believed it could change the trajectory of his life and that of his family. This profile, while a generalization, could humanize all of these variables that make a person more or less likely to leave their home countries. Migration, again, is a personal decision that evades demographic profiles of the push/pull dichotomy or the refugee/brain drain hypotheses.

Of these variables, frequent internet use is my most surprising consistently significant one. It did not come up in my research as a possible variable to influence migration, perhaps because of the internet's relative young age. There is a possible source of error if this variable is capturing subjects' income levels. Income level and internet use could be correlated because both internet devices and internet itself is expensive; so higher income people could be migrating more, consistent with the brain drain hypothesis. However the most obvious explanation is that people use the internet to get an idea of other countries and plan their migration. As the world

becomes more virtually connected, people have more of an idea of what other places will be like, which might be an impetus to migrate. They can also make online connections that could translate to relationships and professional networks in the destination country.

In a separate vein, regional analysis allowed me to explore the differences in people wanting and planning to leave their home countries by region. North, West, and Central African countries had higher averages of people wanting and planning to leave their home countries than South and East African countries did. It makes sense that North, West, and Central African countries would have more emigrants because they are physically closer to Europe than South and East Africa. North Africa sends the majority of the African-European emigrants because it is the closest region to Europe. West Africa could have higher rates of wanting and planning to leave because it is a region composed of many small countries, between which it is fairly easy to move. As I stated in the literature review, since the 1970's, West Africa has dominated as the sub-region with the highest mobility rate due to its coordination of immigration between states. West Africa could have higher rates of wanting and planning to leave because it is a region. Additionally, there is a history of European labor recruitment to Francophone countries from North and West Africa. For the less likely regions, South and East Africa, they could have fewer emigrants because they are further from Europe than the other three. A 2010 report on African migration found that these two regions are more often destination places for migrants than sending regions (Shimeles). Furthermore, Hein de Haas found that South Africa has the fewest emigrants because of a lack of colonial ties (2016). It was and is logistically and culturally easier for residents of a former colony to migrate to the country that colonized it. These regional differences are vital to keep in mind when considering migration in Africa because of the vastness and diversity of the continent.

Section 7: Conclusion

The research question of this paper is “Who Wants to Migrate in Africa and Why?” Migration is one of the most prevalent social issues of this era and I wanted to investigate the types of people who are making the decision to leave their home countries. Africa is a huge, diverse continent whose development is rapidly accelerating. I used data from the Round 7 Afrobarometer survey to answer my question. Push/pull hypotheses and the refugee vs brain tension informed how I thought about and developed my research question and methods. Instead of finding a clear, concrete result (“Rich, educated people are pulled from their African home countries to better destinations,” for example), I found that the reasons from emigration within and from Africa are varied, nuanced, and personal. The most consistently significant variables were those that indicated a personal connection to a destination country and ambition for the rest of one’s life. There is not one type of emigrant, just as there is no consistent reason for leaving.

My results were a “both and” answer. People are leaving their home countries for a diverse set of reasons. People who perceive their living conditions negatively and experience violence have significantly higher chances of wanting and planning to leave, indicating push factors. Having at least some university education made people more likely to leave as well, pointing to the brain drain effect. The significance of “negative living conditions” and “no cash income” indicates that migration is an economic choice. The significance of age, gender, and “urban” indicate that there is a demographic more prone to leave their home countries, which could be important for policymakers to tailor their migration laws. The significance of “someone left” and “receive remittances” show how important migration network effects are. The consistent significance of “frequent internet” shows that people presumably can research their destination country, maybe search for jobs, or even create social networks in their new country

before they get there. Overall, my results show that people are migrating for a variety of different reasons with network effects, frequent internet use, and experiencing violence being the most significant predictors of a person wanting or planning to leave their home countries.

Although my results were meaningful and contributed to the body of knowledge in migration studies, this study has limitations. The most significant one is that the survey asked people if they wanted to or had plans to leave, but it did not follow up to see if they actually migrated. Further research could incorporate data on actual migration flows for both the regions and the specific countries. That data could expand the study and make it more quantitative, while interviews with prospective African emigrants would humanize this topic in a way that I could not using only survey data. Afrobarometer could complete an entire study just on the theme of migration asking people where they would migrate to, what their most significant motivators would be, and what would be holding them back. On a separate but related issue, climate migration is one of the most relevant issues of the coming decades, especially in the equatorial regions of Africa. Information about who is most likely to migrate can inform this research.

Looking forward, it is helpful to think of migration as an agent of globalization. How is development affected by globalization? If some countries have high wages, job opportunities, and a strong social safety net, what is stopping those from developing countries to simply move there? On the other hand, migration is an extremely difficult decision at which to arrive, given familial and country loyalties. Will migration become easier as the world becomes more technologically connected or more difficult as xenophobic laws progress? How will the climate emergency inform individuals' decisions to migrate? These are the research questions I would pursue further.

Appendix

Table 1

VARIABLES	Count	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Male	22,880	45,823	0.499	0.5	0	1
Urban	19,828	45,823	0.433	0.495	0	1
Negative Living Conditions	14,816	45,823	0.323	0.468	0	1
Positive Living Conditions	13,990	45,823	0.305	0.461	0	1
No Cash Income	17,680	45,823	0.386	0.487	0	1
Receive Remittances	4,918	45,823	0.107	0.31	0	1
Feel Unsafe	6,074	45,823	0.133	0.339	0	1
Experienced Violence	7,725	45,823	0.169	0.374	0	1
Someone Left	11,330	45,823	0.247	0.431	0	1
Frequent Internet	14,189	45,823	0.31	0.462	0	1
Unemployed	29,361	45,823	0.641	0.48	0	1
No School	6,896	45,823	0.15	0.358	0	1
University	3,983	45,823	0.0869	0.282	0	1
Leave a Lot	7,851	45,823	0.171	0.377	0	1
Plans to Leave	6,142	45,823	0.134	0.341	0	1
West Africa	18,394	45,823	0.401	0.49	0	1
South Africa	6,638	45,823	0.145	0.352	0	1
East Africa	13,591	45,823	0.297	0.457	0	1
Central Africa	3,601	45,823	0.0786	0.269	0	1
North Africa	3,599	45,823	0.0785	0.269	0	1
Young	10,137	45,823	0.221	0.415	0	1
Old	2,887	45,823	0.063	0.243	0	1

Table 2

Variable	Question Asked in Survey	Answer in Survey to Qualify
Male	This interview must be with a	1 if male
Female	This interview must be with a	2 if female
Urban	Interviewer circles either	1 if urban
Rural	Interviewer circles either	2 if rural
Neglivingcond	In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [citizens of your country]?	1 or 2 out of 5
Poslivingcond	In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [citizens of your country]?	4 or 5 out of 5
Receiveremittances	Considering ALL the activities you engage in to secure a livelihood, how much, if at all, do you depend on receiving remittances from relatives or friends living in other countries?	2 or 3 indicating "somewhat" or "a lot"
Feelunsafe	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family felt unsafe walking in your neighbourhood?	3 or 4 indicating "many times" or "always"
Experienced violence	In any society, people will sometimes disagree with one another. These disagreements occasionally escalate into physical violence. Please tell me whether, in the past two years, you have ever personally feared any of the following types of violence? [If yes] Have you actually personally experienced this type of violence in the past two years?	If they indicate they've feared and experienced violence at any of the following settings: "Violence among people in your neighbourhood or village" "Violence at a political rally or campaign event" "Violence occurring during a public protest or march" "An armed attack by political or religious extremists"
Someleft	During the past three years, have you or anyone in your household gone to live in another country outside [given country] for more than three months?	1 if yes
FrequentInternet	How often do you use: <i>[Read out options]</i> The Internet?	4 if everyday or 3 if a few times a week
No cash income	Over the past year, how often, if ever have you or anyone else in your family gone without a cash income?	3 for "Many times" or 4 for "Always"
Unemployed	Do you have a job that pays a cash income?	0 for "No, not looking" or 1 for "No, looking"
Noschool	What is your highest level of education?	0 for "No formal schooling"
University	What is your highest level of education?	7 for "some university" or 8 for "university completed"

Leavealot	How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?	3 for "A lot"
Planstoleave	How much planning or preparation have you done in order to move to another country to live?	1 for "You are planning to move in the next year or two, but not yet making preparations," or 2 for "You are currently making preparations to move, like getting a Visa"
Young	How old are you?	<25
Old	How old are you?	>64

Table 3

Country	Region
Benin	West Africa
Botswana	Southern Africa
Burkina Faso	West Africa
Cape Verde	West Africa
Cameroon	Central Africa
Cote d'Ivoire	West Africa
Gabon	Central Africa
Gambia	West Africa
Ghana	West Africa
Guinea	West Africa
Kenya	East Africa
Lesotho	Southern Africa
Liberia	West Africa
Madagascar	East Africa
Malawi	East Africa
Mali	West Africa
Mauritius	East Africa
Morocco	North Africa
Mozambique	East Africa
Namibia	Southern Africa
Niger	West Africa
Nigeria	West Africa
Sao Tom	Central Africa
Senegal	West Africa
Sierra Leone	West Africa
South Africa	South Africa
Sudan	North Africa
Swaziland	Southern Africa
Tanzania	East Africa
Togo	West Africa
Tunisia	North Africa
Uganda	East Africa
Zambia	East Africa
Zimbabwe`	East Africa

Table 4

North Africa	South Africa	East Africa	West Africa	Central Africa
Morocco	Botswana	Kenya	Benin	Cameroon
Sudan	Lesotho	Madagascar	Burkina Faso	Gabon
Tunisia	Namibia	Malawi	Cape Verde	Sao Tome
	South Africa	Mauritius	Cote d'Ivoire	
	Swaziland	Mozambique	Gambia	
		Tanzania	Ghana	
		Uganda	Guinea	
		Zambia	Liberia	
		Zimbabwe	Mali	
			Niger	
			Nigeria	
			Senegal	
			Sierra Leone	
			Togo	

Chart 1




Table 5: Regression by Region for the Dependent Variable “Leave a Lot” or Wanting to Leave
with Coefficients and Standard Errors

Variables	North Africa	West Africa	East Africa	South Africa	Central Africa
Male	0.0682*** (0.0129)	-0.036** (0.0140)	-0.0229 (0.0144)	-0.0381** (0.0157)	-0.0591*** (0.0179)
Old	-0.124*** (0.0271)	0.0334 (0.0294)	0.0677** (0.0300)	0.0678** (0.0320)	0.055 (0.0419)
Young	0.0222 (0.0157)	0.0359** (0.0171)	0.0313* (0.0176)	0.00642 (0.0196)	0.0564*** (0.0214)
Urban	-0.0121 (0.0128)	0.0503*** (0.0141)	0.032** (0.0146)	0.0169 (0.0160)	0.0604*** (0.0187)
Negative Living Conditions	0.0768*** (0.0151)	0.0465*** (0.0165)	0.0458*** (0.0168)	0.0565*** (0.0191)	0.0637*** (0.0215)
Positive Living Conditions	0.000972 (0.0153)	0.0141 (0.0166)	0.0163 (0.0173)	0.00206 (0.0187)	0.00664 (0.0212)
No Cash Income	0.0474*** (0.0172)	-0.0278 (0.0182)	-0.019 (0.0185)	-0.019 (0.0199)	-0.103*** (0.0218)
Receive Remittances	0.0366* (0.0204)	-0.0133 (0.0220)	0.00465 (0.0237)	-0.00653 (0.0243)	0.0549** (0.0277)
Feel Unsafe	0.0746*** (0.0179)	0.0358* (0.0198)	0.084*** (0.0205)	0.0523** (0.0211)	0.0627** (0.0255)
Experienced Violence	0.116*** (0.0216)	0.0737*** (0.0228)	0.0494** (0.0233)	0.0903*** (0.0248)	0.114*** (0.0261)
Someone Left	0.124*** (0.0169)	0.0326* (0.0180)	0.03 (0.0188)	0.00235 (0.0198)	-0.0222 (0.0216)
Unemployed	0.0297** (0.0135)	0.0102 (0.0148)	0.00499 (0.0150)	0.0283* (0.0169)	0.0223 (0.0188)
No School	-0.056** (0.0219)	-0.0108 (0.0229)	0.0332 (0.0245)	0.0465* (0.0281)	-0.0417 (0.0375)
University	0.0456*** (0.0153)	0.0672*** (0.0188)	0.0258 (0.0226)	0.0185 (0.0221)	0.0846*** (0.0233)
Frequent Internet	0.138*** (0.0141)	0.0459*** (0.0158)	0.076*** (0.0164)	0.0838*** (0.0175)	0.0702*** (0.0197)

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Regression Results for Planning to Leave With Coefficients and Standard Errors

Variables	North Africa	West Africa	East Africa	South Africa	Central Africa
Male	0.0586*** (0.0115)	0.011 (0.0126)	0.0335*** (0.0129)	0.024* (0.0141)	0.0416*** (0.0160)
Old	-0.0796*** (0.0242)	-0.0172 (0.0263)	0.0378 (0.0268)	0.0473* (0.0286)	0.0103 (0.0374)
Young	0.0805*** (0.0141)	0.0336** (0.0153)	0.0638*** (0.0157)	0.0681*** (0.0176)	0.0192 (0.0191)
Urban	-0.00746 (0.0114)	0.0308** (0.0126)	0.0168 (0.0130)	0.0224 (0.0143)	0.0379** (0.0167)
Negative Living Conditions	0.0868*** (0.0135)	0.0544*** (0.0148)	0.078*** (0.0150)	0.0832*** (0.0171)	0.073*** (0.0193)
Positive Living Conditions	0.0177 (0.0136)	-0.0166 (0.0148)	0.00112 (0.0155)	-0.0184 (0.0167)	0.00817 (0.0190)
No Cash Income	-0.0116 (0.0154)	0.0351** (0.0163)	0.0265 (0.0165)	0.0169 (0.0178)	0.00106 (0.0195)
Receive Remittances	0.052*** (0.0182)	0.0241 (0.0197)	0.0133 (0.0212)	0.0369* (0.0217)	0.0352 (0.0247)
Feel Unsafe	0.0305 (0.0160)	0.00725 (0.0177)	0.0395** (0.0183)	0.0251 (0.0188)	0.0245 (0.0228)
Experienced Violence	0.0714*** (0.0193)	0.0174 (0.0203)	0.0466** (0.0208)	0.0169 (0.0222)	0.0645*** (0.0233)
Someone Left	0.199*** (0.0151)	0.0786*** (0.0161)	0.0592*** (0.0168)	0.0859*** (0.0177)	0.0875*** (0.0193)
Unemployed	0.00368 (0.0120)	0.00284 (0.0132)	0.00835 (0.0134)	-0.00765 (0.0151)	0.0319* (0.0168)
No School	-0.0174 (0.0196)	-0.0183 (0.0205)	0.00975 (0.0219)	0.0158 (0.0251)	-0.0199 (0.0336)
University	0.0095 (0.0137)	0.0345** (0.0168)	0.0417** (0.0202)	0.0145 (0.0197)	0.0419** (0.0208)
Frequent Internet	0.101*** (0.0126)	0.0126 (0.0141)	0.0732*** (0.0147)	0.0501*** (0.0156)	0.0246 (0.0176)

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Regression Results for the Whole Continent Across Both Dependent Variables with
Coefficients and Standard Errors

Variables	Leave a Lot	Plans to Leave
Male	0.0382*** (0.0035)	0.0401*** (0.0031)
Old	-0.0807*** (0.0072)	-0.0706*** (0.0065)
Young	0.0554*** (0.0043)	0.0428*** (0.0038)
Urban	0.0348*** (0.0037)	0.0278*** (0.0033)
Negative Living Conditions	0.0259*** (0.0042)	0.0178*** (0.0038)
Positive Living Conditions	0.0099** (0.0042)	0.0082** (0.0037)
No Cash Income	0.0192*** (0.0038)	0.0193*** (0.0034)
Receive Remittances	0.0393*** (0.0056)	0.0803*** (0.0050)
Feel Unsafe	0.0154*** (0.0051)	0.0032 (0.0046)
Experienced Violence	0.0461*** (0.0046)	0.0456*** (0.0041)
Someone Left	0.12*** (0.0040)	0.134*** (0.0036)
Unemployed	0.0221*** (0.0038)	0.0147*** (0.0034)
No School	-0.0335*** (0.0051)	-0.00515 (0.0045)
University	0.0194*** (0.0065)	0.0484*** (0.0058)
Frequent Internet	0.078*** (0.0043)	0.0666*** (0.0039)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8

Margins	Leavealot	Plans to Leave
North Africa	0.209 (0.0081)	0.1498 (0.0072)
West Africa	0.209 (0.0028)	0.179 (0.0025)
East Africa	0.136 (0.0034)	0.085 (0.0031)
South Africa	0.124 (0.0050)	0.091 (0.0044)
Central Africa	0.195 (0.0074)	0.176 (0.0066)

Table 9

Region	Mean (Leave a Lot)	SD
North Africa	0.211	0.048
West Africa	0.205	0.404
East Africa	0.118	0.332
South Africa	0.132	0.338
Central Africa	0.233	0.423

Table 10

Region	Mean (Plans to Leave)	SD
North Africa	0.144	0.351
West Africa	0.179	0.384
East Africa	0.068	0.252
South Africa	0.1	0.299
Central Africa	0.205	0.404

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