"Half of China May Well Have to Die"[1]

JACOB W. HAMSTRA

REVIEW OF JUNG CHANG AND JON HALLIDAY
Mao: The Unknown Story
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005) 832 pages, $35.00 hardcover

Several decades after the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, in which tens of millions of people died as a result of Mao Zedong's misrule, a wave of Mao chic has swept over China. Whole factories manufacture "antique" Maoist kitsch—buttons, posters, *Little Red Books*—for sale to gullible foreign tourists. Chinese taxi drivers hang Mao photos and statuettes from their rear view mirrors as good luck charms, and peasants position shiny posters of Mao near their ancestral altars.

Who was this man, whose reputation seems to have survived the astonishing magnitude of suffering he caused, and whose visage continues to grace the currency of the all-but-nominally capitalist People's Republic of China (PRC)? Ask a Chinese twenty-something this question and the likely response is that Mao was 70 percent correct, 30 percent incorrect. This ratio is the official verdict of China's post-Mao leadership,[2] imparted to schoolchildren in a country where unifying symbols are greatly in demand and there is palpable reluctance to revisit the trauma of China's recent past.

As China has opened up and modernized, Mao has become a sort of national mascot, whose significance and popularity has more to do with the legitimacy crisis suffered by China's contemporary rulers than with communist ideology. Although official China continues to preserve the cult and corpse of Mao, the former dictator is popularly perceived as a

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kind of benevolent lesser deity. Unbelievable as it may seem to the older generation, Mao is being depoliticized. In this sense, the proliferation of Mao trinkets represents the search for a subject of allegiance that stands above the bewildering flux of contemporary Chinese politics and society. For young Chinese, Mao is less a political philosopher or historical hero than a Chinese version of "Uncle Sam."

In the West, the view persists that Mao was a well-meaning peasant leader whose manic idealism led to unfortunate excesses. While few would agree with Jean-Paul Sartre's 1968 description of Maoist revolutionary violence as "profoundly moral," Mao seems to have avoided the opprobrium reserved for Stalin and Hitler as unambiguously evil mass-murderers. This withholding of judgment is in part a product of China's self-imposed isolation under Mao, but it also reflects the perennial Western perception of China as enigmatic and exotic. Moral condemnation is diluted by cultural fascination; Maoism is perceived as bizarre rather than malevolent.

However, none of these narratives—the official hagiography, the popular veneration of Mao as benign ancestor, the Western view of Mao as misguided revolutionary—finds much support in Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's new biography, *Mao: The Unknown Story*. Published 30 years after Mao's death and immediately banned in China, the biography portrays its subject as a ruthless megalomaniac responsible for the deaths of over 70 million Chinese people. Along the way, it presents a stridently revisionist reading of key episodes in the mythology of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including the Long March, the struggle against Japan, and China's role in the Korean War. Unfortunately, these specific reinterpretations sometimes rely on shaky evidence, and the authors' tendency to derive the causes and meaning of events from their conception of Mao's personality at times obscures their historical analysis. Nevertheless, by drawing on over a decade of painstaking research—including recently declassified Kremlin documents—and hundreds of interviews in mainland China, Taiwan, and elsewhere, Chang and Halliday convincingly portray Mao as a brutal dictator who was fully aware of, and utterly indifferent to, the vast human suffering precipitated by his hunger for personal power.

According to Chang and Halliday, Mao's ascent to the position of undisputed ruler of China was a long, calculated process in which his allegiance to communism was merely expedient. Their argument goes beyond the common recognition that Mao embraced communism as a means to achieve the nationalist goals of strengthening China and restoring its preeminent international status. In Chang and Halliday's view, Mao was not a genuine nationalist either. Rather, he simply sought personal power, and

he paid lip service to communism and nationalism in order to gain as much of it as possible. Maoism is often understood as the attempt to use popular mobilization as a shortcut to orthodox Marxism's end-state of history, but Chang and Halliday suggest that Mao wanted to reach this end-state, which he identified with China's ascent to superpower status, so that he, personally, could rule the world. Rooted in this lust for power, Mao's 'mind over matter' voluntarism all but destroyed the Chinese economy during the Great Leap Forward, and the violent class struggle of the Cultural Revolution scarred an entire generation.

But *Mao: The Unknown Story* is not just a story about Mao—it is also a new take on the history and foreign relations of the PRC. In chapters colorfully titled "Why Mao and Stalin started the Korean War," "Maoism Falls Flat on the World Stage," and "Nixon: the Red-Baiter Baited," Chang and Halliday provide a Mao-centric view of PRC foreign policy, in which geopolitical, ideological, and domestic political factors pale in comparison to Mao's personal lust for global dominion. A curious aspect of their account is the relative absence of the United States, which makes the transition from chief imperialist aggressor to naive anti-Soviet ally from the sidelines. American statesmen make occasional appearances only to be predictably duped in their dealings with China by the flawed perspective this biography was written to correct—that the PRC is trustworthy and can be expected to behave in its rational self-interest.

Chang and Halliday's treatment of Chinese domestic politics is equally uncompromising. Here, the CCP is anything but the fraternal group of visionaries depicted in photos staged for American journalist Edgar Snow.[3] Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC from its establishment until his death in 1976, is singled out for demystification. Students of Chinese foreign policy are familiar with the image of Zhou as the suave, charismatic diplomat described by Henry Kissinger as "a man of noble character who towered above the rest in intelligence."[4] Chang and Halliday's portrait is far less flattering. Living in chronic insecurity while a paranoid and omnipotent Mao purged his most loyal attendants, Zhou survived by denouncing his former comrades, abetting their torture and death in prison, and scrupulously avoiding any display of ambition to replace Mao at the pinnacle of the communist hierarchy.

Chang and Halliday's presentation of PRC history is remarkable in another respect: it seems tailor-made to undermine the nationalist narrative shoring up the waning legitimacy of today's CCP. In contrast to official mythology, the authors allege that Mao shrank from fighting the Japanese, and they attribute the CCP victory in the Chinese civil war to

Nationalist Chinese (Guomindang) treachery and incompetence. The CCP is also depicted as inflicting far worse physical and spiritual damage than the hated British imperialists. Britain is despised for trading opium in China in the 1840s, but the communists grew opium in the 1940s and used the proceeds to finance their bid for power. British troops burned the Qing Summer Palace in 1860, an episode that figures prominently in contemporary Chinese textbooks and continues to elicit considerable nationalist rage. But that act pales in comparison to the CCP's destructiveness: "In 1958 the regime did a survey of historic monuments in Peking," Chang and Halliday tell us. "It listed 8,000 historic monuments—and decided to keep *seventy-eight*."[5]

Although Chang and Halliday's account is often compelling, there are two problems with much of the content. First, evidence for some of the authors' stridently revisionist historical reconstructions is often sparse, circumstantial, or difficult to track down. China specialist Andrew Nathan has looked into the sources for several of Chang and Halliday's most sensational "unknown stories," including their claims that Chiang Kai Shek intentionally allowed the Long Marchers to escape and that full-scale war with Japan was triggered by a communist mole in the Nationalist army.[6] Nathan's investigations suggest that Chang and Halliday's use of sources is often highly questionable. The authors' heavily moralized version of Chinese history sometimes leads them to misinterpret sources or infer a conspiracy from a single quote.

The second, closely related difficulty with the book is that the accumulation of Mao's calculated misdeeds is so relentless as to be ultimately unbelievable. Virtually every event during Mao's rule is presented as predetermined by his single-minded pursuit of power. Unfortunately, the authors' moral outrage sometimes tempts them to abuse hindsight. In narrating Mao's childhood and ascent to power, Chang and Halliday occasionally acquire the godlike ability to read the young Mao's mind, interpreting the meaning of his behavior through the lens of his future achievements—an ironically flattering overestimation of his foresight and control over subsequent events. It may be that Mao's character consisted exclusively of lust for power and phenomenal talents of political manipulation. But while the narrow focus on Mao's machinations maximizes opportunities to assign personal blame, it also results in a failure to appreciate other causal factors. The reader is left wondering whether this loss of historical breadth and nuance is a price worth paying for moral clarity.

In the end, historians probably will not whole-heartedly endorse Chang and Halliday's versions of the Long March or the Korean War. Nor

will students of Chinese foreign relations accept the simplistic view that Mao's personal ambition largely determined the foreign policy of the PRC between 1949 and 1976. However, Chang and Halliday's eloquent biography will effectively dispel any lingering romanticism about Mao in the West, even if only a few of its specific reinterpretations take hold. Readers need only recall the fact that Mao presided over the deaths, by starvation and political terror, of over 70 million people, thus surpassing Hitler and Stalin to qualify as the most reprehensible ruler in the history of the world. ■

ENDNOTES

1 Mao Zedong at the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1958.

2 In choosing this numerical formula for a verdict on Mao, reformist leaders cleverly inoculated themselves against conservative criticism by duplicating Mao's own judgment of Stalin.

3 Edgar Snow was an American journalist who visited the Communist's Shaanxi base in 1936, where he photographed and interviewed the young Communist leaders. His account of the visit, *Red Star Over China* (1936), provided Americans with a largely sympathetic view of the CCP. Chang and Halliday suggest that Snow's whitewashing of the Reds was the template for subsequent Western misperceptions of the PRC.

4 Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 65.

5 Chang and Halliday relate an episode in which Mao, "standing on Tiananmen Gate and looking out over the gorgeous palaces and temples and pagodas . . . told the mayor: 'In the future, I want to look around and see chimneys everywhere.'"

6 Andrew Nathan, "Jade and Plastic," *The London Review of Books*, November 17, 2005, <www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n22/nath01_.html> (accessed April 2, 2006).

Sifting Through the Fog of an African Conflict: Explaining the Paradoxes of Sierra Leone's 10-Year War

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REVIEW OF DAVID KEEN

Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone

(Oxford: James Currey, 2005) 400 pages, $59.95 hardcover

Sierra Leone is one of the countries deemed to be giving the African continent a bad name, given its 10-year civil war, abject poverty, and poor human development indicators. In the 1990s, it gained international notoriety due to the role of "blood diamonds" in financing the brutal war and the strategic use of amputation of civilians' limbs as instruments of warfare.

Few analysts have so far attempted to understand and explain the brutal tactics and complex interests fueling Sierra Leone's war. Previous studies by William Reno[1] and Paul Richards[2] provided early analyses of the causes of state failure and the outbreak of violence in Sierra Leone, and a recent collective volume by Sierra Leonean authors attempted a first account of the origins and evolution of the war.[3] However, David Keen's recent publication, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone,* is the first comprehensive study by a single author of the microdynamics of the war, examining the shifting motivations of the main actors, their actions within a changing international context, and international humanitarian and mediation efforts.

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Keen's analysis is based on field research and personal interviews conducted throughout the war, and it yields a thorough account of the multiple layers and causes of the conflict. Although it relies on many firsthand interviews and grey literature, rather than hard data, *Conflict and Collusion* provides a fascinating inside account of a war that has often puzzled analysts and policymakers.

As a backdrop for his analysis, Keen briefly summarizes the widely accepted argument that places much of the blame for the collapse of the state on Sierra Leone's post-independence rulers, particularly Presidents Siaka Stevens (1967–1985) and Joseph Momoh (1985–1992). Having inherited authoritarian institutions and political processes from the British colonial rulers, they manipulated state functions in Sierra Leone to their advantage. Subsequently, Keen examines Sierra Leone's rollercoaster ride between the initial rebel attack of March 1991, two military coups in 1992 and 1997, democratic elections in 1996, the brief capture of the capital in 1999, and the final declaration of peace in January 2002. He recounts in great detail how the attack by a small rebel force of no more than 300 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters and their Liberian backers turned into a large-scale, 10-year war that engulfed the entire country, left more than two million displaced and tens of thousands dead, and was ended only thanks to a robust military intervention by the former British colonial power and the largest UN peacekeeping force of the time.

CAUSES AND DYNAMICS: STATE FAILURE, GREED, GRIEVANCES, AND INTERNATIONAL MYOPIA

One of the most puzzling questions of the war in Sierra Leone has been how a rebellion that quickly turned against its backers could be sustained for almost a decade. Keen identifies the convergence of individual interests at the local level with powerful elite interests as one of the key causes for the intractability of the civil war. He attempts to delve deeper than the generic explanations for the war, such as "greed," "blood diamonds," "government corruption," or a "youth crisis." Uncovering the mechanisms that made war possible, Keen illuminates how the survival and interests of many actors became invested in the continuation of the war. Specifically, Keen analyzes the breakdown of state institutions as a conducive environment for unchecked violence, as well as the confluence of the psychosocial effects of years of injustice and destitution with economic interests. He also examines the numerous external interests—from Liberian rebel-leader-turned-president Charles Taylor to Nigerian troops, along with the international diplomatic and aid community and its often ill-conceived interventions.

STATE FAILURE

In line with existing scholarship, Keen argues that state failure provided the permissive environment for violence to become the main instrument of politics. Regular state institutions were woefully underfunded, government employees were unpaid, and infrastructure was decaying. By the time of the rebel incursion in March 1991, the military had only 1,500 poorly equipped and minimally trained soldiers. Decades of neglect of the military and a personalized and clientelistic political system created a permissive environment for the privatization of state functions, or what Keen calls, with a nod to Clausewitz, "the continuation of economics by other means." This encouraged the subsequent merging of rebel and military interests that gave the war a life of its own.

GREED AND GRIEVANCES

Apart from bringing together many existing scholarly arguments into one comprehensive account, *Conflict and Collusion* makes three main contributions to the existing literature on the Sierra Leonean war. First, it attempts to re-balance the academic "greed versus grievance" debate in favor of the latter. Second, it provides a more nuanced account of motivations for rebel fighters, coming down somewhere between ideology and criminal behavior.[4] Third, it sheds new light on how international policymakers and donors were ill-equipped to properly analyze the conflict, which prevented their taking timely and appropriate action.

Keen argues that the "greed versus grievance" debate, which has dominated political scientists' and economists' analyses of civil war in the recent past, has led to an overemphasis on greed, or economic interests, as a motivation for insurgents to rise up against governments.[5] He convincingly posits that the application of traditional conflict models that overemphasize economic motivation to situations in which a rebellion challenges an incumbent government may lead to faulty analyses and misleading conclusions—as has been the case in traditional analyses of Sierra Leone. Instead, Keen's study demonstrates that the Sierra Leone war cannot be comprehended without a close examination of the social, political, and economic functions of violence in the war.

Control of the diamond fields in eastern Sierra Leone was indisputably a key goal for the rebels and their Liberian backers. However, expanding on his previous work on war economies,[6] Keen underscores that economic motivations for violence are much broader and more varied. Reaping the

benefits of diamond mining and smuggling was mainly an option reserved for senior officers. Yet the war also provided ample opportunities for scores of impoverished youth to enrich themselves through looting, extortion, smuggling, and trade in scarce food or consumer items. This created a war economy dominated by an "ideology of self-help" where those in possession of guns had an entrenched interest in continued disorder and fighting. This led to blurred frontlines and widespread collusion among different factions, which were nominally fighting on opposite sides of the conflict.

Keen concludes that while economic interests are important motivating factors, they are by no means sufficient to explain the outbreak and the dynamics of the hostilities. Government failure, underdevelopment, and structural violence all contribute to grievances and psychological processes that may push individuals to pick up guns and brutalize their fellow citizens.

Despite the lack of a coherent and well-formulated ideology, the RUF's crude antigovernment and antiestablishment slogans originally resonated with the pervasive sense of injustice and deep humiliation among young Sierra Leoneans. Similarly, government soldiers seemed to have few qualms about using the war to their own personal advantage after years of government neglect. The fact that both the RUF and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) recruited from the same pool of disaffected youth was another factor contributing to battlefield collusion and convergence of interests between the rebels and the SLA fighters.

The rebellion also allowed those elites who had been marginalized from the spoils of the clientelistic system to exact revenge against the previous government loyalists and made them sympathetic to the rebel cause. These grievances, Keen argues, were not only responsible for fueling the rebellion, but may account for the extreme brutality employed by all groups in the war. The sense of shame that many young fighters felt about the years of exploitation by elites translated to vicious revenge and the shaming of those that were seen as responsible for their misery, or even those that merely seemed helpless and weak.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

Many external actors had a stake in disorder and war in Sierra Leone, including rebel supporters in neighboring countries, regional powerbrokers, international businesses, private military contractors, and international donors. Although Keen clearly refutes the attempts by various Sierra Leonean governments to blame the war entirely on outsiders, he shows that "bad neighborhood" effects contributed to the outbreak of the war and to its continuation.

Liberian leaders were instrumental in starting and sustaining the war. Liberia provided a supply line for the rebels as well as a pool of well-trained fighters. Diamonds and other looted goods were sold via Liberian markets and ports. Only when international pressure on Liberia's Charles Taylor increased after 1999 did peace seem a possibility. In addition to Liberian factors, the continued presence of Nigerian military forces throughout the war was a symbol of the collapse of Sierra Leone's state and its inability to defend its territory. The Nigerians often were part and parcel of the war economy, trading with rebels and government soldiers. In later years, they were also accused of atrocities against civilians and rebel fighters.

Keen raises particularly trenchant questions for the international community regarding its inability to properly understand the dynamics of the conflict and its probably well-intentioned, but often harmful, interventions that allowed war to persist rather than cease. The Sierra Leonean conflict was all but ignored by the international community for its first few years. Keen provides numerous examples that demonstrate that there was little appreciation in the diplomatic and donor community for Sierra Leone's plight. International donors' primary concern was macroeconomic stability, and the military junta ruling the country from 1992 to 1995 showed great skill in playing along with donor demands to keep aid and loans flowing.

In addition, Keen details how international diplomatic efforts to end the war often seemed half-hearted and misinformed. The failure to back up negotiations with international peacekeeping or enforcement encouraged subsequent fighting. In hindsight, the international pressure on the Sierra Leonean government for power sharing and a blanket amnesty for RUF rebels in the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement seems like the culmination of many years of poor international judgment with respect to the Sierra Leone conflict. It was only after the Lomé Agreement unraveled and more than 500 UN peacekeepers were held hostage in May 2000 that the international community woke up and provided serious enforcement, in the form of British special forces and a robust UN mandate.

CONCLUSION

Given its detail and richness, it is unfortunate that Keen's analysis mainly stops with the early 2000s. Since Keen's book was published in October 2005—four years after the end of the war—one might have expected him to address some of the latest evidence that has emerged. Recent research on the motivations of rebel fighters, the rich insights provided by the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Report,[7] and the statements by numerous war actors before the Special Court of Sierra Leone since 2003 would have helped to support or refute Keen's arguments. At the time of writing, Keen could not have predicted Taylor's arrest in March 2006, whose trial will now provide fascinating new insights into the dynamics of the insurgency and 10-year war. Yet while Keen's analysis does seem to support claims by the Sierra Leone Special Court Prosecutor of a "joint criminal enterprise" between Charles Taylor and the RUF leadership, he never fully pursues that line of reasoning. He also does not seem to appreciate fully the highly professional manner in which the RUF conducted its campaigns.[8] This seems to contradict the seemingly random acts of brutality, which Keen explains as function of individual fighters' grievances and sense of shame.

Despite these small blemishes, Keen's study of the Sierra Leonean war is a monumental work of primary research in a hazardous and data-poor war environment. It provides a rich source of new empirical evidence on the causes and persistence of post-Cold War African conflicts. Aiming to understand the finer nuances of a complex political, social, and economic phenomenon, the book provides a welcome complement to the increasing number of quantitative cross-country studies that take a one-sided focus on insurgents' economic motivations. ■

ENDNOTES

1 William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

2 Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996).

3 Ibrahim Abdullah, ed., *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004).

4 This debate is between Richards and Abdullah and his colleagues. While Richards considers the RUF to have a true ideology and political project, Abdullah et al see the RUF as a criminal enterprise driven by the interests of marginalized youth.

5 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War,* World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355 (Washington: World Bank, May 2001).

6 David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars,* International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

7 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, *Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Accra: GPL Press, 2004), <www.trcsierraleone.org/pdf/FINAL%20VOLUME%20ONE/VOLUME%20ONE.pdf> (accessed on April 2, 2006).

8 For a fascinating account of the highly organized and disciplined nature of the RUF, see for example the statements by witness TF1-141 at <www.sc-sl.org/Transcripts/RUF-041205.pdf> and <www.sc-sl.org/Transcripts/RUF-041305.pdf> (accessed on April 2, 2006).

Is There a Straight Path for Europe?

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REVIEW OF LORENZO VIDINO

Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad

(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006) 403 pages, $27.00 hardcover

"Europe is caught in a struggle to defend its civil liberties and rights while fighting its internal enemy: terrorism."

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Europe thought of itself as the best of all possible worlds. It described its society as democratic, open, tolerant, peaceful, and prosperous. This continental mixture of profound naiveté and arrogance led Europeans to ignore and neglect their internal tensions and minority problems, assuming that the outsider would simply be absorbed into the florid European society, or in some instances, even secretly hoping that the problem would just go away.

In this sense, the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, the London and Madrid bombings, and the recent Danish cartoon controversy constitute an epiphany in recent European history. The old continent has recently come to a collective and painful realization. Although different political actors have given radically different explanations for these current events, everybody seems to agree on at least one point: Europe failed. The rise of Islamic radicalism in Europe is indeed a complex phenomenon that can be discussed from many different perspectives—from a sociological discussion about the meaning of identity and integration, to an analysis of the effectiveness and flaws of immigration and integration policies.

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Lorenzo Vidino's book, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, adopts a security perspective. It sets a clear and comprehensive framework to understand the origins, development, and growth of this trend that has revealed Europe's Achilles' heel. According to the author, the origins of what Vidino defines as a security disaster date back to the 1980s, when lax and poorly planned immigration policies allowed radical elements, in many instances indicted in their own native countries, to settle in Europe. Great Britain set the example by granting political asylum to veterans of the Afghan war and suspected terrorists.

These new arrivals, taking advantage of European democratic traditions, created a complex, multicentric, and widespread network from Frankfurt to London, Madrid, and Milan, embarking on a campaign to recruit and spread their radical vision of Islam. The book explains how Islamic radical movements have been able to select, train, and organize a wide number of passive and active supporters. They used radical mosques such as the Islamic Cultural Center in Milan or the Finsbury Park Mosque in London to foster a sense of identity and community, and recruited their followers from both the criminal underworld and from universities. Potential terrorists come from a highly diversified social and ethnic background. They range from young, unemployed, second-generation immigrant youth living in the Parisian *banlieu* to wealthy professionals educated in Europe's finest universities. Vidino identifies two categories—the homegrown and the home-brewed terrorist. The first is a convert to Islam; the second a Muslim who radicalized his views upon migrating to Europe. Another interesting trend that is observed in the book is the progressive radicalization taking place among younger generations of Muslims born in Europe. Vidino reports how young Muslims have distanced themselves from, and in many instances appear to have become much more religious than, their families.

The recruitment pool of Islamic radicals appears to be wide and diversified. Selection, rather than recruitment at all costs, seems to be al-Qaeda leaders' main concern. Vidino quotes leading terrorism expert and author of *Understanding Terror Networks* Marc Sageman to explain this point: "It's actually like applying to Harvard." From a security point of view, al-Qaeda's highly heterogeneous base of supporters and followers makes profiling substantially more difficult, thus constituting a serious obstacle to combating terrorism.

Moreover, Vidino dedicates a chapter to existing obstacles to fighting terrorism. He explains that European law enforcement agencies are largely unprepared to deal with the rise of terrorism. This is mostly due to

a lack of a clear legal framework that would allow them to disrupt terrorist groups for their illicit activities, such as money laundering or the trafficking of false documents. With the exception of France, European nations face serious difficulties in prosecuting and sentencing people for crimes related to terrorism. The high threshold of evidence needed to press charges, due process guarantees, concerns for civil and political rights, as well as all the legal instruments that are the pride of Europe provide an ideal shelter for terrorists and often bind the state to inaction. This disturbing situation is exemplified by the January 2005 acquittal before an Italian court of members of Ansar al-Islam, an Islamic combatant organization designated as a terrorist group by the UN Security Council. The group's recruitment of *kamikazes* in Italy, the court held, did not violate municipal law and its activities in Iraq constituted "guerrilla warfare" and not terrorism. This case demonstrates how Europe struggles with designing a strategy based on legal tools that would allow it to fight terrorism effectively without jeopardizing its institutions and core values. Most Europeans are unwilling to compromise on what they consider to be constitutive values of their democracies in order to meet the new threats and the new security environment. Their governments are thus faced with the challenge of finding a balance between these two needs. Unfortunately, in many instances, European countries seem to lack direction and a clear long-term strategy.

Vidino presents a well-researched description of the ongoing European struggle against terrorism. He effectively points out past flaws and presents obstacles and contradictions. The global picture is not a reassuring one. On the one hand, Europe has become the shelter for a large number of radical *imams* and terrorists who have developed well-organized, self-sustaining, and interrelated networks all over the continent, and who have recruited and trained a new generation of *mujahedeen* willing to fight in Iraq and Chechnya and to return and apply their experience locally. On the other hand, the continent is still largely unprepared to deal with this new threat because of lax immigration policies, permissive legal frameworks, and poor coordination among different law enforcement agencies.

Europe has failed to integrate, or in many instances even to tolerate, its minorities—but Vidino only mentions this part of the problem in passing. The hopeless reality of the European periphery, characterized by unemployment, social disintegration, and the stigma of otherness that even third-generation immigrants bear, provides fertile soil for radicalism to spread. In such a context, identity politics constitute a powerful drive

that contributes to the success of radical groups such as al-Qaeda. Thus, dealing with rising terrorism from a pure law enforcement perspective, without considering the social and welfare causes, will not provide any long-term solution or stability.

However complex it may be to assess and fully describe the many root causes behind the rise of terrorism and the inefficient response that has been provided so far, Vidino makes it clear that Europe is facing one of the most demanding challenges of its modern history—a challenge that has substantial implications for U.S. national security as well.

Europe has not yet found a "straight path" that would allow it to deal with its internal enemy *and* preserve its concern for civil liberties and human rights. But the lack of a clear strategic and legal framework to deal with this problem is likely to jeopardize the liberties and rights that Europe holds dear and to further exacerbate intolerance, xenophobia, and mistrust for immigrant communities. The effectiveness of Europe's response to al-Qaeda and to the rise of radical Islam on the continent will thus play a significant role in shaping the continent's future identity and values. ■

Nation-Building

NICHOLAS KENNEY

REVIEW OF FRANCIS FUKUYAMA (ED.)

Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 272 pages, $ 55.00 hardcover, $21.95 paperback

Francis Fukuyama, author and distinguished professor, has edited a new compendium of essays on nation-building. The contributors are academics and experts, and after reading *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, one might think that nation-building has ceased to be the controversy it was as recently as the 2000 presidential campaign, when George W. Bush derided the Clinton Administration's use of the armed forces to help rebuild post-conflict nations.[1] This book is a dry compilation of "lessons learned" from past U.S. nation-building efforts, including Haiti, Somalia, Japan and of course, the two main case studies: Afghanistan and Iraq. It is a how-to (or more often, a how-not-to) book on nation-building; it does not offer any lively debate between the authors, nor does it examine the implementation of nation-building in the context of an overall national security strategy. The editor brings little of his flair for cross-cultural comparison and grandiose historical analyses.[2] And the individual authors generally treat nation-building as a business, thus writing, it often seems, for a limited audience of government officials, contractors, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers with nation-building expertise and responsibilities.[3]

For the most part, the essays are quite clinical, treating nation-building as if it were all management science and no leadership art, while often drawing commonsense conclusions from the case studies. Many of the contributors' conclusions as to lessons learned are less than revelatory. For

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example, of the American experience in Haiti during the Clinton administration, the reader discovers that nation-builders should not draw down their military forces before reducing, if not eliminating, social and political violence: "The diminished level of American military commitment directly detracted from the ability of the United States to curb violence and electoral irregularities, and indirectly limited its political leverage among Haitian leaders." In other words, there were not enough troops to keep order, conduct fair elections, and coerce the anti-American Haitian leaders. And while Clinton earns poor marks for nation-building in Haiti and Somalia, the post-World War II occupation of Japan is held up as a model of success, since American officials skillfully used the emperor's symbolic authority to gain Japanese public trust and deftly coordinated civilian and military operations. Indeed, it breaks little new ground to assert that the stabilization and reconstruction of Japan went well or that security is a prerequisite for successful nation-building.

It is when the authors turn to the contemporary, albeit unfinished, instances of nation-building that the truly detailed postmortems begin, which is slightly ironic considering that the nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have not concluded. Oddly, the contributors fail to note that they are giving the anatomy of *ongoing* operations. How can we look "Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq" when there is still so much left to be done in both countries? Afghanistan has made strides politically, but economically all indicators show that it is fast becoming a narco-state. Larry P. Goodson notes in his chapter on Afghanistan: "At its current growth rate, the illicit Afghan economy [mostly opium production] will soon equal the licit economy, on which the former already has profoundly distorting effects." In Iraq, recent news reports appear to indicate the beginnings of civil war.[4] Fukuyama would have done well to include a chapter on how the United States, NATO, and other nation-builders should proceed in Afghanistan and Iraq, using the lessons of the past few years to shed light on the next few. In addition, given that Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing nation-building operations, this compendium would have benefited from more analysis from the practitioner's perspective. The majority of the contributors are academics, and thus the on-the-ground realities are difficult to fathom after reading many chapters.

An exception is S. Frederick Starr's chapter on Afghanistan. He provides one of the better analyses of Afghanistan by examining the sovereignty-legitimacy tradeoff. After U.S. forces defeated the Taliban regime, the first task of the Bush administration's nation-building experiment in Afghanistan was to establish the country's sovereignty and territorial

integrity. But this exclusive focus on sovereignty, Starr argues, had a detrimental effect on the fledgling state's legitimacy. From the Taliban's fall in 2001 to 2003, when the Bush Administration changed its strategy, U.S. forces consolidated power for the new regime, but only at the expense of its long-term legitimacy. In late 2003, the U.S. policy in Afghanistan shifted with little fanfare but with significant success. Instead of only focusing on improving sovereign control of territory, the Bush administration instituted a dual strategy which also included addressing legitimacy issues such as NGO accountability, balance of ethnic representation in the central ministry staffs, and assisting the new central government in the removal of disloyal governors and local chiefs. Prior to this policy shift, the Bush administration unwisely had set aside legitimacy issues for the later electoral process to address. Starr presents a compelling argument that sovereignty and legitimacy should not be pursued *seriatim*, but rather simultaneously.

In support of this argument, Starr provides one of the most interesting insights in his analysis of the role of nongovernmental organizations. In the postconflict devastation of Afghanistan, the mission of the NGOs was to alleviate the suffering of the population. In pursuit of this laudable goal, the NGOs often, if not always, bypassed the local government's embryonic administrative systems. But in so doing the NGOs undermined the legitimacy of the new government in two related ways: 1) they implicitly demonstrated the government's powerlessness; 2) by usurping much of the relief responsibility, the NGOs denied the new administrators the opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to govern. Starr writes, "[D]elivery of services at the local level was one of the two prime tests of the government's legitimacy."[5]

Lessons about these types of tradeoffs are the most valuable, because they recognize that nation-building has an inherent, inescapable tension. On the one hand the United States' mission is to build relatively quickly a new democratic nation in the promotion of American values and ideals; on the other hand the United States' mission is to create local capacities that enable the new nation to become self-governing in the long run. Oftentimes, the more support that is lent to a government in the short term, the less likely the government will survive without that support in the long term. The South Vietnamese government during the Vietnam War exemplifies this phenomenon. Starr scratches the surface of this tension, and some of the other essays on the history of development and nation-building also provide glimpses of it, but the book and its readers would benefit from additional exploration of such issues.

Larry Diamond's chapter, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq," is

well-written and presents a rare mixed perspective of both practitioner and academic. A professor at Stanford and fellow at the Hoover Institution, he was also senior advisor on governance and political transition to the Coalition Provisional Authority from January to April 2004. Diamond rightly goes back to the first days after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, when widespread looting and unchecked property crimes occurred across the cities and towns. Security is the first priority in any nation-building operation, and the Defense Department failed miserably when it did not deploy enough troops to maintain civil peace in the immediate aftermath of the war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's reaction to this failure with the now famous pithy dismissal, "freedom's untidy,"[6] neglects Diamond's key point—that it is the first job of government to dull the untidy edge of freedom by protecting its citizens and their property from a Hobbesian "war of all against all."

This brings us to perhaps the most glaringly obvious lesson from the American experience in nation-building: that the government needs to have a plan for postconflict situations, and when it has such a plan, it should use it. This lesson was ignored from the outset in Iraq, which should boil the blood of U.S. taxpayers, no matter whether they were for or against the war:

> The State Department had for several years prior to the onset of war [in Iraq] conducted preliminary planning for stabilization and reconstruction by engaging a wide range of experts, including émigré Iraqis, in detailed consideration of the political, economic, and societal aspects of post-Saddam Iraq. . . . Defense planners do not seem to have made great use of the earlier work done at State.

Contemptuous of State Department regional experts who were seen as too "soft" to remake Iraq, Pentagon planners shoved aside the elaborate State Department planning in the Future of Iraq project, which anticipated many of the problems that quickly emerged after the invasion.

This, together with the idea that nation-building is at least as much a civilian as a military operation (and that, whatever the division of labor, the two sides must be well-coordinated), will be the enduring lessons from these experiments. Whether these lessons are actually learned is, sadly, an open question; one of the continuing themes of this book is that the United States government often prefers to reinvent the wheel rather than use the hard work of past administrations.

Given that these lessons of nation-building are still unlearned, despite their great cost in lives and money, one hopes that Fukuyama and his contributors' next book will be less about how to build nations and

more about whether this business of nation-building should go on at all. ■

ENDNOTES

1 "If we don't have a clear vision of the military, if we don't stop extending our troops all around the world and nation building missions [sic], then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road, and I'm going to prevent that." Candidate George W. Bush at the October 3, 2000 Debate with Vice President Al Gore. <www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html> (accessed April 1, 2006).

2 See Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1996) and *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992). He has also written a recent monograph on nation-building: *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

3 The sponsor of the April 2004 conference on nation-building, upon which the book is based, was the chairman and CEO of a government and defense contractor, Bernard Schwartz of the Loral Corporation.

4 See, e.g., Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An Update," *The New York Times*, March 19, 2006.

5 The other prime test for legitimacy was the inclusiveness of those leading and staffing the government.

6 Secretary Rumsfeld told reporters soon after the invasion:

> . . . freedom's untidy. And free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. And that's what's going to happen here . . .

For transcript excerpts, see "A Nation at War: Rumsfeld's Words on Iraq: 'There is Untidiness,'" *The New York Times*, April 12, 2003.