Hemispheres

The Tufts University Journal of International Affairs

Photographic Exploration

Editor's Note

Previous editions of *Hemispheres* have addressed how and why states manipulate each other to promote a specific agenda. Though these so-called "positive policies" are of extreme importance, this volume addresses the increasingly important theme of deterrence. If we accept that one of the primary goals of every state is its own preservation, it is of vital importance for scholars and government officials to understand how and why states act to increase their influence and, ultimately, achieve and preserve hegemony in their respective political and historical context. Contemporary international politics further demonstrate the need for understanding the effects of preventative policies. American relations with Iran, North Korea, China, Sudan, Israel, and Cuba, to only list a handful, are primarily concerned with policies designed to prevent the rise of future challenges to American military, economic, or political influence. This year's edition of *Hemispheres* attempts to make a small contribute to the extremely vast and diverse amount of writing on security studies and provide exceptional undergraduates with the opportunity to join the discussion.

The effectiveness and necessity of the aforementioned strategies is, however, difficult to judge. Both domestic constraints and the necessity to maintain international peace and stability, however, often trump the need for a state to maximize its relative power. The six essays selected for publication in this year's edition of *Hemispheres* highlight the need to evaluate the myriad factors that states must consider in their decisions to enact specific foreign policies. Whether it is the use of force or the mere threat of force, these essays analyze the diverse and complex nature of threat assessment and response in international relations.

In light of the historical importance of deterrence in international relations, this year's edition of *Hemispheres* features articles spanning three centuries. Interestingly, many of our authors come to different conclusions on the importance, necessity, and effectiveness of preventative policies. Our first essay evaluates the French desire for continental hegemony and war with Spain during the eighteenth century whereas the second evaluates the restrictions that domestic politics placed on

the United States facing World War I. Two other essays come to different conclusions on the relevance and impact of peacekeeping operations. The final two papers featured this year discuss the changing face of international relations theory. American interest in Central Asia and the impact of terrorism is changing the entire balance of power across the region. Furthermore, as our final essay discusses, the very nature of why nations fight is changing in the post-cold war era.

Hemispheres deeply appreciates the help and support of the Tufts University International Relations, Political Science, and Economics departments for their continued advice and support of our publication. We would also like to thank the Tufts Community Union Senate and Allocations Board for their financial support and counsel. Most importantly, however, we are sincerely extremely grateful to the contribution of the students who submitted their works to our publications and the professors who encouraged them to do so. Please enjoy the high level of scholarship and superb writing that makes this twenty-ninth volume of Hemispheres our best one to date.

<div align="right">Andrew Wolinsky</div>

Security or Opportunity? Limited Aggression and French Crisis Provocation, 1700-1702

by Steven Ward

In 1700, following the heirless death of King Carlos II of Spain, King Louis XIV of France negated the Second Treaty of Partition, meant to equitably divide Spain and its possessions among the European powers, and placed his son Philip of Anjou on the Spanish throne. He took further steps to exert French control over Spain and its territories, and ended up triggering the formation of a wide countervailing coalition and the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. The war ended French hegemony in Europe and the Treaty of Utrecht established a much more equitable balance of power. In short, France fought a costly war and lost in terms of international positi.on Why, then, did France pursue a policy which antagonized the European powers to the point of conflict? Two theories provide competing hypotheses. An offensive realist hypothesis, based on assumptions that regardless of circumstances states will act aggresively when possible to improve their position in the international system, predicts that great powers, especially hegemons, will pursue policies of opportunistic expansion in order to maximize their relative power. This first hypothesis posits that France, as the European hegemon in the late 17th century, recognized the death of Charles II as an opportunity for it to easily increase its relative power because of its existing advantage. Defensive realism, on the other hand, assumes that the international system only rewards aggression under certain circumstances, depending on several factors, particularly, and most pertinent for the purposes of this paper, the offense-defense balance of military technology. Specifically, aggression is rewarded and conflict is likely when offense dominates, and the

---

Steven Ward is a senior majoring in International Relations at Tufts University.

opposite is true when defense dominates. As a correllary, states are more likely to precipitate crises for political gain in times of defense dominance because they do not expect nor fear the costs of war as a result. The defensive realist hypothesis first recognizes that French power was in decline and that France did not hope for nor anticipate war as a result of the negation of the Second Partition Treaty. Instead France, recognizing the defense dominance of the early 18th century, pursued a policy expected to prevent its position from weakening further without forcing it to engage in a costly war. I argue that this second hypothesis provides a more complete and compelling explanation for the origins of the War of the Spanish Succession.

<u>Introduction: The Case and Hypotheses</u>

In 1697, a wearied France emerged from the unanticipatedly long, costly, systemwide Nine Years War. Louis XIV had apparently outgrown his lust for battlefield glory, and France had begun to fall from its mid-century position as the undisputed European hegemon. However, five years later, after abrogating the Second Partition Treaty and antagonizing the other European great powers, Louis found himself once again embroiled in a major continental war, facing a daunting countervailing alliance. More than a decade later, the war would end with France defeated and in a severely weakened position relative to its rival great powers.[1]

Why did Louis XIV break the Second Partition Treaty following the death of King Carlos II of Spain? Why did he proceed to antagonize the other great powers to the point that they formed a balancing alliance? In short, why did Louis pursue a policy which resulted in an extended and costly war against the rest of Europe's great powers? This paper attempts to explain the seemingly irrational actions of King Louis XIV which resulted in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Two variants of realism provide hypotheses which address this question. According to offensive realists, states seek to maximize their security by maximizing their relative power. Thus, states take advantage of favorable circumstances to engage in opportunistic expansive war. Strong states are more likely to engage in expansive wars of opportunity than are weaker states. The offensive realist hypothesis explains French actions prior to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in these terms. French leaders perceived that they enjoyed an advantage

over their great power rivals at the time, and sought to increase their relative power by using the existing advantage to take control of Spain and its dependencies following the extinction of the Spanish Hapsburg dynasty.

Defensive realism, on the other hand, assumes that since states seek only to maximize their security instead of their power, they respond to shifts in the balance of power as well as certain characteristics of the international structure, specifically the offensive-defensive balance of military technology, in making foreign policy decisions. Defensive realism, in particular balance of power theory and a revised, more nuanced offense-defense theory yields the following hypothesis: when defensive military technologies are perceived to be dominant, states facing adverse shifts in the balance of power will seek to increase their security by provoking crises and small, limited wars in the belief that they can control the consequences of such events. In the case of the French provocation of the War of the Spanish Succession, Louis XIV recognized France's relative decline versus its European rivals, as well as the defense dominance of the late 17th century. His actions following the death of Carlos II are consistent with the crisis and limited war provocation predicted by balance of power and offense-defense theories.

Both variants of realism present hypotheses which appear to hold great explanatory power in the case of the French provocation of the War of the Spanish Succession. On a cursory inspection, the War of the Spanish Succession looks like an opportunistic war of expansion. However, an examination of the historical record reveals that the defensive realist hypothesis provides a much more complete explanation of the origins of the crisis.

Offensive Realism

Offensive realism, while diverging greatly in some respects from its theoretical cousins within realist scholarship, shares with them several basic assumptions about the international system and the study of state interaction. Most important among the assumptions shared by the various schools of realism are that states are the primary actors, that the international system is anarchic, that the nature and structure of the international system, as opposed to a state's internal makeup, is what determines state behavior, and that a state's most important ambition is

simply to survive.[2]

It is on the question of how states can best ensure their security and survival, given the nature of the international system, that offensive realism takes on a more specific and peculiar identity. Offensive realists emphasize the uncertainty inherent in the international system, and come to the conclusion that because a state can never be sure of the intentions or future capacity of its neighbors, it will seek to increase its relative power regardless of systemic conditions. The international system provides strong incentives for states to "achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power."[3]

As a consequence of these assumptions, offensive realists see the international system as a very dangerous arena in which aggression is rewarded. However, it is important to note that offensive realists do identify circumstances in which aggressive behavior will be more or less frequent. While there is no distinction between "status quo" states and "revisionist" states in terms of identity, there are certain states which, because of their share of the distribution of power, will be more or less likely to engage in expansive war. Weak states, those without the capacity to expand their power in the face of stronger neighbors, will defend the status quo. Strong states will take advantage of their position and attempt to maximize their power.[4] Thus conflict is most likely when there is an uneven balance of power within a system.

Strong states, however, will not simply expand in any place without regard to circumstances. States which can expand will expand but only when "they are presented with opportunities that will easily and cheaply increase their relative power."[5] While some states engage in extremely aggressive behavior, known as manual expansion, most states engage in "incremental, repeated, and localized efforts to expand power when such opportunities arise."[6] It is important to note that this behavior, known as automatic expansion, does not arise from a sinister and well-planned effort to become the most powerful state in a system, but rather from the very incentives that the international system itself provides.[7]

The characteristics of the type of expansive behavior which offensive realism predicts are important to enumerate in order to determine their presence or absence in French behavior leading up to the War of the Spanish Succession. One characteristic is that the expansive state will "go about expanding in a manner that draws the least attention of

the other great power."[8] This obviously precludes, at least in the case of automatic expansion, the extremely aggressive behavior displayed by Willhelmine or Nazi Germany, or Napoleonic France. From this first characteristic, Eric Labs identifies two different types of expansive behavior, which are associated with two different categories of expansive states. Island powers, or states with strong navies, will attempt to expand overseas, in areas where other powers are unlikely to notice or care. On the other hand, land powers with strong armies will expand only very slowly and by small amounts, since they will not be able to hide expansion from rivals.[9]

There are two other types of expansive behavior which are relevant to the French instigation of the War of the Spanish Succession. First, offensive realism predicts that states will expand into areas which they have identified as power vacuums.[10] This is very pertinent to the end of the 17th century, as the entire continent perceived the imminent death of Carlos II as a looming power vacuum in Spain.

The second type of aggressive, opportunistic behavior is the expansion of war aims. Eric Labs has identified several instances in which states have, after initial successes, expanded their war aims and behaved more aggressively than they had planned.[11] This behavior comes about as the result of two factors. First, the victorious state may fear the renewed rise of a defeated state. Second, a successful state may perceive that the opportunity exists for further expansion. The very success a state experiences can contribute to this perception.[12] The principle of expanding war aims may be applied to the early 18th century to explain Louis XIV's behavior following his acceptance of the final testament of Carlos II.

The assumptions of offensive realism lead to the hypothesis that states which perceive that they have an advantage in relative capbilities over other states are likely to engage in small-scale expansive behavior when there is an opportunity to increase their relative power cheaply and easily. Because the creation of a power vacuum presents one such opportunity, the creation of a power vacuum also presents the conditions necessary for a state which sees itself as holding a relative power advantage to pursue an expansive policy. Furthermore, once the initial aims of the state have been achieved, offensive realism predicts that there will be incentives for the state to widen these aims and engage in further aggres-

sive behavior.

In terms of the French provocation of the War of the Spanish Succession, the offensive realist hypothesis predicts that certain types of evidence should be found regarding the 17th century European power structure and the actions, expectations, and motivations of French leaders. Specifically, for the offensive realist hypothesis to hold, French leaders must have perceived that France held an advantage in relative power over its rivals which would allow it to expand cheaply. French policy makers must also have perceived the opening of a power vacuum in Spain on the death of Carlos II. Evidence that French leaders expected conflict and victory, and that initial successes led to a heightened sense of relative strength which contributed to the French escalation of the conflict would also support the offensive realist hypothesis.

Defensive Realism

Defensive realism shares with offensive realism the four basic assumptions mentioned above. However, this is where the similarities end. While offensive realists assume that states seek to maximize their relative power regardless of other systemic variables, defensive realists believe that states only seek to maximize their security.[13]

A security dilemma arises because each state's goal is to increase its own security. When one state increases its security, this decreases its neighbors' perception of security. States are threatened when their neighbors experience high relative gains in terms of security and power. For instance, if one state makes a territorial gain, or acquires new weapons, or new economic power, its neighbors will feel threatened and seek to address their relative decline in power and security. Defensive realists, therefore, say that all states have a status quo bias. They are more concerned with preserving the existing distribution of capabilities than they are with maximizing their own relative power.[14]

Balance of power theory predicts that states will act when they are threatened by adverse shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities. There are two broad categories of balancing, or responding to a perception of decreased security. Internal balancing involves arms-racing or other policies and actions which increase a state's internal strength relative to its neighbors. External balancing involves alliance formation, undermining opposing alliances, or other external efforts to increase

security.[15] In stark opposition to offensive realism, therefore, defensive realism predicts that states which experience adverse shifts in the balance of power will be more likely to behave aggressively, by either arms-racing, forming alliances, or taking aggressive military action to increase their security.

However, defensive realists also recognize that there are certain characteristics of the international system which either intensify or mitigate the security dilemma, and therefore make conflict more or less likely. Among these is the offensive-defensive balance of military technology.

The offensive-defensive balance of military technology is a rather slippery concept which has been defined in various ways by different scholars. For the purposes of this paper, the offensive-defensive balance of military technology will be defined as the balance of weapons technology which either makes territorial conquest easier or harder.[16] In general, technologies which increase tactical mobility tilt the balance toward the offense, while technologies which improve the ability to protect and hold territory tilt it toward the defense. There is some disagreement on the influence of weapons which improve firepower, but the majority of scholars agree that they improve defensive capabilities.[17]

Traditional offense-defense theory predicts that when offensive technologies are dominant, conquest will be easy and conflict will be more likely. When defensive technologies dominate, defense of territory will be easier and conflict will be less likely. Stephen Van Evera argues that offense-dominance invites opportunistic expansion, encourages arms-racing, provides incentives for states to strike first, and generally decreases security and intensifies the security dilemma. Defense dominance has the opposite effect.[18]

There are striking problems with traditional offense-defense theory. Most importantly, it fails a number of empirical tests regarding the perceived balance and the actual frequency of conflict. In Particular, Keir Lieber identifies the twenty years following 1850 as a period of perceived defense dominance. However, this peorid also saw some of the most successful expansive behavior in history, in the form of the Wars of German Unification. Following the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, though, offense was generally assumed to be dominant. Contradictorally, there were no wars in Europe between 1870 and 1914.[19] Further-

more, the nuclear defense-dominance of the post-1945 era should have seen infrequent or absent war and crisis provocation. It has in fact seen conflicts of all types short of full nuclear war.[20]

These empirical problems anticipate an inherent flaw in offense-defense theory. The flaw becomes obvious from an examination of the logic behind Van Evera's argument regarding crisis provocation. Van Evera argues that offense dominance encourages states to pursue risky diplomatic policies and to provoke crises, or what he calls a "halfway-step to war."[21] This is because when offense is dominant, the rewards of a "fait accompli" or provoked crisis will be greater. "When security is scarce, winning disputes grows more important than avoiding war."[22] Under offense-dominance, states are more concerned about winning than about not-losing. Thus, they are more willing to risk defeat. This argument dismisses a key assumption of defensive realism: the status quo bias. The status quo bias has a strong empirical basis in psychology, particularly in research conducted by prospect theorists.[23] Simply put, people prefer not to lose than to win. They value the maintenance of an existing position over an improvement in position. This concept, translated to state behavior, is a cornerstone of defensive realism.

While Van Evera argues that ease of conquest erases the status quo bias, it seems more likely that risk-aversion would lead to increased caution during times of offense-dominance. When conquest is easy, the consequences of unanticipated escalation are more likely and more dangerous. On the other hand, when conquest is hard, dramatic and disastrous loss, as consequences of inadvertent escalation, are perceived to be unlikely and are undervalued as possible outcomes.

Adjusting for the apparent contradiction between the centrality of risk-aversion and the predictions of traditional offense-defense theory requires a more nuanced description of the differing intentions of states initiating conflicts. Specifically, what is necessary is a distinction between policies of controlled and uncontrolled aggression. Uncontrolled or unlimited policies of expansion are wars which involve two or more great powers, are fought at the highest level of intensity, and are initiated with the express goal of complete political domination of one or more states by another. Limited or controlled wars of expansion are wars or provoked crises which have as their end a finite political goal short of domination. They can be fought by one or more great powers, and are

usually not fought at the highest level of intensity. Most importantly, leaders expect that they will be able to control limited policies of expansion. This is key to understanding the difference. If leaders expect that they will be able to control the crisis or the conduct of the war in such a way that will prevent escalation, the decision to pursue such a policy is vastly different than the decision to engage in total and uncontrolled war. Obviously, Otto von Bismarck's decision to go to war with Denmark in the 1860s is not comparable to Germany's invasion of France in 1914.

Traditional offense-defense hypotheses may succeed in explaining the occurrence of uncontrolled war, but hypotheses regarding the provocation of controllable crises and conflicts are logically backward and fail the empirical tests discussed above. Rather than decreasing the frequency of all types of conflict, defense dominance contributes to a short-term perception of security which makes the instigation of limited crises more likely. The sense of security and confidence in the ability to control crises arises because of the effect which defense dominance has on the expectations of policy makers regarding their own defensive capacity and the offensive capacity of other states.

Most obviously, when defense is dominant, policy makers perceive that the defense of territory is easier than conquest. They apply this to their own borders, and conclude that because of the prevailing balance of military technology, the immediate risk of dramatic territorial loss is lowered. This contributes to a sense of security which allows states to behave more aggressively, at least in terms of provoking limited crises. Because of the perception that defense in general is stronger than offense, states do not fear the consequences of inadvertent escalation.

Defense dominance also contributes to an expectation that rival states will be hesitant to take offensive action in response to policies of limited expansion or crisis provocation. This is because when defensive technologies are dominant, offensive technologies and strategies are considered inefficient relative to their defensive counterparts. Other great powers are less likely to be threatened in the short-term by small-scale crisis provocation or limited conflict. States responding to provoked crises or policies of limited conflict will also be hesitant to take action to reverse the gains made by the initiating state because the difficulty of conquest makes such action prohibitively expensive. This further contributes to a sense that crises and conflicts can be controlled.

It is necessary to emphasize that defense dominance does not alone provide incentives for crisis-provocation or the prosecution of controlled wars. In fact, the sense of security created by defensive superiority would appear to dampen a states' motivation for provoking conflict. However, a defense dominance-generated sense of security is inherently short-term; it does not contribute to states' long-term security calculation. States provoke crises and initiate policies of controlled expansion because of long-term threats to their security, which arise because of perceived losses in terms of relative capabilities. Ultimately, the two theories presented above must be used in tandem to yield the following synthesized hypothesis with regard to crisis provocation and limited wars of expansion: states which perceive that they have experienced an adverse shift in the balance of power, or that they need to even the international playing field are likely to provoke crises or initiate limited wars of expansion if the perceived risk associated with these policies has been lowered by the perception of defensive military technological dominance.

This revision of offense-defense theory has strong explanatory power, especially with regard to the periods of history which cause the traditional theory to fail. Between 1850 and 1871, most European powers perceived that defensive military technologies were dominant, largely as a result of the emergence of the railroad and its expected utility in mobilizing defensive forces.[24] However, it was during this period that Prussia undertook its expansive program to unite the German states. Keir Lieber notes that "it was largely *because* the railroad made the defense of Prussian territory easier...that Prussia was able to act aggressively toward its neighbors."[25] It is also important to note that the Wars of German Unification were of a limited nature. Even in the face of seemingly nonexistent opposition in 1866, Bismarck did not allow Moltke the Elder to escalate the Austro-Prussian War to an unlimited conflict and march on Vienna.[26]

After 1871, and largely because of Prussian successes, the European powers decided that they had misperceived the contribution of the railroad to the offense-defense balance, and now believed that offense was dominant. As a result, there were no limited wars of expansion in Europe, and no wars at all on the continent until the First World War, which was decidedly unlimited.[27]

The other period which troubles traditional offense-defense theorists is the nuclear age. Nuclear weapons have clearly shifted the military technology balance to the defensive side, but small-scale crises and limited wars have still been common.[28] The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the Cuban missile crisis are just a few examples of anomalous behavior if one accepts the precepts of traditional offense-defense theory.[29] However, these episodes all fit the description of crises and wars of limited expansion pursued as the result of perceived adverse shifts in relative capabilities during a period of defense dominance.

The hypothesis synthesized between balance of power theory and a revised offense-defense theory predicts the presence of specific types of evidence in the historical record of the European crisis of 1700-1702. French leaders must have perceived that the late 17th century was a period of defense-dominance. They must also have perceived a recent decline in relative power versus Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and Austria. Most importantly, French policy makers must exhibit a disinclination to fight a major, systemic war, as well as a belief that, as a result of the predominance of defensive military technology, the conflict over the Spanish throne could be controlled and would not escalate to threaten French security.

Historical Review of the Case and Analysis of Evidence

For the purposes of evaluating the two hypotheses presented above, a review of the crisis over the succession to the Spanish throne will include three components. First, a survey of the prevailing balance of power in late 17th century Europe, and more importantly of the balance of power as perceived by French policy makers, is necessary to a defense of either hypothesis. Second, the offensive-defensive balance of military technology of the period must be defined. Finally, a survey of the crisis itself and the expectations and motivations of French policy makers will be instrumental in determining which hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation for the initiation of the War of the Spanish Succession.

The European Balance of Power in 1700

The late seventeenth century was a time of transition in terms of

the European balance of power. Spanish decline, epitomized by its defeat in the Thirty Years War, and the centralization of the French executive administration and political system had made France the European hegemon by mid-century.[30] Great Britain, Austria, and the Dutch Republic remained second to France, particularly in terms of military power, during most of the 17th century. Even as late as 1680, France was considered "the only great military power in Europe."[31] The next 20 years, however, would bring French hegemony into question by the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession.

French relative decline from 1680 to 1700 was precipitated by international conflict and the domestic improvements of its rivals states. With the decline of the Ottoman empire by 1688, Austrian power relative to France grew by orders of magnitude. Leopold I could now commit greater resources to reversing French expansion in the Spanish Netherlands and the German territory.[32]

Also in 1688, William of Orange took the British crown from James II, and in 1689 brought the formerly neutral England into the Grand Alliance, along with the Holy Roman Empire, the German states, the Netherlands, England, Spain, Sweden, and Savoy, against France.[33] The Nine Years' War, which ensued from 1688 to 1697, sapped French strength and bankrupted the state. Furthermore, the war established England and Austria as France's great power peers.[34] Clearly, then, by 1697 France had experienced a drastic relative decline and was not, in real terms, a European hegemon.

However, it is important to question whether French elites correctly perceived the relative decline experienced between 1680 and 1697, or whether the perception lagged behind the event. This is difficult to determine absolutely, but there are indications that Louis did indeed sense that France had experienced a loss of relative power, if not a complete reversal of the hegemony of the mid-17th century. By 1697, Louis desperately sought peace. He gave up, temporarily at least, goals of expansion in central Europe which he had pursued for decades, and turned to diplomacy as a means to solidify France's geopolitical position, especially with regard to the question of the Spanish succession.[35] The seemingly cooperative and conciliatory French position during the negotiations for the First and Second Treaties of Partition, to be discussed more completely later, is a further indication that Louis recognized France's weakened

position relative to Austria and England after 1697.

The evidence presented here seems to favor the defensive realist hypothesis. Although France was a European hegemon as late as 1680, the next 17 years drastically altered the balance of power. The rise of Austria and England as French peers appears to have been correctly interpreted by Louis and his advisors. This severely weakens the offensive realist hypothesis, which posits that French perceptions of relative strength caused them to precipitate an opportunistic conflict, but is in line with predictions that French leaders provoked a crisis as a result of perceived relative decline.

The Offensive-Defensive Balance of Military Technology in Europe

Scholars are in general agreement that the turn of the 18th century was a period of defense dominance in Europe.[36] By the middle of the 17th century, the technology of fortification was ascendant over that of conquest. Italian development of vastly improved geometric fortress designs spread to France and culminated in the work of Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, one of Louis XIV's military advisors and an engineer specializing in fortification. [37] Throughout the late 17th century, Vauban implemented geometric designs and strengthened fortresses and the expanding French border in general.[38]

The preeminence of fortress technology led to a basic shift in military doctrine in the middle of the 17th century. Known as positional warfare, the prevailing military strategy by 1700 centered around the use of fortresses as bases for offensive action. This was particularly true in France. Louis XIV, influenced by Vauban, emphasized both the defensive and offensive role of fortresses and enthusiastically accepted the tenets of positional warfare.[39]

Positional warfare clearly shows how the defensive tilt of military technology made conquest harder. Offensive action was largely tied to fortresses, and campaigns were fought from fort to fort. Mobility was an undervalued military characteristic in the strategic culture of the late 17th century. Instead of the sweeping, invasive maneuvers common in eras dominated by mobility-enhancing technology, offensive action was limited mostly to siege craft.

A pertinent question with respect to explaining the origins of the War of the Spanish Succession is whether or not defense-dominance

contributed to a perception within the French foreign policy elite of lowered vulnerability to invasive offensive action. While direct evidence of a lowered sense of risk is difficult to find, indications of such can be extrapolated from French military policy. As discussed above, Louis XIV clearly had an understanding of and appreciation for positional warfare. Most French offensives in the 1670s and 1680s were aimed at capturing key fortresses or small pieces of territory in order to improve border security.[40] Some scholars have attributed this defensive aggression to the predominance of a "fear of invasion" over a "lust for conquest" within the strategic psyche of Louis XIV.[41] However, it is more likely that a consciousness of the dominance of the defense over the offense discouraged military operations aimed at dramatic conquest and encouraged more limited war aims which complemented the state of military technology. This same consciousness would have mitigated the fear of becoming a victim of another state's aggression, and in fact led to the undervaluing of the escalation of conflicts and crises to major wars as possible outcomes.

This evidence clearly supports the defensive realist hypothesis. It is widely accepted that the War of the Spanish Succession was fought during a period of defense-dominance. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that the French not only correctly perceived the balance of military technology, but that they embraced the strategic conclusions which followed from it. Finally, while it is nearly impossible to find statements by French leaders expressing a lowered sense of risk as a direct result of defense-dominance, it is quite possible to deconstruct French strategy during the period and find that outcomes associated with offensive strength, such as invasion, conquest, and crisis escalation, were undervalued in relation to outcomes associated with defensive strength.

Three Stages of Crisis: Expectations and Motivations of French Policymakers

The events which precipitated the War of the Spanish Succession are most usefully studied as three distinct stages, with respect to the expectations and motivations of French foreign policy. The first stage began in 1697 with the conclusion of the Treaty of Ryswick and the end of the Nine Years War, and ended on November 1, 1700, with the death of Carlos II. This period was characterized by extremely conciliatory diplo-

macy, or what John Lynn calls "a policy of peace at nearly any price."[42] With the rise of English and Austrian power, made evident by the result of the Nine Years War, Louis XIV recognized that his weakened position required him to at least appear to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the question of the Spanish succession. Austrian Emperor Leopold I would not allow Spain to come under French control, and England and the Dutch Republic would not allow either France or Austria to assert total control over the Spanish throne.[43]

What ensued was a period in which England, Spain, the Dutch Republic, and the German states split up Spanish possessions and awarded the Spanish succession to Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria. France was to be given only Naples and Sicily. England, France, and the Dutch Republic signed the First Treaty of Partition in 1698. In 1699, though, Joseph Ferdinand died and the treaty had to be rewritten. Louis XIV took an even more conciliatory and reasonable stance. He assented to the succession of Austrian Archduke Charles to the throne of Spain, while settling for the annexation of Naples, Sicily, and Lorraine.[44] Leopold I refused to sign the Second Partition Treaty, apparently hoping to use his newly powerful position on the continent to secure the entire Spanish inheritance for his son.

The two most important pieces of evidence which rise to the surface upon investigation of the diplomatic period of the crisis are a French recognition of its own relative weakness along with an Austrian perception of its own relative strength. Louis' reasonable behavior and conciliatory diplomacy clearly shows that between 1680 and 1697, power shifts had led French policy makers to adopt a more cautious approach in dealing with the other European powers. Louis desperately wanted to avoid another major war. At the same time, Leopold's refusal to accept compromise in the question of the Spanish succession shows that Austrian power was on the rise. Indeed, Leopold's difficult attitude may have increased Louis' awareness of Austria's rising level of power relative to France. The interaction between French relative decline and Austrian relative growth, demonstrated so clearly in European diplomacy between 1697 and 1700 weaken the offensive realist hypothesis while at the same time creating the conditions which the defensive realist hypothesis predict would cause France to provoke a crisis.

The second stage in the crisis consists of the short period of days

between the death of Carlos II on November 1, 1700, and the negation of the Second Treaty of Partition by the ascent to the Spanish throne of Philip of Anjou. In light of the above discussion of France's conciliatory behavior, it is puzzling that Louis should have broken the treaty. His motivations for doing so and his expectations of the consequences are key to determining the cause of the action.

The opportunity arose for Louis to break the treaty because of Spain's desire to avoid partition. Carlos II issued a final will and testament, which was unveiled upon his death, leaving the entire Spanish inheritance to Philip, Duke of Anjou. The French decision to break the treaty was influenced by two factors. The first was a fear that the rising Austrian power would appear to his south. Louis XIV himself wrote that "it might easily happen that this ambassador [of Spain] might have had instructions to forward an express to Vienna immediately after I should have refused the will, and to offer the entire succession to the Archduke."[45]

The second factor which pushed Louis to accept the will of Carlos II was a general sense on the continent that England and the Dutch Republic would not easily go to war to enforce the partition of Spain. In fact, Leopold's refusal to sign the Second Treaty of Partition was in part caused by assurances that he "had not the least room to suspect that King William and the republic of Holland entertained any design of supporting the disposition of the Spanish succession by force of arms."[46] This same sense pervaded the French court. Louis guessed correctly that England and Holland would not intervene if he simply broke the treaty and placed his son upon the throne, as long as Philip was "willing to cede his rights as he does to the Duke of Anjou."[47]

The seemingly inexplicable negation of the Second Treaty of Partition makes more sense on a closer inspection. French fear of Austrian rising power, combined with a sense of security from English and Dutch intervention caused Louis to accept the will of Carlos II. He knew that he was provoking a crisis which would threaten Austria and bring conflict between the two states, but he felt that the conflict would be controllable, in great part because he would be fighting a defensive war in Spain against Leopold I.[48]

This evidence is clearly supportive of the defensive realist hypothesis. France's acceptance of the will of Carlos II was triggered by the

confluence of two perceptions within the policy making elite. First, the rise of Austrian power was a threat that required reversal, or at least some blocking action. Second, there was a sense that the crisis could be controlled and held short of major war. This feeling likely came in large part from the culture of positional warfare and a belief in the power of defensive military technology over offensive military technology.

The final stage of the crisis began in November,1700 and ended in September, 1701 with the formation of an alliance between England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria in opposition to France. This period saw a drastic increase in aggressive French action. Louis had initially accepted the will of Carlos II with the intention of removing Philip from the French line of succession, but when the Second Partition Treaty was broken successfully, Louis changed his mind.[49] This was a threat to England, the Netherlands, and Austria, but it was certainly not the only French action which menaced the other powers.

In February, 1701, French troops invaded the Spanish Netherlands and took control of border fortresses. They disarmed Dutch soldiers and took control of territory from which they could threaten England. Ostensibly, the invasion was meant to protect the Spanish Netherlands for Philip's Spain. However, Louis XIV "immediately began negotiations for the annexation of the territory to France."[50] This was a step toward war with England and the Dutch.

Louis further threatened the English and the Dutch by granting French merchants special privileges in trade with Spain. Since England and the Netherlands were seafaring commercial powers, this action was particularly harmful to their interests.[51] Finally, that summer, Louis concluded a treaty between France, Spain and Portugal essentially giving the French control over all Spanish and Portuguese ports, closing off the entrance to the Mediterranean. Again, the effect of this treaty was magnified because of English and Dutch reliance on sea power.[52]

This renewed aggression of Louis XIV has been attributed to a resurgence of his youthful passion for conquest and glory.[53] In terms of structural realism though, the aggression of the post-diplomatic period can be explained by either offensive or defensive realism. French actions between November, 1700 and September, 1701 fit the description of expanding war aims predicted by the offensive realist hypothesis. Initial successes may have led Louis to grow confident in his military capabili-

ties. However, French aggression can also be explained by defensive realism. The defense dominance of the period contributed to a sense of security and ability to control conflict during the diplomatic period of the crisis, which led to Louis' negation of the Second Partition Treaty. This same defense dominance-generated sense of security and control would have been reinforced by the English and Dutch acceptance of Philip of Anjou as King of Spain. Having successfully checked Austrian power, Louis would have sought to roll back the relative power gains made by the English and the Dutch during the Nine Years War. His heightened sense of control made him confident in taking incremental steps toward this goal. Unfortunately for the entire continent, Louis miscalculated his ability to take advantage of limited crises and launched Europe into major war by the beginning of 1702.

<div align="center">Conclusion</div>

The War of the Spanish Succession was exactly the type of conflict Louis XIV sought to avoid following 1697. It was protracted, costly, and ended, without question, French hegemony on the continent. An explanation which fits the record of the French provocation of the crisis must account for Louis XIV seemingly blundering into a major war. Although on first inspection, the French provocation of the crisis appears to be a clear-cut case of opportunistic expansion, the evidence does not support this impression. First of all, it is quite clear that France recognized that it was no longer a hegemon in 1697. It is also clear that Louis XIV's acceptance of the will of Carlos II was influenced more by a fear of the rise of Austrian power, and by a belief in his ability to control the ensuing conflict, than by a sense of opportunity arising from a relative power advantage. Finally, the expanding war aims of the French after November, 1700 were more likely caused by a heightened sense of security than by a heightened sense of strength.

French provocation of the crisis of 1700-1702 is better explained by the defensive realist hypothesis combining balance of power theory with revised offense-defense theory. France perceived that it had experienced a decline in relative capabilities and was threatened by England and especially Austria by 1697. The actions of Louis XIV after the death of Carlos II were motivated by fear of long-term Austrian domination combined with a short-term sense of security and ability to control crises

and limited conflicts. This sense of security was a result of the defense dominance and prevailing strategic culture of positional warfare that pervaded Europe following 1650. Louis XIV bungled into the War of the Spanish Succession not because of overconfidence, but because of an exaggerated sense of defense dominance-generated security.

The conclusions of this study have broad implications for offense-defense theory and the understanding of conflict in general. Many scholars question the utility, practicality, and ultimately the legitimacy of offense-defense theory, and rightly so. The theory is much too simplistic. However, applying more nuance and subtlety when describing and categorizing conflict appears to resurrect the theory. The defense dominance-generated sense of security presented above can explain many instances of crisis instigation and interstate conflict that fall short of full intensity. More research is necessary to determine whether there exists a corresponding sense of insecurity associated with offense dominance which produces cautious behavior and infrequent uncontrolled conflict, but one final observation can be drawn from this study which illuminates the absolute necessity of deepening this area of scholarship. Louis XIV believed that he could control the conflict, but he wound up igniting a major, systemic war. The obvious lesson is that defense dominance can be dangerous. It can skew perceptions of the balance of power and distort policy. Particularly in the defensively dominant nuclear age, and now in this period of American primacy and increasingly aggressive behavior, the lessons drawn from French crisis provocation seem extremely germane to foreign policy debates.

Notes

[1] John A. Lynn. "A Quest for Glory: The Formation of Strategy under Louis XIV, 1661-1715" The Making of Strategy:Rulers, States, and War ed. Murray, Knox and Bernstein. (Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press, 1994) pg. 200-203

[2] For a full discussion of realist assumptions and the variants of realism see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 2001) pg. 15-36

[3] Ibid., 35

[4] Ibid., 37

[5] Eric Labs. "Beyond Victory:Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims" Security Studies (Vol. 6, No. 4 Summer, 1997) pg. 12

[6] Ibid., 12

[7] Ibid., 12

[8] Ibid., 13

[9] Ibid., 13

[10] Ibid., 16

[11] See Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory" for a discussion of these episodes.

[12] Ibid., 19

[13] Kenneth Waltz "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" Classic Readings of International Relations ed. Williams, Goldstein, and Shafritz. (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh, 1999) pg. 52

[14] Eric Labs "Beyond Victory", pg. 9

[15] Charles Glaser "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help" Theories of War and Peace ed. Brown, Cote Jr., Lynn-Jones and Miller. (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001) pg. 101

[16] See Keir Lieber "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense Defense Balance and International Security" International Security (Vol. 25, No. 1. Summer 2000) pg. 76-77 and Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufman "What is the Offense Defense Balance and can we measure it?" International Security (Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998) pg. 8 for a discussion of various methods of defining the relative ease of conquest.

[17] Jack Levy "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis" International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 28, No. 2, June, 1984) pg. 8 and Keir Lieber "Grasping the Technological Peace" pg. 80-81

[18] Stephen Van Evera "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War" International Security (Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998) pg. 7-10

[19] Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace" pg. 86

[20] Ibid, 102

[21] Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" pg. 10

[22] Ibid., 10

[23] For a full discussion of prospect theory and risk-aversion, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" Econometrica (Vol. 47, No. 2, March, 1979) pg. 263-292

[24] Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace" pg. 85

[25] Ibid, 85

[26] Labs, "Beyond Victory" pg. 25-26

[27] Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace" pg. 86

[28] Ibid, 96

[29] Ibid, 97-98

[30] John B. Wolf The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715 (New York, Harper and Row, 1951) pg. 98

[31] Ibid., 97

[32] Ibid., 34

[33] Ibid., 43

[34] Ibid., 52

[35] Ibid, 53 and Lynn, "A Quest for Glory" pg. 201

[36] Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology" pg. 14

[37] Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War" Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986) pg. 68-90

[38] Ibid., 86-87

[39] Lynn, "A Quest for Glory" pg. 193-194

[40] Ibid., 193

[41] Ibid., 199

[42] Ibid., 201

[43] Guerlac, "Vauban:The Impact of Science on War" pg. 59

[44] Ibid., 60

[45] Louis XIV to the Count de Briord, Personal Correspondence, Fontainebleau, November 14, 1700

[46] Excerpt from the Memoirs of Torcy, in Letters of William III and Louis XIV, vol. II ed. Paul Grimblot. (London, UK, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1848) pg 456

[47] Louis XIV to the Count de Briord

[48] Lynn, "A Quest for Glory" 202

[49] Ibid., 202

[50] Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, pg. 62

[51] Ibid., 62 and Lynn, "A Quest for Glory" pg. 203

[52] Wolf, Emergence of the Great Powers, pg. 63

[53] Ibid., 62 and Lynn, "A Quest for Glory" pg. 202-20

Bibliography

Glaser, Charles. "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help" Theories of War and Peace. ed. Brown, Cote Jr., Lynn-Jones, and Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

Glaser, Charles and Kaufman, Chaim. *What is the Offense Defense Balance and can we measure it?* International Security. Vol. 22 No 4, Spring 1998.

Grimblot, Paul. ed. Letters of William III and Louis XIV. London: Longman, Green, and Longmans, 1848.

Guerlac, Henry. "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War" Makers of Modern Strategy. ed. Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. *Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk*. Econometrica. Vol. 47 No. 2, March 1979.

Labs, Eric. *Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,* Secrity Studies, Vol. 6 No. 4, Summer, 1997

Levy, Jack. *The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis*. International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 28 No. 2, June 1984.

Lieber, Keir. *Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense Defense Balance and International Security*. International Security. Vol. 25 No. 1, Summer 2000.

Louis XIV to the Count de Briord, Personal Correspondence, Fountainbleau November 14, 1700.

Lynn, John A. "A Quest for Glory: The Formation of Strategy under Louis XIV, 1661-1715." The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Ed. Murray, Knox, and Bernstein. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2001.

Van Evera, Stephen. *Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War*. International Security. Vol. 22 No. 4, Spring 1998

Waltz, Kenneth. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" Classic Readings of International Relations. ed. Williams, Goldstein, and Shafritz. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1999.

Wolf, John B. The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715. New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

Domestic Constraints and Realist Imperatives: Explaining United States' Foreign Policy During World War I

by Samuel Ronfard

Abstract:

This essay attempts to explain the factors influencing the decision-making of American leaders, especially President Woodrow Wilson, in deciding whether or not to intervene in World War I. Ronfard analyzes realist imperatives, Wilson's idealism with regard to international relations, and domestic public opinion, among other factors. Ronfard points out that the United States did not intervene until late in the conflict, even though it may have been expected to intervene earlier because a victory for the Central Powers would have severely harmed its interests. Ultimately, Ronfard concludes that domestic concerns such as public opinion and Wilsonian idealism had a strong enough effect on decision-making to delay US intervention, which ultimately happened anyway because of the mutually opposed interests of the US and Germany.

Samuel Ronfard is a senior majoring in Philosophy and Economics at Tufts University.

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was mortally wounded during his visit to Sarajevo. What followed was a cataclysmic world war that threatened the foundations of the international community. Under President Wilson, the United States remained neutral from the outbreak of the war in August of 1914 until April 2, 1917, when Wilson declared war on Germany. It is not surprising that the United States joined the war; rather it is surprising that it waited so long to do so. There is clear evidence that as early as August of 1914, President Wilson feared a German victory because of the "disastrous [consequences] to the world"[1] such a victory would have. If it is true that Wilson and his advisers were aware of the dangers of a German victory as early as 1914, why did the Wilson Administration wait until April 2, 1917 to declare war on Germany?

Both Arthur Link and Ernest May identify Wilson's idealism as the underlying factor behind American foreign policy from 1914 to 1917. They argue that Wilson did not want to intervene early on because he felt that America's "mission to insure a just and lasting peace of reconciliation"[2] would best be served by staying out of the war. They contend that the rapidly deteriorating relationship with Germany in 1917 caused Wilson to change his mind. Wilson now believed that "the goal of righteous peace […] justified full scale participation."[3] Wilson realized that only through American intervention would he be able to mediate a peace among the belligerents and create his desired "eternal peace."[4] It was this reasoning, they argue, that led to Wilson's decision to intervene in the war. While Wilson's idealism certainly greatly influenced American foreign policy, it was not the only influence. Over-reliance on Wilson's idealism to explain the delay in American intervention downplays the importance that both domestic constraints and realist imperatives had on American foreign policy.

This paper will argue that domestic and systemic constraints played a major role in the apparent delay in United States intervention in Europe. To support these claims, I will draw upon two theories from within the defensive realist research program; Walt's "balance of threat" theory and Christensen's "domestic mobilization" theory.

Walt's "balance of threat" theory argues that states will "seek to deter or defeat the power posing the greatest threat."[5] I contend that Germany's bid for hegemony in 1914 threatened American security and

consequently caused the United States to balance against Germany's rising threat by entering the First World War on the side of the Allies.

The Wilson administration did not declare war on Germany in 1914 because their perception of the threat lagged behind the actual magnitude of the threat.

Christensen's "domestic mobilization" theory states that the height of the mobilization hurdles faced by states' leaders will impair to varying degrees their ability to implement preferred policies.[6] Once the Wilson administration fully understood the threat of Germany, the decision to stay out of the war was a result of the high mobilization hurdles it faced. War was not declared until the hurdles were lowered to the point where war could be declared.

Pervasive analysis is necessary to reveal that the delay was caused by both Wilson's idealism and domestic constraints. Although Wilson attempted to maintain US neutrality he could not escape the systemic forces which were inevitably driving him to war. Thus, this paper will express the defensive realist belief that, although systemic forces can be mitigated by domestic constraints as well as by leaders' beliefs and perceptions, in the end state's actions are determined by the international system.

Theoretical Section:

I) <u>Wilson's idealism in American Foreign Policy</u>

Wilson's idealism and his beliefs about what was the right course for American foreign policy had their foundation in his religious and ethical upbringing. He was a Calvinist, and as such, firmly believed that "God controlled history and used man and nations in the unfolding of His plans and according to His purposes."[7] Additionally, Wilson believed that democracy was both "historically inevitable,"[8] and the "most humane and Christian form of government."[9] Consequently, the United States had a sacred mandate to fulfill its duty as the guarantor of democracy and peace in international politics.[10] It was not supposed to seek great wealth but rather to fulfill the divine plan by "advancing peace and world brotherhood."[11] One scholar summed up Wilson's idealism in the following manner:

"[America's] mission was to realize an ideal of liberty, provide a model of democracy, vindicate moral principles, give examples of actions and ideals of government and righteousness to an independent

world, uphold the rights of man, work for humanity and the happiness of men everywhere, lead the thinking of the world, promote peace, - in sum, to serve mankind and progress."[12]

Wilson had a very idealistic view of foreign relations. He believed that relations between the great powers were similar to ones between "civilized gentlemen."[13] He thus believed in diplomacy and discussion to resolve international conflicts.

Link and May both contend that Wilson's views of foreign relations and America's role led the administration to initially promote neutrality followed by intervention. Wilson, as late as 1916, referred to the war in Europe as "a drunken brawl in a public house."[14] This analogy provides an insightful view into Wilson's reasoning for not intervening. Wilson argued at the outbreak of the war that it was necessary for the United States to restrain itself from intervention so that "the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for [the belligerents could be brought about]"[15]. The US could not broker a fair peace if they were involved in the 'brawl.' By staying out of the war, Wilson believed that the United States would best be able to broker a fair peace. That is why Wilson actively sought to mediate a peace among the European powers throughout the war. Colonel House was sent to Europe in the hopes of brokering a peace in 1914. Wilson also continued to make repeated overtures to the belligerents for an American mediated peace throughout the war.[16] In the end, Wilson's "struggle for peace ended in war."[17] By 1917, repeated failed attempts at mediation convinced Wilson that a fair "negotiated, not dictated [peace]"[18] could only come about through American intervention.

The argument that Wilson's idealism was the main cause behind the delay in United States involvement in the Great War will be supported if the following predictions are proven correct. (1) Wilson actively sought to broker a selfless peace among the belligerents throughout the war. (2) American economic and political interests did not influence Wilson's policies. (3) Wilson tried to restrain public opinion during times of crises with the belligerent, and sought to remain completely neutral. (4) Wilson's decision to intervene in 1917 was solely based on his belief that it was the only way the United State could help broker a fair peace among the warring factions.

II)   Realist imperatives and domestic constraints in American

foreign policy

Underlying Walt's "balance of threat" is the assumption that a state's primary concern is security. Though maximizing security is the desire of every state, the security dilemma presents the paradox that a state seeking to maximize his security will have the reverse effect of making another state less secure, leading states "to worry about one another's intentions and relative power."[19] Walt argues that states "seek to deter or defeat the power posing the greatest threat,"[20] for two reasons. First, a state's security and survival is greatly at risk if it does not balance or deter a potential hegemon before it gets too powerful.[21] Second, by joining the weaker side in a conflict both the new member's influence and its chance of successfully advocating for a preferred policy increase as a result of the weaker side's greater need for assistance.[22] Though leaders can deter potential threats, their perception of such threats may be lessened by the effect of structural modifiers, such as geographic proximity and the perceived offence-defense balance in military technology.[23] Once a threat has been perceived, the ability of states' leaders to implement their preferred security policy to respond to that threat will depend on the height of the mobilization hurdles facing them.[24] Christensen argues that low mobilization hurdles will lead to the implementation of a leader's preferred security strategy. High hurdles will lead to an over-active security policy, and very high mobilization hurdles will lead to an under-active security policy.[25]

A combination of these two theories provides a good explanation for Wilson's delayed action. In 1914, though the US had identified Germany as a threat, it did not feel it was great enough to justify intervention. Additionally, it faced extremely strong domestic opposition to the war. Although the Wilson administration did not consider intervention in 1914, it did perceive a German victory as "fatal to our form of Government and American ideals."[26] This belief in the danger of a German victory led to policies that appeared neutral but attempted to balance Germany. Though the Wilson administration did not express outright support for the Allies because of domestic opposition, there were less-publicized means. For example, the Allies were allowed to bankroll their war efforts by floating loans in the United States.[27] Additionally, the Wilson administration's reaction to Germany's submarine warfare in comparison to its reaction to the British imposition of a blockade on the

Central powers shows a clear discrepancy in the American stance.[28] By 1917, the resumption of unrestricted warfare by Germany along with the Zimmerman telegram lowered mobilization hurdles to the point where the Wilson administration was able to implement a policy of intervention.

The argument that balance of power considerations and mobilization hurdles played a significant part in the delay in American involvement in World War I will be supported if the following predictions are proven correct. (1) The Wilson administration recognized Germany as a threat as the war progressed. (2) The Wilson administration having recognized Germany as a threat pursued a policy aimed at deterring and balancing Germany. (3) The Wilson administration purposely delayed intervention because it realized that the mobilization hurdles it faced were too high and instead concentrated on influencing public opinion towards favoring intervention until it believed that the American public was ready to go to war. (4) The Wilson administration pursued sub optimal security policies until mobilization hurdles were lowered enough to implement a policy of intervention.

Evaluation of each theory:

I) <u>Proving the "Wilson idealism" thesis.</u>

By the spring of 1915, the United States was the only remaining great power not directly involved in the war taking place on the European continent. From the beginning of the war Wilson sought to treat both sides fairly and to avoid American military involvement in the war. He believed and continued to believe throughout the war that a just and fair peace was possible and that it was the responsibility of the United States to pursue this option.[29]

Wilson's commitment to American neutrality is evident in the policies he undertook at the outbreak of the war. Almost immediately after the start of hostilities between the European great powers, Wilson appealed to the public to "be impartial in thought as well as in action."[30] He quickly moved to put these words into practice by placing a ban on credit given to belligerents in August of 1914.[31] His support for peace was also evident early in the war. In September of 1914, just two months after the outbreak of war, Wilson allowed then Secretary of State Bryan to pursue efforts to mediate peace between the warring powers.[32] Bryan's effort failed, yet this did not deter Wilson from seeking to achieve a

peaceful end to the war. In December of that same year, he sent Colonel House to start secret negotiations with the belligerents. However, House's negotiations went nowhere because of the unwillingness of the European powers to compromise on their war aims.[33]

In 1915, Wilson's policy of strict neutrality met its first challenge. His decision to place a ban on the extension of credit given to belligerents faced increasing pressure from the domestic economy. His response was determined by the interaction of two opposite forces: his personal desire and the desire of the American public to remain neutral and the need to support American economic growth by providing the Allies with an extension of credit. In the end, Wilson reversed the policy and allowed the extension of credit to be given to the all belligerents. Ernest May argues that Wilson justified this seemingly un-neutral change in policy by arguing that an increase in American prosperity was synonymous with an "increase in the power [of the United States] to do good."[34] So while American economic and political interest did influence Wilson's policies, they were subordinate to Wilson's greater goal of fulfilling the United States mission to 'do good' in the world.

If American economic interests did play a role in the shaping of Wilson's policies, what about the influence of public opinion? Public opinion did not affect Wilson's choice of policies because it supported the same policies that Wilson's idealism advocated throughout the war. However, public opinion in combination with Wilson's idealism did constrain the policies advocated by certain members of his administration and vocal members of the public. Theodore Roosevelt advocated a more confrontational stance towards Germany over the submarine issue. [35]

Wilson's treatments of the submarine controversy, which arose in early 1915 and continued until the United States declared war on Germany in 1917, as well as his continued efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the war show his desire to both resolve the European conflict through his mediation and to prevent United States entry into the war.

On February 4, 1915 the German government announced that it would start its blockade of the British Isles using submarine warfare. This announcement shocked the world community and faced Wilson with difficult choices. In light of the new German strategy, Wilson saw two possible options. He could either seek to come to an understanding with Germany over the submarine issue and the rights of neutrals or

he could seek an American-mediated peace. Ultimately, Wilson chose to pursue an American mediated peace because he believed that it was less likely to cause American intervention. It is in this context that the House-Grey memorandum should be understood. The House-Grey memorandum stated that President Wilson was ready, upon hearing from Britain and France that the time was ripe, to call a peace conference. The Allies would accept, if Germany then refused to take part, the United States would then probably enter the war on the side of the Allies. Wilson endorsed this plan because he believed that it provided him with a way to secure an American mediated peace without American intervention.[36] In light of this, the seemingly strong response of Wilson to Germany's declaration of its intention to uses submarine warfare is more understandable. Wilson, although reluctantly, stated that he would take "any step necessary to safeguard American lives and property [and would hold Germany to a] strict accountability."[37] He said this because he believed that failure to strongly condemn Germany's action would have alienated British support for the House-Grey memorandum.[38] The sinking of the Lusitania on May 7th, 1915, led to a mixed reaction by the Wilson administration. Wilson did not want to react too strongly because he feared this might lead to American intervention. However, he had to balance this with appearing strong against the Germans at the risk of alienating the British. As a result, Wilson decided to pursue a firm yet patient policy in response to the Lusitania sinking, asking in three different notes to the German government that Germany end its policy of unrestricted warfare and follow a "scrupulous observance of neutral rights."[39] Germany made no such promises until the sinking of the Arabic, in August of 1915, when Wilson increased pressures on the German government forcing it to suspend its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.

While this was happening, discussion on the House-Grey memorandum continued. As discussion continued, Wilson increasingly came to see the House-Grey memorandum as providing the best way to prevent American intervention. This led him to see the preservation of good relations between England and the United States as the key to securing peace. That is why Wilson threatened to break diplomatic relations when the Sussex was sunk by a German U-boat on April 16, 1917. This threat resulted in the German promise to end submarine warfare.[40]

Shortly after the Sussex pledge was given by the German government, negotiations between Great Britain and the United States over the House-Grey memorandum broke down. The allies refused to compromise on their war aims. This led Wilson to realize that the only situation in which the Allies would have agreed to American mediation was if they were facing an unfavorable peace. As long as the Allies believed they had a chance at victory they would refuse American mediation.[41]

The break down in the discussion with the British government and the upsurge in neutralism that emerged after the Sussex pledge led Wilson to switch his policy towards the British government. He realized that only by appearing extremely neutral and appearing willing to condemn both sides could the United States gain British support for an American mediated peace.[42] Consequently, he decided to send a letter of protest to the Allies over the conduct of their blockade of the Central Powers.

The decision of Wilson to accept the offer of Germany on December 12, 1916 to help it seek "an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace,"[43] shows his desire to promote an American mediated peace surpassed his dislike of the German government. However, the refusal of the German government to accept American mediation at the peace table led Wilson to realize that the Germans just wanted the help of the United States to force the Allies to the peace table where Germany would be in a position to obtain favorable peace terms. As a result Wilson immediately stopped negotiations with the German government.[44]

On January 31, 1917, Germany resumed its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. This led Wilson to once again attempt to avoid war and to negotiate a peace. This is evident in his message to Congress, where he said that unless:

"American lives should in fact be sacrificed by [German] commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask that authority be given to me any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas."[45]

In sum, Wilson would not declare war on Germany unless he was forced to do so. Soon afterwards, he was when in February and March of 1917 the Laconia, the City of Memphis, the Illinois and the Viligencia were all sunk by German submarines. These sinkings, were compounded by the receipt of the Zimmerman telegram and the revolution in Russia. These factors led Wilson to conclude that America's mission to insure a just and lasting peace could only be brought about by "the assertion of such power and influence among the Allies that would come to the United States by virtue of its sacrifice of blood and treasure."[46] Consequently, it was with a heavy heart that Wilson went to Congress on April 2, 1917, to ask for a declaration of war on Germany.

There is evidence that Wilson actively sought to broker a selfless peace among the belligerents throughout the war and that Wilson did seek to remain completely neutral. However there is also evidence that suggests that American economic interests did, albeit subconsciously, influence some of his policies towards the warring powers. Similarly, although Wilson's decision to intervene in 1917 seems strongly influenced by his belief that by intervening in the war the United State could help broker a fair peace among the warring factions, the influence of economic factors cannot be underestimated. Consequently, while Wilson's idealism was a driving force behind American foreign policy, the universal desire of all states to maximize their security and similarly their economic power influenced his polices and inevitably led him to war.

II)   Proving the "domestic and systemic constraints" thesis

Wilson was inaugurated into the presidency of the United States on March 4th, 1913. Within eighteen months he was faced with the outbreak of one of the world's most destructive wars and forced to make critical foreign policy decisions regarding American involvement. However, in 1913 Wilson was not preoccupied with the increasingly tense situation in Europe. His appointment of William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state reflected a deeper concern for domestic rather than international politics.[47] In 1913, the threat of Imperial Germany to American security had not yet taken center stage in Wilson's mind.

After the outbreak of the war, the threat that Germany posed to the security of the United States became apparent to Wilson and members of his administration. Though never expressed publicly there is

evidence in recorded conversations of their concern for American security. Secretary of state Lansing, who replaced Bryan after he resigned, came to feel around 1915 that "submarine warfare was a threat to American interests,…, he concluded that a German victory in Europe would be contrary to America's future well being."[48] Colonel House, Wilson's closest adviser, described the diplomatic goals of the United States during wartime as the preservation of Britain's friendship and the enlargement of America's relative power and influence.[49] This clearly shows a concern for the rise of Germany's power. Though Wilson was appalled by Germany's invasion of Belgium and use of submarine warfare he still believed neutrality to be the best policy. However, the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare and the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, convinced Wilson that American interests were seriously threatened. This is evident in the fact that he allowed Colonel House on October 17, 1915, to start discussion with Great Britain's ambassador Sir Edward Grey on what would later become called the House-Grey memorandum.[50] By 1915 Wilson had clearly recognized Germany as a threat to national security. I contend that the delay in the recognition of this threat by the Wilson administration is due to the geographic location of the United States. The distance between Germany and the United States lessened the effect of Germany's increasingly militaristic and opportunistic foreign policy on American strategic thinking.

The recognition by the Wilson administration of the German threat should, according to Walt, have led it to pursue a foreign policy aimed at deterring or balancing against Germany. Such a policy is effectively what the United States pursued from 1915 until its entry into the war in 1917. Two opposite forces influenced American foreign policy during that time, domestic constrains on one hand and systemic imperatives on the other. The interaction between these two opposite forces led to the creation of the following important policies: (1) the decision on August 26, 1915 to allow American financial institutions to provide the belligerents with loans, (2) opposition to German submarine warfare, (3) almost complete disregard for British actions on the sea, (4) the House-Grey memorandum.

The debate over belligerent nation's access to American financial institutions was one of the most important debates facing Wilson. Originally Bryan was allowed to implement a ban on credit on the bel-

ligerents in August of 1914 after successfully arguing that loans were inconsistent with a policy of strict neutrality.[51] However, this policy was reversed when Lansing convinced Wilson that American interests were best served by an extension of credit to the Allies. Lansing convinced the President by showing him that America's material interest was dependent on the foreign war trade, which by 1915 was conditional on the extension of credit to the Allies. Lansing also argued that it would be as un-neutral to stop the flow of goods as it was to stop the extension of credit.[52] This change in policy which took place in the spring of 1915 also coincided with the realization by many within the Wilson administration that Germany's victory would be disastrous to the United States. However, domestic opposition to war prevented more direct American help to be given to the Allies at the time. The extension of credit to the belligerents was effectively an extension of aid to the Allies, since by 1915 the British navy controlled trade over the seas and prevented German passage. This resulted in an increased interdependency between the United States and the Allies. The United States' trade to Europe increased from $1.7 billion to $6.2 billion while its trade with the Central powers dropped from $345 to $2 million.[53] This increased interdependency would play a major role in the eventual declaration of war by tying Anglo-American control of the seas to America prosperity. This increased dependence on Anglo-American control of the seas would put the United States on an inevitable collision course with Germany, especially after the German high command decided to allow unrestricted submarine warfare.

Anglo-American control of the sea greatly influenced the Wilson administration's response to actions from both sides. A look at these responses reveals both the impact of domestic constraints and the clear rapprochement between British and American interest in the policies pursued by the Wilson administration.

On February 4, 1915, the Germany announced its decision to start a submarine campaign in the waters surrounding the British Isles. This announcement directly challenged Anglo-American control of the seas upon which American prosperity rested. Accordingly, the response of the Wilson administration was fairly strong. Wilson stated that he would take "any step necessary to safeguard American lives and property [and would hold Germany to a] strict accountability"[54] for violations

of neutral rights. The sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 left over 180 Americans dead and Wilson with a dilemma. The German government was clearly in violation of international law and had disregarded the Wilson's administration's decision to hold it accountable for its submarine policy. This left the Wilson administration with three choices. It could back down and lose face, reiterate its stance on the rights of neutrals and demand a promise from the German government to stop or it could press to the point of war. The strong domestic opposition to war, irritated by the Lusitania incident, led to the decision of the Wilson administration to settle for the second option and to reiterate its demands to the German government.[55] The sinking the Arabic in August of 1915, during negotiations between Washington and Berlin, further backed Wilson into a corner. He could not give in or little by little the United States would lose more of its rights to German aggression, yet he could not go to war because he opposed it with the majority of the American public.[56] He thus once again asked the German government to promise that further "efforts would be made to provide for the safety of passengers and crews"[57]. Faced with continued American demands the German government finally acquiesced to American demands in the Arabic pledge.

Around the same time on March 11, 1915, the Allies put in effect what was a blockade on the central powers. They agreed to "prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany."[58] The Wilson administration was occupied by the submarine controversy and did not initially respond to the violation of neutral rights. However, in the election year 1916 Wilson was pressed to appear more neutral in his treatment of the belligerents. As a result he sent a note condemning the British policy as "violating American neutral rights"[59] which, while it was disregarded by the Allies, appeased the public. The Wilson administration did not seek British compliance to this note because by then it had become evident that the preservation of Anglo-American control of sea was vital to the American economy.[60] The prosperity of the American economy, which was critical to American security, was one of the systemic forces that would force Wilson, against his will, to go to war with Germany.

The Wilson administration had faced two challenges to its neutrality from both Britain and Germany. The resolution to each challenge showed how Wilsonian policy and public opinion had changed since the

outbreak of war. The US held Germany accountable for violating neu-tral's rights on the sea. However, he made no action against England for similar behavior. These policies had the effect of creating a more nega-tive image of German militarism in the American public, thus preparing the ground for war.

The strongest evidence for an American balancing strategy was the House Grey memorandum. This would allow the US to enter war pending Germany's failure to attend peace talks. [61] The plan reveals that the Wilson administration was aware of the domestic constraints it faced in implementing a balancing strategy. The fact that the Wilson administration approached Sir Edward Grey four times in the period between October of 1915 and February of 1916 with this plan shows the existence within the Wilson administration of a desire to balance against Germany.[62]

Domestic constraints and the reliance of the United States on Anglo-American control of the seas conflicted once again in April 16, 1916 when the Sussex was sunk by a German boat. The same hurdles to policy were present as at the time of the sinking the Lusitania and the Arabic. As a result, the Wilson Administration sent a note which stated that if Germany did not "abandon its present method of submarine war-fare against passenger and freight carrying vessels [the US] would break diplomatic relations."[63] The Germans retreated again and promised in the Sussex pledge that a ship "shall not be sunk without warning or with-out saving lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance."[64] The United States finally received a promise for the end of unrestricted submarine warfare; however it was conditional on the United States' condemnation of the British blockade. War was thus inevitable because of the support for the Allies and the reliance on international trade. This would precipitate a German return to unrestricted submarine warfare leaving the United States no other choice but to declare war on Germa-ny.

Wilson's close victory in the 1916 elections shows that anti-war sentiments still ran high. However, the events of 1917 would lead to a complete reversal in public opinion, lowering the mobilization hurdles and enabling the Wilson administration to declare war on Germany. On January 19, 1917, President Wilson received the Zimmerman telegram, where Germany offered to help Mexico regain some of the territory it

had lost in previous wars if it declared war on the United States. This enflamed the public and paved the way for American intervention. Days later on January 31, 1917, the German high command decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson realized war was unavoidable and asked Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to prepare for a draft on February 4, 1917.[65] When the Laconia was sunk on February 24, Wilson was able to ask for permission to arm merchant ships. The fall of the Russian Tsar followed closely. These events significantly reduced domestic constraints faced by the Wilson administration. The fall of Nicholas II removed the last hurdles to American entry into the Triple Entente as the Unites States could now portray the war as a fight between autocracy and democracy. After three more ships were sunk Wilson convened his cabinet on March 20, 1917 and then Congress on April 2, 1917 to ask for a declaration of war against Germany.

There is clear evidence showing that the Wilson administration recognized Germany as a threat and was prevented from pursuing policies because of very high mobilization hurdles. However, there is minimal evidence showing active and direct balancing actions. There is evidence, however, that the policies pursued by the Wilson administration unknowingly balanced Germany's threat and unknowingly shifted public opinion towards support for the war by pursuing policies which implied a preference for the Allies on moral and objective grounds. This implied preference was a result of the systemic need of the United States to maximize its security which meant supporting American prosperity and inevitably meant support for the Allies.

Conclusion:

Looking back at the events that took place from 1914 to 1917, it becomes evident that the United States had to be involved in the war. The United States was an important member of the international community and held an important stake in the stability of the international community. The security dilemma rendered conflict between the United States and Germany inevitable as they held opposite security requirements. United States' security depended on American economic prosperity, which depended on Anglo-American control of sea and on free trade between the European nations. Germany's security depended on the opposite. Germany needed to break Anglo-American domination of the sea to win the war.

If systemic forces rendered American intervention inevitable the question arises concerning the delay of action. The events that took place from August 1914 to April 1917 show that the delay was caused by a combination of Wilson's idealism with strong domestic opposition to war. The combination of these two forces had a mitigating effect on the realist imperatives that drove the United States to war and thus delayed American intervention. Although systemic forces can be mitigated by domestic constraints as well as by leaders' beliefs and perceptions, in the end state's actions are determined by the influence of systemic forces.

The events that took place from the outbreak of the First World War until American entry in April of 1917 shows that the realist view of the international system dictating the actions of states is mostly correct. The delay in the implementation that such a model predicts can be attributed to the mitigating effects that domestic constraints and leaders' beliefs and perceptions have on realist imperatives.

Notes

[1] Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985) pp. 9

[2] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), pp. 89

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 433

[5] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politic: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Longman, 2003): pp. 113

[6] Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) pp. 13

[7] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 12

[8] Ibid., pp. 22

[9] Ibid., pp. 13

[10] David Steigerwald, Wilsonian Idealism in America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) pp. 26

[11] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 16

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 18

[14] William L. Langer, "Wilson: His Education in World Affairs," in Earl Lathan, eds. The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958): pp. 168

[15] "American Neutrality _ An appeal by the president", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War: A History of Our Relations with Germany and Great Britain as Detailed in the Documents the Passed Between the United States and the Two Great Belligerent Powers, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917) pp. 2

[16] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp.

347

[17] Ibid., 437

[18] William L. Langer, "Wilson: His Education in World Affairs," pp. 171

[19] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," pp. 128-161

[20] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," pp. 113

[21] Ibid., pp. 108

[22] Ibid., pp.109

[23] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," pp. 128-161

[24] Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, pp. 13

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: Norton & Company Inc., 1971) pp. 45

[27] Ibid., pp. 29

[28] ibid., pp. 56

[29] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 31

[30] "American Neutrality _ An appeal by the president", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1, pp. 2

[31] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 44

[32] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp. 73

[33] Ibid., pp. 79

[34] Ibid., pp. 41

[35] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 90

[36] Ibid., pp. 48

[37] Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War, pp. 54

[38] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign

Policies, pp. 58

[39] "The Secretary of State to the American Ambassador at Berlin", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1, pp. 54

[40] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp. 92

[41] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 65

[42] Ibid., pp. 70

[43] "German peace note", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1, pp. 140

[44] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 77

[45] "Address to Congress on February 3rd, 1917", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1, pp. 164

[46] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 89

[47] Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World, 24

[48] Ibid, 22

[49] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp. 40

[50] Lester h. Woolsey, "The Personal Diplomacy of Colonel House," The American Journal of International Law, Vol 21, No. 4 (October, 1927), pp. 713

[51] Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies, pp. 44

[52] Ibid.

[53] Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921, pp. 4

[54] Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War, pp. 54

[55] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp. 152

[56] Ibid., pp. 158

[57] Ibid., pp.162

[58] Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War, pp. 55

[59] Ibid., pp. 79

[60] Ibid., pp. 109

[61] Lester h. Woolsey, "The Personal Diplomacy of Colonel House," pp. 712

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917, pp. 92

[64] "Text of Germany's reply to our note", S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1, pp. 131

[65] Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921, pp. 16

Bibliography

Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957)

David S. Muzzey, "Colonel House's Story" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1. (Mar., 1929): pp. 79-86.

David Steigerwald, Wilsonian Idealism in America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994)

Edward H. Buehrig, "Wilson's Neutrality Re-Examined" World Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1. (Oct., 1950): pp. 1-19.

Edward Mead Earle, "A Half-Century of American Foreign Policy: Our Stake in Europe, 1898-1948" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Jun., 1949): pp. 168-188.

Edward S. Martin, The Diary of a Nation: The War and How We Got Into It (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1917)

Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)

Henry Cabot Lodge, War Addresses 1915-1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917)

Ido Oren, Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003)

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000): pp. 128-161

John J. Mearshiemer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W.

Norton, 2001)

John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the fight for the League of Nations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Lucian Lamar Knight, Woodrow Wilson: The Dreamer and the Dream (Atlanta, Georgia: The Johnson-Dallis Co., 1924)

Robert E. Osgood, "Woodrow Wilson, Collective Security, and the Lessons of History," in Earl Lathan, eds. The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958): pp. 187-198

Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985)

Ross A. Kennedy, "Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security" Diplomatic History 25, no.1 (winter 2001): pp. 1-31.

Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: Norton & Company Inc., 1971)

S. D. Fess, The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War: A History of Our Relations with Germany and Great Britain as Detailed in the Documents the Passed Between the United States and the Two Great Belligerent Powers, 64th Congress, 2sd Session, Parts 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917)

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in Rober J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politic: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Longman, 2003): pp. 108-115

Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-

sity Press, 1996)

Tony Smith, America's MIssion: The United States and Worldwide Struggle for Democracy ini the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: A Twentieth Century Fund Book, 1994)

Wolfgang Friedmann, "Intervntion, Liberalism, and Power-Politics: The Unfinished Revolution in International Thinking." Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 83. No. 2. (Jun, 1968): pp. 169-189.

The Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Intersections of Threats and Action

by Kristin Soong

Abstract:

  United Nations peacekeeping operations were originally established to facilitate the tense and unstable peace process between combatants after war. Over the years, peacekeeping operations have expanded to adapt to the increased violence that has characterized the small wars of the post-Cold War era. UN forces on the ground have found themselves confused, unprepared and unwilling to engage in the kind of combat operations that these new expanded missions entail. Mandates from the UN outlining the rules of engagement for operations are noticeably unclear, reflecting growing uncertainty over the role of force in peacekeeping. This paper traces the success of the threat of force and the actual use of force as strategies for ending wars and concludes that the combination of these factors that most enhances the credibility of the mission determines success.

Richard T. Halverson is a senior studying Philosophy and Government at Harvard University.

"No amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed." The Brahimi Report

       The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a period of intrastate instability and violence that demanded new approaches to international peacekeeping operations. Historically, United Nations peacekeeping missions were invited by disputants in national or international conflicts to act as a security guarantor and to provide a buffer between enemy forces as they negotiated a peace agreement. The UN stressed the neutrality of its troops and guaranteed that force would not be used except in self-defense. In the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping suffered terrible failures in the missions to Bosnia and Rwanda as they found themselves-- poorly armed and coordinated-- in the midst of full-scale civil wars. With the failure of peacekeeping forces to protect civilians, stop genocides and generally carry out their missions, debate arose surrounding peace enforcement and the use of force by UN troops to coerce combatants into submission. Problems with the use of force in UN missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia clearly demonstrated that new policies, strategy and force deployment methods were needed in order to achieve success in hostile environments. What remained unclear was the extent to which force could be used and how better to employ or avoid it. Variation across time and conflicts suggests that interacting factors such as the ability to use force, the timing and type of force used and the use of credible threats of force in the past had some effect on the success or failure of UN interventions in ending wars.

       This paper explores the role of force in UN peacekeeping missions in four intrastate conflicts: Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. It examines these cases, and points within these cases, where the use of force was not authorized by the Security Council (SC) and no force was used (Type 1), where force was authorized and not used (Type 2) and where force was used (Type 3) to determine the effectiveness of these strategy types in convincing combatants to stop fighting.[1] Examined under this rubric, the cases merited the following question: what single, most important variable was present in cases of UN peace enforcement leading up to and immediately preceding war termination? I posit two hypotheses to answer this question. First, authorization alone

for the use of force (i.e. the threat of force) by the UN has been the most important variable in ending wars (h1). Second, there is a very positive correlation between the use of force and ending fighting which suggests that the use of force has been the most important variable in ending wars (h2).

After reviewing the four cases, my research disproves the hypothesis that the authorization for force alone is sufficient to end violence. The research also does not give conclusive evidence to prove the competing hypothesis that the use of force more often than not leads to war termination. Instead, the findings point to an alternate hypothesis, which states that credibility, defined by demonstrated willingness and ability to use force to fulfill a mandate, is the most important variable in ending wars. High force credibility is achieved when combatants believe that threats of force will be backed up by the use of force. Once a precedent has been established that threats will be followed by the use of force, future threats of force alone may be effective in ending violence because they are perceived as credible. If effectively established, credible force will both compel combatants to stop fighting and deter continued or renewed fighting for fear of unsustainable future losses. The coordinated timing of the threat and use of force as well as the ability to use force decisively once it is authorized is key in making force a credible deterrent.

While this investigation does not go into the many other factors that play into successful war termination, it does offer multiple and competing theories for the maximization of credibility. This argument does not directly debate the effects of force on the negotiation process, the merit of force over negotiation as a tactic or the value of force in peace building after war ends. Its limited objectives are to determine what combination of threat, resource mobilization and use of force in UN peacekeeping missions tends to compel combatants to stop fighting. The conclusion suggests topics for further research and proposes modest recommendations to increase the successes of peace enforcement in future missions.

I. Rwanda: A Type 1 Case

In 1993, tension between the historically ruling Tutsis and the Hutu majority in Rwanda led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to facilitate the terms of a peace agreement between the two

groups. The mission appeared to be a case of classic peacekeeping: the Rwandan government had invited the small, lightly armed force to patrol problem areas in the short-term. Problems arose when UN commanders on the ground in Rwanda asked for permission from the SC to perform arms raids. The commanders had received word that Interahamwe Hutu extremists were stockpiling weapons with the intention of killing Tutsis.[2] The UN rejected this request arguing that seizing weapons, which would require the use of force, did not fall under UN peacekeeping protocol and would undermine the organization's neutrality clause.[3] When peace talks derailed in 1994 after President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, suspicions about the extremists' plan for war were confirmed. For weeks, Hutu extremists slaughtered Tutsis and moderate Hutus as remaining peacekeepers stood by powerless to stop what became one of the bloodiest and most politically controversial cases of genocide.

Today, Rwanda is seen as an extreme case of incompetence and failure to act in modern peacekeeping. The case of Rwanda differs on the whole from the other cases in this study in that 1) the threat of force and 2) the use of force were basically non-existent. Predictions made by UN Force Commander Romeo Dellaire suggest that 5,000 troops (about twice the size of the force deployed) with a mandate and capability to use force could have saved many of the 800,000 lives lost. This estimate has been validated by military experts and highlights the variables, namely UN mandate and capability for the use of force, that this study seeks to measure in relation to successful peace enforcement.[4] By examining critical points in the mission where mandates could have been issued, forces deployed and credibility raised, we can begin testing the hypotheses to see which actions could have played the greatest role in turning the situation in Rwanda around.

To begin with, stronger UN mandates and threats of force at several points in the conflict could have led to reluctance on the part of the Hutu militias to continue attacks. The fact that the Tutsis gathered in UNAMIR camps under peacekeeper protection were not attacked shows that armed peacekeepers were seen as an impediment to the genocide. However the willingness of the extremists to attack an isolated group of Belgian peacekeepers and several sites under UN control reveals that the presence of peacekeepers alone does not necessarily deter violence. Another noteworthy fact is that genocide ensued in Rwanda until the RPF

Tutsi militia returned from exile to use force against the Hutu extremists. Here, the use of force by a combatant group was the primary determinate in ending the war. However peacekeepers, unauthorized and materially unprepared to launch attacks, would likely have been overwhelmed had they tried to compel combatants by force.

We cannot infer from the examples of Rwanda that increasing troop levels, strengthening the force mandate or providing the means for force would have stemmed the violence because theses are all hypothetical options. No direct threats for the use of force or force mobilization were carried out in Rwanda. The only thing we know for certain is that inaction by UN forces resulted in the loss of many lives at high costs to both the reputation of the UN and its peacekeeping agenda. In order to verify either of the hypotheses in this study, we must look at cases where the lessons of Rwanda were fresh in the minds of decision makers. The following cases will examine whether the threat of force, the use of force, or some combination thereof had the highest rate of success in ending wars.

II. Bosnia: A Type 2 Case

Political instability and ethnic clashes in the former Yugoslavia erupted during the same early post-Cold War period as Rwanda. The separation of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia provoked a power struggle between the countries and their various ethnic groups over the contiguous territory of Bosnia. In May of 1992, reports of humanitarian aid blockage and ethnic cleansing prompted the SC to call for a stop to these actions by all sides. Two weeks after their resolution for an end to violence was ignored, the SC went as far as to impose sanctions but did not authorize the use of force to compel combatants to stop violating human rights.[5] In the following months, the SC expanded an existing UNPROFOR peacekeeping force in the region to implement the terms of a cease-fire and to guarantee the delivery of aid. Three more mandates were issued upping UNPROFOR troop numbers but human rights abuses escalated steadily. This was an early indication that resolutions and troop presence alone would not deter acts of violence. In August, with peace talks coming to a standstill, the SC authorized Resolution 770, the use of force by "all measures necessary" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.[6] While employing the same strong language as the UN resolution for the Gulf War in 1991,

770 proved to be inconsequential: UNPROFOR peacekeepers deployed in Bosnia were not given the tactical means nor the commands from the standing officers to use force against the armed groups in Bosnia. While the UN frequently and publicly upped its presence and issued more hard-line mandates, human rights violations persisted, suggesting that threats alone up to this phase of the UNPROFOR mission were not sufficient to compel combatants to stop fighting.

Yet in the following months, the UN issued more threats of force with the intention of deterring combatants. Humanitarian issues in Bosnia had become the centerpiece of the UN debate as images of displaced people in Europe's backyard provoked outrage. This outrage however did not convince states to lend more of their peacekeepers for missions where military engagement with the combatants would occur. The UN thus maintained its threat of force strategy, hoping to minimize the actual commitment of troops and to avoid tarnishing its reputation for neutrality and non-use of force. This strategy again came in to question when, in direct defiance of UN aid protection, an Italian aircraft with humanitarian supplies cargo was shot down by Serb forces. Soon after this attack, the UN discovered that civilian aircraft were used as shields for Serb bombers to attack Bosnian territory.[7] The UN responded to these incidents by establishing a no-fly zone over Bosnia but the lack of UN enforcement instructions for the zone allowed the ban to be violated repeatedly. The UN approved more stringent monitoring for the zone but avoided any enforcement resolutions until 1993, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to enforce the zone with its aircraft. Recognizing heavy UN restrictions on NATO as an obstacle to the quick use of force, the Serbs used a "short hop flying" strategy to continue bombing missions without triggering NATO enforcement.[8] Clearly the Serbs were deterred into short hop flying by the NATO air presence but not to the point where they gave up bombings all together.

With air patrol in effect, the UN struggled to establish a much needed credible presence on the ground. Safe areas were set up in Srebrenica and elsewhere to protect civilians and ensure the free movement of UNPROFOR. Resolution 819, the Safe Areas Resolution, demanded the withdrawal of combatant forces from protected areas and described "the readiness to consider immediately adopting necessary measures" to implement the resolution.[9] Again however, UN forces lacked the clear

mandate for enforcement of the safe areas. When pressed, the SC stated that the troops were only allowed to use force "in reply to bombardment" once a breach of the zone had occurred.[10] As a result, Bosnian Serbs ignored safe area rules and committed mass murder in Srebrenica, attacked Sarajevo, Gorazade and menaced other towns as peacekeepers stood by without any official orders to stop them.[11] Here, the deployment of peacekeepers did not deter the Serbs from committing mass violence, as h1 would predict.

It was not until 1994, after Serb forces had repeatedly targeted UN troops, that NATO air strikes and UNPROFOR offensives were implemented. The air and ground strikes noticeably curbed Serb bombing activity, suggesting that the use of force did effectively combat Serbian military ambition as stated by h2. After hitting initial targets, NATO moved on to coercive air strikes to force the Serbian military out of Sarajevo. The Serbs agreed to pull out in light of NATO demands, implying that the recent use of force had convinced them the NATO threat was real—an affirmation of both the first and second hypothesis. However on August 28, after the time limit allotted for compliance expired, Serb forces launched an attack on Sarajevo, killing 43 people.[12] It seemed the Serbs had once again called the UN use-of-force bluff. Humiliated by their belief in the Serbs' promise to withdrawal, the UN decided it could not gamble on the fall of Sarajevo and authorized NATO to launch counter force strikes on Serb military targets.

Operation Deliberate Force thus marked a turning point in the war. It was the first authorization for a "proactive" as opposed to "reactive" use of force in Bosnia.[13] Unlike previous air strikes and threats, NATO forces gave a clear ultimatum for the withdrawal of Serb forces from Sarajevo. There was no requirement of a Serb offensive to launch strikes. The mere failure of Serb forces to withdraw in a timely fashion would unleash a full-force bombing campaign with multiple targets. A few days after the ultimatum had expired and Serb forces had not withdrawn, NATO began bombing Serb military targets. Initially, the Serbs appeared to fortify their position in an attempt to wait out the bombing—an indication that force actually had the opposite effect than predicted by h2. NATO officials warned in private about the lack of appropriate targets and talk of removing the peacekeepers began to circulate.

With the use of force all but discredited, a sudden compliance of

Serb forces during a brief pause in air strikes created a critical resurgence in the negotiation process and ultimately ended the war in Bosnia. This sudden capitulation of Serb forces as NATO options were dwindling indicates a possible counter-hypothesis. According to Thomas Schelling, combatants tend to over estimate the enemy's resolve to use force when they do not know the limits of the mandate that the enemy is working under. NATO exploited this tendency by unleashing heavy force and then pausing their bombings and allowing Serbs the chance to pull out before unleashing what Serbs expected to be renewed and perhaps escalated force.[14] With the actual ability to use force at a low, concealing the rules of engagement for force rather than using them as inflated threats created an element of uncertainty that helped NATO convince the Serbs that the cost of continued war was to great to bear. This suggests that manipulating threats rather than always raising them to the extreme was a more successful strategy.[15] The case of Sierra Leone traces the realization of this strategy and highlights the shift from isolated attacks to a coordinated system of threats backed by force.

III. Sierra Leone: From Type One to Type Two and Beyond

Conflict in Sierra Leone flared as the UN struggled to defend itself under criticism for Bosnia and Rwanda. Dissidents from Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seized the capital of Freetown and critical industrial centers in an attempt to control the country's diamond industry. The government called in a private, heavily armed South African military firm and produced a quick victory over the rebels. While not under the auspices of the UN, the success of the mercenaries was an early indication that RUF combatants would stop fighting when faced with the decisive use of force. However the withdrawal of the private forces before a firm cease-fire or peace agreement with the RUF was reached allowed the militants to rearm over the next few months. In 1996, political insecurity led to several violent coups and the deployment of a regional observer missions to negotiate a cease-fire and peace plan.[16] The presence of regional peacekeepers stabilized Freetown and other strongholds but the situation in the countryside deteriorated steadily. For the next two years, reports of maiming, murder and displacement in Sierra Leone made international headlines, putting pressure on the UN to intervene directly. In the debate that followed, peace brokers decided to allow more concessions such as diamond rights and amnesty for RUF

militants in order to bring them into signing the Lomé Peace Agreement in July of 1999. The militants agreed to the favorable terms but took them as a sign that they could weasel out even more if they raised the stakes and continued their attacks. Further RUF attacks were followed by demands for greater concessions such as the release of suspected RUF war criminals.[17]

In February of 2000, the UN and other peacekeeping forces agreed that the appeasement strategy toward the RUF was not producing results. The UN doubled the size of the UNAMSIL force deployed to oversee the Lomé Agreement and expanded the area of enforcement to include new locations.[18] Resolution 1289 changed the character of the mission to include more robust, quasi-enforcement measures, which on paper seemed to allow the peacekeepers to "take the necessary actions to pro-tect civilians". Despite the strongly worded mandate, UNAMSIL's field capabilities remained inadequate. RUF militants antagonized the poorly equipped peacekeepers, who surrendered their weapons and allowed RUF forces to advance on Freetown.[19] Clearly, the UN resolutions authorizing force did not automatically change the atmosphere out in the field, as h1 would predict.

In early 2000, peacekeeping forces hit rock bottom. The rates of combatant disarmament were lower than at any time that year.[20]   Bold moves to disarm the rebels in key diamond territories resulted in the kidnapping of hundreds of UN peacekeepers who were unprepared to defend themselves in RUF dominated territory.[21] With several countries threatening to withdraw their forces, the UN had to change the course of the mission. A British rapid reaction force was called in to fan out around the country. The UN hoped the appearance of the heavily armed units would deter the RUF from attacking. While not officially under UN control, the British force attended UN meetings, trained UN troops and patrolled along side UNAMSIL. For the first time in the conflict, the troop increase was accompanied by specific mandates for the arma-ment and training of the peacekeepers to use force. This meant that the mission could be carried to the full extent of its authorization. By March 2001, British and UNAMSIL forces were going after RUF territory, se-curing strategic positions and borders, cutting off RUF communications and re-supply lines and rescuing peacekeepers held hostage. The RUF attacked these forces intermittently but were met with strong reprisal.

The application of coordinated and robust force by the UN and British troops marked a significant departure from the reactive strategies relied on in previous missions.

The intervention in Sierra Leone turned from what could have been another failed peacekeeping mission into a flexible peace enforcement mission that set the stage for a Sierra Leonean Army takeover of patrols by 2002. The success of the better-coordinated forces in Sierra Leone after 2000 shows that the professionalism and robustness of the force deployed has an effect on the combatant's willingness to continue fighting. The ability of the forces after 2000 to carry out the terms of the UN mandates restored the organizations credibility, backing previously hollow UN threats with the use of force. Sierra Leone after 2000 marks the shift to a Type 3 case, where the force exerted was commensurate to the force threatened by SC mandates. To more fully understand the implications of a Type 3 case, we must look at Kosovo, where threats issued by the intervening party were automatically backed by force until compliance was achieved.

IV.   Kosovo: A Type 3 Case

In the late nineties, ethno-national conflicts and territorial disputes in Kosovo again turned the attention of the international community to the former Yugoslavia. This time, the UN immediately intervened under a Chapter VII mandate, demanding cease-fire, an end to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians and the removal of Serb forces from Kosovo. These requests however were met with increase violence until October of 1998 when NATO stepped in with a self-imposed mandate to "threaten, and if necessary, use force". While the legitimacy of the NATO intervention without a UN mandate is questionable under international law, the effectiveness of NATO's decisive use of force in exacting compliance with UN demands had important implications for Kosovo and peace enforcement more generally.

NATO' willingness and ability to use force, as evidenced by the activation of assets in preparation for an air campaign in October of 1998, initially elicited Serb compliance. Serbia's leader Slobodan Milosevic quickly agreed to remove his troops from Kosovo however the actual failure to withdraw suggests that Milosevic would rely on the effectiveness of the same hollow promises made to UN forces in Bosnia.[22] However unlike UNPROFOR in Bosnia, NATO was prepared for Mi-

losevic's non-compliance and its mandate was such that non-compliance alone would authorize air strikes. On March 23rd 1999, NATO made the critical decision to go forward with Operation Allied Force, an air campaign designed to end human rights violations and eradicate Serb forces from Kosovo. The campaign began with robust, coordinated strikes. In line with Schelling's description of the ideal risk campaign, strikes were designed to escalate steadily, maximizing shock effects early on so as to ensure capitulation when a bombing pause was introduced. NATO was seasoned by its dealings with Milosevic in the past and knew that his full compliance rested on the perception of NATO's credibility to increase force indefinitely until compliance was achieved. NATO resolved to continue the air campaign not only until the Serbs agreed to remove its forces but also until the forces were actually mobilized to leave Kosovo.

Initial NATO targets were hit with no retaliation from the Serbs, suggesting at this early stage that the use of force had paralyzed the enemy. However, friction in the form of bad weather, civilian leaders' unwillingness to release ground forces or better equipment and popular resistance to bombings caused a slow in the campaign, reducing NATO's ability to deliver the quick blow-after-blow strategy they needed for the early part of the campaign.[23] Serbs interpreted the intermittence as a sign of weakness for NATO. They began attacking NATO aircraft and UN ground personnel and stepping up the ethnic cleansing campaign.[24] Milosevic, who had grown increasingly hostile in his rhetoric, stated that the Serbs would not capitulate to NATO, exhibiting the regimes willingness to endure the use of force by the intervener.[25] This hard-line appeared to be another case of Yugoslavia's willingness to call the NATO bluff despite both the use of force and the threat of greater force in the future.

NATO responded to Milosevic's hard-line by almost doubling NATO troop commitments in April.[26] New targets including bridges and electricity grids were approved and a second, more aggressive phase of bombing ensued. NATO began asking its members to authorize ground troops to support its second phase, sending a signal to the Serbs that the alliance was ready to incur possible casualties to get the job done. Similar to the first NATO appeal for force activation in October of 1998, Milosevic responded to the threat of ground troops by expressing his willingness to comply with NATO demands.[27] This time however,

NATO took a hard line. In order to ensure compliance, NATO resolved to continue strikes even after the Serbs made an initial offering to withdraw. NATO expressed its determination to continue bombings until Serbian troops actually started withdrawing from the prohibited areas. As Serbian forces began to withdraw, multinational KFOR peacekeeping troops moved in and pushed the withdrawing Serbs to move more quickly. The reintroduction of KFOR troops at this critical juncture helped to reestablish the credibility of UN peacekeeping forces and helped quell disagreements between NATO and the UN over supremacy.

V.   A Summary of Findings

My findings show several unexpected patterns in the success and failure rate of UN peacekeeping missions. While all of the missions were severely flawed and their positive effect on ending each war is debatable, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from points in each mission where fighting ended as a direct result of military action. H_1 proposed that threats in the form of SC mandates authorizing force or troop increases were enough to end the conflicts. While threats and troop presence sometimes had the immediate effect of quelling violence, threats alone were generally insufficient in not counter productive to ending these conflicts. H2, which correlates the use of force to ending wars, seems convincing on the surface because war termination in every case examined followed decisive military action by one side. However, the increased use of force does not automatically lead to war termination, as failed cases in early Sierra Leone and Bosnia prove, and cannot be the sole determinant in ending wars. If force were the sole determinate, interventions by First World soldiers with first rate weapons and training, like NATO, would consistently "out force" combatants and have much better success records then they do today. In reality, combatants in these cases were not easily deterred, even when an intervening party capable of unleashing great force was introduced. Relative success toward the end of the latter cases in Sierra Leone and Kosovo reflect a learning curve surrounding the effects of coercion by force, revealing the importance of the credibility to unleash even greater force if demands go unmet. Several factors such as timing, equipment, command and control and mission flexibility along with the threat and use of force leads to the conclusion that force credibility is actually the most important factor in ending wars.

VI. Reestablishing Credibility in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Credibility is fostered when decisions are made early on by an intervening force in a conflict to back up threats of force with the actual ability and will to use force in abundance. In Rwanda, hollow denunciation by the UN and the insignificant force deployed during the genocide were a telling testament to the meager will of the international community. This period in peacekeeping history proves that when the UN does nothing to back up its resolutions, combatants take the inaction as a sign of weakness and as license to continue fighting. Just as strong words by the SC did nothing to protect the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans that died in 1994, increasing the threat of force in Bosnia also proved insufficient in ending the war. Robert Pape explains in his book Bombing to Win that manipulating risks by making threats but keeping actual force in abeyance fails when the risk strategy fails to achieve initial credibility. Threatening to use force without the will or ability to use it negates credibility and denies future threats of force the credibility and coercive power they need to be effective. Threats, Pape argues, only carry coercive weight in so far as the combatants believe the coercer will actually carry out the threat. In Bosnia, the SC issued over fifty resolutions in hopes of deterring the Serbs. In many cases, the international community, and probably the Serbs, knew the resolutions were "undeliverable" because of the lack of military will expressed openly by member states and the repeated use of empty threats throughout the conflict.[28]

Increased credibility can be seen in missions where fewer empty threats were issued, when threats were backed by timely enforcement and when the demands and commitment of the intervener were clear. Kosovo suggests that the successful use of force did not depend on the amount of force used but the "proficiency with which preparation and conduct were managed at every level, from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical."[29] At the planning and tactical level, NATO was prepared with both targets and resources to deliver air strikes as soon as the Serbs failed to comply with the mandate to withdraw. Honest military assessments, while not always heeded, helped to coordinate the authorizations made by the North Atlantic Council with the actual needs of the commanders on the ground for successful use of force. At the strategic level, the solid coercive force against ongoing campaigns served as a deterrent for future actions, which the Serbs feared would

be met by even greater levels of force. In Sierra Leone, the introduction of coercive action by fresh, better-equipped peacekeepers after 2000 finally enabled the critical advancement into RUF territory. Increases in troop levels and armament alone were not sufficient in ending the war in Sierra Leone, as evidenced by the repeated testing by combatants of the new peacekeepers' will. The combination of better forces with clearer mandates for the coercive use of force led to success in the first battles of 2000, creating a formidable reputation for the new peacekeeping force. These examples of successful missions give rise to a more complicated and pressing question: how can the UN maximize its credibility with the limited will and resources of its members?

The Brahimi Report, authored by the Special Panel on UN Peace Operations, highlights the current debate in the UN over maximizing force credibility. "No amount of good intentions' the Report states 'can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force." In terms of credibility, the Report proposes that it is not the use of force but rather the peacekeepers' ability to operate at the appropriate level authorized for each mission that matters. This refers to the narrowing of the expected utility of threats and the use of force to cover the defense of oneself and the goals of the mission rather than increasing force with the overarching goal of threatening the combatants. The Report warns that the United Nations must send forces prepared to both strike and defend against counter-strikes in order for force to be useful. The Report also points to the need for "robust doctrine and realistic mandates… to strengthen the capacity of the UN to accomplish" the missions. It calls for less vagueness in the mandates issued, which it says accounts for the proliferation of threats without action. By making mandates specify which authority is to coordinate the use force, in which situations and how much force can be used, UN mandates will be better-fulfilled, more successful in achieving stated goals and more likely to carry credible threat in the future.

The early achievement of force credibility makes both the threat and the use of force more effective in the process of ending wars by UN intervention. Credibility is achieved when the forces successfully carry out the mandates of the SC with an appropriate amount of force; one that limits casualties and collateral damage while convincing combatants that continued force would be more costly than surrender. The evidence

from past missions neither condemns nor enshrines UN peacekeeping, as we know it, but rather highlights the need for greater connectedness between the forces at the UN's disposal and the stated goal of the mission. The UN must be selective in its use of threats and force or risk losing credibility and jeopardizing the effectiveness of future missions when threats are not carried out or carried out poorly. Binding stated objectives to thorough prewar assessments of force capability and mission feasibility does not necessarily limit the UN's ability to conduct peacekeeping missions. On the contrary, limited missions with clear goals will be more easily planned for and accomplished, creating the early credibility needed to carry out future missions with greater likelihood of success.

If the history of peacekeeping can be thought of as one long mission where past events affect the success and credibility of future endeavors, today's operations mark a critical point where a turn around is needed to save the credibility of UN peacekeeping. Ongoing conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo may draw greater foreign interest if peacekeeping missions are designed with the success of the intervening force in mind. Without firmer mandates backed by robust and timely force, UN peacekeeping is doomed to become one colossal failed mission.

Footnotes

[1] The above typologies are designed to highlight the general character of each mission. The missions are organized along a continuum loosely based on chronological order and the use of force.

[2] Trevor Findlay The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 279.

[3] Greg Barker. "Ghosts of Rwanda". A Frontline Documentary. WBGH Educational Foundation, Boston, MA. 2004.

[4] Barker

[5] Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The UN Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 88.

[6] Findlay, 137.

[7] Boulden, 90.

[8] Boulden, 98.

[9] Boulden, 94.

[10] Boulden, 95.

[11] Findlay, 229.

[12] Findlay, 259.

[13] Boulden, 110.

[14] Boulden, 112.

[15] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.

[16] Malan, Mark et al. "Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight". Monograph 68. (Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria, South Africa, 2000), 1.

[17] Malan, chapter 3.

[18] Findlay, 299.

[19] Malan, chapter 3.

[20] Economic Community of West Africa. "ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan". Togo, October 1997. http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html.

[21] Findlay, 300.

[22] Jon Pevehouse Jon and Joshua Goldstein. "Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32 No. 4, August 1999, 541.

[23] Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 220.

[24] Clark, 229.

[25] Clark, 226.

[26] Clark, 389.

[27] Pevehouse and Goldstein, 543.

[28] Mats Berdal, "Un Peacekeepin in the Former Yugoslavia" Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping ed. Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes (New York St. Martin's Press, 1995) 233.

[29] Ian Bartholomew and Jim Whitman, "UN Peace Support Operations: Political-Military Considerations" Beyond Traditional Peackeeping ed. Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 171.

Bibliography

Barker, Greg. "Ghosts of Rwanda". A Frontline Documentary. WBGH Educational Foundation, Boston, MA. 2004.

Bartholomew, Ian and Whitman, Jim. UN Peace Support Operations: Political-Military Considerations. Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping eds. Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes. St. Martin's Press. New York, NY, 1995.

Berdal, Mats. UN Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia. Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping eds. Donald Daniel and Bradd Hayes. St. Martin's Press. New York, NY, 1995.

Blechman, Barry M and Cofman Wittes, Tamara. "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly, Issue 14, No. 1, Spring, 1999.

Boulden, Jane. Peace Enforcement: The UN Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 2001.

Brahimi, Lakhdar et al. "Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations". New York, NY 2000. www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations

Burk, James. The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J, 1998.

Clark, Wesley. Waging Modern War. Public Affairs, New York, NY. 2001.

Economic Community of West Africa. "ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan". Togo, October 1997. http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html.

Findlay, Trevor. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford University Press, New

York, NY, 2002.

Malan, Mark et al. *"*Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight". Monograph 68. Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria, South Africa, 2000. http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Content.html

Pevehouse, Jon and Goldstein, Joshua. "Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43 No. 4, August 1999, p. 538-546

Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1996.

Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1966.

Photographic Exploration

Deterrence: The Success and Failure
of Preventative Policies

The past thirty years have brought upon the world a multitude of events in which deterrence has played a key role. Deterrence has had wide-ranging effects, including the suppression of war and nuclear conflict. In this issue of Hemispheres we wish to explore the influence of deterrence, in its many forms, on policies and events around the globe.

Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the Cold War, many strongly held beliefs of the time were still maintained in communist countries. The dichotomous views of the capitalistic and communist countries were at no time more evident than during the Korean nuclear crisis involving the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. During this conflict, the United States, employed deterrence in its response and negotiations with North Korea to prevent North Korea from appropriating, and using its "supposed" nuclear arsenal which would precipitate nuclear war. Communication between these countries evolved into the Six Party talks which began in August 2003. As of yet, there has been little headway gained through these talks. Thus deterrence in this context has not been successful in the nuclear disarmament of North Korea.

Nuclear deterrence has also been an important aspect of American relations with Iran. There have been many anti-U.S. protests by Iranian civilians because they resent Washington's efforts to halt construction of a civilian nuclear program for energy purposes. The U.S. for its part has incessantly tried to prevent and hinder Iran from any nuclear development because it fears that Iran's intentions are to build weapons of mass destruction, not enhance its energy capabilities.

In the context of the Taiwan Straits conflict, the U.S. has utilized its military and global power to prevent further military and political action between the Taiwan and China. Through diplomatic and military chan-

nels, China and Taiwan have been successfully deterred not to go to war.

In other areas of the world, deterrence has also played a role in preventing further ethnic and political conflict. Within the Balkans, the European Union Force (EUFOR) has been essential in keeping maintaining the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Bosnian War of the early 1990's. Their role, according to the Dayton Agreement is to enforce peace as an international military force. They have engaged in various programs to this end such as the "Harvest" campaign which solicits the voluntary anonymous surrender of weapons by civilians and carries out the destruction of these weapons. In Sudan, United Nations peacekeeping forces have also been a large deterrent in further ethnic conflicts between the Janjaweed, a militia group of the Arab tribes, and the non-Arab peoples of the region that began in February 2003.

Economic deterrence and U.S.-China trade relations have also become embroiled in the conflict with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and their attempts to takeover the U.S. oil company, Unocal Corp. The government officials within the U.S. prevented CNOOC from buying out Unocal because they felt it would pose a national security risk and also represented unfair trade practices.

As we settle into the new century and view China's rise in economic and political power in the world, we are also able to see the U.S. exploring ways to maintain its power within the East and the world. The U.S.'s efforts to increase amiable ties with India, another rising power of the Eastern region, are attempts at balancing the accumulating power of China and the possible negative consequences this may mean for the U.S.

The success and failure of preventative policies have translated into stagnation in international negotiations but also peace in other regions of the world. The following images are intended to provide a visual exploration of these issues.

South Korean soldiers come out from a CH-47 during a military exercise against North Korea amid tensions of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program, at Yeonki village of Chungnamdo province, south of Seoul, Thursday, July 31, 2003. U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said that North Korea had not agreed to a U.S. proposal for multilateral talks, and was instead sticking to a demand for bilateral talks with Washington. (AP Photo/ Yonhap, Jo Yong-hak)

This file photo taken on Sept. 5, 2004 shows the No. 931 artesian well flat of China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) Ltd. being repaired. Unocal Corp. is weighing a $16.6 billion offer from Chevron Corp. that received quick regulatory approval and a rival $18.5 billion all-cash bid from Hong Kong-based CNOOC Ltd. that has become highly politicized over concerns about national security and U.S.-China trade relations. (AP Photo / Xinhua)

Palestinians watch U.S. President George W. Bush's speech on
U.S. policy on the Middle East on an Egyptian satellite channel,
at restaurant in Shati refugee camp in Gaza city Monday June 24,
2002. President Bush urged the Palestinians Monday to replace Yas-
ser Arafat with leaders "not compromised by terror" and to adopt
democratic reforms that could produce an independent state within
three years. (AP Photo/Adel Hana)

A veiled Sudanese woman holds an AK-47 during a demonstration, in Kartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, March 8, 2006. Tens of thousands of Sudanese marched through Khartoum on Wednesday, rejecting the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in the conflict-torn region of Darfur and demanding the expulsion of the top U.N. and U.S. envoys in the country. (AP Photo/Abdel Raouf)

A new E2K early warning plane leads the formation of a Taiwanese indigenous IDF, 2nd left, US F-16, center top, US F-5E, center bottom, and a French Mirage 2000 during a commissioning ceremony for two E2K early warning planes, Saturday, April 15, 2006, at the Pingtung Airbase in Pingtung, southern Taiwan. Taiwan's military on Saturday showed off two early-warning planes recently purchased from the United States to bolster its defenses against the island's rival, China. (AP Photo/str)

Some 200 Iranian students staging a demonstration in front of Western embassies in Tehran drag U.S and Israel flags on the ground Wednesday May 25, 2005 to support Iran's nuclear program. Key European Union foreign ministers sought anew Wednesday to persuade Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions, as Iran's president said his country was prepared to compromise. As Iranian negotiators sat down with the foreign ministers from France, Britain and Germany and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, Iran's President Mohammad Khatami signaled there was room to maneuver regarding its threat to resume uranium enrichment. (AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian)

Hemispheres, Vol. 29, 2006

German soldiers, members of the European Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia (EUFOR), drive an armored personal carrier to destroy a number of weapons seized during this year's "Harvest" campaign, at the German base camp in Rajlovac, near the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, on Monday, March 21, 2005. The Harvest campaign is designed for civilians who own illegal firearms to give them anonymously to peacekeeping troops without suffering any consequences.

French President Jacques Chirac goes aboard "Le Vigilant" nuclear submarine, Thursday, Jan. 19, 2006 at the L'Ile Longue military base in France. France would respond firmly, possibly with non-conventional weapons, to any state-sponsored terror attack against it, President Jacques Chirac said in a speech reaffirming the need for the French nuclear deterrent. (AP Photo/Jacques Demarthon/Pool)

Gunmen keep guard as thousands of people gather to listen to the speaker of the Somali parliament, Shariif Hassan Sheikh Aden, unseen, in this Sunday, Feb. 6, 2005 picture in Mogadishu, Somalia.Somalia is a safe haven for terrorists in East Africa and the government-in-exile is needed to restore law and order to the Horn of Africa nation, the commander of a U.S. counterterrorism task force told The Associated Press Friday, May 13, 2005. U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Samuel Helland, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, said in an exclusive interview from his headquarters in Djibouti, that U.S. troops were working with Somalia's neighbors to improve their border security since U.S. pressure on the al-Qaida terror group in Pakistan and Afghanistan may force some members to seek refuge in East Africa.(AP Photo/Karel Prinsloo)

US President George W. Bush, left, and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh shake hands in New Delhi, India, Thursday, March 2, 2006. Bush, seeking to warm relations with the world's largest democracy, effusively praised his Indian hosts Thursday amid last-minute haggling in search of a nuclear deal with New Delhi. (AP Photo/Gurinder Osan)Weapons are stored by peacekeepers until destruction. (AP Photo/Amel Emric)

The Necessity of EUFOR: *Why the international military presence continues after 10 years without armed conflict.*

by Peter Maher

Abstract:

The paper argues that given the changing international security environment and geopolitical strategic interests after the end of the Cold War, the European Union's military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is necessary for regional stability and post-war development. The paper explores in detail the various domestic impediments to security sector reform and suggests policy prescriptions which could mitigate sectarian opposition to reform legislation if properly implemented. Peter Maher conducted the research for this paper while in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 2005.

Peter Maher is a junior studying International Relations at Tufts University.

The region of the western Balkans and more specifically, the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), has been plagued by numerous attempts on the part of power mongering politicians whose campaigns to ensure their own political stability have resulted in continuing ethnic strife. During the crises of the 1990's the international community waxed and waned in its support for and against various warring factions in BiH. The debate over military intervention on behalf of the international community yielded mixed decisions resulting in the affirmation of status quo policies.[1] Finally, after the Serb massacre of 7,000 Moslem men and boys outside of Srebrenica drew the world's attention to its television screen, domestic uproar in the United States and other western countries caused a furor within parliamentary discussion, resulting in a call for definitive military intervention. This soon led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb military contingents in hopes of stemming the sieges and subsequent massacres of Bosniak and Croat populations. This proved effective. Thereafter, NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), operating under a one year peacekeeping mandate, guaranteed that rival ethnic factions would not engage each other while American boots were on the ground.

Some have painted a fairly dire picture for the future of this dynamic and diverse country. General malaise and disenchantment has blanketed a population stricken by a lack of faith in their own politicians and an uncertainty of future economic prospects. Common conversation amongst average citizens generate opinions of the international presence that tend to ebb and flow between feelings of resentment and indispensability. However, any hypothetical scenario without an overarching, foreign military authority is met with apprehension[2]. Even Lord Ashdown, the Bosnian High Representative, believes that the country is not threatened by a return to war but rather, "[t]he real threat is that the economy does not improve fast enough, living standards don't rise quickly enough, or, for some, don't rise at all, and that this leads to a period of instability and social unrest."[3] Foreign soldiers are not going to solve all the problems plaguing Bosnian society but they can provide a basic point of security necessary from which long term development can commence. "The underlying logic of the emerging paradigm today is that, while military intervention can address the symptoms of a crisis and bring peace, a more comprehensive peace operation is required in order to address the root causes of a crisis and restore lasting

stability."[4] Nevertheless, foreign military arrangements used as a supplement to overall international endeavors for reform and stability have proven and will prove beneficial in the future.

After ten years of military peacekeeping missions in BiH, the primary responsibilities of these missions have been accomplished. Renewed ethnic conflict has, as of yet, not occurred and the likelihood of it actually taking place are slim to none. The European Union (EU) is now heading the international military operation in BiH, having started its mandate as of 2 December 2004. The debate that now persists is the necessity of an international military contingent considering that the renewal of conflict between prior warring parties is no longer feasible. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic interests of NATO and the EU in Bosnia, describe the present security situation, and uphold the given reasoning for the continued existence of an international military presence under the guises of the EU's Operation Althea.

Strategic Interests

In June of 2004 members of the NATO and the EU met in Istanbul, Turkey to discuss cross-Atlantic relations on the topics of Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. This summit officially brought to an end the eight year Stabilization Force (SFOR) peacekeeping mission in BiH. Based on the terms agreed upon by the "Berlin plus" arrangements adopted on 17 March 2003 the EU would take over where SFOR was leaving off[5]. This meeting signaled the finalization of an era, one characterized by liberal interventionist attempts on the behalf of the United States to bring peace and stability to an area racked by ethnic conflict for the majority of the early 1990's. What should be examined at this point is the rationale behind NATO's departure from the Balkans and the EU's sudden interest in proposing its own legitimate military solution to an area considered by many in the international community to be its own back yard.

According to a briefing distributed by the International Crisis Group, the motives for the handover of the international mission from the auspices of NATO to the EU "have less to do with the real security situation in that country than with EU eagerness to bolster its credibility as a security actor and the U.S.[6] desire to declare at least one of its long-term military deployments over."[7] As of 2004, the United States was heavily involved in serious

military engagements across the Middle East in Afghanistan (where NATO is also operating[8]) and Iraq. The drain on resources to supply these missions has left NATO and American defence policy planners alike to start chopping off the loose ends of their peripheral engagements elsewhere in the world. Finalizing an engagement before the proper domestic institutions have been built to ensure the country can fill the power vacuum left by the departure of an international presence is in and of itself a threat. This point is reinforced by Marina Caparini:

> **Security sector reform in the Western Balkans, then, is not so much the consensual product of a rational process of self-evaluation by national political elites as it is an instrument to serve the interests of external actors and agendas. Its economic base is correspondingly contingent and non-self-sustaining, and in the event of 'donor fatigue' – which may now be in danger, *inter alia* because of competing demands from Afghanistan and Iraq – the maintenance even of the progress made so far becomes moot.[9]**

Considering the vital resources that were being expended in the Balkans during a time of crisis for the United States, it was only pragmatic and economical for it to allocate those resources towards undertakings it deemed a higher priority. NATO's time had come and gone in the Balkans and it was time for the EU to take over a problem that American legislators saw as a European problem.[10] The United States allowed for this handover because it trusts the EU as a partner not to allow for the grim circumstances described by Caparini to hold true. "In the context of Washington's overall strategic aim – to ensure that a failed state in Bosnia does not pose a continuing danger to European and transatlantic institutions – it has also been important for the US to ensure that its political investments in the region pay off."[11] This will be made possible by the EU involving itself in an area that will become intricately tied to the union through accession processes and further security arrangements in the future. Moreover, NATO is not fully pulling out of Bosnia, maintaining instead an advisory mission meant to cooperate with and assist EUFOR with about 150 personnel headed by a one-star US general.[12]

A comparison of American and European strategic interests in BiH shows the rationale behind the former's willingness to take over the latter's role. "The United States' interests were primarily related to threats of global security, the Balkans being one of them, whereas the EU, as an emerging regional player, defined its interests in the Balkans basically in the terms of EU enlargement and regional stability."[13] In strictly geopolitical terms

the EU, since the collapse of the bipolar Cold War environment, has been seeking to become a balancer to what it and the rest of the world sees as a globe dominated by American hegemony. According to Adrian Treacher, "This was made all the more pressing as the USA began to downsize its military presence on the European continent and it became clear that the Europeans would have to assume more responsibility for their own security."[14] The main issue at hand though is the question of capabilities associated with this responsibility and if the EU has transformed its collective defence policy in a way where these capabilities are properly suited for a peacekeeping environment. Treacher suggests that the EU move to peacekeeping operations was one borne not of structured intent but rather of opportunities provided by the cessation of Cold War great power tensions. Certain 'exogenous shocks' produced a *reactive* policy of peacekeeping intervention. Treacher emphasizes that, "the series of violent crises in the Middles East, sub-Saharan Africa and particularly in south-east Europe would prove the 'learning ground' out of which the Member States would ultimately and unanimously consent to bestowing their Union with military attributes. However, this was to be a *reactive* process and cannot be attributed, to any degree, to the integration underway in other policy areas."[15]

Regardless of intent, the EU does have a strategic interest in the stabilization of tensions in BiH and in its continuing economic and political reform. So as the United States begins to recognize and take action against peripheral threats in other parts of the globe and as the EU furthers development of a communal security agenda in its own sphere of influence, we see the changeover of authority in BiH going from the former to the latter. The Istanbul Summit allowed for a massive weight of responsibility to be taken off the shoulders of the United States, especially considering its geopolitical position in the Middle East at the time. Operation Althea is the largest peacekeeping mission ever undertaken by the EU and it has embraced the mission as an affirmation of its efforts to clean up a mess that was dealt with poorly some ten years ago.

Domestic Reservations

Although the international community upholds the transition as an epochal moment in the trans-Atlantic relationship, Bosnians are none too excited about seeing the Americans leave and the Europeans arrive. There are two main justifications for this uneasiness. First is the memory of the

failed attempts by the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) to ensure the wellbeing of Bosniaks in UN-designated 'safe areas' such as Sarajevo and Srebrenica. In an interview with the International Relations and Security Network, Rasim Kadic, the president of the Bosnian Liberal-Democratic Party, pointed out some memories in particular have left the Bosniaks considering the European role in the war as 'dishonorable': "The Dutch government is responsible for the deaths of 8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica by failing to protect them. The majority of European countries were against the suspension of the UN's arms embargo on the Bosnian government which disabled us from defending ourselves. At the same time those countries were against military strikes on Bosnian Serb positions."[16] Moreover, Bosnian politicians are familiar with the tough approach used by the Europeans in their characteristic "carrot and stick" model. Although the carrots of EU accession are tempting, "with memories of Srebrenica still vivid, the idea of a 'tough' EU military posture cannot help but evoke doubts."[17] Secondly, citizens do not feel that the Europeans will be looking out for their vital interests: "many Bosnians view the leading European powers with suspicion, not only because of war-time failures, but also because they tend to believe they are more motivated by business or neo-colonial interests than the Americans."[18] The EU is not held in very high regard amongst many of the Bosnians in the Federation of BiH to the extent that some have even labeled EUFOR as a training operation for a newly contrived common defence policy. "They (the Bosnians) fear that BiH is being used as a testing ground for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at a time when the European Union is not equipped for so great an undertaking, and that failure would both undermine stability in the Balkans and erode support for ESDP."[19] On the other hand many of the Serbs in Republika Srpska (RS) have a mentality varying from outright ambivalence to an 'anybody but the Americans' attitude; this being understandable considering that Bosnian Serb military units were on the receiving end of American precision guided Tomahawk missiles during NATO air strikes at the end of the war.[20]

European Peacekeeping Experience

The EU has already been engaged in two other peacekeeping operations before moving into Bosnia-Herzegovina: one in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that began in June of 2003 and the other being

Macedonia, where the EU took over one of NATO's missions for the first time, in March of 2003. Both of these missions were undertaken in the hopes of stemming armed conflict between rival factions. They both also lasted collectively for a total of nine months: four in the DRC and five in Macedonia. What the EU faces in BiH will be far different than what it has become accustomed to in other parts of the world and region. It will be a long-term mission operating within an environment where the cessation of armed conflict between rival factions is not the priority.

Considering the character of previous missions, one would presume that the EU is not prepared for a long-term engagement in BiH. However, "experts say that while its short peacekeeping stints in the conflict zones of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo have not necessarily prepared it for a longer-term, non-conflict mission in Bosnia, the EU is more suited to challenges where a failure to make quick decisions would not result in tragedy."[21] Quick decisions regarding armed advances on civilian populations and the defense of those populations thereafter will not have to be made by EUFOR soldiers in the present security situation. These days, conflicts are reserved to the political and economic spheres. Based upon the present situation, EUFOR is perfectly capable of handling the bare minimum tasks of preventing armed conflict. Merely the presence of a foreign military deters militant groups from skirmishing. If this is the case then further examination of EUFOR's mission is necessary in order to validate its continued need and existence in BiH.

Operation Althea

Operation Althea is active under the same force levels as NATO's SFOR with troops and personnel numbering around 7,000. At the time of NATO's withdrawal from BiH, approximately 80 percent of the troops in SFOR belonged to EU member or partner countries. This made the transition more of a symbolic event than one characterized by the need for new operational level structures. Essentially, the soldiers just had to change the patches on their uniforms and spray paint the sides of their vehicles with different logos. The basic principles of the mission also mirror those of SFOR: to enforce Chapter VII (of the United Nations charter) provisions in order to guarantee continued compliance with the General Framework Agreement and to provide a safe and secure environment in BiH.[22] These forces operate in three different sectors known as military Areas of Opera-

tion each of which is comprised of a Multinational Task Force.[23] 33 member nations contribute troops, equipment, and resources to their own respective Multinational Task Forces.

The Thessaloniki agenda confirmed that "the Balkans will be an integral part of a unified Europe."[24] This concept has been parlayed into a new mandate for EUFOR that, in some aspects, differs greatly from that of SFOR's. The key supporting tasks consist of providing support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), most notably in the apprehension of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), and also to provide the security environment necessary for which the police can tackle the ever growing problem of organized crime. EUFOR's mission will be more robust than that of SFOR. "In addition to maintaining a secure environment, EUFOR's declared intention it to pursue a more multi-faceted approach to security, specifically supporting implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton."[25] NATO, as a defense alliance, has the capabilities, wherewithal, and fortitude to cope with separating warring parties. The EU, through EUFOR, is taking a much different approach "gearing its efforts to peacekeeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances able to undertake combat operations."[26]

Under the assumption that EUFOR is not needed as a military force but rather as a supporting role in the advisory and reform of domestic institutions, the average criticism would be concerning the need for EUFOR in fulfilling its two key supporting tasks: apprehension of war criminals and organized crime. Organized crime in BiH has been under the magnifying glass since the Office of the High Representative received the "Bonn Powers" giving him the ability to sack local political officials not only for corruption but also for involvement in organized crime syndicates. Organized crime is an overarching, umbrella term used to describe, in the case of Bosnia, individuals in a structured grouping that partake in the trafficking, distribution, and transportation of human beings, illicit drugs and illegal arms, throughout the country and region. These groups of individuals are the same ones suspected of harboring PIFWCs in rural areas just outside the country in Serbia and Macedonia. Therefore, there is a connection between EUFOR's responsibilities in helping to crack down on organized crime and facilitating the ICTY.

Critics testify that current institutional security structures within

BiH are capable of dealing with both of these issues and to some extent they are, but only to a certain extent. Corrupt officials and their role in organized crime coupled with still elusive war criminals do not bode well for those purporting systemic change and institutional reform. It must be emphasized that EUFOR is to play a supplementary role, assisting local security structures in accomplishing these tasks. The question of whether or not local structures will be able to work self-sufficiently without EUFOR will be addressed later on. Critics have even gone as far as to question the purpose of pursuing war criminals. They have been on the run for years now and therefore have no involvement with day to day machinery of the government and have no influence in the future of the country. James Meernik proposes that, based on scientific data acquired through the Kansas Event Data System, "the arrests and judgments of war criminals had only a limited effect on improving relations among Bosnia's ethnic groups. Mostly, the apprehension and judgments of war criminals had no statistically significant effect."[27]

This sort of opinion is fairly short-sighted. First of all, for the idealistic purposes of justice and reconciliation, these war criminals must be brought in front of the ICTY and put on trial. Bosnians and the international community alike believe that true reform and progress cannot be made unless General Ratko Mladi□ and Radovan Karadzi□ are sent to The Hague for atrocities they have committed. It is difficult, even from an outsider's perspective, to believe that citizens will be able to move on with their lives when the individuals who are believed to have committed atrocities against their family and friends still have not been apprehended. There is also the belief that these war criminals still hold some influence in domestic politics and might actually be taking part the obstruction of institutional reform. Borut Grgi□, the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia explained that the apprehension of these criminals is necessary not only for the psychological effect they have on the Moslem population but also on the political level. "By apprehending these criminals you are taking away one more card nationalist politicians can play to rile up domestic support for their radical policies."[28] Indicted war criminals like Mladi□ and Karadzi□ are looked upon as heroes in the RS, not necessarily because they increased the general wellbeing and standard of living of the Bosnian Serb population but because RS politicians promote them as people who succeeded in the establishment of a separate, autonomous Serb entity,

completely dismissing the atrocities committed against Bosnian Moslems. With this mentality, it will be even harder to achieve further cooperation for reform on the state level when politicians are not only driving a wedge between the two entities every chance they get, but are actually supported by their fellow constituencies on an ideological basis. "With the apprehension of these criminals," Grgi☐ continues, "nationalistic politicians in the RS will lose support for their policies, thereby paving the way for more liberal and moderate politicians to become part of the fold."[29]

So why can't the domestic structures now in place in BiH take care of these problems that are plaguing its society without the help of EUFOR? A thorough analysis of the police and military institutions in BiH will show that without assistance from international forces like Operation Althea, the problems presented above cannot be solved. Although BiH has made definitive strides in security sector reform since the cessation of war ten years ago, it does not have the operational capabilities to handle tackling corruption, organized crime, and PIFWCs, while at the same time managing primary duties as guarantors of peace and security to the population.

Police Structures

The issue of police reform within BiH is a fairly complicated one. Relieving the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) is a non-policing unit meant to monitor, inspect and most importantly, train existing local police structures. It does not have executive mandate and does not perform operational duties.[30] Although the EUPM does much to help local police units, structurally, police institutions are plagued by systemic problems. First of all, police structures are defined along cantonal borders in the Federation and situated within the Ministry of the Interior in the RS all of which are completely autonomous of each other. Funding for the separate police structures within the Federation is not done on the federal level. Money comes from within the cantons and therefore is not centralized. Because of this, drastic financial inequalities exist amongst the cantons and multi level bureaucracy hinders the ability of police officers on the tactical level to work swiftly with efficiency. The centralized system in the RS appears to be much more efficient. However, the different police institutions do not work together. There is no communication at the state level, and because the policing structures are not centralized, territorial disputes persist on

question of authority in cross-entity operations. This idea is summarized in the Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

> **"While the IPTF and EUPM have made significant contributions to improving the effectiveness of policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sustainability of their reforms has been compromised by systemic problems arising from the overall organization of policing within Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, policing is currently carried out by over 15 police forces, fragmented and uncoordinated along ethnic and administrative lines. Unable to operate across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), police face criminals who are united, well resources, and operate with near impunity. These systemic deficiencies result in a system incapable of dealing effectively with complex crimes, including organized crime, corruption, and trafficking in drugs and human beings."[31]**

In October of 2004, the EU Secretary General, Javier Solana, made Bosnian police reform a necessity for the commencement of accession procedures. The main issues on the reform agenda include the development of state level structures and subsequent legislation and budgeting along those lines.

These priorities have been embarked upon with little success. On 30 May 2005, "after 12 hours of debate, 62 lawmakers in the 83-seat RSNA (Republika Srpska National Assembly) voted against the police restructuring plan" as presented by the EU.[32] Milanko Mihajlica, the Head of the SRS Caucus stated that, "the acceptance of the proposed police reform would mean the acceptance of the beginning of the end of the RS," adding that "nobody can force us to commit political suicide."[33] Much of the blame has been placed on the majority ruling nationalist party, the SDS. After the vote Paddy Ashdown made apparent his disgust for what he sees as the stubborn and ostentatiously obstructionist party: "the party founded by Radovan Karadzi□ has shown itself incapable of looking to the future and, once again, placed a blight on the future of the whole country."[34] This mentality that state level police reform will inherently lead to the destruction of the RS is actively exacerbating any prospects BiH might have of EU accession.

Military Structures

At time being, military reform might very well be going down the same path. BiH has two separate militaries, one for the Federation and one for the RS. Force levels since the war have been drastically reduced with the help of EU programs focused on the demilitarization of armed

ethnic forces and their subsequent reintegration into society. At the end of the war, approximately 430,000 troops comprised the Armed Forces. As of early 2005, this has been reduced to a force of approximately 12,000 troops. For a country of four million people, troop levels this high are a huge economic drain in an area already plagued by staggering (some estimates argue 40%) unemployment. "The primary purpose of any armed force is to defend its country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The situation in BiH is unique, however, with two distinct armed forces in defence of one country. Such a defence structure has led to armed forces that have become an economic burden on the country."[35] The economic burden is attributable to the size of the Armed Forces. This has left these same forces unable to function operationally and achieve their basic priorities. Training, spare parts, general maintenance, and weapons modernization have taken a back seat to rudimentary subsistence. As a result, the quality and efficiency of the Armed Forces has been in steady decline for years.[36] The complete lack of common military doctrine, standards of training, military organization, and equipment between the two entities does not allow for the Armed Forces as a whole to work as a legitimate force able to cope with common military responsibilities.[37]

2.9% of the GDP is allocated to the military in BiH. This is a massive commitment for a post-war economy which should be devoted primarily to the reconstruction of social and political institutions as well as military structures. A basic consensus needs to be made at the state level and this should be able to happen without such a massive allocation of resources devoted to the military, dwarfing in some cases countries of comparable size.[38] As state level police reform is needed in order to ensure Stabilisation and Association talks, state level military reform has been billed by NATO as a necessity for beginning Partnership for Peace talks. The Armed Forces have a long way to go if they plan on achieving this goal. Even so, some are optimistic that BiH will be able to come to an agreement between the entities on state level military structures and reform in its budgetary and legislative aspects in the near future. Although this may be overly ambitious, it is still necessary to have this mindset in order to energize state structures and engage public opinion.[39]

The Defence Reform Commission's report in 2003 provided instructions for remodeling these structures as a means of entering the Partnership for Peace. After two years of grudgingly slow campaigning for defence

reform, the Council of Ministers on 18 July 2005 signed the draft laws for a single, state level military force. In a statement by John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning in BiH, he explained that "the envisaged regimental concept and a structure comprising three multi-ethnic brigades and unified personnel, training, and logistical commands will provide the basis for a defence establishment geared towards the challenges of the future rather than the past."[40] Although this can be considered as a massive step in the right direction, governing parties still have to ratify the reform legislation. Police reform had been passed by the Council of Ministers too, until RS politicians turned it down. Knowing this, there is still the looming possibility that RS politicians will treat military reform just like they treated police reform. The measures are being made but it is still up to politicians at the entity level to decide if they really want to go through with reforms, thereby boosting state authority, or hoard local power by giving military legislation the thumbs down.

Theoretical and Tactical Reform

Reform, at first glance, would seem like an easy process when examining the 'carrots' the EU and NATO are offering BiH for its cooperation. All BiH has to do is meet these specific objectives, although not simplistic in any stretch of the imagination, and they will be provided with territorial peace and stability through NATO and economic security with the most powerful economic community in the region through the EU. However, the ability to not only ratify legislation but also enact it varies in difficulty when reform is broken down into theoretical and tactical levels. The below graph was constructed by the author to assist and simplify the concept of varying difficulties at different levels of military and police reform in BiH.

	Theoretical Level	**Tactical Level**
Military Reform	<u>Easy</u> – Already a centralized disbursement of funds out of Ministry of Defence. Needed for entry into PfP. Tangible security benefits from NATO membership.	<u>Hard</u> – Military defends a country. Difficult when soldiers pledge allegiance to different nations. They don't recognize one flag. Soldiers are paid very little and situation is made worse with conscription.
Police Reform	<u>Hard</u> – Distribution of funds done on the level of municipalities in the FBiH. Needed for entry into EU. RS already voted it down. Still opposition to the reforms. Benefits from EU accession idealistic and intangible.	<u>Average</u> – Police officers will be dealing with civilians – biases may prevail, especially considering different nations will be policing each other. But there will be less friction between the police forces because their main task will be to keep peace and order (which is made easier with intl. military force still in the area.)

Military reform should be moderately easy at the theoretical level. There is already a centralized state level structure, the Ministry of Defence, that distributes funds where and when necessary to both the Federation and the RS. Entry into the Partnership for Peace has been made contingent upon a state level military structure. Ratifying legislation for this will be easier than was the case for police reform because it is only one of a select few conditions that need to be met for joining NATO as opposed to the multitude of conditions set by the EU to engage in accession talks. Moreover, with NATO, BiH will have territorial security provided by the most powerful defense alliance in the world. The idea of territorial security is a far more tangible concept in the eyes of politicians who might oppose security reforms than is the idea of future economic prospects through the EU via police reforms. Politicians in the RS, if not reform minded, are mindful of power politics and they know that joining NATO will only bolster their status on the world stage. They have witnessed the evolution of NATO throughout the Cold War and have experienced its capabilities first hand during the Balkan wars of the 1990's. The benefits provided by NATO membership are more tangible than the idealistic prospects of economic security as promised by the EU.

The tactical level of military reform, on the other hand, will prove to be more challenging. This past year, the March class of recruits in the RS, on their own accord, pledged allegiance to the RS and not to BiH as is written in law. The crowd in attendance also booed Bosnia's national anthem and rose in cheers at the playing of the national anthem of the RS. The military's job to protect the territorial integrity of a country is made difficult when the soldiers supposedly defending the country instead pledge allegiance to their respective nations and/or entities. Furthermore, military personnel are paid very little, partly due to the fact that the country is having trouble maintaining such large forces and conscription is still rule of law. When we compile these factors on the tactical level, conscription, low pay, and pledges of allegiance to entities and not the state, there is less incentive on the part of military personnel to work as a functional unit with soldiers from other backgrounds in defense of *one* country. Critics of this idea would point to the recent success of a Bosnian mixed ethnicity military contingent that was recently sent to help fight in Iraq. However, members of this platoon were fighting outside of their own country, not for their country. This coupled with the fact that they were being paid exponentially

more money to fight in Iraq in comparison with their salaries back home gives the soldiers more incentive to work together efficiently.[1]

The theoretical level of police reform will also prove fairly difficult. Seeing as funds distribution is decentralized, colossal administrative overhauls are necessary in order to guarantee that funds are disbursed equally based on proportionality across the entities and cantons. The vote on police reform has already come and passed. Now, RS and Federation politicians will have to sit down and rehash the same topics which led to a no vote in the RS. Any agreement that will come of this will be less than optimal for the system as a whole. As long as RS politicians see police reform as a direct infringement on the entity's sovereignty, little can be hoped for. This decision is also fueled by hopes of accession into the EU. The chair of the Bosnia's Council of Ministers, according to the International Crisis Group, has set the target of 2009 for accession.[2] Bearing in mind that the target is overly ambitious and then combining this with the idealistic and intangible economic prospects of accession, it is very unlikely that benefits of police reform will provide the motivation for local politicians to embrace it with open arms in the future. RS politicians have even less incentive to strive for SAA talks when they see French and Dutch referendums voting down the new constitution.

The tactical level of police reform has both its difficulties and simplicities. Police officers will operate on an inter-entity basis. Therefore, biases and prejudices held against other ethnic groups might come to a head in the form of police discrimination. With ethnic war still fresh in the memories of many citizens, it is hard to imagine what officers will do when given a bit of power and authority, never mind weaponry. Tensions will be reduced by the fact that the main task of a police unit will be to maintain peace and security at the local level, a universal concept hopefully held by all officers. This contrasts with the idea of soldiers pledging allegiance to separate entities. Basic tasks will only be made easier by the presence of EUFOR soldiers and EUPM personnel as they are there for assistance in case anything goes wrong.

EUFOR's Role

So how does EUFOR fit in to all of this? The above discussion on the difficulties of police and military reform pertain to the security sector as a whole. The need for reform in this sector directly correlates to the

continued persistence of an international military operation. When BiH is faced with the myriad complications and inefficiencies of the security sector, Operation Althea is held on the backburner as an overseer that ensures peace and security while reform legislation unfolds. In the present situation, renewed armed conflict is not possible but in the words of Margaret Thatcher, "You can't cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the past 12 months!"[3] To put it bluntly, domestic structures are not capable of operating self-sufficiently without an international military presence in the current environment.

This concept should not overshadow the drastic need for reform in other areas of society in BiH. Administrative level political structures are too many and the inherently bureaucratic nature of these structures is only multiplied when separate administrative levels operate without cohesiveness and continuity. The Office of the High Representative has exercised the use of the "Bonn Powers" for 8 years now and it is time to start restricting these powers while simultaneously giving more authority and responsibility to democratically elected Bosnian politicians.[4] The first High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, believes "the tenth anniversary of Dayton is the appropriate occasion to end the mandate of the High Representative and to transfer full powers and responsibilities to the various elected Bosnian representatives."[5] Additionally, politico-economic troubles are directly related to defense and security reform. Obstructionist politicians are responsible for the woes of police reformists throughout the country. This could also be an impediment to military reform in the future. Too much money is spent on the continuation of large armed forces that are not necessary for contemporary security objectives. Mandatory conscription, reinforced in the Defence Law of 2004, only adds to the economic drain. Money is disbursed inefficiently within current police structures because the system is so decentralized. Furthermore, the situation is aggravated because Bosnians perceive the Europeans poorly, seeing them as being involved in the area for their own strategic interests in addition to their unscrupulous indecision during times of crisis. Unfortunately for the Bosnians, EUFOR is all they have. A small NATO contingent aside, the Americans have pulled out of the country and hopefully for good. A collective European military force is better than none at all.

In an interview with the *NATO Review* the Bosnian Defence Minister Nikola Radovanovi□ stated, "It's now increasingly up to Bosnian

institutions to take the responsibility for the peace process and to think to the future of our country beyond the foreign military and civilian presence. We have to take our destiny in our own hands."[6] The author commends and agrees with the Bosnian Defence Minister in this regard. Bosnian politicians have to start working together in order to further reforms in the military and civilian sectors of their own society. However, the Defence Minister continued saying, "EUFOR should be the last foreign military presence under a UN mandate in this country and will likely come to an end in the not too distant future." Hopefully EUFOR will be the last foreign military presence in BiH. Conversely, EUFOR cannot come to an end as long as military and police reform remain unattended to. If the EU was to pull out its military forces before reforms ensuring the efficient functionality of the domestic military and police structures have taken hold, then BiH loses its insurance policy while still in a transitional environment. Many in the country think that it is merely the presence, the sight of EUFOR soldiers in fatigues, which keep ethnic tensions from boiling up again.[7] Without EUFOR operating within Bosnian territory, domestic military and police structures must be prepared to deal with this possibility.

Suggestions

The EU force in BiH should continue operating within the borders of the country as long as reforms in the military and police sectors have not been pursued with success. This will constitute a long-term effort on the part of the EU especially considering the obstacles reform has met so far and the grudgingly slow pace at which discussions of these reforms take place. The Council of the European Union has already recognized t   his fact and has "considered that a EUFOR presence would be required beyond the end of 2005 and called on the appropriate Council bodies to take any necessary steps to that end."[8] The international community should continue to encourage politicians in the RS and the Federation of BiH to work together and build a level of common understanding on the necessity of state level military and police structures. EU accession and NATO membership should be stressed in this regard. Conscription should also be abolished. The dire economic situation in BiH is only aggravated when citizens are forced into military service at low wages thereby further reducing already deplorable troop morale. The EU should help fund wages for a professional

military until a market economy develops that can support a viable tax allocation in this regard. Eventual ratification and implementation of these reforms will allow for the EU to begin pulling its troops out of the area. Disengagement must be in the form of a gradual reduction of international force levels. This is due to the tactical difficulties discussed above in implementing the reforms. Once reforms are implemented, soldiers will need time to become accustomed to them. When the option of troop withdrawal finally becomes available to the EU it should not do so in one sweeping departure of all forces.

This is a conditional policy, dependent first upon reform to take place at the political level. The withdrawal of EUFOR troops is directly contingent upon the ratification of reform legislation. Once this happens, it will mean that politicians are finally working together at an inter-entity, state level. Therefore, while it will signal the end of EUFOR and the achievement of proper military and political reform, it will also mean the beginning of a new era of cooperation and progress within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notes:

[1] For more information regarding Britain's part in the stalling of military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, See Ben Simms' *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia.*

[2] The author is able to base this assumption off of his own conversations with Bosnian citizens, political officials, and soldiers operating within the territory.

[3] NATO Review, "Interview with Lord Ashdown: Bosnian High Representative," ed. Christopher Bennett, (Brussels: Jean Fournet, 2004): pp.38

[4] Alexander Yannis, "The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates in the Balkans: Bridger Over Troubled Waters," *Journal of International Relations and Development,* Vol. 5 No. 3 (Sept. 2002/3): p.261

[5] The Berlin Plus arrangements "provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. In effect, they allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged." NATO Topics, "NATO-EU: A strategic partnership." <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html> Last Updated: 2 December 2004

[6] NATO is an international military alliance compromised of 26 member countries. Although responsibilities within the organization are shared by all member states, the United States is largely known to be the main supporter and contributor, in turn using the organization as an instrument to achieve its own goals.

[7] International Crisis Group, "EUFOR: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements," Europe Briefing, (Sarajevo/Brussels: 29 June 2004): p.1

[8] NATO took over leadership of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as of August 2003.

[9] Marina Caparini, "Security Sector Reform and Post Conflict Stabilisation: The Case for the Western Balkans." *Security Sector Reform Yearbook,* (2004): p.25

[10] Jones, Walter "Debate in House of Representatives"

[11] International Crisis Group "EUFOR" p.3

[12] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *NATO Review*, (Brussels: Jean Fournet, 2004): p.8

[13] Hanns D. Jacobsen, "Economic Security and the Stability Pact for South East Europe," <http://www.studienforum-berlin.de/Economic%20Security_2005.pdf> p. 6

[14] Adrian Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation," *European Foreign Affairs Review,* No. 9 (2004): p.53

[15] Ibid p.55

[16] Anes Alic, "Filling NATO's boots in Bosnia." International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Security Watch: 27 May 2004 <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=8901> Two aspects of this quote should be taken into consideration. First, there was and still is a dispute over the true number of Bosniaks massacred at Srebrenica at the hands of the Serbs. Naturally, Moslem figures tend to be somewhat inflated whereas Serb figures tend to be lower than the average accounts. The number is general assumed to be around 7,000.

[17] International Crisis Group, "EUFOR," p.6

[18] Ibid, p.6

[19] Lionel Ponsard, "The dawning of a new security era?" *NATO Review*, ed. Christopher Bennett, (Brussels: Jean Fournet, 2004): p.20

[20] Hawton, Nick. "EU troops prepare for Bosnia swap." BBC News, Sarajevo: 23 October 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3944191.stm>

[21] Alic, p. 1

[22] EUFOR, "Background Brief and Facts," <http://euforbih.org>

[23] EUFOR, "Bosnia Geographic Breakdown," <http://euforbih.org>

[24] General Affairs and External Relations Council (of the European Union), "The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration." Western Balkans – Council Conclusions, (16 June 2003): p.1

[25] Posnard, p.22

[26] Ibid, pp.21-22

[27] James Meernik, "Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia," *Journal of Peace Research,* (May 2005): p.271. For full data tables and information on the steps taken to acquire these data go to <http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets>

[28] Borut Grgi□, personal interview at the Center for Strategic Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia: 12 July 2005.

[29] Ibid

[30] EUFOR "Mission Overview," <http://euforbih.org>

[31] Police Restructuring Commission, "Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Sarajevo: December 2004.

[32] SETimes, "Republika Srpska Government Blamed for Stalling BiH's Progress on Road to EU," SETimes, (1 June 2005): p.1 <http://www.setimes.com>

[33] EUPM, "PPID Sarajevo Weekend Media Summary," European Union Police Mission Information Department, (Sarajevo: 2-3 July 2005): p.2

[34] SETimes p. 2

[35] EUFOR "Bosnia and Herzegovina Today"

[36] Defence Reform Commission on Bosnia-Hercegovina, "The Path to Partnership for Peace," 25 September 2003: p.69

[37] Ibid, p.69

[38] International Monetary Fund, "BiH Country Report," (July 2003); The Military Balance 2001-02, The International Institute for Strategic Studies

[39] International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," Crisis Group Europe Report No.160, (17 January 2005): p.50

[40] Colston, John. "Statement by the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning on defence reform in Bosnia." Sarajevo: 18 July 2005. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/ s050718b.htm>

[41] Erwin Br□nik, personal interview at the Slovene Military Barracks, Celje, Slovenia: 26 July 2005.

[42] International Crisis Group "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited' p.50
Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the cold war," *International Organization,* Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996): pp.445-475. Quote originally published in *U.S.*

News and World Report, 9 July 1991 p.31.

[43] For more on this topic see the European Stability Initiative's "Open Letter to Lord Ashdown" 2003 and Markus Bickle's Balkan Crisis Report 12 November 04.
 Bildt p. 10

[44] NATO Review, "Interview with Nikola Radovanovi□: Bosnian Defence Minister," *NATO Review*, ed. Christopher Bennett, (Brussels: Jean Fournet, 2004): p.45.
 Br□nik Interview

[45] Council of the European Union, "Press Release: General Affairs and External Relations," Luxembourg, (13 June 2005): p.6

11

Bibliography:

Alic, Anes. Filling NATO's boots in Bosnia. International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Security Watch. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=8901 (accessed May 27, 2004)

Bennet, Christopher. *Interview with Lord Ashdown: Bosnian High Representative.* NATO Review. 2004:38.

Bennett, Christopher. *Inter*view with Nikola Radovanovi□: Bosnian Defence Minister. NATO Review. (2004): 45.

Caparini, Marina. *Security Sector Reform and Post Conflict Stabilisation: The Case for the Western Balkans*. Security Sector Reform Yearbook (2004): 25

EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited. International Crisis Group: Crisis Group Europe Report No.160, (2005): 50

EUFOR: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements. International Crisis Group. *Europe Briefing* (2004): 1

Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina Police Restructuring Commission. Police Restructuring Commission, Sarajevo. December 2004.

Hawton, Nick. *EU troops prepare for Bosnia swap*. BBC News, Sarajevo: 23 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3944191.stm

Jacobsen, Hanns D. Economic Security and the Stability Pact for South East Europe http://www.studienforum-berlin.de/Economic%20Security_2005.pdf

McCalla, Robert B. *NATO's persistence after the cold war*. International Organization. (1996) 50.3: 445-475.

Meernik, James. *Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia*. Journal of Peace Research. (2005): .271.

NATO Topics. NATO-EU: A strategic partnership. http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html (last updated December 2, 2004).

The Path to Partnership for Peace. Defense Reform Commission on Bosnia-Hercegovina. (2003): 69

Ponsard, Lionel. *The dawning of a new security era?* NATO Review. (2004): 20.

PPID Sarajevo Weekend Media Summary. European Union Police Mission Information Department, (2005): 2

Press Release: General Affairs and External Relations. Council of the European Union. (2005): 6.

Republika Srpska Government Blamed for Stalling BiH's Progress on Road to EU. SETimes. http://www.setimes.com (accessed 1 June 2005)

Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop. NATO Review (2004): 8

The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration. General Affairs and External Relations Council (of the European Union): Western Balkans – Council Conclusions. (2003): 1

Treacher, Adrian. *From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation*. European Foreign Affairs Review. 9:53.

Yannis, Alexander. *The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates in the Balkans: Bridger Over Troubled Waters*. Journal of International Relations and Development. 5.3: 261.

Why Mixed Dyads Fight: Dispute and War in Chechnya and Cyprus

by Barry M. Hashimoto

Abstract:

A robust finding of the democratic peace literature reveals that democratic-autocratic pairs of states are more likely to fight wars than homogenous dyads are. Democracies establish a separate peace, but engage the remainder of the world's states differently. Establishment of an imperfect status quo and inability to address the initial demands of both sides are deficiencies that lead these pairs to fight repeatedly over the same issues. I compare disputes of this type in Chechnya and Cyprus, arguing that if domestic institutions determine foreign policy choices, they are also a major source of failure in the resolution of mixed dyad disputes and a catalyst of their increasing violence. This comparative study contradicts the monadic and normative versions of democratic peace theory, avoids using nationalism as an explanation, finds that international institutional constraints have inconsistent bearing on democratic decisions for war, and argues that the effects of signals of resolve in mixed dyads are unreliable, as they are contingent on an evolving context.

Barry M. Hashimoto is a senior studying Government and Earth Sciences at Dartmouth University.

Introduction

Disputes, crisis, and war are salient situations in which societies face an unpredictable loss of life, property, and regime legitimacy. The United States declared war on the same dictatorship at least twice since the end of the Cold War, while Israel has fought multiple non-democracies repeatedly since the end of World War II. The consequences of these wars are not trivial, and in light of much speculation about the effects of democracy on international relations, the behavior of variable regimes is an important area of investigation.

The evidence indicates that dyads containing a democracy and a non-democracy (mixed dyads) behave differently than homogenous dyads do. I explore the Russian-Chechen disputes (1994-1999) over the status of the Chechen Autonomous Republic[1] and the Turkish-Greek disputes (1967-1974) over the status of Cyprus to identify instances of democracies fighting multiple wars with the same non-democracy. My objective is to uncover the related institutional processes in the Chechnya case and compare the evidence to the Cyprus case.

I find in the Russian case that a nominal democracy constructed a feedback loop that increased the probability of war recurring with Chechnya. The evidence is organized to reveal the ways that elite level decisions are constrained domestically and internationally. I draw several conclusions. The organization of democratic domestic institutions matters. The *resolution* and chances of *re-initiation* of a conflict may be highly contingent on it. I attempt here to link the failure of peaceful bargaining in Chechnya to systemic "flaws" in Russia's institutional arrangement. To complement research on the *efficiency* of democracies in disputes and war, this analysis examines a prominent case of democratic *inefficiency* in war. Here, I argue that democratic institutions do not "finish the game." They often terminate wars with autocracies such that the latter are equally or more prone to revive threats. International constraints – whether normative or based on the actions of specific elites – play a minimal and supportive role. They give tacit assent to, but do not veto the policy choices of democracies in mixed-dyad conflict. Finally, mutual attempts to signal resolve suffer from the contexts in which they are interpreted – contexts that evolve over the life of an ongoing dispute.

This paper is presented in four parts: I first discuss the theoretical background of my case studies; second, I examine the Russia-Chechnya case (1994 and 1999); third, I compare the findings to the Turkey-Greece case (1967 and 1974); finally, I conclude with implications and some unresolved questions.

I. Several Peaces, Many Theories

The democratic peace paradigm has initiated a debate about the pacifism of democracies and democratization, sending waves into the methodology and epistemology of International Relations as a study of inter-state violence.[2] One finds facts more reliably than their explanations. Both the social facts and their explanations have ushered in a renewal of the debate concerning complex causation.[3] Formal models, large N statistical tests, historical process tracing, and even "laboratory" studies and simulations are simultaneously involved in the puzzle. Emerging patterns are generally confirmed by reproducible research.[4] Two binaries are usually present in explanatory attempts for democratic pacifism: normative v. structural and monadic v. dyadic.[5]

Proponents of the dyadic peace contend that as the level of democracy increases, disputes are less likely to escalate to violence.[6] Backed by various studies, these proponents argue that democratic dyads are involved in a low number of disputes and that mixed dyads are involved in a much higher number of disputes, uses of violence, and reciprocated use of violence.[7] Proponents of monadic pacifism argue that a democratic peace effect holds regardless of regime type.[8] David Rousseau discovers a weak version of this effect in mixed dyads, using different data sets and tracing processes by which the monadic effect declines and dyadic effect increases along with the escalation of stages of a dispute.[9]

Normative explanations generally focus on the socialization and world outlook of elites nested in liberal regimes versus the absence of Kantian, Schumpeterian and other liberal socializations in non-democracies.[10] A partial list of what institutional explanations rely on is: (1) fear of punishment via the domestic sphere for taking costly risks in war and the behavioral incentives they produce[11]; (2) the fear of punishment from public opinion in polls and elections[12]; (3) information embedded in and emerging from democratic institutions at the many forking paths of a developing dispute[13]; (4) targeted regimes' incentives to avoid war with democracies that might

be seeking to divert the attention of public opinion[14]; (5) the number of vetoes in a power-sharing agreement; and (6) the level of accountability of leaders to the selectorate and winning coalition they rely upon for political existence.[15] Not every variety of explanation can be counted on in a mixed dyad, but those involving the games of political punishment and the process of bargaining for optimal equilibrium certainly can.

The Institutional Approach: Parsing War

Because "democracies do not fight other democracies," mixed dyad disputes are the only set of disputes in which a democracy might conceivably fight. Since mixed dyad wars are the only set of wars in which a democracy actually *does* fight, it is necessary to look within this set and within democracies themselves to uncover the determinants of their behavior. Is it "democracy" that produces the results measured by political scientists, or the institutions within democracies? Following this school of thought, the institutions of the range of regimes enveloped by the word, "autocracy" are just as central to the analysis. If, as Michael Desch argues, "regime type hardly matters," how do a few international-level structural constraints account for the diversity of political behavior in the world?[16] In mid-century, Seymour Lipset, Joseph Schumpeter, and Robert Dahl laid the foundations for institutional analysis of the polymorphic phenomenon of democracy.[17] Today, it is generally acknowledged that the aggregation of "regime type" leads to weak understandings of interactions between states, but practical social science is premised on aggregating a diverse reality into the smallest number of communicable concepts. However, it is also the job of the social scientist to determine what the smallest number ought to be.

Not all democracies "are created equal".[18] According to Rousseau, for example, Polity IV sets frequently used to code for regime type can turn out to be deceptive, intellectual constructs, oversimplifying reality and masking a richer variation of state behavior. Even the gold standard democracies are surprising exceptions to the monadic peace. Reiter and Stam argue that democratic regimes abandon their scruples about violence when they face nascent democracies that are weak targets. Though their argument is not new, their explanation is. They argue that democracies face constraints that limit their options to the use covert action – a method of circumventing public opposition to operations not critical for national security.[19]

Gowa and Rousseau also suggest that autocratic dyads display a

surprising low level of violence.[20] This seems somewhat counter-intuitive given the volume of research pointing to: (1) illusions created and sustained in incompetent autocratic power ministries; (2) the proneness of non-democracies to select wars with a low probability of victory and fight them without great effort; (3) the logic of survival that compels "semi-repressive, moderately exclusionary" regimes to increase their demands when they are fighting wars they know they are losing; and (4) the logic of survival that compels that dictators to end wars by calculating private goods – rather than public goods – redistribution schemes.[21] Echoing Maoz and Russet, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman confirm that despite a slight monadic effect associated with the democratic community, mixed dyads appear to be the most war-prone, rather than homogenous autocratic dyads.[22] Reiter and Stam identify strong evidence that autocracies are the "culprits" in these cases. That is, autocracies start the conflicts. From an expected utility perspective, however, both adversaries have rationally excluded options other than fighting on the eve of war[23]. The analysis of the institutions that comprise states and are tangent to them promises to offer more fruitful explanation for patterns in which democracies are not simply the victims of autocratic aggression.

For the past several decades, scholars of international politics have expected theories that are sensitive to the interaction of domestic and international factors in shaping major events. Rousseau's study is a recent, inspirational attempt to do so, and illuminates the international relations of institutional arrangements. *Democracy and War* argues for the analysis of sub-state and international institutions as constraints regardless of regime type, although the purpose of the book is to explore the democratic peace. For example, he uses Saudi Arabia and Jordan as case studies to suggest how domestic-institutional and international constraints might function as determinants of peace/war in autocratic dyads. In the case of Saudi Arabia, he identifies a monarchial inability to mobilize public opposition to Nasserism in Yemen in 1967. In the case of Jordan, he identifies international pressure from Egypt and Syria to press for war in 1967, King Hussein's belief of the inevitability of war with Israel and his fear of being punished by Palestinian domestic factions. Simultaneously, he shows how democratic constraints malfunctioned on the road to war in India (centralization of foreign policy), El Salvador (public animosity toward Guatemala), and Britain (coalition forming) in three cases.

In this model of conflict recurrence within mixed dyads, I accept the assumption that institutions are better units of analysis than the aggregated – albeit useful – concept of "regime type." Whereas "regime type" is a good proxy variable for the study of general trends, sub-regime analysis is necessary for validating these trends and exploring their "error terms."

The Mixed Dyad Pathology

I have pointed to the evidence that autocracies are more likely to attack democracies than vice versa. Given the impressive win-loss record of democracy, is there an autocratic deficiency that leads them to commit themselves repeatedly to disputes, to crises and sometimes to war? Whereas the systemic effects of regime changes have been addressed in Realist literature, I consider the institutional effects on agents faced with important decisions in mixed dyad conflicts.[24]

Sometimes, democracies attack first in anticipation of security threats. Bueno de Mesquito and Lalman offer an intriguing and logical explanation for this type of action. The authors claim that democratic leaders fear exploitation from autocratic leaders, leading them to wage preventive war if their first strike capability is favorable. Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth point out that only one case – the Six Days War (1967) – qualifies for this logic. Though it lies outside the scope of their argument, the American led Coalition invasion of Iraq (2003) is another data point. As we will see, the first Chechen war in 1994, and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 are additional data points. The point of this analysis is simply that interaction in these cases is linked to earlier interaction. In interactions at the dispute level, certain mixed dyads exhibit a pathology leading to the continuous failure of a stable status quo.

Once in war, domestic institutions on the democratic side may interact in a way that provokes the dispute's renewal from the autocratic side. Pinpointing which exact institutions is difficult, since they interact with one another in a game-theoretic manner (in Russia even the opportunity for institutions to forcibly intervene in the affairs of each other existed in the early 1990s). The evidence is revealed in analysis of competition for political power in the domestic endgame nearing the termination of a war and in the voices of political challengers with objectives rivaling and purporting to be more useful than those of the failing regimes. Whether or not the failing regime's members are punished and replaced by another, failure

in war has its consequences. In the two cases considered here, threats to the democratic adversary are re-issued.

I propose two general paths of mixed dyad dispute re-initiation, and examine case studies of the second path. Path one is deduced from the Selectorate Theory and diverges when the initial ruling elite or coalition maintains majority political power. The *reduction* of the surviving winning coalition following the regime's termination of the war is one variable among several that may determine the process of new threat-making and eventually, new war-mongering.

Path two, in which the ruling elite or coalition is punished, seriously weakened, or forced to share political power with challengers, is character-ized by the *enlargement* or *replacement* of the surviving winning coalition. In both Cyprus and Chechnya, non-democratic entities with the decision-making capacities of states, this change in the organization of power is associated with a new dispute between two regimes that had previously disputed.

Interestingly, one case (Cyprus) displays the pattern of status quo-war, and the other (Chechnya) case displays the pattern of war-war. Although the two cases are ostensibly quite different and the regimes had different motives for choosing war – that is the point. The parallels that do exist re-veal interesting and generic processes. Although the comparative literature has yielded fruitful analyses of federal secession within the former Soviet Union, secession leading to violence between the center and a federal unit is congruent to games nations play when they go to war.[25]

Mixed Dyad Wars of Interest

A limited list of "path one" might include the Six Days War (1967), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). A similarly limited list of "path two" in-cludes the France/Britain and Germany 1914-1939, the Suez Crisis (1956), the Turkish disputes with Cyprus (1967 and1974), the first (1994), and second Chechen wars (1999).

In each case, the democracy initiated the war, and a previous dispute within dyads had been resolved with at least a cease-fire. I analyze in some depth the Russian rivalry with Chechnya, and then compare it with the macro-features the Turkish-Greek disagreement over the governance of Cyprus.

Claiming Russia's status as a democracy at *any* point in its history

is bold. I use the minimal classification, treating Russia and Turkey as democracies, even though they fail the standard tests for "openness" or liberal norms. Russia is ideal for this analysis, which focuses on the domestic-institutional constraints of war initiation and not on the liberal normative constraints of some democratic peace literature. There is at least no danger of confusing deep-level causes of monadism or dyadism. Because Russia possesses a constitution that grants it a democratic infrastructure, I proceed in spite of objections that the Russo-Chechen wars were fought by two oligarchies.

Technically a semi-presidential system under Boris Yeltsin's 1993 constitution, Russia is usually classified as super presidential due to the president's extensive powers.[26] In the pages that follow, I highlight the unique arrangement of Russian domestic institutions from 1993-1999 and shifting international constraints on Boris Yeltsin's and Vladimir Putin's Chechnya policies as an example of what I have called "path two." I begin by assuming that basic war-aims at the outset of the 1994 conflict were (1) independence on the Chechen side and (2) retention of Chechen territory on the Russian side.

II. Russia and Chechnya in Two Cases of War

When President Boris Yeltsin secretly authorized the invasion of the autonomous republic of Chechnya in 1994, most of the political establishment supported him, despite the personal reservations of some members.[27] Dzhokar Dudaev's election in Chechnya and his withdrawal from the Chechen-Ingush Republic precipitated plans in Moscow that lead to a failed invasion in November, 1991. When major combat operations did begin (1994-1996), Russian forces killed roughly 45,000 Chechens and forced 2 million to flee. The campaign was a failure for Russia. Yeltsin terminated it stop-start fashion with an ambiguous peace that parties on both sides dishonored. In October 1999, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin – Yeltsin's designated successor – reciprocated the frequent incidents of Chechen terrorism with a new war. He leveled Grozny, using bombers armed with fuel-air explosives. On the ground, the *zachistka* ("mop up") operations reminiscent of the 1994-1996 war resumed – a blatant use of disproportionate force.[28] Recent studies count the casualties in the hundreds of thousands.[29] Following the assassinations of several Chechen elites in charge of militias, a shaky status quo has emerged that is less than ideal for

either side.[30] Based on the failures of the 1996-1999 interlude, ongoing elite competition within Chechnya, and the unspecified nature of the presidential succession in Russia – the conflict is still actively evolving.

Russia as a Democracy

Earlier I briefly addressed the problem of using Russia as a democracy in a model of mixed dyad war. Russia was a democratizing state in 1994, when war was declared on Chechnya. Some might classify it as an oligarchy in 1999, when Russia reciprocated acts of war in the form of terrorism and the invasion of Dagestan. Classification of a democracy as a regime holding repeatable elections with uncertain and irreversible outcomes qualifies Russia in both years as a democracy, but other theoretical qualifications for this claim – the most prominent being political openness – are absent.[31] Relying on the highly correlated Voice and Accountability (measuring the openness of the media), Freedom House, and Polity IV indicators, Russia ranks among Malaysia, Morocco, Zambia, Gabon, and Lebanon for democratic qualities.[32] As Fish notes, his classification of Russia as a failed democracy based on greater-than-minimal standards differs from the views of Russian experts Philip Roeder, Daniel Treisman, Michael McFaul, and Valerie Bunce.

It seems at best presumptuous and at worst ethnocentric to conclude that every form of democratic organization proceeds sequentially from the generation of an electorate and the protection of its private property to the qualities of Western and Western-managed democracies such as Canada, France or Japan. A glance at the democratic history of South Africa, China or Italy illustrates the different paths taken by different societies. What a minimalist – or lowest common denominator – definition of democracy does is allow the analyst to better identify the behavior produced within disaggregated components of more normative definitions of democracy. Examining the interaction *between* these components allows the analyst to construct more reliable explanations for behavior and to better assess later developments that modify the behavior.

As I discuss below in qualifying Chechnya as a unit of analysis, this is not a state-centered discussion. The analysis focuses on institutional determinants nested within the adversaries' regimes rather than on structural variables or emergent properties of the international system. Rousseau's study of war origins, for example, employs a model of institutional con-

straints to explain why Faisal's Saudi Arabia maintained the status quo with Nasser's Egypt – a dyad in which one state was a textbook monarchy while the other was experiencing profound changes in the institutions that connected the public to elites.[33] Similarly, Russia from 1994-1999 is ideal as a case study for institutional constraints on elites' decisions, even if during the critical periods, the state was neither a perfectly open democracy nor a non-democracy.

In using Russia, I sideline the liberal normative variables that one might argue for in cases where consolidated polyarchies choose war or peace. Many historians have observed that Yeltsin only held superficial democratic ideals, which he adopted late in life. One potential criticism of this approach is that *illiberal* normative factors may have played a causal role. They very well may have. An academic polemic surrounds the question of whether norms are endogenous to institutions, vice versa, or are exogenous factors. This debate is not directly addressed here. I assume that institutions enveloping agents with diverse norms played a hand in the two conflicts, and I show how the regimes containing those institutions extended the lives of two conflicts.

Chechnya as a State

Another complication with this case study is that Chechnya, an entity within Russia's complex power-sharing network of 89 federal units, is not recognized as a sovereign state. This fact places Chechnya on unequal footing with Russia by excluding potential structural factors of the international system that would otherwise apply. For example, a federal entity deep in the southern tier of Russia's Eurasian heartland enjoys none of the normative, international privileges of sovereigns. Although Chechnya lacks the macrostructures of normal states, first-hand accounts testify that extraordinary individual agency (i.e., leadership) is in high supply.[34] Since the variable of interest is the existence and fracturing of political leadership following the 1994-1996 campaign, this analysis can proceed without having to declare the state-hood of Chechnya.

Throughout waves of the Russian and Soviet empires' "bandit extermination" campaigns in the Caucasus, Chechnya maintained an enviable level of autonomy. Chechnya's leaders certainly took advantage of the bizarre federalism and the instable asymmetry between center and periphery. Having declared support for Germany during its WWII push to the Caspian

Sea, Chechens later suffered the ire of Stalin, but repatriated following his death. In April 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin established the "9 plus 1" scheme for an even more decentralized Soviet Union, granting "virtually unlimited power" to the local republics.[35] Until Putin's federal restructuring, Russia continued to grant a sizeable amount of autonomy to its 89 domestic units. Many of Chechnya's neighbors within the federal nest of Russia were candidates for state-hood. While Russia financially appeased many, it decided to strike out against one unit in particular.[36]

The Chechen Domestic Opposition

While Chechnya from *perestroika* to the present can not be considered a modern state governed by the rule of law, a fluid and personalistic social network allowed for constraint and punishment of elite actions. Chechnya can best be coded as an oligarchy from 1994 to 1999. Dzhokar Dudaev, the declarer of Chechnya's independence from Doku Zavgaev's independent Chechen-Ingush Republic (from 1991), played the lead role in the conflict with Russia from 1994-1996. During the 1994-199 period, Chechen civil society was colored by an oligarchy of elders, extremist warlords such as Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev, an associated mafia economy in Chechen society, and combatants such as Habid Abdul Rahman (before his assassination, a Saudi also known as "Khattab"), who represented a modest influx of Wahabbi fighters after 1994.[37]

While it was led by a number of (as opposed to a single) warlords, there existed all the hallmarks of normal political competition, minus the rule of constitutional law. Prior to 1996, there existed organized political opposition to pure warlordism.[38] This opposition was at first represented by Moscow-controlled Doku Zavgaev, the former first secretary of the Communist Party in the earlier Chechen-Ingush Republic. Other opposition elites include Beslan Gantemirov, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Ruslan Labazanov, Yaragi Mamodaev, Zemlikhan Iandarbiev (to reappear later), and a group of 150 Chechens who launched a coup against Dudaev in the spring of 1992. Deposed by Moscow in 1991, Zavgaev himself later returned to lead the Chechen Government of Renewal to seek peace terms with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in August 1995 and participated in an election that Dudaev protested on the grounds of its illegality. In the end, Zavgaev was prohibited from office in Chechnya by at least two sources: violent competition from Dudaev and domestic outrage over the opening of mass

graves; and revelation of torture and Russian war atrocities.[39] Zavgaev's and Dudaev's disappearance marked the beginning of a different phase of oppositional figures – a period of competing warlords who would escalate the war to include acts of terror against civilians, punctuated by the heavy-handed responses of the Russian military.

Dudaev was assassinated in the spring of 1996 near the end of the first war. His office was filled by Iandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov, both charismatic personalities who opposed one another as acting president and general, respectively. Maskhadov's subsequent election to the presidency did not change the fact that other factions considered the war incomplete. A cast of characters including Iandarbiev, Basaev, Raduev, former Zavgaev-era official Movladi Udugov, and tycoon Boris Berezovskii colluded separately and together in various instances to undermine the Maskhadov-dominant regime.[40] Tied to this development is Yeltsin's inability to manage the first war's deceleration or termination due (in part, at least) to his fears about political punishment at the ballot box in the presidential elections of 1996. The Kremlin's knowledge that no single Chechen elite could tether the more radical elements in Chechnya made Russia focus its attention on war as a solution once again in 1999.

What were the general domestic and international factors that streamlined the decisions in Moscow and what were the dyadic effects that made war more probable? Russia's signaling efforts, democratic arrangement, and the two international contexts of 1994 and 1999 are discussed in the following sections.

Signals in the Soviet Twilight

The first signals that Moscow sent to Dudaev's government and to the Chechen public in late 1991 confirmed any suspicions of weakness. At the time of Dudaev's declaration of independence from the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the struggle over the destiny of the USSR – encapsulated in the struggle for power over Russia between Gorbachev and Yeltsin – was at hand. A weak show of military resolve followed Moscow's "cheap talk" in the form of a declaration of emergency rule.[41] While tens of thousands of Chechens marched to Grozny's center to demonstrate their support for independence, Yeltsin sent a small group of paratroopers into Chechnya on November 11. When Gorbachev rescinded Yeltsin's orders, the Russian military abandoned the troops. Humiliated, they left Grozny on a bus.[42]

Lacking the legitimacy to take action against Chechnya, all Yeltsin could do at this stage of the Soviet Union's collapse was issue unsupported threats. While Moscow sent conflicting signals, Dudaev acted on those that would best serve the interests of Chechen independence. It was only on December 25, when Yeltsin succeeded Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union in its final week of existence that Moscow could *begin* to develop of clear and resolved policy toward Chechnya. In the meantime, Yeltsin had chosen a cheap and convenient solution to a certain problem, mobilizing too little material resource and betting that he would escape the political costs of his action in the face of an ongoing competition for political legitimacy. In this sense, the demise of the Soviet Union opened a window for action that had been closed to Gorbachev. Unlike one popular explanation for war in democratizing societies, claims of nationalism did little or no work in moving Russia to war.[43]

Did Yeltsin later decide that any attempts to signal resolve to Dudaev would be ineffective? With the post-*perestroika* reduction in Russian defense spending in the background, my assessment is that Yeltsin either did not attempt to bluff resolve by signaling (believing that signals of resolve would be useless), or did so by the weaker method of "tying his hands" to the Russian democracy's evaluation of his performance.[44] In the run-up to war, Yeltsin chose to link his political fortune to appearance of future audience costs (from parliament or the public) and issue threats backed by the still sizable asymmetry between Russian and Chechen military resources. In effect, he miscalculated his bluffing, acting on his, and his advisors' perceptions that Chechnya would back down from any potential conflict with the might of the Soviet, martial relic. The alternative would have been to sink a considerable portion of his budget into training the Russian military in urban warfare operations and mobilizing additional forces at the southern tier. At the time, lack of ideological purpose plagued the military, and great disparities in wealth between officers and low-ranking soldiers resulted in the poor quality of the armed units. These signs would have been far more visible to Chechens buying Soviet arms from impoverished soldiers and officers than to Yeltsin's circle of civilian and military advisors in Moscow.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, among others, assured Yeltsin that the forces they were committing were necessary to seize Grozny. Yeltsin frequently acted on information of this sort. After the 1993 con-

stitutional crisis, he drew close and manipulated the number of hawkish officials upon whom he relied.[45] Yeltsin depended on them, and they ended up depending on him for their survival. While this is not unusual in any presidential system, the particularities of the Russian presidential system (discussed below) allowed the executive to act unconstrained by an elite audience. The public opinion of the moment would only have reinforced their private information about Grozny. Russian audience costs operated at a level below that of Western democracies.

Dudaev wavered between inviting an invasion from Russia and claiming that Yeltsin's refusal to meet face to face with him was responsible for the one of many peaceful resolutions that they might have accorded.[46] Chechnya had been terrorized by recurring campaigns of extermination from the beginning of the 19th century through the twentieth. It is possible that Dudaev's perception of the botched 1991 invasion led him to conclude that Russia would not muster the military capabilities to seize Grozny. Had he interpreted Yeltsin's signal of resolve in this fashion – he would have been correct, according to our ex post knowledge of events.

On the Russian side, there was a sensation of being capable of issuing threats and executing policies without the consequences of payment for bluffing about, or failure in those policies. Assuming that Chechen elites were knowledgeable of the power of Russia's president in comparison to its parliament, the arrangement would have made bluffs indistinguishable from threats with true intention like those of 1994's violent intervention. It was as if the weak show in 1991 tuned Chechnya's ears to one frequency, and any further signals from Moscow were drowned out by the noise of its own static. Furthermore, Chechen elites were ostensibly acting with incentives to not back down from a dispute whose first battle they had emerged from as the default victor. Combined, these factors made war more probable, and they are the prelude to the re-initiation of war after both parties had tried once (1996) to negotiate a new status quo.

Streamlining the Decision for War

Two symptomatic trends of institutional streamlining appear on the democratic side of the Russian-Chechen dyad. By "streamlining," I mean the absence of effective vetoes against the use of political power that prevent nascent policies from proceeding unaltered in democracies.

First is the ambiguous corporatism of the post-USSR Russian military

and Yeltsin's caprice in rearranging the rank and persons associated with its agencies. Whether Yeltsin perceived that the military did not need significant attention because as a whole it did not oppose the new democratic regime in Russia, or whether he harbored the more sinister intent of keeping a divided institution weak and malleable, Yeltsin failed to strengthen the military or create checks and balances between its agencies. He also actively encouraged competition (and neglected to encourage cooperation) between the Interior Ministry, Federal Border Service, Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information, the FSB intelligence structure, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Emergency Services, and Rail.

The effect of such competition was that the military was fractured – groups clashed under unorganized competition where they might have cooperated. Opportunities abounded for obsequious officials and disappeared for critical ones. Even though he had formerly sought a diplomatic solution to the separatist problem in Chechnya in 1992, Yeltsin's defense minister, Pavel Grachev convinced the president two years later that war would be a short one.[47] Kremlin insiders Sergei Shakhrai and Nikolai Egorov (Ministers of Nationalities), Andrei Kozyrev (Foreign Minister), Viktor Chernomyrdin (Prime Minister) and political opponents of the Yeltsin regime such as Ruslan Khasbulatov (Speaker of Parliament in 1994) all supported war and believed that victory would be quick.[48] The lack of clarity in the position of Russian generals vis-à-vis the state turned into unification of opinion under President Vladimir Putin – probably because many dissenting opinions had been eliminated.[49] Whereas the military was not unified enough to oppose the outlandish invasion in 1994, it had become too much an instrument of the state by 1999.

Second, Russia's elites progressively reinforced a theme of private goods re-distribution rather than the distribution of public goods that it promised as a democratizing state. As parliamentary dissatisfaction with Yeltsin's cadre forced its numbers to dwindle in 1992-1993, the opportunity and necessity for self-reinforcing action increased.[50] The 1993 deadlock with Parliament over Yeltsin's constitution and his orders to storm the parliament building are symptoms of unconstrained decisions. The second institutional trend in Russia's democracy from 1993 to 1999 saw the birth and then repeated restructuring of democratic institutions at the hands of political elites. Both trends, the products of numerous interacting variables, help explain the recurrence of war.

Fish attributes pathological super presidentialism in part to the 1993 Constitution written by President Yeltsin.[51] Extraordinary presidential powers were the product of a process, however. The impotence of Russia's initial parliamentary opposition in the Congress of People's Deputies was increased by: (1) the results of the April 1993 referendum, (2) Yeltsin's negotiated creation of the Council of the Federation, granting regional elites powers in an attempt to neutralize the effect of the hostile legislation of the Supreme Soviet; (3) Yeltsin's famous Decree 1400, which supported the opinion of the April referendum, dissolved the legislature, and called for new elections; (4) the violent resolution of the October deadlock in parliament; and (5) the polarization of the new legislature into the pro-Yeltsin Russia's Choice party versus the extreme right wing Liberal-Democratic Party headed by Vladimir Zhirinovksy and the allied Russian Communist Party and Agrarian Union. The structure of the bi-cameral legislature became such that it limited the ability of opposition parties to affect presidential decision-making. The Council of the Federation, under control of the president, acted as a check on the State Duma – the lower house, of which only half the seats were chosen by local constituencies.

In contrast to democracy optimists among Russian area specialists, Fish concludes that democracy *failed* in Russia for three reasons, one of which is directly evident in the streamlining of Yeltsin's and Putin's choices in favor of war. A poorly articulated semi presidential arrangement in the 1993 constitution, he argues, rendered Russian institutional arrangement unarmed against the increasing strength of unchecked executive power.[52] In addition to the inability of parliament to reject nominees for the Russian prime ministry, Fish identifies the following five features as weaknesses of super presidentialism: (1) the perception of an unproven democracy's illegitimacy when decisions are linked to one man alone; (2) the aborted development of oppositional parties due to the flimsiness of parliament; (3) the lack of opportunity for masterful politicians to challenge incumbents; (4) the de-institutionalizing prerogative that an over-powerful leader discovers he must adopt; and (5) the president's control over public expenditure.[53] All five features increase the potential for unconstrained arbitrary action by decreasing the number of "veto actors," and make Russia a curious case of democracy at the least.

Although they were unconstrained by democratic institutions, the secretive decisions of the Russian Security Council and President Yeltsin

to invade Grozny on November 28-30, 1994 seem more characteristic of a democracy planning for a quick victory against a weaker foe.[54] The military actions were far from covert, however. Rather than fearing public outrage, it is more plausible that Yeltsin and the more hawkish advisors feared only negative responses from high-ranking officers in the military and opposition politicians. The memoir of Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Sergei Yushenkov, is an example of these latent and circumvented sentiments.[55]

An intriguing explanation of the selectorate theory would focus on Yeltsin's expansion of his winning coalition (in the decentralization involved in creating the Council of the Federation) in an attempt to balance the impending punishment from Russia's legislature, which was hostile to Yeltsin's and Gaidar's economic program. The regional leaders Yeltsin chose to enfranchise were the sort who could improve his chances of political survival, but they were *not* the sort who could negatively affect the presidential powers laid out in the reconstructed 1993 constitution. Having sought and reached a new power equilibrium, Yeltsin was able to take the risk in dissolving parliament, calling new elections, and risking the outcome. The mixed outcome was surprising, but turned out to be of little importance. Extremists in the new Federal Assembly could be counted on by the public to legislate for order, but they remained conspicuous targets of misrepresentation and were in a poorer position to maneuver in opposition to the executive in the wake of the October-November revisions to the 1993 constitution.

The Duma's lack of power vis-à-vis the president ought to have significantly reduced the probability of future punishment by the time Yeltsin called his cabinet to the war table in 1994. Despite the perceptions of Yeltsin's core, did the political victories of the executive in 1991-1994 reduce the probability of punishment? Not exactly. The threat of punishment arrived later, and it increased the probability of another war in Chechnya. In this sense, "inexperience with democracy" takes on a new meaning: Yeltsin and the elites who depended on him took too many risks, being unaccustomed to the constraints built into any democratic organization, no matter how minimal. Yeltsin seems to have made a critical error in 1994: he believed that "the golden age" of his power would outlast the termination of the war in Chechnya. The president's need for personal security required that he configure a transition of presidential power to a figure

loyal to him. He found escape from failure in an entrepreneurial insider of the KGB security world who also incidentally supported the fighting in Chechnya. If Yeltsin's administration was inexperienced with democratic politics, Putin's administration appears to have updated its strategy using the materials at its disposal – namely, the relative power of the president versus the legislature.

Inescapable Punishment

A re-distribution of private goods to political elites following opposition victories in the 1995 parliamentary elections characterizes Yeltsin's 1996 victory. By December 1995, 3.2 percent of the public favored the war in Chechnya and 51.1 percent supported a "cut and run" strategy.[56] During the 1995 parliamentary elections, Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of Russia led the largest voting bloc in the State Duma. In doing so, Ziuganov beat out other, better financially equipped leaders – an indication of the effect of the Russian public's discontent with Yeltsin. The President's actions demonstrate his fear of reflective punishment from domestic and international (Western) sources. By many measures, he had learned that he was, in fact, accountable to his coalition of supporters, and more loosely – to the Russian public.

Neil Robinson concurs in retrospect that "Yeltsin's use of his formal powers after 1993 was slighter…than [his] appellations suggest… he did not use his powers to govern with great purpose except to get himself re-elected and to maintain himself in office." It appears that Russia's super presidentialism garnered the worst of both democratic and autocratic regimes.[57] It restricted Yeltsin from acting absolutely to quell the Chechen insurgency, but failed to prevent him from engaging Russia a poorly chosen war. In theory, Russia's experience recalls the ubiquitous "Nike swoosh" of regime competency reproduced in Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' study.[58]

Just one of a series of humiliations the Russian military experienced in the 1994-1996 campaign was a massive street battle on New Year's Eve 1995 in Grozny, where Chechen forces slaughtered hundreds of Russian soldiers. What can account for the seemingly senseless blunders of the Russian armed forces? High-ranking Russian officers criticized the decisions to commit inferior infantry to Chechnya while reserving the elites for the elites – using the Kantemirov and Dzherzhinskii divisions and units from Tula and Pskov as political tools. This behavior parallels Argentina's

seemingly bizarre decision to preserve elite units trained for arctic warfare – a strategy that contributed to failure in the Falklands War. The Soviet Union had prepared the Russian military for war in Eastern Europe and trained it for logistical battles with a technologically capable foe. While Afghanistan was an experience that does much to explain the opposition to war in Chechnya from some quarters of the military, which experience strangely was not sufficient to prompt a cycle of learning in the military. One possible explanation is that this process was distorted in the *perestroika* transition and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Another potential factor might be the disconnect between the Soviet officer class and the infantry fighting in Afghanistan.

When the losses of the Chechen campaign became painfully clear, public opinion toward Yeltsin – initially supportive of his presidency and of the war – plummeted. In his 1993 referendum over the president's legitimacy vis-à-vis the parliament, Yeltsin was given preferential treatment by the roughly one quarter of the Russian constituency who voted. In contrast, he received a 10 percent rate of approval in polls on the eve of the 1996 election.[59] To secure victory for the second half of the 1990s, he initiated a massive show of financial generosity toward disgruntled civic structures and federal elites in the months before the election. He spent an estimated $11 billion, draining a $10.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund intended to assist economic restructuring. Next to his complacency in 1992-1994, such actions indicate learning and last minute fears of a delayed punishment at the ballot box for the unprofitable war.

In the run-up to the 1996 presidential elections, General Aleksandr Lebed threatened to draw votes from Yeltsin in tacit support of Ziuganov's platform. Yeltsin's imperative for reelection in 1996 was to convincingly end the war in Chechnya. He did so by unilaterally declaring victory after negotiating with Iandarbiev.[60] Following a narrow first round victory, the president then co-opted Lebed prior to the run-off elections. After victory, Yeltsin resumed the war. An outspoken critic of the Kremlin and an advocate of non-democratic solutions to Russia's governance problems, Lebed brokered the 1996 peace despite opposition from Kremlin elites. [61]

Yeltsin's efforts to procure a valid election for himself indicate a large winning coalition system with the shift to distribute public goods, as characterized by Bueno de Mesquito and colleagues. However, this limited analysis indicates that Yeltsin perceived private re-distribution as

more useful. Yeltsin's regime evidently believed it had selected Chechnya as an easy conflict, but it did not "try harder" than the Chechens in 1994-1996, as the selectorate theory predicts it should have.[62] The explanation may be that Chechnya was a colonial war in the theory's rubric. A better assessment maintains that Yeltsin's executive cabinet simply misjudged the difficulty of the Chechen campaign in bypassing formal and informal checks and balances applicable to democratic decisions of war. The explanation for this delusion has been covered, and its symptoms are exhibited in the government's need to form blocs to balance conservative elites in parliamentary and presidential elections, or in the personal ambitions and entrepreneurial spirit of elites in Yeltsin's government. Whatever democratic institutions were present failed to prevent a war that cost an inordinate loss of blood and property.

Despite their presence, public opinion constraints at the time were not the kind that prevented war. Public opinion about leaders and elite opposition exists in any type of political regime. One might believe that democratic institutions ought to permit the transitivity of these preferences. In reality, the super presidential system insulated the decision process at the executive level. Even in the gold standard "polyarchies," Arrow's famous statement of the Condorcet paradox has been applied to the operation of foreign policy choices independent of public preferences.[63] Public opinion can be added to the trash heap of potential democratic variables that might have prevented Russia from going to war again with Chechnya. It did not, and theoretically, it could not have prevented the decisions made by Yeltsin's successor.

In decision, Yeltsin's government failed to consider the possibility of increasing audience costs that could be unleashed in referenda, parliamentary elections, or presidential elections. Having removed Zavgaev from office in Chechnya, Yeltsin led Russia into a war to remove Zavgaev's more radical replacement. Threats to the president's political survival led the government to conclude a peace that was broken and tenuous. Yeltsin's successor would make the similar decisions five years later, provoked by Shamil Basaev's 1996 invasion of Dagestan, terrorism in Moscow and Chechnya, and the intractability of the political solutions attempted in the intervening years of 1997-1999. In sum, nascent and evolving democratic institutions streamlined the decision to pursue a costly war, led to an unsatisfactory draw and helped produce a status quo that was different – but

no better – than the initial one. Failure of the equilibrium became apparent in 1999.

International Constraints in 1999

International constraints failed in both 1994 and 1999, but for different reasons. American and European timidity to damage and willingness to preserve the legitimacy of the nascent Russian democracy led Western leaders to uphold Russia's claims to territorial integrity. The Clinton administration in the U.S. financially supported Russia in 1994 and 1996 with IMF loans; Western multinational corporations continued to invest in Russian natural resources; and states ignored Chechnya's potential status as a party to a conflict in need of negotiation. [64]

In 1999, Russia's economy was in shape to finance war, but European and American criticism over human rights issues in the war, the destruction of urban areas, the displacement of millions of refugees, and a serious falling out with the West over NATO's spring 1999 campaign in Kosovo left Russia internationally alienated. Putin overrode the negative international constraints by linking the Chechen dispute with the terrorism of militia leaders Basaev and Raduev, and by criticizing the European treatment of Northern Ireland, the Basque province, Corsican separatists, and the NATO campaign in the former Yugoslavia.[65] NATO had bypassed a resolution in the UN Security Council to strike at the Milosevic's forces because the other members predicted that Russia might use its veto.

The alliance then adopted a new "Strategic Vision," which was seen as a slight to the mutual "romance" of the early 1990s. Yeltsin's government – with Vladimir Putin as acting president in the spring of 1999 – reconfigured its own set of preferences in response to this ostensibly humanitarian, Western move.[66] NATO's actions in particular reinforced Russia's self-styled legitimacy, and permitted Russia to conceive a second Chechen war.

Putin's Choice

Satisfactory resolution of the Chechnya problem was the greatest requirement for the survival of Yeltsin's successor. Power struggles had marked the end of the first conflict – a process that restricted Russia's ability to effectively bargain down the end of the war. Lebed brokered a peace deal and granted autonomy for Chechnya, but was removed from office by

presidential competitors soon thereafter. The nature of the coming transition was centered on the maneuvering of individuals, not the procedures of aggregated institutions, and the transition from Yeltsin to Putin was one of a larger winning coalition to a smaller one. Putin had, by the time of his inauguration, cultivated personal contacts in Moscow's city hall, among members of the ex-KGB elites, and among Yeltsin's political allies.[67] Public opinion was fanatical over the prospect of retribution for high profile Chechen terrorism in 1999. It soared when Putin's hard-line policy was revealed. The new president spit insults, vowing to slaughter Chechens "in the outhouse" and personally piloted a Su-27 fighter over Grozny.[68] Even if public opinion had little or no direct effect on the probability of war in Chechnya, it strengthened Putin against his domestic competition and was entered into his government's calculus of the consequences of renewed fighting.

Whereas Yeltsin found it necessary to decentralize, to sack cabinets, parliaments, ministers, aides, and to restructure ministries, agencies, and the military, Putin systematically centralized power. Electing a small circle of trusted peers – the *siloviki*, many of them former FSB intelligence agents – Putin enhanced the effects of super presidentialism. He nevertheless imitated Yeltsin's reduction of parliamentary power in holding veto over executive policies. The result was a loss of Duma seats formerly held by the Communist-Agrarian opposition, to cite just one example. At the same time, a centrist coalition between Putin's Unity Party and the Primakov-Luzhkov Party gelled in 2001, untying the president's hands.[69]

By re-centralizing the autonomy that Yeltsin had used to his advantage against Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet in the early 1990s, Putin reduced the number of elites he was accountable to and increased the predictability of their decisions. The new regional elites were authorities cut from the same cloth as the *siloviki*, and frequently replaced officials in violation of the constitution.[70] In this case, a public campaign to increase the rule of law (Evangelista, 124-138) paradoxically correlated with a scheme to distribute private goods to elites. Finally, Putin neutered the informational and oppositional role of liberal democratic freedoms of speech and association in a series of attacks on the press and opposition groups in civil society – many of which served the platforms of wealthy, politically active Russians.

Matthew Evangelista argues that plans for re-initiation originated not in the designs of the defeated Russian military, but rather from within Ser-

gei Stepashin's Interior Ministry. Hy hypothesizes that the kidnapping of General Genadii Shipgun in Chechnya prompted this shift in policy preferences.[71] Of course, the invasion of Dagestan and Chechen militia leaders' bombings in Moscow and elsewhere contributed to this decision, as well. The executive's final decision to disband the 1997-1999 equilibrium and to revive the war was unconstrained by elites nested in legislative institutions, international sources, and oppositional elites in the private sector. The evidence indicates that all potential domestic sources of opposition were streamlined in the run-up to the renewal of major combat operations. If we consider the size of the winning coalition reduced by Putin's actions, these adjustments *contradict* the selectorate theory's predictions that a reduction in the winning coalition should correlate with a state's low effort in war.[72] If anything, Putin's government tried harder than Yeltsin's in the second Chechen campaign.

Violent Signaling

If signaling failed to produce peace in the first campaign, it also functioned poorly in the second campaign. Early in his tenure in Moscow Putin renovated the military).[73] His honest use of language and show of force in 1999 might have been confused with the abundant "cheap talk" of Yeltsin, but it is unclear whether Putin ever intended to bluff. His talk, as it turned out, was not cheap. The president placed his career on the line for Chechnya.[74] Upon entering office in 2000, he struck without pause against Grozny's fractured leadership.

The explanation proposed here is that during the period of shifting equilibria in 1997-1999, Moscow had lost a significant amount of credibility in the eyes of the replacement elites in Chechnya. Yeltsin's preoccupation with staying ahead of his opposition after 1996 necessitated compromises in his Chechen policy. Grozny interpreted this as a harbinger of Chechen victory. In the logic of mixed dyad war – it became victory, though short-lived. Rather than attempt to signal to Chechnya *prior* to war, Putin chose to do so in the first few months with a massive campaign. Putin's sprint back to Grozny in 1999 both re-established his bargaining credit in the near abroad and increased his domestic tenure.

Putin also benefited from the low initial probability of audience costs imposed by oppositional or aligned elites, though he took steps to decrease that probability even as he invaded Grozny. The costs sunk in mobilized

resources and tied hands in the second Chechen war sent a message to members and former members of the Commonwealth of Independent States such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Moscow was willing to intervene with force in its near abroad, but with greater efficiency than the Yeltsin period.

Putin's much maligned crackdown on the Russian independent media also figures in our explanation. Ironically, the manipulation of press freedom during Putin's tenure would have increased signals of resolve such that the informational model of signaling might predict a lower probability of war.[75] Repression of civil opposition structures only could have strengthened signals of resolve toward the Chechen leadership, though they would have reduced the effect of information opposition to the war. However, in light of Putin's crackdown, it is unclear whether Chechens interpreted these policies as all bluff, or as sincerity. Since the reduction of press freedoms came at the same time as the bombs fell on Grozny rather than before, Chechens probably concluded the latter. Chechens had learned from the first campaign that Russia could not sustain heavy losses in a prolonged war. It is likely that elites in Grozny reasoned that to repel Moscow again, it would be necessary to call Moscow's bluff, endure the bombings and invasions, and hold out for the payoff of an extended war. What resulted was the suboptimal combination of (1) Putin's incentives to re-establish credit lost during Yeltsin's term and (2) Grozny's incentives to resist an easy capitulation given that elites were *informed* of Putin's "strike hard and fast" strategy.

The explanation that the second war was a "war of revenge" informs the reader more about the persuasions employed by Chechen elites in order to rally support for and prolong their tenure in political-military power. Without a doubt, the fact that ethnic Chechens had seen the business end of the Russian stick repeatedly strike at them for over 200 years made this a convincing argument for any elite who wished to gain standing. Moscow's decision to violently re-negotiate a new status quo gave young Chechen warlords a chance to rise in opposition to moderates and veterans of the first war who were likely to be more cooperative with Moscow.

III. Turkey and Greece in Mixed-Dyad War

Both Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman and Rousseau both cite the series of disputes between Turkey and Greece over the status of Cyprus,

jointly populated by Greek and Turkish citizens. This brief analysis draws heavily from their summaries. [76]

Similar to Chechnya, the island of Cyprus is a former colonial possession. In 1576, Turkey claimed it. In 1878, Benjamin Disraeli's Britain began its mandate, and during WWI annexed the island. From 1931 to 1959, the demands of ethnic Greek residents for *enosis* (unity with Greece) were manifested when former colonel George Grivas and his Greek National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) attacked Turkish forces and communities on the island. Tensions erupted into violence during the years 1954, 1959, 1963, 1964 and 1967.

A perpetual point of contention was the unilateral veto that the Turkish Cypriot co-president held over the Greek Cypriot co-president. This was, however, only a proximal cause of disagreements over the adversaries' demands. Prior to the 1974 war, Greece had demanded a unitary rule by the Greek Cypriot majority, and Turkey had demanded partition of the island along national lines. A junta of junior military officers took control of Greece following a coup in 1967, distanced themselves from the Soviet Union and the Europe simultaneously, and triggered a crisis on Cyprus that came frighteningly close to an inter-state war. Although 1967 was negotiated to a new status quo, the National Guard retained a presence that would provide a base for the 1974 coup against Makarios.

In both non-democracies, elite competition exhibits a number of parallels. The effects of extremists rivaling moderates brought the dyads to violence. However, Turkey and Greece bargained the 1967 crisis back to the status quo before major combat operations began[77], in contrast to outcome of the 1994 decision on Chechnya. In 1974 when Turkey declared war on the newly-installed Greek Cypriot government, the war lasted five days – from July 18-22. This rapid victory starkly contrasts with the ongoing "dirty war" in Chechnya following the start of major combat operations in 1999. Neither issue has been satisfactorily settled. Turkey's belated recognition of the Greek Cypriot government was a major factor in the European Union's consent to open talks about Turkey becoming a member state. In Chechnya, both assassinations of Chechen elites, and attacks on civilians attributed to Chechen militias continue.

Variable	Russia 1994 Greece 1967	Russia 1999 Greece 1974
Dyad Type	✓	✓
Territory/Contested Remands	✓	✓
History of Violent Disputes	✓	✓
Ethnically and Religiously Mixed	✓	✓
Failure of Constitutional Options in Disputed Territory	✓	✓
Asymmetry in Raw Measures of Military Strength (Including Terrain and Tactics)	✓	✓
Nature of the Non-Democratic Leader: Personalistic and/or Militaristic	✓	✓
Democratic Public Opinion Generally Supportive of War	✓ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✓
Non-Democratic Public Opinion Generally Supportive of War	✗ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✓
Non-Democracy Initiates Threat of Violence	✗ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✓
Successful Signals of Resolve	✓ [Cyp] ✗ [Che]	✗
State-Based International Constraints Effective	✓ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✗
International Legal Constraints Permit War	✗ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✗
Democracy Attempted Third Party Resolution of Dispute	✓ [Cyp] ✗ [Che]	✗
Dispute Ends in New Status Quo and Great Fire	✓	✓ [Cyp] ✗ [Che]
Economic Trump Moderates in Non-Democracy	✗ [Cyp] ✓ [Che]	✓
Moderates Trump Economics in Democracy	✓	✓
Democratic Decision For War by Full Debate	✗	✗
Democracy Vote Overwhelming First	✗	✓
Democratic Victory	N/A ✗ [Che]	✓ [Cyp] ✗ [Che]

The Purpose of the Comparison

The malfunction of enduring peace is a characteristic of this small sample of mixed dyads in which hundreds of thousands of lives were lost to war. The argument presented in this analysis is that the use of force against Chechnya in 1994 primed the Russia-Chechnya dyad for another war, but also that the decision to not use force in Cyprus in 1967 did *not* move the dyad toward a more stable status quo. This argument depends on linking the pattern of decisions on the Russian (or Turkish) side to the pattern of decisions on the Chechen (or Greek) side.

First, although two cases alone do not constitute a basis for inference about the processes of war re-initiation in the greater population of mixed dyads, the theories from which this argument draws its intuition are drawn from a much larger and more diverse sample of reality. While the explanation argued for here is backed by existing theories of rational actor behavior, this analysis only illuminates the correspondence between an (albeit reductionist) theory and the actual events it proposes to explain.

Opportunities for further research include large N comparisons of mixed-dyad disputes for the purpose of discerning the probability of war based on the number of previous disputes and the way in which the parties resolved them. While this analysis identifies processes leading to mixed dyad war re-initiation, it basically ignores the risk of selection bias, as it analyzes two cases of the dependant variable without including any cases where war was avoided in a mixed dyad undergoing a series of disputes. Therefore, this argument says little about the rate of appearance of this facet in international relations, while saying much about the process when it matters the most – when states choose war.

Elite Succession and Learning in Chechnya and Cyprus

After Moscow assassinated Dudaev, power struggles ensued between Maskhadov, Iandarviev, and a number of less influential warlords like Basaev and Raduev. Contrary to analyses that conclude Dudaev's assassination led to a better chance of peace (Lievan 1998), my explanation would suggest that such a move *increased* the probability of a future war by removing a constraint on the younger, more radical political actors in Chechen society. In Cyprus, the more moderate Archbishop Makarios III, who had mollified some of the violence associated with the EOKA movement, clashed

with Greek extremists Grivas, Sampson, and other members of the revived EOKA-B. While the 1967 crises did not end in war, Makarios was eventually ousted by hard-line oppositional forces demanding *enosis*.[78]

Turkey's lack of support for Makarios' government increased the probability of a recurrence of war by the same mechanism at play in the Chechen case. A counterfactual analysis would certainly reveal ways in which the Turkish Cypriot presidency could have been modified to placate a large number of the immediate demands made by the Greek Cypriot constituency of the island, just as Evangelista is convinced that if Yeltsin had personally met with Dudaev, the probability of a peaceful compromise would have been enormous.[79] Meanwhile, the mainland Greek military regime in Athens struggled to strengthen the radical EOKA leadership and National Guard in Cyprus following its loss of credibility during the 1967 crisis. Again, in the outcome of both cases, the extremist faction gained the upper hand and captured control of the state just prior to the *recurrence* of war.

At the same time – just prior to war recurrence – the democracy's military had undergone reforms, and its leadership was experiencing a period of unified decision-making.[80] In Russia, Yeltsin's resignation and Putin's reforms produced a window of action. In Turkey, a coalition with Bulent Ecevit as prime minister produced the window of action, which it continued to exploit even after the UN Security Council declared a cease-fire. In the language of our analysis, each state's leader relied on a smaller number of politicians, which also meant that there were fewer enfranchised politicians to oppose bellicose policy. Accordingly, choosing to fight would be less difficult than it had previously been.

Both democracies had learned from prior wars that a massive show of force was necessary at the onset of any war with the particular adversary. The elites comprising Putin's government had done so in observing Yeltsin's flagging campaign. Those in Ecevit's government had done so during Turkey's experiences with EOKA guerilla activities and the unpredictable Greek military junta that had prompted the 1967 crisis.

In both cases, political competition in the non-democracy resulted in the shift from peaceful[81] bargaining or status quo to violent bargaining. The democratic adversary contributed to a shift in the non-democratic domestic politics in specific ways. Fighting a major war and terminating it in stop-start fashion was Russia's method. Establishing a status quo that was vehemently opposed by most of the domestic opposition within Cyprus

was Turkey's method. What both methods hold in common is that they completely avoided addressing the initial demands of *both sides*. Resolution of the question was simply postponed.

The Logic of Leaders' Actions

The leadership of both Chechnya and those making decisions for Greek Cypriots: (1) determined that they would be able to fight their democratic opponents with some perceived advantage; and (2) realized that they could do so without losing the critical support of elites enmeshed in their networks of political power, even with heavy military and population losses. Likewise, both Putin's and Ecevit's governments: (1) assessed the threats to Russians and Turkish-Cypriots posed from these new leaderships as great enough to warrant a renewed resort to arms; (2) predicted the ability to win a quick war and maintain political power. This pattern demands an explanation.

The logic of action on all four sides fits neatly with the predictions of Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' (2002, 2003) theory of the dynamics of elite behavior. Analyzing the size of the winning coalition (W) on either side of the disputes sheds light on the logic of puzzling decisions and the determinants of these wars. While the precise size of W need not be specified, approximate sizes and the direction of changes in W shed light on the decision constraints faced by a leader. [82]

On the autocratic side, W decreased from 1967 to 1974 and 1994 to 1999. Greece's military dictatorship in 1974 had consolidated its grip over oppositional voices by 1974, whereas Chechnya was more divided by opposition factions in 1999 than it was in 1994. The opposition factions in Chechnya that held the most legitimacy and had the most firepower were bound to be much smaller than Dudaev's group in 1994, and bound to be accountable to other warlords in position to replace or assassinate them. Interestingly, both Chechnya and Greece became more willing to engage in a risky and costly war the second time around – fighting battles against a recent superpower in the first case, and a powerful NATO ally in the second case. Both actions are the result of less accountability to the public, and more responsibility to a small coalition of powerful warlords.

The dynamics of the make-up of the democratic W also make an interesting subject of study. While Gorbachev, the last Secretary of the USSR was initially unwilling to fight in Chechnya, the first elected president of

Russia was willing to do so. The vast difference in W between the two leaders resulted in their different forecasts of the way the war would turn out.

The entrepreneurial Yeltsin relied on far fewer political agents with true oppositional power for his legitimacy than did Gorbachev, master of a crumbling empire. Numerous sources indicate that: (1) Russia under Yeltsin showed a lack of significant effort against the Chechens; and (2) winning the 1996 election and pulling out of Chechnya in the same year required of the president one thing above all – a re-distribution of private goods in the form of public offices for key figures, one of whom was Putin. The second president's war effort in Chechnya was far greater than Yeltsin's, based on the qualitative evidence alone. While Russia's 1999-2000 assault did not yield a clear-cut victory, it dealt a blow that Chechen leadership has not recovered from. Remarkably, the game between Russia and Chechnya is still unresolved.

One explanation in two parts accounts for the Russian experience in the second Chechen War. First, Putin was accountable to a coalition in 1999 that had initially increased in size since Yeltsin's secret choice for war in 1994. This resulted in a war only when the perceived probability of victory was higher, and a war in which Putin summoned overwhelming force in order to defeat Chechnya at the outset. The second part in our explanation of the second Chechen war relies on a reduction in W as media agencies came under state influence, Russian federal entities and Moscow elites became a smaller but more loyal group as time passed, and Russia became less accountable to international sponsors after NATO's 1999 Kosovo campaign. This observation is of a pattern of expansion, reduction, expansion, reduction in the size of the Russian W from 1991 to approximately 2001, corresponding with a steady reduction in the size of the Chechen W after the initial spike in its size related to declaration of independence from the short-lived Chechen-Ingush Republic.

International Normative Constraints

It is insightful to note here that neither international legal agreements nor customary conventions prevented large-scale war in 1974 and 1999, but that the probability of preventing war in 1974 was higher than in 1999. One might base this counter-factual prediction on the fact that a cease-fire had been accepted as the most useful option for the adversaries in 1967, and that international factors were at least prominent, if not instrumental

in negating options for war. I argue to undermine this proposition below, in maintaining that the probability of war increased after the 1967 crisis, even though it had been peacefully resolved. After all, a major point in the argument has been that the democratic interaction with non-democratic regimes in multiple disputes ends in failure at some unspecified probability.

Because Chechnya technically was and is a federal entity, the use of monopolistic violence on the part of the Russian state was and is legal, as some analysts have argued.[83] If one counts Chechnya as a de facto sovereign, Russia's decision to use measured force was reciprocation for acts of war (Basaev's and Raduev's attacks on Russian civilians) and a justified act of self-defense.[84] In the Turkish case, the Greek mainland coup that displaced Cyprus' Makarios violated the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements, the 1960 Cypriot Constitution and the 1967 Vance Accord.[85]

Whereas Putin embraced invasion (without heeding the objections of international peers), Ecevit consulted Britain in hope of peaceful negotiations with the Greek junta. Did international institutions play a hand in this willingness on Ecevit's part? The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) bound Turkey, Greece and European third parties in 1974. Problems of security were linked to a greater binary in international relations – the threat of proxy wars between the United States and the USSR. Britain, Europe, and the United States lent their ears to Turkey, but after seven years of rule by an anti-communist Greek junta, most international pressure for a peaceful resolution vanished. The UN Security Council took little action to deter Turkey from invading Cyprus and shalling Greek cities. Despite a prior success in resolving a Cyprus dispute, international constraints were inconsistent in this case.

In 1994, the West was too pre-occupied with Russia's volte face and economic therapy to pay heed to a war raging quietly on its southern flank. In 1999, the states whose "opinions" mattered to the Kremlin had been alienated by a hostile attitude toward the humanitarian wars in the Balkans. Did Kremlin and Duma elite' judge that the marginal losses of prestige and international maneuverability were acceptable could be balanced by security gains in neutralizing the Chechen threat? If evidence points to this, it would weaken the case that international normative constraints on democracies are significant. What 1999 informs the author is that the international isolation of states negatively correlates with peaceful bargaining in a dispute, especially when the pair of states at hand is a mixed dyad and has a prior

history of conflict. Both cases paint the picture of inconsistent international norms that intuitively might constrain democracies from fighting.

While most normative theories of democratic peace do not purport to explain peaceful democratic behavior toward non-democracies, they rely on an aggregated liberal norm that conditions the decisions of elites toward the like-minded. These constraints, however, are not liberal at all, in the sense of fostering virtues such as tolerance, autonomy, or open-ness. They are based on a shared understanding of predictable behavior – a status quo susceptible to shifts in its foundations. So, to speak normatively in the parlance of a rationalist, international norms selectively apply not because of any discriminatory scheme against illiberal regimes, but simply because states in mixed dyads have not had the opportunity to, or repeatedly fail to establish an enduring status quo.

International Inter-Elite Constraints

Why were international efforts antecedents of the retreat from the bring of war in 1967? Would Turkey have chosen war to launch its aerial and naval campaign against Greece had U.S. State Department diplomats and Ambassador Cyrus Vance not renegotiated the dispute in a timely and efficient manner? Neither Europe nor the United States urgently pursued conflict negotiation in 1974 or 1999. War followed. The United States urgently dissuaded Turkey from fighting in 1967, and warned Greece that it could not afford to intervene on the junta's part in the future. War was postponed for seven years. Does this mean that international inter-elite constraints had a strong effect? The presence two other variables complicates this conclusion.

First, public support for the two non-democracies' war objectives differs. In 1967, the Greek public and political elites did not favor war as the optimal solution, whereas the Chechen public and elite opposition were wildly supportive of Dudaev's hawkish platform in 1994. Second, Turkish signals of resolve in 1967 can be considered successful in ex post analysis. In contrast, signals of resolve from the democracy in 1974 amounted to nothing, and in 1999 they were irrelevant.

What these facts lead the author to conclude is a feature of signaling that is actually quite intuitive. When leaders try to signal their willingness to choose war over peace in order to meet some pre-determined objective or maintain some course of policy, signaling is largely dependant on

factors other than the policy aims. Moreover, signals can be distorted by other information. While signals often relate imperfect or purposefully manipulated information, they also may be read in an unpredicted context by an adversary's leaders.[86]

For example, assuming that information about the levels of public support for the regime reached Ankara in 1967 and 1974, signaling was read in a different context in 1974 than it was in 1967. In addition, the Greek public and Greek-Cypriot public were unsupportive of war and had little or no information about the nature of the Greek junta that had come to power in 1967. While the disconnect between the public and elites in non-democratic regimes leads to increasingly arbitrary foreign policy "probes," the regime was newly established and could be judged as inherently unstable. Turkey (and especially the Western states that dissuaded it from attacking) likely weighed the likelihood of a Greek civil war in the aftermath of a failed attempt to impose a unitary state in Cyprus.

The state of relations between domestic public opinion and leadership set the context in which Turkey read signals from across the Aegean in 1967. In 1974, the signals of a military junta in its seventh year of power set a very different scene in which Ankara interpreted the overthrow of Makarios and build-up of Greek forces in Cyprus. Since elections had been indefinitely suspended, Ankara could trust Athens to act unilaterally in neglect of the welfare of Greek Cypriots. Athens could do so without fear of public reprisal, as long as the public supported fighting for *enosis* more than they feared an overwhelming Turkish victory as the outcome of that fight. Finally, the Greek junta's history of survival and the abundance of pro-*enosis* Greek Cypriots on the island were factors in Turkey's interpretation of Greece's messages.

On the Turkish side, the mobilization of a strong and unified military in Turkey had sent a powerful notification of resolve to Greece and Greek Cypriots in 1967. In 1974, the message remained the same, yet Turkey had agreed to peace over war in one prior instance. It is likely that the Greek junta evaluated Turkey's 1976 decisions in light of its 1967 decision for peace and status quo. The difference in how the Greek and Turkish governments read one another's signals was a major contribution to the outset of a disastrous war for Greece in 1974.

In the early 1990s, Russia had failed to capitalize on the oppositional divisions within Chechnya. First, the information channels between Gro-

zny and Moscow were poor. Second, any signals that Yeltsin attempted to broadcast to the Chechen elite were cut short by his choice to launch a weak invasion in 1991 – a choice which fits neatly with Fearon's expectation that states have incentives to bluff.[87] The failed bluff – an attempt strangely carried out with neither sunk costs nor tied hands – was killed during the following three-year period of indecision over Russia's Chechen question. This bluff, the period of domestic turmoil from 1991 to 1993, and the devolution of autonomy and financial assets to federal regions at the same time established the context in which Dudaev and every other Chechen resident would interpret Moscow's signals concerning the Russian resolve to retain its breakaway province.

I have argued that this failure of signaling, and the choices for war were endogenous to power struggles – those of the dying Soviet Union and those within the new Russia. The resultant super presidentialism, an outcome of executive-legislative and executive-regional bargaining, institutionalized a system of governance that unable to broadcast accurate information. Russia was unable to inform the Chechen leadership when it might make long term gains by accepting temporary losses, and what the specific issues of salience were to Moscow elites. The 1993 constitution's government consistently failed to open up bargaining space by releasing un-contaminated information about itself to Chechnya.

The Chechen wars demonstrate that Russia's minimalist democracy (open competition in unpredictable and irreversible elections) was not a system that – by deliberate or chance design – could prevent a costly war. Likewise, Russia relied on remarkably few agencies and individuals to provide information about Chechnya to decision-makers. A key feature of the 1993 constitution had placed security agencies such as the FSB under the executive wing, allowing for the selective distortion of information. How might this contribute to the probability of war?

Beyond signaling, the perception that the Greek junta would assume a greater risk in war for a demand of Greek rule on the island was a boon for Ankara. The justification of self-defense against Greek aggression would (and did) provide an opportunity to resolve the situation in Turkish favor by partitioning the island into separate regimes. In stark contrast to 1967, both parties in 1974 favored a quick and violent resolution of their conflicting aims. 'Quick' is the key word here. States are assumed to avoid war if possible. The perceived availability of a shortcut to better outcomes leads

to the preference of violent over diplomatic bargaining or maintenance of the status quo.

As discussed, this behavior is strikingly similar to Putin's choice to fight Chechnya in 1999 and advance the bargaining process to a violent stage – revealing information with bombing raids rather than diplomacy. The behavior of the non-democratic adversary, international normative and elite-based constraints, domestic streamlining, and the prospect of a quick and sizeable match between demands and gains reinforced one another and made the choice for war easy in the democratic capital.

IV. Conclusions

I classified the Russia-Chechnya and Turkey-Greece disputes as "path two," whereby a mixed dyadic dispute recurs when the dyad resolves a prior dispute and the non-democratic incumbent leaves office. The alternate path, not explored here, occurs when the incumbent retains power following an initial dispute or war and prior to the re-initiation of war. The cases in this study are unsurprisingly diverse, but they exhibit a common pathology. Despite a complexity of causes for the wars, I have shown how democratic institutions that streamline the democratic choice for violent bargaining are instrumental in the failure of peaceful resolutions in heterogeneous dyads. These resolutions leave the non-democracy in a position where competing elites revive the initial demands. I briefly recap the main features of the story below.

In Chechnya, bargaining became increasingly violent before settling into a temporary status quo. That status quo was a poor one, resulting in a cease-fire that was more nominal than real as entrepreneurial elites jockeyed for power. Factionalized, they invited renewed war upon the province by behaving as if at war in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Moscow. The conditions flowing from the initial status quo provided ample support for Russia's choice to invade Chechnya a second time. In Cyprus, a spike in violence and the threat of war was resolved peacefully, but the established status quo failed to address the *enosis* issue. The replacement of a moderate leader by an extremist, then war followed. The Turkish government chose war in anticipation of EOKA-B anti-Turkish policies.

In both cases, resolution of the adversarial demands was postponed. The prediction of monadic peace fails. Democracies became *more* hostile in the second round of conflict, choosing to exploit an opportunity for a

quick resolution of the conflict, regardless of how bloody it might be. In both cases, elites' ex ante perspective led them to believe that war would be a cheap policy choice. Using an ex post analysis, one could conceivably argue that the choice was well calculated by Ankara, but poorly by Moscow. It is, however, generally impossible to make the first conclusions with certainty, rooted as it is in unobserved events. In the Russian case, the war that resulted *was* lengthy and costly, regardless of what the diplomatic alternative might have been. Instead of seeking to answer why such a misperception existed in the first place, I seek to demonstrate how those with misperceptions proceeded to implement their policies unconstrained by the institutions designed to constrain them. What I find is that, unsurprisingly, democracy is flawed in certain arrangements. Super presidentialism was the flaw in the Russian case.

While non-democratic regimes are assumed to be more "adventurous" in their foreign policy, given the disconnect between the public and the elites, it is paradoxical that regimes should choose violence over peace repeatedly. The pattern of interaction between democratic infrastructure, international normative and elite-based constraints, and the level of public support for the regime and for war set the context for the interpretation of signals of resolve. In this analysis, I found that signals of resolve were interpreted in quickly evolving circumstances. Whereas signals between homogenous dyads including stable regimes can be comparatively measured, they make unreliable constraints in mixed dyads with frequent regime changes ("path two," by definition) that are sometimes a result of the dispute.

Following a devastating war for Greece, the regimes in Athens and Cyprus experienced another coup, while Ecevit resigned amid controversy in Turkey. The fundamentals of the *enosis* issue remain unresolved today. While Putin's Chechen cause benefited from the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, Russia and Chechnya are still part of an evolving dispute, as events like the Beslan school attacks clearly indicate.

These findings indicate that a "thicker" international society, where institutions and international identities are not contingent on purely rational choices might stem the escalation of conflicts in which democracies become increasingly hostile toward non-democratic adversaries. Empirical literature indicates that this has been accomplished among democratic dyads, despite

numerous series of increasingly hostile European disputes in homogenous, democratic dyads. Such conclusions inevitably elicit objections, since the modern European Union has attempted to mediate both disputes, and has failed to do so.

The outcome of the 1967 crisis is the beacon of hope in this analysis. There, a pre-existing international security regime entered the calculations of decision makers in Ankara. Whereas literature in other traditions – predominantly the neorealist – argues that bipolarity necessitated the bifurcation of international security communities. One product of this effect was NATO and the European Community. The argument presented here predicts that such communities might arise in response to *any* relational pathology. International ties between democracies are becoming more established in modern international relations. Aside from providing better answers into why mixed dyads go to war, further research might establish why a world of heterogeneity seems unable to establish institutions thick enough to constrain a common form of self-interested violence.

(Footnotes)

[1] Also referred to as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI)

[2] Immanuel Kant 1724-1804., *Zum Ewigen Frieden. English; Perpetual Peace / Immanuel Kant ; Edited, with an Introduction, by Lewis White Beck.*, 1st ed. ed.Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (Dec., 1986), 1151-1169

[3] Bear F. Braumoeller, "Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics," *Political Analysis* 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2003, 2003), 209-233, http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/3/209.

[4] Bennett, *The Behavioral Origins of War / D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam.*Rousseau, *Democracy and War : Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict / David L. Rousseau.*

[5] Rousseau and others, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88*, 512-533

[6] John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (Jun., 1997), 267-293.

[7] Bueno de Mesquito and Lalman (1992) show that 43.9% of all dyads in their study of 189 total that reciprocate violence (make war) involve one democracy. See pg. 152.

[8] Bennett, *The Behavioral Origins of War / D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam.*Kenneth A. Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1 (Feb., 2001), 32-60.

[9] ibid.

[10] Doyle, *Liberalism and World Politics*, 1151-1169Douglas C. Foyle, *Counting the Public in : Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy / Douglas C. Foyle.*

[11] Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-, *War and Reason : Domestic and International Imperatives / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman.*H. E. (Hein Erich) Goemans 1957-, *War and Punishment : The Causes of War Termination and the First World War / H.E. Goemans.*Dan Reiter 1967-, *Democracies at War / Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam.*

[12] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 536.James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (Sep., 1994), 577-592.

[13] Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain Or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring, 1999), 233-266.

[14] Benjamin O. Fordham, "Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary use of Force," *The Journal of Politics* 67, no. 1 (2005), 132-153.

[15] Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536

[16] Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly MAtters," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (Fall, 2002), 5-47.

[17] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man : The Social Bases of Politics / Seymour Martin Lipset.*, Expanded ed. ed.Joseph Alois Schumpeter 1883-1950., *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.*, 3d ed. ed.Robert Alan Dahl 1915-, *Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition, by Robert A. Dahl.*

[18] Bear F. Braumoeller, "Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (Sep., 1997), 375-402.

[19] Rousseau, *Democracy and War : Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict / David L. Rousseau.*Reiter, *Democracies at War / Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam.*

[20] Joanne S. Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets : The Elusive Democratic Peace / Joanne Gowa.*

[21] Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition / Jack Snyder.*Goemans, *War and Punishment : The Causes of War Termination and the First World War / H.E. Goemans.*Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536

[22] Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-, *War and Reason : Domestic and International Imperatives / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman.* pp. 150-160.
Rousseau tests the monadic hypothesis and finds only low levels compared with the dyadic hypothesis.

[23] Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-, *The War Trap / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita.*

[24] Richard Rose 1933-, *Elections without Order : Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin / Richard Rose and Neil Monro.*

[25]   Henry E. Hale, "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting," *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 1 (Jan., 2000), 31-56.

[26]   Fish,M.Steven (Michael Steven), 1962-, *Democracy Derailed in Russia : The Failure of Open Politics / M. Steven Fish.*

[27]   Wayne C. McWilliams, *The World since 1945 : A History of International Relations / Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski.*, 5th ed. ed.John B. Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya : Roots of a Separatist Conflict / John B. Dunlop.*Matthew Evangelista 1958-, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*

[28]   ibid., pg.146

[29] Putin's popularity dropped from 80 percent to 50 percent once he failed to secure a quick victory. See McWilliams, *The World since 1945 : A History of International Relations / Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski.*, pg. 516.

[30]   Salman Raduev in 2002, Zemlikhan Iandarbiev and Akhmad Kadyrov in 2004, and Aslan Maskhadov in 2005.

[31]   Fish,M.Steven (Michael Steven), 1962-, *Democracy Derailed in Russia : The Failure of Open Politics / M. Steven Fish.*

[32]   Cited in ibid., pp. 21-26

[33]   Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World / Joel S. Migdal.*

[34]   Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner.*

[35]   McWilliams, *The World since 1945 : A History of International Relations / Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski.*, pg. 506

[36]   Daniel Treisman, *After the Deluge : Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia / Daniel S. Treisman.*

[37]   Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya : Roots of a Separatist Conflict / John B. Dunlop.*, pg. 147

[38]   ibid., pp.149-153. Tracey C. German 1971-, *Russia's Chechen War / Tracey C. German.*, pg. 105

[39]   Edgar O'Ballance, *Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995 / Edgar O'Ballance.*, pg. 212-213

[40]   Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*, pp. 46-52

[41]   Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya : Roots of a Separatist Conflict / John B. Dunlop.*, pp. 315-318

[42]   ibid.

[43]   Mansfield and Snyder, *Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War*, 297-337, pg. 298

[44]   Fearon, *Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes*, 577-592Fearon, *Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs*,

68-90

[45] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*

[46] ibid., pp.32-34

[47] ibid., pp.32-35

[48] ibid., pp.22-32

[49] ibid.

[50] Rose, *Elections without Order : Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin / Richard Rose and Neil Monro.*Fish,M.Steven (Michael Steven), 1962-, *Democracy Derailed in Russia : The Failure of Open Politics / M. Steven Fish.*

[51] ibid., pp. 193-198

[52] ibid., pp.203-209

[53] ibid., pp.224-243

[54] Reiter, *Democracies at War / Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam.*

[55] Cited in Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya : Roots of a Separatist Conflict / John B. Dunlop.*, pp. 210-211.

[56] Lieven, *Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner.*, pg. 50

[57] Neil Robinson 1964-, *Russia : A State of Uncertainty / Neil Robinson.*, pg.83

[58] Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536

[59] Fish,M.Steven (Michael Steven), 1962-, *Democracy Derailed in Russia : The Failure of Open Politics / M. Steven Fish.*, pg.217

[60] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*, pp.42-43

[61] ibid.

[62] Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536

[63] Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the use of Military Force Abroad," *World Politics* 47, no. 4 (Jul., 1995), 534-554.

[64] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*, pp.147-148

[65] Bobo Lo 1959-, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy / Bobo Lo.*, pp.84-85

[66] Dmitri□ Trenin, *Russia's Restless Frontier : The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia / Dmitri V. Trenin, Aleksei V. Malashenko, with Anatol Lieven.*

[67] Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy / Bobo Lo.*, pp. 22-23, 40

[68] Lieven, *Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner.*, pg.58

[69] Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy / Bobo Lo.*, pg.137

[70] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*, pg.138

[71] ibid., pp.73-74

[72] Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536, pp. 252-264

[73] Lieven, *Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner.*, pp. 124-125

[74] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*, pg.63

[75] Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy / Kenneth A. Schultz.*,Schultz, *Looking for Audience Costs*, 32-60

[76] Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-, *War and Reason : Domestic and International Imperatives / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman.*, pp.160-164, Rousseau, *Democracy and War : Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict / David L. Rousseau.*, pp.121-125

[77] Clashes at Kophinou were followed by Turkish air raids over Greek Thrace, after which the Greek junta removed Grivas from position and consented to a reduction of troops. He did not, however, demand the removal of the National Guard, the force supported by mainland Greece.

[78] Reunification of Cyprus with the Greek mainland.

[79] Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista.*

[80] Rousseau, *Democracy and War : Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict / David L. Rousseau.*, pg.125

[81] Although in Chechnya, peace does not in fact describe the years of 1996-1999.

[82] Commonly denoted, (W) in Bueno de Mesquita, *The Logic of Political Survival*, 536

[83] Lieven, *Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner.*

[84] Although Matthew Evangelista points out that Russia used indiscriminate and disproportionate force in the second war.

[85] Rose, *Elections without Order : Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin / Richard Rose and Neil Monro.*, pg.128

[86] Fearon, *Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes*, 577-592

[87] ibid.

Bibliography

Bennett, D. Scott. "The Behavioral Origins of War / D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam."

Braumoeller, Bear F. "Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics." *Political Analysis* 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2003 2003): 209-233.

Braumoeller, Bear F. "Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (Sep. 1997): 375-402.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. *The Logic of Political Survival.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003.

Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-. "War and Reason : Domestic and International Imperatives / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman." (a).

Bueno de Mesquita,Bruce, 1946-. "The War Trap / Bruce Bueno De Mesquita." (b).

Dahl, Robert Alan, 1915-. "Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition, by Robert A. Dahl." .

Desch, Michael C. "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly MAtters." *International Security* 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.

Doyle, Michael W. "Liberalism and World Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (Dec. 1986): 1151-1169.

Dunlop, John B. "Russia Confronts Chechnya : Roots of a Separatist Conflict / John B. Dunlop." .

Evangelista, Matthew, 1958-. "The Chechen Wars : Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? / Matthew Evangelista." .

Fearon, James D. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (Feb. 1997): 68-90.

Fearon, James D. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (Sep. 1994): 577-592.

Fish,M.Steven (Michael Steven), 1962-. "Democracy Derailed in Russia : The Failure of Open Politics / M. Steven Fish." .

Fordham, Benjamin O. "Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary use of Force." *The Journal of Politics* 67, no. 1 (2005): 132-153.

Foyle, Douglas C. "Counting the Public in : Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy / Douglas C. Foyle." .

Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the use of Military Force Abroad." *World Politics* 47, no. 4 (Jul. 1995): 534-554.

German, Tracey C., 1971-. "Russia's Chechen War / Tracey C. German." .

Goemans, H. E. (Hein Erich), 1957-. "War and Punishment : The Causes of War Termination and the First World War / H.E. Goemans." .

Gowa, Joanne S. "Ballots and Bullets : The Elusive Democratic Peace / Joanne Gowa." .

Hale, Henry E. "The Parade of Sovereignties: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting." *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 1 (Jan. 2000): 31-56.

Huth, Paul K., 1959-. "The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century / Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee." .

Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. "Zum Ewigen Frieden. English; Perpetual Peace / Immanuel Kant ; Edited, with an Introduction, by Lewis White Beck." .

Lieven, Anatol. "Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power / Anatol Lieven; with Photographs by Heidi Bradner." .

Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Political Man : The Social Bases of Politics / Seymour Martin Lipset." .

Lo, Bobo, 1959-. "Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy / Bobo Lo." .

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 297-337.

Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 624-638.

McWilliams, Wayne C. "The World since 1945 : A History of International Relations / Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski." .

Migdal, Joel S. "Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World / Joel S. Migdal." .

Munck, Gerardo L. (Gerardo Luis). "The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies." *World Politics* 54, no. 1 (Oct. 2001): 119-144.

O'Ballance, Edgar. "Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995 / Edgar O'Ballance." .

Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett. "The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (Jun. 1997): 267-293.

Reiter, Dan, 1967-. "Democracies at War / Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam." .

Robinson, Neil, 1964-. "Russia : A State of Uncertainty / Neil Robinson." .

Rose, Richard, 1933-. "Elections without Order : Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin / Richard Rose and Neil Monro." .

Rousseau, David L. "Democracy and War : Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of

International Conflict / David L. Rousseau." .

Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth. "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (Sep. 1996): 512-533.

Schultz, Kenneth A. "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1 (Feb. 2001): 32-60.

Schultz, Kenneth A. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain Or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 233-266.

Schultz, Kenneth A. "Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy / Kenneth A. Schultz." .

Schumpeter, Joseph Alois, 1883-1950. "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy." .

Snyder, Jack L. "Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition / Jack Snyder." .

Treisman, Daniel. "After the Deluge : Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia / Daniel S. Treisman." .

Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia's Restless Frontier : The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia / Dmitri V. Trenin, Aleksei V. Malashenko, with Anatol Lieven." .

To Base or Not to Base: That is the Central Asian Question

Reflections on Uzbekistan's Decision to Evict U.S. Forces in July 2005 & Possible Implications for U.S. Cooperation with other states in Central Asia

by Dennis Schmelzer

Introduction: Is Central Asia Part of a Zero-Sum "Great Game"?

Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, few believed that the United States would ever be drawn into Central Asia, or even that the United States would have substantial interests in doing so. Yet, as Roy Allison notes, since 9/11 the "post-Soviet states of Central Asia have come to occupy a front-stage geopolitical location hardly imaginable before."[1] Accordingly, following those attacks, "Washington moved quickly to expand its options in Central Asia." [2] In doing so, it "rapidly secured permission from the states of the region to overfly their territories," "set up substantial bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan," and "set up a refueling mission in Turkmenistan."[3] Some feared that this new American presence in the region would be viewed by Russians as an encroachment on their post-USSR "sphere of influence" and, as Allison proposes, that "[o]ne outcome for this region … could be a reply and reinforcement of traditional strategic competition between major powers seeking to secure their interests."[4] Indeed, as Allison asserts, this would

Dennis Schmelzer is a senior at Columbia University.

even fit in with the "prevailing general sense of grievance and zero-sum thinking within much of the Russian military-security establishment …that 'the United States is systematically appropriating Russia's geopolitical space.'"[5] With this in mind, Robert Brannon asserts, "Both Russia and the United States have recognized the importance of Central Asia. Their current competition for regional influence has been compared to the historical contest of Russia and Britain, referred to by Peter Hopkirk … as 'The Great Game.'"[6]

Anyone following newspaper over the past year might be inclined to agree that there has indeed risen a struggle for dominance and basing rights in Central Asia. In July 2005, for instance, two significant developments in the region were prominently featured in newspapers. First was a joint statement by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization calling for coalition troops to set a deadline for withdrawal from Central Asia. As the Associated Press headline read, "Central Asian alliance calls for U.S. pullout date: Russia, China among those seeking firm date for withdrawal from region."[7] By the end of the month, Uzbekistan had formally evicted the United States from the base on its territory at Karshi-Khanabad, giving the United States six months to comply.[8] Accordingly, October brought word that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had reached an agreement on long-term rights to maintain the American air base in Kyrgyzstan that would ensure the security of the base.[9] A month later, newspapers reported the final the departure of American forces from Uzbekistan and an anonymous Russian defense official suggesting that Russia was "studying how feasible it would be to base a Russian Air Force group in Uzbekistan" with the good infrastructure the Americans had left behind.[10]

With such a barrage of news, one might indeed conclude that there exists a zero-sum struggle for influence and dominance in Central Asia between the United States and Russia, even if – as U.S. Army Colonel Dianne L. Smith suggested as early as 1996 – "the new Central Asian nations are participants, not pawns, in this struggle for influence."[11] Yet is this conception accurate? As this paper shall argue, it is not. Fundamentally, this paper seeks to understand two basic questions surrounding the events of the past year. First, why did the Karimov regime of Uzbekistan ask U.S. forces to leave its territory, when less than two years before it had signed a "long-term security partnership" with

the United States[12] and seemed to be Washington's most favored partner in the region? Second, is this explanation unique to Uzbekistan and the Karimov regime, or does it have greater implications for the region as a whole and the future cooperation of Central Asian states and Russia with American forces in the region? To answer these questions, it is first – in the words of Olga Oliker – "critical to understand exactly why Uzbekistan … [had] been willing to grant access and pursue ties, and what they hope[d] to gain from this cooperation."[13] Once that is understood it is possible to explore why Uzbekistan chose to completely reverse its course, and whether it is possible that others may be inclined to as well.

As this paper shall assert, then, Central Asian relations with both powers immediately following the September 11 attacks were largely positive sum, in which Central Asian states were not required to align themselves with one power to exclusion of others and could freely cooperate with either, none, or both of the two powers based on their own preferences, domestic situations, and individual concerns. The decisions made by Central Asian states post-9/11 were made independent of competing great power pressures. Because Russia chose not to compete with the U.S. in the region, there existed a positive sum environment in which Central Asian states could benefit through cooperation with both great powers. This was made possible by Russian President Vladimir Putin's perception that the United States and Russia shared mutual interests in the region and his acceptance of an American role in a common fight against terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan. And given opposition to Russian influence developed in the 1990s, then, Uzbekistan was eager to align itself with the United States.

Ultimately, though, Russia and the United States have articulated fundamentally conflicting strategies for fighting the War on Terror in Central Asia beyond Operation Enduring Freedom. As Russia and the U.S. have diverged ideologically in how to fight terror, the widening gap has and will continue to force Central Asian states to choose one ideology over another. Thus, while the post-9/11 world saw a positive sum environment, these diverging strategies may lead to a zero sum environment in which Russia is likely to be the preferred power in the region. With the current U.S. strategy, a great game is not a likely scenerio, as the U.S., without Russian backing, is unlikely to be able to win any central asian partners in a truly zero sum world. And while "Central

Asian states are anything but monolithic in terms of foreign policy,"[14] I shall further argue that the perceived interests of the regimes in control of three of the other four states in Central Asia is likely more in line with Russia's counterterrorism strategy. It was the fundamental difference between Russia's and the U.S.'s counterterrorism strategy that led Karimov to abandon his initially preferred partner, the United States, for partnership with Russia following the Andijan uprising.

In short, then, while the United States has never had any Central Asian partners to the exclusion of Russia beyond Uzbekistan, I shall argue that Washington runs the risk of losing its current partners in the region for very much the same strategic reasons that caused Uzbekistan to realign towards Russia in 2005.

Filling the Void: Russian and American Influences in Central Asia Prior to 9/11

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, the Central Asian states were the last to be released from the Soviet grip, virtually abandoned by a Russia that "appeared relieved to jettison the burden of subsidizing the Islamic fringes of the empire … [and to] focus on [its] economic collapse at home, loss of superpower status, and security issues in Europe."[15] With memories of Afghanistan fresh in the minds of many Russians, noted Colonel Smith in 1996, "Central Asia was a backwater," until, of course, "the fall of Kabul, the coup in Dushanbe, and trips by Islamic leaders to Central Asia occurred" and a "threat loomed of significant Iranian and Turkish influence spreading throughout the region."[16] By March 1992, then, a formal collective security agreement replaced Russia's ambivalence, through which "Moscow exerted a benign equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine [which essentially decreed] 'We aren't going to get actively involved ourselves, but everyone else stay out.'"[17]

Despite the passive nature of the declaration, though, Russia was already heavily involved in the region by its nature as the self-proclaimed successor state to the Soviet Union, regardless of its desires to be there. Even after military forces were divided, Russia maintained "a substantial role in protecting the southern borders of Central Asian states. This kept Central Asian countries, to varying degrees, in a form of security dependence on Moscow and confirmed Russia as the primary…

security manager for the region."[18] Indeed, the mix of periods of Russian disinterest followed by periods of Russian assertion was clearly felt by the Central Asia states. Thus, as Brannon notes, while "Central Asian leaders initially were reluctant to leave the Soviet Union," eventually "Russia's often erratic behavior … served to distance the Central Asian states from Russia politically."[19]

Indeed, the Central Asian states were both dependent on Russia for security and, at the same time, fearful of its erratic behavior and ambitions as the successor state to the Soviet Union. Smith summarized this situation in 1996, noting that

> On the one hand, Central Asian leaders recognize the consequences if Russia does not get involved. Faced with civil war in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has stated that he would 'like to see the Russian Federation as a kind of guarantor of stability in the region, or more simply put, as a guarantor of the survival of the administration that exists in Tashkent today.' On the other hand, CIS members have suspicions and concerns about Russia's intentions to inherit the Soviet Union's ambitions … The example of the Warsaw Pact, which Russia frequently puts forward as a model for the CIS, makes Central Asian leaders uncomfortable, remembering as they do that Pact's "multinational response to attempts at political self-direction in Hungary and Czechoslovakia."[20]

Accordingly, each of the Central Asian states was forced to choose its own path and, faced with new identities, suspicions about Russia's intentions, and practical considerations about what was needed from Russia and what Russia could provide, "a web of bilateral agreements developed" rather than "a security community including Central Asian states grouped around Russia" as had been intended by the Russians with the CIS.[21] At one side of the spectrum, following a civil war that lasted through most of the mid-1990s, Tajikistan emerged at the end of the decade as a nation heavily reliant on Russian forces and influence, with "[m]ore than 20,000 Russian ground forces and border guards … still guard Tajikistan's southern border with Afghanistan" in 2002.[22] On the other end of the spectrum, Uzbekistan's President Karimov, the same

man who had sought the Russian Federation as a guarantor of security earlier, "became the most outspoken critic of Russia and the most eager to enter into cooperation with the United States."[23]

The United States in the 1990s, however, was in no rush to serve as an ally of Uzbekistan or counter to Russia. That is not to say it did not assist the Uzbekistan or other Central Asian states; rather, it built "low-level military-to-military contacts with the Central Asian states, both on a bilateral basis and through NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program."[24] Mindful that "Russia throughout the 1990s tended to perceive U.S. efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus as hostile encroachment and an attempt to woo Russia's last natural allies away from it,"[25] American activities were designed "to limit the capacity of Russia to strong-arm the Central Asian states, without directly confronting Russia in the region, by steering clear of promising security guarantees to the local regimes."[26] Thus, even when "President Islam Karimov made it a central facet of his foreign policy to turn away from Russia and to demonstrate Uzbekistan's independence from Moscow's control," his efforts at building closer ties were limited by "U.S. concerns about Karimov's human rights record and Uzbekistan's relatively low value to Washington at the time."[27]

The American Option: Uzbekistan Gets Its Ally

Events in 2001, however, would change Uzbekistan's situation, as it did the Central Asian political landscape as a whole. As Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal note, after all, "The September 11 attacks sent shock waves of horror around the world, but they also proved a major windfall to the Karimov government, which at once became a key player in the Bush administration's war effort."[28] For Karimov, it was a golden opportunity. Not only did he wish to show his independence from Moscow, but he had also been fighting the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an organization that advocates the use of violence to install an Islamic state" and overthrow his regime since 1992. In fact, the IMU had "enjoyed support from the Taliban that included housing, political offices, training camps, and bases for military operations and recruitment."[29] Thus, "Suddenly, the Islamic threat that Tashkent faced locally was transformed into a global problem," and Karimov hoped to garner international and American support to counter

the problem, both in Afghanistan and against terrorist **"colleagues on Uzbek soil."**[30]

From the American point of view, as Eugene Rumer of the Institute for National Strategic Studies pointed out, "After 10 years of working to maintain its distance from Central Asia, the United States has landed squarely in the middle of it."[31] Uzbekistan suddenly became a major ally for the United States given its proximity to Afghanistan, and the United States was so eager for access to Uzbekistan – "which has the best transport facilities, air bases, and military capabilities in the region"[32] – that Uzbekistan even got the United Sates to "sign an agreement with Uzbekistan that pledged Washington to 'regard with grave concern any external threat' to Uzbekistan."[33] Of course, Washington did not pledge to protect Uzbekistan from internal threats like the IMU, nor did it pledge any concrete defense in the event of external attack. Regardless, "The U.S. decision to place a substantial military force in Uzbekistan was taken by many in the Uzbek government as a clear demonstration of U.S. support. The Karimov regime sought to build on this by formalizing relations … [and] wanted its neighbors and Russia to be aware of this new 'partnership.'"[34] For its part, in the course of the security cooperation framework Uzbekistan signed with the United States to formalize long-term relation in 1993,

> Uzbekistan reaffirmed its commitment to further intensify the democratic transition of its society politically and economically… [and set] priority areas such as building a strong and open civil society, establishing a genuine multi-party system and independence of the media, strengthening non-governmental structures, [and so forth].[35]

Such promises seemed as a small price to pay for the Karimov regime, at least initially, to secure their American partners. As a result, "Uzbekistan rapidly moved to the top ranks of U.S. aid recipients, picking up both economic and military aid packages."[36]

Russia, Central Asia, and Operation Enduring Freedom

It is important to remember, of course, that this strengthening American-Uzbek relationship took place in the context of a greater Central Asian environment, and one watched over quite carefully by

Russia. Given the still "[d]eeply embedded in the Russian psyche is the notion that Central Asian states are simply 'nashi,' the Russian word for 'ours,'"[37] it is critical to note that the United States did not seek to establish bases in Central Asia without first consulting President Putin of Russia for his support. As Brannon notes:

> On September 18, 2001, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the United States would seek approval from several states in Central Asia and support from Russia to deploy military assets in the region to support the war on terrorism. Rumsfeld's statement seemed to imply that operations planned for Afghanistan might be launched from bases in nearby Central Asia. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov responded by saying there was no basis for U.S. claims to a requirement for access to military bases in Central Asia… Shortly thereafter, to Ivanov's apparent surprise and perhaps consternation, Putin held a press conference to declare Russian support for the U.S. request.[38]

One must remember, then, that states that responded to the American request for basing rights were not facing a choice between America and Russia; instead, they were faced with a single request by the Americans, and one that enjoyed Russian support.

Thus, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Tajik offers of bases and over-flight access were not viewed by the regimes as threatening to their already good relations with Moscow.[39] The fact that "in a reorientation of Russian policy, Putin accepted the need to share responsibilities in Central Asia" with the United States in the fight against the Taliban and terrorism,[40] however, only begs one question: had the states been faced with a zero-sum choice between the United States and Russia, which one would they have chosen? Or, less counterfactually, should Russia decide that shared responsibility with the United States in the Central Asian counterterrorism fight is no longer desirable, which power – the United States or Russia – would these states align with? And was that the point of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's joint statement, to reverse Putin's previous acceptance of shared responsibility in the Central Asian counterterrorism fight? It cannot be assumed that the U.S. would have been chosen over Russia as a partner in the region. Since both the U.S. and Russia were on the same page and sought the same behavior from

the states, their decision to align with the U.S. was not to the exclusion of Russia but was the product of concurrent rather than competing great power pressures. To understand the remarkable shift of Uzbekistan from staunch American supporter to most anti-American state in Central Asia, it is important to consider the greater context of what was happening at the same time in the post-Soviet space.

Roses and Tulips: Would Revolutions By Any Other Name Smell as Sweet?

To liberal observers in the West, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan may seem to have been isolated instances of people rising up against authoritarian regimes and, if anything, merely positive examples of indigenous democratic movements. In addition, such observers might only see one of which – the Tulip Revolution of Kyrgyzstan in May 2005 – as relating to Central Asia. To leaders of Central Asian's autocratic regimes and to Russia's President Putin, however, such movements were far more ominous signs. As Roy Allison suggests, for instance, Central Asian and Russian discomfort at what might be seen by them as overzealous Western promotion of democratization can even be found earlier than these revolutions within the American justifications for the Iraq War. As Allison notes, "The personal insecurity of these rulers increased when the prospect for democratic transformation was used as one rationalization for the violent overthrow of Saddam Hussein…, as well as for the peaceful overthrow of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze at the end of 2003."[41] And if the Iraq War and the Rose Revolution in Georgia had reason to make leaders nervous at the time of Allison's paper in 2004, the Orange and Tulip Revolutions certainly could only exacerbate those sentiments.

The Tulip Revolution, for Karimov, would seem most ominous. After all, aside from the American airbase in Karimov's Uzbekistan, the United States' other main base was located in Kyrgyzstan. As Brannon noted in 2004, "Although this force may help Kyrgyz authorities deal with terrorist threats, coalition troops are unlikely to back the government in disputes with political opposition forces."[42] By contrast, Olcott points out, "Russians are … playing an increased role in bolstering the internal security of the Kyrgyz regime."[43] By the time of the Tulip Revo-

lution in 2005, of course, even Russian internal support was not able to save President Askar Akayev from being overthrown and forced to flee on March 24, 2005. At least, however, the Russians were willing to try to assist Akayev with maintaining internal order and regime stability. By contrast, not only did coalition forces not try to defend the regime against the internal opposition when it came, but rather

> [v]arious international news agencies, including the *New York Times*, have reported that American funding and support, from governmental and non-governmental sources, helped in part to pave the way for the pro-opposition demonstrations by providing means of printing materials and literature. US State Department statements have partly substantiated such claims.[44]

To Uzbekistan's Karimov, then, it appeared that the United States and western organizations may have helped to overthrow the regime of another U.S. ally on the War on Terror; this could not have been a comfortable thought, given his own reliance on his American partners and their assistance. The great American partner that had seemed to be Uzbekistan's savior in Karimov's eyes in his fight to free himself from Russia and the IMU suddenly became the biggest threat.

Of course, Karimov was affected much more by other events around the time of the Tulip Revolution than by mere observation of Akayev's fate. Just before the outbreak of the Tulip Revolution in Krygyzstan, after all, there were the uprisings that broke out in eastern Uzbekistan at Andijan along its border with Kyrgyzstan. With Karimov's regime concerned that a loss of control there could spread to other areas and bring down the government, the conflict came to a climax on May 13, 2005 – eleven days before Akayev was ousted in Kyrgyzstan – when Uzbek interior ministry troops and soldiers reportedly opened fire into a crowd of demonstrators to battle with rebels within the crowd. Most significant to Karimov, however, may have been the responses to these actions by Russia and the United States. From Russia, who Karimov had distanced Uzbekistan from repeatedly in the past, "Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the unrest was an 'internal affair."[45] By contrast, from his American allies and partners Karimov received a message from White House spokesman Scott McClellan that "said the authorities should show restraint in Andijan."[46] When suggestions of American

support for the Tulip Revolution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan were raised following Akayev's eventual resignation, Karimov may very well have attributed the unrest in his own country as having been stirred up by the same American and Western NGOs and forces.

Perhaps Karimov might have overlooked McClellan's comments and his own suspicions, though, had it not been for the international reactions afterwards. Yet

[i]n the weeks to follow, the U.S. joined a chorus of nations calling for an independent, international investigation of the Andijan events and, along with several European nations, refused to participate in a highly-suspect, Uzbekistan-sponsored "international" investigation that included CIS states, China, Iran, India and Pakistan.[47]

While Russia, China, and the other neighbors that Uzbekistan had sought independence from earlier all agreed to respect Uzbekistan's internally run investigations, the United States and others in the West who had been considered Uzbekistan's partners did not trust the Karimov government to investigate the incident. According, Uzbekistan served U.S. troops an eviction notice just four days before

Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns was going to pressure Tashkent to allow an international investigation into the Andijan protests, which human rights groups and three U.S. senators who met with eyewitnesses said killed about 500 people… [and] to open up politically -- or risk the kind of upheavals witnessed recently in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.[48]

The Andijan incident served, then, to reorient Uzbekistan's foreign policy, turning it from a U.S. ally on the War on Terror to a nation seeking a closer relations with Russia, which seemed a more welcome friend to the autocratic Karimov given its own response to the events at Andijan.

As the *Washington Post* noted in July 2005, "Uzbekistan has been widely viewed as an important test for the Bush administration -- and whether the anti-terrorism efforts or promotion of democracy takes priority."[49] Clearly, as the article suggests, the Bush administration selected the promotion of democracy over anti-terrorism in Uzbekistan. According to an unnamed senior official cited by the *Post*, "We all knew

basically that if we really wanted to keep access to the base, the way to do it was to shut up about democracy. We could have saved the base if we had wanted."[50] So why did the Bush administration choose not to keep quiet about democracy? Was it because democracy was more important than anti-terrorism efforts? Or was it because, in the end, democracy has become a central part of Washington's anti-terrorism strategy in the wake of the Iraq War? Perhaps the answer to this question can explain help whether and where Russian and American strategies on the War of Terror have diverged in Central Asia.

Divergent Strategies for Winning the War on Terror in Central Asia

Clearly, it was easy for Russia, the United States, and the Central Asian states to agree on what needed to be done in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, to fight terrorism in Central Asia. Russia, for instance, has a clear interest in dealing with the threat of Islamic extremism along its long and volatile "southern flank."[51] Having fought a long and painful war in Afghanistan against those forces before, it clearly understood the threat the Taliban and the fundamentalists they sheltered poses. So did Uzbekistan, with IMU members sheltered by both the Taliban and Northern Alliance and using their territory as an operating base.[52] Even Turkmenistan stepped beyond its normally declared policy of "permanent neutrality" and isolation to offer overflight access and a refueling station to coalition forces. As Olga Oliker notes in this regard,

> Tajikistan and Turkmenistan perhaps come closest to having provided the assistance for OEF purely out of support for the operation itself. Like Uzbekistan, both countries felt a significant threat was posed by the Taliban's proximity, so much so that Turkmenistan had sought a 'separate peace' with the Taliban prior to September 2001.[53]

In short, it was not exceedingly difficult to convince regional players that Afghanistan posed a significant threat to regional security and to accordingly build consensus around the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Beyond that common vision of battling the fundamentalist Taliban regime, though, what fronts were seen as important to the regional

actors? One answer to this is the internal domestic fronts in Central Asia, or the internal stability of Central Asian states themselves. Indeed, reducing instability in Central Asia seems like the paramount goal of all involved. The United States and Russia, however, had fundamentally different conceptions of how that could be achieved.

For the United States, it may seem at first as if the removal of the Taliban regime has resulted in a shift back towards its pre-9/11 interests in the region. After all, before September 11, 2001, "U.S. interests in Central Asia were secondary economic concerns; interests derivative of the goals of others, such as concern about Russian imperialism or … ideological goals such as democratization."[54] As the U.S. decision to choose the promotion of democracy in Uzbekistan over its basing rights might suggest, those secondary interests like democratization have risen again to the top of the American agenda for Central Asia. Such a view, however, would seem deceptively simple. After all, as Olga Oliker would suggest, the current administration's interest in democratization is not merely a secondary goal or lofty interest. Instead, Oliker argues, there is a belief in Washington that has taken hold post-9/11 that democratization and liberalization in themselves are necessary to provide real security and real long-term counterterrorism solutions. As Oliker notes, today in Central Asia

> most of the security tasks are domestic, police tasks and many of the long-term solutions must be political and economic, rather than military. Perhaps somewhat ironically, after years of debate about whether the pursuit of democratization and human rights was a worthwhile U.S. security policy goal, it now appears that such efforts are, indeed, critical to 'hard' security goals—even as the task of advancing them appears even more difficult than before.[55]

Therefore, looking beyond the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it might seem that we have moved back to the same secondary concerns, but while the tasks may be the same, the reasons and priorities assigned to them are not. As the Bush administration might argue, for Central Asia democratization is no longer just a lofty goal; rather, it is essential to fighting terror over the long term. Indeed, as President Bush wrote in the introduction to the National Security Strategy of 2002,

America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness … because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order… We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.[56]

Ultimately, then, the Bush administration decided in 2005 that, "[b]eyond OEF, U.S. interests in this region are amorphous and predominantly non-military."[57]

In a speech in March 2005 – the same month as the Andijan uprising – President Bush made this link between counterterrorism strategy and democratization once again, noting that

When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored and appeased, kept in a box or bought off.[58]

Accordingly, though Uzbek bases were seen as useful to the United States in its mission, they were not, as Olga Oliker asserts, "in and of themselves a reason for continued close relations with the Central Asian states beyond the present [OEF] mission."[59] Accordingly, Oliker notes,

Afghanistan presented [the Bush administration with] a clear-cut illustration of the dangers of how state failure can create transnational threats, which when unchecked have the capacity to terrorize governments and populaces worldwide. Central Asia, with its combination of increasingly authoritarian regimes, limited central control, popular

dissatisfaction, high levels of corruption, and criminal activity is both a waystation for and a source of these threats.[60]

To the United States, then, it was not deemed advisable to maintain a presence and complicity with these problems in Uzbekistan in the face of Karimov's continued trends towards illiberal policies.

Russia, though wary of the same instability that concerns the United States, offered a very different solution to dealing with such instability and the domestic threats that arise within them. As Oliker notes, unlike the United States, Russia "views the radical Islamic threat in the same way the Central Asian governments have tended to see it—as a significant danger that justifies police crackdowns and less than liberal policies."[61] Thus, Karimov's regime has at times berated Moscow for "exaggerating the Islamic fundamentalist threat to justify Russian bases in the region, but in times of stress, even Karimov has sought Russian assistance."[62] And, far from the wavering Russia of the early 1990s, Putin's Russia has, "[a]t a time of upheaval in the Middle East… tried to project Russia's image as a traditional, reliable partner for the quasi-autocractic Central Asian leaders."[63] Thus, Russia maintains its 201st Motor Rifle Division on the ground in Tajikistan, its thousands of border guards along Tajik borders, a new airbase near the American one in Kyrgyzstan, and has even considered basing arrangements in Uzbekistan following the American withdrawal there. These movements are generally aligned with Russian assertions that, "while the Americans are here now, we are in the region forever."[64]

Thus, as "the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization's] statement appears to reflect growing uneasiness with the U.S. presence and increasing concerns that the United States is encouraging the overthrow of Central Asia's authoritarian governments,"[65] Russia has promoted its own strategic doctrine for fighting terrorism, which amounts to the same it has consistently applied in Chechnya. As Olcott notes, then, "Geography demands that the Central Asian states and Russia reach some form of accommodation."[66] For the moment, it would seem that the trends toward less liberal, more oppressive policies among Central Asian states might demand that these states and Russia reach some form of accommodation as well.

Conclusions: Back to Home Base?

Clearly, Uzbekistan's shifts between strategic partners in recent years have been much sharper vis-à-vis the United States and Russia than other states in the region. In a zero-sum manner, it has constantly sought to align with only one of the two powers at a time, with no ground in between. Other states in the region, namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have chosen to try to align and cooperate more with both powers, and thus are perhaps less likely to make as abrupt a shift as the Karimov regime towards one side or another. An unexpected Andijan-type uprising in any of these three could, of course, produce unexpected consequences. And given Russia's more forceful and less liberal strategic vision for the War on Terror, constant Russian resolve to stay in the region, Russian insistence on non-interference in other states internal affairs in the region, Russian willingness to help in such internal affairs when needed, and trends of increasingly repression and less liberalism in these three states, they are likely over time to be compelled towards greater military and basing cooperation with Moscow rather than with the United States, as Uzbekistan was.

Indeed, with the warm bilateral relations that these three states shared with Russia before American forces arrived, it could be said that these states have always been primarily aligned with Russia, and that their partnership with American forces was always contingent on Russian consent. While these states may welcome American aid and assistance where it does not conflict with their interests or threaten their Russian partners, then, it is indeed likely that, should their own rulers perceive American democratization efforts to be as threatening as Karimov did following the Andijan uprisings and Putin did following the Orange Revolution, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan could feel just as compelled to evict American forces as Uzbekistan did in July 2005. This would be the result, however, of diverging American and Russian strategic visions for combating terrorism in the region, and not some great power, zero-sum competition to gain overwhelming dominance or influence in Central Asia akin to a modern day Great Game.

Notes

[1] Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." <u>International Affairs</u>. 80:2 (2004), 277.

[2] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University, 2004), 448-449.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." <u>International Affairs</u>. 80:2 (2004), 277.

[5] Ibid 278

[6] "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 436.

[7] The Associated Press. 5 July 2005.

[8] Wright, Robin and Ann Scott Tyson. "U.S. Evicted from Air Base in Uzbekistan." *The Washington Post*.
30 July 2005, Page A01.

[9] Brinkley, Joel. "Rice Reaches Pact on Keeping Central Asia Base." *The New York Times*. 12 October 2005

[10] Ames, Paul. "Uzbekistan Closes Airspace To NATO." *The Moscow Times*. 24 November 2005, Page 3.

[11] Smith, Dianne L. *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), iii.

[12] Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock of Central Asia." *Journal of International Affairs*. 56:2 (Spring 2003), 5.

[13] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 453.

[14] "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century*. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 425.

[15] Smith, Dianne L. *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 14-15.

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." <u>International Affairs</u>. 80:2 (2004), 285.

[19] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 427.

[20] Smith, Dianne L. *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 17.

[21] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 427.

[22] Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2002 <http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20020301faessay7972/pauline-jones-luong-erika-weinthal/new-friends-new-fears-in-central-asia.html>

[23] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 427.

[24] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 447.

[25] Ibid 457

[26] Ibid 447

[27] Ibid 448

[28] Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2002 <http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20020301faessay7972/pauline-jones-luong-erika-weinthal/new-friends-new-fears-in-central-asia.html>

[29] Ibid

[30] Ibid

[31] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 430-431.

[32] Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal. "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2002 <http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20020301faessay7972/pauline-jones-luong-erika-weinthal/new-friends-new-fears-in-central-asia.html>

[33] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 449.

[34] Ibid 454

[35] Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock of Central Asia." *Journal of International Affairs*. 56:2 (Spring 2003), 8.

[36] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 449.

[37] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf,

eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 426-427.

[38] Ibid 428

[39] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 455-456

[40] Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." International Affairs. 80:2 (2004), 285.

[41] Ibid 279

[42] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 433.

[43] Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock of Central Asia." *Journal of International Affairs*. 56:2 (Spring 2003), 6.

[44] "Tulip Revolution." Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyz_revolution_of_2005>

[45] "May 2005 Unrest in Uzbekistan." < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_2005_unrest_in_Uzbekistan>

[46] Ibid

[47] Ibid

[48] Wright, Robin and Ann Scott Tyson. "U.S. Evicted from Air Base in Uzbekistan." *The Washington Post*.
30 July 2005, Page A01.

[49] Ibid

[50] Ibid

[51] Brannon, Robert. "Regional Security Cooperation and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: A 21st Century 'Great Game'?" In Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 435.

[52] Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal "New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2002 <http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20020301faessay7972/pauline-jones-luong-erika-weinthal/new-friends-new-fears-in-central-asia.html>

[53] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 455-456

[54] Ibid 447

[55] Ibid 453

[56] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. September 2002 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf>

[57] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel

L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 446.

[58] Cause, Gregory. "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" *Foreign Affairs*. 84:5 (2005), 64.

[59] Oliker, Olga. "Friends Like These: Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia." in Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, eds. *In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), 451

[60] Ibid 452

[61] Ibid 457

[62] Ibid

[63] Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." International Affairs. 80:2 (2004), 279.

[64] Ibid 277

[65] "Central Asian alliance calls for U.S. pullout date." The Associated Press. 5 July 2005

[66] Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock of Central Asia." *Journal of International Affairs*. 56:2 (Spring 2003), 7.

Tufts University's Program

Foreign Policy
Analysis

Global Conflict,
Cooperation, and
Justice

Regional and
Comparative
Analysis

Tufts' Program in International Relations (IR) was established
in 1977 to prepare undergraduates for the rigors of
graduate school in international affairs. IR has succeeded
well in its original mission -- graduates are accepted
into all of the leading graduate schools of international
affairs, as well as to top programs in law, political science,
business, and education.

The Program in International Relations delivers the
hallmark of a Tufts education -- small class sizes allowing
for individual faculty attention to students. Drawing on
the strengths of 15 departments and five related
programs, the IR Program is fully integrated into the
broader university mission of providing a liberal arts
education. Nearly 40 percent of Tufts IR majors pursue a
double major, with languages and economics the leading
affiliated concentrations.

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International
Economic and
Environmental Affairs

Nationalism, Culture,
and Identity

The IR Program strongly encourages its majors to supplement the undergraduate experience by participating in both Tufts and non-Tufts overseas studies programs. Study abroad not only facilitates completion of concentration requirements but also helps prepare students with linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and sociological knowledge necessary to succeed in today's rapidly changing world.

In addition to traditional careers in foreign service, law, business, and banking, graduates of the IR Program have combined their interest in international affairs with those in the arts and humanities to pursue careers in film, journalism, performing arts, and cultural analysis. Perhaps the best measure of success has been the positive feedback from alumnae. Graduates report that the IR Program prepared them well for professional lives in global affairs, whether in the public, private or non-profit sector.

Please contact us to learn more about Tufts University's
Program in International Relations.

Tel: 617.627.2770
Fax: 617.627.3083
Web: ase.tufts.edu/ir
E-mail: internationalrelations@tufts.edu

International Relations
TUFTS

Department of Economics
Tufts University

The Department Congratulates
the Student Authors and Staff of
Hemispheres

The success of Tufts' International Relations Program is demonstrated by the enthusiasm that IR students show for producing a journal devoted to social, economic, political, and legal issues. Since 1976, Hemispheres has been a showcase for students who are actively engaged in their own education.

The Department offers courses that are part of the IR program and three majors that are of interest to IR students.

B.A. in Economics or Quantitative Economics

Economics is one of Tufts' most popular undergraduate majors. The major provides a solid background for many different career paths-- from employment immediately after graduation to postgraduate study. It is particularly appropriate for those with interests in business, finance, law, or public policy.

M.A. in Economics

Tufts offers an eight course program of study leading to an M.A. in Economics. It is designed for students who have completed a baccalaureate degree and have taken some college level work in economics and mathematics. A degree in economics is not required for admission and well-prepared students can complete the program in one year.

For more information please visit our website at http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/ or our offices in Braker Hall.

CONGRATULATIONS…

to the staff of

Hemispheres

for another fine issue

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

David Art
Jeffrey Berry
Kerry Chase
Consuelo Cruz
Robert Devigne
Richard Eichenberg
James Glaser
Marilyn Glater
Gary McKissick

Malik Mufti
Philip Munoz
Kent Portney
Elizabeth Remick
Pearl Robinson
Deborah Schildkraut
Tony Smith
Vickie Sullivan
Jeffrey Taliaferro

**TUFTS UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
EATON HALL
MEDFORD, MA 02155
(617) 627-3465
http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci**

Explore the World with Tufts!

TUFTS PROGRAMS ABROAD

http:/ase.tufts.edu/studyabroad
Dowling Hall
Medford, MA 02155
617-627-2000