

Working Women's Social Exclusion  
from the Turkish Labor Market

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## Abstract

Neoclassical economists have interpreted women's increased presence in the labor market as a product of expanding economic growth. Yet, women's status in the labor market continuously stagnates in Turkey even though economic restructuring since the 1980s has enhanced the country's macroeconomic competitiveness. What accounts for this abnormality? Drawing from feminist perspectives, this thesis has synthesized a capability approach framing of social exclusion and expressed women's exit from the Turkish labor market as a "capability deprivation". Such synthesis builds on multi-dimensional and dynamic visions of well-being and explains the transition in Turkey from patriarchal norms to "neopatriarchal" institutions operating in the household, labor market, and state. The decline of women's presence in the Turkish labor market is shown as an outcome of the interaction between economic restructuring and institutionalized patriarchal norms.

## Acknowledgements

This thesis is an attempt to be productively frustrated with the escalating violence in Turkey since 2012. Professor Weiping Wu and I began working towards solid research questions for this eclectic vision on why women are leaving the Turkish labor market in 2014. After several failures, I approached Professor H. Tolga Bölükbaşı and asked him how to write about Turkey. Thanks to our resilience, I found my voice to speak about issues affecting women in Turkey at the 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Tufts Women’s Center Symposium on Gender and Culture. Professor Wu’s insightful comments on my first draft and Professor Bölükbaşı’s helpful comments on my arguments have allowed me to produce a non-orientalist explanation of processes causing substantial discrepancies in female labor force participation between Turkey and the world. This study has been completed thanks to their understanding and encouragement.

I dedicate any and all of my academic success that has led to this point to my grandmother, the loveliest girl of Erenköy, and my *b.babacığım*, the late Prof. Dr. Kamil İmamoğlu. I am also incredibly thankful for the support of my Kayserian anomalies, my mother and Memo, and the strength of Rockford’s finest bass player. I carry the young souls lost in Gezi, Suruç, and Ankara in their love.

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**Working Women's Social Exclusion  
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## Chapter 1–Introduction

The Republic of Turkey boasts the 17<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world with a Gross Domestic Product of \$799.54 billion (World Bank 2016). Yet, Turkey has been unable to fuel women’s development using this macroeconomic endowment. For instance, Turkey reports a high Gender Inequality Index (0.359) in comparison to European Union (EU) (0.140) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (0.146) averages (UNDP 2015). This index compiles basic development indicators such as maternal mortality rate and proportion of adult male and females with some secondary education (ibid). It is troubling that an OECD member since 1961 and an official EU candidate since 1999 reports such great discrepancies.

Turkey is a late-industrializing country that transitioned to an export-led growth economy in the 1980s. Neoliberal economic policies were implemented with reforms to industrialize Turkey’s production processes to increase macroeconomic competitiveness. These structural changes coincide with the beginning of deeply-embedded patriarchy manifesting itself in women’s exit from the workforce. Women’s exit from the Turkish workforce implies a decline in women aged 16 and over who are actively seeking work, presently employed, or expecting a recall after being laid off (Ehrenberg and Smith 2014). The state’s interests in maintaining conservative constituents has re-domesticated working women.

Presently, Turkey’s female labor force participation stands at 33.6 percent: roughly 30 percent short of the OECD average (OECD 2016). The low “economic

activity” of Turkey’s working women is also uncharacteristic of countries facing similar macroeconomic struggles<sup>1</sup>. This study terms the culmination of institutional reforms towards export-led growth and the revitalization of patriarchal norms as Moghadam’s (2004) “neopatriarchy”. It discusses “neopatriarchy” as an institutionalized social construct that has been a Sisyphean weight on working women in Turkey.

As Turkey’s female labor force participation has been declining –with insignificant recoveries– since the 1980s, I interpret women’s exit from the workforce as social exclusion. In the 1990s, social exclusion studies emerged in European policy literature after The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the European Union (Çelik 2014). Social exclusion can be defined as a twofold concept: “denial of social, political and civil rights of citizens in society or the inability of groups of individuals to participate in the basic political, economic, and social functionings of the society” (Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou 2010, p.242). Basically, social exclusion has been used to explain both a nature of policymaking and a deprivation experience for groups of individuals. This study evaluates “neopatriarchy” as a social exclusion policy trait since the 1980s that has removed working women’s ability to participate in the labor market.

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
<sup>1</sup> Morgan Stanley has been calling countries with at-risk currencies since Chinese Yuan devaluation in 2013 the “Troubled Ten”. These emerging markets compete with China’s exports and include Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey. The term is revised based on macroeconomic performance and applied to a wider range of countries (Worrachate 2015).

This thesis addresses the research question: How can we explain the social exclusion of working women from the Turkish labor market? The research asked two interlinked exploratory questions to answer the research question:

1. How have patriarchal social norms resurfaced in “neopatriarchal” institutions?
2. What are the consequences of “neopatriarchal” governance on the social exclusion of working women in Turkey?

The research explains the grave implications of “neopatriarchy” by building on Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability Approach framing of human development.


Figure 1 The Capability Approach Framing of Human Development



Source: Robeyns (2005) and Clark (2006) interpretations of Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability Approach to Development

As seen in Figure 1, I modified and summarized Sen and Nussbaum’s framework through the help of Robeyns (2005) and Clark’s (2006) studies. Based on this collective research, I re-conceptualized the capability approach as a three-stage individual decision-making model. In the first stage, individuals use “resources” and “commodities” to access “capabilities”. “Resources” are individual endowments ranging from being literate to being healthy. These are used to command over material goods called “commodities”. “Resources” and “commodities” are combined to produce the set of all possible opportunities as “capabilities”. Finally, “individual conversion factors” are used to filter individuals’ “capabilities” to the limited set of feasible “capabilities”. These factors

range from personal, social, environmental to institutional factors. The “individual conversion factors” are an element of the model that allows for real-world applications. The second stage contains the feasible “capabilities” and a “choice (agency)” element that is influenced by “individual conversion factors”. The final stage called “functionings” records the final outcome of the decision-making process. Based on Robeyns (2005), these three stages are termed “means to



achieve”, “freedom to achieve”, and “achievements” respectively (p.98).

This study interprets the declining labor force participation of women in Turkey through the capability framing of human development. As seen in Figure 2, my interpretation takes “resources” and “commodities” as determined in patriarchal family settings. For example, valuation of male children over female children causes girls to be raised for future caregiving. The capabilities I assess are “capability to work” and “capability for voice”. I conceptualize “neopatriarchy” – the interaction of Turkey’s patriarchal history and neoliberal economic policies– as an underlying “individual conversion factor”. I see these interactions as furthering the social exclusion of working women by constraining the “capability to work” and “capability for voice”. These weakened capabilities form the “capability set”.

In this model, “neopatriarchy” directs women away from the labor market thereby exacerbating working women’s social exclusion.

This model is a response to the neoclassical literature’s understanding of the gender implications of development. Assuming economic growth will automatically generate development, international public institutions promote neoliberal economic restructuring with the promise of better living standards. These structural changes include trade openness, labor market deregulation, divestment from publicly-owned manufacturing enterprises, macroeconomic discipline comprised of fiscal austerity and inflation targeting (Mukhopadhyay 2015; Çağatay and Berik 1990; Arıcanlı and Rodrik 1990). Neoclassical thinking justifies structural change by positing that economic growth will “trickle down” to the masses.

While economic growth trickles down, neoclassical economists expect female labor force participation to follow a U-shaped pattern (Goldin 1994). Influenced by Goldin (1994), the neoclassical literature of the past twenty years has expected female labor force participation to vary based on education (Klasen 2005), fertility and marital status (Ganguli et. al. 2014), urbanization (Dildar 2015), social constructs (Göksel 2013; Mirzaie 2015), and job quality (Çağatay and Berik 1990; Tzannatos 1999; Salehi-Isfahani 2013). Although these studies mention female-headed households, they assume a traditional heterosexual family setting. At the first stage of development in middle income countries, female labor force participation will decline as men take industrial jobs with high wages (Çağatay and Berik 1990; Tzannatos 1999). Women will be concentrated in household

production including reproductive and informal work (Çağatay and Berik 1990). At the second stage, as the economic products needed for global competitiveness become more sophisticated, governments will initiate gendered education campaigns (Klasen 2005). Women's paid work to supplement household income will be necessary to purchase a broader range of commodities (Dildar 2015). Women's employment will be in the growing service sector that includes clerical work (Tzannatos 1999). Women and families with girl children will make education investments that reflect employment prospects (Dildar 2015). As development increases urbanization, the fertility rate will decline as cost of living increases (Ganguli et. al. 2014). The declining fertility rate will reduce women's care burdens and initiate their career-building (ibid). At the third stage, gender equality in the labor market will be achieved, while it might take time for equal earnings between men and women (Goldin 2015). This neoclassical literature, however, is limited by its assumption that governments share a universal commitment to economic growth which would automatically eradicate deeply-rooted gender discrimination.

I challenge neoclassical expectations by exploring the processes leading up to working women's ever-declining labor force participation patterns in Turkey. I explain these women's experiences as social exclusion in the form of reduced "capability to work" and "capability for voice". I highlight "neopatriarchy" as the cause of their reduced agency to participate in the labor market. The rest of this thesis is structured to support this explanation. Chapter 2 summarizes Sen and Nussbaum's Capability Approach and the applications of the decision-making

model to social exclusion. These applications have been primarily focused on cases in the EU. Chapter 3 provides a feminist critique on neoclassicist expectations of economic growth and gender. It reviews women's employment decisions as subject to household, market, and state constraints. Chapter 4 explains the emergence of Turkey's "neopatriarchal" governance and its implications on women's exit from the workforce. I identified the patriarchal legacies of the single-party period and the 1980s military regime, and the neoliberal economic policies for labor suppression in the 1982 Constitution as characteristics of Turkey's "neopatriarchy". Chapter 5 concludes.

## Chapter 2–The Capability Approach Framing of Social Exclusion

The conceptual framework of the study is based on Nussbaum and Sen’s capability approach framing of development. This chapter outlines their work and explores social exclusion as an explanatory theory. The overlapping elements of the capability approach and social exclusion are identified through two European social exclusion studies. The purpose of this exercise is to form a basis to explain the low “economic activity” of working women in Turkey.

### 1. The Capability Approach

The capability approach creates an analytical model of individual decision-making to explain development. The decision-making model assumes that the individual’s objective is achieving the best set of opportunities given their resources and constraints. Research implementing the capability approach has discussed multi-dimensional well-being (Robeyns 2005). It has evaluated personal, social, and institutional determinants of well-being on whether they improve or constrain human development.

The neoclassical understanding of development stands in stark contrast to the capability approach. Neoclassical theories evaluate well-being in isolation and define poverty as a lack of income (Clark 2006). Expecting economic growth to “trickle down” to the masses, it basically frames development as a product of humans accumulating income from working, and deriving utility from the consumption of goods and services. As such, the capability approach provides a more balanced understanding of a human-centric development.


Like other alternative approaches to development, Sen's thoughts were shaped in a global economy transforming from Fordism to post-industrial production in the 1970s. Understanding poverty "in terms of poor living, rather than just as lowness of incomes" (Sen 2000, p.3), Sen's capability approach contains Aristotelian influences. In an address to the Asian Development Bank, Sen acknowledged that while income is vital to decent living, the freedom to partake in activities a person wants to do is more reflective of their quality of life (Sen 2000). In other words, even if macroeconomic growth "trickles down" to the masses, it does not imply improved living standards. Some researchers contest the originality of human-centric development thinking (see Room 1999, Peruzzi 2014). Yet, Clark argued Sen's multi-dimensional understanding of poverty is historically significant as it reestablished humans as the ends of development rather than maintaining their status as instruments of the economy (Clark 2006). In creating a space to discuss variation in people's quality of life based on capabilities, Sen's capability approach is an original contribution as it recognized diversity between individuals as well as groups of people (Clark 2006).

### Conceptualizing the Capability Approach

In her theoretical review of the capability approach, Robeyns (2005) defined three components of a capability assessment: "means to achieve", "freedom to achieve", and "achievements" (p. 98). The "means to achieve" begins with converting resources (e.g. education) and income earned from work, into "commodities". "Commodities" are used to identify a set of capabilities that an individual or group might be able to achieve. For the "commodities" to be

transformed into capabilities, they must be assessed with respect to “individual conversion factors” (Robeyns 2005). Based on the context where the capability approach is implemented, we can discuss “individual conversion factors” that either hinder or foster (or both) possible capabilities into becoming feasible capabilities. Although Robeyns (2005) emphasized that Sen does not distinguish between the phrases “capabilities” and “capability set” (p.100), Clark (2006) distinguished between capabilities humans may have the chance to achieve, and capabilities humans are likely to achieve by referring to the latter as the “capability set” (p. 35). Clark’s conceptualization provides a deeper understanding because he embeds the role of “individual conversion factors” into the capability assessment. These “individual conversion factors” carry implications that are paramount to using the capability approach as an evaluative framework.

Figure 3 The Capability Approach Framing of Human Development



In Figure 3, I modified and summarized Sen and Nussbaum’s framework based on Robeyns’s (2005) and Clark’s (2006) interpretations. I re-conceptualized the capability approach as a three-stage individual decision-making model based on their collective research.

In the “means to achieve” stage, individuals use “resources” and “commodities” to access “capabilities”. “Resources” are individual endowments ranging from being literate to being healthy. These are used to command over material goods.

“Resources” and “commodities” are combined to form the set of possible “capabilities”. Finally, “individual conversion factors”<sup>2</sup> are used to filter individuals’ “capabilities” to the likely set of feasible capabilities.

In efforts to achieve a deeper understanding, this study will classify personal, social, institutional, and environmental factors. Personal factors include health, sex, race, literacy, and cognitive abilities (Robeyns 2005). Social factors include social norms, class hierarchies and gender norms within the household (Agarwal 1997). Institutional factors include state provisions, economic policies, gender norms outside of the household (Arıcanlı and Rodrik 1990; Moghadam 2004; Chant 2008; Bonvin 2012)<sup>3</sup>. Finally, environmental factors include geographic location (Robeyns 2005).

The second stage contains feasible capabilities in the “capability set” and a “choice (agency)” element that is influenced by “individual conversion factors”. The interactions between “individual conversion factors” and other elements of the capability approach justify using it to assess real-world issues. As such, “choice” is not determined by well-being since our goals and preferences are governed by a multitude of sources including those captured in the “individual conversion factors” (Sen 1990; Robeyns 2005). These decisions may even go against individual well-being (Sen 1990).

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<sup>2</sup> Researchers classify factors according to their conceptual undertakings. For instance, Robeyns (2005) views the state and social determinants as both social factors. In contrast, in her assessment of bargaining and gender relations Agarwal (1997) classifies the state as an institutional factor and social determinants as a social factor.

<sup>3</sup> Chapter 3 will outline specific differences between gender norms within and outside of the home.

The final stage records the outcome of the decision-making process. The “achievements” or “functionings” elements reflect the constraints discussed in the preceding stages. Given the human-centric interpretation of development as expanding the possible lifestyles people can achieve, functionings are the “actions and activities they want to engage in, be whom they want to be” (Robeyns 2005, p.95).

## 2. Social Exclusion

Social exclusion complements the capability approach framing of development. While theoretical and policy-level debates continue, it has been defined as a two-fold concept. Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou’s (2010) assessment of social exclusion risks amongst groups participating in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) provides a general definition: “denial of social, political and civil rights of citizens in society or the inability of groups of individuals to participate in the basic political, economic, and social functionings of the society” (p.242). In short, social exclusion is studied as an individual or group level “capability deprivation” experience or a nature of policymaking.

Sen (2000) connected social exclusion to historical literature on poverty and deprivation by defining it as a form of multi-dimensional “capability deprivation”. He argued that an individual or group experience of impoverishment is social exclusion if the occurrence removes them “from social relations” (Sen 2000, p.5). Social exclusion is a multi-dimensional deprivation because being excluded “from social relations” can lead to other “capability deprivations” (ibid). For instance, Adam Smith claimed that if an impoverished person is deprived of “being able to

appear in public without shame”, they would be unable to improve other aspects of their life through means requiring public engagement (Sen 2000, p.4). If people are unable to participate in public life because of a “capability deprivation”, then this impoverishment is social exclusion.

Forming a causal relationship between policymaking and social exclusion experiences has been framed in an active-passive divide (Peruzzi 2014). Sen distinguished between deliberate policies aiming to remove a group from “some opportunities” as active social exclusion policymaking and policies that create unintended consequences as passive social exclusion policymaking (2000, p.15). He exemplified active exclusion as immigrants and refugees not being given public benefits in their new countries and passive exclusion as persistent unemployment caused by slow economic growth (ibid). These policies create social exclusion as both will lead to further “capability deprivations” that affect public engagement. As such, even if social exclusion is unintended, Sen urged policymakers to rectify the circumstances of deprived individuals.

Social exclusion has become the European Commission’s (EC) approach to poverty and social disadvantage that was originally proposed during the European Economic Community’s (EEC) Paris Summit of 1972 (Room 1999; Çelik 2014). It was at this meeting that community members somewhat agreed upon the value of social policy to economic and monetary union in Europe (Çelik 2014). However, the economic turmoil of the late 70s and early 80s prevented operationalizing the social policy emphasis in 1972 (ibid). At this time, Britain under Margaret Thatcher adamantly rallied against a unified social Europe (ibid). Opposing a “federalist”

Europe, Thatcher practiced neoliberal governance and austerity in using public resources for social policies.

Neoliberal governance and economic turmoil (e.g. 1979 oil crisis) delayed the formation of a strong and socially-unified Europe (Çelik 2014). Naturally, other community members challenged neoliberalism. Starting from 1985, EEC President Jacque Delors opposed Thatcher's social policy stance (ibid). In contrast to Thatcher, Delors proposed to strengthen social policy by addressing social partners—unions, employer representatives and others—as actors in policymaking (ibid). He promoted social dialogue between governments and social partners in EEC countries (ibid). He based his arguments on the same rhetoric as The Paris Summit by linking social policy to European economic integration (ibid). These efforts culminated in the 1988 draft European Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights as guidelines for ideal living conditions in Europe (ibid). As a consequence of Britain's opposition, the EEC was unable to establish this charter unanimously (ibid).

Despite Britain's efforts against a unified social Europe, The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the European Union (EU) with a strong social protocol (Çelik 2014). Under the social protocol, the EEC became the EC and roughly 350 social partners were legally permitted into the European legislative process (ibid). The social protocol reform facilitated EU's transition from Keynesian government actors to expanding the legal role of non-governmental organizations. For instance, Maastricht's social protocol included the Agreement on Social Policy (ibid). This document addressed negotiating labor market conditions to improve living and

working environments, provide decent social protection, enable social dialogue, develop a strong workforce, and prevent social exclusion (ibid). In the 1990s, social exclusion was legally established on the EU agenda where social partners actively negotiate with governments for a strong social Europe (Peruzzi 2014).

The Republic of Turkey began the EU accession process with association to the Council of Europe in 1949 (Çelik 2014). Landmark agreements towards accession include The Ankara Treaty of 1963 that marked the beginning of a trade relationship, and The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 that emphasized the value of a strong social protocol to European identity and accepted Turkey as a pre-accession member (ibid). For Turkey to become a full member of the European Union, the country must fulfill Europe's social policy mandates including increased stability of institutions protecting minorities, furthered democracy and superiority of law, and protected human rights (ibid). Based on EU progress reports on Turkey's accession, Turkey has been unable to reduce barriers on the right to strike or the right to organize (ibid). It also suffers from weak social dialogue and unhinged police terror against mobilized subordinate interest groups (ibid). While EU-funded social exclusion reports are published (see Adaman and Keyder 2006), these reports have not been tools for social change.

### Elements of Social Exclusion

Researchers have conceptualized five properties of social exclusion. Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) claimed existing literature sees the multi-dimensional and dynamic aspects of social exclusion as what sets it apart from traditional views of poverty.

First, social exclusion as limited “functionings” are the products of multi-dimensional “capability deprivations” (Room 1999). This corresponds to the understanding of well-being in the capability approach and goes beyond a financial interpretation of poverty. Social exclusion begins with “means to achieve” in limited access to “resources” and “commodities”. The “individual conversion factors” actively or passively limiting “capabilities” such as political engagement, leisure, social activity, or community facilities results in “capability deprivations” in the “capability set” of “freedom to achieve”. As a result, groups with “resources” and “commodities” limitations experience exacerbated social exclusion.

Second, social exclusion is dynamic and it intensifies with duration (Byrne 1999). A person’s current decisions (“choices”) and endowments (“means to achieve”) are not the only causes of their current social exclusion (Peruzzi 2014). Furthermore, the longer a person has been limited in their “means to achieve”, the greater the temporal social exclusion they experience. In other words, social exclusion can be caused by previous stages and future prospects of an individual’s lifecycle. Similarly, current policy regimes are not solely responsible for current social exclusion. The intensity of policy-generated social exclusion increases with the length of time these policies are in place. As a result, social exclusion must be defined within the spatial and temporal context in which individuals experience it and in which policies further or resolve it (Byrne 1999; Peruzzi 2014).

Next, social exclusion is a relational issue and group experience. Expanding an example of decrepit community facilities in Room’s (1999) review of social exclusion can help explain these two aspects (p.168). Failing community facilities

foster social exclusion across all households depending on accessing these “capabilities”. Local cultures expand social exclusion and jeopardize future positive relations by imposing limitations on engaging with authorities for renewing community facilities. State housing projects transfer social exclusion to a wider group of people through funneling a group of disadvantaged people into the area while aware of the failing community facilities. Altogether, an entire community faces social exclusion rather than the direct beneficiaries of community facilities.

Social exclusion is a relational issue (Room 1999). In the decrepit community facilities example, a strong local culture hindered relations between the community and outside authorities. In this community, the individual’s ability to “appear in public without shame” required silence towards authorities. Feminists argue that traditional cultures disproportionately limit the freedoms of women (ibid). In other words, women have lower social participation, are less socially integrated, and have a relatively more formidable lack of power as a result of culturally embedded gender-specific disadvantages (ibid). Women’s disadvantages begin in the household and are intensified by policies that further hinder women’s bargaining positions in various milieus of interaction. The capability approach discusses these cultural disadvantages in social and institutional “individual conversion factors”.

Social exclusion is a group experience (Room 1999). In Room’s example, policymakers transferred social exclusion to more people by funneling a group of other disadvantaged people into the area. Room (1999) divided people into three groups: people at the same level (e.g. family, locals, colleagues), people with better

opportunities, and people with worse opportunities. He argued that policymakers separate people with better opportunities from people with both extremely bad and relatively bad opportunities by creating targeted policies (Room 1999). In other words, policymakers group people with bad opportunities together without factoring in diversity and create broader group-level social exclusion.

Fifth, social exclusion accumulates over time and results in catastrophe without successful policy interventions (Room 1999). Policymakers tend to have a convenient selective memory when viewing poverty. Instead of using the multi-dimensional and dynamic definitions of social exclusion, they tend to view poverty as life under an arbitrary poverty line (ibid). Conversely, poverty is a multi-dimensional issue that intensifies with duration and is geography specific. Room (1999) referred to the breaking point of social exclusion as “catastrophe” (p.171). After catastrophe, the new order becomes “social detachment” and this is not reversible.

### 3. The Capability Approach Framing of Social Exclusion

Robeyns (2005) argued that using the capability approach for policy evaluation needed “explanatory theories” (p.94). In light of this, social exclusion research in the past decade has included studies framing social exclusion processes within the capability approach. For instance, Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) and Peruzzi (2014) have appealed to the theories’ shared multi-dimensional and dynamic visions of well-being. Reviewing these studies and their results provides insight on what questions have been asked in using social exclusion as an explanatory theory for a capability approach study.

Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) and Peruzzi's (2014) empirical studies questioned whether certain population characteristics contribute to social exclusion. These studies vary in the extent they apply the capability approach in modelling and defining variables. They also vary in their approach to the two-fold definition of social exclusion as a group experience of multi-dimensional "functionings" deprivations or as a result of social exclusion policymaking.

In their paper assessing social exclusion risks amongst population groups in countries participating in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) created a method for identifying population members at high risk using ECHP data from 1994-1998. First, they selected a set of ECHP indicators based on the overlapping elements of social exclusion and the capability approach to identify "capability deprivation" (Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou 2010). Second, they created a "static indicator of cumulative disadvantage" for international comparison on each indicator (Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou 2010, p.246). Third, they identified dynamic social exclusion risks by studying the cumulative indicators for thirteen EU countries with sufficient data (Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou 2010). Their conclusions noted how "capability deprivations" lead to "functionings" deprivations.

The authors chose income, living conditions, necessities of life, and social relations as indicators for evaluating social exclusion (Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou 2010). Challenging the neoclassical perspective, their methodology valued the subjective indicators just as much as income. The living conditions indicator is a weighted index of twenty-two items on quality of accommodations

and household amenities (ibid). The authors did not expect all living conditions descriptors to hold equal value in each ECHP country (ibid). As such, they weighted a given asset with respect to its importance for the average household in a particular country during 1994-1998. The necessities of life and social relations indicators are general definitions of well-being. Yet, the authors suggested ECHP constructed the necessities of life indicator with insufficient information (ibid). They also said the social relations indicator discounts “choice (agency)” by simply reporting the number of social interactions of household members (ibid). In other words, whether the person does not like speaking to others or whether they are geographically isolated is not reflected by this indicator. They concluded the paper with an international comparison of static cumulative deprivation indices.

Regardless of the authors’ criticisms of the necessities of life and social relations indicators, their social exclusion risk methodology is spatially and temporally contextualized. First, they viewed income as a “resource” to achieve a greater “capability set”. Second, they conceived dynamic and spatially contextualized conclusions by weighting index components to reflect the values of average households, in a given country, at a given time. Third, their social relations indicator somewhat reflects social and institutional “individual conversion factors”. In short, this empirical study has a multi-dimensional and dynamic understanding of well-being where social exclusion begins as a “capability deprivation” and exacerbates limited “functionings” over time.

Peruzzi (2014) also used overlapping elements of the capability approach and social exclusion to create her empirical model seeking multi-dimensional and dynamic social exclusion risks. Her data was the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) and its follow ups. Like Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010), she used the notion of transforming “resources” into “capabilities”. She sought the extent “childhood deprivation” created “capability deprivation” in the short-term (adolescence) and the long-term (adulthood). Empirically proving that social exclusion intensifies with intra-generational “capability deprivation” transfer, she claimed a preventative value of targeting welfare investments to children. She saw the value of the capability approach in evaluating “the long-term processes affecting social exclusion” (Peruzzi 2014, p. 337).

Figure 4 The Capability Approach Framing of Intra-Generational “Capability Deprivation” Transfer



Source: Peruzzi (2014, p. 342-344) interpreted based on Robeyns (2005) and Clark (2006)

Figure 4 expresses Peruzzi’s (2014) model using the capability approach terminology. The childhood phase and the transition between childhood and adolescence are components of “means to achieve”. The childhood phase is analogous to “resources”, “commodities” and “capabilities”. Peruzzi’s constructs in the childhood phase form the “capabilities” that are transformed using “individual conversion factors” to the adolescence phase. She chose “material deprivation”, “family background”, and “early cognitive ability” as three

“childhood deprivations” that are determined by the individual’s family and institutional provisions (Peruzzi 2014). The breadth of these “means to achieve” determine the breadth of the “capability set” and “functionings”.

The transition from childhood to adolescence is analogous to the process of converting “capabilities” into the “capability set” after filtering through “individual conversion factors”. Peruzzi (2014) defined “adolescence deprivation” as a product of the interaction between “childhood deprivation” and the individual’s personal characteristics (e.g. high school grades, “smoking habits” (p.343)), the neighborhood environment (e.g. level of trash on neighborhood streets) and social surroundings (e.g. quality of the people in the neighborhood) of the adolescent. Using these “individual conversion factors”, the study argued “childhood deprivation” has a significant negative impact on “adolescence deprivation”. Robeyns’s (2005) “means to achieve” is completed with the transition from childhood to adolescence. The remaining “capabilities” form the “freedom to achieve” stage.

The “freedom to achieve” stage has two elements: “choice (agency)” and the “capability set”. In this study, “adolescence deprivation” is a product of the interactions between “childhood deprivation” and “individual conversion factors”. For example, the presence of trash is a cause of “adolescence deprivation”. If someone lives in a filthy environment that is underserved by trash collectors, s/he is limited in their “capability” to live in a safe environment. The interactions between “childhood deprivation” and “individual conversion factors” cumulate and constrain the “capability set” for being knowledgeable, enjoying emotional well-

being, living in a safe environment, and avoiding risky behavior (Peruzzi 2014). Furthermore, the individual's decision of staying in this neighborhood includes "choice (agency)" in Peruzzi's model.

The "mid-life social exclusion" stage is the product of the "adolescence deprivation" and the "childhood deprivation" stages. The list of adulthood "functionings" reviewed for this study was selected based on a democratic process reflecting British public opinion on well-being (Peruzzi 2014). Yet, this set of "functionings" are only applicable to this study where, Peruzzi (2014) was concerned with reviewing Britain's intra-generational "capability deprivation" transfers. For instance, she did not discuss gender differences or racial inequalities in accumulating disadvantages. In fact, Peruzzi discussed a homogenous and un-gendered society where the only gender disadvantage is experienced during childhood. In her study, being a child of a "teenage mother" or a "single mother" (p.346) limits "means to achieve". However, the implications of teenage pregnancy or raising a child alone on an adult woman's life are not part of the analysis.

Consequently, social exclusion studies should only be reviewed for suggestive lists of "capabilities" and "functionings" as these vary with study context. Jackson (1999) criticized the grouping of gender and sex by researchers discussing social exclusion. This is symptomatic of both Papadopoulos and Tsakoglou (2010) and Peruzzi (2014). The former used ECHP data without variables on gender or sex. The latter used a static approach to gender and discussed having a single mother as a material disadvantage for a child. Jackson (1999) argued that "un-gendered" social exclusion discussions are limited in their conclusions because they avoid

intra-household bargaining realities. For instance, both Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) and Peruzzi (2014) discussed labor market participation. However, neither outlined the disproportional care work obligations of some household members. Likely caused by data limitations, they did not discuss gendered social exclusion experiences.

#### 4. Conclusions

The capability approach and social exclusion are complementary theories to explain well-being. Their multi-dimensional and dynamic understanding of individual deprivations contrasts neoclassical literature. Neoclassicists understand development as growth in the extent humans accumulate income from working and derive utility from consumption. However, the capability approach and social exclusion assess personal, social, institutional, and environmental “individual conversion factors” that undermine or enhance “choice (agency)”. In other words, these theories are able to evaluate the variables leading to individual decisions.

As discussed by Clark (2006), the capability approach is a substantial addition to the literature because it emphasizes the diversity of people. This overlaps with Room’s (1999) view of social exclusion as a group experience. Policymakers can worsen “capability deprivation” by separating people with bad opportunities from people with better opportunities. If governments make a deliberate effort to deprive citizens of civil rights, they actively create social exclusion by hindering group ability to participate in basic public spheres. The European policymaking tradition of viewing capability expansion as development—instead of economic growth as development—emerged in the 1990s. While the EU has been valuing human-centric

development parallel with economic integration across member states (and candidate countries), EU candidate Turkey has failed to make similar progress.

Recent studies assessing social exclusion risks through the capability approach such as Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) and Peruzzi (2014) have provided gender-neutral conclusions. Jackson (1990) criticized such studies that “easily elide gender and women” in which “women are commonly listed, without comment, amongst vulnerable groups” (p. 130). Jackson (1990) argued such social exclusion studies understand women as “excluded subjects, equivalent to anatomically challenged poor men” (p.140) Acknowledging Jackson’s concerns, this thesis assesses gender-specific experiences of social exclusion to explain low labor force participation of working women in Turkey.

The capability approach can be used to theoretically ground social exclusion studies. For instance, Peruzzi (2014) identified the match between social exclusion and the capability approach as the “intrinsically dynamic” (p.337) nature of both theories. Her dynamic empirical model concerns the relationship between different stages of life and social exclusion risks. We can build on her conceptualization in a gender analysis of determinants of labor market participation decisions.

Chapter 3 will define the roles of the historical patriarchal legacy and neoliberal economic policies in the social exclusion of working women from the Turkish labor market. The study will deliver a gendered vision of the capability approach framing of social exclusion.

### Chapter 3–Labor Market Participation Bargains under “Neopatriarchy”

Chapter 2 introduced a conceptual framework combining the capability approach and social exclusion. Papadopoulous and Tsakloglou (2010) and Peruzzi’s (2014) studies have shown Jackson’s (1999) criticism of “ungendered” social exclusion evaluations remains meaningful. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to acknowledge such feminist criticisms and shape the understanding of gender in our study with respect to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. First, the theoretical, contextual, and policymaking shortcomings of the neoclassical evaluation of female labor force participation is critiqued from a feminist perspective. Second, the household, market, and state levels of “patriarchal bargains” are explored with feminist explanations of women’s “economic activity”. Third, the bargaining processes exacerbating working women’s social exclusion from “neopatriarchal” Turkey’s labor market are added to the Chapter 2 framework.

#### 1. Feminist Critique of Neoclassical Interpretations of Gendered Development

Everyone aged 16 and over who are actively seeking work, are employed, or expecting a recall after being laid off are participating in the labor market (Ehrenberg and Smith 2014). Neoclassical literature interprets female labor force participation from a market standpoint while feminist literature seeks the role of bargaining in women’s “economic activity” (Kabeer 2016). Neoclassicists assume women’s participation in the labor market is a reaction to wages and prices. This understanding views humans as instruments of the economy rather than encouraging market activity to improve humans’ quality of life. As such, neoclassicists have a limited understanding of how institutions impact decision-

making. Feminist evaluations on theoretical shortcomings of neoclassical expectations from growth and gender strengthen this argument.

Neoclassical macroeconomic studies influenced by Solow (1956) have evaluated economic growth as an outcome of labor and capital accumulation. Solowists have expected female labor force participation to rise as a result of changes in prices and wages due to economic growth (Braunstein 2008). The abstract connections in Solowist literature encouraged a macroeconomic institutionalist perspective (ibid). Institutional economics has evaluated the economic growth potential of norms and structures that influence labor and capital accumulation patterns (Seiz 1995). However, institutionalists have also taken the processes creating institutions as exogenous to their models (Braunstein 2008). In other words, causal explanations on power and coercion are not part of these studies (ibid). Both strands of macroeconomic literature have expected the commitment to economic growth to eradicate gender inequality in the labor market.

Microeconomic studies influenced by neoclassical growth literature continues the tradition of treating the processes producing institutions as exogenous (Braunstein 2008). These studies create game theory scenarios to discuss the objectives of actors, evaluate potential outcomes, and determine rules for achieving desired outcomes (Seiz 1995). For example, Thomas (1990) presented two intra-household bargaining scenarios for resource distribution. Under the first scenario, household members cooperated to produce egalitarian outcomes either by unanimous decisions or allowing a “benevolent dictator” to make decisions on behalf of the household (Thomas 1990). In the alternative scenario, household

members were able to act on their self-interest and did not have to cooperate (ibid). He tested their potential outcomes while assuming mothers were more altruistic towards their daughters and fathers were more altruistic towards their sons (ibid). He did not address the institutions supporting actor's objectives nor the power imbalances that would make mothers act more altruistically than fathers.

In contrast to assuming gender roles, feminist literature has drawn attention to the self-interested objectives behind women's assumed altruism (Braunstein 2008). For instance, if a woman invests a large portion of income into her children, it may be to coerce them into taking care of her at old age (Kandiyoti 1988). Kandiyoti (1988) discussed "capability-deprived" women's bargaining objectives in the Muslim Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia. These "male farming systems" have historically barred women from property rights and limited their engagement outside of the household through social norms (Kabeer 2016, p.298). As a result, women have labored in unpaid domestic work, relied on patrilineal institutions to exist, and have had lower life expectancies than their male counterparts (ibid). Lacking certainty for care in their old age, Kandiyoti (1988) argued that the constrained socioeconomic position of women encouraged coercion as a survival mechanism. Such feminist literature challenges neoclassical models assuming innate altruism (Braunstein 2008).

Instead of grounding their assumptions on altruism, neoclassicists use econometric models to validate scenarios and evaluate potential outcomes. Thomas (1990) tested his hypotheses by regressing wages on child health indices using Brazil's 1982 Population Census. As expected, he found that parents invested more

in their *favorite* child and mother's income had a greater positive impact on family welfare for father's income (Thomas 1990). Kabeer (2016) challenged the reliability of altruistic parent assumptions. Perhaps fathers who permit their wives to work also treat their children better (Kabeer 2016). In her theoretical review of how game theory, feminist perspectives, and institutionalism can create better explanations, Seiz concluded: "whether we seek to improve, to supplement, or to counter game-theoretic work, we clearly need analysis that is neither wholly formalized nor economic and is qualitative and historically specific" (1995, p.616). Eclectic models resulting from such an approach could provide greater insight on growth and gender.

## 2. Patriarchy

A spatially and temporally grounded explanation of working women's labor market participation in developing countries must include both "intra-household" and "extra-household" determinants (Agarwal 1997). According to Agarwal (1997), bargaining happens in the household, neighborhood, marketplace, and state. Bargains in one domain can impact bargains in other domains and constrain "women's sphere of influence" to the home (Braunstein 2008, p.966). The supply-side explanation of women's "economic activity" decisions have concerned variations in household composition and patriarchal institutions by geographical context. The demand-side reviews have reflected the impact of bargains in other domains on employer hiring and firing decisions. State actors have supported gender equality policies with respect to "state capacity", policy legacies, desire for international integration, quality of democratic participation.

## Supply-Side “Patriarchal Bargains”

Working women’s employment decisions in developing countries share women’s motivation to escape poverty. Based on Kandiyoti (1988) and Kabeer’s (2016) interpretations of maternal altruism, their employment decisions could be self-interested but confined within historically-embedded patriarchal institutions. Feminist literature has argued that the extent patriarchal institutions affect the outcome of employment decisions can be determined by geography and household division of labor.

**Table 1 - Time Use by Sex in Turkey and Countries at Similar Gross National Income per Person**

| Country*          | Work Burden                       |       |     |                              | Total Work Time (%) |             | Time Allocation (%) |        |                   |        |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-------|-----|------------------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|
|                   | Total Work Time (minutes per day) |       |     | Female work time (% of male) | Paid Work           | Unpaid Work | Time Spent by Women |        | Time Spent by Men |        |
|                   | Year                              | Women | Men |                              |                     |             | Paid                | Unpaid | Paid              | Unpaid |
|                   |                                   |       |     |                              |                     |             |                     |        |                   |        |
| Mauritius         | 2003                              | 393   | 369 | 107                          | 54                  | 46          | 30                  | 70     | 80                | 20     |
| Panama            | 2011                              | 502   | 487 | 103                          | 57                  | 43          | 40                  | 60     | 74                | 26     |
| Mexico            | 2009                              | 614   | 536 | 115                          | 48                  | 52          | 28                  | 72     | 71                | 29     |
| Turkey            | 2006                              | 439   | 355 | 124                          | 42                  | 58          | 15                  | 85     | 75                | 25     |
| Hungary           | 1999-2000                         | 439   | 388 | 113                          | 52                  | 48          | 39                  | 61     | 67                | 33     |
| Republic of Korea | 2009                              | 333   | 285 | 117                          | 63                  | 37          | 44                  | 56     | 86                | 14     |

\*Table covers countries in [-5,14] range of Turkey's 2010 Gross National Income per capita due to data availability, sorted by lowest income.  
Sources: UNDP (2015), Table A4.1 and WB World Development Indicators (2015); based on Chant (2008) Table 3

Concentration in unpaid work prevents working women from accessing social insurance through labor. On average, 58 percent of all unpaid labor in the household is done by women (Klugman et. al. 2014, p. 140). Table 1 contains time use data for a set of countries that can be classified as “middle income” with respect to Turkey. In all cases, women spent more time working than men. Furthermore, time allocation by sex reveals that the larger portion of women’s work is unpaid, with Turkey reporting a 60 percent discrepancy between paid and unpaid work. Chant (2008) interpreted instances like the Republic of Korea where women’s time

is spent relatively more equally between paid and unpaid work as women offering to do more unpaid work to obtain their “husband’s permission” to participate in the labor market (p.191). This interpretation is verified as men spend only 14% of their time on unpaid labor in the Republic of Korea. As unpaid women’s work is not registered as “economic activity”, women may work more than men but they are unable to access social security benefits.

Studies influenced by Boserup (1970) have assumed the gender composition of production in developing countries reflected the extent that historical patriarchal institutions exacerbate gender discrimination. “Male farming systems” have historically barred women from land ownership (Kabeer 2016). This active social exclusion is an underlying factor causing traditionally low female labor force participation in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia (ibid). On the other hand, “female farming systems” have historically “feminized responsibility” by conditioning women to fulfill both the reproductive burden and share breadwinner responsibilities (Chant 2008; Kabeer 2016). “Female farming systems” in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America have been characterized by higher female labor force participation (Kabeer 2016). However, this social inclusion has been unfavorable as women’s employment does not indicate greater welfare such as reduced gender discrepancies in unpaid work (e.g. Panama and Mexico in Table 1).

There is also regional variation of women’s “economic activity” in geographies with “male farming systems”. For instance, Spierings (2014) sampled national household surveys for roughly 250,000 women from 28 Muslim-majority

countries to measure how patriarchal institutions impact women's employment. He found that the variation of non-agricultural paid employment in this "male farming" region varied between 3.6 percent in Yemen to 47.8 percent in Nigeria (Spierings 2014). Broad geographic expectations of patriarchy will yield inconclusive results and models must be more specific.

Variations in women's "economic activity" may be better explained by assessing geographic patriarchal institutions. Spierings used the dependent variable of women's non-agricultural employment to seek the regional variation in the strength of "institutionalization of public seclusion values" and "institutionalization of traditional family values" (Spierings 2014, p.93). His expectations of patriarchy were akin to Agarwal (1997). Agarwal (1997) emphasized the role of "extra-household" dynamics in shaping the interactions between intra-household actors and the broader spatial levels that form the "public sphere". The public spheres in her analysis addressed interactions of the household with: other households, the market, the community, and the state (ibid). She argued household entitlements are shaped by these domains where gender relations are "constituted and contested" (Agarwal 1997, p. 34). Likewise, Spierings's (2014) econometric model found household composition affected intra-household bargaining with respect to the extent patriarchy was institutionalized in the public sphere. For example, female employment was 33 percent lower in countries barring women from leaving the home without a male relative ("purdah" traditions) in comparison to countries with milder public seclusion (Spierings 2014, p.99). Specifying the concentration of

patriarchal institutions in geographical locations can explain whether a woman belonging to a particular household is likely to work.

#### Demand-Side “Patriarchal Bargains”

Feminist macroeconomic literature has explained employer decisions to hire working women by evaluating domains creating bargaining power. The first domain is the home. Traditionally, developing country households have been characterized by a gendered division of labor where most unpaid work is done by women. The household devalues these contributions by assuming women’s altruistic composure. The second domain is the market. Market agents restrict their accounting of goods and services to production that can be sold in the market. As the greater portion of women’s work is concentrated in sustenance, the market valuation of women’s “economic activity” negatively affects their ability to participate in the labor market. This is because employers have impressions of women as mothers and expect them to be less attached to their careers and more attached to their families.

The gendered division of labor has been evaluated as a norm that enforces a secondary earner status on working women in developing countries. For instance, Sen (1990) traced the gender wage gap to the division of labor in South Asian households. He argued that women in these countries are concerned with “family welfare” more than their own well-being (Sen 1990, p.126). He based this notion on the innately altruistic nature of mothers who perceive their interests as less important than family interests in “capability-deprived” environments. Although Sen’s (1990) study is spatially grounded, restricting women’s agencies to altruism

hinders the validity of his assessments. Agarwal (1997) argued that Sen's (1990) women were altruistic because his explanation was limited to the overt ways in which women protest and the explicit ways in which women bargain. In other words, women have more than one way of communicating their unhappiness. These include: "persistent complaining, pleading ill-health, playing off male affine and consanguine against each other, threatening to return to natal home, withdrawing into silence, withholding sex" (Agarwal 1997, p.18). As a consequence of Sen's incomplete vision of saintly women in impoverished circumstances, Agarwal (1997) believed the development projects that Sen influenced are charitable, rather than engaging women into believing they can live better lifestyles.

Assuming women possess an innate desire to allocate most of their time to benefit their families has made them less entitled to intra-household "resources" and "commodities" allocations. Sen (1990) created a game theoretic model and allocated "perceived interests" and "perceived contributions" to explain the processes creating the unequal entitlements of his gendered actors (p.125). The household perceives women's largely unpaid work as less valuable than men's largely paid work (Sen 1990). Even if women are engaged in paid work, their reproductive responsibilities confine household interpretations of their work to sustenance-related fields (ibid). As a result of discounting the value of women's contributions, the household grants more entitlements to men (ibid). These entitlements are influenced by socially ascribed expectations on interests such as altruistic mothers and self-interested fathers (Kabeer 2016). Expectations from children to grow into these roles causes gendered discrepancies in education and

network (e.g. after school, boys play while girls take care of siblings) endowments as well (Sen 1990). The distribution of entitlements engrains greater gendered inequalities each time the allocation decision is made (ibid).

The market valuation of time spent on work creates the second norm enforcing a secondary earner status on women. Studies influenced by Waring (1989) have emphasized how economic accounting processes reject production resulting from women's labor. The neoclassical definition of "economic activity" as the production of goods and services that can be "bought and sold in the market place" excludes a vast portion of work performed by women (Kabeer 2016, p.298). This is because "economic activity" can result from an individual's own production but also from an individual "appropriating" another's production (Braunstein 2008, p.967). In other words, women's unpaid labor in the household can include domestic work for sustenance and informal production that men sell in the market place (Dildar 2015).

The household devalues women's contributions while the market discounts the majority of women's work from "economic activity". Mandel and Semyonov (2005) argued socially ascribed maternal and secondary-earner roles to women is a cause of gender discrimination in hiring practices. Companies have to internalize the costs (e.g. daycare) associated with women's maternal roles as state coverage declines (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). Women are expected to take parental leaves while men are not (ibid). Reproductive costs associated with women workers incentivize employers against hiring women for jobs with large training

investments (ibid). The employer's expectation is informed by household division of labor norms.

Preferring male candidates exacerbates gender pay gaps and furthers "occupational segregation" (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, p.951). Manufacturing, construction, transport, and communications continue to be male-dominated sectors across the globe (Klugman et.al. 2014). On the other hand, women practice in education, health, social work, providing menial labor as clerks, hospitality, and retail sellers (ibid). Seguino argued "semi-industrialized export-oriented economies" with balance of payments deficits exploit the gender pay gap to attract foreign direct investment (2012, p.7). Women in these developing countries have been employed for low wages in producing labor-intensive manufactured goods requiring low skills (Çağatay and Berik 1990; Seguino 2012).

Low quality employment does not "challenge traditional gender norms" (Braunstein 2008, p.973). For example, the Republic of Korea's working women were channeled into labor-intensive sectors (Braunstein 2008). Aristocratic men in this country collected unearned revenues called "rents" by appropriating the benefits of working women's "economic activity" (ibid). Companies have maintained patriarchy by channeling women into jobs that pay less, locating factories near villages to access the labor of daughters facing patriarchal mobility constraints (ibid). The gendered division of labor from home spills into the market as employers help maintain the secondary earner status of working women. Patriarchal institutions are strengthened by this market fortification.

## State Actors and Patriarchy

State actors have various constraints determining their likelihood for supporting the interests of working women. For instance, Htun and Weldon (2010) studied state propensity for adopting and implementing gender equality policies. They conceptualized “state capacity”, earlier policies, international advocacy, and “degree of democracy” as parameters (Htun and Weldon, 2010, p.208). Htun and Weldon (2010) suggested state emphasis on enhancing “capabilities” for women varies with: effectiveness of state institutions, policy legacies, value of global integration, and quality of democratic participation. National context has multiple characteristics informing the causal links creating gender policies.

Concerns for creating an internationally competitive market has influenced state allocations of “capacity” in developing social insurance mechanisms. Social insurance as a combination of social security and social welfare, emerged during import-substitution periods of industrializing countries (Kabeer 2016). Male-biased social insurance systems allocated social security earnings to men with full-time employment (ibid). At the same time, social welfare expenditures enhanced institutionalized education while internalizing reproductive costs (ibid). States began divesting from social insurance to attract foreign direct investment by reducing labor costs during export-led growth periods (ibid). While some reproductive costs have been absorbed by the private sector, these additional expenditures have incentivized gender discrimination in hiring practices (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). When labor-related means to internalize reproductive costs

decline, the unpaid labor of women absorbs these costs as per the gendered division of labor.

The extent working women's agency is sacrificed through social insurance divestment policies varies with respect to patriarchal legacies. For instance, Moghadam (2004) studied how competitive market reforms are changing the patriarchal family in the Middle East. She defined "neopatriarchy" as "the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the context of dependent capitalism...modernized patriarchy" (Moghadam 2004, p.148). Weak social insurance in the presence of strong patriarchal institutions such as public seclusion can be lethal to women's "capability to work". Under "neopatriarchy", austerity policies to increase market competitiveness will exacerbate the social exclusion of working women from the labor market.

The instrumental value of gender equality policies is determined by state actors' strategies for national integration into the global economy. For instance, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the foremost international document for resolving the public and private inequalities affecting women (Çakırca 2013). CEDAW was rejected by conservatives in the US on the grounds that it would ease access to abortion (Htun and Weldon 2010). On the other hand, Peru's putsch regime ratified CEDAW and attended the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing (ibid). While the US "state capacity" could implement CEDAW, religious interests outweighed concerns on ratifying the international document. On the other hand,


Peruvian despots sought international approval for their new regime by supporting gender policies contradicting undemocratic practices.

The quality of public representation in decision-making affects the influence of women's interests on gender policy debates. While democratic participation is valuable within itself, whether individual concerns are reflected on to collective agendas of representative agencies determines the quality of "capability for voice" (Fukuda-Parr 2003; Bonvin 2012). In other words, the existence of representative actors does not imply the voices of members are reflected in public debates. For example, women's groups are unlikely to negotiate for social insurance reforms under neopatriarchal "state capacity" (Htun and Weldon 2010). The decision to dismiss these debates reflects the imposition of group elite interests on to members. While other issues such as preventing sexual harassment at the workplace are pressing, if social insurance reforms are more important to members then the quality of public representation is limited in this context.

### 3. Conclusions

A capability approach framing of the bargaining processes exacerbating working women's social exclusion from the labor market under "neopatriarchy" is visualized in Figure 5. This model combines the capability approach conceptualization from Chapter 2 with the feminist critique in Chapter 3. The "means to achieve" stage contains elements taken as a given in the "neopatriarchal" setting. The "freedom to achieve" stage covers the results of socially ascribed expectations on male and female agency. The "achievements" stage outlines the

labor market results of the diminished agency of working women. Chapter 4 applies this model to the context of Turkey.



### “Means to Achieve”

This study assumes intra-household allocations of “resources” and “commodities” entitlements are determined by patriarchal social norms. In the demand and supply bargaining processes concerning working women’s employment decisions, feminist literature highlighted the widespread social norm of women providing unpaid work for household sustenance (Chant 2008; Kabeer 2016). Feminist studies have suggested “male farming systems” and the strength of gendered household division of labor elucidates whether women would be able to seek work (Boserup 1970; Spierings 2014; Kabeer 2016). The household perceives women’s largely unpaid work as less valuable than men’s largely paid work (Sen 1990). As children are expected to grow into these roles, there is a gender-biased distribution of “resources” (e.g. networks and education) and “commodities” (i.e. material goods) (ibid).

The capabilities assessed in this study are “capability to work” and “capability for voice”. The dynamics of “capability to work” includes the household division of labor and social insurance provisions (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). The “capability for voice” refers to the ability of collective agents to represent the interests of their members in negotiations with authorities (Fukuda-Parr 2003; Bonvin 2012). These two capabilities are what individuals should be able to obtain given their “resources” and “commodities” allocated by the household.

This study uses “neopatriarchy” as an underlying “individual conversion factor” to filter “capability to work” and “capability for voice” into the “capability set”. The two components of “neopatriarchy” are patriarchal legacies including gendered public seclusion and neoliberal economic policies such as state divestment from social insurance. These dynamics are forces that interact to reduce the “agency” of working women to participate in the labor market. The dynamics that created Turkey’s “neopatriarchy” will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Historically embedded patriarchal social norms can limit women’s engagements outside of the home and bar women from enjoying the same civil liberties as their male counterparts (Kandiyoti 1988; Braunstein 2008; Kabeer 2016). This social exclusion begins in childhood years and leaves working women under-skilled, under-networked, and confined to precarious jobs with revenues appropriated by male family members (Sen 1990; Braunstein 2008). Women “overspecialize” in household sustenance while informal work prevents their

access to social security (Braunstein 2008). Collective representation of women's issues is limited as a result of public seclusion.

The austerity principles of states where patriarchal social norms continue have reinforced the gendered division of labor. Beginning in export-led growth periods, states reduced their coverage of social insurance to increase market competitiveness. Companies have been internalizing the costs of women's reproductive responsibilities (e.g. daycare, parental leave) as state support rescinds (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). State divestment from social insurance incentivizes gender discrimination in hiring practices as employers absorbing the costs associated with gendered responsibilities make women more expensive to employ than men (ibid). The unpaid labor of women absorbs reproductive costs when labor-related supports are unavailable. Patriarchal social norms on public seclusion are reinforced and institutionalized by "neopatriarchal" states implementing neoliberal economic policies.

#### ["Freedom to Achieve"](#)

The "freedom to achieve" stage of this study highlights state-induced gender inequality in labor market participation bargains. It focuses on the "neopatriarchal" state's role in directing working women's agency away from the labor market. The "capability set" of women living under "neopatriarchy" contains the constrained "capability to work" and "capability for voice". Public seclusion norms initiate both innately low "capability for voice" and unfavorable "capability to work". This historical patriarchy is exploited by "neopatriarchal" states with socially conservative agendas. These states harness power by exploiting the

traditions of families opposed to strengthening the position of women in the public sphere (Moghadam 2004). The role of Turkey's post-1980s "neopatriarchal" governance in reducing working women's agency to participate in the labor market will be discussed in Chapter 4.

#### "Achievements"

The "achievements" stage of this study displays the final outcome of the labor market participation bargains under "neopatriarchy". Working women face Sisyphean hindrances from historical patriarchy that are strengthened by neoliberal economic policies. I expect the interactions of the components of "neopatriarchy" to exacerbate the social exclusion faced by women prior to economic restructuring. I identify the steady decline of female labor force participation as the manifestation of exacerbating social exclusion.

## Chapter 4– Constraining Capabilities through “Neopatriarchy”

“Neopatriarchy” is composed of patriarchal legacies and rent-seeking capitalism (Moghadam 2004). This chapter evaluates the role of state institutions in crafting “neopatriarchy” in Turkey. The patriarchal legacies of the single-party period and the 1980s military regime have contributed to shaping contemporary patriarchal institutions. Neoliberal economic policies initiated during the export-led growth reforms have bounded state actors’ global integration strategies. The interplay between these components have crippled “capability for voice” and caused unfavorable “capability to work” for workers.

### 1. Patriarchal Legacy of Limited Gender Inclusion in the Single-Party Period

The nation-building phase of the secular Republic of Turkey is a great anomaly in the history of West Asia. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by soldier-turned-policymaker Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with a centralized governance structure. Turkey’s revolutionary government worked towards creating a modern economy and population from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. In 1924, the Islamic Caliphate was eradicated and legally disestablished gendered public seclusion norms to begin the incorporation of women into the public sphere. The reforms enacted in the single-party period still set Turkey apart from other countries in the region that have religion sanctions for citizenship (Moghadam 2004).

Reflecting a pattern in Eastern nation-building identified by Moghadam (2004), Turkey actualized economic reforms *with* education reforms. In 1923, the business-friendly economic policy of the new republic was ordained after the Izmir Economic Congress (Çelik 2014). Education reforms were synchronized with

economic policies as an educated workforce served the global economic integration interests of the new country. As such, Clause 87 of the 1924 Civil Code of Turkey stated: “Women, men all Turks must complete primary education” (ibid). However, rural areas were outside of the purview of nationalist reforms, and coup d’états strengthened the socio-economic divide between rural and urban dwellers (Buğra and Özkan 2012). Feudal patrilineal families dominated rural areas that provided Turkey’s agricultural economy (ibid). As a result, privileged urbanites were the sole beneficiaries of gender inclusive legal reforms (Kandiyoti 1987). Despite the strong legislative value of education, 80 percent of the female population was illiterate in 1950 (Buğra and Özkan 2012).

Under Atatürk’s leadership, the political elite of Turkey decreed a series of reforms for establishing the legal personhood of women. Based on the Swiss Civil Code, the 1926 Civil Code of Turkey outlawed polygamy and decreed gender equality in court testimony, inheritance, and divorce (Arat 1994). Women’s suffrage was granted gradually, first in municipal elections in 1930 and then in national elections in 1934 (Kandiyoti 1987). Turkey went from the ruins of a sultanate to electing eighteen women representatives in eleven years. Women’s “capability for voice” in the public sphere was given a legal basis at this time.

Feminist scholars have argued the instrumental value of gender inclusion for nation-building state actors. Kandiyoti (1987) suggested the timing of women’s political emancipation indicated early gender equality reforms intended to separate Turkey from European dictatorships rather than empower women. For instance, although the majority of women were working as unpaid agricultural workers, they

were not even able to benefit from the polygamy ban (ibid). The limited implementation of women's civil rights reforms prevented benefits from accruing to rural women.

Arat (1994) proposed Turkey was not a democratic society in the 1930s and 1940s. While suffrage was granted to women in the early 1930s, the reigning Republic People's Party (CHP) founded the Turkish Women's Federation in 1924 (ibid). Although this collective agency was to represent women's political interests, CHP discouraged women "from activism independent of the state" (Arat 1994, p.243). CHP facilitated the Federation's dissolution once their politics began to diverge in 1935 (Arat 1994). Turkey experienced periodical military coup d'états after the transition to a multi-party parliament in 1946 (ibid). The socio-economic divide between rural and urban women had solidified by the time the Federation was reestablished to further women's rights in 1949.

The decrees of the single-party period separated modern Turkey from authoritarian regimes whether Islamic or European. While the national government expected their reforms to lead to women's empowerment, their main focus was to establish a nation. The early "passive" social exclusion of rural women resonates in contemporary Turkey in the prevailing gendered division of labor.

## 2. Code Reforms through Gender Activism

Until 2003, Turkey's Civil and Penal Code legitimized the gendered division of labor. The codes valued family honor over gender equality in citizenship and maintained patriarchal institutions. Contemporary "neopatriarchal" governments have exploited these legacies to reinforce their constituencies. The codes were

changed after seventy-seven years once gender equality issues gained instrumental values in state actors' strategies for global integration.

The early gender equality reforms were unable to reverse deeply rooted patriarchal norms. The 1926 Civil Code approached women as extensions of their families rather than autonomous beings. Articles 152-159 referred to the status of married women (Tekeli 1992). These articles defined women as homemakers and men as breadwinners (152); gave husbands the power to represent the family in the public sphere (154); and permitted husbands to delegate representative powers to wives as long as husbands were held responsible for wives' actions (155). Also, a wife's decision to join the labor market was made subject to her husband's approval (159) (Tekeli 1992; Çakırca 2013). The Civil Code confined intra-household freedoms rather than enhancing individual freedoms.

The 1926 Penal Code constructed women as instruments for protecting "men's honor" (İlkkaracan 2007, p. 7). Adopted from Italy, the code harbored perpetrators of honor crimes and softened penalties for crimes against women (İlkkaracan 2007). For instance, sentences of rapists were waived as long as they married their victims (ibid). İlkkaracan (2007) argued that the code valued restoring the family's honor—their daughter's virginity—more than punishing the perpetrator of rape. The code's classification of rape as "crimes against society" as opposed to "crimes against individuals" supports this claim (İlkkaracan 2007, p. 8). Turkey's rape laws likely scared a woman from rejecting a man, lest he rape her and marry her to *legally* restore her family's honor.

LGBT and women's groups have tirelessly advocated for reforming Turkey's codes. Gender activism reemerged in the 1980s during Turkey's CEDAW debates after ending abruptly in the single-party period (Arat 1994). Gender activists survived the military infractions to democratic rule following the 1980 coup d'état. The military government began their reign by disbanding unions and political parties, imprisoning and torturing thousands from progressive and leftist organizations (Çakırca 2013). Gender activists were not subjected to these violations of human life (Aldıkaçtı Marshall 2009). In a similar way that Htun and Weldon (2010) understood Peru's 1990s putsch regime, perhaps the military state wanted to improve their image through romantic notions of encouraging women's rights (see Chapter 3).

Surviving post-coup purges, gender activists successfully used their "capability for voice" to muster international support against gender inequality in Turkey's codes. In 1985, Turkey ratified CEDAW: the foremost international document for resolving inequalities against women (Çakırca 2013). Gender activists relentlessly used CEDAW to legitimize gender equality norms during code reform debates. As a result of activism, the Turkish Constitutional Court began annulling gender discriminatory clauses of the Civil Code in 1990 (ibid). In 2001, the 1982 Constitution defined family "as an entity that is based on equality between the spouses" (Çakırca 2013, p.160). This new approach to family delegitimized the Civil Code's approach to married women. Gender activism gained international support to enable husbands and wives to make equal-weighted decisions regarding the family's presence in the public sphere.

The strength of LGBT and women's groups "capability for voice" has deteriorated against the authoritarianism of the current Islamist government. For example, code reforms have not prevented violence against women as domestic crimes have increased 1400% between 2004 and 2011 (Candaş and Silier 2014). Perhaps the government's insufficient preventions against this violent trend indicates their valuation of securing their patriarchal base over protecting women's right to life.

### 3. Legal Constraints to "Capability for Voice"

The 1980s military regime produced the notorious 1982 Constitution that continues to limit democratic participation in Turkey. For instance, the Trade Union Law No. 2821 and Collective Agreement, Strike, and Lockout Law No. 2822 have constrained trade unions' representative abilities as collective agents in negotiations with authorities. These limitations to "capability for voice" have constrained civil society as well.

#### Labor Suppression

Law No. 2821 limits the representative power of trade unions by constraining the worker's ability to unionize (Aklar 2010). Law No. 2821 permits unions to be established at the sector level and prohibits organizing at the occupational and workplace levels (ibid). This prohibition has crippled workers' "capability for voice" as union bureaucracies are detached from occupational and workplace issues. For instance, 16 percent in a sample of 1242 workers from some of Turkey's industrial cities agreed with the phrase: "unions are not interested in us" (Adaman et. al. 2009, p.182). Also, 36 percent said they were not union members because

they were afraid of being fired (ibid). Law 2821 poses a disincentive for workers to unionize as it prevents workers from the same workplace or occupation from coalescing against bad working conditions.

Law No. 2822 limits the actions that organized labor can take to influence collective bargaining (Aklar 2010). Law No. 2822 requires unions to represent at least 10 percent of workers in a sector and 50 percent of workers at a workplace to participate in collective bargaining (ibid). Since Law No. 2821 imposes restraints on unionizing at the workplace, workers are likely to organize only when they are already in a strong network. For instance, 62 percent of the 1242 workers agreed with the phrase “almost all workers were already union members, hence I joined too” as their reason for union membership (Adaman et.al. 2009, p.185). Workers left outside of the union network have an even weaker “capability for voice” as they face barriers in joining a union and wanting representation by seasoned workers. The “capability for work” also suffers as creating favorable working conditions without union support is more difficult.

In the summer of 2015, automotive workers and companies experienced the results of Law No. 2822’s limitations on collective agreements. Law No. 2822 limits the negotiation period for collective bargaining over wages and benefits to fifteen days (Şen-Taşbaşı 2014). First, workers at a Renault plant in Bursa went on an unauthorized strike after they found out that workers in their union at the local Bosch plant received a 60 percent raise (Candemir 2015). Their business-friendly union’s absence during the first twelve days of the strike caused Renault workers to organize at the workplace and draw new agreements (Resneck 2015). As a result

of this infraction to Law 2821's prohibition on workplace organization, workers at Ford in Eskişehir, and other plants joined the stoppage (Candemir 2015). While the workers at all plants eventually agreed on wages with management, without the protection of a legally strong union, roughly 500 workers were dismissed from their jobs (TRTWorld 2015). The strong opposition to unions by the state triggered a national manufacturing catastrophe.

Post-1980s state actors have justified cherry-picking social partners in collective agreements through Law No. 2821 and 2822's bureaucratic hurdles against the agency of workers. This limitation to workers' "capability for voice" has limited unionization to 5.4 percent of wage and salary earners (down from 10.6 percent in 1999) (Şen-Taşbaşı 2014). Furthermore, Law No. 2822's dual-threshold for participating in collective bargaining has excluded workers from collectively negotiated wages and salaries. Only 17.6 percent of workers were covered by collective wage agreements (compared to 67,5 percent in EU member states) in 2010 (Özçüre et. al. 2013). Since Turkey has ratified union and social dialogue friendly International Labor Organization (ILO) Agreements No. 87 and No. 98, Law No. 2821 and 2822 impose baseless hindrances (Çelik 2014).

### Civil Society Suppression

Contemporary Turkey's anti-union stance resonates in the state's approach to the agency of civil society. Disavowing the political agency of unions and civil society has allowed post-1980s governments, especially the government reigning since 2002, to act without "public deliberation, scrutiny, and contestation" (Candaş and Silier 2014, p.117). Turkey's stance contrasts the inclusive nature of The

Maastricht Treaty's Social Protocol that permitted roughly 350 social partners into European policymaking (see Chapter 2). The EU's association of labor suppression with civil society suppression is reflected in annual criticisms of social dialogue in progress reports on Turkey's EU accession process (Çelik 2014).

Notoriously, Article 51 of the 1982 Constitution and Law No. 2911 requires unions to request permission to hold public meetings (Şen-Taşbaşı 2014). If the government believes the union meeting poses a threat to *national security and public health*, then the government can repeatedly postpone the meeting until the threat disappears (ibid). From 1963 to 1980, over 200 strikes were delayed on a similar legal basis (Çelik 2008). Between 1983 and September 2007, national security and public health concerns were cited to justify delaying strikes encompassing over 600 businesses and 350,000 workers (Çelik 2008). The 1982 Constitution has been instrumental to capitalist embezzlements. It has also prevented social movements by allies in solidarity with workers.

#### 4. Women's Exit from Manufacturing

The conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) replaced the military regime in 1983 (Arıcanlı and Rodrik 1990). ANAP's prime minister Turgut Özal was a former World Bank bureaucrat. He began restructuring the economy by moving from an import-substitution economy to export-led growth under the military regime and continued these reforms while leading ANAP (ibid). Relishing in the limited opposition after the 1982 Constitution, ANAP sought to attract foreign direct investment, divest from state industrial production, and provide export

subsidies (Voyvoda and Yeldan 2001). Some costs of export-led growth specifically constrained working women's "capability to work" in manufacturing.

ANAP maintained high export revenues for employers by severing the link between "gains in labor productivity" and changes in manufacturing wages (Voyvoda and Yeldan 2001, p.375). At the height of the export-led growth economy from 1983 to 1987, manufacturing grew 8.6 percent and shaped 10.8 percent of Gross National Product (Voyvoda and Yeldan 2001, p.378, 379). However, inflation rose from 18.4 percent during the final years of import-substitution (1972-1976) to 40.7 at the height of export-led growth (ibid). As such, export-led growth generated unsustainable revenues for employers while workers rapidly lost purchasing power (Çağatay and Berik 1990).

ANAP's trade liberalization and labor market "reregulation" created surplus manufacturing labor and "defeminized" the labor market (Çağatay and Berik 1990). Çağatay and Berik (1990) studied the differences between women's employment trends in Turkish manufacturing compared to other countries industrializing in the 1980s. In general, developing markets preferred to employ women when there was an abundance of labor-intensive and low-skilled jobs while women's labor had a relatively lower cost than men's labor (ibid). In Turkey, these conditions held under import-substitution but loosened after wealth losses due to substantial inflation under export-led growth.

Manufacturing was "defeminized" because of the changes in unionized men between the import-substitution (1966-1982) and export-led growth periods (1983-1987). Under import-substitution (1966-1982), there was a high concentration of

women workers in textiles, apparels, tobacco, and pottery (Çağatay and Berik 1990). The reduced real wages under export-led growth created Turkey's competitive edge in these perfect competition markets (ibid). However, these markets were no longer ideal for "feminization" as "repressive labor policies" following the 1982 Constitution removed the cost advantage of women workers (ibid). Restrictions to unionizing and union activity by Law No. 2821 and No. 2822 reduced the population and "capability for voice" of unionized male workers (ibid). Relative to unionized men's labor, women's labor was low cost but so was men's labor.

When all labor is low-cost and the number of jobs are not growing, manufacturing employers have preferred male labor. Turkey's female share of employment in manufacturing is 19.6 percent (ILO 2016). Moghadam's "neopatriarchy" could suggest the 1926 Civil Code's Article 159 requiring women to ask their husband's permission to work contributes to the current lack of women in the manufacturing sector. Perhaps, employers assume they would be bringing maladies to the household division of labor if they hired wives and sisters.

Evoking patriarchal emotions to justify gender-based actions is also a union strategy. In September 2006, a protest by eighty-five workers initiated fifteen months of collective bargaining at a Novamed plant in Antalya (Ustubici 2009). All assembly line workers of this German multinational were women (ibid). Headed by two seasoned male employees, Novamed workers joined Petrol-İş (ibid). Petrol-İş is a union representing 35 percent of workers in the petroleum, chemical, and rubber sectors (ibid). The workers unionized against employment conditions such as

requiring the employer's permission to get married or have children to prevent too many workers from taking maternity leave (ibid). Those who did not comply were subject to mobbing by supervisors (ibid). In her gender evaluation of the Novamed strike, Ustubici (2009) identified that Petrol-İş used the word "bayan" (missus, miss, lady) rather than "kadın" (woman) in their public communiques. The first word is preferred by those subscribing to patriarchal norms while the second implies women's individuality. The union appealed to patriarchal emotions to protect women by emphasizing the German employer's impositions on family life.

## 5. Conclusions

Turkey's contemporary "neopatriarchal" governance is a product of patriarchal legacies from the single-party period and the 1980s military regime, and neoliberal economic policies initialized in the ANAP period. State actors' stance on developing women's civil liberties has varied with the value of gender equality to actor strategies for global integration while maintaining the support of their constituents.


Early gender equality reforms established women's legal personhood yet institutionalized patriarchal norms. The 1926 Civil Code decreed gender equality in court testimonies, rights to inheritance, and divorce. At the same time, the code defined married women as extensions of their families and required women to ask for their husband's permission to participate in the labor market. In the 1930s, the Turkish Women's Federation was first encouraged but opposed once the Federation's politics diverged from the CHP platform. The continuance of patriarchal norms particularly effected rural women. The socio-economic divide

between rural and urban women had solidified by the time the Federation was re-established in the late 1940s. The single-party period's homemaking expectations from women resonate in modern-day Turkey.

The early 1980s military regime ended political opposition and used CEDAW debates to create a façade of respecting democracy. The regime violently cracked down on political dissidents until the 1982 Constitution passed parliament. At the same time, the military regime engaged with gender activists and facilitated CEDAW debates. The 1982 Constitution was rigged to silence the opposition by evoking patriotism. Unions must ask permission to hold public meetings and the government can reject the request if the meeting poses a threat to “national security and public health”. Organized workers seeking to broaden their “capability for voice” have been silenced through these means while the natural allies of workers have been complacent. Also, Law No. 2821 and No. 2822 regulated workers' right to unionize and the actions of unions during collective bargaining. The recent spontaneous struggles at Novamed and the automotive industry foreshadow negative implications for the entire economy if these impositions continue.

The state's instrumental treatment of gender equality has caused gendered “capability deprivation” since the state initiated neoliberal economic policies. Figure 6 traces labor force participation dynamics since 1988. ANAP's export-led growth reforms created surplus manufacturing labor. Also, Law No. 2821 and No. 2822 encouraged deunionization by male workers. As a result, employers acted on their predisposition to associate women with household sustenance and exchanged women with deunionized male workers. ANAP's reforms were supported by

neoliberal international agencies worried about the spread of the Islamic Revolution in Iran to Turkey. The international pressure garnered through CEDAW during code reform debates was absent during ANAP's disestablishment of the labor market as an institution for upward mobility. ANAP's legacy includes weakened labor market institutions that have perpetuated informality, limited job creation, and an unprecedented 19.5 percent decline in female labor force participation between 1980 and 2004.



Ganguli et. al. (2014) argued women between the ages 35-44 are likely to have made their decisions to have children, get married, and have a career. Their approach is emulated.  
 Source: ILO (2016), Key Indicators of the Labor Market Database; OECD (2016) Labor Force Status by Sex and Age Dataset

In some instances, it has paid to treat women as “bayan” in others as “kadın”. The early-2000s code reforms were enacted by the state as a response to gender activism and international pressure garnered from CEDAW. Back then, feminist activists were struggling for rights-based issues while the state was trying to use

gender equality for economic integration. As indicated by the 1400% increase in domestic violence against women during 2004-2011, the current gender struggle has reverted to survival-based issues. As the instrumentality of women's civil rights to the current government has declined, state actors are unlikely to work to reduce violence against women. The state's active social exclusion of women perpetuates the crippled "capability for voice" and unfavorable "capability for work" accumulated from patriarchal legacies and neoliberal economic policies.

## Chapter 5-Conclusion

This study explored the processes causing working women's absence from the Turkish labor market (Figure 6). It created an eclectic model to explain the impact of "neopatriarchal" institutions on women's social exclusion. It suggested deeply-rooted gender discrimination negatively influences women's labor force participation. This feminist perspective disputed neoclassical expectations on positive economic growth expanding women's "economic activity". Since Turkey's macroeconomic expansion coincides with the continuous decline of women's presence in the labor market, the study provided a valuable perspective.

The processes causing working women's social exclusion were drawn from critically evaluating and compiling established theories in the literature. The experiences of women in Turkey was understood as a "capability deprivation" and expressed through a capability approach framing of social exclusion. This synthesized model drew from Sen and Nussbaum's work (Figure 1) and was adapted as a three-stage individual decision-making model (Figure 2). In the first stage, individuals used endowments to envision opportunities. The conceptual framework filtered these wishes through real world constraints. The second stage expressed realistic opportunities and hypothesized the direction of the individual's decisions regarding these opportunities. The final stage presented the outcome of the decision-making process. Based on Robeyns (2005), these three stages were termed "means to achieve", "freedom to achieve", and "achievements" respectively.

The “means to achieve” stage explained patriarchal bargaining outcomes that have historically allocated less resources to women. Ideally, the individual should be able to achieve “capability to work” and “capability for voice” with their allocations. Our study assessed “capability to work” with respect to the gendered division of labor and “capability for voice” as the ability of collective agents to represent the interests of their members in negotiations with authorities.

Even in this early stage, the “capability to work” and “capability for voice” of working women in Turkey have been largely limited. Turkey’s 1926 codes defined women as instruments of men’s honor and required a wife to obtain her husband’s permission to work. In the early 1980s, Turkey enacted export-led growth reforms by easing capital flows and “deunionizing” male labor. These legal and market forces crafted Turkey’s “neopatriarchy” and confined women’s capabilities. Export-oriented policies created low-waged and labor-intensive work to attract foreign direct investment. While other emerging markets channeled women into these industrial jobs, Turkey exchanged female workers with deunionized male workers to satisfy male breadwinner expectations. Turkey’s “neopatriarchy” crowded out working women from the labor market while limiting “capability for voice” for all workers. Implementing export-led growth reforms in a patriarchal setting has been lethal to women’s participation in the workforce.

The “freedom to achieve” stage was the result of Moghadam’s (2004) “neopatriarchy” –patriarchal norms interacting with neoliberal economic policies– filtering “capability to work” and “capability for voice”. The dynamics crafting Turkey’s “neopatriarchy” had both historical and political roots. Post-1980s

“neopatriarchal” governments have continued to value macroeconomic competitiveness and conservative constituents’ interests over gender equality. As a result, women’s ability to influence the public sphere through working outside of the home and being represented by collective agents has further declined.

“Neopatriarchal” state actors have fortified patriarchal bargaining outcomes derived in household and labor market domains that have encouraged women’s withdrawal from the workforce. Presently, women in Turkey spend 85 percent of their time in unpaid work while men spend 75 percent of their time in paid work (Table 1). Even though women’s unpaid work includes informal production with revenues appropriated by men, the existing division of labor has enforced employer expectations of innate maternal altruism. State actors’ failure to rectify women’s disproportionate unpaid work is passive social exclusion. The state is also continuing the active social exclusion of working women from the labor market by maintaining an aversion to strengthening the position of women in the public sphere. Given household and labor market bargains resulting in unfavorable outcomes for women, “neopatriarchal” policymaking has aggravated women’s absence from the labor market.

The “achievements” stage expressed the impact of “neopatriarchal” governance on working women’s pre-existing social exclusion. The interactions of patriarchal norms and economic reforms have created Sisyphean limitations to working women’s labor market participation bargains in Turkey. These social exclusion consequences have shown that in the absence of state support to gender equality, economic growth does not lead to increased presence of women in the workforce.

The social exclusion model evaluated “neopatriarchal” governance as the culprit of working women’s absence from the Turkish labor market. Further investigation is needed to evaluate whether the social exclusion model holds in the household setting. Feminists have expected the household employment decision to be determined by geography and household division of labor subject to historically embedded patriarchal institutions. Turkey abolished the “male farming system” during the single-party period while upholding the husband as the breadwinner. The constrained understanding of freedom has created class-based differences in labor market participation bargains. The differences in working women’s social exclusion experiences could be investigated through household interviews and valuable for understanding future clashes between labor and capital in Turkey.

The thesis has contributed to understanding Turkey’s peculiar labor market outcomes in the context of other emerging markets reporting higher female presence in the workforce. The study framed social exclusion through the capability approach and explained gender specific “capability deprivations” as an outcome of the gendered household division of labor, with employers’ expectations of women’s adherence to socially ascribed maternal roles, and state actors’ attitudes towards gender inequalities. The study used “neopatriarchy” to connect the outcome of intra-household bargains to employers’ and state actors’ behavior towards maintaining gender discrimination in the labor market. Informed by feminist criticisms of prevailing discussions on women’s social exclusion, the thesis framed a gendered understanding of working women’s experience in the Turkish labor market.

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