

## BOOK REVIEWS

### *The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally*

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By William Shawcross

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, 463 pp., including index, \$19.95.

Often in the course of William Shawcross' post-mortem on the final days of the Shah of Iran, you have to applaud his reporting, admire the richness of detail, and conclude with a hearty "So what?" Once you have finished *The Shah's Last Ride*, you will know more about the spleen of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi than the White House press corps knew about the colon of Ronald Reagan. You will probably care even less.

When the shah fled Iran in 1979, he was already suffering from systemic cancer. His brief exile was a tragicomic odyssey in search of both a safe port and a good doctor. Along the way, a host of Third World wheeler-dealers and dictators, First World political operators and vainglorious physicians gathered to feast on the not-quite dead carcass. King Hassan booted him from Morocco when the Iranian revolutionaries called for his assassination. The Bahamians gouged his entourage mercilessly, at a rate that would soon have eaten up even the shah's many millions. The Americans first invited him, then withdrew their invitation when Iranian militants took the US embassy staff hostage in Tehran. Even Memorial Sloan-Kettering Hospital in New York, which had once accepted a million-dollar donation from the shah, tried to elude treating him. Finally, Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos offered him sanctuary, in a quixotic effort to use him as a "card" to play on behalf of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 US presidential election. The shah did not prove to be much of a card, so some Panamanians flirted with the idea of extraditing him to Iran, or perhaps suborning a doctor into putting him to sleep like a dog. Torrijos, Shawcross suggests, even made passes at the shah's wife, and General Manuel Antonio Noriega bugged the ex-emperor's phone calls. A critical spleen operation was postponed repeatedly, as American, French and Panamanian doctors squabbled over nationalistic protocol in the operating room. Finally, the shah and his doctors took the travelling road show to Egypt, where Anwar Sadat stood by him to the last, but Pahlavi died not long after the long-delayed splenectomy.

Two years before, the shah's doctors had recommended that his spleen be removed immediately. If they had done so, he probably would have lived to a ripe old age. But with his regime crumbling around him, the shah was reluctant to let his subjects realize he was so ill. Indeed, he himself did not know just how ill he was, since his entourage and his wife contrived to prevent his doctors from telling him he actually had cancer until long after he had

gone under the knife once and had begun chemotherapy. It may strain credulity that the ruler of a large country could have been so naive and easily fooled, but then this was the Shah of Iran. If anything, the cancer that rotted his body makes an appropriate metaphor for his rule. Surrounded by sycophants, he remained until the last completely ignorant of the causes of his country's historic upheaval, alternately describing Khomeini as a communist, and dreaming up wildly improbable plots by Britain's MI6 and the CIA to explain why he had lost his grip on his power.

Shawcross, however, does not see it this way. For him, the unconscionably poor treatment of the shah's cancer becomes a metaphor for Western betrayal of its longtime ally. The doctors used the shah for their own purposes, just as the United States and Britain had when he ruled Iran. "His downfall was that his allies . . . encouraged him in his conviction that he alone mattered in Iran," Shawcross concludes. While he is far from a David Frostian admirer of the shah, Shawcross manages to find much that is noble, particularly in his end. "He behaved during that forlorn and tawdry journey with both courage and dignity" (p. 416). It is hard to believe that such an observation comes from a clear-eyed critic like Shawcross, a Briton who wrote *Sideshow*, the widely acclaimed dissection of the US and Kissinger's role in Cambodia. More than once, one is tempted to suspect that Shawcross promised to say nice things about the dead, in exchange for getting access to some of the key figures he has extensively interviewed: the queen, the shah's twin sister Ashraf, even Noriega.

The material Shawcross presents hardly supports his own kind words of conclusion. The shah emerges in exile very much like the man who had been king: petty (offended when visitors did not curtsy or address him as "your majesty"), mean-spirited (unable to mourn for the friend he betrayed and sent to his death in a last-ditch attempt to save himself), confused and hopelessly out-of-touch (he thought the militant students who seized the US embassy were probably communists in drag). In sickness as in health, he managed to find time for a night out with prostitutes; as his courtiers had pimped for him in Tehran, so did Noriega's sleazy thugs in Panama City.

Pity the shah? It is hard. The bulk of Shawcross' book is devoted to the protracted medical nightmare of his exile, but most of his readers will find it much harder to sympathize with the victim than did Shawcross. Aside from a lack of heroic attributes, the shah just did not have it all that bad. Much is made here of the difficulties of the rich and famous in obtaining discreet medical care; for instance, the shah had to be shuffled through underground tunnels in the middle of the night on the way to the operating room for fear of Iranian assassins. Treated privately in the palace, his blood was not tested in a hospital for fear of disclosure of his condition. Those were undeniable difficulties. On the other hand, the shah had a leading French oncologist who commuted to his bedside from Paris — often on a moment's notice. Celebrated American doctors flew their entire surgical teams halfway around the world on his behalf. IBM arranged the airlift of sophisticated blood separators to him. American, Panamanian, and Egyptian officials went to great lengths to

assure security. David Rockefeller, perhaps because of the shah's heavy investment in Chase Manhattan Bank, dispatched assistants to his side, and they quite effectively and vociferously prodded the Carter administration into repeatedly intervening on the shah's behalf.

Henry Kissinger made much of the failure of the Carter administration to succor the shah. So does Shawcross, and it is curious to see these two figures on the same side of any debate. How could other allies rely on America, if it sold out such a longtime friend? There are two points to consider. First, US officials actually did quite a lot for the shah — so much so that the mullahs were always able, correctly, to point to US complicity in keeping the shah from the terrible wrath of their kangaroo courts. Second, why should the Carter administration feel obligated to stand by a rotten dictator who had been foisted on the Iranian people by British and American machinations that, many years before, established his dynasty, and then restored him to the throne in a coup at least partly engineered by the CIA? Exasperated by the efforts of the shah's friends to intervene on his behalf, President Carter at one point exclaims, "Fuck the shah" (p. 241). Cutting him loose would have gained at least as many friends as it lost. Instead, the United States neither had its cake nor got to eat it. It backed the shah just enough to infuriate its enemies, but not enough to reassure its friends.

One thing shouts from the pages of Shawcross' book, though not in so many words: the shah was not fit to rule a country. So ignorant, he blithely outraged the mullahs and the bourgeois alike by instituting a calendar based on the non-Islamic reign of Darius the Great. So cowardly, he prematurely fled the country in 1953 when the CIA and others were engineering a coup for him. So indecisive, he was incapable of acting when the revolution heated up in 1978. Finally, he left his country when the US ambassador told him to go — and complained miserably afterwards, much like a little boy bitter that his daddy made him go outside without his coat.

The shah's last travails in exile were metaphoric in this regard as well. Certainly, the squabbling of his doctors, their delays and infighting, may have contributed to his early death. Yet Shawcross seems to overlook an important point: who was to blame for that? Pahlavi was, after all, a grown-up, sapient until the end. In exile, he was surrounded by advisers, American and Iranian. He was still rich. The tragedy, for those who cared, was simply that he proved to be as incompetent at managing his own medical care as he had been at running his own country.

Reviewed by Rod Nordland.  
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*Inside Development in Latin America: A Report from the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Brazil*

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By James Lang

Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988, 307 pp., \$37.50 cloth, \$12.50 paper.

Most of the existing literature on Third World development, when it does not deteriorate into an extremist diatribe on the evils of economic dependency and Western cultural imperialism, employs sophisticated macroeconomic models and complex quantitative analyses to generate prescriptions for the ills of poor countries. Such literature focuses on the current account, exchange rates, export-led growth, public sector spending, and the like. Especially in the 1980s, a "decade of crisis" throughout the developing world, all emphasis has been on debt servicing, IMF-imposed austerity, and the search for macro-level solutions to a host of pressing problems.

A refreshing and eminently readable departure from these standard macroeconomic tracts on development is James Lang's *Inside Development in Latin America: A Report from the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Brazil*. In a smooth, almost folksy style, Lang takes the reader "behind the scenes" to examine the status of grass-roots development projects in agriculture and public health in three Latin American countries. His report is a selective compilation from visits to 34 development projects in six Latin American countries between 1981 and 1984 under the sponsorship of the Kellogg Foundation. It is an honest attempt to examine the mechanics of agricultural development and public health from the vantage point of the individual workers involved. His descriptive style, citing personal interviews and poignant observations, is engaging and informative while resisting the temptation to merely deteriorate into a sophisticated travelogue.

The selection of the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Brazil is appropriate, given that they represent the three most commonly used groupings of Latin American countries. The Dominican Republic is from the most underdeveloped group of Latin American nations, comprised mainly of small countries; Colombia represents the "middle range" of countries, with higher levels of GDP per capita and more advanced industrial sectors than the first group; and Brazil is one of the "first-tier" Latin American countries with well-developed industrial sectors and large internal markets for manufactured and consumer goods. The countries highlight one of Lang's key underlying themes: in spite of the vast differences in levels of income and industrialization among these countries, the challenges of grass-roots development are essentially the same. He argues that in the drive to "modernize" and "industrialize" the needs of the lower classes of society have often received low priority or have been ignored altogether.

In the opening section on the Dominican Republic, Lang demonstrates that rural agricultural development is beneficial and can be promoted through careful planning and local community involvement without depleting the national treasury. Plan Sierra, a pilot project designed to target rural development in a key northwestern agricultural zone, is such an example. The Plan was a comprehensive program of technical education, government credit extensions, and careful supervision by trained agronomists through each phase of planting and harvesting. Designed to boost production of both cash crops and necessary foodstuffs, the Plan achieved modest yet commendable results. Local farmers learned to work together in sharing ideas and methods, and were able to improve their economic situation through more local self-help and less central government intrusion. The author convincingly argues that projects like Plan Sierra can work if trained local staffs are given funding and the freedom to work with minimal centralized supervision.

Moving on to Colombia, the book shifts focus to community health. In spite of many lingering (and some apparently intractable) problems, Colombia is, Lang argues, a model for the region. He applauds the effort to decentralize community medicine and to reach the urban and rural poor who traditionally have had little access to medical care and who often lack basic education in matters of hygiene and disease control. He describes Colombia's health system as a well-organized chain ranging from the small rural health posts to the specialized hospitals in the large urban centers. The goal of the health system design is to educate citizens at the local level about the necessity of preventive medicine in order to minimize the need for expensive and specialized care. While he praises the philosophy behind such health care systems, Lang is quick to identify areas of concern. Money simply is not spent where it is needed most. Funds are allocated to educate doctors in surgical specialties and to equip urban hospitals which cater to the upper classes with the latest medical technology. For the poor, however, essential vaccines remain unavailable, and adequate supplies of clean drinking water and access to sewer systems are merely a dream. If governments truly want to improve health care, Lang argues, priorities must change.

The largest section of Lang's book is devoted to Brazil not only because of its size and regional importance, but because (as Lang admits) it is the country he has visited most frequently and about which he knows the most. He describes in extensive detail governmental agriculture and health care projects in two separate regions but expresses little optimism for their success. Lang views the Brazilian approach to development as an expensive "big-project" philosophy that has succeeded in turning the nation into a world industrial power but has left the majority of Brazilians poor, destitute, and isolated from the benefits of "modernization." Inappropriate development, he argues, is not really development at all.

*Inside Development in Latin America* is a persuasive and well-written book. Lang's general arguments are convincing, and he provides a good feel for the challenges development workers face on the ground level. If it has one flaw, it would be that Lang's zeal for local development may actually go too far in

its rejection of the macro-level type of analysis mentioned earlier. One gets the feeling that if only Latin American governments would quit building dams and subsidizing automobile factories, and, instead, pour their resources into credit programs for small rural farmers, sewage systems for urban slums, and basic health care, development problems would disappear. Of course, Lang is correct in arguing that these matters should receive greater emphasis in development programming than they do currently. But to describe them as if they were a panacea for present problems and a vehicle to national prosperity is unrealistic.

There is, of course, great room for criticism of Latin America's approach to development. But in his scathing dismissal of national governments, the IMF, and just about everybody else involved in macroeconomic planning, Lang reveals an ignorance about basic economic realities that weakens his analysis. It is not enough to call for increased spending on programs for the poor; governments cannot spend what they do not have and escape the consequences for very long (a verity for which the current debt crisis is all the proof needed). It is unfair for him to roundly condemn the government's economic planners without suggesting more realistic ways for solving the problems he so effectively brings to the reader's attention.

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## *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule*

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By J.F. Brown

Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988, 576 pp., including appendixes, bibliography, chronology, index, \$57.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

J.F. Brown's analysis of the roughly 40 years of communist rule in Eastern Europe is lucid and enjoyable reading. Although the volume is a well researched and detailed account of the region, it does not claim to provide a complete history. Rather, several "intertwined motifs" which have characterized and shaped Soviet domination are traced within the eight Eastern European nations. Despite an over-reliance on secondary sources, the book clearly succeeds.

In the four years following the end of World War II, the six Warsaw Pact countries, along with Yugoslavia and Albania, had Stalinist systems thrust upon them. Designed to bind the region more closely to the Soviet Union, this uniform political and economic model ignored the distinctive historical and cultural features of each country. This, along with the ever-changing ebb and flow of relations between Moscow and Washington, produced significant variations in policy and perceptions within the Eastern European countries. The "loss" of Yugoslavia in 1948 and Albania in 1961 are dramatic examples of this incongruence, while intransigence to reform in the 1980s — most notably in East Germany and Czechoslovakia — represent a curious contemporary manifestation.

Postwar Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe has followed distinct phases, corresponding roughly with the changes in leadership in Moscow. Brown argues that problems of Soviet succession and continuity in bloc actions remain the fundamental dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership. In 1947 Stalin founded the COMINFORM to emphasize Soviet dominance and to favor the local "Muskovite" faction at the expense of popular acceptance of the regime in question. After the 1956 upheavals in Hungary and Poland, Khrushchev sought to change the means of control (though not the substance) and created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to form a "less brittle" partnership between superpower and client state. Gorbachev represents a new approach to this important motif, yet he is not immune to its inherent dangers.

While Brown reports that both Soviets and Eastern Europeans consider their trade relationship a form of mutual exploitation, the Soviet Union has been the biggest loser overall. Cheap oil and other resources from the Soviets led to impressive economic growth in the aftermath of the "Prague Spring." But the Soviets have remained the buyers of last resort and have even allowed their allies to run sizable deficits in order to meet the payment schedules of Western creditors. The shock of OPEC oil price hikes in the early 1970s, the

influx of ill-used petro-dollars to the region, the Soviet unwillingness or inability to plan for future energy and raw materials needs, and the same tired centralized planning system convinces Brown that the long-term economic outlook is bleaker than ever.

In addition, Brown argues that relations between Eastern Europe and the West will continue to pose problems for the Soviet Union. There has always been a general attraction to things Western, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, countries with strong historical attachments to the West. During detente, with its massive flood of Western credits and multiplicity of contacts, West Germany emerged as an influential economic agent in the region and now rivals the United States in direct financial involvement. The author maintains, however, that US policy is still the most influential and credible presence in the region. By stressing differentiation, or treating each country according to its domestic policy and "independence" from the Soviet Union, the United States has been successful in securing its presence within each country.

Few can dispute that it is an exciting time in Eastern Europe. Although Brown rejects the notion of an overriding theme in his work, the coattail effect of *perestroika* serves as a unifying force. Twenty-five years ago, the author, along with many Western analysts, believed the factors of de-Stalinization, nationalism, and need for economic reform would "push" Eastern Europe toward pluralism. The invasion of Czechoslovakia put an end to such thinking:

August 1968 shattered this optimism, and yet 20 years later the urge for change is still there and the need for it is even greater. The crucial question is — or is going to be — how long can the Soviets and the East European elites resist it, or how long will they continue to think there is still more to be gained by resisting the urge than accomodating to it or even embracing it (p.449)?

Brown contends that Eastern Europeans today know the limits of their hopes and desires (however ardent they may be), and realize that there are no quick answers. This new realism is the difference between calls for reform 25 years ago and those heard today. The emergence of massive and dangerous ecological problems and the recurrence of demographic and social upheavals, such as labor shortages, low birthrates, and the treatment of minorities, are fundamentally affecting the framework and extent of reform measures. Of course, the general malaise resulting from 40 years of communist rule and the undisputed failure of the regimes to substitute rising living standards for a long-dead Marxist ideology have also had their effect. These developments have taken their toll on the region and now point to systemic reform, not to just treating the worst aspects of the Stalinist system. For if, as the author demonstrates, Stalin were to come back and look at Eastern Europe today, he would have no trouble in recognizing the model he left behind.

The possibilities and complexities represented by the era of *glasnost* and *perestroika* and the calls by some Soviet leaders for "socialist relations of a new type," are the themes on which this excellent book concludes. As Brown



emphasizes, recent history has witnessed the strange spectacle of Gorbachev nearly foisting reform-minded ideas (though, admittedly, not systemic ones) on certain reluctant allies. With its interest in tracing the developments which have caused this type of reform to be thought of as indispensable, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule* is itself indispensable. A clearer guide to understanding the dynamics and potential future of the region is barely possible.

Reviewed by Tom Yazdgerdi.

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## *The Legality of Non-forcible Counter-measures in International Law*

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By Omer Yousif Elagab

Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1988, 272 pp., \$59.95.

In a 1978 case between the United States and France, an arbitral tribunal held that "counter-measures" were legally permissible under some circumstances. By "counter-measures" the tribunal apparently had in mind violations of legal obligations, but not resort to force in violation of the United Nations Charter. The notion that there is a rule in the international legal order that authorizes violations of some but not all other rules of the order appeals to the imagination of publicists.

The first sustained attempt to explore the bounds of this new formulation, to see whether it is better regarded as a minor variation of the traditional law of reprisal or something else, was a book by Professor Elizabeth Zoller in 1984.<sup>1</sup> That book had serious conceptual shortcomings and even within its own "naturalist" framework had unaccountable gaps in logic and research. Now, Dr. Elagab, a Sudanese scholar with a D.Phil. from Oxford University, has come to grapple with the same issues from a basically "positivist" perspective. He has done so considerably better than Zoller, but the definitive work has yet to be written.

Elagab's first three chapters sketch out what purports to be the evolution of the doctrine of reprisals from the early seventeenth century. The next three set out interpretations of the classical conditions for reprisal, which are assumed to have developed into a modern law of counter-measures: prior breach of the law, unsuccessful demand for justice, and proportionality of the reprisal to the breach and the demands of justice. The final four substantive chapters discuss the degree to which more general rules of the legal order restrain non-forcible counter-measures, such as rules requiring respect for human rights, private property rights, innocent passage and freedom of navigation on the high seas, and limits to national prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction; treaty commitments outside the treaty allegedly violated to give rise to the right to impose counter-measures; and economic coercion. A final chapter summarizes the conclusions of the earlier ones with some more general observations. The organization is clear and well-conceived.

Unfortunately, within this excellent framework there are some omissions, some problems of logical presentation, and a pompous writing style that makes the entire work difficult to understand beyond the normal difficulties inherent in scholarship at the forefront.

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<sup>1</sup> Zoller, *Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures*, reviewed by Alfred P. Rubin in *The Fletcher Forum* 10(2):343-347 (1986).

Two glaring omissions in a work purporting to be a comprehensive overview are the neglect of "rectification" as a rationale for counter-measures and an arguable restriction on their scope,<sup>2</sup> and a neglect of the problem of *ius standi*, the need for a legal interest in a particular dispute as a threshold before counter-measures can be considered.<sup>3</sup>

The logical presentation has notable difficulties. For example, he writes:

In the wake of the freezing of Chinese assets by the United States, China imposed a retaliatory freeze . . . . These actions could be construed as a recognition on the part of the Chinese government that the seizure of her assets in the United States constituted a breach justifying its decision to retaliate. However, on the bases of the evidence drawn from the settlement Agreement [of 1979] between the two States, it would appear that China could not have adhered to the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, the course adopted by her could in no sense qualify as legitimate counter-measures (pp. 38-39).

But this does not appear in the chapter on proportionality; it is taken from the chapter on the doctrine of counter-measures since 1945. What does "in no sense" mean here, where state practice as evidence of the law is being presented? Is not Chinese state practice as much state practice as American? What particular provisions of the claims settlement Agreement of 1979 is "evidence" of Chinese disproportion? Why not evidence of a bargain in which both sides gave unrelated concessions to the other? How is the incident doctrinally significant? Such paragraphs and generalized, unsupported conclusions abound.

As to the writing style, my own being no model, I write the following with some hesitation. But is it really necessary to write: "The present writer is inclined to suggest that a half-way compromise may be countenanced as a solution to the dogmatic complexities arising from a mistaken but bona fide belief" (p. 50)? How do we know a "compromise" is "half-way" or three-quarters way (and in which direction)? Are compromises "countenanced"? Are

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2 See Sheehan, "The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of Self-Help in International Law as Justification for State Use of Armed Force" in *The Fletcher Forum* 1:135-153 (1977). Sheehan invented the word "rectification" to label the right of self-help a state has when injured legally (thus having "standing") by the failure of another to do its legal duty, to perform that duty in place of the defaulting state. The idea was discussed briefly in *Proc. Am. Soc of Int'l L.* 71: 30-31 (1977). The rationale appears in British literature by 1879 at the latest. See McNair, *International Law Opinions* 2:273-276 (1956). Zoller also neglects it. Perhaps the reference to "use of armed force" in Sheehan's title misled Zoller and Elagab; but, the principle is not so restricted. Surely, if they had not thought the analysis by Sheehan or the British Law Officers of the Crown to be worth pursuing, they would have given some reason; academics normally ignore only the arguments to which they have no answers.

3 The International Court of Justice has rejected legal complaints three times on the ground of lack of standing in the petitioner: The Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (*Liecht. v. Guatem.*), *I.C.J. Reports* 1955; The South West Africa Case (*Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa*), *I.C.J. Reports* 1966; The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd., Case (*Belg. v. Spain*), *I.C.J. Reports* 1970. I have seen no published legal analysis of these cases or the general notion of "standing" except criticism by academics and others who seem to feel that litigation is the best way to solve international disputes.

the "complexities" really "dogmatic"? If "the present writer" is "inclined to suggest" something, why does he not just do it?

The conclusions summarized at the end of the book also seem confused. Five factors are listed to "explain the necessity for retaining non-forcible counter-measures as a means of enforcing international legal order" (pp. 214-215). Only one seems to make sense, the third: "to restore an equitable balance between the disputing parties until a solution is found." That is, to avoid the situation by which a state breaching the law has the advantages of the breach, and thus no inducement to settle the dispute. The other factors, such as the second: "there might be inadequate international machinery for enforcing compliance with the terms of [a] settlement," seem to be either redundant or to relate to other problems than the reach of non-forcible counter-measures. Indeed, one, the fourth, seems to cut the other way: "[T]he symbolic effect of counter-measures is as important as their instrumental effect. Obviously no state will want to be portrayed as a delinquent state which does not perform her international obligations until she is pressurized [sic] to do so by means of self-help measures." But a review is not the place for a counter-essay on counter-measures.

In sum, Elagab's volume is a notable contribution to scholarly analysis of the peaceable recourse the international legal order allows to states to encourage others to observe their obligations in our highly competitive world. But, it seems incomplete and badly in need of competent editing.

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## *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*

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By James Bill

New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988, 520 pp., \$25.00.

After most American foreign policy debacles, there arises a virtual cottage industry of literature by scholars and policymakers looking to place blame. In the 1950s the debate centered on "who lost China?" and in the 1970s, "who lost Vietnam?" In the 1980s the question is, "Who lost Iran?" The latest salvo fired in the Iranian debate comes from James Bill in *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*.

Bill, director of the Center for International Studies and a professor of government at the College of William and Mary, finds plenty of blame to go around. He begins his very readable account of the US-Iranian relationship in the honeymoon years preceding the 1953 Musaddiq affair. Throughout, he has an almost romantic vision of the relationship that "might-have-been," had the United States played its cards differently with Musaddiq. Bill is quick to criticize the cold warriors of the time who feared Musaddiq's nationalist fervor and who "had great difficulty . . . distinguishing national movements from communist movements in the Third World" (p. 80).

What clouded the thinking of American policymakers perhaps even more than their preoccupation with communism was oil. Black gold combined with the "red threat" dominated US policy objectives in Iran for the next 30 years. The first manifestation of this two-pronged strategic interest was the decision to use the CIA to unseat Musaddiq, a decision which, Bill argues, left a "running wound that bled for twenty-five years" (p. 86) until nationalism reared its head again in the person of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

In the intervening years, the Americans tied their star to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Despite periodic attempts to pressure the shah into making reforms, the relationship grew stronger, until the two countries became inextricably intertwined during the Nixon-Kissinger years. With American forces tied up in Vietnam, and with the British decision to pull out of the Gulf, Nixon and Kissinger blindly placed an excess of power in the shah's hands. They gave the shah a virtual *carte-blanc* to purchase whatever American weapons he wanted, and indirectly exempted Iran from the arms sale review process in the State and Defense departments.

At the same time, the price of oil quadrupled. Iran's revenues in 1973 jumped from \$4 billion to \$20 billion which only encouraged the shah's already healthy appetite for weapons. There was never an attempt to reassess the Iranian domestic situation or to encourage reform. In fact, the CIA and SAVAK, the Iranian Intelligence and Internal Security Agency, worked together closely during this period, a time of ruthless repression. As long as

the shah kept the Soviets at bay and the oil flowed, nothing else seemed to matter. Nixon and Kissinger never critically examined Iran's domestic landscape and the growing repression. As Bill explains, the "United States anchored its national interests to this small, non-Western, absolute monarchy on a scale unprecedented in American diplomatic history" (p. 210). The United States and the shah's interests became one.

Surprisingly, Bill is not as critical of the Nixon and Kissinger years as one might expect. While the facts amassed in the book are a rather scathing indictment of their term in office, Bill never lays the blame squarely where it belongs. The bridge between the precedent set by Nixon and Kissinger to the legacy Carter inherits is never made. Subsequently, Carter is faulted for trying to undo some of the mistakes of his predecessors, rather than Nixon and Kissinger being blamed for their own shortsighted and careless policies.

Nonetheless, it is Carter who tries to hold together the pieces as the shah's empire begins to crumble. But everything he tries falters. Even though Bill goes out of his way to take Carter off the hook for his human rights policy, he ultimately comes down hard on him, highlighting the inconsistencies and contradictions in his handling of the shah.

Throughout, Bill cites examples of the shah's megalomania and repeatedly illustrates missed opportunities the shah had to save himself. Yet, Bill is more inclined to find fault in American policymakers and presidents and is even willing to blame Americans for the shah's personality disorders. In the end, the shah is let off relatively easily, and it is Carter who is left holding the bag.

While Bill reluctantly places the ultimate responsibility for the shah's demise on Carter, he saves some of his most cutting remarks for National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and to a lesser extent on Brzezinski's Iran advisor, Gary Sick. Bill calls Brzezinski's attempts to absolve himself of blame "self-serving." Brzezinski and Sick's indictment of the State Department's Iran desk officer Henry Precht is particularly unsettling for Bill, given that Precht was able, if belatedly, to see the end coming for the shah, and encouraged a different course of action. Bill is confident that Brzezinski's ardent "save-the-shah-until-the-bitter-end" policy prevented any rapprochement with Khomeini and only served to delay the inevitable disintegration of the shah's regime.

Yet one must seriously question whether talks with Khomeini would have endeared him to the American point of view. It seems highly unlikely that Iran would have developed any positive relationship with the United States after the shah's fall. Given that in the first 250 pages of his book Bill outlines the growing anti-American sentiment in Iran, and Khomeini's strong anti-Western proclivities expounded in his speeches and writing, any other conclusion seems mere fantasy.

Despite this, the book is excellent for students of foreign policy, as well as for policymakers themselves. It is an excellent lesson in what *not* to do. Bill even outlines a twelve-point program to prevent future debacles, including a call to reduce the "influence of private interests that seek to promote a

particular foreign policy" (p. 441). He describes the heavy burden placed on policymakers by influential private citizens — referred to as Pahlavites — among them, David and Nelson Rockefeller, and, after he left office, Henry Kissinger. Bill's documentation of the workings of the Pahlavi lobby gives new meaning to the power of the "old-boy network."

In the end, neither his massive lobby nor his abundant arms depot nor the most powerful nation in the free world could save the shah. Only Muhammad Reza Pahlavi himself could have taken the steps to unite his country behind him, and this he repeatedly refused to do. Because the American eagle tied its fate to the shah's lion, when one fell, so did the other. It will be a long and difficult struggle before the eagle will fly again over Iran.

Reviewed by Anne Donohue.

Ms. Donohue is a candidate for the M.A. degree at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

## *Communication, Development and the Third World: The Global Politics of Information*

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By Robert L. Stevenson

New York: Longman, 1988, 223 pp., \$35.95

Should the United States, Great Britain, and Singapore rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)? A year ago the question would have been dismissed, but two developments — the increase in stature of the United Nations as a whole, and the election of a new, more moderate UNESCO director-general — make the question a legitimate one.

Robert Stevenson stops short of making a recommendation, but *Communication, Development and the Third World* is a useful summary of the issues for those interested in joining the debate. He provides a readable account of events leading up to the US decision and suggests innovative approaches to the issues which led to the withdrawal. Stevenson's book, however, is not an analysis of UNESCO, but rather an examination of the issues for which UNESCO was a forum. Specifically, Stevenson asks in an international context: What is the purpose of journalism and how does it relate to development?

Advocates of the once popular New World Information Order (NWIO) insisted that journalists should join the effort in assisting developing nations. Western reporters saw this as an infringement of free speech and felt that uncritical reporting would be a disservice to countries that had few checks and balances. "Watchdogs, not lapdogs" was one of many slogans of the era. While Stevenson is no apologist for NWIO, he takes its allegations seriously about biased, harmful reporting. He examines and rejects the Marxist-style arguments about communication's role in development that, for a time, threatened to make a North-South debate into an East-West problem. Instead, he sees the NWIO debate in a developmental context and asks what role communications should or does play in fueling economic development.

Efforts to link communications and development have a long history in the West. Stevenson retraces the work of early theorists such as Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner who documented the rise in the number of radios and television sets and waited expectantly for development that never came. Schramm and Lerner got it wrong, Stevenson argues. The number of radios and television sets available to a nation is a neutral fact. It is telecommunications — the number of telephones — that really matter. Telecommunications enhance the infrastructure and improve the business climate. UNESCO should stop worrying about television, radio, and cultural imperialism and direct its energies toward wiring the globe with fiber optical cables, microwave towers, and satellites to help nations reach the magical take-off point.



Who was responsible for the wasted decades? American theorists who pushed radios and televisions on an unsuspecting Third World, or irresponsible Third World leaders who wanted empty symbols of development without first laying the technological underpinnings? And who should take the blame for the decade-long argument over “development” and “protocol” journalism that was instrumental in undermining UNESCO?

Stevenson faults Western journalists for losing control of the dialogue long before UNESCO became polarized. He suggests that the NWIO debacle occurred because Western journalists and governments did not speak up soon enough. The point is also made that NWIO may have been touted by Third World governments but that Third World journalists themselves were embarrassed by it. Developing nations, Stevenson argues, “need to acknowledge to themselves as well as to the world that most of what happens to them is of their own making” (p. 176). No one forced less developed states to adopt television, and no one forced them to accept insipid Western programming.

An examination of the Third World alternative news agencies is equally harsh. Squandering precious resources on public relations releases that pass for news, they deserve to have their copy thrown in the trash bins of “legitimate” news agencies. One reason Stevenson suggests that the NWIO debate may have faded is that Third World news agencies have discovered through their own experience the problems of logistics, deadlines, pleasing clients, and keeping costs down.

For all its usefulness, the book is not without flaws. Readers may get impatient with the author’s continent-by-continent comparisons of the number of radios and televisions in various regions. The information could have been presented more economically in chart form, and the focus seems to stray a bit from the book’s theme. Also, those who follow the free press-UNESCO debate may doubt that the world really needs another content analysis study featured in Chapter 8, “A Day in the World’s News.” Its conclusion — that rather than uniformity, the global news system is really quite diverse — has limited application. The system may seem diverse on a slow news day, but one would expect to see much more conformity on a day with a major international news event, such as a Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Should the withdrawn states rejoin UNESCO? Stevenson sidesteps the political question in order to ask one much more fundamental: What direction should a new, reformed UNESCO take? His book makes a serious and important contribution to the field as journalists, governments, and communications scholars gladly emerge from the polemical and unproductive era of the past decade.

Reviewed by Mary A. Thompson-Jones.  
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## *Human Rights in the People's Republic of China*

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By Yuan-li Wu, Franz Michael, John F. Copper, Ta-ling Lee, Maria Hsia Chang, and A. James Gregor

Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988, 332 pp., including appendix and index, \$35.00 hardcover.

The principal achievement of the international human rights movement is that it has provided a relatively precise, legal framework against which alleged violations can be measured, and on the basis of which they may be condemned. In establishing mechanisms designed to promote a degree of accountability on the part of all governments, international human rights treaties have enabled the critics of any given government (or regime) to transcend the expression of mere subjective political preferences and to demonstrate the violation of clearly defined and generally accepted principles of human dignity. Of course, the dividing line between law and politics is not always sharp and much human rights literature is located in a twilight zone between these two realms.

The principle failing of *Human Rights in the People's Republic of China* is that while it purports to examine internationally accepted human rights standards, and to evidence their flagrant violation by the Chinese government since 1949, no more than a token gesture is made toward identifying the precise standards in question. The concept of human rights is not used in any technical, legal sense but in a thoroughly superficial manner which is unsuited to a scholarly work prepared by some of the United States' leading sinologists. John Copper, for example, asserts in an opening chapter that "rights and freedoms for the individual are embodied in Chinese humanism," and "that the concept of human rights in traditional China included political freedoms — meaning individual freedoms and protection from unrestrained rulers — and economic rights . . . [N]either was emphasized at the expense of the other" (p. 9). But this potted history of Chinese political philosophy falters under the slightest scrutiny. Until the late nineteenth century, the Chinese language even lacked any equivalent of the term "rights." Moreover, traditional Confucianism has always emphasized the value of harmony and condemned dissension. In a Confucian framework it is appropriate and accurate to speak of the benevolence of the ruler, but quite misleading to speak of the "human rights" of his subjects. "Rights" which exist at the sole discretion of the ruler are temporary privileges rather than human rights.

But, whose concept of human rights are we discussing anyway? A reasonable assumption is that the authors would have opted for the catalogue of human rights which has been more or less universally accepted by the international community and embodied in legal terms in the 1948 Universal Declaration

of Human Rights. Two of the authors invoke the Universal Declaration as one of the appropriate benchmarks (the other being the *American* Declaration of Independence and the *American* Bill of Rights), but then proceed to offer a definition which is not universal but reflective of a particular Western libertarian concept of rights. In such a version, *inter alia*, economic rights are translated into "economic freedom of choice." This standard is closer to that of the conservative US philosopher Robert Nozick than to a standard to which the Chinese can be held clearly accountable under international law.

In so far as reference is made to international standards, the information provided is incomplete and thus misleading. We are told that China "has not ratified any of the major UN human rights documents" (p. 16). Nor, of course, has the United States, but that fact is not mentioned. What could and should have been noted is that China, unlike the United States, has ratified two very important international treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (ratified on November 4, 1980) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified on December 29, 1981).<sup>1</sup> Leaving aside questions of definition, the authors provide a powerful and unremitting indictment of many of the policies which have been pursued in China since 1949. (It seems to be implied that the human rights situation was quite satisfactory up until that time — see, for example, p. 10).

In essence, the book is divided into two parts. The first examines the Chinese system from 1949-1984 (although occasional references pertain to later events). Separate chapters on the role of law, the political system, the economy, and the role of ideology are included. The chapter on Chinese economy is confused at best. It concludes that it would "be possible to avoid posing equality and freedom as policy opposites" if the economic system could "produce a continually expanding national pie with the shares of the major sections of the population all rising sufficiently so that enough can be provided even for the least able and fortunate" (p. 97). Yet, China's economic successes over the past decade (per capita income has more than doubled and GNP has risen, on average, 7% per annum) have not automatically brought improvements in the human rights situation. Although the authors' implicit assumption that economic well-being can substitute political freedom would gladden the heart of any Marxist, it seems incompatible with the assumptions made elsewhere in the volume.

The best chapters are those in the second part of the book which provide detailed accounts of the gross and persistent human rights violations to which various "target-groups" have been subjected. Separate chapters survey counter-revolutionaries, a convenient catchall classification for any enemy of the Party line, farmers, businesspeople and workers, intellectuals, political dissidents, political factions, women, ethnic minorities and religious groups. Much of the analysis is careful, detailed and well-written. It thus helps to redress

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1. *Human Rights: Status of International Instruments* (Geneva: United Nations, 1987) 96 and 139.

the unfortunate immunity from criticism of human rights violations that China has so undeservably enjoyed until very recently.<sup>2</sup>

What is missing from this volume, however, is an evenhanded attempt to analyze the extraordinarily complex challenges which will confront US human rights policy-makers in the future. Is the conception of human rights embodied in international law fully compatible with Chinese cultural and philosophical traditions? What are the implications if it is not? Can "liberalization" of the economic and political system suffice to ensure respect for human rights, or is there a fundamental incompatibility between the Chinese system and the very concept of human rights? Finally, what constructive but incrementalist measures could be urged in order to improve the existing situation? With these questions unanswered, this volume is more of a brief for the prosecution than a scholarly overview and analysis of the Chinese system and human rights.

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2. For an excellent analysis of the extent of that immunity and some possible explanations for it see R. Cohen, "People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (1987):447-549.

## *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy*

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By H. W. Brands, Jr

New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 252 pp., \$40.00

No administration, not even Richard Nixon's, has been able to centralize the foreign policy process completely. The Eisenhower administration was no exception. Scholars have long debated how to apportion responsibility between Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, inappropriately excluding other key players. *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy* is an attempt to remedy this situation by means of a collective biography of the individuals who fashioned American foreign policy during the 1950s.

H. W. Brands, Jr., divides the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy players into three groups. Closest to the president was his "inner circle" including Dulles, the militant diplomat, and his brother Allen, who presided over the CIA during its "golden age" when, inverting Clausewitz, "politics was now war by other means" (p. 67). Completing this first group of the president's most intimate advisors was his brother and confidant Milton.

Occupying the next concentric ring were the "lieutenants," those who "served as Eisenhower's men on the spot" during crisis situations (p. 71). They were Walter Bedell Smith, sent to the sticky 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, and Robert Murphy, rushed to Lebanon with US Marines in 1959.

Furthest from the president were the "agitators and agents" who supplied the administration with fresh approaches and served foreign policy needs at home. They were C. D. Jackson, the tireless psychological warfare expert; Harold Stassen, special assistant for disarmament who was critical in creating the appearance that the administration supported arms control; and Henry Cabot Lodge, the cold warrior at the United Nations who came to appreciate the importance and perspective of the emerging nonaligned movement.

A chapter is devoted to each individual and to Eisenhower himself. Together, they form a collection of interesting and largely autonomous mini-essays. Brands writes well, adding a personal dimension to the characters and occasionally turning a nifty phrase. Moreover, the book is well-documented, reflecting the author's familiarity with both archival sources and the most current secondary works.

In waging the Cold War, the Eisenhower elite got their hands fairly dirty. It is remarkable how cold these warriors could be when it came to threatening nuclear war over the Taiwan Straits, propping up strongmen like South Vietnam's Diem, and staging coups in Iran and Guatemala. Admirably, Brands is critical of this aspect without being strident. He presents a strong

case for the thesis that the Eisenhower administration, despite the harsh rhetoric of anticommunism and "massive retaliation," more frequently exhibited restraint. Such was its decision, for example, not to intervene at Dien Bien Phu to save the French.

Less convincing is where Brands locates the source of this restraint: the experience of World War II. Without question, Eisenhower himself gained his sober view of war and his resulting caution from his service in Europe. But Brands enlarges this argument to include his advisers without conclusive evidence. While it may be likely, it is not clear that they exhibited restraint because of their wartime involvement, especially judging from the individual cases Brands has selected.

Still, Brands is discerning enough to qualify this assertion, and the general link between the war and the administration's foreign policy is one of the book's most important. Certainly World War II catapulted the obscure general into the limelight, rendering him the Republicans' obvious choice to topple the Democrats in 1952. Many of the president's foreign policy advisors also owed career boosts or jobs in the administration to their wartime service. Without it, we might never have heard from them again and Allen Dulles "probably would have languished on Wall Street, boring friends with stale stories of intrigue from the Great War, rather than replenishing his repertoire with fresh material" (p. 201). Eisenhower hired a few, such as Bedell Smith and Robert Murphy, because they earned his confidence while serving under him during the war.

Ultimately, however, the book lacks a compelling argument. Apart from the World War II theme, there is far too little that binds these mini-essays together. The selection of individuals seems arbitrary, especially considering the marginal impact that some (such as C.D. Jackson) had on policy. Others around Eisenhower such as Gordon Gray, Andrew Goodpaster, and Douglas Dillon are scarcely mentioned. Further, there is the annoying frequency with which phrases such as "must have been" and "probably" pop up. It makes one wish at points that Brands had stuck more closely to his thorough documentation.

While *Cold Warriors* fails to provide any major statement on Eisenhower's foreign policy, it does provide a useful, closer look at the individuals who helped shape that policy. As such, it represents a worthwhile contribution to the history of the Cold War.

Reviewed by Philip Nash.  
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## *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887 — 1939*

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By David A. Lake

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, 264 pages, \$29.95

*Power, Protection and Free Trade* represents an insightful examination of the external forces which mold the development of American trade policy. While David Lake agrees that domestic politics affects trade policy and strategy, he maintains that the most significant factors are the opportunities and constraints of the international economic structure. As a rule, external factors are more significant than internal ones.

Lake first describes his theory of international economic structure and strategy, and then analyzes US commercial policy during the isolationist period, 1887-1939. The examination of the US isolationist period is used as an analytical tool to understand the present era of declining hegemony, and as a tough test case for his theory.

The international economic structure is "the configuration of nation-states within the two dimensions of relative size and relative labor productivity" (p. 11). Relative size (total trade as a proportion of total world trade) conditions a nation's ability to regulate disturbances in the system. Relative labor productivity (worker productivity as compared with a global average) impacts economies of scale and the climate for imports and exports.

There are four basic types of international economic structures, Lake argues: hegemonic leadership, bilateral opportunism, unilateral opportunism, and multilateral opportunism. Each nation's trade volume and labor productivity determines its relative position internationally, its interests and likely strategy. Whether a nation will be protectionist at home or desire free trade, and whether it will attempt to persuade other nations to follow a particular policy is Lake's focus. (While a nation seldom desires protection abroad, Lake argues that the term applies when a nation pursues protectionist measures at home which it knows will be reciprocated.)

This fairly simple model is the basis for understanding national trade strategy. It intentionally minimizes domestic factors. Politicians do capitulate to the various needs of industries and interest groups. Pure domestic politics will always play a critical role in determining trade policy. However, these domestic interests are best understood in how they interact with external constraints. Ultimately, the interest of national trade will respond to the demands of the international economic structure.

The key domestic player is the foreign policy executive who "acts as a conduit, channeling the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure into the domestic political process" (p. 87). In the United

States, the president maintains control over trade by calling it a foreign policy issue.

Lake argues that domestic interests conformed little with American trade policy from 1887-1939, supporting his theory for the superiority of external factors. Lake divides the period into four phases with each phase identifying America's response to the constraints of the changing international economic structure. During the first phase, 1887-1897, Great Britain's role as free trade hegemonic leader enabled the United States to limit imports, expand exports by reducing duties on certain raw materials, and push exports to Latin America at the expense of British and European competitors. Domestic political debate centered on how to accomplish these goals, not the goals themselves.

During the second phase, 1897-1912, the United States continued to "free ride" on Britain's position and increase exports to Latin America. Resistance from continental markets, however, increased. Tariff acts were designed to maintain protection at home, which was still possible within a structure of declining British hegemony, and were used as "bargaining chips" in negotiating more open trade with France and Germany.

The United States pursued a policy of tariff restraint during the third period, 1912-1930, for fear of foreign retaliation — the first time in American history that export expansion took precedence over import protection. Britain had evolved from hegemonic leader to opportunist. The United States had no choice but to accommodate Britain's new position and recognize the constraints of bilateral opportunism and the necessity to favor free trade.

Finally, in the fourth phase, 1930-1939, the international structure deteriorated to one of unilateral opportunism. Protectionism abroad, without regard to US action, made tariffs a "domestic" issue. Even President Hoover called for protection, the only president to do so during this period. The infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff was passed by Congress only to be modified four years later when the costs of protectionism proved too high.

Lake argues that this historical analysis demonstrates a systemic logic behind US policy, and illustrates the power of the foreign policy executive in transforming the opportunities and constraints of the international economic structure into domestic trade debate and strategy. A limitation in Lake's theory, which he acknowledges, is that it explains only the general pattern of trade policy. The detailed pattern of protection across industries and regions is best explained by analyzing the influence of interest group actions. The distinction between general strategy and the summation of policy across industries and regions is not clear. While Lake admits that general theories do not have particular predictive abilities, one is still disappointed that so broad a brush is applied.

The greatest disappointment of the book, however, was Lake's failure to apply his theory to the international economic structure of multilateral opportunism, the structure which he argues has characterized the international economic order since 1975. While the historical record is still in the making, it would have been interesting if Lake had devoted a closing chapter to the



interests and strategies of nations in our present economic structure. (Perhaps that will be the welcome subject of his next work.)

Lake's discussion highlights the truly evolutionary process of trade policy, both at home and abroad. There is an unending fluidity as each nation responds to external events and domestic needs. This volume contributes an important evaluation of likely responses to given changes in the international economic structure. America's economic prowess may decline, and Japan and the newly industrializing countries' (NICs) trade policies may become more open over time, but that will not be all. The theoretical framework developed here gives a likely indication of what the American and European response will be to more open borders and the NICs subsequent response. While Lake's theory is limited, nonetheless, it provides a method of analysis for discussing such questions. That, in itself, makes this book an important addition to trade literature.

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*Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*

By Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett

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London: KPI Limited, 1987, 328 pp., \$57.50 cloth.

The imposition of rapid modernization violently and fundamentally altered the traditional, segmented societies of the Middle East. Ensuing clashes between forces of tradition and change destroyed what had been for centuries a cohesive and congruent social order. Iraq has had a particularly difficult and raw recent history. As Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett demonstrate in *Iraq Since 1958*, Iraq has not had an easy time adjusting to the pressures and demands of modernity.

The authors' detailed and efficiently organized narrative examines the forces and personalities which have shaped Iraq's progression from British-sponsored monarchy to Ba'hist dictatorship. Within this history the authors identify two important themes. First, they submit that Iraq has never been the radical, socialist, pro-Soviet state the Western press has made it out to be. Indeed, this appears to be the case. The Ba'ath Party's treatment of Iraqi Communists and its diplomacy during the war with Iran suggest that the Iraqi-Soviet friendship has been simply a calculated move on the part of the Ba'ath leadership to acquire cheap weapons and to draw the Iraqi Communist Party into its fold as it consolidated power. Similarly, Iraqi tirades against Israel and promises of support for the Palestine Liberation Organization have turned out to be inflated and empty political rhetoric. Promises of civil rights and democracy have been equally hollow.

Second, the analysis of the predominant position of the Ba'ath Party and the rise of Saddam Hussein in *ideological* terms is inaccurate. Iraq's politics are brutal and highly personalized; allegiance to the current regime is more the result of intimidation or familial and regional links than ideological affinity. The fact that Adnan Khairallah, Iraq's minister of defense, and Sa'dun Shakir, the minister of interior, are from Saddam Hussein's hometown, indicate that the regime probably does emphasize regional and kinship ties. The Ba'ath Party's vicious repression and extermination of Communists and Kurds demonstrates the regime's reliance on the politics of fear rather than ideological legitimacy.

An implicit third theme in *Iraq Since 1958* is Hussein himself. Hussein is the anti-hero of this narrative; his progress from co-conspirator in the 1959 assassination attempt of President Abdelkarim Qassim, to the leading organizer of the Ba'ath Party in the 1960s, to president in 1979, is a leitmotif in the story of modern Iraq. Hussein is linked to almost every major political event in Iraq since the revolution. Even when he is not overtly a part of some developments, the reader understands that he is somewhere behind the scenes.

One cannot separate Iraq's history or policy during the past 20 years from Hussein and the cult of personality which has risen around him.

The book produces only two reservations. The international context in which post-1958 Iraqi history has occurred is noticeably lacking. The full flavor of Iraq's history — or of any Arab country for that matter — is missed if not understood in the context of the overlapping internal, regional, and super-power tensions which so characterize Middle East politics. Although the book aims to be a history of Iraq and not the entire Middle East and while some inter-Arab and superpower conflicts are briefly noted, one still wonders, for example, about the role regional rivalries and Arab cultural politics have played in modern Iraq.

Hussein's charismatic hold on Iraqis is also puzzling. When one reads, for instance, that a February 1986 edition of the government newspaper *al-Thawra* featured a photograph of Hussein decorating a man who had shot his own son dead for refusing to fight in the Iran-Iraq war, one wants to know *why*: why does Saddam Hussein apparently have such a seductive appeal for Iraqis? why is there a cult of personality surrounding someone who strikes the outside observer as nothing but a vicious dictator?

These, however, are small reservations. *Iraq Since 1958* is a well-written, interesting survey. Its articulate explanation of the complex forces in Iraq make the book especially valuable to nonspecialists. The Slugletts' history is a solid contribution to current scholarship on Iraq, scholarship which, as the authors note in the introduction, is severely limited by the current regime. Replete with "democratic executions," thousands of "disappeared" Kurds, and filled with political intrigue, Iraq's modern history as recounted here at times reads like a political novel.

Reviewed by Steve Walker.

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## *Essays on a Half-Century: Ideas, Policies, and Action*

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By W.W. Rostow

Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988, 190 pp, \$29.95 hardcover.

"Can-do" enthusiasm radiates in much of *Essays on a Half-Century: Ideas, Policies, and Action*. Rostow begins a speech in 1970 with a quote from Coleridge:

If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us!

This maxim could serve as theme to this entire collection of essays with the author himself unfortunately falling prey to the clutches of, if not "passion and party," then unflagging optimism and overt simplicity.

From Rostow's "three years' immersion in the study of communism" came his belief that "by, say, 1965" the United States could "shatter the belief in communism as the unique method for rapid development" (p. 40). First given as a lecture in 1954, these remarks, taken from the essay "Marx was a City Boy," can only cause the reader to puzzle over the quality of Rostow's study during those years and wonder what he makes of it all some 35 years later. Taking David Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant* as his inspiration, Rostow concludes that the "Free World" and technology will provide "education and example" and will be the banner around which peasants of the world will unite. Here, and in many other places in the book, the reader feels uneasy. Perhaps begrudging the author's resiliency of ego in allowing such statements to go unedited, the reader half wishes the voice of the narrator would avail itself of the passing of time and, with temporary barriers lifted, comment on how history in fact has transpired. A sort of "and yes dear reader" is hoped for, not to deprecate or retract but rather to talk about how and why such conclusions so blithely asserted have gone so decisively astray.

Such annotation with the benefit of hindsight would also have been welcome in a 1960 paper entitled "Some Lessons of History for Africa." Rostow turns to the problems of societies in transition, urging them to learn from the mistakes of others. He encourages African nations to sift through the methods, models, and madness of Western industrialized countries to select judiciously the tools and techniques they deem most suitable to help ease themselves into the modernized world. With a vision unclouded by parochialism, he states that "the evolution of each nation, like that of each individual, is unique" (p. 71).

Laudable as this culturally sensitive statement is, the need for economic growth remains. Talking about Africa and his "take-off" theory of economic development, Rostow advises leaders to "[m]ake modernization the first order

of business" (p. 74) while asserting that "[t]he task . . . is not . . . a matter of class struggle" but rather a process which needs "a sense of brotherhood within nations and cultures and between nations and cultures" (p. 77). Considering the disparate resources, geography and history of the African continent, how and where this "take-off" will occur is never entertained.

Assuming the "take-off" occurs, the question of its diffusion remains. How can economic modernization spread beyond national boundaries? Rostow points out that ". . . no nation has modernized . . . without the government playing an important role in the four fundamental tasks of the preconditions [for take-off]: education, agricultural policy, social overhead capital, and policy designed to improve the foreign-trade balance" (p. 75). What can one learn from this except that the task of providing for these preconditions has proven too great for the vast majority of African governments, while brotherhood within nations (let alone among cultures and states), has eluded both modernized and developing societies alike.

An essay written after the 1984 presidential elections, "Charting a Course Toward 1988," asks the question of "how can we build societies that reconcile efficiency in a world of rapidly evolving technologies with the humane values in which Western culture is rooted" (p. 189)? Rostow laments the lack of "a lucid definition of issues and choices" by the candidates and warns that shortly "the social and physical infrastructures of the advanced industrial countries will erode" (p. 189). Yet, Rostow is not easily overwhelmed by the complex issues he addresses. Contending that "if we work together as a community," the United States can overcome unemployment, the federal deficit, and the risk of inflation. The reader is hard-pressed to disagree with his assumption that "it may appear utopian to hold up a vision of national consensus and of cooperation among business, labor, government and the two major political parties" (p. 190).

It is difficult to reconcile this volume of proposals and analyses gone awry with Rostow's remarks in the preface that "an author's ideas are often more clearly expressed when applied to concrete circumstances, as in the pieces contained here, than when expounded abstractly" (p. ix). One begins the book in anticipation of the tangible and finishes the book with a sense only of the insubstantial. "Concrete circumstances" elude the reader and Rostow alike. Good intentions and engaging earnestness abound in these essays, but much of what is said simply does not wash with what has transpired these fifty years.

Without commentary or reflection on the vagaries of time, this collection is a less than fitting tribute to Rostow's public service. As they stand, these essays serve only to disillusion and disappoint. The reader recalls the words of Coleridge and worries what indeed blinds this author's eyes.

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## *Rethinking Nuclear Strategy*

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By Stephen J. Cimbala

Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1988, 278 pp., \$40.00.

In the past two decades US nuclear strategy has been revised significantly. The orthodoxy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has been shattered by demands for limited nuclear options, strategic defenses, and even war-fighting capabilities. Yet, as analysts continue to debate the merits of one strategy versus another, little attention has been focused on how a more complex nuclear strategy could actually be operationalized. Flexible offenses and impenetrable defenses may be both desirable and attainable, but they could also jeopardize the command and control survivability necessary for even minimum deterrence. In *Rethinking Nuclear Strategy*, Stephen Cimbala cautions against ignoring this paradox of deterrence stability: "force structures are more deterring if they are more complex, but command systems contribute more to deterrence if they are simple" (p. 260).

The point is well taken, but one wonders why it took so long to make. The reader is subjected to 200 pages of rehashing before any rethinking is done. The review of US strategic deterrence, SDI, NATO strategy, extended deterrence, Soviet strategy and the Israeli nuclear deterrent is comprehensive and well-researched, but not related to the author's central thesis, which is not revealed until the conclusion. Unfortunately, the lengthy introduction does not introduce a framework within which to analyze the information that follows.

After comparing different nuclear strategies, Cimbala advocates a policy of "assured coercion," which would require both fighting forces and coercive forces. The coercive forces would be withheld from the early stages of combat as a threat to cities and other valuable targets in the hope of ending the conflict. However, the early destruction of the enemy's political and military leadership must be avoided, Cimbala argues, in order to preserve the possibilities of terminating hostilities. Command and control systems should not be targeted.

One wonders, though, if our opponents would be as generous. In describing Soviet nuclear strategy, the author himself admits that "the Soviets would almost certainly choose the nuclear blitzkrieg," which would require counterforce and countercommand targeting (p. 149). The objective of assured coercion may be to terminate hostilities as early as possible, but the goal of the Soviet nuclear *blitzkrieg* is victory. Cimbala does not address the sharp contrasts between the two strategies.

Before one is too critical of assured coercion, one should remember that "the more demanding the expectations placed upon strategic forces, the more probable it is that the control system will fail . . ." (p. 250). If command

stability depends on "simplicity" and "redundancy," the United States must invest in a command system which can "fail gracefully." The cause of a military defeat should not be aborted war plans induced by a command and control failure. Under those circumstances, no strategy could succeed.

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## *The Japanese Way of Politics*

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By Gerald L. Curtis

New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 301 pp., including index, \$25.00 softcover.

Dominance of Japanese politics by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has led many to believe that the Japanese political system is static and reminiscent of the country's feudal past. However, relatively few people in the West understand how Japan's political system actually works. Most available literature in English unfortunately reinforces prevailing stereotypes: that the Japanese government is dominated by the rural-based LDP under the thumb of a powerful bureaucracy, and that this system, though stable, is unresponsive to the desires of the electorate. Gerald Curtis dispels these misperceptions in *The Japanese Way of Politics*. He argues that under the cover of LDP dominance, the dynamics of Japanese politics have been transformed.

In the 1940s, the Allied Occupation authorities placed a high priority on democratic political reform. Consequently, Japan's political system was based on the British parliamentary model. Curtis demonstrates that although the Japanese have adapted their parliamentary government to fit Japanese society, it does not betray its Western ideals. Furthermore, democracy and competition continue to be essential ingredients in the Japanese formula.

Curtis quickly dispels the wide-spread belief that the LDP has always maintained unrestrained control over government policy. Curtis explains that a majority position does not assure the LDP control over Diet committees which process legislation. The Diet, for example, has the right to require the prime minister and cabinet members to appear for questioning on government legislation, a technique the opposition parties can use to criticize or embarrass the LDP. Delay tactics can also effectively kill legislation since bills cannot be carried over from one session to the next. Even at its peak of power, the LDP can be forced to compromise. Given the Japanese preference for consensus, the LDP prefers to give small payoffs like "working out the timing of a[n] . . . [opposition] walkout from the Diet in protest of some LDP proposal, or agreeing not to ram through one bill in exchange for . . . [an] agreement to let others come up for a vote" (p. 124). Even though opposition parties are becoming more fragmented, their views will undoubtedly still factor into policymaking.

The assumption that minority views carry no weight in Japanese politics is also outdated. While Curtis admits the influence of opposition parties is waning, he maintains that other forces have now taken their place. Elections, for example, are increasingly won or lost on the appeal of a candidate and his stand on the issues rather than his party affiliation. The proliferation of political issues in recent years that have attracted wide public interest and



high voter turnout constitutes a major evolution in the democratization of Japanese politics. This development has been further enhanced by tense competition for district seats between candidates of the same party. Curtis suggests that popular support may in fact be more important in Japan than in the United States.

Despite LDP dominance, Curtis makes a compelling argument that pluralism is growing in Japan. The historically prominent role of the bureaucracy in Japanese politics, which Chalmers Johnson championed, is changing.<sup>1</sup> The Diet, and particularly the LDP's role in policymaking, has continued to expand considerably since the 1950s, primarily as a result of changes in political recruitment. Former high-level bureaucrats are finding it increasingly difficult to get elected, their place being taken by career politicians. The public is no longer willing to abide by the dictates of bureaucrats.

What then is the LDP's secret for success? Curtis believes it is their long-standing priority of winning elections. This simple formula has made the LDP more flexible to changes in the social and economic environment than ideologically-based parties such as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). As the electorate's concerns have changed, so have the LDP's. The LDP has of course benefited from its dominant position as the leading party. Control over the government's purse strings has given the LDP the flexibility to reorder its policy objectives whenever they have felt it was necessary.

Spurred by competition in the 1960s, the LDP became determined to dominate the political mainstream which centrist parties had started infiltrating. The LDP blatantly adopted many of the opposition's policies in order to broaden their base of public support. The strategy worked. Curtis provides data from recent elections to prove his point that the LDP has expanded its historic rural support to now include most segments of society. He concludes that this "catch-all" party meets the needs of most sectors of Japanese society.

Curtis has produced a highly accurate and timely picture of Japanese politics. A brilliant and insightful analysis, it will certainly be a standard text in the years ahead.

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<sup>1</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

## *Sanctity Versus Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments*

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By Kenneth A. Rodman

New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 448 pp., including index, tables, \$45.00.

By the end of World War II, the United States was the architect of an international order which stressed private capital flows as a means of world development. Of primary importance was the direct investment of American capital into Third World countries to promote growth and development of raw materials. The US government encouraged American corporations to contract with Third World governments for the exploration and production of their natural resources. The resulting "concession agreements" were the foundation of an international natural resource regime championed by the United States and other industrialized nations.<sup>1</sup> In this regime, host countries had very little leverage and foreign investors profited handsomely from the exploitation of precious raw materials.

In *Sanctity Versus Sovereignty*, Kenneth A. Rodman describes the consequences of US international natural resource policy in the Third World. The increasingly nationalistic policies of less developed countries (LDCs) after independence forced US actors to shift their focus from the production of Third World natural resources to technical and managerial assistance. As the title suggests, Rodman characterizes US policy by the conflicting principles of sanctity and sovereignty. He explores the reasons why US policy has shifted from sanctity to sovereignty during the past 40 years and what economic and political factors have influenced this trend.

Sanctity refers to *Pacta Sunt Servanda* — the sanctity of the contract. When forces of economic nationalism in LDCs threatened to alter the numerous postwar concession agreements, foreign corporations and the US government clung to the view that the contracts were sacred and constituted a pillar of international law incapable of being legally altered.

Sovereignty, on the other hand, refers to the natural right of Third World host countries to control their own natural resources. As host countries learned the value of their precious raw materials and gained the technical knowledge to independently exploit them, they acquired tremendous leverage in bargaining for greater control and a larger profit in resource extraction. Bolstered by the idea of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, host countries demanded changes in the original concession agreements.

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<sup>1</sup> Regimes have been described as by Friedrich Kratochwill and John Gerard Ruggie as "governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of their behavior in various issue areas."

By examining the philosophical origins of the two conflicting principles and emphasizing the reasons for the erosion of the international natural resource regime, Rodman argues that the concession system was an integral part of the world order which the United States has sought to preserve since World War II. Initially, the United States pursued a deterrent strategy which enforced the sanctity of contracts through diplomatic and economic pressure. These instruments, however, could not stop the system's erosion. The United States and the resource investors were compelled to change their policy, adapting to Third World economic nationalism.

What were the major forces behind the adaptation of the US international natural resource regime policy? Were they primarily economic or political? A selection of case studies weighs the importance of both economic and political factors. Rodman argues that it was *both* the diplomatic concerns of national security and the economic concerns of private corporations that influenced the US position toward the nationalization of Third World raw materials.

The underlying message is simple. Since World War II, the changing official US policy has not had a consequent effect on the nature of international resource relations. The United States moved from a policy of regime maintenance with emphasis on precedent and principle (sanctity), to a policy of accommodation which accepted the *fait accompli* of host country ownership (sovereignty), and focused on short-term diplomatic interests and an ongoing relationship with the dispossessed firm. Unfortunately, the outcome is that, with the exception of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Third World producers are still unable to translate "formal sovereignty" into economic clout.

Although Rodman captures the changes in US international natural resource policy, unfortunately, his case studies are not particularly compelling. Instead of developing and supporting his theories, they tend to be oddly irrespective of them. In addition, Rodman neglects to speculate on the future of US policy or provide policy prescriptions given the nature of the structural changes he identifies in the international natural resource regime. In short, the argument seems to run out of steam too soon. Regrettably, the reader loses the tantalizing insights found in the first part of the book.

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*Controlling East-West Trade and Technology Transfer:  
Power, Politics, and Policies*

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Edited by Gary K. Bertsch

Durham: Duke University Press, 1988, 460 pp., \$48.50 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Growing trade imbalances, fear of competitive inferiority, and mounting budget deficits have fueled the debate in the United States over export control policies. The Pentagon and the Reagan administration for years decried lax controls on high-tech exports as giving the Soviets the rope to hang America. Big business and a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences have countered that the current multilateral export restraints in addition to unilateral US controls handicap American competitiveness. As international competition stiffens and East-West relations relax, Europe and Japan are increasingly vocal in their impatience with US controls on items of dubious military value. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) is charged with settling these disparate interests and is the focus of *Controlling East-West Trade and Technology Transfer: Power, Politics and Policies*, edited by Gary Bertsch.

This volume not only provides a detailed study of COCOM's 40-year history of international power politics but also provides a cogent and valuable analysis of the competing interests within each member country. Observance of COCOM regulations is purely voluntary and the long-term success of the organization depends on a mutual perception that export controls benefit each country's national self-interest. The implications of non-compliance is perhaps best provided the infamous Toshiba-Kongsberg affair. Despite COCOM agreements, the Japanese Toshiba Machine Company sold milling technology to a Swedish company who then transferred the technology to the Soviets, allegedly enabling the Soviets to build quieter, more sonar-evasive submarine propellers. The fallibility of governmental mechanisms to guard against such infringements of COCOM export controls demonstrates the potential weaknesses of the current export control regime.

Written by area experts, the country analysis provides a solid historical framework for understanding each member state including their attitudes toward trade with the Soviet Union and their respective mechanisms for instituting COCOM controls. Particular features of some Allied members are highlighted: the independent streak of the French export control system, the conflicting need in Great Britain to maintain its special relationship with the United States while maintaining a national consensus on the benefits of free trade, and the West German dissent from American-led responses to political events, such as the declaration of martial law in Poland and the 1980 Olympic boycott.

Former ambassador to West Germany and Hungary and former assistant secretary of state for European affairs, Martin J. Hillenbrand, offers insightful and prescriptive observations on how to narrow the gulf in American and European perceptions of export control. As a starting point, he and other contributors urge the United States to recognize the strains resulting from two key features of its export control policy: extraterritorial reach, the requirement that US export licenses be on products containing American-made components even when those products are exported from outside the United States; and the application of export controls to further foreign policy goals.

US insistence on coupling foreign policy goals — such as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan — to export controls is an extremely divisive force within the Western alliance. William Long argues that the executive branch exerts more influence in this export control area than in any other area of foreign economic policy. He traces this excessive executive control to provisions originally granted in wartime. Once a degree of autonomy had been established, the executive branch continued to pursue policies which reinforced its authority, flexibility, and control. Case studies by Steve Elliot on US energy trade controls and by Bruce Jentleson on the Soviet-European gas pipeline provide compelling examples for this argument.

Michael Mastunduno argues that continued US insistence on retaining these features of its export control policy will erode US leadership capacity in the future. COCOM's long-term strength and stability depend critically on the willingness of US officials to engage in a more constructive dialogue with other COCOM members on areas of concern. The politicization of strategic export issues will only undermine the effectiveness of the controlling regime.

This volume is a model for those writing in the field. Its integrated editorial approach avoids repetition and links themes and arguments together in a logical and clear manner. The reader is left not only with an understanding of the political complexities and limitations of COCOM, but a formula for future progress.

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## *Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954*

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By Melanie Billings-Yun

New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 200 pp., \$25.00.

Melanie Billings-Yun's book might have been better titled "Decision to Postpone a War" given the US subsequent experience in Vietnam. As it is, she has added yet another primer on the roots of American involvement in Southeast Asia. By analyzing the Cold War preoccupations of the United States, the turbulent domestic politics of France during the 1950s, and by painting a radically revisionist portrait of President Eisenhower, she has produced a thought-provoking treatise on why America did not intervene on behalf of the French during their debacle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

The daring reassessment of President Eisenhower is the book's major thesis. Throughout, Billings-Yun challenges the popular view of the passive chief executive practicing his golf swing while his hyperbolic secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, took the initiative. With the help of previously classified presidential papers and military and government documents, Eisenhower is revealed as a crafty but principled tactician who controlled the American response at Dien Bien Phu "by sleight of hand."

Billings-Yun reminds us of Eisenhower's tenuous hold on Republican allegiance. His election in 1952 was seen by many as a landslide for a war hero, not a Republican. Truman had earlier approached him to head the Democratic ticket and, even after he was elected, Eisenhower continued to dream of starting a centrist third party. Attempts by Eisenhower to steer a middle ground between the eastern establishment wing of the party and the "Asia Firsters," his dual campaign pledge to stop the spread of communism while cutting back on government (mostly military) spending, and his personal ambivalence toward the Republican agenda, convince Billings-Yun that Eisenhower was something of an iconoclast. Unfortunately, the evidence only seems to confirm the stereotype of Eisenhower as more willing to defer to Congress than other post-Depression presidents.

More convincing is her explanation of Eisenhower's ultimate refusal to aid the French. Repelled by the French insistence on maintaining a colonial policy in Indochina and guided by his keen military sense, Eisenhower recognized the folly of the Maginot-style human fortress the French had erected in the remote valley at Dien Bien Phu. Whether he orchestrated the fateful Foggy Bottom meeting of April 3, 1954, coined by Chalmers Roberts as "the day we didn't go to war," from a golf course is still disputed. Billings-Yun believes that Eisenhower established conditions that sealed the doom of a proposed air strike days before the meeting, and speculates that if he was indeed serious

about intervention, he would have used his sway on Capitol Hill and lobbied Congress long before. "Eisenhower indeed was playing golf at Camp David during the conference, but acted with the forced calm of a general who stands back while subordinates carry out his strategy" (p. 93). After emphasizing Eisenhower's dependence on Congress and his uneasy relationship with the GOP, Billings-Yun seems to indicate that perhaps the president had more clubs in his bag than was thought previously. The evidence offered here, however, remains unconvincing.

Billings-Yun argues that the odd-couple quality of Eisenhower and Dulles illustrates the president's tendency to "let others in his administration take the blame for unpopular stands and himself the credit for moderating them" (p. 19). Billings-Yun cites in particular a March 1954 speech to the Overseas Press Club when Dulles stirred McCarthyist sentiments for intervention in Indochina with his call for "united action" just at a time when the administration was trying to deflect attention from the mounting carnage at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles, like Eisenhower, detested French colonial policy in Indochina but hated even more the idea that the French would make a "limp-wristed deal" with the Communists at the upcoming Geneva Conference and sell out Indochina.

The two men also had different interpretations of the "New Look," the National Security Council's answer to containing communism while pruning defense outlays. While Dulles saw the policy through the lens of "massive retaliation" and "brinkmanship," it was ironically Eisenhower, the war hero, who saw it as a way to cut costs and relieve America from the burden of underwriting the total defense of its allies. Adumbrating Paul Kennedy, Eisenhower intoned, "To watch vigilantly on the military front must never mean to be blind on the domestic front." And later on, "A bankrupt America is a defenseless America" (p. 17).

Billings-Yun is careful to note the Cold War context of this foreign policy decision, the stranglehold of McCarthyism, the outcry over the "loss" of China to the Communists, and the fear of another land war in Asia. And she rightly emphasizes how political instability in postwar France affected the administration's prolonged flirtation with intervention. Eisenhower and Dulles were desperate to get France to ratify the European defense community (EDC), an integrated European defense force that would have included armed German units. The fragile government of Prime Minister Joseph Laniel kept tying ratification of the EDC to US assistance in Indochina.

Several colorful portraits of the major players in this drama are also included. Particularly good is the depiction of the hawkish Admiral Arthur Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who continued to endorse intervention, known as "Operation Vulture," right up until the fall of Dien Bien Phu. (He even considered scattering a few tactical atomic bombs around Indochina to deflect the Vietminh.) Senators John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson make cameo appearances with painfully ironic comments about the folly of getting involved in Vietnam, and Vice-President Richard Nixon makes a prescient

comment (at the time considered a serious gaffe) about the willingness of the United States to dispatch forces to Indochina should the French abandon their position.

Although I quarrel with the author's touched-up view of Eisenhower, *Decision Against War* is well-written and solidly researched. It is a thought-provoking addition to the literature on this understudied prelude to our involvement in Vietnam.

Reviewed by Carol Hills.

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## *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*

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By Paul Gordon Lauren

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, 388 pp., including index and bibliography, \$34.95.

*Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* makes a persuasive and disturbing case. Paul Lauren argues that racism has been and continues to be one of the primary forces in foreign policy. After reading the book, one feels acutely the need for revision of standard Western historiography.

A professor of ethics and public affairs at the University of Montana, Lauren discloses a largely unfamiliar racist history in the West. Through the writings and statements of leaders and intellectuals from Aristotle to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Lauren exposes the racist elements which motivated their actions and influenced their thought. This racism is thoroughly examined through historical examples including an extensive review of Darwinian rationales for discrimination. Lauren narrates the important discussion of race after each of the world wars, detailing the proposed Japanese provisions for racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant, and, later, the attempts by American blacks to question the hypocrisy of racial discrimination in the United States after Allied pronouncements during the war against Hitler. The final chapters review the changes wrought by the newly independent Third World on human rights instruments and their efforts to eliminate racial discrimination including a lengthy treatment of international attempts from 1946 to the present to end apartheid in South Africa, and a discussion of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3151 that equated Zionism and racism.

The power of Lauren's work is his sweeping challenge to the common interpretations of the motivations for political actions. Lauren argues that white racism was one of the fundamental causes of, *inter alia*, Japanese expansion after World War I, the refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations, the inclusion of the national sovereignty provision (Article 2[7]) in the United Nations Charter, the postwar decay of European empires, and US support of South Africa. Lauren asks Westerners — and particularly Americans, whose actions receive considerable attention — to reconsider their entire base of assumptions about the motives that have driven them and their leaders. Was constructive engagement truly seen by the Reagan administration as “the most effective means not only to serve US interests but also to coax South Africa to end its occupation of Namibia and ameliorate its policy of apartheid” (p. 263)? Or, as Lauren suggests, does the policy which evoked “euphoria” from the racist South African regime and condemnation from the rest of the world really have racist underpinnings?

In presenting so forcefully the racist motives behind Western actions, Lauren leaves two gaps: he largely ignores the racist actions of non-Western culture, and he seems to deny the power of other motives in determining the actions of countries and their leaders. The latter of these is perhaps inevitable in a book which seeks to redefine the traditional wisdom concerning so many events. Nonetheless, Lauren's refusal to qualify the racist motive as being one of many and his insistence on promoting its importance without addressing more widely discussed historical motives weaken his otherwise convincing argument.

The scant treatment of racism outside white Western culture is more problematic. In the introduction, Lauren cites the definition of racism found in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It states that "'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction . . . based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying . . . human rights . . . ." Despite this acknowledgement of the broad character and global extent of racism, Lauren chooses, although it is never stated explicitly, to focus almost exclusively on discrimination as practiced by white Westerners. He provides only an occasional phrase which indicates an awareness and concern for the discrimination practiced by non-Western cultures and peoples.

His treatment of Japanese expansion after World War I and during World War II, for example, rings hollow. Presenting it as a triumph of Asians over Europeans, Lauren ignores the brutality and racist undercurrents of Japanese expansion that cause tension in East Asia to this day. It is only in the epilogue that Lauren addresses the hypocrisy of non-white as well as white nations.

Too often ignored by textbook histories, the pernicious role of racism is made clear. Lauren's work, while needing to be integrated into a more complete appraisal of the influences and motivations in foreign policy and supplemented by documentation and evaluation of racism exhibited outside non-Western cultures, is nonetheless, a cogent and provocative testimony.

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## *Innovation and The Arms Race: How The Soviet Union and The United States Develop New Military Technologies*

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By Matthew Evangelista

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988, 320 pp., \$32.95.

At a time when the superpowers have achieved the first agreement reducing nuclear weapons — the INF treaty — it might seem preferable to explain disarmament phenomenon, rather than return to another analysis of the arms race. However, with thousands of tactical nuclear weapons still poised to defend both Eastern and Western Europe, and with the United States and the Soviet Union still spending billions on research and development to achieve technological or numerical superiority, cogent analysis of the arms spiral continues to be more pertinent than ever, especially if one hopes to find a way to undo the arms race.

Through a new methodological approach, Matthew Evangelista in his *Innovation and The Arms Race* develops a compelling explanation for the stimulus of the arms race. The author's basic contention is that in the patterns of arms innovation there are revealing and important insights about why and how the arms race continues.

The study is divided into two parts; the first is a theoretical analysis of the arms race and superpower innovation, and the second is a case study on the origins of tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, Evangelista attempts to broaden his proposed scheme to include other types of weapons.

The social and political sciences traditionally approach the issue of foreign policy, and the arms race in particular, through two commonly accepted explanations, each emphasizing internal or external determinants of state behavior. Evangelista proposes that neither model is capable of explaining innovation patterns in the arms race. He argues that arms innovation represents a subtle mixing of both internal and external dynamics, and that this combination has an identifiable design. Part of this design is the vastly different approach taken by the United States and the Soviet Union toward arms innovation.

In the United States, the innovation process begins at the lower levels, from the scientists and military officials who produce new military equipment. This first stage, the "technocratic initiative," is followed by three others: consensus building, promotion, and "open windows" (public perceptions of external threats that allow the military to push a new weapon into production). Ultimately, the necessary high-level endorsement is reached.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the process is reversed. The catalyst for arms innovation usually originates at high levels because of the secrecy, rigidity, and compartmentalization of the political system. This top-down approach discourages individual initiative. The five stages speak for them-

selves: "stified initiative," preparatory measures, high-level response, mobilization, and mass production.

The case study of tactical nuclear weapons development in the United States and the Soviet Union in the second part of the book provides concrete examples for Evangelista's theoretical model. Thanks to the careful utilization of archival material, declassified documents, and extensive Soviet sources, the result is high quality. Evangelista never limits his findings to isolated sources or common assumptions. His detailed analysis of the reasons and ways tactical nuclear weapons were invented, produced, and deployed as a major component of modern military policy of both superpowers is compelling.

Why do the superpowers continue the arms race? Much of the blame is placed on the United States for not having learned the lessons of the "last move" myth, or the belief that the Soviet Union will always hold in check American technological breakthroughs. The current debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), for example, illustrates how this point permeates American security discussions.

If Evangelista explains why and how the superpowers continue the arms race, he does not give a satisfactory reason why they should stop. Nor does the author suggest at what stage it would be more valuable for US policy-makers to trade American technology for Soviet quantity. If, as the author concludes, the "last move" is a fallacy, Reagan's hope to create a better and more secure world with SDI seems mistaken. In the end, technology will never guarantee Western security, only a political and moral commitment will.

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*Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America, Volume 1: The United States, Central America, and Contadora*

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Edited by Bruce M. Bagley

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, 275 pp., including index and appendix, \$32.50

In early 1983, Columbia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela formed the *Contadora* group as a diplomatic initiative to curbe the perceived fear of direct US intervention in Central America. Since then, the *Contadora* process has been eclipsed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias's *Esquipulas* Peace Plan, for which he received the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. In spite of *Contadora's* supersession, it is crucial to continue examining the issues which govern cooperation in the region. *Contadora* marked the first attempt to institute and secure an established framework for the conduct of peace negotiations, and, more important, it served as the precedent for Arias' later proposal. *Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America* explores this history and the prospects for a resolution which satisfies regional concerns and US strategic interests.

The ten contributions present a diverse spectrum of opinion concerning the significance of the Sandinista government to US strategic interests in the Caribbean. Issues that shape the regional conflict are discussed and debated. For example, the legitimacy of US security interests in Central America is reexamined and evaluated; the good faith of US foreign policy toward Central America is questioned on the basis of its inconsistencies and ideological commitments; and the role played by the US Congress in limiting or influencing the formulation of policy is assessed as to how effectively it promotes or restricts the prospects for peace.

Alan Sternberger and Susan Kaufman Purcell provide the strongest arguments in support of the current US policy in Central America. Sternberger claims that Nicaragua's superior military forces and equipment in comparison to other Central American nations make it imperative for a strong US military presence in the region. Only through US involvement will a "stalemate of force [develop] that will allow the political forces time to institutionalize new socioeconomic structures" (p. 45). The *Contadora* effort focused precisely on overcoming the perception that military parity between countries was a precondition for peace, insisting that the political development of Central America had been hindered by extreme poverty, collapsed economies, and polarized societies. The continued neglect of these fundamental problems can serve only to stall any resolution of the conflict.

Complementing Sternberger's geopolitical evaluation of the conflict, Purcell opts for a political assessment which defines the constraints faced by all

countries in formulating policies in Central America. However, both Sternberger and Purcell buttress their arguments on the anachronistic supposition that Central America is an East-West issue. In doing so, they fail to unearth the more important social and historical issues that need to be overcome before a stalemate of forces is possible.

Wayne Smith and William LeoGrande contributed analyses which criticize US policy under Reagan. Smith insists US policy in Central America has been characterized by a lack of consensus and direction. Accordingly, this absence of orientation has led to divergent and misguided objectives within the administration. For example, consider the assessment made by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig: "In Central America we have a case of Soviet expansionism carried out by their Cuban allies. What we must do is draw a line and stop this Soviet aggression in its tracks" (p. 69). Smith proposes that the United States should prevent Nicaragua from acquiring advanced military capabilities rather than concentrating its efforts on overthrowing the Sandinistas. US support and training of the *Contras* are in effect tantamount to an undeclared war.

Similarly, LeoGrande builds a clear and strong argument against US efforts to roll back rather than contain the Sandinista revolution. He reveals the inconsistencies between American public endorsements of the *Contadora* peace process and the administration's actions to block all progress and agreements, which in their view would compromise US hegemony in the Caribbean.

As these essays demonstrate, the *Contadora* peace process has had to overcome tremendous obstacles to survive as a political and diplomatic alternative in Central America. The ongoing crises in the region require continued reflection on *Contadora's* objectives, evolution, and dynamics as a multilateral effort to seek political solutions to the conflict in Central America. The balance of opinions collected here, the greatest contribution of *Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America*, is fundamental in clarifying the scope of the debate.

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