

This analysis does not imply that the difficulties in a broad Palestinian identity preclude the event of a Palestinian state becoming legitimate to its constituents. If the state proves to be economically viable and its institutions provide well for the needs and interests of the Palestinian people, Kelman's model agrees that the system could prosper standing on its "instrumental" leg alone.

Facing West From California's Shores

KENNETH R. SONENCLAR*

The rise of the American "Sunbelt" and the concomitant decline of the "Frostbelt" has become a popular and important topic in recent years.¹ Discussion has focused upon various causes and domestic consequences of this stunning shift of political, social and economic power. The potential im-

impact of this phenomenon on foreign policy, however, has received scant attention. Nevertheless, it is already evident that this complex regional tug-of-war portends important adjustments in the substance of America's foreign relations. At the very least, the rise of Western America will encourage adoption of a more evenhanded foreign policy between Europe, Asia and Latin America.²

A brief look at the American West's explosive development since World War II is necessary to understand the extent of the region's potential impact on U.S. foreign policy. Part of California's flowering is attributable to dynamic population growth. As *New Yorker* staff writer E. J. Kahn observed after analyzing the

*Kenneth R. Sonenclar, is a candidate for the MALD degree at The Fletcher School. The author wishes to thank Elizabeth A. Brown for valuable comments on an earlier version of this article.

1. The Sunbelt region is composed of the Old South, the Southwest and the Southern Far West. The Frostbelt contains the Northeast and the Northern Midwest. This subject is covered in depth in Kirkpatrick Sale, *Power Shift*, (New York: Random House, 1974; Vintage, 1976), and more recently, and briefly, by Horace Sutton, "Sunbelt vs. Frostbelt: A Second Civil War?" *Saturday Review*, 15 April 1978, pp. 28-37.

2. Observers of the Northeast's declining influence on national policy have outlined a very diffuse power shift into the Sunbelt. This is a useful approach, particularly for tackling such problems as how the Federal pie will be divvied-up next year. But tracking the control of foreign policy requires a slightly different perspective. Direction of U.S. foreign relations is an aspect of political power which has traditionally resided at the nation's center — the section of the country which, because of a confluence of economic, academic, political, social and cultural forces, sets the pattern, or the tone, of national life. The Northeast has long functioned as the American center. That the East is losing its claim to national dominance is obvious. Yet, as the center vacates the Northeast, it cannot be evenly distributed from Roanoke Rapids, N.C. to Eureka, Calif. The question is, then, which section of the country will challenge the Northeast for national leadership? A host of symbols indicate there is only one contender — the West Coast, particularly California.

1970 census, "In the 20th century there have been four great flows of population: South to North, rural to urban, metropolitan to suburban, and just about everywhere to California."³ The Golden State is still attracting well over 1000 migrants daily, many from the large Frostbelt states, and California's population is expected to top 30 million by the turn of the century.⁴ Moreover, recent settlers are a far cry from the down-and-out *Grapes of Wrath* families which moved West during the Depression. A significant portion of today's migrants are young, intelligent professionals, disrupting the traditional flow of the inter-regional brain-drain.

California's highly-skilled and educated labor force is a key element in the state's economic base, which is already developing along futuristic lines. As *Business Week* has reported: "With 75% of its non-agricultural work force in service jobs (vs. 70% nationwide) and most other workers in high-growth manufacturing industries, California is usually relatively immune to business cycle recessions." Moreover, the state, because it is constantly renewing its base of growth industries, is expected to grow 25% faster than the national economy through 1985. The industries supporting California's economy include computers and peripheral equipment, apparel, federal non-defense agencies, plastics products, air transportation, electrical equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing and agricultural services. All of these industries depend on national or international markets.⁵ Other vital industries to the state are agriculture, defense, tourism and oil production. California is the nation's leading agricultural producer and home of the two largest banks lending to agribusiness. Besides offering year-round good-weather training facilities to the armed forces, many of the country's largest defense contractors, such as Lockheed, North American Rockwell, Litton and Hughes Aircraft are located in California.

Business interests are already forming a foundation for the future Western-oriented foreign policy. California's burgeoning trans-Pacific commercial relations, among other factors, are fueling the spread of a Pacific consciousness, removed from the European world of the American Eastern seaboard. Almost 70% of California's foreign trade is carried on across the Pacific.⁶ Interestingly, Canada's westernmost province, British Columbia, is also trading extensively with Pacific nations. William Bennett, the provincial premier, recently said

3. E. J. Kahn, *The American People*, (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1974), p. 3.

4. *New York Times*, 19 February 1978, pp. 1, 65.

5. *Business Week*, 17 July 1978, pp. 55-56. Several other California industries, whose impact reaches far beyond pumping up the economy, are also reinforcing the power shift from East to West. These are the so-called "popular" culture enterprises — the movies, popular music, radio and especially television.

6. Richard Reeves, "California vs. the U.S.," *Esquire*, February 1978, p. 65.

that B.C. "has great wealth and an economy that is more international than internal."⁷

Looking across the Pacific, ties between the American West Coast and East Asia are expanding on many levels. A proliferation of East Asian study centers at Western universities should raise the level of East-West understanding.⁸ Reduced costs of travel and shortened travel times are already increasing passenger traffic across the Pacific. Discussing the "illusions of distance" in *Foreign Affairs* 10 years ago, Albert Wohlstetter pointed out that: "If sonic booms prevent supersonic aircraft from flying over land, New York will once again, as in the time before the building of the transcontinental railroad, be closer to Europe than to Los Angeles. . . . Travel time from Los Angeles to Tokyo may be cut by nearly two-thirds. It will take perhaps 40 minutes more to get from Los Angeles to New York."⁹ Wohlstetter's predictions for this partially redrawn globe, allowing for expanded use of supersonic aircraft, are probably close to fruition. Moreover, advances in telecommunications are already multiplying public and private contacts across the Pacific.

Greater cultural awareness and sensitivity between the Orient and the United States will also ensue from the increasing interdependence of national economies. As cheap labor disappears, use of automation expands, and manufacturing costs equalize around the world, transnational corporations will increasingly locate plants within consuming markets. Japan, with its export-led economy, has already set patterns in this area. Other relatively developed East Asian nations are likely to follow suit. Typically, Japanese companies deal with California-based American businessmen when exporting to the United States. When considering constructing production facilities in the United States, Japanese firms have been drawn to the American West Coast for the same reasons that have enticed American firms.¹⁰

7. *New York Times*, 30 April 1978, p. 6. The *Times* reporter recorded other some observations which suggest an interesting kinship between the American and Canadian West Coasts. He wrote: ". . . in general, a visitor from still-snowy Quebec finds little sense of crisis — or of identification with Eastern Canada — in this complacent, easy-living and verdant city. Vancouver rarely suffers the harsh winters that afflict the rest of the country, and when one looks East, his view of Canada is cut off by mountains that serve as a 'security blanket,' as one resident put it. Westward, there is only the Pacific Ocean, which figures prominently in leisure activities here, and on which British Columbia's products and minerals are shipped."

8. Noted by Ladis Kristof, Portland (Oregon) State University geopolitical scientist, in a conversation at the Fletcher School, 1978.

9. Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (April 1968): 247.

10. Among other inducements for business, the state touts its image. Not long ago, the Governor of California, Jerry Brown, toured Japan trying to woo the managers of the large Japanese automakers to build their American production facilities in his state. The Governor's sales pitch was noteworthy: "Wherever you go," he told the president of Datsun, "people know California and have a pleasant association with it. I think that any product that is made there cannot help but pick up that association." As the journalist who reported the incident observed, the Governor was "talking about California as if it were a country with its own identity and culture." Orville Schell, "Eastward Ho!" *New Times*, 6 March 1978, p. 53.

Various other circumstances could also bolster the economic importance of the Pacific basin to the United States. Should the "de-Maoization" of China continue, emphasizing economic development over ideology, important trade and finance opportunities are sure to open up. If the United States edges closer to Peking as a hedge against the Soviet Union to the point of supplying arms to the Chinese, West Coast defense contractors will be among the first American interests to benefit.

Development plans of the ASEAN states (Association of Southeast Asian Nations — Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) also call for stepped-up American involvement. Vietnam's relatively liberal foreign investment guidelines will attract American business if relations are normalized. Already extensive U.S. economic ties to Korea and Taiwan are likely to prosper. A durable Pax Pacifica could facilitate progress in all of these areas.

An additional and critically important actor along the Pacific rim is Mexico, which also shares a 2000-mile land border with the Southwestern United States. Economic ties between the United States and Mexico are already extensive and will become more complex, particularly if Mexican oil reserves prove as bountiful as some have predicted.¹¹ Moreover, as Stanford political scientist Richard Fagen has pointed out, it is crucial to underscore the elements of the Mexican-U.S. relationship which place Mexico in a special position among developing countries from an American perspective.¹²

Furthermore, Mexico figures to become an increasingly important fixture in the international thinking of the Southwest and Far West as the Mexican-American population grows. *The New York Times* reports that because of immigration and a high birth rate, Mexicans are now the nation's fastest growing minority, with 16 million people, according to figures which undoubtedly leave out millions of others living in the United States illegally and beyond the reach of the census takers. In the Southwest, Chicanos form a significant share of the population. In California, Mexican-Americans comprise 16.5% of the population.¹³ In the future, leading members of the Chicano community will certainly rise to positions of business and political influence in the Western states. Members of this elite can be expected to demonstrate a special interest in strengthening ties across the border. Development of the Mexican economy,

11. Some estimates now place Mexico's potential reserves of oil and gas beyond those of the Persian Gulf.

12. Richard Fagen, "The Realities of U.S.-Mexican Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 55 (July 1977): 688. Fagen notes that almost 70% of all Mexican exports are directed toward the United States, and better than 60% of Mexican imports are of U.S. origin. The United States is the primary source of direct foreign investment (over \$3 billion), not to mention the overwhelming influence on tastes, consumption patterns, and mass media content. Furthermore, Mexico carries a quarter of all loans and credits to developing countries by private U.S. banks.

13. *New York Times*, 4 June 1978, sect. 4, p. 3.

moreover, particularly if a more equitable income distribution can be achieved, will ease some of the tension now felt between the two countries. Better understanding of Mexico and its problems, within the framework of Western interests, could lead to improved relations with all of Latin America which, along with Mexico, have long suffered from Washington's neglect.

What then is delaying the emergence of the new era of Pacific relations? Several identifiable factors, though declining in importance and vitality, are likely to forestall the incorporation of Western interests into a coherent American foreign policy. Most conspicuous, perhaps, is the tight grip the Eastern establishment retains on foreign policy decisionmaking. Fewer restrictions prevail today, but admission to the inner circles of official and unofficial foreign policy formulation is still contingent upon the right Eastern affiliations. Recent American Presidents from across the Sunbelt — Texas, Georgia and California — have all been constrained to select their foreign policy advisors from an axis grouped loosely around the Ivy League, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Op-Ed page of *The New York Times*. This is changing — as demonstrated by the growing stature of West Coast universities and think tanks — but the rise and fall of such institutions is necessarily a slow process.

Many other factors which have helped sustain the East's dominant position are also under attack. For instance, while most large American banks offering substantial global services are based in New York, California hosts the world's largest bank and several other fast-growing financial institutions. Moreover, foreign banks, which might once have limited their American presence to New York, can be found today in many key Sunbelt cities. Japanese banks, in particular, following their clients, have opened offices in a number of California cities. In another area, New York's position as the principal gateway for foreign air traffic is how history, as international flights enter American airports across the country.

A renascent sectionalism, manifest in a revived spirit of regional resourcefulness and independence, has also furthered the Eastern eclipse. This has come as a response to the perceived inability of Washington to respond to the people's needs.¹⁴ Because of the East's close association with the Federal establishment, anger and distrust at Federal control has sometimes meant anger at Eastern control. This spirit has fueled a rise in regional self-esteem around the nation. Californians, for the most part, no longer suffer from an inferiority complex to the Northeast. On the other side of the fence, the media has played an important role in reinforcing the traditional — Eastern — outlook of American foreign policy.¹⁵

14. For an interesting essay on the new American sectionalism, see Kevin Phillips, "The Balkanization of America," *Harper's*, May 1978, pp. 37-47.

15. Editorial offices for the consequential foreign affairs journals are located in either New York

Also retarding the development of America's Pacific relations has been a history of often ugly racial hostility. Discrimination against Mexicans and East Asians dates back to the ceding of California to the United States by Mexico and the discovery of gold in 1849. A century of violence, political manipulation and economic abuse followed. However, since World War II, discrimination has eased considerably, particularly intolerance directed against East Asians.

Internationally, images blurred by distance, cultural ignorance and wrongheaded interpretations have underlain many of America's problems in East Asia, which have persisted beyond the fall of Saigon. For example, as Robert C. Christopher concluded recently about relations with Tokyo: "Over the last decade successive U.S. administrations have repeatedly displayed gross insensitivity to legitimate Japanese concerns and a conspicuous lack of respect for Japanese pride."¹⁶

Historical insensitivity to Mexican and Oriental interests is largely a reflection of the central and blinding role Europe has played in America's political, social and economic development. From the nation's founding, whenever America has looked outward, it has looked to Europe. Granted, the United States has intently watched events in many parts of the world, particularly East Asia where America has fought two wars since 1950. Yet, in a very real sense, Uncle Sam has always had his back turned to Asia. The American view of the Far East (as revealed by the terminology itself) has been obtained by looking *around* the world at the region. The post-war impediment of the Soviet prism has particularly distorted this perspective. Economic, social and political movements within the United States, as earlier outlined, are already instigating a reconsideration and reorientation of the traditional American perspective.

This is not to suggest that a foreign policy incorporating Western interests would bring an enlightened and faultless understanding of East Asia and Latin America to U.S. foreign relations. Nor would such a policy augur America's abandonment of Western Europe. Although the West Coast is geographically more distant from Europe than the Eastern seaboard, modern telecommunications and transportation certainly minimize the difference. Moreover, one can

or Washington. New York houses the head offices of virtually all American newsgathering organizations — newspapers, newsmagazines, wire services, radio and television networks — large enough to support overseas staffs. While the television networks have all moved their entertainment divisions to Los Angeles from New York, news divisions are still ensconced in the East. Network news executives very likely believe, as Henry James did, that California lacks "solidity and seriousness." [Noted in Kevin Starr, *Americans and the California Dream 1850-1915* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 428.] Lending credibility to the national news broadcasts apparently requires stationing an anchorman somewhere it snows with regularity. But the recognition of viewers' tastes (who knows if it is true or not?) forms part of the vicious cycle reinforcing the Atlantic perspective.

16. Robert C. Christopher, "America and Japan: A Time for Healing," *Foreign Affairs* 56 (July 1978): 859.

no longer argue convincingly, as Frederick Jackson Turner once suggested of the pioneers who built the American West, that "the men of the Western World [have] turned their backs upon the Atlantic Ocean."¹⁷ Ancestral heritage and many of the other factors which have held Europe so close to the East are also present in the West. Furthermore, regardless of cultural heritage, certain ties exist between all states which share a relatively common degree of affluence and some commitment to democratic and capitalistic institutions.

Nevertheless, it is at least conceivable that Western Americans do not and will not share the high degree of attachment and obligation to Europe — to the relative exclusion and detriment of other concerns — felt by Easterners and demonstrated by current American foreign policy. Taken with the West's fast growing importance and the range of its emerging interests, it seems reasonable to suggest that America's growing role in a Pax Pacifica could also generate a declining involvement with Europe.

How far off is the emergence of a Western-oriented foreign policy? In examining the suggested power shift within America, one must rely to some extent upon the transfer of symbols from one coast to the other. Today's most obvious symbol is California's enigmatic Governor, Jerry Brown. Martin Nolan, former Washington bureau chief for the *Boston Globe*, has written that: "The maps and polls of 1980 identify Mr. Brown as the regional candidate of the West, bearing the hopes and fears of a large region also struggling for a place in Presidential politics."¹⁸ It is too soon to tell whether the country is ready for a President who prefers *Co-Evolution Quarterly* (a Whole Earth Catalog publication out of San Francisco) over *The New York Review of Books*.¹⁹ Certainly Brown's ascension to the Presidency would accelerate the West's march toward national dominance by providing the best possible forum for articulating the West's interests. But with or without a Brown presidency, it is evident that a nation's foreign policy cannot express the views of one region which ignore or contradict the concerns of another region. In a democracy, such a course invites, at a minimum, unsettling discord. For that reason, a Western foreign policy — a new American foreign policy — may only be truly visible when California's interests become America's interests.

17. Frederick Jackson Turner, "Contribution of the Frontier to American Democracy," (1903) in *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), p. 253.

18. Martin F. Nolan, review of *Jerry Brown* by J. D. Lorenz, *Brown* by Orville Schell and *Jerry Brown* by Robert Pack, in *New York Times Book Review*, 31 April 1978, p. 1.

19. Anthony Lewis, "A Brown Study: III," *New York Times*, 13 February 1978, p. A21.