

COERCION AS A TOOL FOR THIRD PARTY CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

ROLES, MODES, AND USE

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

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April 2004

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For family and friends, far and close.

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Abbreviations

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| CMR | Crude mortality rate |
| CPSU | Communist Party of the Soviet Union |
| CPY | Communist Party of Yugoslavia |
| EC | European Communities |
| EU | European Union |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| ICJ | International Court of Justice |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| ICTY | International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia |
| ICTR | International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda |
| JNA | Yugoslav National Army |
| LTTE | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| UN | United Nations Organization |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| U.S. | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| SFYR | Socialist Federation of Yugoslav Republics |

Abstract

This essay inquires into the use of coercive interventions in international affairs. International relations are structured by the realist, liberal and utopian view of the international system. Each of these theories proposes different security concepts by which international conflict can be deterred or suppressed. Their coexistence and imperfect implementation, however, creates an inadequate international system in which non-state conflicts are not efficiently engaged. Partial accountability and integration of international actors are key shortcomings of this system. Indeed, an excessive focus on states has created the perverted situation in which state rights dominate over human rights. These shortcomings can be remedied by a comprehensive and far-reaching set of institutional reforms at the international level.

Even if an effective collective security system is being restored through reform, its efficiency relies on the credible deterrence of those actors who are capable of affecting the international system. In case of faulty behavior by these actors, the deterrent threat must be executed to uphold international peace and security. Its execution takes the form of forceful interventions, which are implemented by third parties. On the policy level, intervening actors can play a series of roles, choosing among a number of forms and modes of coercive intervention. These choices are not arbitrary but can be matched to the intensity level of the conflict that is being engaged. This matching of intervention with conflict intensity requires a delicate process in which correlations are identified and codified.

Introduction¹

Evil triumphs when good men do nothing.
Edmund Burke

Conflict is everyday life as individual aims and interests constantly clash.² Psychologists, psychoanalysts and political philosophers disagree on how individual interests, aims, roles, perceptions and world visions are formed by, and thus differ in their assessment of the causes of conflicts.³ They agree, however, that the individuality of man generates sets of values and understandings that all differ from each other. There are no perfectly congruent interests and understandings, and conflict of interests is more a question of time than a question of occurrence. Conflict seems inevitable by the very nature of human individuality, yet conflict is not necessarily undesirable. Clashing interests and views may result in new thoughts and solutions. For Charles Darwin, the result of conflict is the generation of inherited characteristics, which promote the likelihood for survival. For Sigmund Freud, conflict is a learning process. Participants of conflict discover the causes and problems of conflict when they endure it. They so learn how to cope with it, and how to avoid future conflict. Conflict in the Freudian conception is addressed from within. Then, of course, there is also a Hegelian and Marxist assessment of conflict. Georg W. F. Hegel's famous conception trinity - thesis, antithesis, and synthesis – stipulates the generation of constructive produces (the synthesis) when thesis and antithesis clash. Karl Marx applied Hegel's understanding of conflict onto societal structures. There, the infrastructure's and the supra-structure's different paces of

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² Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, 3rd American edition, (New York: MacGraw Hill, 2004), p9.

³ *Idem*, p12-15.

evolution generate friction and conflict out of which better societal systems emerge (the synthesis). In Marx's understanding, this conflict was both inexorable and indispensable.⁴

The collision of interests, aims, perceptions, roles, or world visions also suggests - but not prescribes - a negative produce. Indeed, many conflicts may well be reconciled peacefully once they are articulated and visible and apprehendable for either opponent. The problem lies in the eventuality that reconciliation might not be feasible, or worse, might not be desired. Conflict then escalates to destructive 'heights'. In such cases, the horrors of conflict are frightening: Destruction of physical assets pairs with the wounding and killing of humans, humiliating and traumatizing the opponents durably. Often, such 'negative conflicts' durably affect the opponents' willingness to compromise. This is the vicious circle of negative conflict: Investments into adversarial - and not reconciliatory - conflict resolution policies become more costly, the more willing the opponents are to defend their aims and interests. After a certain point, leaders on either side are virtually incapable to de-escalate the adversarial process, as 'sunk costs' - past investments without tangible payoffs - must be justified to the constituencies.

This thesis focuses on the study of such 'excessive negative conflict' in the international arena. There, the study of conflict is in stronger demand than ever. Internal conflicts in the Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Ivory Coast and Haiti, ethnic cleansing in East Timor, Rwanda, Zaire and Bosnia, resurgent and new types of international wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo, and not-so-new forms of international terrorism in New York, Bali and Madrid suggest that more work in the field of conflict resolution is required.⁵ In its contribution to the field of conflict resolution, this thesis focuses on the use of third party coercion for conflict

⁴ *Op. cit.*: Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, p10.

⁵ Mark Duffield would strongly disagree with this point of view. For a critical (damning) and provocative but highly interesting analysis of the conflict resolution industry see: Mark Duffield, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid," in *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1996), volume 20, number 3, pp173-193.

resolution. It attempts to give answers to these three questions: Should third parties force conflict resolution, can third party coercion be used in conflict resolution, and how?

Coercion in international politics is indisputably a sensitive issue. It stipulates the bending, if not the violation of state sovereignty and international state equality. Per definition, coercion is a direct attack on the Westphalian thought which elevates state consent to the ultimate determinant for international action. The high number, the magnitude and gravity of contemporary conflicts, however, suggest that the Westphalian political thought requires revision, or, at least, adaptation. Indeed, if a pure Westphalian system ever existed, the international systems moved away from the Westphalian conception since then. As Aristotle would put it, the ‘form of the international governance’ evolved significantly enough from its ‘supposed foundation’ as to provoke frictions, tensions, and conflict between them.⁶ Conflict on ‘the ground’ in the Monrovia and Mogadishu is therefore but the terrestrial reflection of a conflict on the meta-level of international affairs, which conceptualizes the international system as a pool of atomized, independent and internationally unaccountable sovereign nation states. This system is, the high number of conflicts suggests, incapable of coping with events ‘on the ground’. In Aristotle’s philosophy, such a situation of decay forces change and leads to the next form of governance.

In line with this, it is the purpose of this thesis to inquire into this friction between the micro and the macro level of the international system, and to sketch the new forms and principles that are required to make it work. There are three prongs of attack to this endeavor: Part one discusses the theoretical and philosophical considerations implied in present day conflict resolution. It argues that a new view on international duties and mechanisms is required, and that existing security concepts must be made more reliable, accountable, and predictable. Part two inquires into the different roles of third parties from a policy point of

⁶ This is an analogy of Aristotle’s thought. He believed that when one form of governance becomes enough corrupted (tensions with its original form of governance become paramount), history will bring about the next form of governance.

view. How can foreign actors intervene into conflicts, and how do their roles evolve over time? Part three, finally, examines the actual implementation of foreign intervention in relation to the warring parties in a case study of foreign intervention in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

The thesis has been written for the fulfillment of the Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy thesis requirement of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.⁷ Jeswald W. Salacuse, Henry J. Braker Professor of Law, and Diana Chigas, Adjunct Assistant Professor of International Diplomacy, both faculty members at the Fletcher School kindly supervised and advised the writing of this essay. I am thankful for their supervision and constructive assistance.

The paper starts with a brief literature survey pointing at the key written sources that were consulted in course of research. The survey is followed by a brief outline of the methodology chosen. Then, the essay is divided into the three aforementioned parts, a macro-, a meso-, and a case analysis of coercion. The macro part maps out the understanding of conflict and coercion in international relations theory. It inquires into the security concepts that are being put forward by these theories for conflict prevention and resolution and analyzes their applicability and effectiveness in the political reality. The meso-analysis maps the middle ground of coercion theory between the first theoretical and the third applied section. Moving gradually towards the actor on the ground, this part identifies the different forms and modes of third party coercion. The final case study then tests the theory on real life events. The conclusion then discusses the findings of this research paper, providing considerations and recommendations for third party intervention for peace.

⁷ At the Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, USA.

1. Literature survey and methodological foundation

1.1 Literature survey

The different kinds of writings, which have been used for this thesis, are exposed in this literature survey. The survey is tentative and does not pretend to provide an exhaustive inspection of the vast literature on third party coercion in conflict resolution. It serves as a simple contribution for the distinction of the different currents of writings, which impacted on this essay.

The first set of writings relates to international relations theory. Its abstract conceptualization of inter-state relations is both the basis and cause of this study. Its theoretical main families, realism, liberalism and utopianism are at the heart of the explanation of contemporary conflict, which is the very object of analysis. International relations theory is exposed and described by a high number of authors, a selection of which are Thomas Pangle⁸, Stephen van Evera⁹, Robert Jervis¹⁰, Harry Clor¹¹, Michel Nicholson¹², and especially James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.¹³ Their summaries and explanations of the theory provide a standard overview. However, they do not attempt to adapt the theoretical understanding of the international system to on-ground realities such as the persistence of non-state conflict. Classical sources of the political philosophy are integrated into the manuals as primary sources, which can be accessed on a variety of websites.

⁸ Thomas Pangle, "The Moral Basis of National Security: Four Historical Perspectives," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp307-372.

⁹ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert Art and Waltz, Kenneth N. (editors), 6th American edition, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), chapter 3.

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," in *International Security*, Summer 1999, pp42-63.

¹¹ Harry Clor, "Woodrow Wilson," in *American Political Thought*, Morton Frisch and Richard Stevens (editors), (New York: Scribner's, 1971), pp191-217.

¹² Michael Nicholson, "Realism and Utopianism Revisited," in *Review of International Studies*, volume 24, 1998, pp65-82.

¹³ James Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 5th American edition, (New York: Longman, 2001), chapter 2.

Closely linked to the theory is a second set of authors that deals with international ethics such as humanitarian interventions. These authors predominantly stem from the security studies domain, and include George Kennan¹⁴, Claes Ryn¹⁵, Richard Sears¹⁶, Nathan Tarcov¹⁷, William O'Brien¹⁸, Sissela Bok¹⁹, Karen Smith, Margot Light²⁰, Thomas L. Pangle, Peter J. Ahrens Dorf²¹, Thomas Ward²² and Alton Frye.²³ They are complemented by Francis Harbour²⁴, Stanley Hoffman²⁵ and Michael Smith²⁶ for the post-Cold War morality of the use of force in international politics.

The third segment of scholarly work referred to in these pages is a number of policy papers from the wider field of applied conflict resolution. In contrast to international relations theory, these essays bridge the various disciplines of international relations research, political sciences, economic relations, international law and history. The use of coercive diplomacy, for instance, is comprehensively exposed by authors like Lawrence Freedman²⁷, Clarence Marsh Case²⁸, Alexander L. George²⁹, Martin Patchen³⁰, Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C.

¹⁴ George Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 64, Winter 1985/1986, pp205-18.

¹⁵ Claes Ryn, "The Ethical Problem of Democratic Statecraft," in *Power, Principles, and Interests: A Reader in World Politics*, Jeffrey Salmon, James P. O'Leary, and Richard Shultz (editors), (Lexington: Ginn Press, 1985), pp109-24.

¹⁶ Richard Sears, "The Classical Understanding of International Politics," in *Power, Principles, and Interests: A Reader in World Politics*, pp81-97.

¹⁷ Nathan Tarcov, "Principle and Prudence in Foreign Policy," in *The Public Interest*, Summer 1984, pp45-60.

¹⁸ William O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War*, (New York: Praeger, 1981).

¹⁹ Sissela Bok, "Early Advocates of Lasting World Peace: Utopians or Realists," in *Ethics and International Affairs 2nd American edition*, Joel Rosenthal (editor), (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1999), pp124-147.

²⁰ Karen Smith and Light, Margot (editors), *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

²¹ Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace*, (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1999).

²² Thomas Ward, *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

²³ Alton Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).

²⁴ Francis Harbour, "Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core," in *Ethics and International Affairs*, pp103-123.

²⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, "The Political Ethics of International Relations," in *Ethics and International Affairs*, pp28-49.

²⁶ Michael Smith, "Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of Ethical Issues," in *Ethics and International Affairs*, pp271-295.

²⁷ Lawrence Freedman (editor), *Strategic Coercion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

²⁸ Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-Violent Coercion: A Study in Methods of Social Pressure*, (New York: The Century Company, 1923).

Hayes³¹, Gordon A. Craig and, again Alexander L. George³², who might be the most renowned specialist of this non-substantive mode of persuasion. Centered on the economic modes of coercion are Sidney Weintraub³³ who analyzes U.S. economic coercion, and Jonathan Kirshner³⁴, Miroslav Nincic, Peter Wallensteen³⁵, and Margaret P. Doxey³⁶ who inquire into the generalities of economic sanctions. Influential research on the military modes of coercion has been conducted by the seminal Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing³⁷, but also by Keith B. Payne³⁸, Robert Art, Kenneth N. Waltz³⁹, Karin von Hippel⁴⁰, Jarat Chopra⁴¹, Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel.⁴²

The concluding Yugoslav case study largely builds on former academic research both at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.⁴³ Also, complementary material on social interactions, especially negotiation behavior and opportunities is being expanded from former seminar

²⁹ Alexander L. George, *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

³⁰ Martin Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988).

³¹ Donald C. F. Daniel and Hayes, Bradd C., *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crisis*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1999).

³² Gordon A. Craig and George, Alexander L., *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd American edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

³³ Sidney Weintraub (editor), *Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

³⁴ Jonathan Kirshner, *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁵ Miroslav Nincic and Wallensteen, Peter (editors), *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics*, (New York: Praeger, 1983).

³⁶ Margaret P. Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

³⁷ Glenn H. Snyder and Diesing, Paul, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

³⁸ Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence - and - A New Direction*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).

³⁹ Robert Art and Waltz, Kenneth N., *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th American edition, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

⁴⁰ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁴¹ Jarat Chopra, *Peace Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority*, (London: Routledge, 1999).

⁴² Max G. Manwaring and Fishel, John T. (editors), *Towards Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

⁴³ Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, seminar paper, Crisis Management in Complex Emergencies class, fall semester 2003, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford: Unpublished, text with the author, 2003); *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, seminar paper, Yugoslav Crises class, spring semester 2003, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva: Unpublished, text with the author, 2003).

work. Negotiation theory can be found in the edited work of J. William Breslin, Jeffrey Z. Rubin⁴⁴, and William Zartman⁴⁵ and the comprehensive manuals of Friedrich Glasl⁴⁶, Jeswald W. Salacuse⁴⁷, and Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Lee Kim.⁴⁸

1.2 Methodology

In line with international relations writing, this thesis embraces a policy approach to the roles, modes and use of third party coercion for peace making. The strength of an international relations approach lies in its interdisciplinary nature, policy argumentations, and policy references to observed international practice in individual scenarios. Its strength does not derive from quantitative empirical research, which is common to the wider field of political science, but not to international relations.

The approach to conflict from international law, diplomacy⁴⁹ and economics implies a ‘top down’ engagement of the topic. Abstractions of human collectives – ‘states’, the ‘international community’, and ‘coalitions’ – are the primary focus of an international relations method in international relations conflict resolution studies. This is yet certainly not the only available access to conflict resolution, which can equally well be established by ‘bottom up’ sciences like psychology and sociology in which the individual human being more clearly takes center stage. Still, however, the object of this study is the very well being of every individual. Its emphasis on states and coalitions should not distract from this finality. Indeed, the longevity of the international relations ‘top down’ approach to human affairs is questionable. As non-state actors make the frontpages with ever increasing frequency, the

⁴⁴ J. William Breslin and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (editors), *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, (Cambridge: Program of Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1999).

⁴⁵ William Zartman and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (editors), *Power and Negotiation*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*: Friedrich Glasl, *Konfliktmanagement: Ein Handbuch für Führungskräfte, Beraterinnen und Berater*, 1997.

⁴⁷ Jeswald W. Salacuse, *The Global Negotiator: Making, Managing, and Mending Deals Around the World in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*: Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*.

⁴⁹ Diplomacy is the U.S.-American equivalent to history, political science and philosophy in continental European teaching of international relations.

psychological and sociological gateways to conflict studies might become more important for international relations research in the near future.

PART I

Conflict and conflict resolution in the international system

2. The political philosophy of the international system

This first part conducts an analysis of the role, modes and use of third party coercion on level of the international system. Three major schools of international relations theory explain the behavior of states in this system. Realism, liberalism and utopianism also explain why conflict exists, and by which security concepts sources of conflict can be eliminated. The schools of thought provide three different views on international affairs. Yet they are not fully independent one from another. Rather, their current forms integrate, analyze and modify the assumptions of each other school. They so identify the strengths and weaknesses of each other. Newer and less established concepts of the international system like ‘critical IR theory’ provide additional views on states and conflicts. For the purpose of this essay, however, realism, liberalism and utopianism suffice. These three schools of thought are clearly established, and their respective assumptions and conclusions are clearly defined and accessible. Also, the centrality of the classical three is reflected by their impact on applied foreign policy making, in which each school’s influence can be identified.

The following exposure of international relations theory chiefly serves the purpose of conflict analysis. It provides an overview over the security concepts, which are being prescribed by the three schools. These concepts explain how international insecurity could and should be confronted, and what means and tools could be used to mitigate the natural attraction of states to instability-fostering policies.

2.1 Realism and its derivatives⁵⁰

The maybe most prominent, and supposedly oldest framework concept of international relations is realism. It can be traced back to Thucydides' analysis of the Peloponnesian War in 431BC.⁵¹ In the western world⁵², it was then Nicolo Machiavelli⁵³ and Thomas Hobbes⁵⁴ who adapted the realist school of thought to the phenomenon of nation states building. Today, these three authors' analyses are considered the founding writings of 'classical realism'. Machiavelli's best known work, *The Prince*,⁵⁵ for instance, was the first political writing to distinguish between domestic and foreign politics. Although his very personal philosophy⁵⁶ differed from it (this is widely ignored), his work exposes the core elements of classical realism. Its central theme is that the international system forms an anarchical polity in which no actor can trust another. Without supreme enforcer of international law and order, this system is inherently insecure and instable. Aggressions by neighbor states are constant possibilities, as scarce resources, hunger for glory and thirst for power of political leaders actively promote expansionist and belligerent strategizing. In Machiavelli's realism, the only way to induce solidity into the naturally instable international system is universal military armament. Armed protection establishes military stalemates between states, a balance of terror in which no actor can dominate. Yet, the problem of universal armament is technical

⁵⁰ For the realist and liberal school, see: *Op. cit.*: Thomas Pangle, "The Moral Basis of National Security: Four Historical Perspectives," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*; *Op. cit.*: Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, chapter 3; *Op. cit.*: James Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, chapter 2; *Op. cit.*: Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neo-liberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," in *International Security*, p42.

⁵¹ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Thucydides: The History of the Peloponnesian War, 431 B.C.," from *The Classics Archive*, accessed March 26, 2004, available from:

<http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html>

⁵² Sun Tze's influential *Art of War* and Ibn Kaldun's seminal *Muqaddimah*, for instance, are not included in this survey.

⁵³ Nicolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527 AD.

⁵⁴ Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679 AD.

⁵⁵ Constitution Society, "Nicolo Machiavelli," from the *Constitution Society homepage*, accessed March 25, 2004, available from: <http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm>

⁵⁶ The *Discourses on Livy* and not *The Prince* are considered to codify Machiavelli's personal philosophy. See: CTBW, "Niccolo Machiavelli," from the *CTBW homepage*, accessed March 27, 2004, available from: <http://www.ctbw.com/lubman.htm>

development: As the firepower and mobility of troops are being enhanced, disequilibria of armament undermine the balance of power mechanism.

Thomas Hobbes saw the world similarly. In his view, man is evil, and this evil is being projected onto foreign policy making. Borrowing from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (and others') vision of society, Hobbes applies the contractualist theory onto the international system: Contractualism⁵⁷ departs from the assumption that the natural state of mankind is endless Armageddon, the combat of one against another. It believes that man can agree to give up its sweeping individualism in favor of peace. For peace, however, man must 'contract into' a regulated form of coexistence. Consequently, man contracts into the creation of a supreme enforcer of coexistence, the separation of society and government, the establishment of ruled and rulers. Applying this theory to the international level, Hobbes therefore suggests that the natural mode of international coexistence is permanent conflict, and that only the ceding of state powers to supranational institutions is capable of imposing peace. While Machiavelli and Hobbes share this understanding, Hobbes believes in the possibility to eliminate at least two sources of conflict. If they are already egoistic, then statesmen can at least be socialized to formulate foreign policies on the basis of national interests, only. 'Irrational and emotional motivations', the quests for glory and personal power, could be eliminated if statesmen are held accountable by their constituencies. Still, Hobbes is pessimistic about the compatibility of needs of natural capital. Resources being scarce, this national demand will remain the key driver for unilateral action. The incompatibility of material interests is an unflagging generator for conflict.

Today, classical realism has been supplemented by neo-realism, neo-classical realism, liberal realism and offensive realism. These sub-schools share the classical core assumptions: The international system is endemically insecure and prone to conflict. Foreign policy making

⁵⁷ For the contractualist theory, see, among others: Digital Archive, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Du Contrat Social, Geneva, 1762," from the *Digital archive*, accessed March 11, 2004, available from: http://un2sg4.unige.ch/athena/rousseau/jjr_cont.html

is motivated by selfish interests, and “[g]overnmental policy is based on retaining power rather than pursuing ideals.”⁵⁸ This *Realpolitik* dominates in national security policymaking and suppresses the possibility for international cooperation. This rather pessimistic and deterministic view of international affairs conditions a specific security concept called the ‘national security paradigm’. In this realist concept, the nation-state is the only guarantor of security.

2.2 The liberal school

Liberalism and its sub-schools, liberal realism and defensive realism are the immediate response to realism. Its early proponents, John Locke⁵⁹ and Montesquieu⁶⁰ shared the realist understanding of a naturally anarchic international system. States compete over scarce resources, so making conflict an endemic element of international life. Yet liberals see international cooperation as a possible and capable way out of the dilemma. Cooperation such as proliferation treaties, arms limitations agreements and arbitration clauses build trust in an environment essentially hostile to confidence. This is permitted by the universal comprehension of the linkage between peace and commerce: Commerce generates wealth and so moderates interests. It also permits universal access to resources, so eliminating this source for conflict. Liberals believe that statesmen can understand these effects of trade. They also believe that the commerce’s requirement for peace requires restraining statesmen from choosing the belligerent path.

Implicit in the liberal idea is a socialization process of the statesmen. Learning that commerce has beneficial produces, politicians achieve security (‘high politics’) through

⁵⁸ Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527),” from the *Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy homepage*, accessed March 27, 2004, available from:

<http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/m/machiave.htm>

⁵⁹ John Locke (1632-1704). Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “John Locke,” from the *Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy homepage*, accessed March 27, 2004, available from: <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/l/locke.htm>

⁶⁰ Montesquieu (1689-1755). Athena, “Montesquieu: Lettres Persannes,” from the *Athena homepage*, accessed March 26, 2004, available from: http://un2sg4.unige.ch/athena/montesquieu/mon_lp_frame0.html

economics (low politics'). In order to preserve international stability and spur commerce, leaders therefore pursue national interests defensively. Compared with realism, liberalism establishes a stable system by virtue of equal access to resources. As such, liberalism prescribes a different security paradigm, the so-called 'international security concept'. This concept reflects global economic interdependencies. Consequently, it suggests that the security of one state depends on the security of another. Differently put, only if all states have access to 'vital' resources, no state will adopt expansionist policies.

2.3 Utopian input⁶¹

'Early utopians' and 'utopian realists' are the two dominant currents within the utopian segment. The school's denomination, 'utopianism' is generally interchangeably used with idealism. In the U.S., it is also called 'Wilsonianism' in reference to the American wartime president who officially restated, but never implemented Immanuel Kant's ideas. This school assumes the presence of globally shared values, rules and principles, which are able of elevating collective interests over particular interests. The lead thinker of utopianism was Immanuel Kant.⁶² According to his thought, the international security dilemma comes about by states' adherence to universal moral imperatives, or collective interests. Kant's believe can be paraphrased by John Nash's game theory exposed in the next diagram: In a 'prisoner's dilemma', the payoff of collective policy making is superior to individual and unilateral policy choices.⁶³ Based on realist readings, Kant saw that unilateral, nationalist policy making in an anarchic world establishes exactly this 'prisoner's dilemma' of

⁶¹ For the utopian school, see: *Op. cit.*: Harry Clor, "Woodrow Wilson," in *American Political Thought*, pp191ff; *Op. cit.*: Michael Nicholson, "Realism and Utopianism Revisited," in *Review of International Studies*, pp65ff.

⁶² Mount Holyoke College, "Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch, 1795" from the *Mount Holyoke College homepage*, accessed March 26, 2004, available from: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>

⁶³ The payoff is represented by numbers. The higher the number, the higher the payoff. If state A and B decide unilaterally they would chose non-cooperation. If they cooperate, the collective outcome is yet higher. The individual outcomes and the collective outcome are highlighted as bold. The individual solutions represent a unilateral, realist-based policy choice. Liberalism cannot be displayed in this highly simplified game theory model.

international security.⁶⁴ Working together on security issues, an adherence to collective interests outflanks the international security dilemma. In practice, Kant envisioned perpetual peace by the formation of a federation of like-minded states (states which all believe in the same imperatives). This federation should be a union of democracies, or ‘republics’, as Kant called it.

The utopian understanding of mankind is fundamentally different from those of the realist and liberal schools. Utopians believe that the nature of man can be changed, and that so, “radical change can be brought about in the international system by sets of political

Diagram 1: International security dilemma

| | State A cooperates | State A doesn't cooperate |
|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| State B cooperates | 3 Sum=6 3 | 4 Sum=5 1 |
| State B doesn't cooperate | 1 Sum=5 4 | 2 Sum=4 2 |

choices.”⁶⁵ Consequently, utopianism is substantially less pessimistic and deterministic than realism and liberalism.

This understanding entails another, third security concept, the so-called ‘global security concept’. Collectively shared values require a collective defense thereof. As such, the ‘global security concept’ relies on both a collective security mechanism and strong inter-state cooperation as fertilizers for peace. The differences to the realist and liberal security concepts are fundamental. Stability in the realist world relies on a lucky balance of states bristled with weapons. Peace in the liberal international security framework depends on the socialization of leaders and the defensive implementation of national interests. The utopian adherence to supreme values and interests, however, fundamentally changes the nature of the international

⁶⁴ Jervis calls this dilemma the international ‘security dilemma’. *Op. cit.*: Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in *The Use of Force*, pp35ff.

⁶⁵ *Op. cit.*: Michael Nicholson, “Realism and Utopianism Revisited,” in *Review of International Studies*, p66.

system, elevating the global interests above the national interests. Outfoxing the security dilemma, utopianism offers an ethical and non-determinist alternative.

3. Testing political theories on the political reality

“Differences in national interests provide ever-present sources of conflict among states.”⁶⁶ The three schools of thought share the assumption that conflict is a result of incompatible national interests, and that there is an international security dilemma. Yet they prescribe different remedies to their diagnose of international insecurity. This section starts with a definition of the feathery term of ‘security’ and examines the implementation of the three security concepts in the political reality. It then challenges these security concepts by the introduction of contemporary ‘new conflicts’. Indeed, non-international conflicts (to use ICRC terminology) are the majority of conflicts in this post-Cold War era. The section attempts to answer the question whether standard international relations theory is capable of explaining and curing these new types of conflict.

3.1 Security concepts in the international polity

3.1.1 Security

The analysis of different security concepts requires the prior definition of security. Security is defined by interests, or needs. “How a nation defines its interests both sets its fundamental course in world affairs and significantly shapes the means to get there.”⁶⁷ More exactly, security is defined by the way in which interests are being pursued. The ability to advance and protect interests is the degree of safety that a state enjoys. Interests can take a wide range of forms, and some interests are more central to state security than others. They are generally difficult to assess and hard to quantify. A simple differentiation and

⁶⁶ Robert J. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in *The Use of Force*, p301.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*: Robert J. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in *The Use of Force*, p302.

systematization of state interests according to their significance in international politics may yet suffice for a big picture. Four general levels of interest can be identified: ‘Survival interests’, ‘vital interests’, ‘major interests’, and ‘peripheral’ interests.⁶⁸ Survival interests cover the supreme needs of a given political entity. In the case of the state, this survival interest is generally understood the very territorial integrity and survival of the homeland. Survival interests tend to focus on conventional inter-state war⁶⁹, the only form of armed conflict considered capable of threatening the territorial integrity of a homeland. Second to these supreme needs are ‘vital interests’. These essentially include access to those resources, which are indispensable for the maintenance of the domestic political, economic and social order.⁷⁰ Vital interests are of very strong importance to states, but their fulfillment can be contorted over time. “Vital interests are those whose costs to the nation are somewhere between severe to catastrophic if not protected.”⁷¹ The pursuit of vital interests can be diplomatic or military, depending on the urgency of need fulfillment. Additional interests can be identified, yet they are no longer the key determinants of state behavior. The pursuit of ‘major interests’ and ‘peripheral interests’, for instance, may be on a state’s political agenda. States are yet not dependent on their pursuit for survival, but their safeguard generates extra political, economic or social benefits. As such, their pursuit is unlikely to result in significant conflict, and certainly not in military conflict.

3.1.2 Realism

The realist ‘national security concept’ is at the very heart of real world security policy making. It assumes that “nationalism and national self-interests remain the most potent forces

⁶⁸ As proposed by Professor Richard Schulz in his class on “The Role of Force in International Politics”, fall semester, 2003, the Fletcher School.

⁶⁹ Conventional war isn’t meant in the military sense: Conventional war may well include modern types of warfare, such as nuclear war.

⁷⁰ As proposed by Professor Richard Schulz in his class on “The Role of Force in International Politics”, fall semester, 2003, the Fletcher School..

⁷¹ *Op. cit.*: Robert J. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in *The Use of Force*, p302.

in international affairs.”⁷² Today, as ever since, each state adopts an independent security policy. The primacy of ‘survival’ dictates the primacy of self-interest based security policy making in the realist world. Interests, even survival interests of others are secondary. In the real world, despite the existence of ‘liberal’ alliances and ‘utopian’ collective security mechanisms, ‘realist’ national security policy making remains at the forefront, as will be explained shortly: Contingency planning is being conducted the inner circles of national general staffs. Few national troops are integrated into alliances, if they are at all. Alliances do exist, but they are selective and incomplete: Not every state is in an alliance, and even those who are do not fully cooperate in security policy making. Even within NATO, the world’s strongest and widest alliance, there is no common contingency plan making. The supranational UN general staff, envisioned by articles 43-49 of the UN Charter was never assigned work or troops. The national security concept therefore appears to be very present in the contemporary international reality.

Contingency plans remain the most secret national documents that national governments produce. Consequently, realist security planning is not only one of three security concepts. Rather, it is also an ever-tempting fallback option in cases of actual or perceived failure of liberal and global security concepts.⁷³

3.1.3 Liberalism

Also the liberal ‘international security concept’ be identified in the political reality. Political fora, military alliances and disarmament treaties are the three main pillars of this concept. Political and economic cooperation can be traced back to at least the early 19th century when fluvial commissions (the Rhine Commission) and international labor unions were established. Also military peacetime (in contrast to wartime) alliances are a recurring

⁷² *Op. cit.*: Robert J. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in *The Use of Force*, p301.

⁷³ G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” in *The Use of Force*, 4th American edition (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp321-346.

phenomenon. Examples are the 'Holy Alliance', the 'Concert of Europe', NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Internationalism, the regulation of international life by means of treaties, became particularly fashionable in the early 20th century, when a comprehensive set of (naval) disarmament treaties was signed. SALT, START, and NBC weapons agreements are their modern counterparts. Key to the liberal security concept is the partial accommodation of the security dilemma: International cooperation in the form of alliances can partly safeguard 'survival interests'. States are less concerned about their very capacity to defend the homeland as they join efforts. States are also less concerned with the pursuit of 'vital interests' as cooperation facilitates commerce and access to resources. Their cooperative safeguard of 'vital interests' eliminates a powerful cause for international conflict. Interests (needs) are still domestically defined, but cooperation permits accommodation of different states' interests by eliminating problems of (mis-) understandings and (mis-) perceptions, and by establishing a regime of resource distribution. Continued cooperation and dialogue in international fora fosters trust in an inherently hostile environment. This security concept applies to the real world in which liberal thought dominates, alliances are being extended,⁷⁴ and international organizations multiply.

3.1.4 Utopianism

The utopianism 'global security concept' has been implemented by the League of Nations and the United Nations collective security systems. Elevating collective security⁷⁵ over individual security, the UN charter formally suppresses unilateral, national security policies. Yet the UN system codifies yet a variegated form of utopian collective security.

⁷⁴ An example being the enlargement of NATO on April 2, 2004. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Welcomes Seven New Members," from the NATO homepage, accessed April 7, 2004, available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/04-april/e0402a.htm>

⁷⁵ Collective security means that an aggression against one state is considered an aggression against all other states, triggering the *casus foederis*. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, seen in relation to article 2(4). 'Natural' self-defense in case a state was being attacked remains an option under article 51. See: United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*, accessed March 24, 2004, available from: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

Some states are more equal than others because they are factually not subject to collective security mechanism. This is the case of the five permanent Security Council members⁷⁶ who, with their veto powers, may block any action directed against them. Moreover, although the Security Council does have the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”⁷⁷ its members are not obliged to actively engage any threat to peace. The seizure of issues is voluntary.⁷⁸ The UN security system thus provides neither automatic nor universal collective security. As Craig and George note, the UN organization “[h]as no sovereign decision making. It is an association of independent, sovereign states which depends for its effectiveness on the capacity of its member states to agree and to cooperate.”⁷⁹ As such, the UN is an imperfect reflection of the utopian model. A perfectly implemented global security concept doesn’t require paralleling security concepts. The shortcomings of the UN system, however, do. Despite its looks, the UN is an improper realization of Kantian thought. Although officially it is a federation of like-minded (democratic) states with subscribed to the universal imperatives outlined in the Charter. But many of its member states are only ‘democratic’ by name.⁸⁰ Of those states that are democratic, some prefer hardline realist policies and the possibility of aggression in international relations.⁸¹

⁷⁶ U.S., China, Russia, France and the UK. Listed in article 23(1) of the UN Charter. This article must be interpreted ‘progressively’ (to use international law terminology), Russia has replaced the USSR by virtue of the Alma Ata agreement of 1990. From an international law point of view this succession is far from self-evident. Yehuda Z. Blum, “Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations,” in the *European Journal of International Law*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from: <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol3/No2/art8.html>

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*: United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*, cited from article 24(1).

⁷⁸ The elements are included in article 39 of the UN Charter. “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” *Idem*, citation of article 39.

⁷⁹ *Op. cit.*: Gordon A. Craig and George, Alexander L., *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, p95.

⁸⁰ For the list of UN member states, see: United Nations Secretariat, “List of Member States,” from the *UN homepage*, accessed March 28, 2004, available from: <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>. Contrast this list with the qualification of regimes by the US government: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Field Listing - Government Type,” from the *CIA homepage*, accessed March 28, 2004, available from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2128.html>. For an assessment of the governmental *democraticness*, see (to cite one publication only): The Freedom House, “The World’s Most Repressive Regimes,” from the *Freedom House homepage*, accessed March 28, 2004, available from: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/mrr2003.pdf>

⁸¹ Such as the US in Iraq, 2003, and Israel in the occupied territories and the wider region.

3.2 Paralleling paradigms

Each family of international relations theory defines conflict and its resolution differently. The preceding section showed that all three frameworks coexist in the political reality. Why is this so? Because of its morality and stability, Kant's collective security system is widely considered the desired solution of the international security dilemma. It is the only conception of international relations that establishes a 'moral' and optimistic (not pessimistic and deterministic) view on international coexistence of man. In utopianism, the preference of man is peace. Human action is far from being necessarily bad and selfish, as man can learn to cooperate and share moral imperatives. Indeed, the most influential written guidelines for human behavior, religious documents and philosophical works, virtually universally reflect humankind's desire for peace. If man uses force in their interactions, they don't like to do so *per se*. But *Realpolitik*, the security dilemma, leads to mistrust. The security dilemma can be directly traced back to the fragmentation and separation of humankind into nation states.⁸² It is the distinction, pronunciation, and perpetuation of difference between groups and identities, the 'us' and 'them', which leads to mistrust ('they are different'), and which undermine the acceptance and implementation of common moral values, such as peace.

As long as political leaders perpetuate instill this sense of difference into their population, there is no strong popular push for the global security system. This is the case today, where the UN has doubtful popular support, and where there hardly is any discussion about a more perfect implementation of the global security system.⁸³ Political leaders therefore retain a liberty of choice of security concepts. They can push for one of the three world visions and security concepts, and they can make their decisions dependent upon their personal motivations, and the current circumstances and trends in international affairs. U.S.

⁸² *Op. cit.*: Mark Duffield, "The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid," in *Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*.

⁸³ The approval ratings in the US are legion. Also, Switzerland, the newest member of the UN, approved accession by 54.6% of the popular vote, only. Raymond Beninato, "Switzerland Votes to Join the United Nations Despite Neutral Status," from the *Cornell Review homepage*, accessed April 21, 2004, available from: <http://www.cornellreview.org/viewart.cgi?num=151>

and Spanish decisions to unfold re-emptive action against Iraq in 2003 are good examples of such decision-making. In the case of the U.S., the decision for war was a showed the electorate that the President was ‘willing to fight terrorism’. The Security Council’s tacit rejection of the invasion was portrayed as a ‘failure of the UN’. Today, it seems clear that the Iraq did not threaten any other international actors. As such, the decision to go to war never based on valid security considerations. Rather, a forceful showing on the international stage catered to the American public opinion, showing firm and efficient implementation of a political agenda. In Spain, the decision to go to war equally depended on considerations of circumstances. Although Iraq was a highly repressive regime, there was no necessity by the collective security system to intervene in Iraq. Yet the Spanish participation in the U.S. coalition provided political support to the Spanish conservative government.

The possibility to choose security concepts on circumstances like for instance selfish political gains, explains why the overall worldwide security structure swings erratically between realism, internationalism and utopianism. The result is the juxtaposition of three different security concepts, and an imperfect implementation of either. Realism may cede to internationalism and utopianism, yet utopianism is improperly implemented, is thus backed up by alliances (the international concept), and permits the fallback to realism in times of alleged or actual failure. This coexistence of security concepts undermines the trust in either concept, and especially in the global, which most strongly depends on trust and cooperation.⁸⁴ The inconsequent and conflicting implementation of security concepts is therefore the prime casualty of the international security systems (and theory) centered on the nation state. State sovereignty, the delimitation of nation-states, allows national leaders to frame national security plans without assuming responsibility of the global ramifications that these plans create. This creates distrusts, and no incentives for cooperation. In this understanding, the very idea of the nation state is a structural impediment to global security.

⁸⁴ Such as the current U.S. administration, Israel, North Korea, and others. For the U.S., see: *Op. cit.*: G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” in *The Use of Force*, pp321-346.

3.3 Efficiency of a mixed system

The crucial determinant of the validity of this system of mixed security concepts, however, is its efficiency and not its intellectual and practical purity. In the post-Cold War period when the Security Council was unblocked, there were small numbers of inter-state conflicts. Between 1990 and 1997, only seven international conflicts took place.⁸⁵ Most of these conflicts occurred because the Security Council didn't actively prevent them from taking place. Conflict can be anticipated, and the Council, as the deployment to Macedonia in 1999 showed, can decide preventive peacekeeping. The U.S. intervention in Iraq, the most recent international conflict, happened as no military resistance was given to an aggression against and the occupation of a state. Bypassing the Security Council, the U.S.-led coalition failed the collective security mechanism by its military might. Other member states failed the collective security mechanism by not putting up substantial resistance against the U.S. intervention. Indeed, the UN institutionalization of veto powers permitted the U.S. to impose its will militarily, and to not have to fear repression in the Security Council, where the U.S. is absolved from responsibilities by virtue of its veto power.

The post-Cold War international conflicts appear to have happened because of the faulty design of the global security system. Yet their number was relatively low. It seems therefore that the mixed international system does well, though not perfectly well, eliminate the possibilities of international conflict. The high number of non-international conflicts, however, suggests that the system-mix is very inefficient in its dealing with this category of conflicts.

⁸⁵ Robert Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him: America's Quest for a Post Conflict Stability Force*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p84.

4. The challenge: New conflicts and new concepts

Non-international conflicts are the primary new security threat that emerged from the post-Cold War order. There are two concerns with non-international wars: First, the territorial sovereignty of the state embroiled in civil war officially denies the international community to intervene, and to resolve the conflict without the state's consent. Governments who are fighting rebel forces, or governments who are suppressing minorities and majorities may do so virtually without restraint. Second, civil conflict represents the emergence of powerful non-state actors. Rebel forces, militia and other armed non-state groupings are today being equipped and funded by private donors. This phenomenon creates alternative, say non-state powers, which are largely unbound by international obligations, such as international humanitarian law.⁸⁶

Both the multiplication of civil wars and the punch and sparking distance of non-state actors (say terrorism) are the key challenges to the security concepts put the state actor and state relations center stage. This section inquires into this phenomenon, highlighting how non-state actors affect global security.

4.1 Non-state conflicts

The international law of armed conflict is closest to defining forms of armed conflict. It distinguishes two broad categories of conflicts, international and non-international conflict (say civil war), the conduct of which are regulated by different conventions and protocols.⁸⁷ The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 define an international conflict as “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict [...] between two or more of the High Contracting

⁸⁶ Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, *The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law*, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), pp380-381.

⁸⁷ For instance, the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions applies to international conflicts, while Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions (both Protocols were signed in 1977) applies to internal wars.

Parties”.⁸⁸ State are High Contracting Parties, thus international conflict is inter-state war.⁸⁹ Subsequent international legal practice expanded this understanding of international conflict to include ‘internationalized’ civil wars. Internationalized civil wars are domestic civil wars, which know an international intervention, or civil wars in which a party to the conflict is under general guidance by foreign governments.⁹⁰ Yet what is a civil war?

Unlike international conflict, internal conflict can only partly be identified and defined by signatures on humanitarian conventions. In civil wars, armed confrontation takes place within the territorial boundaries of a state, where it is impossible to distinguish the warring parties on grounds of their passports. While the state troops are usually well identifiable, the rebel militia, their counterpart, is generally difficult to identify. The identification of actors of civil war, and thus the qualification of an internal conflict as such, is necessarily more factual. For internal conflict to exist, there has to be “a conflict that takes place on the territory of one state, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces [...] that, under responsible command, exercise such control over part of the territory in a way which enables them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ Cited from ‘common article 2’ of the Four Geneva Conventions. The article can be found in each of the four conventions: International Committee of the Red Cross, “1949 Conventions and 1977 Protocols,” from the *ICRC homepage*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebCONVFULL?OpenView>

⁸⁹ *Op. cit.*: Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, *The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law*, pp162-163.

⁹⁰ This is an extension of the original concept brought about by international tribunals. The International Court of Justice made the link between foreign controlled groupings and international state responsibility in the “Nicaragua case” (Nicaragua v. United States of America). The court found that U.S. over the Contras in Nicaragua was substantial enough to make the U.S. responsible for parts of their conduct. Implementation of the judgment was never heeded by the U.S. By virtue of article 94(2) (“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”) the Security Council could have given effect to the judgment. Yet this would have failed on the U.S. veto. See: International Court of Justice, “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),” from the *ICJ homepage*, accessed March 29, 2004, available from: <http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idecisions.htm>. The criteria for the determination of foreign involvement – and internationalization of an internal conflict – was subsequently relaxed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the “Tadic Case”. Instead of effective control (“Nicaragua Case”), general control of foreign non-state militaries engages a state in international responsibility, bringing about internationalization of civil conflict. See: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Judgments,” from the *ICTY homepage*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from: <http://www.un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm>

⁹¹ *Op. cit.*: Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, *The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law*, pp257. The definition can also be found in the Additional Protocol II of 1977, article 1(1) *in fine*. *Op. cit.*: International Committee of the Red Cross, “1949 Conventions and 1977 Protocols,” from the *ICRC homepage*.

4.1.1 Reemergence and evolution of 'civil war'

As alluded to, the end of the Cold War cemented the rarity of international conflicts in the post-bipolar world order. "Very few [...] states [...] today fear external threats to their physical safety." The few who do are the delegates of the low number of international conflict described before. Yet, the post-Cold War retraction of superpower security umbrellas lead to a multiplication of wars conducted by non-state actors. "The end of the Cold War brought about far-reaching political changes that culminated in a great rise in civil wars."⁹² Ironically, it led to the "unintended consequence of inspiring more and more dissident forces within the state to seek sovereignty, by force if necessary."⁹³ Internal conflicts make up for the larger share of conflicts, today: Out of the 49 wars that occurred between 1990 and 1997, 42 were internal.⁹⁴ In the year of 2000, 27 out of 29 armed conflicts were non-international.⁹⁵ A domestic conflict entails privatization of conflict: Conflict is both sought and funded by private actors.⁹⁶ This privatization is not only a challenge to domestic security, but also to worldwide stability. More often than not, private funding origins from illegal and transnational sources: International arms trade, international drug trafficking, international smuggling and blackmailing of the diaspora are recurrent methods of income generation.

These trans-border activities question the domestic nature of civil war. "Civil wars are now internationalized in a way that is very different to their predecessors during the Cold War when they were internationalized as proxy wars between the two superpower blocs."⁹⁷ The international community does no longer find itself on one specific side to the internal conflict,

⁹² Peter Uvin, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict*, (Paris: OECD, 1999), p2.

⁹³ *Op. cit.*: Gordon A. Craig and George, Alexander L., *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, p147.

⁹⁴ Robert Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him: America's Quest for a Post Conflict Stability Force*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p84.

⁹⁵ "27 out of 29 conflicts in 2000 are internal," a in-class presentation by Jennifer Leaning of the Harvard School of Public Health held at the Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies class of Sue Lautze, states (slide 6).

⁹⁶ Joanna Macrae, "Analysis and Synthesis," in *The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action*, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002), p5.

⁹⁷ Hugo Slim, *International Humanitarianism's Engagement with Civil War in the 1990's: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory*, Briefing Paper for ActionAid/UK, 1998, accessed March 30, 2004, available from:

<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a033.htm>, p4.

when superpowers supported one of the two factions in ideologically motivated wars. Rather, despite their new passivity towards internal conflicts, third state actors are being embroiled into domestic conflict. Whether third states accept it or not, non-state actors do regularly affect the international system. Their largely criminal methods of income generation, but also their growing punch and sparking distance do affect international order.

4.1.2 Accountability of non-state actors

Non-state-conflicts create negative international spillovers, affecting international peace and security. They are generally also characterized by a high level of brutality. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, genocide in Cambodia, Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern Zaire⁹⁸, terrorist attacks in Lockerbie, New York, Bali and Madrid, deliberate displacement and starvation of populations in Somalia and the Sudan⁹⁹ are examples of extreme violence by non-state actors.¹⁰⁰ Yet, non-state actors are not subject to international obligations. Non-state actors are not even obliged to respect the international minimum standards for interaction, the law of armed conflict. This impunity is the second casualty of state sovereignty and a states-based international system, which prohibits the integration of non-state actors into the international legal system.

4.2 Non-state conflict resolution in theory

Conflict in the present world appears to be almost exclusively generated by actors within states, and not by anarchic and conflicting relations between states. These conflicts devastate their locations of conflict and create negative international spillovers. Yet the non-

⁹⁸ The genocides of Burundi and Eastern Zaire are often forgotten. They are closely linked to the Rwandan 1994 genocide, explaining the true conflict situation in that latter country. The incidents of 1994 were no singular event. See: Rene Lemarchand, "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which genocide? Whose genocide?," in *African Studies Review*, Volume 41, Number 1, 1998, pp191-212.

⁹⁹ Somalia in the early 1990s, Sudan since the early 1990s.

¹⁰⁰ Other examples are, of course, valid as well: Multinational corporations foster instability and conflict, as well, and are not held accountable for it. The examples of petrol industries igniting conflict in the Sudan, or Angola, are well documented.

state actors involved in these conflicts are hardly bound by international mechanisms, especially not the international security mechanism. On the other hand, those actors, which are supposed to cater for international peace and security, the states, are not willing to engage non-state actors determinedly. State sovereignty, the idea of exclusive geographical jurisdictions, prohibits the global security mechanism to intervene into affairs located within state borders. These two phenomena constitute a decisive accountability gap in contemporary international relations. Violent non-state actors can virtually irresponsibly adopt any kind of action they like, and the international state system is not required to hold them responsible. This opens up a whole in the international system in which non-state conflict can exist and subsist.

4.2.1 Integration of non-state actors into the international order

The responsibility gap is a challenge to state-centered international relations theory: Non-state conflicts, which emanate from within states, are not explained by the state-centered theory, which understands conflict as the result of the international system. This situation requires change. Any force capable of creating international spillovers (including armed conflict) must be integrated into a global theory and a global order in which rights, roles and obligations are clearly and universally allocated. This internalization of causers of international change requires a supplementation of state-centered approaches to international affairs. Only if this is done, international phenomena such as international terrorism and intra-state conflict can be explained on an international relations level. Equally, only if these phenomena are clearly explained by international relations theory, remedies against them can be prescribed.

Practically, this means that international law must be expanded to non-state actors. This does yet not mean that non-state actors become as important as or equal to states. Yet means must be found to hold these actors (as any actor capable of affecting international

coexistence) responsible for their actions. Responsibility should depend on actors and action, and not on location: It is the originator of international action which counts and which must be held accountable for actions taken. If responsibility is determined by the geographical location of actors, accountability mechanisms are inevitably being distorted.

4.2.2 Widening reach and responsibility of the collective security system

The flip side to the integration of non-state actors into the international system is the extension of the reach and responsibility of the collective security system. State sovereignty must not be an impediment to the resolution of non-state conflicts as it is the case currently. Current state-centered international relations theory relies on Westphalian state equality and sovereignty. Indeed, though increasingly limited, state sovereignty continues to occupy the supreme ground in international affairs and international law today.¹⁰¹ It suggests that no intervention can be deployed against perturbing events within states, even if the international community is affected by these events. Exclusive jurisdiction prohibits interventions into states without the consent of the state concerned. State sovereignty is therefore an impediment to the reach of the collective security system.

Furthermore, however, state sovereignty is also an unwelcome limitation of state responsibility. Governments, under the nation-state world vision, are accountable to their population and territory, only. They cannot be made responsible for the fate of populations and events which are not located or which do not occur in their territories. States can therefore not be held accountable if they do not actively push for conflict resolution in foreign conflicts. The collective security mechanism obliges states to consider an attack on one as an attack on all. As such, the collective security mechanism (theoretically) expands state responsibilities for conflict resolution to international conflicts. However, the collective security mechanism

¹⁰¹ See, for instance, article 2 of the UN Charter.

does not expand this responsibility to non-state conflicts. Switzerland, for instance, is not being held responsible for its neutrality and its passivity towards internal conflict in Somalia.

Because of its maximization of collective benefits (as compared to individual benefits), the collective security system is considered the most desirable security concept. Its implementation provides for moral conflict management. The current limitation of the reach and responsibility of the collective security system though state sovereignty, however, is a problem.

4.2.3 The case for intervention

The existence and brutality of non-state conflicts requires remedy. The need to intervene into non-state conflicts is derived from both security considerations and ethics: Negative spillovers are security threats that legitimize intervention by the international community, and overriding of state sovereignty. Also, ‘humanity’ obliges an active engagement of conflict. The moral principle of ‘humanity’, the International Committee of the Red Cross writes, obliges everybody “to alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found [...], to protect life and health and to ensure the respect for the human being.”¹⁰² The universal ratification of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 suggests that the international community understands compliance with this moral imperative as an obligation.

4.3 Conflict resolution efforts in the political reality

The case for intervention appears to be widely shared. Indeed, it seems that the theory of non-state conflict resolution is being translated into practice. So-called ‘non-conventional threats’ to security and humanity by non-state conflicts are today being encountered by innovations in each of the three security paradigms. Coercive concepts have been advanced and developed for the maintenance of the international system in light of the new

¹⁰² International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,” from the *ICRC homepage*, accessed April 1, 2004, available from: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JN9H?OpenDocument&style=Custo_Final.3&View=defaultBody2

challenge.¹⁰³ While they differ in form, they share the assumption that sovereignties must be breached in times of unwanted conflict. This understanding in fact fuses international conflict resolution and non-state conflict resolution: In either case, sovereignty is being breached. Indeed, one shouldn't forget the fact that state sovereignty is equally breached in case of international conflict. Under the collective security system, an attack on one is considered an attack on all. As such, the entire international community may authorize coercive interventions against the aggressor, and not only the state, which was attacked. The following parts of the essay can therefore be considered applicable to types of conflict.

This view falls in line with the object of this thesis, which is coercion in third party conflict resolution. Then third party conflict resolution can take place both in inter-state and the non-state conflicts.

4.3.1 Coercive intervention in the realist school of thought

Each meta-concept of international security has been supplemented by an special elixir against new conflicts: Realists advocate for pre-emption, liberals for humanitarian interventions, and utopians for collective security extended to domestic affairs.

Contemporary realists believe that deterrence is of limited use in non-state conflicts: Deterrence works against state actors who occupy a clearly defined territory, and against which retaliatory measures can be clearly targeted. It does not fully work against non-state actors who cannot be targeted effectively. Deterrence, it is important to understand, is a threat. It bases on the threat of use of force against installations of assets deemed valuable by the enemy¹⁰⁴. It does not rely on the actual use of force. Deterrence is thus factually the non-violent (because not implemented) form of pre-emption. It induces a very clear political

¹⁰³ *Op. cit.*: Gordon A. Craig and George, Alexander L., *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, p155.

¹⁰⁴ In the nuclear lingo, these strategies are called 'counter-force' and 'counter-value', respectively. The latter's idea is to virtually take the other's population as a sort of hostage. Deterrence doctrine is heavily influenced by nuclear armament, and its applicability for current modern non-state conflicts is questionable. See: Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in *Foreign Affairs*, volume 57, summer 1979, pp975-986.

choice: To abstain from using military force in international relations. Deterrence thus bases therefore on the persuasion that the costs of a certain course of action outweigh the benefits that are hoped being gained by that very course of action. As it has been mentioned, realist thinks it difficult to inflict damage on a non-state actor. Yet non-state actors have become willing and capable of strategically threatening survival and vital interests of states. This development is especially worrisome in times of religious fundamentalism and weapons proliferation. “Containment [of threats] is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”¹⁰⁵ As deterrence is no longer possible in case of non-state actors, they can only be counteracted by virtue of pre-emption.¹⁰⁶ Unlike a pre-emptive threat, the actual use of pre-emption is yet problematic. It disconnects the principle of attack-and-response (action-reaction), as defense antedates supposed aggression. Doing so, the pre-emptive attack makes the supposed aggression impossible. The supposed aggression not taking place, however, it can hardly be proven that it would have effectively occurred. The justification of pre-emption is therefore highly complicated, and the problematic of proof is paramount.

The strategy of pre-emption is an interesting topic, which is especially burning at the time of writing. Yet, the concept is neither new nor solely applicable to non-state actors. Pre-emption has been especially popular in international conflicts in the early 20th century. Indeed, historians agree that ‘a cult of the offensive’, the idea that first strikes are decisive, have been a major trigger of World War I.¹⁰⁷ The very idea of pre-emption is not necessarily purely realist. Its real world implementation, however, shows strong realist traits. Its unilateral

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Government, Office of the President (George Bush), “Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy (West Point),” from the *White House homepage*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Government, National Security Council, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” from the *White House homepage*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, p6

¹⁰⁷ Jack Snyder, “The Cult of the Offensive in 1914,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert Art and Waltz, Kenneth N. (editors), 6th American edition, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), chapter 9; John J. Mearsheimer, “Hitler and the Blitzkrieg Strategy,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert Art and Waltz, Kenneth N. (editors), 6th American edition, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), chapter 10.

use and its disconnection of attack-and-response, for instance, are violations of international law.¹⁰⁸ These violations are in line with realist thought, which doesn't attribute any value to international codes of conduct (international law), but which bases its independent, national security policy making on its very own views and assessments.

4.3.2 Liberal humanitarian interventions

The current liberal remedy to new conflicts is humanitarian interventions. “[The term] [h]umanitarian intervention refers to the use of international military force to stop the massive abuse of human rights in another state.”¹⁰⁹ Military force is therefore not used to repel a prior or pre-empt a future attack, but to punish the disrespect for international law, especially human rights law. Proponents of this strategy argue that human rights derive from humanity. Being a concern to all, violation of human rights law may be counter-acted by any international actor. In the liberal mindset (not in the realist, which doesn't give any priority to international law), human rights law is considered a crucial element of the international order.¹¹⁰ Humanitarian interventions have been witnessed in Bangladesh (by India, 1971), Cambodia (by Vietnam, 1979), Uganda (by Tanzania, 1979), and in Kosovo and Serbia (by NATO, 1999).¹¹¹ The concept's current implementation has similar shortcomings as the pre-emption doctrine. It remains unclear which circumstance permits such an engagement, and by whom the engagement is being decided. Currently, without guidelines on humanitarian interventions, which establish the when and how, liberal coalitions against civil conflict are

¹⁰⁸ Article 51 of the UN Charter.

¹⁰⁹ Hugo Slim, “Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights: The Humanitarian Agency Perspective,” in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000), accessed April 4, 2004, available from: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a084.htm>

¹¹⁰ „Frieden ist nicht lediglich als eine Abwesenheit kriegerischer Auseinandersetzungen zu verstehen, sondern eine Friedensbedrohung kann bereits dann vorliegen, wenn wesentliche Elemente der internationalen Rechtsordnung verletzt werden, die Voraussetzung für einen dauerhaften Frieden sind. Wesentliches Element in diesem Sinne ist zweifellos der Menschenrechtsschutz.“ [Peace is not solely absence of armed conflict. Rather, a violation of essential elements of the international legal order may amount to a threat to peace. Human rights protection is undoubtedly such an element.] [My translation]. Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Irak, Eine Krise auch für das System der kollektiven Sicherheit,” from the *Max-Planck Institute (Heidelberg) homepage*, accessed April 3, 2004, available from: <http://www.mpil.de/de/Wolfrum/irak.pdf>, p4

¹¹¹ More cases can be identified in the nineteenth century, i.e. the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849 or the US intervention in Cuba in 1898. *Op. cit.*: Hugo Slim, “Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights: The Humanitarian Agency Perspective,” in *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*.

highly selective and arbitrary.¹¹² As they are not filtered through the collective security mechanism, humanitarian interventions risk serving national interests, so recreating a paternalistic international system.¹¹³

4.3.3 Global UN extentionism

In his *Agenda for Peace*, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expanded on the different forms of UN action for peace.¹¹⁴ Clearly, neither pre-emption nor humanitarian interventions could have been included in his inquiry into the UN conflict resolution toolbox. Neither strategy derives its authority from the collective security mechanism. Clearly, a Secretary-General of the United Nations could not accept such proceedings. The UN recognized, however, that there is a need for new concepts for post-Cold War conflict engagement. As the *Agenda* sets it out, the UN Security Council may authorize the use of three different types of coercive conflict resolution measures, sanctions, ‘robust peacekeeping operations’, and peace enforcement missions.

First, the concept of sanctions is both old and self-explaining. It seeks behavioral change by means of diplomatic, judicial, technical or economic punishment. Second, ‘robust peacekeeping missions’ are the coercive variant of classical peacekeeping, which is consent-based and which is not supposed to be armed. Without going too far into peacekeeping theory, peacekeeping indeed occupies a continuum that stretches from non-coercive to coercive. Transposed to the UN Charter, peacekeeping is a tool for conflict resolution that stretches from a non-coercion character (chapter VI of the charter) to coercion (chapter

¹¹² This is being confirmed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Why did the international community intervene in the Balkans, and not in Rwanda, Northern Uganda, the Sudan? For more discussion on the humanitarian intervention, see: *Op. cit.*: Alton Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*.

¹¹³ Jonas Hagmann, *Noam Chomsky: The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, seminar paper, Les Crises Yugoslaves class of André Liebich, spring semester 2003, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva: Unpublished, text with the author, 2003).

¹¹⁴ United Nations Secretariat, *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), (New York: United Nations Secretariat, 1992), accessed April 1, 2004, available from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

VII).¹¹⁵ Indeed, peacekeeping is an invention of the UN¹¹⁶ and is as such not clearly allocated to neither Charter chapter. If peacekeeping missions are deployed with the consent of the state concerned, and without a mandate to truly actively uphold the respect for a peace treaty, such missions are called ‘classical peacekeeping missions’ based on ‘chapter 6.5’. Although classical missions are deployed in the respect of state sovereignty (they base on the prior consent of states), the potential use of armed force in self-defense gives even classical peacekeeping a slightly and potentially coercive charter. Thus its basis is considered chapter 6.5, and not the purely non-coercive chapter VI. More robust missions, however, are designed to more clearly impact state sovereignty. Robust missions are heavily equipped, and actively defend or impose their mandate. Under robust peacekeeping, mandates survive even the withdrawal of state consent.¹¹⁷ Yet they are still being deployed with the consent of states, at least in their early phase of operation. As such robust peacekeeping tends towards chapter VII, but does not yet reach chapter VII. Accordingly, robust peacekeeping missions are being called chapter 6^{2/3} missions in UN lingo.

Third, peace enforcement missions are military sanctions directly aimed against states. Enforcement missions have been authorized against Korea (1950), Iraq (1991), Haiti (1994), Somalia (1994), Yugoslavia (1994 and 1995), Kosovo (1999, *ex post facto*) and East Timor (1999). Their mandate directly and indisputably derives from chapter VII of the UN Charter. In practice, as UN member states do not delegate national contingencies to a UN army, as the

¹¹⁵ For more peacekeeping theory, see: *Op. cit.*: Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, chapters 3-5; Hilaire McCoubrey and Morris, Justin, “Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era”, in *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 1999, pp137-51; Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 3rd American edition, (New York: Westview Press, 2000); Elizabeth Cousens and Kumar, Chetan (editors), *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, (New York: Lynne Rienner, 2001). *Op. cit.*: Donald C. F. Daniel and Hayes, Bradd C., *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crisis*, chapters 1-2.

¹¹⁶ *Op. cit.*: United Nations Secretariat, *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), para46. Peacekeeping was the idea of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, in the name of whom peacekeeping awards are still being awarded.

¹¹⁷ *Idem*, para 20. “Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned.” The ‘hitherto’ suggests that the deployment of peacekeepers remains legal even after a state revoked consent.

Charter demands¹¹⁸, the execution of peace enforcement missions is contracted out to member states. This ‘privatization’ of the use of force against state sovereignty, the reliance of the UN on coalitions of the willing who are prepared and willing to execute the Security Council’s decision is a major problem to the efficacy of UN peace enforcement. It suggests that peace enforcement does not automatically occur when there is a threat or breach of peace. Rather, it requires the voluntary sponsoring of troops by member states. The fact that states are free to decide on this issue leads to selectivity in peace enforcement implementation. Only those missions who are backed by military powers are being implemented.

The use of coercive measures is yet more complicated than that. As it has been alluded to, UN coercion falls under chapter VII of the Charter. This chapter can only be entered into by the Security Council¹¹⁹ by virtue of article 39. This article states that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”¹²⁰ Originally, this gateway to the imposition of coercive measures has been seen in connection with article 2(7) of the Charter, which declares domestic matters essentially out of reach of the UN. This structuring of the global security mechanism, however, leaves the Council totally impotent in face of non-state conflict. Innovative as its members are, however, the Security Council developed a new practice for conflict resolution. Today, the UN copes with non-state conflict by the authorization of sanctions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions for domestic situations. Incrementally, the collective security mechanism has been extended from international to the domestic affairs: In the post-Cold War decade, the term

¹¹⁸ Article 43(1) of the UN Charter, which reads “All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*, accessed March 24, 2004, available from: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

¹¹⁹ Note that there is an alternative mechanism to enter into chapter VII, which is yet highly contested. The General Assembly might invoke General Assembly resolution 377(V) of 1950 to do so.

¹²⁰ *Op. cit.*: United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*.

‘threat to peace’, one of the three gateways for coercion under article 39, has been enlarged to include a series of domestic events like grave violations of human rights¹²¹, civil wars¹²², international terrorism¹²³, refugee flows¹²⁴, humanitarian crises¹²⁵, ethnic cleansing¹²⁶, genocide¹²⁷, and even anti-democratic coups d’état.¹²⁸ These situations being considered today a ‘threat to peace’, UN coercion is possible.

This innovation, however, is not without shortcomings. The concept is neither clearly implemented nor is it comprehensive in its content. First, the Security Council has considered each of these aforementioned criteria ‘exceptional enlargements’ of the notion of ‘threat to peace’. As such, an anti-democratic coup in Haiti in 1994 permitted an international intervention in this particular case. Yet in any future coup, there is no obligation by the Security Council to intervene. Continuing to call any intervention into domestic affairs exceptional, the Council abstained from imposing more stringent duties on itself for future action. While Liberia was considered a threat to peace because of its internal conflict, Sudan is not considered so, today. The implementation of the UN *extensionist* doctrine is highly arbitrary. Second, it remains questionable which criteria have been used to legitimize and legalize coercion by the global security mechanism. If anti-democratic coups are considered a threat to peace (in some times and places), are rigged elections so as well? While the

¹²¹ Such as Iraq 1991 for the treatment of domestic minorities, not for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. UNSC Resolution 699 of April 5, 1991 and UNSC Resolution 688 of 20 April 1991.

¹²² Such as Liberia 1992. UNSC Resolution 738 of 1992.

¹²³ Such as Libya 1992 and Sudan 1996. UNSC Resolution 748 of 1992 and UNSC Resolution 1044 of 1996.

¹²⁴ Such as Haiti 1994. UNSC Resolution 940 of 1994. For an extensive case analysis, see: Jonas Hagmann, *The UN in Haiti: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding*, seminar paper, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security class, spring semester 2003, (The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2003), unpublished, text with the author.

¹²⁵ Such as Somalia 1992. UNSC Resolution 794 of 1992. For an extensive analysis, see: M.-C. Wembou, “Validité et portée de la résolution 794 (1992) du Conseil de Sécurité”, in *Revue Africaine de Droit International et Comparé*, Volume 5, 1993, pp340-354; Flückiger, Silvio. “Les opérations traditionnelles de maintien de la paix,” in *L’opération de maintien de la paix en Somalie: Entre continuité et rupture*, seminar paper, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security class, spring semester 2003, (The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2003), unpublished, text with the author.

¹²⁶ Such as Yugoslavia. For an extensive analysis see: Thorburn, Ingrid, *Enforcement Action Under Chapter VII: The Case of Former Yugoslavia*, seminar paper, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security class, spring semester 2003, (The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2003), unpublished, text with the author.

¹²⁷ Such as Rwanda 1994. UNSC Resolution 929 of 1994.

¹²⁸ Such as Haiti 1994. UNSC Resolution 940 of 1994.

identification of criteria for intervention, and the gradual compiling of these criteria in a wider list of ‘threats to peace’ is pragmatic and useful, there should be a transparent process by which these threats are being identified. The current ad-hoc character of the identification of ‘threats’ seems to be too easily influenced by circumstances.

4.3.4 Juxtaposition of current doctrines on non-state conflicts

Pre-emption, humanitarian intervention and the extension of the collective security mechanism to domestic affairs all serve the same purpose. They all fight non-state sources of conflict, and they all curtail state sovereignty. Unfortunately, however, each strategy has significant shortcomings: Pre-emption is illegal from a global point of view. It introduces policymaking based on second-guessing. Preemption opens the door wide open for arbitrary and predatory use of force in international relations,¹²⁹ risking to revive an international system deprived of common rules, a world in which ‘the powerful do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. Humanitarian interventionism is (or might be, a cynical commentator could argue) morally motivated, but is equally unlawful and selective as pre-emption. UN *extentionism*, finally, is the only legal strategy against non-state threats. Yet its current implementation provides for selectivity of conflict resolution, perpetuating an imperfect collective security construct.

As this analysis suggests, the end of the Cold War did not bring about clarity. Rather, the adding of a new layer of juxtaposed security concepts (for non-state conflicts) has created a complex framework of international relations, a ‘new complexity’ (*eine neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, to use Habermas’ terminology¹³⁰) that is neither just nor efficient. Unfortunately, unlike the juxtaposition of inter-state war related security concepts, the overlap

¹²⁹ The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq being the primary example.

¹³⁰ Sven Schröder, “An der Zeitenwende zu postmodernen Internationalen Beziehungen? Die Südpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Europäischen Union im Vergleich,” from the *Gradnet homepage*, accessed April 8, 2004, available from:

http://www.gradnet.de/papers/pomo2_archives/pomo98_papers/snschroe98.htm#fn14

of non-state actor related security frameworks did not prove to work: Non-state conflicts subsist, and the recent trends in international terrorism suggest that non-state actors are neither deterred nor effectively engaged by the new conflict resolution strategies.

5. The response: A vision of a general doctrine of third party intervention for peace

In light of all these shortcomings, there is a pronounced need for a consolidated approach to non-state conflict resolution. As the weaknesses of current approaches are known, a just and effective conflict resolution mechanism can be designed. This section attempts to do so, exposing a visionary, general, just and efficient doctrine of third party intervention for peace. The three key questions that have to be addressed for this are the authority of action (who decides peace-enforcing missions?), the decision making process for intervention (how are interventions decided?) and the identification of the actual causes for intervention (when are coercive interventions authorized?).

5.1 Who? The authority

The decision-maker, the authority, is key for coercive interventions. As new threats affect the international community, the latter must be well represented in the decision making body. This argument is the application of the contractualist theory to the international level. Within states, individuals cede the monopoly of violence to the government only of this government is accountable to the society. Within the international system, states allow others to intervene into their domestic affairs only if the latter are accountable. The accountability of the authority, which decides on coercive interventions, is important. It can be connected to the issue of legitimacy: Only if the intervening authority is legitimate in the eyes of states, the wider international community is implementing its resolutions. The establishment of legitimacy of the authority is thus determinant.

In political theory, three patterns of legitimacy exist: Legitimacy of a decision-making body can be established by charisma (its unmatched leadership or wisdom), tradition (practice), or its logical structure, impartiality, and accountability (a law abiding depersonalized administration in Weber's terminology).¹³¹ Pre-emptive and humanitarian interventionist doctrines, it has been alluded to, are decided by a restraint body, which holds no mandate from the international community. World opinion suggest that the composition of these decision making bodies are not perceived legitimate outside of the body's members. Russia and China, for instance, strongly opposed NATO intervention into Kosovo in 1999. Continental European states and most of the world opposed U.S.-led pre-emption in Iraq in 2003. No case can be made that these restraint groups of actors (NATO, and the U.S.-led campaign, respectively) are legitimate authorities by virtue of their charisma, or global tradition, as states outside these bodies never conferred a mandate to them.

In case of UN *extensionism*, the Security Council is legitimized and held accountable by virtue of the UN Charter. This document prescribes duties and obligations of its supreme decision making authority, and holds the Council responsible for its action. The global security system's executive body thus seems significantly more appropriate for the international system than a random coalition of willing and potent states. In international affairs, where states are equal just like individuals within a state, the only legitimacy of a supreme decision making body derives from a representative, depersonalized supreme bureaucracy.¹³²

The current composition of the Security Council, however, is only partly representative of the international community. Indeed, a significant amount of historical considerations distort its construction as a purely representative executive body. Instead of being elected, five member states are seated in the Council on grounds of their World War II

¹³¹ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, (Thüringen: Mohr Verlag, 1989).

¹³² ICISS (Canada), "Legitimacy and Authority," in *The Responsibility to Protect*, accessed April 4, 2004, available from: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Supplementary-Volume.pdf>, pp155ff.

merits. This permanent allocation of seats undoubtedly contradicts the democratic requirement, which is necessary to establish the Security Council's legitimacy. As such, a visionary authority for peace must include a democratically elected, and truly representative executive body, but no permanent seats.

5.2 How? The decision-making procedure

The legitimacy requirement also includes the decision making process as such. Legitimacy relies on undistorted decision making procedure by which each member, but also the collective body as such can be held accountable for its actions.

Veto powers within the Security Council distort the democratic requirement in two ways. First, veto powers grant five states permanent impunity in international affairs, as no reprisals can be decided against veto powers in case of their transgression of international law and order. The establishment of an executive council that is unaccountable is neither legitimate nor just. It creates the perverted situation in which a small set of actors judges and counter-acts other actors' behavior without being accountable for the very same actions themselves. An example is Russia's gross violations of human rights law in Chechnya, or U.S. gross violations of humanitarian law in Guantanamo Bay, two violations of international law against which the Security Council cannot take action because of Russian and U.S. veto power. Second, veto power doesn't only permit those states to be unaccountable to the international community; it also provides these states extreme influence on any collective action. The presence of veto powers means that any peace mission can only be decided if it is in the interest of all five permanent veto powers. Inevitably, this leads to selectivity and unpredictability of UN conflict engagement: Missions are dispatched to locations of interest for veto powers (i.e. Macedonia, Haiti), and not to their allies (i.e. Israel) or places deemed

non-strategic (i.e. Rwanda).¹³³ In a purer, responsible global security decision-making body, no veto powers must exist.

Veto powers thus distort the efficiency of peace interventions. Rather than basing decisions to intervene on needs, political considerations can be bluntly put forward. An efficient and representative, say non-selective decision making procedure yet requires more than the abolition of veto powers. Even in the absence of veto powers, the Security Council may not be willing to take on a portfolio. If the Council lacks interests, i.e. in case of destabilizing situations in marginalized areas of the world, there is no obligation to act under the UN Charter. Then although the Security Council has the primary responsibility for peace and security, it has discretionary powers to whether or not to engage destabilizing situations. The potential result of this has been witnessed in Rwanda in 1994, when the Council did not stop the *genocidaires*. Democratic accountability does not stop at majority rule. Majority rule can be another source of selectivity in decision making, if the majority is not obliged to engage i.e. all ‘threats to peace’. In order to not be selective, therefore, minority interests must be engaged as well. To do so, there must be an obligation for the Council to discuss and assess any ‘threat to peace’.

5.3 *When? Motivations, causes and benchmarks*

The last sentence makes the transition to the third key issue, the motivations and causes of intervention. An obligation to act requires clear benchmarks by which a ‘threat to peace’ can be identified as such. The challenge is to identify these and to quantify them objectively. The current unguided apprehension of situations by the Security Council leaves him too much leeway. In the current era of UN *extentionism*, there are virtually no benchmarks that determine when a threat to peace is being identified as such. It has been exposed, the UN defines a number of benchmarks such as the ousting of a democratically

¹³³ *Op. cit.*: Joanna Macrae, “Analysis and Synthesis,” in *The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action*, p6.

elected leader, grave human rights violations, genocide, humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, refugee flows, terrorism. But none of these benchmarks has been made permanent. Also, it is not exactly clear what these benchmarks are. This is problematic, because if a benchmark can be politically assessed only, then there is a risk that the benchmark is ignored (it can be argued away). This is the case, for instance, for genocide. The Genocide Convention does identify genocide as an elevated number of casualties belonging to a specific group. Yet 'the elevated number' is subject to political appraisal. As such this particular benchmark risks being ignored, just as it was in Rwanda in 1994.

The establishment of factual benchmarks is certainly a difficult endeavor, and involves a lot of cynicism. The example of genocide serves again for illustration. A number, for instance 10'000, could set a factual benchmark for the determination of the presence of genocide. If there is at least that number of killings among a particular ethical, religious or national (etc.) group, a situation is genocide. This factual determination of the presence of genocide requires the Security Council to act. Yet this determination of a benchmark raises two key problems: First of all, the number is completely arbitrary, and second, it suggests that lower numbers of casualties are admissible. This is certainly not the purpose of benchmark setting, and is rightly criticized for cynicism. Yet it is the belief of the author that such benchmarks could not only be set, but that they are also necessary. A minimalist but factual approach to benchmarks is still, despite these criticisms, better than no factual benchmark. A number of casualties in cases of systematic extermination of coherent groups can be set, and should be so. The setting of benchmarks is discussed in more depth in the following.¹³⁴

Factual benchmarks could serve as means to oblige the Security Council to take up portfolios. They could also be linked to an obligation to adopt certain measures. Yet, it seems that this latter linkage might be too radical an idea for real world reforms of the UN system. Still, the current system requires a permanent codification of benchmarks that have already


¹³⁴ See *infra*, title 8.

been identified, and a factual quantification of these. New benchmarks could be devised as necessary. The creation of benchmarks would tremendously enhance the accountability of the Security Council, and so make its work more legitimate and predictable.

In parallel, mechanisms for the engagement of threats should increase the input of the international system into the executive body. The General Assembly, for instance, could be allowed to task the Security Council to inquire into a situation that has not yet been codified as a benchmark for engagement, but which the Assembly deems a threat to peace.

5.4 Final considerations on a new concept of third party interventionism

The establishment of both mandatory decision-making and objective benchmarks for it would fundamentally alter the dynamics of UN engagement of threats to peace. There is no



reason to reject mandatory decision making as an unbearable duty: The Security Council would still be free to decide whether or not he wants to decide action. Yet with such a decision making process, the international community would be held, for once, accountable for its actions, reducing the possibilities for selective engagement of crises. A streamlined and clarified process for decision-making would deconstruct the current Council's contorted legitimacy based on a mix of historic leadership and incomplete democratic representation. A legitimization of the UN as a depersonalized, bureaucratic authority would render UN actions

significantly more transparent and predictable. Its immediate consequence would be the extension of collective deterrence to the non-state actors: Bureaucratic rule and clear benchmarks permit all actors to anticipate UN reaction to threats to peace. If UN action is less selective and doubtful, the deterrence of the collective security mechanism is more credible.

The vision put forward here is admittedly utopian. It reflects an understanding that human rights are inherent to man, and that no political limitations such as state sovereignty should stand between man and the fulfillment of its needs. Certainly, domestic affairs should not be regulated or sanctioned by an international body, in general. Yet, the international system based on the equality and sovereignty of states allows for non-state conflict, a pattern that cannot be tolerated. In key issues, such as the respect of the right to life, international interventions into ‘domestic affairs’ should both be possible and automatic. The slow emancipation of mankind from aristocratic and autocratic rule led to the perverted world in which state sovereignty, the protection of the ruling government, has been more clearly codified and more strongly implemented than the rights of man. The need for foreign interventions for the sake of human rights has been recognized decades ago. Yet, the imperfect implementation of the collective security system accords certain states virtual immunity in international affairs. It also creates a collective security system, which is selective, not automatic, and thus not credible. These shortcomings distort the legitimacy of the collective security system and undermine its credibility with weaker states. Consequently, fear from political abuses of the collective security system reinforces states’ flight into the concept of state sovereignty, their last and most radical security umbrella. The situation should be revised and inverted. It should be protection of the rights of man, the ultimate founders of the international system, which should be protected most strongly. The way to these starts with reforms of the international structure.

PART II

Role and modes of third parties in forced conflict resolution

6. Forms and means of third party intervention

The first part of this thesis established the need for third party coercion in the contemporary international system, and the processes of decision making that is required for it. This second part makes the transition from the macro-level to the micro-level, where the actual interaction between interveners and warring parties is taking place. It inquires into strategic aspects of third party intervention in any type of conflict: What does the intervener look like, what type of coercion can the intervener apply for conflict resolution, and what type for which part of the conflict process? The second part also inquires into the advantages and drawbacks of these different forms of coercion, and distils the multiple requirements for intervention. This section frequently refers to the role of the international community in the Balkan crises of the 1990s for reality check.¹³⁵ A comprehensive analysis of the Yugoslav crisis and the international response to it are then given in part three of the essay.

6.1 Third parties

On the international level, third party coercion was portrayed as the intervention of the collective security system into conflict. If threatening the international order, disputes of warring parties (those parties whose conflict is being addressed by the intervention), this thesis argues, should be resolved by an intervention of the international community. Yet the definition and composition of the ‘international community’ is far from clear. In popular lingo, the ‘international community’ has a connotation of a universal and homogenous network of states and peoples. In reality, however, the ‘international community’ is neither homogenous nor inclusive.¹³⁶ The ‘international community’ is a case-dependent loose

¹³⁵ For this cross-reference, a prior seminar research paper serves as foundation. *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*; See also: *Op. cit.*: Donald C. F. Daniel and Hayes, Bradd C., *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crisis*, chapter 3.

¹³⁶ The Stanley Foundation, “Post-Conflict Justice: The Role of the International Community,” in *Report of a*


coalition of states and state organizations willing and capable of addressing a conflict or an issue. More often than not, these coalitions are being led by powerful states and organizations like the US, Russia, China, Japan, the EU, the UN Security Council, or NATO. These coalitions are neither global nor homogenous. Their case dependency can be well displayed by the example of Yugoslavia: During its dissolution in the early (and late) 1990s, the ‘international community’ was configured as a coalition chiefly comprising the US, the EU, NATO and Russia.

The term ‘international community’ must be consumed with prudence. Coalitions, which are unbalanced and not representative of the global community of nations, run the risk serving selfish interests. The current structure of the international collective security system, it has been argued, exactly risks being such a coalition. Interests are not necessarily a bad thing *per se*. Indeed, to demand an interventionist stance by states pre-supposes interests. But the finality of interests matters. Whether interests are purely selfish or selfish and altruistic in the same token is a difference. The pursuit of peace through national security policies is selfish. The pursuit of peace through the collective security system is selfish (serves the demand for peace and negatively affects the security of others) and altruistic (one’s interest for peace doesn’t negatively affect the other’s security). The risk of a promotion of selfish interests other than survival interests under the fig leaf of global concerns remains a possibility. Indeed, in the real world virtually every state has interests in every corner of the world. In a continuously globalizing world, even ‘medium’ and ‘small powers’ are likely to do so. As a means to not export individual agendas through global action, the reformed Security Council should make sure to compose any peace enforcement mission out of a multitude of national contingencies. This has not been done so recently. In Haiti (MNF), U.S. contingencies were the sole component of the international force. In East Timor (INTERFET), Australia was the dominant player in peace enforcement.

To limit particular interests, the third party coalition for coercive intervention for peace should thus be composed as a balanced group of actors. The supreme authority, the Security Council, what is not the case at the time of writing, should supervise the impartiality of this group to the interventionist mandate. Even more preferably than this is a proper UN force. This solution to the problem is yet too idealistic to be practicable in the political reality.

6.2 Forms of intervention

Once dispatched, third parties can intervene into conflict in different forms. Third party intervention can range from simple facilitation of talks to a straightforward imposition



of the international community's will. The coerciveness of intervention therefore depends on the mission's mandate. The following diagram¹³⁷ highlights this correlation between form of mandate and degree of coercion. As the diagram shows, coercion, or compellence, is an extreme form of third party intervention. It is the only form of third party intervention that does not derive its mandate from the consent of the parties that are targeted by the engagement. Compellence fully breaches their sovereignty. This has advantages and disadvantages. A benefit of a forced intervention is the ability of the interveners to flexibly alter their mandate. Deriving their mandate from a supreme authority (the Security Council),

¹³⁷ This diagram has been, in principle, developed in the 'Processes of International Negotiation' seminar of Professor Salacuse, held on Thursday, November 20, 2003. Facilitation and compellence are added categories.

the intervening coalition may at any time resort to less coercive methods of conflict resolution. This can be displayed by the example of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Although this intervention was not legal on its outset (thus making this intervention a bad example), its implementation highlights well this mechanism. The intervening third party first attacked the Serb forces as a means to end ethnic cleansing of the province. This form of intervention was most coercive. Yet once the cleansing was stopped and tensions between the Albanian and Serb population eased, the intervening coalition was able to cease using compellence for peace making. It could selectively alter its form of intervention and use adjudication, arbitration and mediation as alternative means of dispute settlement mechanisms. This flexibility of mandate is not possible if an intervention starts from a consent-based mandate. To can be shown on a second example: The Norwegian Foreign Ministry is currently facilitating peace talks in Sri Lanka. Its mandate to do so derives from the consent of both the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Although the LTTE wished a more forceful role for the Scandinavian delegation, the government rejected ever since an increased internationalization of the conflict. Without the consent of either side, the delegation is not able to extend its mandate, but in light of the government's volatile stance on the peace process, this is exactly what seem required.¹³⁸ A mandate based on compellence permits therefore flexibility in the engagement of a conflict. This is crucial for the different stages of conflict resolution.

6.3 Means of intervention

The different forms of intervention, which are required in different stages of conflict, are being analyzed in a later part. First, a more detailed inquiry into the means of intervention is necessary. There are three broad categories of means of forceful intervention by which

¹³⁸ For a case study on the Norwegian role in Sri Lanka, see: Jonas Haggmann, *The Sri Lankan Peace Talks: A Case Study of Third Party Intervention*, seminar paper, Processes of International Negotiations class, fall semester 2003, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Medford: Unpublished, text with the author, 2003).

coercion can be projected. These can be differentiated according to the substantiality of their coerciveness: Coercive diplomacy, non-military substantive sanctions and military substantive sanctions.

6.3.1 Coercive diplomacy

The mildest means of coercion is coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy attempts to induce change of behavior (for instance the cessation of hostilities) by virtue of a ‘forceful persuasion’ (to use Alexander George’s terminology) that a given course of action will be resisted by substantive policies.¹³⁹ Studies of coercive diplomacy, it remains to be noted, concentrate on their ‘defensive’ use, that is “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop [a course of] action he is already embarked upon.”¹⁴⁰ It seems more difficult to compel an actor to actually embark on a new course of action.

Coercive diplomacy is a threat of substantive retributions, not their actual use. “It aims to persuade rather than to seize [...] and it must form a part of a concerted campaign involving a variety of means [...] to influence behavior.”¹⁴¹ This concerted campaign includes a forceful display of what happens if the threat is not heeded,¹⁴² usually by means of demonstrative resorts to exemplary violence.¹⁴³ “[C]oercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy [...] as it offers the possibility to achieve one’s objective in a crisis economically.”¹⁴⁴ The foundations of threats, however, remain substantial. The fact that threats might not be perceived as credible entails a risk that sanctions must be implemented. This can inflict heavy costs on the intervener.

¹³⁹ *Op. cit.*: Donald C. F. Daniel and Hayes, Bradd C., *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crisis*, p21.

¹⁴⁰ *Idem*, p71. An offensive use of coercive diplomacy, say compellence to start do something is called ‘blackmail’.

¹⁴¹ *Idem*, p22.

¹⁴² Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in *Use of Force*, chapter 4.

¹⁴³ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chapter 1.

¹⁴⁴ *Idem*, p72.

To avoid a potential need to execute the threat, there is a series of elements that must be considered by the policy maker who announces a threat, namely the clarity and content of demand, the use and scope of urgency, the means of punishment, and the question of rewards.¹⁴⁵ First, it must be clearly established what action is demanded from the addressee. If the object of ‘forceful persuasion’ is not clear, there is a risk of misunderstanding. A misinterpretation of demands can lead to an unnecessary and costly execution of the threat. Second, the intervener must clearly establish whether his demand for behavioral change is linked to a sense of urgency. In which time frame has the threat to be heeded? Again, an unclear indication of ‘time-urgency’ (to use military terminology) is a source of confusion and threat inefficiency. Third, the kind of punishment for non-compliance must be clearly fixed. This condition implies the presence of capabilities, which are required to execute the threat (airplanes for instance in case of a military threat). When the strategy of punishment is clearly defined, it provides the addressee a possibility to rationally assess the costs that he will incur in case of non-compliance with the threat. It therefore permits him to realize on his own that his course of action will inflict upon him unbearable costs. Self-persuasion of the fallacy of a given course of action reinforces the efficiency and credibility of the threat. Fourth, the intervener has to decide whether or not the threat of punishment is linked to a reward. Conditional inducements of a positive character, rewards for compliance, reinforce incentive and likelihood for compliance.

There are different ways by which these four elements can be expressed, Alexander George correctly notes. A threat can be tacit, clear from the get-go (‘dictum’), or gradually clarified (‘turning of the screw’). As that clarity of threats eliminates most sources of misunderstanding, however, a clear and one-off announcement of the nature and contents of threats seems most efficient. ‘Amendments of threats’ by gradual clarification creates a sense of negotiability of demands. Unless this is the deliberate intent of the intervener (which

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem.*

shouldn't be the case, because it undermines the transparency and predictability of intervention), this strategy undermines the efficiency of diplomatic threats.

6.3.2 Non-military substantive sanctions

Substantive actions must be implemented when coercive diplomacy fail (when threats must be executed). These actions can be separated into five categories, effective diplomacy, technical, judicial, economic and military sanctions. Because of their impact, the military sanctions will be discussed in a separate paragraph.

6.3.2.1 Effective diplomacy

The tool with the least substantive coercive effects is 'effective diplomacy'. Effective diplomacy must be distinguished from coercive diplomacy, which is threats-based. Effective diplomacy (in the sense of international political action) creates substantive effects, which are yet somewhat difficult to grasp. For instance, a condemnation of state or non-state actor behavior in international fora does mobilize other states and actors against this misconduct. Equally, the interruption of diplomatic relations, or the very diplomatic non-recognition at the outset of state birth can produce substantive effects. Because of this diplomacy, the targeted states are unable to enter into beneficial political (i.e. international fora), economic (i.e. free trade areas) or technical (i.e. the Postal Union for worldwide mail delivery) relations with at least some parts of the wider international community. The second example highlights well the difference between coercive diplomacy and effective diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy would threaten the imposition of economic sanctions, but effective diplomacy does not permit entrance into economic relations. Effective diplomacy hurts because it takes away opportunities, it doesn't lower the addresses current political status or economic potential.

In the former Yugoslavia, effective diplomatic sanctions were cast at the very outset of the conflict. After their visit to the Balkans in early February 1991, Fernandez Ordones and

Cathérine Lalumiere, the delegates of the Council of Europe announced that if the Yugoslavia republics wished to join the Council, they had to peacefully resolve their differences. This announcement is not a threat, although it made admission of the republics conditional upon their behavior. It induced a change of course, yet as the Yugoslav republics were not members of the Council of Europe, the object of the sanction is not an infliction of current costs onto the parties.

The line between coercive diplomacy and effective diplomacy is thin. Yet coercive diplomacy is both a wider and less substantial concept. It is a threat of any type of substantive action, but not a substantive action by itself. The threat aims to inflict costs as a means to affect the targeted actors choice of course of action. Effective diplomacy, in contrast, is a substantive action. It eliminates future benefits as a means to induce a change of behavior.

6.3.2.2 Technical sanctions

Technical sanctions are the second set of non-military substantive sanctions for peace. In general, they take the form of decreased technical (pragmatic) cooperation. Technical sanctions are pragmatic 'red tape barriers' (to use trade terminology). The abolition of border cooperation, like for instance liberal control of cross-border commuter movement, is a technical sanction. Such technical sanctions are generally both too sectoral and too mild as to force change, and they hardly create urgency for compliance. Yet they serve well as means to signal intent of action. Signaling is key in a form of interaction, especially in the case of coercion of actors. Technical sanctions show intent to effectively cross the rhetorical threat threshold. It signals the readiness to use sanctions, which are substantial and which inflict costs. A non-Yugoslav example, out not related whatsoever to belligerent behavior, is the current state of relations between Switzerland and the European Union, especially Germany. In their negotiations on economic cooperation, Germany is putting on pressure on the Swiss Government to relax its demands by an intensification of border controls. The effects of this

inflict only few costs on Switzerland (traffic jams along the border), but it clearly signals German discontent with the Swiss stance at the EU negotiation table in Brussels. Whether this signal induces behavioral change of the Swiss magistrates is unclear at the time of writing. One can assume, however, that they will well integrate this signal into their assessment of the negotiation situation.

6.3.2.3 Judicial sanctions

In contrast to technical sanctions, judicial sanctions are used very infrequently in international affairs. Their use became, however, more popular since the mid-1990s. Judicial sanctions (judgments, like the imprisonment of war criminals¹⁴⁶) are coercive *per se*, yet they can be both agreed upon and imposed. As it has been alluded to in the section on the roles of third party intervention, the adjudication of verdicts can be based on prior consent. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, for instance, is such an adjudicatory and coercive, but agreed upon dispute settlement mechanism.

In times of armed conflict and third party intervention, however, judicial sanctions are being imposed. The prime manifestation of such imposed sanctions are the establishment of international tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Convicting and imprisoning leaders, tribunals sanction groupings by affecting their political capabilities, generally by locking them away or by de-legitimizing their political work. The international tribunals active proceedings against violators of international humanitarian law and human rights law (the sole bases for such action at the time of writing) serve as a deterring threats for imitators. Also, judicial sanctions are often linked to other, diplomatic and technical issues.

¹⁴⁶ In rare cases, judicial sanctions are non-substantive, as well. So was the case of the French's intelligence services' sinking of the Greenpeace Rainbow Warrior ship (and killing of a Greenpeace photographer who was held inside it) in New Zealand. One part of the settlement included an apology by French officials to New Zealand.

Compliance with ICTY decisions, for instance, can be rewarded with an end of technical sanctions or acceptance of Yugoslav states to the European Union.

It remains to be mentioned here, that in their role as a means of coercion, international tribunals are impacted by the shortcomings of the UN system. The creation of tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but not for other countries such as the Sudan, North Korea, or Afghanistan is selective. The establishment of a truly globally active International Criminal Court (the ICC) without geographical limitations of mandate has been designed to remedy this shortcoming. Yet, interestingly, the permanent Security Council members Russia, China, and the U.S have not ratified its statute. The latter eventually forcefully sought, and obtained, legal immunity from the ICC for its military forces abroad.

6.3.2.4 Economic sanctions

The fourth set of non-military substantive sanctions is economic sanctions. Economic sanctions include a positive and a negative continuum. They can take the form of a withdrawal of positive support (aid) that reduce benefits, or of an imposition of sanctions, which inflict costs. Many development studies inquired into the use of conditional aid, but few inquired into its strategic use.¹⁴⁷ Security studies, in contrast, focus on the strategic use of economic sanctions, but hardly consider the possibility of a revocation of positive support.¹⁴⁸

Economic sanctions have a double objective. First, the imposition of economic pain is decided in the assumption “that the economic costs would induce the victim nation’s decision

¹⁴⁷ International Monetary Funds, *Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs*, 2001, accessed April 11, 2004, available from: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/>; Devendra Raj Panday, “Can Aid Conditionality Help Governance Reform in Needy Countries?,” from the *Transparency International homepage*, accessed April 11, 2004, available from: <http://www.tinepal.org/corruption3.htm>; James Boyce, “Aid conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints,” in *Development and Change*, volume 33(5), November 2002; Ravi Kanbur, “Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa,” in *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*, Finn Tarp (editor), (New York: Routledge, 2000), accessed April 11, 2004, available from: <http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/sk145/papers/africaaid.pdf>

¹⁴⁸ Miroslav Nincic and Wallensteen, Peter (editors), *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion*, (New York: Praeger, 1983); *Op. cit.*: Margaret P. Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*; *Op. cit.*: Sidney Weintraub (editor), *Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration*.

makers, out of concern for the national welfare and their own incumbency, to abandon the course that provoked the economic retribution. A loss of external markets, of needed goods and capital, would lead them to reason that the costs of the controversial policy outweighs its benefits.”¹⁴⁹ Success of this form of sanctioning is, however, rare. Sanctions are targeted at the formal economy, only. Diminishing its freedom of action, economic activities are simply pushed into the semi-legal gray and illegal black economy.¹⁵⁰ More often than not, it is the very targeted actors who control these gray and black markets. Iraq, Haiti¹⁵¹, Bosnia and Kosovo are examples of failing sanctions. Failing to affect their intended targets, the result is that the costs of sanctions are being borne by the general population. The second objective of economic sanctions is the “idea that other politically potential actors, as well as the [...] public, will blame the incumbents for bringing the economic difficulties upon them, resist their clinging to such costly policies, and ultimately remove them from power by any means necessary.”¹⁵² This is “the naïve theory of coercion”, as Galtung puts it.¹⁵³ While he admits that in fact, sanctions can step up pressures on political leaders, there is a strong possibility that instead of challenging their leaders, the public rallies around them, blaming the international community for the negative economic impacts. In this case, sanctions *foster* support for the targeted policy, they do not reduce it.

In the former Yugoslavia, both scenarios could be witnessed. After the imposition of a series of multilateral and bilateral sanctions, politicians adhered steadfastly to their nationalist policies. Only in mid-1995, after almost four years of armed conflict and in combination with

¹⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*: Miroslav Nincic and Wallenstein, Peter, *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion*, p4.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Dziedzic, “Developing a Political Economy of Durable Peace,” in *The Quest for Durable Peace: Evolving Strategies of Peace Implementation*, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming 2004), chapter 5.

¹⁵¹ For an analysis of failing sanctions in Haiti, see: *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The UN in Haiti: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding*, pp14-15.

¹⁵² *Op. cit.*: Miroslav Nincic and Wallenstein (editors), Peter, *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion*, p5.

¹⁵³ Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,” in *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion*, Miroslav Nincic and Wallenstein (editors), pp17ff.

military sanctions, popular pressure became one of multiple reasons for the Serb government to cease supporting the Serb Republica Srpska in Bosnia.¹⁵⁴

6.3.3 *Military deployments*

Military sanctions are also a substantive tool for coercion, yet their lethality radicalism provides reason for a separate analysis. Military compellence targets the very existence of the adversary. It does not, as non-military substantive sanctions do, simply coerce the addressee to comply with a demand by an infliction of high costs. Military sanctions are thus very radical. Conflict resolution is sought by the very annihilation of the opposing parties. There are three types of military sanctions that differ in scope and radicalism, namely demonstrative troop deployment, military enforcement, and all-out occupation.

6.3.3.1 Demonstrative deployment of force

The demonstrative deployment of troops is the most widely employed type of military sanction by the UN Security Council. In UN lingo, the demonstrative deployment of military is called peacekeeping. As it has been explained, the presence of UN peacekeepers may go counter to the will of the targeted actors. In this case, the sanctioning character of chapter VII based peacekeeping is its potential use of armed force for the defense of the mission's mandate (note that this is not so in the case the parties consented to the deployment, in such a case self-defense could be understood as resembling a very special form of an 'adjutory process'). The mandate sets the limits of the role of peacekeepers. In case of classical peacekeeping, the targeted actors do not expect an offensive manouver from peacekeepers. The advantages of such a use of military has been widely described. It serves as a moderator and potential freezer (the case of Cyprus) of conflict. The disadvantages, however, have also become legion. Peacekeeping operations tend to freeze situations without resolving the

¹⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, pp28-29.

problems (such as Cyprus). Also, classical peacekeepers (which are lightly armed and without forceful backing) showed no resistance to incursions into their mandates. This was the case in Yugoslavia, where Serb forces under General Ratko Mladic's command captures the UN protected 'safe city' of Srebrenica, killing 8'000 Bosniak civilians. The weakness of such troop deployments led to the emergence of the doctrine of 'robust peacekeeping' described

| Box 1: Forms of coercion | | | |
|--|------------------------|---|---|
| Type of coercion | Impact | Effects | Risks |
| Coercive diplomacy | Threat | Can, as any threat, induce change at no cost for all parties to the conflict, depending on credibility and clarity of message | Miscommunication as a constant source of inefficiency, which might require execution of threat. Costs depend on the character of threat |
| Effective diplomacy | Threat and substantive | Can, as any threat, induce change at no costs. Withholding of benefits, no infliction of costs | Withholding of benefits, isolation of target actor can lead to rally-around-the-flag and radicalization, no change of strategy |
| Technical sanctions | Threat and substantive | Inflicts minimal costs and minimal incentives for change, signals intent to inflict substantive costs | May be simply ignored |
| Judicial sanctions | Threat and substantive | If implemented, decapitates criminal leadership structure. Likelihood for change dependant on successors | Can lead to rally-around-the-flag and radicalization, no change of strategy. Humiliation of identity can heavily affect long-term relations |
| Economic sanctions | Substantive | Strong effects, but low incentive for compliance as unintended adverse are likely to prevail | Can be very ineffective, strong adverse effects inflict costs on wrong actors |
| Military classical peacekeeping | Substantive | Moderates or freezes conflict, incentives for change unclear | Willingness to defend the mandate, equipment determine whether effects are created |
| Military punishment | Threat and substantive | Lethal, very clear threat, inflicts high costs and incentives for change | Aside moral considerations of use of force, the threat might not be considered credible |
| Military occupation | Substantive | Lethal, complete seizure of sovereignty, permits total diktat of international will (fully efficient inducement of change) | Eventually the temporarily seized sovereignty must be transferred back |

above.¹⁵⁵ As peacekeeping becomes more robust, it becomes more of an enforcing military mission.

¹⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*: Donald C. F. Daniel and Hayes, Bradd C., *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crisis*, chapter 2.

6.3.3.2 Peace enforcement: Punctual punishment

Peace enforcement is thus the more offensive variant of peacekeeping. In the past, it has been used both punctually for punishment and massively for occupation and an all-out imposition of international will. Punctual punishment combines threats with substantial sanctions: It is a threat in so far as it is a demonstration of what might come more if the targeted actor doesn't comply with the demand. It is also substantial as it generates substantial effects on the ground, as targets are being destroyed by the use of punctual violence. As any means of coercion, (military) punishing excursions are another, though lethal means of signaling widely used in international conflict resolution. In the case of Yugoslavia, NATO was authorized by the Security Council to punctually strike Serb positions in Bosnia in summer 1994 and late 1995. Though the strikes of 1994 were not considered credible demonstrations of military might by local parties (the Serb factions took peacekeepers as hostages to counter-coerce the UN and to successfully demand an end to the air strikes; also, ethnic cleansing continued Bosnia-wide), the punctual and increasingly intense strategic bombing in late 1995 effectively induced change in the hardline Serb leadership. The exemplary use of force by NATO in 1995 is considered to have provided a major leverage of negotiation to the international community during the Dayton peace talks.¹⁵⁶

6.3.3.3 Peace enforcement: Occupation

The most radical variant of peace enforcement is, however, outright occupation, as it is being professed in Kosovo at today. Virtually seizing the sovereignty over a designated territory, this form of intervention permits the intervener to radically alter the political landscape, and to dictate behavioral political at gunpoint. This element of occupation might be tempting, yet occupation is a most dangerous concept. Then although it permits to radically alter the situation on the ground, durability of its effects is far from automatically guaranteed.

¹⁵⁶ Michael Watkins, "Getting to Dayton: Negotiating and End to the War in Bosnia," from *Blackboard*, HBS Case Number 1-800-134, 1999, Processes of International Negotiations class of Jeswald W. Salacuse, fall 2004.

As it will be discussed later¹⁵⁷, the seizure of sovereignty by coercive intervention must eventually be handed back to the local population. In light of this inevitability, any coercive intervention must be highly legitimate. Then to create lasting effects, for coercive interventions to really resolve conflicts, the affected population must at some point share the reason of the international community for intervention. If not, the behavioral change, which was imposed or induced by the foreign intervener, will vanish into thin air soon after the departure of the internationals. Indeed, there is a very complicated dilemma of post-conflict peace building that must be addressed. Outright occupation of territory is not only sustainable; it also conveys a strongly undemocratic image. Yet, the complex question of how an occupation of a country can be transitioned into local ownership surpasses the framework of this essay and must be discussed elsewhere.

6.4 Interrelation between means of intervention

Box 1 on page 58 summarizes the different effects, which different means of coercion generate. Each means of coercion except outright military occupation, it has been alluded to, shares the same potential for signaling. Therefore, as means of coercion convey messages, the efficiency of the use of either means is strongly dependent upon the clear identification and articulation of the behavioral change that this means desires to instigate.¹⁵⁸ This means no less that the all actors to a conflict must decide rationally in face of costs and benefits, that all these costs and benefits can be assessed correctly by them, and that the targeted actors are able to both receive and evaluate a threat correctly.¹⁵⁹ To use coercion as a means to correctly transmit a signal might thus be as challenging to the intervener as the very decision to intervene.

¹⁵⁷ *Infra*, title 7.2.4

¹⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*: Lawrence Freedman (editor), *Strategic Coercion*, chapter 2 (“Compellence: Resuscitating the concept”).

¹⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*: Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in *Use of Force*, p70.

7. Role of third party coercion in evolving conflicts

After the forms and means of intervention have been exposed in detail, this section now attempts to link the ‘how’ to the ‘when’ of international coercion for peace. The linkage depends on the evolution of conflict over time. This section thus starts with an overview over the evolution of conflicts in general, and then exposes the different roles of third party coercion in its individual phases.


7.1 Evolving conflicts

Conflicts, as all crises, evolve over time. As such, third parties have different roles to play in different conflict phases. Schneider and Diesing’s visualization of the evolution of a crisis serves to highlight these different phases of a crisis,¹⁶⁰ portraying a crisis cycle. The Schneider and Diesing model is extensively used in crisis management theory. It bases on the understanding that a crisis is the crossroads between peace and war.¹⁶¹ Practically, this means that war is not an elevated level of confrontational interaction, but a derailed situation, which catapults the social interaction between actors out of the crisis management process. Doing so, this widely used model stipulates a form of god forsakenness of war situations. Jumping out of the crisis management box, armed conflict is not a manageable form of interaction. In the crisis management framework, can be deemed legitimate. The prevention of war is clearly the most desired objective of crisis management. The Schneider and Diesing model therefore serves to inquire into the detailed pre-war phases of crisis as a means to convey an understanding of conflict dynamics to crisis managers.

¹⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*: Glenn H. Snyder and Diesing, Paul, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, p15 (for the original diagram).

¹⁶¹ For the definitions of crises, and an analysis and adaptation of the Schneider and Diesing model, see: *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, pp4-7.

The concept of evolving conflicts is very useful for conflict resolution, but the differentiation between war and peace is not. Indeed, the placing of war outside the crisis




management box suggests some fatalism once war starts, and, worse, portends to not even attempt to pragmatically engage armed conflict. This hands-off understanding of armed conflict is very inappropriate. Armed conflict is just another, though most radical, form of social interaction. As any form of interaction, outsiders can affect armed conflict.

While the conflict cycle scheme of the Schneider and Diesing model are retained for the purpose of this essay, a series of adjustments are necessary. As armed conflict is considered just one of many expressions of conflicting views and interests, war is being made an integral part of analysis, and a part of the crisis cycle (and not its outcome). The adapted model is portrayed in diagram 5 on page 63. It displays, simplistically, the evolution of conflict over time on the x-axis, and a continuous scale of conflict intensity on the y-axis.

Aside the inclusion of war into the cycle, the continuous scale is the second adaptation of the model. The original diagram differentiated the intensity of adversarial interaction along two categories, 'crisis' and 'non-crisis' (this is identified by the 'crisis threshold' in diagram 4 on this page). The problematic in this differentiation is the need to define 'crisis'. A continuous scale of conflict intensity eliminates this identification temporarily. Temporarily, because inevitably, it has been discussed, 'threats to peace' (crises) must also be identified by

the collective security mechanism. The crisis threshold may thus be replaced by an intervention threshold, above which the Security Council is deemed to engage a conflict actively. This threshold is clearly linked to a certain level of intensity of adversarial



interactions, yet at which level this threshold should be set is a question of minimalist benchmark definition. In the case of genocide, this could be, again the famous 10'000 casualties. Again, the strategy of minimalist benchmark setting will be discussed shortly.¹⁶²

Yet, starting from the benchmark and moving upwards, the scale suggests that gradually more coercive means of intervention can be deployed by the third party as means to repress adversarial interaction.

7.2 Coercion in evolving conflicts

As the scale suggests, the interventionist international community can meet different conflict intensities with differently coercive means. This sub-section inquires into the role of third parties in different phases of conflict, which are the pre-conflict, escalation and de-escalation (generally considered the true conflict phase), and the post-conflict phase. The analysis of the first and the last phase of conflict permit to look into the related concepts of conflict prevention and conflict deterrence.

¹⁶² *Infra*, title 7.3.1

7.2.1 Conflict transformation

The analysis of the different third party roles in evolving conflicts requires a prior, abstract and more detailed understanding of conflict transformation. Conflict intensity is no singular concept. Rather, conflicts evolve along a number of continua. Pruitt and Kim identify five such continua along which conflict expand and reduce their overall intensity, namely the ‘light-heavy’, the ‘small-large’, the ‘specific-general’, the ‘do good-hurting’ continua, and the multiplication of conflict locations.¹⁶³ While this more differentiated understanding of conflict is highly abstract, it provides deeper insights into the issue of coercion for peace.

The ‘light-heavy’ continuum refers to the range of coercive forms of interaction between warring parties. Starting from light reprisals, the continuum goes up to the heaviest form of interaction, armed conflict.

A second method by which coercion can transform a conflict is to widen the conflictual interaction in quantitative terms. “As conflict escalates [...] there is [...] a tendency for the parties to become increasingly absorbed in the struggle and to commit additional resources to it in an effort to prevail.”¹⁶⁴ The classic example for this continuum is the beginning of the Cold War, when allied distrust led to decreased cooperation, the formation of adversarial political alliances, and hostile military pacts. This second continuum is the ‘small-large’ spectrum and refers to investments placed into conflict.

A third possibility to affect the state of a conflict is its escalation from specific to general issues within the ‘specific-general’ range. “[S]mall, concrete concerns tend to be supplanted by grandiose and all-encompassing positions and by a general intolerance of the other side.”¹⁶⁵ This range refers to the general nature of relations among adversaries.


¹⁶³ *Op. cit.*: Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, p89f.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibidem.*

Fourth, and related to the prior range, is the transformation of the aims of conflict. From ‘doing well’ for one self, the aim of conflict can be transformed into ‘winning’ over the adversary and even deliberately ‘hurting the other’.

Finally, fifth, Pruitt and Kim stress the possibility to transform a conflict by the multiplication or the reduction of the very number of conflict zones. This method, however, requires the presence of multiple potential conflict zones. During the Cold War, such ‘third



battlefields’ were often located in the global south, where proxy wars could be fought between the Western and the Eastern block. In non-state conflicts, the multiplication of conflict zones is slightly more difficult to apprehend. In case of territorial non-state actors such as the various fractions in Yugoslavia, conflict can be multiplied by the choice of locations of operations. For instance, the government of Croatia was the first actor to be embroiled in conflict with the Serbia backed Serb separatists along in the Croatian Eastern Slavonia region and along its Krajina border. The emergence of conflict in Bosnia, however, transformed the conflict when new fronts between Croat and non-Croat groupings (against Serb forces in western Bosnia, and against Bosniaks in the southern Mostar region). This example, exposed from a Croat point of view (there was a multitude of other front lines, which will be referred to more clearly later in this essay¹⁶⁶). A second example of a

¹⁶⁶ *Infra*, title 9.

transformation along this continuum was the 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia. Then, the Alliance not only attacked Serb positions in Kosovo, the matter in dispute, but also targets in Belgrade and other Serb cities of mainland Serbia.¹⁶⁷

The five continua drawn together form what is called here the ‘conflict map’, a visual representation of the form and scope of a conflict. It is the purpose of third party intervention to attack each apex of this conflict map, and so to reduce and eventually eliminate the conflict. The corresponding diagram has been exposed on the previous page.


7.2.2 *Pre-conflict phase: Prevention and deterrence*

Conflict only arises when preventive safeguard mechanisms fail. Part one of this paper identified the shortcomings of the structural conceptualization of the international system as the main reasons for conflict. Although the international community cannot directly be held for existing conflicts (it is not the international community which committed genocide in Rwanda), the system in which the international community exists does not provide for an effective engagement of these conflicts. The responsibility of the international community is thus the perpetuation of this deficient system. A more efficient and predictable engagement of non-state conflicts by the international community system would deter non-state actors from using violence as a means to get their way.

Passive coercion (deterrence) is thus the appropriate tool for conflict prevention. As it is visualized in the next diagram, deterrence establishes well-defined limits to conflict transformation. The conditions for deterrence have been largely included into the efficient articulation of a threat, above. Though deterrence is not necessarily military, deterrence is a clearly most widely covered in security studies literature. As deterrence is nothing else than a threat, military deterrence theory can also be applied *mutatis mutandis* to diplomatic, technical, judicial and economic deterrence. One key aspect of military deterrence theory is its

¹⁶⁷ Strictly speaking this term is a tautology. Serbia includes three areas called Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

strong bias towards nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons suggest an immediate availability of capabilities for deterrence (the threat), or retaliation (the execution of the threat). Their deployment requires virtually no time. In non-state conflicts, however, nuclear military deterrence is not an option. Third party interventions are dispatched with the intent to alter political behavior, and not to pulverize wrongdoers. The reference to nuclear military theory



does not serve to discuss the applicability of nuclear weapons in conflict resolution. Rather, it serves to highlight a virtually inevitable capability gap in the concept of pre-conflict deterrence. The decision and implementation of type of retaliatory sanctions (judicial, economic, military etc.) takes time.

In the post-Cold War era, many writers regret the 'fallacy of deterrence' in regard to non-state conflicts. Military thinkers assume that the difficulty of targeting non-state actors (by nuclear weapons) is the main source of current insecurity. This understanding relies on a strong bias towards nuclear weapons, or the availability of immediate retaliatory sanctions. The fallacy of post-Cold War deterrence, however, does not solely rely on the problem of targeting. Rather, it depends on the newly rediscovered 'time lag' between decision and implementation of a retaliatory sanction in the absence of nuclear weapons. Then today, in situations of non-state conflict, no immediate retaliatory sanctions are available. Even the imposition of an economic sanction requires time to develop effects. Military sanctions do so

as well. The U.S.-led military buildup in Iraq in 1990/1991 and Afghanistan 2002 showed what time it takes to assemble a capable force in different parts of the globe, even by the sole superpower.

Clearly defined deterrence, whatever its content, prior to the emergence of conflicts can serve as limitations to conflict behavior. As diagram seven on the previous page visualizes, clearly defined and well articulated deterrence restrains, or fences in the conflict map. The inevitable time gap in the execution of deterrence, however, introduces doubt in its execution, and so undermines the credibility and efficiency of deterrence. In a collective security system, which is not predictable, or which does not have clearly recognizable (preferably objective) benchmarks, the time gap opens then becomes a strong source of deterrence inefficiency. As non-state actors are not sure whether, how, and when the collective security mechanism reacts to their transgressions, they have considerable freedoms to adopt destabilizing behavior.


Because of its inefficiency, deterrence in the pre-conflict phase is thus a doubtful concept. Yet, as an alternative to punishing deterrence, sanctions could be applied ‘inversely’. Rather than inflicting costs, the international community should seek to integrate non-state actors into international networks. Integration and positive support to non-state actors creates interdependency, which is both conducive to cooperation and a restraint for transgression. Such integration and positive support can take a wide range of forms, from economic aid to dialogue and confidence building.

7.2.3 Escalation and de-escalation phases

The escalation phase of the conflict is taking place when either warring party adopts measures that inflict increasing costs on the opponents. Like a vicious circle, either side attempts to impose its view by relatively harsher policies. ‘Harsher’ refers to a transformation of the conflict to higher intensities along one or more of the five transformation continua.

Once the logic of escalation sets in, conflict becomes highly destructive and at a certain moment the rationality of actors fades away. Emotional gains associated with the victory of the conflict are becoming more important than objectively assessed tangible benefit. In Kaufman's view, this pattern has become particularly pronounced in post-Cold War non-state conflicts, which are largely ethnically motivated and strongly linked to an irrationally high value of the territory or 'the homeland'.¹⁶⁸

In this phase of the conflict, it is the aim of third parties to de-escalate the situation, and to transform the conflict 'down' along the five transformation continua (as visualized in the following diagram). To do so, and key to foreign intervention, is the imposition of 'crisis escalation dominance' by the third party.¹⁶⁹ Crisis escalation dominance is the control over how, when and whether or not the conflictual intensity of a crisis is being altered or



transformed. In simpler terms, crisis escalation dominance is the appropriation of the overall control over a conflict, in this case by a third party. Whether or not the third party can truly affect, mitigate and resolve a crisis depends on its ability to create this domination. Yugoslavia, for instance, was permitted to become a protracted conflict, it is widely argued, because the 'international community', NATO, the UN, Russia, and the major Western

¹⁶⁸ Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, Robert Art and Waltz, Kenneth N. (editors), 6th American edition, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), chapter 26.

¹⁶⁹ Crisis Management in Complex Emergencies class. Fall semester 2003, Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.

powers was both willingly and unwillingly (as the later analysis shows¹⁷⁰) very slow in establishing its crisis escalation dominance.¹⁷¹

Semantically, the denomination of escalation control is inaccurate, as crisis control aims at the de-escalation of conflict, and not its escalation. A more appropriate term is conflict transformation dominance. Indeed, conflict transformation dominance may include both escalatory and de-escalatory means. The use of escalatory elements in a strategy designed to end conflicts seems confusing at first sight. Yet, de-escalation may well be established by a temporary escalation of conflict.

The exposure of different forms of coercion suggested a correlation between forms and intensity of coercion. Effective diplomacy, it was argued, generally inflicts fewer costs than military strikes. The wide continuum of intervention, from slightly coercive to an outright imposition of international wills¹⁷², suggests that third parties have a coercion toolbox, which is likely to be more complete than the one of the warring parties on the ground. Differently put, the international community can decide to either adopt coercive measures that match the events on the grounds, or it can impose coercive measures that supersede the coerciveness of the conflict. This understanding of third party intervention is abstract and complex, and will be explained in more detail in the following section.¹⁷³

7.2.4 *Post-conflict phase*

The post-conflict role of intervention is similar to the pre-conflict role. “Conflict-limiting norms and institutions, fear from escalation, social bonds and crosscutting group memberships have tremendous force, accounting for the quiet way in which most conflicts are pursued and the high rate of peaceful conflict resolution ordinarily founding human affairs.

¹⁷⁰ *Infra*, title 9.

¹⁷¹ *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, p27.

¹⁷² The continuum in fact starts with non-coercive measures, as diagram 3 on page 48 suggests.

¹⁷³ *Infra*, title 7.3

However, these safeguards are not always present or strong enough to avert escalation.”¹⁷⁴ It is again the primary aim of coercion to re-establish a credible deterrent against future conflicts. Moreover, interveners have to transition the conflict phase into durable peace. If the international community imposes or induces a peace agreement, then it also has to manage this agreement beyond the signing of the treaty.¹⁷⁵ To create a durable agreement, third parties must make substantial efforts to reconcile the former opponents by help of whatever means available (for instance, such as truth and reconciliation committees).¹⁷⁶ This endeavor is delicate, and its efficiency depends to a large extent on the degree of self-determination that has been suspended by virtue of intervention. Because clearly, coercive intervention stands for an imposition or inducement of views, which were not shared by local parties prior to the intervention. If this will is being imposed, than its substance must somehow be transitioned into the targeted actors to become durable. In some form, therefore, the post-conflict phase represents a handing back of actors’ ability to decide their own destiny, an ability that has been temporarily impaired (or even seized) by the international intervention. Although post-conflict peace building is not the primary aim of this essay, it is clear that coercion has effects on this last phases of a conflict, as the legitimacy of intervention comes into play. If coercive interventions are decided and conducted in accountable, predictable, and transparent ways, an intervening force enjoys more legitimacy even within the targeted actor¹⁷⁷ than an intervention which is both selective and representing particular agendas. The U.S.-led intervention into Iraq, 2003, and its current peace-building efforts are a good example for the linkage between legitimacy and post-conflict efficiency. As the coalition fails to smoothly transition self-determination back to the Iraqi population, and as many local actors understand

¹⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*: Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, p143.

¹⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*: Jeswald W. Salacuse, “After the Contract, What? The Challenges of Deal Management,” in *The Global Negotiator: Making, Managing, and Mending Deals Around the World in the Twenty-First Century*, pp193-204.


¹⁷⁶ *Op. cit.*: Dean G. Pruitt and Kim, Sung Lee, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, pp217-219.

¹⁷⁷ This argument admittedly refers to civil conflicts, rather than fundamentalist terrorism. In Serbia, the transparency of the ICTY helped to foster support for it even by the population whose leaders were being indicted.


the intervention as a breach of UN law, the post-building process suggests becoming more cumbersome.

7.3 Correlation of coercion and conflict

The description of conflict prevention, escalation, de-escalation and post-conflict conflict deterrence suggest that the forms of foreign coercion can be correlated with the




intensity of the targeted conflict. Intensity of conflict can be visualized within the conflict transformation diagram (diagram 9 on this page), where concentric circles differentiate



increasing levels of conflict intensity (moving outwards). A specific conflict may hit on number of intensity levels, as the conflict map suggests. Diagram ten shows this.

The challenge to third parties is to correctly assess any given level of conflict intensity with a corresponding coercive means, and to alter this match as conflicts evolve. The diagram on this page provides the big picture of crisis evolution in time, linking the simple (adapted



Schneider and Diesing) model of conflict intensity to the more complex (Kim and Pruitt inspired) model of five-continua. This challenge applies especially to the escalation and de-escalation phases.

In the simple model (Schneider and Diesing), the intensity of a conflict is singular, say a conflict has a clear and single level of intensity. Accordingly, the choice of coercive tools is rather simple for the intervening authority. In the more complex five-continua model, however, there is, potentially, no singular level of intensity of the conflict as conflict scores


differently on different scales. The more differentiated view of conflict makes the appropriate choice of means of intervention more difficult.

7.4 Matching conflict with coercion

There are two strategies according to which third parties can chose and employ coercive measures. The first strategy ‘under-aims’ the level of conflict. Imposing sanctions ‘that hurt’, this strategy aims at moderating conflict behavior. The second strategy is to ‘over-shoot’ the witnessed intensity level of the targeted conflict in terms of coercion. This strategy more straightforwardly imposes the will of the intervener.

7.4.1 Under-aiming conflict levels


Under-aiming the intensity of conflict levels means adopting coercive measures, which do not match the conflict’s intensity. This could be, for instance, the imposition of technical sanctions in face of ethnic cleansing. The rationale behind this strategy is to constantly inflict (rather low) costs upon the perpetrator. This strategy can be visualized



according to the two conflict evolution models (diagram 12 on this page for the simple model, diagram 13 on the next page for the five-continua model). The strategy of under-aiming the conflict intensity can be explained by an example. In the first model, a situation **A** of the

conflict implies that any coercive strategy that resorts to soft coercion (which is below **A'**) like technical sanctions is an under-aiming strategy.

In the complex model, any coercive strategy that resorts to soft coercion inside **circle A** is considered the same. The identification of this threshold **A** in the complex model highlights the problematic of multiple, or non-singular intensity thresholds. As the diagram



suggests, the conflict map is not congruent with one single intensity threshold **circle A**, which has been allocated to the lowest conflict intensity score of the conflict map (which in this case happens to be on the 'specific-general' continuum, as marked by a red spot).

An under-aiming strategy continuously inflicts costs, inducing a change of course of action. It has a strong emphasis on education, permitting the targeted actor to effectively apprehend the situation and to change his behavior. Because third party action is less coercive than on-ground conflict intensity, this strategy is a de-escalatory strategy for the imposition of conflict transformation dominance.

7.4.2 Over-shooting conflict levels

Once the under-aiming strategy is understood, its alternative, the over-shooting strategy can easily be apprehended. In contrast to the first, this strategy employs means that are more coercive than the conflict intensity on the ground. Differently put, this strategy

escalates the conflict as a means to impose conflict transformation dominance. After this imposition, the conflict can then be de-escalated. The most intrusive example of such a strategy is the use of punitive strikes, or troop deployments. Both are radical in the sense that the international community disposes a virtually unlimited number of them. Air strikes can today be executed with low risks, from high altitude. Peace enforcement, well planned by the entire international community, can easily outgun the warring parties.

The use of an escalatory strategy could be seen as a variant of the ‘give war a chance’ argument that has been eloquently so exposed by Edward Luttwak.¹⁷⁸ Luttwak argued, cynically, that war is a conflict resolution mechanism. In his belief, warring parties will be eventually exhausted or eliminated. Peace rules after this kind of conflict resolution. The conflict escalation strategy shares the assumption that peace can be brought about by an outgunning and exhaustion of the targeted actors. But as Luttwak’s argument, an escalating strategy by the international community is a moral problem. By an escalation of the conflict, the community temporarily expands the conflict map, bringing it to higher intensities of interaction. In such scenarios, the international community potentially kills actors for collective peace, which is considered a more important aim than the respect of every life. The moral dilemma is apparent.

This is also a reason why the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is so inappropriate. Humanitarianism saves life and mitigates suffering. The creation of suffering for these ends is not acceptable to humanitarianism. One can argue that both ‘humanitarian interventions’ and coercive collective security interventions do both derive from the principle of humanity, the aim for peace and the care human life. Because of the just mentioned reason, and despite what western leaders like making belief¹⁷⁹, however, these strategies can be called conflict

¹⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*: Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” in *Foreign Affairs*, pp36ff.

¹⁷⁹ For an analysis of the ‘new military humanism’, see: Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*, (Chadlington: Pluto Press, 1999).

resolution strategies, but not humanitarian.¹⁸⁰ It is important to acknowledge this moral problem. Coercive strategies, especially over-shooting strategies, are not purely moral. Sometimes, they couldn't even be farther from this. Still, it seems, coercion is necessary for peace maintenance.

7.5 Benchmarks

This section returns to the key challenge of coercion in international affairs, namely the setting of benchmarks. As the analysis showed so far, two types of benchmarks are required, namely thresholds for intervention and benchmarks for the correlation of conflict with coercion.

7.5.1 Benchmarks for intervention

As it has been alluded to before, it is possible to set objective benchmarks for intervention, despite the moral problems that are attached to it. Sciences are capable of identifying turning points at which peace is threatened, if one wants. Humanitarian criteria can set scientific benchmarks for excess mortality. Nutrition sciences can set objective thresholds for malnutrition.¹⁸¹ As these criteria are the cornerstone of intervention, the last chapter of this essay is devoted to their discussion.


7.5.2 Benchmarks for correlation of conflict and coercion

More important in this section is the objective correlation of conflict and coercion. It makes sense to link the intensity to of a conflict to the degree of coercion used by the

¹⁸⁰ William Pfaff, "Humanitarian Intervention in Iraq," from the *IHT homepage*, Tuesday, March 30, 2004, accessed March 30, 2004, available from: <http://www.iht.com>

¹⁸¹ See for instance: Peter Howe and Stephen Devereux, "Intensity and Magnitude Scales for Famine," from *Blackboard*, Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies class of Sue Lautze, spring 2004. See especially their attempts to classify crises according to their severity and intensity, pp4-5. See also: David Alexander, "The Study of Natural Disasters, 1977-1997: Some Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge," in *Disasters*, 1997, 21(4), pp284-304.

international community for its repression. Yet it is difficult to clearly correlate the different degrees with each other. When is a conflict violent enough to permit economic sanctions, when is it to allow for military strikes? A general correlation of conflict and coercion can be



done, as diagram 14 suggests. Its equation of conflict intensities and coercion is both tentative and arbitrary. Certainly, there are no guidelines of the exact equation of the two scales. International political organizations and research institutes alike try to establish objective criteria for this linkage.¹⁸² Its setting, however, depends on a consensus among nations. Clearly, as any benchmark related to in these pages, it should be the UN, which clearly establishes these thresholds of correlation. A transparent public correlation of conflict intensity levels to coercive counter-actions would clarify the reactions that a non-state actor could expect from the Security Council. This, once more, would enhance its deterrent radiation as the guarantor of international peace and security.

¹⁸² Such as the Commission for Intervention and State Responsibility. See: *Supra*, titles 5.1 through 5.3

8. Requirements for successful coercion

This section more deeply inquires into intervener or the targeted actors, looking into the requirements and conditions for third party action. The results suggest that both the use and success of coercive interventions depend on a variety of factors, and that coercion, not surprisingly, is a limited concept. Finally, this eighth section discusses criteria for the determination of success or failure of forceful intervention.

8.1 Intervener

Upon the reaching of pre-established benchmarks, the international community can decide coercive intervention into ‘domestic’ affairs. Yet interventions don’t automatically materialize when after their authorization. Rather, there is a series of requirements necessary for the implementation of coercive interventions even after the decision of the authority to do so. In *Strategic Coercion*, Lawrence Freedman proposes nine criteria which should be met for successful use of coercion: There must be a clear demand, a use of an ultimatum, a threat to defeat the adversary, the use of positive rewards, assurance against future demands, the presence of usable options for implementation, strong leadership, and domestic and international support.¹⁸³

8.1.1 Threats and ultimatums

Some of these elements have been referred to, already. The primary aim of coercion is compellence, which functions by virtue of an unexecuted threat. A threat, it has been described, requires a clear communication of a clear demand.¹⁸⁴ This demand may be formulated as an ultimatum to increase pressure, and may be linked to some forms of positive

¹⁸³ *Op. cit.*: Lawrence Freedman (editor), *Strategic Coercion*, p80.

¹⁸⁴ *Op. cit.*: Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in *Use of Force*, pp73-74.

benefits in case of compliance. The need for an assurance against future demands may be assumed to be included in the formulation of the threat.

8.1.2 Capabilities

Also some parts of the capability aspect have been discussed, especially the time lag between authorization and deployment of sanctions. The capability requirement for intervention is crucial. A threat that bases on options of implementation that do not exist is not credible. Indeed, if threats of intervention are clearly hollow, warring partners may be able to provoke intervention, which cannot possibly take place. Capabilities include the willingness and capability to accept limited business possibilities abroad in case of economic sanctions, and, of course, capabilities in terms of military hardware. On the economic level, continuing globalization does create possibilities to impose economic sanctions. On the military level, despite the desirability of global disarmament, the necessity to have coercive means at the disposal of the collective security mechanism seems established. This has been acknowledged by the UN Charter, which demands member states to second troops to an integrated collective command structure.

8.1.3 Domestic political support

Closely linked to the need of 'usable options' for coercive interventions is the domestic support for this implementation. The usability of an option not only depends on its availability, but also on the political will of its owner to employ it for collective security. Indeed, in the current UN system, which knows no implementation of its most crucial articles of chapter VII¹⁸⁵, the political will to devote assets to coercive strategies is more often than not the key determinant in the question whether or not coercion is possible. In this system, domestic support for foreign intervention depends on each country's individual evaluation of

¹⁸⁵ Articles 44-48 of the UN Charter.

costs and benefits of an intervention, and not, as it should be, by a collective (UN) assessment of costs and benefits of interventions.

The designation of national troops to a higher authority is, in this world, a sensitive issue. Recent years not only showed reluctance by UN member states to do so, it also showed moves in the opposite direction. Since the mid-1990s, for instance, the world's most powerful state, the U.S., officially rejects any seconding of national contingencies to UN command.¹⁸⁶ The capability dilemma at the supranational level requires the invigoration of the corresponding UN provisions, the establishment of standing, though possibly de-centralized UN armies. The idea of such a reinvigoration is certainly not new¹⁸⁷, yet, despite the rhetoric, there is simply no implementation by national chiefs.

8.1.4 International political support

By extension, international support to UN interventions can be added to the requirement of 'political will'. This requirement refers to the necessity of wide support among UN member states within the UN structure. In the current system, it also refers to international solidarity to sponsor military troops for the collective good, should they be demanded.

8.1.5 Intervention leadership

Freedman's requirement for strong leadership can be expanded to include the coordination among third party members. Necessarily¹⁸⁸, a third party consists of multiple actors. The presence of multiple actors, however, risks entailing multiple approaches to conflict resolution and multiple methods of conflict assessment. Differing approaches distort

¹⁸⁶ Jonas Hagmann, *From PRD 13 to PDD 25: Somalia as a Turning Point in US International Policy*, seminar paper, *Histoire et Politique Internationales*. academic year 2001-2002, the Graduate Institute of International Studies, (Geneva: Unpublished, text with the author, 2001).

¹⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*: United Nations Secretariat, *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), para43.

¹⁸⁸ This is good to avoid particular interests in the case of interventions. *Supra*, title 6.1

the signals that are being sent to the targeted actors, and so undermine the credibility of the threat and the collective security mechanism. This problem was well documented during the Yugoslav disintegration¹⁸⁹ where unclear crisis leadership and conflicting approaches to the crisis (crises) undermined the efforts by the international community to affect the evolution of the conflict, and its attempts to establish crisis transformation dominance.

8.2 Warring parties

It is appropriate to look into the role of the warring parties in international conflict resolution, as well. In non-coercive intervention (mediation, facilitation etc.), it is these parties, which determine the success or failure of third party intervention. It is these parties' perception of the gains or costs of continued conflict, which determines whether a situation is 'ripe' for conflict de-escalation.¹⁹⁰ Non-coercive interventions (per definition: based on consent) must be conducted carefully. It is only successful, if the situation is 'ripe' for it. "The issue of timing is important since interventions or conciliatory gestures made at inappropriate times may be counterproductive"¹⁹¹. Interventions in unripe conflicts may deepen antagonism and conflict. Perera and MacSwiney believe that "every lapse, deviation or errors, any prevarication in honouring pledges [by the third parties], are being pounced upon as opportunities to mount resistance" by the opponents.¹⁹² Case studies on consent-based interventions on Sri Lanka confirm this.¹⁹³

Kriesberg identifies three conditions for ripeness of a situation for settlement through negotiation or third party mediation, namely Domestic pressure, the relations between the

¹⁸⁹ *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, p33 and p37.

¹⁹⁰ "Ripe [...] means that the time is right for de-escalation". Louis Kriesberg, "Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves", in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (editors), (Cambridge: PON Books, 1991), p223.

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹² Rienzie Perera and Morgan MacSwiney, *EC Conflict Assessment Mission – Sri Lanka*, (Brussels: European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, 2002), accessed October 29, 2003, available from: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/mission/srikan.pdf, p4.

¹⁹³ *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Sri Lankan Peace Talks: A Case Study of Third Party Intervention*.

adversaries, and the international context.¹⁹⁴ The difference between non-coercive and coercive interventionism is that these three conditions can be imposed by force in the latter case. There is no need by third parties to wait for the perfect moment to propose their good offices. During the phase of coercion, unless international demands are complied with, classical negotiation and mediation requirements are thus suspended.

This analysis of the interaction between local parties and the international intervener suggest that there are no requirements towards the local party for third party intervention except those listed before. Indeed, it seems that the rationality of the targeted actor and its capability to assess the international community's intentions correctly are the only requirements. This is the reason why coercion is generally understood as a one-way form of interaction.

8.3 Criteria for success of peace expansion

In this essay, a number of requirements for the conduct a successful intervention have been listed. These included requirements of a legitimate authority, a transparent decision making process, benchmarks for intervention, and more. These requirements largely explain the deployment of an intervention, but less so the success of its outcome. An illustrative series of criteria by which the success of foreign intervention can be measured is provided in this paragraph. It includes theoretical criteria such as the conflict map reduction criteria, but also practical humanitarian and public health criteria. Moreover, these criteria serve a second purpose: When criteria are being used to measure the success of an intervention, then they can also be used as a benchmark for intervention.

¹⁹⁴ *Op. cit.*: Louis Kriesberg, "Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, p227.

8.3.1 Conflict map criterion

The conflict-map criterion has been touched upon. It is a tentative methodology of an assessment of the scope and intensity of a conflict. The success or failure of intervention is being measured by the quantitative change of the surface of the conflict map, measures as a difference between the pre-conflict and the post-intervention situation. This type of measuring requires that a quantitative conflict map analysis be conducted prior to the intervention. But how practicable is such an assessment? It appears that the five determinants of the conflict map, the 'light-heavy', the 'small-large', the 'specific-general', the 'doing well-winning-hurting' continua and the number of conflict zones could be assessed and fixed on intensity scales, in practice. If so (such a methodology would require quite more in-depth research), then the conflict map methodology would provide a practicable though rudimentary tool for success assessment. Its key shortcoming is yet apparent: It departs from the assumption that conflict is defined by its five parameters. More practical than this theoretical assessment are humanitarian and public health criteria.

8.3.2 Humanitarian criteria

The establishment of objective and practical criteria for intervention assessment is, it has been discussed, both a difficult and a cynical endeavor. It is cynical as it sets benchmarks which separate situations into such that are 'worth being eliminated' and such that are not: 'Sub-benchmark' situations and the suffering by persons who are caught in these are considered permissible (again, the famous example of the 9'999 killings in case of genocide). The setting of objective criteria by which separate situations into threats to peace can be identified, and by which the effects of interventions against these can be assessed, is yet possible by means of minimalist objective approaches (say the lowest common denominator of the states' views on these benchmarks).

The field of humanitarian assistance proposes the crude mortality rate (CMR) as such a criterion. Indeed, humanitarians do use the CMR as a benchmark for the qualification of a situation as a humanitarian crisis. The minimalist objective benchmark in humanitarian aid work is fixed at a CMR of ten deaths per 10'000 persons and day, or 10/10'000/d.¹⁹⁵ Any mortality above this threshold is considered a humanitarian emergency, but not so mortality rates below it. Why 10, and not more, or less? The CMR benchmark is a perfect example of an arbitrary and minimalist, but objective benchmark. Studies have shows that crude mortality rates can easily and rapidly be assessed region wide.¹⁹⁶ As such, the CMR could serve as an indicator for the international community to act. Subsequently, after the intervention has ended, the success of intervention can be measured. Immediately after the genocide, the Goma refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo knew CMRs between 19.5/10'000/d and 31.2/10'000/d, or between two and three times the humanitarian benchmark. CMRs are rapidly available to the Security Council (although this specific example here refers to post-genocide data), and so provide a basis to act. The CMR is only one of many criteria, yet it is a powerful one. Although the number of deaths hardly accounts for any non-lethal degree of suffering, it is the ultimate indicator for the existence of a threat to peace. A CMR as elevated as in the Rwanda case should have led to an intervention. The success of this intervention could then have been measured on the post-intervention CMR.

Within the wider humanitarian field, two more objective criteria can be identified, namely the number of displaced persons, and the more recent SPHERE standards.¹⁹⁷ In case of displacement, a case can be made similar to the CMR. Although currently there is no crisis rate (a distinct number of displaced persons per day), one could be set in minimalist ways. Unlike displacement, the SPHERE standards include of objective benchmarks, solely. The

¹⁹⁵ *Op. cit.*: Peter Howe and Stephen Devereux, "Intensity and Magnitude Scales for Famine," from *Blackboard*, pp2-3; See also: Goma Epidemiology Group, "Public Health Impact of Rwandan Refugee Crisis: What happened in Goma, Zaire, in July 1994?," in *The Lancet*, Volume 345, February 1995, p340.

¹⁹⁶ *Idem*, p340.

¹⁹⁷ The SPHERE Project, "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response," from the *SPHERE homepage*, accessed April 2, 2004, available from: <http://www.sphereproject.org>

SPHERE standards quantify the needs for water, food, shelter, health care and education by human beings, providing practical indicators for needs assessment and needs fulfillment. The SPHERE standards could serve as minimum benchmarks for the identification of peace (and threats to peace). The compatibility of on-ground situations with these standards can be objectively measures. Situations that are inferior to these standards can be considered threats to peace. Accordingly, the post-intervention assessment could indicate the success of the international remedy against this situation.

Certainly, the shift from CMR benchmarks to displacement and SPHERE standards represents an increasingly wide definition of peace, and threats to it. Yet they seem still more easily quantifiable than un-quantified ‘grave human right violations’, the currently most prominent criteria for intervention. Admittedly, the SPHERE benchmarks are a radical proposal. It construes the responsibility of the international community for peace as more than the mere elimination of conflict and killings (which can be measured by the CMR). Yet the understanding that each man deserves minimum shelter, water, food, shelter, health care and education doesn’t seem that absurd.

8.3.3 Public health criteria

The same logic applies to public health criteria. Nutrition science is, for instance, able to identify protein deficiencies in human bodies, and the comparison of conflict with pre-conflict data can identify situations of grave threat to the survivability of man, or peace. Such an understanding would enlarge the notion of peace to include absence of suffering based on nutritional needs. Instead of setting a global benchmark, nutrition science depart from the ‘natural’ malnutrition’ in individual countries. This departure of ‘normal trend’ for the identification of crises is an alternative methodology to a crisis threshold such as the 10/10’000/d in humanitarian relief work. In the case of children in Africa, this percentage is estimated at 5-8% of the overall population (the use of this public health example, which is

defined in region-specific terms, only shall not suggest that the international community should use such criteria. The differentiation of benchmarks along regions or continents could be understood as selectivity and double standards). Again, if such benchmarks would be adopted, the malnutrition prevalence of for instance 23% in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo months after the end of the Rwandan genocide would have factually established a threat to peace, and the need for intervention.¹⁹⁸ Like the humanitarian criteria, the one public health criterion exposed in this paragraph shows another possibility how to identify a threat to peace, an intervention, and the success of an intervention.

8.3.4 Further criteria: From democracy to durability

Conflict map, humanitarian and public health criteria for the assessment of success and failure of international interventions are certainly only illustrative. Yet they present possibilities to conduct objective assessments. Moreover, they highlight the strong dependency of coercive interventions on the definition of peace and threats to peace, or benchmarks. Other criteria might well be devised, as Security Council practice showed. The reinstatement of a democratically elected President, for instance, has become a criterion for intervention in 1994.

More benchmarks are likely to be identified as the need for it materializes. Today, it remains the highest priority to codify those criteria that have been identified so far. Whether the benchmarks include anti-democratic actions, or the mere durability of an international intervention, the biggest need is the permanent retention of objectively defined benchmarks by which coercive interventions are permissible, and by which the success of such interventions can be measures.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibidem.*

PART III

The case of Yugoslavia, and conclusions

9. Coercion in Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav disintegration of the early 1990s and its aftershocks in the late 1990s was a test of the international security system for its capacity to engage and eliminate threats to international peace and security. Situated at the very cutting-point between the Cold War and the post-Cold War order, the Yugoslav disintegration process was a virtual playground for most different forms and elements of international crisis management. In this section, the Yugoslav dismemberment case is briefly analyzed along the theory exposed in this thesis.

9.1 The Yugoslav crisis (short history)¹⁹⁹

Generally, four major structural (long-term) causes are identified as the lead reasons for the disintegration of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslav Republics (SFYR). These are the imbalanced and heterogeneous nature of the federation (historical legacy, irreconcilable nationalistic and religious allegiances), the nationalization of politics and generation of uncontrolled centrifugal forces through decentralization of the one party system, democratization and “de-titofication” (disintegration of communist control and ideology), and economic tensions (uneven development and distribution of wealth). The conjunctural (short-term) causes of disintegration can be identified in the 1989-1991 timeframe, although their significance varies with the six republics and two provinces.²⁰⁰ They are fourfold as well and include the strong demise of the communist ideology after the fall of the Berlin wall, the multiparty elections which were held in all republics (but not on the federal level), the tensions between newly elected nationalist and democratic parties (Slovenia, Croatia,

¹⁹⁹ For more details, see: *Op. cit.*: Jonas Hagmann, *The Yugoslav Disintegration of 1989-1995: Aspects of Third Party Crisis Management*, pp10-31. For particularities of Macedonia 2001, see: Jonas Hagmann, *New Forms of International Democracy Assistance: Security Sector Reform in Macedonia*, seminar paper, The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies class, spring semester 2004, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford: Unpublished, text with the author, 2004).

²⁰⁰ Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia. ‘Autonomous’ provinces within the republic of Serbia but with equal voting rights on the federal level since the Constitution of 1984: Vojvodina and Kosovo.

Macedonia, the Bosniak Bosnia) with confirmed communist (or socialist) republics and institutions (Federal bodies, Serbia, Montenegro), and finally, most importantly, the different declarations of independence by those nationalist parties and republics (again, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and the Bosniak Bosnia).

The disintegration of the Soviet empire affected Yugoslavia, a socialist mini-empire. The regional bankruptcy of communism declared by the CPSU's downfall questioned the legitimacy of the Yugoslav one-party system and its CPY. Legitimacy of government was therefore sought in democratic multiparty elections, but not on the federal level, which remained socialist and Serb-controlled. The very beginning of the crisis can be located in 1989 when Serb President Milosevic revoked the autonomous statuses of the Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces. Newly elected nationalistic and confirmed socialist nationals increasingly pitched policies against each other. To extend their reach, socialist leaders attempted to subjugate the (still socialist) federal bodies, especially the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) under their control. The non-socialist republics refused these attempts and gradually ceased cooperation in federative bodies. Talks on new federal forms failed when nationalistically, ethnically and religiously motivated armed communal clashes overtook the political agenda. In 1991 and 1992, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia declared independence from the federation. But not before long, communal violence served the Serb dominated JNA as a pretext to intervene and to uphold (federal) law and order in the separatist republics, resulting in all-out war between the Slovenia and the JNA, Croatia and the JNA, and between the three major Bosnian factions (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks). Montenegro allied with Serbia, and Macedonia somehow miraculously seceded without the firing of a single shot. The nationalization of politics from the federal to the republican level was therefore the major driver of conflict, turning into a self-sustaining policy once nationalistic and ethnic rhetoric transformed itself into physical violence. Options of compromise became impossible, as kinship and cultural identities became war aims. Conflict centered on the redrawing of

boundaries along ethnical, and not administrative lines. These diverged especially significantly along the Croatian-Serb border and the entire, strongly ethnically mixed Bosnia.

The crisis (crises) de-escalated in different phases, depending on the republic in focus. Slovenia quickly expelled the JNA in a ten days war, forcefully confirming its political sovereignty and territorial integrity in summer 1991. Macedonia seceded quietly from the federation in 1992 when it became clear that war aims were defined by virtue of ethnical boundaries, and not primarily the control of strategic areas and resources. Macedonia being a rather homogenous country, the Republic was able to secede peacefully. Its single major minority, the Albanian Macedonians had weak links to the Yugoslav nationalist power holders, only.²⁰¹ Montenegro allied with Serbia. War raged on, however, between Croatia and Serbia and the different Bosnian factions. In summer 1995, Croatia finally successfully drove Serb forces out of its Country, so effectively de-escalating the Croatian-Serb conflict by virtue of military victory. A similar solution appeared to come about in Bosnia when allied Croat and Bosniak forces scored decisive victories over Serb contingencies. Yet before a military solution was imposed, the international community ‘forcefully mediated’ a peace treaty, the Dayton peace accord. The Dayton accord, however, was not a comprehensive peace agreement for the Balkans: It neglected the questions of Albanian minority statuses in Macedonia and Serbia (Kosovo, especially) and imposed a fragile form of governance in Bosnia. These neglects led to the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the 2000 Serb revolution, and the 2001 Albanian insurgency in Macedonia and to the instability of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9.2 The international system at the end of the Cold War

At the end of the Cold War, the only intervention scenarios into domestic affairs were contingency plans by western or eastern alliances. The antagonism between East and West had paralyzed the UN collective security mechanism, yet because of their security umbrellas,

²⁰¹ Albanians they had (and have) strong links with Albania and Kosovo, but neither of them called the shots on within the Yugoslav Federation.

the bipolar international system knew few non-state conflicts such as civil wars. The respective superpowers largely successfully supplanted or counter-acted them in either hemisphere. When the wall fell in Berlin in November 1989, the end of the bipolar order was in sight. Only few months later, the USSR ceased to exist, and with it, the UN blockade.

To many, the change can be surprise. Accordingly, no plans had been made for the post-Cold War international system. Its characteristics so came about through heuristic practice, which was the described expansion of UN peacekeeping, and later, the use of humanitarian interventions and pre-emptive strikes for peace. No clear concept for the management of non-state conflicts emerged in the 15 years following the *Mauerbruch* in Berlin. The Yugoslav disintegration, a result of the communist bankruptcy in Eastern Europe and wider Eurasia (though not global), completely fell into the transition period to the current system. As such, 'international (western) attempts' to resolve its conflict largely consisted of trial and error proceedings.

9.3 Roles, forms and use of third party coercion in Yugoslavia

The heuristic approach to conflict resolution in the wider context of a rapidly and radically evolving international system led to a high number and a variety of conflict resolution attempts by the internationals.

9.3.1 Pre-conflict phase: Prevention and deterrence

As the powers of the USSR quickly faded away, the Council of Europe, the European Communities, NATO and, eventually, the U.S. stepped in and appropriated conflict management leadership. The effective action taken prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, however, was purely rhetorical. Each of the four players warned Yugoslav republics that a use of violence in the settlement of their territorial disputes would impair their further integration into the western world.

At the end of half a century of separation between the East and the West, this diplomacy couldn't have an important impact. Not integrated into the western world, there was hardly any positive economic or political support. Its revocation could thus not have been threatened, simply as the capabilities to do so were lacking. Deterrence against non-state conflict, however, didn't work either. As the new system was about to be identified, there was no predictable and clear conflict suppression mechanism that could have deterred the Yugoslav factions from resorting to violence. Conflict prevention and deterrence thus failed dramatically. The reason for both failures can be linked to the transformation of the international system at the very end of the Cold War. As such, the Yugoslav conflict could almost be seen as a victim of history, if only prevention and deterrence would have improved since then.

9.3.2 Escalation and de-escalation phases

The western-led international community employed the entire range of coercive measures, say diplomatic, technical, judicial, economic, and military sanctions without ever being able to fully exert conflict transformation control. It remains unclear why this was so. The international community was reluctant to use strongly coercive measures. This reluctance was first justified on ground of Yugoslav state sovereignty. Yet this argument became soon redundant, as the disintegration process quickly transformed non-state conflict into a classical inter-state conflict. Sanctions of medium coercive character like judicial sanctions were imposed in 1994, only, and economic sanctions were partial designed and poorly implemented. The ICTY not only got established late into the war(s), also, it started to generate its substantive effects in the post-war period, only. Bilateral and multilateral economic sanctions prohibited the trade in war materials and petrol, only, and did not inflict substantial economic costs on the warring parties. They were also poorly implemented,

permitting the Slovene, Croat and Serb factions to illegally import the war material that they required.

Military sanctions were employed in 1992, when UNPROFOR, a lightly armed UN peacekeeping mission was dispatched to Croatia, and then Bosnia. With a rigid and defensive mandate, however, this force was unable to provide strong incentives to stop the ethnic cleansing. Over the years of their deployment, UNPROFOR even started to show an incapability to defend its limited mandate. In 1994, Serb factions took hostage numerous peacekeepers, and in summer 1995, Serb forces overran a UN protected 'safe zone', Srebrenica. The reluctance to impose crisis transformation dominance by virtue of conflict escalation led even to such disastrous incidents of 1994. Then, the international community was so divided as to authorize punctual military punishment (air strikes) while peacekeepers were still on the ground. As a result, hundreds of blue helmets were taken hostage, leading to the perverted situation that the targeted actors were successful in coercing the intervener to stop its bombings.

The effective de-escalation of the Yugoslav crisis largely followed Luttwak's idea of belligerent self-resolution. In summer 1995, Croat forces were able to finally expel Serbia-backed Serb forces from Croatian territory, and a Croatian-Bosniak alliance in Bosnia was able to inflict decisive defeats on the same Serb factions in the Bosnian theatre. The merit of the NATO air strikes of late 1995 was not, it is largely agreed, the direct imposition of peace through coercion. Yet the NATO strikes, and the muscular threat thereof was well suited to freeze the conflict momentum in the rough equilibrium that came about by the Serb defeats.

9.3.3 Post-conflict phase

The use of coercion in the post-conflict phase was thus exactly this threat of future air strikes. This threat established a credible but temporary deterrent against the resumption of armed conflict. Only few years later, conflict again broke out in Serbia, more precisely in its

southern province of Kosovo. In 2000, finally, conflict broke out between Albania-backed Albanian forces and the government of Macedonia. In Yugoslavia, the international community was thus unable to transform its threat of coercion into effective deterrence. This incapacity is today being perpetuated on the international system level, just as it has been described in the previous sections.²⁰² Being selective and arbitrary in its interventions, the international community, acting through its executive organ, the Security Council, is unable to credibly deter and so prevent non-state conflict. In the Yugoslav case, this phenomenon was even more worrisome, as the conflict became an international conflict, thus the type of conflict in the combat of which the collective security system is supposedly more efficient.

9.4 Causes of success and failure of coercion

The brief analysis of third party coercion in Yugoslavia showed limited success. Multiple obstacles hindered the international community from a more effective engagement of the situation. The causes were the trial and error approach to conflict resolution, the reluctance to adopt an over-shooting strategy, and significant leadership problems on the international level.

First, as it has been described, the community was about to find out its new *modus vivendi* for non-state conflict elimination. Adopting a trial and error approach to this objective, a variety of coercive tools were clearly badly employed. The judicial sanction could not possibly develop strong effects before some time. Economic sanctions were too narrowly defined and too laxly verified as to be effective. Military sanctions, finally, were employed in incompatible modes, such as the combination of air strikes with unprotected on-ground peacekeepers.

Second, the west was very reluctant to adopt ‘over-shooting strategies’. Never did it attempt to de-escalate the situation by a short-term expansion of the conflict map. This

²⁰² *Supra*, title 4, especially 4.3.4

reluctance was strongly visible at times, for instance when the deployment of ground troops was being debated in the western press. The intensity of the conflict (ethnic cleansing) was so never truly matched by third party coercion. The strategy chose inflicted continuous but low costs on the parties involved. It did not resolutely cater to peace, as an over-shooting strategy would have done.

Third, the entire peace 'making' effort was undermined by latent leadership problems. Indeed, the European state and the U.S. were repeatedly in strong opposition in their views on the further proceeding in the Balkans. The examples are numerous, but a simple one suffices here: In the early conflict phase, the U.S. insisted on the maintenance of a Yugoslav union. James Baker, then Secretary of State, went on record to not recognize any unilateral secession. Some European states, however, recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. These incompatible signaling of international intent undermined the credibility of its actions. More importantly, it showed Bosnian factions (especially the Bosniak majority) that statehood could be sought by violence.

10. Conclusions

This thesis attempted to inquire into the roles, modes and use of coercion by third parties in times of international and non-international conflict. To do so, it was necessary to describe and analyze the international system, first. Part two of the essay then inquired deeper into the application of and specific requirements for successful coercive interventions. The research paper frequently referred to the example of the Yugoslav disintegration process of the early 1990s, which was also briefly outlined in part three. A series of lessons can be deducted from the findings, which pertain either to the construction of the collective security system, or the hands-on application of coercion in times of crisis.

10.1 The international system

Although the readings on coercion in international politics are abundant, it appears that the shortcomings of conflict resolution in the modern era has rarely been linked to the very structure of the international system. This thesis tentatively attempted to bridge this gap. Both a positive and a negative lesson derive from this analysis. On the positive side, sovereignty has indeed been pierced by the international security mechanism. This is an important step towards the elevation of the rights of man over the rights of governments. “Sovereignty [...] carries with it primary responsibilities for states to protect persons and property and to discharge the functions of government adequately within their territories.”²⁰³ This responsibility aspect, and the ‘violence of non-intervention’²⁰⁴ have been neglected for too long.

Yet, despite these advances, the international security system remains flawed. The distorted composition, the twisted decision-making process, and the discretionary power of the Security Council to seize situations at its gusto, which make the collective security system incapable of casting a credible and efficient deterrent against non-state conflicts. To a certain extent this inefficiency also derives from conflicting state-centered approach to international relations, and especially international security theory. There are a number of reforms, which would remedy at least parts of these shortcomings. Institutional reforms of the UN, but also wider inclusion of international actors is desired and required.

10.2 Coercion on the policy level

On the policy level, there are a variety of tools available for conflict resolution. This particular essay only focused on coercive tools. Without any doubt, non-coercive might more often than not be the better, and certainly the preferred, way for dispute settlement. Yet there

²⁰³ *Op. cit.*: Hugo Slim, *International Humanitarianism’s Engagement with Civil War in the 1990’s: A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory*, p8.

²⁰⁴ *Op. cit.*: Jarat Chopra, *Peace Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority*, 198.

are situation in which non-coercion fails, and when forceful interventions are necessary. The policy level analysis highlighted a number of important conclusions.

Because of its one-way characteristic, coercion may be a tempting, though supposedly rapid, tool for conflict resolution. Yet once coercion is being used, inevitable a moment will come up when the so-appropriated autonomy of actors must be relinquished and transitioned back into the hands of the targeted actor. “Reconciliation in post-conflict societies cannot be imported from the outside.”²⁰⁵ This is one of many, but a particularly crucial limitation of the use of coercion in international affairs. The durability of its effects is far from unclear. It depends on a variety of requirements which can be traced back not only to the conduct of intervention, but also to its very authorization. Post-intervention proceeding inevitably returns powers back to the targeted actors, and so re-create interactions based on two-way processes. Finally, there are not only considerable moral questions involved in the use of coercion, its very success is also very hard to assess objectively.

10.3 The way ahead

Some further proceedings are clear from this essay, some are highly complicated. There is a need for reform on the international level and a restructuring of the international security concepts. The confusing concepts of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and pre-emptive strikes should be disentangled and prevented from re-occurring. In the same token, the UN system should be restructured and reinforced, and any type of international actor bound into a system of accountability and responsibility. There should be a duty to act on the international level. If ethnic cleansing and genocide happens in the late 20th century, despite all the progresses internationalists think having achieved, then Burke’s Manichean statement is more applicable then ever.²⁰⁶ To make the ‘good men do something’, however, requires more than

²⁰⁵ Luc Huyse, “The International Community, “ from the *IDEA homepage*, accessed April 15, 2004, available from: <http://www.idea.int>, p163.

²⁰⁶ In the introduction.

an obligation to act. There should be inquiries into the identification and codification of objective benchmarks prove of abuse.

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| European Union | http://www.europa.eu.int |
| Freedom House | http://www.freedomhouse.org |
| ICISS (Canada) | http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp |
| Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy | http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/ |
| SPHERE Project | http://www.sphereproject.com |
| United Nations Organization | http://www.un.org |
| -- International Law Commission | http://www.un.org/law/ilc |
| U.S. State Department Country Profile | http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/mk |

Appendices

Appendix 1: Chronology of Yugoslav disintegration²⁰⁷

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| 1989 | |
| Jan 1 | Spain assumes the EC presidency |
| Jul 1 | France assumes the EC presidency |
| 1990 | |
| Jan 1 | Ireland assumes the EC presidency |
| Jan 11-14 | Slovene and Croatian delegations abandon the Yugoslav Communist Congress |
| Jan 24 | Heavy riots in Kosovo over revocation of autonomies by Serbia |
| Feb 1-2 | JNA re-establishes law and order in Kosovo |
| Feb 14 | Croatia's Parliament legalizes the multiparty system |
| Feb 21 | BiH legalizes the multiparty system |
| Feb 24-25 / May | Franjo Tudjman elected and re-appointed President of Croatia |
| Apr 8 | First multiparty elections in Slovenia won by the DEMOS party. Presidential elections won by Milan Kucan |
| Apr 22 / May 6 | First multiparty elections in Croatia won by the CDU party |
| Jun 29 | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) established to provide financial support to Central and Eastern Europe countries |
| Jul 1 | Italy assumes the EC presidency |
| Jul 2 | Slovene Parliament adopts the "Declaration on the Sovereignty of the State" Kosovar MPs of Albanian origin proclaim independent Republic of Kosovo |
| Jul 20 | Serbia legalizes multiparty system |
| Jul 25 | SDS party establishes the Serbian National Council as authority of Serbs in Croatia |
| Aug 8 | SFYR legalizes multiparty system |
| Aug 19 | Serbs in Croatia vote for independence of the Krajina |
| Oct 1 | Serbs in Croatia proclaim independence and establish the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina |
| Nov 11 / 25 | First multiparty elections in Macedonia won by the VMRO-DPMNE parties |
| Nov 18 | First multiparty elections in BiH. Outcome proportional to ethnic composition of the society |
| Nov 19-21 | Charter of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) signed |
| Dec 9 | First multiparty elections in Serbia and Montenegro won by the socialist parties Serb presidential elections won by Slobodan Milosevic |
| Dec 22 | New Croatian constitution disqualifies minorities as national constituencies |
| Dec 23 | Referendum for independence accepted in Slovenia |
| 1991 | |
| Jan 1 | Luxemburg assumes the EC presidency |
| Jan 9 | SFRY orders dismantlement of non-regular forces in Yugoslavia |
| Jan 25 | Macedonian parliament adopts declaration of independence |
| Jan 27 | Macedonian parliament elects Kiro Gligorov President of Macedonia |
| Feb 8 | Council of Europe delegation visits Yugoslavia: If the SFRY wished to join the Council it had to peacefully resolve its crisis and hold multiparty elections for the SFRY parliament |
| Feb 28 | Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina declares intention to remain in Yugoslavia |
| Mar 2-3 | JNA intervenes in Serb controlled Croatian regions after armed clashes between Serbo-Croats and Croatian police forces |
| Mar 6 | Slovene parliament decides moratorium on sending Slovenian draftees to JNA |
| Mar 21 | The presidents of the Yugoslav republics agree on holding presidential meetings for discussion of the form and content of the SFRY |
| Mar 26 | EC demands dialogue on Yugoslavia's future |
| Mar 28 | First Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Split |
| Apr 4 | Second Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Belgrade |
| Apr 11 | Third Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Brdo |
| Apr 18 | Fourth Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Ohrid |

²⁰⁷ *Op. cit.*: European Union, "The History of the European Union," from the *European Union homepage*; Balkan Repository Project, "Yugoslav Crisis January 1990 - December 1995," from the *Balkan Repository Project homepage*, accessed January 24, 2004, available from: <http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/chronology/index.html>

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|-------------|--|
| Apr 29 | Fifth Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Cetinje |
| May 2 | Armed conflicts breaks out between Serbo-Croats and Croatian police forces |
| May 5 | Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, calls on citizens to confront the JNA Kiro Gligorov, president of Macedonia, declares secession in case Slovenia and Croatia secede |
| May 10 | SFRY parliamentary session interrupted as republics question Serb appointment of Kosovar representative |
| May 19 | Croatian referendum on independence approved by a large majority, boycotted by Serbo-Croats |
| Jun 6 | Muslim National Council of Sandzak, Serbia, established by Sulejman Ugljanin |
| Jun 19 | Sixth and final Yugoslav presidential meeting held in Stojcevac Opening session of the CSCE held in London, call for democracy and human rights protection in Yugoslavia |
| Jun 21 | US Secretary of State Baker states that the US won't recognize unilateral secessions |
| Jun 25 | Slovenia declares independence Croatia declares independence Serbo-Croats of eastern Croatia establish the Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem |
| Jun 27 | Armed conflict between Slovenia and the JNA breaks out |
| Jul 1 | The Netherlands assume the EC presidency |
| Jul 2 | Armed conflict between Slovenia and the JNA ends |
| Jul 5 | European Council condemns use of force in Yugoslavia |
| Jul 7 | EC sponsored meeting between heads of Yugoslav states leads to the Brioni Agreement which provides for a cease-fire and a moratorium on secession |
| Jul 9 | EC parliament declares to not recognize unilateral secessions |
| Jul 15 | Occidental Economic Summit held in London. Participants agree on annual meetings with the USSR and define a support plan for economic support |
| Jul 29 | JNA withdraws from Slovenia |
| Aug 22 | Failed coup in the USSR |
| Sep 7 | Opening of the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague Macedonia votes for "independence and possible association with Yugoslavia" |
| Sep 17 | Lord Carrington brokers ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia |
| Sep 25 | UNSC declares developments in Yugoslavia threat to peace and imposes sanctions on military materiel |
| Oct 8 | After the expiration of the Brioni Agreement, Slovenia and Croatia declare independence |
| Oct 15 | Mikhail Gorbachev brokers ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia Croatian CDU party of Bosnia and Bosniak PDA party declare sovereign BiH after representatives of the Serbian SDP party left the session |
| Oct 25 | Serbs in BiH constitute own parliament |
| Oct 29 | EC threatens sanctions in case of use of military force |
| Nov 6 | EC establishes an European Humanitarian Aid Office |
| Nov 8 | EC suspends trade agreement with Yugoslavia and Yugoslav membership in the PHARE development program |
| Nov 9 | SFRY requests UN peacekeepers |
| Nov 9-10 | Serbs in Bosnia approve referendum for continuation of federal Yugoslavia |
| Nov 23 | Carrington and Vance broker ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia |
| Nov 27 | UNSC authorizes a UN peacekeeping mission for Yugoslavia |
| Dec 10 | First opinion of the Badinter Commission on State Recognition published |
| Dec 17 | EC declare criteria for state recognition |
| Dec 18 | SFRY rejects the EC declaration as intervention in internal affairs |
| Dec 19 | Republic of Srpska Krajina established, Milan Babic named president |
| Dec 23 | Germany recognizes independence of Slovenia and Croatia |
| Dec 24 | The Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem joins the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina |
| Dec 25 | Mikhail Gorbachev resigns as President of the USSR |
| 1992 | |
| Jan 1 | Portugal assumes the EC presidency |
| Jan 2 | Vance brokers ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia |
| Feb 2-22 | All parties accept Vance Peace Plan including parliament but excluding government of the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina. Schism of power leads to double-rule |

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|-------------|--|
| Feb 14 | EC International Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina opened in Sarajevo |
| Feb 21 | UNSC deploys UNPROFOR under command of General Satish Nambiar of India |
| Feb 26 | Parliament of the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina elects Goran Hadzic new president |
| Mar 1 | Referendum for BiH independence approved, although boycotted by Serb minorities |
| Mar 17 | Montenegro votes for incorporation into the Common State of Yugoslavia (with Serbia) |
| Mar 17 | Coutilhero Plan signed by Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian faction of Bosnia, proclaiming independent and unified Bosnia with three national constituencies |
| Mar 22 | Slovenia and Croatia become members of CSCE |
| Mar 26 | JNA withdraws from Macedonia |
| Apr 7 | US recognizes BiH in its existing borders |
| May 19 | JNA withdraws from BiH |
| May 22 | Slovenia, Croatia and BiH admitted to the UN |
| May 31 | Parliamentary elections in the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) won by socialists |
| Jun 11 | EC parliament recognizes dissolution of the SFRY, disqualifies FRY as successor to SFRY |
| Jun 20 | Bosniak BiH declares state of war |
| Jun 21 | Croatia launches offensive against the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina |
| Jun 30 | UNSC condemns Croatian offensive, demands withdrawal |
| Jul 1 | The UK assumes the EC presidency |
| Jul 4 | Badinter Commission rejects FRY as successor of SFRY |
| Jul 11 | NATO-led sea blockade of Yugoslavia becomes operational |
| Aug 2 | Franjo Tudjman re-elected president of Croatia |
| Aug 13 | USNC condemns ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia |
| Aug 25 | International conference on the former Yugoslavia opens in London |
| Sep 3 | Permanent Committee of the UN and EC for Yugoslavia established in Geneva |
| Sep 23 | UNGA suspends FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) from UN membership |
| Oct 7 | EC Commission grants emergency aid to the victims of war in Yugoslavia |
| Oct 9 | UNSC imposes flight-ban over Bosnia |
| Nov 16 | UNSC imposes further sanctions against FRY |
| Nov | William J. Clinton elected US President |
| Dec 6 | Milan Kucan re-elected Slovene president |
| Dec 18 | UNGA calls on Chapter VII actions against FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in case of their continued support to Serbian forces in BiH |
| Dec 20 | Republica Srpska changes the structure of the executive, elects Radovan Karadzic president |
| | FRY federal, republican and local election won by socialist parties. Slobodan Milosevic re-elected president of Serbia |
| 1993 | |
| Jan 1 | Denmark assumes the EC presidency |
| Jul 1 | Belgium assumes the EC presidency |
| Nov 1 | Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty") enters into force, EC becomes part of EU |
| 1994 | |
| Jan 1 | Greece assumes the EU presidency |
| Jul 1 | Germany assumes the EU presidency |
| 1995 | |
| Jun 1 | Spain assumes the EU presidency |
| Mar 20-21 | EU Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe signed in Paris |
| Jul 1 | France assumes the EU presidency |
| Dec 14 | Dayton Peace Agreement signed in Paris |
| Dec 20-21 | Brussels donor conference for the reconstruction of BiH |
| 1996 | |
| Jan 1 | Italy assumes the EU presidency |
| Jun 1 | Ireland assumes the EU presidency |
| Jun 10 | Slovenia formally applies to join the EU |
| Nov | US President William J. Clinton elected for second term |
| Dec 4-5 | London Conference on implementing peace agreements in Yugoslavia |

Appendix 2: Abbreviations specific to Yugoslavia

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| BiH | Bosnia-Herzegovina |
| CDU | Croatian Democratic Union |
| CP | Communist Party |
| CPSU | Communist Party of the Soviet Union |
| CPY | Communist Party of Yugoslavia |
| DEMOS | Democratic Party of Slovenia |
| EC | European Communities |
| EU | European Union |
| FRY | Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) |
| FYROM | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| ICJ | International Court of Justice |
| ICTY | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia |
| ILC | International Law Commission of the United Nations |
| JNA | People's Yugoslav Army |
| KLA (<i>UÇK</i> , Kosovo) | Kosovo Liberation Army (<i>Ushtria Çlirimtare E Kosoves</i>) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NLA (<i>UÇK</i> , Macedonia) | National Liberation Army (<i>Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare</i>) |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe |
| PDA | Bosniak Muslim Party for Democratic Action |
| SDP | Serb Democratic Party of Serbs in Bosnia |
| SDS | Serb Democratic Party of Serbs in Croatia |
| SFRY | Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR (<i>SSSR</i>) | Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (<i>Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh</i>) |
| VMRO-DPMNE | United Macedonian opposition parties |

Appendix 3: Actors and affiliations in Yugoslavia

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| ASPIN, Leslie | US Secretary of Defence, 1993-1994 |
| BABIC, Milan | Leader of Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina, the state of the Serbs in Croatia, 1991-1992 |
| BAKER, James A. | US Secretary of State, 1989-1992 |
| BOBAN, Mate | Political leader of <i>Herceg-Bosnia</i> , the Croatian Republic in Bosnia |
| BULATOVIC, Momir | President of Montenegro, 1992-2000 |
| BOUTROS GHALI, B. | Secretary-General, UN, 1992-1996 |
| BROZ-TITO, Josip | Called "Tito", President of the federal government, ruler of Yugoslavia until his death in 1980 |
| BUSH, George H. B. | President, US, 1989-1993 |
| CARRINGTON, Peter | Co-Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Secretary-General, NATO, 1984-1988 |
| CHERNOMYRDIN, V. | Prime Minister of Russia, 1992-1997 |
| CHENEY, Richard B. | US Secretary of Defence, 1989-1993 |
| CHRISTOPHER, Warren | US Secretary of State, 1993-1997 |
| CLAES, Willy | Secretary-General, NATO, 1994 -1995 |
| CLINTON, William J. | President, US, 1993-2001 |
| COULTIHERO, Jose | Chairman of the EC International Conference on BiH |
| DELORS, Jacques | President, EU Commission, -1994 |
| DE CUELLAR, Javier P. | Secretary-General, UN, 1982-1991 |
| DE MICHELIS, Gianni | Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italy, 1989-1992 |
| DE POOS, Jacques | Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 1984-1995 |
| EAGLEBURGER, L. S. | US Secretary of State, 1992-1993 |
| GLIGOROV, Kiro | President of Macedonia, 1991-1997 |
| GORBACHEV, Mikhail S. | General Secretary of the Politburo, 1985-1991 |
| GREGURIC, Franjo | Prime Minister of Croatia |
| HADZIC, Goran | President of the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina, 1992- |

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| HÄNSCH, Klaus | President, EU Parliament, 1994-1999 |
| HALILOVIC, Sefer | Bosniak military leader, 1990s |
| IZETBEGOVIC, Alija | President of Bosnia, 1990-, Bosniak political leader |
| JOULWAN, George A. | SACEUR, NATO, 1993-1997 |
| JOVIC, Borislav | President of the SFRY, early 1991 |
| KARADZIC, Radovan | Leader of the <i>Republika Srpska</i> , the Serb Republic in Bosnia |
| KIRYENKO, Sergey | Prime Minister of Russia, 1997-1998 |
| KOSTIC, Branko | President of the SFRY, late 1991-1992 |
| KUCAN, Milan | President of Slovenia, 1990-1998 |
| LONCAR, Budimir | SFRY Minister of Foreign Affairs, -1991 |
| MAKSIC, Milivoje | SFRY Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1991-1992 |
| MARKOVIC, Ante | SFRY Prime Minister, -1991 |
| MAZOWIECKI, Tadeusz | UN Special Envoy, 1992- |
| McCANZIE, Louis | UNPROFOR commander in BiH, 1992- |
| MESIC, Stipe | Prime Minister of Croatia, 1990, president of the SFRY, 1990-1991 |
| MILOSEVIC, Slobodan | President of Serbia, 1990-2000 |
| MITROVIC, Aleksander | SFRY Prime Minister, 1991-1992 |
| MLADIC, Ratko | Military leader of the <i>Republika Srpska</i> , the Serb Republic in Bosnia |
| NAMBIAR, Satish | UNPROFOR military commander, 1992- |
| OVEN, David | Co-Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992- |
| PANIC, Milan | Prime Minister of FRY, 1992- |
| PERRY, William J. | US Secretary of Defence, 1994-1997 |
| RASKOVIC, Jovan | Leader of the Serb minority party SDS in Croatia, -1992 |
| SANTER, Jacques | President, EU Commission, 1994- |
| SILAJDZIC, Haris | Bosniak Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| SOLANA, Javier | Secretary-General, NATO, 1995-1999 |
| SULEJMAN, Ugljanin | President of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, supreme body of the Muslim community in Serbia |
| TORNBERY, Cedric | Head of civil affairs components of UNPROFOR, 1992- |
| TUDJMAN, Franjo | President of Croatia, 1990-1999 |
| VAN DEN BROEK, Hans | Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 1982-1992 |
| VANCE, Cyrus Roberts | UN Special Envoy to Yugoslavia, 1991-1992, Co-Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992-, US Secretary of State, 1977-1980 |
| WOERNER, Manfred | Secretary-General, NATO, 1988-1994 |
| YELTSIN, Boris N. | President of Russia, 1991-1999 |