

**AN EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERESTS BEHIND  
UNITED STATES POLITICAL SUPPORT OF ISRAEL**

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis

**Submitted by Osnat Lupesko-Persky**

October 2006


© 2007 Osnat Lupesko-Persky

<http://fletcher.tufts.edu>



**THE FLETCHER SCHOOL**

TUFTS UNIVERSITY



## **An Examination and Analysis of the Interests behind United States Political Support of Israel**

October 2006

**Submitted by:**

Osnat Lupesko-Persky (ID: 991056105)

**Submitted to:**

Professor Andrew Hess



This paper is submitted as thesis for Master in International Law and Diplomacy, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, October 2006

## Table of Contents

---

Table of Contents.....	2	Analysis of core events which led to American denunciation of Israel based on national and strategic interests.....	47
Introduction .....	4	US Foreign Policy Towards Israel Post Cold War .....	64
Mearsheimer and Walt’s claims that construct the piece.....	5	A New World order, American foreign policy and Israel’s role ....	64
Understanding Realism According to Mearsheimer and Walt.....	7	Core political events which led to American support of Israel based on American national and strategic interests post Cold-War.....	73
The counter-arguments to Mearsheimer and Walt’s claims .	10	Core political events which led to conflict between the US and Israel based on American national and strategic interests .....	91
US Foreign Policy towards Israel during the Cold War .....	17	Analysis of core events which led to American denunciation of Israel based on national and strategic interests.....	92
When did the actual diplomatic, financial and economic support begin? .....	17	Conclusion .....	100
Identifying US National and Strategic Interests in the Middle East During the Cold War .....	23	Appendix A: Interview Summaries .....	104
Core political events which led to American support of Israel based on American national and strategic interests .....	27	Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer .....	104
Analysis of core events which led to American support of Israel based on national and strategic interests .....	29	Ambassador Martin Indyk (PhD) .....	106
The 1973 war and the American pressure on Israel .....	32	Mr. Chuck Freilich (PhD) .....	109
The “Booming” of American-Israeli military and strategic cooperation during the 1980s .....	37	Mr. Steve Grossman .....	112
Core political events which led America to denounce Israel based on American national and strategic interests .....	45	Bibliography .....	116

**Author's Note:**

I'd like to extend my outmost gratitude to Chen (Zak) Kane (PhD) for helping me shape and form this paper and to my husband and friend Eldad Persky, for helping in the creation of this paper. I take full responsibility for any mistakes found in the paper.

Osnat Lupesko-Persky

---

## Introduction

---

This research is originated from the need and will to respond to some of the allegedly conclusive claims made by Harvard University Professor Stephen M. Walt and Chicago University Professor John. J. Mearsheimer (hereinafter: “*Mearsheimer and Walt*”) in their working paper titled “**The ‘Israel Lobby’ and U.S. Foreign Policy**”<sup>1</sup> (hereinafter: “*the piece*”). The piece was published in two versions: one through Kennedy School of Government’s website and the other through the London Review of Books. I will examine the version as was published by KSG and not the as was published by LRB<sup>2</sup>.

If this piece’s idea can be summarized in one sentence, I would define it as “American foreign policy towards Israel and the Middle East is influenced by the ‘Israel Lobby’ to such an extent that it *diverts* America’s foreign policy from following its true, *realistic* national interests”.

Following its publishing, the piece which was questioned by its intent, methodology, claims and ideas, had stimulated many reactions - both harsh critique as well as supportive ones. Much of the grave critique focused on the methodology the researchers used to construct their ideas, as well as the alleged political ‘anti-Israeli’, at times ‘anti-Semitic’, ideas which stem from Mearsheimer and Walt’s assertions<sup>3</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (hereinafter: “*Mearsheimer and Walt*”), *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, March 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Online link to the KSG version - <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011>  
Online link to the LRB version - [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html)

<sup>3</sup> Substantial criticism regarding the methodology and political conceptions was made by Harvard Law Professor Alan Darshowitz, “*Debunking the Newest - and Oldest - Jewish Conspiracy: A Reply to Mearsheimer-Walt “Working Paper*”, which was published by KSG on April 2006. Online link to Prof. Alan Darshowitz paper - [http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working\\_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf)

This paper will *not* focus on the methodology, the issue of morality and the political ideas that construct the piece, as these were extensively discussed and dealt with thus far.

Rather, this paper will confront the preliminary fundamental assertion which was made by Mearsheimer and Walt at the beginning of the piece, and which they did not seriously substantiate although its importance. However, to put things in order and prevent confusion, I will shortly describe the basic claims that the piece is constructed of (i.e. 'the logic') and later specify which assertion I am challenging in this paper, how and why.

### ***Mearsheimer and Walt's claims that construct the piece***

The outline in which the piece is constructed upon is quite coherent, and one can easily identify Mearsheimer and Walt's focal claims that are built one based on the other. Following are the focal assertions that are made:

1. *"The US national interests should be the primary object of American foreign policy"* and this rule applies for the US foreign policy in the Middle East as well<sup>4</sup> - both researchers are well known as, and base their specific claim on a *realist* view, according to which great powers seek to maximize their share of world power in order to become the hegemon in the international arena<sup>5</sup>. The way for the U.S to reach this objective, as asserted in the piece, is by following its own national (security, strategic, economic, etc) interests.

---

<sup>4</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, *supra* note 1, at p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> The description is based on John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, c2001. Introduction Chapter X. In his book, Mearsheimer introduces his "offensive realism" theory which is realist in nature and concludes that the pursuit of hegemon power makes powerful states more prone to war.

2. *The US is giving Israel non-proportional and unconditional support*<sup>6</sup> - the researchers examine the different aspects of support the US has given to Israel starting from the Yom Kippur War (October 1973): financial, diplomatic, conflict resolution/negotiation and militaristic, and the extent of the support.
3. *While during the Cold War Israel may have been a strategic asset*<sup>7</sup> *today Israel is not a vital strategic asset and there is no compelling strategic or moral case for US backing/support, rather, Israel is a strategic liability*<sup>8</sup> -
  - a. Over 3 pages, Mearsheimer and Walt explain how Israel is a not a strategic asset but a strategic liability in the US foreign relations in the Middle East and world-wide. Moreover, they claim that support for Israel served as an additional motivation to conduct terror attacks against the US. Thus, the researchers conclude that while support for Israel in the Cold War could be explained by U.S interests at the time, these interests no longer apply today and Israel, realistically, is a mere liability.
  - b. Following Walt and Measheimer conclude that there is no *moral* basis for supporting Israel - one of the aspects they refer to under the moral category is the *democratic aspect*, although a democratic issue does not necessarily have to be considered as a moral issue. Over less than a page they claim that the Israeli democratic principals do not align with

---

<sup>6</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, *supra* note 1, at pp. 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, at p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 4-6.

American values<sup>9</sup>. They also do not explain why they categorize democracy as a moral aspect and not a strategic one<sup>10</sup>.

4. *Conclusion A: the current US foreign policy support for Israel conflicts with American national interests and basically harms the US in the Middle East and World wide - as Israel is a strategic burden in the war on terror and the broader US effort to deal with rogue states.*<sup>11</sup> In other words, *the US is not following its own interests but Israel's interests.*
5. *Conclusion B: this unconstrained illogical foreign policy support is explainable only by attributing the support to the pressure made by the 'Israel Lobby' in the US - "were it not for the Lobby's ability to manipulate the American political system, the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is today"*<sup>12</sup>. In other words, the two claim that the *'Israel Lobby' distorts American Foreign Policy to such a degree that it currently contradicts and jeopardizes U.S. interests*<sup>13</sup>.

### ***Understanding Realism According to Mearsheimer and Walt***

In order to have a better understanding of the perspective's basis from which Mearsheimer and Walt draw their assertions and conclusions, a short description and examination of '**Offensive Realism**', a political school of thought both scholars are considered as prominent members of, is in order.

---

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*, at p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> As will be examined further in the paper, the 'Democracy' aspect is not automatically regarded as a moral one, rather as an aspect that can be considered both under *strategic* and moral issues.

<sup>11</sup> John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *Unrestricted Access - What the 'Israel Lobby' wants, it too often gets*, in *Foreign Policy Journal*, July/August 2006, pp. 57-58. In their *Foreign Policy* article, Mearsheimer and Walt repeat the focal point made in their piece.

<sup>12</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, *supra* note 1, at p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> As concluded by Dennis Ross, *The Mind-set Matters-Foreign Policy is shaped by leaders and events, not lobbies*; *Foreign Policy Journal*, July-August 2006, pp. 60-61.



The term 'Offensive Realism' which was determined by Mearsheimer in his book "*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*" (published 2001)<sup>14</sup> means that great powers seek to maximize their share of world power and thus are especially prone to war<sup>15</sup> as each power seeks to become the hegemon, i.e. the only great power in the system<sup>16</sup>. Although the US had exited the Cold War period as the *only* super-power in the world, the fact that it still maintains its forces in Asia and Europe is the proof that the realistic concept is 'alive and kicking' claims Mearsheimer. The premise of offensive realism relies on the following three core 'realism' beliefs<sup>17</sup>:

- 1) Realists view *states as the principal actors* in world politics, mainly great powers, as these states dominate and shape international politics and thus cause the deadliest wars<sup>18</sup>.
- 2) Realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their *external environment* and not by internal characteristics, i.e. there is no "good" and "bad" states that depend on culture/politics<sup>19</sup>.
- 3) Realists hold that *calculations about power* are what dominate states' thinking<sup>20</sup>.

Based on these core beliefs Mearsheimer determines that it is a self-help world and concludes that states operating in it almost always act according to *their own self-*

---

<sup>14</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, *supra* Note 5.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.*, at pp. X-XI.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*, at p. 1 and p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.*, at pp.17-18.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*, at p. 17 and p. 361.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.*, at p. 18.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.*, at p. 18.

*interests* and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states or to the interests of the international community<sup>21</sup>.

Walt shares the same realist perspective, as evident in his writing, according to which “America’s economic, military, and ideological power is the taproot of its *international influence* and the ultimate guarantor of its *security*. Anyone who thinks the United States should try to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or defend a particular ally must start by acknowledging that *America’s ability to do any of these things depends first and foremost upon its power*”<sup>22</sup>.

As evident in both researchers’ writings, together<sup>23</sup> and separately, the implementation of seeking power is done and *should* be done carefully, as super powers weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits<sup>24</sup>. In other words, only when the *vital interests* of the power state are under threat, it makes sense for the state to use force<sup>25</sup>. And how can a state determine when those are at risk? For that Mearsheimer answers that “the trick for a sophisticated power ‘maximizer’ is to figure out when to raise and when to fold”<sup>26</sup>.

This short examination of the ‘offensive realist’ perspective can help the reader understand the foundations for Mearsheimer and Walt perception of international

---

<sup>21</sup> *Id.*, at p. 33.

<sup>22</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *In the National Interest - A new grand strategy for American foreign policy*, BOSTON REVIEW A POLITICAL AND LITERARY FORUM (date unpublished), available at: <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html>

<sup>23</sup> John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *Keeping Saddam in a Box*, An additional article, New York Times Op-Ed, 2.2.2003. This is an additional article written by Mearsheimer and Walt which reflects their realist perspective.

<sup>24</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, *supra* note 5, at p. 37

<sup>25</sup> As concluded in Stephen M. Walt’s Boston Review article, *supra* note 22: “The final option is *offshore balancing*, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests”.

<sup>26</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, *supra* note 5, at p. 40.

affairs in general and America's foreign affairs in particular. This perception serves as the basis of *Conclusion A*, as mentioned above (p. 3), which determines that the US has no vital interest in supporting Israel and moreover, supporting Israel harms US vital interests.

As apparent from the piece, Mearsheimer and Walt regarded *Conclusion A* as obvious, as they did not broadly examine and research the factors leading to their conclusion but mostly stated it as an obvious fact - they did not consider the changing US foreign policy to Israel during the Cold War, as they did not research the different influential factors, agendas, different political situations and more at present. Such an in-depth research, which is, in my opinion, necessary in order to get from *Conclusion A* to *Conclusion B*, is lacking in their academic piece.

### ***The counter-arguments to Mearsheimer and Walt's claims***

In this paper, I challenge *Conclusion A* and hence *claim 3*, which mainly assert that the US 'foreign policy behavior' *does not* follow its own national and strategic interests but rather operates to achieve Israeli interests (*Conclusion A*). As mentioned above (p. 3), this conclusion relies on the presumption that there are *no viable American interests* for supporting Israel today, if not the contrary i.e. that the national interests today lead to *not supporting* Israel<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>27</sup> As reflected in John J. Mearsheimer, *Hearts and Minds*, The National Interest, No. 69 Fall 2002, pp. 13-16. online version: <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0030.pdf>  
Mearsheimer wrote on p. 16: "If Israel refuses to end its occupation, *America should cut off diplomatic and economic support to Israel*. In short, the United States either has to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or distance itself from Israel."

I will not discuss the quality, extent and worth of the American aid to Israel per-se, nor will I deal with *conclusion B* - which is the 'Israel Lobby' dominance and affect in foreign affairs, for mainly two reasons:

- a) Due to the nature of this paper, a thesis, I should not over-extend my research to more than one main topic. Dealing with more than one issue will have a direct effect on the quality of this academic work and its in-depth analysis.
- b) As mentioned above, much have been said, written and discussed about the question of the impact of the 'Israel Lobby', as it was the main issue of the piece<sup>28</sup>. However, not much has been said and written about Mearsheimer and Walt's preliminary assumptions regarding US interests and patterns of 'foreign affairs behavior'.

### Theoretical framework and tools of research

Throughout this paper, I intend to challenge Mearsheimer and Walt's described assertions about the non-existing U.S. interests with regards to Israel through the following hypotheses:

- 1) **My preliminary hypothesis is that US relations with Israel are shaped, managed and conducted based on America's own national and strategic interests in the Middle East and its global agenda.** Moreover, this relationship, which I assert changes from time to time and from issue to issue,

---

<sup>28</sup> For critique responses to the issue of the 'Israel Lobby' - see Alan Dershowitz, "*Debunking the Newest - and Oldest - Jewish Conspiracy: A Reply to Mearsheimer-Walt "Working Paper" supra note 3.* Additional responses: Aaron Friedberg, *An Uncivilized Argument: Claiming that the Lobby endangers America is irresponsible and wrong*, Foreign Policy Journal May/June 2006 pp. 59-60; Also:

is basically constructed and shaped by America's different administrations and their different perspective and agendas regarding U.S national and strategic interests, Israel and the Middle East<sup>29</sup>. In order to examine and prove my hypothesis I will make two sub-hypotheses:

**A) When the US supports Israel, past and present, it does so based on its own national and strategic interests and because the specific administration in charge assumes that it will benefit US interests;**

During both the Cold-War and post Cold War era, the US had supported Israel in situations in which the American administration foreign policy's agenda reflected at the support as *beneficial to the US*. My hypothesis is that this pattern of behavior was true in the Cold War period and is true today.

**B) When it does *not* align with its national and strategic interests, past and present, the US does *not* support Israel.** Moreover, when there is conflict of Israeli and US interests, the US tries to use its power and influence to align Israel with its interests. This, I claim, is true to both the Cold War period, where according to Mearsheimer and Walt Israel could be seen as a strategic asset<sup>30</sup>, and post Cold War era. The decision regarding conflicting interests and US response lies, de-facto, within the American administration and its foreign policy agenda.

---

<sup>29</sup> Denis Ross, *The Mind-set Matters-Foreign Policy is shaped by leaders and events, not lobbies* supra note 13, at p. 60.

<sup>30</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, supra note 1, at p. 4: "Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War" However also note that "Israel's strategic value during this period should not be overstated".

In order to examine the validity of my hypotheses I intend to analyze different periods and major political situations, in which America's foreign policy was brought to the test regarding Israel. My examination will be divided by the two hypotheses mentioned above (A and B) and in each chronologically by the scale of time - during the Cold War (1948-1991) and post Cold War era (1992-2006).

The situations presented as examples in this paper have been chosen on two bases:

1) *selectively* - based on research and writer's understanding of what is captured as major political situations which put into tests US foreign policy behavior and American national and strategic interests;

2) *interviewees* - people that interviewed for the paper who chose, based on their own experience and knowledge of US-Israeli relations and the Middle East, the exemplifying cases in which the US followed its national and strategic interests.

The Interviews were conducted with the following professionals from three different affiliations - the US Administration, the Israeli Government and AIPAC - all of which had valuable relevant experience in the US-Israel relations:

1) *Ambassador Martin Indyk* (PhD) - who served as United States Ambassador to the state of Israel in the years 1995-1997 and from 2000 to 2001; Ambassador Indyk also served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1997 to 2000. Ambassador Indyk now works as Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

2) *Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer* (PhD) - who served as United States Ambassador to the state of Israel in the years 2001-2005; Ambassador

Kurtzer also served as United States Ambassador to the state of Egypt in the years 1997-2001. In November 30, 2005, Ambassador Kurtzer was appointed Princeton University's first S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor in Middle East Policy Studies in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

- 3) Mr. Steven Grossman - who served as Chairperson of the National Democratic Committee (NDC) in the years 1997-1999 and served as president of American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) from 1992 to 1996.
- 4) Mr. Chuck Freilich (PhD) - who served as Israel's Deputy National Security Adviser for Foreign Affairs during the years 2000-2005, and as a Senior Analyst at the Israel Ministry of Defense in the years 1993-2000. Currently, Mr. Freilich is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center of International Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

By defining the national and strategic American interests that led America to support Israel or conflict with Israel - both in Cold War and today, and by examining the different political situations in which the different US administrations have followed America's interests, whether they aligned or did not align with Israel, I will try to identify what are the interests, establish the validity of these interests and by that, the validity of my preliminary hypothesis.

*Defining National and Strategic Interests*

Before starting the analytical part of this paper, a definition of *National Interests* and a definition of *Strategic Interests* is required. Determining and clarifying a definition that this paper will follow upon is required<sup>31</sup>. Moreover, although national and strategic interests are mentioned in this paper in 'one breath', each term has its own meaning;

**National interests** - According to Elizabeth Stephens<sup>32</sup>, the 'national interest' constitutes an aspect of foreign policy to which statesmen profess to attach great importance. The advancement of what is defined as the national interest, according to Stephens, forms the basic objective of foreign policy and is "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts." Thus, although the ambiguity of the definition and for her book's purposes, Stephens bases 'national interest' definition on the realist perspective that "*a state will use the resources at its disposal to try to guarantee what it regards as its security and well being*"<sup>33</sup>. However, a clear definition of the national interest requires *agreement on the nature and priority of values and objectives foreign policy should promote* and has to assume that *decision-makers behave rationally*<sup>34</sup>.

**Strategic interests** - According to Stephens, strategic interest approach looks at the *way states mobilize their military* and other such capabilities in support of their political goals. Examining the US, Stephens concludes that since the second World War, American decision makers have come to regard the Middle East as vital to their common perception of the strategic interests for three main reasons: 1) oil - as it

---

<sup>31</sup> In my opinion, after reviewing many of the writings, books and articles, there is general agreement as to what those interests are (i.e. security, intelligence, power, etc). The disagreement takes place regarding the *ways to achieve* those interests (i.e. support Israel, etc.)

<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel : The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton-Portland (2006).

<sup>33</sup> *Id*, at p. 22.

<sup>34</sup> *Id*, at p. 25.



pertains international stability; 2) Geopolitical importance of the region for great powers; 3) US commitment to the security and survival of Israel, the only parliamentary democracy in the region<sup>35</sup>.

I agree with Stephens's description of national interests and strategic interest as forming foreign policy. However, I find that strategic interests' role is more than "supporting political goals". Strategic interests' role is also in *enabling the realization of national interests*, which are the main interests. Thus, from one main national interest such as 'national security' stem many strategic interests, such as: 'good relations with Arab neighbors', 'stability in the Middle East', 'balance of powers', etc.

It is also important to note that Stephens considers security of democratic values as a main US strategic interest, unlike Walt, Mearsheimer and other scholars, who considered it part of the moral value<sup>36</sup>.

This paper will be based on the Stephens definitions of national and strategic interests, as described above.

---

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*, at p. 26.

<sup>36</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, Supra Note 1, at pp. 8-11.

---

## US Foreign Policy towards Israel during the Cold War

---

### ***When did the actual diplomatic, financial and economic support begin?***

Trying to trace the exact date and starting point of the alignment between US and Israeli interests is impossible. However, many writers note that although it might be expected, it was not started during the Holocaust, although there was a very strong moral basis to support the establishment of a Jewish state. As journalist Glenn Frankel notes:

*“All David Ben-Gurion wanted was 15 minutes of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s time. Israel’s founding father, one of the indomitable political leaders of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, came to Washington in December 1941 yearning to present the case for a Jewish state directly to the American president. He took a two-room suite at the old Ambassador Hotel at 14<sup>th</sup> and K for \$1,000 a month and cooled his heels for 10 weeks, writing letters and reports and making passes at Miriam Cohen, his attractive American secretary. But Ben-Gurion didn’t get the meeting. Not then, not ever. Not even a pair of presidential cuff links.”<sup>37</sup>*

Indeed, according to Elizabeth Stephens<sup>38</sup>, the response of the Roosevelt administration to the Jew’s desperate need for sanctuary outside Europe was one of virtual inaction. Despite the emergence of concrete evidence and eyewitness accounts of the Nazis wholesale murder of European Jewry, US officials either refused to believe what they were told or to act upon these accounts. In addition, during the early

---

<sup>37</sup> Glenn Frenkel, *A Beautiful Friendship? In search of the truth about the Israel lobby’s influence on Washington*, Washington Post, Sunday, July 16, 2006 available at: [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR10060712\\_01627.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR10060712_01627.html)

<sup>38</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel : The Role of Political Culture in Defining the ‘Special Relationship’*, *supra* note 32, at p. 14.

1940s Roosevelt assured King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia that he would take no action which is hostile to the Arab people<sup>39</sup>.

However, claims Stephens, the following Truman administration was more supportive of the idea of the creation of a Jewish state for moral reasons<sup>40</sup>. This support did not include, nevertheless, military or financial American support in 1948, the night following the Declaration of Independence when Israel was attacked by the armies of five Arab countries, as well as the Palestinians, and was under clear existential threat. As Karen Puschel (hereinafter: Puschel) notes in her book US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation:

*“When the US cast its vote in 1947 in support of the establishment of the state of Israel, neither Harry Truman nor any other key foreign policy figure in Washington believed that the tiny state would be of assistance in furthering American strategic objectives, indeed, opposition to Israel from within the foreign policy community was intense. It was largely based on the belief that US support for Israel would be harmful to key US strategic and political interests in the region - particularly, preserving western access to oil, maintaining friendly relations with the Arab world and countering the spread of communism.”*<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*

<sup>40</sup> *Id.*

<sup>41</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, The Jerusalem Post, Westview Press, p. 11.

The assumption that American foreign policy 'interest' in Israel came in a much later stage is also strengthened by data regarding US financial assistance to Israel starting from the year 1949. Following is the specified data of US *economic and military assistance* to Israel from 1949 to 1973 (including):<sup>42</sup>

Year	Total	Military Loan	Military Grant	Economic Loan	Economic Grant	FFP Loan	FFP Grant
1949	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1951	35.1	-	-	-	0.1	-	-
1952	86.4	-	-	-	63.7	-	22.7
1953	73.6	-	-	-	73.6	-	*
1954	74.7	-	-	-	54	-	20.7
1955	52.7	-	-	20	21.5	10.8	0.4
1956	50.8	-	-	10	14	25.2	1.6
1957	40.9	-	-	10	16.8	11.8	2.3
1958	85.4	-	-	15	9	34.9	2.3
1959	53.3	0.4	-	10	9.2	29	1.7
1960	56.2	0.5	-	15	8.9	26.8	4.5
1961	77.9	*	-	16	8.5	13.8	9.8
1962	93.4	13.2	-	45	0.4	18.5	6.8
1963	87.9	13.3	-	45	-	12.4	6
1964	37	-	-	20	-	12.2	4.8
1965	65.1	12.9	-	20	-	23.9	4.9
1966	126.8	90	-	10	-	25.9	0.9
1967	23.7	7	-	5.5	-	-	0.6


<sup>42</sup> Clyde R. Mark, chapter 1: *ISRAEL: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE*, In: *Israeli-United States Relationship*, Editor: John E.Lang, pp. 1-20 2006 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. at p. 18

The table specifies the American military and economic loans and grants to Israel. It does not specify assistance from other sources, such as Bank loan, Jewish refugee resettlement Grant and others. Those can be found at pp. 19-20 of the article.

<b>1968</b>	<b>106.5</b>	25	-	-	-	51.3	0.5
<b>1969</b>	<b>160.3</b>	85	-	-	-	36.1	0.6
<b>1970</b>	<b>93.6</b>	30	-	-	-	40.7	0.4
<b>1971</b>	<b>634.3</b>	<b>545</b>	-	-	-	55.5	0.3
<b>1972</b>	<b>430.9</b>	<b>300</b>	-	-	50	53.8	0.4
<b>1973</b>	<b>492.8</b>	<b>307.5</b>	-	-	50	59.4	0.4

<sup>43</sup>

Based on the data above, following is a visual presentation regarding the time the American financial assistance to Israel substantially increased -



As can be seen in the table above, US financial assistance to Israel was quite modest in the first decade of Israel's existence; The U.S. did not show unique interest in Israel, its needs and its existential threats. Moreover, according to Puschel, US was not

<sup>43</sup> Table signs: \* = less than \$50,000; - = None; FFP = Food for Peace

willing to be perceived as working with Israel, let alone allied with it<sup>44</sup>. A salient example of the conflicting interests was President's Eisenhower's opposition to Israel's 1956 Sinai campaign because of the potential escalation of Soviet threats and concerns that the US would lose influence in the increasingly Arab-nationalist Middle East if it was prescribed as supporting the colonialist ambitions of Britain and France with whom Israel was allied<sup>45</sup>.

Military loans/grants, non existent during that decade, began only during the 60s and intensified substantially only after Israel's decisive victory over the armies of three Arab countries in the 1967 Six Days War. This, in my mind, was when the initial realization took place, especially in America and in the Arab armies that were armed by the Soviet Union, regarding the extent of Israel's military strength and the fact that it will probably 'remain on the world's map' in the future. At this stage America realized that Israel can serve its interests as the only effective 'Soviet deterring' military power in the Middle East.

When asked to trace the emergence of American national interests in Israel, *Ambassador Kurtzer* referred to the Johnson's Administration<sup>46</sup>. William B. Quandt shares this view in his comprehensive book Peace Process - American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967. Based on Quandt , prior to the Six Days War, the U.S., headed by President Johnson, gave Israel a *red light* to initiate the war (i.e. "don't fire the first shot"), which later turned into a *yellow light* only (which literally meant: "be careful" and "*don't count on the United States if you get into trouble*"). In

---

<sup>44</sup> Karen Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra note* 41, at p. 12

<sup>45</sup> Lenore G. Martin, *Assessing the Impact of US-Israeli relations on the Arab World*, July 2003 Strategic Studies Institute, p. 8, available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB104.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> Based on a personal interview (via phone) with Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer (PhD) on 9.15.2006, 04:30pm, interview attached as *Annex 1*.

addition, Johnson refused to give Israel any guarantees to provide US military assistance if necessary to reopen the Tiran straits<sup>47</sup>. However, according to Quandt, American foreign policy had changed after the Six Days War and shifted from its long standing emphasis on maintaining the territorial integrity of each state (the *Eisenhower Doctrine* in 1956) to a more nuanced stance, emphasizing negotiated settlement (*land for peace exchange only. A*)<sup>48</sup>. Apart from that, the U.S. saw it as its direct interest in the ME to ensure that the military balance will not shift back against Israel<sup>49</sup>.

Ambassador Indyk traces the beginning of the alliance to the early 70's, and points to the *Jordanian crisis* (September 1970), as the focal point in the US-Israeli relations in which Israel assisted America to secure King Hussein in power by deterring Syrian military intervention in Jordan<sup>50</sup>. For Quandt, during this period US-Israeli relations were stronger than ever, as Israel has proven itself a valuable strategic ally to America<sup>51</sup>.

Mr. Freilich noted that an interest-based relationship started only later, during the Reagan administration, when Israel was viewed as a strategic asset and when mutual military and strategic cooperation has emerged<sup>52</sup>.

Thus, it seems that there is no one mutually agreed event in which The U.S.-Israel alliance emerged or U.S. approach towards Israel has transformed. Rather, it was a series of events in the Middle East that started as a moral commitment following the

---

<sup>47</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE PRESS, Washington D.C, at p. 40.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.*, at p. 41

<sup>49</sup> *Id.*, at p. 45

<sup>50</sup> Based on a personal interview (via phone) with Ambassador Martin Indyk (PhD), on 10.6.2006, 02:00pm, interview attached as *Annex 2*.

<sup>51</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 83

<sup>52</sup> Based on a personal interview with Mr. Chuck Freilich (PhD) on 9.27.2006, 04:00pm, interview attached as *Annex 3*.

Holocaust, continued with the aftermath of the Six Days War that gradually led the US to consider Israel as a strategic ally in the Middle East. Moreover, one can easily trace the change of discourse in American foreign policy as a direct result of the change in the Administrations' agendas and perspectives towards Israel, which started with the Johnson presidency.

In the following section, I will examine significant events that took place in the Middle during the Cold War. Some of these served American interests and thus instigated its support of Israel while other interests, conflicting to Israel's, have instigated American denunciation of Israel and at times political pressure. Additionally, I will examine incidents that took place during the same period, which negatively affected American interests and thus drove it to withdraw its support from and at times also denounce Israel. However, prior to that, an overview of American interests in the Middle East during that period is necessary.

### ***Identifying US National and Strategic Interests in the Middle East During the Cold War***

According to Quandt, any definition of national interests contains a *strong subjective element*, which applies to most foreign policy aspects<sup>53</sup>. This definition relies on the minds of those who are in power. Quandt further defines the American national interests related to the Arab-Israeli diplomacy during the Cold War:

- 1) **Containment of Soviet influence and limiting its influence in the Middle East** - Quandt asserts that most analysts until 1990 would have said that this was a major American national interest in the region. Many, if not all

---

<sup>53</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 12.



- researchers of the Cold War would agree with this definition. In addition, all of the interviewees had mentioned 'Soviet deterrence' as the major American interest in the Middle East region as well.
- 2) A strategic interest that derived from 'Soviet Containment' was defined by Puschel as '**developing countermeasures to Soviet weaponry and tactics**'<sup>54</sup>. During the cold war, and in particular post Six Days War (June, 1967) Israel had become a *laboratory* for developing militaristic *countermeasures to Soviet weaponry and to Soviet tactics*'<sup>55</sup>.
- 3) **Oil** - as Ambassador Indyk defined in his interview, the American interests in the Middle East at the time were "Israel, oil, oil and oil...".<sup>56</sup> The oil interest was not second to Soviet-deterrence. Throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s Middle East oil was readily available for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan. American companies made good profits, and threatened disruptions of supply had little effect. The conscious effort to keep Persian Gulf affairs separate from the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed to work quite well at that time. However, according to Quandt the picture had changed in the late 60's when the British withdrew their military presence from the Suez Canal<sup>57</sup>, which led to the creation of the following discussed interest. Ambassador Indyk emphasized the strategic interest the US had in maintaining good relations with oil-

---

<sup>54</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at p. 15.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.*

<sup>56</sup> Ambassador Indyk's interview, *supra* note 50.

<sup>57</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 12.

producing Arab states as a way to keep oil prices low. The overarching interest to control oil prices dictated the importance of the following interest<sup>58</sup>:

- 4) **Maintaining regional stability** - as mentioned was a strategic interest in order to *maintain low oil prices* (and in order not to endanger the American administration as well)<sup>59</sup>. Additionally, it was desirable to avoid instability that might open the doors to Soviet intervention in the region. In his interview, Mr. Grossman defined “promoting stability” as one of the major US interests in the region, not necessarily as means of securing low oil prices, but more as means of *maintaining balance of power*<sup>60</sup>. Securing regional stability was also instrumental in advancing an additional important interest, which will be discussed further: **Advancing the peace process in the Middle East**. This interest was intensively advanced by the various US administrations since Nixon’s.
- 5) **Special American commitment to Israel** - Quandt defines it as a national American concern and interest (which lasted also post Cold War); the US was an enthusiastic supporter of a Jewish state based on a clearly rooted sense of moral commitment to the survivors of the Holocaust, as well as due to an intense attachment of American Jews to Israel<sup>61</sup>. In my mind, this interest may be a necessary but insufficient variable in explaining U.S. support of Israel .Thus it may have been an early underlying factor intensifying a positive

---

<sup>58</sup> Ambassador Indyk’s interview, *supra note 50*.

<sup>59</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 12.

<sup>60</sup> Based on a personal interview (via phone) with Mr. Steve Grossman, on 9.17.2006, 11:00am, interview attached as *Annex 4*.

<sup>61</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at pp.12-13

approach towards Israel; however, it does not explain the long-term U.S. policies in the region. In addition, the American commitment to Israel was balanced by a desire to maintain American interests in surrounding Arab states (which was related to oil and regional stability). Although one could argue over the question of whether this interest should be seen as a national interest, this paper will not deal with the theoretical aspect of it. De-facto, most of the different American administrations during the cold war did define it as a national interest.

- 6) **Peace process in the Middle East as the yardstick that served the American national interests during the Cold War** - Quandt identifies it as the 'common yardstick' interest that *enabled the coexistence* of the following major American national interests in the Middle East: relationship with Soviet Union in the Middle East, access to inexpensive oil, and support for Israel (or-special American commitment to Israel). These interests were readily accepted by successive administrations - U.S. Presidential consistent thinking through the 70's and 80's was that promoting the peace process in the ME would resolve all conflicting interests<sup>62</sup>, and especially the interest of containment of the Soviet Union<sup>63</sup>.
- 7) An additional interest that was brought up by Ambassador Kurtzer, which is not necessarily relevant solely to the period of Cold War, is the American interest of **promotion of democratic ideas**, as it was part of American foreign-policy starting from the Wilson administration.

---

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*, at p.14.

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*

Although Ambassador Kurtzer referred to the spread of democracy as a *national interest*<sup>64</sup>, both Mr. Grossman and Mr. Freilich viewed it as a *moral consideration rather than a national interest*<sup>65</sup>.

**Core political events which led to American support of Israel based on American national and strategic interests**

Core events according to interviewees

The interviewees provided different, sometime even conflicting, examples for events when the US supported Israel based on its own national and strategic interests.

**Ambassador Indyk** defined the relationship during the Cold War as based on **mainly strategic and militaristic cooperation vis-à-vis the Soviet front and the Arab nationalist front (Syria and Egypt):**

- Ambassador Indyk gave, as a symbolic example, the Israeli-American strategic and militaristic cooperation in protecting King Hussein in the **Jordanian Crisis** (September 1970). The fact that Israel, based on US support, prevented one Arab country (Syria) from attacking another Arab country (Jordan), proved to the US that *when Israeli interests were not in jeopardy, Israel would follow and help promoting American interests.*
- **The Yom Kippur war** (10/1973 war) was another example, as it was Kissinger who was able to persuade Golda Meir (Israel's Prime Minister) not to conquer the Egyptian land and accept the cease fire.

---

<sup>64</sup> Ambassador Kurtzer's interview, *supra note 46*.

<sup>65</sup> Mr. Grossman's interview, *supra note 60* and Mr. Freilich's interview, *supra note 52*.

- Further on, Ambassador Indyk refers to the **1991 Gulf War** and to the fact that the US used its relations with Israel to persuade it not to respond to Iraq's recurrent missile attacks in order to maintain the coalition with Arab and Muslim countries which supported the US-led coalition. Ambassador Indyk summarized the point by asserting that in all of these cases the intensity of American national interests was greater than Israeli interest and thus Israel conceded<sup>66</sup>.

**Mr. Grossman** defined the US-Israeli relationship as 'rock-solid' both in the White House as well as in the House of Representatives, based on national American interests. The examples that he raised were somewhat surprising:

- In response to the Israeli **bombing of the nuclear facilities in Ozirag**, Iraq, in 1981, America had two faces, claims Grossman - the one, external, of criticism by President Bush Sr., but the other was less critical as it promoted US agenda of keeping weapons out of the hands of those involved in the regime in Iraq.
- The US 'unspoken' policy of 'looking the other way' regarding **Israel's development of WMD**, which basically conflicted with America's public and declared foreign policy. America looked the other way, claims Grossman as it aligned with its *deterrence strategy* in the Middle East at the time - the fact that Israel became a deterrent force in the region aligned with America's own strategic interests.

**Mr. Freilich** sees the beginning of real alignment of interests and cooperation only at the late 70's – early 80's, especially during the Reagan administration: that was the time when both states were seeking ways for initiating **bilateral cooperation** with

---

<sup>66</sup> Ambassador Indyk's interview, *supra note 50*.

each other. Mr. Freilich gives the following co-operations which took place in the 80s, as examples supporting his claim: the US positioning of **arms in Israel**, its growing **intelligence cooperation** with Israel, its cooperative **military ground exercises** with Israel, the strategic analysis cooperation the joint weapon development projects (such as the LAVI Fighter Jet and the anti-ballistic missile system Arrow) Freilich also mentions as an example the US-Israeli cooperation with Turkey on **military drills** in the mid 90s.

***Analysis of core events which led to American support of Israel based on national and strategic interests***

As described above, the cold war was a period during which American national and strategic interests in the ME were relatively clear, as a result of the balance of powers. So were Soviet national and strategic interests. Thus, each side advanced the creation of coalitions and proxies in the Middle East, as it was a strategically important region. While important regional actors like Egypt and Syria followed the Soviet patronage, Israel (despite its socialist foundations) gradually proved that its military and strategic capabilities, as well as its consistent democratic regime could serve important American interests in the region.

I have chosen the following three cases, out of the many that were presented by the interviewees, which exemplify U.S. support of Israel following the *fulfillment of American national and strategic interests*. In other words, the cases presented reflect that it was in the US best interest to support Israel at the time.

## **The Jordanian Crisis and US-Israeli military strategic cooperation**

### **The Nixon administration's agenda:**

Post Six Days War, the American administration, now acknowledging Israel's military abilities vis-à-vis Arab countries and Soviet support and in the midst of the Cold War, *shifted* its foreign policy from *Eisenhower's approach* of pressing Israel for immediate withdrawal (as was in 1956-57 with the **Suez Crisis**) and "*territorial integrity*" to *Johnson's new approach of negotiated settlements*, based on Security Council Resolution 242 which followed Six Days War. However, Quandt claims that the cause of shift in foreign policy was not only the 'Soviet-deterrence' interest, or regional stability; the intensely pro-Israeli tone of public opinion, the views of Congress, the private lobbying of Johnson's many Jewish friends, and Nasser's unfounded accusation all played a part in America's new foreign policy<sup>67</sup>.

Based on the new approach, Nixon and Kissinger, then the head of US National Security Council, advanced a new policy of negotiations, both in the Middle East and outside in order to create, according to Quandt, a "structure of peace"<sup>68</sup>. Moreover, Nixon, burnt by the Vietnam harsh experiences, sought to disengage America from the role of 'world policeman' and thus was quite cautious about the volatile Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Puschel, the real aim behind the new policy was to *thwart Soviet objectives in the Middle East*<sup>69</sup>. The new policy had resulted in **The Rogers**

---

<sup>67</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 45

<sup>68</sup> *Id.*, at p. 60.

<sup>69</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra note 41*, at p. 19

**(Secretary of State) Plan** (June 1970) aimed at advancing a state of peace between Israel and Egypt, which was turned down by both Israel and the Soviets<sup>70</sup>.

**The Jordanian crisis:**

A short period after the failed Rogers plan, military battles took place between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had settled its militaristic operations in Jordan without the approval of King Hussein, and the Jordanian military. These battles have harshly increased towards September 1970 and King Hussein, who felt immensely threatened by probable Syrian engagement in the battles, turned to the US for help. The latter, which saw Hussein as a pro-western ally in the generally hostile region, engaged Israel, whose planes made low over-flights over the Palestinian Liberation Army's tanks (coming from Syria) as a sign of warning. As a result, the PLA (Palestinian Liberation Army) withdrew its forces and Hussein's regime was once again secured.

**Lessons learned:**

According to Quandt, the American *fears of radicalization, polarization and confrontation* that had haunted policy makers post 1967 only increased following September 1970. Yet, the region seemed *stable* and the Americans credited its stability to the *military balance* that unquestionably favored Israel.

In addition, Nixon and Kissinger used this event to follow their *Soviet deterring interest*, by demonstrating to Sadat that the Soviet military presence in his country was an obstacle to his recovering Sinai, as Soviet arms to Egypt would be matched by

---

<sup>70</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p, 68



American arms to Israel. Quandt criticized Nixon and Kissinger's approach as one who focused on the international message (to Soviets) instead of being focused on the regional one (America anti Arab), a mistake which he asserts led to the 1973 war<sup>71</sup>.

This strategic military cooperation between the US and Israel was initiated out of the need to serve *major American interests*, such as Soviet-deterrence, Soviet allies deterrence (Egypt), maintain stability in the region and assisting allies (Jordan) in need.

Based on Ambassador Indyk's **evaluating definition of the nature of the relationship**<sup>72</sup> - in this instance American interests clearly exceeded the Israeli interests (which were not under jeopardy), and thus Israel assisted America based on its request.

### ***The 1973 war and the American pressure on Israel***

#### ***The war and the creation of a new American foreign policy***

The 1973 war was the first time when the US openly and dramatically assisted Israel against its Arab neighbors, claims Puschel. The reasons for the US support of Israel during the war are complex; on the one hand, *historical and moral commitments* to Israel had been displayed by the US since 1948 and had been greatly enhanced with the groundswell of popular support for Israel following Six Days War. On the other hand, the situation in 1973 was *not unequivocal* (Israel was not under existential threat) and two additional interests were (1) avoiding a superpower confrontation with

---

<sup>71</sup> *Id.*, at p. 85

<sup>72</sup> Ambassador Indyk's interview, *supra note 50*.

the Soviets; and (2) minimizing the damage to US-Arab relations<sup>73</sup>. However, *the American support was far from unlimited and actually arrived a few days after the war had started*. As Quandt stresses out, the administration's policy, at least in the beginning of the war, was of 'evenhandedness': *neither Nixon nor Kissinger had made an issue out of the fact that the Arabs were the ones breaking the status quo post 1967 by firing the first shots on a sacred Jewish holiday*. In fact, the Arab's actions were perceived foolish but not immoral (following the 67 occupation of Arab territory). Moreover, when Israel confronted military difficulties on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts and turned to the US for aid, Kissinger responded slowly, blaming the Defense Department repeatedly<sup>74</sup>. Taking all of the conflicting interests under account, including the concern about a possible Soviet military interference, the US interest was to enable the *creation of a new reality in the region*, in which on the one hand, Israel would not be able to conquer more territories (thus the slow military equipment assistance), but on the other hand, the Arabs would not threaten Israel's existence or change the status-quo ante (thus the assistance). Moreover, the administration saw the diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict in the days post-war as most significant, as President Nixon, who realized that the Israelis would not withdrawal from Arab territory unless offered some kind of US guarantee, felt strongly that the Israelis must see the US as a *reliable partner* during the crisis for the sake of postwar diplomacy (diplomacy or stability?)<sup>75</sup>. Thus, while the Americans waited patiently watching Israel regaining its power in the battles the Saudis decided to embargo oil

---

<sup>73</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at pp. 20-21.

<sup>74</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 109.

<sup>75</sup> *Id.*, at p.108

shipments to the US because of U.S. due to ammunition delivery to Israel. As its oil interest was under jeopardy, Nixon gave Kissinger a full authority to negotiate a cease-fire which was reached shortly after<sup>76</sup>.

### **Lessons learned**

Much can be learned about how the American administration navigated its way through a volatile situation in which conflicting interests were involved - on the one hand, American concerns that its relations with Arab countries would be affected during the war and afterwards were justified, as the Saudis eventually initiated an oil embargo. On the other hand, the oil embargo was initiated only after Israel had regained its power in the war, a situation which enabled the Americans to press Israel for a cease fire more easily as the result was going back to the status quo ante, just as Nixon's administration expected and wanted. It is worth noting that the 1973 war was not the first one in which the US was blamed by Arab countries for aiding Israel - the Six Days War was the instigator of that although Israel did not get American military or financial support. Thus, in my opinion relations with the Arab world as an interest did not play a substantial part per-se (as 'blaming' was expected in any case), rather, it was only when the relations were linked with oil, that the US became more active in promoting the cease-fire.

**With all the mentioned conflicting interests, why, then, is this case chosen as one reflective of when American interest align with supporting Israel?** The answer is that one fundamental US interest was that Israel would not be damaged too severely in order to protect 'Soviet deterrence' as well as 'Arab-nationalist countries

---

<sup>76</sup> *Id.*, at p.119

*deterrence*' and maintaining regional stability interests, as the US saw Israel as the only power in the region being able to oppose Soviet influence and weapons.

However, the most substantial factor here was that in this period a *new strategy* emerged by the Nixon administration, as described by Puschel: *using the postwar environment, in which both sides suffered, in order to launch a viable peace process in which America will give the leading tone*<sup>77</sup>. This strategy seemed as one that can gradually resolve the mentioned conflicting interests; deter and reduce the influence of the Soviets and would secure the export of oil to America. Moreover, the administration realized that Israel had the main role in this strategy as it was the party required to give up territory for its security. Thus, not only would the US have to provide Israel with guarantees but also it would have to create a reliable relationship with Israel to build credibility and trust.

As Quandt well described the change in policy:

*“The shift in policy brought about by the October war was at least as important as that produced by the Jordan crisis of 1970. The result of the earlier crisis had been an inactive, status quo-oriented policy; the result of the October 1973 crisis was a much more active approach aimed at bringing about sustained change. For the first time the US committed its top diplomatic resources to a sustained search for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”*<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at p. 23.

<sup>78</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 125

I would add that from an American foreign policy perspective that up to that point saw the main strategic interest in *military strategic deterrence*, October 1973 marked the *shift* towards the promotion of peace in the region. Thus, while the main national interests remained the same, *a new strategic interest* was introduced to the equation of American foreign policy. And indeed, early as 5 and half years later the first fruits of this policy emerged as Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement on April 1<sup>st</sup> 1977.


*The change in US Assistance to Israel following Yom Kippur War*

Following the analysis of the American interests during the Yom Kippur War and reasons for its support for Israel, an examination of the change in American financial assistance to Israel in the years following 1973 until the end of the Cold War is necessary. As is specified in the chart below, the financial assistance to Israel has increasingly grown since the end of 1973, a fact that strengthens the conclusions above regarding the emergence of American interests in Israel:

Year	Total	Military Loan	Military Grant	Economic Loan	Economic Grant	FFP Loan	FFP Grant
1974	2,621.3	982.7	1,500	-	50	-	-
1975	778	200	100	-	344.5	8.6	*
1976	2,337.7	750	750	225	475	14.4	-
TQ	292.5	100	100	25	50	3.6	-
1977	1,762.5	500	500	245	490	7	-
1978	1,822.6	500	500	260	525	6.8	-
1979	<b>4,888</b>	<b>2,700</b>	<b>1,300</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>5.1</b>	-
1980	2,121	500	500	260	525	1	-
1981	2,413.4	900	500	-	764	-	-
1982	2,250.5	850	550	-	806	-	-

<b>1983</b>	2,505.6	950	750	-	785	-	-
<b>1984</b>	2,631.6	850	850	-	910	-	-

79



In addition, in 1979 the American assistance to Israel was doubled; this, due to the fact that the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was signed, following an Israeli obligation to dismantle all settlements and evacuate Israeli settlers from the area within 2 to 3 years<sup>80</sup>.

***The “Booming” of American-Israeli military and strategic cooperation during the 1980s***

***The Reagan administration and Israel: beginning of a bad relationship***

Reagan came into office in a period when the American and Israeli administrations were divided over many issues which directly impacted the health of the US Israeli

<sup>79</sup> Clyde R. Mark, chapter 1: ISRAEL: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, supra note 42, at pp. 18-19.

<sup>80</sup> Camp David Peace Accords, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, available at - <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm>

relationship. According to Bernard Reich<sup>81</sup>, although the Carter administration's major political success was in achieving Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, there were many disagreements regarding the methods and mechanisms best suited to achieving political goals as peace and security for Israel, the preferred end-result, and the modalities that best served national interests<sup>82</sup>.

Reagan came to office with a very different perception of Israel and its importance. Unlike Carter, who did not see Israel as a strategic and military ally, Reagan saw Israel as an important ally in the struggle against the Soviets. In addition, he was opposed to dealing with the PLO until the latter changed its policies by renouncing terrorism, accepting the UN resolution 242 and acknowledging Israel's right to exist<sup>83</sup>. As evidence, On November 30<sup>th</sup> 1981 the US and Israel have signed MOU on strategic cooperation, in which the two countries recognized the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter threat to the region from the USSR.

The progress of the new friendship was halted twice - the first time because of the Israeli bombing of nuclear facilities in Oziraq, Iraq on June 7<sup>th</sup> 1981, an action that led to US denunciation in the international forum<sup>84</sup>. The second time, which is considered the significant one, was following Israel's 1982 invasion into southern Lebanon in order to evacuate the PLO leadership from Beirut. Although Reagan's administration

---

<sup>81</sup> Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel - the nature of a special relationship*, pp. 227-244, in: *The Middle East and the United States A historical and political reassessment*, edited by David W. Lesch, Trinity University, Westview Press; second edition 1999.

<sup>82</sup> *Id*, at pp. 230-231.

<sup>83</sup> *Id*, at p. 231

<sup>84</sup> Mr. Grossman's interview, *supra note* 60. In his interview, Mr. Steve Grossman reflected on the Israeli bombing of nuclear facilities in Oziraq, Iraq, as an act which the American administration publicly denounced, but internally supported (post-act). However, I think that does not align with the American interests at the time, which had the interest of supporting Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran at the time. Moreover, the fact that America supported the Security Council Resolution 487 from 19<sup>th</sup> June 1981 which condemned Israel for the attack indicates that the Reagan administration reflected on the action as one conflicting with American interests.

tried to use the period for renewal of Arab-Israeli peace initiative the Israelis have refused the proposal and soon after came the Sabra and Shatila massacre which resulted in sharp deterioration in the US-Israeli relations<sup>85</sup>. The American dissatisfaction with Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's decisions and with Israel's actions in Southern Lebanon soon led into an American operative intervention in Lebanon in order to secure the exit of PLO leadership to Tunisia, an act which will be explored in the following sub-chapter.

### **The turmoil**

According to both Puschel and Reich, the Lebanon war was the peak of the deteriorating relations between the US and Israel<sup>86</sup>. After the war, or as Reich indicates, by the summer of 1983<sup>87</sup>, the negative perception of the Israeli government by the Reagan administration started to change. Puschel recognizes the following factors that contributed to the positive change:

- (a) Sharon who was the Defense Minister during the war resigned after an Israeli investigation committee concluded that he could no longer serve as Minister of Defense
- (b) Begin resigned and a new prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, who was more pragmatic towards the Americans, took his place.
- (c) Secretary of State George Shultz, who initially had a pro Arab perspective, due to his professional past, became later in the period post Lebanon war the key architect of a close US-Israeli relationship.

---

<sup>85</sup> Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel - the nature of a special relationship*, *supra* note 81, at pp. 232-233

<sup>86</sup> *Id.*, at p. 233, as well as at: Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at p. 65.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.*



(d) An additional factor that contributed to the renewal of strategic cooperation was *terrorism*. The administration had to start dealing with the new phenomenon, and thus increasingly looked at Israel as a contributor to the solution. In 1983, as the US began laying plans for dealing with the terrorist threat both in Lebanon and Syria, Israel had an obvious role to play through both intelligence cooperation and experience which Israel acquired through its struggle against terrorism. The war against terrorism created an atmosphere highly conducive to closer cooperation with Israel.<sup>88</sup>

Thus, as the number of terrorist incidents increased, the mood of the country was affected by the specter of Arab support for terrorism. According to Puschel, this made it easier for pro-Israel interest groups like AIPAC to find a sympathetic audience for their efforts on Capitol Hill<sup>89</sup>.

#### *The time for strategic cooperation*

**The first crack** - These events advanced the Israeli government in reaching its goal, which was formal strategic cooperation with the US (through agreements or MOU), as they also brought the American administration and especially the Defense Department, which was traditionally hesitant to formalize the relationship, closer to Israel. A crack in the Defense Department objection was found as the US Navy was looking for a port to support the Sixth fleet; in mid November 1983 a US supply ship, the USS Rigel, arrived in Haifa for boiler repairs at the Israel shipyards<sup>90</sup>.

---

<sup>88</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at pp. 65-70

<sup>89</sup> *Id.*, at p. 73.

<sup>90</sup> *Id.*, at p. 74.

**Difficulties with Syria** - the US, still in the Lebanon mess in 1983 and looking for a way out, realized that the way to leave and maintain stability would be by a mutual Israeli and Syrian (who imposed a threat to American forces there) withdrawal from Lebanon. This interest of reducing Syrian threat was shared by the Israelis and the way to obtain the interest was through a show of combined US and Israeli strength. Thus, on November/December 1983 Washington ordered air strikes on Syrian positions in Lebanon. Two US planes were lost in the process<sup>91</sup>.

**The products of the US-Israeli strategic cooperation** - Puschel describes the following military and strategic cooperation following 1984:

- Newly created Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) was established in January 1984, led by Major General Menachem (Mendy) Meron and Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe, then Director of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department. Soon agreement was reached on several joint projects in non-controversial fields, such as *medical programs* of US soldiers being treated in Israeli hospitals in the events of disaster such as the Beirut disaster, storing of US military supply in Israel and more<sup>92</sup>.
- During 1984, with the parameters of strategic cooperation in place, both sides turned their attention to finding practical areas of cooperation:
  - *Military cooperation* had begun due to Israel's *advanced technological* base and its renowned ability to translate ideas into new military hardware.
  - The US Navy developed the most extensive cooperative relationship with Israel. By mid April 1985, the Sixth Fleet became a regular caller at Haifa

---

<sup>91</sup> *Id.*, at p. 78.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.*, at p. 82.

Port, where the Navy could take advantage of high-quality workmanship at the port's maintenance and repair facilities, its ready availability of superior quality fresh food supply.

- Another important aspect of cooperation was Israel's unique ability to provide *realistic training opportunities* for US naval forces<sup>93</sup>.
  - Israel's army bases also served the US – in 1986 it was reported that US Sixth Fleet fighter pilots had been practicing precision attacks at a site in the Negev Desert since late 1985 at least<sup>94</sup>.
  - The Marine Coeps also discovered unique training opportunities in Israel in the form of live-fire exercises, beach assaults, and even combined-arms exercises.
- The most visible instance for strategic cooperation begun in 1986, when Israel became the third country to join the US in Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. In 1988, testifying to the success of the program in Israel, agreement was reached on a cooperative SDI project - the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile system. By 1988, the US and Israel were cooperating in a variety of weapons development and production projects including aircraft, mini-RPVs, electronics, naval vessels, tank guns, and terminal guidance bombs<sup>95</sup>.
  - Because US weapons systems were often used in combat for the first time by Israel and often against Soviet-made weapons, Israel had an important if not

---

<sup>93</sup> *Id.*, at p. 88,

<sup>94</sup> *Id.*, at p. 89.

<sup>95</sup> *Id.*, at p. 96.

necessarily desirable longstanding role to play in the area of *weapons evaluation*, which also led to defense trade between the two countries.

- The pick of the strategic cooperation was on April 21<sup>st</sup>, 1988 when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Agreement that institutionalized the emerging strategic relationship<sup>96</sup>.

### **Lessons learned**

It is obvious that it is Israel who initially sought to reach formal strategic and military cooperation. Israel's interest was stronger than the American one. However, the turmoil in Reagan administration's approach towards Israel gradually took place post Lebanon war;

- As the administration was more occupied with the Cold War and focused on the anti-Soviet strategic and military interests, so did it find Israel useful in this regard. Indeed, US officials reflected on the cooperation as one useful for anti-Soviet interests only, as they feared the reaction of Arab states, while Israel reflected on the cooperation as serving broader interests of deterrence and regional stability.
- Although it seems that the initial instigator for cooperation was based on US strategic interests (developing better weapons and developing deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviets), it seems that the cooperation increased the intimacy between the two sides - as Secretary Shultz began visiting in Israel, as well as Secretary of Defense Weinberger and many army commanders and personnel.

---

<sup>96</sup> Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel - the nature of a special relationship*, supra note 81, p. 234

Critiques of the cooperation claimed it is based more on political will, and not on pure realistic interests, and that Israel is more of a liability harming US interests than a strategic asset<sup>97</sup>. This claim seems realistic and fair. However, I would claim that the administration's agenda and political orientation *is-is* the engine that moves the wheels of foreign policy. Thus, the term 'realistic interests' is mostly based on political approach and political agenda, i.e. two administrations with different political orientations and aims would define differently national/strategic interests; just as the Carter administration did not think to use Israel for military cooperation, as its political agenda focused more on conflict resolution, the Reagan administration saw Israel in a strategic light as its main motivator was developing smart weapons to deter the Soviets.

US assistance to Israel following the strategic cooperation<sup>98</sup>

Year	Total	Military Loan	Military Grant	Economic Loan	Economic Grant	FFP Loan	FFP Grant
<b>1983</b>	2,505.6	950	750	-	785	-	-
<b>1984</b>	2,631.6	850	850	-	910	-	-
<b>1985</b>	3,376.7	-	<b>1,400</b>	-	1,950	-	-
<b>1986</b>	3,663.5	-	<b>1,722.6</b>	-	1,898.4	-	-
<b>1987</b>	3,040.2	-	<b>1,800</b>	-	1,200	-	-
<b>1988</b>	3,043.4	-	<b>1,800</b>	-	1,200	-	-

As is reflected in the Matrix above, the US assistance to Israel increased during the time the strategic cooperation between the two countries developed substantially.

<sup>97</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at pp. 90-91

<sup>98</sup> Clyde R. Mark, chapter 1: *ISRAEL: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE*, *supra* note 42, at p. 18.

***Core political events which led America to denounce Israel based on American national and strategic interests***

In this part of the chapter I will examine major political events that took place during the Cold War in the Middle East, which involved Israel and in which the US chose not to support Israel, as it would harm its national and strategic interests.

Although American interests were relatively known and clear during the Cold War, as well as were less complex than they are today, the US as a great power had to maneuver among the conflicting interests; the confliction of the different interest was emphasized especially during and after the 1973 war as Saudi Arabia imposed its oil embargo which led to US advancing a cease-fire in the region. By that the US balanced between the interest of Israeli military victory against states militarily equipped by USSR and its oil interest.

**Core events according to interviewees**

1) In his interview, Ambassador Kurtzer emphasized the following examples of conflict of interests following US foreign policy which did not support Israel:

- **Beginning of 1973 war** - US decision not to give immediate military aid to Israel at the beginning of 1973 war.
- **Sinai** The 1975 reassessment of Sinai disengagement talks and the American demand to cut off supply of weapons.
- Carter's failure during the Camp David summit to resolve the Gaza occupation and settlements through negotiations.
- The American-Israeli conflict in Lebanon during 1982.

- The Bush (senior) and Shamir conflict over **settlements and the holding of American loan guarantees** to Israel, as a result.

2) Ambassador Indyk reflected on the whole period prior to the 70s as one in which Israel did not really play a significant part in American interests and thus there was general lack of American support.

3) Mr. Grossman gave as an example a case which can serve Ambassador Indyk's assertion -

- **The 1956 Sinai war** in which Eisenhower's Administration joined the Soviet demand for Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza which were occupied by the Israelis during the war.

Later in time, Mr. Grossman gave the following examples:

- **The 1981 AWAC debate** (hereinafter: the AWACS debate) - in which Reagan proposed and eventually decided (supported by Senate) to sell 5 AWACS aircraft and sixty-two F-15 fighter-bombers to Saudi-Arabia although Israeli objection based on the claim that it would harm regional security interests<sup>99</sup>.
- **1991 Iraq war** - as the U.S. tried to maintain a stable coalition along with Arab countries (such as Saudi Arabia), it had pressured Israel to restrain from reacting to Scads missiles fired on Israel by Iraq ruler, Saddam Hussein.

4) Mr. Freilich, shared much of the points raised by the others, and added some more:

---

<sup>99</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel : The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra note 32*, at p. 170

- The 1981 American denunciation (both publicly and through not signing an MOU of strategic cooperation with Israel) of Israel due to the Israel's **annexation of the Golan Heights** by law.
- The 1981 **AWACS debate**.
- The 1981 Israeli bombing of nuclear facilities in **Oziraq**, Iraq which led to American support of Security Council resolution denouncing Israel's acts.
- **The 1982 Lebanon war**, in which Israel and America were in conflict due to Israeli harsh bombings in Lebanon and America's demand to safely evacuate the PLO leaders who stayed in Beirut.
- **The 1991 Gulf War**, in which Israel was captured as a barrier to the creation of stable American coalition along with Arab states against Iraq.

***Analysis of core events which led to American denunciation of Israel based on national and strategic interests***

As the following events have mostly taken place during the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, an examination of the Reagan and Bush Administrations and their political foundation is in order;

**The Reagan administration - a peak of strategic cooperation with Israel**

Stephens describes well Reagan's 'political foundations' regarding Israel - Reagan began his presidency substantially pro-Israeli. As an economic liberal he felt the US owed protection to the survivors of the Holocaust, as a political conservative, he came to regard Israel as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Reagan was a New Right neo-conservative President, and from an ideological perspective, his philosophy was



commensurate with that of Begin. Moreover, Reagan came to his presidency with a defined vision of the world - the basic tenets of Reagan's policy were virulent anti-communism, the heightening of tensions with the Soviet leadership and a dramatically increased defense budget.<sup>100</sup> Reagan's preoccupation with the Soviet Union was almost manifest in his Middle Eastern policy, claims Stephens. In contrast to the Carter administration, Reagan did not focus on peace-making, but on building a strategic consensus between both the Arabs and Israel aimed at blocking Soviet expansion in the area<sup>101</sup>. Thus, under Reagan's leadership, the importance attached to Israel's position as a strategic asset increased. As did the military assistance it received. Stephen's conclusion explains and supports the former chapter's analysis of the "booming" of American support for Israel during the 80s.

### **Conflicts of interests**

Although the 80s were considered the peak of strategic cooperation between the two countries, they also reflect a period of some of the greatest conflict of interests between the two countries. America found itself within a short period of time (1981-1982) objecting to Israel's actions - both militarily and politically. These objections led to the administration's public denunciations of Israel, to its supporting UN's Security Council resolutions which criticized Israel and its applying economic pressures on Israel. These cases will be following analyzed:

### **1981 and the Reagan Presidency - a year of conflicting interests**

---

<sup>100</sup> *Id.*, at p. 165

<sup>101</sup> *Id.*, at p. 166

According to Bernard Reich, the US initiated its support to Israel by agreeing to create a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Israel on strategic cooperation in which the two countries *recognized* the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter threats to the region from the USSR<sup>102</sup>. For Israel, the signing of the MOU was the public proof that America recognizes Israel as an equal *ally* that can benefit America. For the U.S., the MOU reflected the beginning of possible strategic cooperation as part of the net of cooperative alliances against the USSR which Reagan aspired to. Thus, the signing of the MOU on November 30<sup>th</sup> 1981 was not the result of moral thinking or sympathy towards Israel. Rather, it was a reflection of *strategic realist agenda* following Reagan's belief in the Soviet growing threat and thus in the need to create strategic ties with credible allies who have the ability to assist the US in the region. Israel was considered *The Ally* for such a goal. However, as Puschel mentions in her book, the administration was not as enthused about the plan as was Reagan. Thus, she claims, in the negotiations for the formation of the MOU, the administration had deliberately "put the Israelis through hell" because the U.S. wanted to limit any possibilities for real cooperation<sup>103</sup>. Moreover, the U.S. was also aware of the probable problems that might arise from such an agreement with Israel and counted on Israel to not rock the boat<sup>104</sup>.

However, situations demonstrating conflict of interests took place during the first year of Reagan's presidency which raised important issues regarding how the U.S. and Israel should deal with each other -

---

<sup>102</sup> Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel - the nature of a special relationship*, *supra* note 81, at p. 232

<sup>103</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at p. 39.

<sup>104</sup> *Id.*, at p. 39.

### **Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities**

The first case in which Reagan has 'tasted' the conflict of interests and ways of dealing with it was due to Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities, on June 7<sup>th</sup> (1981). Following the surprising raid, according to Stephens, Reagan sympathized with Israel's claim that its security interests were threatened by the Iraqi capability to produce nuclear weapons<sup>105</sup>, as Israel's decision to bomb the Tammuz 1 site was based on the fact that in a few weeks Israel would not be able to neutralize the facilities without causing radioactive fallout. However sympathetic, until the reactor raid Reagan believed that Israel was America's friend and was puzzled and angry that he had not been consulted before the preemptive strike<sup>106</sup>. Eventually, America supported a UN Security Council Resolution 487 of 19<sup>th</sup> June 1981, which strongly condemned Israel's attack and regarded it as a violation of the UN charter and the norms of international conduct<sup>107</sup>.

Stephens claims that the bombing raised the fundamental question as to *how Israel and the US should deal with each other*. The American ambassador to Israel, Samuel W. Lewis, claimed that after the attack Israeli officials were ignored that their actions had had a direct impact on US interests. If Israel wanted to be America's ally, greater consultation between the two governments was required and Israel was not to inflict further surprises.

---

<sup>105</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, at p. 167.

<sup>106</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 167-168.

<sup>107</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 487 from June 19<sup>th</sup> 1981, available at UN Security Council website: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/IMG/NR041874.pdf?OpenElement>

Further on Stephens asserts that while the administration saw the major threat to Middle East security in Soviet expansionism and thus considered it possible to create cooperation between Israel and moderate Arab states, it failed to take into account the political perspectives of the regional states involved<sup>108</sup>.

### **The AWACS Dilemma**

The sale of five AWACS aircraft and sixty-two F-15 bombers to Saudi-Arabia raised the dilemma of sale of arms to the Arab states versus the security of an ally - Israel. Prior to authorizing it, there were different pros and cons to the deal which were based on different realist perspective - some (Weinberg) endorsed the thinking that Saudi Arabia required the weapons to deter possible attacks from revolutionary Iran and Soviet client states, others (Haig) were unconvinced that the continued security of Saudi Arabia was dependent on the sale of the five AWACS<sup>109</sup>. Later in time, when Israel revealed that it had flown over Saudi on the way to bomb the reactor, Saudi officials argued that they required the AWACS to defend themselves against Israeli 'aggression' and to fulfill their pan-Arab responsibilities of detecting and warning other Arab states of an impending Israeli attack. Thus, Israel objected to the sale and tried to put pressure in preventing the sale through American Jewish leaders. As the conflicting interests were clear - an ally's security and regional stability on the one hand, and oil, technologies and preserving good relations with Arab states on the other, the decisive voice was the President, who was in favor of making the deal.

---

<sup>108</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, at p. 169

<sup>109</sup> *Id.*, at p. 170.

According to Stephens, epitomized in the slogan 'Reagan or Begin', the President effectively made the AWACS sale a test of his personal prestige and authority.

Stephens cites Regan's declaration soon after making the decision -

"As President, it is my duty to define and defend our broad national security objectives...And while we must always take into account the vital interests of our allies, American security must remain our internal responsibility. It is not the business of any other nation to make American foreign policy".<sup>110</sup>

Although this situation cannot be considered a conflict of interest between the US and Israel which threatened the good relations and cooperation between the two, this case does symbolizes that when it comes down to its calculation of interests - *the US considered its interest before its allies' interests*. Moreover, the decision making process in this case clearly demonstrates the *conclusive power the President holds when dealing with a foreign policy dilemma*.

### **The Israeli Golan Heights Law**

On December 14<sup>th</sup> 1981, the Israeli parliament ("Knesset"), headed by hard liner Prime Minister Begin, had legislated The Golan Heights Law which extended the Israeli civilian jurisdiction to the occupied Golan Heights (from the Six Days War). The Reagan administration, outraged for what they considered an act which harmed their interests in the region, responded immediately - on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1981 the US supported a UN Security Council Resolution 497 (at its 2319<sup>th</sup> meeting) which decided that "the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect"

---

<sup>110</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 170-171.

(article 1) as well as “Demands that Israel, the occupying force should rescind forthwith its decision” (article 3)<sup>111</sup>. That was not enough for the American administration - a day later, on December 18<sup>th</sup>, the US suspended the document in protest at Israel’s decision to extend its civil jurisdiction to the occupied Golan Heights. The one act, claims Puschel, said more about how the administration viewed the MOU and its intended effect on Israeli actions than did all of the preceding negotiations<sup>112</sup>.

### **Lessons learned**

As mentioned above, Reagan had started his first presidency term supportive of Israel and believing that the interests of the two countries align. More specifically, he appreciated Israel’s strategic capabilities in contributing to the US primary goal of Soviet deterrence. However, soon he found out that the interests do not always align, and that Israel does not consider U.S. interests when it feels that its vital interests are under jeopardy. The **Osiraq bombing** is the symbolic example for this approach. However, through these events in his first year of presidency, Reagan had also proven that although his moral and political support of Israel as a state and as an ally are strong, *the American national interests come first*; In my opinion, all of the examined situations demonstrate that *when the act harmed or could harm US interests*, if only by a small arguable extent, the US has *acted upon those interests* by both reacting ‘*passively*’ against Israel, through public statements, criticism and joining UN Security Council resolutions denouncing Israel, as well as by reacting ‘*actively*’ against Israel,

---

<sup>111</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 497 from December 17<sup>th</sup> 1981, available at UN Security Council website -

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/IMG/NR041874.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>112</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra note 41*, at p. 50.

by installing strategic agreements (MOU) and by selling arms to countries who impose a threat to Israel.

### **1982 - Israel vs. U.S in the war in Lebanon**

The political events taking place in 1982 overshadowed those of 1981, claims Puschel: frustration with the Israeli government spread to the Pentagon, administration and through Washington and it was steadily growing. In the absence of a clear policy, administration officials tended to go their own way. In February 1982 Secretary of Defense Weinberger completed a 10-days-tour through South Africa, Oman and Jordan, notably ignoring Israel and signaling that the US needs more than one friend in the region<sup>113</sup>.

1981 was a volatile year regarding Israel and the PLO - as the PLO people, who based themselves in Lebanon, had shelled with rockets the northern Galilee and Israel perceived the threat as a grave one that should be dealt with. The cease fire agreement which was signed the same year, was not captured by Israel as one that can restrain the PLO from repeating the aggressions.

On June 3<sup>rd</sup> 1982 Israeli Ambassador to United Kingdom was shot by Abu-Nidal's people. Following, and although the PLO was not involved in the assassination, Israel responded by bombing West Beirut. The PLO retaliated by firing on Israeli settlements in the Galilee. On June 6<sup>th</sup> Israeli divisions crossed into Lebanon<sup>114</sup>.

Although America's initial response to the Israeli invasion to Lebanon was fairly quiet, it had changed once Reagan found out that the Israeli army did not stop in the 25<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>113</sup> *Id.*, at p. 52.

<sup>114</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, at pp. 175-177.

mile it needed to establish as a security zone (from PLO shelling of Israeli settlements) but continued towards Beirut. According to Stephens, the U.S. reaction towards Israel's justification of the invasion have changed also due to the fact that this war was very different from previous Arab-Israeli wars; It was a long war (compared with those of 1967 and 1973), lasting almost three months, fought in densely populated urban areas and under the close scrutiny of the world's media. Moreover, Israel's participation caused dissension within Israel and outrage in the international community. America was the crucial factor in determining the course of the war because as long as the Reagan administration viewed the war as conducive to or, at least congruent with its interests, it enabled the Begin government to continue to pursue its own aims<sup>115</sup>.

Thus, the events in Lebanon created significant friction between the U.S. and Israel - in early July 1982 Reagan had contributed a contingent of US Marines as part of the UN-sponsored multinational force for peacekeeping in Beirut, which was in charge of supervising and protecting the evacuation of PLO fighters as they departed Beirut. Soon after additional events, such as the murder of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel (by Lebanese opposition) and the Sabra and Shatila massacre have kept American forces in Lebanon. According to Puschel it was then that IDF and American forces had different objectives<sup>116</sup>; while Begin saw the expulsion of the PLO as a victory against terrorism, an opportunity to deal a blow to Palestinian aspiration in the Territories and perhaps as a western superiority over the USSR, the US did not see it eye to eye with Israel. Rather, it was very critical towards Israeli bombings in Lebanon

---

<sup>115</sup> *Id.*, at p. 174.

<sup>116</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at pp. 56-57.



(which at some point made Reagan evoke the image of the Holocaust to protest the Israeli action). Moreover, President Reagan announced a peace plan that ran headlong into Begin's expectations regarding the fading of the Palestinian issue. The crucial point of the Reagan Plan was its call for "self-government by Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan". *Thus, the peace plan came to symbolize the seemingly total lack of identification of views between the US and Israel, not just over events in the region but also over the shape of future Israel.*<sup>117</sup>

### **Lessons learned:**

If in 1981, the first year of presidency, Reagan and his administration experienced 'samples' of situations in which conflict of interests was built in, in 1982 the experience reached its peak in the Lebanon war. Reagan, Weinberger and the rest of the administration did not speak the same language that Prime Minister Begin and Minister of Defense Sharon spoke. The American quiet acceptance of the Israeli invasion to Lebanon as means of Self Defense soon turned into anger, disappointment and to personal involvement by intervention. The U.S. pulled pressure and influence over Israel, to make the latter stop the Beirut invasion. Moreover, the US had sent troops to secure the evacuation of Israel's biggest enemy - the PLO. *The conclusion is that from the moment the US figured that its interests and the Israeli interests do not align and even conflict (following Israeli invasion to Beirut and its shelling), it made sure to secure its interest in the region - both by pressuring Israel as well as by intervening in the conflict.*

### **The Bush administration - changing of interests A: The Gulf War**

---

<sup>117</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 59-60.

### **The 1991 war in Iraq - a conflict of interest?**

Before focusing on the breakup in relationship between the American administration and the Israeli government which evolved around the dismantling of settlements and the loans guarantees, a short examination of an additional case-dilemma which had occurred during in the Bush Presidency during 1990-1991 is essential, as this case exemplifies how the US managed to impose its own interest on Israel when the latter had conflicting interests;

### **Mearsheimer and Walt - the 1991 War reflects that Israel is more of a burden than a valuable ally**

In their piece, Mearsheimer and Walt claim the following:

*“Even if Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War, the first Gulf War (1990-1991) revealed that Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The United States could not use Israeli bases during the war without rupturing the anti-Iraq coalition, and it had to divert resources (e.g., Patriot missile batteries) to keep Tel Aviv from doing anything that might fracture the alliance against Saddam”<sup>118</sup>.*

In other words, the two professors claim that Israel was a burden to America in the first Gulf war. *But was it really the case?*

### **1990-1991: the American Israeli conflict of interests**

---

<sup>118</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, *supra* note 1, at p. 4.

Indeed, Israel was the strongest single power in the region, which happened also to be a strategic ally of the United States. Israel had the most sophisticated, technically-advanced, and compatible facilities in the region as well as formal program of strategic cooperation with the United States. Thus, in the initial days following the US decision to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia (following August 1990), there was excited speculation in the Israeli press as to what Israel could do to assist the US<sup>119</sup>. *Washington did need Israel's assistance in this war, but not in the way Israel had thought of* - according to Puschel, the first phone call reportedly made by the US to any Middle Eastern state on the night Iraq invaded Kuwait went from Robert Kimmit, under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to Israel's ambassador in Washington. His message was that Washington wanted Israel to *"keep its head down and its guns holstered"*<sup>120</sup>. By that, American asked its first ally in the Middle East to keep, from now on during the preparations for war, a "low-profile". Although the cynicism and criticism the request stirred within the Israeli public and institutions and although the request clearly harmed Israeli national interests, it followed the request. From then on, the US - in order to maintain its coalition (especially with Saudi Arabia), and Israel (following American request), kept on a "low-profile" relationship; until late in the crisis Washington refused to engage in any operational coordination with Israel or even to discuss scenarios that involved Israel being drawn into the conflict. The one area where Washington did feel comfortable engaging in close cooperation was in the realm of intelligence and information exchange. The two countries share the intelligence they had about Iraq.

---

<sup>119</sup> Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, *supra* note 41, at p. 115.

<sup>120</sup> *Id.*, at p. 116.

However cooperative, as time got closer towards the beginning of Desert Storm Operation, Israeli leaders looked for reassurances that its interests were being looked after and the administration was not necessarily giving them the assurances they needed. This situation reflected the different, if not conflicting, national interests each country followed - the American administration had to maintain its coalition with Arab states in order to have troops in place close-by to Iraq and also in order to have the public justification for going out to war with an Arab Muslim state. Israel, on the other hand, had to look after its security interests as well as be prepared (militarily and in the home front) for the chance of an unconventional attack coming from Iraq. Although the threat to Israel was immanent and the Israeli interests were surely put under jeopardy, Israel had agreed to follow the American request and not retaliate in case of an Iraqi attack.

### **The alignment of interests**

Although having different interest at first, Puschel asserts that as closer the time got towards the operation itself, a new partnership between the US and Israel had emerged which was based on mutual interests -

*“It thus not simply Israel’s policy of restraint that ushered in a new closeness in relations, but the underlying perception of mutual interests between the two countries upon which restraint rested. Both Shamir and Bush understood the game evidently being played by Saddam Hussein of trying to bring Israel into the conflict. The effort to foil this ploy created a de facto partnership in the Gulf War.”<sup>121</sup>*

### **Lessons learned**

---

<sup>121</sup> *Id.*, at p. 134.

Indeed, the two countries have entered into the situation in having conflicting interests, as examined. However, the alliance between the countries was grave enough, as well as the US political pressure on Israel to make Israel follow US interests. Israel did so apparently for two main reasons: first, Israel relied upon America, its assurances and strength in conducting the war and protecting Israel's interests. Second, as Puschel mentioned, Shamir realized that Israel would benefit by taking the 'sitting still' approach and that any use of force on its behalf may risk the coalition built by the US as well as threaten the rebuilt alliance between the two countries.

Thus, I find this case to be a good example of how the *US not only followed its own interests, but also managed to make Israel, who had viable conflicting interests, to follow American interests, based on the good relations between the two* (and still maintain full strategic cooperation with Israel). Thus, the situation was a 'win-win' for America; it won the war with Arab support and gained prestige around the world, as well as maintained its good relations with Israel, its ally.

### **The Bush administration - changing of interests B:**

#### **Loan Guarantees vs. the Israeli Settlements**

#### **The Bush administration - more demanding of Israel**

*The Bush (senior) presidency symbolizes the end of the Cold War and the diminishing Soviet threat*<sup>122</sup>. Thus, serious questions arose as to the rationale and the worth of strategic cooperation between the two countries. According to Puschel, the reassessment of US strategic priorities and commitments abroad took place and the US-Israeli cooperation was of no exception, as the entire premise of the strategic

---

<sup>122</sup> *Id.*, at p. 100.

cooperation was the Soviet threat. As a result, Israel's strategic importance was reduced in the eyes of the new administration<sup>123</sup>.

Stephens reaffirms Puschel assertion by emphasizing that neither Baker nor Bush shared the special regard for Israel held by Reagan, Shultz or Haig<sup>124</sup>.

At the same time, the efforts to promote peace in the region have increased and Israel was considered a valuable side. Once the Soviet power and influence over Arab countries diminished, America was free to 'get down to business' in initiating negotiations aimed at promoting regional stability; As the new administration had more of a 'blunt approach' towards Israel and its hard liner Prime Minister Shamir than the Reagan administration's officials had, the new American officials started raising the issue of the dismantling of settlements for peace: Baker spoke specifically of "territorial withdrawal" stating that "for Israel now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of greater Israel. Israeli interests in the West Bank and Gaza - security and otherwise - can be accommodated in a settlement based on resolution 242...Stop settlement activity...reach out to Palestinians who deserve political rights"<sup>125</sup>.

### **The entanglement of the issues of settlements and loan guarantees**

From the outset, the question of loan guarantees and settlements was a source of tension in relations between the Bush administration and the Shamir government, as

---

<sup>123</sup> *Id.*

<sup>124</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, p. 208.

<sup>125</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 212-213.

Shamir's perception of Israeli security was based on an ideological view of the land and the assumption of Israel's intrinsic right to it<sup>126</sup>.

However, the new Bush administration was not impressed with this perspective. It actually held a different perspective which considered the weakening of the Soviet power and thus the change in Israel's strategic role as well as America's role in advancing the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The administration also considered the fact that the Jewish community was not supportive of Bush prior to his election and thus did not feel obligated to them as constituency. The result was that the administration did not permit the subject of settlements to recede to the US-Israeli agenda<sup>127</sup>.

Thus, when Israel announced its would seek \$10 billion in loan guarantees for the resettlement of Soviet Jews, President Bush, who decided not to enable Israel receive money again without guaranteeing to halt ongoing Israeli settlement activity, harshly objected. Moreover, Bush had used all of domestic power and influence in order to make his case (withhold the loans guarantees from Israel) to both Congress and the American people and thus gained their support. In addition, Bush had won domestic support just after he had protected Israel's interests in the Gulf War. Thus, no one suspected him of being anti-Israeli. On the Israeli side, Shamir's strategy that the loans will be given without any obligation based on pro-Israeli lobby and moral support failed.

---

<sup>126</sup> *Id.*, at p. 220.

<sup>127</sup> *Id.*, at pp.221-224.

By withholding the loans, claims Puschel, not only had Bush prove that he is the one making decisions that follow what he defined as American interests, but also he managed to force Shamir to the negotiating table - the Madrid Conference of 1991.

### **Lessons learned**

While it is true that the Bush administration had less emotional and moral attachment to Israel, I do not believe his decision was reached based on this 'lack of' part. Instead, *this situation is reflective of American administration motivated and acting based on its own interests which are decided and formed by the President and his administration.* This case is an example of the fact that the American president has the last word in foreign policy issues.

When the walls of the Berlin Wall fell, the strategic thinking changed dramatically. Ambassador Indyk correctly defined: *American strategy had changed from 'Soviet deterrence' during the 80s to a policy of pursuit of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors during the 90s and with this change.* With the change, American foreign policy have also changed; As Bush, who enjoyed domestic and international popularity at the time, strived to advance the peace interest as soon as possible, he defined the Israeli settlement as a barrier in reaching his goal. Moreover, he used the financial leverage he had in both "punishing" Israel for its policy as well as for dragging Israel to participate in the first peace conference which led the way to future ones.



---

## US Foreign Policy Towards Israel Post Cold War

---

### ***A New World order, American foreign policy and Israel's role***

#### *A new world order with new interests?*

As the Soviet power was rapidly fading away in the beginning of the 1990s, a new world order soon emerged, in which there was only one super-power, the United States. Due to the change of structure, the major national interest which revolved around 'Soviet Deterrence' also faded and *with it* the interest of strategic cooperation with countries who can deter Soviet power (with strategic countermeasures), among them - Israel.

But did this mean the end of the relationship? Mearsheimer and Walt claim that realistically, that should have been the end as Israel was no longer a strategic asset but turned into a burden regarding all American interests - security, oil and stability<sup>128</sup>. In other words, the professors, who initially saw Israel as somewhat benefiting US interests (in one aspect alone), concluded that there were no interests left.

*But is it really the case? In order to analyze it, and based on the first part where I demonstrated that US.-Israel interests were composed from more than one interest, we need to examine whether all other major American interests faded as well and if not, whether they have completely changed post Cold War and how.*

Let us briefly observed the interests that were mentioned above, on page 21:

---

<sup>128</sup> Mearsheimer and Walt, *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, *supra* note 1, at pp. 4-7

- 1) **Oil** - the interests of trading oil in low prices with Gulf countries have remained and with it the strategic interest of maintaining **good relations with Arab states**.
- 2) **Keeping regional stability** - although the 'Soviet danger' was gone, the interest remained a focal point in US foreign policy and both the Bush and Clinton administrations have made it their high-priority goal. Thus, the strategic interest of **advancing the peace process in the Middle East** was given more emphasis. In order to maintain this interest, the following interests emerge:
- 3) **Advancing peace process in the Middle East** - based on Quandt, even if we take off the interest of 'Soviet Deterrence' out of the equation, there are still additional interests who remain viable post Cold War, which are: *American access to inexpensive oil and support for Israel*.<sup>129</sup> According to both Ambassador Kurtzer<sup>130</sup> and Mr. Grossman<sup>131</sup>, the different American administrations realized that regional stability can be reached through the promotion of the peace process. Today, advancing regional stability is captured as an American interest not only because of 'safe' oil, but also because of American security interests (terrorism and the threat of WMD) and needs. Although this interest can be maintained as part of 'keeping regional stability', my assertion is that during the 90s this strategic interest has taken 'a life of its own' as the pinnacle foreign policy of President Bill Clinton; i.e. it was not for reaching regional stability but it became an independent interest.

---

<sup>129</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p.14.

<sup>130</sup> Ambassador Kurtzer's interview, *supra note 46*.

<sup>131</sup> Mr. Grossman's interview, *supra note 60*.

- 4) **Promotion of democratic ideas** - although this interest was discussed above and is not the focal point of the paper, it is important to mention that the idea of promotion of democratic ideas as an American national interest (not only as a 'moral cause') is not out of the picture. On the contrary, based on the NSS 2002, the current Bush administration has clearly reflected on promotion of democratic ideas around the world as a national interest and part of the American foreign policy<sup>132</sup>.
- 5) **Special American commitment to Israel** - as discussed above (p. 24), although one could argue over the question of whether this interest should be seen as a national interest, this paper will not deal with the theoretical aspect of it. De-facto, the American support of Israel has continued past the Cold war through both Clinton administration and the Bush former and current administration and its basis can be explained. However, it is important to mention that although the verbal commitment, no *mutual security agreement* (which comes to assure that when one country is attacked the other will come to its rescue) was ever signed between US and Israel<sup>133</sup>. Similarly, no *nuclear umbrella* was signed. This, unlike the US and UK or US and Japan and South Korea, who have signed such agreements. In addition, post Cold War-Israel is not captured as a state facing an immanent threat anymore.
- 6) **Security interest/War on terror** - the US had suffered from terror attacks who were conducted against its own civilians outside the US, during the Cold War,

---

<sup>132</sup> The democracy agenda as an American national interest is reflected in: *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, September 2002, at p. 25. The NSS is available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>

<sup>133</sup> Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel-the nature of a special relationship*, supra note 81, at p. 239

by religious and national fundamentalist organizations (such as the 1983 and the 1984 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, 1985 kidnap of the Akila Lauro cruise, 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103<sup>134</sup>). However, these terror attacks were mostly against American public offices abroad, as well as outside US territory. The horrendous terror attacks conducted on 9/11/2001 against US citizens on US soil has changed the administration's perspective regarding American foreign policy in the international arena in general and in South West Asia and the Middle East in particular. Not only that the national security interest received the phrase "War on Terror", but more importantly the *strategy* of dealing with the interest has changed; from the strategy of deterrence, which guided the American foreign policy throughout the Cold War, post 9/11/2001 the American administration came to speak in *preemptive self-defense* terms, as is evident in the US National Security Strategy of 2002 (hereinafter: NSS)<sup>135</sup>:

*"The United States have long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case of taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place as to the enemy's attack. To forestall and prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States, if necessary, act preemptively"*

---

<sup>134</sup> The data taken from: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, *Significant Terrorists Attacks against the United States and its Citizens 1946-2001*, available at: <http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/101/timeline.html>

<sup>135</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, *supra* note 132, at p. 15.

7) **(Non) Proliferations of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)** - this interest is intertwined with the former one. Although this interest was always part of American national security interest, especially during the Cold War, the 9/11/2001 terror attacks have given a whole new 'life' and meaning to this interest. The need to prevent WMD proliferation in rogue states or states which support terrorism, such as Iraq and Iran, is based on the fear of those weapons getting into the hands of terror organizations<sup>136</sup>, who will not be deterred of using it.

When defining the new strategic interest as perceived by Washington in the post Cold War Middle East, Stephens emphasizes the following three interests:

- (1) The threat of radical states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea, which manifested itself to the direction of nuclear proliferation;
- (2) The increasing appeal in the region of Islamic fundamentalism - which posed a threat to the more traditional conservative leaders of the Middle East who provided America's traditional basis of support, and also posed a threat regarding Islamic terrorist organization against Western targets.<sup>137</sup>
- (3) The threat of Islamic terrorist organizations against Western targets globally<sup>138</sup>.

Hence, It seems that much of the American national interests which existed during the Cold War have remained post Cold War. The new administrations that led America post Cold-War and which now had the time and ability to focus on interests other than

---

<sup>136</sup> *Id.*

<sup>137</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, at pp. 230-231.

<sup>138</sup> *Id.*, at p. 231.

the Soviet ones, *created new strategies to achieve those interests*. Moreover, new global situations which America encountered as a nation and as a super-power led to the creation of new interests and new strategies, which were shaped differently by each administration and its own world view.

### **Does Israel have a role in US interest in the new world order?**

In order to prove Israel's relevancy to US interests in the new world order, Israeli politicians increasingly argued that the country could now play a new strategic role in the Middle East by containing the forces of radicalism and maintaining the status quo in a region where religious militancy was on the rise. Stephens claims that this appeared to be a convincing argument because the American administration still considered its interests to be under threat. It was just *the nature of the threat that had change*<sup>139</sup>. There are two conflicting approaches to this important question:

#### **Steven R. David vs. Edward N. Luttwak**

**Steven R. David** (hereinafter: David) represents the voice claiming that *not only that the US has interests in the Middle East post Cold War, but that in order to maintain those interests, it has an interest in supporting Israel*. In his piece "The continuing importance of America in the Middle East after the Cold War"<sup>140</sup>, that was published in 1997, David predicts that the Cold War will not end American interests in the Middle East due to the following hypotheses:

- 1) Instability and warfare will continue to characterize much of the Middle East.

---

<sup>139</sup> *Id.*, at p. 230.

<sup>140</sup> Steven R. David, *The continuing importance of America in the Middle East after the Cold War*, at pp. 94-106, in: *U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS*, Edited by Gabriel Sheffer, FRANK CASS.

- 2) The instability will threaten key American interests including access to oil and concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons.
- 3) American ties with Israel will be maintained regardless of security considerations.<sup>141</sup>

All three hypotheses are relevant to understand David's approach towards US foreign policy in the Middle East, as each one refers to and raises different American interests as well as analyzes the continuing roots for the instability in the Middle East post Cold War.

Although all hypotheses are relevant to the understanding of predictive American foreign policy in the Middle East, I will focus on the third part as it relates to US foreign policy towards Israel. In the third part David asserts that American interests will *continue* to be engaged by Middle Eastern developments because the U.S. will continue to be concerned about Israel for three reasons<sup>142</sup>:

- 1) *The mutual values shared by the states* - support for democratic regimes, admiration for Israel, constant threat to Israel's security regardless of peace process.
- 2) *The pro-Israel lobby* which is widely believed to be among the most effective in the US.
- 3) *The US will continue to maintain strategic interests with Israel* for the following reasons -
  - a. Concerns that will engage US such as supply of oil, the spread of WMD, radical Islam and the impact of terrorism will remain.

---

<sup>141</sup> *Id.*, at p. 94.

<sup>142</sup> *Id.*, at p. 103.

- b. Israel is a strategic ally in times when defense budget declines.
- c. The peace process itself will enhance American interests and engagement in the Middle East.
- d. The US is key external power in the peace negotiations and could well be called upon to provide peacekeeping forces to assist the implementation of an agreement.<sup>143</sup>

To conclude, although the piece was written prior to 9/11/2001, the American interests, according to David, were pretty similar to what they are today. David emphasizes the security interests (WMD, radical Islam) as the guiding interests of American foreign policy in the new millennium. In this foreign policy, he asserts, Israel still has an important role, mainly for strategic reasons.

On the other side of the fence stands **Edward N. Luttwak**, which in his piece Strategic Aspects of US-Israeli Relations<sup>144</sup>, published in 1997, claims that although Israel's great contribution to US interests during the Cold War, Israel's role in the international context post Cold War does not fit the new world - both internally and externally<sup>145</sup>.

The problem according to Luttwak is that although there is no Soviet Union anymore and *Islamic fundamentalism will not replace it*, the *mechanisms* of strategic cooperation are yet to be dismantled, because of various bureaucracies that have included cooperation with Israel in their repertoire and now seek to protect it<sup>146</sup>.

---

<sup>143</sup> *Id.*, at p. 104.

<sup>144</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategic Aspects of US-Israeli Relations*, at pp. 198-211, in: *U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS*, Edited by Gabriel Sheffer, FRANK CASS.

<sup>145</sup> *Id.*, at p. 208.

<sup>146</sup> *Id.*, at p. 210.



Luttwak claims that U.S.-Israel current unique relations are as a result of *inertia* rather than real existing interests.

The fact that there are threats today, claims Luttwak, does not necessarily mean alliances are in order. Now days, Israeli and American policy makers both tend to perceive fundamentalism as a threat to westernizing elites in Islamic countries, their own (and other western) interests in those countries, and even to their own two countries directly. But that consensual threat perception does not in itself constitute the basis of strategic cooperation between the two. Only a further consensus on how to respond to Islamic fundamentalism can do that, and relevant to 1997, Luttwak did not think such perception existed.

It is worth noting that the piece was written prior to 9/11/2001 and prior to the American military involvement within countries in the Middle East.

Luttwak reviews and criticizes the views that support the claim that there is shared consensus perception of response to Islamic fundamentalism:

- 1) *Israel as a democratic role model* - Luttwak asserts that this reason is not fulfilled as Israel is not an important exporter of mass-culture products and also do not maintain the principal of freedom of speech at all cost.<sup>147</sup>
- 2) *Israel as an economic role model for fundamentalist Muslim countries* - American response can only be to favor the general economic development of the relevant countries, and to encourage a more even income distribution with them. Israel's role as an aid-giver, model and market for Islamic countries could only at best be trivial as compared to that of countries like Japan. Moreover,

---

<sup>147</sup> *Id.*, at p. 209.

Israel is excluded by Muslim countries and captured as undesirable partner de facto.<sup>148</sup>

- 3) *Iranian threat (through propaganda and its funding)* - Luttwak claims that while the US has conflicting interests with Iran, Israel has aligning interests, due to their mutual enemy - Iraq.<sup>149</sup>

To conclude, it seems that both David and Luttwak refer to the *same threats*, and thus consider the *same American national interests*. However, it is the *content* and type of strategies that they consider differently - while David still considers Israel as an *ally and a strategic partner* in the new American strategies that deal with security issues in the Middle East (mainly because of aligning interests), Luttwak, on the other hand, asserts that Israel is now *out of the game* mainly for social reasons but also for strategic ones, as the old mechanisms are no longer relevant and Israel *cannot be beneficial* in amending US relations with the Arab-Muslim world<sup>150</sup>.

### ***Core political events which led to American support of Israel based on American national and strategic interests post Cold-War***

#### *Core events according to interviewees*

Ambassador Indyk divides the post Cold-War era into two periods: the first during the 90s and the second post 9/11/2001. Each represents a different American strategy and interests and in each Israel had a strategic role in the eyes of the administration:

---

<sup>148</sup> *Id.*

<sup>149</sup> *Id.*, at p. 210.

<sup>150</sup> It seems that Luttwak did not estimate correctly the evolving situation in the Middle East regarding the Iranian threat towards Israel and the fact that this might align American and Israeli interests.

1) *Strategic shift towards peace process during the 90s'* - after the Cold War the US strategy shifted from alliance (anti-Soviet) to strategic partnership in the *pursuit of peace*. This strategy was initiated in the Madrid Conference (1991), but intensified following the Oslo Accords in 1993.

2) *Israel as a valuable side* - The strategic relationship, claims Indyk, was based on: *Israel giving up territories for peace* and the US minimizing the risks Israel may face (security) as a result.

Indyk emphasizes that when there was no Israel cooperation at that time, such as during the Netanyahu period (1996-1999) a great deal of tension was created between the two countries. The pressure was resolved Netanyahu attended the Wye Summit, between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which the American administration arranged.

3) The terror attacks of 9/11/2001 changed the nature of alliance again, from *advancing peace process* to the interest of "*war on terror*", Indyk asserts. While Mearsheimer and Walt claim that support for Israel is damaging the interests of fighting terrorism, the reality is that the Bush administration *sees it differently* based on the American perspective of "*either you are with us or against us*". Following this perspective, Israel is considered an ally. Another example of strategic alliance based on anti terror-alliance is of Pakistan. Although the US for many years had a very strong policy against Pakistan's non democratic regime and nuclear program (and tests), following 9/11/2001 attacks and Pakistan's strategic and geographic importance, the US has developed a strong alliance with it.

Ambassador Kurtzer have specified two national interests that stand in the basis of US support of Israel throughout the different administrations as -

- 1) Strategic and intelligence interests - as Israel, who is a regionally strong country, has always been a reliable ally in the region, and consistently shared information with the US.
- 2) Promoting democracy and democratic ideas - the fact that Israel is a democracy since its beginning in the region.<sup>151</sup>

Mr. Grossman - identifies the following American national interests today that lie in the basis of the US-Israeli relations:

- 1) *Political instability in the Middle East continues*, claims Grossman. In this unstable region, Israel is a stable, reliable and strong partner and has been an ally of the US for military, medical and intelligence purposes.
- 2) *The terror issue and threat of nuclear proliferation*, which Grossman identifies as the most important issue to the US today.

As an example of American strategic interests that align with Israeli interests, Grossman indicates US 'quiet policy' of "looking the other way" regarding Israel's nuclear abilities. By this, the US supports Israel as a deterrent power in the region.<sup>152</sup>

Mr. Freilich stresses that the US foreign policy being supportive of Israel post Cold War is the result of the following issues:

---

<sup>151</sup> Ambassador Kurtzer's interview, *supra* note 46.

<sup>152</sup> Mr. Grossman's interview, *supra* note 60.

- 1) *The terror and WMD threat as mutual to both countries* - the terror threats and the fear of WMD proliferation in the Middle East are threats that captured a considerable place in US foreign policy. Those new threats and fears are mutual to both countries, argues Freilich.
- 2) *Similar strategies* - In addition, the two countries have unprecedented similar strategic agenda of confronting terror, although the American strategic foreign policy is much broader.
- 3) *Personal Relations improving post cold war* - an additional factor is the improvement of relations between the two countries post Cold War, as President Clinton had created warm relations with Israeli Prime Ministers Rabin and Barak, based on their political affiliation and the fact that they aligned with American initiatives for peace negotiations.
- 4) *9/11/2001 terror attacks and their influence over the Bush administration* - the fact that the terror attacks took place in the midst of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, had an effect on the Bush administration and its relations with Israel.

In this part of the paper, which analyzes US foreign policy towards Israel post Cold War, the interviewees *did not give many examples of specific situations* which mainly revolve around Israel<sup>153</sup>. Rather, they focused on *two cases* which reflect long-periods: one is the *peace process* which lasted throughout the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, and the other is the *9/11/2001 terror attacks* which symbolize the beginning of a new foreign policy for America. In my mind, the reason they gave these examples is

---

<sup>153</sup> This, in opposite to the Cold War period, where most cases mainly revolved around Israel and its conflicts with other Arab countries in the region. In the cases given as an example, such as: Six Days War, 1970 Jordanian crisis, Yom Kippur War and more, the US took the role of an observant or passive participant (Jordanian Crisis), however it was never actively involved.

because post Cold-War America had taken a far *greater role* in the region than it did in the Cold War period. The fact that the American administration took charge, mainly based on its own interests, on the peace process, and later on took charge on regime change following the terror attacks have made the US an active participant, if not initiator, in the situations taking place in the region.

Thus, in the following sub-chapter I will analyze the roots of Clinton and Bush administrations' foreign policy and support towards Israel;

### **The roots of the US administrations support for Israel**

#### **The Clinton administration - pushing the peace process forward**

No president ever came to office with a more promising set of circumstances for promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors that did Bill Clinton, claims Quandt<sup>154</sup>.

Immediately after being elected Clinton tried to get the Arab-Israeli negotiation process back on track and sent Secretary of state Warren Christopher to the Middle East to advance the idea.<sup>155</sup> The American administration was so keened in pushing the Israeli-Arab negotiations back on track that over his four years as Secretary of States, Christopher made some twenty trips to the Middle East in pursuit of a breakthrough<sup>156</sup>. There were several separate fronts for negotiations: Syria, the Palestinians, Jordan and Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon were linked as the first did not allow the latter to conduct direct negotiations with Israel and to have an agreement

---

<sup>154</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 321.

<sup>155</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 324-325.

<sup>156</sup> *Id.*, at p. 324.

without the return of the Golan Heights, and Jordan was not willing to resolve the conflict prior to the Palestinians.

### **The Oslo Accords**

Although the agreement was negotiated in Norway without American substantive role but that of a facilitator, the signing of the Accords was held under Clinton's supervision in the White House which has a symbolic meaning as to the role of the US for both Israelis and Palestinians. However, America's role did not end on the White House loan. After the implementation agreement was signed (Cairo Accord - May 1994) and both Israeli and Palestinians' encountered conflicts and difficulties, both turned to the US for support.<sup>157</sup>

The Oslo process, which led to the signing of the Oslo Accords in which Israel had made both emotional and factual painful concession towards the Palestinians but mostly towards the PLO, which was captured as a terror organization in Israel for so many years, has led to a great deal of appreciation towards Israel and the Israeli leadership by President Clinton, as he emphasized in his book My Life<sup>158</sup>:

*"I asked him (Yitzhak Rabin - O.L-P) why he had decided to support the Oslo talks and the agreement they produced. He explained to me that he had come to realize that the territory Israel had occupied since the 1967 war was no longer necessary to its security and, in fact, was a source of insecurity. He said that the Intifada that had broken out some years before had shown that occupying territory full of angry people did not make Israel more secure, but made it more vulnerable to attacks from within..."*

---

<sup>157</sup> *Id.*, at p. 330.

<sup>158</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2004.

*Over time Rabin's analysis of the meaning of the West Bank to Israel would become widely accepted among pro-peace Israelis, but in 1993 it was novel, insightful, and courageous. I had admired Rabin even before meeting him in 1992, but that day, watching him speak at the ceremony and listening to his argument for peace, I had seen the greatness of his leadership and his spirit. I had never met anyone quite like him, and I was determined to help him achieve his dream of peace.*"<sup>159</sup>

### **Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement**

Immediately after the Oslo Accord was signed, Israel and Jordan had initiated an outline agreement that was to serve as a framework of peace negotiations. With help from the Americans, the two sides worked out the text of a peace treaty<sup>160</sup>. As President Clinton described: "*on July 25<sup>th</sup> King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin came to town to sign the Washington declaration, formally ending the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel and committing themselves to negotiating a full peace agreement...The next day, the two leaders spoke to a joint session of Congress, and the three of US held a press conference to reaffirm our commitment to a comprehensive peace involving all the parties to the Middle East conflict.*"<sup>161</sup>

However, as reflected in Clinton's book describing the administration's involvement in promoting the peace process at that point (years 1993-1995), the administration's role was far from only 'facilitating', or providing a good advice and direction for the parties' problems. The administration was actively *involved* in trying to resolve the problems

---

<sup>159</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*, *supra* note 158, at p. 545.

<sup>160</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 333.

<sup>161</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*, *supra* note 158, at p. 609.



that were barriers to negotiations at the time; when Hezbollah's terror attacks against Jews in Argentina, Panama and London occurred close by in time to the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, attacks which had an effect on the probability of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, Clinton had called Syrian President Assad to tell him about the Israeli-Jordanian announcement, to ask him to support it, and to assure him that Israel and the United States were still committed to successful negotiations with his country<sup>162</sup>.

### **The Camp David 2000 Summit and Clinton's disappointment**

This Summit represents, in my mind, the pinnacle of the American attempts to achieve a finalized deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians which would provide security to the Israelis and a homeland to the Palestinians. As an Israeli, I reflect on it as an Israeli pinnacle as well - the most sincere (and last) attempt for a finalized resolution, which the Israeli government, headed by Prime Minister Barak, had tried to achieve with the Palestinians.

In Camp David, Maryland, the Americans facilitated, mediated and guided the negotiations for several weeks. Much has been written regarding the reasons for the failure of the negotiations, from people who actively took part in the negotiations, such as President Clinton, Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and the special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross, to others who had a secondary roles, such as Clayton Swisher<sup>163</sup> and Ron Pundik<sup>164</sup>, who was one of the two initiators of the Oslo negotiations and Accords.

---

<sup>162</sup> *Id.*, at p. 610.

<sup>163</sup> Clayton Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process*, Nation Books 2004

From both Clinton's description in his book<sup>165</sup>, as well as Ben-Ami's description in Ha'aretz newspaper interview<sup>166</sup>, it is apparent the two reflect on the refusal of the Palestinian leader to submit a serious, valid, counter offer to Clinton's suggestions, as one of the main sources for the failure of the summit. As Clinton describes:

*"On the first day, I tried to get Arafat past his grievances to focus on the work ahead and to get Barak to agree on how to move through the issues...Arafat hadn't come with a set of negotiation points; this was all strange territory to him...Now if we were going to get this done, Arafat had some compromising of his own to do on concrete matters..."*<sup>167</sup>

*When the Palestinians didn't offer Barak anything in return for his moves on Jerusalem and territory, I went to see Arafat...It was a tough meeting, and it ended with my telling Arafat that I would end that talks and say he had refused to negotiate unless he gave me something to take back to Barak...After a while Arafat gave me a letter that seemed to say that if he was satisfied with the Jerusalem question, I could make the final call on how much land the Israelis kept for settlements and what constituted a fair land swap. I took the letter to Barak and spent a lot of time talking to him...eventually Barak agreed that Arafat's letter might mean something..."*<sup>168</sup>

*On the ninth day, I gave Arafat my best shot again. Again he said no. Israel had gone much further than he had, and he wouldn't even embrace their moves as*

---

<sup>164</sup> Ron Pundik, *Camp David 2: Israel's Misconceived Approach*, Peres Center for Peace, available at: <http://www.peres-center.org/media/Upload/229.pdf>

<sup>165</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 911-916.

<sup>166</sup> Ari Shavit, *The Day the Peace Died*, Ha'aretz, 9.14.2001. Translated from Hebrew. available (Hebrew) at: <http://www.7th-day.co.il/mehumot/hayom.htm>

<sup>167</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*, *supra* note 158, at p. 912.

<sup>168</sup> *Id.*, at p. 914.

*the basis for future negotiations. Again I called several Arab leaders for help...<sup>169</sup>*

*Arafat had wanted to continue the negotiation, and on more than one occasion had acknowledged that he was unlikely to get a future Israeli government or American team so committed to peace. It was hard to know why he had moved so little...Arafat was famous for waiting until the very last minute to make a decision...<sup>170</sup>*

Although there are different assertions as to why Arafat did not, or could not for that matter, accept the Israeli proposal even not as a starting point for future agreement, it seems that his refusal and his quick turning into the other option - violence - had created clear disappointment and distrust with him among the American Administration. The lesson was learned from the point of view of the American administration, and it was passed on to the Bush administration.

### **Lessons learned: The US role in the Israeli-Arab peace process**

The Clinton administration came into power while there was a momentum in the Middle East for the peace initiative; not only that Clinton was committed to the idea, but more importantly he had an Israeli partner, Prime Minister Rabin - who was willing to make painful concessions on behalf of his people for the price of acceptance, security and peace, as well as a willing (at the time) Palestinian leader - Arafat, a Jordanian partner and an Egyptian assistance.

---

<sup>169</sup> *Id.*, at p. 915.

<sup>170</sup> *Id.*, at p. 916.

Throughout these years, the United States had ensured its role as the active mediator between Israel and the Arab countries. It did so willingly, as a continuation of the role it took upon itself starting from the 70s.

While there is a claim that the American *active involvement* in the Israeli-Arab peace process was too active, thus harming American national interests (such as security), there is an opposite claim according to which the US policy have been *too passive*; in his book, Quandt asserts that although the many peace negotiations during 1993-1994, the Clinton administration approach of letting Israel set the pace was wrong. As time is an essence in the Middle East, the United States did little to impart its own sense of urgency. On the Syrian front in particular, it was unable to close a deal that seemed ripe for the making. Nothing happened in Clinton's first term comparable to the Kissinger Shuttles, Camp David, or Baker's organization of the Madrid Conference<sup>171</sup>.

Indeed, the Clinton administration was not able to produce a viable, long-standing peace between both Israel and the Palestinians (as the Oslo Accords failed under implementation) and Israel and the Syrians. However, I think much credit is being given to the US administration's power to influence the involved countries, their leaders and even constituencies.

The peace process between Israel and the Palestinian authority started with a positive note, but due to events which the administration couldn't control (Rabin's assassination, Palestinian terror attacks within Israeli recognized territories, hardships of implementation and more) it had failed. Regarding Syria - according to Professor

---

<sup>171</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 340.

Reuben Miller from the University of Colorado, Denver<sup>172</sup>, throughout the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 there were serious Israeli and American attempts to resume negotiations with the Syrians: in 1994 and 1995 the Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Rabin negotiated seriously with the Syrians. On 1996 Shimon Peres and Uri Savir met with a Syrian delegation and tried to reach an agreement with them. Similar efforts were made in Washington later on between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk Al-Shaara. On December 1999 and the beginning of 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to Washington to negotiate with the Syrians headed by Faruk Al-Shaara. On a couple of occasions, back in July 1994 and again in March 2000, Clinton and Assad met in Geneva. At other times, the Syrian leader met with US Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright and other diplomats<sup>173</sup>.

### **The Bush administration - back to strategic alignment?**

What are the guiding lines that led President Bush's foreign policy?

Quandt had defined the new elements of the foreign policy as follows:

- (1) *The expectation of continuity* - such as between Bush Senior and Clinton
  - might not be appropriate in the new millennium. Several new factors had to be taken into account:
    - i. The end of the Cold War.
    - ii. The old policies of containment and deterrence and alliance formation had been subjected to critical scrutiny; some felt that

---

<sup>172</sup> Reuben Miller, *The Israeli-Syrian Negotiation*, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Fall 2000, at pp. 117-139, available at: [http://mUSE.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean\\_quarterly/v011/11.4miller.pdf](http://mUSE.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v011/11.4miller.pdf)

<sup>173</sup> *Id.*, at pp. 117-118.

American is too assertive and others saw a moment of American primacy that should not be let slip.

(2) *Neo-cons*: the presence in the Bush administration of a number of senior figures who had sharply defined views on American foreign policy. Their voices reflected the neoconservative agenda, based on an almost missionary sense that American power should be used not only for the classical purposes of defense but also to spread American values of democracy and freedom. That Agenda had a direct effect on the Middle East.<sup>174</sup>

However, the new perception of foreign policy did not revolve around the Israeli-Palestinian broken peace process. According to Stephens, for the first eight months of President Bush's term in office, the US-Israeli relationship was lukewarm as the President focused his attention on domestic affairs. In early 2001, the administration had shown little interest in the escalating Intifada despite the increasing morality rate amongst both Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>175</sup>

Quandt asserts similar things. However, he claims the Middle East featured prominently on the new administration's agenda. There were multiple issues stemming from the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Even if the conflict could not be resolved right away, the US could not remain silent in the face of the ongoing violence, the continued occupation and construction of settlements by Israel, and the requests for an active American role by a number of key Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi

---

<sup>174</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at pp. 387-388.

<sup>175</sup> Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, *supra* note 32, at p. 248.

Arabia, and Jordan, all of whom could be threatened by the real collapse of the peace process. And then there were the constant requests for aid from Israel and from some Arab regimes, especially Egypt and Jordan. In addition, there were issues of how to deal with Saddam Hussein, sanctions against Iraq, and its presumed programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Iran was also a topic of concern.<sup>176</sup>

Regarding the peace process there was not much Bush could do or wanted to do, following American interests and a simple logic; when he became president things had already fallen apart. Camp David had failed, the Palestinians had launched a new intifada and Ariel Sharon, a hardliner from the Likud Party, had replaced Barak. Having watched Mr. Clinton bash against a brick wall, the new president was reluctant to dive straight after him<sup>177</sup>. The disappointment with Arafat which initiated in the end of Clinton's presidency was emphasized from the beginning of Bush's term. In addition, Bush decided to give a card Blanch to newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, although his past hard-line and morally questionable record<sup>178</sup>.

However, quite quickly Bush reshaped his decision as the escalation of violence between the two sides roared, and sent his Secretary of State, Colleen Powell, to the

---

<sup>176</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra* note 47, at p. 389.

<sup>177</sup> "The unblest peacemaker - "America is paying for the crimes of Israel." Discuss, special report America and Israel, *The Economist* print edition, Oct 4<sup>th</sup> 2001.

<sup>178</sup> *Id.*, at p. 390; In his book, Quandt describes President's Bush's approach towards Arafat and towards the failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process based on a National Security Council meeting, in which it was claimed that Bush had said the following things:

according to Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, who was present, Bush commented on the recent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations:

"We're going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on the ME conflict.

We're going to tilt it back toward Israel. And we're going to be consistent. Clinton overreached, and it fell apart. That's why we're in trouble", Bush said. "If the two sides don't want peace, there no way we can force them".

Then the president halted. "Anybody here ever met Sharon?"

After a moment, Powell sort of raised his hand. Yes, he had. "I'm not going to go by past reputations when it comes to Sharon. I'm going to take him at face value. We'll work on a relationship based on how things go."

He'd met Sharon briefly, Bush said, when they had flown over Israel in a helicopter on a visit in December 1998. "Just saw him that one time. We flew over the Palestinian camps." Bush said sourly. "Looked real bad down there. I don't see much we can do over there at this point. I think it's time to pull out of that situation."

Middle East to see whether new initiatives will be welcomed. This had taken place during June 2001, three months before 9/11 attacks.<sup>179</sup>

### **American foreign policy post 9/11/2001 - a turmoil**

In my mind, the US NSS from September 2002 reflects best the new strategic path which, from now on, led the way of American foreign policy. The two important factors which served as guiding lines of the new foreign policy were:

- (1) **Democracy requirement** - according to chapter 4 of the US NSS, 'Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflict', American support is guaranteed to the Palestinians if they "*embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption and firmly reject terror*". By that the Palestinians "can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state".<sup>180</sup> Regarding Israel, it is mentioned in the NSS that Israel has a stake in a democratic Palestinian state. However, the text conditions the withdrawal from the occupied territories with a progress towards security. In other words, the administration does not have high expectations from Israel, as long as the Palestinian violence continues.
- (2) **Preemptive self defense replacing deterrence** - as mentioned in p. 67 above, this strategy, which is referred to under chapter 5 'Prevent our Enemies from Attacking US, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction'<sup>181</sup>, reflects another substantial idea which lead the administration following 9/11/2001. This strategy, which broadens the borders of legitimacy of preemptive self-

---

<sup>179</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at p. 392.

<sup>180</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, at p. 9.

<sup>181</sup> *Id.*, at p. 12.



defense, lies on the notion of threat to freedom and to democratic values as well as on the notion of threat from non-conventional weapons getting into the hands of terror groups.

According to Quandt, two camps were formed following the disaster of 9/11/2001: the first led by Powell who was lobbying hard to complement the call for a cease-fire between Israel to the Palestinians with what he termed as a “political horizon”. The other camp, defined by Quandt as the neo-cons, followed the agenda that now, the US should show strength and that starting to court after Arab states by advancing peace process is a sign of weakness.<sup>182</sup> Certainly the press photos showing citizens of Arab and Muslim countries (including Palestinians) celebrating in the streets of their countries following September 11<sup>th</sup> terror attacks also did some harm among the administration personnel.

President Bush decided to follow Powell’s recommendations at the time, based on the rationale that as part of the war on terror, the US would need to create a broad coalition with Arab and Muslim countries. In early November 2001, Bush carried a meaningful speech in the United Nations, in which he put forth his vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace. By this, claims Quandt, Bush had dared to express in words what his predecessors, including Clinton, had not.<sup>183</sup>

**Two countries facing terrorism: America being passive in Israeli ‘Defensive Shield’ Operation:**

---

<sup>182</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at pp. 393-394.

<sup>183</sup> *Id.*, at p. 395.

However, as the agenda of “war on terror” increased within the American administration following the seemingly victory in Afghanistan and the tough policy towards Iraq, the confidence in Arafat, who continued to be passive regarding terror attacks conducted within Israel, disappeared<sup>184</sup>. This approach was finalized following the bloody month of March in which 11 suicide attacks were conducted against Israelis, including Hamas horrific suicide bombing in Netanya on a Passover night in which 30 people were murdered and 140 people injured<sup>185</sup>. This time, claims Quandt, there was no call for restraint; on March 29 Sharon authorized operation “Defensive Shield” in which Israeli troops re-occupied cities which served as haven for terrorists in the Palestinian Authority. On April 4, 2002 President Bush said: “*America recognizes Israel’s right to defend itself from terror*”. This approach reflected the new administration’s NSS that was published only 5 months later. That was a signal to Sharon that he was relatively free to take any approach he chose to confront the violence coming from the Palestinian authority.

Ambassador Indyk relates the ‘card blanch’ given to Sharon at the time to the public pressure on Bush by the Jewish Lobby<sup>186</sup>. However, I find that it is possible that the decision not to pressure Sharon to withdrawal and the latitude given to him in order to confront terror cells within the Palestinian Authority simply aligned with the new American strategic and the new administration’s agenda, both were a result of 9/11.

### **Lessons learned**

---

<sup>184</sup> *Id.*, at p. 396 and at p. 398.

<sup>185</sup> *Id.*, at p. 398. The number of casualties from the Netanya terror attack are taken from Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), available at - [http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/sib3\\_04/park\\_c.htm](http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/sib3_04/park_c.htm)

<sup>186</sup> Martin Indyk’s interview, *supra note* 50.

The 'hands off' policy of the US towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is criticized by Quandt<sup>187</sup>. In addition, the US foreign policy of support towards Israel following the 9/11/2001 terror attacks is under scrutiny. Quandt asserts that this policy is wrong, as it damages the relationship between the US and Arab-Muslim countries and breaks the chances of having a large coalition with them in the war on terror.<sup>188</sup>

Pursuing the continuation of negotiations, or at least some form of discussion, might have served US interests better, as it would have been a sign of its authentic attempts to reach regional stability. However, would such an active involvement really made a difference - nationally (Israel-PA) and regionally (Middle East in general)? I do not think so, as both sides pursued violence methods at that stage (2001-2004), which might have even harm the US foreign interests if it would have interfered. Moreover, Clinton's public disappointment with Arafat's leadership and willingness to end the conflict transferred well to the Bush administration. This notion finalized on March 2002 when bloody terror attacks were conducted against Israeli citizens within Israel. By that time the new American strategies (of war on terror, preemption and "with us or against us") were formed and enacted in Iraq. The American foreign policy, which put less emphasis on the need for a large coalition (as Quandt himself mentioned) but more emphasis on its new mentioned strategies, aligned with Israel's policies which also followed "the war on terror" on its own territory. Thus, the administration, which truly considered Israel to be an ally (both *strategically*<sup>189</sup> and *morally*), reflected on Israel's policies and behavior as compatible to the situation it was in.

---

<sup>187</sup> William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, *supra note 47*, at pp. 408-409.

<sup>188</sup> *Id.*, at p. 410.

<sup>189</sup> As emphasized throughout the paper.

***Core political events which led to conflict between the US and Israel based on American national and strategic interests***

The Clinton and Bush administrations represent improvement between Israel and US relations. Both administrations felt they have had in the Israeli side government that they could work with, based on their own policies and agendas - Clinton and Rabin created a special relationship, Clinton and Barak have also created a stable relationship based on Barak's willingness to 'close a deal' with the Palestinians. Bush had also created a positive relationship with Prime Minister Sharon. However, *was it a 'holly alliance'* as some try to define it? Weren't different interests playing their part in the relationship between the two? Did the US follow Israel blindly, just because the latter 'wanted so'? Several cases from the last decade show, that when Israel's actions did not fit the administrations' agenda, foreign policies and perspectives, they have pressured Israel to follow American lead.

**Core events according to interviewees**

Ambassador Indyk gives 2 instances in which American interests overcame Israeli interests - the first from the second Intifada while Sharon considered killing Arafat and the Americans objected. The second regards Israel's will to start engaging in talks with the Syrians and Americans veto.<sup>190</sup>

Mr. Grossman - gave the following situations as exemplifying when US interests conflict with Israel's:

- 1) Israel's weapons deal with China - which the US harshly objected to and eventually prevented.

---

<sup>190</sup> Ambassador Indyk's interview, *supra note 50*.

- 2) The settlements issue - the US and Israel have 'agreed to disagree' over the settlements. Grossman stressed that the disagreement over settlements reached its highest peak in the Bush (Senior) presidency when hardliner Shamir was Israel's Prime Minister. The conflict ended when Rabin came to power with a peaceful agenda.<sup>191</sup>

Mr. Freilich - mentioned the following situations as exemplifying conflict between American and Israel's interests:

- 1) The peace process - in which the US expects Israel to make painful concession which Israel is not willing to make.
- 2) The American pressure not to react militarily to Palestinians attacks - although it is not clear to which events Freilich refers.<sup>192</sup>

***Analysis of core events which led to American denunciation of Israel based on national and strategic interests***

*Something has to come out of the negotiations*

Although peace negotiations were first and foremost dependant on Israeli and Palestinian concessions, the results were very much up to the administration's convincing and pressure which was activated upon the leaders *during* the negotiations. Although no doubt the US wanted negotiations to succeed for the sake of the peoples and the region, it also wanted it to succeed for the sake of US itself and for the sake of American interests; world prestige as mediator, better profile in the

---

<sup>191</sup> Mr. Grossman's interview, *supra* note 60.

<sup>192</sup> Mr. Freilich's interview, *supra* note 52.

eyes of people in Muslim and Arab countries and stability and involvement within the Middle East. Succeeding in forming an agreement, required serious, long persuasion from US leaders towards both leaders to make concessions that their constituencies back home might not agree with and accept. As this paper focuses on Israeli-US relations I would focus on the American pressure on Israeli leaders. In addition, I agree with Ambassador Indyk's assertion that it was Israel who was required to make the tangible concessions on the matters of territory, Jerusalem and the question of 'right of return'.

### **The Wye Agreement**

The goal of the Wye River Conference, held on October 1998, was to bring the peace negotiations between the Israelis, now headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinians, led by Chairman Arafat, on track, and to continue the implementation of the Oslo Accords.

Netanyahu was a right wing hardliner, who was elected based on a hard-line right wing agenda following increased Palestinian terror attacks within Israel during 1995 and 1996. He arrived at the Wye Plantation promising to his constituencies back home that he would do everything in his power to advance the release of Jonathan Pollard, a Jewish American citizen who, while serving as in the US Navy's Intelligence sold information to Israel's Mossad, as well as promising not to release Palestinians prisoners with 'blood on their hands' (committed murders and injuries based on political motive). These two things were on the Israeli public agenda.

During the negotiations, Netanyahu, who was dealing with the issue of release of prisoners with 'blood on their hands', conditioned his agreement to their release with

Clinton's promise that he would agree to release Pollard if that what it takes to make peace<sup>193</sup>. Although Clinton's initial promise, when the time was right he refused (following a talk with Sandy Berger and George Tenet). Netanyahu, who was left with one promise at hand to make to his constituencies, eventually caved in on it as well, after much persuasion from Dennis Ross and Madeleine Albright<sup>194</sup>.

### **The Camp David Summit (2000)**

During the Camp David Summit Israel's Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, increased the concessions he was willing to make towards the Palestinians. Although immense political pressure from home regarding the magnitude of concessions, and the fact that terror attacks have not ceased after the Wye Agreement, Barak was willing to reach a finalized agreement with the Palestinians. In addition, the American pressure following Arafat's demands regarding the issue Jerusalem, have led Barak to agree to concessions which the Israeli public at the time was not willing to make - on the question of sovereignty of eastern Jerusalem;

As described by Ben-Ami, Barak arrived to the summit without mentioning concessions in Jerusalem<sup>195</sup>, as he knew the Israeli public was not in favor for such a move. However, during negotiations Barak agreed to have a Palestinian Capital in East Jerusalem, sovereignty over the Muslims and Christian quarters of the Old City and the outer neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. In response, Arafat told Clinton he demands to have sovereignty over all of east Jerusalem, including Temple Mount. As apparent from Clinton's description, although the Palestinian refusal to any Israeli offer

---

<sup>193</sup> Clinton, *My Life*, *supra note 158*, at p. 818.

<sup>194</sup> *Id.*, at p. 819.

<sup>195</sup> Ari Shavit, *The Day the Peace Died*, *supra note 164*.

to them, the administration allowed for the discussions to continue and eventually Barak agreed that the Palestinians will get effective control over the Temple Mount and all East Jerusalem. Arafat did not accept that as well and the negotiations broke.<sup>196</sup>

It could be argued that more than the sides (and in this instance, especially the Palestinian side) were ready to reach a finalized resolution that would include concessions to all the problematic issues, the mediating active side, led by Clinton, wanted to reach that deal regardless of both sides' interests and more importantly, constituencies.

### **Lessons learned**

The US administration played an important role as an active mediator in both instances. While it had considered both sides' interests it clearly had its interests at hand, as otherwise it would not have been so enthused to try, once and again, to engage both sides, even if reluctant at talks which led to concessions that at times were unacceptable by both Israeli and Palestinian publics. The result was that these negotiations which produced agreements were not implemented and kept by the leaders themselves for long and both parties resumed to violence again.

### **The Israeli Arms sales to China**

Israel, which is one of the world's largest arms exporters, had entered into disputes with the US administration, several times, over sell of arms to China.

---

<sup>196</sup> Clinton, *My Life*, *supra note 158*, at p. 915



As the American interest was to prevent China's high-level arming, as it imposes a threat to the US and to its interests (such as protection of Taiwan), it had imposed, twice, sanctions on Israel after a dispute over Israel's sale of different arms to China.

On 2000 Israel had cancelled a deal with China regarding the sale of 'Falcon' spying jet planes, following American pressure to cancel the deal.<sup>197</sup>

The tensions over the attempted sale did not cease there. On May 2005 the Pentagon had frozen Israel's planned participation in a project developing advanced fighter planes (as well as frozen any strategic cooperation with Israel for almost a year), due to what the Pentagon considered an Israeli move to supply Beijing with spare parts of Israeli attack drones which originated from the US.<sup>198</sup>

As a result, the US administration made 3 demands from Israel:

- 1) The transfer of information regarding more than 60 security deals conducted with China in past years
- 2) Israel would be required to submit to the American a specific examination of the Israeli supervision system regarding arms sale and export control.
- 3) The creation of an American-Israeli MOU regarding the sale of weapons which will increase the coordination among countries on arms sale.<sup>199</sup>

---

<sup>197</sup> Ze'ev Shif, *The Security Crisis with US increases: Demands Israel to increase the supervision over weapons export and increases sanctions*, Ha'aretz, June 23, 2005. Translated from Hebrew. Available (Hebrew) at:

<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=587226&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0>

<sup>198</sup> *Tensions Over Israeli Arms Sales to China*, BuSinessWeek online, May 2, 2005, available at:

[http://www.bUSinessweek.com/magazine/content/05\\_18/b3931083\\_mz015.htm](http://www.bUSinessweek.com/magazine/content/05_18/b3931083_mz015.htm)

And: Cornal Urquhart, *US acts over Israeli arms sales to China*, The Guardian, Monday June 13, 2005, available at:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1505209,00.html>

<sup>199</sup> Ze'ev Shif, *The Security Crisis with US increases: Demands Israel to increase the supervision over weapons export and increases sanctions*, *supra note* 195.

**Lessons learned**

These conflicts show that the US is not hesitant to use its economic and strategic leverage in order to pressure Israel to cease from conducting in a way which might threaten American interests however beneficial to Israeli interests. These political high pressures, coming from administration officials such as Douglas Feith, who is known for his political support of Israel, prove the point that Ambassador Indyk was making according to which when American interests overcome Israeli ones (security vs. financial), Israel will follow American interests (however not willingly).

Moreover, these examples show that the American administration is not hesitant in using harsh methods, including security and financial sanctions, towards Israel when its national interests may be harmed.

**Israeli-Syrian negotiation prospect**

In the recent Lebanon war (July-August 2006) between Israel and the Hezbollah, the American administration has clearly taken Israel's side. Unlike the former Lebanon war (1982) in which Reagan's administration pressed Israel to reach a cease-fire, in this instance, the Bush administration supported Israel's attacks and actually tried to 'get more time' for Israel in the international arena so it would 'finish the job it had started'. The reason for such a policy is clear: it aligned with the administration foreign policy agenda which reflected on Iran as part of the axis of evil, as well as with the administration's reflection on Syria as a country who is harboring terrorism. As the Hezbollah considered a terror organization and the long arm of Iran, the US favored an Israeli militaristic move which has the potential of harming and weakening Iran. In addition, the long history of the US with the Hezbollah (example: 1983 Hezbollah

attacks on US Marines barracks in Lebanon) also strengthened US support of Israel in its war against the Hezbollah.

Although Israel had harmed the Hezbollah by killing many of their activists, as well as damaging their militaristic facilities, the war did not end with Israel's utter victory. Israel, too, had suffered from rockets launched by Hezbollah to Israeli cities, the Israeli population was affected by the Hezbollah threat, many soldiers were killed while fighting in Lebanon and the Hezbollah was not really deterred from leaving South Lebanon, its home-base.

Following the end of war Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, gave interviews to the press, reflecting on his will to reach a peace agreement with Israel<sup>200</sup>.

During the last decade Israel responded positively and with interest to some of the Syrian positive statements regarding peace talks; as was the case with Rabin who conducted negotiations with the Syrians, and Barak who negotiated with the Syrians in Shepherdstown under American mediation.

Although there was an Israeli interest in trying to advance negotiations with Syria, as the latter was captured as the key to weakening the Hezbollah and the arms transfer from Iran to Lebanon, Israel chose to publicly reject that option for now.

Israel's approach aligns with the American foreign policy which have tried and succeeded in isolating Assad and Syria following the latter's involvement in the murder of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri as well as following Syria's public alliance with Iran.

---

<sup>200</sup> Yoav Stern, *Assad: Peace talks with Israel could be completed in 6 months*, Haaretz correspondent, and The Associated Press, 2 October 2006, available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/769460.html>

The American influence over Israel is apparent; Israel's Internal Security Minister, Avi Dichter gave a statement following his recent meeting with US NSC advisor, Steve Hadley, in which he placed three conditions for resuming negotiations with the Syrians. The conditions were similar to the American ones, which are: the closing of terror organization offices in Damascus, the cease of support for Hezbollah and *intervening in internal Lebanese affairs and the prevention of entrance of terrorists from Syria to Iraq.*<sup>201</sup>

This Israeli response, which was embraced by Israeli officials, has raised criticism in Israel, as some reflected on it as an opportunity to neutralize one of the future threats to Israel's security.<sup>202</sup>

### **Lessons learned**

While it is far from being clear whether Israel would have responded positively to such a Syrian statement if it was not for American pressure and interests, the additional question that arises is whether Israel is also paying a political price for aligning its interests with American interests which, today, takes a hard line versus Syria.

---

<sup>201</sup> Shmuel Rosner, *The US is objecting to a separate Israeli-Syrian track*, Ha'aretz (through WALLA!), 20 October 2006. Translated from Hebrew. available at:

<http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/15/993231>

<sup>202</sup> Danny Yatom and Moshe Amirav, *The Golan in the role of Sharm*, Ha'aretz, 7 October 2006, available at:

<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/770552.html>

---

## Conclusion

---

So how the US foreign policy is created - past and present - regarding Israel? What is the basis for its decision making? Is it based on rational thinking, led by American national concerns and interests? Or does it follow an unrealistic guiding-line, which derails it from true American interests?

As US foreign policy increasingly comes under scrutiny world wide following the US invasion to Afghanistan and especially to Iraq, the political and academic voices claiming that the US support of Israel drives it away from the path it *should* take grow louder than ever.

This kind of claim requires serious, in-depth examination and analysis. Claiming that by supporting Israel the US does not follow its true realistic interests, and pointing blaming fingers for this support (and other actions US takes in the Middle East), towards the Jewish Lobby ignores the complex sets of interests and considerations that were considered by the different Administrations leading the American people throughout the years.

In contrast to the generic accusation, I raised two sub hypotheses - first: when the US supports Israel it does so mainly based on its own interests, and second: when the US does not support Israel, it also does so based on its interests. Throughout the paper I have examined whether my hypotheses have bases, whether the different administrations have followed a consistent line of interests and whether the American foreign policy towards Israel during the period of the Cold War was much different than it is today.

It is not. Indeed, during the Cold War the national US interests were clearer than they are today, that is mainly the result of the dissolve of the Soviet Union and the threat it imposed on American interests. Yet, most of the interests which led the US during the Cold War have simply remained relevant - oil, stability in the Middle East, advancing a peace process between Israel and Arab States, proliferation of WMD and terrorism. What have changed, to a certain extent, are the strategies used and the emphasis given to those interests.

The emphasis given to the different interests, and the strategies laid-out to achieve them are typically formed by the President, by his administration and also by external circumstances (such as security threats, wars, etc.) While President Carter's attitude towards Israel came out of his focus on conflict resolution between Israel and Egypt, President Reagan focused on Israel as a great asset in weakening the Soviets. At the same time, Reagan did not hesitate to sell AWACS to the Saudis while it was viewed as a clear security threat to Israel. All in the name of American interests in the region.

The end of the Cold War did not terminate Israel's importance in the Middle East, at least not in the eyes of President Clinton. As his main foreign policy goal was to achieve peace in the Middle East in order to promote regional stability (and also acquire American world-wide prestige as a mediator), he needed willing sides, and he found them, mainly, as examined, in the Israeli leadership (Rabin and Barak). It can be claimed that the Clinton period is also reflective of Israel acting in contrast to its security interests and in contrast to the public opinion, due to the American consistent

pressure in pursuing peace with what is seen as the enemy (e.g., Netanyahu's Wye Summit and Barak's Jerusalem concession).

The George W. Bush administration also brought with it a shift in emphasis on U.S. interests - from President Clinton's pursuit of peace in the Middle East which was shattered into pieces in Camp David - to President Bush's "war on terror" and "either with us or against us" strategies. Following the current administration perspective and strategies, clearly Israel has an important role in the Middle East as Israel is, according to the administration, on the "with us" side. Whether this strategy makes sense or not is one thing, however the fact of the matter is that this is the *realist* perception of the administration. Thus, consistent with its agenda, the administration vetoes Israel's willingness to negotiate with Syria and vetoes Israel's willingness to sell weapons to the Chinese.

In conclusion, I think that the American foreign policy - its formation, guidelines and leading interests are the products of the relevant administration and especially the President, as this is the one area (unlike domestic) that he can craft according to personal perspectives.

Although I do believe that realistic interests are not the only mechanism leading the US to support Israel, I also do not disregard their importance, as they are the leading force in the formation of the policies. Indeed, the friendship that has emerged between the two countries is unique, and it is maintained and advanced *also* by the work of the Jewish lobby. However, the basis to it all, in past and present, lies within the American

interests and the way that American presidents over the years personally believed they could best be fulfilled.



---

## Appendix A: Interview Summaries

---

### *Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer*

Introduction: I focus in my thesis on the M&W preliminary claim that currently there are no valid US national interests that lead to support of Israel.

My thesis' goal is to examine this claim and see whether it is valid, in my hypothesis I make to arguments which are:

- 1) when the US supported Israel - during CW and post CW it was based on its own interests, and these interests aligned with Israel's interests
- 2) there were many occasions - during CW and post CW - in which the US national interests did not align with Israel's interests and thus the US did not support Israel.

I asked Ambassador Kurtzer for his input, whether he thinks this is correct and if he can give me examples of his own experience from situations of support and conflict -

Amb. Kurtzer agreed with my preliminary assumption.

Amb. Kurtzer mentioned that there are serious national security interests that lead the US in its foreign policy.

### **Amb. Kurtzer gave examples of conflict of interests when the US did not support Israel:**

**1975:** reassessment Sinai disengagement talks. The demand to cut off supply weapons.

**Camp David:** Carter failed with Gaza negotiations and the Israeli settlements there

**80s:** Lebanon conflict with Israel

**1991:** Bush and Shamir regarding settlements.

Kurtzer defined the US interests that were the basis to the conflict with: Israeli settlements, stability in the Middle East and US good relations with Arab countries.

**I asked the Ambassador whether he would identify the Six Days War as such (conflict of interests):** he did not. He thought that there was a preliminary support, support of 242 (land for peace), the USS Liberty was managed well.

Kurtzer would place more conflict of interests over the 1973 war - US chose not to give assistance (weapons wise) only until after the war broke.

**I asked Aamb. Kurtzer where he would place the beginning of the 'shared interests' -**

- Kurtzer answered that it was post Eisenhower period, post 1956 (Tiran) when the US kicked Israel's taking of the Tiran's (French and UK initiative).
- Kennedy years - he objected to WMD built by Israel. recommended a book by Cohen. US tried to prevent Israel from developing its nuke site. However, it did not seem to have a regional effect. "why was that the case?"
- Kurtzer put the finger on the Johnson years. Close contact between Ephi Evron and Johnson.

**I asked Kurtzer about US national interests that stand in the basis of US support of Israel and that are represented throughout all different administrations:**

- 1) Strategic and Intelligence interests: Israel has been a reliable ally strategically and intelligence wise in the region. It has consistently shared its information with the US. Moreover, it is a regionally strong.
- 2) Efficacy of US foreign policy is of promoting democracy and democratic ideas throughout the years starting from the Wilson administration. The fact that Israel is a democracy since its beginning in the region is a major factor.

In response to the W&M piece Kurtzer mentioned that although the two hold realists views, in their own piece they contradict their realist perception (as they claim that the US does not follow its interests) which is inconsistent with their views. He mentioned that it seems that they, who were very upset with the decision to go to war with Iraq, looked for someone to blame for Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq and traced Israel as the major cause while it is not so in reality. Israel did not dictate the decision to go with Iraq.

### **Ambassador Martin Indyk (PhD)**

Introduction: I focus in my thesis on the M&W preliminary claim that currently there are no valid US national interests that lead to support of Israel.

My thesis' goal is to examine this claim and see whether it is valid, in my hypothesis I make to arguments which are:

- 1) when the US supported Israel - during CW and post CW it was based on its own interests, and these interests aligned with Israel's interests
- 2) there were many occasions - during CW and post CW - in which the US national interests did not align with Israel's interests and thus the US did not support Israel.

I asked Ambassador Indyk for his input, whether he thinks this is correct and if he can give me examples of his own experience from situations of support and conflict -

The cold war represents many instances where **Israel was not supported by the US**, it is less true after the 70s. before the 70s Israel did not play much role in the CW. After 1973 Israel became more of an ally for the US and the US encouraged Israel. Indyk also mentioned 1970 of **US-Israeli militaristic cooperation to protect Jordan** from Syrian intervention: Israel was then a strategic ally in protection of Arabic Jordan from Soviet regime.

After the CW: the strategy shifted from alliance to **strategic partnership in the pursuit of peace** which started in Madrid but intensified in Oslo and 1993. The strategic relationship was based on: **Israel giving up territory for peace and the US minimizing the risks Israel may face (security) as a result**. This new strategic relationship over the 90s justified strategic support.

During the 90s when Netanyahu was prime minister there was interlude in that effort when Israel stopped cooperating and there was great deal of tension between the administration and Israel. However, leaning heavily on Netanyahu had produced the Wye Summit.

With Barak in power a new partnership created.

In between the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Sharon comes to power and explains to Bush that the real problem is terrorism. Bush shrugged and did not take him seriously.

And then came 9/11<sup>th</sup> which changed the nature of alliance again, to **“war on terrorism”**. Although W&M claim that support for Israel is damaging the interests of fighting terrorism, Indyk asserts simply that the Bush administration sees it differently based on the strategy of “you are either with us or against us”. the president's national interest is the war on terror and in that interest Israel is considered an ally.

Following Bush gave a card blank to Sharon as long as it does not pose a problem for America, i.e. wars. When Bush thought Sharon was going too far he said so. The Israeli entrance to the west bank is one instance where there was domestic pressure on Bush (by Israel Lobby) to not put too much pressure on Israel. However, this is a small grain of truth in the whole beach of evidence who point otherwise. Also - Israel pulled out.

### **Instances where Israel followed American interests -**

Sharon did not kill Arafat, although wanted to, due to Bush's request.

Today - Israel does not start engagement of talks with Syrians due to American refusal 1982 where Israel did not harm the PLO people while US escorted them out of Lebanon. (I gave this example and Indyk agreed with me) First Gulf War - Israel was hit with Iraqi missiles but did not respond.

1973 war when Kissinger stopped Golda from conquering Egyptian land.

In all of these cases the intensity of American national interests was greater than Israeli interest Israel thus conceded.

However when Israeli interests are greater than American ones) which happens more because Israel is a small state with clear interests while the US is a super power with world wide influence and thus its set of interests are less defined).

The lobby can't change the mind of the American administration when it set his mind on something against Israel which follows the American interests (AIWACs, guarantee loans, Netanyahu). However, when the US supports Israel, the Israel lobby's influence is influential.

Recent Lebanese war: common interests in destroying Iran's missile launchers capabilities. US gave Israel the time Israel did not achieve the goals, that was not stopped. Bush did not regard it as conflict of interests.

Indyk emphasizes what is really in the base of the relationship and the American support, which is the mind set of the administration and perceptions.

### **US national interests:** Israel, oil, oil and oil...

- 1) fellow democracy
- 2) Jewish/Holocaust
- 3) Israel strong
- 4) Oil - through good relations with Arab states.
- 5) Oil - export Arab members in the region.
- 6) Arabs-Israel in conflict interests, the derived interests are to square the tensions.

Thus, the government pursues peace in the Middle East. The government needs strong relations with Israel as Israel is the one required to give up territory. Israel has

to feel confident with the US and its ability to defend itself, this is the only way in which it can move towards territory giving and peace which will stabilize the region.  
The US policy has been pro-Israel, pro-Arab and pro-peace.

Intelligence interest - Indyk asserts that the US has the no.1 intelligence relationship with Israel, more than any other country in the world.

Military interest - is Israel's ability to defend itself against Arab armies. Israel's ability to test American weapons.

Israel strategic value to the US - there is unwillingness of US to look at Israel in that way, except for 1970 with Jordan. However, Indyk thinks that it is valuable one. In the Gulf - Israel is not captured as valuable.

These help achieve oil in reasoned prices

**Mr. Chuck Freilich (PhD)**

Introduction: I focus in my thesis on the M&W preliminary claim that currently there are no valid US strategic national interests that lead to support of Israel.

My thesis' goal is to examine this claim and see whether it is valid, in my hypothesis I make two arguments which are:

- 1) when the US supported Israel - during CW and post CW it was based on its own interests, and these interests aligned with Israel's interests
  - 2) there were many occasions - during CW and post CW - in which the US national interests did not align with Israel's interests and thus the US did not support Israel.
- **Dr. Freilich defined the advantage of Israel to the US as a bank account which you have but you cannot claim it/withdrawal from it.**

**Pre cold war:**

- **The stating point of alignment in relations:** The establishment of the state of Israel did not concern the US interests. Israel became an apparent strategic asset, according to Freilich, starting from the beginning of the 80s. during the Cold War: America supported Israel as it did not afford to lose in the Middle East vis-à-vis the USSR. Also, there was Jewish support for supporting Israel.
- **Admitting the problem:** Israel is a liability to the US regarding maintaining good relations with Arab states starting from the 70s.
- **The strategic relations started in the Reagan administration during the 80s for three reasons:**
  - o Begin government: disagreement about the Palestinian issue, moral support was not sufficient. Claimed that Israel is a strategic ally and the Jewish leadership supported it, the Reagan administration was hardliner Soviet wise which developed strategic cooperation.
  - o Post 67 - US started to see Israel as powerful and this has developed to a change in view in 1972 "The black September", 1973 it was understood that Israel is here to stay.
  - o The end of the 70s the real cooperation began: 78-81 trying to find ways for bilateral cooperation, US prepositioned arms in Israel, growing intelligence

cooperation, cooperative ground exercises, strategic analysis cooperation, development of joint weapons such as the LAVI and the HETZ. In 1978 Israel became non NATO ally, in 1985 Free Trade Agreement JPMG is the most important until today. also, cooperation with Turkey on military drills in the mid 90s. Reagan was very supportive of Israel due to the American anti-Soviet foreign policy.

- The US confronted problems in which it could not use its ally: two examples are in the 1991 and 2003 war. However, the level of pre war cooperation was very high.

### **After the Soviet Union collapses:**

- Clinton administration faced terror threats and attacks, fear of WMD in the Middle East, Iraq war (1991). The threats are becoming similar for both countries since 1993, which are terror and WMD in the wrong hands.
- 9/11/2001 is a primary threat similar to this faced by Israelis. There are joint fears at the same states.
- They have unprecedented similar strategic agenda of confronting terror, although it is not the same as the US' strategic foreign policy is much more broad.
- Also, the relations of the different American administrations post Cold War had really improved in comparison to those in the Cold War - Clinton had created warm relations with Rabin and Barak (also based on their political affiliation and the fact that they aligned with the American initiatives for peace negotiations).
- 9/11 happened, Bush was all tied up with the terror attack and its ramifications and the Palestinians have started their Intifada (terror attacks).
- Thus, we see the world in similar ways.

### **The strategic interests that lead the US to support Israel:**

- Israel as a Reliable ally
- Strategic interest (cooperation)
- Intelligence
- Operational cooperation
- Protecting an ally - as an American interest

### **Incidents in which the US did not support Israel because it did not align with its interests**

- peace process - the US expects Israel to make concessions Israel is not willing to make.

- Pressure not to react militarily - to the Palestinian attacks
- 1982 war
- 1982 Oziraq - bombing the nuclear in Oziraq
- Israel "Golan Heights" law - sanctions
- 1<sup>st</sup> Gulf war - Israel not to participate and not to shot missiles although its rights
- All of the arms sale to Egypt (made it the biggest army in the Middle East)
- AIWACs back in the 80s (1981)

**Freilich was the only one to admit frankly that in many times supporting Israeli is demanding, as it is defending Israel in arenas/settings in which Israel is not popular: UN resolutions, IAEA. At the same time this is a special relationship.**

**The starting point:** began only after 56 (where the US conflicted with Israel, UK and France over Tiran), in 67 the US was too tied up in Vietnam, but then the US started to reflect on Israel on a positive note. This perception had developed and it wasn't until the early 80s, Israel became a value much more than a burden.

### **US foreign relations towards Israel after Lebanon**

Do see it as a failure. Equal to Iraq, does not decrease the level of commitment, still on the same boat, concerned with Iran, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and more.

**Democracy as an interest** - Freilich, like Grossman, reflects on it as a moral value, not so much as an interest (maybe because in his lecture he mentioned that the US should forget about having a viable democracy in Iraq).

The countries share same interests after 9/11

On a more personal note, Freilich thinks that when the average American looks at Israel today he basically sees a "small US", a fighting democracy, fighting terror, looks a lot like the US, and there is a Jewish influence (lobby) that is much more in Congress than in administration.

**Jewish power is 2% in the US, thus its ability is really limited.** AIPAC - the administration uses its services when needs and wants and when they don't want they don't need it. ex: AIWACs. Another example is the embargo on foreign country in 1996 (Iraq) which AIPAC promoted and the administration did not do.

### **Administration has its own direction.**

Also, is the American support on the expense of anyone else? Would things look different if it wasn't for the support? Would we not have troubles in the Middle East with the rulling in Saudi Arabia? Would we not have terror? Would it be different if Israel did not exist? Although Arab leaders like to present it this way (rhetoric), the reality is that things in the Middle East are the way they are regardless of Israel's existence.



**Mr. Steve Grossman**

1. The relationship between Israel and US - the assertion that US Israeli relations are driven by the Israeli lobby is simply a political statement as opposed to empirical statement. American interests in Israeli are solid through a change in time.
2. Grossman objects to the W&M claim that during the Cold War - Middle East was grasped as "ground zero" for conflicts between US and Russia and now that there is no Russia the interests are gone.
  - a. Real issue - always political instability in the Middle East. Many of the Arab countries were created by agreement (Iraq and others) formed by western nations. The instability throughout the region and the US-Israeli relations is one of stable, reliable, strong partner in the region so the US has an ally in the region of military/ medical/ intelligence.
  - b. As to the claim that may it not be the USSR the political instability and threat to democracy and to US interests, the threat of having WMD in the wrong hands - policy makers, non-partisan, it is more important today to have a secure stable in the Middle East so we count on the ME.
  - c. Grossman also mentioned terror and WMD.
  - d. Gives the Oziraq 1981 example is of why its critical to have Israel as a forceful ally.
  - e. The Arab and Muslim leaders use of the Palestinian issue as a way to defeat their own issues in their countries - they have an interest in prolonging the issue and not solving it. This is why Israel is being treated as a cancer in the region - bcs it resolves those leaders' interests with their own constituencies. A way to defeat the criticism towards them.
  - f. W&M is flawed in the sense they see the end of the CW as the cease of American interests in Israel, while the opposite is true - there as not been a moment where instability ceased in the ME- from terror to WMD.

3. Grossman reflects on the Democratic factor (having a democratic country in the ME as an interest) not as a strategic factor but as one related to a moral one (having democratic values which align with the American values).
4. Having the right smack a critical mass, ally that could be relied upon - the most pressure issue right now to the US is a threat of WMD not only to Israel but to the US itself.
5. While the relationship has been always that of support for Israel, there have been disagreements between the countries, one of "enough is enough":
  - a. because of the complexity of interests in the ME,
  - b. and in order to maintain allies in the Arab World.
  - c. also bcs they don't want to unleash radical forces.
  - d. sometimes Israel does things that the US is not happy about:
    - i. 1956 war is one example (Eisenhower)
    - ii. "the limit of power" - 1991 war (be careful of what you wish for)
    - iii. A defining moment in US-Israeli relationship was in the AIWAX in the Reagan administration (the need for a bigger coalition)
6. However, these conflicts are in rock solid relationship in the white house. Has most support in the House of Representatives (that the US-Israeli relationship is strong and based on vital national American interests).
7. the conflicting interests that Grossman could think of:
  - a. **Preventing terror:** The US need to strengthen the leaders of countries that have the capacity of rise of radical extremists behavior to the use of violence and religious
  - b. **Absence of conflict:** The US seeks stability absence of conflict: US in conflict seeks to create balance, to not change of balance of power.

- c. **Promoting Stability** - Stability with the Arab countries: strengthening the hand of the heads and countries that have the capacity to oppose radical extremists' behavior that use terror, violence and religious extremists.
  - d. **Oil** -
  - e. **WMD in the wrong hands**
8. **Examples of American strategic interests that align with Israeli interests:**
- a. **Bombing the nuclear facilities in Iraq, Iraq in 1981:** in this situation America had two faces, claims Grossman, the first was a public face objecting the bombing (criticism on Bush's side toward Israel), the second was less critique as it forwarded US agenda of keeping weapons out of the hands of all parties of the regime in Iraq.
  - b. **Another example is that the US never made an issue about Israel's nuke developments and capabilities, which constitute deterrence. This "looking the other way" reaction, which is in conflict with the declared US policy regarding WMD proliferation, does align with US strategic interests:**
    - i. Although the US officially is for WMD non-proliferation, the two, claims Grossman, are linked: the US, which uses deterrence strategy, supports Israel which as a deterrent force in the region.
    - ii. US supports Israel as the only WMD in the ME, it is in the interest of the US due to the threats in the region which threaten the US.
    - iii. Grossman equated it to the situation with India - although the US policy is to support non-proliferation, the US supports and advances the transfer of technology information to India, a US ally, as it is the biggest democracy in the world, with the largest economy and the US has both strategic and economic interests there.
9. **The conflicting US interests with those of Israel:**

- a. Israelis willingness to transfer weapons to China. Israeli had economic interests while those of US were military advancement and strategic interests.
- b. US and Israel have “agreed to disagree” over settlements. Israel was always saying that it broadens the already existing settlements (from small villages to communities to cities) over the last 40 years. Bush felt that Shamir is not strait with him about the settlements issue, which substantially harmed the relationship between the administration and Israel and caused severe break in the relationship. This led Bush to oppose anything that Shamir asked including “the loans guarantees”. This created an explosion of disagreement between US and Israel regarding how Israel uses its funds. Thus ended only with the Israeli election of the new Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

---

## Bibliography

---

1. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (hereinafter: "*Mearsheimer and Walt*"), *THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*, March 2006.  
  
Online link to the KSG version - <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011>  
Online link to the LRB version - <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01.html>
2. Alan Darshowitz, "*Debunking the Newest - and Oldest - Jewish Conspiracy: A Reply to Mearsheimer-Walt 'Working Paper'*", published by KSG on April 2006.  
  
Online link to Prof. Alan Darshowitz paper - [http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working\\_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf)
3. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, c2001
4. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Unrestricted Access - What the 'Israel Lobby' wants, it too often gets, in *Foreign Policy Journal*, July/August 2006, pp. 57-58
5. Dennis Ross, The Mind-set Matters-Foreign Policy is shaped by leaders and events, not lobbies; *Foreign Policy Journal*, July-August 2006, pp. 60-61.
6. Stephen M. Walt, *In the National Interest - A new grand strategy for American foreign policy*, BOSTON REVIEW A POLITICAL AND LITERARY FORUM (date unpublished), *available at*: <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html>
7. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *Keeping Saddam in a Box*, An additional article, *New York Times Op-Ed*, 2.2.2003

8. John J. Mearsheimer, *Hearts and Minds*, The National Interest, No. 69 Fall 2002, pp. 13-16. online version: <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0030.pdf>
9. Elizabeth Stephens, *US Policy towards Israel : The Role of Political Culture in Defining the 'Special Relationship'*, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton-Portland (2006).
10. Glenn Frenkel, *A Beautiful Friendship? In search of the truth about the Israel lobby's influence on Washington*, Washington Post, Sunday, July 16, 2006 available at: [http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR10060712\\_01627.html](http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/12/AR10060712_01627.html)
11. Karen L. Puschel, *US-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era-An American Perspective*, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, The Jerusalem Post, Westview Press.
12. Clyde R. Mark, chapter 1: *ISRAEL: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE*, In: *Israeli-United States Relationship*, Editor: John E.Lang, pp. 1-20 2006 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
13. Lenore G. Martin, *Assessing the Impact of US-Israeli relations on the Arab World*, July 2003 Strategic Studies Institute, p. 8, available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB104.pdf>
14. William B. Quandt, *PEACE PROCESS-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967*, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE PRESS, Washington D.C.

15. *Camp David Peace Accords*, Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, available at -

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm>

16. Bernard Reich, *The US and Israel - the nature of a special relationship*, pp. 227-244, in: *The Middle East and the United States A historical and political reassessment*, edited by David W. Lesch, Trinity University, Westview Press; second edition 1999.

17. UN Security Council Resolution 487 from June 19<sup>th</sup> 1981, available at UN Security Council website:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/IMG/NR041874.pdf?OpenElement>

18. UN Security Council Resolution 497 from December 17<sup>th</sup> 1981, available at UN Security Council website -

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/IMG/NR041874.pdf?OpenElement>

19. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, The White House The NSS is available at:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>

20. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, *Significant Terrorists Attacks against the United States and its Citizens 1946-2001*, available at:

<http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/101/timeline.html>

21. Steven R. David, *The continuing importance of America in the Middle East after the Cold War*, at pp. 94-106, in: *U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS*, Edited by Gabriel Sheffer, FRANK CASS.
22. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategic Aspects of US-Israeli Relations*, at pp. 198-211, in: *U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS*, Edited by Gabriel Sheffer, FRANK CASS.
23. Bill Clinton, *My Life*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2004.
24. Ari Shavit, *The Day the Peace Died*, Ha'aretz, 9.14.2001. Translated from Hebrew. available (Hebrew) at: <http://www.7th-day.co.il/mehumot/hayom.htm>
25. Reuben Miller, *The Israeli-Syrian Negotiation*, Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 2000, at pp. 117-139, available at: [http://mUse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean\\_quarterly/v011/11.4miller.pdf](http://mUse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v011/11.4miller.pdf)
26. "The unblessed peacemaker - "America is paying for the crimes of Israel." Discuss, special report America and Israel, *The Economist* print edition, Oct 4<sup>th</sup> 2001.
27. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), available at - [http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/sib3\\_04/park\\_c.htm](http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/sib3_04/park_c.htm)
28. Ze'ev Shif, *The Security Crisis with US increases: Demands Israel to increase the supervision over weapons export and increases sanctions*, Ha'aretz, June 23, 2005. Translated from Hebrew. Available (Hebrew) at: <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=587226&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0>



29. *Tensions Over Israeli Arms Sales to China*, BuSinessWeek online, May 2, 2005, available at:

[http://www.bUSinessweek.com/magazine/content/05\\_18/b3931083\\_mz015.htm](http://www.bUSinessweek.com/magazine/content/05_18/b3931083_mz015.htm)

30. Cornal Urquhart, *US acts over Israeli arms sales to China*, The Guardian, Monday June 13, 2005, available at:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1505209,00.html>

31. Yoav Stern, *Assad: Peace talks with Israel could be completed in 6 months*, Haaretz correspondent, and The Associated Press, 2 October 2006, available at:

<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/769460.html>

32. Shmuel Rosner, *The US is objecting to a separate Israeli-Syrian track*, Ha'aretz (through WALLA!), 20 October 2006. Translated from Hebrew. available at:

<http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/15/993231>

33. Danny Yatom and Moshe Amirav, *The Golan in the role of Sharm*, Ha'aretz, 7 October 2006, available at:

<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/770552.html>

34. Personal interview (via phone) with Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer (PhD) on 9.15.2006, 04:30pm, interview attached as *Annex 1*.

35. Personal interview (via phone) with Ambassador Martin Indyk (PhD), on 10.6.2006, 02:00pm, interview attached as *Annex 2*.

36. Personal interview with Mr. Chuck Freilich (PhD) on 9.27.2006, 04:00pm, interview attached as Annex 3.
37. Personal interview (via phone) with Mr. Steve Grossman, on 9.17.2006, 11:00am, interview attached as *Annex 4*.

**Additional resources:**

38. Akiva Eldar, *Is America a strategic liability?* Haaretz online journal, June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2006  
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/722953.html>
39. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *A Dangerous Exemption*, Foreign Policy, July-August 2006, pp. 63-64
40. Noam Chomsky, , *The Israel Lobby?* March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2006,  
<http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cmf?SrctionID=11&ItemID=9999>
41. Like Nixon to China?, The Economist print edition, May 29<sup>th</sup> 2003, Washington DC.
42. *To Israel with love*, The Economist print edition, August 3<sup>rd</sup> 2006, Middle East policy
43. *No schmooze with the Jews - However entwined the sentiments, the national interest comes first*, The Economist print edition, April 4<sup>th</sup> 2002
44. 2006 ביולי 12, הארץ, הזנר, שמואל רוזנר, מאת: שיט, אמריקה מרוצה, translation: Shit, America is Satisfied, Shmuel Rozner, Haaretz Online Edition, 7.19.2006  
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtSR.jhtml?itemNo=740212&objNo=59705+&returnParam=Y> (in Hebrew)

45. David Verbeeten, *How Important is the Israel Lobby?* Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006, online edition <http://www.meforum.org/article/1004>

46. 20.9.2006 הארץ, שמואל רוזנר, הרהורים פרועים של מצוקה, translation: *Wild Thoughts of distress*, Shmuel Rozner, Haaretz Online Edition, 20.9.2006, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=765320&contrassID=2&subContrassID=3&sbSubContrassID=0> (in Hebrew)

47. Theodore C. Sorensen, *DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS*, Columbia Classics