
SECURITY IN A POST-HEGEMONIC WORLD

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Metamorphoses and Models

By various accounts, bipolarity has ended and the superpowers have disengaged. The East-West ideological contest is over. Global politics are being restructured. "The tectonic plates that have undergirded world politics for half a century have shifted," as Joseph Nye has written.¹

Such descriptions originate in the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from East-Central Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

Additional events, such as the electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Namibia peace accord, and the negotiations on Cambodia, emphasized a world order in flux in 1989–1990. The former superpower adversaries joined purposes so that conflicts which had eluded settlement for years were either resolved or moved toward solutions. In the Persian Gulf War, Soviet acquiescence to US military action and support for United Nations (UN) resolutions were critical.

Since the United States and the Soviet Union seem less willing to compete with one another globally, one might expect fewer and less intense political/military crises in the Third World. Few observers, however, accept such a hopeful scenario. In Eastern Europe, for instance, there is ample evidence confirming an increase in intra-state nationalisms and inter-state rivalries despite the end of the cold war's artificial divisions.²

The cold war's cessation, then, may spell not more peace, but rather an intensification of conflict. To some, these conditions spell dangers warranting extreme measures for the preservation of stability.³ The Gulf War provided proof that the end to the cold war, the demise of bipolarity, and the beginning

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1. Joseph Nye, "American Strategy After Bipolarity," *International Affairs* Vol 66, No. 3 (1990), 513.
2. Daniel N. Nelson, "All is Not Quiet on the Eastern Front," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (November 1990). See also a more complete discussion of all threats to regional peace in Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," *Foreign Policy* 82 (1991).
3. See, for example, John Mearsheimer's advocacy of nuclear arms proliferation as a deterrent to future outbreaks of European war in "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* Vol 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990).

of superpower disengagement do not guarantee worldwide tranquility. Indeed, recent history and empirical efforts suggest that multi-polarity "entails more violence, more countries at war and more casualties."⁴

Realpolitik, a return to political realism, is an appealing alternative in attempting to guarantee peace and security in this new world order. As the uncertainties and dangers of the post-cold war environment become evident, interest in older, comfortable paradigms such as realpolitik will grow. Indeed, the recycling of realpolitik began in the late 1970s. By the early 1980s, this "neo-realism" had many scholarly adherents.⁵

Realist tenets emphasize power as the fundamental commodity of international relations, national interests as the guiding principles of policymakers, and balances of power as the means by which to pursue such interests without war. Despite "the uncertainty of all power calculations,"⁶ the language and policy prescriptions of realpolitik have "dominated US policy since World War II."⁷ A bi-modal concentration of power was thought to contribute to stability between the United States and the USSR *and* among their smaller allies.⁸

Realists will argue that, after the demise of a bipolar concentration of power, nation-states will return to a general struggle for power, defined primarily in military terms, as they pursue national interests. National interests require that states seek "military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by potential enemies," a capacity which can be augmented through alliances with other states. In such conditions, peace and stability "result through the operation of a balance of power propelled by self interest."⁹

In the realpolitik view, only an interlocking grid of balances will avoid inter-state warfare or limit the spread of civil wars beyond one country. Whether in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, or Latin America, reducing superpower rivalry connotes a heightened need to maintain an equilibrium of power in each region, presumably by manipulating economic assistance and arms transfers and injecting one's forces when necessary to maintain balances. For the realist, arms and influence, used in the pursuit of great powers' national interests, become the only means by which to balance forces around the world, thereby avoiding war.

Such policies are inherently flawed, however. Security now requires much broader "coverage" and far more dynamic qualities than *national* security policies premised on the "use of force or the credible threat to employ it" as

4. Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 64, No. 1 (March 1970), 98-123.

5. One example of this energetic debate can be found in *International Organization* No. 38 (Spring 1984), which contained several important essays about "New Realism."

6. See, particularly, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), 222-40.

7. Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984), 7.

8. Kenneth Waltz makes the case that bipolarity connoted distinct advantages for peace and stability in *Man, State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

9. For a succinct, capsulized version of realist views of international politics see Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 76. Quotations in this paragraph were taken from Kegley and Wittkopf's summary.

the "ultimate factor" in regulating the international system.¹⁰ Lacking the predictability of the cold war international system and the minimal conflict at the center of that system (Europe), the new world order must not fall back on a force-centered, nation-specific understanding of security that expects peace to be present only if power is balanced. Feasible alternatives to a post-cold war neo-realism do exist, the strength of which can be seen in a discussion of security, threats, and capacities.

Security, Threats, and Capacities

As a prescription for security in the post-superpower, post-cold war world, a realist balance of power thesis is an invitation to disaster. The notion of constructing lasting regional stability with military assistance programs, prepositioned equipment for rapid deployment forces, and periodic deployments of major powers' ground, naval, or air units has never worked in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. In the Middle East, a military equilibrium is neither immutable nor a substitute for security. Despite the end to the Gulf War, regional peace cannot be guaranteed unless longstanding regional issues are addressed and a permanent architecture is erected within which to abate future threats to Middle East stability. On a broader plane, several problems underlie the inadequacy of a realpolitik military equilibrium as a substitute for security in the Middle East or in any region.

Security is almost always confused with power in realist analyses. However, accumulating power through economic output, growth and productivity, military prowess, readiness, projection capability, social cohesion, and political legitimacy does not *equal* security. Rather, security is a function of the ratio between these elements and the economic, political, and military threats perceived to imperil a political unit. Hence, *security is a dynamic ratio of threats versus capacities*. Security may be enhanced by reducing perceived threats or by enlarging capacities or by both. Therefore, threat abatement strategies which depend upon diplomacy to reach arms control agreement, trade, or sociocultural ties, for example, may enhance security as much if not more than policies meant to maintain power.

This fundamental confusion in realist thought between security and power is derived from the notion that friendly governments can be protected by supplementing their arsenals of tanks, warplanes, and missiles. This ignores entirely the difference between a regime's legitimacy and its ability to confront an armed attack on its border. It is not by accident that the most insecure regimes often accumulate the most raw power. In the bipolar, hegemonic world of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union contributed heavily to the military arsenals of regimes in greatest peril from within: cases

10. An intelligent exposition of this view, using these phrases, can be found in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The United States and the Shape of the New Europe," (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University, 1990), 8. (Paper prepared for the Conference on "The New Europe and U.S. Interests," November 30–December 1, 1990). Although I disagree with his view, Aspaturian has provided a very clear presentation of this perception of post-cold war international relations.

such as Afghanistan, Iran, and South Vietnam are obvious examples. Throughout much of the developing world, the principal rationale for US aid programs during the cold war was frequently the assumed Soviet/Communist threat to an existing government.

This confusion between power and security also obscures the reciprocal causation between *threats* and *capacities*. Raising a state's power capacities, particularly militarily, often heightens the threat profile of that country to its neighbors, who, in turn, may compensate by enhancing their own capacities, thereby undercutting security even further. In this realist portrait of world politics, power is applied (when persuasion fails) "through *threats* or promises to do either harmful or helpful things. . . . Given the nature of military force, the *threat* to do harm is the more common means by which it [such force] can be employed in exercising power."¹¹ Thus, threats from others imperil national interests, while countervailing threats reinforce security. The never-ending cycle of threats and counter-threats appears to suffice as a path to security in the realist argument, but the contribution of threats built on military capacities to *insecurity* is ignored.

Massed tank armies, supersonic jet fighters, and large naval combatants have no utility in defending sovereignty against debilitating worldwide economic trends, religious fundamentalism, destabilizing mass migrations, terrorist attacks, or punitive actions of multilateral organizations.

Dismissing long-term consequences of force-based security is an additional error of realist prescriptions. If superpower disengagement precipitates multiple balances of power around the world, then unending commitments will have to be made for their maintenance. A decision to rely on one kind of capacity—military strength—as a source of balance will necessitate constant and expensive repairs to the conditions of such a regional equilibrium. This has been evident for several decades in the Arab-Israeli standoff that has, at best, been a violent peace.

In addition, momentarily compelling policies can have deeply troubling long-term consequences, an outcome the realist perspective does not address. Americans are aware, for instance, of the West's substantial support for Iraq, including weapons, intelligence, energy supplies, and food, during its war against Iran. That the United States and a multilateral coalition had to combat

11. Donald M. Snow, *National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 10–11, emphasis added.

this same country in 1991 was not unrelated to American willingness to support Iraq as a balance against Iranian Islamic fundamentalism. Western states contributed greatly to the arsenal that was in Baghdad's possession by 1990.

The inapplicability of military power to emerging threats underscores further the error of relying on a realist perception of the post-cold war world order. A strategy for global security stressing capacity enhancement, especially military, while doing little to reduce threats, ignores the mismatch between most forms of military power and external threats which nation-states increasingly confront today. Massed tank armies, supersonic jet fighters, and large naval combatants have no utility in defending sovereignty against debilitating worldwide economic trends, religious fundamentalism, destabilizing mass migrations, terrorist attacks, or punitive actions of multilateral organizations. With the "diffusion of power away from states to private actors" and the transnational problems that political leaders must confront in the late 20th century, it is apparent that a "military balance is not sufficient" to provide security in such an environment.¹² Some capacity based on a state's armed forces may be required for the self-defense of certain states, but disproportionately large standing forces and burdensome commitments of national resources to a military-industrial complex are, most certainly, an insufficient guarantee of a country's security.

Although this analysis illustrates flaws in the realpolitik thesis, policy prescriptions are often still derived solely from realist, balance of power views of international relations. American reactions to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, for instance, evoked realist images—that war is always possible and often probable given the inherent desires of malevolent men to dominate others. Large and capable national military forces become the only means of protecting states' security and self-interest against adversaries grown too powerful. Accordingly, regional balances of power, supported by larger nation-states, must be maintained to thwart the aggressive resurgence of any individual state.

The continued strength of this realist balance of power perspective is likewise seen in the reluctance of the United States and other large states to perceive security as being dependent on factors other than armed forces. This is certainly evident as plans are made for the removal of military equipment from Europe. Although a considerable portion of US stockpiles in Europe have been utilized in Middle East combat, much will remain that is no longer required for defense in Central Europe. "Cascading" is the term used to suggest the transfer of principal American weapons (e.g., US-built M-1 main battle tanks) to other allies in Europe and around the world. CFE-affected items, thus, may not be destroyed but simply removed from the Atlantic to the Urals arena of the CFE accord.

The Soviet Union has thus far announced no plans to provide more T-72 tanks, armored vehicles, or other items to Syria, Yemen, Libya, or other long-

12. Nye, 519.

standing Middle East clients. However, Moscow's need for cash and the immediate payment ability of some countries may well enhance the Soviet propensity to make such sales. Prior to CFE, but since the advent of Gorbachev, Soviet arms transfers to less developed countries *increased* by several billion dollars—from \$13.8 billion in 1985 to \$19.1 billion in 1987—before beginning to decline in 1988 and 1989. When finally calculated, 1990 Soviet arms deliveries likely will have fallen under \$15 billion, but the pattern of Soviet military transfers through 1988 revealed strong consistency with pre-Gorbachev, pre-reform behavior.¹³

American arms deliveries to less developed countries were calculated to have been about \$6 billion in 1989.¹⁴ In addition, sales and grants by other countries (e.g., China) are not diminishing. Reductions in arms export data in the late 1980s may indeed have been transient. Larger nation-states are still intent on influencing global events and conflicts in pursuit of what they deem their national interests. Although this growth in arms sales illustrates the apparent and enduring appeal of the realist paradigm, its continued preeminence and applicability in a new world order is questionable.

An Alternative: Regional Collective Security

When the curtain lifted on a post-hegemonic world, the new stage was revealed as one of threat-rich environments and capacity-poor states. The world was tacitly aware of this for forty-five years, but in the cold war environment, the other superpower's interests were presumed to foment every conflict. The West's principal adversary was always lurking behind revolutionary movements, left-wing coups, general strikes, and student barricades.

Now, however, even that dubious post-World War II "order" in international affairs has waned. The international system is often understood as "largely characterized by anarchy under the mantle of sovereignty." Continued reliance on force as the necessary guarantee of security¹⁵ is the likely response to such a characterization of the international environment. Considering the United States as the only superpower within a unipolar world system is a variant of this force-as-guarantor-of-peace model. Potentially, this might require frontline American military presence in response to any aggression threatening distant US interests.¹⁶

13. See, in this regard, data and statistical analyses presented in Yang Zhong and Daniel N. Nelson, "Domestic Reform and the Third World Policies of China and the USSR," (San Francisco: American Political Science Association, 1990). (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September, 1990).

14. Directorate of Intelligence, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990), 180, 194.

15. A widely used text, Donald M. Snow, *National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), exhibits such an argument. See Snow, Ch. 1, especially page 19, from which these quotes are taken.

16. This, again, is the argument of Vernon Aspaturian.

An interlocking web of regional collective security arrangements is an alternative to the *realpolitik* construction of international security, in which the intervention of powerful nation-states, their militaries, and their weapons is neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain peace and security.

In strategic terms, collective security differs fundamentally from common defense. In the latter, dominant or hegemonic powers often gather allies around them, sharing not values but opposition to a clear and ominous adversary. Alliances for common defense implement strategies of containment and deterrence, and attempt to prevent war by balancing capacities, not by reducing threats. Capacities, invariably, are once again defined in military terms, and measurements of such strength are narrowly construed to include the size of standing armed forces, the numbers of certain kinds of weapons and equipment, and the modernity or sophistication of that equipment.

Collective security, however, emphasizes the other side of the security ratio, namely threat reduction. Rather than enhancing capacities, especially military strength, collective security strategies suggest that threat abatement *can* be achieved, in many cases, before expending resources to heighten capacities.

Collective security begins with the premise that threats may arise from within, not only externally, and that their avoidance is at least as critical as countering those external threats with military capacities. Collective security arrangements are bound to *include*, not exclude, concern for the peace, stability, and well-being of all participants. Non-offensive defense strategies of members, studies of conflict reduction by joint academic/policy centers, mediation via crisis resolution organs, collective and binding economic sanctions for punitive responses, and peacekeeping forces to separate disputants, are all examples of collective efforts which avoid resorting to military capacities. Collective security does not deny a right of self-defense, but is intended to minimize the exercise of that right through the abatement of threats.

Indeed, collective international action increasingly is required due to the transnational nature of conditions that imperil states. To "invest resources in managing transnational interdependence" has become the foremost challenge of policymakers in the United States and other powerful states at the end of the twentieth century.¹⁷

In the Third World, incremental movement toward alternative security arrangements during the late 1980s and outset of the 1990s has occurred. For example, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have played a larger role in seeking the resolution of civil war in Cambodia. As the Vietnamese withdrew combat units, the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot accelerated their efforts to oust Hun Sen, who was installed by Hanoi in 1979. ASEAN members have been eager to secure a settlement that would keep Hanoi out of Cambodia while avoiding further American, Chinese, or

17. This is Joseph Nye's argument in *Bound to Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Nye advocates a principal US role in such transnational responses, but nevertheless points to the changed nature of world security and the requirement for American adaptation to those new conditions.

Soviet involvement in the conflict. Thai Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh drafted a cease-fire agreement to present to warring factions at a Japanese-sponsored meeting in Tokyo during early June 1990.¹⁸ Japan, by hosting the meeting, also sought to re-enter Southeast Asian diplomacy. By seeking an end to external power intervention *and* a widened role for collective mediation and/or peacekeeping, ASEAN members have begun to develop new security roles. This is far from becoming collective security, and there is ample evidence of an arms race within the region fueled by mutual mistrust.¹⁹ Nevertheless, a potential exists that ought to be enhanced through extra-regional support.

In Africa, a five-nation multilateral West African peacekeeping force, numbering more than 6,000 troops, was sent to Liberia in a precedent-setting attempt to end civil war and bloodshed in Monrovia. Under the vague umbrella of the sixteen-member Economic Community of West African States, a summit meeting in Mali at the end of November 1990 sought an accord to end the Charles Taylor-led uprising and install an interim government. Again, there are many problems with this action, including Nigeria's dominance, raising fears of a regional hegemon-in-the-making. Yet, the notion of collective security has begun to emerge. A more limited effort has started in Central Africa where Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi sent small teams of military officers to join a peacekeeping force in Rwanda.²⁰

The construction of these regional architectures for collective security will be extraordinarily complex. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) has existed for years, but has yet to evolve into a continental organ for conflict resolution or peacekeeping. Previous efforts at OAU peacekeeping have worked to the disadvantage of those depending on OAU actions (e.g., in Chad during the early 1980s).²¹ The Organization of American States and other regional organizations such as the Rio Pact, at this point have equally little collective security potential, primarily due to a legacy of inaction and hegemonic dominance which has precluded any self-generated reform.

Further generation of collective security alternatives will depend upon the inauguration of a "test-bed" Euro-Atlantic organization following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the continued cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in zones of regional conflict, and

18. Steven Erlanger, "Cambodian Factions to Meet Today," *New York Times*, 4 June 1990.

19. See Stephen Erlanger, "Economic Rivalries Find Asian Rearming," *International Herald Tribune* (7 May 1990).

20. Reports on the West African community's efforts, noting both the promise and the problems in the multilateral intervention in Liberia, include Peter Grier, "Liberians Face Increased Violence," and Allison Boyer, "West Africans' Controversial Role," both in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 November 1990. See also the reporting of Kenneth B. Noble in *The New York Times*, especially "14 African Leaders Press Liberian on Cease-Fire," 28 November 1990, and "Liberian Factions Agree to a Cease-Fire," 29 November 1990. The Rwandan case is mentioned briefly in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10 November 1990, 923.

21. The OAU's actions in the Chad-Libya conflict were described as having a "weathervane quality" by René Lemarchand, "The Crisis in Chad," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 246. The OAU peacekeeping force of some 3,000 men deployed to Chad in early 1982 was described by the same author as exhibiting "utter impotence."

the financial and material support of the richer developed countries, especially Japan and Germany.

The 1990s should be a decade in which the construction of regional collective security organizations is inaugurated, with Europe's endeavors providing an initial framework for application to other regions. Institutionalizing CSCE in the reluctant and modest ways to which the United States agreed, and for which the Paris CSCE summit gave its approval, will be inadequate. The small size of the secretariat beginning work in Prague and the minimal responsibilities in other domains (election monitoring and a center for conflict resolution) provide neither an opportunity to assess the potential of collective security nor an experiential base on which other regions can draw. The ideal forum for initiating a new "Euro-Atlantic Security Organization," following the CSCE, will be the 1992 Helsinki II meeting.

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Many tasks and responsibilities related to security can be given to a new Euro-Atlantic organization, administratively housed within a permanent "Security Commission" of the organization's secretariat. Difficulties with the CFE accord underscore the importance of moving ahead with Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). CSCE has hosted the CSBM talks, with progress evident both at the Stockholm session in 1986 and in the 1989-1990 discussions. As force levels in Europe come down, unilaterally or in concert with CFE-specified numbers, it becomes all the more vital to link transparency, information exchange, and other measures to each incremental reduction. Notwithstanding delays in CFE implementation, a successor to CSCE must incorporate confidence and security-building measures, seeking to reassure all member states about the others' military activities through prior notification, observation, data exchange, and other more innovative ideas (e.g., zones of national confidence along states' frontiers).

Some capacity to deploy peacekeeping forces should also be developed to keep sides apart while adjudication, arbitration, or other conflict control mechanisms are utilized. Small numbers of such units should be maintained and dispersed in multinational garrisons throughout Central Europe. Contingents from all member states, proportional to their population, could be assigned to the Euro-Atlantic organization, with accompanying transportation assets.

An alternative to this suggestion is the metamorphosis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into a larger, collective security entity, although

this would raise the controversial issue of criteria for entry. Would democratic processes somehow be used as a litmus test? What would be the basis for exclusion or denial of entry? Far better than NATO's disruptive enlargement is a CSCE-born organization, from the outset incorporating all areas in which conflict may arise and avoiding the vestiges of common defense against an adversary that is no longer evident.

American, Soviet, German, and Japanese policymakers as well as those of other advanced nation-states must strive to see beyond national security to global security.²² Due to their military, economic, and political capacities, their cooperation to limit disputes and conflicts around the world will have greater consequences for threat abatement than any effort solely within the Third World. The United States and the USSR retain military might, with American forces clearly able to project force in various regions much more readily than the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated by American requests for financial compensation from other states for the US force commitment against Iraq, future large-scale military deployment of US armed forces in combat roles is far more costly than the United States itself can absorb (without grievous economic consequences).

Thus, the economic role of the so-called Group of Seven (G-7) countries, and particularly Japan and Germany, becomes a critical component of alternative security architectures. Other countries need to join in the search for global security by contributing heavily to the costs of creating multilateral institutions in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. A "Fund for Regional Security," established by the G-7 states, might be an appropriate way to channel monies for initiating regional collective security organizations. Regardless of the mechanism, however, the investment by advanced industrial states in such alternatives to a realist paradigm of world security is essential.

These proposed regional security organizations could potentially direct their attention to a variety of areas and issues such as bringing cease-fires and negotiated settlements to civil wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sudan, Mozambique, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Peru, El Salvador, and other countries. Implicit to this charge is the reference of disputes to mediation and the monitoring and extension of human rights and of democratic processes, tasks undertaken not in a manner of neo-colonial oversight from Europe or North America, but rather through acts of regional organizations of collective security.

This collective security process as an alternative to the realist paradigm can begin immediately. Permanent members of the UN Security Council, with Japan and Germany as observers, should act as co-sponsors to convene "regional Helsinki processes" soon after the 1992 meeting in Helsinki, but not later than 1993–1994, with many of the initial goals seen in Europe. Especially

22. Michael Intriligator, "Global Security," (Moscow: IMEMO, 1990). (Paper presented at the Conference on Conversion and De-Militarization of Security, co-sponsored by IMEMO and the Council on Economic Priorities, November 10–14, 1990).

important in the early stages will be human rights activities and CSBMs. In regions in which existing organizations have already shown signs of pushing ahead in these arenas, institutionalization of the process, to include a secretariat, an assembly, and specialized commissions in security and human rights fields, could be undertaken.

But these notions about specific steps are less important in the near term than recognizing broader principles to guide a post-cold war search for security. Superpower disengagement need not connote a revitalized *realpolitik* global power struggle, with peace everywhere hanging on a precarious balance of power. Capacities built on armed forces yield implicit threats to others, undercutting the delicate ratio from which security results.

Alternative strategic visions that guide collective security can be implemented, although policymakers cannot expect weak-capacity states caught in a threat-rich environment to take these steps alone. The former superpowers and their principal allies have a clear responsibility to lead in the construction of post-hegemonic global security. For the United States, there is no greater opportunity than to take a leading role in the preparation of a new global security environment in the twenty-first century.



