

Present at the Creation

David Ekbladh

Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies

Security studies and its close cousin strategic studies have established impressive institutional and intellectual authority. The emerging collection of Hertog seminars on strategic issues that have begun sprouting at campuses around the United States joins established institutes such as the International Security Program at Harvard's Belfer Center, International Security Studies at Yale, the Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford.¹ These are just a few of the centers around the country that shape and extend the contours of these fields by cultivating research, publications, conferences, and younger scholars. Behind these sit a solid rank of patrons—the government, a select group of foundations, and wealthy individuals—that assure that participants in the field have the wherewithal to go about their tasks. Undoubtedly, security studies practitioners share perennial scholarly concerns about the proverbial barbarians at the gate. Although questions of whether the right methods are being used, the best students are being attracted, and the relevance of the research produced never quite disappear, no one can doubt that the field has reached a high pitch of influence within the scholarly and policy communities.

As with other academic tribes, security studies shares the need for scholars to position their work in an established narrative as well as to socialize their apprentices and audiences to a particular brand of inquiry. To this end, a standard tale of the past has been repeated in seminar rooms, “state of the field” articles, and books. This story sees the emergence of security studies as a direct response to the Cold War and nuclear issues. As an American project, security

*David Ekbladh is Assistant Professor of History at Tufts University and was a fellow of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His current book project, *Look at the World*, explores the rise of a new American globalism in the crisis years of the 1930s and 1940s.*

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1. The Hertog seminars are an initiative supported by financier and philanthropist Roger Hertog to establish at a few leading universities a network of strategic studies seminars on the example of the “Studies in Grand Strategy” seminar regularly taught at Yale University by John Lewis Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charles Hill. On the origins of the Hertog seminar program, see Amy Dockser Marcus, “Where Policy Makers Are Born,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122973925559323583.html?mod=article-outset-box>.

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studies has particular historical origins in the unraveling of the international order in the 1930s. The response from a set of individuals was to bind together a variety of new and traditional disciplines to enable policymakers and the public to fully grasp the complex issues they faced. This effort marshaled non-governmental and governmental resources in a way that had not happened in peacetime. The hope was that this approach would aid the United States in forging a new “grand strategy,” which it desperately needed to confront global disorder. Perhaps equally important, this crisis was not seen as a passing event. The chronic instability of the 1930s exposed the pathologies of the modern world and demanded that a new field of security studies be made a permanent innovation to allow the United States to contend with perpetual threats. It was in the crisis of the 1930s that crucial ideas were forged or recast and vital networks between individuals and institutions were built. Security studies would carry on into the Cold War because it was created not to meet one particular crisis but to offer resources to promote a particular conception of national security over the long term.

The central figure in this rise was historian Edward Mead Earle. Overlooked and largely confined to footnotes today, Earle integrated different areas of inquiry to create a new field, defining it in ways that remain relevant. He built structures that nurtured numerous individuals who would go on to be lively figures in security studies’ postwar “golden age.” As with many fields of inquiry, this critical moment in the origins of security studies is as much a tale of the historical conditions that helped to shape it as it is a story of theoretical and methodological innovations. Scholars are not slaves to particular historical moments, but the origins of security studies are a reminder that what is feasible within an academic setting often depends on broader social, political, and historical circumstances and events. Earle was no Zeus with the Athena of security studies springing fully formed from his head. Like any academic entrepreneur, Earle depended on the contributions of other influential actors who were also responding to a changing international scene. He also could draw on existing scholarly disciplines and institutions in a way that lent support and credibility to a fledgling field. Nevertheless, his efforts produced crucial foundations for security studies today. The origins of security studies also provide insight into how new capacities were created to support an emergent form of American globalism that was maturing well before the entry of the United States into World War II.

Earle guided and presided over the creation of basic approaches and institutional supports that are still common in the world of security studies. These developments had their roots in the progressive history that informed much of Earle’s scholarship and activism. As the world situation turned dark in the

1930s, this background led Earle to propose an innovative and extensive project to foster a U.S. grand strategy to meet the new threat posed by totalitarian states that sprang from the Depression. Earle found considerable support for his efforts, particularly in the vital patronage offered by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY). With this long-term foundation support and the institutional backing of the Institute of Advanced Study (IAS), in Princeton, New Jersey, Earle was able to collect leading and emerging scholars on strategic issues for an influential seminar. Those assembled at the IAS endeavored to change the public as well as policy debates over the U.S. security posture in the years before World War II. These individuals moved easily into government service before the United States was actively engaged in that global conflict, building state capacity on security-related issues. Many of the assumptions and relationships forged in this period of crisis were carried into the Cold War world, a place where Earle and many of his collaborators saw similar threats. Even though Earle's personal contributions in the Cold War would be limited, the project he spent so much time cultivating had already begun to change academic and policy discourse and transform the capacity of the United States to think strategically.

The Problem That Is Security Studies

Security studies, as Joseph Nye Jr. and Sean Lynn-Jones state, is "not a discipline but a problem." Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of security studies, the major problem guiding research tends to be violence in world affairs (both between states and within them) and the variety of threats that can bring about conflict. The issue of maintaining security in the face of such threats has typically, but not always, been viewed through the prism of the nation-state.² As the problems of security touch a wide selection of social, cultural, economic, psychological, environmental, historical, legal, and political questions, the lens of one discipline is inadequate. Because of this, the field is ecumenical and predisposed to interdisciplinary approaches (regardless of whether international relations and political science predominate). Even the long-awaited institutional history of security studies repeats the received wisdom that the field is a recent innovation, locating its origins in the years after World War II and linking its evolution explicitly to the appearance of nu-

2. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 6; and Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 8.

clear weapons.³ Such a view assumes that before this inquiry, work on strategic issues was limited to a handful of interested officers in the professional military and a few scholars within the field of diplomatic history. Outside these cantons, there was little work in political science and international relations that focused on the imperatives of strategy—even if there was a great deal of scholarship in the interwar period regarding the prevention of conflict and the costs of war. What is more, even among those working on these issues, there was little of the coordination and interdisciplinary effort that marked postwar scholarship.⁴

As the conventional story goes, World War II began the germination of security studies when the government called civilian scholars into wartime service. The demands of global war forced them to begin considering issues that had once been considered only by the military and a small cadre of other government officials. Transformation came with the Cold War and the arrival of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie's 1946 volume on the atomic bomb, *The Absolute Weapon*, is seen as part of the catalytic moment that produced security studies, as scholars sought to understand this quantum leap in military technology along with the emergence of a new world order.⁵ Epoch-making shifts raised a set of complex and perpetual questions. Civilian academics and scientists found their continued engagement vital and sought after by the government. It should be said there was considerable comfort working closely with the organs of state policy. It grew from a firm feeling that the variety of scholarship in this new field was fused with the problem of security in the present. With this ethos and the Cold War imperatives of the 1950s and 1960s, strategic scholarship flowered. Many who established reputations in that period produced work that continues to influence the field. A parade of innovative concepts, such as deterrence, emerged that are still foundational to discussions of strategic issues and have considerable import in the larger field of international relations.⁶

Yet, a golden age often appears only in hindsight, and such is the case with security studies. Those looking back from the grim 1970s undoubtedly thought the immediate postwar decades were brighter. By the mid-1960s, limitations were appearing on various intellectual fronts, including deterrence theory.

3. Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, pp. 8, 73, 98–99.

4. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 211–213.

5. See Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946).

6. Nye and Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies," pp. 8–9; and Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," pp. 213–225.

Even more unforgiving was the very world that strategic studies attempted to understand and influence. The Vietnam War undermined the field in a number of ways. It exposed the limits and myopia of some tropes in the field. Long-standing assumptions about university cooperation with the government and military affairs broke down. Critiques gained traction. Stanley Hoffmann's trenchant commentary about the state of international relations as a field of study, particularly its relentless focus on the United States, was painfully relevant to the interrelated field of security studies.⁷ Such disillusionment seemed to promise stagnation for security studies.

Influential constituencies concluded that atrophy in security studies would have repercussions in critical areas of scholarship and policy, particularly in the realm of arms control. This concern spurred a concerted move by universities, the government, and foundations to resuscitate the field. In the early 1970s, the Ford Foundation took the lead on this "urgent need" by supporting several academic centers.⁸ Other philanthropies, including the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation, joined the cause later. Resources they provided not only strengthened inquiry in the field; they have become indispensable to its operation. Largesse allows the ongoing operation and research within influential institutes and think tanks while nurturing junior scholars at critical phases of their careers. It also cultivates inquiry in quarters that nourish security studies such as international relations theory, diplomatic history, and military affairs.⁹ This recent activity is merely part of a long tradition of work by foundations and other institutions seeking to cultivate security studies as a response to a perceived need for its analysis.

Interventions beginning in the 1970s sparked a "renaissance" in security studies that was palpable by the 1980s. The new approaches and a broadening of the pale of inquiry that accompanied this renewal continued after the Cold War came to a close. The field showed itself to be adaptable to the new issues and threats that emerged after the superpower struggle ebbed. The institutional support and growth came with changes in international affairs, the shape of nuclear and conventional military affairs, and increased access to reliable data. Among the varied elements that helped to revitalize the field was an increasing use of history to illuminate the questions crowding the security

7. Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 41–60.

8. Information Paper, "The Foundation's Program in Arms Control and International Security," December 1972, Report No. 002003, Ford Foundation Archives, New York City, p. 20; and Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 216.

9. Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, pp. 92–98.

studies docket.¹⁰ This is less an innovation, however, than a renewal of history's methodological importance to the field. It also draws attention to a critical point of origin for security studies. History plays a role not just as those external, unfolding events that shape the field, but also as a discipline that provides professional and intellectual identity to a lost founder, Edward Mead Earle.

A New Historian: Edward Mead Earle

Edward Mead Earle's intellectual journey hugged the shifting contours of American higher learning during the last century. Born in 1894, Earle was positioned to take advantage of these changes. Undergraduate education drew him to Columbia University, recently transplanted to Morningside Heights in New York City and straining to fulfill Nicholas Murray Butler's expansive vision of a research university. In 1917, degree in hand, Earle was swept into World War I, serving in both the field artillery and Air Service. After the war, a short stint at National City Bank gave way to the lure of scholarship. Returning to Columbia, Earle completed a Ph.D. in history in 1923 and immediately graduated to an assistant professorship at his alma mater.¹¹

No doubt Earle owed his good fortune to the publication of *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism*. The book's scope still impresses today. Deploying German, French, and English sources, it explored the collision of British, French, German, Ottoman, and Russian interests in the construction of a strategically vital railway through the Middle East. Rather than depicting it as the pure product of ambitious statesmen or national ambitions, the book acknowledged that the demand for the railroad sprang from the needs of modern industrial societies and their urges for markets, raw materials, and influence. In this, Earle's work acknowledged that world affairs were influenced by a multiplicity of interlocking actors. The politics of the railroad drew in industry, financiers, the media, religious groups, and the public. The forces unleashed played out on a struggling Ottoman Empire, itself eagerly seeking to modernize. Indeed, Earle believed that "the Baghdad Railway contributed to . . . Turkish participation in the Great War—and to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire—[which] was not so much the fault of the Turks . . . as it was the blight laid upon Turkey, a 'backward nation,' by European im-

10. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," pp. 216–222.

11. Edward Mead Earle, curriculum vitae, 1954, Earle Faculty File, box 7, Shelby White and Leon Levy Archives Center, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey (hereafter IASA); and Michael Rosenthal, *Nicholas Miraculous: The Amazing Career of the Redoubtable Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), pp. 136–155.

perialism.”¹² The book is critical of imperial competition and the tensions it inspires. Earle saw history replaying itself as the United States extended its own commercial, diplomatic, and military interests in the former Ottoman Empire. He feared that such commitments would invariably become a “menace . . . [if] they should lead republican America in the footsteps of imperial Germany.”¹³ Over the next decade, a staple view of Earle’s writing was that unwarranted and ill-considered policies seeking commercial gain and control of raw materials would eventually lead the United States to grief.¹⁴

Earle was, of course, using what was then very recent history for describing what is now called “policy relevance.” His book demonstrates that he saw history as a complex international interaction, embracing the whole of society. In addition, it situated the United States squarely within a global frame. Such an approach placed Earle among what were called the “New Historians.” Columbia was one of their hives. During Earle’s education, it hosted leading exponents James Harvey Robinson and the venerable Charles Beard. Infused with the progressivism of the era, the New Historians’ vision grew out of the nineteenth-century fascination with Rankean “scientific” history with its firm belief in the power of primary sources and a quest for objectivity. The new school felt that the bloodless “scientific” approach of its predecessors was out of step with the pressing demands of modern life. Within it, the emphasis was on high politics and diplomacy, which failed to capture the breadth of history. More important, this approach seemed consciously divorced from the contemporary world. The best history was the sort that threw light on the needs of the present. It put particular stock on investigations of the recent past, but it did not seek to limit the horizon of inquiry. Partisans for the New History saw it as a vast canvas absorbing the interlinked economic, intellectual, and cultural issues that, taken together, established a richer view of the human past. Crucially, the New Historians saw their approach as a servant to progress. Robinson and others thought that historians could do their work best by ignoring disciplinary boundaries and embracing methods that could best illuminate the questions besetting the world around them. Echoing calls heard in the new millennium for “interdisciplinarity,” the New Historians eagerly extended their arms to the emergent and activist social sciences for the methods they had to understand societies. With these assets in hand, historians could reveal

12. Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 234–235.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 350.

14. Edward Mead Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 108 (July 1923), pp. 104–107; and “Trade Imperialism Called War Peril,” *New York Times*, May 14, 1926.

how the past shaped the present, which, in turn, meant that contemporary problems could be grasped and overcome. Observers have noted that the New History was not a coherent theory or methodology. Rather, it was a posture and a “stimulus to action” that saw history, properly supported by other disciplines, as a mechanism for understanding and confronting the problems of the complex, interdependent modern world.¹⁵

Columbia buzzed with these ideas, and they were the foundation of Earle’s intellectual development. His later thinking and actions owed much to the engaged posture of the New Historians. Columbia also offered entrée into New York’s foreign affairs community, with Earle becoming vice chairman of the recently formed Foreign Policy Association in 1924. Through the 1920s, his work continued to focus on the Near East. He published on American missionaries there in *Foreign Affairs* and maintained focus on the international politics surrounding raw materials.¹⁶ Prominent productivity prompted promotion. Columbia made Earle associate professor in 1926, but even greater opportunities awaited.

A sign of Earle’s prominence and promise was that the newly formed Institute of Advanced Study picked him to join its first class of scholars. The 1930 founding of the IAS (operations began in 1933) was one product of the rage of institution building across the university, social science, and foreign affairs worlds in the first half of the twentieth century. Brainchild of Abraham Flexner, a doyen of the foundation world, the IAS was to be a first, a university without students offering scholars time and focus for pure research.¹⁷ Those around Earle were blinding lights in a variety of fields. When the IAS moved into its permanent home of Fuld Hall in Princeton, New Jersey, Earle was steps from luminaries including Albert Einstein and Kurt Gödel. Einstein and Earle became close enough that the historian sometimes drove the physicist to New York City.¹⁸ Although the appointment allowed Earle to trade on the cachet of

15. John Higham, with Leonard Krieger and Felix Gilbert, *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 109–116; Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1975), pp. 36–39; James Harvey Robinson, *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York: Macmillan, 1912); and Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 90–100.

16. Edward Mead Earle, “American Missions in the Near East,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (April 1929), pp. 398–417; and Edward Mead Earle, “International Financial Control of Raw Materials,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (July 1926), pp. 188–196.

17. *The Institute for Advanced Study: An Introduction* (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Advanced Study, 2009), p. 10.

18. Earle to Veblen, July 15, 1939, box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA; and Fuld Hall floor plan, ca. 1940, box 1, Frank Aydelotte Faculty File, IASA.

the IAS, he would not immediately profit from all the resources, human and otherwise, surrounding him. Through the mid-1930s, he was dogged by illness, which kept him from intense work. In fact, his relative lack of production in that period led to some concern (and disparagement) regarding the trajectory of his career.¹⁹

A Grand Strategy to Promote Grand Strategy

Earle's personal health would improve as the state of world affairs degenerated. By 1937, like many other observers, Earle had become profoundly worried by what he considered unprecedented threats to international order and with them the security of the United States. Two powerful and interlinked forces were responsible—the rise of totalitarian states and the unrelenting global Depression. Earle responded to this dual danger as those steeped in the progressive ethos of the New History might, turning the sights of his scholarship on the problems of the present.

Putting aside reservations about the United States becoming involved in global activism, Earle embraced the mission of explaining how it might have to change itself and the world to neutralize emerging threats. His ideas would be important, but his institutional status was just as vital to mustering the right resources to the cause. Earle shared his proposal with colleagues at the IAS and internationally. His goal was expansive and ambitious: build a new regime of inquiry that would serve as a standing resource for U.S. national security.

Earle's conception of the threat gripping the world was built around totalitarian regimes. With their authoritarian governance, firm hold on the media, control of the schools, and other aspects of civic life that came with the "extension of government control into virtually every domain of human relations," these regimes appeared as something new to history. These relationships fused into a domestic character where everything was subordinated to struggle. Earle's view, shared by increasing numbers of liberals, was that in countries infected by totalitarianism, the state was war. Even in peacetime the organization, national rhetoric, and economic policies of totalitarian regimes were geared to struggle.²⁰ This domestic orientation made them a threat internation-

19. Farrand to Flexner, August 23, 1938; and Flexner to Farrand, August 27, 1938, box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

20. Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Vol. 3: *The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 164–169. See also David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), pp. 69–101, 102–132.

ally. They looked upon “war rather than peace as the normal law of life.” Indeed, as early as 1937, Earle felt that peace existed in name only, as “the world may now be said to be in various stages of mobilization for war.” This did not just mean specific armed preparations but the control of exports, the husbanding of strategic raw materials, boycotts, food rationing, and civilian populations “kept in a febrile state of emotional excitement” by propaganda and high military expenditures. These state controls had been seen in the Great War and were erupting again in a time of apparent peace. It was a sober reminder that the “nation in arms” was “all-embracing” and that any effort to explicate this reality would have to be of similar scope. It also meant that the broad sweep of military issues was nonnegotiable and forced the question of whether liberal, democratic societies could adapt to a reordered international system and meet this qualitatively different threat.²¹

The historical uniqueness, intensity, and persistence of the totalitarian threat required a long-term, coordinated national response. Global and historical forces had instigated this menace, but the response had to be American. Most existing scholarship, Earle believed, had failed to foresee this problem. The “superabundance” of research on collective security, international law, and the role of international institutions (i.e., the League of Nations) that had dominated interwar international relations was now moot in the face of a new world disorder.²² Earle’s project, set apart with its orientation toward military and strategic issues, was specifically meant to contend with a world in flux.²³

There had been great strides in the study of international affairs in the interwar years. Indeed, it was an era of creation. Across higher education in the interwar period, a number of programs and schools devoted to international relations sprouted. Among these were Tufts University, which, in partnership with Harvard, planted the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Johns Hopkins, which broke ground on the Walter Hines Page School; and Yale, which cultivated the Institute of International Studies (IIS). Much like its peers, IIS actively endeavored to shape international affairs through the creation of a cadre of well-educated undergraduate and graduate students to stock the governmental, advocacy, educational, and business organizations instrumental to international society. Like the Page School, which sought to help shape the

21. Edward Mead Earle, “Military Policy and Statecraft: A Proposed Field of Study in International Relations,” n.d. [November 1937], box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA. A revised version of this was later published as Edward Mead Earle, “American Military Policy and National Security,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1938), pp. 1–13.

22. Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 189–225.

23. Earle, “Military Policy and Statecraft,” p. 5.

contours of scholarship and “elucidate the problems of policy,” IIS hosted a research program that supported Frederick Dunn, A. Whitney Griswold, Nicholas Spykman, and Arnold Wolfers, whose interests could be said to include strategic issues.²⁴ Even though IIS had as a central plank of its research program U.S. foreign policy and approached questions with a reasonably diverse disciplinary palate and in global frame, it, like many of the other new centers, was committed to a more diffuse approach to international relations. Security was an issue (although rarely by name), but it was just one element within these diverse and diffuse international relations programs. Their scope was expressed in an early proposal for the Page School that outlined an extensive vision for “ascertaining the fundamental conditions of international life.”²⁵

A focus on security and strategy along with a focus on high-level research (there were to be no graduate or undergraduate students) made Earle’s program stand out in this growing international relations community. Earle envisioned not a single “project but a subject for research.”²⁶ The creation of this subject was imperative because Earle “doubted whether the United States has any officially recognized military policy.”²⁷ The military had plans, but these were based on the last war, and there was little liaison between the services and key branches of the government. Here the effort crossed into the arena of statecraft. A full-fledged grand strategy would have to coordinate the diplomatic, military, and executive branches in this effort. Indeed, Earle assumed this need for integration, often speaking of change to military as well as foreign policy. In later comments, Earle was clear about the particular value of scholars given the perspective and distance they could provide. Social scientists were given a prominent role in his vision. Earle desired serious research, but from the start, he was out to create the means to influence the course of national policy. Any attempt to facilitate strategic thinking would require

24. Memorandum: “Organization of Material for Institute Studies” n.d. [1935], box 2, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale Institute of International Studies, Yale University (hereafter MAYU).

25. Yale Institute of International Studies, Report for the Year 1936–37, MAYU; Yale Institute of International Studies, Report for the Year 1937–38, box 2, MAYU; and “Department of International Law and Relations,” n.d. [1925], box 1, RG 8.010, Series 1, 2, 3, Special Collections, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University. It is interesting to note that the list of subjects initially envisioned for the Page School included the history of international relations, international law, diplomatic practice and procedure, international organizations, and the “conditions out of which international controversies arise and methods adapted to correcting those conditions.” Under the final heading, the topics leading to “controversies” that required study were physical geography, commercial interests, “racial diversities, nationality, etc.” The Page School was later superseded by what is now the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

26. Earle, “Military Policy and Statecraft,” pp. 6–7.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

changing public opinion along with scholarly discussion. Earle optimistically thought that the isolationist tendencies of the public would melt away when it was presented with a well-articulated national security policy.²⁸ Fostering change in government policy required a specific approach. Scholars in this new field could produce monographs, but it was equally important to distill ideas so they could easily be manipulated by the “hands of persons who actually influence the course of events in Washington.”²⁹

Earle shared his ideas with peers at the IAS as well as other colleagues in the United States and internationally. He received favorable responses from them and from Flexner. Yet, even with the support of the IAS, there were limits to what a prominent academic and institution could catalyze on their own. Constructing a new field of inquiry and assuring it had a rapid and pronounced impact on the strategic posture of the United States was unthinkable without significant funding. To find a patron for this new field, Earle performed rites well known even today in the internationalist arts: he sought out the foundations, specifically the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

A Foundation for Security Studies

The Carnegie Corporation emerged as an outgrowth of steel magnate Andrew Carnegie’s personal philanthropy. It was incorporated in 1911 to “promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding among the people of the United States.” Carnegie’s death in 1919 left the foundation on an independent institutional footing.³⁰ Although its charter limited the scope of its grants, the corporation still had a dramatic impact on the shape of global affairs. With a staff steeped in mainstream liberal internationalism, the foundation bestowed domestic, educational, and scholarly grants that sought to create the capacity in American society to contend with global change.³¹ This is now well understood regarding CCNY’s support of area studies and “Sovietology” during the Cold War, but this approach predated World War II.³²

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–5.

29. “Supplementary Statement on American Military Policy,” n.d. [1938], box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

30. Carnegie Corporation Charter, Constitution, and Bylaws, <http://carnegie.org/about-us/governance-and-policies/>. The corporation amended its charter in 1917 to allow grants to “Canada and the British colonies” and again in 1948 in former British dominions and former colonies.

31. See Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (New York: Palgrave, 2004); and Inderjeet Parmar, *Special Interests: The State and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1939–1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

32. David C. Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Earle was a known quantity to CCNY. After his appointment to the IAS, the corporation provided him travel funds, and their working relationship was such that its president, Frederick Keppel, considered himself a “member of the society for the Preservation of Ed Earle.”³³ Despite this, there would be disappointment. Earle approached CCNY in late 1937 with a proposal to support his expansive vision and met with reservations. Lacking his sense of urgency, the corporation’s trustees considered the project tantamount to propaganda and suggested that the government might better fund such work, if it was to be done at all.³⁴

Persisting, Earle offered a revised request in November 1939. He did not back away from the view that issues surrounding national defense remained “the most pressing problem facing the United States in this decade,” and he was confident that “nothing which has happened in the intervening time has altered this prophecy.” So the prophet made an explicit call for “a historical and critical study of a Grand Strategy for the United States.” His definition of the concept would find adherents in security studies today:³⁵ “[Grand strategy is] . . . that combination of domestic and military policies by which the vital interest of a nation may be most effectively advanced and defended. In some circumstances the diplomatic and in others the military instrumentalities will be more important, but they are always inextricably connected.” As in his 1937 appeal, Earle thought that articulating such a strategy would benefit not only policymakers, but also the public in grasping the wide and ever increasing spectrum of issues that went into creating military potential and potential threats. Earle was not establishing the idea of strategy—it had a long and ven-

33. Record of Interview, October 8, 1937; and Grant, May 5, 1938, box 135, Carnegie Corporation of New York Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (hereafter CCA).

34. Report on Grant, Studies in Military and Foreign Policy, box 178, June 23, 1942, CCA.

35. Take, for example, Barry R. Posen, who asserts that “a state’s grand strategy is its foreign policy elite’s theory about how to produce national security. Security has traditionally encompassed the preservation of a nation’s physical safety, the country’s sovereignty, and its territorial integrity, and its power position—the last being the necessary means to the first three. . . . A grand strategy enumerates and prioritizes threats and adduces political and military remedies for them.” Posen, “The Case for Restraint,” *American Interest*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (November–December 2007), <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331>. The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, which has served as a model for other recently established academic grand strategy programs, explains the concept: “We define ‘grand strategy’ as a comprehensive plan of action, based on the calculated relationship of means to large ends. Never an exact science, grand strategy requires constant reassessment and adjustment. Flexibility is key. Traditionally believed to belong to and to be best-developed in the politico-military and governmental realms, the concept of grand strategy applies—and ISS believes is essential—to a broad spectrum of human activities, not least those of international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private businesses and corporations.” See Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and Studies in Grand Strategy Seminar, International Security Studies, Yale University, 2011, <http://iss.yale.edu/brady-johnson-program>.

erable history—but he was recasting inquiry into it as something beyond simple military or political questions while helping to create the societal and governmental means in the United States to contend with its complexity. This restructuring would assist in rousing and preparing the country as a whole for the dangers abroad. This time Earle did not have to place much emphasis on the forces and threats that justified his plans: events had done that for him.³⁶

Others had come to share Earle's sense of threat, assuring that CCNY took just three months to assent to his request. World events and the corporation's response to them opened the vault for the experiment. Carnegie extended a significant first grant of \$6,500 (more than \$102,000 in 2010) for the formulation of "a theoretical 'Grand Strategy' for the United States" with "especial emphasis on the interrelation of diplomacy and arms as alternative and interdependent means of achieving national security."³⁷ These pennies were overture for the pound, as CCNY would remain a loyal supporter of Earle for the next fifteen years.

CCNY's investment cannot be credited to revisions to Earle's proposal. Loosened purse strings at CCNY reflected a hinge moment of the twentieth century. World War II had begun. Carnegie, like other foundations and internationalist bodies, was already moving to educate the American public and build national capacity for greater engagement in world affairs.³⁸ Much has been made of the government's tortuous efforts to change the international posture of the United States, but there was a concurrent and often independent mobilization of nonstate capacity as part of the recalculation of the weight of the United States in world affairs. In the interventionist camp, new organizations were formed and existing bodies redoubled their efforts. Just a few months after CCNY made its grant to Earle, calculations for a new grand strategy became imperative after the abrupt subtraction of the national power of France from the mathematics of global power in the summer of 1940.³⁹ As the shattered Third Republic fell to pieces, CCNY was among those internationalist and interventionist bodies shocked into vigorous action. Keppel earmarked \$500,000 (more than \$7.8 million in 2010) of the foundation's budget for a

36. All quotations in this paragraph can be found in Earle to Dollard, "Memorandum Concerning a Study of American Military Policy," November 2, 1939, box 178, CCA.

37. Corporation Secretary to Aydelotte, February 3, 1940; and Grant, February 1, 1940, box 178, CCA.

38. Inderjeet Parmar, "The Carnegie Corporation and the Mobilisation of Opinion in the United States' Rise to Globalism, 1939–1945," *Minerva*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 2000), pp. 355–378.

39. Marvin R. Zahniser, "Rethinking the Significance of Disaster: The United States and the Fall of France in 1940," *International History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1992), pp. 252–276; and Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 69–101.

program to build capacity in the United States for the trouble ahead. With such resources available, the question became how to spend this money. Elihu Root Jr.—son of a pillar of the establishment and onetime president of CCNY, Elihu Root—proposed how this “emergency program” might be organized.⁴⁰

In the fall of 1940, Root proposed a troika of themes. Like Earle’s proposal, these were prefaced on imminent danger that was the product of structural changes in global life. The totalitarian challenge was all encompassing because it threatened not just a stable liberal world order but the very survival of liberal societies. Root’s point A asked whether modifications were “desirable” to U.S. foreign policy in light of recent “changes in the international situation.” This was not a matter solely for the State Department, as “minds a little more removed from the stress of the diplomatic struggle” (i.e., historians, economists, and philosophers) might be able to make useful suggestions. Point B asked a deeper question about how the “democratic system” might have to mutate to survive in a “rapidly shrinking and highly militarized” world. Root was mixing some of the fears of a “garrison state”—popularized by political scientist Harold Lasswell—with more defuse fears that the democratic process in the United States “involves too much delay and wasted motion to fight successfully with tyranny.” The trick was to find a blend where inefficiency could be avoided “with a minimum of danger to the essentials of the process [democracy] itself.” Point C posed the problem of “morale” and how to understand its good and bad sides. Root was gingerly raising the controversial point that propaganda was needed to make the public toe the interventionist line.⁴¹

Leading members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment were solicited for

40. Elihu Root Jr., “Notes in Regard to the Formulation of an Emergency Program for Carnegie Corporation,” October 4, 1940, box 251, CCA. The senior Root was one of the more influential men of his time. He served as secretary of war—establishing a general staff and the War College for the U.S. military as part of what were known as the “Root Reforms”—and later as secretary of state. He also helped to found the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Society for International Law, and he was the first president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A close friend of Andrew Carnegie, he was president of the Carnegie Corporation from 1919 to 1920, and chairman of its board from 1920 until his death in 1937. For his work in fostering international law and conciliation, he was awarded the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize. See Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954). Although less influential, the younger Root was a founding partner of the elite law firm Root, Clark & Bird (now the multinational legal goliath Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP) and was well connected in New York circles. See “Elihu Root Jr., Lawyer, Is Dead: Statesman’s Son a Civic Leader,” *New York Times*, August 28, 1967.

41. Quotations in this paragraph are taken from Root, “Notes in Regard to the Formulation of an Emergency Program for Carnegie Corporation.” On Lasswell’s “garrison state” formula, see Lasswell, *Essays on the Garrison State*, in Jay Stanley, ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), pp. 17–75.

comments on the feasibility of Root's program and to put "flesh on the bones."⁴² Not unlike today, luminaries were quick to reply to a major funder. This is not to say that the pack, including Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Charles Beard, Lasswell (who offered a proposal masquerading as comments), Henry Luce, and Earle merely rubber-stamped the Root program. In the unsettled fall of 1940, however, they concurred with its general outlines. Beard thought the program identified "three great problems of our troubled times" and proposed an integrated research program to attack it.⁴³ Luce agreed that "pro-democracy propaganda" was at the heart of the matter. He was willing to apply that "horrid word" that so many others replaced with the term "morale" to obscure the reality that they were attempting to influence the public.⁴⁴

Coming out of the discussion was a "National Emergency Program" (NEP) that straddled the United States' entry into World War II. The grantees included organizations that would be assumed to have a role: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Social Science Research Council found funding readily available. Elite university programs benefited, but there were also programs that reached deep into American society to reshape it for the conflict. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching was given significant funds to improve science education in secondary schools "to meet the newly recognized demands of war and industry." There were also attempts to promote widespread "adult education" that would support the war effort. Grants were made for traveling exhibits sponsored by the American Museum of Natural History and for the provision of music records and their players for the men crowding army camps.⁴⁵

The NEP and the response to it demonstrate that the basic terms of debate and similar beliefs about the state of world affairs were shared across this elite group. The members of this clique also understood that the problems they faced were beyond the capacity of the government alone. Success would require the commitment of a range of social resources. Like Earle, many involved in foreign affairs had come to accept that global upheaval, particularly the Great Depression, had triggered malevolent forces. The interconnected and interdependent world of the "machine age" was Janus faced. Various epoch-making technologies such as radio and aircraft were loose on humanity and held amazing promise. These forces, however, destabilized societies and left

42. Dollard to Keppel, October 11, 1940, box 251, CCA.

43. Beard to Keppel, October 26, 1940, box 251, CCA.

44. Luce to Keppel, October 27, 1940, box 251, CCA.

45. National Emergency Program Cumulative Review, 1940–1942, October 15, 1942, box 251, CCA.

room for a new type of regime to emerge. Totalitarian governments could bend modern technologies to their own ends, enhancing their ability to control their populations and extend their influence. With these capacities, totalitarian regimes appeared to be a rising and permanent force in world affairs.⁴⁶

Earle's program at the IAS was one node of this wide-ranging response. Still, activity at Princeton was seen to have particular value. As the NEP got under way, Carnegie solicited the views of Nathaniel Peffer, professor of international relations at Columbia and a contributor to *Harper's Magazine*. Sharing many internationalist assumptions, Peffer was a sympathetic reviewer. He believed that the character of totalitarian regimes assured "nothing is certain" when "the ruling principle of international society is now force." The new normal demanded that the United States had to become wise in ways of force.⁴⁷ In his initial survey of the program, Peffer believed that the IAS seminar had "not yet" reached the pitch needed to fulfill the ambitions of the NEP.⁴⁸ As the seminar picked up tempo, Peffer revised this view:

[Earle's seminar] work is nearest to being basic, most nearly related to what the corporation had in mind when it laid down its emergency program. . . . Its purpose can be summed up as the study of the place of war in history and, therefore, of the first principles of the larger strategy, "the grand strategy" of America's place in the world. Neither of these subjects has yet been really faced in American contemporary thought, still less in American education. This is not a program that can be carried out in one year or two, or perhaps, ten. Earle has chosen to go about it by setting up in Princeton a continuous seminar, though with changing personnel. . . . It is too early to make final judgment on the worth or final usefulness of the Institute's program. But the beginnings show distinct promise. Earle is a highly competent man. His academic prestige was high as early as fifteen years ago, and he has qualities of tough-mindedness and worldly practicality, as well as contact with the world of politics, that are invaluable for this kind of work. . . . There is, then, promise that the Institute seminar will develop into a full-fledged Center of Military and Political Studies, the first of its kind in the country. But whether it fulfills the promise or not, the need for such an institute is clear.⁴⁹

Peffer spoke for many others with his support for the fabrication of this new field of inquiry. War and the geopolitical crisis brought by the fall of France made Earle's unique attempt to build and fill the grand strategy niche all the more important. The project may have retained the propagandistic elements to

46. Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 31–50.

47. Nathaniel Peffer, "The Age of Unreason," *Harpers*, March 1939, pp. 342–343.

48. Memo, Peffer to Keppel, December 1, 1940, box 251, CCA.

49. Jessup to Root, June 25, 1942, box 251, CCA.

influence public “morale” that the trustees had seen earlier, but this was now acceptable to a foundation tuning its program to just those sorts of concerns. The NEP’s relation to Earle’s program is a reminder that the seminar was synchronized with a broader sense of national urgency. More to the point, for several formative years, sustaining grants for Earle’s program were provided under the NEP.

Earle was also quick to tie his efforts to those of others devoted to strategic and military issues. He used his position with the Rockefeller Foundation-funded American Committee to draw together major figures into discussions forging links between the academy and the government for national defense. A dinner meeting hosted in New York on October 30, 1940, is a prime example of this networking. Leading scholars of international affairs including A. Whitney Griswold and Tyler Dennett were there, as well as staff from the Foreign Policy Association. Further texture was added by the presence of military officers and government officials who were involved in mobilization issues. The meeting recapitulated many of the points Earle had already articulated—that in the United States, particularly within its government, there had been little thought about how defense policy and prosecution of modern war required the full spread of a society’s capabilities. Civilian expertise in mobilization, propaganda, technological innovation, and strategic thinking was vital to any calculation of war-making potential. Germany’s easy victories at the start of World War II demonstrated it had learned this lesson. Earle believed that militaries alone were incapable of the comprehensive action required by modern war. Hierarchy of rank meant that “seniority weights more heavily in the scales than conspicuous ability and independence of judgment.” In the case of the United States, recent history had exposed the “feast or famine” of attention and funds to military and strategic issues. The government, as a whole, lacked institutional sinew to deal with strategic issues. Here civilians and particularly scholars could be an asset. If suspicions of military issues could be put aside and the “widest possible discussion of military problems, conducted on the highest possible plane,” could be sponsored between the civilian and government worlds, then the United States could harness its potential to produce an effective and efficient national defense.⁵⁰

Earle’s varied activities should be placed in context with a larger military-academic complex bubbling up around Princeton and across the nation. Social science research at Princeton on the impact of radio, which began with the aid

50. “Studies of National Defense: An Obligation of Scholarship,” October 30, 1940, box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1937, would be the foundation on which the Princeton Radio Listening Post was built. Established in 1939, it plucked German, Italian, and even British broadcasts from the air for analysis of their propagandistic content.⁵¹ Various members of the Princeton University faculty were drawn into postwar planning through official channels as well as through the national Universities Committee on Postwar International Problems, which arose in 1940 and would feed public and government discussions of a new world order. These were tied to other urgent scholarly efforts. The New England academic mind was also turning to the concerns of war and how to drum up public “morale” to support interventionist policies. Philosopher Ralph Barton Perry raised the “American Defense, Harvard Group,” which eventually mustered Carl Friedrich, Talcott Parsons, and Perry Miller to its colors.⁵² What is more, initially these sorts of programs were launched and bankrolled not by the state but by a cross section of advocacy, academic, and philanthropic groups. The above are just samples, but they reveal that well before official U.S. involvement, leading universities and their faculties were anxiously engaged in the sort of preparation that many in the interventionist community believed societies demanded for modern, total war.

The work of these institutions and individuals demonstrates that even in the university world, Earle was not alone in seeing new threats abroad. His seminar was the direct and indirect beneficiary of a broad set of existing ideas and a selection of American nongovernmental actors that was beginning to rally. Nevertheless, this does not take away the originality and importance of what was starting in New Jersey. At the same time, it highlights that Earle’s initiative stood out as a unique attempt to integrate various aspects of strategic scholarship and self-consciously bind together a new scholarly enterprise.

The Makers of Modern Security Studies

Even before the Carnegie money was in the till, there was action at Earle’s encampment in New Jersey. By late 1939, the reputation of the IAS and its proximity to the resources of Princeton University allowed Earle to

51. Brett Gary, *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 106–108; and Damien Keane, “An Ear toward Security: The Princeton Listening Center,” *Princeton University Library Chronicle*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Autumn 2009), pp. 45–62. On radio research generally, see Susan J. Douglas, *Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination* (New York: Times, 1999), pp. 124–160.

52. “Report of the Chairman for the Period September 15, 1940–March 15, 1941,” box 1, Records of American Defense, Harvard Group, Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

mobilize a methodologically and topically diverse seminar.⁵³ His seminar drew on scholars from American universities, particularly those from the growing throng of international relations institutes and programs, as well as institutions abroad. In its first three years, the seminar was able to build an impressive roster that included Thomas Bailey, Felix Gilbert, Charles Stacey, Etienne Mantoux, Gilbert Chinard, William T.R. Fox, Harold and Margaret Sprout, Albert Lauterbach, Herbert Rosinski, Alfred Vagts, Horst Mendershausen, Albert Weinberg, Etienne Denney, William Lockwood, and Bernard Brodie. A biographer of one participant noted that the roster included just about every scholar working on strategy in the United States.⁵⁴ This exaggerates but only slightly. Regardless, it was a prominent and up-and-coming cohort. Among the class were specialists in economics, history, politics, and international relations from Europe as well as the United States. Indeed, the number of international “importations” raised eyebrows at CCNY, compelling Earle to reassure them that there would be a raft of “domestic products” as time went on.⁵⁵

From the start, the seminar operated like an institute, bringing together those focused on strategic issues. Grant funds provided research support, travel funds, and salaries for many participants. On occasion, the Rockefeller Foundation added to the cause with grants in aid for particular scholars’ projects. One of the first beneficiaries was Alfred Vagts and his research on the history of the balance of power.⁵⁶ Then as now, this sort of aid had outsized benefits for junior members who were able to finish research projects and raise their profiles. The benefits were designed to have immediate and crosscutting impacts. One goal was to change the academy. Young alumni would insinuate themselves into university departments around the country, and established scholars would return to their home institutions carrying “new concepts of national problems and international relations” after a stint at the IAS.⁵⁷ Accordingly, the IAS and Earle were quick to highlight their successes in placing

53. Although the seminar was often referred to as the “Princeton Seminar” (and occasionally the “Princeton Military Seminar”), this denoted geographic, not institutional, location. The IAS convened it.

54. Barry H. Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 2.

55. Jessup to Root, June 25, 1942, box 178, CCA.

56. Grant in Aid, September 27, 1939, box 350, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RG 1.1, Rockefeller Archive Center, North Tarrytown, New York. On Alfred Vagts’s views on the balance of power, see Vagts, “The United States and the Balance of Power,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (November 1941), pp. 401–449; and Vagts, “The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea,” *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 82–101.

57. Edward Mead Earle, “The Princeton Program of Military Studies,” March 1942, box 24, Earle Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter MLP), p. 4.

seminar members in faculty positions, influencing the curricula at other institutions, and giving a warm reception to their publications—a common trait in security studies institutes today. By gaining legitimacy, their contributions would alter public debate and government policy. It would produce a cadre of civilians able to integrate the complex issues that make up strategic thought. If the emergency demanded, these individuals could then participate in military and government affairs.⁵⁸

With the interventionist focus of the seminar, Earle was disavowing earlier, more circumspect views of U.S. global activism. He lamented how the academy had failed to engage issues surrounding strategy and military issues in a utilitarian manner before the war. He jabbed peers, wondering “why” other academics “have been notably negligent in discharging their obvious responsibility to provide the data which are essential to an intelligent consideration of the critical issues of defense and foreign policy which the nation now faces.” He and others were left to ask, “[W]hat does our history and the experience of others suggest as to the wisest policies to be pursued” in the face of this transformation.⁵⁹ In the spring of 1941, Earle stated that the problem of strategic studies was not bounded by the immediate crisis—although world war provided “added importance and urgency.” Research and teaching on security required perpetual effort to create “a body of expert knowledge essential to the formulation of public policy,” and this standing “reserve of trained scholars who . . . [having] devoted . . . [a] considerable portion of their lives to problems of strategy would be of inestimable service to the nation.”⁶⁰

Within their focus on politics, society, and security, seminar participants shared a set of largely unstated assumptions. All believed in the value of protecting liberal life from the dangers of totalitarianism (although this did not mean that all were uncritical of liberal societies). Even so, there were terms to be sorted out. One of these was national security. Historians have suggested that national security was a new doctrine that “did not emerge apart from Soviet-American relations” and was not in common use before 1946. Yet “national security” was a catchphrase for the seminar from its start and was regularly applied to pre-World War II threats by its members.⁶¹ Defining the boundaries of U.S. national security was vital to the construction of any new

58. “Report of Work Accomplished under a Grant, February 13, 1941,” box 178, CCA.

59. Edward Mead Earle, “Memorandum Concerning a Possible Volume on the Changing Conditions of American Security, Past, Present, and Future,” December 4, 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

60. Earle, “The Princeton Program of Military Studies,” p. 3. See also Edward Mead Earle, “The Princeton Program of Military Studies,” *Military Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1942), pp. 21–26.

61. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 12, 194–201.

grand strategy—and it is a reminder of the almost caduceus-like embrace between the distinct concepts of security and strategy that is still present in the field. Appreciating the importance of the term “national security,” the seminar held an exchange, led by Albert Weinberg (his first book, *Manifest Destiny*, was a defining work on the subject), to pin down its meanings.⁶² There were as many views as there were participants, although a consensus emerged that it referred to the ability of a nation-state to secure its territory, rights, political independence, and national interests. There was firmer agreement, however, that the term was decisively subjective and could have numerous meanings—particularly when the vague idea of national interest was emphasized.⁶³

What all seminar members could agree on was that the bases of U.S. national security had been smashed by the upheaval of the 1930s. A reigning assumption emerged among the participants (which was particularly popular with Earle) that a “relatively stable international order” was necessary to achieve national security. This order no longer existed. Totalitarians had reset the world stage, voiding the established world order. Until the crisis of the 1930s, a balance of power in Europe and Asia, British command of the seas, the geographical position of the United States, a liberal economic system founded on the gold standard and free trade, as well as that aforementioned “relatively stable” international order had collectively offered security. Earle had a decidedly rosy view of the century after 1815, asserting that its “spirit . . . was fundamentally anti-militarist and anti-imperialist,” that there was “a vague aspiration for a brotherhood of man,” and that the “general assumption that democracy was the desirable state of things.” The interwar period had brought irredeemable alteration. War only emphasized that standing assumptions about security had become dangerous illusions. German victories had destroyed what remained of the power equilibrium, and their effects were cascading into international affairs. The Triple Alliance and Japan’s attempt at a “new order” in Asia were largely reflections of Nazi domination of Europe. These aggressive regimes had emerged because of the Depression, which had corroded liberal international economic order and the stability it brought. This had given the opportunistic infection of totalitarianism a chance in the global body politic. Its continued virulence “constitutes a basic challenge to liberalism, capitalism, and democracy.” The two sects of totalitarianism, the “creeds” of communism and fascism were a “negation of every accepted tenet—liberal and conservative—of organized society.” They sprang “the revolutionary age

62. Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935).

63. Various Memoranda, 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP.

in which we live," with its perplexing leaps in technology that abetted the totalitarians' urge to extend their power and subvert their enemies. German success, flowing from the ability of totalitarian societies to marshal these forces, demonstrated that conventional strategies were frighteningly outmoded to assure the security of the United States.⁶⁴

The seminar's self-conscious efforts to remedy this deficiency had a ready impact. Harnessing its resources, members pushed their own projects forward. Brodie established his scholarly bona fides by publishing a study of the revolutionary impact of industrial technology on naval affairs (in which he profusely thanked Carnegie and Earle). Keeping with the seminar's goal of influencing public discussion and policy, Brodie quickly produced *The Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* and prognosticated on naval strategy in the Atlantic.⁶⁵ The Sprouts offered further perspective with additions to the library on U.S. naval power.⁶⁶ True to the full spectrum of inquiry the project demanded, there was also work on nonmilitary issues. Stephen Possonby worked up a project on the psychological aspects of modern conflict. Bailey completed his *Diplomatic History of the American People*, the first of ten editions of what became a standard text on the subject.⁶⁷ These and other works were accompanied by a flurry of articles and editorials, which would only intensify as new members were drawn into the seminar.

The IAS provided a port from which Earle could sally into the acrimonious debate over intervention. He joined 100 historians convened by William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies in calling for aid "bolstering the fighting resources of Great Britain and her Allies."⁶⁸ He opined for intensified study of military topics as a basis to improve thinking on national security.⁶⁹ Interventionist formula were rolled together into a 1941 book, *Against This Torrent*.⁷⁰ Not unlike some early twenty-first century scholars, Earle believed that transformative strategic moments in American history

64. Edward Mead Earle, "Memorandum Concerning a Possible Volume on the Changing Conditions of American Security, Past, Present, and Future," December 4, 1940, box 33, Earle Papers, MLP; and Edward Mead Earle, "The Future of Foreign Policy," *New Republic*, November 18, 1939, p. 92.

65. Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941); and Bernard Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1942); Bernard Brodie, "The Strategy of the Atlantic," paper presented at the Conference on North Atlantic Relations, Prout's Neck, Maine, September 4–9, 1941 (this conference was sponsored by the ACIS).

66. Harold Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).

67. Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: F.S. Crofts, 1940).

68. "Historians Urge Help for Allies," *New York Times*, June 27, 1940.

69. Edward Mead Earle, "Military Study Urged on All," *New York Times*, November 16, 1941.

70. Edward Mead Earle, *Against This Torrent* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941).

provided a basic guide to a changing global landscape.⁷¹ At the same time, the nature of totalitarian states and the technologies that shrunk the globe meant that “we now know that conventional military standards and time honored concepts of defense are no longer relevant to our security.” There was a danger of militarism in the new grand strategy required to meet this threat, but a full commitment of a range of civilian voices to “the widest possible discussion of strategic issues, conducted on the highest possible plane,” might be an inoculation to this disease. Collected effort would spark the “spirit” in the body politic necessary to confront these threats.⁷² There was undoubted self-justification in the book, but reviewers saw it as an effective retort to noninterventionists and voices such as those of Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh seeking accommodation with the totalitarian “wave of the future.”⁷³

Of all the scholarship produced by the seminar, perhaps the most far reaching in its impact was Earle’s 1943 *Makers of Modern Strategy*.⁷⁴ Like so much else, it conformed to the grand strategy that Earle had laid out for the seminar. Conceived in 1942, it was hurried to press to remedy the absence of a book of its type in English. Aimed at being a statement on military thought and not military history, the book sought university audiences that “finally are concerning themselves with military affairs.” Another goal was to aid in the training of soldiers, but the book was also explicitly aimed at a general public that still “has not been trained to think and judge in military and strategic matters.” The final product was very much an expression of the seminar, as many of its members made contributions—although numerous other scholars participated.⁷⁵ Altogether, it produced a solid review of strategic thinking from Machiavelli onward. The volume had an expansive view of strategy, considering political leaders and even intellectuals along with professional soldiers as instrumental to its evolution. Nevertheless, it reflected the time in which it was written. One concluding theme was the influence of the profound changes that ideology had brought to strategy in the 1930s. The book concluded with a chapter on Adolf Hitler’s “totalitarian strategy” for warfare and its successful blend of the civilian and military realms. The strategy was made possible by the extreme regimentation the Nazis brought to German society. Hitler effec-

71. Take, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

72. Earle, *Against This Torrent*, pp. 8–9, 63, 69, 3.

73. John Cournos, “Three Arguments against the ‘Wave of the Future,’” *New York Times*, June 8, 1941.

74. Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943).

75. Edward Mead Earle, “Purposes and Character of Proposed Volume of the Development of Modern Military Thought,” March 27, 1942, box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

tively deployed psychological and political means coupled with new technologies (especially mass media such as radio to spread invidious propaganda) to divide and confuse his enemies. Altogether, Hitler's approach reflected the "revolutionary" force of totalitarianism, reshaping the globe and with it the understanding of strategy.⁷⁶

Makers of Modern Strategy was a considerable success and would help to fulfill Earle's ambition to create a field that would reach beyond the immediate crisis. Its wartime popularity made the transition to peace. Throughout the golden age of security studies, military officials read it and students were offered it as a basic text. It was regularly reprinted and translated into numerous languages with more than 10,000 copies sold by 1970.⁷⁷ In 1986 Peter Paret (who had just been inducted into the IAS) brought out a revised edition with the aid of Princeton seminar veterans Felix Gilbert and Gordon Craig. Although the rationale and much of the original structure of the first edition were maintained, there were changes, among them Hitler no longer warranted a chapter.⁷⁸

Despite its considerable influence and achievements, the Princeton seminar had limits. Its scholarship was Eurocentric, and this bias was funneled into strategic analysis. The gazes of its members (including its international participants) were firmly fixed on the politics of the old world, and this led to blindness toward complex issues such as colonialism that were important fixtures of world affairs. There was a tendency to see Germany as the preeminent threat while viewing events in Asia and elsewhere as a sideshow. Such a perspective, however, reflected the dominance of "Atlanticist" views in American officialdom and may be one reason the ideas emanating from the IAS were widely and positively received.⁷⁹

Security Studies Goes to Washington and to War

For all the seminar's accomplishments, the goal was never solely to push the boundaries of scholarship and improve the academic commons. Earle and oth-

76. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 510–515.

77. Thomas to Kaysen, September 25, 1970, box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA. It appears that after Earle's death, the IAS held the rights to the book and made a comfortable annual income off royalties.

78. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). In 1986 Peter Paret joined the IAS as Andrew W. Mellon Professor.

79. On the dominance of "Atlanticist" attitudes in the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy in the interwar period, see Kenneth Weisbrode, *The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats Who Forged America's Vital Alliance with Europe* (New York: Da Capo, 2009), pp. 11–60.

ers also sought to synchronize their scholarly work with national policy. In the early months of the war, Earle offered the diverse academic resources around Princeton to Naval Intelligence for service in the “many-sided and complicated business” that was “modern war.”⁸⁰ The seminar’s most powerful impact, however, would not come from drawing the government into the seminar but from insinuating the seminar into the government. Earle’s own engagement rapidly blossomed into government service. In February and March 1941, he took a tour of British and U.S. territories in the Caribbean, including those offered to the United States in the “destroyers for bases” deal of 1940, to report on “morale.” Although made at the request of the Office of Naval Intelligence (and possibly for Secretary of War Henry Stimson with whom Earle was said to have a “confidential relationship”), the tour was paid for by CCNY.⁸¹ On the heels of this trip, in July 1941, William “Wild Bill” Donovan summoned Earle to Washington to help organize and staff the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).⁸²

As an intellectual operation, the seminar encountered problems with such collaboration. By late 1942, Earle was lamenting to backers at Carnegie that the academic side of the seminar was becoming hard to sustain, as the Allied war effort siphoned off members.⁸³ By 1944, members were in the U.S. Army infantry; the Economic Warfare Board; the staff of Charles de Gaulle; the General Staff of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces; and the OSS. Brodie followed the trend, taking a commission in the U.S. Navy that would attach him to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, which would then detach him to the State Department for the San Francisco Conference.⁸⁴ Despite privileged positions, seminar members were not immune to the human costs of armed conflict. Etienne Mantoux, an economist and seminar member in 1941–43, was killed while serving with the French army in Germany just before the war

80. Earle to Director of Naval Intelligence, May 16, 1942, box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA. He highlighted not only strategic resources, but also Princeton University’s public opinion research programs as well as its industrial relations section. The IAS was singled out not only for his seminar but also for its school of mathematics and the Economic Section of the League of Nations that was in exile on its campus.

81. Record of Interview, CD and Edward M. Earle, February 13, 1941; Edward Mead Earle, “Confidential Memorandum Concerning Intelligence Problems in the West Indian Bases, Particularly Trinidad and Jamaica”; and Edward Mead Earle, “Confidential Memorandum Regarding Problems of Morale, Recreation, and Health in Connection with American Naval and Air Bases in the Caribbean Area,” box 135, CCA.

82. Earle to Aydelotte, October 13, 1945; and Abstract from Army Air Force Recommendation for Medal of Merit for Edward Mead Earle, n.d. [1945], box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

83. Record of Interview, WAJ and Edward Earle, September 22, 1942, box 178, CCA.

84. Partial List of Members of the Princeton Military Studies Group, 1939–1944, n.d. [1945], box 6, Earle Faculty File, IASA; and Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy*, pp. 2–3.

ended. His well-known retort to John Maynard Keynes's criticism of the Versailles settlement that took form at the IAS, *The Carthaginian Peace*, was published posthumously.⁸⁵

Earle became even more heavily invested in government service once the battle was joined. After working with the OSS, he was made special consultant to the commander of the Army Air Forces. In this role, he became central to the organization of the Committee of Operations Analysts. It was a bland title for a body that was to decide the pivotal question of how to best deploy Allied air power against the German and Japanese war economies. Entrepreneurial skills honed at the IAS proved invaluable. Earle enlisted and coordinated the relevant Allied agencies involved while gathering "able and distinguished men."⁸⁶ The able were an eclectic mix, including a selection of serving air force officers as well as banker Thomas Lamont; former antitrust lawyer Fowler Hamilton; economics professor (and later devotee of international development) Edward S. Mason; and Elihu Root Jr.⁸⁷ Their magnum opus was the "Combined Bomber Offensive" (CBO), which restructured Allied bombing efforts in preparation of the invasion of Europe. Synchronizing the operations of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Force, the CBO offered a blueprint for this ultimately successful strategic campaign.⁸⁸

The award of the U.S. Presidential Medal for Merit (which also highlighted his promotion of what was termed "an informed and sound public opinion") and the French Legion Honor attest to the value that governments placed on Earle's contributions.⁸⁹ Wartime activities of the seminar's members presaged much Cold War collaboration between those in the pale of security studies and the U.S. government. It is often assumed that scholars were swept into the war effort and that this experience left a willingness to work closely with organs of state during the Cold War. The wartime service of members of the Princeton seminar and particularly Earle's activities demonstrate that this was hardly true for all influential academics. Before the war, they agitated to be close to the centers of authority. Government service was a fulfillment of this goal.

85. Hartz to van Ittersum, June 22, 1945, box C1622, League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Switzerland; and Report on Grant, December 31, 1941, box 178, CCA. See also Etienne Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace: Or, the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

86. Abstract of Army Air Forces Recommendation for Medal of Merit for Edward Mead Earle.

87. It is interesting to note that the Lamont and Mason families endowed various entities at Harvard that now support security studies, including parts of the Harvard Kennedy School, which houses the Belfer Center and its International Security Program.

88. Charles W. McArthur, *Operations Analysis in the United States Army Eighth Air Force in World War II* (Providence: American Mathematical Society, 1990), pp. 8–16.

89. Abstract of Army Air Forces Recommendation for Medal of Merit for Edward Mead Earle. See also Earle, curriculum vitae, both in box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

Scholarship was tailored to their image of national security and the needs of the national policy they thought necessary to assure it. Their involvement not only helped to build the state's capacities, but also altered the scholarly terrain on which others would work. The sort of closeness to government power that ginned up considerable criticism in the 1960s and beyond was not something foisted on figures in security studies by the Cold War; it was something implanted as a basic element of the security studies enterprise from the beginning. What is more, wartime service did not end the emergency. Even after fascism's defeat, the dangers of totalitarianism remained.

Grand Strategy Reenlists for the Cold War

Following the end of World War II, Earle believed that imperatives defined in the 1930s had not dissipated. With the unprecedented role that the United States was taking on in shaping the postwar world, the need for extensive study of the issues surrounding grand strategy was even more necessary. This reality fed Earle's view that the United States "cannot escape the role of Great Power that History and Destiny have thrust upon us." It had to continue to grow into the understanding that the United States' national power was an extensive and multifaceted mix "[of] modern industry, modern agriculture, modern communications, and modern finance. . . . It is also education, the press, the church and the spirit of our youth" and, in fact, "there is no phase of American life which does not contribute to our national power." Like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union could not be treated as a normal state, as its totalitarian nature led it to "operate under particular laws of dynamics." It was "armed Jacobinism" that put force first with its goal of establishing a "new social order by subversion, revolution, and arms." These goals were obviously antithetical to the "relatively stable world order" that Earle had earlier articulated as the basis of U.S. national security. Once again, the United States was impelled to mobilize its national capacity for a global struggle.⁹⁰

Even before the end of the war, Earle was angling to restart his seminar to meet the demands of history and destiny. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had been among those in the military who had depended on the sort of work that Earle and his compatriots had done. Realizing this, Earle approached him in 1945 about the possibility of the government underwriting the seminar with a hefty \$1 million endowment (more than \$12 million in 2010).⁹¹ Undoubtedly, there was the self-justifying urge to perpetuate a suc-

90. Edward Mead Earle, *National Power and World Order* (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1948), p. 17.

91. Earle to Forrestal, May 29, 1945, box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

cessful academic initiative, but Earle firmly believed that the broad strategic questions that had roared to life in the 1930s remained pressing. While compelling, his argument did not convince the U.S. government to provide such support. CCNY, however, continued to share his views and remained a stalwart benefactor. Through the 1940s and into the early 1950s, the corporation generously funded the renewed efforts of what it referred to as the “Earle Seminar” in its official documents.⁹² Funds may not have come from Washington, but a steady stream of officials made the trip to Princeton for IAS symposiums. These seminars became increasingly well known, even to the public. A *New York Times* profile of the IAS in 1950 portrayed Earle and his seminar as constituting an authoritative segment among “one of the most dramatic assemblages of intellectual power to be found anywhere in the world today.”⁹³

Postwar meetings were indeed impressive and maintained the seminar’s internationalist credentials. The presence of esteemed scholars such as Edward Hallet Carr and Arnold Toynbee only enhanced the seminar’s profile. Their careers were aided as well. Each was offered financial support for extended time at the IAS and entrée into Earle’s seminar. This support facilitated their various writing projects (including the first volume of Carr’s monumental *History of Soviet Russia*), but also further exposed them to American scholars and the public.⁹⁴ Carr first visited in 1948, as his keystone work, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, was becoming a bible for realist disciples. It was the culmination of a determined campaign by Earle to entice Carr to Princeton to help clarify “power problems” that were still “shockingly abused and misunderstood by American scholars and publicists.”⁹⁵ Earle, however, was quickly disappointed by Carr’s contributions.⁹⁶ Precisely why is unclear, but the two had plenty of room for disagreement.

There were undoubted philosophical differences behind Earle and Carr’s disagreements. Earle’s unwavering view that the Soviet Union perpetuated the totalitarian menace must not have sat well with Carr, a man whose sympathy with the Soviet project was apparent in his writings (although he was not uncritical).⁹⁷ They also sparred over major U.S. Cold War initiatives such as the Marshall Plan. Carr saw the plan as bound up with the desires of American

92. Record of Interview, Edward M. Earle and PH, April 22, 1946; Earle to Herring, May 8, 1946; and Earle Seminar Grant, March 4, 1948, box 178, CCA.

93. Gertrude Samuels, “Where Einstein Surveys the Cosmos,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1950.

94. Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892–1982* (New York: Verso, 1999), p. 142; and William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 208. Time at the IAS allowed Edward Hallett Carr to finish the first of his three-volume history of the Soviet Union. See Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

95. Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity*, p. 141.

96. Record of Interview JG and Ed Earle, April 6, 1948, box 178, CCA.

97. See Michael Cox, ed., *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 145–197.

producers to see their “exports subsidized by the American government,” while Earle preferred to see it in glowing terms as “a spectacular example of a fundamental Anglo-American principle of statecraft—enlightened self-interest.”⁹⁸

Earle’s opinion of Carr also may have reflected his own ambivalent views on the nascent concept of realism. Earle’s name has recently been dropped in among those responsible for the rise to dominance of realism in American international relations.⁹⁹ Yet, Earle was not an unabashed devotee of the concept. During the war, he roughly handled the magnum opus of a founder of American realism, Nicholas Spykman. He found Spykman’s focus on a narrow concept of power as the sole basis of international affairs unpersuasive and out of line with American traditions. It was not that national power did not matter, but that Spykman’s notion of it as well as his concept of the balance of power were restrictive and reductive. Spykman’s view did not have room for the broadly based demands of strategy that included not just military, geographic, and political considerations but also the social, psychological, ideological, and moral imperatives that drove national interests.¹⁰⁰

Although critical of those with too restrictive of a view of power, Earle continued to deride the “cynicism and intellectual nihilism” of scholars in the thrall of “pacifist, isolationist, and economic determinist philosophies” that he believed ruled the day in the 1930s. For Earle, this left the United States vulnerable to the totalitarian threat and was an object lesson that the interpretation of the recent past was no academic exercise when it steered public debate in the wrong direction.¹⁰¹ In Earle’s later work, there were certainly elements that realists would hold close, but powerful strains of liberal, internationalist, and clearly idealistic ideals coexisted in the man along with the tenants of the New History. Grasping this is a reminder that contemporary theoretical categories are not tailored to fit actors in the past. Rather than being focused on propagating a specific methodology or theory, Earle was invested in the construction of the infrastructure of a field of study.

98. Edward Mead Earle, “The American Stake in Europe: Retrospect and Prospect,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (October 1951), p. 429.

99. Inderjeet Parmar, “The Roles of Carnegie and Rockefeller Philanthropy in the Development of the Realist Traditions in American International Relations and in the United States’ Rise to Globalism,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 28, 2007.

100. Edward Mead Earle, “Power Politics and American World Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (March 1943), pp. 94–106. Earle was responding to Nicholas John Spykman’s major work, *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

101. Edward Mead Earle, “A Half-Century of American Foreign Policy: Our Stake in Europe, 1898–1948,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (June 1949), p. 184.

The waning years of the seminar corresponded with the early years of the Cold War. The well-established pattern of integrating academics, intellectuals, policymakers, and military figures begun before the war continued in a Cold War world. Topics included the condition of France, the dynamics of Soviet policy, and discussions of the state of liberalism as a political philosophy.¹⁰² One of the more influential meetings held under the auspices of the seminar was a November 1950 conference on German rearmament. The meeting drew regulars such as Craig and Gilbert but also prominent Europeanists Franz Neumann and Hajo Holborn. The U.S. government sent a delegation of U.S. Army generals and Robert Tufts of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Raymond Aron was also in attendance, as was a newcomer to the IAS, a Foreign Service Officer on leave from the State Department—George F. Kennan.¹⁰³

Alumni continued to fan out across the country. Brodie moved to the Institute of International Studies at Yale in 1945 and on to RAND in 1950. In 1951, William T.R. Fox was picked by Columbia to head its new Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). While undoubtedly gratified, Earle might not have been surprised by his alma mater's choice of a seminar veteran given that he was on the institute's advisory board.¹⁰⁴ The founding of IWPS was one sign that the study of war and peace within the academy was moving toward the strategic emphasis marked out at the IAS and that the ideas Earle pioneered were firmly entrenched in the intellectual landscape. The Institute of War and Peace Studies continues to be an influential hub of security and strategic studies today.

Earle and his seminar remained in an influential position, but no one knew their time was marked. Earle's health problems returned, laying him low for much of 1952–53. On June 24, 1954, just days after receiving an honorary degree from Columbia, Earle was struck down by renewed illness at the age of sixty.¹⁰⁵ The sudden news compelled the then head of the IAS, J. Robert Oppenheimer, to inquire about the remaining CCNY funds (he hoped to employ them for continuing the studies of modern history that the seminar had begun). Carnegie officials responded that the corporation's policy when a scholar died was to ask for grant funds to be returned. The IAS remitted the

102. Conference on Modern France, February 1–4, 1950; and Members of the Seminar on the Dynamics of Soviet Policy, Spring Term 1948, both in box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

103. Conference on German Rearmament, November 10, 1950, box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA.

104. "Columbia Finds War-Peace Study," *New York Times*, December 10, 1951.

105. Earle to Anderson, December 3, 1953, box 178, CCA; Earle to Oppenheimer, September 17, 1952, box 7, Earle Faculty File, IASA; and "E.M. Earle Dead: Military Expert," *New York Times*, June 25, 1954.

balance and with that Earle's seminar abruptly ended.¹⁰⁶ Although the IAS continued historical work, it did not continue Earle's strategic studies in anything like their full form. It is ironic that a scholar who worked so long to establish the supports for the study of foreign and military policy failed to leave a specific institution tied to his reputation. Propelling relevant ideas and individuals outward, not drawing them into a single organization, would be his legacy, and it is one reason for Earle's relative obscurity today.

The apparent disjuncture from the past brought by the atomic bomb and the intensification of the Cold War conspired to hide Earle's influence. There is a regularly repeated story that Brodie told his wife: the attack on Hiroshima had rendered obsolete all of his research up to that point on the impact of technology on strategy. This assumption that nuclear weapons reset inquiry on strategy has been the basis of the view that 1945 is the point of origin for security studies.¹⁰⁷ But taking a longer view of just Brodie's body of work offers a bridge between the two eras. In importance senses, Brodie did not wander far from basic concepts accepted by the Princeton seminar. Discussions of the atomic bomb and deterrence were an extension of his earlier commitment to explaining the influence of modern technological change on naval operations. Technology's impact on strategy was a staple concept for the cadre at the IAS. It was the outsized impact of one new technology—nuclear weaponry—that was being explored in a security studies frame that already had affinities for how technology interfaced with strategy.

Brodie's postwar professional trajectory would be ballistic, but it received a critical boost from the Princeton seminar. It is a reminder that those aided or influenced by the IAS seminar—Brodie, Craig, Carr, Fox, Gilbert, the Sprouts, and others—had outsized impact in their respective academic fields as well as in the nexus of policymaking. The seminar's intellectual products still define basic aspects of the field. Prominent voices still consider *Makers of Modern Strategy* a "landmark," and it soldiers on as an educational tool for those seeking to perpetuate the field.¹⁰⁸ Yale's heralded Studies in Grand Strategy seminar is just one of the university courses that continues to assign the book.¹⁰⁹ Others aided by Earle still have resonance in central scholarly debates, even if their reputations and publications have faded. Some did this by transmitting

106. Oppenheimer to Lester, September 13, 1954; Anderson to Oppenheimer, September 20, 1954; and Oppenheimer to Anderson, September 22, 1954, all in box 178, CCA.

107. Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, pp. 98–99.

108. Eliot A. Cohen, "Review of *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 220, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53277/eliot-a-cohen/makers-of-modern-strategy-military-thought-from-machiavelli-to-h>.

109. "Studies in Grand Strategy" syllabus, spring 2010, <http://iss.yale.edu/brady-johnson-program>.

assumptions from the 1930s into the emerging Cold War. Bailey is one of those whose notoriety has shrunk with his passing, but in the 1940s and 1950s his was an influential voice. Participation in the seminar aided the completion of his influential text on U.S. diplomacy and undoubtedly flavored his 1950 *America Faces Russia*, which aimed to provide historical context for the Cold War. It followed the seminar's pattern of turning scholarship into a tool to confront the problems of the present. "God forbid," Bailey wrote his publisher, "that the present cold war should develop into a shooting one, but if it does, I suspect that my book would be widely used in the armed services for indoctrination services."¹¹⁰ Bailey unequivocally blamed the Soviet Union for dismembering the Grand Alliance and initiating the Cold War. His accusation followed patterns of ideas that permeated and were propagated by the seminar—that totalitarian regimes upset global stability and demanded a U.S. response. It is also a model "orthodox" interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. Like other scholars, Bailey argued that, in the years after 1945, "communist tactics had within a few months caused the American people to modify drastically their way of life, and to change drastically their most basic foreign policies." "Portentous new policies and departures" such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were "not products of the American tradition or of basic American desires. They were . . . authored by the men in the Kremlin."¹¹¹ Bailey's views did not differ widely from the overall tenor of the seminar, and they show where its consensus views could lead. Long after the seminar dissolved, the shape of dominant scholarly debates in fields critical to security studies are still defined by its influence. Bailey's and similar orthodox interpretations remain one enduring panel in the "triptych" of Cold War historiography in which generations of scholars have positioned themselves for or against in an argument without end.¹¹²

Earle's Conclusion, A Beginning for Security Studies

Earle and his collaborators etched the outlines of security studies long before the Cold War. Today, the activities of various security studies hubs populating American universities echo his ambitions. They seek not only to influence academic discourse, but to engage policymakers and shape public discourse on

110. Quoted in Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p. 306.

111. Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 345–346.

112. On the "triptych" of traditionalism (or orthodoxy), revisionism, and postrevisionism of Cold War historiography, see Anders Stephanson, "The United States," in David Reynolds, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 27–48.

key issues. Their focus on the United States, rightly lamented at different moments by various critics, was present at the creation of security studies, as was service to American national interests. Earle himself held a strong and idealized view of the U.S. role in a transformed world. Yet, the IAS seminar was not populated by sheltered jingoists; participants saw problems in an explicitly global frame. Indeed, global change was the major spur to assemble a U.S. grand strategy supported by an entirely new sphere of scholarship. This inquiry was done in close contact with international trends and counterparts (admittedly ones with whom they shared views). At the same time, participants generally assumed that the leverage necessary to contend with global threats was best found at the national level. Much of the impetus for this intellectual shift was historical: a response to the interwar inability of the League of Nations, the European power system, the U.S. government, and the scholarly world to provide effective answers to pressing security problems. This national focus meant that from the start security studies in the United States readily connected itself to the demands, desires, and legitimacy of the American state.

Edward Mead Earle did not create the ingredients, but he whipped them together to create what we now recognize as security studies. Cadre for his IAS seminar was drawn from existing institutions of higher learning. The seminar drew inspiration and credibility from long-standing disciplines such as history while drawing in ample inputs from the waxing social sciences and particularly the fledgling field of international relations. To be sure, not all of the theories and methods that drove Earle and his collaborators still reign. The emphasis on totalitarian threats has ebbed, but Earle's efforts, particularly in marshaling institutional support, allowed a synthesis of components that remain building blocks of the security studies today. Although it is commonplace to understand security studies in context with political science theories and methodologies, the field has strong links to particular debates and schools flowing from history. This is true not just in terms of methodology but also in terms of its institutional evolution. Even in its willingness to employ whatever social science or humanistic methods needed to find answers to contemporary problems, the field reflects progressive impulses of the early twentieth-century New Historians. Such urges have been renewed at Columbia University, where a new Hertog seminar announces the desire to foster a "research program that employs historical analysis to confront present and future problems in world politics."¹¹³

113. The Hertog Global Strategy Initiative, Columbia University, <http://globalstrategy.columbia.edu/about/>.

Nevertheless, the evolution of security studies cannot be seen as a simple scholarly progression. Earle, like numerous of his successors today, sought to influence not just the mechanisms of state, but society's understanding of world affairs. In turn, that external world has had a significant impact on the shape of security studies. This means not just the imperatives and questions scholars felt compelled to address, but also the scope of institutional patronage available for that inquiry. The renaissance of the 1970s and 1980s was a product of university and foundation investment as much as methodological and intellectual innovation. This type of catalytic patronage, however, was an echo of the decisive investment by CCNY in the IAS seminar. In both of these historical moments, financial commitment was driven by the perception that world events demanded it. Earle was a unifying figure, but he could not have accomplished what he did without other institutional support and hospitable historical conditions. It is a reminder that in a policy-oriented field of inquiry, external imperatives have tremendous influence on the opportunities available to even the most accomplished (or entrepreneurial) minds.

The bonds of cooperation that Earle helped to develop across government, the philanthropic world, and academia have endured. The enthusiastic scholarly commitment to the state and policy that characterized the first decades of the Cold War were hardly without precedent. Earle's seminar and his own career had already marked a path and left an influential set of books and concepts as milestones. It should again be emphasized that Earle was not the sole voice in the creation of this now influential subfield, which combines history, economics, political science, and international relations (among other disciplines); security studies has been shaped by trends in these larger areas of inquiry as well. Earle's own reputation may have faded as scholars have moved the debate to new issues instrumental to strategy and security. Nevertheless, their inquiry is still done on institutional and intellectual footings that Earle laid, which may be just how he wanted it.