

The Fares Center

for Eastern
Mediterranean
Studies



TUFTS

Engaging in Dialogue
on U.S. Foreign Policy

LIGHTING THE PATH
TO UNDERSTANDING

Occasional Paper No. 1



First occasional paper of the Fares Center
for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts
University, as part of the FCEMS Series on
Lighting the Path to Understanding

Engaging in Dialogue on U.S. Foreign Policy

Occasional Paper No. 1

A report on the conference *Engaging in Dialogue on U.S. Foreign Policy*
November 8-9, 2004, Tufts University, Medford/Somerville, MA

Sponsored by The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies,
in conjunction with The Fletcher School, Office of the Provost,
University College of Citizenship and Public Service

Rapporteur and Writer: Michael Kugelman, Research Assistant,
The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University,
and Master's Degree Student, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Consulting Editor: Peri Bearman

The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Dr. Jamshed Bharucha
Mr. Richard E. Blohm
Mr. Fares I. Fares
Dr. Leila Fawaz
Dr. George Marcopoulos
Dr. Jeswald W. Salacuse

ACADEMIC STEERING COMMITTEE

Dr. C.A. Bayly
Dr. Anne H. Betteridge
Dr. Selma Botman
Dr. Jamil al-Dandany
Dr. John L. Esposito
Dr. Robert Ilbert
Dr. Cemal Kafadar
Dr. Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr
Dr. Abdul-Karim Rafeq
Dr. Mark Tessler

FARES CENTER STAFF

Leila Fawaz, Founding Director
Stephen Guerra, Center Administrator

Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Preface: Leila Fawaz, Founding Director, The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies | 1 |
| Introduction | 3 |
| Session I: "Building a More Informed and Engaged American Citizenry" | 5 |
| Session II: "Promoting Middle East Peace" | 7 |
| Dinner Lecture: "The Struggle for Ideas in the Middle East" | 12 |
| Session III: "Communicating with the Arab World" | 14 |
| Luncheon Lecture: "Can Truth Figure in Dialogue on American Foreign Policy in the Middle East?" | 19 |
| Session IV: "Engaging in Dialogue with the Muslim World" | 22 |
| Session V: "Learning Lessons From Iraq" | 28 |
| Concluding Remarks | 34 |
| Participants | 35 |

Preface

The need to understand the Eastern Mediterranean region has never been more pressing. The attention of policy makers and concerned citizens alike is constantly drawn to this part of the world—encompassing modern-day Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey, a wide swath of land rich in history and diversity, as well as complexity. Since its founding in 2002, the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University (FCEMS) has sought to provide—through lecture series, seminars, roundtable discussions, and conferences—an academic forum for dialogue on the issues impacting the region.

This FCEMS Series on Lighting the Path to Understanding represents the Fares Center's latest effort to raise awareness of the Eastern Mediterranean. The series shall identify a particular issue with immediate relevance to the region and subject it to examination and/or analysis. It is our genuine hope that each paper will shed sufficient light on the subject at hand to generate increased understanding of the issue among the series' intended audience of foreign policy makers, elected officials, academics, journalists, and the global citizenry. We are equally hopeful that, through generating this higher level of understanding, each paper will also provide some guidance to those individuals tackling the challenges currently affecting the region.

Occasional Paper No. 1 addresses U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, using the November 2004 conference, *Engaging in Dialogue on U.S. Foreign Policy*, as a framework for examination. This first paper, recognizing the conference participants' depth and diversity of knowledge and experience, allows their remarks to drive the analysis. Summaries of each lecturer's comments are presented here, with an additional section in the introduction capturing the core themes coming out of the conference. Collectively, the comments and themes comprise an admirably diverse set of observations on, recommendations for, and an overall assessment of, U.S. Mideast policies.

We wish to thank the following people, without whose generous

support and assistance neither last November's conference nor this exciting new Occasional Paper Series would have been possible: Mr. Fares I. Fares, trustee and member of the Fares Center executive committee; Dean Robert Hollister and the University College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts; Provost Jamshed Bharucha and the Tufts Office of the Provost; Dean Stephen Bosworth and The Fletcher School at Tufts; Dr. M. Lee Pearce; Mr. Hossein Fateh; Ambassador William A. Rugh; Dr. Walid Khalidi; and Dr. Stephen W. Van Evera.

Dr. Leila Fawaz
Founding Director, The Fares Center
for Eastern Mediterranean Studies
Tufts University

Introduction

The Tufts University conference *Engaging in Dialogue on U.S. Foreign Policy*, specifically planned to occur just days after the 2004 U.S. presidential election, was envisioned as an effort to provide guidance and advice to a new or returning presidential administration on pressing issues of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Breaking news from the region at the onset of the conference attested to its timeliness and import: U.S. and Iraqi military forces launched a major operation in Fallujah, Iraq, on November 7, while Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat languished in a coma during the course of the conference. These and similar significant events—and their possible consequences for U.S. foreign policy and engagement in the Middle East—were regularly invoked throughout the two-day conference, which featured panel discussions on U.S. citizenship and engagement, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, American public diplomacy in and dialogue and engagement with the Arab and Muslim worlds, and the war in Iraq. Conference participants—a diverse range of academics, diplomats, and journalists from the Middle East, South Asia, and the United States—strove to provide recommendations for the second Bush administration as it sets out to develop its foreign policy for a region in which American involvement is inevitable and whose events on the ground continue to change by the day.

COMMON THEMES

Several core themes emerged during the two-day event. Among them are the following:

- *The link between effective U.S. policy in the Middle East and successful public diplomacy.* Policies—especially those that focus on engagement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Middle East governance, and realistic solutions for Iraq—can influence the U.S. image abroad as much as a successful public diplomacy that listens to, engages, and informs foreign opinion.
- *The importance of historical lessons and the need for American foreign policy makers to consider past history and politics when formulating policy.* From Shiism in Iraq to popular sentiment in Iran, and

from the impact of American support for the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan to the volatility of post-conflict situations in the 1990s, U.S. policy makers must have a broader, more accurate cognizance of historical and current realities in the Middle East and the Muslim world.

- *The high value of expert views in the formation of foreign policy.* Experts can provide valuable information and knowledge that foreign policy makers may not possess to as high a degree or on as deep a level. Tapping into the knowledge bases of experts can contribute to more sustainable foreign policies that truly reflect realities on the ground.

Note: All conference presenters have approved the following summaries for publication.

Session I: “Building a More Informed and Engaged American Citizenry”

Speaker: The Honorable **John Shattuck**, Chief Executive Officer,
John F. Kennedy Library Foundation

Chair: **Robert Hollister**, Dean, University College of Citizenship
and Public Service, Tufts University

The opening conference session assessed the degree of American citizenry engagement in foreign policy. **Ambassador Shattuck** prefaced his remarks with a note of hope, citing the large voter turnout in the recent U.S. presidential election as evidence of an engaged citizenry. He argued that evidence exists that the American public does not support the unilateral aspects of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy. Polls indicate that many Americans prefer multilateral approaches to fighting terrorism, and that many Americans believe U.S. policies have alienated many in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Ambassador Shattuck sketched the evolution of U.S. public opinion on foreign policy since the post-Cold War period. Following a brief period of euphoria that greeted the fall of the Berlin Wall, engagement yielded to a more domestic focus on American economic issues. Two conflicting forces shaped U.S. perceptions of world affairs at this time. The first, integration, was driven by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the spread of democracy in many previously authoritarian countries. It emphasized the primacy of market economies and technological advances. The second, disintegration, was fueled by the proliferation of “failed states,” increasing income gaps, and the rise of terrorism. Initially “mesmerized” by forces of integration, Americans soon fell prey to the forces of disintegration, particularly following the 1993 crisis in Somalia. The costs of disengagement became clear through the expensive burden of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda and the Balkans and through increased terrorism, especially when the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked. Public opinion began slowly to shift back toward

engagement during the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, yet it would take the September 11, 2001 attacks to jolt Americans fully out of their disengagement. Ambassador Shattuck judged that the U.S. public is now more engaged in foreign affairs and more interested in working with other countries than at any other time since World War II, yet at issue now is what happens next.

Ambassador Shattuck analyzed the forces shaping U.S. public opinion during the second Bush administration. First is the set of traditions that has characterized U.S. foreign policy for fifty years: a commitment to international law, a reputation for moderation, and the promotion of peace. Yet these traditions are often countered by other traditions, including isolationism (affected by geography and temperament), exceptionalism, and unilateralism (a belief that the United States must use its power or risk losing it).

A second set of influences on public opinion is more immediate: fear and threat perception (often filtered through political leaders), values, economic interests, the media (mainstream television shapes public opinion, though limited U.S. media coverage of foreign issues often provides a skewing effect), academic centers (universities and foreign policy think tanks have a particularly significant role during periods of fluidity), and private interest groups and non-governmental organizations (both of which blossom during periods of breakdowns in foreign policy consensus).

The third major influence on U.S. public opinion is the president. A question in the wake of the November election is whether President Bush will take note of polls showing broad support for a foreign policy that emphasizes multilateral engagement with other countries or whether he will justify his re-election victory as a mandate for continuing the unilateral emphasis of his first administration. Ambassador Shattuck closed with a quotation from John F. Kennedy, who announced soon after the Cuban missile crisis that the United States is “neither omnipotent nor omniscient,” and that there is “no American solution to every world problem, but a world solution,” with American leadership. Such a statement, Ambassador Shattuck said, probably reflects the views of many Americans today.

Session II: "Promoting Middle East Peace"

Speakers: **Sari Nusseibeh**, Rita E. Hauser Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University (2004-2005)

David J. Greene, Acting Director of the Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, United States Department of State

Naomi Chazan, Robert Wilhelm Fellow, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2004-2005)

Chair: **Jeswald W. Salacuse**, Henry J. Braker Professor of Law, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

This session offered an optimistic assessment on the status of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Conceding that his remarks represented a Palestinian perspective that is "not necessarily widespread," **Dr. Nusseibeh** stated that the Palestinian and Israeli peoples have laid the groundwork for future peace and that there is an opportunity for the United States to help make these local efforts successful. He cited with approval the June 2002 speech in which U.S. President George W. Bush outlined his vision for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, making an unprecedented U.S. presidential commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state, alongside the commitment to Israel and its security. The president's vision, Dr. Nusseibeh recounted, predicated a solution to Israel's long-term security problem on the fulfillment of the Palestinian right to be free. Israel's other problem, that of its self-definition as a Jewish state, can also only be resolved by recognizing a state for the Palestinians, based on the 1967 borders. The president's (later) letter of American commitments to Israel, Nusseibeh submitted, does not constitute a change in the president's vision, though it does in addition highlight the United States' long-standing support for Israel's self-definition, and the need therefore to look for other ways to resolve the refugee problem than by their wholesale return. Israel cannot achieve full security with its continued occupation; as long as Israel occupies the Palestinian areas, Israelis will be victims of terrorism. In addition, the number of Arabs in

Israel is approaching the number of Israel's Jews. This fact, Dr. Nusseibeh said, implies that a continued occupation may endanger Israel's identity as a Jewish state.

Dr. Nusseibeh admitted that one component of Bush's vision for peace is unpopular with some Palestinians—the U.S. condition that in order to endorse a Palestinian state, reforms must occur, particularly in the realm of governance. Dr. Nusseibeh expressed vigorous support for such reforms, however. A Palestinian state must be democratic, he explained, because the struggle for a state must be understood in the context of the human rights long denied to Palestinians during the occupation. If a Palestinian state fails to offer such rights, it holds no value.

Dr. Nusseibeh addressed the importance of Palestinian and Israeli grass roots efforts for peace. American involvement is necessary and desirable, yet insufficient to create a lasting settlement; Israelis and Palestinians alike must be willing to support and work towards a true solution. For international diplomatic activity to bear any fruit, the popular conditions among Israelis and Palestinians must be such as to welcome and encourage such activity. His current project, the Voice for Peace initiative, seeks to develop “terms of reference” for an eventual solution. These terms, he noted, are very similar to those in Bush's speech. Currently, 150,000 Palestinians and over 250,000 Israelis have signed the document. The initiative's aim is “to create a voice” that political leaders on both sides will have to reckon with. One of its two guiding principles is an immediate emphasis on final settlement issues; learning from the failures of the many attempts at Palestinian-Israeli peace, Dr. Nusseibeh noted, this project first identifies ultimate goals for a final peace (for which there is a majority conditional support among the two populations), and then works backward to focus on interim solutions (which without being tied to an endgame can easily fail in pushing the peace process forward). The other principle is the belief in empowerment from “the bottom up.” Instead of appealing to political leaders, diplomats, or other elites for signatures, the document primarily seeks out “ordinary people,” whose acts of signature come to be viewed as an exercise in the collective effort at national self-determination.

Ordinary Israelis and Palestinians can help each other to impact their own future, Dr. Nusseibeh concluded, and the Voice for Peace project (which is overseen by an Israeli organization as well as by a Palestinian one) has the power to influence Israeli and Palestinian policy makers. Now is therefore an ideal time for American and European engagement to complement Israeli and Palestinian grass roots efforts, and the conditions are ripe for reaching a conclusive peace settlement.

Mr. Greene stressed above all the determination of the George W. Bush administration to seek a two-state solution, with the two sides living in peace and security. Citing the failing health of Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat, Mr. Greene contended that a process of leadership succession had already begun. President Bush's commitment to human dignity "drives the desire" for a two-state solution. The administration's hope is to jump-start the Roadmap for Peace initiative through effective implementation of the Gaza disengagement plan. It will consult with Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations—its partners in the quartet that developed the Roadmap plan—along with Israel and the Palestinians. Mr. Greene noted that U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Dibble was presently in the region consulting on how to ensure that Gaza becomes a basis for lasting peace. The United States, he vowed, is willing to undertake the "heavy lifting" to help create a Palestinian state at peace with Israel.

Mr. Greene described what each side, the Palestinians and Israelis, must do to help facilitate the conditions for peace. A new Palestinian leadership must confront those who support violence, as a Palestinian state cannot be established based on terror and violence. Good governance, delivery of services, and an environment fit for investment are all considered necessary elements of Palestinian reform; "lagging" reform compromises prosperity. On the other side, Israel must take steps to help boost the Palestinian economy. He supported Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's efforts towards the dismantling of settlements, a plan that, despite Israeli domestic opposition, is still on track. The United States, Mr. Greene stated, is "working to ensure" that the plan is implemented.

Dr. Chazan declared that after four years of deadlock in the peace process, signs of change may have arrived in the form of the Gaza disengagement plan and a Palestinian leadership change. She counseled immediate action, as the window of opportunity will close quickly, and failure to act now could jeopardize the prospects for a two-state solution. Dr. Chazan offered four reflections on immediate prospects for ending the current stalemate: (1) The Gaza disengagement and the change in Palestinian leadership have generated a fluidity not seen in four years, yet the fluidity does not in and of itself signify change. Therefore, these shifts must be transformed into productive change. The moment is ripe for a change in Bush administration policies vis-à-vis the peace process, she stated, particularly with the United States needing to improve relations with Europe. Dr. Chazan pointed out that British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been encouraging President Bush to move forward on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. (2) Periods of fluidity are contradictory. They engender both opportunities and perils. While the current fluidity could reinvigorate the Roadmap plan and breathe new life into peace negotiations, it is also inherently dangerous and risks spawning anarchy and conflict on the Palestinian side. (3) Coordinating mechanisms are necessary. When the Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans “go their own way,” confusion reigns and each side blames the other. The three sides, as well as neighboring Arab states and the European Union, must have a means of coordinating their discussions. (4) The Israeli side faces difficulties. Three factors may hinder Israel’s ability to produce peace with the Palestinians. One is the problematic nature of the Gaza disengagement plan. While promising—it marks the first time an Israeli prime minister has dismantled settlements in areas other than the Sinai, as well as the first time an Israeli prime minister has taken steps “to dismantle” the occupation—it is also unilateral and coercive. It emphasizes conflict management more than conflict resolution. It fails to deal with the West Bank. And it lacks a true set of objectives. A second mitigating factor is the major instability of the Israeli political system. Ariel Sharon’s ruling coalition, Dr. Chazan noted, is a shaky minority government. Most significantly, she added, much of the opposition to Sharon comes from his own party. The third factor is Arafat’s death:

Israel has long justified its policies on the fact that it lacked a Palestinian peace partner, and Arafat's passing means that Israel no longer has an excuse and must now somehow find a new partner.

Three future scenarios are possible, Dr. Chazan concluded: continuance of the status quo, which would be "catastrophic"; an implementation of the disengagement plan with no further initiatives, which would be "a major tragedy"; or, impelled by change on the ground, a return to negotiations culminating in a real settlement. Israel, for its part, must make appropriate gestures on sensitive issues. It must advocate Palestinian elections. It must "consider" releasing Marwan Barghouti, the jailed leader of Arafat's Fatah movement. It must implement settler withdrawal and relocation policies. And, finally, she reasoned, Israel must invite the United States to be an honest broker once again. If each side takes actions within its control, she said, "we might just do it this time."

Dinner Lecture: “The Struggle for Ideas in the Middle East”

Speaker: The Honorable **Edward P. Djerejian**, Founding Director, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

Chair: **Jamshed Bharucha**, Provost and Senior Vice President, Tufts University

Ambassador Edward Djerejian, a longtime diplomat who chaired the congressionally mandated U.S. State Department’s 2003 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, spoke of the importance of coupling U.S. public diplomacy efforts with effective U.S. policies in the Middle East. Public diplomacy involves a “struggle for ideas” between extremism and moderation, a struggle of increased importance since September 11, 2001. The War on Terror, in fact, is not merely a battle against terrorists, but also a “key subset” of the struggle for ideas. To triumph in this struggle, effective policies must be developed to address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to craft a solution to the conflict in Iraq that puts into place a representative government, and to embrace the need for political and economic reforms in the Middle East.

In 1993, Ambassador Djerejian recounted, he gave a speech asserting that if the United States were to face a new enemy in place of the Soviet Union, it would probably be extremism or terrorism. For the United States to deal with such a threat, he said then, it would have to tackle the root causes of extremism in the Middle East through active attempts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and through advocating political and economic reforms in the region. The Arab world’s sense of humiliation derives from poor governance, which affords little freedom of expression. Yet Ambassador Djerejian averred that up to now, these policies have mostly been adopted only rhetorically.

These 1993 policy recommendations are still pertinent today, the ambassador argued. The United States must address political and

economic reforms and governance in the Middle East, as well as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which in particular will benefit by both the Gaza disengagement and Palestinian leadership change. U.S. actions vis-à-vis Middle East reforms and governance must be patient, even though there is visible promise of a burgeoning civil society in the Middle East, as evidenced by the growth of non-governmental organizations in Syria and the appearance of women's rights activists in Turkey. The American promotion of such reforms is vital yet challenging, Ambassador Djerejian said, and policies must be tailored to each country's unique conditions. As for Iraq, "Jeffersonian democracy" is not a realistic hope, but the United States should nonetheless promote policies that create enough stability to sustain a political process with a representative government.

Session III: "Communicating With the Arab World"

Speakers: **Hisham Melhem**, Washington, D.C. Bureau Chief, *An-Nahar*
The Honorable **William A. Rugh**, Associate, Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy, Georgetown University
The Honorable **Edward P. Djerejian**, Founding Director,
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

Chair: **Mark Tessler**, Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor
of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

This panel addressed the broad issue of American public diplomacy and its impact in the Arab world. **Mr. Melhem** discussed the U.S. image in the region, emphasizing that both Americans and Arabs must take action to better relations. Both sides harbor stereotypes of the other, with Arabs complaining of U.S. condescension and Americans regarding Arabs as thin-skinned and indignant. In the early twentieth century, however, the United States was widely admired in the Middle East as an enlightened, modern power offering refuge and opportunity. American universities were founded in the region, and Arabs traveled to the United States. The positive perceptions fueling this "age of innocence," Mr. Melhem noted, were rooted in the absence of a U.S. colonial legacy. Views of the United States began changing in the mid-1960s, and issues such as the Palestinian question, American support for autocratic regimes, Iraqi sanctions, and globalization (regarded by some as U.S. imperialism) have since conspired to deflate the once-glowing regard for the United States. The War on Terror has not endeared Arabs to Americans either. It perpetuates an oversimplified, melodramatic obsession with the destruction of what is regarded as a monolithic force of terrorism. Yet terrorism cannot be given a universal definition, and it manifests itself in two different ways. One of these, which Mr. Melhem identified as nihilistic terror, has materialized throughout history in the form of twelfth-century assassins on suicide missions, nineteenth-century anarchists in Europe, and today's current incarnation of al-Qaeda. It rejects negotiations and

demands and must be fought with coercive means. The second manifestation of terror flows from political causes, such as the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and self-determination in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Palestine. With this type of terror, coercion is not effective, unless it is part of a political resolution. Despite these distinctions in terrorism, President Bush has nonetheless equated al-Qaeda terrorism with that of the Palestinians.

Mr. Melhem revealed that in 1950 the United States resolved to launch a “propaganda” campaign to counter Arab anti-American sentiment that the U.S. government attributed to the Palestine issue. The objectives of new U.S.-financed media in the Middle East such as Radio Sawa and the al-Hurra satellite television station, he argued, are eerily similar to that campaign in 1950. Turning to a general discussion of today’s Arab media programming, he noted that new non-U.S. financed outlets such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, and others have broken barriers between Arab states and challenged traditional values and taboos. Yet these same media are guilty of a “false liberalism”—the embracing of ideology to the detriment of objectivity and the employing of poorly trained journalists. Arab media incorporate technology with American-style reporting, yet programming invariably devolves into shoddy, loud journalism that features debates monopolized by extreme views. Coverage of the war in Iraq has often been sensationalist, with media “mobilizing” to marshal all their available resources to amplify Arab opposition to the U.S. presence in the region. Such mobilization may include the exploitation of images of civilian casualties and war’s destruction.

Mr. Melhem argued that one way for the United States government to ameliorate its image is to moderate its phraseology, noting how the West Bank and Gaza have been described as “so-called” occupied territories and how Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has been labeled a “man of peace.” The path to any constructive dialogue between Americans and Arabs lies in each side’s willingness to be more introspective and self-critical. Yet, ultimately, such adjustments are insufficient if not accompanied by effective policies, as only policy shifts have the power to change attitudes. No one, Mr. Melhem declared, is born anti-American.

Ambassador Rugh spoke on the state of United States public diplomacy, highlighting its importance while listing obstacles to its success and providing recommendations for the future. Though public diplomacy constitutes a small portion of U.S. foreign policy efforts, it still plays a key role in its capacity as a channel for the global battle of ideas. American public diplomacy helps explain U.S. foreign policies and American culture to foreign audiences. In tracking foreign perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, public diplomacy also helps capture international public opinion, a boon for U.S. policy makers. Yet Ambassador Rugh lamented how the U.S. government is not always eager to take foreign views into account during the policy making process. He acknowledged that public diplomacy is not the cure-all for the world's ills, yet argued that it still retains significance. Policy changes are not the sole means of lessening anti-U.S. sentiments; discourse and rhetoric are equally instrumental in the war of ideas. Public diplomacy can, in fact, inform policy.

Ambassador Rugh enumerated the barriers to current U.S. public diplomacy: Post-Cold War budget cuts have been major. Heightened security concerns following the September 11, 2001 attacks have sometimes led to the closure of U.S. embassy libraries. The new security climate has also affected educational exchange, which he singled out as one of public diplomacy's best tools. New visa requirements have slowed the flow of foreign students to American universities, and foreign students are wary of the prospect of harassment. Meanwhile, the Information Revolution's effects—particularly satellite television and the Internet—pose a new challenge, as the rapidity and ubiquity of these new media reach Arab societies before American embassies can respond. Additionally, the attempt to bring diplomats closer to policy makers through the 1999 merging of the United States Information Agency with the Department of State has backfired in that coordination with embassies has worsened and caused a blow to public diplomacy officers' freedom of action abroad. Finally, the ambassador faulted U.S. President George W. Bush for his disregard of foreign opinion. Such lack of concern at the top bedevils lower-level attempts—including those of U.S. ambassadors in the Middle East—to foster effective public diplomacy strategies.

Ambassador Rugh offered some ideas on how to revitalize public diplomacy. The government must choose dialogue over unilateralism, he said, and emphasize the importance of listening as well as acting. The State Department must recruit public diplomacy staff well schooled in relevant languages. He advocated that American centers and libraries be reopened, and that the Arabic service of Voice of America be revived. Finally, he recommended more funding for public diplomacy activities, noting monies earmarked for public diplomacy now constitute a mere one-quarter of one percent of the U.S. defense budget.

Ambassador Djerejian, in his dinner lecture the previous evening, had described which policies the United States must adapt in the Middle East as a complement to successful public diplomacy. He now discussed the type of public diplomacy that should be combined with these policies. The first step, he asserted, is for the United States to transform the ways it advocates its policies abroad. Agreeing with Ambassador Rugh, he added that listening is of the essence. Though the State Department's definition of public diplomacy involves informing, engaging, and influencing foreign opinion, listening to and understanding that very opinion must always precede such actions. He referred to the findings of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, which he chaired in 2003. For example, while Radio Sawa—a U.S.-sponsored initiative that broadcasts both American and Arab popular music interspersed with news clips—has resonated with its young audience, the degree of influence the station has exerted on changing the minds of its listeners is less encouraging. U.S. public diplomacy, to be successful, requires resources, personnel, and money. Cross-departmental coordination must improve, and comprehensive evaluations of existing public diplomacy programs must be undertaken. He praised the American Corners program, a new type of overseas U.S. cultural center. This initiative, already established in the Muslim regions of Russia and Central Asia, is based in public spaces such as commercial venues, libraries, and halls. It provides Internet access, teleconferencing capabilities for featured speakers, and a selection of

American books. Such facilities, Ambassador Djerejian concluded, afford a workable balance of security and access. If these diplomatic efforts are complemented by effective U.S. policies such as engagement on the Palestinian issue, a solution in Iraq that produces a representative government, and the promotion of good political and economic governance in the Middle East, then the George W. Bush administration stands a strong chance of “galvanizing” the region’s moderates and scoring a public diplomacy coup.

Ambassador Djerejian concluded with a call for organizational change in the U.S. government. One feature of this organizational restructuring is the establishment of a special counselor to the president on public diplomacy, modeled on the advisory role that the journalist Edward R. Murrow exercised in the John F. Kennedy administration. The reasoning behind this idea is that it allows the strategic direction of public policy to emanate from the top of the policy-making hierarchy. Ambassador Djerejian also proposed that the National Security Council “revivify” a coordinating body for public policy, and that the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs position be strengthened. A final step in revamping the structural role of public diplomacy is to build up human resources. Training programs and career tracks of Foreign Service Officers should be enhanced so that American diplomats can acquire more lasting cultural and linguistic understanding. Currently, a U.S. diplomat does not become an Arabist following one year of relevant training, because eventually he or she will be posted to a different region and lose this expertise. By contrast, Soviet diplomats underwent four or five year training tracks that enabled them to learn and maintain a high level of language expertise. These changes in approach, Ambassador Djerejian stressed, must begin now.

Luncheon Lecture: “Can Truth Figure in Dialogue on American Foreign Policy in the Middle East?”

Speaker: **Ian Lustick**, Bess W. Heyman Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Chair: **Ali Banuazizi**, President, Middle East Studies Association, and Professor of Psychology and Codirector, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Program, Boston College

In a lecture grounded in political philosophy, **Dr. Lustick** issued a call for more inclusion of expert views in U.S. foreign policy on the Middle East. Since “truth” is in itself unknown, the operative question, he argued, is the extent to which experts are able to participate in public dialogue based on what they sincerely believe to be the truth, regardless of whether it is politically palatable or even understandable. He argued that when it comes to the Middle East, a major gap separates public knowledge from private belief, even at the highest levels. He illustrated this with an example: As a one-time U.S. State Department employee, he was told his expert recommendations would not be well received at the top and presented with the option of reducing the amount of truth in his analysis, in order to increase the likelihood it would actually be read by decision-makers. Later, he did become part of a group of experts invited to discuss international affairs with President George H. W. Bush and his senior advisers. The discussion was rich and substantive, **Dr. Lustick** recalled, yet the subject matter was regarded as taboo for the general public. Indeed even the fact that senior officials could and did contemplate positions and ideas about the Middle East discussed easily in private could not be made public.

Political thinkers have differed in their views of the role of sincerity in public discourse. The eighteenth-century French political thinker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, identified “insincerity before the law” as a sin deserving of capital punishment. Rousseau demanded that participants in public debate pursue their genuinely felt sense of what would be best for the entire community. On the other

hand, James Madison and the American Federalists, who had a determinative influence on the American Constitution, believed that driven by self-interest, individuals could, would, and indeed should, give public voice to that which each perceived would further his own interest, regardless of whether such public debate was sustained sincerely or disingenuously in its invocations of the public interest. Indeed, owing to the central role the U.S. Constitution gives to the passionate participation of self-interested citizens, Americans tend to assume that public statements of politicians, and even those of experts, do not reflect their actual private beliefs.

Dr. Lustick argued that the Israel lobby's domination of American foreign policy with regard to many aspects of Middle Eastern politics is rooted in the Madisonian character of our institutions that depends on each passionate faction being checked by an equal and opposite force arising from the cauldron of American political competition. In foreign policy matters, however, factions representing various interests in a tangled problem overseas do not exist. As in the case of U.S. policy toward Cuba, American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian problem has been very far from the international consensus. In each of these cases dominant domestic lobbies operate unchecked by countervailing domestic political interests. With no set of countervailing interests to arrest the Israel lobby's power, Lustick explained, the Madisonian system produces distorted outcomes that then become enshrined as public knowledge. Expert counter-views then become impossible to advocate without seeming to be disrespectful, radical, or beyond the national consensus.

That is the normal state of affairs for American foreign policy in regard to the Middle East. But Dr. Lustick observed that the George W. Bush administration has done substantially greater damage to the principle of democratic dialogue over complex foreign policy questions. He quoted a remark attributed to a senior adviser to the current President Bush that experts represent, for this administration, a threat—a “reality-based group”—whose views should have no relevance for an administration out to create its own realities, and then to change those realities, or the perception of those realities, as it may seem convenient. The danger, Dr. Lustick noted, lies in the absence of a political ambition “to stabilize reality”

into a context in which argumentation can retain value. To remedy the current chasm separating private belief and public knowledge, Dr. Lustick contended, experts must exercise more of a role in U.S. foreign policy. Truth can be a part of the dialogue on Middle East questions, but in the current context it is unlikely, when articulated, to be heard as measured or “balanced.” Instead, he said, experts must be willing to hear their sincere views denounced as slanted, biased, or radical. But in the current context, that is likely to be more a reflection of the distorted character of public policy and public knowledge than it is of the nature of those views.

Session IV: “Engaging in Dialogue with the Muslim World”

Speakers: **John L. Esposito**, University Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Professor of Islamic Studies, Georgetown University

Vali R. Nasr, Professor of Middle East and South Asia Politics, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

Feroz Ahmad, Adjunct Professor of Diplomatic History, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Ayesha Jalal, Professor of History, Tufts University

Chair: **Sugata Bose**, Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and South Asian Affairs, Harvard University

Dr. Esposito spoke of the challenges to successful dialogue, noting how the post-September 11 era has been particularly fraught with difficulty. He cited the fear of one colleague from the Arab world that the United States would capitalize on the attacks by seeking to “redraw” the map of the Middle East. On the U.S. side, the United States government has occasionally framed its post-September 11 policies by the use of such terms as “crusade.” Soon after the attacks, the U.S. government decided to concentrate on Iraq and to relegate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the back burner. One must consider the impact of such decisions on dialogue, Dr. Esposito stated. The issue of engaging in dialogue with the region is, in fact, complex. For example, with *whom* does the United States engage? Efforts have focused on engaging “moderate Muslims,” but the insertion of “moderate” implies that “it is not self-evident” that most Muslims are not extremists. This inability to assume automatically the absence of extremism in most of Islam is not the case with Judaism or Christianity. Yet unless the clear distinction between mainstream views and extremism in Islam is made, dialogue cannot occur. In addition, dialogue is challenged if the term “moderate” is defined too narrowly, as in “absolutely secular.”

Ultimately, Dr. Esposito concluded, foreign policy is a part of public diplomacy. The United States must reexamine its Middle

East policies, as it is American foreign policy that meets the most opposition from those in the Middle East with mainstream views. Many in the region admire American values but believe the United States commits a double standard by failing to apply them in its Middle East policies. Americans must listen to and be mindful of such views. They must then fashion a foreign policy that can be approached, discussed, and explained—in other words, a foreign policy that can sustain a dialogue. For example, true dialogue on the Roadmap plan will not be possible until U.S. foreign policy adapts a balanced approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Dr. Nasr spoke of the prospects and challenges for U.S. dialogue with Iran, positing that better U.S.-Iranian relations may be predicated on a better American understanding of conditions on the ground in Iran. While American contexts for possible dialogue with Iran involve the War on Terror, the war in Iraq, Iranian nuclear technology, and domestic forces in Iran pushing for political change, Iran's proposed focal points for dialogue revolve around the long-term implications of the American presence in the region. Stability and prosperity are larger concerns in Iran than questions of freedom, particularly as American actions have disrupted the past regional balance of power: Pakistani and Iranian gains in Afghanistan have been reversed, as has Iranian "expansionism" in parts of Iraq. Additionally, the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have drastically altered state structures. Yet none of these developments, Dr. Nasr argued, are reflected in current U.S. policy-making or featured in American attempts at dialogue. The American footprint, he continued, has profound consequences for Iran, particularly as the Iranian "zone of influence" crosses Iranian national boundaries and extends from Najaf, Iraq, to Herat, Afghanistan.

Another major issue on Iranian minds is the Shiite revival in Iran, hastened by Iraq's new status as one of the Arab world's first "openly Shiite" countries. This Shiite revival is not a manifestation of Iranian hegemony, but rather a cultural phenomenon that boasts intellectual dynamism and reflects a Shiite sentiment of freedom from past Sunni constrictions. Yet recognition of this sentiment is

wanting in U.S. Iran policies, Dr. Nasr declared, with any consideration of the Shiite question regarded only in terms of sectarianism and conflict in Iraq. Though American policies in Iraq are wedded to the Shiite community, the United States has no major relationships with key Shiite political players. On a related note, Iranians wonder whether the United States will replace the Sunni “bulwark” removed in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, or whether the bulwark will simply be abandoned. Dr. Nasr wagered that these questions—the division of power across the region, the significance of the new cultural elements of the Sunni/Shiite dynamic, and how the United States and Iran can benefit—constitute a true framework for U.S.-Iranian dialogue.

Dr. Nasr turned to U.S. perceptions of Iranian politics and society, asserting that Iran’s leadership is regarded as theocratic, apolitical, and ideological, while the Iranian populace is often thought of as harboring broad disaffection for the ruling regime. These perceptions are invariably filtered through an optic of regime change. Yet the reality, he noted, is much more complex. For example, the right to obtain nuclear weapons is one issue for which the Iranian regime enjoys full public support. Many believe that the weapons issue risks diminishing Iranian popular goodwill vis-à-vis the United States, and that the West could provoke Iranian nationalist sentiment around the single issue of nuclear weapons. Dr. Nasr noted, however, that the Iranian regime is concerned about stability and order. Many Iranians, particularly those in business, have associated President Mohammed Khatami with mismanagement and gridlock, and the Khatami regime is equated with that of Pakistan—technocratic, authoritarian, and lacking in political reform. Iran’s ruling leaders, though mindful of the nation’s prominent role in the region, are simply concerned with their own survival, particularly since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Iran’s leaders are, in fact, less ideological than in past years, and some of their major emphases of governance are management, prosperity, and national interest. Ultimately, Dr. Nasr concluded, American images of Iran are outdated. A “commonality of views” between the Iranian people and their leaders does, in fact, exist, a reality the United States has not yet acknowledged. An appropriate starting

point for U.S. dialogue with Iran, Dr. Nasr recommended, would be for the United States to base its policies on a more realistic picture of Iran.

Emphasizing the importance of historical memory, **Dr. Ahmad** provided a rich retrospective of key events of the last few decades that affected U.S. engagement with the Middle East. It is common, he observed, to dismiss past events as insignificant. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's recent thanking of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi for paying compensation for the 1986 Berlin disco bombing is an example. Yet such marginalizing of history, he argued, is misguided, particularly with regard to American relations with the Middle East. The United States' encounter with the Middle East began only after World War II. The country was then blessed with a positive image, devoid of an imperial past. At the time, U.S. policy makers concluded that nationalism constituted the major threat to American interests; accordingly, the United States identified Islam as the best weapon to contest nationalism. In 1961, the Islamic University was founded in Saudi Arabia, and in the next few years nationalism suffered a series of blows in the Muslim world: Indonesia's Sukarno and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah were overthrown; Arab forces were humiliated in the 1967 Six Day War; and Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser died. As secular nationalists continued to fall, Ahmad observed, Saudi interpretations of Islam were on the rise. The importance of Saudi Arabia to American interests was magnified in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution in Iran. The United States continued to support a friendly Islam, now in Afghanistan, as the CIA funneled weapons and funds to non-Afghan Muslim fighters for use against the Soviet Union.

The United States was most concerned about the Soviets' defeat, Dr. Ahmad said, and thought little of the effect of this defeat and the influence it would have on the victorious *mujabidin*. The children of these Muslim fighters, in fact, would be schooled in Pakistan's *madrasas*, where, emboldened by the success of their fathers against the Soviets, they would entertain hopes of one day defeating another superpower. Ahmad cited the scholar Albert

Hourani for predicting, as early as 1991, that Islam would become the West's new enemy. Cultures, Dr. Ahmad said, paraphrasing Hourani, are more comfortable with the availability of enemies to hate. Nevertheless, American policies now seek to promote democracy in the Muslim world, though the U.S. government maintains friendships with authoritarian leaders throughout the region. To win the War on Terror, Dr. Ahmad asserted, the United States must focus more on terrorism's root causes and reach out to the Muslim world. He recommended that the objectives of the United Kingdom's Scotland Yard be a model. This police agency pledges to keep London safe from terrorists, while also recognizing that maintaining relations with Muslims is a necessary condition for achieving that goal.

Dr. Jalal followed with a sketch of events in South Asia, emphasizing that U.S. policy has failed to fathom the Subcontinent's myriad complexities. The United States, she argued, must employ creative strategies, along with constant engagement, to produce lasting peace and stability. U.S. efforts to promote freedom and democracy should be applauded—particularly as Muslims often harbor skepticism about U.S. intentions—yet may be insufficient to dispel long-standing sentiment against the United States. In addition, the promotion of democracy is not always what it seems. The exigencies of the War on Terror have seen the U.S. government supporting Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (and praising his military) at the expense of democracy. The United States has also done little about Pakistani educational curricula, parts of which advocate hatred of India and the United States.

Turning to Kashmir, Dr. Jalal noted that the conflict has received wide attention mainly because of the risk of nuclear conflagration. The Kashmir question is often oversimplified, with undue emphasis on ethnicity and insufficient attention to the question of artificial borders. Such a superficial approach favors conflict management over conflict resolution, an insufficient strategy for a conflict that, Dr. Jalal declared, can only be resolved through an emphasis on the people themselves. In fact, “no amount of support” from Pakistan and India can help the United States

accomplish its foreign policy goals on the Subcontinent as long as the United States fails to employ “some means of empathy” with the sentiments of the people. A simple redrawing of boundaries will fail to find a solution to the elusive prospect of Kashmiris living side by side despite linguistic and religious differences.

The United States, which, in line with India’s wishes, has thus far limited its direct involvement in resolving the Kashmir crisis, can nonetheless provide a significant contribution through promoting what Dr. Jalal called “imaginative” notions of sovereignty that take account of political aspirations, regardless of religion. While religion is a factor in the Kashmir imbroglio, so is the “denial of democracy.” The United States must probe and “scrutinize” developments in this region, she explained, noting the existence of democratic traditions in South Asia that U.S. policy has often overlooked. In conclusion, continuous dialogue, mutual respect, and understanding are instrumental for U.S. relations with the Muslim world.

Session V: “Learning Lessons From Iraq”

Speakers: **Juan R. I. Cole**, Professor of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Richard Shultz, Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

The Honorable **Barbara Bodine**, Executive Director, Middle Eastern Governance Initiative, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Chair: **Stephen W. Van Evera**, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This final session employed the ongoing events in Iraq as a case study for current U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Each panelist identified areas in which U.S. policy makers have gone wrong. **Dr. Cole** began with the assertion that the United States has failed to understand the intricacies of Shiite politics. He recalled former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz observing that post-Saddam Iraq would be a better ally than Saudi Arabia, because the new Iraq would be both secular and Shiite. In fact, Dr. Cole argued, Iraqi Shiism is a very complex affair. He provided a historical overview of Shiism in Iraq, noting its similarities with Iranian Shiism and the historical connection between the two. Indeed, he reasoned, the view that no Iranian influence should exist in Iraq is akin to saying that no Vatican influence should prevail in Ireland. In the early twentieth century, Iraqi Shiites were marginalized, with many drawn to communism during the 1940s and 1950s. It was at this time that *Da'wa*, a Shiite party with elements of communism, was formed. After the Sunni Iraqi Ba'th party came to power in the 1970s, a period of rising Shiite activism ensued, with riots occurring throughout slums in Baghdad. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, during which Ayatollah Khomeini had implored Iraqi Shiites to overthrow Saddam Hussein—a member of Iraq's Sunni minority—the *Da'wa* party was banned in Iraq, and many of its members fled to Iran. Following the Gulf War, major Shiite uprisings occurred in Iraq, although the United States did not provide support. After

these failed efforts, a split in the Shiite clerical leadership occurred. 'Ali al-Sistani, based in Najaf, emerged as a mainstream source of support for most Shiites. He counseled Shiites to refrain from politics; he himself had remained quiet throughout the Saddam era. Meanwhile, Sadiq al-Sadr attracted the support of younger Shiites. He was more radical than al-Sistani and was assassinated in 1999. His son, Muqtada, took his father's place.

Following the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, leaders such as al-Sistani voiced a desire for Islamic law, for a judicial role for clerics, and for the new Iraqi government to be authorized by religious leaders. Al-Sistani was not initially well regarded by the Coalition Provisional Authority, Dr. Cole noted. Yet the Shiite leader demonstrated his enormous influence in Iraq—particularly in Shiite Iraq—through his ability to get hundreds of thousands of Shiites out in the streets. Dr. Cole averred that current American fortunes in Iraq would be more positive had the United States begun accommodating al-Sistani much earlier, particularly because al-Sistani's demands pertained to issues such as democratic elections that Americans held in high regard. Meanwhile, the United States failed to resist al-Sadr during the immediate post-Saddam period. His political movement was not accorded a role in the interim government overseen by the Coalition Provisional Authority; it would agitate for American forces to withdraw from Iraq and then form its own army. Eventually, the United States announced that it sought al-Sadr “dead or alive” and a showdown occurred in the Shiite city of Najaf. Dr. Cole insisted that the United States simply did not understand the emotions evoked in Shiites when American forces fought with al-Sadr's followers in Najaf, a city the Shia regard as sacred. He likened attacks on Najaf to an assault on the Vatican. U.S. military actions in Najaf were protested by Shiites in Lebanon, Iran, and Pakistan. While the U.S. won the battle in Najaf—it defeated al-Sadr's forces—it lost the “hearts and minds” of many Shiites around the world. The result could have been worse, as American soldiers and the forces of Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi had considered storming Najaf's Mosque of 'Ali, which Saddam Hussein had done in 1991. Yet the Americans were bailed out by al-Sistani, who ordered Iraqi Shiites to march on Najaf to

demand that the shrine be saved. Ultimately, Dr. Cole concluded, “from A to Z” the United States has never understood Shiite politics in Iraq and has consistently been manipulated. The one saving grace is that the American objective in Iraq—a January 2005 parliamentary election with a Shiite majority—is the same as that of al-Sistani. If this objective is not attained, Dr. Cole warned, the situation in Iraq will explode.

Dr. Shultz selected two recent articles in the journal *Foreign Affairs* as a framework for describing several U.S. intelligence and military mistakes during the conventional war phase of March 2003. One, “What Went Wrong in Iraq?,” was written by former Coalition Provisional Authority adviser Larry Diamond in the journal’s September/October 2004 issue. The other, contributed by Tufts professor Tony Smith, was written in the following issue as a response to Diamond’s article. Smith’s remarks described the U.S. military intervention as “imperial aggression” and dismissed U.S. rhetoric about democratizing Iraq as a lie. At any rate, Smith wrote, Iraq lacks the requisite conditions for democracy. Diamond, like Smith, opposed the war, but rejects the U.S. operation as being imperial. He wrote that the U.S. government’s inaccurate belief that Iraq would soon acquire weapons of mass destruction constitutes a “strategic mistake.” Nevertheless, Iraq can be democratic, and the United States has the opportunity to encourage Iraqi political development. For those favoring Smith’s view, Dr. Shultz pointed out, military lessons are quite few, as military power will simply fail for its inability to sustain a bad policy. However, those subscribing to Diamond’s opinion argue that the lessons are broader, and that the U.S. made several mistakes in postwar planning and management that have strengthened the conditions for insurgency. These mistakes are particularly significant because the general conditions that led to them had been duly noted by the U.S. Department of Defense planners during military interventions in the 1990s.

Dr. Shultz first identified one major intelligence mistake: the lack of prewar attention to the possibility of significant postwar insurgency activity. He noted that policy makers and senior-level intelli-

gence managers never asked their insurgency experts to explore this possibility. It is something that should have been undertaken.

Dr. Shultz noted three other U.S. mistakes: The first was insufficient planning for the post-conventional war period, although important lessons had been learned in the 1990s about how ethnic divisions and an absence of rule of law during immediate post-intervention periods can militate against the establishment of security. He pointed to the breakdown of the interagency process as the key problem. The second mistake was rooted in the belief that the post-intervention period would be tranquil, not violent. Turbulent conditions predominated in Iraq as well as in international interventions of the 1990s, however. The amount of military force in post-conflict situations must often exceed the level of force used in ending the actual conflict. If one were to extrapolate the level of force present in Kosovo or Bosnia during the 1990s, Dr. Shultz said, more troops would be required today in Iraq. And this is true particularly of military police, civil reconstruction specialists, and other types of troops trained to help ensure enough post-conflict stability to create the conditions for political and social change. The third mistake lies in not fully developing a plan for the new Iraqi military. It was necessary to disband the army but elements of it needed to be quickly reorganized into new security forces. This necessitated vetting processes to select personnel from the army, intensive training programs, and demobilization and reintegration plans for those not selected. Only now is this fully taking place. Defense Department officials observed during the 1990s the importance of army demobilization. Yet, in Iraq, people were “sent home” with no income and no future. An opportunity was initially lost to reconstitute the Army so that it can bring back stability and the conditions for political evolution. Instead, Dr. Shultz concluded, “tens of thousands” of Iraqis were ripe for recruitment into the insurgency.

Ambassador Bodine drew on her experience as a past U.S. coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction in Baghdad to discuss errors in U.S. policy, particularly the American inability to maintain security in the immediate post-intervention period. Prior to the military

operation, she noted, the United States, specifically Department of Defense (DOD) senior civilian officials, held certain assumptions, many of them “naïve and arrogant,” for example, that U.S. forces would be greeted as liberators, not occupiers, and that Iraq would become a “beacon” of democracy and transform the political landscape across the Middle East. Despite the studies by governmental and non-governmental institutions and a series of Senate hearings, Ambassador Bodine argued, key questions were not seriously addressed or debated within the Administration, especially DOD, and if they were they were dismissed out of hand. However, while the Iraqi Shia would welcome the American-led liberation, the Bush administration over-promised on their future role, indicating in some circles that the United States encouraged the marginalization of the Sunni population. At the same time, the Iraqi Sunnis would be cautious and wary, fearing, with some justification, that they were going to be held collectively culpable for Saddam and his regime. And, finally, the Kurds were anxious to preserve and protect their pre-invasion autonomy against what they feared would be American demands for a centralized and unified Iraqi state.

U.S. problems in Iraq and the escalating violence, Ambassador Bodine asserted, are rooted in a pattern of poor planning that has plagued U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq. A “critical moment” occurred when the U.S. military, on orders from DOD, failed to curb widespread looting that convulsed the country. The message to the Iraqis, Ambassador Bodine contended, was “we’re not interested in you,” but simply in the geopolitical goal of “regime change.” Therefore, the average Iraqi traded personal security “for an amorphous thing called freedom.” The Department of Defense, she declared, simply failed to take the appropriate steps to protect the security of the average Iraqi citizen. She praised the focus on schools, yet noted that if children do not feel safe going to school, the schools serve little purpose. She recounted how Iraqis had informed her and the senior U.S. military commander of the need to establish quickly clear law and order in Baghdad and elsewhere. Although the senior military promulgated such an order, it was never truly enforced.

Ambassador Bodine concluded by considering whether any post-

conflict plan ever existed. In fact, two did. One was the 18-month interagency Project for the Future of Iraq, chaired by the Department of State and shelved by DOD. The other was a 25-page outline of concepts, assumptions, and broad-brush timelines written in Kuwait in the final weeks before the invasion by the DOD Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs that, as a conscious decision, never rose above the level of “working draft” (that is, it was never vetted interagency and had no Washington “buy-in”). In retrospect, the Administration chose to embrace a vision that ignored the views of experts in and out of government on Iraq, on post-conflict challenges, and on political reconstruction, with tragic and costly consequences for the Iraqi people, the interests of the United States, and the political landscape across the Middle East.

Concluding Remarks

Speaker: The Honorable **Ghassan Tuéni**, Editor-in-Chief, *An-Nahar*

Chair: The Honorable **Richard Murphy**, Independent Consultant

Ambassador Tuéni issued a call for global engagement. He invited President Bush to use his re-election victory not to legitimize more preemptive war but instead to spearhead what Ambassador Tuéni deemed “preemptive diplomacy.” U.S. unilateralism is simply untenable, he argued, given the rise of China and the burgeoning development of the European Union. Multilateralism can work in the fight against terrorism, he said, noting that Muslim governments in the Middle East and elsewhere have willingly joined the War on Terror in order to demonstrate Islam’s rejection of terrorism. We should not fear a “clash of civilizations,” Ambassador Tuéni asserted. What worries him, however, is what he labeled the “world insurgency of tomorrow”: the prospect of the developing world, slighted by the unwillingness of the developed world to engage it, lashing back through terrorism. Ambassador Tuéni concluded that, despite its imperfections, the United Nations—particularly if its proposed reforms are adopted—is best equipped to provide a framework for cooperation between the developed and developing worlds, and in so doing to generate a global community of democracies that would work for the eradication of the roots of terrorism. Ambassador Tuéni also stressed the centrality of the Palestine question in any search for Middle East peace.

Participants

Feroz Ahmad is a Visiting Scholar at the Fares Center at Tufts University and Adjunct Professor of Diplomatic History at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He taught at the history department at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, from 1978 to 2002, and has written widely on Turkey, including most recently *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (OneWorld, 2003).

Lawrence S. Bacow was appointed the twelfth president of Tufts University on September 1, 2001. He holds five faculty appointments at Tufts in the Departments of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Economics, and Civil and Environmental Engineering, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the Department of Family Medicine and Community Health at Tufts University School of Medicine.

Ali Banuazizi is President of the Middle East Studies Association and Professor of Psychology and Codirector of the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Program at Boston College. His publications include the coedited *Myths about the Powerless: Contesting Social Inequalities* (Temple University Press, 1996).

Jamshed Bharucha is Provost and Senior Vice President and Professor of Psychology at Tufts University. Prior to Tufts, he was the John Wentworth Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Dartmouth College. He held several leadership posts at Dartmouth, including most recently Deputy Provost and Dean of the Faculty.

Barbara Bodine is Executive Director of the Middle Eastern Governance Initiative at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. In 2003, Ambassador Bodine, a former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, was appointed coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and the central regions of Iraq.

Sugata Bose is Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs at Harvard University's Department of History. His field of specialization is modern South Asian and Indian Ocean history. His new work, *Empire and Culture on the Indian Ocean Rim*, will be published by Harvard University Press.

Stephen W. Bosworth is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has served in the United States Foreign Service both abroad and in Washington, D.C., including most recently as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and the Philippines.

Naomi Chazan, the Robert Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2004-2005), is Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Between 1992-2003 she was a Member and Deputy Speaker of the Knesset representing the Meretz party. Professor Chazan has authored and edited eight books and over sixty articles on African politics, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and women and politics, including *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

Juan Cole is Professor of Modern Middle Eastern and South Asian History at the University of Michigan. His most recent book is *Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shiite Islam* (I.B. Tauris, 2002).

Edward Djerejian is Founding Director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. His diplomatic career spans the administrations of eight U.S. Presidents, including Bill Clinton, who nominated him as United States Ambassador to Israel. He has also served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton.

John L. Esposito is University Professor of Religion and International Affairs, Professor of Islamic Studies, and Founding Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. The author of more than thirty books on Islam and Muslim politics, his most recent books include *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* and *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (both Oxford University Press, 2002).

Leila Fawaz is Founding Director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and Issam M. Fares Professor of Lebanese and Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. Among her publications is *Modernity and Culture From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* (coeditor, Columbia University Press, 2002).

David J. Greene is Acting Director of the Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. State Department, the office where he has been based since 2003. Since joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1996, he has also served in Egypt and Vietnam.

Robert M. Hollister is Dean and John DiBiaggio Professor of Citizenship and Public Service at the University College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University. Previously, Dr. Hollister was Dean of the Tufts Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and Director of the Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is coeditor and contributing author of several books, including *Governing, Leading and Managing Nonprofit Organizations* (Jossey-Bass, 1993).

Ayesha Jalal is Professor of History at Tufts University. She is currently working on a new book-length project titled *Partisans of Allah: Meanings of Jihad in South Asia*.

Ian S. Lustick is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he holds the Bess W. Heyman Professorship. Among his recent publications is *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: British Ireland, French Algeria, and Israel and the West Bank/Gaza* (Cornell University Press, 1993).

Hisham Melhem is Washington, D.C. bureau chief for the Lebanese paper *An-Nahar*. He is also the moderator of a weekly show on Al-Arabiya satellite television. Mr. Melhem appears regularly on American television as a commentator and analyst on Arab-American relations, media, and other Middle East related issues.

Richard W. Murphy is an independent consultant based in New York City. From 1989 to 2004 he served as the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for the Middle East, Council on Foreign Relations. He also spent 34 years as a career foreign service officer, which included stints as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Vali R. Nasr is Professor of Middle East and South Asia Politics in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He joined the faculty in 2003 after teaching at the University of San Diego,

the University of California in San Diego, and Tufts University. Among his many published works is *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

Sari Nusseibeh is the 2004-2005 Rita E. Hauser Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University, during which he will study the limitations of the use of force/violence as a means of achieving or opposing political objectives. He is a Professor of Philosophy at Al-Quds University, the Arab University of Jerusalem, and was appointed President in 1995.

William A. Rugh is an Associate at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and a Board Member at AMIDEAST, where he was president and CEO from 1995 to 2003. A former Ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, he has published numerous journal articles and op-eds on Middle Eastern subjects, and in 2004 the Public Diplomacy Council published his edited anthology *Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds Through Public Diplomacy*.

Jeswald W. Salacuse is Henry J. Braker Professor of Law at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and he served as The Fletcher School's Dean for nine years. His most recent book is *The Global Negotiator: Making, Managing, and Mending Deals Around the World in the Twenty-First Century* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

John Shattuck is Chief Executive Officer of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation. His career has spanned nearly three decades in government service and the nonprofit sector, including a period as the U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Among his publications is *Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and the Roots of Terrorism* (Harvard University Press, 2003).

Richard H. Shultz is Director of the International Security Studies Program and Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is currently writing a book titled *Ethnic, Tribal and Religious Warriors: How Non-State Armed Groups Fight* (forthcoming, Columbia University Press).

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, where he is also Vice Provost for International Affairs. His books include *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Indiana University Press, 1994).

Ghassan Tuéni is presently President of “Les Editions Dar An-Nahar” and Editor-in-Chief of *An-Nahar* newspaper as well as Trustee Emeritus of the American University of Beirut. He was formerly editor-publisher of *An-Nahar* and member of the Lebanese Parliament. Among his recent publications is *Iraq and Terror: Dialogue with Despotism* (collected articles September 2002-April 2003, in Arabic).

Stephen W. Van Evera teaches international relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is Professor of Political Science. He has published books on the causes of war and on social science methodology, including *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell University Press, 1999), as well as articles on American foreign policy, American defense policy, nationalism and the causes of war, and the origins of World War I.

The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies

The mission of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University is to create an academic environment for the promotion of greater understanding of the rich heritage of the Eastern Mediterranean, and of the significant challenges that this region faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The center acts as a major focus for cross-regional and cross-cultural analysis, providing a forum for the articulation of a broad diversity of viewpoints in the belief that this will serve as an effective means of conflict resolution.

The main countries concerned are Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and the neighboring countries of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey, together with any other country or region of the world whose history and politics affect them. The region's history and its pivotal role in world politics have attracted the interest of scholars concerned with fields as diverse as the origins of writing and the beginnings of modern science. In focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, the center is a rich source of current information and data on the area, encouraging the consideration of policy issues from an international perspective.

In addition to constituting a valuable resource for Middle East majors and graduate students in other fields, the university-wide center's links to the existing curriculum include collaboration with a number of schools, departments, and programs at Tufts. Visiting fellowships are offered annually to prominent and promising scholars from abroad who can make significant contributions to the center's teaching and research and its analysis of public policy issues.

The center sponsors academic symposia, conferences, and seminars that enhance its commitment to cross-regional analysis and to the encouragement of a diversity of voices from within and outside the region. It publishes occasional papers and the proceedings of workshops and conferences on the history, culture, and international relations of the region.

TUFTS

The Fares Center
for Eastern Mediterranean Studies
Leila Fawaz, Founding Director
Cabot Intercultural Center
160 Packard Avenue
Medford, MA 02155
Telephone: 617-627-6560
Fax: 617-627-3461
E-mail: fares-center@tufts.edu
Web: <http://farescenter.tufts.edu>

