

THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON CULTURAL HERITAGE PRESERVATION  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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## INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest periods of human civilization, human beings have used different forms of cultural exchange to build positive relationships between themselves and other nations of people.<sup>1</sup> This practice between groups of people builds upon the anthropological phenomenon of reciprocal gift giving amongst individuals.<sup>2</sup> Today, groups of people organized into political states with legal personality continue the ancient practice of cultural exchange, though under the relatively new moniker of “public diplomacy.” This Capstone is an exploration into the value and effectiveness of cultural exchange through the state practice of cultural heritage preservation as an instrument of public diplomacy.

To understand the role that cultural heritage preservation plays in U.S. foreign policy, we must first develop a definition of public diplomacy. Whereas traditional or formal diplomacy refers to the communication and interaction between members of two different governments, public diplomacy refers to the communication between a government (or an agent thereof) and a foreign public, or between the publics of two states (facilitated by either or both of their governments). Some practitioners of public diplomacy may refer to these as “Diplomacy” (or “big ‘d’ diplomacy”) and “diplomacy” (or “small ‘d’ diplomacy”), respectively.<sup>3</sup> Others refer to public diplomacy simply as “PD.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arndt, Richard T. *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2005. 1


<sup>2</sup> Mauss, Marcel. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Translated by W. D. Halls. Reissued. New York: Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc., 2000. 25

<sup>3</sup> Luke, Christina M., and Morag M. Kersel. *U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology: Soft Power, Hard Heritage*. New York: Routledge, 2014. 15

<sup>4</sup> Henrikson, Alan K. “Public Diplomacy (PD): Toward a more ‘Diplomatic’ World.” Lecture, Medford, MA, March 14, 2018.

It was Edmund Gullion, the third Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, who in 1965 first coined the term public diplomacy to describe this type of communication.<sup>5</sup> Over the ensuing half-century, a number of scholars, most notably Nicholas Cull, Joseph Nye, and Nancy Snow have offered competing definitions, all of which maintain several commonalities. Most notable are Nye's three dimensions of public diplomacy: "daily communication, strategic communication, and the development of lasting relationships with key individuals."<sup>6</sup> The definition of public diplomacy that I have developed and use in this work builds off of theirs.

Public diplomacy is a government effort to communicate with a foreign public, or to facilitate communication between domestic and foreign publics. This communication can take the form of information broadcasting, which can be thought of as public affairs, and exchanges or cultural programming, which we can call programmatic work. For both public affairs and programmatic work we observe government communication as well as government-facilitated communication. The figure below outlines this conception of public diplomacy.



<sup>5</sup> Szondi, Gyorgy. "Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences." *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, October 2008. 2

<sup>6</sup> Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (5<sup>th</sup> ed.). New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 107-109

Government communication ranges from press conferences with embassy spokespeople to the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) in which emerging foreign leaders travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with U.S. government officials. Government communication also comprises the inherent message sent to a foreign public by a certain act of the government or of government officials. This type of indirect communication often overlaps heavily with formal, state-to-state diplomacy, such as when a state sends a deputy foreign minister to a certain meeting instead of the foreign minister herself. Similarly, when President Obama held an Iftar dinner at the White House during Ramadan, he was communicating a message of the United States as a place of inclusion, appreciation, and respect for Muslims and religious pluralism to Islamic communities across the globe.<sup>7</sup>

Government-facilitated communication can take the form of one-way information broadcasts via the Voice of America, or international exchanges like the Fulbright program which sends Americans to teach and research overseas and brings foreigners to American academic institutions. The difference between government communication and government-facilitated communication is the level of interaction between the government (and agents thereof) conducting the public diplomacy, and the foreign public receiving it. The IVLP is considered government communication since participants in the program meet directly with U.S. government personnel, whereas the Fulbright program is government-facilitated communication since participants are not government officials but do receive government-funded grants.

There are several further attributes of public diplomacy that must be mentioned. For the purpose of this Capstone, I will continue to describe them within the U.S. context. First, the goal of public diplomacy is to advance the foreign policy objectives by fomenting goodwill for the

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<sup>7</sup> Brayton, Jenna. "President Obama Hosts a Ramadan Iftar Dinner at the White House." National Archives and Records Administration. June 23, 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/06/23/president-obama-hosts-ramadan-iftar-dinner-white-house>.

American people and American values through mutual understanding. Second, in addition to the government and government-facilitated dichotomy, there exists a one-way communication (as in the case of international broadcasting), and two-way communication (such as exchange programs) dichotomy as well. Third, the information conveyed via public diplomacy initiatives is truthful and not intended to deceive. This final quality of public diplomacy is what distinguishes it from propaganda. Unlike public diplomacy, propaganda is not necessarily truthful and is usually intended to deceive. A further requisite of propaganda is that it is not always immediately clear or explicitly stated which actor is the one conveying the information (or facilitating the exchange thereof) and whether that actor is masquerading itself for another.<sup>8</sup> The best propaganda is often the one that is most similar to (or most indistinguishable from) a routine public diplomacy program. Finally, a fourth characteristic of public diplomacy is that it refers exclusively to a practice, or set of behaviors, engaged in solely by state actors within the international system.

While many non-governmental organizations, businesses, academic institutions, and even private citizens acting on an individual basis (through personal travel or otherwise) take actions that complement U.S. public diplomacy initiatives or advance U.S. foreign policy objectives, only the U.S. government has the authority and legitimacy to speak on behalf of the entire American citizenry. The actions of these other groups are what we may call “public diplomacy activities” – engagement that advances U.S. public diplomacy goals though not at the direction of the U.S. government. Because the constituencies for all other organizations are smaller than that of the U.S. government, they reflect a mere subset of the American population. As stated above, public diplomacy is communication between a government and a foreign public or

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<sup>8</sup> Cull, Nicholas J., David Culbert, and David Welch. *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003. 39



between two foreign publics. Only programs that emerge through the public policy planning process (via the legislature or foreign policy bureaucracy) represent the entire population. It should be noted, however, that public diplomacy programs are often outsourced to private implementing partners. The involvement of private organizations in these cases would still be considered public diplomacy since it comes at the direction of the U.S. government (and with taxpayer funds).

A distinct benefit of public diplomacy activities undertaken by private corporations is that they can serve as a laboratory for new types of large-scale institutional marketing that can be later adopted by governments. This stems from the tendency of private enterprises being less risk averse than governments.<sup>9</sup> Because of this, they are more willing to try new, unorthodox methods of communicating a message to a specific audience. Similarly, subnational governments can be great innovators of public diplomacy strategies, especially with regards to tourism and other cultural messaging, since the stakes are lower for these entities than for a national government operating in the international system. However, although “the private sector has vast resources to contribute to public diplomacy... corporations may be more willing to support, rather than to directly engage in public diplomacy in order to protect their economic self-interest.”<sup>10</sup> By merely sponsoring a public diplomacy initiative, the private enterprise receives good press and spreads its brand, while simultaneously supporting government efforts and abdicating any responsibility for the outcome of those efforts.

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<sup>9</sup> Bellante, Don, and Albert N. Link. “Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse Than Private Sector Workers?” *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 34, no. 3. 1981. 409

<sup>10</sup> White, Candace L. “Exploring the Role of Private-Sector Corporations in Public Diplomacy.” *Public Relations Inquiry* 4, no. 3. 2015. 306

The Institute of International Education (IIE) has for many decades been an implementing partner for the U.S. State Department's administration of Fulbright grants.<sup>11</sup> Because IIE is involved on a contractual basis, sanctioned by the U.S. government, its participation in administering Fulbright grants can be considered public diplomacy (or at least part of the public diplomacy implementing process). On the other hand, an initiative by a university to establish a direct exchange program with another university in a different country is not public diplomacy, but rather an example of a private institution engaging in a public diplomacy activity. If the university were to receive a government grant to defray costs related to the exchange program, however, this would then become an instance of public diplomacy.

I recognize that a major limitation of excluding non-governmental actors from my definition of public diplomacy understates the work that these groups do (either intentionally or not) in achieving a state's public diplomacy (and thus foreign policy) objectives. Making a distinction between state-driven public diplomacy and NGO-specific public diplomacy activities also relies heavily on a unitary actor model of international relations, in which minimal consideration is given to the impact of sub-national actors in the execution of a state's foreign policy.<sup>12</sup> Understanding this, I believe the salience of the constituency issue bears more weight. Public diplomacy programs are either mandated in legislation written by members of Congress elected by popular vote (and often with the financial backing of a broad array of interest groups), or through the foreign policy bureaucracy, which is headed by individuals who are confirmed by the legislature. Through either avenue, the legislature – representing the will of the people – has an opportunity to express its opinion and maintains the authority of bureaucratic oversight. This

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<sup>11</sup> Sowa, P. A. "How Valuable are Student Exchange Programs." *New Directions for Higher Education*. April 11, 2002. 65

<sup>12</sup> Powell, Robert. "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate." *International Organization* vol. 48, no. 2. 1994. 324

process democratizes the public diplomacy policy planning process and ensures that the interests of various constituencies are considered in the formulation of policy. It grants the individuals creating policy with the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the entire American public.

### *Public Diplomacy and Power*

Public diplomacy is often presented within the framework of state power, specifically soft power, in the international relations literature. Robert Dahl's definition of power has set the basis by which the concept is debated by political scientists today. The definition of power offered by Dahl, that "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do," is a sound building block for the definition used in this work.<sup>13</sup> The shortcomings of Dahl's definition are that it does not account for what Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes would later dub the second and third faces of power. Whereas the second face of power accounts for the structural agenda-setting that denies *B* the ability to seek out other courses of action, the third face of power represents a conflation of real and subjective interests in which *B* is not even aware of other courses of action.<sup>14</sup> "In any case, an exercise of power is *always* detrimental to the interests of *B* according to the three-dimensional view."<sup>15</sup> Although "detrimental" as Baldwin puts it might be rather harsh, this last point does follow logically.

If there were a certain course of action for *B* that was both in *A* and *B*'s favor, *A* would have no need to exert power to influence *B*'s decision as *B* would be inclined to follow that course of action regardless. *A* would only have exerted power to establish a framework, institution, or structure that allowed *B* to perceive this specific course of action as aligning with

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<sup>13</sup> Dahl, Robert A. "The Concept of Power." *Behavioral Science*, vol. 2, no. 3. July, 1957. 202-203

<sup>14</sup> Lukes, Steven. *Power: A Radical View* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Palgrave, 2005. 20-29

<sup>15</sup> Baldwin, David. *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. 18

its interests. Otherwise, *A* could have exerted power directly over *B* to get *B* to follow this course of action, if it were not originally in *B*'s interest to do so. Ultimately, *B* is going to act in a manner that results in a higher holistic payoff of quantifiable and unquantifiable units. For the purposes of this Capstone we can conceptualize power as the ability of one actor to manipulate the payoffs of other actors or the perceived payoffs of other actors in order to realize a course of action by those actors that aligns with the interests of the initial actor – that is, the actor exerting power.

The exertion of power always starts with an intentional act, but over time may become unintentional if the actor is able to establish a framework, institution, or structure, that results in decisions that land in its favor. This phenomenon can also essentially amount to an externality of a decision made by a powerful actor earlier in time that bears repercussions on the way other actors will behave later in time. This aspect of power bears close resemblance to what Pierson and others have called path dependent power, in which “each step along a certain path produces consequences... [which] begin to accumulate... [and] generate a powerful virtuous (or vicious) cycle of self-reinforcing activity.”<sup>16</sup>

This is also a sign of public diplomacy's utility as an instrument of soft power. Nye defines soft power as the “ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion” but rather, through co-option and attraction.<sup>17</sup> In other words, a country's soft power instruments are its non-military and non-economic tools of influence. Like the path dependence of power discussed above, public diplomacy is itself path dependent and can become a self-perpetuating mechanism of a state's foreign policy. Take France for example; starting

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<sup>16</sup> Pierson, Paul. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2. June, 2000. 252

<sup>17</sup> Ikenberry, G. John. “Capsule Review: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.” *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2004.

with the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century rule of the Sun King, Louis XIV, the French state has pursued a nation branding strategy that aims to label it as the epicenter of high culture.<sup>18</sup> Since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century France has sought, through the Alliance Française, its global network of cultural missions, to promulgate the brand started centuries before and to create a space to conduct public diplomacy with foreigners where they were.<sup>19</sup> Because of decisions made by the French state over 150 years ago to actively pursue this brand, other non-governmental actors (e.g. American Hollywood films) portray France in this same light, which only works to reinforce the image put forward by the French state. That foreign non-governmental actors seek to emulate aspects of French culture speaks to the soft power that the French state has accumulated through the dedicated work of the Alliance Française.

In addition to the buildup of soft power through public diplomacy, the French case highlights two other important features of public diplomacy – nation branding and path dependency. Although the externalization of public diplomacy caused by a centuries-long effort at creating a national brand may seem attractive to many states as such public diplomacy activities reduce the cost of states pursuing their own public diplomacy, and since to certain foreign publics a specific message may be more persuasive if it is communicated through non-governmental channels, some states may reach a point in their development when they determine that it is in their strategic interest to replace or significantly alter their national brand. This is best exemplified by Switzerland’s public diplomacy strategy. Long known for its beautiful landscapes, political neutrality, and delightful artisanal goods (think Swiss cheese and chocolates), the government of Switzerland has pursued a public diplomacy strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr., *The Future of Power*. New York City: Public Affairs, 2011. 81

<sup>19</sup> Clerc, Louis, Nikolas Glover, and Paul Jordan, *Histories of Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding in the Nordic and Baltic Countries: Representing the Periphery*. Boston: Koninklijke Brill, 2015. 24

century that brands the country as a hub of entrepreneurship and innovation.<sup>20</sup> Although this currently cuts against the grain of how other actors perpetuate the old image of Switzerland, the Swiss government is working across sectors to push out this new image. That a country is capable of establishing a public diplomacy strategy to alter its national brand is itself an indication of power. States with fewer resources, or with extremely negative reputations will find it harder to levy the tools of public diplomacy to alter the perceptions of foreign publics.

A final attribute of power that must be noted is that it is not a zero-sum quantity. That is, actors in the international system do not compete over a set amount of power. Rather, they attempt to find new avenues by which to accumulate and exert their power in order to manipulate the payoffs of other actors so that their actions will align with the interests of those powerful actors. This holds true for public diplomacy as well. States do not engage in public diplomacy at the expense of other states, but rather seek to find new arenas in which to communicate with the public of another country. Cultural heritage preservation, and the focus of this Capstone, is just one such avenue. Typically, the more power a state has the better suited it is to engage foreign publics through different means. As Alan Henrikson notes, states with limited power (or limited capacity) find public diplomacy more important than large states, which due to naturally larger connections with foreigners through other sectors, will see public diplomacy as a lesser priority.<sup>21</sup> Croatia expends more of its foreign policy resources on conducting public diplomacy, for example, than does the United Kingdom, since the U.K. already has an identifiable national brand and due to its commercial and cultural ties with other countries has non-governmental means that facilitate societal exchange.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Bortoluzzi, Francesco, and Jonas Brunschwig. "swissnex Boston: Connecting the Dots between Switzerland and North America." *Murrow Center Public Diplomacy Workshop Series*. Lecture, Cambridge, March 9, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Henrikson, Alan K. "Public Diplomacy (PD)." March 14, 2018.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

Soft power and public diplomacy are at times erroneously conflated. The popularity of McDonald's fast food restaurants in some countries or Beyoncé's music in others is not an indicator of the effectiveness of the U.S. public diplomacy strategy in that country, but rather it is a testament to the soft power emanating from American cultural brands and icons. Public diplomacy initiatives are just one (rather organized) way in which the United States exerts its soft power abroad. It is also important to mention that other elements of soft power are often interwoven into public diplomacy programming, which often gives the illusion of fungibility between pure public diplomacy and those other elements of soft power. For example, if a U.S. embassy hosts a monthly lecture series on genres of American music, it might work with a U.S. band popular among a target demographic within the host country to put on a show at the embassy while that band is on tour. Having discussed public diplomacy and its relation to power at length, the next section will focus on cultural heritage preservation – the means by which U.S. public diplomacy will be explored in the body of this work.

### *Cultural Heritage Preservation*

To understand cultural heritage preservation as a tool of public diplomacy, we must first define cultural heritage, for which several competing definitions also exist in the archeology, conservation, and development literatures. For the purpose of this study, cultural heritage may be thought of as the remnants of the tangible achievements and manifestations of human values, traditions, beliefs, lifestyles, and intellects.<sup>23</sup> It is also the intangible social customs and norms that produce the societies which allow for the creation of tangible heritage, and which gives

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<sup>23</sup> ICOMOS International Cultural Tourism Committee. *International Cultural Tourism Charter: Principles and Guidelines for Managing Tourism At Places Of Cultural And Heritage Significance*. Paris: ICOMOS International Cultural Tourism Committee. 2002.

purpose, meaning, and context to human relationships.<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that many states maintain their own specific legal statutes in their bodies of law that define their national cultural heritage and regulate its treatment. The preservation of cultural heritage seeks to maintain both the tangible and intangible attributes of the site or artifact in question, while also protecting it from further human or environmental destruction, and promoting its existence and continued relevance to humanity today. The designation of a site, artifact, or practice as cultural heritage recalls (and at times memorializes) the past, contextualizes the present, and envisages the future. As an instrument of public diplomacy, efforts by the U.S. government to preserve foreign cultural heritage overseas allow for an opportunity to facilitate relationships between civil societies in both countries. It also serves as an indication of the U.S.'s commitment, respect, and appreciation for the richness of foreign cultures and histories, and highlights to the world a critical aspect of the American identity: that the American people form a nation of immigrants with roots extending to all corners of the Earth.

The U.S. effort to preserve cultural heritage abroad is public diplomacy because it is an effort facilitated by the U.S. government to bring together Americans and foreign nationals. In so doing, the U.S. government aims to advance foreign policy goals like creating a stable source of income revenue for rural communities by preserving a site that then becomes a tourist attraction, or by facilitating the societal healing of a post-conflict state by preserving sites of cultural and historical importance. By enabling collaborative work between U.S. citizens and those of the host country, the U.S. seeks to create mutual understanding and foment goodwill for Americans among the foreign population. Efforts by the United States government to preserve

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*



cultural heritage abroad, is one such example of the U.S. government communicating a message to a foreign public.

### *Motivation*

Since childhood, I have had a fondness for maps. One of the many children's atlases I received as a youngster was (in my opinion) a little too cartoonish. The political boundaries were drawn so thick that it was impossible to make out Kinshasa from Brazzaville on opposite shores of the Congo River, and little Singapore seemed to have sunk into the Straits of Malacca. Of course, the cartographer's most egregious fault was in using the Mercator projection! But I loved this atlas most of all, the reason being that for each country it included a few images of national landmarks, that is, of each country's cultural heritage. I would look down in wonder at my map, and like Charlie Marlow in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, would often tell myself "when I grow up I will go there."<sup>25</sup> The maps in my atlas, however, were not empty swaths like Marlow's, but rather full of images of Angkor Wat, Machu Picchu, Ile de Gorée – images that shed light on the peoples that inhabit our Earth, their histories, and their values.

The treatment of cultural heritage in international affairs raises many issues – most of which exist beyond the scope of this Capstone. Chief among these are who determines what constitutes cultural heritage and whether cultural heritage ought to be preserved in the first place. By choosing to include certain images and not others, the cartographer of my favorite childhood atlas had the editorial power to define a country's identity for young map-lovers like myself. Decisions like these have the power to shape and frame the collective memory of a society, and to constrain the comprehension of outsiders wishing to understand it. Whether non-nationals

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<sup>25</sup> Conrad, Joseph, *Heart of Darkness*. New York: Signet Classics, 2008. 11

should play a role in this process raises an entirely separate set of ethical questions. Most worrisome is the threat of excluding the heritage of and thus erasing the cultural legacy of those who have been historically marginalized and oppressed.

As has been mentioned, cultural diplomacy is one of humanity's most primordial methods of facilitating contact between groups of people. Since the emergence of archeology as a tool of diplomacy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, states have engaged with each other through the practice of cultural heritage preservation in an attempt to meet the ultimate goal of all public diplomacy programming – to build mutual understanding so as to advance their own state interests.<sup>26</sup> Most of the literature examining state efforts at cultural heritage preservation has done so through the lens of archaeology and museum studies. While valuable for understanding the technical and operational aspects of such work, the critical discussion of cultural heritage preservation in other fields remains in its infancy. This work seeks to treat cultural heritage preservation as an instrument of public diplomacy, within the broader interdisciplinary field of international relations.

Practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy must be anticipative – they need to get ahead of news stories before they are reported, they must identify social and communicative trends as they emerge, and they must constantly seek new ways of facilitating mutual understanding between the people of the United States and those of other countries, so as to promote a positive image of the U.S. and advance American interests and foreign policy goals. It is ironic then that cultural heritage preservation, a field physically grounded in the past, has taken on an understated yet important role in U.S. public diplomacy. At its core, cultural heritage preservation seeks to

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<sup>26</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 25

conserve (and in many cases promote and protect) the sites, artifacts, and intangible traditions that shape the identity of a nation.

At a time of growing nationalism in the United States and other highly industrialized Western democracies, there is now greater need than ever for a frank discussion on the utility of a cultural heritage preservation foreign policy. As a field, cultural heritage preservation is remarkably multifaceted. This dynamism makes it both a tool and a hindrance for addressing an array of issues in international relations. The role of determining what constitutes cultural heritage and who has ownership over it is complicated. Cultural heritage can be the source of conflict and a factor in overcoming it. It can be a tool for sustainable development, or it can lead to further environmental degradation and social stratification. As the protests and counter-protests over the removal of a Jim Crow-era Confederate statue in Charlottesville, Virginia during the summer of 2017 demonstrate, it can play a role in crystalizing a national identity or further dividing a people along social, ethnic, ideological, religious, or linguistic lines.

At its core, cultural heritage represents the work of our ancestors. It is the physical or social embodiment of their intellect, their achievements, their aspirations, and their flaws. Cultural heritage comprises manuscripts and monuments, practices and paintings, citadels and cemeteries that shape our collective memory and serve as constant reminders of the past. While we the living extend the limits of the humanly possible, we have an equal duty to our ancestors and our posterity to preserve, protect, and promote humanity's cultural heritage.

Cultural heritage preservation presents a unique opportunity for U.S. public diplomacy. Due to its status as a great power in global politics, U.S. cultural and commercial exports have reached virtually every corner of the Earth. As you read this, the chances are better than not that someone somewhere is eating a Big Mac while drinking a Coca-Cola and watching a Hollywood

blockbuster on a Dell laptop. To varying degrees, foreign publics are highly attuned to at least mildly cognizant of U.S. popular culture and historic landmarks. By investing in cultural heritage preservation, the U.S. shows the world that it takes unique interest in the physical manifestations of foreign cultures. This counters the image of an American public that is largely insular and ignorant of the rest of the world. It also highlights the ethnically heterogeneous composition of American society, and the familial lineages that the American public shares with the rest of the world. Finally, cultural heritage preservation provides yet another avenue down which the citizens of two countries can meet, enter into dialogue, maintain contact, and facilitate mutual understanding.

The primary aim of this work is not to argue the virtues of cultural heritage preservation; it accepts them as a given. It focuses instead on the role cultural heritage preservation plays within the larger context of public diplomacy, and operates under the assumption that there are certain factors – be they structural, operational, budgetary – that hinder the progress that could otherwise be made. Specifically within the U.S. context, this Capstone seeks to identify those elements that limit the effectiveness of cultural heritage preservation foreign policy, and offer policy recommendations to improve them.

More than any other project, the United States has provided more resources towards the preservation of the archeological sites at Babylon, Iraq.<sup>27</sup> This site of immense cultural importance to the Iraqi people and of universal value to humankind was partially destroyed by U.S. military forces during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.<sup>28</sup> This project, which conventional wisdom would have one assume to be an excellent recipient for funds, has borne mixed results. As an important place that was partially destroyed by the U.S. government, the message of

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<sup>27</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 78

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

atonement that comes from repairing the irreplaceable treasures of the Iraqi nation has the potential for being a very powerful gesture. However, this has not been the case.

Although the U.S. was expeditious in its efforts to build a capacity training institute in Erbil that targeted Kurdish minorities in addition to the Iraqi Arab majority, and which served as a non-military point of contact strengthening the government-to-government ties between the two states, it remains unclear to what extent sentiments of goodwill and support for the United States, its people, and their values, has been fomented through this project among the Iraqi population at-large.<sup>29</sup> It could simply be that enough time has not yet passed to capture generational changes in Iraqi public opinion. After all, most of the Iraqis working on this project are local adolescents and young adults who would have been children during the U.S. invasion (and subsequent destruction of some of the sites) and have not yet reached the requisite social standing in their society to influence their communities' perceptions.<sup>30</sup> This however, would be something that policy planners at the State Department would be able to glean from the appropriate analysis of project monitoring and evaluation reports. Or it could be that the efforts of the U.S. are indistinguishable from the countless other non-governmental and international organizations working at the site. Perhaps the U.S. has not done enough to disseminate information about its work in a manner that resonates with Iraqis. Understanding which combination of these, and other possible answers, if any, are the cog stalling the wheel, will allow policymakers to implement the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation in a manner that more efficiently uses taxpayer funds, and which provides a higher return on investment in the form of greater utility as a public diplomacy program.

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<sup>29</sup> Allen, Jeff. "Interview with Jeff Allen." Online interview by author. February 26, 2018.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

Having now established a definition for public diplomacy and cultural heritage preservation, and having explained how the U.S. tries to use the former to advance the latter, it begs the research question, and the subject of this paper: what elements of the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation currently limit the effectiveness of such programming as a tool of U.S. public diplomacy, and what changes can be made to maximize the value of U.S. efforts in this area?

Keohane and Nye introduced the concept of complex interdependence into the international relations literature. These scholars define complex interdependence as the nature of a relationship between two or more societies that are connected through multiple channels.<sup>31</sup> Although the term refers primarily to the non-governmental sector (note that the authors refer to *societies* and not *states*), it is useful to draw a parallel for thinking about the various fields in which states interact. We operate under the assumption that public diplomacy programs that capitalize on ever expanding fields is a good thing. For this reason the research question posed above is framed in the negative.

It is assumed that cultural heritage preservation is a worthwhile tool of public diplomacy, and that under ideal conditions would be extremely effective. As the brief description of the Babylon case above indicates, there are projects which superficial intuition would have us assume would be extremely worthwhile public diplomacy opportunities. The challenge lies in understanding under what conditions this would be the case. In evaluating the effectiveness of this program, there is greater utility in identifying the weak points in the way the policy is formed, structured, and implemented, than in highlighting the multitude of aspects from which such a program derives its strength as a foreign policy. Finally, because the ultimate objective of

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<sup>31</sup> Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence," in Richard K. Betts *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. 167

this Capstone is to provide policymakers with actionable proscriptions, it is critical to identify the limiting factors so that they may be addressed in those proposals. Given the practical orientation of this work, if I were to focus instead on the positive aspects of the foreign policy, the recommendations listed in the penultimate section of this Capstone would be less useful. They would essentially amount to telling policymakers to continue doing the things they do well. Without ever addressing the weak points in the policy, there is no certainty that the public diplomacy outcomes would improve.

## BACKGROUND

Historically, the U.S. has conducted cultural heritage preservation unilaterally since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and multilaterally through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for much of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and for some years during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Many leaders of the young United States of the 18<sup>th</sup> century had a romanticized vision of Ancient Greece and Rome, and looked to these societies while constructing their own. Chronicling the histories of Greeks and Romans was seen as preserving the philosophical underpinnings of the United States. And so, since the earliest days of the republic, there has been a keen state interest in preserving historical treasures from these civilizations.<sup>32</sup>

Like much of 19<sup>th</sup> century U.S. foreign policy, the first efforts at what we might today call public diplomacy were south-facing – towards neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Whereas in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century expeditions to preserve cultural heritage were largely academic in nature and undoubtedly neo-colonial, as looting of cultural artifacts was rampant with little regard for their importance to host countries, starting in the 1930s the U.S. developed a formalized government policy of cultural heritage preservation abroad. It was Nelson A. Rockefeller, along with Albert Giesecke, the Civil Attaché responsible for educational and cultural affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru, who pushed for U.S. assistance in preserving Peruvian cultural heritage after “[Rockefeller] learned of the Peruvian government’s inability to preserve and analyze a hundred or more pre-800 A.D. bundles from the tombs at Paracas” during

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<sup>32</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 19-20



a trip to South America in 1937.<sup>33</sup> This trip cemented Rockefeller's interest in Latin America and in telling the story of the United States to Latin Americans. It also weighed so heavily on President Franklin D. Roosevelt that he appointed Rockefeller to serve as the first head of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, a wartime special agency focused on anti-Nazi propaganda and public diplomacy (including cultural heritage preservation) in the Western Hemisphere, and the predecessor to the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs today.<sup>34</sup> During this same time period, U.S. academics and missionaries who were living abroad worked to establish a network of research centers. The degree to which these religious, cultural, and educational institutions engaged on issues of cultural heritage preservation varied depending on time and place.<sup>35</sup> After World War II, the U.S. government pursued cultural heritage preservation through the newly founded postwar global institutions.

For over 70 years, UNESCO has been the premier international institution advancing the cause of cultural heritage preservation. Currently, there exists a fairly robust international treaty regime on cultural heritage preservation promulgated by UNESCO (see Appendix A for the complete treaty regime). Whereas the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) serve more as broad affirmations of cultural rights, some of which had previously been included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), culture-related treaties adopted through the UNESCO framework focus on the preservation, protection, and promotion of cultural heritage. The cornerstone of this regime is the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, of which the U.S. is a state party. The U.S. played an

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<sup>33</sup> Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, 77

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 79

<sup>35</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 25-29

instrumental role in the founding of UNESCO during World War II and laying out a vision for a new international order. After all, it was the American Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish who penned the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution: “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”<sup>36</sup> Since the 1980s, however, U.S.-UNESCO relations have been fraught with periods of U.S. non-participation and refusal to pay its biannual dues. Despite this, the U.S. was still elected to sit on the organization’s Executive Council, despite having lost its right to vote in the organization’s General Conference pursuant to Article 4, Section 8 of the UNESCO Constitution.<sup>37</sup> In the fall of 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced that the United States would be withdrawing from UNESCO completely.<sup>38</sup>

With this recent withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, the vast majority of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy is conducted through one program – the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP). The State Department’s Cultural Heritage Center (CHC) within the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which itself belongs to the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R) manages operational aspects of the AFCP. The AFCP was established by an act of Congress signed into law in 2000, and which entered into force the following year. In the law, Congress points to U.S. efforts to preserve cultural heritage abroad as an important way of showing a “non-commercial, non-political, and non-military [face of the United States to other countries].”<sup>39</sup> The AFCP is a public diplomacy program in which U.S. ambassadors serving in low and middle income countries can

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<sup>36</sup> UNESCO. *UNESCO Constitution*. London, November 16, 1945.

<sup>37</sup> Papagiannis, George. “UNESCO and Global Politics.” *UNESCO: Education Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Lecture, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2015.

<sup>38</sup> Nauert, Heather. “The United States Withdraws from UNESCO.” Press statement, Washington, D.C., October 12, 2017.

<sup>39</sup> Public Law 106-553. H.R. 4942, 106th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office. 2000. (enacted 2001).

apply for grants from the Fund to conduct short and medium term preservation projects. I must stress that the U.S. government does engage in the multidisciplinary issue of cultural heritage preservation on other fronts as well (e.g. preventing the trade of illicit cultural objects, etc.), but engages in cultural heritage preservation as an exercise in public diplomacy solely through the AFCP.<sup>40</sup>

Although public diplomacy and cultural heritage preservation each have their own respective, well-established bodies of literature, there is surprisingly little overlap for two fields that fit so well together. One notable exception is Christina Luke and Morag M. Kersel's *U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology: Soft Power, Hard Heritage*, which provides a comprehensive descriptive analysis of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Barbara J. Little and Paul A. Shackel's *Archeology as a Tool of Civic Engagement* offers readers several compelling case studies that identify a society's social and emotional link to cultural heritage. This work also engages in a broad discussion of the ethics surrounding cultural heritage preservation, and the ways in which "outsiders" may be seen as a tool and a hindrance in preservation projects. Little and Shackel's work is most useful as a guide to preservationists and policymakers faced with decisions over what sites should be preserved, and the degree to which or technical method by which the preservation projects should take place. It does not specifically address the issue of advancing U.S. public diplomacy goals through cultural heritage preservation, though the authors do consider ways to best engage with host communities as a foreigner involved in culturally-sensitive work. Within the small cultural heritage preservation as public diplomacy literature there exists hardly any evaluative analysis of governments' leveraging of their cultural heritage preservation foreign policies as instruments of

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<sup>40</sup> Personal communication with State Department Contact 1, Cultural Property Researcher. U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. July 6, 2017.

public diplomacy. This Capstone seeks to begin to fill that gap by exploring the effectiveness of cultural heritage preservation as public diplomacy in the U.S. context.

Luke and Kersel, and Little and Shackel each identify factors that can make a cultural heritage preservation project useful for forging transnational bonds or promoting civic engagement. Luke and Kersel identify the bureaucratic processes by which sites are selected to be important in ensuring that the ones which are selected are archeologically significant, and meet strategic goals, and thus warrant the investment.<sup>41</sup> From this point, we can extrapolate that the availability, utility, and use of impact evaluation results in determining future projects is also a useful tool for determining whether or not a project will be successful. Little and Shackel stress the importance of finding ways to communicate to a lay public about the preservation efforts at a particular site. The authors make a special point to note that policymakers and preservationists must employ multiple channels of communication to have their message penetrate the population.<sup>42</sup> In the context of this work, we might infer that the collaborators on a project are equally important and determinant of the project's success.

### *The Intersections of Cultural Heritage Preservation and U.S. Foreign Policy*

Although the AFCP is the cornerstone of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy, the United States does engage on this issue in other ways. Most large diplomatic posts will often have an extra fund, essentially a rainy day fund of unappropriated money, which they can dip into to enhance public diplomacy projects already underway. Many U.S. students and

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<sup>41</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology*, 102

<sup>42</sup> Little, Barbara J., and Paul A. Shackel. *Archaeology as a Tool of Civic Engagement*. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2007. 263

academics are also sent abroad to work on cultural heritage projects through Fulbright grants and other government-sponsored fellowships.

After the AFCP, the most institutionalized way in which the United States participates in cultural heritage preservation is through its obligations under the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. In compliance with this treaty (the second most important in the UNESCO cultural heritage preservation treaty regime), the U.S. Congress passed the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) in 1982. The CPIA regulates the import and export of cultural property into and out of the United States. It also established a process by which the U.S. can enter into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with other countries regarding the study, exhibition, and treatment of each other's cultural heritage.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, it affords the U.S. government the power to grant certain non-governmental organizations the ability to negotiate MOUs directly with other states party to the 1970 convention. Consistent with U.S. cultural heritage preservation policy in general, the focus on the Western Hemisphere persists through CPIA action. Although the U.S. has sought to engage countries in the Middle East and other emerging regional powers in the global south, it is with longtime partners in its own hemisphere that the U.S. has signed the most MOUs.<sup>44</sup>

Although the CPIA is operated by ECA, it does not fully meet the criteria for public diplomacy. While the material goal of the CPIA is similar to that of cultural heritage preservation, it encompasses much more of a security focus. This is evidenced by the high correlation of MOUs with countries undergoing conflict, and with one of the purposes of the

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<sup>43</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology*, 64

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 66

original convention as outlined in its preambulatory clauses.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore the program is not leveraged to foment popular good will for the American people and American values, at least not more than any other effort at international cooperation seeks to achieve this fundamental purpose of public diplomacy. Nonetheless, it remains a critical pillar of the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation. Because it is not wielded as a tool of U.S. public diplomacy, it will not be a subject of further discussion in this Capstone.

### *Alternative Conceptions of Cultural Heritage Preservation*

There are several media theories that can be applied within the context of a state's cultural heritage preservation foreign policy. The manufactured consent theory pioneered by Walter Lippmann in the 1920s and later modified by others including Noam Chomsky, and the market for loyalties model developed by Monroe Price could each have some explanatory power in describing the reasons why the United States might include cultural heritage preservation in its public diplomacy toolkit. These two theories could also be helpful in predicting the conditions achieved should the foreign policy be conducted successfully.

Manufactured consent theory centers on the notion of a pseudo-environment, which is an individual's simplified model of the real world – a framed image that includes certain aspects of the real world and excludes others. The biggest factors in shaping any person's pseudo-environment are the preconceptions formed by international news media, education, lived experiences, and personal contacts, among others. Humans are compelled to take certain actions based on their pseudo-environments. In turn, these human actions impact real world events. Individuals' actions impact each other, but these actions are based on their own pseudo-

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<sup>45</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology*, 67

environments. Manufactured consent theory asserts that power agents with the ability to influence individuals' pseudo-environments manufacture public opinion.

When applied to cultural heritage preservation foreign policy, under manufactured consent theory we would observe a power agent, in this case the United States government, using the public diplomacy tool of cultural heritage preservation to reinforce or alter the pseudo-environments of a foreign public. By carefully selecting which sites and artifacts it chooses to preserve, the U.S. would be working to create a positive image for itself in the minds of the foreign public in question. The manufactured consent theory also predicts that we would see journalists perpetuate the U.S. government line on the reason for preserving a certain site and the benefit they receive from U.S. involvement, the message that the preservation work sends to the foreign public about U.S. values, and the necessity for ongoing work in this arena.

The market for loyalties, on the other hand, focuses on winning the hearts and minds of a public. This theory centers squarely on national identity. In the market for loyalties, differing versions of national identity (or a set of cultural or national values) is a commodity sold by governments, interest groups, businesses, religious organizations, and other members of civil society to a set of consumers – a country's citizenry. The sale occurs in the marketplace of the media, in which the currency of exchange is loyalty or citizenship.

This theory can be adapted to U.S. efforts in the domain of cultural heritage preservation overseas. Here, the seller would be the U.S. government, and the buyer is a foreign public. In this case the good being sold is a set of identities reinforced by the preservation of specific cultural sites and artifacts, in exchange for goodwill and positive attitudes towards the U.S., its foreign policies, its people, and their values. The exchange takes place in the media, depending on the extent to which cultural heritage preservation efforts are publicized, otherwise the

exchange occurs in those spaces where foreign publics learn about U.S. cultural heritage preservation efforts (e.g. public presentations, university lectures, site visits, etc.).

An extension of the market for loyalties theory hypothesizes that a cartel is formed to prevent new entrants from entering the market. Under this theory, as I have applied it to cultural heritage preservation, the U.S. would be competing perhaps with a host government that wishes to sell its citizenry a different national mythos or set of cultural values through the monuments it erects or the sites it prioritizes in preserving. The cartel formed in this instance would likely comprise the host government, the U.S., UNESCO, and other states or NGOs involved in cultural heritage preservation. These actors would seek to cooperate in order to keep new entrants from entering the market. According to the market for loyalties theory, the U.S. and other actors would respond to a shift in cultural values and national identity by changing the types of sites and artifacts they choose to preserve and the messages they highlight in pursuing those efforts so that they better align with current national identity. The host government might choose to pass legislation regulating which sites can be preserved, in what way, and by whom. International organizations might adopt resolutions promoting certain state behavior, or consecrate certain sites with internationally-recognized designations.

That the U.S. would enter a foreign country's market for loyalties is also consistent with this theory. Scholars have posited six international interests that foreign countries might have in another's market for loyalties.<sup>46</sup> Three of these – global stability, democracy promotion, and promoting friendly threats – are security-related, while the other three – eliminating potential threats, countering poor country image, and creating receptive markets for multinational

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<sup>46</sup> Gideon, Carolyn. "Session 12: Propaganda." *International Communication*. Lecture, Medford, MA, October 19, 2017.



cooperation – are public diplomacy-related.<sup>47</sup> U.S. efforts to preserve cultural heritage overseas help to eliminate potential threats by aiding in peace processes, promoting a positive image of the United States as a country interested in the history and heritage of other countries, and creating a receptive market for multinational corporations by helping to create new tourism destinations.

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

## ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

To identify those elements of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy which limit its effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. public diplomacy and answer the research question above, we can think of all elements falling into one of four broad answers: organizational structures and processes, messaging, impact evaluation, and collaboration. To ascertain the degree to which any one of these answers could be true, we evaluate them by considering a series of dimensions including: country and site selection, grant size, overlap with UNESCO World Heritage sites, project implementers (that is, the participants selected to work on the site), local public perception of the project, host government reaction to the project, and State Department procedures. The table below summarizes the analytic framework described in greater detail in this section. In the matrix, each column represents the four identified possible answers, and each row contains the dimensions considered. The italicized text at each intersection details the observable condition that would have to exist for the possible answer to be true.

	<b>Ineffective Organizational Structures and Processes</b>	<b>Ineffective Messaging</b>	<b>Ineffective Impact Evaluation</b>	<b>Insufficient Leveraging of Collaboration</b>
<b>Country and Site Selection</b>	<i>Do not advance U.S. PD or FP goals</i> <hr/> <i>Decision-makers and decision-making process do not consider PD or FP goals</i>	<i>No messaging</i> <hr/> <i>Messaging does not advance U.S. PD or FP goals</i>	<i>No change in country and site selection based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Countries and sites selected already saturated by other actors → U.S. role does not stand out independently</i> <hr/> <i>Too few collaborators → U.S. can't capitalize on their investments</i>
<b>Grant Allocation</b>	<i>Poorly matched to achieve U.S. PD or FP goals</i> <hr/>	<i>No or insufficient funding in grant specifically for</i>	<i>No change to grant size based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>U.S. funding is too small to achieve objectives on its own and there is</i>

	<i>Decision-makers and decision-making process do not consider grant size necessary for achieving PD or FP goals</i>	<u><i>communications</i></u> <i>Grant size negatively affects perception of U.S. commitment by foreign public</i>		<u><i>insufficient collaboration to meet funding gap</i></u> <i>Funding from collaborators so great it overshadows U.S. work</i>
<b>UNESCO Overlap</b>	<i>Too much consideration of UNESCO sites leads to too high overlap or too low overlap to achieve U.S. PD and FP goals</i> <u><i>No consideration of UNESCO overlap/no effort to find “sweet spot”</i></u>	<u><i>Mixed messaging between U.S. goals and values vs. UNESCO goals and values → no clear distinction between the two</i></u> <i>Insufficient coverage to highlight U.S. role in preserving a non-UNESCO site</i>	<i>No change in UNESCO overlaps based on past successes and failures</i>	<u><i>Too high to distinguish U.S. role</i></u> <i>Too low to leverage U.S. role</i>
<b>Programmatic Implementers</b>	<i>Programmatic implementers poorly matched to achieve U.S. PD or FP goals</i> <u><i>No process in place to maintain/track relationships in the long-term</i></u>	<u><i>No messaging about program implementers/mutual understanding</i></u> <i>Group composition sends implicit message to foreign public that does not advance U.S. PD or FP goals</i>	<i>No change in group composition based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Programmatic implementers mismatched to achieve U.S. PD or FP goals.</i>
<b>Local Public Perception of Project</b>	<u><i>Negative or indifferent local public opinion</i></u> <i>State Department procedures inadequately plan for project changes due to unfavorable public opinion</i>	<u><i>Negative or indifferent local public opinion or awareness of project</i></u> <i>Widespread misinformation surrounding project, and ineffective/insufficient measures taken to counter misinformation</i>	<i>No evaluation of public opinion of project or long-term changes in perceptions of the U.S.</i>	<i>Locals attribute programmatic work primarily to collaborators</i>
<b>Host Government Reaction</b>	<i>Project does not achieve PD or FP goals because host government reaction not considered in selection process</i>	<i>Ineffective messaging to dispel misinformation disseminated by host government</i>	<i>No evaluation of changes in formal diplomatic relationship</i>	<u><i>Collaborating organizations are hostile to/critical of host government resulting in negative host government reaction</i></u> <i>Host government promotes collaborators’ efforts and not U.S. efforts</i>
<b>State</b>	<i>Selection criteria and processes are not</i>	<i>No clear responsibilities or</i>	<i>No clear guidelines for impact</i>	<i>No formalized structure for</i>

<b>Department Procedures</b>	<i>formally structured or defined</i>	<i>guidelines for messaging about projects</i>	<i>evaluation during, after, or long after project</i> <hr/> <i>Not conducted consistently</i> <hr/> <i>No procedure to consider results in future decisions</i>	<i>choosing collaborators or leveraging collaboration</i>
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TABLE 1 – Analytic Framework

### *Four Possible Answers*

I have chosen to consider four possible answers – ineffective organizational structures and processes, ineffective messaging, ineffective impact evaluation, insufficient leveraging of collaboration – in investigating the research question: what elements of the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation currently limit the effectiveness of such programming as a tool of U.S. public diplomacy, and what changes can be made to maximize the value of U.S. efforts in this area? I have chosen these specific answers, because as was described in the previous chapter, they are mentioned (or alluded to) in the cultural heritage preservation literature as reasons for which a project might or might not be successful. These four possible answers form, by no means, an exhaustive list. But rather, as they signify a consensus within the limited literature on this subject, they represent an appropriate point of departure for this Capstone, which itself attempts to bridge the gap between the cultural heritage preservation and public diplomacy literatures.

Ineffective organizational structures and processes, refers to the decision-making process of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy. The decision-making process includes the people or groups of people making the decisions, and the manner in which they do so within the larger public diplomacy and foreign policy bureaucracies, and given the context of any legislative constraints or mandates placed upon them.

The second possible answer in identifying the elements limiting the effectiveness of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy as an instrument of U.S. public diplomacy is messaging. Messaging refers first to the largely complementary work typically done by a diplomatic post's Public Affairs Section (PAS) to highlight U.S. involvement in cultural heritage preservation in country. This includes the extent to which the PAS publicizes information about the project on the embassy website and social media accounts. It also considers the extent to which the diplomatic post seeks to influence local news media coverage of the preservation work to advance broader U.S. public diplomacy goals. In countries with a relatively free press this would include insufficient efforts by the diplomatic post to have op-eds published in local newspapers, conduct press conferences specifically related to the preservation work, or engage with local newspaper writers and editors, as well as radio and television broadcasters to positively influence the coverage. In countries with limitations on free press (or with hostile views towards the U.S.), poor messaging would include insufficient efforts by the PAS to gain coverage of the preservation work and the U.S.'s role therein. In the case of this analytic framework, messaging also refers to the implicit communication from the U.S. government to the foreign public that comes by virtue of the site selected for preservation and the amount awarded to that project or to all projects in that country.

The third possible answer, ineffective impact evaluation, concerns the degree to which efforts are undertaken to improve U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy to render better results in the future. It also considers the degree of policy reformulation based on the empirical findings of an impact evaluation.

It has been longstanding policy at the Department of State for public diplomacy projects conducted by ECA to receive an impact evaluation only if requested by the diplomatic post.<sup>48</sup> Impact evaluations are conducted at the State Department in Washington, D.C. where career State officials undergo a study of the programs requested. Impact evaluations do not occur in country since the Foreign Service Officers staffing diplomatic posts rotate out of their position every one to three years and therefore lack the institutional memory or presence to conduct a meaningful long-term impact evaluation.<sup>49</sup> The diplomatic post requesting the evaluation is also responsible for funding it, which places a further disincentive on Foreign Service Officers from seeking out this information from their colleagues in Washington.<sup>50</sup>

The fourth possible answer to the research question at hand is insufficient leveraging of collaboration. This possible answer encompasses the relationship between U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy on a bilateral and multilateral (through UNESCO) basis. It also considers U.S. collaboration with other non-governmental actors in the field of cultural heritage preservation, namely NGOs, and academic institutions. It considers the extent to which a site being preserved through the AFCP is saturated with other actors and the degree to which the U.S. leverages their presence in achieving its own public diplomacy goals.

### *Seven Dimensions of Each Possible Answer*

The country and site selection is the byproduct of a bureaucratic decision-making process. Both civil servants and Foreign Service Officers are participants in this process, at times organized into formal review panels. A complete description of the decision-making

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<sup>48</sup> Personal communication with State Department Contact 2, Program Evaluation Research Analyst. U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. June 27, 2017.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

process is described in the first case study below. Selecting the right countries and sites is important to achieving public diplomacy goals since some will make more efficient use of taxpayer resources and help advance other U.S. strategic interests and foreign policy priorities. It is therefore important to understand what effect (if any) each possible answer would have on the countries and sites selected to receive AFCP grants.

Complementary to the country and site selection decision-making process is the allocation of grant money from the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation to posts implementing a cultural heritage preservation project. Because grants that are too small cannot adequately address the technical needs of the project, and those that are too large are a waste of resources that could have been spent elsewhere, it is important to examine the effects of grant allocation for each of the possible answers.

As previously discussed, UNESCO is the premier international organization tasked with preserving, protecting, and promoting the world's cultural heritage. The United States was a founding member of the organization but has maintained a tenuous relationship over the past three-and-a-half decades. There has been a noticeable trend over the past few years, however, of increasing overlap of sites funded through UNESCO and through the U.S. unilaterally.<sup>51</sup> This corresponds to the declining U.S.-UNESCO relationship. Compared to the level of sites receiving both UNESCO and U.S. funds today, there was a lower level of overlap in the early 2000s when the U.S. was in the process of rejoining UNESCO. As the relationship grew more tense due to disputes over heritage protection in Iraq and Afghanistan, and ultimately with the admission of Palestine as a member-state (triggering an automatic stop in U.S. funding), culminating in the announcement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson of the U.S.'s intent to

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<sup>51</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 109

withdraw from the body in the fall of 2017, the percentage of UNESCO sites funded by the U.S. grew.<sup>52</sup> As the number of UNESCO sites receiving AFCP funds grew, the program became more distant from its early precedent of supporting projects of hyper-localized importance.<sup>53</sup> Considering the implications of this dimension for each possible answer will help to distinguish whether or not policymakers are properly considering pre-existing UNESCO designations in the policy-making process. A high incidence of overlap might make the U.S.'s role indistinguishable from that of other actors or successfully leverage pre-existing preservation infrastructure and paint the U.S. as a team player on the international stage. In theory, depending on the context of the country in question, there should exist an optimal level of overlap between AFCP projects and UNESCO World Heritage sites.

Programmatic implementer refers to the people and groups of people selected to conduct the project's programmatic preservation work. Depending on the specific project, programmatic implementers may be Americans or host country nationals with academic, or archeological or conservation backgrounds. They may be individuals or conservation-focused NGOs. Some of the value of cultural heritage preservation as an instrument of U.S. public diplomacy is enabling programmatic implementers to interact with counterparts from the corresponding country, or with local populations at-large. The degree of success in achieving public diplomacy goals may depend on the extent of interaction between American programmatic implementers and host country nationals (either implementers or not).

The local public perception of the project is perhaps the greatest indicator of the success of an individual project with it achieving its stated public diplomacy goals. A distinction here is necessary since public support for the project might not equate to an overall improvement in the

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*



foreign public's opinions of the U.S. due to other factors (e.g. U.S. military involvement, other foreign policies, etc.). Nevertheless, when the foreign public approves of the project and associates it with the U.S., this is likely to have positive public diplomacy implications in the long run if human relationships are sustained and messaging is effective.

The host government reaction is an important dimension to consider since in many countries where the U.S. conducts cultural heritage preservation, the host government has very strong control over information and news flows. Therefore the host government is poised to influence the perception of the U.S. presence among its citizens. However, individual country context matters in examining the host government's reaction. In some countries, a positive host government reaction indicates that the U.S. is achieving its public diplomacy goals through cultural heritage preservation foreign policy, and in other countries, a negative host country reaction may indicate the same. Furthermore, there is a temporal matter to consider. Because any change in public opinion is likely to come after U.S. presence, we might witness an unfavorable host government attitude towards the U.S. before and during the programmatic work, and a positive (or at least less unfavorable) attitude at some point afterwards.

The last dimension considered for each possible answer is State Department procedures. According to the organization behavior model of decision-making, bureaucracies operate according to standard operating procedures.<sup>54</sup> The final dimension explores the degree to which such standard operating procedures exist and are followed with regards to U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy in order to advance U.S. public diplomacy and foreign policy goals.

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<sup>54</sup> Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decisions*, 169

### *Ineffective Organizational Processes and Structures*

If this possible answer holds true, the observations expected for the various dimension are as follows. The decision-making process would result in country and site selections that do not advance stated U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. This could be because the decision-making process, or the decision-makers themselves do not sufficiently consider U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. Similarly, the sizes of project grants would be poorly matched to achieve the public diplomacy or foreign policy goal. Again, this would indicate that the decision-makers or the decision-making process does not allow for ample consideration of the grant size needed to achieve public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. With regards to the percentage of sites selected that already receive significant support through UNESCO's World Heritage Programme, we would either see too high of an overlap, which disables foreign publics from distinguishing the U.S. role, or too low of an overlap, which reduces efficiency by not leveraging existing infrastructure and institutional support to complement American programmatic work. Essentially, there would be too much consideration either in favor of or against UNESCO in the decision-making process, or, UNESCO overlap would not be considered at all, which would have a similar effect, resulting in either too high of an overlap or too low of an overlap to successfully achieve U.S. public diplomacy goals. Decision-makers would rely too heavily on information regarding the abundance of UNESCO sites, or the lack thereof, instead of placing U.S. interests first, or they would not rely on that information at all, and in turn the sites selected might coincidentally have too high or too low of an overlap to be effective. There would also be no effort to find the "sweet spot" that allows the U.S. to leverage UNESCO participation without being completely overshadowed by it. This is an ideal level of overlap,

however, which changes depending on the country context and the specific public diplomacy goals identified by the PAS.

If current organizational structures and processes result in reduced effectiveness for U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy, we would see programmatic implementers who are poorly matched for reaching U.S. public diplomacy goals. This might take one of several forms depending upon the individual site and country context. Perhaps the preservation work includes too many Americans and too few host country nationals or vice versa, or maybe there is an overreliance on non-governmental organizations in a country with which the U.S. should be seeking to strengthen academic ties. Additionally, policy makers will not have established the appropriate bureaucratic infrastructure to facilitate long-term binational relationships of programmatic implementers. This might mean that formal alumni groups exist (on paper or online), but these networks are not harnessed by the State Department or not given the resources or impetus to flourish and tighten social and professional bonds after project completion. It could also be that the individual personalities of the implementers involved are not conducive to the maintenance of long-term cross-cultural relationships, or that there is too great of an overlap in skillsets and experience so that alumni implementers do not view alumni networks as particularly valuable professional resources.

If ineffective organizational structures and processes is the answer to the research question, we will also observe negative or indifferent local public perception of the project. The State Department will also lack (or inadequately implement) procedures intended to alter the project, or the messaging strategy, when indications of negative public reaction that could be antithetical to larger U.S. public diplomacy goals arise. Additionally, the host government reaction will not have been considered during the selection process. Recall that this Capstone is

considering cultural heritage preservation foreign policy as an instrument of public diplomacy. Therefore it is possible for a host government to have a negative reaction to a project, which in turn advances U.S. public diplomacy goals by energizing a local population that already has an antagonistic predisposition towards the host government, and which views U.S. involvement as positive. Finally, we would also observe state department procedures that were not formally structured or defined or which do not help to advance public diplomacy objectives, or a process that is routinely bypassed for inconsistent, ad hoc processes.

### *Ineffective Messaging*

If ineffective messaging is the answer to the research question posed, we will observe that there is no messaging complementing programmatic work, or that the messaging does not advance U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. Messaging may not advance U.S. public diplomacy goal or foreign policy goals if it does not highlight specific site selections, reasons for selection, the connection (historical, cultural, diasporic, if any) between the site selected and the interests and values of the American people, or if it is otherwise not well conceived to resonate with the target audience. For grant allocation, there would be no or insufficient funding for messaging specifically tied to cultural heritage preservation, forcing diplomatic posts to divert funds from their general communications budget (if at all). The size of the grant may also be too small to create a positive impression among the foreign public, or if the grant is particularly large, there may be no coverage or insufficient coverage of the grant size, relating it to the degree of interest or investment by the American people in the preservation of the site in question. There will also be no clear messaging to distinguish between advancing U.S. goals and values as opposed to UNESCO goals and values at overlapping sites. Messaging surrounding sites

receiving aid from both the U.S. and UNESCO will have ineffective messaging that underscores the U.S. role. For sites that solely receive U.S. funding, messaging will not adequately present the U.S. as a champion for recognizing the need to preserve the site in question. There will be no messaging, or inefficient messaging that follows the project as it advances, or that highlight the positive externalities of the project, which benefit the host society. The implicit message sent by the composition of programmatic implementers will not advance U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. Additionally, there may be no or limited messaging to highlight the mutual understanding facilitated by program implementers. That is, the diplomatic post's PAS will not facilitate media exposure for the participants or assist in the development of talking points.

If there is ineffective messaging surrounding the project, there is likely to be indifferent or negative local public opinion. Similarly, we might observe misinformation surrounding the project or the U.S. role therein and inadequate efforts to counter this misinformation. This misinformation may come from the host government, for which we would continue to see inadequate efforts to dispel the misinformation. Additionally, there would not exist formal guidelines, procedures, or roles for messaging from the State Department in Washington, D.C., or from the post's PAS.

### *Ineffective Impact Evaluation*

If poor impact evaluation is the cause for limited effectiveness of U.S. cultural heritage preservation foreign policy as an instrument of U.S. public diplomacy, we will witness insufficient change in country and site selection based on past successes and failures. Similarly, there will be insufficient change to grant sizes based on lessons learned and synthesized in impact evaluations. The extent of UNESCO overlap will also be insufficiently adapted based on

results of impact evaluations, as will the composition of programmatic implementers. These expected results all hinge on the assumption that policy-makers are routinely performing impact evaluations and in so doing, consider the dimensions listed above. Of course, if the impact evaluations indicate that no change is needed in the operation of the AFCP, the above indicators could be evidence that this possible answer does not answer the research question.

We would observe no evaluation of local public opinion of the project or of long-term changes to perceptions of the U.S. government and the American people and the degree to which the project may have affected those changes in perception. There would also be no evaluation of formal diplomatic relationship with the host government due to any changes in perception of the U.S. by the foreign public, and the degree to which changes in public opinion of the U.S. affected changes in formal state-to-state relations. Finally, we would see no clear guidelines for evaluations during, after, and long after the project; evaluations, if any, would be inconsistent in the regularity with which they occur and the indicators they consider. There would be no State Department procedures to change future projects based on findings of impact evaluations.

### *Insufficient Leveraging of Collaborations*

For this possible answer, under the first dimension, we would observe that the countries and sites selected are ones that are already saturated by other actors, so that U.S. presence or involvement does not stand out independently, or that there are too few partners to achieve the project goals and thus achieve the U.S. public diplomacy goals tied to the project. Funding provided by the U.S. would be too small to achieve enough on its own without supplemental funding from other sources, or the funding or technical capacities provided by other actors are so great that they overshadow the U.S.'s work. With regards to the degree of UNESCO overlap, it

would either be too high to distinguish the U.S. role or too low to leverage the U.S. role in the preservation efforts. Programmatic implementers would be poorly matched to help achieve U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy objectives, given the degree of overlap with other collaborators. This could be because the programmatic implementers are working more with project collaborators than with U.S. government officials, or because collaborating organizations rather than State Department policymakers are determining the composition of project implementers. Or, it could be that the program implementers are all host country nationals and the collaborating organizations do not have any Americans so there are no relationships being formed through U.S. involvement in the project. Either they would lack the technical skills, or their organizational mission or values would be antithetical to those promoted by the United States.

If insufficient leveraging of collaboration is the answer to the research question, the predominant local perception of the project will not distinguish between the U.S. role and that of collaborators. Similarly, the host government would have a negative reaction if the collaborators were antagonistic or hostile towards the host government. If not, the host government might promote to the local population the collaborators' role in the project at the expense of the U.S.'s. Finally, there would be no formalized State Department procedure for choosing collaborators or leveraging collaboration on projects, or for choosing sites based on the number and types of actors already engaged in preservation work there.

## METHODOLOGY

To answer the research question at hand, I employed a case study methodology. The two cases considered are a holistic bureaucratic analysis of State Department policy formulation and implementation of the AFCP, as well as a case study of AFCP projects in Myanmar with particular focus on the preservation of the First Baptist Church in Mawlamyine between 2012 and 2018. Understanding the State Department policymaking process elucidates the degree to which ineffective organizational structures and processes and inefficient impact evaluation answer the research question, since both of these possible answers depend largely on actions taken by career professionals at State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C. The Myanmar case study, however, looks more closely at actions taken in the field, that is, the programmatic implementation of AFCP grants. This helps to distinguish between the remaining possible answers – ineffective messaging and insufficient leveraging of collaborations – both of which are activities driven by the diplomats and project implementers in the field.

The Myanmar case study was selected due to the availability of scholarly literature on the sites preserved, as well as the ease of direct access to diplomats and preservationists involved in those projects. The Mawlamyine church preservation is also considered one of the more successful projects.<sup>55</sup> Evaluating a project that is seen as having few, if any, factors that limited its effectiveness is helpful as it provides a “floor” of minimum factors. It can be assumed that the factors that limit the effectiveness in this more successful project are even more limiting in other, less successful projects. Although Mawlamyine is seen as a relatively successful case, it should

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<sup>55</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.



still be noted that it is not a perfect case. Even the preservation work there could benefit from slight changes, as will be discussed in greater detail below.

Although the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation has traditionally been most aggressively employed in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the creation of the AFCP in the early 2000s, the U.S. has sought to extend its reach in this regard to other regions of the world. With heavy military presences in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and in an effort to confront a rising China in Eastern and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, there is added value in conducting a case study in one of these regions.

To conduct these case studies, I relied on primary source State Department documents, including standard operating procedures and annual reviews from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, in addition to the existing academic literature on the AFCP and U.S.-UNESCO relations. I also examined press statements issued by relevant diplomatic posts, CHC, and ECA. For this study, I conducted a series of interviews with current and former State Department officials, and implementing partners with experience working on cultural heritage preservation projects either at diplomatic posts overseas or at the State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C. The case studies are applied to my research question using the analytic framework developed above. I will use the findings from the case studies to evaluate the evidence for each of the dimensions described above. These findings will be used in the discussion section below to fill in a parallel matrix that will then be compared to my analytic framework. This will allow me to clearly identify which of the four possible answers (or which elements of each answer) is best suited for answering the research question addressed by this Capstone.

## EVIDENCE

### ***Case Study: Bureaucratic Analysis of State Department Policy Formulation and Administration of the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation***

As the name of the grant implies, the driving impetus behind all cultural heritage preservation projects under the AFCP starts at diplomatic posts overseas.

Each year, ECA's Cultural Heritage Center invites U.S. Ambassadors serving in eligible countries to submit proposals on behalf of museums, ministries of culture, NGOs, and other qualified entities for projects to preserve cultural heritage. The Center coordinates the review of proposals and recommends projects for funding. Funding opportunities are announced [each fall], and awards are announced in the spring.<sup>56</sup>

In reality, this often means that the Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) – the U.S. diplomat who manages cultural programmatic public diplomacy work within a post's PAS – issues a call for proposals from prospective non-commercial project implementers based in country or in the U.S. By law, AFCP grants may only be issued for projects in countries that are in the bottom two-thirds of the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index.<sup>57</sup> The Appendix attached contains the complete list of countries that were eligible to apply for AFCP grants in the fall 2017 application cycle.

Candidates can apply for either a small grant (from \$10,000 to \$200,000) or a large grant (over \$200,000). Small grants can only fund three types of projects: the preservation or restoration of cultural sites, the preservation or restoration of cultural objects and collections, and the preservation of forms of traditional cultural expression. U.S. embassy personnel from the PAS (in some larger embassies the ambassador may establish a more formal AFCP Selection

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<sup>56</sup> Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State. *AFCP Fact Sheet*. Washington, D.C. 2015.

<sup>57</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archeology*, 98

Committee) perform a preliminary review of nominations.<sup>58</sup> The top applicants for each country are forwarded to the State Department in Washington for final review, where they are first evaluated on a 100-point scale by ECA. After this, ECA sends all applications to the public diplomacy offices of each regional bureau where regional public diplomacy experts rank them before being sent back to ECA for final review and grant allocation.<sup>59</sup> A list of required application materials, another of ineligible activities and unallowable costs, and a third of ECA's point-based ranking criteria are in the Appendix C attached.

The number of applications submitted, and the number selected for grants is highly variable from year to year and from place to place. As one Deputy Public Affairs Officer (DPAO), the second in command of the PAS at Embassy Kigali in Rwanda, with significant experience working on the AFCP shared with me, embassy teams will often pursue a strategy that makes sense within the country context and public diplomacy objectives that they are trying to achieve.<sup>60</sup> Some posts will cull the number of applications they pass on to ECA to just one or two very well developed proposals, while others might choose to forward many more, or even all applications they receive in the hope of having several smaller projects receive funding.<sup>61</sup>

Large grants can fund a wider array of projects including: preventive conservation (addressing conditions that damage or threaten the site); stabilization (reducing the physical disturbance [settling, collapse, etc.] of a site); conservation (addressing damage or deterioration to a collection or site); consolidation (connecting or reconnecting elements of a site); anastylosis (reassembling a site from its original parts); or restoration (replacing missing elements to recreate the original appearance of a site, usually appropriate only with fine arts, decorative arts,

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. *Call for Proposals for the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation*. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Fall 2017.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 4. Phone interview by author. March 28, 2018.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

and historic buildings).<sup>62</sup> The selection process differs significantly for large grants as well. Large grant applications are considered in two rounds. In Round 1 a team comprised of personnel from ECA and the regional public diplomacy offices review and rank application abstracts. ECA notifies embassies whose projects receive a favorable review to submit final applications, which are reviewed by the same team as in Round 1. During Round 2, however, ECA may consult with other federal agencies with equities in the project, as well as the State Department's Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP), and the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations prior to making final selections. A full list of Round 1 and Round 2 application materials can be found in Appendix C.

### *Country and Site Selection*

That the applications are reviewed several times by staffers in ECA as well as the regional bureaus is indicative of some prioritization of the public diplomacy merits of the individual projects themselves. However, this may not be enough to overcome the structural deficiencies in the manner by which applications are assessed. Together, the rationale for U.S. support and media outreach strategy account for only 25% of the available points in ECA's ranking system. The U.S. government funds the AFCP to serve a public diplomacy purpose. If proposals are evaluated on a scale that does not overwhelmingly prioritize the public diplomacy value of the project, it is unclear that the individual projects will be useful as public diplomacy tools. A worthwhile counterargument to this point is that the feasibility of the successful completion of the project by the implementers seeking funding should also receive considerable weight since a project that is done poorly, or which must be abandoned along the way could hurt

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<sup>62</sup> U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. *Call for Proposals*. Fall 2017.

the image of the United States. Because applications begin at post, however, there is a great disparity in the numbers and qualities of applications. A common theme that appeared in each of my interviews was that posts in which top leadership or individual CAOs prioritize public diplomacy programs, specifically the AFCP, are likely to have more applications or applications of a higher quality. This is because the CAOs will be more willing, or will be instructed to work with the organizations applying for funding to fine tune the application before submission.<sup>63</sup> Therefore the initial phase of the AFCP process is an incredibly subjective one, which may not necessarily yield the results that best advance U.S. public diplomacy goals. Furthermore, because the grant recipients are the ones that apply to preserve a specific site, they may prioritize the archeological merits of the site over its value as an instrument of forging mutual understanding between the people of the United States and those of another country.

In 2017, 40 projects in 35 countries received AFCP grants – six in Africa, nine in East Asia and the Pacific, five in Europe and Eurasia, six in the Middle East and North Africa, six in South and Central Asia, and eight in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>64</sup> The geographic distribution of awards in 2017 remained relatively constant from that of 2016 in which 39 projects received funding – eight awards were made to projects in Africa, six to East Asia and the Pacific, nine to Europe and Eurasia, five to the Middle East and North Africa, four to South and Central Asia, and seven to Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>65</sup> Both of these figures represent a substantial downsizing of the scope of the program compared to 2015 in which 91

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<sup>63</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3. Online interview by author. February 7, 2018.

<sup>64</sup> Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State. *2017 AFCP Awards*. Washington, D.C. 2017.

<sup>65</sup> Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State. *2016 AFCP Awards*. Washington, D.C. 2016.

projects were selected for funding from a pool of 339 applications.<sup>66</sup> The table below summarizes the number of proposals and awards for each year in the 2014-2015 application cycle.

	<b>Africa</b>	<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>East Asia and the Pacific</b>	<b>Europe and Eurasia</b>	<b>Middle East and North Africa</b>	<b>South and Central Asia</b>
<b>Proposals</b>	48	63	51	79	58	40
<b>Awards</b>	13	15	16	18	12	17
<b>Percent of Proposals Funded</b>	27.08%	23.80%	31.37%	22.78%	20.68%	42.50%

**TABLE 2 – AFCP Proposals and Awards by Region, 2014-2015**

Source: 2014-2015 AFCP Annual Report, Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The sharp decline in the number of projects represents the partial defunding of the AFCP by Congress.<sup>67</sup> As the section below indicates, the average grant size did not change considerably over the past three cycles. The awards granted in the past three years, which were selected during the last three years of the Obama administration, are consistent with President Obama's pivot towards Asia policy.

It should also be noted that the vast majority of the projects selected are smaller, less well known sites. In Cambodia for instance, rather than choosing to preserve some section of the ruins at Angkor Wat, the U.S. has instead invested in the conservation of 20<sup>th</sup> century ethnographic objects at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. In countries like Cambodia, focusing on sites that honor the victims of a crime against humanity perpetrated by an authoritarian government also parallels U.S. messaging on its commitment to democracy and human rights. In other cases, such as the preservation and interpretation of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Spooner's Cotton Ginnery in Saint Kitts and Nevis, the U.S. has selected a site that recalls a common history

<sup>66</sup> Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State. *2014-2015 Annual Review*. Washington, D.C. 2015.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

shared between the two countries. Oftentimes, as in the transatlantic slave trade and the exploitative economy that it supported symbolized in the Saint Kitts case mentioned above, the projects selected for preservation are ones that highlight a common theme between the histories and cultures of the two countries. This can be a useful strategy in increasing the public diplomacy relevancy of the project as it not only produces easier talking points, it portrays the United States as a willing partner in working to heal the wounds of a sometimes painful history.

### *Grant Allocation*

Applicants must propose a budget, but often the grant received is less than the amount requested. Though this is standard of the grant-making industry, it forces implementers to downscale projects or expend fewer resources on promotional or communications activities or on other aspects of the projects that forge human relationships with foreign nationals.

In 2017 the United States spent on \$6,074,612 on AFCP grants.<sup>68</sup> Grant allocations ranged from a \$24,000 award to preserve 19<sup>th</sup> century royal artifacts housed at a museum in Bangkok, to several \$500,000 awards to conserve the ruins of a slave trading post off the coast of Sierra Leone, Solomon's Pool in the West Bank, and the Maya ruins at Pelenque in Mexico.<sup>69</sup> The average amount awarded to each project in 2017 was \$151,865.<sup>70</sup> Similarly in 2016, \$6,007,768 was awarded in AFCP grants, with the size of the average award being \$154,045.<sup>71</sup> In 2015, the amount awarded was more than double what would later have been awarded in 2016 and 2017 combined. Of the \$77,775,948 requested through all proposals, the State Department

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<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> Educational and Cultural Affairs, *2016 AFCP Awards*.

awarded \$13,451,889 in grants.<sup>72</sup> In 2015, the average grant size was \$147,823. Comparing this figure to the average amount of the grant request made in the application, which was \$229,428, we see that the difference between the average amount requested and the average amount awarded was over \$80,000.

Civil servants at ECA must strike a delicate balance in awarding funds. In addition to ensuring an equitable geographic distribution that reflects the United States' commitment to engaging with peoples from all parts of the world while also targeting those communities that would most advance the country's public diplomacy goals, they must decide between funding a smaller number of larger projects at the level requested, or more (and possibly smaller) projects at levels below those requested.

### *UNESCO Overlap*

The degree of UNESCO overlap is not formally considered by officials at the State Department, however, CAOs in the field find this is a good way of capitalizing on work already done and to attach the U.S.-name to a brand that is very popular in most countries.<sup>73</sup> There is a growing trend of AFCP grants going towards more UNESCO projects.<sup>74</sup> However, because most UNESCO sites are relatively large (after all, they are *world* heritage sites), and because AFCP grants are relatively small, AFCP grants typically fund just a specific section of a UNESCO site.<sup>75</sup> This is useful as it is easier to highlight the U.S. contribution to the overall preservation. Many AFCP projects are archeological sites adjacent to but not included in

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<sup>72</sup> Educational and Cultural Affairs, *2014-2015 Annual Review*.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>74</sup> Luke and Kersel, *Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology*, 109

<sup>75</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3, February 7, 2018.



UNESCO sites.<sup>76</sup> This also makes it easier to distinguish between the U.S. and UNESCO contribution as well as the values that each entity upholds.

It is important to note that the CHC actively promotes the number of AFCP grants funding UNESCO World Heritage sites. On its home webpage it includes a link to a world map documenting each UNESCO site that has been the recipient of an AFCP grant. This message clearly indicates the public diplomacy value with which civil servants at ECA view the funding of UNESCO World Heritage sites.

Of the 40 projects that received AFCP awards in 2017, five of these, or 12.5%, were designated UNESCO World Heritage sites. The decision to fund a project preserving the ruins of the transatlantic slave trading post at Bunce Island in Sierra Leone is particularly noteworthy since Sierra Leone does not have any sites inscribed on UNESCO's world heritage list. Of the 39 projects that received funding in 2016, six, or 15% were UNESCO World Heritage sites. Furthermore, in 2016 ECA funded two sites, one in Guyana and the other in Tonga, in countries that do not have any UNESCO World Heritage sites. Over these two years, of the sites that received AFCP monies, only one of them, Mozambique Island, had a preservation mandate that overlapped entirely with that of the UNESCO site.<sup>77</sup> In all other instances, the preservation work was for a specific part of or sub-project within the site. The funding of projects in countries without any UNESCO sites could be a particularly worthwhile public diplomacy strategy within the cultural heritage context. The lack of a UNESCO site could reflect the opinion of the global political elite that the country has no sites or artifacts of "outstanding universal value."<sup>78</sup> By

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<sup>76</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>77</sup> Educational and Cultural Affairs, *2016 AFCP Awards*.

<sup>78</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Centre. "The Criteria for Selection." Accessed April 2, 2018. <https://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/>.

focusing on these countries in particular, the United States reaffirms the importance of those countries' cultural heritage. In the right context, this can prove to be a very appealing message.

### *Programmatic Implementers*

State Department officials maintain a low degree of control over programmatic implementers since the individuals working on a site are chosen by the organization receiving the AFCP grant. Particularly eager CAOs will work to facilitate connections, but otherwise most of this work is done by the grantee. If the grantee is a U.S.-based organization they are likely to have a predominantly American set of workers, while a local NGO will be more mixed.<sup>79</sup> For projects that are completed by academic institutions, there is usually the greatest effort to include nationals of both countries.<sup>80</sup> The State Department does not maintain an alumni community for past AFCP participants however, and there seems to be little (or at least sporadic) efforts to highlight individual programmatic implementers in the public communications of individual diplomatic posts. On the CHC's home webpage, however, there is a link to blog posts written by programmatic implementers. Unfortunately, it seems that this blog has been abandoned as several years have passed since it was last updated.

Although the technical qualifications of the organization and individuals participating in the preservation work are considered in ECA's point-based ranking system under the "supporting materials" category, there is no explicit consideration of the level of interaction between U.S. and host country professionals. Knowing that this is a public diplomacy grant offered through ECA, applicants might discuss the level of interaction and capacity-building under the "rationale for U.S. support" section of their application, but there is otherwise no mechanism by which

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<sup>79</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 4, March 28, 2018.

<sup>80</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3, February 7, 2018.

ECA could pre-assess the nature or strength of the human relationships forged through each proposed project.

### *Local Public Perception of Project*

From the anecdotal data collected through the series of interviews conducted for this study, it appears that any formal measurement of local public perception is not a standard practice. That is, again, depending on the personal interest in the AFCP by embassy leadership, a diplomatic post may or may not decide to expend the resources needed to conduct accurate public opinion polling on the subject of preservation work.

As one Foreign Service Officer who administered a grant to restore a genocide memorial in Rwanda told me, “the locals in the area are very aware of the work we do.”<sup>81</sup> The problem, this person told me, was that the U.S. work on this issue was not well known outside of the community directly impacted by it. Specifically with the purpose of informing Rwandans who travel to this memorial from other parts of the country about the investment the United States had made in the preservation of the site, Embassy Kigali worked with the University of Pennsylvania, the current grantee, to include a line item for plaques in their current budget proposal for grant extension.<sup>82</sup> This addition to the budget request indicates at least an informal attempt to evaluate how more public diplomacy value could be drawn from this project.

One former Foreign Service Officer who served as the CAO in Sri Lanka shared with me that despite having a concerted public diplomacy strategy of reaching out to the Tamil minority population on the island, it was difficult to gage this community’s perception of an AFCP

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<sup>81</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 4, March 28, 2018.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

project.<sup>83</sup> Although the project had no direct ties to Tamil culture or history, Embassy Colombo was still very eager to know how Tamil Sri Lankans viewed the project and the U.S. This former diplomat mentioned that poor formal diplomatic relationships hindered the embassy's ability to engage the Tamil minority population, and thus conduct any formal polling or even gather a sense of public opinion through outreach and other events.<sup>84</sup>

### *Host Government Reaction*

Overall, ECA and diplomatic posts do not seem to give much weight to the host government reaction when implementing the AFCP. The only cases in which this becomes an issue are those in which the implementers require special visas or permits to preserve archeological remains that are protected by legal statute.<sup>85</sup> Most host governments with friendly or neutral stances towards the U.S. view the AFCP, at most, as another means by which two societies can interact.<sup>86</sup> From my interviews and personal communication with civil servants who work on the AFCP, no country views the program as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship.

As was mentioned above, the U.S. and Sri Lanka did not enjoy a positive bilateral relationship after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, around the same time during which an AFCP grant was awarded for the documentation of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Dutch fort in Batticaloa. Although upkeep of the fort had been ignored during the civil war and was also at risk of coastal erosion, the Sri Lankan government was very combative of the U.S. work on the site. This was very frustrating for the CAO at the time, especially because the preserved fort, which is also a

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<sup>83</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3, February 7, 2018.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 4, March 28, 2018.

UNESCO site, had the potential of drawing tourists to the underdeveloped eastern region of the island.<sup>87</sup> Despite this formal diplomatic tension, the Sri Lankan government never made any effort to delegitimize, undermine, or disseminate misinformation regarding the nature of the preservation work.<sup>88</sup>

### *State Department Procedures*

Formal State Department procedures exist and are followed. However, no overarching communications policy has been instituted requiring embassies administering AFCP grants to include the promotion of these projects in their communications strategies. Additionally procedures for programmatic evaluations exist but are severely deficient. Because evaluations only occur when requested by a specific diplomatic post, the risk of selection bias is high since only those diplomats that take great personal interest in the project will make the effort to facilitate this evaluation and secure embassy funding to cover the cost of it. Furthermore, once the evaluations are conducted they are shared with the diplomatic post that requested them. It is the responsibility of the personnel in the field to share these findings with their public diplomacy colleagues in Washington, D.C. Due to the relatively quick rollover time for diplomats, it is not unreasonable to think that there could be severe delays throughout this process. Additionally, there does not appear to be a formal policy in place that once an evaluation has been done for a project, that the findings thereof will be considered when the same organization applies for funding, or more generally, for future projects in the same country or at the same site. Finally, there exists no formal process by which the existence of other collaborators working at the same site is considered. In summary, the procedures that do exist are followed, and overall seem to

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

prioritize public diplomacy utility. There are major shortfalls, however, in ensuring that projects are integrated into communications strategies and receive impact evaluations.

### ***Case Study: First Baptist Church of Mawlamyine, Myanmar***

U.S. missionary Adoniram Judson built the original First Baptist Church in Mawlamyine, Mon State, Myanmar in 1827.<sup>89</sup> As a historical figure, Judson represents one of the oldest connections between the U.S. and Myanmar. He has become a prominent cultural icon even among non-Christians in Southern Myanmar, and his work in the region remains relevant today due to the continued use of the Myanmar language Bible first translated by Judson, as well as a Myanmar-English dictionary that he authored.<sup>90</sup> The church today, which is the third iteration of the original building established by Judson, serves as a beacon of hope and place of gathering and empowerment for the Baptist Christian minority in Mawlamyine.<sup>91</sup> In addition to the cultural and social importance to the host community, the church building itself is an excellent example of English-influenced Gothic Revival architecture typical of Southern Myanmar, which is mixed with traditional Burmese teak wood trusses and roof arrangements.<sup>92</sup> The church's roof, which was in severe deterioration and had been found to be contaminated with asbestos was recently restored with AFCP funding.<sup>93</sup> The award was issued to the World Monuments Fund (WMF), a leading archeological conservation NGO based out of New York City, and which has been the recipient of dozens of other AFCP grants since the program launched in the early 2000s.

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<sup>89</sup> World Monuments Fund. "First Baptist Church of Mawlamyine." Accessed March 10, 2018. <https://www.wmf.org/project/first-baptist-church-mawlamyine>.

<sup>90</sup> Anderson, Courtney. *To the Golden Shore: The Life of Adoniram Judson*. Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1987. 76

<sup>91</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>92</sup> World Monuments Fund. "First Baptist Church of Mawlamyine."

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

### *Country and Site Selection*

Derek Mitchell served as U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar from 2012-2016. Among Foreign Service Officers and others who have worked with him, he is known to be a strong advocate for proactive public diplomacy programming.<sup>94</sup> This keen interest on his part, and the resulting pressure that public diplomacy officers would have felt to meet that interest, explain the increase in Embassy Yangon's public diplomacy work during the same period.<sup>95</sup> Additionally, as the first U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar in 22 years, he believed that forging as many links as possible between the two societies would serve the long-term interests of both countries.<sup>96</sup> During Ambassador Mitchell's tenure, two sites in Myanmar received AFCP funding – the First Baptist Church of Mawlamyine, and the Shwe-Nandaw Kyaung Palace in Mandalay.<sup>97</sup> Each of these sites received an initial grant, and a follow-on grant in a subsequent year.

The First Baptist Church seems to have been a particularly good choice for preservation based on a number of criteria, including its utility as a symbol of strengthening U.S.-Burmese bonds and the suitability of the work undertaken at the site. As a historical site, it bears unquestionable value due to the role it plays as social gathering place for Baptist Christian minorities in Mawlamyine.<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, it highlights a historical connection between the U.S. (and by extension the American people) and the Burmese people. This would have been a very intentional decision, and indicates a strong consideration of the public diplomacy value of the project, especially since the preservation work itself (roof refurbishment) is relatively minor.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> Mitchell, Derek. "Interview with Derek Mitchell." Phone interview by author. March 14, 2018.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>99</sup> Interview with Derek Mitchell, March 14, 2018.

Ambassador Mitchell felt that the “freshness of the bilateral relationship gave the AFCP more juice.”<sup>100</sup> That is, there was a sense among Mitchell and his advisors that cultural programming like the AFCP would have even more public diplomacy utility given the specific country context they faced in Myanmar. For this reason, Mitchell explains that Embassy Yangon worked with the WMF to first submit an application for the conservation work at the palace in Mandalay, as it was important to show the Burmese people that the Americans would “celebrate Burmese culture first,” before highlighting the historical ties through the work at the Mawlamyine church.<sup>101</sup>

It is important to note that part of the objectives outlined in the grant application for this site were capacity building of local conservationists, as well as engagement with the church congregation, a minority group of interest to the United States government.<sup>102</sup> This is also evidenced by the amount of Embassy communication highlighting this project specifically, including the ties between American Baptist and Burmese Baptist communities and a high-profile visit and press conference by Ambassador Mitchell at the site.<sup>103</sup>

### *Grant Allocation*

The State Department awarded a \$125,000 grant for the restoration work at the First Baptist Church.<sup>104</sup> This reflects 83% of the initial \$150,000 requested.<sup>105</sup> According to preservation expert Jeff Allen of the World Monuments Fund, the amount awarded, though less

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

<sup>104</sup> U.S. Mission Burma. “U.S. Embassy Announces Project to Restore the Historic First Baptist Church in Mawlamyine.” Press statement, Yangon, September 14, 2015.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.



than requested, is still an appropriate amount to complete the technical mission of the project.<sup>106</sup> However, this grant is relatively large compared to the distinction of the monument that is being preserved within Burmese society at large. Nevertheless, among Burmese Baptists the site is one of the most important landmarks. Although it is thought that the same preservation work could probably have been accomplished with a smaller grant, the larger allocation allows for more incorporation of this project into the Embassy's media strategy on the part of the WMF. Embassy Yangon included routine updates on the work at Mandalay and Mawlamyine in its public statements and communications with the press and on social media. Funding for these activities were not directly supported through the AFCP, but were made a priority for the PAS due to the level of attention given to the program by top embassy leadership.<sup>107</sup> The high grant amount also acts as an inherent message of support to the Baptist minority population – a Burmese community with which Ambassador Mitchell eagerly tried to build relations.<sup>108</sup> The larger grant amount also allowed for the project implementers to engage the church congregation in the preservation work and organize training sessions to achieve the capacity-building aspect mentioned in the original application.

Both the First Baptist Church in Mawlamyine and the Shwe-Nandaw Kyaung Palace in Mandalay have received follow-up allocations from the AFCP after their initial grants ended.<sup>109</sup> This is a common tactic employed by many embassy PAS. Although this may be an indication of a lack of evaluating grant amounts to achieve the technical preservation and public diplomacy goals listed in the application, many host communities interpret these follow-on grants as a doubling down of the U.S. commitment to preserve a specific site rather than an indication of

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> Interview with Derek Mitchell, March 14, 2018.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

shortcoming, or of insufficient capacity or commitment on the part of the U.S. to accomplish the task.<sup>110</sup> Project implementers, such as the World Monuments Fund, which currently operates nine AFCP grants, also prefer to return to the AFCP for additional funds, since in so doing, slight changes can be made to address unexpected challenges that arise during the initial preservation work.<sup>111</sup>

### *UNESCO Overlap*

Neither of the current AFCP projects in Myanmar has also received UNESCO World Heritage designation. However, at the time of this writing, the Burmese government is compiling a list of site proposals for consideration by UNESCO's World Heritage committee. Though the list of site proposals is not yet finalized, it is widely expected that the Burmese government will nominate the Shwe-Nandaw Kyaung Palace at Mandalay as a candidate for World Heritage designation in 2018 or 2019.<sup>112</sup> It does not appear that the potential for future UNESCO designation was formally considered during the application process for a follow-on grant for the palace at Mandalay.

Speaking about the WMF's preservation work on the Sri-Ksetra Temples, a WMF project in Myanmar that has not received AFCP support, Allen offered some worthwhile comments on distinguishing between the efforts of UNESCO and other preservation organizations. The temples, he notes, are just one part of the Pyu Ancient City World Heritage site. This is an important distinction because it allows the WMF to highlight its work in preserving a specific portion of the larger site. If there were complete overlap between the monuments being worked

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<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

on by the WMF and by UNESCO, it would be harder for the WMF, a much smaller organization, to differentiate, and for the local population to recognize this separate organization's specific efforts. Allen notes that the same principle has been applied by embassies that have sought funding for AFCP projects in other countries in which he has worked, such as Iraq.<sup>113</sup>

Allen prepared the application for both AFCP grants in Myanmar. In making these applications, Allen makes a strong effort to identify sites and preservation work that would be of greatest interest to the U.S. Department of State.<sup>114</sup> In his estimation, as well as that of former diplomats who have been on the administrative side, the State Department likes working on UNESCO sites because they are able to capitalize on the UNESCO brand, and make it seem like the U.S. relationship with UNESCO is not as contentious as it actually is.<sup>115</sup> For this reason, he remains optimistic that a change in the palace at Mandalay's UNESCO designation will only increase the likelihood of a follow-on grant from the AFCP.<sup>116</sup>

### *Programmatic Implementers*

All of the AFCP grants in Myanmar are currently awarded to the World Monuments Fund. The WMF is one of the largest U.S.-based NGOs working in the field of cultural heritage preservation. The WMF has worked on some of the most challenging preservation projects (technically and socially) including the Babylon Fortresses in Iraq and the temples of Angkor Wat in Cambodia.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3, February 7, 2018.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

The majority of preservationists working on the Myanmar projects are American, though there are several foreign national consultants. Furthermore, WMF workers often work closely with local government officials if the site being preserved has some domestic legal protection (e.g. a historical landmark designation). On almost all sites, WMF workers seek to engage local members of the academic and archeological communities. Sometimes embassy contacts are needed to facilitate these introductions, the degree to which this occurs successfully often depends on the interest and motivation of individual diplomats assigned to administer the AFCP. Although there seems to be no formal process by which the State Department evaluates the effectiveness of group composition of preservationists working at an AFCP site, in the case of the WMF, individual program managers often seek to maintain relationships with these individuals or institutions. Additionally, although ECA maintains a very robust alumni community for almost all of its cultural exchange public diplomacy programs, it does not in the case of the AFCP.<sup>118</sup> Instead, individual programmatic implementers work to maintain ties on their own. Because the number of organizations that apply for AFCP grants is relatively small, and due to the close-knit nature of the preservationist community, some long-term relationships have formed naturally. However, most of these relationships are among American implementers.<sup>119</sup> In this regard, more can be done to maintain ties between Americans and host country nationals.

In the case of the First Baptist Church, WMF partnered with members of the church congregation. This was seen as important because since the church building is a cultural heritage site that still serves a social function as a gathering place today, the congregation was eager to

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<sup>118</sup> Interview with State Department Contact 3, February 7, 2018.

<sup>119</sup> Interview with Jeff Allen, February 26, 2018.

join in, and take ownership of the work.<sup>120</sup> Because the First Baptist Church is not a designated landmark by the Burmese government, the WMF did not have to receive any extra approval from local authorities other than those permits required to do the preservation work. Allen claims that he and many of his colleagues prefer working on sites that do not require close cooperation with local authorities, since the added layer of bureaucracy is cumbersome, and sometimes, local authorities can be overly hostile or indifferent to the work being accomplished.<sup>121</sup> When he prepares applications on behalf of the WMF, he prioritizes sites that require minimal interaction with local host government authorities. The bypassing of this point of government contact is positive from a public diplomacy standpoint as it allows project implementers to engage more closely and more directly with members of the country's civil society instead.

### *Local Public Perception of Project*

Although no formal survey of local public opinion on the work at the First Baptist Church has been conducted, anecdotally, people involved in the project feel that it has generally received a warm reception, especially by the demographic most targeted by this project, the Baptist minority community of Mawlamyine. There does not appear to be any misinformation about the site, and locals seem to attribute the work being done to the U.S. Given this anecdote from just one site, however, I do not believe we can make the assumption that this is the case in most other instances. Because of the inherent Myanmar-U.S. connection symbolized by the First Baptist Church, this might help make the fact that the U.S. people, through their government, are working to preserve this site. It remains unclear whether for sites that lack such a direct connection to the American people, if local communities would just as easily attribute the work

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<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

to the U.S. Furthermore, the perception among the local population might differ depending on the type of site and the country context. Perhaps some might think that the U.S. is there to claim or plunder cultural artifacts, manipulate a country's history, or launch a campaign of neo-colonial cultural conquest. In the case of Mawlamyine, Ambassador Mitchell visited the First Baptist Church several times, often with journalists in tow, which certainly helped local communities associate the preservation work with the U.S.

### *Host Government Reaction*

In the case of AFCP projects in Myanmar, the importance of host government reaction does not appear to have been considered during the application process. The formal application process does not account for expected host government reaction. Although Allen purports that working with Burmese officials on certain projects is not a particularly enjoyable task (the Burmese civil service is neither as professional nor as formalized as those of other countries), this does not translate into active efforts by the Burmese to undermine AFCP projects.<sup>122</sup> At the same time, the Burmese government does not make particularly strident efforts to highlight the U.S. government efforts to preserve sites of cultural significance.

Mitchell states that the guiding philosophy for any formal diplomatic interaction during his tenure was to frame the United States as a “partner in reform.”<sup>123</sup> To this end, neither he nor any of his subordinates faced hostility with regards to preservation work. Mitchell attributes this in part to the embassy's decision to pursue work at Mandalay before Mawlamyine. He also attributes a lack of overt hostility to the underdeveloped Burmese bureaucracy, much of which operates on a patronage system, and which is overly reliant on top-down orders. Understanding

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> Interview with Derek Mitchell, March 14, 2018.

this, Mitchell himself developed personal relationships with two key advisors in the office of the Burmese president. He also instructed his embassy team to keep the Burmese government informed of the progress on both projects. This level of transparency was taken as a sign of good intentions on the part of the United States by the Burmese. It likely prevented a diplomatic quarrel over the preservation work at Mawlamyine, especially since the Burmese government has a difficult history with regards to the treatment of the country's ethnic and religious minority groups.

### *State Department Procedures*

The AFCP projects in Myanmar all received grants through the formal State Department process. However, there exists no formal communications strategy at the AFCP-level to highlight these projects in host country media. Instead, this work is left to individual diplomatic posts. If Ambassador Mitchell were not so proactive with regards to public diplomacy, it is likely that Embassy Yangon's PAS would not have been so ardent in its efforts. The biggest failure of State Department procedures is that the projects have not been evaluated. Although the projects in Myanmar are all relatively recent (they all began within the past decade), the public diplomacy program evaluation process is not automatic. If diplomats at post do not request that these projects be evaluated, it will not occur. Evaluations are useful in that they ensure consistency in project success and allow for future projects in the same country, or the same site, or the same technical area, or that seek to engage the same target demographic useful indicators for how the project can be modified to improve its effectiveness in the future.

## ***Discussion***

In this section I will aggregate, for each dimension of my analytic framework, the anecdotal data described in the two case studies above. This discussion will be used to determine which of the four possible answers has the most explanatory power in answering the research question: what elements of the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation currently limit the effectiveness of such programming as a tool of U.S. public diplomacy, and what changes can be made to maximize the value of U.S. efforts in this area? The proceeding discussion will also be the basis of the policy recommendations presented in the next chapter. I have first summarized the findings in the matrix below. The italicized text at the intersection of each possible answer (columns) and criteria (rows) represents the observed reality based on the findings from the two case studies. From this table it is clear that ineffective impact evaluation is the possible answer that best answers the research question, though elements of other possible answers are also applicable.

	<b>Ineffective Organizational Structures and Processes</b>	<b>Ineffective Messaging</b>	<b>Ineffective Impact Evaluation</b>	<b>Insufficient Leveraging of Collaboration</b>
<b>Country and Site Selection</b>	<i>Some consideration of PD or FP goals</i>	<i>Messaging varies, often advances PD goals</i>	<i>No consideration of changes in country and site selection based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Growing tendency to select specific aspects of sites in which other collaborators are present</i>
<b>Grant Allocation</b>	<i>Grants generally matched to achieve technical goals, and often sufficient to achieve PD goals</i>	<i>Not enough money itemized for messaging</i>	<i>No consideration of changes to grant size based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Funding from U.S. stands out on its own</i>
<b>UNESCO Overlap</b>	<i>No formal consideration of UNESCO status leads towards trend of funding more UNESCO sites, depending upon country context this</i>	<i>No mixed messaging between U.S. and UNESCO values due to U.S. preservation of certain parts of UNESCO site</i> <hr/> <i>Insufficient coverage of U.S. role in</i>	<i>No consideration of changes to UNESCO overlaps based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Neither too high nor too low to distinguish or leverage U.S. role</i>



	<i>might or might not work towards achieving U.S. PD goals</i>	<i>countries without UNESCO sites</i>		
<b>Programmatic Implementers</b>	<u><i>Programmatic implementers adequately matched</i></u> <i>No process in place to maintain/track relationships in the long-term</i>	<u><i>Some messaging about program implementers/mutual understanding</i></u> <i>Group composition often sends implicit message that does advance U.S. PD or FP goals</i>	<i>No consideration of changes to group composition based on past successes and failures</i>	<i>Programmatic implementers usually matched to achieve U.S. PD or FP goals</i>
<b>Local Public Perception of Project</b>	<u><i>Indifferent or positive local public opinion</i></u> <i>State Department procedures inadequately plan for changes due to unfavorable public opinion</i>	<u><i>Indifferent or positive local public opinion or awareness of project</i></u> <i>Misinformation surrounding projects is uncommon, and sufficient efforts are taken when it is present</i>	<i>Infrequent and non-standardized formal evaluations of foreign public opinion</i>	<i>Locals do not always accurately attribute work done by the U.S.</i>
<b>Host Government Reaction</b>	<u><i>Host government reaction is considered in the selection process to the degree that host government cooperation is needed to achieve technical goals of project</i></u> <i>Host government reaction not otherwise considered, though this does not seem to hinder progress towards PD or FP goals</i>	<i>Effective messaging to dispel misinformation when disseminated by host government</i>	<i>Infrequent and non-standardized formal evaluation of changes to formal diplomatic relationship</i>	<u><i>Collaborators are not hostile/critical of host government</i></u> <i>Host governments will sometimes promote collaborators' efforts more than or instead of U.S. efforts</i>
<b>State Department Procedures</b>	<i>Selection process and criteria are formally structured and defined</i>	<i>No clear responsibilities or guidelines for messaging about projects (no consistency or balance between messaging from post, implementers, and D.C.)</i>	<u><i>Guidelines for performing formal evaluations exist but do not encourage their routine</i></u> <u><i>Not conducted consistently</i></u> <i>No procedure to consider results in future decisions</i>	<i>No formalized structure for choosing collaborators or leveraging collaborations</i>

TABLE 3 – Evidence Applied to Analytic Framework

### *Country and Site Selection*

Based on the case studies above, we can conclude that the public diplomacy value of pursuing specific projects in specific countries is considered during the decision-making process. However, there is room to increase the degree to which this factor is specifically considered. Furthermore, we found that messaging on the AFCP varies, usually due to the importance placed on the program by individual CAOs and ambassadors at post. Due to the irregularity with which impact evaluations are conducted, there is no consideration of whether or not to make changes during future application cycles based on the lessons learned in the past. Finally, although there is a growing tendency to select sites at which other organizations are present, often, the work the U.S. funds in these contexts will be for very specific portions of the larger archeological site, allowing for the U.S. role to stand out independently.

### *Grant Allocation*

Although the amount of money awarded to project implementers through AFCP grants is usually less than what was requested, we find that grant allocations are typically well suited for achieving project goals. One problem, however, is that there is often not enough money prioritized for messaging on the subject of preservation work. When project implementers have tight budgets, this will often be an aspect of the project that they must cut, forcing embassies to divert funds from their own communications strategies, assuming they wish to highlight U.S. work in this area at all. Because of the way in which impact evaluations are conducted, there is no way of knowing whether, or how, grant allocations should change in future years to maximize the public diplomacy value of the projects which they support. When the U.S. funds projects at

sites at which other actors are present, the U.S. support will often stand out because of the limited scope of the U.S. project.

### *UNESCO Overlap*

With regards to UNESCO overlap, once again it appears that the lack of regular, formal, impact evaluations is the factor, which most limits the effectiveness of the AFCP. There is a trend towards increasing the number of UNESCO sites that receive AFCP funds and there is no institutional mechanism in place at the State Department to ensure that this results in the public diplomacy outcome that would most favor U.S. interests. Besides this, we see that there is no formal consideration of UNESCO designation in the application process, and that the growing trend towards funding UNESCO sites is a result of the applications making it to ECA for further consideration. The findings are inconclusive on whether this advances U.S. public diplomacy objectives and remain highly country-dependent. However, the United States has made the wise decision to fund projects in countries without a UNESCO presence. Messaging around these projects seems limited, and in no way stands out more than that of any other project that receives an AFCP grant. Finally, the degree to which the U.S. is funding sites at which other collaborators are engaged does not seem to be a limiting factor.

### *Programmatic Implementers*

Because programmatic implementers are self-selecting as the initiators in the application process, they often choose projects that they are confident they can complete successfully. This is also true in contexts when they will be working at the same site as other collaborators. However, there is no State Department program in place to track relationships formed through

the AFCP overtime, this is in stark contrast to the multitude of alumni programs that exist for almost all other cultural exchange initiatives. With regards to messaging, the case studies discussed above show that because of a focus on capacity building in the AFCP's administration from post, there is usually a congenial attitude towards including host country nationals in the preservation work. The messaging about the relationships formed through this process, however, is severely lacking. Messaging on the topic of the preservation work is also highly country-dependent, and in some instances driven by the PAS at post, and in others by the project implementers themselves. Finally, because the AFCP does not receive regular evaluations of its grants, there is no consideration of changing group composition based on past success and failures. This essentially shuts the door to learning or testing new methods that could improve the public diplomacy value of the program.

### *Local Public Perception of Project*

The United States engages with foreign publics through the AFCP with the hope of fomenting goodwill for the American people, and their values. That ECA does not conduct regular impact evaluations to measure changes in foreign public opinion as a result of U.S. government investments in the cultural heritage of other countries is the most problematic finding from this study. However, from the anecdotal data collected, it appears that local public opinion of the U.S. has, if anything, only improved in places where the U.S. has engaged through the AFCP. It could also be that the generational changes in opinion have not yet taken hold, and we therefore might expect more robust results to come in the future. Furthermore, in the cases where there has been severe misconceptions about the type of work the U.S. was doing, we see that the U.S. is more or less effective at dispelling misinformation about its intentions. Finally,

locals that are directly engaged with the project or maintain a close proximity to the site attribute the work the U.S., as do others in countries where the PAS successfully communicates on the work that the U.S. is doing. In cases like the Rwanda example above, however, it appears that there is some work left to be done in ensuring that all who interact with a site are aware of the resources the United States invested in its preservation.

### *Host Government Reaction*

In the decision-making process, the host government reaction to an AFCP project is only considered to the degree to which host government cooperation is needed for access to the site. As Allen pointed out, many project implementers who prepare the applications will often choose sites in which limited interaction with the host government is needed. Despite this, there seems to be little consideration when selecting sites of how the host government will react and what measures should be in place depending on the nature of their response. Based on the data collected in this study, however, it does not appear to have a debilitating effect on the program. When the host government does become overtly antagonistic of U.S. efforts through the AFCP, diplomatic posts have proven quite capable in neutralizing the misinformation, or combatting the negative perceptions, that spread as a result. The anecdotal account of the AFCP project in Mawlamyine suggests that this type of engagement creates an environment conducive for future cooperation between the U.S. and host government. The unavailability of consistent evaluations on this subject, make it nearly impossible to prove this point empirically, and thus to consider changes to the program that would make it even more effective at reaching U.S. public diplomacy or foreign policy goals. Although the collaborators working on sites at which the U.S. also works are not hostile or critical to the host government, the host government, will at

times, go out of its way to highlight the efforts of these other organizations at the expense of the U.S. such as in the case of Babylon, Iraq.

### *State Department Procedures*

This study has found that when the State Department has appropriate bureaucratic procedures in place, such as for the site and country selection and grant allocation processes, they are fairly successful. The problem, as this study finds, however, is that the State Department lacks clear messaging guidelines that go beyond a general expectation that both the project implementer and the diplomatic post will promote messages of the work being done and why, in the foreign press. In the case of impact evaluations, the State Department does have a procedure in place, and the procedure is followed. The problem here is that it is a procedure that to a large extent disincentivizes diplomatic posts and policymakers at ECA from learning about past successes and failures. Finally, there is no formal procedure in place for leveraging collaborators, however, through my discussions with project implementers and diplomats, this does not appear to be a factor that limits the effectiveness of the AFCP as an instrument of U.S. public diplomacy.

The answer to the research question posed at the start of this study – what elements of the U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation currently limit the effectiveness of such programming as a tool of U.S. public diplomacy, and what changes can be made to maximize the value of U.S. efforts in this area – is first and foremost ineffective impact evaluations. The manner in which impact evaluations are done for AFCP projects is ineffective in that it does not allow for decision-makers to learn from past projects and give them the option to make changes

that will extract greater public diplomacy utility from governmental investments in the preservation of foreign cultural heritage. Ineffective messaging and ineffective organizational structures and processes were both found to have some limiting elements, but neither proves as debilitating as the lack of routine, formal impact evaluations. Insufficient leveraging of collaborations is not an answer to this research question. In fact, from the data analyzed in this study it appears that the U.S. is quite effective at leveraging collaboration. Of course, the lack of impact evaluations prevents me from determining this with any meaningful amount of confidence. Now that we have a clearer picture of those elements which limit the effectiveness of the AFCP, I will present in the following chapter a list of policy recommendations before offering some concluding remarks.

## POLICY PROPOSALS

The preservation of cultural heritage can shape a country's identity, bring closure to conflict, and provide a sustainable means by which economies can advance and democratic institutions can stabilize. When countries engage in cultural heritage preservation, they are employing an instrument of public diplomacy – that is, they are facilitating the development of human relationships based on mutual understanding. The United States' investments in this area also serve an important role in conveying a message to the peoples of the world that the U.S., a country of immigrants, values their culture and recognizes its contribution to humanity. The eight policy proposals below address the factors that most limit the effectiveness of the current U.S. foreign policy on cultural heritage preservation as an instrument of public diplomacy and consider how the United States can remain a relevant actor in this field over the next several decades.

### **1. Conduct standardized impact evaluations for more projects on a regular basis.**

Impact evaluations will enable State Department policymakers to better understand the long-term effects of the AFCP while controlling for a variety of factors. Impact evaluations will also be a useful tool in determining which sites and countries and grant allocations to make in future application cycles. Routinizing the impact evaluation procedures at the State Department will require a shift in resources in the short term, and an increased budget in the long term. These costs are worth bearing since the information gathered and applied from impact evaluations will ensure the most efficient use of taxpayer funds.



- 2. Adjust the ECA Ranking System for small grants to consider explicitly the public diplomacy value of a proposed project.** Right now only 25 out of 100 points are allocated for messaging and rationale for U.S. support, ten and 15 points respectively. Given that most budget requests are cut anyway, at 15 points, the importance of the applicants' proposed budgets are overweighed. The budget criterion should be reduced to only five points. The remaining ten points should be put towards rationale for U.S. support, which would discuss how the proposal advances a broad array of U.S. interests. The original 15 points from rationale for U.S. support should be used to create a new criterion: public diplomacy utility. A specific focus on the public diplomacy merits of a program during the application process will reinforce the value of the AFCP as a public diplomacy tool for project implementers while conducting programmatic work. The table below compares the two ranking systems.

<b>ECA AFCP Point-Based Ranking System</b>	
<b>OLD</b>	<b>NEW</b>
Purpose and Summary, Description, Time Frame, Importance: 25 points max	Purpose and Summary, Description, Time Frame, Importance: 25 points max
Urgency: 10 points max	Urgency: 10 points max
Sustainability: 10 points max	Sustainability: 10 points max
Rationale for U.S. Support: 15 points max	Rationale for U.S. Support: 10 points max
Media and Outreach Plan: 10 points max	Media and Outreach Plan: 10 points max
Budget and Budget Narrative: 15 points max	Budget and Budget Narrative: 5 points max
Supporting Materials: 15 points max	Supporting Materials: 15 points max
	Public Diplomacy Utility: 15 points max

**TABLE 4** – Proposed ECA AFCP Point-Based Ranking System

For proposals for large grants under the AFCP, applicants should be required to submit a Statement of Public Diplomacy Utility along with Statements of Urgency and Sustainability to ensure that applicants are thinking of their role not only as preservationist but also as agents of cultural exchange. Furthermore, a written statement

of public diplomacy utility will compel the State Department panel that conducts the first round review to consider the public diplomacy implications to a degree which the current application process does not.

- 3. Develop an AFCP communications strategy that is flexible but that ensures the message gets out.** ECA should work with the public diplomacy offices of the various regional bureaus at the State Department to ensure that upon issuing an AFCP grant, diplomatic posts, ECA, and project implementers have a coordinated communications strategy. The contents of these strategies will be negotiated among the relevant parties, and the distribution of communication and type of communication will change depending upon the country and project context. Furthermore, by standardizing the process by which AFCP communications strategies are developed, the State Department will address the issue of making sure a message gets out, even from those posts whose CAOs have little personal interest in the project.

- 4. Rejoin UNESCO and highlight the work the U.S. does where UNESCO is absent.**

UNESCO's World Heritage Programme remains extremely popular across the world.<sup>124</sup> The United States must commit to engaging the peoples of the world in cultural heritage preservation not just unilaterally through the AFCP but multilateral through the international institutions it played a key role in founding. Re-entering UNESCO will help to portray the United States has an engaged partner in the international system. By virtue of the efforts made by ECA to highlight the number of overlapping AFCP and UNESCO sites, it is clear that the consensus within the foreign policy bureaucracy is that presenting engagement through UNESCO is positive publicity for the U.S.

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<sup>124</sup> Gmelch, Sharon Bohn, and Adam R. Kaul. *Tourists and Tourism: A Reader* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2018. 175

However, given the domestic political climate, rejoining UNESCO is not likely to occur in the near term. In the meanwhile, the United States must emphasize the work it does in countries that do not have any UNESCO World Heritage sites at all. By highlighting these projects in particular, through press statements and high level visits, the United States could posture itself as caring about a culture that the rest of the world has forgotten. The empathetic framing of this message would have very powerful public diplomacy value for communities who, due to overexposure to the U.S. military, have a harsher view of U.S. foreign policy.

- 5. Allow all countries to receive AFCP grants.** Currently only the bottom two-thirds of countries on the UN's Human Development Index are eligible to receive preservation assistance through the AFCP. Congress must update the operative legislation to allow for the AFCP to be a truly global program. Excluding a third of the world's countries shuts the U.S. out from the opportunity to engage with communities in countries of key strategic importance to the U.S. Currently the U.S. cannot engage with countries in the Baltics, Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or the Lesser Antilles of the Caribbean. The countries of these regions are rich in cultural heritage, the preservation of which poses a great opportunity to strengthen ties between the people of those countries and of the United States. By setting development-based limitations on the types of countries that can receive AFCP funding, the U.S. Congress conflated the development benefits of the program with the public diplomacy intention with which it was introduced. The two-thirds limit is arbitrary and should be abolished.
- 6. Build an AFCP Alumni Community.** The AFCP is one of the few exchange programs operated by ECA that does not have an official alumni community. As the program

approaches and enters its third decade of existence, ECA should strongly consider developing at least an online alumni community to re-engage past project implementers from around the world and help them expand their networks. This can be complemented by other event programming in the future. Because ECA runs several other alumni communities, it has the demonstrated ability of establishing networks, and due to economies of scale would be a relatively cheap undertaking. ECA must reinforce to current and past project implementers the important role they serve as agents of a public diplomacy program.

7. **Increase funding.** Between 2015 and 2016 the congressional appropriation for the AFCP, and thus the number of projects funded, dropped by more than half. Congress must restore AFCP funding to the 2014-2015 levels to ensure projects have the resources needed to achieve the technical and public diplomacy objectives. The increase in funding will also ensure that the program maintains a broad regional and thematic reach for the types of sites chosen for preservation.
8. **Address issues of cultural heritage preservation domestically.** Neither global nor domestic politics occur in a vacuum. As a great power, the eyes of the world are fixed on the U.S. To increase credibility on issues of cultural heritage abroad, Americans must address them first at home. This city on a hill effect is an important element of U.S. soft power, and will provide greater public diplomacy utility to the AFCP if issues concerning the treatment of the physical manifestations of painful periods of U.S. history like the westward expansion, Civil War, or Jim Crow era are treated in a manner that is respectful of all Americans, pays appropriate tribute to those who suffered, and marks the progress

our society has made, instead of memorializing insurgents and perpetrators of Native American genocide.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Nye, Joseph. *The Future of Power*. 5

## CONCLUSION

Public diplomacy is one of the oldest tools of statecraft and as we advance further into the digital age, the cross cultural, human-to-human interactions that government-sponsored cultural and educational exchange promote will become increasingly important. Because of the symbolic power of cultural sites, artifacts, and practices, and the societal meaning derived from them, cultural heritage intersects the field of international affairs in many overlooked yet important dimensions. In fact, were it not for the careful consideration of cultural heritage, the history of the Second World War may be very different. In Europe, special units of the U.S. military rescued countless pieces of art from potential destruction by Axis forces.<sup>126</sup> Meanwhile in the Pacific, U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson appealed directly to President Truman when war planners refused to remove Kyoto – the ancient capital of Japan and a city of renowned cultural importance – from the shortlist of potential atomic bomb targets.<sup>127</sup> Had President Truman not taken this advice, the world would have 17 fewer UNESCO World Heritage sites, and Japanese-U.S. relations in the post-war era would likely have been much more fraught.

Cultural heritage continues to find its way into the diverse domains of international affairs today. The world's cultural heritage are facing a slew of new threats. By some estimates, at the height of its territorial control, the Islamic State was financing nearly half of its operations by selling up to \$100,000,000 of stolen cultural artifacts on the dark web.<sup>128</sup> As global climate

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<sup>126</sup> Edsel, Robert M. *The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History*. New York: Hachette Book Group. 2009. 12-13

<sup>127</sup> Oi, Mariko. "The Man who Saved Kyoto from the Atomic Bomb." *BBC News*. August 9, 2015.

<sup>128</sup> Paton, Callum. "ISIS Makes up to \$100 Million a year Smuggling Ancient Artifacts from Iraq and Syria." *Reuters*. August 7, 2017.

change takes hold, rising sea levels and acid rain are eroding sites of historical significance.<sup>129</sup> And as countries capitalize on their heritage resources to develop their economies, they undermine the rights of indigenous communities and expose new challenges of sustainable development.<sup>130</sup>

This Capstone sought to begin to bridge the gap on cultural heritage preservation and public diplomacy. Sites and artifacts of cultural and historical importance tell some of humanity's oldest stories. The messaging potential for a state that willingly invests its resources in the cultural heritage of another is immense. The research on how this is most effectively conducted, however, is minimal. To that end, further study in this area remains imperative. For future researchers in this field, with budgets and time that surpass my own, I suggest comprehensive case studies that control for a broad range of variables – time, place, type of site, size of grant, etc. I also urge future researchers to track public opinion on sites receiving AFCP funds. Public diplomacy works on a generational scale. To get to the heart of the question posed in this Capstone a long-term investment is needed in data collection. One which may be best suited for government-sponsorship, and which might be provided if the U.S. Department of State formalizes and routinizes its policy on impact evaluations for projects conducted under the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation.

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<sup>129</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center. "List of Factors Affecting the Properties." Accessed April 12, 2018. <https://whc.unesco.org/en/factors/>.

<sup>130</sup> Daes, Erica-Irene A. "The Impacts of Globalization on Indigenous Intellectual Property and Cultures." *Australian Human Rights Commission*. Lecture, Sydney, May 25, 2004.





## APPENDIX A – THE UNESCO CULTURAL HERITAGE TREATY REGIME

CONVENTION	YEAR OF ENTRY INTO FORCE / (YEAR OF U.S. RATIFICATION)
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, 1950 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With Annexes A to E and Protocol Annexed, 1976**</li> </ul>	1952 / (1966)  1982 / (1989)
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, 1954 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First Protocol, 1954*</li> <li>• Second Protocol, 1999*</li> </ul>	1956 / (2009)  1956 2004
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970	1972 / (1983)
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972	1975 / (1973)
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2001*	2009
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003*	2006
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005*	2007
<p style="text-align: center;">* = <i>Treaties to which the United States is not party</i>            ** = <i>Ratification by the United States during a period of retreat from UNESCO</i></p>	

## APPENDIX B – COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE AFCP AWARDS

HDI RANK	COUNTRY	HDI VALUE	HDI RANK	COUNTRY	HDI VALUE
	<b>HIGH</b>				
64	Mauritius	0.781	101	Tonga	0.721
65	Trinidad and Tobago	0.78	102	Libya	0.716
66	Costa Rica	0.776	103	Belize	0.706
66	Serbia	0.776	104	Samoa	0.704
68	Cuba	0.775	105	Maldives	0.701
69	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.774	105	Uzbekistan	0.701
70	Georgia	0.769		<b>MEDIUM</b>	
71	Turkey	0.767	107	Moldova (Republic of)	0.699
71	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.767	108	Botswana	0.698
73	Sri Lanka	0.766	109	Gabon	0.697
74	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.765	110	Paraguay	0.693
75	Albania	0.764	111	Egypt	0.691
76	Lebanon	0.763	111	Turkmenistan	0.691
77	Mexico	0.762	113	Indonesia	0.689
78	Azerbaijan	0.759	114	Palestine, State of	0.684
79	Brazil	0.754	115	Viet Nam	0.683
79	Grenada	0.754	116	Philippines	0.682
81	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.75	117	El Salvador	0.68
82	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	0.748	118	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.674
83	Algeria	0.745	119	South Africa	0.666
84	Armenia	0.743	120	Kyrgyzstan	0.664
84	Ukraine	0.743	121	Iraq	0.649
86	Jordan	0.741	122	Cabo Verde	0.648
87	Peru	0.74	123	Morocco	0.647
87	Thailand	0.74	124	Nicaragua	0.645
89	Ecuador	0.739	125	Guatemala	0.64
90	China	0.738	125	Namibia	0.64
91	Fiji	0.736	127	Guyana	0.638
92	Mongolia	0.735	127	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.638
92	Saint Lucia	0.735	129	Tajikistan	0.627
94	Jamaica	0.73	130	Honduras	0.625
95	Colombia	0.727	131	India	0.624
96	Dominica	0.726	132	Bhutan	0.607
97	Suriname	0.725	133	Timor-Leste	0.605
97	Tunisia	0.725	134	Vanuatu	0.597
99	Dominican Republic	0.722	135	Congo	0.592
99	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.722	135	Equatorial Guinea	0.592

HDI RANK	COUNTRY	HDI VALUE	HDI RANK	COUNTRY	HDI VALUE
137	Kiribati	0.588	163	Haiti	0.493
138	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.586	163	Uganda	0.493
139	Bangladesh	0.579	165	Sudan	0.49
139	Ghana	0.579	166	Togo	0.487
139	Zambia	0.579	167	Benin	0.485
142	Sao Tome and Principe	0.574	168	Yemen	0.482
143	Cambodia	0.563	169	Afghanistan	0.479
144	Nepal	0.558	170	Malawi	0.476
145	Myanmar	0.556	171	Côte d'Ivoire	0.474
146	Kenya	0.555	172	Djibouti	0.473
147	Pakistan	0.55	173	Gambia	0.452
	<b>LOW</b>		174	Ethiopia	0.448
148	Swaziland	0.541	175	Mali	0.442
149	Syrian Arab Republic	0.536	176	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.435
150	Angola	0.533	177	Liberia	0.427
151	Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.531	178	Guinea-Bissau	0.424
152	Nigeria	0.527	179	Eritrea	0.42
153	Cameroon	0.518	179	Sierra Leone	0.42
154	Papua New Guinea	0.516	181	Mozambique	0.418
154	Zimbabwe	0.516	181	South Sudan	0.418
156	Solomon Islands	0.515	183	Guinea	0.414
157	Mauritania	0.513	184	Burundi	0.404
158	Madagascar	0.512	185	Burkina Faso	0.402
159	Rwanda	0.498	186	Chad	0.396
160	Comoros	0.497	187	Niger	0.353
160	Lesotho	0.497	188	Central African Republic	0.352
162	Senegal	0.494			

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2016 Human Development Report, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>

## APPENDIX C – AFCP APPLICATION MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES

### List of AFCP Application Materials (small grants)

1. **Full and complete Application for Federal Assistance** (SF-424), including Budget Information for Non-Construction Program (SF-424A), Assurances for Non-Construction Programs (SF-424B), and if applicable, Disclosure of Lobbying Activities (SF-LLL);
2. **Project Basics**, including title, project dates, and AFCP focus area
3. **Project Applicant Information**, including contact information, DUNS Number, and SAM registration status:
  - a. **Note on DUNS Number and SAM Registration:** Applicants requesting \$25,000 or more in federal assistance must have a Dun & Bradstreet Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, a NATO Commercial and Government Entity (NCAGE) code, and be registered in the System for Award Management (SAM) prior to submitting applications. This process can take weeks/months, especially for non-U.S. applicants. Applicants may acquire DUNS numbers at no cost by calling the dedicated toll-free DUNS number request line at 1-866-705-5711 or by requesting a number online at <http://fedgov.dnb.com/webform>. Non-U.S. based applicants may request a NCAGE code at <https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/AC135Public/scage/CageList.aspx>. SAM is the official, free on-line registration database for the U.S. government. [www.SAM.gov](http://www.SAM.gov) replaced the Central Contractor Registration (CCR), the Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA), and the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) in July 2012. [www.SAM.gov](http://www.SAM.gov) collects, validates, stores, and disseminates data in support of federal agency acquisition and grant award mission. Registration in SAM is free: <https://www.sam.gov/portal/public/SAM/>
4. **Project Location**
5. **Proof of Official Permission** to undertake the project
6. **Project Purpose** that summarizes the project objectives and desired results
7. **Project Activities** description that presents the project tasks in chronological order
8. **Project Time Frame** that lists the major project phases and milestones with target dates for achieving them. Applicants may propose project periods of up to 60 months.
9. **Project Participant Information**, specifically an estimated number of non-U.S. and U.S. participants and estimated number of primary and secondary participants, as well as resumes of the proposed project director and other primary project participants;
10. **Statement of Importance** highlighting the historic, architectural, artistic, or cultural (non-religious) values of the cultural site, collection, or form of traditional expression;
11. **Statement of Urgency** explaining why the project must take place now;
12. **Statement of Sustainability** outlining the steps or measures that will be taken to maintain the site, object, or collection in good condition after the AFCP-supported project is complete; or, in the case of forms of traditional cultural expression, to preserve and disseminate the documentation, knowledge, or skills gained from the project;
13. **Detailed Project Budget**, demarcated in one-year budget periods that lists all costs in separate categories (Personnel, Fringe Benefits, Travel [including Per Diem], Equipment, Supplies, Contractual, Other Direct Costs, Indirect Costs, Cost Sharing); indicates funds

from other sources; and provides a justification for any anticipated international travel costs;

- a. **Note on Cost Sharing and Other Forms of Cost Participation:** There is no minimum or maximum percentage of cost participation required for this competition. When cost sharing is offered, it is understood and agreed that the applicant must provide the amount of cost sharing as stipulated in its proposal and later included in an approved agreement. The applicant will be responsible for tracking and reporting on any cost share or outside funding, which is subject to audit. Cost sharing may be in the form of allowable direct or indirect costs.
- 14. Budget Narrative** explaining line by line how costs are estimated (quantity x unit cost, annual salary x percentage of time spent on project, etc.) and unique budget line items;
- 15. Attachments and Supporting Documents** including, at a minimum and required, five (5) high quality digital images (JPEGs) or audiovisual files that convey the nature and condition of the site, object, or form of expression and, in the case of a site or object, show the urgency or need for the proposed project (collapsing wall, water damage, worn fabric, broken handle, etc.), any historic structure reports, conservation needs assessments, and other planning documents compiled in preparation for the proposed project;
- 16. Amplifying AFCP via Current & Emerging Technologies:** AFCP welcomes innovative ideas on how applicants plan to use mobile and online technologies strategically to amplify AFCP support for cultural heritage preservation locally and to share compelling project-related content with both targeted and broad audiences.

Source: Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

### **AFCP Ineligible Activities and Unallowable Costs (small and large grants)**

1. Preservation or purchase of privately or commercially owned cultural objects, collections, or real property, including those whose transfer from private or commercial to public ownership is envisioned, planned, or in process but not complete at the time of application
2. Preservation of natural heritage (physical, biological, and geological formations, paleontological collections, habitats of threatened species of animals and plants, fossils, etc.)
3. Preservation of hominid or human remains
4. Preservation of news media (newspapers, newsreels, radio and TV programs, etc.)
5. Preservation of published materials available elsewhere (books, periodicals, etc.)
6. Development of curricula or educational materials for classroom use
7. Archaeological excavations or exploratory surveys for research purposes
8. Historical research, except in cases where the research is justifiable and integral to the success of the proposed project
9. Acquisition or creation of new exhibits, objects, or collections for new or existing museums

10. Construction of new buildings, building additions, or permanent coverings (over archaeological sites, for example)
11. Commissions of new works of art or architecture for commemorative or economic development purposes
12. Creation of new or the modern adaptation of existing traditional dances, songs, chants, musical compositions, plays, or other performances
13. Creation of replicas or conjectural reconstructions of cultural objects or sites that no longer exist
14. Relocation of cultural sites from one physical location to another
15. Removal of cultural objects or elements of cultural sites from the country for any reason
16. Digitization of cultural objects or collections, unless part of a larger, clearly defined conservation or documentation effort
17. Conservation plans or other studies, unless they are one component of a larger project to implement the results of those studies
18. Cash reserves, endowments, or revolving funds (funds must be expended within the award period [up to five years] and may not be used to create an endowment or revolving fund);
19. Costs of fund-raising campaigns
20. Contingency, unforeseen, or miscellaneous costs or fees
21. Costs of work performed prior to announcement of the award unless allowable per 2 CFR 200.458 and approved by the grants officer
22. International travel, except in cases where travel is justifiable and integral to the success of the proposed project
23. Travel or study outside the host country for professional development
24. Individual projects costing less than \$10,000
25. Independent U.S. projects overseas

Source: Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

### **ECA AFCP Point-Based Ranking System (small grants)**

- Purpose and Summary, Description, Time Frame, Importance: 25 points max
- Urgency: 10 points max
- Sustainability: 10 points max
- Rationale for U.S. Support: 15 points max
- Media and Outreach Plan: 10 points max
- Budget and Budget Narrative: 15 points max
- Supporting Materials: 15 points max

Source: Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

## List of AFCP Application Materials (Large Grants)

### ROUND 1 – PROJECT ABSTRACT REQUIREMENTS

1. **Full and complete Application for Federal Assistance** (SF-424), including Budget Information for Non-Construction Programs (SF-424A), Assurances for Non Construction Programs (SF-424B), and, if applicable, Disclosure of Lobbying Activities (SF-LLL)
2. **Project Basics**, including title, project dates, location, and site
3. **Project Applicant Information**, including contact information, DUNS Number, and SAM registration status
4. **Special Designations** (national monument, World Heritage Site, etc.)
5. **Law/s Protecting the Site or Collection** (citations only)
6. **Project Purpose** that summarizes the project objectives and desired results
7. **Statement of Importance** highlighting the historic, architectural, artistic, or cultural (non-religious) values of the site or collection

### ROUND 2 – FULL PROPOSAL REQUIREMENTS

1. **Revised Project Abstract**, if applicable
2. **Revised SF-424**, if applicable
3. **Proof of official permission** to undertake the project and the full endorsement and support of the national cultural authority in the host country
4. **Project Activities Description** that presents the project tasks in chronological order. If the proposed project is part of a larger effort involving multiple projects supported by other entities, the plan must present the full scope of the preservation effort and the place of the proposed project within that larger effort
5. **Project Time Frame or Schedule** that lists the major project phases and milestones with target dates for achieving them (**Note:** Applicants may propose project periods of up to 60 months )
6. **Project Participant information**, including resumes or CVs of the proposed project director and key project participants
7. **Statement of Urgency** indicating the severity of the situation and explaining why the project must take place now
8. **Statement of Sustainability** outlining the steps or measures that will be taken to maintain the site or collection in good condition after the AFCP-supported project is complete
9. **Detailed Project Budget**, demarcated in one-year budget periods (2018, 2019, 2020, etc.), that lists all costs in separate categories (Personnel, Fringe Benefits, Travel [including Per Diem], Equipment, Supplies, Contractual, Other Direct Costs, Indirect Costs, Cost Sharing); indicates funds from other sources; and gives a justification for any anticipated international travel costs
10. **Budget Narrative** explaining how the costs were estimated (quantity x unit cost, for example) and any unique line items in the budget
11. **Ten (10) or more high quality digital images** (JPEGs) or audiovisual files that convey the nature and condition of the site or museum collection and show the urgency or need for the proposed project (collapsing walls, extensive water damage, etc.)

**12. Relevant supporting documentation**, such as historic structure reports, restoration plans and studies, conservation needs assessments and recommendations, architectural and engineering records, etc., compiled in preparation for the proposed project

Source: Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State



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