

**A Nation of Mothers:
Public and Private Applications of Gender and Domesticity in Indonesian Culture and
Politics**

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An Honors Thesis for the Department of Political Science

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Abstract

A Nation of Mothers:
Public and Private Applications of Gender and Domesticity in Indonesian Culture and Politics

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This thesis examines gender ideology in Indonesian culture and politics, using the domestic realm as a microcosm to study the New Order gender philosophy. Concentrating on the relationship between domesticity and sociopolitical systems, I will provide nuanced insights into gender equality in Indonesian society, placing household patterns of female autonomy within the context of a dichotomous relationship between male and female participation in the private and public realms. Through quantitative analysis, I confirm that there exists a state-dominated gender ideology that creates bifurcated spheres for men and women established through the veneration of women's position within the family. In my analysis, I identify a societal equilibrium in which decision-making responsibility is shared within the home between the husband and the wife, and women perform the lion's share of the household work; women are awarded dominance over the domestic realm as a means of limiting their ability to participate in the public arena. Finally, my use of political, economic, sociological and psychological paradigms will allow me to better situate my findings within national and international scholarship on gender equality from a global, multidisciplinary perspective.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Both informal observation and scholarly analysis conclude that both private domestic life and the public sphere inform one's position within society. The intersection between gender and power is active in both the home and sociopolitical arenas, and public constraints serve to dictate the opportunities available to individuals within a particular culture both in society and in the home. These opportunities are often based on one's identity within various social cleavages, particularly gender. Although gender is only one of many social cleavages—including religion, ethnicity and socioeconomic status—it is a cleavage that crosscuts society, interacting with other facets of individual identity in ways that limit or shape female opportunities and agency within her community and nation. The impact of gender on shaping an individual's experience is equally powerful in both the public and private spheres, and the gendered power dynamics examined in this thesis must be viewed as the (accumulated) effect of domestic arrangements and public gender norms.

Feminist scholars have long criticized the dominant paradigms in economics and political science for attempting to disengage the private from the public. They argue, for example, that one cannot begin to analyze female participation in political institutions without thoroughly studying a woman's place in the family and how that may empower or disempower her to participate in political systems. From a political perspective, this artificial dichotomy between public and private life effectively restricts the analysis of women and politics, as any analysis that omits the study of the politics of the household ignores a crucial aspect of the female experience and the female domain.

From an international development perspective, few programs address the female position within the family, despite the fact that the home is a sphere in which female agency is

crucial if she wants to participate actively in political institutions and economic markets. Development projects typically focus on education, access to financial markets, skill-building and the improvement of female work conditions as pathways to improving female autonomy in the developing world. However, at the heart of these programs lies the assumption that women have enough domestic autonomy, both due to household decision-making patterns or female domestic obligations, to participate in gender mainstreamed-development projects. Because familial relationships dictate female opportunities, especially in patriarchal societies in which the husband serves as the sole decision-maker in the household, a discussion of family dynamics is inherently relevant to, although often omitted from, a discussion of female participation in the workplace and politics. Thus, although the family is a private entity, it serves as a reflection of broader socioeconomic trends. Consequently, the study of the family has implications not only for household equality but also for the analysis of gender equality in the public sphere. The interaction between gender norms in the public and private spheres must play a substantial role in discussions of women and politics or international development.

These private dynamics encompass numerous facets of domestic life, including household decision-making authority and the division of household tasks. Internationally, household decision-making is monopolized by men, who are also more likely to be employed outside the home. Women are more likely to be found engaging heavily in domestic work, working outside of the home predominantly due to economic necessity. In order to more fully incorporate women into national labor markets and democratic decision-making processes, it is crucial to first determine how decision-making power is distributed in the home, and how that translates into the decision to work domestically or outside of the home. These two domestic processes—household decision-making and household division of tasks—fall under the umbrella

of household bargaining power, as both can be seen as the outcome of negotiations between members of the family. Research on household bargaining power, or the relative ability of each spouse to attain his or her preferred outcome during a negotiation process, not only provides a unique opportunity to study societal gender trends within the microcosm of the home, but also allows for one to project household power structures on society as a whole in order to gain insights on the private applications of national gender ideologies. Although the concept of household bargaining power provides us with a useful framework for studying gendered dynamics within the home, due to its incongruence with particular aspects of Indonesian gender culture, my patterns of household dynamics will not be characterized as the outcome of a bargain.

The focal point of this thesis is household dynamics among Indonesian families. Although Indonesian women are incorporated into and respected by Indonesian cultural norms and the Indonesian state, their role is unequivocally centered on the household, where they are able to exert their autonomy. The significance of this autonomy, however, is diminished by the fact that women have little freedom to operate outside of the home. While women may reign domestically, men control the public spheres of society.

This Indonesian gender ideology presents many discrepancies between apparent gender equality and female autonomy and the underlying gender norms that serve to constrain and determine female opportunities in these societies. The juxtaposition of female autonomy within the home and female subservience within the public realm complicates the relationship between the public and the private, as Indonesian women occupy a space in society that can be characterized as “separate but equal.” Although women enjoy greater autonomy relative to their female counterparts in other developing countries, this autonomy takes the form of strong

cultural norms that implicitly confine women to the domestic sphere by venerating their role as mothers and homemakers. These gender roles were enforced by the policies of Indonesia's authoritarian ruler, Suharto, in the latter half of the 20th century.

Scholars have made many attempts to disentangle the ambiguity surrounding Indonesian gender roles, specifically the dichotomy between seemingly high levels of female autonomy and overbearing gender identities that are prevalent in all Indonesian social stratifications. Analysis from a Western perspective poses an added challenge, as many of the realms in which women have autonomy, such as the household and economic markets, are viewed in the Western world as indicators of female power and normative goals of gender equality. However, when examining Indonesia, it is crucial to take into consideration cultural attitudes toward gender equality, allowing one to determine to what extent women either have the freedom to shape their own experiences or are simply operating autonomously within spaces that society and politics have designated specifically for women.

Although Western normative attitudes toward gender will be unavoidably present throughout my whole analysis, I will use empirical analysis to first provide an unbiased assessment of current gendered conditions within Indonesian families and political systems. If this is executed correctly, I will be able to analyze the relationship between and significance of certain variables in order to develop informed assessments of female agency and freedom of opportunity within Indonesian families and society, despite Western norms that may permeate my analysis. Differentiating between socioeconomic and cultural determinants of household dynamics will facilitate much of this analysis.

Using survey data collected in East Java and North Sumatra, Indonesia, I will illustrate the relationship between women's autonomy and their relegation to particular societal spheres by

examining gendered norms within the household and policy preferences toward progressive gender policies. First, I will evaluate the body of literature on household bargaining power, the determinants of household division of labor, and gender attitudes and identity in Indonesia. These findings will then inform my interpretation of regression analyses used to formulate a comprehensive model examining household decision-making authority, household division of labor, and support for or opposition to progressive gender policies. I will look to build a causal relationship between external environmental factors and the distribution of household decision-making responsibilities and the allocation of household tasks, providing an explanation for the apparent ambiguity observed in Indonesian gender norms. Analyzing the determinants of particular household outcomes will not only provide me with empirical evidence to support or question current scholarship on gender and politics in Indonesia, but will also establish conclusive evidence regarding household dynamics, which would aid policy makers in attempts to engage more women in the public arena.

In order to place my findings within a political context, I will then use my two models of household dynamics to determine what predicts the degree to which individuals support Indonesian public policies focused on gender equality, specifically support for policies that place quotas on the number of female executives and policies that promote equal pay for men and women. The synthesis of my findings will provide insights toward the development of policies that will help Indonesian women expand their agency. My findings regarding policy support for gender equality will additionally help discern what factors lead an individual to support specific public policies, and thus how to most effectively generate public support for policies and candidates who promote progressive gender political platforms. This analysis is of particular

importance to a democracy such as that in Indonesia, where political efforts to promote gender equality must be met with public support in order to succeed.

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will outline the literature necessary for best understanding and interpreting the findings in the remaining portions of this thesis. Chapter 3 will provide an explanation of the two empirical methodologies—binary logistic regression and ordinal probit logistic regression—that I use in my analysis. Because the analysis of logistic regression requires slightly different interpretations, Chapter 3 will also contain information on how to properly interpret coefficients in logistic regression. It will also contain justifications for decisions regarding inclusion or exclusion of particular measurements, based both on econometric theory and my own understanding of Indonesian culture.

The empirical substance of my thesis is found in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in which I will propose and discuss my models of household decision-making authority, household division of tasks and political support for progressive gender public policies. Chapter 4 will focus on my model of household decision-making, finding most importantly that the correlation between seemingly positive, yet still sexist, ideals toward women and the likelihood of enjoying shared household decision-making authority may be a compelling explanation for the ambiguities surrounding the role and apparent autonomy of Indonesian women within the home.

Chapter 5 will use many of the same socioeconomic and cultural indicators used in Chapter 4 to examine the determinants of the division of labor within Indonesian families. In this chapter, I will argue that Indonesian society rests at an equilibrium point in which women do the housework and take care of the children and men work outside the home to provide for their families. In support of my argument, I find that for women in the sample, culture reinforces domesticity, while socioeconomic factors allow women to deviate slightly from traditional

divisions of household labor. This provides evidence for the “separate spheres” argument, wherein women are granted domestic freedom in exchange for public obedience.

These two models will then be incorporated into Chapter 6, which will attempt to determine the predictors of support for progressive gender policies. Not only will this allow me to ascertain which policies have the most potential for success in Indonesia, but it will also give me an opportunity to gain insights on attitudes toward gender equality from the revealed preferences of support for gender policies. I find that the concept of “state ibuism,” state-driven gender ideological identification, is endorsed by both men and women, and is significant in dictating their policy preferences.

Ultimately, I will synthesize these three areas of focus in order to provide a comprehensive depiction of Indonesian gender roles. My analysis confirms that the state-dominated gender ideology of Suharto’s New Order creates separate spheres for men and women by venerating the female position within the family. This creates a societal equilibrium in which women are awarded dominance over the domestic realm as a means of limiting their ability to participate in the public arena. This can be seen in the prevalence of shared decision-making authority and unequal division of household labor, performed primarily by the woman. While the literature on Indonesian culture and politics discuss these two trends extensively, my analysis expounds on this framework. I will argue that while this equilibrium is derived from ethnicity and state-driven gender ideological identification, socioeconomic factors can result in a deviation from this equilibrium and can incentivize individuals to adopt non-traditional gender roles, although only to a limited degree. Finally, the empirical findings allow me to attribute the dichotomy between private female autonomy and public female subjugation to the strong endorsement of benevolent sexism in Indonesian society. The juxtaposition of gender

mainstreamed policies and female subordination to both the state and the husband, fostered through benevolent sexism, suggests that combating female marginalization in Indonesia and promoting gender equality poses particular challenges, as the gender ideology is promoted through the state, culture and psychology, leaving few vehicles that can be mobilized for cultural and political transformation in attitudes toward gender. While this thesis specifically examines these gender norms and attitudes from the vantage point of families and the home, it is important to recognize that the domestic and the state are not discrete realms; not only do societal and socioeconomic factors from outside the home impact domestic arrangements and vice versa, but also the relationship between the private and the public is actively utilized in order to determine and solidify Indonesian gender ideology.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

While the study of the family is often forgotten in political science, the fields of economics, psychology and sociology offer important insights and tools for studying the domestic sphere. The home is a space deeply familiar to and personal for anyone studying it from an academic angle. Attempts to study the home are clouded by researchers' own perceptions or normative assumptions of family dynamics, often instilled in them through socialization processes that begin in the very sphere that they are attempting to objectively examine. For this reason, I am careful to present both neo-classical and feminist approaches to the household; in my analysis of gender, families and power in Indonesia, I present several viewpoints that offer nuanced, sometimes contrasting, explanations for gender patterns in Indonesia.

Initially, my analysis of the family was centered on the concept and identification of domestic power. However, in my preliminary stages of research, it became clear that from a political and sociological standpoint, "power" is a broadly ambiguous term that lacks concrete meaning and is approached very differently throughout the literature. Family economics and sociological analyses of the household focus on the concept of power as a means of capturing elements of individual control and agency within the household. There is an inevitable specification problem here; the fact that power, especially when analyzed in a private sphere such as the home, is an intangible concept means that it cannot easily be measured empirically. Thus, scholars have been forced to rely on proxy variables to measure power that are often riddled with cultural and personal biases both in study design and interpretation. For example, many Western scholars fixate on the concept of economic autonomy and household decision-making as an indicator of relative power within the household. Yet, for reasons articulated later

in this chapter, these representations of power would paint a flawed picture when applied to Indonesian families. Because of this complication, I will refrain from using the term “power” to describe household relationships. Rather, I will examine household decision-making authority and division of labor as a means of analyzing the overall spousal dynamics, as opposed to household bargaining power.

Gender in Indonesia: “State Ibuism,” Ethnicity and Islam

These spousal dynamics are particularly important in Indonesia, where gender ideology is prevailing in all aspects of society and politics, largely due to efforts of Suharto and the New Order to infuse gender and motherhood with his authoritarian regime and attempts to unify Indonesia after the fall of colonial rule. Although Suharto’s regime fell in 1997, and Indonesia has recently made significant process toward gender equality, including having a female president, the gender ideology of the New Order is still felt throughout the nation as women struggle to assert their authority in the public realm and dismiss the image of the solely domestic wife and mother still present in Indonesian cultural and political mindsets. My analysis here will highlight the role of Indonesian politics, ethnic identities and religion in shaping the nation’s gender ideologies.

Home to a population of almost 250 million, the archipelago nation of Indonesia possesses the world’s largest Muslim population and numerous ethnicities and local languages (BBC News 2012). Colonized by the Dutch, many of the Indonesian institutions were developed during the colonial period, which was characterized by indirect rule and a form of institutionalized apartheid and a society in which men dominated all aspects of life and controlled political and economic institutions. After the fall of the Dutch colonial regime and a

brief period of Japanese colonial rule during World War II, Indonesia was ruled first by President Sukarno, who worked to unify and nationalism? Indonesian citizens, and then by Suharto, who initiated an authoritarian regime, known as the New Order, which would last from 1967 to 1998. Suharto's rule was characterized by strong economic growth, which helped him maintain power and buy loyalty, and brutal suppression of opposition. Indonesia finally transitioned to a democracy with the fall of Suharto, which was brought on by a combination of the end of the Cold War and liberalization of the economy, necessitated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Vickers 2005).

Suharto's regime made the family a central part of its social policy, emphasizing traditional gender roles as a strategy for promoting the healthy and prosperous future of the Indonesian state. The following policy under the New Order was widely spread in Indonesian society in the 1990s. It states:

“Women, as citizens as well as a human resource for development . . . have rights, responsibilities and opportunities which are the same as men in all aspects of development. The fostering . . . of the role of women as equal partners of men is aimed at increasing their active role in development activities, including efforts to materialize . . . a healthy, prosperous and happy family, as well as the development . . . of children, adolescents and youths, within the framework of the development of the complete Indonesian human . . . The position of women within the family and society and their role within development must be maintained and increasingly stepped up in order to provide the greatest possible contribution towards the development of the nation, while being mindful of their essential nature . . . and dignity” (Tiwon 2000: 73).

The perceptions underlying this policy are significant, as is the presence of a strong emphasis on separate spheres for men and women. In essence, this New Order cited female dignity and capacity as the rationale for its policies, strongly contrasting with other state policies that, for example, restrict female suffrage because of fear of the incompetence of women. Rather, women are relegated to the domestic realm because they have the privilege of securing the future

of Indonesia, thus illustrating how benevolent sexism both compliments and constricts women in the public arena. Suryakusuma (1988) labels this trend “state ibuism.”¹

Blackburn elaborates on state-constructed veneration of motherhood, stating that “governments have wanted responsible modern mothers, who can raise healthy children of good moral character” (2004: 138). Motherhood is culturally idealized, evidenced by the fact that many view motherhood as the natural order for all women. Furthermore, “motherhood was associated with the ‘private’ world of the home as distinct from the ‘public’ world dominated by men. Mothers had a right to be active in the public world – so long as it was justified in the name of the family” (Blackburn 2004: 141). Thus, while Indonesian women may participate in the public sphere, their participation is predicated on the fact that they are first and foremost mothers. In short, the dominant Indonesian political ideology equates the state with masculinity and the home with femininity, establishing laws and policies that promote this dichotomy not only between man and woman, but also between public and private.

This notion of the family was further enforced by family planning laws implemented by Suharto’s regime with the hope of reducing fertility and population growth. From the 1960s, Suharto’s family planning initiative aimed to “attain majority acceptance of the principle of family planning, introducing the concept of a small prosperous family, and ensuring that adequate contraceptive services were provided to married couples who wishes to plan their families” (Seltzer 2002: 68). While the family planning laws gave women the freedom of using contraception, it still deprived them of the personal decision, as women only had the freedom to operate within the framework of national law (Warwick 1986). Although Western scholarship often views family planning and reproductive rights as symbols of empowerment, in this

¹ In Indonesian, “ibu” means mother (Robinson and Bessel 2002: 5).

instance, control of a woman's reproductive systems were transferred from the home to the state, still depriving her of agency in the decision.

The ideology behind the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) and the Dharma Wanita, the two most prominent women's organizations in Indonesia, further illustrates the powerful state-led determination of gender identities. The PKK is the women's organization championed and administered by the New Order regime. Established in the 1970s, it oversaw health, literacy and economic schemes aimed at improving family life among Indonesians, particularly rural Indonesians. The Indonesian New Order gender ideology was heavily incorporated into the PKK. For example, "under the PKK's organizational structure, the wife of any male head of office, from the highest (that is, the president) down to the lowest (the village head), automatically became the head of her husband's position within the PKK branch" (Marcoes 2002: 189). But a minor part of the PKK, this structure very effectively highlights the New Order seemingly contradictory gender ideology. The wife has the ability to hold a leadership position, but that ability is not resultant from her own qualifications or power, but rather from that of her husband. Although membership in the PKK has diminished since the fall of Suharto, and the organization has been renamed to highlight family empowerment as opposed to family guidelines, the prevailing gender ideology of female domesticity remains an emphasis of the organization, while the PKK's prevalence in Indonesian society ensures that the ideology it espouses will be projected wherever the PKK has influence (Marcoes 2002).

Similarly, Dharma Wanita, the women's organization for the wives of civil servants, also champions the domestic role of women, used by the Suharto regime to manage "women's dual role in public and domestic spheres as guarantor of harmonious social and family relations, as well as her supporting role to her husband" (Porter 2002: 86). While its reach is more limited

than that of the PKK because it is only available to those working in the public sector, it shares many similarities, especially in that membership is again dictated by the husband's status, in the same way that a woman's husband dictates leadership positions within the PKK. Thus, the female position within Indonesian society is unambiguously derived from her position in the household, even within the context of women's organizations.

Robinson argues that "the 'uniformization' of gender identities through state ibuism – particularly in the two main official women's organizations, the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) and Dharma Wanita – presented the apex of the homogenizing strategies of the authoritarian New Order state" (2002: 8). In other words, while numerous state initiatives solidify this private/public dichotomy between female and male societal spheres, the primary vehicle for this effort was women's organizations. This mentality coincides once again with the understanding that women's participation in the public sphere is solely determined by her place within the home; more specifically, her standing in the public sphere is determined by her husband's standing in the public sphere, and this mentality was resoundingly apparent in the organizational structures of the PKK and the Dharma Wanita.

This political gender ideology works in tandem with religious and ethnic institutions that further enforce Indonesian gender ideologies. Javanese ethnicity is particularly interesting; anthropologists and sociologists have studied the role of Javanese women extensively. Javanese society is very loosely organized, with high rates of mobility and relatively weak marital links. Families are organized around nuclear families, and households make decisions based on expenditures jointly, with women controlling many of the household finances (Frankenberg and Thomas 2001). Javanese women are also expected to play an active role in commerce and agriculture (Blackburn 2004). The concept of "state ibuism" is particularly relevant to the

Javanese; like many other Indonesian social groups, the Javanese center their societal organization on motherhood.

The structure of Javanese society demands a critical analysis of gender roles and domestic relationships. Because the society is organized bilaterally, the gendered balance of power might not be immediately obvious. For example, Western scholars might view a Javanese household organization as one that has a high degree of gender equality. However, this cultural mindset is potentially problematic and one that researchers familiar with Indonesia voice frequently. Kathryn Robinson articulates this well arguing, “Western commentators have seized on women’s economic participation, and their apparent relative economic autonomy in the region as one of the indices of their social power” (2000: 145). Robinson argues that this is an incorrect perspective; female relative economic autonomy in Indonesia is not an indicator of social power, as Indonesian women, particularly Javanese women, do not gain power from control of the household finances, as money is considered “low prestige” (Robinson 2000: 145), and “while Javanese women may enjoy some economic autonomy, they may enjoy less than was previously thought, since patriarchal controls may co-exist simultaneously” (Wolf 2000: 90). Adding to this is the argument that women exhibit more control than men, so family money is better protected when it is in their hands. This mentality, although complimentary toward women, works to relegate women to the domestic realm, albeit through praise of their abilities rather than a critique of their insufficiencies.

Finally, the concept of spiritual potency is particularly powerful in Javanese society, with those who have the highest level of spiritual potency exemplifying self-control and self-mastery. This societal structures places women in inferior social positions; “the assertion that males are spiritually stronger than females is used to justify *priyayi* declarations that women should defer

to and faithfully serve men, whether their husbands, fathers or rulers” (Brenner 1995: 21). Yet, despite this structural and spiritual hierarchy, the gender roles are more ambiguous. For example, there is a Javanese wedding tradition that is thought to determine the gendered division of domestic power. According to ritual, when a Javanese bride and groom are wed, the husband and wife have the opportunity to throw betel leaves at the other; whoever successful hits the other person first is predicted to have the power in the household. Brenner describes the contradictory gender dynamic highlighted by this tradition. “The dominant ideology dictates that the wife should defer to her husband’s greater prestige and authority as the nominal head of the household; thus, the bride is supposed to make sure that the groom wins the betel battle . . . [However], the reality of the situation is that in many Javanese households, women enjoy a de facto power which far outweighs that of their husbands” (Brenner 1995: 23). Again, however, it is important to emphasize that although Javanese women may exert great control in the household, their control is limited to their designated sphere. Interestingly, when this is the case, the household fails to serve as a microcosm of societal gender norms, but rather is actively incorporated into the creation of Indonesian gender norms.

In short, much of the literature on Javanese gender patterns concludes that although society places more value on men, Javanese women enjoy significant control in the home, particularly regarding household finances. In addition to having primary control over household finances, Javanese women are also often the breadwinners of the family, earning income equal or in excess of their husbands’ income (Brenner 1995). However, despite this control over the household, “according to key ideological formulations, women have certain inborn character traits that doom them to an inferior station in life no matter how much money they earn or how much power their wield within the household” (Brenner 1995: 25). This is partially attributed to

the fact that the area over which women have the greatest control, domestic tasks and economic activities, is actually deemed unrespectable in Javanese society (Errington 1990). Although Javanese society is focused on motherhood, and the women enjoy a great deal of autonomy, this should not be interpreted as gender equality because women are culturally attributed the roles that are deemed spiritually undesirable in Javanese society, and men and women are awarded little space to expand their spheres of activity or influence.

In contrast, the Batak society of North Sumatra is organized along patrilineal lines, and kinship is the foundation of social relationships. Thus, the study of household bargaining power has significant ramifications for societal gender norms in Batak-dominated North Sumatra (Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001). The patrilineal nature of the Batak extends well beyond the household, and women are excluded from both private and public decision-making (Blackburn 2004). I expect these household dynamics to be strongly significant in my empirical analysis. Although Javanese and Batak societies are very different, the homogenization efforts of the Suharto regime discussed by Blackburn (2004) ensured that its gender ideology focused on separate, dichotomous spheres for men and women that extended to all ethnicities, largely through initiatives such as the PKK.

The third and final dimension of Indonesian gender dynamics relevant here is the interaction between Islam, the state and gender ideology. As the largest Muslim country in the world, I would remiss to exclude Islam from my analysis. However, there is a surprising dearth of scholarly work focused on the role of Islam in Indonesia; “although there is considerable interest now in comparative essays on women and the state in Islamic countries, Indonesia is almost always omitted from such collections. . . The observers who do register this fact often comment on how little the Indonesian state elects?? the interests of Islam, in its relations with

women as in other matters” (Blackburn 2004: 5—6). The role of Islam in Indonesia greatly contrasts with its role in other majority Muslim states, where Islam becomes the backbone of society and governance (Blackburn 2004: 104).

That being said, Islam does play an important role in Indonesian politics, and Islamic organizations have obstructed state attempts to promote and legislate gender equality. Much of the discussion regarding Islam, the Indonesian state and gender focuses on the province of Aceh, which is ruled by syriah law. Because do not examine Aceh in this thesis, I will not spend time here discussing the gender dynamics of the region, which share few similarities to those of the rest of Indonesia. However, recently, Islamic forces have played a stronger role in state politics. For example, the opposition of Islamic political groups stalled the “Bill of Gender and Equality,” based on the fact that higher levels of female labor market participation might increase conflict within marriage (Yamin 2012). Thus, while the discussion of Islam will not play a central role in my analysis, it is important to keep in mind that there are Islamic opposition groups that serve as obstacles to gender equality in Indonesia, and may further contribute to the relegation of the women to the domestic sphere.²

Theoretical Models of Bargaining Power

The contextual background to Indonesian gender culture and politics can now be applied to the academic study of the family, discussed here at length. Initial studies of family economics established the baseline for applying economic analysis to a private, non-market entity.

Pioneered by Nobel-prize economist Gary Becker, these studies were some of the first to apply economic methods to traditionally sociological research questions, including racial

² Results of correlation analyses indicate that in the sample used in my analysis, Islam is not correlated with attitudes toward gender.

discrimination, altruism, envy, and family structure. Becker's models of household bargaining are known as common preference models, where the preferences of the household are expressed on a single curve of preferences, rather than a combination of individual's preferences that are negotiated and agreed upon to form a map of utility curves. These models assumed that the spouses act as one unit and that their utility can be maximized using one curve, rather than a distinct curve for each partner. Becker and others of the common preference body of thought rationalized this assumption through use of the altruistic or benevolent dictator model, in which the head of the household acts as a proxy for the rest of the family, operating unilaterally but taking into equal consideration the preferences of the entire model rather than his own (Becker 1974, 1981). Paul Samuelson's analysis of household indifference curves (1956) adopts a similar attitude, basing his theory of the consumer on the "spending unit" of the family. While Samuelson argues that one cannot have an indifference curve that expresses the interests of an entire community, he states that a family indifference curve is possible, as the tastes of one family member are inherently linked to the tastes of the other family member through a "consensus" or "social welfare function" based on the intense connectivity of family members (Samuelson, 1956, p. 10). In these models, utility is mapped for the whole family, fail to account for differing preferences between the husband and the wife, and offer no discussion of whose preferences are best represented in the utility curve.

By the 1980s, household economists began to question the validity of the altruist assumption, which previously obviated the need for different utility curves for the husband and the wife. Scholars realized that the model is flawed in its failure to accurately assess how family-level utility curves are derived. While it is a fair assumption that family members' interests are interrelated, and that familial ties suggest the family members consider take the preferences of

others in the household when making decisions, it represents a naïve view of power dynamics, overstating the altruistic tendencies of the head of the household. Even casual reflection suggests that when one person in the home has unilateral control over household decisions, it is unlikely that he will emphasize the interests of other members of the household to the same degree he considers his own interests. This is particularly important in patriarchal societies, where the wife has little say regarding family dynamics.

Using the tenets of game theory to remedy the problems with the common preferences model, scholars proposed viewing family decision-making as a series of Nash-distributed bargaining models. This new set of theories, established largely by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) modeled family decisions as the sum of negotiation and bargaining by both adult individuals in the family, relying on their reservation utility or threat point (often based on the outside options available to each individual in the marriage) to mark the space in which an individual is willing to negotiate. Manser and Brown introduce a bargaining framework that allows not only for the husband and the wife to have different utility functions, but also gives them a game theoretical means through which to reconcile those different utility functions. Their model predicts that one agrees to a bargain if the gains from cooperating with one's spouse are greater than the gains from not agreeing or bargaining, citing wage rates as the most important determinant of this threat point.

In the McElroy-Horney model (1981), husband and wife demand functions are based on their respective consumption of market goods, leisure and household goods. They assess how those expenditures are determined and therefore how husbands and wives bargain for their own preferences in terms of allocation of resources. The space in which an individual is willing to bargain is based on the level of utility that individual can achieve outside the marriage. This

differs slightly from Manser and Brown, who define the threat point as the outcome of not negotiating or agreeing with the spouse, rather than the level of utility achieved outside the marriage (essentially, the level of utility achieved through divorce).

Lundberg and Pollak (1997) synthesize these models, describing the “the utility received by husband or wife in the Nash bargaining solution depends upon the threat point; the higher one’s utility at the threat point, the higher one’s utility in the Nash bargained solution” (29). For example, if a couple is bargaining over the distribution of household chores, in a divorce model, a wife may assess her threat point based on how many household chores she would have to do in the case of divorce, possibly as a function of her income and her ability to hire help to complete household chores, while in a separate spheres model, she might assess her threat point at her level of utility in the case of not agreeing. More concretely, this might be her level of utility either with completing all the chores, or with having the house be messier. If the wife is unconfident that she could earn enough in the labor market to provide for herself if the marriage were to dissolve, she might be willing to either clean more or have a messier house, as opposed to demanding that her husband pick up some of the slack.

While these Nash-bargained solutions provide us with a useful thought exercise in analyzing what and when an individual will sacrifice in a marriage, they are unrealistic for several reasons. First, they assume a level of rationality that extends beyond the typical analytical abilities of an individual. For example, while the model may predict that an individual should rationally choose divorce because he or she could earn a sufficient income without a marriage, it ignores potential personal investments, such as spousal love, that might keep that individual in the marriage despite poor bargaining power. Second, it does not propose a useful measurement of bargaining power. In order to make legitimate use of the household bargaining models, one

must have extensive knowledge of the ideal desires and outcomes in particular situations. Moreover, if the intent of the model is rigorous quantitative analysis, researchers must be able to track minute changes in marginal effects of external environmental factors on household bargaining power. Again, this would require unrealistically extensive knowledge of socioeconomic, psychological and personal aspects of the individuals in the marriage. Basing a measure of bargaining power on assumptions of preferences would yield bias results. Third and finally, the model is relatively static. Although it is only meant to be the theoretical basis of household analysis, it does not leave much space for the interaction between factors or in tandem with cultural characteristics that change bargaining power.

Gender and the Family

The econometric, mathematical depiction of household bargaining power demands contextual analysis. Additionally, although the models of household bargaining power are typically applied to gender, their theoretical underpinnings avoid a discussion of both public and private gender roles and how those roles may be advantages or disadvantages in the ability of an individual to exert power within the household and within her marriage. As my thesis rests on the assumption that men and women occupy vastly different spaces in society—internationally, women are found in the home caring for the family while men are found outside the home, providing for the family—I find this reliance on economic factors short-sighted on the part of household economics theorists.

Despite the need for multidisciplinary analysis, too often in political literature scholars fail to connect household arrangements to gendered patterns in the public sphere. Private household dynamics have important consequences for public participation, whether one is

examining how a woman's position within the home informs her policy preferences or how her domestic responsibilities serve as time constraints to her participation in civic society.

Paradigmatically, the study of the public sphere and the private sphere is divided, with the public/private characterization “used to refer both to the distinction between state and society (as in public and private ownership), and to the distinction between non-domestic and domestic life” (Okin1991: 68). Although past political philosophers have used the family as a unit of analysis for analyzing the proper role of the state, Okin continues, arguing that “most contemporary political theorists continue the same ‘separate spheres’ tradition by *ignoring* the family, and in particular its division of labour, related economic dependencies, and power structures” (1991: 69). The following analysis provides support for the validity of studying the linkages between private and public gender norms, as “the family [is] inevitably tied to its gender structure, but ... until that structure [is] successfully challenged there could be no hope of equality for women in either the domestic or the public sphere” (Okin1991: 68). In other words, gender equality in the home is inherently linked to gender equality in society as a whole. This is particularly relevant in Indonesia, where Suharto's New Order exploited the relationship between the public and private in an attempt to create rigid Indonesian gender ideologies.

This section will delve into the public attitudes that impact private structures, beginning first by introducing three psychological attitudes toward gender—hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, zero-sum beliefs and gender essentialism—before applying these attitudes to theories of the family and division of household tasks.³ Hostile sexism is the more overt form of sexism and takes the form of negative stereotypes and attacks on the nature of women that are then used to confine them to limited social settings and levels of status and power (Glick and Fiske 1997). For

³ Concrete examples of these psychological terms can be found in Appendix B. For each of these four concepts, I have enumerated the indicators used in the Women in Leadership survey to measure respondent's endorsement of hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, zero sum beliefs and gender essentialism.

example, one facet of hostile sexism is the attitude that women are petty and complain often or that they are controlling over men. Typically, when one thinks of aggressive sexism, one is thinking about hostile sexist attitudes. Domestically, the hostile sexist perception that women are weak and incompetent may contribute to women having diminished power in the household or limited freedom to work outside the home.

Benevolent sexism, in contrast, is defined as “a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to elicit behavior typically categorized as prosocial (e.g., helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g., self-disclosure)” (Glick and Fiske 1996: 491). Examples of benevolent sexism include the idea that “women should be cherished and protected by men” and “men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing in order to provide financially for the women in their lives” (Brown et al. 2013: 39). Often benevolent sexism may go unnoticed, as it does not directly attack a woman for her gender; rather, it subtly undermines female opportunity by evoking traditional gender stereotypes, such as nurture and compassion. For example, the belief that women should be cherished and protected by men could relegate women to the domestic realm, as it is where they will be most safe. The idea of benevolent sexism also dually perpetuates the idea that women are only suited for particular tasks, as they are both superior to men in certain ways or that they need to be protected from the ugliness of particular jobs. In Indonesia, the idea of benevolent sexism can explain why women are often given factory tasks of needlework, as women are both more careful than men and need to be protected from dangerous jobs that involve manual labor. From a sociopolitical standpoint, it is clear that the New Order strategy of rhetorically entrusting women with the future of Indonesia through their role as mothers is a representative of

benevolent sexist attitudes, as it simultaneously compliments women's integral role in Indonesia yet and reinforces the dichotomy between private women and public men.

Both hostile and benevolent sexism assume female inferiority and effectively result in female subordination (Glick and Fiske 1996). Furthermore, in cultures more strongly rooted in patriarchy, women are more likely to endorse benevolent sexism as they feel the need to be protected from male dominance (Glick et al. 2000). Although no research has been done on benevolent sexism in Indonesia, the idea that women should be cherished does appear to be culturally prevalent, thus providing the justification for the study of benevolent sexism in Indonesian culture.

Zero-sum beliefs are based on the idea that every situation has a winner and a loser and that a win for person A results in an automatic loss for person B. In gender, "the zero-sum belief that advances in gender diversity ultimately means losses for men" (Prime, Moss-Racusin & Foust-Cummings 2009: 10). A man endorsing zero-sum gender beliefs would likely agree with the statement "when women work they are taking jobs away from men" (Brown et al. 2013: 125). These beliefs become particularly important when discussing support for particular policies, such as quotas for women in executive positions and equal pay laws, and represent the mentality that one group must be dominant in society, as equal rights to two groups would result in the diminution of rights for the previously dominant group. Pragmatically, it is plausible that the idea of zero-sum gender equality contributed to the creation of separate spheres for men and women to limit competition for jobs and leadership positions in Indonesian society.

Finally, gender essentialism is the idea that "differences between the sexes are of an intrinsic nature, closely associated with physical, physiological, and/or spiritual differences" (Crompton and Lyonette 2006: 601). In other words, those who endorse gender essentialism believe strongly

that there are natural, even biological, aspects of gender, and that gender is a cornerstone of personal identity. Within the context of the New Order gender ideology, this is particularly important, as the state's approach to the role of women was very much dependent on the idea that motherhood and the natural difference between the genders necessitated a sharp dichotomy between public arenas for men and private arenas for women.

These psychological attitudes can be seen in economic and political analyses of the family. Economic support for the relegation of the woman to the home can be found again in the work of Gary Becker. He argues for the division of labor between the husband and wife as a way of increasing the efficiency of the familial unit, as “the theory of comparative advantages implies that the resources of members of a household (or of any other organization) should be allocated to various activities according to their comparative or relative efficiencies” (Becker 1981: 32). Due to societal norms, differences in returns to education and biology, Becker advocates for the woman to specialize in domestic production, while the man specializes in market work outside of the home because of these natural and socialized gender-based comparative advantages.⁴ When examined in context with the New Order's emphatic attempts to create a domestic sphere for women and a public sphere for men, the Beckerian model of household production is exceedingly relevant.

As previously discussed, although family economics is a sizeable area of research for economic scholars, there is not an analogous focus on the family in political science. However, in the political science discipline, two particular studies do place the family at the center of the political analysis—Iversen and Rosenbluth's 2006 examination of household bargaining power and political preferences and Burns, Schlozman and Verba's 2001 study of household and personal determinants of political participation and civic engagement.

⁴ I will refer to these arrangements as “Beckerian household arrangements” for the remainder of this thesis.

The work of Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) is directly relevant to the work in this thesis. Their analysis of the gendered division of labor in the home and the resultant gender voting gap uses structural constraints facing men and women as determinants of the voting gap. For example, they find that gender, as well as the interactions between gender and labor force participation, marital status or set of skills demanded in the workforce are all significant indicators of leftist tendencies in voting. This division is attributed to the differences in welfare state policies, as the structural constraints facing women compel them to support different policies from men. While this work will be discussed further during my analysis of the gendered differences policy preferences literature in Chapter 6, it is cited here to support the claim that the family and household dynamics and study of political systems are intrinsically linked.

Burns, Schlozman and Verba focus on the relationship between the private and the public from a different angle; they analyze the determinants of varying degrees of political participation and action between men and women from the perspective of household responsibilities. They enumerate six explanations for lower levels of political activity among women when compared to men. Five out of six of these explanations focus on the family:

1. Political participation, which includes all voluntary activities that are intended to influence the political system, is a substantive time constraint, and in societies in which women disproportionately take care of the children and tend to the home, they are unable to commit nearly as much time as men to political participation.
2. Similarly, raising children can not only monopolize a woman's time, but also monopolizes her energy, leaving her little cognitive ability to focus on other tasks.
3. Patriarchal familial structures in which men control the home are projected on society, leaving women little room to participate in political systems dominated by men.

4. Women have less access to socioeconomic resources that facilitate political participation, such as education and independent income.
5. Women are socialized to have less desire to participate in politics and do not believe that politics are relevant to their lives (Burns, Schlozman & Verba 2001: 7—8).

In sum, these gendered dynamics present in domestic life extend beyond the home and play an important role in determining political systems and participatory trends. The relationship between household dynamics and political participation is empirically supported in Burns et al.'s work, as is the negative relationship between earned income and share of household completed for each spouse. While their specific findings are not relevant here, they do empirically confirm that there is a relationship between household dynamics and political participation, thus providing justification for the inclusion of family research in political science.

An area of neglect in the political science is the application of the aforementioned research to non-Western societies. Though the literature discussed here makes compelling arguments connecting gendered trends between the private and public spheres, many of these studies are focused on attitudes that are inherently Western; civic society, divorce and the analytical reliance on rational economic actors are all trends that, although familiar with Western readers, are not easily translated to a non-Western society such as Indonesia.⁵

Gender and Modernization

A discussion of gender norms in a developing country like Indonesia must take into consideration the trajectory of changing attitudes toward gender as a country modernizes and the structure of its economy and demand for labor changes. Inglehart and Norris argue that four

⁵ It is important to emphasize that I am using the economic definition of rational behavior, which can be understood as an actor making informed decisions to maximize his or her self-interest. Despite popular connotations of the word “rational,” there are no normative judgments attached to my use of the word.

stylized facts can be observed as countries develop. These include the observation that while the process of secularization works in tandem with the societal modernization and thus increases gender equality, religiosity still strongly influences social norms regarding the relationship between the public and the private, and that participation in Islamic religious institutions is one of the strongest barriers to gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Thus, the Inglehart-Norris thesis claims that secularization occurs through both economic and societal modernization and facilitates gender equality, but that Islam might play a role in tempering the level of equality. When one differentiates societies as agrarian, industrial and postindustrial, gender equality indicators improve as societies transition into modernity.

Inglehart's and Norris's portrayal of this trend, however, might be unnecessarily linear. In her economic historical analysis of female labor force participation in the United States, Claudia Goldin observes a U-shaped pattern, where women leave the work force when the country begins modernizing, returning to household production for a historical period of time before rejoining the workforce when the society begins reaching higher levels of gender equality. When economies are primarily agrarian, women participate in the labor force at a very high degree, as the nature of economic production did not favor men over women. However, once countries begin modernizing into more industrial production systems, women are relegated to the domestic arena. It is perhaps in this economic system that Becker's idea of comparative advantage and separate arenas for male and female production is most applicable. Finally, as social norms and female education improves, women return to the workforce (Goldin 1994). Given Indonesia's status as a developing low-middle-income country, it will be fascinating to see if transformations in gender norms take the form of a linear trajectory toward gender equality or a U-shaped transition into modern economic production.

For the purposes of this thesis, the Goldin argument perhaps holds more credence than the Inglehart-Norris argument. While both empirical evidence and personal conjecture supports their argument regarding secularization, modernization and gender equality, its emphasis on religion and social norms inevitably views gender relations through a biased lens and valorizes secular societies over religious ones. I will return to the Inglehart-Norris argument when discussing gendered differences in policy preferences; however, for the time being, I will use Goldin's argument, which focuses on the gendered comparative advantage in production technologies in discussing changes gender norms along the modernization trajectory.

Conclusions

A study of Indonesian history and culture emphasizes the need for an analysis of household dynamics that takes into consideration the respect Indonesian society places on motherhood. Despite differences between patrilineal and matrilineal organization, the communal aspect of Indonesian society demands that scholars apply a different lens to the analysis of household dynamics than they would when studying the West. The communal aspect of Indonesian society also calls into question the validity of the McElroy-Horney or Manser-Brown methods of bargaining power, as it is may be likely that the Common Preference Model is a more valid representation of family dynamics. This is because the McElroy-Horney and Manser-Brown models are based on the underlying assumption that not only do spouses have preferences that are separate and distinct, but also that those preferences are self-interested, rather than concerned with the overall well-being of the family. The Common Preference models, however flawed in Western society may better represent the nature of Indonesian families, as the maternal focus on the family makes it likely that the spouses would put the interests of the family first,

and therefore, unless the two spouses have vastly contrasting ideas regarding how to best promote the general familial welfare, their preferences could likely be represented by a sole utility curve, rather than a utility curve for each spouse.

Indonesia's focus on motherhood also suggests the need to heavily incorporate the idea of benevolent sexism into any analysis of gender relations. As argued by many of the scholars cited in this literature review, the impact of idealization of women and motherhood calls into question the true egalitarian nature of seemingly gender equal policies and trends. Although mothers are deeply respected in Indonesian society, the respect for women does not necessarily translate to female agency. Therefore, if the judgment of levels of gender equality is based on female agency, the interpretation of motherhood as a woman's natural role diminishes the agency of women, thus jeopardizing the characterization of Indonesian gender patterns as equal between men and women. The remainder of this thesis will incorporate these findings and nuances into the empirical analysis found in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3: Analytical Methodologies

The data for my analysis comes from a survey conducted by Tufts University that examines barriers to women's employment in Indonesia. It contains basic demographic information, including gender and ethnicity, marital status, family composition, religion and work history. Also included in the data are psychological scenarios aimed at uncovering deep-seated sources of gendered biases in attitudes toward working women. However, because incorporation of the scenarios would limit my sample size for regression analysis, I will not be using them in my study.

The survey was administered in the fall of 2012 to 240 men and 547 women in North Sumatra and East Java, Indonesia. Twenty-eight enumerators from two Indonesian universities were sent into the field, going house to house to find adults who would be willing to participate in the survey. The enumerators were provided with a map of locations chosen specifically to allow for a representative sample of participants in each province, selecting households that fit the locational criteria on their map (Brown et al. 2013). While this thesis can exist as a stand-alone analysis, it is also part of this broader Tufts University research project examining barriers to women's employment.

Of the 790 survey respondents, 75 percent lived in a rural setting, while the remaining 25 percent lived in an urban setting. Participants were roughly evenly divided between East Java (58%) and North Sumatra (42%). Approximately half of the participants ethnically identified as Javanese (51%); 20 percent identified as Batak, 15 percent as Madura and 15 percent as other ethnicities. Eighty percent of respondents identifies as Muslim, with the next largest group identification being Protestantism (8%), followed by identification as Christian, more broadly (5 percent). 67 percent of the respondents were married. Because my analysis examines spousal

household decision-making, only the 67 percent of respondents who are married will be included in the following analyses. While relationships among extended family members and relationships between non-married couples also hold important insights regarding gender equality, those power relationships extend beyond the purview of this thesis.

Unfortunately, the survey data provides us with little information on the political behavior of the survey respondents. While I would ideally like to identify salient relationships between the study participants' household situations and their political tendencies, I only have data to focus on support for two progressive gender policies.

The universality of family, the household and gender warrants specific definitions for the terms I will be using in my thesis. For family, I will be relying on Koning's definition—family “refers to the interactions between people who are related by blood or marriage on matters of common concern (marriage, childbirth, financial matters, roles and responsibilities) and which usually take place within the realm that they share daily, i.e. the house or household” (Koning 2000: 182—182). This same definition will then be applied to the household. Although communal living and kinship patterns complicate the definition of the household, because this sample is limited to married couples, the kinship dynamic is minimized. Concisely, the household is “the basic residential unit in which economic production, consumption, inheritance, child rearing, and shelter are organized and carried out” (Haviland et al. 2011: 491).

Defining female agency is a more complicated task, particularly for cross-cultural analysis. Saptari discusses this complexity well, differentiating between agency defined by “the capability to minimize one's ability to undertake the tasks and duties allocated to a person” or “the ability to stretch the boundaries defining one's social space” (Saptari 2000: 20). Because women in Indonesian households are granted a great deal of ability to perform their household

duties, as they are limited to the domestic realm, I prefer the latter definition, focusing on defining one's own social space. Thus, in Indonesia, female agency would be characterized by the ability of a woman to expand her social space beyond both the home and the gender ideologies promoted by the New Order.

Finally, running throughout my analysis is the situation I have been referring to as the "separate spheres" argument. Because I am incorporating this dynamic into my overall argument, I must take a moment here to explicitly define it. "Separate spheres" refers to the situation fostered by both the New Order's gender ideology and Indonesian (particularly Javanese) cultural mindset in which women have more autonomy over the home than one might expect, yet are only allowed to operate within the confines of that home, rendering her submissive and without agency.

Because much of my analysis will be using categorical dependent variables, it requires logistic econometric methodology that will be detailed in this chapter. Below, I outline my methodologies for each analysis. In Chapter 4: Household Decision-Making Authority, I adopt a binary logit regression model. Chapter 5: Household Responsibilities and Chapter 6: Household Dynamics and Gendered Political Preferences both use an ordinal probit regression model. My explanation features a description of the models I have selected, the rationale for why I have chosen one model over another one, and brief background information necessary for interpreting the results of logistic regression analysis.

Binary Logit Regression Methodology

My analysis for Chapter 4 will be in the form of three binary logit regression models, each of which examines the probability that the respondent has a particular household decision-

making outcome. The first model analyzes the characteristics of shared household decision-making responsibilities, the second model analyzes the characteristics of unilateral household decision-making responsibilities, and the third analyzes the characteristics of no household decision-making responsibilities. In all three models, the outcome of decision-making responsibilities will be a binary dependent variable taking the value zero or one. A value of one indicates a positive outcome and a value of zero indicates a negative outcome. For example, if a respondent has a value of 1 for the shared decision-making responsibility model, then he or she shares decision-making responsibilities with his or her spouse.

For each possible household decision-making outcome, I will run a separate regression for men and women. This will not only illustrate the impact of gender on household decision-making outcomes, but will also allow me to analyze differences in the impact of the independent variables with respect to household decision-making outcomes. In a separate regression for men and women I can easily examine the effect of, for example, being the primary earner on the probability that the individual shares decision-making responsibilities. It is logical to hypothesize that because women are often not the primary earner, being the primary earner would have a stronger effect on household decision-making authority for women than it would for men. Examining separate regressions for men and women highlights these differences.⁶

The alternative method of examining differing returns based on gender is to regress both genders in the same model, using interaction terms and a gender dummy variable to assess significance and magnitude of the factors. In such a model, I would have to rely on a dummy

⁶Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) adopt a similar methodology in order to estimate the differential impact of labor market participation on household division of labor. The authors estimate the impacts of various factors on household division of labor using separately regressions for men and women in order to see how the household division of labor is affected differently by various factors for men and women. For similar methodologies, see “Gender Differences in Political and Civic Engagement among Young People,” (Niemi, Eichenberg & Portney 2009). All of these authors present results for men and women separately to facilitate a comparison of the differential impact of independent variables.

variable for female gender that will isolate the magnitude and significance of the female effect on household decision-making outcomes. Additionally, I would need to incorporate interaction terms to judge varying effects of the independent variables for men and women. Because the use of interaction terms unnecessarily complicates my analysis, I will simply provide two separate regressions for men and women.

My analysis in Chapter 4 will take the form of a nonlinear probability model, as opposed to a latent variable model. While a latent variable model allows for more of a continuum in values for the binary dependent variable, it is easier in this case to adopt a model in which the value of the independent variables is related to the probability of an event happening; in this case, the probability that the respondent has or does not have specific levels of household decision-making authority. While a latent variable model would mathematically create different levels of decision-making authority between 0 (no possibility that an individual has that decision-making outcome) and 1 (a guarantee that an individual has that decision making outcome), the nonlinear probability model is equally advantageous, as it uses the probability of particular outcomes to derive odds of how often an event will happen relative to how often it will not happen. This is advantageous because it constricts all possible outcomes to values between 0 and 1. Other empirical models do not restrict the values to points between 0 and 1 which, when working with probabilities, leads to unrealistic results. Because it is impossible to have a probability of making cooperative decisions less than 0 percent or greater than 100 percent, it is necessary to adopt a binary logit probability model to correct for this.

Binary regression models differ from the linear regression models because they do not assume linearity in the parameters. Thus, interpretation of the coefficients is less straightforward than in linear regression models. In short, “the magnitude of the change in the outcome

probability that is associated with a given change in one of the independent variables depends on the levels of all the independent variables” (Long and Freese 2006: 131). While the coefficients provide an overall picture of the relationships and trends present in the data, the analysis of more specific relationships between the independent variables and household decision-making authority require an analysis of changes in predicted probability over the range of the independent variables.

The model for household decision-making authority went through several forms before settling on binary logistic regression. Initially, I took the three possible household decision-making outcomes and combined them into a scale. A value of 1 indicated that the individual had no decision-making authority, a value of 2 indicated that the individual made decisions together with a spouse while a value of 3 indicated that the individual made unilateral decisions. While this provided me with a range of household decision-making authority, I felt it masked many trends. In Indonesian society, where women have shared decision-making authority in the household, yet not in society, my results cannot be viewed as a continuum. Furthermore, despite the complications of Indonesian gender patterns discussed in Chapter 2, from a normative perspective, I believe that emphasis must be placed on shared decision-making authority. Although female empowerment is a main motivator for this thesis, ideally that would be expressed in the form of joint decision-making as opposed to the female possessing unilateral decision-making power. If conclusions from my thesis could be used to inform NGO and government initiatives to increase female empowerment within the home, it is most useful to have an understanding of the characteristics that positively impact the probability of making household decisions together so these programs could most effectively promote female empowerment.

Alternatively, I could also have adopted a multinomial logit model, which simultaneously estimates binary logit regressions for all outcomes. However, a multinomial logic model automatically assigns one outcome to be the base outcome. For example, the outcome of making no household decisions might be the base outcome and the other two models would be compared against that outcome. While this is valuable in some instances, using a base outcome would not allow me to see the coefficients and magnitude of the independent variables for that outcome. Additionally, I felt as if assigning a particular outcome as the base outcome would unavoidably incorporate my own preconceived perceptions regarding household decision-making outcomes. As with any preconceived idea, this could potentially conceal some trends that I had not anticipated, thus limiting my ability to view the model comprehensively and allow myself the opportunity to find completely unexpected results from my analysis. Therefore, I chose to show three binary logistic regression models for each possible outcome. The results of the multinomial regression are contained in Appendix A and confirm the empirical findings of the three binary logistic regression models reported in Chapter 4.

Ordinal Probit Regression Methodology

The analyses in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are in the form of ordinal probit regression models. An ordinal probit regression model codes the dependent variable in integers from “1 to the number of categories” (Long and Freese 2006: 183). Although initially a standard linear regression model also seems appropriate for ordinal variables, it is impossible in this situation to assess the validity of the assumption of equal distances between categories, which is a necessary assumption for a linear regression model. The ordinal probit regression model is nonlinear in its parameters. Therefore, as with the binary logit model used in Chapter 4, readers should take

caution when interpreting the magnitude of the change in the outcome probabilities expressed in the regression tables.

Chapter 5 examines household responsibilities, specifically doing housework and taking care of the children. The dependent variable, expressed as a three-category ordinal variable, indicates how many domestic responsibilities the respondent undertook in the past week. A value of 1 indicates that the respondent neither did housework nor took care of the children, a value of 2 indicates that the respondent either did housework or took care of the children but did not do both, and a value of 3 indicates that the respondent either did housework or took care of the children. In short, the consecutive integers represent household responsibilities of low (or nonexistent), medium and high. The potential problems with this measurement are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, but in short, the survey does not provide us with a mutually exclusive measurement of time. In other words, although a respondent may have done both housework and cared for the children in the past week, it does not mean that he or she did not participate in market work, and with the information available from the survey, it is impossible to come up with a measure of domestic responsibilities that shows the time spent on domestic work relative to the time spent on market work. However, because doing housework and caring for the children are a time constraints regardless of work conducted outside the home, it is still an interesting analysis in its own right.

In Chapter 6, the dependent variable will represent support for progressive gender policies. Respondents were given the option of responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” along a 7-point scale. Although in this case the dependent variable looks like a continuous variable, because we cannot make assumptions about similarities between the distances of each possible response, an ordinal categorical model is less problematic. For

example, we cannot assume any relative numeric relationship between “strongly agree” and “agree.” Although the variable is expressed on a 7-point scale, we have no evidence to support the conclusions that a respondent who “strongly agrees” with gender quotas is $1/7^{\text{th}}$ more supportive of them than a respondent who “agrees” with gender quotas.

In both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, it is reasonable to assume that the responses are ordered correctly. In Chapter 5, each level of household responsibility represents more completion of more chores than the preceding level; proper ordering is therefore unambiguous. Similarly, in Chapter 6, each subsequent category indicates more support for progressive gender policies.

The following chapters contain the empirical analysis of the data, using the methodologies in this chapter to examine the findings and observations contained in the literature review and available from the Tufts University dataset.

Chapter 4: Household Decision-Making Authority

Through a state-driven gender alignment process, the literature suggests that gender ideology in Indonesia allows women control over the home. Although every family is different, and personal characteristics result in variations on the dominant familial structure, in typical Indonesian families, the husband provides for the family, while the wife controls the income. It is the wife who controls the finances, although it is unclear if she simply manages the domestic accounts or if she also makes expenditure decisions. This chapter will examine this facet of household dynamics, determining which spouse makes the expenditure decisions and which factors contribute to the distribution of household decision-making authority between the husband and the wife.

From an economic perspective, individuals make expenditure decisions based on a combination of budget constraints and personal preferences for consumption. Taking these two factors together, individuals choose to consume a basket of goods that is within their budget, yet also allows them to achieve the maximum amount of utility from their consumption. Because the empirical literature disproves the claim that household consumption preferences can be mapped using the preferences of a single household member, household expenditure decisions should instead be viewed as the outcome of a negotiation in which the two spouses advocate for their own consumption point before negotiating to a point that satisfies both members of the marriage. In using this rational economic perspective, it is logical that the one who earns the money, typically the husband, would be the one who would have more control. This perspective, however, must be reconciled with the Indonesian norm in which the woman is awarded control over the domestic realm.

The study of household expenditure decisions can provide important insights into the study of relative power within marriages, helping to illuminate how power dynamics rooted in gender attitudes might serve as constraints on a woman's time and movement. By incorporating variables that encapsulate a multitude of demographic factors, including economic indicators, political culture, religion and psychological perspectives on gender, the regression analyses in this chapter propose a more comprehensive model of decision-making authority that weighs the significance of socioeconomic and cultural characteristics on household negotiations.

Thus, the Indonesian cultural context demands that I depart from a Westernized notion of power when examining the data. Hence, the model of household decision-making authority will be analyzed in light of the Indonesian gender norm that women control the finances.

Furthermore, household decision-making patterns in which the husband and the wife share decision-making responsibility, or in which the wife controls the household expenditure decisions should not be described as egalitarian household arrangements; under the separate spheres arrangement, female control over the home is not indicative of gender equality in Indonesian culture and politics. I define household decision-making authority as the share of input the respondent enjoys regarding decisions about spending the family income, measured in three discrete levels of input ranging from no input to unilateral decision-making.

This chapter provides an overview and justification of my logistic regression models of household decision-making authority. As stated in Chapter 3, the first regression examines the probability that the respondent makes decisions cooperatively with his or her spouse. The second models the probability that the respondent makes decisions alone, and the third models the probability that the respondent does not have any input in household expenditure decisions. The findings show that level of education, benevolent sexism and economic indicators including

monthly family income and breadwinner status are the most significant correlates of household decision-making patterns. I will argue that my model of household decision-making authority confirms the cultural attitudes of Javanese society and the New Order gender ideology, but adds to this understanding of the cultural framework by identifying the relationship between benevolent sexism and household decision-making authority. Moreover, one can take from this analysis several important conclusions. First, despite Indonesian cultural norms that assign women control over household finances, there is a prevailing norm in which men make decisions regarding household expenditures. Second, although it is tempting to view deciding together as an indicator of egalitarianism within the home, one must refrain from doing so, as this norm may be the result of benevolent sexism and thus still perpetuates gender inequality. Finally, although there exists a culturally determined familial equilibrium where women play a role in making household expenditure decisions, particular socioeconomic factors, such as education or being the primary earner, result in movements away from this equilibrium point. In cases where this is true, the result may actually be a higher degree of female agency, as the woman's household position is determined by individual characteristics, not cultural norms.

Empirical Measurements

The analysis of household expenditure decisions will be derived from a survey question that asks "who makes the decisions about how the family income will be spent?" Approximately 44 percent of married respondents say that they make decisions together with a spouse or another family member; the next most popular response was that the respondent makes decisions unilaterally in the household. While it would be ideal to have the responses of both spouses in the same household in order to compare perceptions of household decision-making authority

between the husband and the wife, this survey only interviewed one respondent per household. I therefore must assume that their responses are an accurate depiction of decision-making in the household.

Table 4.1: Who makes the decisions about how the family income will be spent? *Frequency and Percentage Responses of Married Survey Respondents*


Response	Frequency	Percentage
I do	142	31.2
My spouse does	102	22.4
Another family member	9	1.9
I make decisions together with my spouse or another family member.	202	44.4

When broken down by gender, a pattern emerges in which men are more likely to possess unilateral decision-making authority and women are more likely not to enjoy any decision-making authority at all. This pattern is depicted in Graph 4.1, found below. Thus, while control of the household finances is a responsibility that Indonesian culture attributes to women, there still exists a gender disparity wherein men are more likely to make unilateral decisions and women are more likely to surrender decision-making to their spouses, presenting a challenge for interpretation and a puzzle potential for the study of gender in Indonesia. If more men are saying that they control the finances, is there a slow movement away from the Javanese and New Order gender ideologies in which women are granted control over the domestic realm because their outside options are extremely limited? If so, as women's control of the domestic sphere erodes, is she given more agency to expand her sphere of influence to other realms, such as political arenas, or are shifting gender norms simply resulting in further political and social marginalization of Indonesian women? While part of this patterns accounted for by variation in

ethnicity, the gender ideology of the New Order was ethnic-specific, so we should expect more household decision-making authority from women regardless of ethnicity. Thus, if control of household finances and attention to detail are attributed to Indonesian women, not just Javanese women, the above trend still represents a deviation from the cultural norm and may indicate changing gender patterns as Indonesia urbanizes and modernizes and the New Order fades in Indonesia's political memory.

An alternative explanation is rooted in the differences between controlling the household finances and making household expenditure decisions. These results may provide preliminary evidence that although Indonesian women control the household for day-to-day operations, they lack financial control of decisions regarding how the household actually operates. However, because the survey question asks explicitly about decisions, this explanation is less likely; changing gender norms through modernization and the diminishment of New Order gender ideologies due to the fall of the regime are more likely.

Graph 4.1: Who makes the decisions about how the family income will be spent?
Percentage Responses of Married Male and Female Survey Respondents



The fact that the measure of household expenditure decision-making responsibilities is based on self-generated responses raises the concern of biased results. For example, if a respondent wished for the enumerator to view him or her as a strong authority within the household, he or she might exaggerate his or her influence in family income decisions. However, there is no relationship between gender of the survey enumerators, respondent gender, and household decision-making authority, so I assume that this potential bias is not a source of inaccuracy in my model.

Using household expenditure authority as my dependent variable, I examine the impact of various socioeconomic and cultural variables that can be theoretically hypothesized to impact household decision-making authority. From a socioeconomic perspective, age, education, urban residence, community of women working, bread-winner status and monthly family income will be regressed on household decision-making authority.

Age and education are both measured in yearly units. Urban status is measured using a dummy variable in which a value of 1 indicates that the respondent lives in an urban area. The community of women working is a discrete scale variable that can take the value from 0 to 5, with 0 representing a respondent answer that none of the women in his or her neighborhood work and 5 representing a respondent answer that all of the women in his or her neighborhood work. Breadwinner status is a dummy variable based on whether the respondents affirmatively answered the question “Are you the primary earner in your household?” The final socioeconomic variable is monthly family income, measured in millions of rupiahs.⁷

Together, these variables represent the impact of rational incentives on individuals regarding household decision-making authority, as they all change the ability of the respondent to participate in market work (education, age, and breadwinner status) or the environment in

⁷ One million Indonesian rupiah is equivalent to roughly one thousand US dollars

which the individual may participate in the labor market (urban status or community of working women). I hypothesize that breadwinners will have a greater likelihood of controlling the household income, as will those who are more educated, due to increased opportunities in the labor market. This effect should be greater for women, as it is a deviation from traditional gender roles (although this effect may be mitigated by the predominance of Javanese study participants).⁸ If working outside of the home is correlated with controlling the household income, I predict that as more women in the community work, the respondent will enjoy community externalities wherein female respondents will have more input into household expenditure decisions. Finally, I predict that urban status will decrease the likelihood of the woman controlling the finances, particularly in Javanese cultures. This is because I hypothesize that those in an urban environment would have weaker ties to culture and ritual, and that the ideal of Indonesian women controlling the finances will not be as prevalent a societal norm.

The cultural variables that I am examining are the impact of Islam, Javanese ethnicity, the endorsement of benevolent sexism, and endorsement? of gender essentialism on household decision-making authority. Islamic identification is represented by a dummy variable in which a value of 1 indicates a Muslim respondent. Likewise, Javanese ethnicity is represented by a dummy variable; respondents assigned a 1 identified as Javanese, while respondents assigned a 0 identify as other ethnicities, the most significant of which are Batak and Madura. Finally, the benevolent sexism variable represents a discrete scale variable that averages a respondent's reaction to scenarios that indicate the extent to which he or she endorse benevolent or hostile sexist gender notions. For the cultural reasons discussed in Chapter 2, I predict that Javanese ethnicity will be highly significant and positively correlated with the probability that a woman

⁸ The regressions were run both with and without survey weights. The results did not vary based on the weighting schemes.

controls the household finances or shares decision-making responsibility with her husband. However, I think this effect will be tempered for Muslim respondents; identification as Muslim should lower the probability that women make any financial decisions within the household, although the effect is likely to be insignificant due to the weak impact of Islam on identity for many areas of Indonesia, excluding Aceh. I predict that endorsing benevolent sexism will increase the likelihood that decision-making responsibility is shared for both men and women, as respondents may view sharing decision-making responsibility with men as rightfully helping potentially incapable women complete their household duties. Finally, higher levels of gender essentialism should be correlated with traditional gender roles, in line with the separate spheres argument that is rationalized based on the natural role of women.

While the aforementioned variables can all be theoretically linked to household decision-making authority, due to the nature of this particular research topic, it is impossible to collect measures on all variables that could impact household decision-making authority. Many of these variables are unobservable and would require intensive observation sessions of the interactions between the respondent and his or her spouse. For example, the survey itself cannot provide us with measurements of how intimidation or fear might play into household decision-making authority. More qualitative research methods may be helpful in gathering information regarding the nuances of the distribution of household decision-making authority among spouses, but these are tasks that must await future research.

Presentation of Findings

Table 4.2 contains the results of my logistic regression model, with coefficients and significance levels next to the variable names and standard errors expressed below.

Table 4.2: Logistic Analysis of Household Decision-Making Authority

	Decide Together		Decide Alone		No Decisions	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Age	0.02 (0.03)	0.004 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
Education	0.19*** (0.10)	0.13**** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.09)	-0.15**** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.001 (0.05)
Urban	-0.63 (0.71)	-0.20 (0.43)	0.99* (0.67)	0.83** (0.49)	-0.65 (0.89)	-0.66* (0.47)
Islam	0.40 (0.83)	1.36**** (0.58)	-0.46 (0.72)	-0.06 (0.60)	0.21 (0.92)	-1.14**** (0.50)
Java	1.13*** (0.57)	0.80*** (0.36)	-0.66 (0.55)	0.02 (0.42)	-0.59 (0.67)	-0.86*** (0.37)
Benevolent Sexism	1.42**** (0.49)	0.13 (0.27)	-1.19**** (0.43)	0.34 (0.33)	-0.17 (0.48)	0.52** (0.28)
Women Working	-0.26 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.22)	0.31 (0.32)	0.07 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.16 (0.23)
Primary Earner	-1.03 (0.84)	0.17 (0.51)	1.34* (0.90)	1.01** (0.56)	-0.14 (0.95)	-1.47*** (0.69)
Monthly Family Income	0.07 (0.18)	0.26**** (0.09)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.24** (0.14)	-0.23 (0.26)	-0.13* (0.09)
Gender Essentialism	-0.14 (0.26)	-0.24* (2.12)	0.19 (.25)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.28)	0.57*** (0.24)
Constant	-9.73****	-3.03*	6.99***	-1.37	0.31	1.8
N	84	170	84	170	84	170
Pseudo R ²	0.24	0.13	0.18	0.13	0.09	0.13

*p<0.20; **p<0.10; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.01

Overall, female control within the household is still prevalent, represented by the likelihood of shared decision-making in the home. However, the New Order separate spheres ideology is less dominant than I might have expected. It is clear that cultural factors, such as Islam and Javanese ethnicity, are significant determinants of household decision-making authority. Nonetheless, because socioeconomic factors such as education, primary earner status and family income are still influential determinants of decision-making patterns, I am unable to assert that Indonesians are motivated primarily by cultural or rational responses to socioeconomic variables in terms of household decision-making.

The relationships between independent factors and household decision-making authority provide us with many insights regarding private dynamics within Indonesian homes, while at the same time, the overall model allows us to supplement current understandings of Indonesian household patterns by incorporating a diverse range of variable, including psychological attitudes toward gender. When viewed comprehensively, the model confirms the unique aspects of Indonesian gender ideology discussed in the literature review; Javanese men and women are much more likely to have shared decision-making patterns, and Javanese women are significantly less likely to make no decisions within the household. However, as the literature effectively conveys, gender relations within the Javanese community are ambiguous, and one should be wary to interpret household patterns in which women make decisions as representative of societal egalitarian gender relations.

The specification of psychological indicators helps give new insight to the ambiguity of female empowerment in Indonesian families. For male respondents, the endorsement of benevolent sexism is positively correlated with an increased likelihood of making shared decisions and a decreased likelihood of making unilateral decisions, and this relationship is

significant even at the 1% threshold. These findings result in two conclusions. First, they establish the need for more research to be done regarding the linkages between seemingly egalitarian relationships and the endorsement of benevolent sexism. Second, the significance of the relationship for men between benevolent sexism and household decision-making authority may imply that female participation in household decision-making is still dictated by men and thus still leaves women little space for exerting their own agency. Thus, my empirical findings point to the endorsement of benevolent sexism as an explanation of and solution to the ambiguity of Indonesian gender roles and the attitudes that accompany the separate spheres conceptualization of gender norms.

Surprisingly, the parameters for age and the number of women in the community who work are generally uninteresting. Although age is significant in one case, the magnitude is very minimal. This indicates that there is not a strong generational effect and that Indonesian household arrangements are not shifting rapidly. The insignificance of working women in the neighborhood suggests a lack of community externalities on household decision-making patterns.

Urban residence significantly increases the likelihood that both men and women will make unilateral decisions in their household. This points to an urban environment in which there is a sole decision-maker in the families, suggesting that spouses in urban families may be more autonomous than in rural ones. The nature of agrarian production versus technological production may shed some insight on this trend; in many situations, agrarian production relies on the entire family to dedicate time and energy to its economic livelihood, whereas in an urban environment, it is more likely that a husband or wife will go to the factory and work, minimizing the communal aspect of living. More research certainly needs to be done on this topic.

Practicing Islam is insignificant for men in all cases or for determining the possession of unilateral decision-making rights for both genders. It is, however, a significant predictor of shared decision-making authority for women and a negative predictor of no decision-making for women. While this contrasts with popular understandings of the intersection of gender and Islam, it is possible that only dominant groups, such as Islamic political opposition groups, espouse those ideals in Indonesia, while for individuals, Islam is either not a significant determinant of one's actions or relative control in certain social situations, or simply serves to amplify other cultural and political forces that would result in shared decision-making within the home. Support for this finding can be found in Blackburn's (2004) argument that Indonesian Islam is not a foundation of Indonesian identity.

Education, primary earner and monthly family income shed light on the impact of socioeconomic status and labor market potential on household decision-making authority. Education increases the likelihood that both men and women will make household expenditure decisions together with a spouse; conversely it decreases the likelihood that men and women will make decisions alone. This suggests that those with higher levels of education (and thus presumably more labor market opportunities) tend to share household decision-making responsibilities more evenly. This is likely because those with higher levels of education are more likely to be thought of as organized or competent with money or that they are more likely to respect the opinion of others. "Psychological autonomy," used by Inglehart and Norris (2003: 90) to explain the impact of education on gender norms, may also explain the significance of education. However, in light of Indonesian cultural norms, where shared decision-making authority may not necessarily be viewed as egalitarian, it is unlikely that this concept is a useful explanation.

Both breadwinner status and family monthly income have noteworthy results. Monthly family income increases the likelihood of women making decisions together or making no decisions, while it and decreases the likelihood that women will make unilateral decisions. When viewed in light of the fact that Indonesian women are assumed to control the finances, this may indicate that this is a traditional value held by upper classes. Families with lower income, who are likely of lower classes, may not endorse this mentality as much as families in upper classes who are more focused on tradition and propriety and would likely have had greater connections with the New Order regime.

When a woman is the primary earner, she is much less likely to make no decisions. Both men and women who are the primary earners are more likely to make unilateral decisions regarding household expenditures. This indicates that although Indonesian women culturally control the finances, who earns the income nonetheless has a powerful impact on who is able to spend it.

Before concluding, I must discuss the final puzzle from my regression analysis. The indicator of gender essentialism, significant in lowering the female probability of making shared household decisions and in raising the female probability of make no household decisions, behaves inversely to my predictions, and requires further analysis from two perspectives. First, gender essentialism is only a significant predictor of household decision-making authority for women, signifying that women, potentially more so than men, believe in the idea that gender is a crucial part of one's identity and its characterizations are intrinsic and natural. If this can be applied to the study of separate gendered spheres in Indonesian society, then it is likely that women play an important role in perpetuating this societal arrangement, given their belief in natural, proper roles for men and women. Second, because the concept of the natural role of

women and the intersection between femininity and domesticity is such as prevailing ideal in Indonesian culture, I expected the endorsement of gender essentialism to be very highly correlated with shared decision-making, or to indicate female dominance within the home. The fact that it does not behave this way may point to a changing norm in Indonesian society in which women surrender to men control over both the public and the private spheres. However, because the concept of gender essentialism is only one aspect of this analysis, more research needs to be to make that claim conclusively.

Conclusions

This regression analyses in this chapter provide a potential explanation for the ambiguities regarding gender norms in Indonesian, especially Javanese, families. While the findings are not conclusive, the importance of benevolent sexism strongly suggests that there are psychological attitudes underpinning the ambiguity of Indonesian gender dynamics. Also, the empirical analysis simultaneously confirms the existence of strong gendered household patterns in Indonesian households and potentially suggests that the New Order gender ideology has diminished slightly in recent years to allow men more control over the household. It is unclear if this slight deviation in gender norms has resulted in an expansion of female agency to the public realm.

Two additional patterns of interest emerged from this analysis. First, although cultural factors, such as Javanese ethnicity, increase the likelihood that women play an important role in decision-making regarding household expenditures, it is clear that the society rests at an equilibrium point in which the men make the household decisions more often than expected

given the New Order's gender ideology.⁹ This suggests that gender norms are dynamic; since the fall of the New Order, households are experiencing reorganization in order to align with gender norms propagated by different regimes and religious forces. Second, both socioeconomic and cultural factors play important roles in determining household decision-making authority.

It is tempting to view the findings contained in the regression analysis from two different perspectives. On the one hand, from the Indonesian contextual perspective, the factors that increase the likelihood of shared decision-making in the home can be viewed as perpetuating the dichotomous, New Order gender ideology in which the woman controls the home. In this case, Islam, Javanese ethnicity and the endorsement of benevolent sexism would be viewed as factors that preserve societal male dominance by granting women domestic control in exchange for public submission. On the other hand, if the pervasiveness of the New Order, "separate spheres" model of gender relations is diminishing, then socioeconomic factors such as education, being the primary earner and increased levels of family income, although effectively results in the same outcomes as the cultural factors, in fact increase egalitarian relationships. Thus, this gives us two alternating interpretations of the data. When the likelihood of shared decision-making patterns is increased by cultural factors, it points to the dominance of traditional Indonesian gender norms and should not be viewed as egalitarian. On the other hand, when the likelihood of shared decision-making outcomes is positively impacted by socioeconomic factors, such as increased levels of education, then it is possible that these household decision-making patterns actually represent a move toward more egalitarian, less rigid gender roles in Indonesian society.

From a policy standpoint, these findings have important implications. Some factors that significantly influence deviation from the traditional distribution of decision-making responsibilities, namely benevolent sexism and Javanese ethnicity, are relatively static variables

⁹ This finding is supported by the results of a multinomial logistical regression analysis

that do not leave much room for intervention on the part of governments and non-governmental organizations looking to mainstream gender as part of economic and political development strategies. However, the significance of being a female primary earner suggests that there is potential for decision-making gains from female labor market participation.

As previously discussed, household decision-making authority falls short of acting as a proxy for household bargaining power. Not only does control over household finances fail to provide us with a clear sense of the distribution of power within the household due to Indonesian-specific gender roles, but it also fails to illuminate the beneficiary of household expenditure decisions. Without itemized information describing how household income is spent, it is impossible to tell if the one making the decisions regarding household expenditure is the one benefitting from those decisions. Two situations are easily conceivable—the first in which the wife makes decisions regarding household expenditure and spends a disproportionate amount of money on items that will only benefit herself, the second in which the wife makes decisions regarding household expenditures and spends a disproportionate amount of money on items that will only benefit her spouse or will benefit the entire family. While the latter pattern could be because the wife is altruistic, it could also be because she fears the consequences of spending an exorbitant amount of money on herself. In the latter case, the distribution of household bargaining power can be disputed. While spouse A might tangibly make expenditure decisions, it is misleading to assign the decision-making authority or bargaining power to that spouse because he or she is not benefitting from the decisions.

Although the findings in this chapter have important insights for understanding private divisions of authority, their salience is slightly undermined by questions of causality. Without further information and more qualitative research methods, it is impossible to argue conclusively

that the factors in the models are the causes of household distribution of authority, rather than a byproduct of it. While ethnicity, education, gender and religion can arguably be assumed to be exogenous to household decision-making patterns, primary earner status, benevolently sexist mindsets and potentially urban residence (if urban residence is due to recent migration) could all be outcomes of household negotiations and therefore could be determined by household authority, rather than the cause of it.

In short, the findings in this chapter are of great interest to those looking to understand not only how decisions are made in Indonesian households from a gendered perspective but also how cultural norms, such as the attribution of control over finances to women, must be analyzed in light of both hostile and benevolent sexism. Nonetheless, the findings must be interpreted with caution due to potential survey bias, cultural bias, and varying interpretations of household power.

Chapter 5: Household Division of Tasks

The previous chapter was primarily concerned with the individual respondent's perception of authority within the household, specifically concerning household expenditures and spending family income. This chapter will attempt to confirm the findings of Chapter 4 and further seeks to provide a more nuanced portrayal of household dynamics in Indonesian families by analyzing the determinants of household division of tasks. When taken together, Chapters 4 and 5 will not only provide an empirical glimpse of Indonesian families that reinforces many analyses of Indonesian gender roles, but also will propose a tentative hypothesis regarding female agency within Indonesian households contextually based both in the ambiguity of Indonesian gender identities and the findings of my regression analyses. I provide additional support for the separate spheres argument, finding that the division of household tasks is much less ambiguous than household decision-making authority. Indonesian households exist at an equilibrium point in which the women perform the domestic work while the men work outside the home.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Indonesian society, both culturally and politically, places tremendous importance on the natural role of the woman. Not only is she responsible for tending to the home, but she is also given the burden of symbolically securing and improving the future of Indonesia by rearing children to be proper Indonesian citizens (Tiwon 2000). Because women throughout the world conduct the majority of unpaid domestic chores, it is important to understand what factors are driving this pattern and to accurately assess the factors determining the division of household chores. These moral and domestic obligations pose a tremendous time constraint on women seeking to work outside the household. As unpaid household work has the high opportunity cost of foregoing wage labor and experience in the work force, it limits the

outside option for those performing the household work. Further, those working primarily in the home become less valuable to the labor force as they lose the skills necessary to work outside the home in favor of the skills used in domestic work.

Household division of tasks is also used as a revealed preferences strategy of analyzing household bargaining power.¹⁰ More clearly, this means that a comparison of labor market potential and domestic work should allow us to hypothesize if women are making the choices to work domestically themselves or if the choice is made for them due to their lack of agency. However, using the division of household tasks as a measurement of household bargaining power is not without biases, many of which preclude using this particular household dynamic as a unit of analysis. Many of these biases are rooted in normative assumptions of household tasks, most importantly that household responsibilities are seen to be inferior to wage or salaried work, and that completing the majority of household responsibilities is evidence that the household worker has lost a negotiation and prefers to work outside the home.

Despite these challenges, it should still be possible to gain some insight into the power dynamics that contribute to the gendered household division of labor. Two areas of analysis will assist us in gathering an intuitive sense of the relationship between female agency and the household division of power. First, the extent to which socioeconomic or cultural factors dictates household responsibilities will provide insights into female agency. If empirical analysis determines that cultural factors are more significant determinants of female household ???than socioeconomic factors, one might be able to tentatively hypothesize that the pattern is due to societal norms, as opposed to female agency. This is because cultural factors, much more than socioeconomic factors, are part of an individual's socialization process regarding gender identity,

¹⁰ See Inglehart and Norris (2006) for a discussion of household bargaining power and gendered division of household labor.

and if the culture instilled in women from a young age the belief that it is their natural duty to cultivate the home, it diminishes the likelihood that the woman chose domestic work over labor market work entirely independently. Second, the significance level of socioeconomic factors, particularly education, will provide us with insight into the relationship between labor market opportunity and household division of tasks. Although my analysis comes from a Western perspective, I believe that women with higher levels of education, which here is serving as a proxy for labor market opportunities, should perform significantly fewer household chores. This is because individuals, when not socialized according to gender norms, should respond rationally to economic incentives. In this case, women with greater education levels should enjoy more labor market opportunities. Thus, women with higher levels of education have a higher opportunity cost of foregoing or reducing labor market participation in order to tend to the household. If these women are responding rationally to economic incentives, there should be a significant negative correlation between education levels and household responsibilities. I do not expect this relationship to hold true in all cases because many women with a multitude of labor market opportunities forego paid work in favor of unpaid domestic work voluntarily. However, enough individuals should respond rationally to the education or labor market incentive for the relationship to be significant.

This chapter seeks to explain the factors that determine which spouse performs the household chores and childcare. While the study of household decision-making authority has important insights for policies aimed at gender equality and female empowerment, examining the household division of labor might have even more salient implications for policy initiatives designed to increase female agency both within and outside of the home. My findings present a Beckerian household equilibrium in which women perform domestic work while men work

outside the home. While culture dictates the likelihood of Beckerian patterns, socioeconomic variables influence deviations from the female dominated household, suggesting that the domestic focus of women may indicate a lack of agency.

In this chapter, I again confirm the equal significance of both socioeconomic and cultural variables, finding that both time or market constraints and cultural frameworks impact the level of household responsibility assumed by the individual. I will argue that the division of household responsibilities is driven by three important factors: Javanese ethnicity, having a child at home, and having a spouse who works in the government. While many factors appear to contribute to this societal and domestic equilibrium, only having a husband who works for the government, women's age and living in a community in which many women work push female Indonesian respondents out of the equilibrium, and living in an urban environment, education and age push men away from this equilibrium closer to a point of shared domestic work.

Empirical Measures of Division of Tasks


It is useful to begin by describing the gendered household division of labor present in Indonesian families. The central variable describing the distribution of activities that make up the respondent's week asks "During the past week, how have you spent your time?" The responses are distributed in the following table.

Table 5.1: During the past week, how did you spend your time?
Frequency and Percentages of Responses

	Frequency	Percent of Responses
Work outside your family home, farm or business	140	16.8%
Work in a family enterprise or farm	104	12.5%
Go to school	26	3.1%
Care for children	225	27%
Household	252	30.3%
Temporarily not work	36	4.3%
Look for work	16	1.9%
Don't know	25	3%
Don't want to answer	8	0.9%

The plurality majority of respondents indicated that at some point in the past week they had cared for the children or done housework. This is unsurprising, given that the majority of the respondents in the sample were female. When separated into male and female respondents, in Graph 5.1, the gendered disparity between market work and domestic work emerges.¹¹

Graph 5.1: Gendered Differences in Time Spent during the Past Week
Percentage Frequency of Responses



¹¹ The results of a weighted tabulation are similarly distributed.

Graph 5.1 highlights the gendered division of labor of households in Indonesia. From my data, it is evident that the household equilibrium in Indonesian families is one in which the wife performs housework and takes care of the children and the husband earns a wage, either outside the home or in a for-profit family enterprise. The non-mutually-exclusive nature of this question neither prohibits the possibility that women both performed housework and worked outside the home¹² nor implies that the respondent did the housework and the respondent's spouse did none of the housework. However, the responses in the data demonstrate patterns that are worth analyzing in their own right, regardless of how many of the listed tasks an individual respondent performed on a given day.

While a continuous measure of the percentage of time spent on household tasks would be an excellent dependent variable, using the Women in Leadership survey, I will be relying on a scaled dependent variable that simply asks whether the respondent cared for the children or did domestic chores in the past week. Although this does not give a clear, quantitative picture of how the respondent spends his or her time, domestic responsibilities, regardless of the amount of time one spends on them, are a time constraint that limits potential to work outside of the home.

An additional methodological concern is the fact that the measure of household division of responsibilities only asks the respondents how they spent their time the past week, rather than how they spent their time on a more habitual basis. While this is certainly not the ideal measurement, both for the lack of specificity discussed above and the fact that the possible responses are not mutually exclusive, I am not concerned about taking the respondents' time use for the past week as representative of their overall time use. While some respondents will likely

¹² Respondents had the option of selecting any that apply in this particular question, so having performed housework or taken care of the kids does not preclude the possibility that they also worked outside the home. is there not a separate variable that simply asks if respondent has a job or not? Sorry...too lazy to go look in dataset

have spent their time this past week differently from how they spend their time regularly, there is no particular reason why this distribution would be correlated with any of the independent variables. Therefore, I am comfortable assuming that any inconsistencies between measurement of time spent in the past week and overall time spent on household work will be randomized and thus will not pose a problem for the inferences drawn from the empirical analysis.

In order to empirically account for gendered differences in household responsibilities, I will regress level of household responsibilities on socioeconomic and cultural variables. By accounting for both socioeconomic variables, such as age, education, urban residence, the number of working women in the community, the presence of a child at home and the sector of spousal work and cultural variables, such as religion, ethnicity and endorsement of benevolent sexist ideals, I can attempt to disentangle the impact of and relationship between tangible forces, including labor market opportunities and time constraints, and cultural forces that are more difficult to analyze objectively.

The relationship between labor market availability and household work is well documented, as is the Beckerian body of economic literature that advocates the division of household works based on comparative advantage. Thus, the socioeconomic variables in my model will serve as an indicator of the individual's comparative advantage, labor market opportunities and time constraints. Older ages suggests that the respondent likely has familial obligations but also might suffer from age discrimination in the labor market. This results in a hypothesized increased responsibility of having greater household responsibilities for women and a decreased responsibility for men, reflective of their wives' increased levels of household work. Likewise, increased levels of education should indicate greater labor opportunities for both men and women, and men should have more household responsibilities, while women should

have fewer. However, culturally this might not hold true, as better-educated women might be of a higher class in which women do not need to work out of necessity. Additionally, whether the spouse works in the public sector provides us with an understanding of the social status of the respondent, helping illuminate structural and class-based constraints on the respondent's time and labor market opportunities.

The socioeconomic variable of urban residence could behave in two competing ways. The first represents the model of urbanization in which men and women in the city enjoy greater incomes, have access to more labor market opportunities, and benefit from a plentiful supply of domestic workers. In contrast, domestic responsibilities in urban settings could be impacted by a recent urbanization trend, in which those living in the city during this particular time in Indonesia's developmental timeline exhibit more traditional gender patterns due to the nature of technological production in urban environments (Goldin 1994). This effect could also be reflected in the variable indicating how many women in the neighborhood work. If household patterns change in response to changing work patterns for women, as more women work, the local community could move toward adopting a more evenly distributed division of household labor.

From a socioeconomic perspective, the final variable of interest is whether the respondent has a child at home. Because child-rearing is highly labor-intensive and the mother is often seen as having the comparative advantage due to biological and socialization factors, having a child at home should significantly increase the likelihood that the woman performs both household and takes care of the children. When approached from an Indonesian contextual perspective, however, having a child at home might have a cultural effect; when the women in the sample

have children at home, they might more strongly endorse the Indonesian emphasis on motherhood and thus be more likely to perform domestic tasks.

I omitted monthly family income from my analysis because it was too highly correlated with other independent variables, namely having a spouse who works for the government. I prefer to examine having a spouse who works for the government because it not only allows me to examine family income (and thus class) effects on household division of labor, but also allows me to tentatively analyze how state welfare policies and the mentality that women's groups such as the Dharma Wanita may have on families in the public sector.

Culturally, I wish to examine the impact of religion, ethnicity, sexist attitudes and gender essentialism on the household division of tasks. Because women are thought to pay more attention to detail and should be protected in the domestic sphere, it is likely that the endorsement of benevolent sexism should decrease the likelihood of having household responsibilities for women and increase it for men. Additionally, I will be examining a variable indicating whether the respondent is Muslim and whether the respondent is Javanese. In accordance with ethnic culture, I expect Javanese ethnicity to be positively correlated with traditional gender roles within the home. Similarly, I predict that practicing Islam will reinforce traditional gender roles regarding division of labor. Again, I expect the endorsement of gender essentialism to be correlated with traditional division of labor, despite the fact that the findings in Chapter 4 provided little support for the relationship between gender essentialism and the separate spheres of Indonesian gender ideology. When taken together, these two families of variables will not only illustrate the different determinants of the gendered division of household labor for men and women, but will also help illuminate the extent to which female agency is exerted in determining that division of labor.

Structurally, I expect the male and female regressions to be the inverse of each other. Although the sample does not contain responses from a husband and wife, it stands to reason that the patterns in the sample that increase the likelihood that a woman will perform housework will decrease the likelihood that a man will perform housework, as there is generally a finite amount of housework, and an increase in one household member's domestic workload should result in a decrease in that of the other member.

Presentation of Findings

The regression model below is in the form of ordinal probit logistic regression. Representative of a rigorous specification process, I believe that the following model most effectively illustrates the relationship between socioeconomic and cultural factors and the amount of household work conducted weekly by the respondent. In order to analyze varying factor returns to the division of household labor with respect to gender, I developed separate models for men and women.

The results table represents the logistical coefficients, with the standard errors below in parenthesis. Levels of significance are indicated by the (*) symbols. The first column represents the findings for men and the second column represents the findings for women.

Table 5.2: Ordinal Probit Logistic Regression Analysis of Household Responsibilities

	Males	Females
Age	0.03* (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)
Education	0.09*** (0.05)	-0.07*** (0.03)
Urban	0.73*** (0.35)	0.65** (0.25)
Islam	0.31 (0.47)	-0.02 (0.24)
Java	-0.51* (0.34)	0.59**** (0.19)
Benevolent Sexism	0.41* (0.26)	0.23* (0.14)
Women Working	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.38** (0.12)
Child at Home	-0.68** (0.36)	0.37** (0.20)
Spouse Government Work	-5.21 (499.1)	-0.87**** (0.29)
Gender Essentialism	-0.16 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.09)
N	130	287
Pseudo R ²	0.20	0.15

*p<0.2; **p<0.1; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.01

Beckerian household arrangements are evident in this empirical analysis. For women, having a child at home, endorsing benevolent sexism, living in an urban environment and identifying as ethnically Javanese lead to increased probabilities of having Beckerian household

arrangements; analogously, for men, having a child at home, and identifying as ethnically Javanese significantly result in completing less housework. Deviations from this equilibrium are determined by age and education for both genders, living in an urban environment and endorsement of benevolent sexism for men and living in a community with a high number of working women and having a spouse who works in the government for women.

This regression model provides us with interesting insights into the determinants of levels of household responsibilities between married Indonesian couples, some highly intuitive and others less so. Both socioeconomic and cultural factors certainly play important roles in determining the amount of household tasks that the individual undertook in the past week. However, I will argue that the combination of Javanese ethnicity, having a child at home and the endorsement of benevolent sexism for women suggests that the Beckerian arrangements are due to cultural, as opposed to either a rational analysis of comparative advantages or free choice on the part of the women. In terms of female agency, however, it is hopeful that socioeconomic factors, such as education, increase the likelihood of a more shared division of household responsibilities.

Age increases the likelihood that women do not perform both household tasks. This can potentially be attributed to the fact that older women likely have more access to domestic workers or are more likely to live with extended families in which daughters-in-law assume many of the household responsibilities. For men, education significantly increases the likelihood of doing some household tasks. This can be attributed to two potential explanations. First, men with higher levels of education are likely to marry women with higher levels of education.¹³ If women respond to economic incentives in the form of increased labor market opportunities, then

¹³ This is supported empirically. The correlation between respondent's level of education and spouse's level of education is 0.64.

perhaps men who are married to highly educated women assume some of the housework when their wives participate in paid work outside the home. The second is that education increases egalitarian values and that men with higher levels of education are more likely to favorably view sharing domestic responsibilities with his wife.

Urban residence increases the likelihood that men and women will perform household tasks. This indicates that urban men assume some household responsibilities, yet this increase in male responsibilities is not great enough to overtake an increase in female domestic responsibilities. However, without more targeted survey data, it is impossible to conclude whether this is due to personal preference or the nature of urban labor markets.

Having a spouse who works in the public sector significantly increases the likelihood that women will have performed no household tasks in the past week. This could be due to a class division in which those who belong to higher classes work for the government and thus have ample access to and ability to consume domestic help. However, in the context of Indonesian women's organizations, namely the Dharma Wanita, this is potentially contradictory. If the Dharma Wanita instills in its members the idea that motherhood and tending to the home is the most significant part of womanhood, and the wives of civic servants are members of Dharma Wanita, I would expect women with spouses in the public sector to perform more housework. Thus, the significance spousal public sector employment further supports the claim that this is a class effect and that those in the public sector have access to domestic help.

Having a child at home is significant across all model iterations. For men, it decreases the likelihood that they will perform household tasks, while increasing the likelihood that women will perform household tasks. This confirms the hypothesis that children serve as a major time constraint on female labor market participation and involvement outside of the home. The

relationship between having a child at home and performing household work for men could indicate that once a child is at home, the division of labor between men and women becomes even more stark, with men spending more time working outside of the home in order to provide for the family, while women spend more time providing for the children. This pattern confirms the Beckerian model of household division of labor.

Culturally, Javanese ethnicity is a highly significant predictor of performing household work and taking care of the children for women in the sample. This is in accordance with Javanese cultural norms, in which the mother is revered as the matriarch of the family and thus is more likely to work as a homebuilder.

Conclusions

The findings in this chapter indicate that Beckerian household arrangements are a deep-seated, unambiguous norm in Indonesian society that is much less fluid than the gendered patterns of household decision-making authority and strongly confirm the idea of “state ibuism” in Indonesian political culture. The distinction between socioeconomic factors and cultural ones allows me to come to a tentative conclusion that the unequal division of household responsibilities results largely from Indonesian culture and gender ideology propagated during the New Order. While I am not prepared to make a strong assertion that this suggests that the household division of labor is not determined by female agency, I do believe that my results imply that women have a limited cultural capacity to argue for reduced household responsibilities.

The distinctions between the model of household decision-making authority and that of household division of tasks indicate that the two facets of household bargaining power are not

compatible in the context of Indonesia families. Although it is impossible to ascertain which of the two is more indicative of household bargaining patterns and represents the outcome of a spousal negotiation, both models are interesting in their own right and have important implications for gender equality.

The measure of allocation of time found in this chapter is imperfect. It fails to provide us with an understanding of how much time is allocated to specific tasks and fails to truly give us an understanding of how much of a constraint is imposed on the respondent because of domestic responsibilities. Additionally, the absence of a precise measure of spousal domestic responsibilities makes it impossible to compare the amount of time the respondent spends on domestic chores compared to the respondent's spouse. Finally, the absence of a time diary prohibits both?? the verification of the respondent's time. Thus, although this model provides us with important insights into the correlates of allocation of responsibilities, it could be greatly improved with the availability of more precise measurements.

Chapter 6: Household Dynamics and Gendered Political Preferences

An important justification for this thesis lies in the exclusion of the study of private arrangements in political analysis. Thus, I would be remiss to omit a brief analysis of the political arena in my examination of Indonesian household dynamics. This chapter examines gendered differences in support for or opposition to progressive gender policies in order to provide a layer of analysis that connects private household dynamics to public political behavior, synthesizing the conclusions from models of household decision-making authority and division of household tasks in order to empirically identify the determinants of policy preferences regarding gender equality. Still, although the findings in this chapter offer only tentative conclusions regarding the interaction between household dynamics and political behavior principally, the analysis does succeed in establishing the rationale for further research in this area.

The literature on personal, private determinants of political preferences approaches the analysis of families similarly to that of household bargaining power. It argues for the need to study individual policy preferences, rather than familial preferences, conceding the fact that men and women rely on different policies to give them economic security outside of the marriage (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). Because men and women occupy distinct spaces politically and sociologically, it is necessary to study their preferences separately, as those in different societal groups benefit in different, often opposite, ways from public policies. While a variety of social cleavages are important sources of diverse policy preferences, because gender has such important ramifications for the balance of power between individuals and the extent to which an individual has the freedom to exercise his or her own agency, studying gendered differences in policy preferences not only shows how men and women exert their political rights in varying

ways, but also allows one to examine revealed preferences of gender rights through approval of particular policies.

The existence of a gender gap in voting is well documented, with political scientists since the mid-20th century studying the causes of varying levels of support for political policies. Historically, women have tended to be more conservative than men, giving rise to a phenomenon referred to as the ‘traditional’ gender gap. In the West, where much of this research has been conducted, “most explanations of the traditional gender gap emphasized structural differences between men and women in religiosity, longevity, and labor force participation” (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 77). Because women have historically been more religious and were societally centered on the home, their domesticity aligned their values more with conservative parties.

, The ‘modern’ gender gap, in contrast, refers to the concept that in postindustrial societies, female political preferences have moved to the left of men; women are more likely to support liberal policies and candidates than their male counterparts. As countries industrialize, “gender roles converge . . . due to the cultural shift in attitudes toward women and the structural revolution in the paid labor force, in educational opportunities for women, and in characteristics of modern families” (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 79). These changes result in a shift in gendered differences of political values wherein women become more liberal than men due to the structural changes resultant from economic and social development. This trend is particularly apparent when support for the role of government...????;

For example, Inglehart and Norris (2003) compare gendered responses for the following question taken from the World Values Survey: “The government should take more responsibilities to ensure that everyone is provided for (1) – People should take more responsibilities to provide for themselves (10)” (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 81). Respondents

were asked to respond on a scale from 1-100, with one representing the strongest support for government assistance to its citizens and ten representing the weakest support. Responses from a wide range of nations show that women are more likely than men to believe that the government should provide for its citizens in all but six nations (The Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam).

Analyzing support for the role and scope of government is particularly fruitful from a gendered perspective, as vast structural obstacles to female achievement drastically change the extent to which men and women would benefit from government policies or would view those policies as a threat to their societal hegemony or privilege. In short, economic and human development changes gendered differences in policy support for progressive gender policies because “women’s new roles within the family, the labor market, the welfare state, and the community may be expected to lead to different patterns of political participation, partisan loyalties, and political priorities on such issues as child care, family support, public transport, the environment and technology, reproductive rights, welfare, education, and defense” (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 89—90).

This explanation for the realignment of gendered attitudes in policy preferences is just one of the prevailing justifications in the study of gendered differences in politics. Researchers have proposed several additional, competing explanations for these differences, and these can be categorized into three competing explanations—socialization, social structural factors and situational constraints (Studlar et al. 1998). The socialization theory argues that from an early age, men and women are socialized into appropriate gender roles. For example, men are taught to be strong and protective while women are taught to be nurturing and maternal. This may lead men to support policies such as defense spending and women to support policies like strong

welfare spending because they have been raised to be strong and aggressive or caring and nurturing, respectively (Conover and Sapiro 1993).

The social structural factor argument rests on the fact that men and women occupy different spheres in society. Due to occupational segregation and labor market discrimination, men and women have access to different economic opportunities that in turn influence their political preferences. Essentially, this perspective is arguing that political preferences are dictated by experiences. Because men and women have different experiences due to their occupation of different spheres in society, they have different policy preferences.

Finally, the situational constraint argument takes into consideration the fact that women naturally face biological and socialized constraints on their time. For example, women may be more likely to support child-care policies because they are more likely to spend time caring for children and would like to alleviate some of the constraints on their time (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). These factors will be taken into consideration as I present my empirical model of political preferences later in this chapter.

As discussed in the literature review, Indonesian women face many obstacles to the attainment of gender equality in the public and private spheres. In the public arena, the government has done much to reduce gender discrimination by banning violence against women and eliminating gender discrimination in the workplace (Robinson and Bessell 2002), but marriage laws and a combination of cultural norms and religion prevent women from achieving the equal status of men. Although female political representation has increased greatly, facilitated by the implementation of an election quota system and numerous laws banning violence against women and combating sex trafficking, women still face the socialization, structural and situational constraints enumerated above. In the context of Indonesian society,

socialization is likely surrounding the concept of the women as the homemaker, or the symbolic Indonesian caregiver. Socialized political preferences also might take into consideration the proper role of men and women, particularly for Javanese respondents, who may view laws that promote equal pay as diminishing the prestige of those who benefit under current arrangements.

This chapter analyzes gendered differences in support for two gender policies. The first policy examined is support for a law to establish a quota system for the number of females in executive positions, while the second is support for laws that promote equal salaries for men and women. Using an ordinal probit logistic regression model, I will present a model that once again finds that benevolent sexism is a strong and fascinating correlate of opinions toward that would facilitate gender equality.

If the Inglehart-Norris analysis of changing gendered differences in political preferences holds true, we should expect women in Indonesia to prefer more rightist polities, given that Indonesia is not yet a postindustrial nation. In this case, this may result in fewer women supporting gender equal policies than men. However, because this study only considers two policies in its analysis of political preferences, we may find that the pattern of conservative women in industrial societies does not hold true. While it is plausible that such a pattern might be present if I examined a broader set of policies, such as policies toward the family, I am skeptical that when asked directly about support for progressive gender policies, women would be less supportive than men.

The Data

Two questions in the survey provide us with insights into respondents' perspectives on progressive gender laws. While the survey does not ask generally about support for government-

backed gender equality initiatives, it does ask about the two specific policies mentioned above— support for a quota system that grants women a fixed proportion of executive positions, and support for laws that close the gendered wage disparity. The gendered responses to those questions are as follows:

Table 6.1: Support for A Quota System that Guarantees Fixed Proportion of Executive Positions for Women

Do you agree with a quota system that guarantees a fixed proportion of places to females in executive positions?	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Strongly disagree	0.9%	0.8%	0.8%
Disagree	20%	17.7%	18.4%
Disagree somewhat	4.6%	3.2%	3.6%
Neutral	8.2%	6%	6.7%
Agree somewhat	17.3%	6.4%	9.8%
Agree	48.2%	59.8%	56.8%
Strongly agree	0.9%	6%	4.5%

The table illustrates that although most men and women agree with a quota system that guarantees a fixed proportion of places for women in executive positions, women are more likely than men to support these policies. The results of a Chi-Squared test indicate that the differences between male and female respondents are statistically significant at the 5% level. This is unsurprising, given that women stand to gain more from such policies, while men may view those policies as a threat to their ability to obtain high-level executive positions.

Similar patterns emerge when I examine the responses for support of laws that promote equal pay for equal work between men and women. Table 6.2 highlights the proportional distribution of responses between men and women. In this case, the gendered differences in support for equal salary laws are significant at the 10% level.


Table 6.2: Support for Policies that Promote Equal Pay for Men and Women

Do you agree with laws that promote equal salaries for men and women in the same positions?	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Strongly disagree	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%
Disagree	9.8%	6.9%	7.8%
Disagree somewhat	5.3%	1.3%	2.5%
Neutral	5.3%	3.9%	4.4%
Agree somewhat	2.3%	4.6%	3.9%
Agree	72.2%	73.9%	73.4%
Strongly agree	4.5%	8.6%	7.3%

In both policy scenarios, women are more supportive than men of progressive gender policies. While this may seem to contradict the Inglehart-Norris thesis that women in industrialized, but not yet post-industrialized nations, are typically more conservative than men, because these questions ask about specific policies, rather than more generic ideological questions, I do not have enough information to fully test their thesis.

The following graph indicates that while similar patterns emerge, respondents are generally more enthusiastic about laws that promote equal pay for equal work as opposed to laws that establish a quota system. Graph 6.1 illustrates the differences in male and female responses to both policy questions, highlighting that men and women are most likely to differ their support for quotas rather than equal pay laws. I will posit explanations for this trend later in the chapter, however, I hypothesize that there is a perception that limited executive positions are available, so competition for executive positions takes the form of a zero-sum game, while women can enjoy a wage increase without a resultant male wage decrease.

Graph 6.1: Percentage Differences in Male and Female Support for Quotas and Equal Pay Laws (Percentage Differences Represented as Male – Female)



Empirical Measurement

I focus on two?? families of explanations for gender differences in policy support: pragmatic self-interest (socioeconomic) and socialization (cultural). All three?? of these characterizations share similarities with Studlar-McAllister-Hayes categorizations. However, to provide continuity with the other models in this thesis and to allow for easier comparison, I will use pragmatic self-interest and socialization as my two competing bodies of determinants. Pragmatic self-interest is most congruent with the socioeconomic variables in other chapters and socialization is most congruent with the cultural sets of variables.

A model of political behavior that relies on a pragmatic self-interested explanation to account for gendered differences in policy support broadly implies that both men and women respond rationally to their environment and the constraints imposed upon them in society. These rational responses are reflected in their support for particular policies. According to the pragmatic self-interest model, women would support more leftist policies than men because, due

to a combination of labor market obstacles and structural time constraints (largely related to raising children), they find that more left-leaning policies give them more opportunity and freedom. In contrast, the socialization model argues that gendered differences are the result of differing psychological and cultural characteristics incorporated into how men and women are raised from childhood. Heavily reliant on compassion and the maternal nature of women, the socialization model would attribute female support for interventionist government policies to the fact that women were raised to be more compassionate than men.

The characterization of pragmatic self-interest will take into consideration socioeconomic and structural conditions that impact men and women differently and therefore create different incentives for supporting or opposing particular policies. These measures will include education, urban environment, primary earner status, monthly family income and domestic work. As in previous regressions, education will be measured by the years of education the respondent has, urban environment will be measured as a categorical dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent lives in an urban environment, and primary earner status will indicate if the respondent views him- or herself as the primary earner. Monthly family income will be measured in millions of rupiahs and domestic work will use the same three-leveled structured used in Chapter 5. These variables have been included in the regression because they are indicators of an individual's ability to participate in the labor market and the extent to which the family relies on his or her income. Thus, the significance of these variables will indicate to what degree individual respondents support particular policies based on their own access to labor markets and economic necessity. I hypothesize that education and urban status will increase support for progressive gender policies for both genders. Male primary earners are likely to oppose progressive gender policies while women primary earners will likely support them. Domestic

work is likely to only be significant for women, and has two competing possible hypothesized outcomes. The first is that women who perform higher levels of domestic work are more likely to support progressive gender policies because they view them as counteracting the time constraints that may bar them from labor market participation. The opposing possibility is that women who perform a lot of housework do so out of choice and believe that women belong in the domestic sphere. If this is the case, they would likely oppose progressive gender policies because they do not believe that women should be participating in the labor market, much less that there should be government policies to facilitate this.

The second family of variables focuses on socialization, using psychological indicators and perspectives on gender as proxies for individual attitudes toward gender ideals. For the purpose of this thesis, I will be assuming that attitudes toward gender are the result of a socialization process that begins with birth. First, I will examine the endorsement of benevolent sexism and zero-sum gender beliefs. Because benevolent sexism bestows upon women a unique type of respect, I predict that endorsing benevolent sexism will increase the likelihood of supporting quota systems, as it gives women an advantage and perhaps shields them from the unpleasant competition at high executive levels. However, zero-sum beliefs should negatively impact support for progressive gender policies, as support for legal measures that help women would be viewed as a loss in the legal position of men.

Additional socialization variables are the number of women in the neighborhood who work, ethnicity and religion. As in previous chapters, examining the number of women in the neighborhood who work is meant to illuminate the extent to which the gender patterns of labor in surrounding homes has community externalities. The relationship between Japanese ethnicity and support for progressive gender policies is difficult to predict, however, because Japanese

ethnicity is very matrilineal, I hypothesize that Javanese ethnicity will be negatively correlated with support for progressive gender policies. Finally, I predict that Islam will be also be negatively correlated with progressive gender policies.

Although I am interested in the relationship between household decision-making authority and progressive gender policies, I omitted this measure from my analysis because it is largely determined by the cultural factors already contained in the regression. I also omit the measure of gender essentialism from my analysis, as it failed to be statistically significant in any cases.

Presentation of Findings

Table 6.3 (found on page 87) contains the results of the ordinal probit regression for support for progressive gender policies. The first two columns model support for quotas for females in executive positions, separated by male and female respondents, and the second two columns model support for policies that promote equal pay for men and women, again separated by gender.

Table 6.3: Ordinal Probit Regression Analysis for Support for Progressive Gender Policies

	1 Level of Support for Quota Systems (Male)	2 Level of Support for Quota Systems (Female)	3 Level of Support for Equal Pay Laws (Male)	4 Level of Support for Equal Pay Laws (Female)
Age	0.04*** (0.02)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.07* (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.04)	0.04* (0.03)
Urban	0.2842 (0.38)	-0.004 (0.25)	0.14 (0.35)	0.18 (0.25)
Islam	-0.15 (0.42)	-0.05 (0.28)	-0.43 (0.39)	-0.19 (0.29)
Java	-0.61*** (0.33)	-0.14 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.30)	0.24 (0.21)
Benevolent Sexism	0.58**** (0.20)	0.10 (0.15)	0.20 (0.20)	0.40**** (0.14)
Zero Sum Beliefs	-0.12 (0.13)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.22** (0.12)	-0.02 (0.09)
Women Working	-0.19 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.14)	0.13 (0.17)	-0.28*** (0.13)
Primary Earner	-0.46 (0.44)	-0.62* (0.31)	-0.80** (0.42)	-0.10 (0.28)
Domestic Work	-0.18 (0.38)	-0.62**** (0.24)	0.01 (0.38)	-0.31* (0.23)
Monthly Family Income	-0.06 (0.09)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.1003)	-0.07* (0.-5)
N	69	128	81	156
Pseudo R ²	0.14	0.04	0.07	0.07

*p<0.20; **p<0.10; ***p<0.05; ****p<0.01

It is fruitful to examine this analysis not only from the perspective of significant variables but also from the perspective of similarities between male and female determinants of progressive policies and similarities between support for quota systems or equal pay.

Education, urban residence, Islam and monthly family income do not provide us with very interesting results. The insignificance of monthly family income indicates that policy support is not divided along class lines, and the insignificance of urban residence suggests that political preferences do not change as a result of living in an urban environment. This suggests that, for the respondents in this sample, class status (evidenced both by education and monthly family income) and religion are not influential social cleavages in determining political preferences for these particular policies.

From the results, it is clear that both pragmatic self-interest and socialization impact individual policy preferences. However, the relationship between the pragmatic self-interest theory and support for progressive policy preferences does not unfolding the way I would have predicted, particularly coming from a Western perspective. This surprising result is most clearly illustrated by the breadwinner variable and the domestic work variable. Domestic work is only significant for women; this is predictable, as women are the ones performing the majority of the housework. However, as the level of domestic work female respondents performed increases, their support for progressive gender policies decreases. From this, I can extrapolate that the women who are performing housework are satisfied doing so and do not desire government policies that would facilitate their entrance into the workforce. While I do not have enough information or cultural insight to make a conclusion regarding the extent to which this truly represents female agency, it is enough to conclude that women who perform housework may not prioritize market work over domestic work.

For men, the relationship between being the primary earner and supporting progressive gender policies is intuitive. Male primary earners are significantly less likely to support policies that promote equal pay for men and women. This confirms the argument that breadwinning men would view those policies as a threat to their ability to provide for their families. Classical theory would describe this as the rational behavior of an economic agent.

For women, however, being the primary earner is significantly and negatively correlated with support for quota systems. Although additional research must be done on this relationship, I attribute this to the fact that these women likely work out of economic necessity. This trend gives rise to two corollaries. First, women working out of economic necessity are unlikely to have access to executive positions, which would be reserved for those in the highest classes or education levels, and thus do not feel the need to support these policies. Second, because many women work out of economic necessity, it is unlikely that their status as a primary earner would impact their view on gender relations and thus would not affect support for gender quotas. Of equal interest is the fact that for women in the sample, being the primary earner is not a significant positive predictor of support for equal pay laws. Once again, this can be attributed to the fact that women work out of economic necessity and either do not feel that they are paid differently from men or that the fact that they are the primary earner does not translate into a change in their attitudes toward gender roles.

The relationship between the number of women in the neighborhood who work and the support for progressive gender policies is also weak. Although a significant indicator of lack of support for equal pay laws, it fails to be very interesting in other cases. However, the relationship between this variable and lack of support may provide additional evidence for the aforementioned argument regarding economic necessity. Additionally, the relationship between

Javanese ethnicity and positive support for a gender quota may represent notions of benevolent sexism but does not demand any further analysis here.

My findings indicate that the endorsement of both benevolent sexism and zero-sum beliefs are significant indicators of support or opposition for progressive gender policies. While zero-sum beliefs are not significant in many iterations of the model, the negative relationship between the endorsements of zero-sum beliefs and support for equal pay laws among male respondents confirms the fact that men feel as if they would stand to lose if women were paid the same as men. However, it is interesting that this relationship does not exist when examining support for quotas. This could be because the men in the sample would not have access to these positions and thus do not have strong feelings toward policies establishing quotas for them.

The relationship between endorsement of benevolent sexism and support for progressive gender policies is positively and highly significant in two cases. First, men who endorse benevolent sexism are much more likely to support a quota system for female executives and second, women who endorse benevolent sexism are much more likely to support equal pay laws. While more psychology research should be done on benevolent sexism, I tentatively hypothesize that those who endorse benevolent sexism may believe that these policies rightfully protect women. This again complicates the understanding of the extent to which respondents' support for progressive gender policies also represent for gender equality more broadly.

Conclusions

From a Western perspective, women in the Indonesian sample fail to adopt pragmatic political preferences. Women who perform high levels of domestic work either do not desire to expand into market work or do not believe that they need or deserve government help in leveling

the playing field between working men and working women. Furthermore, breadwinner women do not favor policies that could increase their income. In contrast, male political preference patterns exhibit more familiarity for Western readers. Male primary earners significantly oppose equal pay policies and apparently believe that an increase in pay for women would correspond with a decrease in pay for men(exhibited through the endorsement of zero-sum beliefs). These patterns result in predicted opposition among men to laws that promote equal pay between men and women. This discrepancy between adherence to Westernized notions of rationality for men and defiance for women suggests that the Indonesian reverence of motherhood permeates many aspects of female life, including generating opposition to policies that could ultimately increase female agency through labor market opportunities and increased potential for professional advancement.

Although the findings in this chapter are conclusive only in the sense that they provide the justification for additional, comprehensive research on the relationship between family arrangements and policy preferences in the developing world, they do provide us with one significant, albeit speculative, conclusion. As already discussed, women who perform household work are significantly less likely to support progressive gender policies. Potentially attributed to the fact that these women do not feel as if they would benefit from these policies because they preliminary???work in the home, this finding could also indicate that, regardless of any normative analyses of female agency, women working in the home strongly endorse the separate spheres of men and women and thus do not believe that women should work outside the home. This poses significant policy challenges in efforts to promote equality, as policymakers not only have to combat more hostile forms of sexism but also have to work within the context of female endorsement of traditional gender norms in order to affect change.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Private household arrangements and societal systems of constraint are both representations of and contributors to national gender identity. Incorrectly ignored from many political analyses, the household has great illustrative possibilities for characterizing gendered power dimensions within a society and offers many insights for explanations to commonly asked political inquiries, including gendered differences in political preferences and participation. The domestic time constraints and agency insufficiencies faced by many women around the world serve as substantial challenges to female participation in political, economic and social settings outside the home. This thesis provides evidence of strict gender roles in Indonesian families, but it also supports the importance of analyzing the public and private spheres together.

State-led gender ideology and the dichotomous relationship between the private and the public in Indonesian politics and culture offer us an opportunity to discuss the ramifications of a national gender identity based on female domesticity and motherhood. In my examination of gender ideology in Indonesian families, I provide strong empirical support for the existence of a prevailing and powerful Indonesian gender dogma that dictates both domestic and public life. When taken in context with the relative lack of Indonesian female control in the public sphere, the finding that the plurality of respondents, including women, shared household decision-making responsibility with their spouses may indicate that their autonomy in the private sphere is at the expense of their autonomy in the public sphere. The division of household responsibilities, wherein women work in the home, particularly when they are also mothers, and men work outside the home, further confirms women's domestic control. The cultural, as opposed to

socioeconomic, motivations of this gender ideology are supported by the positive relationship between ethnicity and domestic work and the negative relationship between ethnicity and support for progressive policies.

Scholars, particularly those primed in Western ideologies, find the discrepancy between the female domestic autonomy and public subjugation in Indonesia perplexing, particularly in terms of household decision-making, which is often viewed in the West as an indicator of power. While the mother-oriented ideology propagated by the New Order provides an illuminating explanation for the female position within the home, I find that the influence of benevolent sexism serves to further improve our understanding of Indonesian gender dynamics. Rooted in psychology, benevolent sexism is thus excluded from many discussions about gender and politics in Indonesia. However, it effectively explains the emphasis that Indonesians place on motherhoods and puts forth a nuanced, concrete driver in Indonesian gender relations. Furthermore, the inclusion of benevolent sexism in my study identifies an important attitudinal obstacle to developing Indonesian public policies that would promote and help attain gender equality that would likely be ignored from gender mainstreamed efforts, thus rendering them potentially ineffective. Additionally, I provide empirical support for the argument that Indonesian men and women exist in separate spheres—the political and social public sphere for men and the domestic, private sphere for women—and are granted autonomy within their respective spheres, while at the same time, I suggest that women may not have as much autonomy in the home as originally thought, evidenced by the patterns of household decision-making authority contained in Chapter 4.

Since 1997, Indonesia has democratized, slowly moving toward higher levels of economic and human development, and subsequently, gender equality. The gender ideology

espoused by the New Order has begun to fade into Indonesia's collective political memory, and the concept of state ibuism is becoming less relevant as time goes on. In her epilogue to *State Ibuism*, Julia Suryakusuma writes “‘gender’ is still essentially a mobilizing force for programmatic intervention and social control . . . Despite everything that has happened, women are still objects socially constructed to fit within a certain hierarchical and patriarchal order” (Suryakusuma 2012), predicting that in the absence of authoritarian rule, Islam will play an increasingly significant role in determining gendered dynamics within society. Although in my findings, Islam did not play an overridingly significant role in determining household outcomes, Islam's increasing grasp on Indonesian society may provide an explanation for the lower levels of female domestic control than I had expected based on New Order gender ideologies. Thus, as Indonesia continues to develop and new social stratifications, particularly Islam, fill the void left by Suharto's regime, scholars should pay close attention to changing gendered dynamics of power within Indonesian households.

This thesis was ultimately intended to bridge the gap between gender analyses of the public and private realms, providing the kind of empirical analysis that is necessary for policy makers and NGOs to design programs that will effectively improve female autonomy. From a normative vantage point, this translates to the support of initiatives that increase female agency. However, ???and the quantitative analysis that went into this project, I found myself constantly grappling with issues of cultural relativism as I attempted to avoid infusing my interpretations with my own personal understandings of gendered power dynamics and feminism. Particularly relevant in the interchange between socioeconomic and cultural determinants of household dynamics, any analysis that attributes household outcomes to cultural determinants in part diminishes the agency of the actors being examined. By saying, for example, that the

significance of ethnicity and benevolent sexism determines how much housework a wife performs, I am inherently implying that for these women, their decisions within the household are not determined through agency. While this may be true, this analysis effectively deprives the women in my sample of freely making the decision to work domestically. Although I still believe when women have agency, decisions between the balance of work and home are based on a confluence of socioeconomic and personal factors, and that the significance of ethnicity and other cultural or attitudinal factors is indicative of a socialization process that facilitates the acceptance of separate gender roles for men and women, I recognize that this perspective is influenced by my own understanding of gender equality and female agency, and that my analysis must give the women in my sample proper respect by recognizing that despite societal constraints, cultural socialization and Indonesian gender ideology, they still may freely choose to work within the home.

The debate regarding cultural relativism and gender equality necessitates a methodological discussion, and feminist methodologies may provide useful insights for combatting cultural relativism. Furthermore, because my work has been strongly influenced by feminist scholarship, it is important to discuss the interchange between quantitative and qualitative analysis in political research. Although my research draws the majority of its conclusions from quantitative research, it would have been impossible to accurately do so without the complementary qualitative analysis both in the form of preliminary and background research and fieldwork conducted this past summer in Indonesia. In this situation, reliance on solely quantitative methods limits the interpreter's potential to make assertive conclusions regarding gender and power within Indonesian homes, as the existing paradigmatic frameworks make it difficult to portray the experiences of marginalized groups, particularly women.

Ann Tickner argues “What makes feminist research unique, however, is a distinctive methodological perspective that fundamentally challenges the often unseen androcentric or masculine biases in the way that knowledge has traditionally been constructed in the disciplines” (2005: 3). In social science research, which was pioneered by and is still dominated by men, reliance on the quantitative methodologies may serve to mask the experiences of marginalized groups, including women. Rather, “feminist inquiry is a dialectical process—listening to women and understanding how the subjective meaning they attached to their lived experiences are so often at variance with meanings internalized from society at large” (Tickner 2005: 4). This perspective is particularly important when studying power within the household, as the concept of power, when quantified, could lead to the possibility of biased interpretations that were discussed throughout this thesis. Thus, future research on this topic should take the form of ethnographic analysis, living and observing families as they make familial decisions on a day-to-day basis, allowing scholars to create their own frameworks for studying the female experience within the household, rather than relying on existing quantitative frameworks to empirically analyze power dynamics. In a political system such as that of Indonesia, where gender roles were mobilized and manipulated by an authoritarian regime in an attempt to solidify control over all societal stratifications, it is crucial to recognize that what could be empirically construed as power may simply be a tool in the state’s manipulation and subjugation of women in order to placate women’s interests and feminist movements. Accordingly, qualitative, ethnographic research methods would not only facilitate more comprehensive and conclusive understandings of household power dynamics, but could also provide a poignant voice and representation of Indonesian wives and mothers.

Appendix A: Psychological Survey Measures

Zero-sum belief items

1. When women work they are taking jobs away from men.
2. When women get rights they are taking rights away from men.
3. Rights for women mean a loss of rights for men.
4. Efforts to reduce discrimination against women have led to increased discrimination against men.

Essentialism items

1. Gender is a very important part of what makes people who they are.
2. People that are the same gender have many things in common.
3. Knowing someone's gender tells you a lot about a person.
4. People are either male OR female, there is nothing in between.
5. Gender is a natural category.
6. Gender categories are important in all cultures around the world.
7. Men have a similar nature.
8. Women have a similar nature.

Benevolent sexism items

1. In a disaster, women ought to be rescued before men.
2. Many women have an innocence that few men possess.
3. Women should be cherished and protected by men.
4. Women should be appreciated by men.
5. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.
6. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
7. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.

Hostile sexism items

1. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality."

2. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
3. Women are too easily offended.
4. Feminists are seeking for women to have more power than men.
5. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.
6. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
7. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.
8. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.
9. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
10. Many women get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.
11. Feminists are making unreasonable demands of men.

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