
Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific

SIMON S. C. TAY

FROM PARTNERSHIP TO PRIMACY

The promise of the 1990s in the Asia-Pacific was that cooperation and increasing parity would mark relations in the region. The common wisdom was that Asia would continue with its decades of rapid growth and rise to become an equal with North America and Western Europe. The “Asian miracle” established a menu of successful policies and a promising path of development toward export-led industrialization and growth.¹ There would be ample room for more countries to join what was termed a “flying geese pattern” of development, with Japan and the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) guiding the near-NIEs of Southeast Asia and the formerly closed economies of China and Vietnam.² The vision of an Asia-Pacific community in the twenty-first century imagined a circle of countries around a rim of ocean, cooperating on the basis of greater partnership and equity.

Then came the Asian financial crisis, beginning in mid-1997 with the devaluation of the Thai Baht, and spreading quickly through almost all the countries of the region. Overnight the Asian miracle became more of a mirage.³ While the causes of the crisis and appropriate responses continue to be debated, the Asian crisis unquestionably changed the balance of influence in the Asia-Pacific.⁴

Simon S. C. Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), a non-government policy research institute, and an associate professor at the National University of Singapore, where he focuses on international law. In fall 2003, he was a visiting associate professor, teaching at Harvard Law School and The Fletcher School. The research assistance of Jonathan Kaufmann, J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, and of Tan Hsien Li, an associate researcher at the SIIA, is gratefully acknowledged.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process—which had flourished in the mid-1990s—floundered, unable or unwilling to respond to the crisis and split by differences between Japan and the United States. The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were severely affected by the crisis and lacked the attention and resolve to provide leadership.⁵

Instead of parity and partnership in the region, the first years of the twenty-first century ushered in a very different reality. As the only country experienced in sustained growth, the United States solidified its status as the preeminent economic and political-security power.⁶ This change from Asia-Pacific partnership to U.S. primacy has been further complicated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States and the Bush administration's subsequent agenda to combat international terrorism, both at home and abroad. While there was worldwide sympathy for U.S. and other 9/11 victims, much of this agenda has been controversial, especially the U.S.-led military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷

To begin, I shall survey the post-2001 U.S. policies with respect to prosecuting the U.S. agenda abroad—an agenda that has initially met with considerable support at home, but has raised increasing doubt and opposition abroad. I argue that the United States is responding primarily to its domestic constituencies, even on these matters of international concern. Correspondingly, concerns have arisen over not only the specific intervention into Iraq but also about U.S. primacy and its longer-term intentions.⁸

Second, the essay will consider the positions and policies of various Asian countries in response to the U.S. post-9/11 agenda and the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. While the post-9/11 agenda has been controversial, I argue that U.S.-Asian relations have largely benefited. I offer a typology of these responses, between those who have closely aligned their own interests with the United States, and those who have sought, with some success, to manage their differences.

Third, the essay will consider a broader context of these events and politics for trying to understand the emerging trends in Asian-United States relations in the post-9/11 period. Asians have not put the same faith in multilateral institutions as some Europeans. Realist attitudes and bilateral ties with the United States have prevailed instead, and I argue that these are moving us away from the vision of an Asia-Pacific that is based on parity, equity, and community. Finally, the essay concludes with some thoughts on the rising East Asian regionalism and its possible relationships to Asia-Pacific institutions and the influence of the United States.

FOREIGN WARS, DOMESTIC DECISIONS

I am not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein.

—U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

OCTOBER 7, 2002

The U.S.-led global war against terrorism President Bush initiated in the aftermath of 9/11 was followed by a considerable period in which domestic opinion in the U.S. was unified. Differences were bridged between the two main political parties and there was strong popular support for measures undertaken at home and abroad. International opinion, too, was initially sympathetic, and response to the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan was largely favorable. Up until the U.S. action in Iraq, only a small minority inside and outside the United States was strongly critical of U.S. policies.

Even with respect to Iraq, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed a resolution that approved, in broad terms, the President's prerogatives to wage war and stated that multilateral efforts would be attempted first through the United Nations.⁹ This spurred the UN Security Council to unanimously issue Resolution 1441 authorizing "tough" inspections and warning Iraq that its non-compliance would be punished.^{10 11} The resolution held Iraq to be in non-compliance with existing UN resolutions, urged its full cooperation on weapons inspections, and threatened unspecified consequences if it did not comply. The seeming consensus behind these two resolutions, however, has since fractured. In the UN, a number of states—most publicly France and Germany—resisted a subsequent resolution to authorize the use of force, and denied that Resolution 1441 had implied such authorization.¹²

In the United States, the bipartisan consensus on Iraq did not survive the uneasy U.S. occupation or the beginning of presidential campaigning in late 2003. U.S. domestic opinion largely supported the initial decision to intervene in Iraq, but may well be turning on other, newer factors. These factors include the lack of evidence that Iraq did in fact have weapons of mass destruction (or was making substantial efforts in that direction), the burden of a U.S. occupation that has cost more funds and human casualties than the Administration publicly anticipated, and the perception that the Bush administration should be giving more attention to a stalling domestic economy with continuing joblessness. As one *New York Times* columnist characterized it, President Bush has gone quickly from "swagger to stagger."¹³

There are also broader concerns about U.S. primacy and the intentions of the Bush administration. As voiced by some within the Administration or close to its decision makers, the United States has considered embarking on a "neo-imperialist" strategy to both utilize and reinforce its primacy.¹⁴ Such thinking has been possible only in the wake of 9/11. International events that otherwise would

have seemed distant may now be seen in connection to concerns about domestic security that touch everyone. What previously had been perceived as foreign engagements to be avoided have penetrated the public consciousness. While not all support President Bush on Iraq, the general opinion continues to be that terrorism is the main threat to the United States post-9/11.¹⁵

There are, of course, differing views on the United States' post-9/11 agenda. Many Americans believe that the war against terrorism cannot be pursued without the support of many states.¹⁶ This multilateralist view reshaped the

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Bush administration's initial push to intervene in Iraq. While not ruling out the possibility of unilateralism for the sake of the safety of the United States, in speeches after late October 2002, the President endorsed working with allies wherever possible, as a first and preferred principle. By November, the U.S. administration softened its stance to allow for a UN resolution, and the support of allies. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 further showed U.S. efforts to generate evidence of international

support for its cause. Yet despite this apparent shift in policy, the resolutions were widely seen as a victory—as were the Republican gains in mid-term elections—for the Bush administration in its goal of shaping and pushing an agenda.¹⁷

The debate over Iraq did not lend itself to concerns about the sentiment of the international community, the principles of international law, or the preference for peace. It was primarily shaped by domestic politics and concerns with public opinion in the United States. The Bush administration's sense of obligation to seek multilateral approval through the UN was not, as such, a response to the concerns of other states.¹⁸ Rather, it was an imposition that it felt obliged to undertake because of public opinion.

Similarly, the debate about the future of a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq was not shaped by concerns that peace-building and sustainable development were the responsibilities of the international community.¹⁹ Rather, it served to persuade the U.S. domestic constituency on two accounts: first, U.S. efforts to replace Hussein would lead to the spread of democracy and human rights in that country and in the Middle East; and second, intervention in Iraq would not lead to a "quagmire" for the United States. Consequently, the U.S. body politic recognizes the pragmatic need to limit the time of interventions and the loss of American lives, with a declared victory afterwards, à la Kosovo and the Gulf War. As the number of American lives lost in Iraq has grown, the public feels increasingly uneasy about the occupation.

While the majority of Americans wish for multilateral support, we should recognize that the word *multilateral* has a unique connotation in today's United States. U.S. multilateralism post-9/11 seems chiefly to refer to a means or process. Multilateralism in these terms is not a meeting of minds. It is a process of engineering consent, with the ultimate aim of assuring a U.S. audience that its executive is not acting alone or in defiance of the common wisdom of the international community. Thus, in the run-up to U.S. action in Iraq, the Bush administration stressed the number of states—big and small, near and far—that supported its decision, even if they made no substantial contribution.²⁰

This idea of multilateralism is a matter of process, not substance.²¹ It is mostly formality, given the U.S. primacy in military, economic, and other fields. Few world leaders have proven ready to risk public and sustained disagreement with the United States. Even those who have done so over Iraq, like in France and Germany, have sought in the aftermath to reach a resolution on the UN and U.S. roles in the occupation of that country.²²

Moreover, President Bush's return to the UN to garner support was primarily driven by American opinion and concern over rising costs and the loss of lives. A well-known aphorism of the late leader of the U.S. Congress, Tip O'Neill, was that "all politics is local."²³ Post-9/11, this idea seems to have expanded to become a touchstone of U.S. foreign policy. The intervention in Iraq—and the resulting occupation—are not primarily concerned with the opinion of other states or international law, but with the wishes and sentiments of the majority in the United States. U.S. primacy and the mindset of primacy post-9/11 reveal how much the United States has impacted the world and yet how little the world—and Asians—seem to count in U.S. calculations of what it can and should do.

ASIAN RESPONSES TO 9/11: WITH US OR AGAINST US?

You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.

—U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH
NOVEMBER 6, 2001

What then has been the response of Asia? Reactions are not uniform. Some states are staunch U.S. supporters and have been proactive in their own domestic fight against terrorism. Others have been ambivalent and even reticent in their responses, preoccupied with their own domestic power politics. Brief sketches of responses in Southeast and Northeast Asia suggest a range of views.

Collectively, the Southeast Asian states have rallied to support U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.²⁴ At the seventh ASEAN Summit on November 5, 2001, leaders of ASEAN countries approved a *Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism* and unanimously condemned the 9/11 attacks as an "attack against

humanity and an assault on all of us.”²⁵ The Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in May 2002 also adopted a work program on counterterrorism. In addition to this session’s statement on anti-terrorism, ASEAN member countries said they were making greater efforts to consolidate peace and maintain stability and security in the region. Furthermore, ASEAN signed an anti-terrorism pact that would commit members to cooperate in stemming the flow of funds to terrorist groups as well as sharing intelligence and increasing police cooperation in order to “prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism.”²⁶

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ASEAN also signed an anti-terrorism declaration with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to reaffirm both parties’ “commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts,” during the 2002 U.S.-ASEAN meeting in Brunei.²⁷

Looking at countries individually, the levels of implementation and practical cooperation varied widely. Some Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines and Singapore have cooperated closely with the United States in the global war on terrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. In the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has allowed U.S. troops to conduct joint counterterrorism military exercises in the south of the country.²⁸ On the subject of the Iraq invasion, the Filipino government gave an early and unequivocal yes. On a brief visit to the Philippines in October 2003, President Bush promised to “help the country weed out terrorism,”²⁹ and millions of U.S. dollars in counter-terrorism aid have been pledged by the U.S. Congress.³⁰

Singapore too has supported the United States as best as it can, as evident by Deputy Prime Minister and then-Defense Minister Tony Tan’s comment that, “we will continue to support the anti-terrorism effort within our capabilities to make a useful contribution.”³¹ Domestic measures were undertaken with laws to allow the country to implement UN Security Council resolutions readily.³² Singapore authorities have also arrested over 30 Jemaah Islamiya operatives in 2002—two-thirds of whom were arrested after the bombing in Bali—and have since uncovered a Southeast Asia-wide network of terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda. The Singapore government subsequently released to the public a parliamentary white paper on terrorism on January 10, 2003, detailing the aims and activities of the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist group and threats to domestic security.³³ Numerous other measures have also been taken.³⁴

The Singapore government has also supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq. This was based on the country’s support for UN Resolution 1441, in which it had participated as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time. Following a visit by President Bush in October 2003 and in the wake of

UN Resolution 1511—which legitimized an international force in Iraq under U.S. leadership—it was reported that the country would further expand security ties with the United States.³⁵

The Philippines and Singapore were the clearest and most consistent examples of supporters for the United States in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Malaysia and Indonesia are examples of two other states in the region whose policies changed between 9/11 and the intervention in Iraq. These states have had to respond to greater domestic pressure to oppose U.S. counterterrorism policies, given their predominant Muslim populations and their sense of solidarity with Afghanistan, the Palestinians, and even networks that the United States has labeled as terrorist.

Malaysia had suppressed Islamic radicals even before 9/11 with its *Internal Security Act* that empowers the government to actively pursue counterterrorism measures domestically. From April 2001 to the end of 2002, over 60 radical Islamic suspects were arrested or detained. Malaysia has also granted the United States access to intelligence information and overflight clearance.³⁶ This has had a considerable effect on the domestic politics in Malaysia. As a result of his responses to 9/11, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir was upheld as an example of a moderate Muslim leader. Past international and U.S. criticism about human rights and the treatment of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim have receded in light of Malaysia's proactive stance in counterterrorism operations. One sign of improved relations was Mahathir's visit to the White House in May 2002.

However, while Malaysia continued with domestic counterterrorism efforts, its international commitments slowed. Malaysia-U.S. relations returned to rocky ground over the Iraq issue. Among Asian leaders, Mahathir was perhaps the most vocal in his opposition and condemnation of U.S. action. At the 58th UN General Assembly in September 2003, and again at the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) meeting in October 2003 in Malaysia, Mahathir accused the United States and the West of using the war on terrorism to dominate the world.³⁷ Furthermore, Malaysian officials backed out of cooperative efforts that would have involved U.S. military and security personnel on Malaysian soil or in Malaysia's territorial waters.³⁸

Indonesia, too, has had its differences with the United States post-9/11. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the moderate-dominated Indonesian Council of Ulama issued one of the harshest international criticisms of the United States. It called on Muslims in the world to *jihad fii sabillah* (fight in the path of Allah) should the United States and its allies commit aggression against Afghanistan and the Islamic world. The Indonesian government also opposed most U.S. anti-terrorism operations. During Operation Enduring Freedom, Islamic radicals were allowed to openly recruit about 300 Indonesian volunteers to support al-Qaeda in fighting the United States in Afghanistan.³⁹ Domestically, the government took only lax anti-terrorist action.

Indonesian actions, or lack of actions, were due to domestic pressures. Political rivals of President Megawati Soekarnoputri perceived any action against Islamic groups as an attempt by her secular nationalist government to repress legitimate desires for greater Islamic influence on Indonesian politics, signaling the advent of a dictatorial regime. Although the mainstream of Indonesian Islam is moderate, political stakes in this fledgling democracy have allowed radical views to influence public debate in Indonesia. The political leadership in Jakarta is now focused on the elections in 2004, which, due to a deadlock between the two largest political parties, will hinge on the views of respected Islamic leaders. Moderate Muslim leaders are thus likely to seek domestic power by supporting Islamic extremists or at least avoiding criticism of their activities.

Intervening events, however, have strengthened the hand of moderate and nationalist leaders in Indonesia to deal with terrorism domestically and improve ties with the United States. The pivotal event was the tragic bombing in Bali in October 2002. The loss of lives (largely foreign and especially Australian), the international attention, and the connections that have been traced to al-Qaeda have enabled Indonesian authorities to investigate and prosecute their case with considerable speed. By the second half of 2003, trials of the suspects had proceeded, with jail terms for those involved. While the terrorist networks in the country have not been dismantled, increased Indonesian attention to terrorist issues is apparent.

The expression of criticism and doubt over U.S. policy also seems to have shifted somewhat. Indonesian public protests over Afghanistan were voluble and perhaps among the most intense of any country in the region. In contrast, while Indonesians' disapproval of Americans remains at unprecedented levels,⁴⁰ protests over the U.S.-led action in Iraq were milder. Muslim sympathies and more radical opinions remain in Indonesia, but seem at present to be off-set by the larger mainstream Muslim groups and political parties that have voiced disagreement with U.S. policy but in more measured tones. Relatively, therefore, Indonesia-U.S. relations appear to have improved.

Concurrent with these developments, the Indonesian government has restarted its military efforts to quell resistance in the province of Aceh. In doing so, some government spokesmen have sought to label as terrorists those who have called for more autonomy and even independence for this resource-rich and under-developed region. U.S. criticism has been more muted than might have been expected, given the record of human rights violations associated with past military interventions into Aceh.

The United States' post-9/11 agenda has complicated existing internal conflicts and insurgencies in Southeast Asia.⁴¹ The ASEAN member state of Thailand seems to stand somewhat between the Philippines and Singapore on one hand and Indonesia and Malaysia on the other. Thailand, while a U.S. ally,

has not been as strongly pro-United States as some ASEAN members. Nor has it been loudly opposed. Instead, Thai policy post-9/11 appears primarily to seek to protect its domestic interests, especially in tourism.⁴² Yet Thailand has joined in regional promises to take action and has not been held out as a laggard in meeting anti-terrorism concerns.

Looking at Northeast Asia, the positions of Japan, China, and South Korea have, on balance, been consistently and strongly supportive of the United States and its war on terrorism. Unlike in Southeast Asian countries, there are fewer internal concerns with Islamic groups, except for western China's considerable Muslim minority. The Bush administration's concerns about North Korea dominate its agenda.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Japan promptly dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to provide logistical support to the action in Afghanistan and intelligence to U.S. counterterrorism military operations.⁴³ China, too, played a vital role by sharing intelligence and sending over a team of counterterrorism experts to Washington, by promising to freeze the assets of terrorist organizations in accordance with UN Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions, and by providing humanitarian relief to Afghan refugees.⁴⁴ Similarly, South Korea strongly condemned the terrorist attacks and pledged full support for U.S. actions. It subsequently offered non-combat troops to support the war effort in Afghanistan.⁴⁵

It would seem that the three Northeast Asian countries have dependably supported U.S. foreign policy. This does not mean, of course, that there are no tensions in relations between the Northeast Asian countries and the United States. In China's case, there are long-standing bilateral issues that have not been resolved, ranging from the cross-Straits issues, human rights, economic competition, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Cooperation between China and the United States for the longer term may well be fraught with difficulties.

President Bush's initial views on North Korea have also increased anti-American sentiment in South Korea, with much of the public believing that the United States aims to keep the Korean peninsula divided.⁴⁶ While South Korea has been a traditional ally of the United States, both parties' policies on North Korea have been divergent of late. Since his victory, South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun has publicly stated his wish for continued diplomacy. In contrast, while distinguishing North Korea from Iraq, the United States continued to push more aggressively for the matter to be brought before the UN Security Council with the option of economic sanctions for errant North Korean behavior.⁴⁷ However, despite rising domestic anti-American sentiment,⁴⁸ South Korea did caution that if North Korea continued to threaten peace, the world community would not ignore it.⁴⁹

For its part, the Bush administration has made it easier for Roh to back U.S. actions. The United States has slowly moved towards diplomatic approaches

to North Korea, using six-party talks as the key process, rather than a military campaign. Bush agreed recently to move U.S. troops out of Seoul to a location more remote from Korean population centers;⁵⁰ this concession, coupled with UN Resolution 1511, made it politically easier for Roh to defy anti-American public sentiment and promise military contributions for the Iraq campaign.⁵¹

In these and other instances we may consider that, while given priority, the post-9/11 agenda of anti-terrorism has not displaced many other concerns in Asian-U.S. relations. The post-9/11 issues have instead overlaid these issues. In cases where countries have seemed to be less cooperative, this overlay has brought new tensions in their relations with the United States. These less cooperative states have therefore risked losing support from the United States on other issues, such as Indonesia's efforts to produce stability, rebuild its economy, and develop a working democracy in the post-Suharto period. The Indonesian experience, post-Bali bombings, however, is unique. It shows that the limits of domestic politics can be explained and accepted to a considerable degree by the Bush administration.

In other cases, like Malaysia and China, post-9/11 security issues have served to forgive past "sins" in the eyes of the U.S. government. Those who are able and astute enough to agree with the United States and move towards fulfilling their obligations have gained. The Malaysian example, post-Iraq, however, suggests that cooperation with the United States by other states must continue without sharp public criticism.

For the majority of Asian states, despite some negative public opinion in many societies and perhaps private doubts, anti-Americanism has not been entrenched as state opinion. Asian leaders have instead responded quite promptly, whether as true allies or opportunistic ambulance chasers, to align their own agenda with that of the United States.

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The rewards of these tactics have been varied. The Philippines have secured financial assistance as well as U.S. advice on its long-standing problems in the south. Singapore has strengthened political and economic ties with the United States, signified by the bilateral free trade agreement. China has found a new balance in its relationship with the United States, building on the earlier resolution of the 2001 landing of a U.S. EP3 plane on China's Hainan Island.⁵²

In the process, the U.S. State Department has complied with Chinese requests to place Muslim separatist groups from the western region of Xinjiang on its terrorist watch list, U.S. complaints on the treatment of the Falun Gong group have diminished, and talk of China as a "strategic competitor" has dissipated. In Japan, efforts

to assist the United States have led to military activities that are unprecedented since the end of World War II. A grateful President Bush has concurrently relaxed U.S. pressure on Japan to reform its economy.

The United States, for its part, seems to have understood that its interests must be pursued in alliance with the states of the region. Political muscle has been used, but U.S. actions in the region have not unilaterally or preemptively exercised force or the threat of force.⁵³ Asian, and especially Southeast Asian, states would vehemently oppose any such action by the United States. If this can be avoided, however, U.S. support for actions such as those in the Philippines may raise some eyebrows in the region but not strong opposition.

While present U.S.-Asian relations have improved, considerable challenges remain for the medium to long term. Perhaps chief among these is the danger that 9/11 will breed a U.S. inattention to other issues in these countries that may then reassert themselves, perhaps suddenly and with considerable consequence.

ASIAN-U.S. RELATIONS: BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND WORLD ORDER

The above survey of responses in Asia suggests that, while there is some variety of opinion and some strands of doubt and opposition, there is no parallel to the reaction in Europe. There, clear cleavages have arisen over Iraq, with France and Germany leading opposition to the U.S.-led action and the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Poland supporting it. Why has division in Asian states not crystallized in this way?

Public opinion is not the chief difference. As in Europe, there is no strong and widespread domestic support among the peoples of Asia for U.S. action in Iraq and the exercise of U.S. primacy. In some Asian societies, there is and has existed for some time an ambivalence towards the United States, captured by the comment "Go home Yankee, and take me with you."⁵⁴ Some feel that the United States has made self-centered and unilateral impositions, without sufficient consultation or consideration of the concerns of Asians or sufficient attention to other issues and approaches beyond military and security responses.⁵⁵ Asian governments indeed face an increasing tension between their external commitments to support the United States and these internal views and demands.

Asian responses may instead be best explained by the ways in which Asians have come to view the world, post-World War II, post-Cold War, and post-1997. In the post-World War II period, the United States emerged as the strongest influence in the region and the guarantor of security for the noncommunist states. Even today, bilateral security arrangements link states like Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines to the United States. Most Asian governments continue to support a U.S. engagement and physical presence in the

region, even if the precise numbers, purpose, and location of these U.S. bases may be debated. Those who do not do so explicitly, tacitly offer support. To many security analysts, these realist and bilateral relationships are the vital relationships in the region. They see multilateral institutions and processes like the UN, APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN itself as epiphenomenal: nice to have, but not essential.

In the post-Cold War period, countries that have sought to emerge in the world economy have had to make economic, social, and political negotiations with the United States. Vietnam, having won a war with the United States, has proceeded to negotiate trade terms with the United States as a path towards its entry into the World Trade Organization. China has gone through much the same route. Other Asian states felt the pressure to respond on issues like democracy and human rights ascendant in the post-Cold War agenda.

In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, states in the region have realized their own vulnerabilities and the continued primacy of the United States. U.S. markets have been the central hope for countries seeking to increase their exports as a means to stimulate their economic recovery. The multilateral Asia-Pacific vision of parity, equity, and community has given way to a realist's assessment of what and who matters. The first fear in the wake of the crisis was not of a unilateral and imposing United States, but of a United States that would retreat in self-satisfaction into itself, equally disinterested in Asia and other regions.

Against this background, the U.S. post-9/11 agenda has turned U.S. attention outwards.⁵⁶ Asia has again received U.S. attention, and Asian governments have generally been quick to align their interests and agendas to those of the United States. Equally, most have sought to prevent direct interventions into their territories and domestic affairs by cooperating with the United States.

While some Asians dissent, this realist logic—that it is best to ally with the United States—prevails. Its policies of “benign selfishness” offer the closest match to world interest—the desire for free trade, rule of law, free movement of capital and people, as well as security for persons and property.⁵⁷ In this view, stability in Asia may be provided by a hegemonic power, as long as it is relatively benign. If the United States carries out its stated plans to free world markets, strengthen developing economies, and engage in nation-building as stated in the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy, global approval will simultaneously increase.⁵⁸

In order to assure the global community that its interest in Asia and the world is indeed benign and broadly supported, however, the United States must first contend with a number of concerns. Chief among these, as this essay has argued, is that the post-9/11 agenda in the United States responds first and most directly to U.S. domestic opinion. This means that there will be severe limits to how much influence other countries, including those in Asia, can have in persuading the U.S. government in any direction that is contrary to the views of the

American voter. U.S. exceptionalism in treaties and multilateral settings illustrates the concerns that Asian and other states have about the dependability and benign character of the United States internationally.

The reverse is arguably true of other countries: for quite a number of states in Asia, the post-9/11 agenda is also intertwined with domestic politics. This seems, in different ways, to be the case for Indonesia and Malaysia, where there are Muslim majorities of different opinions and emphases. In Singapore too, where Muslims are a minority, 9/11 issues have put pressure on interracial understanding and harmony. Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong recognized this issue with the publication of the white paper on terrorism, declaring that it was not to put "a spotlight on the Muslims in Singapore," but rather "a spotlight on those who wish Singapore ill, by committing terror acts."⁵⁹

For these countries, when addressing post-9/11 issues, the government of the day must take into account the local circumstances and sensitivities and avoid adopting a counterterrorism response that may suit U.S. interests but not its own. All countries facing the scourge of *jihad* terrorism have to fight the menace in their own way, albeit with the help of intelligence and legal assistance from other members of the international community, including the United States. The United States cannot win the war for them. Leaders will have to wage their own political battles to win and keep a majority backing. This influence of domestic politics may mean that, at times, these governments must disagree with U.S. policy, at least to assuage internal dissent. It will be necessary for the United States to understand and accommodate these and other undulations and rhetorical retreats without viewing them adversely as being "against us."

Thus while at least some Europeans may strive to uphold multilateralism in the UN and have their own common policies to increase their weight in world affairs, Asian states as a whole do not. They do not put as much stock in such efforts or offer an alternative view of a world order. In this moment of post-9/11 U.S. primacy they have instead sought to protect themselves from U.S. imposition and advance their own national interests as fellow travelers or allies.

What then of the multilateral institutions in Asia? The focus on domestic politics in the United States and in Asian states, as well as a focus on bilateral ties, has a deleterious impact on the broader regional processes of the Asia-Pacific. APEC may be the first victim, unless this grouping consciously reorients its premises of community. In place of APEC, the facts of U.S. primacy and the exigencies of the post-9/11 agenda instead suggest a hub-and-spoke type arrangement in regional relations, with the United States at the center. Security arrangements, in particular, will face adjustments. There is already a perceptible diminution of attention given to multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, which promise cooperative security arrangements with comprehensive and other newer conceptions of security.⁶⁰ Bilateral security arrangements are

instead in the ascendant, with an emphasis on more conventional security issues. In these arrangements, another emerging trend is a U.S. reliance on so-called deputies to guard and drive its interests. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia is often seen as filling this role. Among Asian countries, the Bush administration appears to have given special emphasis to the role of Japan.⁶¹ Yet emphasis on Japanese leadership on such issues is problematic, for historical and current reasons.⁶²

The multilateral process that appears to be underway is occurring among East Asian nations, but not the entire Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN, while not fully recovered from the Asian economic crisis, has made progress. An ambitious plan for an economic community and a security community among ASEAN member states was unveiled at the end of 2003. The "ASEAN plus 3" (ASEAN+3) process, which links the 10 ASEAN members to the three East Asian states of China, Japan, and South Korea, has also emerged as perhaps the most notable expression of a new sense of regionalism.⁶³ ASEAN+3 leaders have sent a strong signal at the informal summit at the end of 1999 and 2000 in calling for the ASEAN+3 process

It is not certain where the fledgling efforts towards East Asian regionalism and cooperation will lead, but their progress and directions will no doubt be affected by U.S. attitudes and actions.

to become a formal summit. Economic ministers and finance ministers have followed up with a number of concrete proposals.⁶⁴

Thus far, the United States has not protested these developments, as it did when the idea of the East Asian Economic Grouping was rendered moot by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in the late 1980s.⁶⁵ Most recognize that the United States' vital interests will not be affected, unless East Asia becomes a closed bloc that seeks to exclude or even oppose the role of the United States.⁶⁶ To date, the ASEAN+3 processes, while bringing

East Asians closer together, remain open to the United States at many other levels. It is also notable that ASEAN+3 processes to date have progressed in financial, economic and other measures, but have not undertaken security cooperation. This is not merely because they wish to avoid U.S. suspicion and opposition. Asians have not found ways to deepen their cooperation and are even less likely to do so in the circumstances of a post-9/11 world, with the push and pull of U.S. priorities.⁶⁷

It is not certain where the fledgling efforts towards East Asian regionalism and cooperation will lead, but their progress and directions will no doubt be affected by U.S. attitudes and actions. A regional effort in East Asia to better address the region's interdependencies and common concerns seems likely to gain support, but one that questions or challenges U.S. primacy will meet resistance and perhaps encounter defections, given bilateral ties with the United States. The efforts of East Asian regionalism, therefore, must work in the shadow of U.S. interests.

ASIA IN A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequalled—strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society ... [t]he great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.

—U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
SEPTEMBER 2002

Relations between the United States and East Asia must no longer be seen as an equation of growing equality or even a partnership of parity. East Asia is instead another region that must deal with the United States on its terms and in response to the agenda that Americans set. The United States sets the price and East Asia is, to use an economic phrase, a *price-taker*.

Things may change sharply if U.S. primacy were to falter and fall away. Assuming that this will not transpire shortly, there may be no consequence to the growing sentiment in Asia and elsewhere against the United States, in the immediate to intermediate term. Yet it seems striking that the current power of the United States, the declared values of the country, and the outpouring of goodwill and sympathy that many in the world felt immediately after 9/11, have not led to a greater and sustained support for the United States in Asia or indeed the wider world.

This has considerable implications for U.S.-Asian relations and the possible future of the Asia-Pacific. There are also factors that East Asians must consider anew in making their foreign policies, both towards the United States and their nascent sense of regionalism.

ASEAN and other Asian countries are right to seek to engage the United States on the counterterrorism agenda. U.S. inattention or resentment towards Asian states resulting from a lack of cooperation can otherwise have negative impacts. However, Asian leaders can and should make stronger efforts to increase the terms of this engagement. The United States can and should be more multi-lateral in both process and substance. Univalent attention to narrow security and military concerns should be broadened with an agenda that considers the needs of peace-building, sustainable development, and prosperity.

The efforts in ASEAN and ASEAN+3 regionalism serve best to help the states in Asia address what issues they can, among themselves. They may also serve as an occasional platform for dialogue and consultation with the United States. In the short to medium term, however, there is little prospect that they will displace the primary importance of bilateral relations with the United States. The hub-and-spoke arrangement of relations will continue between the United States, at the pivotal centre, and different, disunited Asian states at the rim.

The constituency that has the greatest potential for changing U.S. foreign policy is the American people. Post-9/11, Americans know and care more than ever about international events, and Asians feel Americans are able to affect their own security. Their attitudes and expectations continue to shape the positions taken by politicians, including issues that may seem far away, like Indonesian policy. But this constituency is removed from the reach and influence of Asians.

The Bush administration has referred to many traditions and values in United States thinking about the world. These include the need to “champion aspirations of human dignity,” “ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade,” and “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.”⁶⁸ If these values are pursued alongside the global war on terrorism, U.S. leadership in the world would be much more acceptable to many more people. It remains to be seen if the

If America does live up to its values, it will find states in Asia who can and will cooperate.

Bush administration, coming to the end of its term, will be reelected and if the second Bush administration or its successor will live up to these declared aims.

If the United States does live up to its values, it will find states in Asia that can and will cooperate. Most in Asia do not desire an end to U.S. primacy. Indeed, U.S. presence

is what they have known, lived with, and largely prospered from over the past few decades. The overarching wish of Asian states is instead that the present hour of U.S. primacy continues to provide stability and show benevolence for all, even in the face of post-9/11 U.S. exigencies and imperatives. ■

NOTES

1 World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Regionalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

2 Many books lauded the rise of the Asia-Pacific on a number of bases and convictions. Of these, see Francois Godemont, *New Asian Renaissance* (London: Routledge, 1997) for one of the more balanced assessments.

3 Victor Mallet, “Introduction: A Miracle that Went Sour,” *Trouble with Tigers* (New York: Harper Collins, 1998), 1-23.

4 Some emphasize the international factors, especially the lack of financial controls and the dubious policy recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, while others stress internal causes such as corruption, cronyism and nepotism in undermining public and private governance and rational policymaking. Peter Preston, “Reading the Asian Crisis: History, Culture and Institutional Truths,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 20 (3) (December 1998), 241-260. The recommended solutions in meeting the crisis and helping the region recover differ accordingly.

5 There are many works on the challenges and limits of ASEAN. Of these, for policy-relevant analyses on goals and steps for ASEAN, see Simon S.C. Tay et al., ed., *Reinventing ASEAN* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).

6 The U.S. economy in 2002 was twice the size of Japan’s, which was the next biggest. Despite some post-Enron uncertainties, and mixed economic figures in 2003, the American economy remains central to the world and no other major developed economy shows more promise for growth. In military terms, the United States has far outstripped its once and potential rivals, and even its allies. Its military expenditure, by some accounts,

- is equal to the total of the next 15 to 20 countries. The United States is able to project military power across the globe, on its own if thought necessary by Americans. In terms of culture and “soft power” too, the United States—its values and institutions—has widespread influence. There is a current and growing literature on the phenomenon of U.S. primacy. Perhaps the best single work on this is Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (London: Oxford University press, 2002). See also Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2002, 20-33; and Bill Emmott, “A Survey of America’s World Role,” *The Economist*, June 29, 2002, 3-28. For contrarian views, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power* (New York: The New Press, 2003); and, in the wider historical antecedents, see Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
- 7 Just the day after, *Le Monde* eulogized the tragedy with the memorable statement: “We Are All Americans Now.” *Le Monde*, September 12, 2001.
 - 8 For an essay on Asia to begin with a consideration of the U.S. position may seem counterintuitive. However, a central premise of this essay is the recognition of U.S. primacy. Given this, Asia is increasingly in a position of having to respond to the U.S. post-9/11 agenda.
 - 9 “House, in 296-133 Vote, Backs Bush on Using Force against Iraq, Citing a Continuing Threat,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2002, A1, A13.
 - 10 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on November 8, 2002.
 - 11 “Hill Leaders Back Iraq Pact,” *Washington Post*, October 3, 2002, A1, A14, reports the early compromise by some key leaders in Congress, including Democrat Minority House Leader Richard Gephardt.
 - 12 While China and Russia also expressed some reservations, France was seen by some in the United States as the key problem. The other permanent member, the UK, was always with the U.S. stance. See “US and France Agree to Keep Searching for Accord on Iraq,” *New York Times*, October 10, 2002, A17.
 - 13 Maureen Dowd, “Bush, from Swagger to Stagger,” *New York Times*, September 8, 2003, <<http://www.iht.com/articles/109116.html>> (accessed September 8, 2003).
 - 14 The Bush administration evidenced this thinking when it issued its 2002 strategic statement. This sketched out a new doctrine for the U.S. role in the world stressing its global primacy, thus clarifying the Americans’ views on their country’s international duties. This sees the incorporation of socio-economic strategies in addition to military ones in the counterterrorism campaign. Support to moderate governments, especially those of Muslim states, is vital. See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, The White House, September 17, 2002. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States wishes to retain its primacy and to use it to set the world agenda to its own advantage.
 - 15 Eighty-three percent of public leaders and 91 percent of the public view terrorism as a critical threat to U.S. interests and 87 percent of the former and 92 percent of the latter consequently hold global counterterrorism efforts as a crucial foreign policy goal. See *Worldview 2002: Survey of American and European Attitudes and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) <<http://www.ccf.org/publications/opinion/opinion.html>> (accessed November 6, 2003).
 - 16 In the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations Survey, cited above, 61 percent of those surveyed believed that the U.S. should not take action alone without the support of its allies, while 71 percent felt that the United States should solve global problems together with other countries.
 - 17 Gerhard Spoerl, “Bush’s Carte Blanche for the Campaign,” *World News Connection*, November 11, 2002.
 - 18 This can be seen in Rumsfeld’s remarks about “old Europe” and his disregarding of French and German support on the Iraq issue. See “‘Old Europe’ hits back at Rumsfeld,” CNN, January 24, 2003 <<http://europe.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/24/france.germany.rumsfeld/>> (accessed January 24, 2003).
 - 19 “Debate Over Iraq Focuses On Outcome,” *Washington Post*, October 7, 2002; and “US Aides Describe Post-Hussein Occupation,” *The New York Times*, October 11, 2002.
 - 20 The White House lists some 49 countries in the coalition in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These include Angola, Iceland, Macedonia, Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands, as well as countries that offered substantial troop contributions like Australia (2,000) and the UK (45,000). See “ABC Online Factfile: Countries Offering Support for Attack on Iraq,” <<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitem/s811366.htm>> (accessed October 26, 2003).
 - 21 U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has stated that “Multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction.” See “America Ready for War, with or without its Allies.” France and Germany are, in my view, the exceptions, and not the rule.
 - 22 UN Security Council Resolution 1511, adopted on October 16, 2003.
 - 23 Tip O’Neill, *All Politics is Local, and Other Rules of the Game* (New York: Times Books, 1994).

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- 24 "Militancy Threat Brings South-East Asian Nations Together," *Financial Times*, September 21, 2001 <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/asean.htm>> (accessed September 21, 2001). See also, Dana R. Dillon, "The Shape of Anti-Terrorist Coalitions in Southeast Asia," Heritage Lecture #773 <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl773.cfm>> (accessed September 21, 2001).
- 25 See "ASEAN's Fight against Terrorism," CPF Luhulima (English Language), May 23, 2002, TRACeS No.11.
- 26 "ASEAN Agrees on Anti-terror Pact," CNN, July 31, 2002 <<http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/07/30/asean.terrorism/>> (accessed July 31, 2002).
- 27 "ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism," <<http://www.aseansec.org/7424.htm>> (accessed August 1, 2002). See also "ASEAN: New Chief Sets Terror Agenda" <http://abc.net.au/location/asia/GoAsiaPacificLocationStories_766603.htm> (accessed January 21, 2003).
- 28 The Philippines has also allowed the United States port access as well as overhead and transit flights. The Abu Sayyaf rebels have been reduced in size, but recent bombings are still traced back to them. See "The Shape of Anti-Terrorist Coalitions in Southeast Asia."
- 29 "Bush Promises to Help Philippines Weed Out Terrorism," *USA Today* <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-10-8-bush-philippines_x.htm> (accessed October 8, 2003).
- 30 Lowell Dittmer, "East Asia in the New Era in World Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (October 2002), 52.
- 31 The comment was notably made at a news conference after awarding the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, the Meritorious Service Medal. See "Singapore Pledges Continued Support for U.S.-led Anti-terror War," January, 29, 2002 <<http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020129a2.htm>> (accessed January 29, 2002).
- 32 As early as September 2001, the government established an inter-ministerial anti-terrorism task force and in October 2001, issued regulations to facilitate implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism. UNSC Resolution 1373 on the suppression of terrorist financing. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) instructed all banks and financial institutions to identify customers suspected of financing terrorist operations or involved in money-laundering activities, while the police stringently reviewed all financial transactions in Singapore.
- 33 "Parliament to Debate White Paper on Terrorism on January 20," *Channel News Asia*, December 22, 2002 <<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/27814/11.html>> (accessed December 22, 2002).
- 34 Other measures have also been taken. There has also been the survey of Singapore-based U.S. economic interests and areas where Westerners usually congregate, with public warnings and stepped-up security in such places. See "Stepped-up Security Measures at Holland Village Take Effect," *Channel News Asia*, November 25, 2002 <<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/25509/11.html>> (accessed November 25, 2002). In addition, it has agreed to increase intelligence sharing with Australia and expertise on preventing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons attacks. Military escorts have been deployed for vessels moving through regional waters and there has been an increase in naval patrols of sea lanes as well as restrictions on waters surrounding petrochemical installations. Security patrols of Changi International Airport and seaports have also intensified. See "New Wave of Attacks Feared," *The Age*, November 23, 2002 <<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/11/22/1037697877265.html>> (accessed November 23, 2002).
- 35 "Singapore, United States Expand Security Ties During Bush Visit," *The Straits Times*, October 21, 2003. Unconfirmed reports by Reuters also suggest that the country may also make modest military and logistical support to the U.S.-led coalition.
- 36 For more information on counterterrorism action in Southeast Asia, see "The Shape of Anti-Terrorist Coalitions in Southeast Asia."
- 37 For UN, see, e.g., Zainul Afrin, "Dr. Mahathir: United Nations probably at its lowest point in 20 years," *The New Straits Times of Malaysia*, September 27, 2003; and "Islamic States to be Stronger if United: Mahathir," *The New Nation of Bangladesh*, September 26, 2003. For OIC, see "Malaysian Premier Condemns Western Attempts to 'Dominate' Muslims," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, October 18, 2003. Mahathir also made controversial comments about Jewish domination of the world at the OIC, to which President Bush responded when meeting him at the APEC summit.
- 38 See "AFP: Mahathir Says War, Terrorism Sending Asian Defense Spending Soaring," *World News Connection*, September 30, 2003: "Malaysia's Marine Police Commander Muhamad Muda told AFP recently that while the exchange of intelligence and experience were always welcome, 'We don't need foreign ships to come into Malaysian waters for joint patrols. I don't think our government would like that kind of thing.'" and Eileen Ng, "AFP: Malaysia Drops United States as Partner in New Regional Anti-Terror Center," *World News*
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- Connection*, July 1, 2003: "Malaysia's establishment of the centre on its own is seen as partly due to political sensitivities in the mainly Muslim country, which earlier dismissed suggestions it would involve the deployment of U.S. troops in Malaysia."
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 According to public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, only 15 percent of Indonesians have a favorable impression of Americans, and 74 percent worry about a potential U.S. military threat (*Views of a Changing World 2003*, The Pew Research for the People and the Press).
- 41 In Southeast Asia, the continued "soft" approach towards radicalism despite the Bali bombings causes Indonesia to remain vulnerable to terrorism. See "Indonesia Still not Safe from Terrorism, Say Experts," *The Straits Times*, January 28, 2003.
- 42 Much of that tourism is centered in the south of the country, which has considerable numbers of Muslim Thais and an often porous land border with Malaysia. Despite the Bangkok government's claims of being terrorism-free, Thai police have pronounced the presence of terrorist movements in the south at the Thai-Malaysian border where the Bali bombings were allegedly planned. Its reluctance to recognize the presence of terrorists within its borders, for the sake of tourist dollars on which its economy vitally depends, seriously retards anti-terrorism efforts.
- 43 See "Northeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests," Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st Session, November 15, 2001, 17 <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa76190.000/hfa76190_0f.htm> (accessed October 31, 2003). (Hereinafter known as "Northeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests.")
- 44 The standing committee of China's National People's Congress ratified the PRC's accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and signing the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. China also supplied a significant amount of food relief for refugees coming out of Afghanistan pledging \$1.21 million in emergency aid to Pakistan; agreed to provide \$121,000 in aid to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and most recently announced that they would provide an additional 60 truckloads of humanitarian supplies valued at \$1.7 million, "Northeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests," 27.
- 45 Volunteers included 120 medical, 170 sea and 150 air logistics personnel, and 10 liaison officers for operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. See Victor Cha's statement in "Northeast Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests," 74.
- 46 "Bush Facing a Different 'Axis of Evil,'" *The Straits Times*, January 25, 2003.
- 47 "Seoul Requests More Time for Diplomacy," BBC, January 25, 2003 <www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2693447/stm> (accessed January 25, 2003).
- 48 See *ibid.*, and "Anxiety Over the Other End of the Axis," *The Straits Times*, January 13, 2003.
- 49 Reported by the BBC. See above f. 49.
- 50 "S. Korea, U.S. Resolving Yongsan Issues," *The Korea Herald*, October 21, 2003.
- 51 "U.S., Korea Issue Security Statements after Talks," *The Korea Herald*, October 21, 2003.
- 52 "North-East Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and US Interests," 16, 32.
- 53 This is well advised. Sovereignty is a sensitive issue for Asian states. In the wake of the Bali bombing, for example, Australia echoed U.S. sentiments and declared the possibility of unilateral and preemptive forceful measures taken against states that did not adequately deal with terrorism. It caused an uproar among the ASEAN states and soured bilateral ties with some. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, no fan of Australia's, retorted: "As far as the travel warning is concerned, I think Australia is unsafe as are the other ASEAN countries." See "Mahathir Hits Australia on Travel Warnings," November 7, 2002, <http://pgoh.free.fr/aussie_unsafe.html> (accessed November 7, 2002) and "Backlash Shocks Canberra," December 6, 2002 <http://www.inq7.net/opi/2002/dec/06/opi_amdoronila-1.htm> (accessed December 6, 2002).
- 54 "New World Ahead," *The Economist*, June 29, 2002.
- 55 "A Survey of American Power," *The Economist*, June 29 2002, 6-10, 26-28.
- 56 Albeit, as this essay argues, as a function of domestic opinion.
- 57 "The Acceptability of American Power," *The Economist*, June 29, 2002, 10.
- 58 "Building Countries, Feeling Generous," *The Economist*, June 29, 2002, 18-20; and "War on Iraq: U.S. Must Consider Consequences," *The Straits Times*, January 24, 2003.
- 59 "White Paper on Terrorism not Aimed at Putting Singapore Muslims Under Spotlight: PM Goh," *Channel News Asia*, January 11, 2003 <<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/25509/1.html>> (accessed January 11, 2003).

- 60 J. Garofono, "Power, Institutions and the ASEAN Regional Forum," *Asian Survey* 42(3) (May/June 2002), 502-521.
- 61 However, it is mindful of reigniting the old power-rivalry with China and thus tries to assuage Chinese fears by declaring the welcome of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. Still, the United States upholds its values by also stating the importance of curbing unfriendly Chinese military agendas, improving its human rights records, instituting personal freedoms and democracy, that real power comes from socio-political freedom. *Ibid.*, 27-28.
- 62 See also the lagging behind of Japan in forming regional relationships, especially with Russia. This means the closer forging of regional ties without Japan, thereby further undermining credibility of being a regional leader, *ibid.*, 52.
- 63 Simon S.C. Tay, "ASEAN and East Asia: A New Regionalism?" Simon S.C. Tay et al, ed. *Reinventing ASEAN* (ISEAS, 2003), 206-225.
- 64 For example, the ASEAN+3 has seen progress in cooperation on finance. The Chiang Mai initiative of the 13 countries has committed the governments to exchange information and review each other's policies as regards financial policy. They have since agreed to a system of currency swaps, allowing one state to borrow from another on a short term basis to fend off currency speculation and instability. This is closely connected to the currency fluctuations that were the trigger to the Asian crisis that began in 1997. In March 2000, finance ministers from the ASEAN+3 countries agreed to stand by arrangements for currency swaps and to help each other in the event of sudden raids on their currencies. By mid-2001, a number of bilateral swap arrangements had been agreed and were being finalized. The ASEAN+3 efforts laudably recognize and seek to manage the interdependence of the region. See "Progress of the Chiang Mai Initiative," March 28, 2002 <<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if043d.htm>> (accessed March 8, 2002).
- 65 "We do not Reject the West," *New Straits Times*, April 12, 2002.
- 66 For example, some see ideas such as starting an Asian Monetary Fund and trade agreements among ASEAN+3 members would benefit Asians, while discriminating against the United States. Some estimates for example suggest that an East Asian Free Trade agreement, an idea which some have proffered but no country has strongly pursued to date, would result in discrimination against the United States, potentially cutting off \$25 billion in trade. See "North-East Asia After 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests," 22.
- 67 The ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes the ASEAN+3 countries, has promised a "second stage" of preventive diplomacy, but has yet to develop or practice this concept.
- 68 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, titles of sections II, VI and VII respectively.