

## INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: GLOBAL TRENDS AND NATIONAL RESPONSES

SHARON STANTON RUSSELL

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As recently as the late 1980s, scholars and politicians alike tended to view migration, especially international migration, as a subject of peripheral interest.<sup>1</sup> In the academic world, the fact that migration involves aspects of demography, economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology placed it firmly at the margins of—or in the interstices between—mainstream social science disciplines. Moreover, because migration defied monocausal explanations and attracted little funding for academic research, the subject captured the attention of relatively few scholars. Among politicians, migration was considered “low politics,” part of the province of social affairs ministries, labor attachés, human rights nongovernmental organizations, church groups, ethnic politicians, international humanitarian organizations, and the like.

Only a few years later, migration issues have come to be found increasingly on the desks of presidents, prime ministers, kings, finance ministers, parliamentarians, and other participants in “high politics.” Migration has also become a “hot topic” among a growing number of researchers and academics. Why has international migration achieved this new level of prominence, not only in academic and policy circles, but among general populations in developed and developing countries alike?<sup>2</sup> After all, only a small minority of the world’s people, roughly 2 percent, ever move across national boundaries as migrants. Even in extreme or catastrophic cases, such as those of Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Cuba, the proportion of citizens who leave their country seldom exceeds 10 to 25 percent.

One reason for migration’s heightened salience is that international population movements are posing some fundamental challenges to:

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*Sharon Stanton Russell is a Research Scholar at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she is a member of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration. Dr. Russell is co-author of International Migration and International Trade and has written extensively on international migration trends and policies.*

- the search for a “new world order” out of the change and uncertainty that has accompanied the end of the Cold War;
- the post-World War II system of sovereign nation-states;
- the international refugee regime; and
- the political survival of governments and parties in migrant-receiving countries.

A second reason for migration’s higher profile is the growing potential for international migration, driven by three major forces:

- Deepening economic divides between countries. The gap between rich and poor countries, as measured by real per capita income, has widened steadily over the past 40 years.
- Widening demographic differentials. These are perhaps best reflected in the gap between rapid labor force growth in developing countries and slow growth in industrialized countries.
- Sharpening political differentials. These are evident in the differences between countries governed by the rule of law, with active participation by the civil society, and those characterized by weak legal systems, human rights abuses, and violent domestic conflicts.

However, population pressures and economic and political differentials are not the whole story. Other factors are also amplifying, precipitating, and perpetuating international migration flows. These include global networks of communication, transportation, and people-moving intermediaries; growing international trade links; and the collapse of empires, the failure of states, and the resurgence of nationalisms. Although control measures shape and modulate international population movements, the combined effect of these driving forces and amplifying factors has led to a third reason why international migration has become a hot topic: the number of migrants has increased, at an accelerating rate of growth.

### Global Trends

In 1965, there were approximately 75 million international migrants, including the foreign-born, foreign nationals, and official refugees. By 1990, their numbers had swelled to nearly 120 million, equivalent in size to the population of Bangladesh, the ninth most populous country in the world.<sup>3</sup> Between 1985 and 1990 alone, the total stock of migrants increased by about 15 million people or 2.6 percent per year, a rate of increase higher than the 2.2 percent annual rate of natural increase in the populations of less-developed countries. A recent International Labour Office (ILO) analysis of labor migration between 1970 and 1990 provides evidence that the geographical scope of economically motivated migration is spreading as well. This study found a striking 53 percent increase in the number of countries participating in international migration, as senders, receivers, or both. More than half (84 out of 155) of the

countries in the analysis were actively involved in migration streams as of 1990.<sup>4</sup> It is expected that the data for 1990-1995 will show a large increase in both the number of migrants and the number of countries involved in migration, partly as a result of reclassification following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

The world's international migrants are distributed across all regions of the globe: 37 percent in Asia and North Africa; 21 percent in Eastern and Western Europe; 20 percent in the United States and Canada; 11 percent in sub-Saharan Africa; 6 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean; and 4 percent in Oceania. More than half of all international migrants are in developing countries. Contrary to the common perception of international migrants as young adult males, between 40 and 60 percent of all international migrants worldwide—and over half of all refugees—are women and girls.

From the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, Asia produced nearly half the world's refugees, but their numbers have fallen from almost 10 million in 1993 to under 8 million in 1995, largely as the result of repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran. Labor migrants continue to return to the Arab Gulf. Despite the massive departure of the Palestinian population from Kuwait during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, by January 1995 there were nearly 1.2 million expatriates in Kuwait and Kuwaitis were once again a minority in their own land (a mere 37 percent of the total population). East Asia continues to be an especially dynamic region of population mobility. For example, despite Japan's recent economic woes, the stock of foreign workers there doubled from 300,000 in 1990 to 600,000 in 1993.<sup>5</sup> Taiwan had virtually no guest workers in 1990, but had 316,000 by 1995.<sup>6</sup> The last of the Vietnamese "boat people" in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong are being repatriated or resettled, and Vietnam's leaders have indicated that the country now intends to become a major labor exporter. The number of Koreans emigrating to the United States has dropped dramatically from a high of 36,000 annually in the mid-1980s to only 11,000 in 1994. Since 1991, between 5,000 and 6,500 per year have become "return migrants," leaving the United States for Korea.<sup>7</sup>

The Korean case illustrates the broader point that, over long periods of time, as countries develop, they appear to pass through what is called the "migration transition"—going from being sending countries, to both sending and receiving, and finally receiving countries. In China, however, where there are already approximately 100 million internal migrants, 20 million of whom are located in booming coastal cities, the prospects for such a transition are a long way off. This new internal mobility has ramifications for international migration: during the early 1990s, well-organized human smuggling operations involving 30 countries are estimated to have delivered approximately half a million illegal Chinese migrants to Europe, the former Soviet Union, and North America. Another 100,000 have reportedly entered Thailand, with smaller numbers to other destinations in Asia.<sup>8</sup>

Africa as a whole, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, continues to be distinctive for its production of refugees—more than 80 percent of the world's total at the beginning of 1995—and for the volatile and sometimes appalling

nature of these population movements. During 1994, some 2 million refugees fled Rwanda in the fastest exodus of its size ever recorded; in April, for example, nearly a quarter of a million poured into Tanzania in one 24-hour period. There were also significant numbers of new refugees from Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, and Sierra Leone, all but a fraction of whom have remained in neighboring countries. At the same time, there have been some promising developments in the region: nearly three-quarters of a million refugees repatriated to Mozambique during 1994, while smaller numbers repatriated to Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Togo.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the visibility of refugee situations in Africa, not all African migrants are refugees; there are long-standing as well as recent population movements between African countries that are largely economically motivated. Well-established migration streams include those from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea to Côte d'Ivoire and those from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland to South Africa. More recent developments include the movement into South Africa of as many as 2 million illegal migrants from all parts of the continent.<sup>10</sup>

Migration from North Africa has been predominantly labor migration and mostly toward European destinations. Indeed, migration across the Mediterranean basin is a major focus of concern in Europe, prompting great interest in whether and how trade, financial aid, and development assistance might be deployed to help stem these migratory flows. Within North Africa, Libya has been a regional pole of attraction from time to time, notably for Tunisians. Recently, however, Libya has expelled Palestinian, Egyptian, and Sudanese workers for both economic and political reasons.

With regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico is the principal sending country, and the United States is the country of overwhelming attraction. Nevertheless, there is also a considerable, and growing, amount of economic migration among Latin American countries, notably to Argentina and Venezuela, some of it facilitated by regional trade agreements such as the Andean Pact (between Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and the Mercado Común del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR) among the countries of the Southern Cone. The number of officially designated refugees in the region continues to decline and stood at just over 100,000 at the end of 1994. At the same time, there are several notable cases of significant international movements in 1994 as a result of deteriorating political and economic conditions. Haiti and Cuba are perhaps the two most prominent examples.

The United States, Canada, and Australia are the so-called traditional countries of permanent immigration. As of the 1990 U.S. census, the foreign-born population stood at about 20 million, approximately 8 percent of the total population.<sup>11</sup> Since then, and especially following passage of the 1990 Immigration Act, there has been a substantial rise in the number of persons who entered the United States for lawful permanent residence—from 674,000 in 1990 to 877,000 in 1993, compared to about 600,000 per year in the latter half of the 1980s, and 360,000 per year in the late 1960s.<sup>12</sup> These figures do not include asylum seekers (another 144,000 in 1993), people admitted on non-

immigrant visas, or those unlawfully resident in the United States who legalized under provisions of the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 (which has added another 3 million persons in the past decade).<sup>13</sup> The figures also do not include continuing net flows of illegal migrants, whose stock was estimated to be about 3.4 million in 1992 and growing at a rate of 300,000 per year.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to legal, permanent immigration to the United States, Mexico headed the list of major source countries between 1956 and 1993. In 1991, Mexico briefly dropped to second place, after the Philippines. Mexico, Asia, and Central America together now account for over half of the foreign-born population in the United States—a dramatic shift from 1970, when 60 percent of foreign-born residents were from Europe. These numbers and their composition form the backdrop for current heated policy debates on U.S. immigration reform.

Canada held more or less to its targeted intake of about 250,000 persons per year in 1992 and 1993, but annual immigration to Australia has dropped. Australian intake was only 63,000 in fiscal year 1993-1994, an historically low level generally explained by economic recession and high unemployment, both of which have made Australia a less attractive destination for migrants in recent years. Like the United States, both Canada and Australia have experienced a notable shift to Asian source countries over the past decade. Although annual intake in both Canada and Australia is much lower than in the United States, the proportions of foreign-born in the total populations are considerably higher—over 16 percent in Canada and 22 percent in Australia.

Migration to Western Europe has undergone several dynamic shifts in recent years. Europe initiated relatively large-scale labor recruitment in the years after World War II in response to labor shortages and the needs of post-war reconstruction. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, West European countries were admitting upwards of 1 million people annually—ostensibly on a temporary basis under “guest-worker” programs. Large numbers of these were from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and the southern European countries—Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

Such recruitment was halted or slowed during the early 1970s because of rising public concern and the economic recession that followed the oil price rises of the period. The inflow continued, however, primarily because of provisions allowing for family reunification. Between 800,000 and 900,000 people per year were admitted throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. By the late

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1980s, average annual inflows had risen dramatically to more than 1 million per year and in 1992 exceeded 1.7 million.<sup>15</sup> Family reunification continued to be the major component of admissions in most countries, followed by workers and refugees, but the numbers were also swelled by new east-west flows and asylum seekers. The number of people arriving in Europe and lodging claims for political asylum began to rise dramatically in the mid-1980s, reaching nearly 700,000 in 1992. Although so-called "recognition rates" are low, with only a small proportion of asylum seekers granted refugee status, until recently most rejected asylum seekers (and others awaiting adjudication of their cases) remained in the host countries. Since 1987, migration has accounted for more than 60 percent of Western Europe's total population growth.<sup>16</sup> Yet to this day, puzzling as it might seem, European countries insist (unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, and despite evidence to the contrary) that they are not "countries of immigration."

Since 1993, however, the inflow of foreign-born populations to Europe has begun to level off in most countries, especially in Germany and France, the largest receivers. By 1994, the number of asylum seekers also had dropped to less than half its 1992 level. West European states are concerned, nevertheless, that illegal immigration may be on the rise. One estimate puts the stock of illegal immigrants in the region between 2.5 and 3 million; other estimates run as high as 5.5 million.<sup>17</sup>

Several other important features of recent migration to Western Europe should be noted. First, the share of foreigners from non-European Union member countries has increased substantially. As their numbers have increased, certain nationalities have gained importance relative to groups that migrated earlier—for example, Iranians and Sri Lankans in Norway and Sweden; Moroccans, Senegalese, and Vietnamese in France; Africans from the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Cape Verde in Portugal. New and growing east-west flows are especially important for Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Second, as in North America and Australia, migration of highly skilled workers is becoming more common. And third, recourse to temporary worker programs is also becoming more popular—notwithstanding the fact that such programs in the 1960s and early 1970s were not entirely successful, in the sense that "the guests came to stay."

Changes have also occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, which has been emerging as a regional pole of attraction since 1993. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Russia have all begun to receive labor migrants from elsewhere in the region and from developing countries, skilled workers from developed countries, and the return migration of former emigrants. Net immigration to the Russian Federation alone was 916,000 in 1994 and 963,000 in 1995, with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics being the main countries of origin.<sup>18</sup>

With respect to Europe as a whole, upwards of 800,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were being hosted in the region at the end of 1994, in addition to the 1.3 million Bosnians internally displaced. They are a sobering reminder

that all the control mechanisms in the world cannot rule out such volatile flows.

In conclusion, international migration today is characterized by several trends:

- Globalization. International migration is a worldwide phenomenon, affecting developing as well as industrialized countries.
- Diversification. The directions of migration are not simply toward industrialized countries; as of the mid-1980s, just over half of all migrants were in developing countries. A growing number of countries are participating in migration streams.
- Acceleration. The number of international migrants of all types appears to be growing. The official refugee population rose dramatically from just over 8 million in 1980 to more than 14 million at the beginning of 1995 (down from a high of 18 million in 1993) and the number of internally displaced is growing.<sup>19</sup>

### National Responses

Trying to make broad and simple generalizations about international migration, a complex and shifting subject, is a challenge under any circumstances, particularly when looking at national responses. A given country's declared policies toward migration and the control mechanisms it employs to manage migration are usually the products of intense and heated political debate within that country.

One measure of national responses on a global basis may be found by consulting the section on International Migration Policies in the *World Population Monitoring Report*, which presents findings based on regular, periodic surveys of governments, conducted by the U.N. Population Division. According to the 1993 *Monitoring Report*, the percentage of countries that view levels of immigration as too high grew significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has continued to rise, reaching nearly 23 percent in 1993. Some countries that view immigration levels as satisfactory nonetheless have policies to lower immigration; consequently the percentage of governments with such policies is even higher—35 percent in 1993.<sup>20</sup> This has contributed to the general perception that countries around the globe are becoming more "restrictionist," especially in the face of economic uncertainty and adverse public reactions to immigration. However, this should not obscure the fact that most countries view their current levels of immigration as satisfactory and have policies to maintain those levels. Also, a small percentage of countries view the level of immigration as too low and have policies to raise it. The latter include Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Israel, Argentina, Uruguay, Guyana, Canada, and New Zealand. Nor is restrictionism concentrated in industrialized countries. Of the 39 countries that officially view immigration as too high and consciously intervene to lower it, only 13 are developed countries.

The percentage of foreigners in a population is not necessarily a good predictor of national response (although obviously at the individual country level it can play a role in immigration debates). Perhaps paradoxically, the median percentage of foreign-born persons in countries with policies to raise immigration is 11, while it is only 4 percent in countries with policies to reduce immigration.<sup>21</sup>

Countries also have views and policies about the emigration of their own citizens. In 1993, the majority viewed the prevailing levels of emigration as satisfactory and had policies to maintain them; approximately 20 percent viewed emigration as too high and intervened to lower it, while just over 3 percent acknowledged official efforts to encourage emigration. The latter include Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey.

In trying to generalize about responses to international migration at the country level, one can make a broad distinction between countries of origin and countries of destination, although a growing number of countries are in both categories. Regardless of their officially stated views and policies, a number of countries—from Barbados to the Philippines—have encouraged labor emigration as an outlet for their rapidly expanding labor forces and as a source of hard currency remittance inflows. In 1990, total global remittance credits through official channels were over \$71 billion, second in value only to trade in crude oil; net flows to developing countries were nearly \$37 billion, over two-thirds the value of official development assistance that year. In other words, remittances are important and growing mechanisms for the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries.<sup>22</sup>

Some governments also tacitly welcome the voluntary departure of certain ethnic or political groups, as in the cases of Azeris from Turkey and Palestinians from Jordan. At the extremes, governments have been known to forcibly expel residents and even citizens, often to achieve cultural homogeneity or ethnic dominance. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is but one recent example—the practice has a long history, including expulsion of the Jews from Spain in the fifteenth century and expulsion of the Protestant Huguenots from Catholic France in the seventeenth century.

Although emigration has some clear benefits for countries of origin, they are also naturally ambivalent about the phenomenon. They often decry the loss of human capital and in recent years have been confronted with the financial downside of dependence on remittances.<sup>23</sup> This downside centers on their increasing vulnerability to sudden changes in countries of destination, as seen most dramatically with the repatriation and/or expulsion of migrants during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.

Reactions in countries of destination vary widely, can change with time, and may differ depending on the sources and circumstances of the migrants. In both developed and developing countries, those with booming economies and labor shortages have initially welcomed labor migrants, only to become less welcoming or even hostile to immigrants when economic conditions (and with them, domestic political conditions) deteriorate.

Reactions to refugees and other forced migrants can also change over time.

For years, Thailand hosted hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees coming across its eastern border. However, by the late 1980s, resettlement in third countries had slowed and in 1988, Thailand (along with Malaysia) began to repel boatloads of Indochinese attempting to reach its shores. National responses may also be different toward different groups. For example, the United States has admitted very few Haitians or Guatemalans as refugees but for three decades admitted Cubans, granting them virtually automatic adjustment to permanent resident alien status.

Beyond these generalizations about national responses, it is necessary to look at some of the dynamics within countries that help shape those responses. This may be termed the political economy of responses to migration. Five broad groups of potential actors can be distinguished: governmental actors, including elected officials at the federal, provincial, and local levels and politicians of both the ruling and opposition parties; employers and business interests; organized labor; migrant and other allied interest groups; and the general public.

The interplay among and within these groups of actors is often complex and unpredictable, and the groups are by no means monolithic in their stances on particular issues. Governments, especially at the federal or national level, tend to view the determination of who may enter and under what conditions they may remain as a fundamental sovereign right of states. But beyond agreement on this general principle, there is much debate and dissension. The current furor surrounding immigration reform in the United States is an immediate example. Tensions have developed between those who formulate national immigration policy in Washington and

local government officials, supported by public opinion, in states such as California, Texas, and Florida. These localities feel unfairly and excessively burdened by the inflows of immigrants that have resulted from national immigration policies and they want to see the levels reduced. Yet elected officials in New York, a state with one of the largest concentrations of migrants, have come out strongly in favor of continued high levels of immigration, which they view as contributing to their state's economy. There are similarly divergent views (both in the United States and in other industrialized countries) about whether or not illegal as well as legal migrants should be eligible for social benefits such as health, education, and welfare services.

Employers and business communities around the globe tend to be among the staunchest supporters of migratory movements because of their ongoing interest in cheap and readily available labor. Their influence on national policy can be considerable. In countries as diverse as the United States, Malaysia, and those of Western Europe, agribusiness interests have lobbied hard against the introduction of restrictions on entry and against employer sanc-

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tions for hiring illegal workers. The views of organized labor are less predictable. Many labor unions in the United States argue that migrants take jobs away from native-born workers; they opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement on this basis. Yet others are recognizing migrant workers, both legal and illegal, as a new source of energy to revitalize dwindling union membership roles. Similarly, labor unions in Kuwait (whose power has been limited in any event) have tended to take a positive view of migrants. Already-established migrant communities also exert pressures on the formulation of national responses. In Fiji, the long-resident Indian population and native Fijians have united in opposition to the prime minister's recent proposal to encourage immigration of Chinese from Hong Kong.

Indeed, immigration policy debates often create strange bedfellows. A recent *New York Times* article observed that, "As Congress . . . considers anti-immigration measures, it is facing resistance from a surprising alliance of high-technology manufacturers, religious leaders, conservative think tanks, civil liberties organizations and tiny, grass-roots immigrant groups."<sup>24</sup> Added to such cauldrons of domestic debate are the foreign policy dimensions that often accompany international migration and that, in turn, feed back into domestic responses. When the Cuban government began allowing large numbers of people to flee the country by boat in 1994, President Clinton reversed the long-standing U.S. policy of admitting Cubans with virtually automatic rights to permanent residence. In doing so, he faces the potential wrath of the Cuban-American community at the ballot box in 1996. Within the past year, Philippine president Fidel Ramos has similarly faced crises in both the foreign policy and domestic arenas over the arrests, convictions, and in one case execution of Filipina domestic workers in Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>25</sup>

Members of the general public, at least in pluralistic societies, have the opportunity to register their views through electoral processes. In California, they did so in 1994 through Proposition 187, which sought to eliminate the provision of social, educational, and health services to illegal aliens; in Switzerland and France, they have done so through the rising numbers of votes cast for the anti-immigrant Auto and National Front parties, respectively. At the end of the day, national responses are fundamentally influenced by "policymakers' and citizens' concerns for the preservation of a particular national identity (or identities) and widely shared values and for maintaining control over political institutions."<sup>26</sup> Even countries that take a positive view toward the entry of non-nationals want to be seen as being in control of the process.

### Control Measures

All countries have a range of control measures from which to select. Different observers offer different classifications of such mechanisms. In his new book, *The Global Migration Crisis*, Myron Weiner divides these broadly into rules of entry and rules of exit. Along a spectrum from lax to tight, rules of entry may be unrestricted (the United States in the nineteenth century), pro-

motional (Israel with respect to Jews), restrictive but permissive (such as allowing for family reunification), unwanted (as in the case of massive refugee inflows), or prohibitive (as in Turkey's response to Iraqi Kurds in the spring of 1991). Ranging from tight to lax, rules of exit may be prohibitive (common practice among totalitarian states), selective (restricting the emigration of the highly skilled or permitting the emigration of certain groups), permissive (typical of Western democracies), promotional (as in the case of some labor-exporting countries), or expulsive (Indians and other Asians from East Africa).

Another approach, put forward by Aristide Zolberg, distinguishes between "direct controls" and "remote controls," depending upon where they are exercised. Direct controls include those exercised by virtually every country at land border crossings, ports, and airports. Another direct control measure is the round-up and deportation of illegal migrants and rejected asylum seekers. This mechanism has a long history in many developing countries but has also recently found favor in the industrialized democracies.

Remote controls are of three general types. First, passports and visas were widely introduced in the United States and other Western countries during the nineteenth century. Second, "carrier sanctions" require that airlines, ships, and other carriers assume responsibility for validating that each passenger has the travel documents needed to enter the country of destination. Failure to do so results in monetary fines and obligates the carrier to return the traveller at its own expense. Finally, intelligence has been used in countries such as Kuwait where

"security checks" of prospective migrants are common and involve the issuance of "Good Conduct Certificates" and "Endorsements" from Kuwaiti embassies in migrants' countries of origin. Historically, intelligence measures have not been widely used in industrial democracies, but that is changing with the advent of computerized technologies that permit the "tracking" of migrants (such as the EURODOC system) and increased international cooperation among law enforcement officials (through Interpol, for example). To Zolberg's classification, we might add those "remote" and much longer-term controls that consist of efforts to stem migration through fostering economic development in countries of migrant origin, and a fourth category of interior controls, such as residence permits, work permits, identity cards, and practices such as permitting employers to retain and hold a worker's passport (common in the Gulf states).

In the wake of the asylum crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, European and North American countries have introduced a number of other control mechanisms. These include the following: expedited asylum procedures

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to screen prospective asylum seekers at points of entry and to exclude those whose claims are patently "frivolous" or "manifestly unfounded"; off-shore screening (in countries of origin, in third countries, or on the high seas), as was used by the United States in the Haitian and Cuban crises of 1994; and lists of "safe countries" determined to pose little or no risk of persecution. Asylum claimants from designated safe countries are provided with "fast-track" adjudication of their claims (for example, Romanians seeking asylum in Germany), while those who pass through a safe country (such as Bosnians attempting to enter Germany through Austria) are returned to that safe country for processing of their claims. The safe country approach is now embodied in the Dublin Convention,<sup>27</sup> as well as in numerous bilateral agreements between West European countries and their eastern neighbors.

The subject of control mechanisms, like immigration itself, is hotly debated. There are at least two sets of issues: how vigorously they should be implemented and how effectively they work. In the industrial democracies, views on some of these control mechanisms have changed markedly in recent years as the number of migrants has grown and public reactions to migration have become more negative. Only several years ago, the idea of chartering a plane to remove rejected asylum seekers was unthinkable, but France and Germany have done just that recently. Views on the use of certain mechanisms also differ sharply in countries with different political cultures. Countries such as France and Sweden have long had systems of national identity documents (cards identifying the bearer) for citizens and resident aliens alike and these are widely accepted as normal. In the United States, by contrast, any hint of such measures is widely resisted. Even the proposal to verify a worker's social security number prior to employment—which the bipartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (established by the Immigration Act of 1990) has recommended be pilot-tested—has drawn fire from civil libertarians and conservatives alike as an infringement on personal liberty.

Despite such differences, on balance there appears to be a growing convergence among countries in the policy instruments used for controlling migration, especially illegal migration and refugee flows. This is not accidental or even simply the result of a diffusion effect. Within Europe, the convergence of control mechanisms came at the same time the European Union was being forged, when the need arose to harmonize national policies with an eye toward the emergence of common community policies. Among industrial countries more broadly, there has been a great deal of transnational dialogue on control mechanisms among policymakers in both long-standing forums such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and new, ad hoc groups such as the Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee, and Migration Policies in Europe, North America, and Australia. Growing international cooperation to stem terrorism and international trafficking in migrants, along with the awareness that the policies of one country or region may have an impact on those of another, provide further impetus for convergence. In this respect, although the system of sovereign states is still very

much alive, it may be incomplete to talk about national responses. The outlines of supranational responses are visible.

Regarding whether or not control mechanisms work, there are two camps. On one side, Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield argue in their new book, *Controlling Immigration*, that such measures do not work and that there is a growing gap between the stated goals of immigration policies and their actual outcomes.<sup>28</sup> The other side, which includes Aristide Zolberg, Myron Weiner, and Michael Teitelbaum, believes that control mechanisms can and do work. On balance, it may be argued, the burden of evidence lies with the latter group—witness, for example, the decline in immigration and asylum statistics in Western Europe over the last two years. Were it not for the presence of controls on entry, the volume of international migration would likely be even greater than it is. Ultimately, the gap is less between stated policies and outcomes than between stated policies and implemented policies. The real issue may be to what extent internal political debates within liberal democracies permit policymakers to implement control measures, even when general public opinion favors them.

International migration is likely to continue to be a matter of high politics. The demographic, economic, and political differentials that drive the potential for international population movements show no signs of abating any time soon. The continued emergence of a global economy, the liberalization of world trade and transition economies, and the process of development itself add further impetus to such movements. The responsibilities of states to their citizens abroad and the presence of growing foreign populations within their territories raise both foreign and domestic national policy issues that promise to pose challenges for a long time to come.

### Notes

1. For the purposes of this article, the term international migration encompasses all types of human population movements across international borders.
2. This section draws upon Michael S. Teitelbaum and Sharon Stanton Russell, "International Migration, Fertility, and Development," in *Population and Development: Old Debates, New Conclusions*, ed. Robert Cassen, U.S.-Third World Policy Perspectives 19 (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers), 229-252.
3. The principle end-source for data on international migration is the United Nations Population Division, which in turn compiles and analyzes data from four main primary sources: (1) "country estimates," that is, official estimates based on documents such as visas and travel forms; (2) "foreign stock" estimates based on census counts; (3) so-called "balancing equation" estimates, based on the difference between the enumerated population in a census and the "expected" population or natural growth deriving from births and deaths; and (4) refugee statistics from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Figures given here for the numbers of international migrants are from: United Nations, Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock, Revision 1* (New York, 1995), POP/1B/DB/95/1. See Table 1. Comparison of migrant stock in 1990 to Bangladesh is based on: Population Reference Bureau, *1995 World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, DC, May 1995).

4. W.R. Böhning and Nana Oishi, "Is International Economic Migration Spreading?" *International Migration Review* 24, no. 3 (1995): 794-799.
5. SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting System on Migration* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995), 100.
6. *Migration News* (Davis, CA: University of California), October 1995, 9.
7. Pam Belluck, "Healthy Korean Economy Draws Immigrants Home," *The New York Times*, August 22, 1994, A1, B4.
8. Sharon Stanton Russell, "Migration Patterns of U.S. Foreign Policy Interest," in *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy*, ed. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 83-84.
9. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1995* (Washington, DC: Immigration and Refugee Service of America, 1995); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *The State of the World's Refugees* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
10. UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, 190.
11. United Nations, *Trends in Total Migrant Stock, Revision 1*. See Table 1.
12. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1993* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 32, 80-81. See Tables 4, 25, and 26. These figures were derived by taking the number of "immigrants admitted" (excluding those illegal aliens legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, whose "admission" was actually an "adjustment of status") minus the number of refugees who entered the United States in prior years but whose "admission" in the subject year was an adjustment of status, plus the number of refugees who entered the United States for resettlement in the subject year.
13. In 1993, there were over 21 million "admissions" on temporary visas; this figure includes multiple admissions by the same individual and thus does not necessarily reflect the number of people admitted. Categories of persons admitted on temporary visas include nearly 17 million tourists, as well as business people, treaty traders and investors, and students, trainees, and their spouses and children. See Table 39 in *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1993*.
14. Robert Warren, "Estimates of Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, by Country of Origin and State of Residence: October 1992" (Washington, DC: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Division, unpublished report, April 29, 1994), 13.
15. SOPEMI, *Trends in International Migration: Annual Report 1994* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995), 195. See Table A.2.
16. *Ibid.* See Chart 1.6.
17. Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia (IGC), Secretariat, *Illegal Aliens: A Preliminary Study* (Geneva: June 1995), 6; International Centre for Migration Policy Development, *The Key to Europe—A Comparative Analysis of Entry and Asylum Policies in Western Countries*, no. 135 (Stockholm: Swedish Government Official Reports, 1994), 63.
18. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), *International Migration Bulletin*, no. 7 (Geneva, November 1995), 6; Penny Morvant, "Migration Service Releases 1995 Data," *OMRI Daily Digest*, Part I, no. 39, February 23, 1996.
19. UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, 40. Also see Table 2.
20. United Nations, Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, *Draft World Population Monitoring, 1993* (New York, February 23, 1994), ESA/P/WP.121, 410. See Table VI.12.
21. *Ibid.*, 409.
22. Sharon Stanton Russell, "Migrant Remittances and Development," *International Migration XXX*, no. 3/4 (1992): 284, 287. See Tables 1 and 3.
23. When the loss of human capital involves the highly skilled or highly educated, it is

- often popularly called "brain drain." However, it is important to note that emigration of lesser skilled or even unskilled workers can create "manpower bottlenecks" if their departure affects sectors of the economy critical to development (e.g., construction).
24. Matthew Purdy, "Unlikely Allies Battle Congress Over Anti-Immigration Plans," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1995, B1.
  25. President Ramos' personal popularity reportedly plummeted over these incidents. See Philip Shenon, "On Philippine Ballot Today, Well-Worn Names," *The New York Times*, May 8, 1995, A10.
  26. Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 113.
  27. The "Dublin Convention" is the popular title for the Convention Determining the State Responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, signed June 1990.
  28. For more information, see Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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