A Comparative Analysis of the Policies of France and Spain with regard to Native Minority

Language and Culture Groups

An Honors Thesis in International Relations

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ABSTRACT

The following is a comparative analysis of the policies of France and Spain towards native minority groups within their borders. I am studying four cases: the Bretons and the French Basques in Spain, and the Catalonians and Spanish Basques in Spain. I will first determine that differences in policies towards these groups are formed at a state level, rather than being specific to individual groups. Then, I will evaluate theories to explain what factors motivate the creation of state policies towards native minority groups. Ultimately, I will conclude that a state's foreign policy goals serve as the primary motivation for a state's policy choice with regard to minorities that it hosts.

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Europe is a traditionally culture-rich area. It has been relatively densely populated

since the time of the Roman Empire. However, not all inhabitants of Europe belonged to

the same cultural group, or spoke the same language. As the different groups in Europe

fought to expand their territory and dominate their neighbors, some cultures, and the

languages they spoke, grew and thrived while others were threatened, put aside, or forced

out of existence. By the turn of the twentieth century, Europe was largely divided into

nation-states. These nation-states, generally speaking, united people who shared cultural

and linguistic heritage into a single political state with a single government, so that most

Europeans were governed by members of their own cultural group. The nation-states

boasted considerable cohesion in areas like language and culture; this cultural and

linguistic unity facilitated communication and made governance considerably easier.

However, not all of the linguistic and cultural groups in Europe were able to form their own

nation-states at this time, and many of the smaller groups were relegated to regions of

larger states.

These regional languages, and the cultures that they represented, were not given

official status by the nation-states of which they were a part. The nation states valued

cohesion as they looked to solidify their borders and subdue any perceived threat, whether

that threat was internal or external. Unfortunately for many smaller cultures, the emphasis

on cohesion often meant that minority linguistic and cultural groups, which differed from

the norms of the nation-states, were perceived as factions that perpetuated disunity, and

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were not afforded the means, or the right, to expand and maintain their cultural base. Since these groups were generally without official status at the state level, and often without any recognition at all by the states, many regional minority languages and cultures shrunk considerably over the course of the twentieth century.

Today, the European Union estimates that there are more than sixty indigenous regional or minority languages in Europe, and that over forty million people regularly speak these languages[1]. The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages of 1992 defines regional or minority languages as "those traditionally used by part of the population in a state, but which are not official state language dialects, migrant languages or artificially created languages." These groups of language speakers have a unique status in that, unlike immigrant groups, the region that they inhabit is often the only area where the language is spoken. Since these minority groups exist within the borders of established states, they often rely on the support of states with regards to the maintenance and promotion of their languages and cultures. State governments have long struggled with the issue of how to address minority groups within their borders. Different governments have taken different approaches, choosing to accommodate the minority, assimilate the minority to the majority culture, or exclude the minority from the state entirely.

The European Union has laid out a charter, and continues to emphasize the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity as an essential part of the cultural diversity of Europe. However, the Union itself does not have final say in the policies that are put into effect, as it operates under the principle of the subsidiary. Defined in Article Five of the Treaty on European Union, the Principle of the Subsidiary is a mechanism through which

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[1] European Commission. (2012, June 27). *Languages.* Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/facts_en.htm

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the Union seeks to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens. Under this principle, the European Union does not act or legislate on any issue that does not come under its exclusive competence unless its action would be more effective than those taken at the national, regional, or local level.   Since the maintenance of cultural and linguistic diversity does not fall under the competence of the European Union, policies in that domain are established at the member state or regional level. Therefore, regional and minority language groups are subject to different laws and allowed different privileges depending on what state they are in[2].

Though regional and minority language and culture groups can be found throughout Europe, this paper will focus on groups in France and Spain, in order to complete a comparative analysis of the policies of those two states regarding regional minority languages and how these policies affect members of these minority groups.   This paper will evaluate the effects of the French and Spanish policies on the different groups over time, in addition to comparing the differing effects of the two states' policies on language groups in the present day. In examining the language policies of France and Spain, the paper will specifically look at three regional minorities: Breton, in France, Catalan in Spain, and Basque, which is spoken in both France and Spain, as the region where it is spoken, Basque Country, is located on the border of the two states. The four groups will allow for comparison between France and Spain, but will also illuminate any differences in the way that either state has treated different groups within their territory. Examining differences between states and also between groups will help to determine the factors that shape the policies of France and Spain towards these groups as well as outlining the goals that the

[2] Europa (n.d.). *Summaries of EU legislation*. Retrieved from
        http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm

states are trying to meet with their policies towards native regional minority language and culture groups.

Brittany and Catalonia offer a perspective for comparison in that they are similar in size and because both regions have been incorporated into their respective governments since the first part of the sixteenth century. The long histories of relations of the Catalans with Spain and the Bretons with France provide a means to evaluate the development of the language policies of these nations over time. Meanwhile, the Basques offer a different perspective, as the territory, once united under self-rule in the independent kingdom of Navarre, has been split between France and Spain since the sixteenth century, when Castile absorbed the Basque territories that lay below the Pyrenees Mountains. Since the Basque Region, or the area of the former Basque Country, is currently divided, with some members of the minority group in Spain and others in France, the comparison between the policies of these two states can be drawn fairly clearly in this region.

The first governing question of this paper is as follows: Are policies towards minority groups formed at the state level, or are they tailored to each group? If a state is the organization responsible for policy choice and formation, then it follows that most policies would be designed at the state level. However, if the groups themselves, through political action, protest, or another means, were able to influence policy, then perhaps policies towards two groups in the same state at the same time could be different. In answering the question of whether or not policies are generally applied state wide, one can also make inferences about whether the state is at all influenced by the actions of different minority groups in choosing its policies towards regional cultural and linguistic minorities.

After answering the first question, this paper shall seek to determine what factors influence the creation of state policies towards native regional minority groups within their borders. Factors that will be evaluated include economy, ethnicity, the presence of state sponsored nationalism versus ethnic nationalism, domestic political and social unrest in the host-state, and the international situation of the state. As these individual factors change over time, looking at history will be imperative. Understanding shifts in each of these factors at points in time during which there was also a change in state policy will allow for the deduction of which factors truly influence policy change.

What factors have shaped the development of policies towards minority languages in Europe? In answering this question, the paper will discuss the history of the relations between the nations and the sub-state national minority groups within their borders. The factors influencing the policies may differ over time. I anticipate that the level of hostility or cooperation between the group and the state it is a part of, as well as how vocal or active the groups are in seeking more favorable policies, how smoothly government functions can be carried out in the regions, and perhaps even European Union policy towards minority languages and cultures will be factors that affect individual states' policies. The aforementioned factors are not, however, the only ones that will be considered, and these factors will probably be different, or at least of different levels of importance, in the two states evaluated in this paper.

<u>Design of a Comparative Case Study</u>

In examining the difference in policy between the policies of France and Spain with regard to native minority language and culture groups, I have two central governing questions:

1) Are policies towards minority groups formed at the state level, or are they tailored to each group?

2) What factors influence the creation of state policies towards native minority groups within their borders?

In order to answer these two questions, I have chosen the case-study method of analysis. As Donatella della Porta put it in her book <u>Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences,</u> "the choice of the comparative method is not just a second-best one imposed by the availability of data; rather, it is justified by its capacity to go beyond descriptive statistical measures, towards an in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual motivations." (2008). Given that I am seeking to explain the individual motivations of France and Spain, and given that their policies have developed over time, making history important, the case-study method is appropriate.

Rather than studying all of the different minority groups in France and Spain, I have chosen to focus on four cases, one in each country (the Bretons and the Catalonians, respectively) and one that is in both (the Basques). These cases were chosen in part out of practicality, as there is considerably more data on them than on some of the other minority groups in Western Europe. These cases are also very similar; they all have claim to a geographically defined area, and are located within democracies at present. Similarities between these cases allows for a more thorough examination of the different factors that

could have led France and Spain to have divergent policies towards these groups, despite their apparent similarities. Another advantage of these four cases is that they allow for comparison between countries as well as within countries. Studying the commonality in the policies towards the two groups in one country will allow for a determination of the underlying policy of the countries, rather than merely their policies towards specific groups. The term 'minority' is the term that I will use, since all of the groups studied in this paper are in fact minorities within their states.

With respect to my first question, concerning whether policies towards minority groups are formed at the state level, or tailored to each group, my hypothesis is that the states choose policy based on state needs and aims, with little input or influence by the minority groups. In order to test this hypothesis, I will look at the policies chosen by the state governments concerning the minority culture groups within their borders, comparing the cases within the same states to each other where possible. Unfortunately, there has not been an explicit iteration of 'policy' towards minority language and culture groups in either France or Spain. In the absence of a clearly defined policy, I will evaluate the rhetoric surrounding minority nationalism, the laws applied to minority language use, and any actions taken to preserve or disband these minorities by the state governments of France or Spain. Taken together, these factors illuminate the course of action, or 'policy' that the states have chosen to take with respect to minorities within their borders.

For the purposes of this paper, 'policy' will be understood to mean the goal of the state, not the specific measures of enforcement that are used to effectuate these policy aims. The host-state will be the term used to describe the states in which the minority

groups reside at any given point of time. 'Minority' is employed in this paper to describe the ethnic groups in question, rather than 'non-core' group or 'sub-state nation.'

For the sake of clarity, it is also best to classify policies into categories. In this paper, 'policy' will be defined as the choice of the state to accommodate, assimilate, or exclude a minority group. Accommodating policies create "situations where the 'differences' of a non-core group are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place."[3] These policies can include the adoption of measures like allowing a minority a certain level of regional autonomy, allowing the language and culture of the group to persist, giving a language official status, or even exempting members of the minority group from certain federal laws. The term 'assimilationist policy' refers to "educational, cultural, occupational, matrimonial, demographic, political, and other state policies aimed at the adoption of the core group culture and way of life by the targeted non-core group."[4] Finally, exclusionary policies are those that "aim at the physical removal of a non-core group from a host-state."[5] Measures taken under exclusionary policies range from deportation to mass killings, with the latter obviously being more rare.

For the second question, which seeks to determine what factors have shaped the development of these policies, there are more hypotheses to be tested. The dependent variable is the policy that resulted in each country, as defined through an examination of the first question. The independent variables are the factors that helped to shape that policy. There are many theories attempting to explain why states choose policies, each focusing on a different factor, including economy, territorial security, ethnic and cultural

[3] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 21-22). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

differences between groups, and international policy considerations. I will apply several of these theories to each of the case studies, evaluating each instance of policy change over time to determine whether or not the theories are able to correctly predict the policy choices of a state under given circumstances. Applying these theories to several cases is an advantage, since it is likely that each will have success in explaining state policy towards certain groups at different times, but will fail to adequately explain each instance of policy change in each case over time.

The hypotheses that will be tested are theories of minority nationalism. Ethnic theories of nationalism propose that the need to create an in-group and out group identity based on cultural differences is the driving force behind policy creation. Theories of internal colonization assert that the minority group is either assimilated into a state or excluded from the mainstream culture of a state depending on the relative economic strengths of the state and the minority. Marxist theories hold that the industrial revolution inspired states to assimilate minorities to a greater extent in order to promote state-sponsored nationalism that would legitimate the rule of the state over the minority. Transactional theories propose that nationalism and ethnicity are used by the state as a mechanism to create and maintain borders with their neighbors. Still other theories support the idea that it is actually the international situation of the state, rather than domestic politics, that has the greatest influence on the policy choices of a state with regards to the minorities that it hosts.

I hypothesize that most of the theories will be successful in explaining the policy outcomes in either France or Spain at a given period of time, but will fail to accurately predict state policy choices for every instance of policy change in each state over time. I

predict that international concerns, like border security, alliance shifts, wars, and international institutions will have a significant impact on the policies that a state adopts towards minorities. Domestic issues, like cultural differences between the majority and the ethnic minority within a state, will have some influence over the specifics of policy, but not determine the overall attitude of a state towards the minority groups it hosts.

<u>A Review of the Literature on the Subject of Sub-state Nationalism in The Basque Country,</u>

<u>Brittany, and Catalonia</u>

<u>Introduction</u>

In attempting a comparative analysis of the policies of France and Spain towards regional minority linguistic and cultural groups, also called sub-state national groups, I will examine four cases: the Catalonians, the Spanish Basques, the French Basques, and the Bretons. The study of these three groups will allow for comparison within states and between states, in order to offer a complete picture of how the policies of France and Spain have developed over time, and whether they are applied evenly to all minority groups or not. There is a good deal of literature on each of the case studies, though there is considerably less on the French Basques than on any of the other three cases. Many of the theories discussed are applied by various authors to one or more of the cases, while some of them have not yet been tested with these specific minority groups.

<u>Existing Literature</u>

There are actually several different areas of scholarly literature and debate that one must understand in order to develop a clear picture of the situation of regional minorities in France and Spain. Firstly, there is discussion of nationalism. Studying theories of nationalism is important because 'nationalism' is often applied to all of the regional minority groups that I will study. This literature puts forward theories of nationalism to explain both exactly what it is and how it came to exist as defined. This literature discusses nationalism in a broad sense, but often it also discusses the nature of the relationships

between nations and the existing governing state. Both of these subjects are important to us, as none of our three national case studies make up a state in and of themselves, so they must also confront the state, which governs them.

There is also literature discussing the rise of the nationalist movements in each of the three cases that I will examine. In this research, political scientists, ethnologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians alike weigh in on the situation of the native minority groups and how/why those situations came to be. Sometimes scholars apply theories of nationalism to their specific cases, but often they seek to explain only their region, without putting it in context of theories or other minority groups. For this literature review, I will first treat the research discussing nationalism and ethnicity in a broader sense before moving on to scholarly contributions on the specific case studies.

Nationalism

The dominant trend in the literature seems to be to define native minority culture and language groups like the Basques, Bretons, and Catalonians as minority national groups, sub-state nations, or stateless nations. Though there is a clear vocabulary discrepancy, the idea that these groups are 'nations' or 'national' in some way is generally agreed upon by scholars. Furthermore, scholars also evaluate nation-states, like France and Spain, as 'national' groups. Therefore, it is important to understand theories of nationalism, which can be applied to both the sub-state minority groups and the states, in which they reside, to help explain their actions and the development of their policies. Traditionally, there are two understandings of nationalism: modernism and primordialism,

though recently scholars like Daniele Conversi have put forth theories that cannot be strictly categorized into either understanding.

Modernist (or Instrumentalist) Theory

Scholars in this camp hold that nationalism is first and foremost a political phenomenon. As described by Eric Hobsbawn, in his <u>Nations and Nationalism since 1780</u>, modernists "do not regard the 'nation' as a primary nor as an unchanging social entity. It belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state.'"[6] Another central tenant of the modernist theory, which Hobsbawm uses, though attributes to Ernest Gellner, is the definition of nationalism as "a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent." In this view, nationalism does not come from shared history or ideology, but rather from the political idea that a group of people that self-identify as a nation should be able to self-govern.

John Breuilly is a modernist scholar as well. In is book <u>Nationalism and the </u>State, he uses the term nationalism to discuss "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments."[7] In this view, then, nationalism is a sort of propaganda, a tool that helps maintain support for a cause. Breuilly then goes on to explain the three assertions that he thinks nationalist arguments must make. The first is "There exists a nation with a peculiar and explicit character," the second is "The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values",

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[6] Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[7] Breuilly, J. (1985). *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

and the third is "The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty."[8] By getting people to ascribe to the idea that they are part of a nation and that the nation needs to be self-governing, those who started the movement are able to achieve their goals. Breuilly is quick to note that this definition of nationalism is limiting. The movement must be modern, from the period after the American and French Revolutions, when political sovereignty was thought to be a right of the people. Furthermore, the movement must have used national identity (the first criteria) in order to justify their claims of independence. Cases where nationalism was not explicitly used as justification for independence, even when it arose later, like in the formation of the United States, would not fit Breuilly's description.

The insistence on a historically recent time period for nationalism coupled with the insistence on the idea that nationalism was used as a tool to achieve political means left modernism open for criticism from other theorists. This theory in its purest form is not very widely accepted anymore. Rather, scholars have built theories to oppose it, or in some cases, have sought to improve it.

Primordialism

In contrast with the modernist theory, the primordialist theory holds that nation and nationhood are inherent. While modernists say that it has arisen in the most recent historical period and is used as a justification for the promotion of political independence, primordialists emphasize the ethnic nature of nationhood. In the primordialist definition put forth by Walker Connor in a 2004 article entitled "The Timelessness of Nations,"

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[8] Ibid.

nationalism is "tied inextricably to ethnicity: a belief in or an intuitive conviction of

common descent."[9] With the understanding that nationalism is linked to ethnicity comes

the belief that nationalism cannot be invented in order to serve any political purpose. For

theorists like Walker Connor and Michael Hechter, nationalism is a cultural phenomenon,

not a political one.

Another key difference between the modernists and the primordialists is the origin

of nationalist movements. While modernists believe that these movements originate with a

group of elites wishing to garner support for their bid at political sovereignty,

primordialists believe that nationalism is "a mass phenomenon"[10], meaning that in order

for a nation to exist, the members of that group must both identify with the nation and

recognize that it exists as distinct from others.

Hybrid Theories

Aside from the two more traditional outlooks, there are also scholars who agree

with parts of each, combining them to form hybrid theories. One such scholar is Anthony D.

Smith. In his "History and national destiny: Responses and clarifications,"[11] Smith explains

his term of "ethno-symbolism" as a theory suggesting that modern nations have roots in

ethnies (common ethnic heritage), but that they survive not only because of this shared

past, but also thanks to the use of traditional symbols and myths common to the culture by

the people and elites of a group. While he is quick to note that the political and social

situations of the historical ethnies do not resemble the current situation that many nations

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[9] Connor, W. (2004). The Timelessness of Nations. *Nations and Nationalism, 10, (35-47).*
[10] Ibid.
[11] Smith, A. (2004). History and national destiny: responses and clarifications. *Nations and Nationalism, 10 (195-209).*

face, it is the common traditions, myths, memory, and values that lead to the continuity between ethnies and nations. Smith emphasizes that history, then, does play an important role, and that the development of nationalism should be studied over "la longue durée" (long period of time), and disagrees with Walker Connor's assertion that a lack of records on the opinions of the masses in the distant past means scholars must assume that nationalism did not exist.[12]

Another theorist who hybridizes the traditional concepts of nationalism is Daniele Conversi. Conversi agrees to a large extent with Smith, but feels that even the addition of ethnicity as a factor in the development of nationalism is not enough to paint a clear picture of the phenomenon. Conversi says that the opposition of modernism (he calls it instrumentalism) with primordialism is not productive, so he opts to add three more elements, Smith's ethno-symbolic approach and two other approaches: homeostatic and transactional. Conversi's article "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation" explains that the homeostasis model focuses on the rejection of state interference in a nation's affairs as a means of maintaining traditional lifestyles that may have been threatened by state centralization and modernization. Furthermore, he suggests that the transactional approach is the one that fits best to "identify the essential function of nationalism which is to establish and/or defend boundaries between communities."[13]

A final theorist on nationalism, Michael Billig, also proposes a sort of hybrid of the primordialist and modernist theories in his book Banal Nationalism. Billig's theory of

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Conversi, D. (1995). Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as boundary Maintenance and Creation. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1:1 (73-85). doi: 10.1080/13537119508428421*

'banal nationalism' aligns with primordial theory in that it looks at nationalism as something felt every day by the masses. Billig suggests that the image of flags, sounds of national anthems, and the use of national symbols on money that people see every day fosters a sense of national pride in them. These images are so subtle that they are nearly subliminal, and the masses may not be aware of their nationalism on a day-to-day basis. However, Billig notes that the nationalism that has been built by the subtle messages that people receive on a daily basis can be brought to the surface by significant events in the nation, like a war or even just a sports' victory. It is this part of Billig's theory of banal nationalism that aligns with the modernist view that nationalism is used by elites in the nation to garner support or unify the people.[14]

Sub-State Nationalism

The literature discusses nationalism in a broad sense, as seen above, but there are also scholars who put forward theories dealing more specifically with the relationship between a nation-state and sub-state national groups within it. Scholars assert that a sub-state group's nationalism is often a reaction to the policies of the nation-state that governs it. With this understanding, it is clear that these theories should also be evaluated for this thesis, which seeks to explain the formation of policies of two states towards the linguistic minorities in their borders.

Scholar Anthony Birch, in his 1978 article "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration," explains the dominant theories and their weaknesses. The first theory that he discusses is "Internal Colonialism." The main theorist in this vein is

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[14] Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism.* London, England: Sage Publications

Michael Hechter. The theory proposes "the relationship between members of the core community and members of the peripheral communities in a state are characterized by exploitation."[15] This theory thus proposes that the core community is able to exclude members of the peripheral community from positions of power and that they are then able to use the power positions they occupy to control the economic development of the peripheral regions to make them highly specialized in order to benefit the core community. Birch, however, while he does not think that Hechter's theory is invalid, says that it is not strong enough to be universally valid, as some of its proponents argue.[16]

Birch goes on to discuss the "New Ethnicists," those theorists like Walker Connor, Nathan Glazer, and Wendell Bell who discuss the "strength and endurance of ethnic and cultural loyalties."[17] Notable criticisms of this model are that it lacks a real predictive ability concerning how states and sub-state groups interact, and that theorists cannot seem to agree on one set of terminology. Birch worries that whether scholars are defining sub-state groups as "subnations" as does William Petersen, or using Connor's term "ethnonationalism," they are not doing justice to the minority groups. As Birch says: "Any movement that aspires to political autonomy for a community within a definable area deserves to be described as a national movement."[18]

Birch then outlines four basic propositions that scholars should use to approach the issue from an academic perspective, which is how he thinks the issue of sub-state nationalism should be approached. He argues that ethnic loyalties should be seen as

[15] Birch, A. (1978). Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration. *World Politics, 30:3 (325-344).*
[16] Birch, A. H. (1989). *Nationalism and national integration*. Routledge.
[17] Birch, A. (1978). Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration. *World Politics, 30:3 (325-344).*
[18] Ibid.

independent variables, as they persist over a long period of time. He proposes that a sub-state group can be more or less content with their state government given the 'balance of advantages' at a given time, and goes on to argue that the balance of advantages has shifted in favor of the sub-state national groups since WWII, and that recent technological and political developments have "facilitated the task of small but determined minority groups anxious to exert political influence."[19] Birch ends with a prediction that "we have entered a period in which the authority of sizable states containing ethnic or cultural minorities within their borders may be increasingly challenged by nationalist movements," and an assertion that policy makers in these states will not be given clear demands, and thus will struggle to form policies that "placate the nationalists."[20]

Another author, Michael Keating, examines the roles of minority groups in Europe over time in his 1999 article "Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe." Keating asserts: "it is now widely accepted that national minorities are an enduring feature of the state system,"[21] even while noting that it has not always been so, as Marxists and Modernists in the 1960's and before held the view that nationalist minorities would gradually be absorbed into the culture of the nation-state, or given independence if they were unable to do so. Keating, in making this assertion, also recognizes the complexity of the situation that is created in a Europe where minorities relate not only to their states, but also to Europe as a whole, and states must relate to both Europe and the minorities as well.

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[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Keating, M. (1999). Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe. *The Journal of Federalism, 29:1 (71-85).*

Keating emphasizes the history of Europe's development, noting that premodern Europe boasted an extremely complex and differentiated system in which secular and religious, territorial, and economic and political, forces all competed, and sovereignty was "ill-defined and shared."[22] Keating argues that, while the formation of modern states did allow for "concentration of authority within territorially defined units and the assertion of unitary principle of sovereignty," so long as states were monarchies, there was still room for differentiation by the ruler among different groups within the state, allowing each minority group to have a different role.[23]

From Keating's perspective, it is not until the rise of liberal democracy and the nation-state that the system in Europe became simpler. He argues that the liberal assertions of equality for all citizens, coupled with the greater uniformity that was enforced by the bureaucracies of the state called to question the traditionally complex and differentiated state structure of Europe. According to Keating, modern nation building led states to take the form "either of unitary states, with a concentration of authority at the center, or of uniform types of federation, in which all territories had the same relationship to the center."[24] During this time, Keating asserts that the minority national groups were largely confined to operating within the state itself.

Keating does not, however, assert that minority nationalisms must still act only within the state. In fact, he proposes that the rise of Europe allows for great asymmetry in the system. He points to the rise of regionalism, noting that despite the differences among the different regional movements, they all have a scope that reaches beyond the state. "…

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[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

The region must relate to the state, the international market, and the emerging European order."[25] Europe itself, Keating notes, is complex. However, Keating points to it as a resource that sub-state national groups can access in order to achieve their goals. In this case, he argues, complexity and asymmetry are good for the national groups within states, as they can distinguish themselves from other parts of the state and define themselves as a region without depending on the state for resources and support.

Marxist Theories

While many theories are based in nationalism and ethnic identity, other theories look to factors within the state, such as technological developments, political unrest, or the economy, when seeking to characterize the relationship between national minorities and their host states. An example of such a theory is Marxist theory. Karl Marx proposed that the industrial revolution, as it brought technological advancements improving communication, allowed the lower classes

to recognize that their true identity was not as a member of a nation-state, but rather as a member of an international group of laborers, called the proletariat. Marxism holds that, in response to such a realization, and in an effort to maintain control of all of its' citizens, a state will move to create a much more centralized, unitary government.

The move towards a centralized government would allow less room for the social protests of the lower classes, and it would also have adverse effects on the minority groups. Making a government more centralized and efficient necessitates the adoption of one official state language and means that choices are often made at the state level, rather than

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[25] Ibid.

the regional or local level. In addition to advocating the administrative uniformity required by a centralized government, Marist theories hold that the state will promote a state-sponsored idea of nationalism. That is, rather than allowing diverse minority groups within a state to maintain their own customs, language, and cultural heritage, a state will use propaganda to promote the idea that the state, not the minority, actually has the right to rule over a certain region or a certain people.

Marxism often provides valuable insights into the actions of governments that are taken around the time of an industrial revolution, and perhaps even in more modern times when economic disparities arise between a minority group and the majority in a state. However, Marxist theory offers no explanation for any policy choice other than assimilation, and it offers no explanation for policy choices that were made in contexts other than industrial or social revolution. Alone, Marxist theory simply does not have the ability to predict change over time. A better theory is one that would both account for change in policies at different points in time and explain any policy choice, not merely assimilation, on the part of a state.

An International Perspective: Harris Mylonas

One theory, put forth by Harris Mylonas, determines that the foreign policy goals of a state are the primary factor in determining the policy that the state will adopt towards the minorities that it hosts. The theory asserts that states choose policy based on three factors, all of which are focused on international position. Firstly, a state considers whether or not the minority has external support. This support could come from another nation-state, and this is the most common, though non-state actors such as international

institutions, non-governmental organizations, and even multinational firms have become increasingly important in recent years.[26] Mylonas predicts that, in the absence of external support for a minority, the state will adopt a policy of assimilation towards the minority group[27]. Assimilation policy includes measures like "educational, cultural, occupational, matrimonial, demographic, political, and other state policies aimed at the adoption of the core group culture."[28]

Secondly, a state considers whether the external support comes from an ally or an enemy of the state. If the state sees that the minority is receiving support from an ally of the state, the policy choice of that state is one of accommodation.[29] Accommodation policy describes a situation "where the 'differences' of a non-core group are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place."[30] This arises because "a non-core group supported by an ally is less of a security threat than a group supported by a state that is part of an enemy alliance bloc."[31]

The third factor determining a state policy towards minority groups within its borders is whether the state has revisionist or status quo aims. States with revisionist aims are those that have lost territory in war, or those that have expansionist aims.[32] When minority groups have the external support of an enemy, revisionist states are likely to exclude minority groups. Status quo states, or those that have recently gained territory which they need to solidify or recently declined in power relative to other states, are

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[26] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[27] Ibid. p. 37
[28] Ibid. p. 21
[29] Ibid. p. 37
[30] Ibid. p. 22
[31] Ibid. p. 36
[32] Ibid. p. 41-42

unlikely to pursue exclusionary policy, as these often "involve extreme measures that might jeopardize the international status quo."[33] Instead, when a minority has the support of an external group, the status quo state will choose a policy of assimilation, often specifically through the measure of internal colonization, which makes the minority group "a less appealing target for external powers to support."[34]

While Mylonas places much emphasis on the external situation of the state at a given point in time, he does not completely rule out the influence of domestic factors within the state on policy choices with respect to minorities. He notes that, while the overall policy, that is assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion, may be chosen based on foreign policy aims, the specific measures that a state chooses to adopt in order to enforce their broader policy choice can be influenced by the actions of the group itself, the economic needs of the state and the region, and the domestic political situation within the state.

The international aims and position of a state are likely to change over time. As such, Mylonas' theory, which relies on international factors in predicting state policy choices, is able to account for change over time in these policies. The theory can be applied to both France and Spain with relative success. Unlike other theories, like ethnic theories of nationalism and Marxism, which often overlook either the importance of a state's international goals, Mylonas emphasizes the role of policies towards minorities in the broader scale of international interactions. While other theories, like Conversi's transactional theory, are quick to overlook domestic factors such as the economy or the historical relationship between a minority and the state government, Mylonas' theory

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[33] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[34] Ibid.

leaves room for these factors to have a limited influence on the enforcement of state policy choices.

Case Studies

Of course, these theories, especially those regarding the relationship between states and sub-state minority groups, are often applied to the cases of the Basques, Bretons, and Catalonians. Scholars evaluate each of these groups individually attempting to draw conclusions about the movement there. While this literature is extensive, in each case it seems that authors seem to focus on their case study as either completely unique, or as completely typical of some model that they are trying to prove. Furthermore, this research tends to take a sociological or historical perspective, discussing more about the development of the movement itself than the relationship of the movement to the state policies over time.

The Catalonians

Of the three, the case study of Catalonia has perhaps gotten the most attention over time. It is one of the seminal cases of nationalism, and when scholars refer to asymmetrical government (Keating 2001) or Multinational States (Moreno 1995, De La Calle and Miley 2008), they tend to use Catalonia as the "perfect example" of why their theory of nationalism, or politics, or regionalism, works. Like the Basque Country, Catalonia is often compared to other groups within Spain. However, while there is much debate about the kind of nationalism there and how it arose, there is not much consensus, as scholars appear

to take it as an example of a greater phenomenon, rather than as a case study in and of itself.

The Basques

The Basques have been extensively studied since the Second World War, and since the fall of Franco. In every period that authors were writing about minority nationalism, from the 1960's onward, the Basques have been a popular case study. Most scholars, including Michael Keating and Nunez view the Basques as an ethnic group, identified by their common language, culture, and heritage. They also see that the Basques have had one of the stronger economies in Spain[35]. The scholarship often chooses to compare Basque Country to Catalonia. Furthermore, most scholars have seemed to study only the Spanish Basques, and not the French Basques. In his article *The City, Substate Nationalism, and European Governance,* Scott Bollens notes that the Basque Country, thanks to the new European order, is able to reach out to the other side of the French border and work towards regional prosperity.[36] Similarly, Michael Keating points to the rise of Europe as a tool for regions like the Basque Country to come together for economic and political gain.[37] Still, articles that treat the Basques as a cross-border group are rare, as are analyses of the effects of French Policy on the Basques.

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[35] Moreno, L. (1995). Multiple Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain.
[36] Bollens, Scott (2008). The City, Substate Nationalism, and European Governance, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 14:2, (189-222).* doi: 10.1080/13537110801984941
[37] Keating, M. (2001).

The Bretons

There is a rich history of literature on the Breton Movement in France. This movement has been analyzed from a historical perspective[38], and a political perspective.[39] However, most of the analysis here is done from the perspective of the Bretons, assuming the normative position that they are being oppressed and that their rights as a culture are being infringed upon. The research characterizing the relationship of France to Brittany is more extensive. It seems that most, like Berger, agree that there have been elements of "internal colonialism" in France's relationship to the province. Ultimately, though, scholars tend to take for granted that the Bretons, generally speaking, want to work within the French system, not change it.[40]

Conclusion

While there is extensive research on this topic, there is little that specifically answers the questions that this paper seeks to explore. Most notably, there is a significant gap in the scholarly literature concerning the policies of states and analyzing these situations from the state perspective, rather than from the perspective of the individual sub-state group. While the theories of nationalism, and the theories that relate more specifically to sub-state nationalism, are often applied to these cases, they seem to have jumped over the state role, which is seen by most scholars as "given" and as if it is an obstacle to the goals of the nationalist groups.

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[38] Keating, M. (2001). *So many nations, so few states: territory and nationalism in the global era.* In A. G. Gagnon and J. Tully (ed.). *Multinational Democracies* (pp. 39-64). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge Press.
[39] Berger 1978 and Boomgaard 2008.
[40] Berger 1978, Boomgaard 2010, Keating 2001, Sorens 2005.

Another interesting gap in the literature is a lack of exploration of the "multiethnic" or "multinational" state as compared to the "unitary" state. In everything that I read, the scholars seemed to accept that France functioned as a unitary state, while Spain was multi-national. In reality, both states have ethnic minorities and are faced with the challenges of responding to the diverse needs of the minorities within their borders. It may be historically true that France has tended to function as a unitary state, preferring to have as little asymmetry as possible, but there is a lack of exploration of the factors that led to the adoption of this policy choice.

<u>Understanding the Four Case Studies</u>

In order to form a hypothesis about which factors have influenced the development of French and Spanish policies towards native minority languages and cultures within their borders, one must first seek to understand the current situation for minority groups in these states. This paper will draw on the four case studies of the Bretons, the French Basques, the Spanish Basques, and the Catalonians in testing its hypotheses, thus this chapter will characterize these four minority groups' history and their current situations. It will address the official status of the group both within the state and on the international level, the prevalence of each group's language and culture in public and private spheres, the strength of the group identity, the goals of the minorities with regard to autonomy or independence, and the means through which the groups pursue these goals. After having presented the situation of each case study group, the chapter will conclude by making the argument that the differences between groups in France and those in Spain are more significant than the differences between groups in the same state.

<u>Catalonians: A History of Regional Autonomy</u>

Of the four minorities studied, the Catalonians have faced the most accommodating policies over time. They have certainly faced repression and assimilation during certain periods of history, but less so than other groups. The size of the region and history of the group certainly play a part in this, as Catalan is the biggest of the four minorities studied. Catalonia is now a semi-autonomous area made up of four provinces occupying thirty-one thousand square kilometers in the northeast of Spain, centered on Barcelona, the region's

biggest city and its capital.[41] Catalonia has engaged in international trade since at least the twelfth century, and was among the first regions in Spain, and Europe, to industrialize.[42] The Catalonian economy today is still largely industrial, with industry providing work for thirty-four percent of the population in 1990. All four of the provinces in Catalonia maintain a Gross Domestic Product that is higher than the Spanish national average.[43]

Catalonia has a long history of autonomy and even independence. It was one of the first constitutional monarchies in Europe, established in 1164. From the beginning, the powers of the monarch were limited, as they had to swear allegiance to *Usatges i Constitucions de Catalunya* (Customs and Constitutions of Catalonia). The *Corts,* which were legislative bodies made up of nobles and clergy, ensured that the monarch did not have too much power. During the fourteenth century, the Generalitat, or Parliament, of Catalonia was established, functioning as a governing body when the *corts* were not in session.[44] The Crown of Aragon, under the house of Barcelona and then the Trastámara dynasty, maintained the constitutional monarchy until Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabel of Castile in 1469.[45]

In fact, though Catalan language and culture declined some after the union of Castile and Aragon, the Generalitat and the political autonomy of Catalonia were left untouched by the Hapsburg monarchs. The first restriction of political autonomy for the Catalonians came at the end of the War of Spanish Succession, when the Bourbon Philip V became king

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[41] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Catalan in Catalonia*. Retrieved from website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/es51_en.htm
[42] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013). *History*. Retrieved from website: http://www.gencat.cat/catalunya/eng/coneixer-historia.htm
[43] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Catalan in Catalonia*.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013). *History*.

of Spain after having vanquished the Hapsburg rival, Charles, who the Catalonians had supported. With the 1716 Decree of Nueva Planta, Philip V abolished the Generalitat, the *corts,* and all other Catalan institutions. The decree also outlawed the use of Catalan in the government, the courts, or any official administrative documents, requiring instead that Castilian Spanish be adopted as the only official language of the state.[46] Despite restrictions, Catalan was still widely spoken and used in the home and even in published works, especially during the *Renaixença,* or renaissance of Catalan language and culture, that took place in the late eighteenth century.[47] This eventually led to the establishment of the *Mancomunitiat,* an organization to regulate and codify the Catalan language and promote Catalan culture.

During the nineteenth century, unrest in Spain between the middle classes and the nobility were magnified in Catalonia, where the conflict was not just socio-economic, but cultural as well, given that the traditional ruling class was Castilian while the Catalonian traders and merchants were middle-class. In Catalonia, the class conflict was also associated with the *Mancomunitat* and the push for Catalan culture and language to be officially recognized by the Spanish government. As a result of this association, when unrest led General Primo de Rivera to military dictatorship in Spain in 1923, the *Mancomunitat* was abolished. The end of the short-lived dictatorship in 1930, and the creation of the Second Spanish Republic, allowed the Catalonians to regain some of their former freedoms; the Generalitat was re-established, and Catalan was restored to the status of official state language.[48]

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[46] Ibid.
[47] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Catalan in Catalonia*.
[48] Ibid.

The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) brought the fall of the Second Republic, and the start of the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Franco's repressions of Catalan language and culture were probably the harshest policies that have ever governed Catalonia. He abolished the Generalitat, outlawed the language, mandated that street signs and even place names that were in Catalan or referenced a significant event in Catalonian history be changed, and required that all education take place in Spanish only. It was only after his death that representative government, constitutional monarchy, was restored in Spain. In 1977, a royal decree re-established the Generalitat, and the new Constitution of 1979 included a Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. The Constitution was revised in 2006, but maintained Catalonian autonomy.[49]

Today, Catalonia enjoys significant autonomy and greater recognition than many other minority regions. The region is "one of the most integrated European regions from the economic point of view"[50] and the culture is globally recognized as distinct from that of Spain. Though neither the Spanish state nor the European Union have made Catalan an official language, it is the official language in Catalonia, an official regional language in Spain, and it is one of the languages in which the EU Parliament publishes charters, treaties, and other significant documents. Catalan language can be used in instruction at any level of education, including the University level, and has been revived as a language of arts and published work. The language is widely used, and culture is widely recognized, in public and private spheres, media, and even official proceedings. A requirement that public officials in Catalonia speak the language was even upheld by the Spanish Supreme Court.[51]

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

Catalonia's long history of political autonomy and the strength of its industrial economy are two factors that have allowed Catalonians to create and maintain a strong sense of group identity. The sense of Catalonian identity is so strong that more than seventy-eight percent of those people living in Catalonia self-identify as either 'as Spanish as Catalonian,' 'More Catalonian than Spanish,' or 'only Catalonian' in a survey about ethnicity and nationalism.[52] Due in large part to the strength of the group identity in Catalonia, there are many groups in Spain and elsewhere that advocate for increased political and economic autonomy in Spain. In addition to advocating increased autonomy or independence, Catalonians also desire increased protection of their culture, including language, history, and other traditionally Catalan symbols of identity. Generally speaking, however, Catalonians today "make full use of the conventional political opportunities open to them." That the Catalonians have successfully maintained their current level of autonomy and secured limited recognition in Spain and the EU is often attributed to their willingness to advocate for themselves within the established structure of the Spanish government, rather than protesting violently or rebelling against the Spanish state.[53]

Spanish Basque Region: Autonomy and Discontent

The Spanish Basques, unlike their Catalonian compatriots, have struggled to maintain autonomy throughout their history. Though they still have a distinct cultural identity, they are a far smaller group than the Catalonians, and are not as well known

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[52] De la Calle, L., & Miley, T. J. (2008). Is there more assimilation in Catalonia than in the Basque Country? Analyzing dynamics of assimilation in nationalist contexts. *European Journal of Political Research*, (47), 710-736. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00776.x
[53] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

outside of Spain and Europe. An autonomous community within Spain, known as the

Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (CAV), occupies some of what is traditionally referred to as

"Basque Country" in Spain, but part of the traditional Basque Homeland in Spain is found in

neighboring Navarre. Together, the Basque portion of Navarre and the CAV occupy about

eighteen thousand square kilometers in the north of Spain, on the Bay of Biscay. Fishing

and agriculture are two of the traditional industries of the region, but the industrial

revolution brought industry, and today it is heavy industry that dominates the Basque

economy. The industry has brought waves of immigration that some perceive as a threat to

Basque culture.[54] Still, the Basques have maintained a strong ethnic identity, with more

than ninety percent of the population surveyed, including immigrants, claimed that they

felt 'as Spanish as Basque,' 'More Basque than Spanish,' or 'only Basque.'[55]

This strong identity has been challenged at various points in the history of the

Basques. As one of Europe's oldest cultural groups, the Basques were able to stay fairly

isolated and out of the affairs of the rest of Europe until the tenth century. Over the course

of the tenth and eleventh centuries, however, the Kingdom of Navarre, which was Basque,

rose to power in the region, and gradually absorbed the other Basque people into its

territory. The Kingdom of Navarre "created for the first time a more or less unified Basque

political identity."[56] However, by the end of the sixteenth century, Castile had become

more powerful than Navarre, and had absorbed the Kingdom of Navarre into its' territory.

Nevertheless, Navarre maintained at least some of the *fueros,* or special privileges, until the

Carlist Wars in the late nineteenth century. The Basques never capitalized on an

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[54] Solsten, E., & Meditz, S. W. United States Library of Congress, (1988). *Spain - the Basques*.
Retrieved from website: http://countrystudies.us/spain/39.htm
[55] De la Calle, L., & Miley, T. J. (2008).
[56] Solsten, E., & Meditz, S. W. United States Library of Congress, (1988).

opportunity under the Second Republic to regain some regional autonomy and reinstate the *fueros,* and the victory of Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War meant that the opportunity for increased autonomy for the Basques would not arise again until the constitutional monarchy was reinstated in 1977.[57]

Granted limited autonomy in 1977 by royal decree, the Basque Country (in the CAV) was granted regional autonomy in the Spanish Constitution passed in 1978. The CAV was recognized as an autonomous region with the Basque Autonomy Statute of 1979,[58] and the territory of Navarre recognized the Basque minority there with language and culture recognition in the 1982 Law on the Reintegration and Improvement of the Special Regime for Navarre.[59] Since 1979, the CAV has elected a territorial parliament and Prime Minister, and, like Catalonia, has significant freedoms to raise and spend taxes, maintain their own police force, display the Basque flag and other symbols, and use the language in both private and public spheres.[60] Unlike Catalan, however, Basque is not a language that is used by the EU in any capacity, though it does have EU recognition as a minority language.[61]

The groups that advocate for Basque rights within Spain and internationally largely desire greater autonomy within Spain, and greater protection for the Basque language and culture. The most famous group, the Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA), uses terrorist tactics and asserts that the Basque Region should be completely independent of Spain, but these

[57] Ibid.
[58] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Spain).* Retrieved from website:
http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/es31_en.htm#26
[59] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Navarre.* Retrieved from website:
http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/es32_en.htm
[60] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.*
[61] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Comunidad Autónoma Vasca.*

tactics are suppressed by both Spanish and Basque police forces. Other groups advocate complete independence or greater autonomy as well, receive greater support from the Basques on the whole; more members of the Basque Parliament come from the conventional Basque Nationalist Party than from the political wing of the ETA. Basques largely use the Basque parliament and the existing structure of the Spanish government in their attempts to secure more rights. Like the Catalonians, they express their wishes by electing officials that share their values, and by working with the Spanish parliament. Notably, in 2005, the Spanish parliament failed to ratify a proposal for what would essentially amount to independence that had gotten the support of many Basques. Though the ETA "vowed to continue fighting until the Basques are completely independent,"[62] their violent protests tend to bring only more of a Spanish presence in the region, and the majority of Basque people support more conventional parties, hoping to expand their rights by fostering a good relationship with the Spanish state.

Brittany: Struggle to Maintain Identity

The Bretons are a minority group in the northwest of France, mostly in the province of Brittany, though the province only encompasses about four fifths of the traditional homeland of the Breton people. The Bretons have fought to ensure that they maintain at least a part of their culture and identity as distinct from the French people. Though the French state recognizes the union between France and Brittany in 1532 as an important merger of politically independent entities, the Breton culture, and the desire for Breton autonomy, is seen as an anachronism by the French; part of history but not a concern in the

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[62] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.*

present day. Because of the temperate climate and its peninsular position with access to the English Channel, the Atlantic, and the Bay of Biscay, Brittany's traditional economy was centered on agriculture and fisheries. These industries are still important in Brittany, but more as a practical matter than as a perpetuation of Breton identity. There is a small group of devoted Bretons who actively push for greater recognition of the culture, or even autonomy. This group has to work against a state, and many people living in Brittany, who conceive of Breton as a common heritage, folklore for the region to share, rather than a cultural that still exists in the present day.[63]

The struggle to preserve identity, and the attempt to maintain regional autonomy has been a long one for the Bretons. A politically independent Duchy starting in 845 AD, it was not until 1488 that the Bretons made any political agreement with the French. It was in that year that a treaty was signed stating that Anne de Bretagne, the heiress to the duchy, would not marry without the consent of the French king; the French state thus infringed on the autonomy of the Bretons before the two had even formally merged. In 1532, François I of France signed a treaty unifying Brittany to France. At the time of the union, the Bretons maintained their administrative and political autonomy. A little over a century later, in 1675, the French minister Colbert decided to impose taxes on the Bretons. This new measure, a restriction of autonomy and subjugation of the largely independent Bretons, was met with Breton discontent, but Louis XIV enforced it nonetheless. Throughout the eighteenth century, Bretons paid taxes to the French government and became more

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[63] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Breton in France.* Retrieved from website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr3_en.htm

politically integrated in the French state while still maintaining their regional autonomy to a large degree.[64]

With the French Revolution in 1789 came a significant change in the policy towards the Bretons. The new French government sought to abolish the old system of monarchy, and all of the privileges that went along with it, in favor of a highly centralized, highly efficient, and equitable system. All citizens of France were to have the same rights, and the rights of the Bretons to have their own Parliament and be somewhat autonomous ran contrary to the idea of equality and of a centralized, efficient state. Rather than allowing one parliament to rule the region, Brittany was split into five *départements,* or administrative regions, stripped of its political autonomy and its historical claim to the land.[65]

Since that time, the Bretons have not gained any more recognition or autonomy from the French government. The province of Bretagne is allowed certain administrative responsibilities consistent with those carried out by all of the provinces of France, and no more. Though some of the *départements* and certain cities have passed laws recognizing the language or celebrating certain cultural elements, the French state, and even the province of Brittany, which encompasses most but not all of the traditional Breton areas, has not recognized the language as a state or regional language. Breton is recognized as a minority culture and language by the European Union, but France has refused to ratify the European Commission Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. Breton language is not taught in public schools, used in business or the arts to any great degree, or posted on

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[64] Bretagne, Tourisme. (2012). *Chronologie.* Retrieved from website: http://www.bretagne.com/fr/culture_bretonne/histoire_de_bretagne/chronologie
[65] Ibid.

road signs. Political parties that advocate an increase in autonomy, or even mere recognition of the distinctiveness of Breton culture, have limited success in the region, but are not widely recognized outside of Brittany.[66]

The biggest concern for most advocates of Breton rights is the preservation of the culture and the language. Many feel that, in order to survive, the Breton language needs to be recognized by the French state. The French state does not recognize Breton language or culture in any way. Rather than even getting recognition as a minority group, the Bretons are an unofficial culture and an unofficial language. The status of Breton is "defined in negative terms by the laws passed in favour of French," the most recent of which, the 1992 Constitution, officially states that "French is the (only) language of the Republic."[67] The French policy towards the Bretons is framed as "hostile tolerance," where it is permitted but by no means promoted. While autonomy is important, the complete lack of recognition by the French government means that the Breton struggle has come to be one primarily of cultural preservation and less of political autonomy.

French Basques: Finding Identity in France and Europe

Like the Bretons, the Basques in France have very little recognition and no autonomy. Since the French Basques represent only a portion of the whole Basque community, there are some who advocate that the Basques should have greater regional autonomy to restore traditional links to the Spanish Basques, while others advocate independence for the whole territory. The greatest majority of the French Basques merely advocate increased recognition of the Basque culture, especially the language, by the

[66] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Breton in France.*
[67] Ibid.

French government. While the ETA, with its violent protests, does receive some support

and even aid from Basques in France, there are far fewer episodes of violence in France

than in Spain. Basques in France "do not have a common political platform other than

recognition and protection of their language and culture."[68] The most important factor for

the French Basques, then, is perpetuation of their culture, ensuring that their heritage does

not fade to memory, but remains active in the future. They seek recognition from their own

government as well as the autonomy to be able to reform ties that have long been broken

between the Upper (Spanish) and Lower (French) Basque Provinces.[69]

The Basque people were once independent, as the Kingdom of Navarre, but when

that Kingdom lost power relative to Castile and France in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, the Kingdom was split up. In 1515, the Northern part of the Basque Country was

annexed to Castile, while the southern part, which was across the Pyrenees Mountains,

remained independent until 1617, when it was absorbed by the French monarchy. Like

other minorities in France under the monarchy, the Basque Territories in France were

allowed to maintain administrative autonomy, but were required to demonstrate

allegiance to the king, largely by paying taxes and by enlisting in the army when and if the

monarch needed troops for war. It was not until the French Revolution in 1789, when the

National Assembly of France abolished traditional administrative rights of the Basques and

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[68] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
[69] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in France.* Retrieved from Website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr2_en.htm

divided the territory into three *départements* that the French Basques truly lost all

autonomy.[70]

Many advocates for the Basque people recognize that it would be difficult to effect

any significant change in the French policy towards Basque autonomy. There is

disagreement within the movement for Basque rights over what Basque autonomy means

and how to get it. Some Basques seek a fully independent Basque region, and reunification

of Basque region that is currently split between France and Spain. Others seek increased

autonomy within France to "protect and promote group culture. And still others, perhaps

the majority, appear disinterested in the autonomy issue."[71] Those who are not interested

in increased autonomy seek merely to promote Basque language and culture within the

existing framework of the French state and the provincial government. Despite

disagreement about what autonomy means, and whether autonomy would be economically

and socially beneficial, advocates of Basque rights agree that protection of language and

culture are important goals. It is thus in this area that most of the efforts of Basque groups

have been focused.

The Basques are a minority that is recognized as part of a culturally diverse France,

but not granted any privileges for contributing to this diversity. Like the Bretons, the

Basques are not allowed any form of self-government. Though there are efforts by many

citizens to maintain the culture and especially the language of the Basque people, Basque

language has no status in the state of France or even in the region. France refuses to sign

the European Union Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, and the French

[70] Basque Cultural Institute, (2012). *History*. Retrieved from website:
http://www.eke.org/en/kultura/basque-country/historia
[71] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.*

constitution recognizes only French as a language of the state.[72] The issue of language

promotion has been at the forefront of the fight to preserve Basque culture. Educational

reform, allowing and promoting the teaching of Basque in schools and increasing efforts to

educate Basque youth, is the area that has had the most favorable response from the

French government. Some progress has been made, including the use of Basque on select

radio shows on specific stations and in three newspapers in the Basque Region of France,

as well as in pop music and increasingly popular traditional music. These advancements

are, however, limited, and the Basque language, which "continues to serve as one of the

main symbols of a collective identity,"[73] is in decline in France.

Conclusions

      Understanding the current situation of the minority groups within France and Spain,

and the historical path that led to the policies that are currently enforced, it becomes clear

that the differences in policies that each group faces are determined by the states that host

them, and not by other factors. While the Catalonians are the most autonomous of the four

minorities studied, the Spanish Basques have many liberties as well. The Comunidad

Autónoma Vasca (CAV) is equally as autonomous in Spain as Catalonia, both being

recognized as autonomous regions in Spain under the 1979 Constitution. Likewise, Basque

in Navarre is recognized as a regional language. The difference between Catalonian and

Basque autonomy in Spain is simply that the Catalonians live in one united province, while

the Basques are split into Navarre and the CAV. The rights that they have are not less, then,

but the Catalonians do receive slightly more recognition of a traditional homeland than do

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[72] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in France.*
[73] Ibid.

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the Basques.   Still, overall, the two minorities studied in Spain have similar levels of autonomy and cultural recognition. The Spanish state clearly chose the policy based on its own beliefs and needs, rather than determining its actions based on the ethnic or historical background of either minority.

Just as the Spanish state enforces similar policies towards both of the minorities studied there, the French state has adopted the same policies towards the Bretons and the French Basques. Since the French Revolution, neither group has been granted any measure of autonomy, causing both groups to focus their efforts on promotion of language and culture in day-to-day life as well as on education, rather than on political rights.   Neither the Breton language nor the Basque language is recognized as an official state or regional language, and in fact the French Constitution specifically indicates that French is the only official language of the state. The economies of the two regions in France are different, with the Basque region being much more industrial and the Breton more agrarian. Furthermore, the ethnic heritage of the Basques, who have occupied the region for all of recorded history, is also wildly different from that of the Bretons, who are of Celtic origin and came from Great Britain in the eighth century.[74] France, like Spain, chose the policies towards each minority group without considering the diversity of the minority groups, instead considering the needs of the state in policy choices.

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[74] Ibid.

Understanding Spanish Policy towards the Catalonians

Of the four cases studied in this paper, Catalonia is by far the most well known. Catalonia, and the issue of autonomy for the Catalans who inhabit the territory, often comes up in the international media; not only scholars, but also tourists and casual observers are aware of the tension between the Spanish host-state and the Catalan minority. Many attempts have been made to explain the relationship between the Catalans and the Spanish government, but the changes in policy over time are complex. As in other case studies, many scholars focus on the aspirations and methods of the group itself in attempt to explain state policy, but sates, and not minorities, make the policies, so it is important to examine other factors as well. Since many policy changes with regard to Catalonia have come about just after a new government has taken charge of the Spanish state, even theories that examine state motivations behind policies tend to focus on the political and economic issues within the state. Internal politics, governmental change, and economic considerations are factors that bear examination, but they are not the only factors characterizing state policy. In explaining the Catalan situation, one must be able to explain why the Spanish state's goals changed, whether the change was effected by a new government or represented a policy shift within the same government. The best theory to explain the Catalan situation as it changed over time is one that is capable of using both internal and external factors to predict Spanish policy choices.

The Ethnic Perspective

Some theorists posit that groups are brought into conflict because of ethnicity. They argue that ethnicity is inherent in humans as a way to build self-esteem and belonging, and that, since ethnicity is closely tied with identity, and humans identify themselves as 'good,' they will be wary of the other. In this view, it is the presumption that the other is 'bad' that causes tension between two groups. Though not all ethnicists discuss state policies towards minority groups, the logical extension of these theories is that states would be wary of the 'otherness' of the minority groups that they are hosting. This could imply that the state chooses to exclude the minority group or that they would try to assimilate the minority to the extent that the differences between the majority and the minority in the state are not recognizable. Interestingly, though Spain has attempted to forcefully assimilate Catalonians at certain times of its history, the pervasive policy has been one of accommodation, and it is accommodation that continues at present. This section will address the elements of ethnic theory that are persuasive in the Catalan case and identify the theory's weaknesses as well.

When evaluating relative similarities and differences between ethnic groups, the main factors to consider are customs, religion, race, and language.[75] Strikingly, in three of these four categories, the Catalonians are virtually indistinguishable from mainstream Spaniards. The two groups have the same group customs, where 'customs' is understood to cover issues as marriage practices (polygamy vs. monogamy etc.), family structure, and dress, among other things. Like the majority of mainstream Spaniards, a majority of

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[75] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

Catalonians is Roman Catholic, so the two groups are actually identical in religious belief and practice. Spaniards and Catalonians are also physically indistinguishable from one another, as both groups are rooted in Europe, and thus share racial characteristics.[76]

The one of the four major criteria where the Catalonians depart from mainstream Spaniards is language. Catalonian language use has been classified in the following manner: "Group speaks multiple languages, at least one different from the plurality group."[77] Catalan is the native language of the Catalonians. Though many Catalonians now speak Spanish as well, Catalan is an official regional language, and is allowed for use in business and legal administration in Catalonia, despite not being recognized as an official state language of Spain.[78] In the region's history, Catalan has always been the dominant language; though it was outlawed under Franco's regime, the language maintained a strong presence. It is understood by ninety-four percent of the Catalonian population over age two, spoken by seventy-four percent, and most Catalan speakers in Catalonia use the language in all daily situations.[79] The difference in language is definitely a noticeable change from one group to the other. However, this one individual factor is not enough to indicate that the relations between Spain and the Catalonian minority are shaped by a desire to form identity based on ethnic classification.

Even if the issue of language was enough to define an ethnicity, there is strong evidence against ethnic theories in the Catalonian case. If indeed there had been strong in-group/ out-group differences between the Castilian Spaniards and the Catalonians, then

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[76] Minorities at Risk Dataset, 2007.
[77] Minorities at Risk Dataset, 2007.
[78] Bernat, J. I. M. Government of Catalonia, Secretary of Language Policy (2013). *The Cornerstones of Language Policy in Catalonia.*
[79] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Catalan in Catalonia*. Retrieved from website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/es51_en.htm

ethnic theories would predict mutual exclusion. This, however, was not the case. When

Ferdinand and Isabel married in 1469, they united the crowns, if not the kingdoms, of

Aragon, of which Catalonia was a part, and Castile, which occupied the majority of modern

Spain. Rather than maintaining refraining from interaction, or even merely establishing

treaties governing relations between two separate crowns and kingdoms, Aragon and

Castile took the steps to unite the two kingdoms. Neither kingdom was dominant; neither

was subject to the laws or customs of the other. The only thing that was shared was a

monarch, so "the union of the Crowns of Aragon and Castile therefore led to neither a

political and institutional union nor to an economic integration of the Iberian Peninsula."[80]

This union is not characteristic of mutual exclusion, as ethnicists might expect two groups

to undertake. Instead, the Aragon and Castile adopted policies of mutual acceptance,

allowing each kingdom to continue without disruption.

Logically, the Catalonia would be the most different from the rest of Spain at the

very beginning of the union. If ethnic differences between the groups were the cause of

conflict or the main factor shaping policy of one group towards another, then one would

expect that conflict would have arisen between Castile and Aragon at the moment of their

union, but there was peace from the time of the union between Aragon and Castile until

1626. Given that the main ethnic characteristics (religion, race, customs, and language)

were consistent in both Catalonia and Castile during this time period, it seems unlikely that

the rise of this conflict between them can be attributed to ethnic factors. If ethnic concerns

were driving policy choices, then there would have been a gradual push to assimilate the

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[80] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/EBchecked/topic/557573/Spain

Catalonians to the Castilian language, but that simply did not happen until later. It must be, then, that another factor pushed the Spanish to adopt an assimilationist policy on language.

A Marxist Perspective

Another group of theorists, led by Karl Marx, ascribe to the idea that national identity was created as a means for ruling elites to keep the working classes from recognizing their role in the international proletariat. In this theory, nationalism and ethnic conflict are seen as temporary, associated with the time period around industrialization.[81] This theory accurately describes the situation between Catalonia and Spain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Catalonians were highly involved with workers' parties, and separatist nationalism really started to take hold in Catalonia.[82] However, this theory offers little insight in examining conflicts that arose between Catalonia and Spain over the issue of ethnic identification and national allegiance before industrialization, nor does it explain the fact that Catalonia is still actively pushing for greater autonomy though it has been more than a century since industrialization took hold in Spain.

On the whole, Spain was a latecomer to industrialization. Political turmoil and civil wars at the end of the nineteenth century meant that, while the rest of Europe was progressing towards modernity, Spain lagged behind economically. Interestingly, Catalonia did not. The textile manufacturing industry, centered around cotton and calico production,

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[81] Hale, Henry E. (2008) *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press. 22-23. Print.
[82] Catalonia. (2013). In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/99096/Catalonia

took off in Catalonia far sooner than the rest of Spain, and industry expanded from there.[83]

Despite being the industrial center of Spain, Catalonia found itself at the periphery of the

Spanish political system.   While they were able to reap benefits of Spain's preferential and

protected trade areas in the colonies, Catalonians also struggled against a state government

in Madrid that was not alert to the needs of growing Catalonian industries. Catalan

industrialists became frustrated when tariffs did not adequately protect them, the railroad

system was more favorable to imports than transport of domestic goods, laws hampered

the growth of joint stock companies, and technical education was not supported by the

state.[84] The state policies adopted in Spain posed problems for the Catalan industrial

bourgeoisie, which felt oppressed by a central government that did not share its concerns

or manner of thinking about economic development.

     At the same time, workers in Catalonia were becoming increasingly organized. As

Catalonian workers organized, they in turn became frustrated with the Catalonian

industrial elite, which failed to offer adequate support for the socialist workers' unions.[85]

This situation, which arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is

characteristic of what Marxism might anticipate; the workers were starting to recognize

their place in a wider society. However, workers' strike and revolt, led by Alejandro

Lerroux from July 26 to August 1, 1909, which is now known as the 'Tragic Week,' failed.

Catalan industrialists, frustrated with regulatory practices of Madrid, used the revolt to

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[83] Thompson, J. K. J. (2005). Explaining the 'Take-off' of the Catalan cotton industry. *The Economic History Review*, *48*(4), 701-735. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3698796http:/www.jstor.org/stable/178810
[84] Laitin, D. D. (1989). Linguistic revival: Politics and culture in Catalonia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *31*(2), 297-317. Retrieved from http:/www.jstor.org/stable/178810
[85] Ibid.

their own advantage. They portrayed Lerroux, who was indeed from Madrid, as an

outsider sent by the central government to exploit class divides and oppress Catalan

culture. Workers and industrial bourgeoisie came together when they felt that their

culture was being threatened.

This development, of elites using ethnicity to keep the power over the proletariat, or

working class, is exactly what Marx anticipates. Similarly, the banning of the use of Catalan

in public in 1923 by the freshly minted dictator Primo de Rivera can be explained in the

Marxist view of trying to assimilate all citizens to a central ethnic identity in order to

maintain the power of the ruling class. It would seem that the period around

industrialization in Spain fits the bill exactly for Marxist theory to apply. However, the

Spanish government did not attempt to assimilate Catalonians to a Spanish national or

ethnic identity until Primo de Rivera's rise. If the ruling class really did need to use

nationalism to consolidate power, as Marx predicts, then the Monarchy, which was in

power from 1875-1923, should have attempted to replace Catalan with Castilian Spanish

earlier, in fact it was during this time that Catalan language and culture experienced

significant revitalization.[86] Class conflict, then, must not be the only, or even primary,

factor dictating the policy choices of the nation-state.

Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation

One theorist, Daniele Conversi, proposes: "the essential function of nationalism … is

to establish and/or defend boundaries between communities."[87] He makes the assertion

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[86] Ibid.
[87] Conversi, D. (1995). Reassessing current theories of nationalism: Nationalism as
boundary maintenance and creation. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *1*(1), 73-85.

that it does not matter whether ethnic identity arises naturally, as ethnicists argue, or is created to benefit a ruling elite, as Marxists maintain, because in both cases nationalism serves the same purpose. Elements of ethnicism are embedded in this theory, as it maintains that nationalism helps create the distinction between 'self' and 'other.' Furthermore, it shares with Marxism and other so-called 'constructivist theories' the idea that nationalism enables the formation and preservation of political structures. Conversi defines nationalism as "an attempt to seize control of the state," presumably in instances where the nation-state is promoting nationalism.[88] Some instances of Spanish state-sponsored nationalism, demonstrated by forced assimilation to Spanish culture or government, will be examined later.

One of the great strengths of Conversi's theory, however, lies in the duality of his definition of nationalism. He claims that, in addition to a state policy choice, nationalism must also be understood as "a reaction against state interference and expansion."[89] This second definition describes nationalism undertaken by minorities, like Catalonia, when they feel as if they are being oppressed by increasingly far-reaching nation-state policies. With this in view, it follows that Catalonia would support the Hapsburgs after the Bourbons restricted their rights, or that they would support the traditionalist Carlists in hope that restoring the traditional government also meant a restoration of *fueros,* or privileges of regional government. In providing a dual definition of nationalism, Conversi provides a means of explaining the choices of the Catalonians themselves in response to Spanish policy choices. Furthermore, he establishes that nationalism, while most frequently employed by the nation-state, can also be leveraged against it.

[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

This theory provides a convincing explanation for state policy choices in certain contexts as well. If nationalism's primary function is to establish and maintain borders, then one might expect to see the an increase in the assimilationist policies that accompany a nationalist agenda when a nation-state's borders are under threat, either from within, as in the case of civil war, or from an external attack. In fact, it was in 1716, following the War of Spanish Succession, during which the Spanish state had been split up, with parts occupied by France and other parts occupied by Austrian troops, that Catalonia was made to conform to Castilian government for the first time. Philip V, a Bourbon, having just won back Barcelona, which had been occupied by Charles II, his Hapsburg rival, needed to create a unitary state, and define the borders of his kingdom. He did this by abolishing the *fueros,* the privileges of self-government previously allowed to Catalonia, and bringing Catalonia under royal administration through the Decree of Nueva Planta.[90] This forced compliance with the nationalist idea of a unitary Spain is consistent with Conversi's argument that nationalism is used to maintain control within borders.

Similarly, despite the recognition of Catalan Autonomy by the Second Spanish Republic in 1932, the Spanish Civil War, which lasted from 1936 to 1939, ended in the victory of the Spanish Nationalists and Francisco Franco over the Republicans. The victory also meant a revocation of the limited autonomy that Catalonia had been granted during the Republic. Transactionalist theory supports that this shift towards assimilation, towards creating one unitary state within a set of borders, is consistent with the goal of maintaining the borders of a nation-state by enforcing nationalist policies.

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[90] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Despite the success of Conversi's transactional theory in the previously described

cases, where the Spanish state wished to strengthen its borders by unifying the internal

function and culture of the state and the Catalonian minority reacted against it, the theory

is not complete. The biggest flaw with the argument is that nationalism in Spain did not

emerge when this theory might have predicted it would. If nationalism's main purpose

were in fact boundary creation and maintenance, then the emergence of a single state

where there had previously been two states would necessitate the adoption of nationalistic

policies, like the assimilation to a single legal code, form of government, or even language.

Contrary to this logic, however, nationalism was not actually employed by Spanish

monarchs in 1516, when the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile were officially united.

Actually, until 1716, Catalonia was allowed to maintain its own legal code, language, and

system of government.[91] Transactional theory describes why nationalism is used for

boundary creation in certain instances, but it offers no explanation for cases in which a

state chooses to accommodate different ethnic groups, rather than forcing assimilation to a

single, state-sponsored nationality.

Applying a Theory that Works

The previous three theories have largely focused on a single factor in attempting to

explain the policy choices of the nation-state. Policy choices, however, are complex, and

simply cannot be linked to one single element. In order to thoroughly and correctly

illuminate the choices that Spain made in forming its policy towards the Catalonian

minority, a theory must account for both domestic factors, like the desires or actions of an

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[91] Catalonia. (2013). In *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

ethnic minority and the economic and industrial situation within the state, and international factors, like the establishment of firm state borders and the influence of a state's allies and enemies. Though many theories are credible when they are applied to one time frame, they cannot be applied to other situations. A complete theory, then, must also be able to explain the choices that states make in regard to minority policy throughout history; both when there was a change in policy, and when the state chose to maintain its policy despite shifts in other factors.

Harris Mylonas' theory is such a theory. According to Mylonas, there are essentially three policy choices that a state can make regarding a minority within its borders: assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion. Assimilation is expected when the minority does not have external support, or when they have support from an enemy but the state aims to maintain the international status quo, accommodation occurs when the minority receives the support of an ally, and exclusionary policies are adopted when the minority group has the support of an enemy and the host state has revisionist foreign policy aims. Mylonas posits that state policies towards internal minority groups are shaped by the foreign policy goals of a state, but that the minority itself, and the domestic situation of the nation-state government, can influence the means through which these policies are enforced. [92] This theory uses both internal and external factors to determine how policies are chosen and enforced. It can be applied to the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish host state throughout its development and up to the present day. Examining the factors surrounding the changes in Spanish policy over time illuminates the strong

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[92] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 36-37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

influence of international pressures and foreign policy goals on the actions taken towards the Catalonian minority.

The Origins of Spanish Policy: The Union of Aragon and Castile

Like many European nation-states, Spain was not formed at once, but rather through a series of mergers between smaller kingdoms within the borders of the modern nation-state. In 1469, Ferdinand II of Aragon, the kingdom of which the Catalonian principality was a part, married Isabella of Castile. This is the first time period for which we can examine Spanish policy towards Catalonian minorities. Given that Catalonia did not have any external support at the time, Mylonas' theory would predict that the Spanish policy would be one of assimilation. Mylonas also notes, however, that states may choose to pursue assimilation through accommodation when there is no external threat. This is exactly what unfolded in the early part of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain.

While Ferdinand and Isabella's marriage meant that the two monarchies, the crowns, were united, the establishment of a single monarchy, "led to neither a political and institutional union nor to an economic integration of the Iberian Peninsula."[93] Both Aragon and Castile were ruled as they had been before 1469. A part of Aragon since 1137, Catalonia had been completely accommodated, maintaining its own set of laws and even maintaining the right to wage war independently of Aragon.[94] The only change enforced in Catalonia by the "Catholic Monarchs" was Ferdinand's 1486 Sentencia de Guadalupe, which abolished serfdom in response to civil unrest and protest in the lower classes.[95] This action

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[93] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*.
[94] Catalonia (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*
[95] Ibid.

taken by Ferdinand indicates that he preferred assimilation. This change would push the Catalonians towards economic assimilation with Castile, and it also demonstrated that the Catalonians, like each of the rest of the territories governed by the monarchs, must recognize the absolute governing power of the monarch. No longer was the Generalitat, the Catalonian assembly, the supreme authority in Catalonia.[96] When the Catalonian system was not functioning well with the rest of Castilian Spanish society, assimilation was preferable to accommodation, though they pursued assimilation through accommodation whenever possible.

Aragon and Castile were brought even closer together in 1516, when Ferdinand's death meant that the united throne was left to his Grandson, the Hapsburg Charles I. Charles was not Spanish, but Flemish, and had not ever been to Spain before he inherited the joint throne of Aragon and Castile. The idea of a foreign monarch, with his Flemish ministers, caused unrest and uneasiness in both Aragon and Castile. The yearlong regency of Francisco Cardinal Jiminèz, who struggled to maintain the monarchy's power as Charles won approval from European monarchs, exacerbated these tensions. The European rulers resisted Charles' assent to the throne on the grounds that it would give the Hapsburgs too much power, which made Spain's international situation very precarious.

Despite internal tension among the many distinct principalities in Spain and European dissatisfaction with Charles' inheritance of the throne, Catalonia still did not receive any external support. As previously noted, Mylonas predicts that when a minority has no external support the policy pursued by the state, in this case represented by the monarch, would be one of assimilation through accommodation. When Charles finally did

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[96] Ibid.

arrive in Spain, he did in fact maintain the same policy that his grandparents had established, as Mylonas would predict. Charles made his preference for assimilation in the economic realm clear by demanding financial support from each of the principalities in Spain, Catalonia included. Furthermore, while he did not include linguistic assimilation into any formal code of law, Charles chose to learn only Castilian, rather than both Catalonian and Castilian, revealing once more his preference for assimilation to a common system. Assimilation through accommodation continued through Charles' reign and the entirety of Hapsburg rule in Spain. While the monarchs only very rarely enacted new requirements on the Catalonians, they very clearly saw Catalonia as a part of a whole, rather than a semi-autonomous area with special rights.

The Reapers' War and its Policy Implications

One brief exception to the assimilation through accommodation policy pursued by the Hapsburgs occurred when a part of Catalonia was excluded from Spain and ceded to France during the Reaper's War. The Reaper's War, which took place from 1640 to 1658, was a fight between France and Spain within the broader context of the Thirty Years' War. However, this change in policy is explained by Mylonas' theory, which predicts that, when a minority group allies with the external enemies of a revisionist state, that state will pursue a policy of exclusion towards the minority group.[97] There are three requirements that must be met for Mylonas' theory to prove true in this situation. First, Spain must have external enemies. Secondly, Catalonia must have received support from the external enemies of Spain. Finally, Spain must have been a revisionist power at the time.

[97] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.*

The first condition, Spain's enemies outside of their borders, is easily fulfilled. The Reaper's War took place within the broader context of the Thirty Years War, which enveloped the entire European continent.[98] Spain was allied with Austria, which was also a part of the Hapsburg Empire, and faced no real threat from the Italian states, which were largely Catholic, but found itself in a precarious situation with regards to the rest of Europe. France in particular posed problems for Spain. Though the two states shared a Catholic faith, they were driven to conflict because of geopolitical concerns. France's worried that it would be encircled by the Hapsburg empire, which in fact already bordered France with Spain to the south-west, the Spanish Netherlands to the north, and Austria to the East. Spain, on the other hand, was disconnected by France from the Spanish Netherlands and the Austrian Hapsburgs, and therefore faced difficulties in communication by having to cross Spanish territory.[99] Tensions between Bourbon France and Hapsburg Spain had been mounting for centuries, and during the Thirty Years' War, the two sates were in fact enemies, thus the first condition is met.

The second requisite condition for Mylonas' theory to hold is that Catalonia received support from Spain's external enemies. In fact, Catalonia did ally with the French during the Thirty Years' War. The fight between France and Spain for control of Catalonia is known as the Reaper's War. The conflict started between Spain and Catalonia in 1626, when the Spanish monarch, Philip IV, asked the Cortes of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia to pay taxes and send troops to support the rising cost of the Thirty Years' War. Valencia and Aragon both agreed to support the war monetarily, if not with troops, but Catalonia, which

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[98] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*.
[99] Thirty Years' War. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/592619/Thirty-Years-War

still maintained autonomous control of both its military and taxation within the territory, sent neither money nor men to support what it saw as a Castilian war. Spain pushed ahead anyway, even publishing an official Edict declaring a Union of Arms; at least in name, Catalonia was to be just like any other part of Spain, without special privileges.[100]

Tensions between Catalonia and the rest of Spain grew, however, as the province still did not pay any taxes or conscript troops to the Spanish army. In an effort to force the Catalonians to assimilate to the Spanish way and start contributing to the well being of the state, Spain launched a campaign against France from Catalonia. Contrary to what the Spanish expected, the Catalonians still refused to support the Spanish army. Though the Spanish were still attempting to enforce their preferred policy of assimilation, the Catalonian preference was accommodation; they wanted to maintain the right to tax and fight at their own discretion. In response to being asked to quarter troops and pay for a war that they did not support, the Catalonians revolted against the Spanish, and allied with the French, who fought to keep the Castilians out of Catalonia.[101] The second condition, that the Catalonians received support from an external of enemy of Spain, is met through the alliance with the French against the Spanish in Catalonia.

The final condition is that Spain must have been a revisionist power at the time of the Reaper's War. Mylonas defines a revisionist state as one that "lost territory or rose in power relative to competitors."[102] The Spanish state does indeed fit this definition, as it had lost territory, the Spanish Netherlands, early in the Thirty Years' War. Still, Mylonas emphasizes that it is not the actions, but the explicitly stated policy aims of a state that

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[100] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*
[101] Ibid.
[102] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

truly classify it as either revisionist or status-quo power. Much to the chagrin of France, which wished to see a decline in the power of the Hapsburgs, Spain had in fact declared in 1621 that it sought to expand economically into international trade, and that they sought access to ports and shipping lanes in the Netherlands, despite the Netherlands' recent independence.[103] After twelve years of peace, the Spanish sought to revise the status quo in Europe by returning to their former status as a great economic power, and they had lost territory. Both the territorial situation and the explicitly cited aims of the rulers ensure that Spain fits firmly into Mylonas' definition of a revisionist power during the Reaper's War, and thus the third qualification is met.

Given that France, which was Spain's external enemy, supported Catalonia and that Spain held a revisionist foreign policy at the time, Mylonas' theory would predict that Spain would exclude Catalonia. In fact, as the war dragged on, France retreated, maintaining support not for the whole of Catalonia, but only for the territory of Roussillon, which was the part of Catalonia that was on the North of the Pyrenees.[104] Once the French support for the Catalonians to the south of the mountains had ceased, this placed that territory in a situation where they had no external support, and, as Mylonas' theory anticipates, Spain was quick to resume an assimilationist policy there, despite choosing to exclude Roussillon and northern Catalonia, which still had French support, from their borders.

[103] Israel, J. I. M. (1977). A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands 1618-1648. *The Past and Present Society*, (76), 34-74. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/650409.
[104] Generalitat de Catalunya , CultureCat. (2013). The Reaper's War. Retrieved from website: http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/culturacatalana/menuitem.

The War of Spanish Succession: Assimilation through Internal Colonization

The Hapsburg rule in Spain came to an end with the death of Charles II, who left no children, in 1700. Charles' will left his throne to the Duc D'Anjou, the Bourbon grandson of French king Louis XIV, who took over the monarchy as Philip V of Spain. The French were, of course, pleased to see a Bourbon on the throne in Spain; being able to influence Spain would allow French power in Europe and internationally to grow. The appointment of a Bourbon to the Spanish throne, however, was disappointing to both the Austrian Hapsburgs and the English. The Austrians feared that establishing the Bourbons in Spain would eliminate any chance of having an Austrian on the Spanish throne and weaken Hapsburg power in Europe. The English, on the other hand, worried that Bourbon Spain would become a mere appendage for an already powerful France, and thereby upset the balance of power in favor of France, rather than England. The fears of Austria and England led them to wage war against France and Philip V in an attempt to put Austrian Archduke Charles on the throne.[105]

During the war, the Catalonians were allied with the English and the Austrians; opposing Philip V.[106] Spain under Philip V was a status quo power, attempting to maintain the borders of Spain and his rightful inheritance of the throne. Given these conditions, Mylonas' theory correctly predicts that Spanish policy towards Catalonians shifted from assimilation through accommodation under Hapsburg rule to assimilation through internal colonization under Philip V.[107] Internal colonization is not a policy in itself, but rather a means of pursuing policy. Adopting this strategy, a state will regulate the economy of a

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[105] War of the Spanish Succession. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/558207/War-of-the-Spanish-Succession
[106] Ibid.
[107] Mylonas, H. (2013) p. 37

minority in such a way that the minority, often on the fringe of society, will become

dependent on the centrally located ruling group. At the same time, the state will attempt to

repress cultural distinctiveness, making the state more homogenous and thus easier to

govern.[108] This is the policy that was observed During the War of Spanish Succession.

As soon as he took control of the Spanish State, Philip V was under attack from

Austria and England. Mylonas' first condition, then, is met: Spain did in fact have external

enemies at this time. Very quickly, Philip V established a centralized system for tax

collection and administration of laws. The Catalonians felt that these laws infringed on

their traditional *fueros,* or privileges of self-government, which had been maintained

throughout Hapsburg rule.[109] In response to the passage of new taxes and calls to arms to

support the war, the Catalonians revolted against Philip V's rule and allied themselves with

the Austrians and English in favor of Archduke Charles instead. The second condition, that

Catalonia had external support from an enemy of the Spanish host state, is met by this

alliance.

The third and final condition is that Spain was a state with status quo aims. Given

that Philip V was already legally monarch of Spain, and that he wished to maintain his right

to rule the territory that had been willed to him as well as the borders of his territory,

Philip V's government in Spain is certainly characterized as having status quo aims.

Mylonas maintains, "When the host state wants to maintain the status quo in newly-

acquired regions it is likely to pursue assimilationist and internal colonization policies

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[108] Hechter, M. (1979). Separatism and Ethnicity: A response to Sloan's 'Ethnicity or Imperialism?'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *21*(1), 125-129. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/178455.
[109] Catalonia. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*

towards the members… of a non-core group supported by an enemy power."[110] Since Philip V had just come to power, and even more so because he was the first Bourbon on the Spanish throne, Spain was a newly acquired territory for him, and he wished to solidify his control there. All of the necessary conditions, and even the added stipulation that newly acquired territories are more likely than those that have been held for some time to be affected by assimilation through internal colonization, are therefore met.

In order to solidify his control of Spain, the Bourbon king needed to act quickly to gather funding and support for the war. However, Spain's finances were in dire straits, and there was not a single tax or legal code that applied to the whole of Philip's territories. He would need to develop a means of efficient resource extraction from his territories if he was to be able to maintain his throne. The system that Philip V created in Spain would have allowed him to maximize contribution, monetary and otherwise, from all of his territories, Catalonia included.[111] Applying the same taxes to Catalonia as the rest of Spain was an assimilationist move, but to do so with the aim of filling an economic need and without incorporating elements of Catalonian culture or law into the statewide norms indicates that it was a measure of internal colonization.

The War of Spanish Succession dragged on from 1700-1714, and by the end, neither Philip V nor the Archduke Charles was receiving much external support.[112] When the war concluded, the victorious Philip V was monarch of a state of which no single part had significant support from external powers. Mylonas' theory anticipates assimilation when the minority group does not have external support. Philip V's policy immediately after the

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[110] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.44
[111] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*
[112] Ibid.

war was definitely assimilationist. The passage of the *Nueva Planta Decrees* in 1716, "led to the end of Catalonia's own legal-political organization and the imposition of the model of state against which it had fought."[113] Castilian Spanish replaced Catalan in the public sphere, administration, and education. Philip V instructed his magistrates that "the effect be achieved without the citizens noticing it."[114] The desire to gradually make the Catalonians more Castilian is indicative of the Bourbon preference for assimilation. Ultimately, the policy of assimilation and the abolition of the *fueros,* which was adopted by Philip V to enforce this policy choice, are consistent with Mylonas' prediction of assimilation when the minority group does not have external aid. These policies continued through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[115]

The Nineteenth Century: Tumultuous government, Policy Continuity

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the rulers of Spain faced, and generally overthrew, many challenges. The first among these was Napoleon Bonaparte's Invasion of Spain, which was followed by the war of Independence. This relatively brief war, ended in 1812 with the Constitution of Cardiz, was only the start of a tumultuous century in Spain. Conflict between traditionalists, who favored the old system of government and absolutism for the monarch, and the liberals, in favor of an 'enlightened' model of highly centralized government, was a constant feature of the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Spain.[116] Despite all of the internal conflict in Spain, the state faced relatively few enemies

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[113] Alcoberri, A. (2010). The War of Spanish Succession in the Catalan-speaking Lands. *Catalan Historical Review*, 3, 69-89. doi: 10.2436/20.1000.01.40
[114] Ibid.
[115] Catalonia. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*
[116] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Brittanica.*

during the period. Furthermore, these rare enemies never had any cause to support the Catalonians. Mylonas' prediction that lack of external support will yield a policy of assimilation, or assimilation through accommodation, is supported by observable history.

The Carlist wars were the civil wars between the supporters of Isabelle II, the liberalist young daughter of the deceased King Ferdinand II, and Don Carlos, Ferdinand II's traditionalist brother. The First Carlist War lasted from 1833 to 1839. In the struggle between the traditional and the liberal, the Catalonian minority supported traditional Don Carlos. Catalonians believed that a return to the traditional system of government would mean a return to the *fueros* and the semi-autonomy that Catalonia had enjoyed before the French centralized system had been introduced in Spain under Louis XIV and then Napoleon. The failure of the Carlist movement, and the reestablishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1876 left Catalonia under the same assimilationist policies that they had faced since the end of the Iberian occupation by Napoleon.

Despite the fact that Catalonia was assimilated into Spain through its legal status, the language of administration, taxation, and the military, the region maintained its distinctive culture. The Catalan language was kept alive by use in the home and between individuals, and it was the primary means of maintaining a Catalan identity. This identity grew stronger yet in the mid 1850's, when the *Renaixença*, or renaissance of Catalan literature, press, and theatre, took hold.[117] Catalonia was also one of the first regions in Spain to develop industry, and its textiles flourished early in the industrialization process. When Spain proved unable, or unwilling, to give Catalonia access to the free market that they desired, the Catalonians, ever conscious of their differences from Castile, demanded

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[117] Ibid.

political autonomy as well.[118] Still, the internal disagreement was not enough; as Mylonas'

theory predicts, without a change in the external situation of Catalonia or the Spanish host

state, there was not significant change in policy.

The Catalonians continued to face assimilationist policies into the twentieth century

as well. From 1876 to 1913, the push for Catalan autonomy was largely political. The

Conservatives favored increasing regional autonomy in Spain, while liberals wanted

stronger central government. The extent to which the Catalonians were in fact assimilated

into Spain at the time is demonstrated by the fact that, even with the end goal of political

autonomy, the only means through which they could pursue the goal was to buy in to the

Spanish political system. Though a minority of Catalonians did engage in guerilla tactics

against the Spanish, the majority voted in the Spanish elections and elected regional

officials to the Spanish parliament in hopes of gaining some measure of autonomy, rather

than attempting to overthrow the government outright.[119] Without any external aid, the

Catalonians had no choice but to submit to the assimilation of the Spanish state.

Fortunately for the Catalonians, Conservative Prime Minister Eduardo Dato was

elected in 1913. In December of that year, Dato's government passed legislation that

allowed provincial councils within Spain to form Commonwealths, or *Mancomunitat*, with

the aim of facilitating administration, which was thought by conservatives to be more

effective at the regional level. The opportunity to create a commonwealth was open to any

Spanish Provincial Council, but only the Catalonian provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida,

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[118] Laitin, D. D. (1989). Linguistic revival: Politics and culture in Catalonia.
[119] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013). *Towards Autonomy: the Commonwealth of Catalonia, 1914-1925*. Retrieved from website:
http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/guia/antecedents/antecedents13.htm

and Tarragona, chose to do so. Having been granted this limited autonomy, "Catalonia

flourished once again as a political entity within Spain."[120]

Despite this new degree of autonomy, Catalonia was still facing policies that

assimilated it into the rest of Spain. Firstly, the legislation that granted the autonomy did

not make an exception to accommodate Catalonia; it was extended to all provinces.

Furthermore, the four Catalonian provinces that formed the Commonwealth functioned

independently of each other, still defined not by the language and culture that united them,

but by the territorial divisions that had been dictated by the Spanish state. Finally, though

the Mancomunitat undertook administrative tasks at the regional level, the provinces were

ultimately responsible to the central government of Spain, and the commonwealths were

subordinate to the Spanish State. Given that the conservative prime minister favored the

Catalonians, this legislation can be seen as a shift to assimilation through accommodation,

but it is still assimilation.

Dictatorship: Assimilation through Internal Colonization Returns

The autonomy that the Catalonians enjoyed under Dato proved to be short lived. In

1923, the Catalonians and many others supported the coup d'état of General Primo de

Rivera, who had been sympathetic to the Catalonian cause when he was commanding

troops there. Despite the fact that his coup d'état had drawn much of its support from

Catalonia, once he had seized control of the government, de Rivera hardened to Catalonian

demands. [121] In 1925, he abolished the Mancomunitat, believing that regionalism was

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[120] Ibid.
[121] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Brittanica.*

"inconsistent with a Grand Fatherland."[122] Catalan was banned from use in public

administration or official documents, street signs were changed to Castilian Spanish, and

even references to Catalonian culture, such as the flag or the hymn of the reapers, were

considered to be separatist and made illegal. The abolition of the Mancomunitat and many

of the educational institutions that it had created demonstrated de Rivera's commitment to

ensuring that Catalonia was fully assimilated into Spain.[123]

 With the rest of Europe focused on recovering from World War I, the internal affairs

of Spain were of little interest, and the Catalonians did not have any external support. As

Mylonas predicts, given these circumstances, assimilation is the policy that Primo de Rivera

would pursue. Instances in which the minority is without external allies often yields a

policy of assimilation enforced through measures of accommodation, like those seen

towards the Catalonians under Dato. However, Mylonas notes that the way that a minority

organizes itself and the demands that it presents "might account for variation in the type of

measures a host-state pursues once a policy choice is made."[124] In this instance, the

Catalonian demands for increased autonomy ran directly contrary to the dictator's plan for

Spain to be "One, Great, and Indivisible."[125] The Catalonians were very vocal about their

demands and at times made violent threats. Under these circumstances, the only measures

that de Rivera found appropriate in order to achieve the end of a united Spain were those

measures that strictly enforced his assimilationist policy.

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[122] Shlomo, B. (1977). The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A political reassessment. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *12*(65), doi: 10.1177/002200947701200103
[123] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013). *Prohibition During the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera*. Retrieved from website:
http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/culturacatalana/menuitem.be
[124] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.28
[125] Shlomo, B. (1977).

A brief respite from dictatorial repression of Catalonian culture came in 1932, when the newly established Second Republic re-established the regional parliament of Catalonia, which had been dissolved in 1714.[126] Under the Second Republic, Catalonians were greeted with assimilation by accommodation. While the Republic was content to grant the Catalonian minority the right to have a parliament, and even define the territory as a single unit, there was no misconception that the Catalonian state would be independent. Even the majority leader of the new Catalonian state, Francesc Macià, declared "The Catalan Republic as a member State of the Iberian Federation."[127] Despite the small amount of autonomy granted to them, the Catalonians would remain a part of Spain.

The outbreak of civil war in Spain in 1936 and the eventual victory of the Nationalist Party and Francisco Franco in 1939 brought an unwelcome change for the Catalonians.[128] Unlike the Second Republic, Franco would choose to enforce assimilation through repression of Catalan identity and internal colonization. Since Franco took control of the government in during the buildup to WWII, both his nationalist party and any opposition were largely without external support. Though Italy and Germany had supported Franco's claims during the Spanish Civil war, Franco maintained Spain's neutrality during WWII, meaning that Spain was isolated from international pressure during the war. Similarly, Catalonia attempted to protest Franco's oppressive reforms domestically, not seeking outside aid. Even after World War II, though Spain was not immediately recognized by the

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[126] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013).
[127] Colomines, A. (2008). Representing Catalan national identity: Catalonia during the Spanish Second Republic and the Civil War. *Journal of Catalan Studies*, Retrieved from http://www.anglo-catalan.org/jocs/11/Articles & Reviews/Versio pdf/05 Colomines.pdf
[128] Generalitat de Catalunya. (2013).

United Nations and would not join the European Economic Community until after Franco's resignation, Catalonians did not seek outside help.

As previously seen, without the support and influence of international actors, state policies towards minority groups within their borders are unlikely to change.[129] In this case, when neither the Spanish state nor the Catalonian minority had significant allies or enemies, Franco preferred a policy of assimilation. These policies, however, were met with resistance, rather than acceptance, on the part of the Catalonians. Franco wanted to incorporate Catalonia back into the core of the Spanish centralized government and build national, rather than regional identity. As soon as Franco's troops had secured control of Catalonian territory, in April 1938, he revoked the Statute of Catalonian Autonomy.[130] When it became clear that the Catalonians would not readily accede to his demands, Franco chose stricter enforcement measures. Catalonia's lack of external support led to the choice of assimilation as a policy, while the internal resistance of the Catalonian minority to the state's policies pushed Franco to adopt repressive measures in order to ensure Catalonian cooperation with his aims.

Franco's government adopted laws restricting the use of Catalan, governing not only the language used to instruct students but the curriculum as well, and even forced Catalan street and place names to be changed to Castilian. "The censure penetrated into all aspects of daily life and, markedly, into the language, the text books destined for learning, the publications and radio broadcasting."[131] As Mylonas notes, "In the 'age of nationalism,'

[129] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.28
[130] Generalitat de Catalunya, (2013). *Attempt at 'linguicide' during Franco's dictatorship*. Retrieved from website:
http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/culturacatalana/menuitem.be
[131] Ibid.

ruling political elites of the host state have incentives to target non-core groups that are not

mobilized by an external power with assimilationist policies, rather than accommodate or

exclude them."[132] Incentives include ease of administration with shared language and

governmental structure within the state, using the economic strengths of the minority to

the advantage of the state (internal colonization), and, perhaps most significantly, allowing

for the development of bonds that tie the minority to the state, thereby 'immunizing' the

region from future interference by external actors.[133] Thanks to measures of strict

enforcement of Spain's assimilationist policy, Franco was in fact able to facilitate the

creation of a much more centralized state while capitalizing on the advanced industrial

economy of Catalonia during his dictatorship.

Post-Franco Spain: A Shift towards Accommodation?

After Francisco Franco's death in 1975, the Spanish sought a system that was more

representative and less centralized than Franco's regime had been. In December 1978, the

Spanish ratified a new constitution, which established a Constitutional Monarchy. The

1978 Constitution allowed for the creation of 17 autonomous regions, of which Catalonia

was one.[134] As a semi-autonomous region within the Spanish state, Catalonia has its own

provincial government, having re-established the Generalitat. Though Spanish is the only

official language of the state, Catalonian is recognized as an official regional language, and

is therefore permitted for use in the public and private sphere, as well as education, within

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[132] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.38
[133] Ibid.
[134] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Brittanica.*

the autonomous community of Catalonia.[135] The Catalonian government has "significant

latitude in making laws and spending funds for culture, infrastructure, and government

services,"[136] though the central state is still in charge of tax collection and allocating funds

to each Spanish region.

The shift in Spanish policy from assimilation, which had adopted by the Hapsburgs

and enforced with varying degrees of repression until Franco's death, to accommodation

under the Constitution of 1978, can be explained by examining the goals of the Spanish

state, internally and with regards to foreign policy. Assimilationist policies, of which the

goal is "to secure the loyalty of an individual or community ... to the state,"[137] are adopted

when the minority is allied with the external enemies of a status-quo host state, or when

the minority has no external support. It has been demonstrated that one of these two

situations arose in Spain during each time that assimilation was adopted.

Accommodation, on the other hand, is adopted by a host-state in which a minority

group is receiving support of external actors that are allies of the host-state.[138] While the

policies of post-Franco Spain fit with definition of accommodating policies, which allow

minorities to have separate institutions while still owing some degree of loyalty to the

state, certain conditions must be met in order for Mylonas' theory to be upheld. The theory

asserts that when a minority is receiving external support from the allies of a host-state,

the host-state is likely to pursue a policy of accommodation towards the minority[139]. These

policies are adopted in order to build a good relationship between the host-state and the

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[135] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Catalan in Catalonia*.
[136] Gies, D. T. (1994). A Country in Spain. *The Wilson Quarterly*, *18*(1), 70-76. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40258804
[137] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.22
[138] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.37
[139] Ibid.

allies, and because the state does not fear that its allies will attempt to gain control of the

minority's territory. In this case, then, it must be demonstrated that Spain had external

allies, that Catalonia had external support in favor of greater autonomy, and that the

external support for Catalonia came from the Spanish state's allies.

The first condition is that Spain must have had external allies. For much of Franco's

tenure, Spain was isolated from the rest of Europe and the world. Since Spain had declared

neutrality in World War II, and then chosen to side with Italy and Germany, when the Allied

Powers won, they were rightly cautious with regards to Franco's Spain. Though they

avoided many of the diplomatic sanctions that were placed on the Axis Powers, Spain was

not admitted to the United Nations when it was started in 1945. The Allies, especially

democratic states in Europe, like Britain and France, were wary of Franco's fascism.

Spain's international position was helped when, in 1953, the state made a contract with the

United States, allowing them to build four bases in Spain. This situation was made still

better by Spain's 1955 admission to the United Nations.[140] Still, Spain was not perceived as

a major player in Europe or internationally under Franco.

After Franco's death, the Spanish state sought to prove its legitimacy to other

nations. The new government sought to create a reputation for Spain as a democratic and

peaceful country, and pushed for Spain to be further integrated into the global economy.

As Mylonas noted, while external influences on state policy, or external supporters of a

minority, are often nearby states, "non-state actors are becoming increasingly important in

the process."[141] In this case, the allies that were influencing Spanish policy were not

individual states, but rather international organizations, like the European Union, a group

[140] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Brittanica.*
[141] Mylonas, H. (2013). p. 29

into which Spain was seeking entry, and the United Nations, by which it sought to be recognized as legitimate. The condition that Spain have allies is thus met.

The second condition is that Catalonia must have had external support for increased autonomy, and the third is that this support must have come from Spain's allies. As noted above, Spain's allies since the death of Franco have been largely international institutions, the European Union and the United Nations, and their members. These conditions are both satisfied, because it is precisely these international institutions that have offered political support for the cause of minority recognition. Both groups have long been in favor of recognizing the rights, languages, and cultures of minority groups, like the Catalonians. Over time, United Nations and European Union support for and recognition of regional minorities has only increased. As a result, Catalonian demands for increased international recognition have been met with offers of UN and EU support for the region and its' claims of cultural, linguistic, and economic autonomy. For example, the EU officially recognized Catalan as an official language, publishing major European Union documents in Catalan, starting in December 1990. The same body further expressed its commitment to preservation of minority languages and cultures with the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, ratified in 1992 with Spain as a signatory.[142]

Given that Spain was allied with the European Union and the United Nations, and that these organizations have also offered their support to the Catalonian desire for increased autonomy within Spain, Mylonas' hypothesis is that Spain would adopt accommodating policies, or policies allowing Catalonia to maintain "separate institutions

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[142] European Union, Council of Europe. (1992). *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*. Retrieved from website:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm

such as schools, churches, cultural associations, and so forth."[143] We have seen that Spain

did in fact accommodate Catalonia, allowing it to re-establish its provincial government,

take control of education, and promote Catalonian language and culture to groups even

outside of the state. The reasons for the adoption of accommodating policy in this situation

are two-fold. A group supported by an external ally poses a relatively smaller threat to the

host-state's security than does a group with enemy support, and pursuing policies that are

agreeable to allies helps strengthen the alliances themselves.[144] Mylonas' theory correctly

anticipates that a change in Spain's position in the international sphere would change the

state's policy choices with regards to Catalonia.

Conclusions

While ethnic theories of nationalism, Marxism, and transactional theories of

nationalism all have convincing elements, and are applicable to certain time periods or

aspects of the situation in Catalonia, none of them is able to correctly explain all of the

shifts in Spanish policy from the 1516 union of Aragon and Castile to the present day. The

argument proposed by Harris Mylonas, however, is able to correctly predict the policy

choices of each government of Spain at every time period. The theory is useful in that it

explains policy fluctuations as a function of foreign policy aims while still allowing

domestic factors to have a part in determining the measures used to enforce policy goals.

The allowance for the use of both internal and external factors, coupled with the ability to

be applied to any historical period, contributes to the success of Mylonas' theory in the

Catalonian case.

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[143] Mylonas, H. (2013). p. 22
[144] Mylonas, H. (2013). p.36

Spanish Policy towards the Spanish Basques

Though the case of the Spanish Basques is not nearly as well known as the Catalonian case, it has still been widely studied. Many scholars and theorists have attempted to explain why the Spanish state has adopted certain policies towards the Basques at given points in time. Some of these scholars even attempt to explain why Spanish policy has changed over time. In discussing the Spanish Basques, many scholars make a comparison to the Catalonians, who have historically been relatively more autonomous than their Basque compatriots. Given this comparison, it follows that the theorists discussing the Spanish Basques are quick to offer the same explanation for policy towards the Basques as that which they offer for the Catalonians. That is to say that many theorists attempt to explain Spanish policy in the Basque case, as in the Catalonian case, by relying on internal factors like the actions of the minority group itself, the economic advantages offered by the minority group, or the domestic political situation. A few have looked to international factors, though these have tended to focus on international social movements or the adoption of international codes of human rights, rather than foreign policy aims of the state. As in the Catalonian case, the best theory to explain the relationship between the Spanish state and the Spanish Basque minorities is one that uses both international and domestic goals of the state to explain the shifts in Spanish policy over time.

The Ethnic Perspective

      As previously discussed, ethnic theories rely largely on the psychological principle that groups need to create an "other" in order to identify themselves. This theory leads to the implication that states choose to assimilate or exclude the minority group they are hosting depending on how noticeable the differences in culture are between the majority and the minority. The Basques in Spain have been faced with accommodating and assimilationist policies on the part of the Spanish government, depending on the period in time. While assimilation could be explained by ethnic theories, such theories do not provide any explanations for situations in which two different ethnic groups, like the Spanish and the Basques, will accept a policy of mutual accommodation. This section will discuss elements of the Spanish policy towards the Basques that can be easily explained by ethnic theory as well as the weaknesses of the theory.

      In seeking to determine the relative similarities and differences between the Basques and the Spanish majority, four criteria, customs, religion, race, and language, prove important to examine.[145] 'Customs' includes family structure, dress, marriage practices, and other rituals commonly observed by any group. In this area, the Basques are relatively similar to the Spanish majority. Though the Basque traditional clothing is distinct from modern Spanish garb, in day-to-day life the Basque people dress as the Spanish do. Both groups share the same rites of passage and practices regarding marriage and other rites, and the family structure is the same in these two populations.[146] The Basques, like the

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[145] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
[146] Minorities at Risk Dataset. (2007).

Spanish majority, are predominantly Catholic, so the two also share a religion, and there

are "no physical differences in appearance"[147] between the two.

Like the Catalonians, the Basques differ from mainstream Spanish culture in one

very noticeable area: language. The traditional language of the Basque people is very

dissimilar from Spanish, as Basque is an Indo-European language, not a romance language.

Spanish is the official state language of Spain, however the Basque language is currently

recognized as an official regional language in the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (CAV) and in

the Basque part of Navarre.[148] Basques in Spain do speak Spanish, in fact only 28.52

percent of people living in the Basque territory at present actually speak Basque at all,[149]

and surveys show that 77.51 percent of daily communication in the Basque Region of Spain

is done mainly in Spanish.[150] Traditionally, Basque was the main language of the territory,

but declined when the territory was brought under the Castilian crown in 1513, and still

further under Bourbon rule during the eighteenth century. While it is not the main

language of most residents now, movements to improve Basque language education mean

that it is once again on the rise.

Though linguistic differentiation is important, it is not enough in and of itself to

differentiate the groups to the point at which ethnic theorists argue that exclusion, the

creation of an 'other,' would be the policy of choice for the Spanish state. Ethnic theorists

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[147] Ibid.
[148] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Spain).* Retrieved from website:
http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/es31_en.htm#26
[149] De la Calle, L., & Miley, T. J. (2008). Is there more assimilation in Catalonia than in the Basque Country? Analyzing dynamics of assimilation in nationalist contexts. *European Journal of Political Research*, (47), 710-736. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00776.x
[150] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Spain).*

might predict, then, that the Spanish state would adopt a policy of assimilation towards the Basques in Spain. At some periods of time, such as under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1977), assimilation prevailed, as the state attempted to create a unified "Spanish" identity and repress those elements of culture that differed from the Castilian ideal. However, assimilation has not been the choice policy for Spain at every point in history. In fact, the Spanish Basques were allowed to maintain their *fueros,* or certain measures of political autonomy within Spain, from the time of their 1513 merger with Castile until the end of the First Carlist War in the nineteenth century. This allowance of political autonomy by the Spanish state is indicative of accommodation, not assimilation. The lack of assimilationist policy at the beginning of the union of Castile and the Basque country, the time period during which the two would have been the most ethnically different, indicates that ethnicity is not the most important factor for the Spanish state in determining minority policies.

The Marxist Perspective

The theory of nationalism proposed by Karl Marx asserts that state-sponsored nationalism, the policies of assimilation required to induce loyalty to the state, and the sub-state nationalism that occurred as a response to assimilative policies arose temporarily around the time of the industrial revolution as a means to keep working class from recognizing their role in the international proletariat.[151] This theory proves adequate in explaining situations in which the minority group was exposed to industrialization, had

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[151] Hale, Henry E. (2008) *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press. 22-23. Print.

relatively more lower-class laborers than the rest of the state, or had newly acquired

industrial strength that outmatched the political privileges allowed by the central state

government. Marxist theory can be applied to the Spanish Basque case during the

Industrial Revolution; its weakness is that it cannot be extended to other time periods.

Spain was relatively late to join the Industrial Revolution, but when it did, the

Basque Region was among the first to embrace the new technologies, quickly becoming a

center of industry. As technology became available, select regions in Spain took advantages

of the new processes that would allow them to capitalize on their natural resources. New

technologies like the Bessemer Process, which "allowed for the cheap and efficient

production of steel using high-grade, non-phosphoric ore" enabled the Basques to take

advantage of their location on the Bay of Biscay, making for easy trade with international

partners, and the mineral-rich soil found in the territory.[152] The Basques in Spain had great

economic success during the industrial revolution, especially compared to the relatively

backwards and non-industrial Spain. However, the Basques' political power did not match

their level of importance in industry. The Basques were forced to rely on the

"unrepresentative and inefficient political elite in Madrid."[153] The economic policies of the

Spanish state disadvantaged the Basque industrial economy, and despite being one of the

economically stronger regions of a weak, bankrupt Spain, the Basques did not have the

political ability to change the system. Like the Catalonians, the Basques in Spain were at

the economic center of Spain, but the political periphery.

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[152] Harrington, J. (1983). Heavy Industry, the State, and Economic development in the Basque region, 1876-1936. (1983). *The Economic History Review*, *36*(4), 535-551. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2597239.
[153] Ibid.

It was during this the Industrial Revolution, after the Carlist wars, that the *fueros* of

the Basque country in Spain were revoked for the first time. The revocation of a political

privilege corresponds with the adoption of assimilationist policies. As Marxist theorists

would predict, the rise of industry coincides with the adoption of policies that favor state-

sponsored nationalism and state primacy over regional rights. According to Marx, as the

regions expanded industry, the central state became increasingly fearful that the

economically powerful regions would rise against it, so the state enforced strict political

policies. While this assertion is applicable to the Industrial Revolution, it cannot be used to

predict which policy a state would adopt before or after industrialization, nor can it explain

why the assimilation during the Industrial Revolution was limited to political rights, and

largely did not affect culture or language, the two most important areas in creating state-

sponsored nationalism that Marx asserts Spain would have sought at this time.

Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation

Another theory, proposed by Daniele Conversi, combines ideas from ethnicism and

Marxism to explain that states use policy towards minorities as a means of creating border

security. This theory allows for factors like the minority group's reaction to a state policy,

to influence the outcomes of state policy choice, while asserting that the primary aspect

that states use in determining policy towards minorities is the international dynamic.

Conversi says that states have to use nationalism to legitimate their claim to a certain

territory, stating: "If a particular nation is to be defined, it must be bound and delimited,

that is, tied to a previously established space."[154] For Conversi, nationalism serves the specific goal of defining the territory over which a group has traditional authority. This nationalism can be used by the majority, in attempts to assimilate a minority and assert the legitimacy of their rule over said minority, or it can be used by the minority in a reaction to increasingly centralized state policies. In the latter case, the minority group asserts that they, and not the majority rulers, have legitimate claim to govern the territory and the people of the minority.[155]

In the case of the Spanish Basques, Conversi's theory does carry some weight. The Basque national movement did in fact take hold after the end of the Carlist wars, when the *fueros* were under threat. The movement for greater Basque autonomy gained momentum during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), when the *fueros* were actually abolished, and during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975).[156] The rise in minority nationalism in the Basque territory can be characterized as "a reaction against state interference and expansion (through the negation of … legitimacy),"[157] as Conversi suggests that minority nationalism can be.

Conversi's theory also provides accurate explanation of the Spanish state's choice to pursue assimilationist policies after the Carlist Wars. At the time, Spain was in domestic upheaval, and the rulers, specifically the restored monarchy that arose after the Carlist Wars, felt the need to demonstrate that they were the legitimate rulers, and assert their authority throughout all of Spain. In order to be sure that others would not attack or assert

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[154] Conversi, D. (1995). Reassessing current theories of nationalism: Nationalism as boundary maintenance and creation. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *1*(1), 73-85.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/EBchecked/topic/557573/Spain
[157] Conversi, D. (1995).

claim over Spanish territories, including minority regions like the Basque country and Catalonia, the restored monarchy sought to unify their territory culturally and politically. Likewise, challengers to the monarchy, including de Rivera and Franco, chose to assert their authority to rule over a unified Spain by repressing the Basques and other minorities as well.

Conversi's theory does explain the presence of minority nationalism, and the use of state-sponsored nationalism through political and cultural assimilation under the restored monarchy, de Rivera, and Franco. However, the theory predicts that assimilation will occur when a state wants to rule a territory, and exclusion will be the policy of choice when a state does not want to govern a minority group without offering any explanations for situations where the Spanish state has adopted relatively accommodative policies towards the Basques. A better theory would be able to explain the state's choice of assimilation, accommodation, or exclusion at any given point in time, and this theory simply does not do that.

Applying a Theory that Works

Theories seeking to explain and predict Spanish policy with respect to the Basque minority within the state must take into account international factors, like alliances or enemies, and external support for the minority's cause. These theories must not, however, completely write off domestic elements such as the ethnological differences between majority and minority, the internal political situation of a state, or the economy of a state. Harris Mylonas proposes that states will pursue assimilationist policies towards minorities when the minority has no external support, or when the host-state is seeking the status quo

while the minority group gets support from the host's enemies. Accommodation will be the

policy of choice for host states when an external ally of the state supports the minority, and

exclusion will occur when the host state has revisionist foreign policy goals and the

enemies of the host-state support the minority group.[158] While international factors are

the primary forces acting to shape state policy, states may react to domestic factors to

determine the means of policy enforcement. This theory adequately explains the situation

of the Spanish Basques as the policy facing the Basques changed over time.

The Origins of Spanish Policy: Navarre and Castile

The Basque people have lived in what is now northern Spain and southern France

for thousands of years. From the ninth century, the Basque territories were united into the

Kingdom of Navarre, and were politically independent. In 1512, the part of Navarre that

lay to the south of the Pyrenees Mountains, in present day Spain, was absorbed into Castile.

Though the Castilians were at war with the French at this time, the Kingdom of Navarre did

not take either the French or Spanish side; instead, it was a territory over which both

French and Spanish fought.[159] Since the Basques were not receiving the support of any

external power when they were annexed to Spain, Mylonas' theory predicts that the

Spanish state would adopt a policy of assimilation, possibly through accommodative

measures, towards the Basque minority.[160]

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[158] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[159] Ugalde, M. (2009). A Short History of the Basque Country. In *Buber's Basque Page*. Retrieved from http://www.buber.net/Basque/History/shorthist.html
[160] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

When the Basque territories of Navarre were absorbed by Castile, the Spanish central government was not very unified. The Aragonese and the Castilians were still considered separate, and they were ruled as two independent kingdoms. If Spain's policy towards the Basques had assimilation at this time, there would have been little to assimilate to, as it was too early in the union of Aragon and Castile for one culture to have become politically dominant. Still, the Basques, like the Aragonese, were brought into a political union with Spain in treaty structure. Since these treaties are all that any kingdom of Spain shared, and Navarre was made to partake, this can be considered an assimilative measure. However, though in principle loyal to the Castilians, the Basques maintained their *fueros* and their self-rule, being governed not directly by the Castilian monarchs, but by a the General Assemblies, the Basque Parliament.[161] That the minority Basques were allowed to maintain some level of political autonomy for so long is characteristic of the assimilation through accommodation that was expected by Mylonas.

Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and part of the nineteenth centuries, the Basques were allowed to maintain their *fueros* and the Basque Parliament. Though Spain's international situation was subject to shift at various times due to wars and even invasions by the French. External support for the Basques in Spain, however, did not change during this time period.[162] Though there were other Basques just across the Pyrenees, the French Basques were also a minority, and were not in a position to offer support to the Basque movement in Spain. Given that the Basques did not receive any outside support, the Spanish state had no reason to feel threatened by the Basque parliament, political

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[161] Ugalde, M. (2009).
[162] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/EBchecked/topic/557573/Spain

autonomy, language, or culture. Though Castilian Spanish did become increasingly more

popular over time, Basque was never outlawed or censored by the Spanish state in the

seventeenth, eighteenth, or early nineteenth centuries. This lack of policy change is

supported by Mylonas' theory, which asserts that, in order for there to be a policy change

away from assimilation through accommodation, there would have to be a shift in external

support.

The Carlist Wars and Policy Change

It was not until 1839, after the First Carlist War, that the Basques faced any

restrictions in the autonomy that they had maintained since 1512. During the Carlist Wars,

the Basques in Spain supported the pretender to the throne, Don Carlos, against Isabella II.

Carlos was a traditionalist, while Isabella favored the more enlightened, centralized state

that was becoming ever more popular for European monarchs.   The Basques, who had

been allowed by traditional monarchs to maintain their *fueros,* supported Don Carlos,

fearing that Isabella II would revoke them in her efforts to centralize and modernize the

state. When the Carlists were defeated in 1839, Isabella II did in fact limit the *fueros.*

Though these statutes of autonomy were not entirely abolished, their scope was limited,

and Spain asserted its right to enforce customs at the border of the Basque region and to

tax the people within.[163]

The Carlist Wars were an internal affair. Though the Basque region was center of

support for Don Carlos, the Basques themselves did not receive any support from outside

of Spain during the Carlist Wars. This means that Mylonas would still predict assimilation,

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[163] What were the Carlist wars? (2013). *Euskosare*. Retrieved from
http://www.euskosare.org/euskal_herria/faq

potentially assimilation through accommodation. Mylonas maintains that, while a policy is

chosen based on the external support for a minority group and the host-state's foreign

policy goals, the specific measures adopted in order to enforce these policies can differ

based on the actions of the minority group or other domestic factors.[164] After the Carlist

Wars, the overall policy of the Spanish state was still one of assimilation. However,

whereas previously the means of enforcing assimilation was entirely based in

accommodation, the Basques had proven unwilling to assimilate, so after the war, the

Spanish state's enforcement tactics changed. The slight shift in measures taken to realize

the policy goals, then, is consistent with Mylonas' argument.

Francisco Franco: Move towards Assimilation

Following the First Carlist Wars, the rights and autonomies of the Basques were left

largely untouched until Francisco Franco took power after his victory over the Second

Republic in the Civil War (1936-1939). Under Franco, the Basques in Spain, like other

minorities in the Spanish State, faced a policy of strict assimilation. The language, and all

other outward symbols of Basque culture, were banned. The state under Franco became

highly centralized, and the limited autonomy that the Basques had managed to maintain

since the end of the First Carlist War was revoked almost a century later.[165] These moves

clearly represent a shift towards assimilation and away from assimilation through

accommodation, but are this to be expected at the time, according to Mylonas? For such a

shift to be consistent with Mylonas' predictions, Spain would have to have external enemies

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[164] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 37).
[165] Spain. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*.

from whom the Basques were receiving support. This was in fact the case for much of Franco's regime.

Franco, emerging victorious from civil war and seizing power based on his wartime privileges, did not openly engage in World War II. While he expressed support for the Axis Powers, he was never an official ally of those powers. Unlike the rest of Europe, clearly divided into two camps, Franco could not count on allies in Europe. After the war ended, however, this lack of allies quickly turned to a presence of enemies. In 1945, Spain was excluded from the newly created United Nations on the grounds that it was not democratic enough. Europeans and Americans, the Great Powers, looked with great hesitation upon the fascist Franco regime in Spain. None of those nations that were against Spain wanted to actively fight Spain, but Franco was losing respectability and position worldwide as Spain fell behind economically and politically due to exclusion from international organizations.[166] The lack of support that Spain received from the international community was based largely on the lack of democracy in Spain, and on the opposition to repressive measures. International institutions favored the increased representation of all minorities in Spain; the Basque Cause was certainly among those. Thus Mylonas' argument, that Spain, in the face of international opposition, would adopt assimilation policies, proves correct.

Post-Franco Spain: Towards Accommodation

When Franco died in 1975, Spain's policies shifted very quickly towards accommodation. Juan Carlos, who became King after Franco died, expressed willingness to

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[166] Ibid.

allow more democratic measures to take hold in Spain. This secured the support of allies

for Spain. By 1982, Spain had been admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

Spain gained entry into the European Economic Community, the precursor to the European

Union, by 1986.[167] Fortunately for the Basques, and other minorities in Spain, the

international organizations that Spain entered after Franco's death were strongly in favor

of democracy, representation of minorities, and respecting the cultural richness of Europe.

States and international bodies that had been wary of Franco became Spain's allies. As

Mylonas notes, 'allies' of a state do not have to be other states, non-state actors have

become increasingly important over the past quarter century or more.[168] Just as the

support of enemies for a minority brings about the adoption of repressive measures of

assimilation, the support of a state's allies for a minority, according to Mylonas, should

bring about accommodation of the minority groups.[169]

As Spain has been accepted into more international organizations, and those

organizations have increasingly favored the rights of minority culture and language groups,

Spain has in fact become more accommodating towards the Basque minority. Part of the

Basque region of Spain, the CAV, was granted preliminary autonomy in 1977. This

autonomy was secured by the passage of the Constitution in 1979. Now, Basque in Spain is

an official regional language, and in the CAV, as in parts of Navarre, Basque is a legal

language for administration. Basque is also increasingly taught in schools, meaning that

more young people, are learning Basque now than did under Franco, when Basque was

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[167] Ibid.

[168] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 29).

[169] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 37).

banned from schools. Many developments have been made in traditional Basque arts, especially music and dance, and there are now magazines, radio shows, and television stations that all use Basque language and offer a Basque perspective. Spain signed the European Parliament's Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, and has proven itself to be open to offering more rights to Basques.[170]

The Basques hold a relatively favorable position at present. However, while politically and legally speaking, they have the same status as the Catalans, the Basques are not as highly regarded in Spain or the international community. The main obstacle left for Spanish Basques to overcome is that of the stereotypes against them. One stereotype, the perception of Basques as culturally backwards and less refined than mainstream Spaniards, has been around for generations. Though the Basque region is heavily industrialized and is currently one of the more prosperous regions of Spain, the traditional reliance on agriculture perpetuates the idea of the uneducated Basque farmer.

A second stereotype, the idea of the Basques as a violent, radical people, arose more recently, and has perhaps more grave consequences. As Mylonas notes, the policies pursued by a government are chosen largely with foreign policy aims in mind. The means of enforcement, however, are adjusted in response to the group itself.[171] Though the vast majority of Basque people, and even the majority of those who identify as Basque Nationalists, are peaceful, one particular group, the 'Euskadi Ta Askatasuna' (ETA), whose name means "national homeland and freedom" in Basque, has adopted terrorist techniques in protest to the fact that Spain would rule the Basques at all. Spain's response to the ETA's

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[170] European Commission Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in Comunidad Autónoma Vasca.*
[171] Mylonas, H. (2013) *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 28).

violence has not been favorable. While it has not yielded a policy shift, and the Basques are still accommodated by Spain, violent protest and acts of terrorism by the ETA mean that Spain's military has a greater presence in the Basque country than elsewhere, that shows of Basque nationalism are often viewed with suspicion rather than curiosity, and that international organizations are less likely to offer support, since they do not want to be associated with terrorism.[172]

Conclusions

The most convincing theory to explain the relationship between the Spanish state and the Spanish Basque minority at different points of time is that presented by Harris Mylonas. While other theories, like Conversi's transactional theory, Marxism, or even ethnic theories of minority nationalism are able to offer insight into specific situations, like the creation of new state borders, the policies that arose following the industrial revolution, or why a group can be identified as a minority at all, none is able to explain and predict change over time like Mylonas' can. This theory gains its strength from the fact that, while relying on foreign policy and international factors to shape the overall policy of a state, it allows for domestic factors, especially the actions taken by a group to advocate its rights, to have some influence on the means of enforcement. This is especially valuable in the Basque case, where it is often thought that the actions of the ETA have negatively impacted their position relative to the Spanish state.

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[172] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

Since the study of nationalism and ethnicity emerged after World War II, Brittany

has been one of the classic case studies for scholars. Many different theories have been

proposed to explain how states develop their policies towards the minority groups over

which they rule. Quite a few of these theories were even tested or 'proven' using the

Breton case. Several theories are able to explain, or even correctly predict, France's

policies and actions towards the Bretons at different moments in time. The problem with

many theories is not that they fail to predict the outcome of a given situation, but rather

that they are unable to accurately explain the state's actions in every situation and fail to

examine all contributing factors. Most theories attribute the policy outcomes in a state to

the relationship between the minority, in this case Bretons, and the ruling majority, in this

case the French. In doing so, these theories overlook important factors outside the state,

like the foreign policy goals of a state, or the influence of allies or enemies, on the policies

that affect minorities within the state. Though many theories have success in explaining

isolated changes in, or specific elements of, France's policy towards the Bretons, the theory

which best explains the reality of the Breton situation is one that considers both internal

and external factors and is able to explain not just one instance, but changes over time.

Ethnic theories of nation-state formation

Some theories argue that relations between a state and its' minority groups are

defined by the perceived ethnic differences between the two groups. These theories

predict that the more different a minority group is from the dominant group in the state, the more likely the state is to attempt to exclude or eradicate the minority group. Conversely, theories in which ethnicity is the causal variable might anticipate the assimilation or acceptance of groups who are relatively similar to the dominant group in the state. Given that acceptance, rather than assimilation, is more desirable for a minority, as it will allow them to preserve their culture even as members of a governing state, one would expect that the most similar groups will be faced with an accommodating, rather than assimilationist policy. We will see that the Breton culture is relatively similar to the dominant French culture in France, so it follows that one might anticipate assimilation or acceptance. However, this anticipated result has not been consistently observed since the incorporation of the Bretons into France. While there are instances of acceptance, the Bretons have largely been faced with assimilationist policies, and on occasion have even been excluded from mainstream French culture.

Ethicists argue: "ethnic identity is rooted in fundamental human desires for dignity, self-esteem, and/or belonging, and, crucially, that these values are intrinsically *relative,* that they are realized through distinguishing one's own group from that of another."[173] It follows that the most conflict would arise between groups that are very different from one another. However, the Breton and French are extremely similar. The biggest marker of difference between the two groups would be the language. Breton, which is the traditional language, and is closely linked to Welsh and Gaelic, was the most commonly used language in Brittany in 1532, when the French officially annexed the region. Since then, however, the primary language of both France and Brittany is French. French has been the official

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[173] Hale, H. E. (2008) *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press. 22-23. Print.

language of the law and judicial system since 1532, and as recently as 1992, the French

constitution was revised, still excluding Breton and other minority languages in defining

French as the official language of the republic[174].

In other areas, the Bretons are even more similar to the French. The two groups

share a common religion, identifying with the Roman Catholic Church, and this has been a

constant since their union. Furthermore, Bretons are not distinguishable by racial or

physical characteristics from the French. Though certain traditions, like the cuisine or

festivals like Fest Noz were specific to the region, these arose as a practical response to the

agricultural economy of the region, and thus were unlikely to have contributed to a

perceived ethnic difference from mainstream France. Overall, the two groups are

physically and religiously indistinguishable. Despite these similarities, the Bretons have

faced an assimilationist, and occasionally exclusionary, rather than accommodating policy

in France.

Ethnic theories account for the assimilationist policies targeting the Breton language

and seeking to replace it with French, as this is the biggest area of difference. However, the

language barrier has become essentially a non-issue, as so few people, even in Brittany,

speak or understand Breton, and the assimilationist policy has not changed.   Furthermore,

theories using ethnic difference as a causal variable fail to account for the fact that Brittany

was allowed to maintain its own parliament from 1532, just after its union with France,

until 1789, the outbreak of the French Revolution[175]. Despite the fact that perceived

differences between the two groups were much more significant during this time, the

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[174] European Commission, Languages. (2013). *The Euromosaic Report: Breton in France.*
Retrieved from Website: ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr3_en.htm
[175] Bretons. In (2008). *World Directory of Minorities.* The Gale Group. Retrieved from
http://www.faqs.org/minorities/Western-Europe-and-Scandanavia/Bretons.html

French have more tolerance for the Bretons, allowing them greater autonomy before the Revolution than they have since, despite the fact that the perceivable differences between them have waned over time. Where ethnic based theories would anticipate an increase of acceptance over time, there was actually an observable switch towards assimilation, which is not adequately explained.

There are other phenomena that are inconsistent with the prediction of ethnicists that vastly different groups will be excluded, moderately different groups will be assimilated, and the most similar groups will be tolerated. For instance, one would expect assimilationist policies to apply to all areas of a minority culture that was perceived as different from the governing culture. While the Breton language was targeted, the French never attempted to replace other elements of the traditionally Breton way of life with a more 'French' substitute. Breton music and cuisine persisted without great change until the present day. A similar observation of perhaps even greater significance is that the French never pressured Brittany, which was much more agricultural, and industrially backward than the rest of the nation-state to adapt to a more 'French' style economy. The fact that assimilationist policies were not consistently pursued in the areas of the greatest difference between the two groups undermines the ethnic-based theories credibility.

Internal Colonialism

A second group of theories, in which economic motivations of a state are the causal variables for the formation of states' policies towards minorities, is able to explain why the French allowed the Breton agricultural economy to persist when ethnicists would have anticipated assimilation. Scholars like Suzanne Berger and Michael Hechter apply one such

theory, the theory of internal colonization, to the Breton case. The prediction implicit in

this theory is that groups whose economies function similarly to the core group of a state

will be faced with assimilationist policies, while groups whose economies differ greatly

from the majority group will be isolated economically from the center of the state by

exclusionary policies. The Bretons were indeed subject to the 'economic imperialism'

described by this theory, but it is unclear that this is a motivator for state policy.

Furthermore, the theory offers no explanation for the fact that the exclusionary practice

was limited to the economic realm, while assimilationist policies were adopted in the

political and cultural spheres.

The theory of internal colonization is applied to regions where the "center," or

governing group of a state, is very different from the "periphery," or minority groups.

Unlike ethnically based theories, internal colonization focuses on the economic differences

between two groups. While the Bretons may not be radically different from the French in

appearance or beliefs, their economy was, and to some extent still is, vastly different from

that of the rest of France. The region's 3,000 kilometers of coastline, on the Atlantic as well

as the English Channel, have made maritime trades, like fishing and shipbuilding, a

traditional cornerstone of the economy[176]. Furthermore, while cattle were a traditional

choice of livestock for the area, recently pig and poultry industries have been successful[177].

Even after industrialization, the region's economy is heavily reliant on agriculture; the

economy was almost entirely based in agriculture until the interwar period. The structure

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[176] *Getting to Know Brittany.* (2013). Université de Rennes, Rennes, Bretagne, France. Retrieved from http://www.univ-rennes1.fr/English/home/presentation/Environment/Brittany/
[177] European Commission, Europa (2004). *Portrait of the Regions: Bretagne.* Retrieved from: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/EN/fr52_eco.htm

of the economy of Brittany is different from the rest of France, which industrialized relatively earlier.

The internal colonization theory supports the idea that "economic imperialism exists because the Bretons produce raw materials which are processed elsewhere in the nation and must buy French industrial goods dear while selling their own goods cheap."[178] Brittany demonstrates enough difference from France to make this argument persuasive. The Bretons did not have their own industrial centers until after World War II, and even still they are behind other regions in terms of industrialization and GDP per capita[179], which means that they did, and do, rely on bringing in industrial goods from the rest of France. The idea that Bretagne could be an 'internal colony' for France is further supported by the fact that the region is on a peninsula, which makes it relatively difficult to access and removed from Paris – the center of the state's economy.[180]

While examining the economic differences between France and Brittany might lead one to the conclusion that France had adopted an exclusionary, rather than assimilationist economic policy towards the Bretons, in fact, the opposite is true. The mere existence of a difference between the economies of the two groups, or even the fact that one is not as strong as the other, is not proof that this outcome was the goal of French policy. The traditional economy of the Bretons was determined by resources, which means that they are likely to persist regardless of whether policy aimed at assimilation, exclusion, or accommodation. A clearer picture of French policy can be drawn from examining their actions, instead of looking at the structure of the Breton economy. During the pre-war

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[178] Berger, Suzanne (1972). Bretons, Basques, Scots, and Other European Nations. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 3:1 (167-175).*
[179] European Commission, Europa (2004). *Portrait of the Regions: Bretagne.*
[180] *Getting to Know Brittany.*

years of 1870-1914, France actually established "agricultural syndicates and, more generally, attempted to link economic benefits received by the peasantry to state agencies."[181] These actions are consistent with assimilationist policy, rather than one attempting to exclude the Bretons. The regulations on the agricultural economy of Brittany imposed during this period were similar to those facing other regions, indicating that France was attempting to assimilate the Bretons into the structure of the national economy. These inconsistencies make clear that, while internal colonization is a convincing argument, it alone cannot explain France's choices in policy towards the Bretons.

A Marxist/ modernist Perspective

Another theory attempting to explain the policies of France towards the Bretons is the Marxist view of state formation. This theory suggests that, as the industrial revolution took hold, and minority groups had increasing communication with groups in other states, the state governments adopted increasingly aggressive assimilation policies towards minority groups in effort to ensure that the minority groups would identify with the nation-state, rather than being drawn to newly discovered groups outside the state who may be in a similar position.[182] The Marxist argument does account for the shift in France's policy towards the Bretons that occurred at the time of the French revolution, when modernization was just starting to take hold. It does not, however, explain the French policy before the Revolution or account for the continued change in the international environment since then.

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[181] Meadwell, H. (1983). Forms of Cultural Mobilization in Québec and Brittany, 1870-1914. *Comparative Politics, 15*(4), 401-417. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/421850
[182] Hale, Henry E. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 22. Print.

As discussed previously, France allowed the Bretons to maintain their own parliament with a considerable amount of self-rule after the 1532 union. While relations between the two groups were not always easy, and the French response to uprisings and unrest was at times severe, it was not until 1789 that any new restrictions were made. In that year, with the outbreak of the French Revolution, the Breton parliament was shut down and the region's status as a recognized foreign province was revoked.[183] Marxist theory anticipates that this assimilationist shift would be precipitated by a fear among the ruling class, in this case the French, that the subordinates, here the Bretons, would seek outside support and rise against them. This fear may not have been unfounded. The French Revolution marked the first time that a European monarchy had been disabled in favor of a more representative government, and other European states feared that the Revolution could 'spread' from France throughout the continent. The Bretons, who identified with the Roman Catholicism of the monarchs, and who had relatively more freedom under the monarchy, would have every reason, in this view, to rise up against the Revolutionary government, and they may well have received help from other European states, should they have requested it.

With such upheaval in Europe surrounding the French Revolution, the modernist theory, with its assertion that the assimilationist policies are adopted by states in order to encourage minority groups to identify with the nation-state rather than external groups seems logical. Especially since the French Revolutionary government was seeking to establish legitimacy, it is logical that changes in policy would be made to reflect the preferences of a new government, and to extort loyalty from all French citizens, minority

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[183] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013). La Bretagne et son histoire. Retrieved from website: http://www.bretagne.fr/internet/jcms/TF071112_5063/histoire

groups included. Interestingly, however, the Bretons did not tie their identities to those of suppressed minorities outside of France. Instead, faced with the assimilationist policy of the new government, they turned inwards; the sense of Breton identity became increasingly stronger. Bretons started literature circles, encouraged the production of traditional music, and clung more strongly to the traditional observance of the Roman Catholic faith.[184] These developments are indicative of a reaction against the French, which would be anticipated by the modernist argument. However, the Bretons did not seek to identify with internal groups, as the Marxists would expect.

Though the 1789 change in preferences from a policy of accommodation to one of forced assimilation for the Bretons can be explained in part by the fear predicted by the Marxist theory, the circumstances of the time are not entirely consistent with the situation requisite for Marxism to apply. Central to the Marxist argument is the idea that modernization allows increased communication between minority and lower-class groups in different states. As noted above, Brittany was a very latecomer to industrialization. In 1789, while Great Britain was in the throes of the industrial revolution, with steam engine technology developing and textile factories using water or steam-powered mills, these technologies had not yet reached France, let alone Brittany. It was not until 1804 that railroads were developed in England; it would be another 33 years before they made their debut in France, where routes centered on Paris.[185] The Bretons were not exposed to significant modernization in 1789, so industrialization cannot explain the French state's policy shift. Coupled with the inward-looking response of the Bretons to the assimilationist

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[184] Berger, Suzanne (1972).
[185] European Commission, Europa (2004). *Portrait of the Regions: Bretagne.*

policy, the lack of industrialization is enough to call to question the applicability of the Marxist argument in this case.

Applying a theory that works

While ethnically based theories, internal colonialism, and Marxist theories all fail to explain parts of the policy of the French with regards to the Bretons, there is another theory that takes both internal and external factors into consideration, and accurately predicts the changes in French policy towards the Bretons over time. Harris Mylonas proposes that nation-states' policies vary in response to the international environment and the foreign policy goals of the state, rather than in response to changes in the minority groups themselves. The theory predicts assimilation when the minority does not have external support, or when they have support from an enemy but the state aims to maintain the international status quo, accommodation when the minority receives the support of an ally, and exclusion when the minority group has the support of an enemy and the host state has revisionist foreign policy aims.[186]

At first glance, it appears that Mylonas' argument fails to consider internal relations between the minority group and the ruling group at all, and the theory does give more weight to foreign policy aims than internal pressure from minority groups. However, it does not overlook the internal factors. Rather, it asserts that while international pressures dictate whether a state's policy is assimilationist, accommodating, or exclusionary, "variation in non-core group organization might account for the variation in the type of measures a host state pursues once a policy choice is made, but not for the choice of policy

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[186] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 36-37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

per se."[187] This represents a comprehensive view of both internal and external factors determining how policy is chosen and enacted. This theory is able to explain the current situation of the Bretons, but its true strength lies in its ability to accurately predict the changes in policy over time. When we pause to consider the international situation that surrounded each instance of policy change towards the Bretons, it becomes clear that France's policy has been shaped around the state's foreign policy aims and international dynamics, rather than by any actions or characteristics of the Bretons themselves.

The origins of France's policy: Union with Brittany

In 1532, France and Brittany were united in an edict issued by François I of France, who descended from Anne de Bretagne and Charles VIII de France. This is the first time period to be examined in the context of Mylonas' argument. Since Brittany did not have any external support at this time, the theory predicts that the state policy would be one of assimilation, noting that, without external involvement, policies frequently "take the form of assimilation through accommodation."[188] This 'softer' assimilation is exactly what was demonstrated. In the terms of the union, France recognized the privileges of Brittany, notably with respect to the self-determination of fiscal and regulatory practice in the region. France even allowed the Bretons to create their own Parliament in 1554 to make the governing process smoother.[189] These policies definitely sit just on the border between accommodation and assimilation.

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[187] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 28)
[188] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 37)
[189] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013).

Still, while France had a high tolerance for the Bretons and their self-rule, they were insistent that Brittany was a part of France, rather than a separate entity. Two observances can be made which clarify this point. First, François I of France was also the Duke of Brittany. As such, he would have already been the ruler of both Brittany and France, without needing to issue an edict incorporating the former.[190] That he chose to incorporate the two principalities into the same state indicates that the French monarchy preferred assimilation of the Bretons to coexistence with them. Furthermore, while the Bretons were allowed to continue in a mostly autonomous fashion, the 1539 Edict of Villers-Cotterets declared that French was the only judicial language in France.[191] These observations are consistent with the prediction that France's policy would be assimilationist at this time, but that the good relationship between the Bretons and the French resulting from a voluntary union by a shared monarch would predispose France to pursue assimilation through accommodation where possible.

The French preference for assimilation is further demonstrated by their response to the few cases of Breton uprising that happened during the time between the 1532 union and the French Revolution. One notable example is the Révolte des Bonnets Rouges, so named for the red hats worn by its participants, in 1675. Though the Bretons nominally had control of their own finances, the French government was still allowed to levy taxes. The taxing power in itself, requiring the Bretons to participate in the state economy, was a form of assimilation. In 1674, Louis XIV levied a new tax, despite opposition from the Parliament of Brittany. The Bretons rose up against the tax, and the state requiring it, and

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[190] Ibid.
[191] Edict of Villers-Cotterets. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/629231/Edict-of-Villers-Cotterets

were met with "fierce" response from the royal troops and justices.[192] This swift and severe response to the uprising made clear that the French saw the Bretons as their subordinates, and not as their partners. Rather than granting the Bretons the financial control they demanded, the French state reinforced its assimilation policy.

For much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "the autonomy accepted by the royal power allowed Brittany to avoid the majority of the conflicts that agitated the kingdom [of France]."[193] In other words, the Bretons were not immediately assimilated into the French military; they were not needed for many of France's exploits. However, during the reign of Louis XIV, the many wars waged by the king meant that the military was becoming increasingly important in France. It follows, then, that the French felt the need to assimilate the Bretons into the military structure of the state as well. As the seventeenth century came to a close, Louis XIV demanded increasing support from, and put more resources into, Brittany's military. The most prominent example is that of Brest, which, in 1694, was remodeled to house the naval base of Pontant. The expansion of the French Navy in Brittany not only forced assimilation into the French military, but served as a catalyst in assimilating other elements of culture as well.[194]

Stricter enforcement: The French Revolution and Policy Regarding Bretons

During the time from the union of France and Brittany until the French Revolution, France's position in Europe and the international sphere was relatively stable. The wars that did take place occurred in the context of the already existing political system in

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[192] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013).
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid.

Europe. The Bretons did not have the support of external powers, and even on occasions

where some Bretons attempted to ally with another state, as during the War of the

Quadruple Alliance, the Bretons were giving, not receiving support, so the French were not

particularly threatened.[195] The outbreak of the Revolution in 1789, and the establishment

of the First Republic in 1792, however, caused a shift in the international situation, and

therefore a change in French policy towards the Bretons.

The beginning of the Revolution marked the first time since 1532 that the Bretons

had been subject to a change in status in France. Brittany's official status as a recognized

foreign province was revoked and the Breton Parliament dissolved.[196] The new French

government took a firm stance of assimilation towards Brittany; France conveyed to the

Bretons that they were to be French, that they would get exceptions neither in name nor in

government, but would participate in the new system just like all of the other Frenchmen.

There is continuity in that the policy adopted by the government was still assimilationist,

but there was a change from assimilation based on accommodation seen before the

Revolution to pure assimilation during and after it. Mylonas expresses that one might

anticipate this sort of assimilation through cultural imperialism when the minority group is

receiving support from a host-state's external enemy. If Mylonas' theory can in fact explain

this shift from assimilation through accommodation to assimilation through harsher

measures, it must be true that France had external enemies, that those enemies could help

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[195] Quadruple Alliance. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/485955/Quadruple-Alliance
[196] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013).

the Bretons to resist France, and that France was not a revisionist power, but was seeking to maintain the status quo.[197]

At the outbreak of the French Revolution, many members of the French nobility fled France, seeking asylum in neighboring countries, where the monarchies were still intact. The leaders of other European nations were already frightened by the idea that they could be overthrown in their own states; the nobles that left France, bringing with them firsthand accounts of what the nobility in Europe already feared. For the nobles of Europe, the declaration of the right of self-determination and the absorption of the papal territory of Avignon in 1791 was a final straw. These actions, supported by revolutionaries in many other European states, posed a direct threat to the monarchs of Europe. Though war was not declared until April 1792, vast differences in ideology put the French at odds with other European states from the outbreak of the Revolution. Before long, France was fighting against the 'First Coalition' of Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain.[198] The first condition then, is met; France did have external enemies when the shift in the form of policy enforcement took place.

The mere fact that European powers were looking to undermine the new government of France provided motivation for external powers to support the Bretons. As Mylonas notes: "Some external powers support non-core groups solely in order to destabilize a neighbor or to precipitate regime change."[199] Enemies of France would not have to work too hard to encourage counter-revolutionary measures in Brittany. Like the

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[197] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 37)
[198] French Revolution. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/219315/French-Revolution/225806/Counterrevolution-regicide-and-the-Reign-of-Terror
[199] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 37)

monarchies of Europe, the Bretons were also largely anti-revolutionary. Devout Catholics,

many Bretons opposed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, through which the

Revolutionaries attempted to restructure the Catholic Church in France.[200] The levée en

masse, or mandated conscription, and the abolition of provincial privileges were all sources

of conflict between Bretons and Revolutionaries. These actions also represent the internal

colonization, or use of Brittany for its' human and natural resources while denying it

autonomy.[201]

It is exactly these actions, consistent with internal colonialism, which Mylonas

predicts will be adopted towards a minority group that has allied with an enemy of the

status quo host state.[202] Additionally, these measures brought about the Chouan revolts,

counter-revolutionary measures, in Brittany,[203] precisely the destabilizing action that other

European powers desired to produce in France. The Bretons were devoutly Catholic,

opposed to the revocation of their autonomy, and desired to reinstate the monarchy, which

had allowed them relatively more privileges. They would have no trouble getting support

from states that were also looking to ensure the stability of the monarchy in France. Thus

the second condition, that the Bretons were allied with France's enemies, is also met.

The final condition is that Revolutionary France must have been a status quo, rather

than revisionist power. A status quo power is a state wishing to maintain control over

what it has, rather than aiming at conquering new territory.[204] Facing internal turmoil,

France was not in a position to expand its' territory during the Revolution. Both the

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[200] Civil Constitution of the Clergy. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.* Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/119210/Civil-Constitution-of-the-Clergy
[201] Berger, Suzanne (1972).
[202] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 37)
[203] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013).
[204] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 43)

Revolutionaries and the Monarchists in France were looking to maintain control of the state. France stood to lose more from war following attempted territorial expansion than it stood to gain from the expansion. Revolutionaries wanted to spread their ideas, not necessarily occupy and govern more territory. Similarly, the King looked to war as a means of securing outside assistance from other monarchs.[205] The wars instigated by France during the Revolution were an extension of the internal struggle for state control, not an indication of revisionist foreign policy. Especially as the wars continued, and France risked losing territory, the fight was to maintain control within the existing borders, rather than to expand them. Even expansion under Napoleon resulted not in the expansion of formal French borders, but the creation of 'Sister Republics' in the conquered states.[206]

Through the many forms of government in France during the Revolutionary years, one thing was constant: the goal of the leaders was to consolidate support within France first, and then to worry about the rest of Europe. While France did engage in international wars, the issue of primary importance for the Revolutionaries, the monarchy, and eventually even Napoleon, was the control of the French state. Such conditions implied that France was a status quo state. Since France, the host state was a status-quo state engaged with external enemies that, in turn, supported the Bretons, and since there was in fact a shift from assimilation through accommodation to strict assimilation, Mylonas' theory can be successfully applied to this period as well.

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[205] French Revolution. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica*.
[206] Ibid.

Evolution to Present Day Policy: A Different Means to the Same End

Even after the French Revolution, France's policy towards the Bretons was largely unchanged. Significantly, neither was its international situation nor its foreign policy aims. Nineteenth century European states were in a delicate balance. There were frequent minor wars through which each state attempted to maintain its own status in relation to the other European powers. France was no exception. Given the international situation, France, like most European nations, was highly interested in maintaining tight control over its' territory. Even when there was no risk of the Bretons allying with external enemies was low, France did not have significant motivation to change the policy and be more accommodating. This shift towards accommodation, in Mylonas' view, would be precipitated by an alliance between France and a state supporting the Breton cause, and such an alliance simply never arose. Throughout the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Bretons either had no external support at all, or they allied themselves with enemies of the French. In both of these instances, assimilationist policies are predicted, and indeed a policy of strict assimilation was continued during this time.

Despite growing demand among the Bretons for increased rights of language use and autonomy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, France maintained a strict assimilation policy. French military bases were set up in Brittany, industry was sponsored, and the traditional language and culture continued to be suppressed.[207] Such measures are consistent with internal colonialism, which, as previously noted, Mylonas predicts as a method of enforcing assimilationist policies when

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[207] Meadwell, H. (1983).

the host state fears an alliance between the minority group and external rivals.[208] Even

with industrialization, however, the Breton economy lagged behind that of France, causing

many young Bretons to emigrate to elsewhere in the country. The emigration of Bretons,

coupled with the influx of French soldiers and sailors moving into the region, meant that

the Breton population was diluted in Brittany. This phenomenon, the displacement of the

minority population, also falls under the measures of enforcing the assimilationist

preference of a host state, according to Mylonas.[209]

It was not until after World War II that any change in the policy facing the Bretons is

observed. Even then, the change is not in the policy preference, as France still

demonstrates a preference for assimilation. Instead, the change comes in the means of

pursuing this preference. The international system after WWII was changed; not only did

France no longer have to worry about the Bretons allying with its' enemies, it no longer had

any enemies that were able to pose a threat to the state. Furthermore, states in Europe

were concerned with rebuilding their own infrastructures and were not interested in

promoting regime change in France by supporting the Bretons. This left the Bretons once

again without external support.

As predicted for minorities with no external support, the French still preferred a

policy of assimilation with regard to the Bretons, but it took the form of assimilation

through accommodation. While French remained the judicial language of the state, and

education in French was still mandatory, the Deixonne Law of 1951 allowed Breton to be

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[208] Mylonas, H. (2013). (pp. 36)
[209] Ibid.

taught in state schools as an optional subject outside of school hours.[210] The French also

allowed the Bretons to create, in 1977, a system of private schools, called Diwan, that give

instruction in Breton, though the pupils are still required to take graduation-certification

tests in French, and the schools are not state sponsored.[211] The trend towards allowing the

Bretons small amounts of privilege continued when, in 1955, the Comité d'Etudes et de

Liason des Intêrets Bretons (CELIB), an association comprised of local governmental and

cultural leaders, was given official status as an interlocutor between the Bretons and the

state.[212] The Bretons were still subject to the rule of the French, but they were allowed a

platform through which they could express their specific concerns.

In following this trend, one might expect France to grow increasingly

accommodating. Still, the foreign policy situation of the state remains unchanged, and

assimilation is the demonstrated preference of France to the present day. One notable

instance where this preference can be observed is the second article of the French

Constitution adopted in 1992, which explicitly states: "French is the language of the

Republic," without making any reference to minority languages, including Breton.[213] The

policy put forth here is clearly one of language assimilation, rather than accommodation.

Another example of present-day French assimilationist policy is the state's refusal to sign

any international treaties on regional, cultural, and linguistic minorities, including the

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[210] European Commission, Languages. (2013). *The Euromosaic Report: Breton in France.*
Retrieved from Website: ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr3_en.htm
[211] Ibid.
[212] La Site de la Région Bretonne, Office de Tourisme. (2013).
[213] L'Académie Française, (2013). *Le Français Aujourd'hui*. Retrieved from website:
http://www.academie-francaise.fr/la-langue-francaise/le-francais-aujourdhui

Council of Europe Charter on Regional and Minority Languages.[214] The French state

refuses to give even nominal recognition to the Bretons.

Looking Forward: Is Accommodation in Sight?

In Mylonas' theory, in order for France to adopt a policy of accommodation, the

Breton cause would have to be supported by France's allies. France's current allies,

especially those with which it is most closely linked, the other members of the European

Union, have been pushing to recognize minority groups within states. The Charter on

Regional Minority Languages, which France has not ratified, is one such measure. Other

measures include the regional economic programs supported by the EU, and the Council of

the Regions, which allows representation from minorities directly to the EU.[215] The EU has

stated that it wishes to preserve the various cultures of the continent, even using the motto

"united in diversity" to describe the Union's goals for the continent.[216] As yet, this support

of minority groups has been broad, not focused on any one group. Furthermore, neither

France nor its allies have assigned the issue of minority rights enough importance that it

would merit losing an alliance, thus France has not come under any significant amount of

pressure to change its' stance. It is possible that, if the issue gains more importance in the

international sphere, or if the Bretons are able to persuade the international community to

support their cause more specifically and more vocally, France's may shift to

accommodation. The reason this cause has not yet occurred, however, is that the Bretons

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[214] (2013). *The Euromosaic Report: Breton in France.*
[215] European Union, European Commission. (2012). *Regional Policy.* Retrieved from
website: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/index_en.cfm
[216] Eurominority , (2013). *Peoples in Search of Freedom*. Retrieved from website:
http://www.eurominority.eu/version/eng/index.asp

are in effect still without external support of their specific cause, meaning France is getting

no external motivation to have anything but an assimilationist policy.

<u>Conclusions</u>

The strength of Mylonas' argument lies in the fact that it not only accurately

describes the situation in Brittany and France, but also accurately predicts the policy

preferences that France will have at that time. While many theories are able to correctly

explain a specific instance of policy change, they are often unable to explain other changes,

and occasionally predict a policy change should occur when none in fact did. The theory

developed by Mylonas is a comprehensive theory, which demonstrates why the larger

preferences of France have stayed relatively constant since the union with Brittany in

1532. However, the theory is detailed enough to allow for the nuanced changes in

enforcement measures. Since the changes in France and Brittany have been often subtle,

the theory that allows one to see them not as changes in the ends that France wished to

achieve with the Bretons, which has historically been assimilation, but as changes in the

means that they use to achieve this same end.

<center>French Policy towards the French Basques</center>

While there is far less research done on the case of the French Basques than on the Bretons, theorists have used some of the same models to explain the behavior of the French state towards the French Basques. As in the Breton case, most of the theories that are proposed in effort to explain French policy development with respect to the French Basques are successful in explaining certain instances of policy change in French Basque history. However, the ability to explain one particular instance does not validate a theory. That theory must be tested over the history of relations between the host state and the minority group, and must allow for more than one factor to affect policy decisions. This chapter will demonstrate that the foreign policy goals of the French state have had more influence on the policies that the state adopts towards minorities within its borders, like the Bretons and the Basques, than any domestic factor.

Ethnic Theories of State Formation

As discussed previously in this paper, ethnic theories of state formation assert that the perceived ethnic differences between the majority in a state and the ethnic minority that it hosts govern the way that states and the minorities they govern interact. According to such theories, one ethnic group is defined by comparing itself to an 'other,' and the minorities are maintained by the state as 'other' in order to maintain the ethnic identity of the majority.[217] Following this logic, the ruling majority of a state is likely to use a policy of exclusion towards groups that are vastly dissimilar from majority culture, and attempt to assimilate those that are more similar already, perpetuating the idea that one state shares

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[217] Hale, Henry E. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations. *Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 16. Print.

one nationalism. This theory falls short in the case of the French Basques, however, because it fails to account for instances of accommodation of the Basques by the French government. Furthermore, it fails to explain why the French state pursued assimilation, rather than exclusion, at the time when the groups were the most ethnically diverse, that is, just after France annexed the northern part of the Basque territory.

This theory seems to be applicable when it is examined in the context of the present day situation in the Basque region of France. The Basques face a policy of assimilation by the French state, which purports to recognize the cultural importance of the Basque people, but does not offer them any sort of autonomy or any means of protecting and promoting their language and culture. Ethnic theories of state creation would offer the explanation that, in order for such assimilative policies to be adopted, the demonstrable ethnic difference between the Basques and the mainstream French must not be great. Indeed, they are not. In describing ethnic difference, the key criteria for evaluation are language, religion, dress, and customs. The French and the Basques are both majority Catholic, celebrating the same holidays and sharing matrimonial and familial practices. In physical appearance, like in choice of dress, the Basques and the French are indistinguishable.[218]

The ethnic characteristics of the French and the Basques have changed very little over time. The Basque language is not as prevalent now as it once was, meaning that the Basques are more assimilated to French culture now than they have been in the past. The ethic theory relies on ethnic characteristics to predict policies adopted by states. Logically, it is when the two groups shift to become more or less similar ethnically that there would

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[218] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

be a shift in policy. However, this is simply not what we see. The French government was accommodating to the Basques under the monarchy, but the Revolution in 1789 brought assimilationist policies, policies that remain in place today. There was no shift in ethnic identity that occurred in 1789, but there was a shift in policy towards the Basques[219]. The ethnic theory of state creation, then, cannot be the explanation for why the French adopt the policies that they do towards the Basques.

<u>Internal Colonialism</u>

Other theories of nationalism and state creation argue that the main factor in determining the policy choices of host states towards minority groups is economic. Internal colonialism is one such theory, suggesting that those minorities whose economies are most similar to those of a state's core group will be faced with assimilationist policies, while groups whose economies are different, specifically those minorities who have different raw materials or services to offer than does the majority, will be excluded from the core economy.[220] The host state prefers to use the resources of the minority, profiting from their differences without having to change the core economy. In this way, the French government did in fact use the Basque territory during and after the Industrial Revolution.[221]

The Basque Territory, mimicking their Spanish neighbors, and, like the Spanish Basques, occupying a territory rich in natural resources, was an early leader in

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[219] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in France.* Retrieved from Website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr2_en.htm
[220] Hechter, M. (1975). Internal Colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national Development. University of California Press.
[221] Zallo , R. D., & Ayuso, M. Communauté Autonome du Pays Basque, (2009). *Découvrir le Pays Basque* (978-84-457-2869-7). Rúbrica: Grupo Proyección.

industrialization, developing heavy industry due to the large deposits of iron ore, and using

the Bay of Biscay to transport their goods. The French state saw no reason to assimilate

the Basques economically, as they filled a role that the core French culture could not.

However, the Basques were still assimilated culturally and politically. They were made a

part of the *Département des Basses Pyrénées* after the French Revolution, and lacked the

autonomy to regulate, tax, or even provide support to build the infrastructure that they

needed to support their economy. While this policy is consistent with the argument of

internal colonization, it seems unlikely that economic factors provide the primary catalyst

for policy change, as the Basque economy today is fully integrated with that of the rest of

France. While the Basque region still has more heavy industry, other areas of the French

state now fill the same function. The policy of cultural assimilation has continued, but the

economic exclusion of the Basques by the French has ceased.[222]

A Marxist Perspective

The Marxist theory, like the internal colonization theory, is most persuasive for the

time period surrounding the Industrial Revolution. Marxist scholars maintain that states

adopt policies of assimilation, and promote a state-sponsored nationalism in order to

maintain the loyalty of all citizens of the state, especially minorities. The desire to create a

national idea focused around the state means that the state must also work to repress other

loyalties that a citizen must have, like those to the minority group or social class. Marxists

argue that, thanks to improved technology that allowed for better communication and

transportation, lower class and minority people would start to become conscious of their

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[222] Ibid.

identity during the Industrial Revolution. They further argue that the state governments, in response to this newfound recognition, needed to use state-sponsored nationalism in order to maintain control over the minorities, fearing that if they let the minority consciousness develop further, the authority of the state would be questioned.[223]

It is true that during the Industrial Revolution the Basques in France faced policies of assimilation. However, this policy was not a result of industrialization. The French adopted a policy of assimilation, and repression of the Basque Culture and language, starting after the French Revolution in 1789.[224] Though the Industrial Revolution had started in Britain at the time, it was not until the start of the nineteenth century, over a decade later, that industry started to get a foothold in the Basque Region.[225] While the advent of new technology may have contributed to policy choices, it is clearly not the sole reason that the Revolutionary French state chose assimilation over accommodation or exclusion.

<u>Applying a Theory that Works</u>

As discussed previously, Harris Mylonas proposes that international goals are actually the primary motivation for states in choosing policy regarding minorities. He predicts that the host state will choose assimilation when the minority does not receive outside support, accommodation when the minority has the support of an ally, or a is supported by an enemy but the host state prefers the status quo, and exclusion when the

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[223] Hale, Henry E. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 22. Print.
[224] Zallo , R. D., & Ayuso, M. Communauté Autonome du Pays Basque, (2009). *Découvrir le Pays Basque* (978-84-457-2869-7). Rúbrica: Grupo Proyección.
[225] Ibid.

host state is revisionist and the minority is supported by an enemy of the state.[226] Though the international status and foreign policy goals of the state form the basis for policy creation in this theory, domestic factors, like the economy, political climate, and ethnic identity play a role in which measures of enforcement the host state will choose.[227] This theory, more than any other, is best able to explain change in policy towards the French Basques over time.

Origin of Policy: An Edict of Union

France originally gained control of the Basque country in 1589, when Henry IV, who had previously been the King of Navarre, which had been an autonomous community in what is now France even while Spain had absorbed the southern Basque Territory, became the King of France as well.[228] Henry IV ruled these two kingdoms as separate entities, but his successor, Louis XIII, in issuing the 1620 Édit d'Union, actually made the Basque territory part of France. Under this union, however, the Basques, like their Spanish neighbors, maintained special rights, in Spain they were called *fueros,* in France, *fors.* The Basques were allowed to maintain a good deal of autonomy, were not subject to military service, did not have to pay the same taxes, and had special representatives in Paris to advocate for them.

The French state had assimilated the Basques, no longer willing to let them exist as a completely separate entity, but beyond the political assimilation into a single state, the

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[226] Mylonas, H. (2013). *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities.* (pp. 36-37). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
[227] Ibid. p. 28
[228] Wemestre, Y. (2010). *Histoire du Pays Basque.* Retrieved from http://www.lepaysbasque.net/Histoire.htm

French were accommodating towards the Basques. Mylonas predicts "assimilation through accommodation" when the minority group is not receiving external support and the host state does not have any concern that its enemies will try to coopt the minority.[229] This was the case after the Édit d'Union of 1620. The French and Spanish Basques being separate, the Spanish state did not want to offer support to the French Basques, as that would threaten the security of their own control over the Spanish Basques. Meanwhile, the Spanish Basques would not have had the means to support the French Basque cause for autonomy, and other actors were simply too far removed from the situation.

The French Revolution: Assimilation through Internal Colonization

The French Revolution was the first, and only, major instance of policy change towards the Basques. The Revolutionary government wanted to ensure that all citizens of the French state were equal, and that none had special privileges. The revolutionaries also looked to create a highly efficient, centralized state.[230] These two factors combined meant that the *fors,* or special exceptions to state laws that had been maintained by the Basques from 1620 to 1789 were no longer accepted.[231] The Basques, like the Bretons and other minority groups in France, were subject to military service to the French state, had to pay taxes to the state. The legislature was dissolved, and they were absorbed into the *Département des Basses-Pyrénées,* one of a newly created system of close to a hundred organizational units, *départements,* in France. The culture and language of the Basques

[229] Mylonas, H. (2013) p.36-37
[230] French Revolution. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.* Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/219315/French-Revolution/225806/Counterrevolution-regicide-and-the-Reign-of-Terror
[231] Wemestre, Y. (2010). *Histoire du Pays Basque.* Retrieved from http://www.lepaysbasque.net/Histoire.htm

were viewed as inferior to French culture, and the state language was officially made to be French and only French. [232]

These actions are consistent with the policy choice of assimilation through internal colonization. In this situation, a state uses the minority group for its resources while seeking to maintain political and economic control by attempting to assimilate the minority to the customs and culture of the majority. Mylonas predicts that the policy of assimilation, accompanied by the use of internal colonization for enforcement, is chosen by a state that seeks to maintain the status quo when an external enemy of the state supports the minority group.[233] This was the case after the French revolution. Mylonas defines a status quo states as those that "do not seek border changes" and asserts that, in many instances, a status quo state "needs to consolidate."[234] The French Revolutionary government, having recently taken control of the French state, sought to maintain the control that it had, and certainly wanted to maintain all of its territory.[235] Furthermore, by overthrowing the monarchy in France, the Revolutionaries brought suspicion from other monarchs in Europe. Fearing for their own power, the monarchs of Europe were relatively united in opposing the French Revolution. This opposition to the centralized French state meant that the Basques were, in the French view, more likely to receive support from enemies; the only way to ensure that they would not be target of enemy support attempting to overthrow the government was to repress any measure of cultural distinctiveness that they could. This is consistent with Mylonas' argument that status quo host states will assimilate

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[232] Zallo , R. D., & Ayuso, M. Communauté Autonome du Pays Basque, (2009). *Découvrir le Pays Basque* (978-84-457-2869-7). Rúbrica: Grupo Proyección.
[233] Mylonas (2013). p.36-37
[234] Mylonas (2013) p. 43-44
[235] French Revolution. (2013). *In Encyclopædia Britannica.*

through internal colonization when they fear that the minority will have the support of an enemy.

To the Present and Looking Forward

The French policy towards the Basques has not changed since the French Revolution. While it has, at various times depending on the international situation, been more or less like internal colonization, the overall policy choice of France has always been assimilation. This policy has resulted in the severe decline of the language and culture in the Basque region. The language, which has always been the biggest indicator of one's Basque identity, is not recognized at all, as French is the one and only official state language, and there is no political autonomy for the French Basques. Nominally, the French government recognizes the importance of the Basque culture in the history of Europe and even of France itself, but there have been minimal steps taken to preserve it.[236]

Nevertheless, the Basque movement in France has remained strong. Leaders continue to use the political system that is already in place, rather than using violence to protest repressive laws. The only common political program shared by the Basques in France is one of "recognition and protection of their language and culture."[237] In recent years, the Basques have had limited success in securing rights to educate children in Basque, though not as the primary language, and use Basque in media and the arts, though

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[236] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Basque in France.* Retrieved from Website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr2_en.htm

[237] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

it is still not widely used, especially outside of the home.[238] The Basques continue to push

the French government for more rights, though the French are not easily persuaded, still

preferring the idea of the state as one nation with one language and one culture.

Still, as the world, especially Europe, becomes increasingly integrated, international

institutions like the United Nations and the European Union are filling some of the roles

that have traditionally been filled by states alone.[239] Specifically, alliances are now

maintained with institutions, rather than on the basis of individual treaties. France's

present allies, then, are the institutions of which it is a part, including the European Union

and the United Nations. Increasingly, these organizations are pushing their members to

recognize minorities and even grant them rights. For example, the European Union created

a Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and is advocating economic regionalism as a

means of economic growth and promotion of cultural diversity.[240]

As yet, France has not signed the Charter, and has done little to promote

regionalism, but as these issues become more important to the institutions, and those

institutions become increasingly important allies of France, Mylonas' theory would predict

that the policy the French government enforces with regard to the Basques will shift from

one of assimilation to a more accommodating policy. Already, the support of the cause of

recognition and limited autonomy for the Basques by the institutional allies of the French

has led to nominal recognition of the importance of preserving the language and culture,

which was not the French position before. As support for minorities continues to grow

internationally, France will come under increasing pressure from its allies, and is likely to

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[238] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013)
[239] Mylonas, H. (2013). p. 29
[240] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013).

adopt accommodating policies in order to maintain the strength of its alliances and prove

to the institutions that it is a truly democratic state, accepting and recognizing minorities.

Conclusions

　　　　While many theories, like internal colonization, ethnic theories of nationalism and

state creation, and Marxist theories, are able to explain the relationship between the

Basques and the French state at one point in time, none of them are broad enough to

explain the choices of the French state as they have changed over time. Mylonas' theory,

which takes both international and domestic factors into account when evaluating why

states choose the policies that they do, is able to explain why the French state chose policy

at a given time, and is able to explain change over time. The theory is much more flexible

than the others, and is therefore more successful. The true strength of the theory is that,

while it uses international goals of the state as the primary factor influencing policy, it

allows for other factors to have a secondary influence on specifically which measures of

enforcement it uses.

<center>Conclusions</center>

Identifying the Factors that influence policy choices

In each of the four case studies, it is Mylonas' theory that is able to best predict the changes over time in state policy choices. This theory relies on foreign policy goals of a state to predict and explain state policies towards minority groups, while allowing domestic factors like the economy, the political situation, and ethnic identity to serve as secondary influences, not determining policy but affecting the measures through which polies are enforced. Other theories were evaluated, but in many cases the theories did not apply to all four of the case studies. For instance, transactional theory, which states that states use nationalism to create and maintain their borders, is only applicable to the Catalonians and the Basques in Spain, while Internal colonization is much more applicable to the Bretons and French Basques. Theories like these, which proved accurate in some but not all situations in each of the cases to which they were applied, lack strength because they cannot be applied to all cases. If they cannot be applied to all cases, then the theory does not correctly identify the primary factor influencing state policy creation.

Other theories are able to be applied to all four of the case studies examined in this paper. A few are able to correctly explain a policy choice of a state, or even of both France and Spain, at a given time in history. Marxism, for example, was applied to both states. It was able to successfully explain the relationship between the Spanish state and the Catalonians as well as the Spanish state's relationship with the Basques at the time of the Industrial Revolution. However, this theory carried far less weight in France, where the Industrial Revolution was not fully underway when the state adopted strict assimilation

policies, though the theory claims that the Industrial revolution should have served as a catalyst.

Still other theories are applied to all four case studies, but were not able to provide a convincing argument in any of the cases. One such theory is the ethnic theory of national development. Theorists who make this argument claim that ethnic background, and the need of the state to either exclude a minority, thereby turning them into an 'other,' or assimilate them so that there is a single state culture of which all citizens are a part, are the primary factors influencing state policies towards minorities. This argument is appealing because it identifies the only way the groups are distinguishable from the majority in their states. The minorities evaluated here are not socio-economically disadvantaged, nor are they immigrants. The only difference between the minorities studied and the core population of their respective host states is the ethnicity with which they self identify.

This theory seems as though it would be able to explain why states choose the policies that they do, and why the ethnic identity of each minority is so important to them: it is, according to this theory, a question of identity. Unfortunately, the theory of ethnic nationalism fails to account for any policy of accommodation, and at times when the theory would predict exclusion, when a group is the most ethnically different from the core or poses the biggest threat to the perpetuation of the core culture, the actual policy choice for all four of the case studies was assimilation, not exclusion. If this theory were true, then exclusion should have been the policy of choice for time period just after each minority was absorbed into the host state, when they would have been the most different from the core. However, the states chose not exclusion but assimilation. Clearly, there was something that was more important to both France and Spain at each point when they made a policy

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choice, than the ethnic similarities and differences between themselves and the minority

groups.

A final theory was able to identify the factor that the other theories missed: the role

of the foreign policy goals of a given state in influencing domestic policy concerning

minorities. Harris Mylonas proposed that "external involvement is an important path to

national mobilization and the politicization of ethnic differences."[241] The theory was

applied to all four cases, the French Basques, Bretons, Spanish Basques, and Catalonians,

with the same result. Mylonas' theory correctly characterized the situation of the

minorities and the host states' goals at every period of time. Furthermore, the major

changes in both French and Spanish policy throughout history came at times when there

was a shift in the international situation, whether that was a declaration of war, a change

in alliance structure, the gain or loss of relative power of a state, or a change in the foreign

policy goals of a state, from status quo to revisionist. This observation aligns with Mylonas'

prediction, that changes in the international political landscape, rather than any actions

taken by the minority itself or the domestic political or economic climate, is the true

motivation of a state in choosing a policy governing a minority's role in the state.

Significance in International Relations

This paper has demonstrated that policies concerning minorities within a state are

chosen at the state level. Though there is some differentiation of measures used to enforce

policies towards minority groups within the same state, the overall policy is generally the

same, barring a situation where one group had external support an another did not. The

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[241] Mylonas, H. (2013). p. 35

paper has further demonstrated that both France and Spain were primarily influenced by the international alliance landscape and their foreign policy goals. Internal policy choices governing the relationship between the host state and the peripheral minorities are a strategic, rather than social or emotional, concern for the states. Mylonas explains that different policies arise due to the complex nature of relations between minorities, the states, and external powers. "Host states, non-core groups, and external powers interact in a dynamic process forming multiple configurations that give rise to nation building policies."[242] Though the two states did not adopt the same policies at the same time, these differences can be attributed not to a variation in domestic policy preference, but a variation on the international outlook of the respective states at any point in time.

States do not need to choose the same policy in order to be motivated by the same factor. Mylonas predicts, and history has shown, that state preference will vary over time, as the international position of the state varies. States make strategic decisions about domestic policies, choosing those that are best suited to help them reach their international goals at a given time, and are not tied to one policy choice. That one primary factor, namely foreign policy perspective. has been shown to influence two states' policies towards four separate minority groups indicate that states are, in fact, like actors in international relations. The evaluation of both international and domestic influences on the policies of France and Spain with respect to the native minority culture groups within their borders has led to the conclusion that the internal characteristics of a state are far less important than the role the state fills internationally.

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[242] Ibid.

Broader Applications of theory

Mylonas originally applied his argument to cases in the Balkans. This paper has demonstrated that the theory can be applied to cases in Western Europe, where the borders have been relatively more stable than in the Balkans, and both states evaluated are using representative democracy as a form of government. This theory does not limit itself to states with a specific kind of government or cases where the ethnic groups have a specific history, because it distinguishes between the state actors not based on their internal makeup, but rather based on their foreign policy goals. Given that the states have proven to be alike in the factors that they allow to influence the policies that they apply to minorities within their borders, Mylonas' theory should be applicable to any minority group within any state. The theory's success with a variety of cases can be attributed to the fact that it is flexible. It relies on three elements, the relationship of the state to other external actors, the relationship of the minority to those same actors, and the goals of the state. Combining the three elements, the theory yields five possible results depending on how the three elements interact. Thus, while international influence is still the primary influence, there is recognition that it will be more or less potent for states and minorities depending on their situations. It is from this flexibility that the theory draws its strength, and because of this flexibility that the theory is applicable to a wide array of cases.

Implications for Minority Groups and the States

Each of the four cases evaluated here wish to have increased rights, recognition, and autonomy. In all four of the cases, there are extremists who wish to have complete independence from the current host state. Most, however, just want to have greater

recognition and respect within the state. The Catalonians, who currently have the most

recognition and autonomy of the four cases, seek protection of the culture through use of

the "conventional measures available to them,"[243] that is, through the use of political

mobilization within Spain, rather than terrorism. The Spanish Basques are more likely

than any other group to use terror, but those Basques that do use terror are a minority.

Still, the Spanish Basques seek greater autonomy and increased cultural protection, and

despite previous failures with the technique, they are willing to use protest as a means to

achieve that autonomy.[244] The Bretons seek to overcome the negative image associated

with the Breton culture and language, and want increased autonomy and the right to teach

and speak their language and cultural heritage in schools and the public sphere.[245]

Similarly, the French Basques seek simply "enough political autonomy to promote and

protect group culture."[246]

When the desires of the minority groups are translated into the language of state

policy, each of the four groups hopes to convince their respective host states to adopt

policies of accommodation with respect to the minorities within their borders. Mylonas'

theory has demonstrated that foreign policy aims have the biggest influence on policy.   The

theory also says that states are likely to adopt accommodating policies for the minorities

they govern when the minorities have the support of external actors that are also allies of

the host state. Given this prediction, which has been proven by an examination of the

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[243] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
[244] Ibid.
[245] European Commission, Euromosaic (2013). *Breton in France.* Retrieved from website: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/euromosaic/fr3_en.htm
[246] Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) *Minorities at Risk Dataset.*

history of the cases earlier in this paper, it follows that the minority groups will have the greatest opportunity to successfully induce the adoption of accommodating policies by the state when they are able to secure the support of their host state's allies.

Today, the external forces that act as allies for the states are not other states. Though bi-lateral treaties still arise in the modern world, the biggest allies to the two western European states evaluated in this paper are the international institutions of which they are members. Both France and Spain are members of the European Union, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These organizations already advocate representative government and the respect of ethnic minorities in all states, and the perpetuation of cultures and languages that may be at risk of disappearing, like the Breton and Basque language and culture. The European Union increasingly advocates regionalism as a means of economic improvement and cultural recognition, and has passed a Charter on Regional and Minority languages. As of yet, however, the organizations have been focused on human rights protection of minorities. Since none of the groups evaluated here has faced a violation of human rights, the international institutions have been less vocal about offering their support for the minorities.

However, the international institutions have also demonstrated that they have become increasingly willing to intervene on behalf of minorities as time has passed. In the past, an institution may have hesitated to advocate for minority rights, considering it a violation of state sovereignty to intervene unless there was violence against a group. Recently, there has been increased advocacy for political rights, with international institutions demanding that their members give all citizens equal rights to self-expression, and even openly expressing preferences for democracy. The minorities evaluated here face

neither violence nor political oppression, so they have not gotten much support. However, the institutions appear to be increasingly willing to advocate for minorities with less concrete and more abstract goals (e.g. preservation of a culture, rather than an end to violence). If the minorities are going to be able to effect a change in policy, the best method of doing so would be to continue to gain international attention through the use of media and by seeking support and aid from international institutions.

Presently, Spain has a more accommodating approach towards the Basques and Catalonians than France does with respect to the Basques and Bretons. As the international institutions come to increasingly advocate the preservation of these cultures and their languages, and even the increased autonomy that the groups claim would be necessary in order to adequately promote their languages and cultures, France will be more likely than Spain to come under criticism for its lack of accommodation. Already, France has a relatively negative reputation when it comes to the cultural diversity and minority groups within the state. If the issue of minority rights, or of regional autonomy, becomes more prominent in the future, France will have to adjust its policy or face losing some of its authority in the European Union and the United Nations.

Though France may feel the pressure to accommodate sooner, as protecting minority cultures and preserving diversity of language and culture becomes a bigger priority in the international institutions, both France and Spain will feel more pressure to adopt accommodating policies towards the minority groups they host. As Mylonas states: "the strategic benefits coming from the alliance with an external power are greater than the cost of accommodating the non-core group supported by that power."[247] Host states, not

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[247] Mylonas, H. (2013) p. 36

wanting to upset the alliance or lose respect within the international institution, will adopt accommodating policies when it becomes clear that the institutions of which it is a part and the external allies that it has favor the adoption of these policies.

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