CREATING A U.N.
PEACE ENFORCEMENT FORCE:
A CASE FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

—————————— CAPTAIN GREGORY P. HARPER, USN ——————————

The end of the Cold War and the call for a new world order have resurrected numerous demands for the United Nations finally to fulfill the promise and vision of its founders. World leaders, politicians, and academicians increasingly proclaim a need for a revitalized United Nations to play a central role in strengthening and maintaining international peace and security. To accomplish this objective, many recommend the creation of a U.N. multilateral peace enforcement force.

The ideological divisions of the Cold War that undermined the ability of the United Nations to fulfill its mission in maintaining international peace and security have disappeared. As a result, the United Nations has played an increasingly important and active role in international politics during the past three years. However, political actions — in particular, sanctions imposed by the United Nations, which have recently become the organization's conventional political response — have consistently been found to be ineffective by themselves. Political actions alone have been unable to meet the requirements of the international community to enforce political sanctions, and have increasingly demonstrated the need for a contingency force to support political resolutions. A multilateral peace enforcement force would provide the United Nations that enforcement multiplier, allowing it to complement political action.

There are numerous advantages associated with American participation in such a force. The United States unquestionably needs to redirect its resources toward such domestic issues as reinvigorating the economy, tackling the national debt, and implementing health reforms. Simultaneously, however, U.S. leaders are compelled to maintain the American role as the world's sole superpower with unmatched armed forces. These requirements demand restraint in American peace enforcement roles. Accordingly, U.S. participation and leadership in the U.N. force is not only beneficial, but economical.

The increased post-Cold War activism of the United Nations has raised new questions of what actions constitute interference in the domestic affairs of other

Captain Harper is Deputy Director for Intelligence at the JCS Alert Center. This article is adapted from A Blue Helmet Combat Force, *which Capt. Harper coauthored with Capt. Edward J. Dennehy, Lt. Col. William Doll, Lt. Col. Stephen Speakes, and Lt. Col. Fred Treyz, published by the National Security Program at Harvard University.*

nations. Historical and legal precedents concerning state sovereignty have significantly changed. The centerpiece of twentieth-century Wilsonian thought has always been that states are independent and sovereign entities.

Recent actions in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, have introduced a new concept of a selective, collective approach to global security. The threats and challenges facing the United Nations today, such as defeating and deterring aggression, suppressing civil wars, and confronting aggressors like Saddam Hussein, require the United Nations to redefine its concept of sovereignty and to launch collective security missions. Many observers criticize this course of action because the decision to intervene has not always been made consistently.

Explicit criteria may be difficult to define in advance, but in practice, if the Security Council decides that an event constitutes a "threat to international peace and security," the decision to intervene by force cannot be sidetracked by claims of domestic jurisdiction.[1] The United Nations has decided to undertake collective action on a selective basis, including cases when not all members of the organization agree on the course of action. However, selective engagement has become the *modus operandi* for recent U.N. peace operations where there has been Security Council consensus.[2]

In conjunction with the United Nations' new activism, more states are opting for a multilateral, rather than unilateral approach to security operations. In recent years, states have attempted to gain the support and blessing of other U.N. members before unilaterally engaging in security operations. This trend was evident when President Bush sought and gained the active participation of the allied coalition in the Gulf War. On the other hand, states acting in their own self-interest cannot be expected to abandon completely unilateral actions. The raids on Panama, Libya, and the Iraqi intelligence compound are prime examples where the United States might have sought a coalition undertaking but decided to act in its own national interests. This non-traditional policy could be defined as multilateral when possible, unilateral only if necessary.

American Support Is Crucial

American leaders and citizens have recently discovered that multilateral actions can often command broader international support than unilateral ones. As Eric Liu, legislative aide to Senator David Boren stated, "A string of U.S. unilateral . . . scenarios could be perceived as gunboat diplomacy . . . exactly what multinational forces can avoid."[3] In addition, American-led collective action also allows others to contribute. One senior Canadian official recently

1. William J. Durch, *The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 1993: 21.
2. Inis L. Claude, lecture, Conference on Options for U.S. Participation in United Nations Sanctioned Military Operations, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1 April 1993.
3. Eric Liu, personal interview, Washington, D.C., 30 November 1992.

pointed out that U.S. leadership of the Somalian relief effort enabled Canada to do what it had wanted to do for months: join the operation.

A more compelling argument against U.S. unilateral action in this age of high-technology weapons is that the United States possesses the capability to kill thousands of enemy soldiers and destroy selected targets by remote control at significant distances. When the United States acts alone, it often receives criticism for using high-technology weapons, as in the Tomahawk missile attack on Baghdad in January 1993. However, it was a completely different matter when U.N. peace enforcement forces, under U.S. leadership, used those same Tomahawks during the Gulf War. Acting as part of a multilateral force, states were therefore not at all hesitant to use such weapons when their forces were in the heat of battle.

Multilateral action under U.N. auspices commands greater U.S. domestic support as well. Changes in international power relationships have left the United States as the world's sole superpower. Not since the end of World War II has there been such an opportunity for the United States to influence the course of world security. However, a majority of Americans do not want the United States to assume the role of the world's policeman or, as one author described it, to become the world's "Globocop."[4] In a recent poll, Americans preferred, by a three-to-one margin, to send U.N. blue helmet troops rather than American troops to confront violent strife.[5]

While the existence of the U.N. force is likely to enjoy U.S. domestic support, the leadership role that the United States would undoubtedly assume in the operation of such a multilateral force would likely spark a heated debate, centering on issues similar to those that arose during the development of NATO. Early congressional critics of NATO were inclined to regard the Europeans as seeking a free ride from the Americans when it came to sharing security burdens. As former Senator McIntyre stated, "the allies were becoming 'fat and lazy' at America's expense."[6] The Senate was suspicious of European intentions and felt that the United States should pay more attention to American problems at home rather than the problems of the world.[7] Other critics felt that U.S. leadership in NATO gave it too powerful a position in that multilateral organization; at one point General Charles de Gaulle opposed NATO on the grounds that it had been devised by the United States first for its own security and second for Europe's.[8]

Present concerns about the readiness and military capabilities of the U.N. force reflect similar concerns voiced by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the late 1940s concerning NATO's capabilities. At the time, the JCS felt that Western

4. Richard N. Gardner, "Practical Internationalism: The United States and Collective Security," *SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs* (Summer/Fall 1992): 36. See also Robert Wright, "Bold Old Vision," *The New Republic*, 25 January 1993: 19.

5. Edward Luck, "Making Peace," *Foreign Policy* 72 (Winter 1992/1993): 147.

6. Philip Williams, *The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985): 141.

7. *Ibid.*, 142.

8. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton Press, 1969): 278.

European nations had little ability to defend themselves either individually or collectively. The Joint Chiefs were even suspicious of European designs on U.S. military stocks, and wondered if the elaborate framework of the Western Union's Military Committee was a charade.[9] Similar feelings are being voiced today about the U.N. Military Staff Committee (M.S.C.). The creation of a U.N. force will require the same type of active military and political leadership that was exhibited by those who were so deeply involved in the creation of NATO. Dean Acheson, for example, did not fight his battles alone. General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a proponent for the military while Acheson pressed the political fight in Congress to provide forces to NATO.[10]

U.S. involvement in U.N. force applications does involve the dilemma of having U.S. troops engaged in violent conflicts where there is no apparent U.S. national interest. The credibility of this argument grows daily, as the death toll and uproar over U.S. involvement in Somalia build. The right of presidential authority as commander-in-chief has thus far prevailed in Somalia; nonetheless, this issue is politically sensitive, and is raised by those who strongly oppose U.S. forces becoming involved where there is no threat to U.S. national security. A similar debate took place concerning Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which declared that an attack against one member of NATO was an attack against all. In the late 1940s, an obligation to fight a war when the United States had not even been attacked was not viewed as being in America's vital national interests. Nevertheless, the Article was ultimately accepted as an essential component of the treaty.

The U.N. command structure in Somalia recently raised the question of U.S. troops being placed under foreign command. The NATO framework again offers an excellent answer to this dilemma. Although an American general has always served as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the United States has held that position more for political reasons than any other. At lower levels of NATO command, many U.S. troops have served under allied officers.

The Department of Defense has a longstanding aversion to such arrangements in combat situations. Historically, U.S. troops have been led in combat exclusively by U.S. commanders. The rationale for such a concern is that non-U.S. leaders may not possess the experience, sophistication, and professionalism to meet U.S. standards. Consequently, the United States assumed command of the two largest U.N. military operations in history, under General Douglas A. MacArthur in Korea and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in Iraq.

American willingness to commit U.S. forces under U.N. command is also likely to hinge on the competency of the U.N. infrastructure set up to support a U.N. force. The existing M.S.C. is unlikely, in its present configuration, to be able to handle the role, and has been a major source of concern for the United States.

---

9. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States* (Boston: Twayne Publishing Company, 1988): 26-27.
10. Acheson: 495.

The inability of the Permanent Five to reach agreement on any major issue pertaining to the M.S.C. has led to its total emasculation. The U.N. Charter's authors envisioned the continuation of World War II's "Combined Chiefs of Staff" as the U.N. military staff. The M.S.C. was expected to report directly to the permanent membership of the Security Council. Due primarily to political manipulation, the M.S.C. has been moribund and totally ineffective. Because of strongly negative attitudes from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, and from other member states, many believe any attempt to activate the M.S.C. would be impossible. In spite of this difficulty, the M.S.C. is the only military organization provided by the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, massive M.S.C. restructuring or a Charter revision may be required.

Prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States placed little credence in U.N. operations. As a result, the U.S. defense establishment has had little proactive interaction in its military relations with the United Nations. What little association has occurred between the United Nations and the U.S. military has only solidified the general feeling that the United Nations is an inefficient and poorly run organization which will detract from the fighting effectiveness of U.S. forces. To assume that the defense establishment will voluntarily change its attitude regarding U.N. operations is naive. But change is necessary to meet the challenges of today's new collective security environment, where multinational operations are becoming more frequent.

To be at the forefront of what may be the military mission of the twenty-first century, the new chairman of the JCS might consider the creation of a Pentagon working group with the U.N. Secretariat and the permanent membership of the Security Council. They could work together to propose solutions to military issues that are essential in creating a standby force. This JCS group could provide a direct liaison with the U.N. Standby Forces Planning Team, established in January 1993 and comprised of military officers from seven states (Canada, France, Poland, Argentina, Ghana, Pakistan, and Denmark). The team has already been tasked with identifying the resources U.N. member states would be willing to make available for future U.N. peace operations.

Advocacy for the creation of a U.N. military staff should not be misrepresented as zeal to militarize the United Nations. Organization of a strategic staff to support military operations does not alter the purpose of enforcement operations, which would provide the military stability needed to achieve political solutions to major world problems. This staff would ensure that military operations on behalf of the United Nations would be appropriate, given U.N. policy objectives. It would also ensure that they are competently directed and supported.

A Standby Force

Three predominant force models have emerged from these proposals. The first model calls for a U.N. standing force under the control of the Secretary General. The second version is a standby force comprised of earmarked units from members of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Finally,

there is the traditional model of an ad hoc or coalition force similar to the one assembled for the Persian Gulf War.

The major military reason to reject the standing force is its size. For several political and economic reasons, none of the major proposals advanced in support of a standing force recommends a force greater than 10,000 troops. First, many Third World members of the United Nations have grave concerns about the use of a standing force if controlled solely by the Secretary General. Second, the United Nations could not realistically finance any serious proposal calling for a standing force of 10,000 troops. Finally, a standing 10,000-man force could not complete most of the missions which the United Nations envisions.

Since the end of the Gulf War, many Third World U.N. members have indicated that, although the ad hoc coalition led by the United States was a success, they would be reluctant to support a similar coalition in the future. Many members felt that U.S. interests became paramount during' the evolution of the war, and that U.N. objectives were subordinated to U.S. goals. Although an ad hoc coalition might be feasible in the future, the suspicion of superpower dominance could doom such a force. Of course, the time required to arrange such a force weakens a military strategy based on its formation.

A standby force would thus be the most practical and effective of the three proposed models. Such a multilateral force can be formed if significant political and military obstacles are overcome. For this to happen, the United States must take the lead. Formation of the standby force will require a change in the mindset of many American politicians and especially of the U.S. military. In the long term, however, formation of this force is in America's best interest.

The standby force is not only politically feasible, but in several instances the most politically attractive option to U.N. member nations. For the United States, it solves the problem of assuming the role as "Globocop." Latent fears of a U.N. standby force will be minimized by having the force components remain under the control of each contributing state until required for U.N. peace enforcement duty. Neo-colonial fears can be diminished since developing states would contribute to the force. Finally, parliamentary or legal considerations and constraints can be alleviated if the force is established by negotiated agreements similar to Article 43 of the U.N. Charter.

However, a less formal approach could be implemented that would still remain within the spirit of Article 43. Activating memoranda of understanding (M.O.U.) may be more politically acceptable to numerous member states and might alleviate the apprehension surrounding the concept of a "treaty," which is the way some countries perceive Article 43 agreements.

M.O.U.'s are legally binding documents which are more versatile than treaties. This is especially true in the United States, as M.O.U.'s do not require Senate confirmation and can be implemented as a state-to-state or military-to-military executive agreement. Whereas an agreement reached under Article 43 would require a formal treaty as well as Senate ratification, an M.O.U. would carry the same legality and formality as a treaty, but would allow the executive more flexibility in its interpretation and execution.

M.O.U.'s would be politically more palatable than treaties for several reasons.

First, M.O.U.'s could help forge a consensus among nations on such matters as contribution, command and control, readiness, and employment of the standby force. Second, they could lend the force of law both internally and externally to each nation's commitment without formally binding states under the U.N. Charter. Each nation would still, however, need to settle questions pertaining to its own domestic laws and foreign relationships. Third, negotiating an M.O.U. could address the issue of funding and the amount of support each nation would be obligated to pay the United Nations. Finally, this process might also present an opportunity to define the role and structure of the Military Staff Committee as called for under Articles 46 and 47 in the Charter.

A Peace Enforcement Force

All of the proposals and discussions concerning a U.N. force have taken place on the theoretical level. None of the proposals has determined the practical composition of such a force. Peace enforcement, the most militarily challenging and dangerous of the various types of peace support operations, should be the focus of the proposed force. Therefore, a clear understanding of the peace enforcement concept is essential.

There has been considerable misinterpretation of the nomenclature referring to what are collectively called "peace support operations." Even among peace operations experts and officials at the United Nations, the definitions of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and other "peace" terms are often blurred, misused, or interpreted in different ways. From a military perspective, peace support operations include four broad categories:

- *Peacemaking* describes non-military action of a diplomatic nature employed to resolve disputes peacefully.
- *Peacekeeping* involves monitoring and supervising a low-risk environment where military sophistication is relatively low, and the authority for action falls under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes").
- *Muscular peacekeeping* is a recent term describing reinforced military presence that involves actions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- *Peace enforcement* refers to intervention that may involve the highest degree of both risk and military sophistication, with authority for intervention falling under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Another way of examining peace operations concerns the characteristics of the operation that help determine the type of force to be assigned. Figure 1 summarizes these characteristics. In general, the intensity of each characteristic increases as the operation moves from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. This continuum is not rigid; situations will arise where not all of the characteristics are present to the same degree. High-intensity activity may occur in all peace enforcement operations, and a force capable of dealing with these situations is necessarily different from those conducting basic peacekeeping.

Many of the recent military operations undertaken by the United Nations

Figure 1 Characteristics of Peace Operations

Peacekeeping ⟶ Muscular ⟶ Peace Enforcement
Peacekeeping

	Peacekeeping	Peace Enforcement
Intensity of Operations	(LOW)	(HIGH)
Use of Force	(SELF-DEFENSE)	(OFFENSIVE)
Consent	(YES)	(NOT NECESSARY)
Weapons	(SMALL HAND-HELD)	(HI-TECH)
Impartiality	(TOTAL)	(MAYBE NONE)
Personnel Risks	(LOW)	(HIGH)

illustrate the importance of the peace enforcement capability. These operations include the use of force in the Persian Gulf War and resolutions to ensure the destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Iraq; enforcement of no-fly zones in Serbia and in northern and southern Iraq; and the introduction of military troops into Somalia to provide humanitarian relief and to restore law and order.

At the center of this issue is the American public's tolerance of casualties in "wars of conscience" versus "wars of interest." In wars of interest, such as World War II, the American public accepts high casualties because the survival of the nation and a way of life are seen to be at stake. In wars of conscience, on the other hand, the American public agrees to intervene, but will tolerate combat casualties only to a limited extent.[11] The limitations of this tolerance are now clearly being demonstrated in Somalia.

For the force to be effective in the widest range of situations, from civil unrest to total anarchy, it must be trained, equipped and capable of operating at the highest end of the spectrum in Figure 1. Accordingly, the force must be authorized to use extreme offensive force when necessary, in an environment where consent of those embroiled in the conflict may be absent. Additionally, the force must be equipped with advanced weapons to execute its mission, and those inserting the force must be aware of the high risk to personnel. These capabilities render it, in essence, a combat force.

In summary, the multinational force must be capable of carrying out peace enforcement missions. The operations are risky and intense, activating rules of engagement that justify offensive tactics as well as sophisticated weapons. The peace enforcement troops may be partial to one side in a dispute or may intervene without any party's consent. As such, the force should be prepared for a worst-case scenario, where full-scale enforcement is the only possible solution. Once the mission is complete, the force could be withdrawn and other U.N. forces or agencies could conduct the remaining peacekeeping or muscular peacekeeping operations.

---

11. Bernard E. Trainor, Lt. Gen., USMC (Ret.), personal interview, Boston, MA, 8 April 1993.

Force Composition

The standby force would be a multinational army composed of troops specifically earmarked by contributing nations for use in U.N. peace enforcement operations.

Proponents of a standby force vary significantly in their estimates of the size of the force required. Ambassador Richard Gardner calls for 2,000 troops each from the permanent members of the Security Council, plus 600 to 700 each from 30 other nations, for a total force of 30,000.[12] Dr. Alan Henrikson, of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, suggests the formation of a "standing reserve peace force" of up to 500,000 troops equipped with modern weapons to deal with all but the most serious international aggression.[13]

To ensure optimal capabilities, the standby force should be based on the size of a U.S. corps headquarters. Such a unit consists of approximately 55,000 troops and is considered to be the smallest "operational headquarters" — meaning that it has a capability for sustained independent combat operations.

No more than four or five nations at a time should supply troops for such a force. Members of the Security Council would provide the majority of troops, with at least one U.N. member state from outside the Security Council participating as well. Contributing nations would control and fund their troops until called upon by the Security Council. When called, they would come together to constitute the total standby force under the overall control of the Security Council.

Limiting the contributors to the standby force minimizes interoperability problems, disperses the burdens of peace enforcement, and maximizes collective security. Though the symbolism of many countries making small force contributions to the United Nations is reasonable for peacekeeping, such a wide number of contributors is inappropriate for peace enforcement. Armed enforcement, after all, involves offensive action and the credible threat of war, and success in modern war requires effective integration of units and of their training, logistics, and command, control, communication (C3) systems. Such integration becomes logarithmically more complicated with each national element involved.[14]

Selecting force participants from such a narrow sphere, while not politically advantageous, is a military necessity. With few exceptions, the permanent members of the Security Council have a monopoly on large-scale, sophisticated military capabilities. Accordingly, the standby force relies on a permanent member to provide significant aspects of the force while broadening the political base with less sophisticated military capabilities from the temporary members and from at least one non-member. From the point of view of military profes-

---

12. Gardner: 35-49.
13. Alan K. Henrikson, "How Can the Vision of a 'New World Order' be Realized?" *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 16 (Winter 1992): 63-79.
14. United Nations Association of the United States of America, *Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century: A Report of the Global Policy Project* (New York, October 1992): 30-31.

sionals, the need to ensure military competency of the force must transcend political considerations. After the force demonstrates its competence in the field, potential military contributors may be expanded.

Composition of this standby force depends heavily on the possible missions it will be assigned. Probable mission requirements include: conducting a show of force; guaranteeing rights of passage (including securing of ports, airports, and food distribution centers and routes); establishing and maintaining border blockades; implementing armament control and demilitarization (including destruction of storage and weapons sites and destruction of command and control sites); and finally, engaging in limited regional conflicts.[15] Ultimately, if the force must be able to enforce peace, its makeup and capabilities will already have been dictated.

This force must be airlift-capable, ready to deploy personnel within 72 hours, and able to defend against an armored threat. The corps staff must have the capability to integrate air and naval capabilities if joint operations are required and provided on an ad hoc basis. To be completely professional and productive, the force must also possess a fully integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system, and have reliable logistics support. In addition, the force must have received common training during joint exercises, and should be coordinated with a fully functioning U.N. planning staff.

Mobility is a key determinant of the force's flexibility, as providing the airlift and sealift necessary to move a corps-sized force is a formidable challenge. Even the United States, with its tremendous air- and sealift capabilities, required a monumental effort to provide adequate strategic transportation resources during Desert Shield.

If the U.N. force is to be deployable, the United States clearly must take some responsibility for making that need a reality. The United States need not become the sole provider of transportation requirements, however. Current U.N. logistical planners are fully aware that commercial shipping and airframes can meet this new U.N. requirement.[16] However, the U.S. should contribute generously in order to ease technical shortfalls of the many less sophisticated military forces.

One necessary element of the force is an airborne division to provide a forced-entry capability and to enhance responsiveness. Several general officers with experience leading U.N. operations during the 1960s have reinforced the concept that airborne units are extremely beneficial in scenarios where no secure lodgement areas are available.[17] A motorized division also would provide additional tactical mobility, even though it could not be delivered by air.

15. Cdr. Martha Bills, USN; Lt. Col. Robert Butto, USAF; Lt. Col. John Culclanue, USAF; Lt. Col. Marvin Hall, USMC; Lt. Col. Robert Marrero-Corletto, ARNG; Lt. Col. John Scales, ARNG, *Options for US Military Support to the United Nations*, (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992): 9-10.

16. Dennis G. Beissel, Deputy Director, United Nations Field Operations Division, personal interview, Cambridge, MA, 8 December 1992.

17. Russell E. Dougherty, Gen., USAF (Ret.), address to National Security Fellows Program, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 24 November 1992.

Another necessary element for the force is an armored cavalry regiment to provide a versatile combined arms capability. Though reconnaissance is its primary mission, it can also perform as a surrogate for a division-sized force in what the military calls an "economy of force" role.

U.S. Air Force doctrine provides a useful framework for operations that require air power. The Air Force has two experimental wings that are packaged with air capabilities in a reduced, deployable configuration. The tactical air wing based in North Carolina, and the intervention air wing based in Idaho, provide optimal air power packages for certain missions. Use of such forces could be considered during small-scale air operations. In Somalia, for example, small-scale close air support is provided by relatively unsophisticated Cobra helicopter gunships.

If a larger-scale capability to prosecute an air campaign were required, carrier battle groups could be used. Regardless of its source, air power is more easily deployed than ground troops, so that arrival in the area of operation would in many cases precede that of earmarked ground units.

In *An Agenda for Peace*, the U.N. Secretary General's report on peace support operations, Boutros-Ghali made no mention of incorporating naval forces into his proposed standing force. Though their exclusion may seem notable, only a small number of naval operations have been conducted under the U.N. flag. The few that have occurred included humanitarian assistance, maritime peacekeeping, and sea and air interdiction; some operations involved responding to aggression.[18] Many other naval missions could be performed under U.N. auspices, such as maritime enforcement, protection of sea and air traffic, shows of force, or the control of the arms traffic at sea.

Naval enforcement requires sophisticated coordination of operations at sea and in the air; the Multinational Interception Force operations to support U.N. sanctions against Iraq, and the use of sea-based assets to enforce a no-fly zone over Serbia, make this clear. Although not formally included by any proponents of a standby U.N. force, naval forces — with the exception of sealift — may be required in specific situations. A variety of political arrangements could be implemented to procure U.N. naval forces in those instances. Were naval forces needed, the most logical composition would include a small naval squadron with one ship from each participating nation, based on the model of NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic or Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. The U.N. naval force would not have to be a standing force, but ships of separate nations could come together for short periods to conduct an active joint training program controlled by a designated U.N. commander.[19] This standby naval force would enjoy some of the advantages already discussed for the U.N. standby force.

Military forces from diverse backgrounds must be capable of operating together effectively. Different standard operating procedures, language, and

---

18. Jeffrey I. Sands, *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations* (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 10 November 1992): 68.
19. *Ibid.*, 58.

logistical support requirements impede that effectiveness, however. Although interoperability concerns have surfaced throughout the history of U.N. operations, this issue grows in urgency when considering peace enforcement operations. As the spectrum of U.N. operations shifts, military experts agree that previously tolerable deficiencies will result in increased casualties under hostile fire.

Accordingly, the standby force would have to be configured specifically to address these interoperability concerns. Recent history shows that coalitions can, over time, resolve most problems relating to this issue. NATO's current military capability, for example, is a testimonial to diligent staff work solving interoperability issues. The proposed standby force minimizes interoperability problems by centralizing most of the force's resources. One permanent member of the Security Council could provide the corps headquarters, the support command, and the mechanized division; temporary members of the Security Council or members of the General Assembly could contribute the less technical units.

The corps headquarters could provide the force commander and an integrated staff, trained and capable of operating in a combat environment. In addition, senior level liaison officers from the other national forces comprising the standby force could be included in the headquarters staff to enhance interoperability.

The headquarters would provide two important ingredients: standard operating procedures and communications capability. A flexible and responsive communications system was established during Desert Storm that melded several generations of equipment and many different command and staff elements. At the height of the operation, the communications systems supported more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages each day.[20]

Naturally, for the force to be viable, it must be trained as well as it is equipped and staffed. Accordingly, the United Nations first should take advantage of former President Bush's September 1992 offer to make U.S. wargaming facilities available to the United Nations. The U.S. Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) would be an excellent model for a U.N. corps commander's needs, because it is geared to synchronize operations at the corps and division level.

After the BCTP, the next phase of the training should focus on brigade and battalion level commanders and staffs. Lower level computer simulations similar to those used in BCTP would enable successive levels of command to work through a certification program to ensure their readiness. Simultaneously, a training strategy for individual soldiers and their basic building blocks — the squad and crew — must be developed.

A logical outgrowth of this training and exercise concept is the development of a permanent infrastructure. Though this infrastructure could take many forms, one possibility would involve a school for peace enforcement operations. Modeled on the academy currently run by the Scandinavian nations for

---

20. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992): 56.

peacekeeping operations, such a school could be used by military staffs at the strategic and operational levels to develop a repository for doctrine.

Strategic planning and agreement on command and control procedures for any U.N. peace enforcement force must be conducted by some type of staff reporting to the Security Council. Currently, no such staff exists to supervise or control military operations. In practical terms, therefore, the United Nations is incapable of assuming direct control or responsibility for any enforcement operations until this issue is resolved.

To overcome this handicap, a Military Staff Committee could be revitalized for this role. Another possible solution has been offered by a widely respected veteran of peacekeeping operations, retired Indian General Indar Jit Rikhye. Rikhye advocates a conventional general staff that would report to a Military Advisor, who in turn would report to the Secretary General.[21] Although Rikhye's proposal appears to be well suited to some U.N. operations, it lacks one critical feature: political and strategic direction from participating members. To ensure that the political leadership remains in control, a council of ambassadors from the nations contributing forces could be developed to act as political advisors between the standby force and the Security Council.

Even creation of a professional and competent military staff in the U.N. Secretariat will not solve another pressing issue: the inadequacy or lack of a theater-level staff. This deficiency is particularly critical at the start of a crisis, as newly formed staffs have to grapple with team building and major deployment issues. Another related problem concerns control over intelligence and communications. In the proposed force, responsibility for C³I initially falls on the nation that provides a corps headquarters.

The Gulf War teaches an important lesson concerning the coordination of C³I. Faced with forces from more than 23 nations, often with unique doctrine, language, customs, and religion, coalition leaders created the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center. This center allowed coalition forces to coordinate tasks and missions, receive reports, collect data, and harmonize operational planning. As such, it helped mold the coalition into an effective combat force, and it served as the conduit for force coordination.[22] The same type of structure and coordination could be established for the standby force.

A review of NATO standardization agreements would provide U.N. staff officers a detailed list of procedures as well as possible methods for achieving commonality in important items for the military. NATO begins the process with a standard tactical doctrine, and then moves on to develop specific methods for addressing tactical air coordination, command arrangements, fire control measures, and logistics support procedures.

As for intelligence, the United Nations clearly will need some type of permanent capability. In the past, the United Nations ran peace support operations

---

21. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, Indian Army (Ret.), *Strengthening U.N. Peacekeeping: New Challenges and Proposals* (Washington, D.C.: May 1992): 48.
22. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:* 56.

with very little money, relying on a handful of officials with little or no military experience. Today, the United Nations is correcting this situation by establishing a command center that can receive intelligence information. The United Nations and its field commanders are making arrangements to receive military and political intelligence from the United States and other countries willing to share it. As the United States prepared to hand over the Somalia operation to the U.N. force, for example, U.S. officials made plans to sell the United Nations an intelligence system that receives American satellite photos and political analysis.[23] Although this move is but a first step for the United Nations, it is critical for future peace support operations.

In summary, the standby force is a practical compromise between military and political imperatives. Robust enough to fight and win on a high-intensity level, it is sufficiently small and flexible enough to be implemented. Major issues concerning supportability and training can be overcome. The standby force is a sound blueprint for the international community to consider and to refine.

U.S. Leadership Is Required

If the political will exists, procedures that stifle the creation and use of a multinational force can be altered through strong initiative on the part of the United States. The U.S. president will have to address the Department of Defense and provide clear guidance on the importance of creating such a force. Following that initiative, the chairman of the JCS could designate a working group empowered to coordinate with the United Nations, and then to design the force together. This JCS working group could work directly with the multi-national team formed in January 1993 by the Secretary General to compile an inventory of military resources available to the United Nations.

Politically, the president will have to contend with three separate constituencies on the international level: the concerns of the United Nations as an organization, the permanent members of the Security Council, and Third World members of the United Nations. Each has distinct concerns regarding the creation of such a force. U.N. member nations need reassurance that a standby force would not signal an attempt to assert superpower control over the United Nations. The Secretary General will have to endorse this concept in order to achieve agreement from the U.N. Secretariat. The United States, in turn, will have to emphasize to him that this proposal is America's direct response to his *Agenda for Peace*.

The Permanent Five on the Security Council will not have a unified view of such a force, and each member must be approached individually. France and Great Britain must participate fully in order for the force to be realized; the United States will have to appeal to their sense of world leadership and insist that European political and military power, and national interests, will be enhanced by participating in such a force. Russia, too, remains a major world

---

23. Paul Lewis, "U.N. is Developing Control Center to Coordinate Growing Peacekeeping Role," *The New York Times*, 5 April 1993: 10.

power with important responsibilities for international peace, especially since future trouble spots are likely to share Russian borders. The challenge will come in convincing China that a U.N. force would be an opportunity for nations of substantial political and military capability to stabilize a world that threatens to overwhelm current peace mechanisms.

Some Third World nations, on the other hand, may see this force as a blatant attempt by the superpowers to extend their hegemony and to reassert colonialism. Critical developing nations such as Mexico, Egypt, India, and Nigeria must therefore strongly endorse the U.N. force. The U.S. president will have to appeal personally to the heads of state deemed crucial for international support.

Domestically, the president will be required to contend with the Congress, his own Executive branch, and the American public. Key members of the Senate Democratic leadership, such as Senators Joseph Biden and David Boren, are on record as supporting the creation of such a force, and the president should enlist their help in garnering congressional backing.

Creation of a multinational peace enforcement force is a concept worthy of serious consideration. Naysayers will find plenty of ammunition to attack it, and there are many legitimate concerns to overcome before it can come into being. However, these problems can be solved if the political will exists to address them.

History can be cited as a lesson on how to convince the body politic of the need for a U.N. force. In arguing the merits of NATO, Secretary of State Dean Acheson implored the public to focus on the dangers the treaty aimed to counter, rather than to concentrate on the difficulties and problems posed by the arrangement. He reminded them of the benefits that would accrue from the NATO Treaty.[24] Acheson never wavered in the face of hardship, and his success is history.

---

24. Acheson: 276.