

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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The threat of war and "nuclear weapons" are among the greatest concerns which West Europeans -- as well as Americans and Japanese -- have for themselves and their country. This was one of the findings of an eight-country poll conducted in April 1984 by Louis Harris International.¹

Increasing tendency to view both superpowers as threats to peace

In the sixties and seventies, West Europeans felt threatened primarily by the Soviet Union. Since then there has been a growing inclination to regard both U.S. and Soviet foreign policies as threats to peace. After reviewing a great deal of poll data, one analyst put it this way: "A subtle shift in threat perceptions has been occurring, from one concerned largely with a threat from the East to one more concerned with the dynamics of super-power conflict."²

When the same Louis Harris poll asked in April 1984 which of several developments were "most responsible for current international tensions," substantial proportions in six West European countries (range 31% to 54%) mentioned "the Soviet military buildup." Large minorities (range 20% to 47%) referred to "the U.S. military buildup." But when this question is asked without limiting responses to a fixed list of alternatives, West Europeans tend to talk about the danger of the arms race and the tensions between the two superpowers rather than blaming one side or the other.

The increased concern about U.S. foreign policy is based on a growing perception of similarities between U.S. and Soviet policies. Large majorities of West Europeans believe that both super-powers seek military superiority.³ Majorities or pluralities regard both as "seeking world domination." Large minorities think that both "use military force to attain their goals."⁴ A large majority in Britain and a plurality in West Germany felt in December 1983 that recent U.S. policies had increased the risk of war.⁵ And in November 1985, a Gallup survey found British opinion evenly divided (32% to 33%) on whether the United States or the Soviet Union poses the greater threat to peace. Most of the rest (28%) regarded both countries as equally threatening.⁶

Anything which may reduce the risk of nuclear war is welcome

Worries about superpower rivalries and the nuclear arms race lead West European publics to endorse by wide margins almost

any initiative that promises to reduce the risk of war, especially of nuclear war. In May 1984, for example, large majorities (range 65 to 84 percent) in seven West European countries favored a nuclear-free zone in East and West Europe. And a ban on first use of nuclear weapons was favored by between 74 and 92 percent of the publics. A nuclear freeze was supported by majorities or pluralities in five West European countries in which the question was asked in July 1982 (Table 1).

West Europeans also widely favored both President Reagan's so-called "zero-option" proposal of 1981 as well as General Secretary Brezhnev's 1981 proposal for mutual reductions in the number of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. More than seven in ten in three countries surveyed in December 1981 approved of the American proposal "that the U.S. will not station new nuclear missiles in Western Europe if the USSR agrees to dismantle Soviet nuclear missiles now targeted on Western Europe." At the same time, between 46 and 62 percent approved of the Soviet proposal "to reduce the number of Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe if the U.S. agrees not to station new nuclear missiles in Europe" (Table 2). There is little doubt that the 50 percent reduction in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR, which both powers accepted in principle last November, also finds widespread approval among West European publics.

Opposition to the deployment of INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) -- Pershing IIs and cruise missiles -- appears to have been closely related to beliefs about the deterrent value of these new weapons. Those who believed that they would make nuclear war less likely tended to favor deployment. Those who felt INF would increase chances of war or would make no difference tended to oppose deployment (Table 3).

West European attitudes toward the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) appear to be similarly based on perceptions of the deterrent value of the new weapons system. Those who believe that SDI research, or the eventual deployment of an anti-missile defense system, would make a nuclear war less likely tend to support the initiative. Those who think it would make nuclear war more likely tend to oppose it. And those who think it will make no difference are somewhere in between.

In sum, to gain the support of a majority of West Europeans, any new weapons system or arms control proposal must first convince publics that it will reduce the danger of nuclear war.

The role of nuclear weapons: essential for deterrence, unthinkable for use

Despite the lop-sided majorities in favor of nuclear arms reductions, freezes, and removals from Europe, most West

Europeans oppose unilateral nuclear disarmament. They want any treaty or agreement between the superpowers to be mutual, verifiable, and not leaving the West permanently behind the Soviet bloc.

An October 1983 survey in seven West European countries, the U.S. and Japan found majority support for unilateral nuclear disarmament only in Spain (by 55%) and large minority support in Italy (by 35%). In five other West European countries, support for unilateral nuclear disarmament ranged between 15 percent in Norway and 25 percent in the Netherlands (Table 4).

Other data show that neither the British nor the French want their country to scrap its own nuclear weapons.

- o In Britain, a 68 to 23 percent majority think that "Britain should keep an up-to-date nuclear deterrent as long as the Soviet Union continues to possess nuclear weapons."⁷
- o In France, a 68 to 14 percent majority thought that during the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reduction talks in Geneva "which may take several years to conclude" France should either "maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons" (57%) or "increase its nuclear weapons" (11%).⁸

Evidence that West Germans also believe in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons comes from an August 1984 poll by EMNID, the German Gallup affiliate. A 61 percent majority of West Germans agreed that "without deterrence by nuclear weapons the danger of a conventional war in Europe would be much greater." A large minority (37%), however, felt that "the use of nuclear weapons between East and West would be so horrible that nuclear weapons should be abolished at once."⁹

Moreover, at least some of those who would welcome the unilateral removal of all nuclear weapons from Western Europe want the United States to retain its strategic nuclear deterrent. In July 1981, for example, large majorities of West Europeans (five-country average of 65%) were opposed to unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States (Table 5). Clearly, most West Europeans tend to accept the deterrent value of strategic nuclear weapons. And most do not believe that unilateral action by the West will result in mutual nuclear disarmament.

Many distrust the superpowers; want agreements verifiable

Widespread desire for all kinds of peace agreements is accompanied by widespread doubt that the superpowers would honor such agreements. In mid-1982, an average of 63 percent in five West European countries expressed doubt that the Soviet Union would keep its pledge never to be the first to use

nuclear weapons. At the same time, 46 percent expressed little or no confidence in the U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons in Europe except in response to a Soviet attack (Table 6).

Similarly, in Spring 1984, about two-thirds in seven West European countries had little or no confidence that the Soviet Union would keep its word and observe various peace agreements. Many, however (range 34% to 47%) also lacked confidence that the U.S. would honor such agreements (Table 7).

This lack of trust in superpower adherence to agreements has led to a broad consensus that any peace agreement must be verifiable. Most Britons, Germans and Italians in May 1984 (range 78% to 92%) expressed approval of U.S. insistence on adequate means of verification of arms control agreements. At most one in ten in these countries would favor an agreement which could not be adequately verified (Table 8).

More recently, Britons overwhelmingly (by a margin of 88 to 3%) supported the statement that "before we enter into any arms control agreements with the Soviet Union there should always be a reliable method of checking that both sides are not cheating on the conditions of such agreements."¹⁰

Most would fight for their country, but not a nuclear war

While continuing to hope for various kinds of peace agreements and for the mutual dismantling of nuclear weapons, publics tend to favor a military defense of their country against a military attack.

In the fall of 1985, about half (48%) of the general public in the ten countries then members of the European Community declared themselves ready to fight for their country "if another war broke out." Willingness to pay the price of independence varied widely -- from 76 percent in Greece to 38 percent in West Germany. The proportion of "fighters" was especially high in Spain (69%) and Portugal (65%), the two countries which have since joined the EC.¹¹

The European Community question did not specify whether the war would be conventional or nuclear, whether the fighting would take place in one's own country or on foreign soil, and which country would have to be fought. These considerations play an important role. A December 1983 French study, for example, found 79 percent of the French public agreeing that "the invasion of France by a foreign army would justify fighting even at the risk of one's life."¹² At about the same time, a 58 percent majority said that, if the Soviet Union penetrated French territory, the President of the Republic "should at once enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union." Only 32 percent counseled military resistance against the USSR -- 6 percent with nuclear, 26 percent with non-nuclear weapons.¹³

The greatly reduced willingness to resist an aggressor who uses nuclear weapons is well illustrated in a spring 1980 study by the Social Research Institute of the West German defense forces. At that time, a 64 to 19 percent majority of German adults said that the Federal Republic of Germany should use "military weapons" to defend itself against a military attack on its territory. A smaller, 53 to 31 percent majority believed that the FRG should defend itself against a military attack "even if the war is fought primarily on the soil of the FRG." But a 71 to 15 percent majority opposed a military defense of the Federal Republic "if nuclear weapons have to be used on the soil of the FRG."¹⁴

Roughly four in ten are "nuclear pacifists"

Nearly four in ten West Europeans (37% unweighted average for eight NATO countries) can be considered "nuclear pacifists," who oppose any use of nuclear weapons. They agree that "NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances." The number of nuclear pacifists has increased in West Germany since 1981 but has decreased in Belgium and, surprisingly, in the Netherlands, despite the strong Dutch peace movement (Table 9).

Nuclear pacifists in Western Europe are roughly matched in number by those who favor NATO's use of nuclear weapons "if the Soviet Union uses them first in attacking Western Europe" (eight-country unweighted average of 40%). Again there is a wide range of opinion: from 51 percent in Britain to only 30 percent in the Netherlands. Few (between 7% and 18%) support the first use of nuclear weapons "if a Soviet attack by conventional forces threatened to overwhelm NATO forces."

These negative attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons are no recent phenomenon. Despite NATO's long-established doctrine of "flexible response," which provides for the possible use of nuclear weapons if a conventional attack threatened to overwhelm NATO forces, West Europeans have been opposed to "first use" as far back as 1955. At that time, disapproval overwhelmingly predominated to "the use of atomic weapons on enemy soldiers at the front line, if Western Europe were attacked without the use of nuclear weapons." And by 1963, disapproval predominated in four surveyed West European countries even "if it were the only way to stop an enemy at the threshold instead of being overrun (Table 10).

Two major factors appear to underlie opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. The first is the belief that any use of nuclear weapons would quickly escalate into a general nuclear war. The second is the conviction, long held by majorities in West Europe, that neither they nor their country would survive a nuclear war. Back in 1963, fewer than 10 percent in four

major West European countries believed that they personally would survive a general nuclear war. Surveys conducted in Britain and France in the early eighties show that these views have not changed. In January 1983, for example, only 10 percent of Britons felt they would survive a nuclear attack. Seventy percent thought that their country would not survive.

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The risk of nuclear war: deciding factor

To summarize: The realization of what a nuclear war would mean for themselves, their country, and for humanity has hit home. Publics now tend to judge strategies, tactics, and weapon systems by one chief criterion: will this make nuclear war more or less likely?

Whatever the issue -- whether the deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons, a proposal for arms reductions, the development of anti-satellite weapons, or research into anti-missile defense systems (SDI or "Star Wars") -- public opinion largely reflects the sum of individual judgments on whether this policy is likely to increase or decrease the risk of nuclear war.

Majorities in most West European countries believe that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter aggression. They hope that it will never be necessary to use nuclear weapons and do not want NATO to be the first to do so. Small majorities or pluralities favor responding with nuclear weapons to a nuclear attack, but many feel that once a nuclear war starts the game is over.

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- ¹⁴Mathias Schoenborn, "Perceptions of National Security of the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany: Stability and Change in Public Opinion. Paper presented at the May 1981 conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Resarch.
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Table 1

WEST EUROPEAN OPINION ON THREE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

"Here are some other proposals which might be introduced at a conference on disarmament. For each of these, please tell me whether you favor it strongly, favor it somewhat, oppose it somewhat, or oppose it strongly.

Creation of a nuclear-free zone in East and West Europe?

An agreement that neither side will be the first to use nuclear weapons."

FAVOR SOMEWHAT OR STRONGLY

	Britain 5/84 (1131)	Germany 5/84 (1033)	Italy 5/84 (1040)	Belgium 5/84 (1018)	Nether- lands 5/84 (1219)	Denmark 5/84 (978)	Norway 5/84 (929)
<u>Nuclear- free zone:</u>	75	84	69	74	65	76	73
<u>No first use agreement:</u>	88	92	90	83	75	74	85

	Britain 7/82	Germany 7/82	Italy 7/82	FRANCE 7/82	Nethlds 7/82	Denmark	Norway
<u>Nuclear freeze:</u>	48%	55%	65%	41%	63%	N/A	N/A

*The July 1982 question was:

"Some people say that the risk of war would be reduced if the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed to stop producing nuclear weapons and to freeze their nuclear forces at existing levels.

Others say that a freeze would increase the risk of war because it would leave the Soviet Union superior to the U.S. in nuclear weapons.

Which view is closer to your own?"

N/A = not available for these countries.

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 2

Attitudes Toward Zero-Option

vs.
Brezhnev Proposal*

(December 81)

Zero-Option: Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's proposal that the U.S. will not station new nuclear missiles in Western Europe if the USSR agrees to dismantle Soviet nuclear missiles now targeted on Western Europe?

Brezhnev Proposal: (To reduce number of Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe if U.S. agrees not to station new nuclear missiles in Europe.)

All things considered, do you approve or disapprove of the position President Brezhnev has taken on this issue?

	<u>Great Britain</u>		<u>West Germany</u>		<u>Netherlands</u>	
	<u>Zero-Option</u>	<u>Brezhnev</u>	<u>Zero-Option</u>	<u>Brezhnev</u>	<u>Zero-Option</u>	<u>Brezhnev</u>
Approve	71%	46%	75%	56%	73%	62%
Disapprove	19	34	11	20	17	16
Don't Know	10	20	13	24	10	21

* Asked of those who have heard, seen, or read.

Table 3

RELATION BETWEEN INF SUPPORT AND OPINIONS ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Those who support or oppose INF deployment also hold the following views:	BRITAIN		WEST GERMANY		ITALY		BELGIUM		NETHERLANDS		DENMARK		NORWAY	
	INF	Support	INF	Support	INF	Support	INF	Support	INF	Support	INF	Support	INF	Support
	(591)	(466)	(399)	(612)	(323)	(688)	(320)	(593)	(459)	(603)	(342)	(771)	(360)	(496)
(OPINIONS OF U.S. POLICIES)														
Great deal or fair amount of confidence in U.S. foreign policy	65%	42%	56%	31%	74%	58%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
U.S. policies have done more to promote peace than to increase risk of war	NA	NA	53	21	65	33	50	23	27	7	48	13	61	17
U.S. policies have been more helpful than harmful to Survey Country's economy	12	7	13	8	38	21	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Very or fairly good general opinion of the United States	51	27	58	28	59	35	NA	NA	55	19	70	57	68	26
(PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET THREAT)														
Very or somewhat concerned about Soviet coercion of Survey Country	NA	NA	8	7	39	35	34	35	47	36	54	35	55	36
Very or somewhat concerned about Soviet attack on Western Europe	NA	NA	33	25	16	18	31	35	21	15	31	29	46	35
(VIEWS ON DETERRENCE)														
Great deal or fair amount of confidence in NATO's ability to prevent attack	NA	NA	72	52	82	54	76	43	77	38	90	56	93	50
INF will help prevent rather than make Soviet attack on West Europe more likely	NA	NA	85	41	84	29	80	29	73	18	81	29	85	29
(VIEWS ON DEFENSE OF EUROPE)														
Great deal or fair amount confidence that U.S. would defend Survey Country	NA	NA	61	34	72	52	60	40	61	34	31	29	79	48
Great deal or fair amount of confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe	NA	NA	66	43	75	53	68	39	57	29	82	50	78	51
NATO can stop a conventional attack with its conventional defenses	NA	NA	50	55	64	58	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4 (VIEWS ON NUCLEAR FIRST USE)														
Would approve NATO's use of nuclear weapons only if Soviets use them first	NA	NA	52	36	64	36	54	26	50	21	60	30	63	39
(VIEWS ON NEGOTIATIONS)														
U.S. is making a genuine effort to reach INF agreement with USSR	NA	NA	75	39	72	38	62	30	69	29	62	34	86	48

NA means the figures were not available for this analysis.

Table 4

WEST EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR UNILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

September-October 1983

In the current debate over east-west nuclear weapons, which of the following best expresses your personal view about what the west should do:

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Norway</u>	<u>Spain</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Give up all nuclear weapons regardless of whether the Soviet Union does	17	16	23	35	25	15	55	4	22
Introduce no more nuclear weapons, not even if the Soviet Union does	12	13	18	10	20	21	12	8	20
Introduce just enough nuclear weapons to create a balance between east and west until an acceptable agreement can be concluded	62	47	39	30	38	55	16	63	21
Introduce more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union has introduced, in order to establish and maintain nuclear superiority	4	6	1	2	2	3	2	20	4
No answer/No opinion	<u>5</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>33</u>
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Louis Harris International

TABLE 5

DISARMAMENT

Unilateral Disarmament (July 1981)

Regardless of what other countries do and regardless of how the Soviet Union reacts, do you think we should or should not give up all of the nuclear weapons in our soil?

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>
Should give up	21%	33%	26%	46%	41%
Should not give up	68	51	51	48	52
Don't Know	11	15	24	6	6

U.S. Unilateral Disarmament (July 1981)

Well, would you favor the U.S. giving up all its nuclear weapons, regardless of what the Soviet Union does?

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>
Favor U.S. Disarmament	16%	25%	9%	30%	26%
Oppose U.S. Disarmament	72	55	69	62	67
Don't Know	12	19	22	8	7

Table 6

CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET "NO FIRST USE" PLEDGE
July 1982

In a speech to the United Nations in June, the Soviet Foreign Minister pledged that the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. How much confidence do you have that the Soviets will honor this pledge?

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>W.Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>
A great deal	9%	6%	4%	10%	4%
A fair amount	<u>23</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>
Subtotal	<u>32</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>24</u>
Not very much	34	36	43	34	38
None at all	<u>28</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>24</u>
Subtotal	<u>62</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>62</u>
Don't know	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>14</u>
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 7A

WEST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN USSR TO OBSERVE ARMS AGREEMENTS

"How much confidence do you have that the Soviet Union would keep its word and observe such agreements -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

	Britain <u>5/84</u> (1131)	Germany <u>5/84</u> (1033)	Italy <u>5/84</u> (1040)	
A great deal	3%	2%	5%	
A fair amount	<u>26</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>25</u>	
Total confidence	<u>29</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>30</u>	
Not very much	46	59	43	
None at all	<u>20</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>23</u>	
Lack confidence	<u>66</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>66</u>	
Don't know	4	1	4	
	Belgium <u>5/84</u> (1018)	Netherlands <u>5/84</u> (1219)	Denmark <u>5/84</u> (978)	Norway <u>5/84</u> (929)
A great deal	3%	3%	3%	2%
A fair amount	<u>18</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>17</u>
Confidence	<u>21</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>19</u>
Not very much	37	41	39	44
None at all	<u>30</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>30</u>
Lack confidence	<u>67</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>74</u>
Don't know	11	16	13	7

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 7B

WEST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN U.S. TO OBSERVE ARMS AGREEMENTS

"And how much confidence do you have that the United States would keep its word and observe such agreements -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

	Britain <u>5/84</u> (1131)	Germany <u>5/84</u> (1033)	Italy <u>5/84</u> (1040)
A great deal	10%	6%	13%
A fair amount	<u>51</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>49</u>
Total Confidence	61	54	62
Not very much	26	40	25
None at all	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
Lack Confidence	34	45	35
Don't know	5	1	4

	Belgium <u>5/84</u> (1018)	Netherlands <u>5/84</u> (1219)	Denmark <u>5/84</u> (978)	Norway <u>5/84</u> (929)
A great deal	4%	4%	8%	12%
A fair amount	<u>39</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>46</u>
Confidence	43	44	47	58
Not very much	34	31	29	28
None at all	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>
Lack Confidence	47	40	39	35
Don't know	9	16	14	7

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 8

WEST EUROPEAN OPINION ON NEED TO VERIFY ARMS AGREEMENTS

"Lack of trust is one reason why the superpowers have not been able to reach an arms control agreement in recent years. The United States insists that any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union must include provisions for adequate means of verification. That is, provisions which will permit the U.S. to check that the Soviets are keeping the agreement. Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. insistence on adequate means of verification of arms control agreements?"

	Britain 5/84 <u>(1131)</u>	Germany 5/84 <u>(1033)</u>	Italy 5/84 <u>(1040)</u>
Approve	78%	92%	78%
Disapprove	11	6	11
Don't know	10	2	11

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 9

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

May 1984

There are different opinions about the use of nuclear weapons by NATO. Which one of the following is closest to your own?

	<u>GB</u>	<u>F*</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>NL</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>MEAN</u>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
NATO should not use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances	24	44	44	41	35	36	43	30	37
NATO should use nuclear weapons only if the USSR uses them first in attacking Western Europe	51	32	42	44	34	30	35	48	40
NATO should use nuclear weapons to defend itself if a Soviet attack with conventional forces threatens to overwhelm NATO forces	18	17	11	9	14	16	7	11	13
No opinion	7	8	2	5	17	17	15	10	10

*MEAN is the unweighted eight-country average.
The French data are from July 1981.

Source: USIA Surveys

Table 10

ATTITUDES ABOUT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE,
1955 and 1963

- A. "Would you approve or disapprove of the use of atomic weapons on enemy soldiers at the front line, if Western Europe were attacked without the use of nuclear weapons?"
- B. (Unless approve) "If it were the only way to stop an enemy at the threshold instead of being overrun, would you be for the use of nuclear weapons on enemy soldiers at the frontline?"

	<u>Britain</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>W.Germany</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>
<u>RESULTS FOR QUESTION A</u>								
Approve	9%	13%	8%	3%	8%	7%	7%	5%
Disapprove	67	72	79	86	79	75	71	85
Qualified and No Opinion	24	15	13	11	13	18	22	10
Net approval*	-58	-59	-71	-83	-71	-68	-64	-80

RESULTS FOR QUESTIONS A AND B COMBINED

	<u>Britain</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>W.Germany</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	<u>1955</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1963</u>
Approve	42%	44%	31%	21%	38%	22%	26%	22%
Disapprove	20	32	40	50	43	59	38	56
Qualified and No Opinion	38	24	29	29	19	19	36	22
Net approval*	22	12	-9	-29	-5	-37	-12	-34

*Net = Percentage approving minus percentage disapproving

Source: Leo P. Crespi, "West European Perceptions of the U.S.," paper presented to the June 1982 convention of the International Society of Political Psychology. Based on USIA surveys.