Feinstein International Famine Center

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Mapping the Security Environment

Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies

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Executive Summary

This research, commissioned by the UK NGO–Military Contact Group and funded by the Department for International Development (DFID), examines perceptions of security among three sets of actors: peace support operations (PSOs), assistance agencies (AAs), and local populations, in countries in or recovering from crisis. During January—March 2005, a five-person research team from Tufts University conducted interviews with some 350 persons in individual and focus group settings in three locations: Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. The findings were the subject of a seminar hosted by the UK Ministry of Defence in London on 19 April 2005 and the highlights of that discussion are included in this report.

The research made three major findings. First, perceptions of security differ significantly among the three sets of actors. Within the context of their mission objectives, the military contingents that characterize PSOs understand security first and foremost in terms of "force protection", that is, the need for protection of their own personnel from attacks and threats of attack. PSO perceptions of the security needs of AAs and local communities are viewed through those lenses. While AAs are also concerned about insecurity as it impinges on their ability to carry out their assistance and protection activities, they are more likely to take risks in the interest of carrying out their tasks. They also tend to have a better understanding of how socio-economic issues impact on security and generally have a better grasp than PSOs do of the concerns of local populations. For their part, local communities view security as safety from physical harm and abuse but also extending far beyond to encompass a sense of well-being, including elements such as employment, access to basic services, political participation, and cultural identity. As one respondent put it, "*There is no peace without bread*." Thus, communities have a more holistic understanding of what constitutes security than the narrower concerns of the two other sets of actors.

The second major finding is that perceptions differ significantly within each of the three sets of actors. National contingents that make up PSOs have different understandings of force protection and how best to achieve it, reflecting national military and political cultures. This results in quite different security postures even within the same PSO. There are also major differences within the community of AAs, with on the one hand many international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seeking security through 'blending in' with local communities whilst on the other hand UN assistance organizations keeping at arms' length. Differences are evident even among UN agencies and within the NGO family. Local perceptions of security reflect a mélange of factors, including age, gender, economic status, political position, and the like.

Thirdly, perceptions of security evolve significantly over time. The three settings examined were at different stages of their respective crises: Kosovo with relative peace since mid-1999, Sierra Leone since 2000, and Afghanistan with continuing warfare in certain areas. The data suggests that local perceptions of security move rather quickly to encompass a wider range of concerns beyond physical security. While the changing security situation on the ground made for changing roles for outside actors, PSOs and AAs often seemed hard pressed to accommodate to changing needs. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that PSOs have done better at adapting than AAs. At the same time, local communities had little patience for the kinds of discussions of comparative advantage that preoccupy international agencies, being concerned more with enhancing security, broadly understood, than with distinctions about which institutions would assist them in the process.

The report proposes the concepts of physical and human security and of negative and positive peace as a framework for understanding the differing perceptions of security encountered. Physical security is understood to involve protection from harm and abuse, while human security encompasses a broader range of "quality of life" elements. Negative peace is understood to mean the absence of outright conflict, whereas positive peace connotes a situation in which the root causes of conflict are being effectively addressed. Local populations in each of the three settings articulated a strong sense that such security and peace as has been achieved could evaporate quickly if peace were not consolidated and the institutions of civil society not promptly nurtured.

In sum, the data presented and analyzed by the study offers an intriguing and provocative look at the wide-ranging security needs of local communities and the uneven extent to which these are understood and responded to by major international institutions. The voices of local communities are not being heard, much less "privileged," by outside actors. The dominant voices in transition environments instead are those of PSOs and AAs. Even the voice of government is often muffled. Such a disconnect has major implications: if the perceptions of local communities were to be the entry point for outside actor engagement or the benchmark for the effectiveness of international assistance and peace support, a major re-thinking of the ways PSOs and AAs operate would be required.

The report therefore points to the value of increased assessment and analysis of local perceptions by PSOs and AAs. To give the study broader relevance, more research should be conducted in other countries – Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been suggested – and systematized. (Ours turns out to have been a rare study of local perceptions of security issues.) Such ground-truthing is essential for effective programming as well as for enhancing the acceptability of outside agencies. Similarly, and to enhance the overall accountability of outside actors and empower local communities, systematic consultation is required to assess beneficiary perceptions and aspirations with respect to international assistance.

Each of the three case studies is summarized below.

Afghanistan: "Peace is jobs and electricity"

Afghans seem to be holding their breath. Three and a half years after the fall of the Taliban regime, peace, stability and a better life seem finally to be within grasp, at least in Kabul. The feeling of optimism is palpable and clearly linked to the "B52 factor" and the presence of foreign troops. At the same time, as Afghans start to look beyond immediate survival, new needs and challenges come into focus.

The processes set in motion by the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 are more or less on track. Presidential elections were held in October 2004 with an unexpectedly high level of participation and a low level of violence. They have legitimized President Karzai and his government and fuelled massive expectations. The challenge for the government and the international community is to respond to these expectations and to demonstrate visibly that things are changing for the better. Yet the dividends of peace are still a distant mirage for the vast majority of Afghans.

As of the winter of 2004/5 Afghanistan remains a weak, fragmented, and fragile state. Afghans remain at the bottom of the heap in the statistics of human misery. Unless the human needs and grievances of the population are met, the country could easily slide back into chaos. It is not just grinding poverty and underdevelopment, the criminalized poppy economy, the corruption that it generates, and

the weak legitimacy of the State that threaten the success of the peace process. The overwhelming majority of Afghans also want redress for the abuses they have endured.

PSO perceptions of security

Understanding the perceptions of international military contingents on matters of security and relating these to the perceptions of communities is not a simple task. The PSO forces are more diverse than the variegated aid community. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US-led Coalition Forces (CF) do not constitute homogenous blocs. The CF is both a fighting force actively engaged in anti-insurgency activities and a hearts and minds operation that provides assistance to the local population in a manner functional to its military objectives. Its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are located in the more insecure areas of the country. ISAF, based in Kabul, where it has broadly been successful in "stabilizing" the security situation, is not a fighting force. It has its own PRTs in the North and West of the country and is establishing new ones with the stated objective of taking over CF PRTs when security permits. ISAF PRTs are run by individual national contingents and although there is a plan, a coordination mechanism, and recently agreed Terms of Reference (TOR) for all (CF and ISAF) PRTs, huge differences, dictated by national cultural traditions, history, and different security postures, exist both within and among the two groupings.

As one officer put it, reflecting not only on the PRTs but on the overall lack of Coalition strategy for nation-building in Afghanistan: "*Policy is being invented as we go along. All planning is short term.*" A senior ISAF officer summarized the situation as follows: "*Approaches to security vary enormously from* PRT *to* PRT. *Some are more concerned with their own force protection. They drive around in armoured vehicles with flak jackets and weapons at the ready, while others go mainly on foot with floppy hats and no visible weapons. It's more a question of culture than of security on the ground.*"

The security posture is reflective of how PRTs and Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams relate to the local population. Early on, CF PRTs seemed to have a policy of linking assistance to the provision or collection of intelligence information on the insurgency. While examples of direct conditionality seem to be less frequent, the CF PRTs see themselves as part of the CF combat team. As one US officer put it: "*Their role is to provide reconstruction and security in one organization.*" At the opposite end of the PRT scale, the UK approach is to separate security from assistance to the maximum extent possible. A key role of the PRTs is "to build consent" for the international military presence, reflecting a clearer understanding that without such consent PRTs cannot operate. This implies analyzing the situation and defining indicators to measure consent; such indicators have been recently drawn up and are regularly monitored and include local perceptions of security.

AA perceptions

Aid workers raise a mix of physical and human security concerns. While their work is to engage with communities on rehabilitation and development issues, which have human security at the core, personal and agency security were still high on the agenda. Most feel the security situation has improved in recent months, particularly since the elections. The numbers of attacks was down at the time of writing, though it has subsequently increased and though the overall totals are still worryingly high. The lull in attacks was variously attributed to the harsh winter, progress in pushing back the insurgency and in cutting it off from its supporters in Pakistan, and greater caution by aid agencies in venturing into high risk areas. As a UN official put it: "*The most insecure areas are the most neglected by the aid community.*"

UN and NGO security postures contrast sharply. While both have significantly tightened their rules, "*the* UN *has thickened its armour, while the* NGOs *have gone local.*" As one observer noted: "*The* UN *protects itself but this dramatically reduces its access to the local population. It relies heavily on its* NGO *implementing partners and*

in a sense has passed on the risk to them." Many NGOs have drastically limited international staff travel by road. This allows projects to continue but increases the risks faced by national staff. Not a few interviewees mentioned the risks of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: less access means less assistance for the most vulnerable areas, which will lead in turn to growing resentment and an even more fragile security environment.

Local perceptions of security

Afghans citizens have a much wider understanding of security than physical security alone. It is a multilayered concept in which socio-economic aspects – human security – play a key, if not preponderant, role. Typically, focus group discussions would start by identifying physical security issues, usually with an acknowledgement that there has been a significant improvement in recent months. This would be followed by debate within the group on the "elements" of peace. After some scratching the surface, issues of employment, access to services, and welfare would come to the fore. In sum, in the relatively secure physical environment of Kabul and the adjoining rural areas, the absence of armed conflict is an important consideration, but the absence of stable and secure livelihoods is the fundamental determinant in the security perceptions of local communities.

Employment as a component of peace and security came up over and over again, particularly among the most disadvantaged. The clearest formulation was given by an illiterate shopkeeper in Kabul: "*Peace is jobs and electricity*." Often, as soon as one participant mentioned employment, the others chimed in with their own definitions. As a farmer in Paghman put it: "*Now we have security but no jobs – so the peace is not complete*."

Conclusions

Communities, AAs, and PSOs perceive security in ways different yet functional to their modus operandi. It is difficult to generalize on the basis of a short visit limited to the "Kabul bubble" and environs. Yet it is possible to say that the communities whose views were tapped in this study seem to have a much wider definition of peace and security than the outside actors. Peace is much more than the absence of war, they are saying. Positive peace – employment, education, health, electricity and a better life – is high on their agenda. They are also quick to define what is preventing positive peace from being achieved: a corrupt police force, criminality, and a pervasive sense that unless the warlords are reined in and if, Allah forbid, ISAF and the Coalition should leave, chaos could well ensue. This seems to be the central message.

Improved overall security has allowed communities to shift their sights progressively from physical security issues – freedom from fear and violence – to a range of human security concerns. As for PSOs and AAs, their progression along the axis is notably slower. This reflects the nature of their work, in the case of the former, and, for the latter, realtime security concerns as well as a certain sluggishness in adapting to a situation that presents many post-conflict aspects. It should be recognized, of course, that there are great variations within the PSO and AA communities.

Kosovo: "Living in a bubble"

Kosovo has experienced profound conflict between its Serbian and ethnic Albanian populations. In 1989, amid rising breakaway movements throughout Yugoslovia, President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy, a step that deepened Serb–Kosovar Albanian animosity. The majority of Kosovar Albanians initially favoured non-violent political action but the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came to the fore, attacking police and government installations as well as Serb civilians.

As Serbian forces struck back, atrocities were committed and the Kosovar population began to flee in large numbers.

Several international efforts to broker a peace plan failed. Western nations demanded major concessions from Belgrade, including starting a substantive dialogue between the main ethnic communities, the withdrawal of para-military forces, and autonomy for Kosovo. When Milosevic rejected these demands, NATO began a 78-day bombing campaign, leading to an increase in the flow of refugees. NATO bombardment eventually forced Milosevic to withdraw troops from Kosovo in June 1999 and to permit international troops to enter. The UN authorised a Kosovo Force (KFOR) and established a UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) asserting, respectively, military and civil/administrative control over the province. Renewed ethnic violence in 2001 and 2004 raised concerns over UNMIK's ability to maintain peace in Kosovo; talks to determine Kosovo's future are expected to commence by mid-2005.

PSO perceptions of security

While both KFOR and UNMIK are expressions of the will of the international community, they have differing approaches to security. UNMIK's mandate is to maintain "civil law and order, including establishing local police forces" and thus doing battle against "ordinary" crime. KFOR's responsibility, on the other hand, includes deterrence of hostilities. During the first years of its presence this responsibility was paramount. Armed ethnic Albanian gangs had been operating in the demilitarized zone in the South of Serbia proper, terrorising the local population. During 2001 ethnic strife in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) between ethnic Slavs and ethnic Albanians threatened the peace process. Cross-border raids and supply lines had to be cut, which was KFOR's responsibility. In addition, violence broke out in 2001 and 2004 in the divided city of Mitrovica and elsewhere in the province, requiring KFOR's deployment in support of the International and Kosovo Police Services.

While both KFOR and UNMIK acknowledge the tensions that could spark further violence in the community and are well aware of the ongoing ethnic divide, which both fuels and results from these tensions, the two organisations approach the matter of security from different directions. KFOR seeks to keep tensions in check by closely monitoring the ongoing situation and taking swift action to quell any rise in violence. In contrast, UNMIK needs, because of its mandate, to look for ways of drawing the divided community together and creating a climate for the re-establishment of a multi-ethnic society. At times, the aims of the two organisations are not mutually supportive. The restoration of a multi-ethnic society runs at odds with the desires of large sections of the population and efforts to establish it can lead to a rise in tensions. These tensions are then countered by measures taken by KFOR which can, in turn, raise the pressure manifesting itself as attacks across the ethnic divide that further inflame the situation.

Both KFOR and UNMIK personnel view the present uncertainty with regard to a final political status for Kosovo as an invitation to destabilization by radical elements. It is acknowledged that trouble-makers have learned that, through violence, they can draw international attention back to Kosovo.

AA perceptions

Aid agency personnel interviewed referred to freedom of movement, the absence of intimidation, and an environment that allows them to work as central to their perception of security. They are at present under no threat from armed violence resulting from the war. Working among the population and across the ethnic divide, the agencies are aware, however, that tensions can rapidly surface and destroy this perception of seeming tranquility. AAs are also aware that the incidence of crime, looting, and theft have risen considerably. The few aid agencies remaining in Kosovo have been forced to protect their offices with security guards, closed-circuit cameras, and other measures.

All AA interviewees saw the state of the economy, in combination with the unresolved issue of the final status of Kosovo, as serious threats to security and peace. They also point out a connection between the lethargic economy and inter-ethnic animosities. In addition, the lingering violence in the province deters international and diaspora investment, which has led to a moribund economy and high levels of unemployment.

Local perceptions of security

Interviewees made a distinction between the 'negative peace' that exists and the more positive peace for which they long. Differences of opinion followed the ethnic divide. Most of the ethnic Albanians expressed the view that negative peace exists in Kosovo. The presence of KFOR was seen in very positive terms, saving them from Belgrade. They realized that the deterrence of large-scale violence in itself does not bring about peace. Serbian interviewees expressed their sense of the absence of peace, reflecting a perception of living under enemy occupation and having to cope with economic deprivation. Ethnic Albanian respondents, by contrast, spoke of aspects of peace associated with the absence of fear, freedom of movement and the opportunity to live a decent life. The vast majority of interviewees, both Serb and Kosovar Albanian, stressed job insecurity, hardship, and deep feelings of helplessness borne of the realization that no major foreign investment will be forthcoming unless the future status of Kosovo is resolved.

Conclusions

Animosity in Kosovo between ethnic Serbs and Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s led to the attempted redrawing of the map by violent means and to the engagement of the international community and its political, military, and humanitarian institutions in response. Continued ethnic tensions keep the situation unstable today. This result runs counter to the expressed purpose of the international community to create a democratic multi-ethnic state in which freedom and equality are enjoyed by all ethnicities.

KFOR and UNMIK approach the maintenance of security from different directions; KFOR in terms of physical security for the population and themselves and UNMIK in the creation of a society in which the ethnic communities can live side by side in economic and political stability. The local population sees security in terms of this missing economic stability and the pressures it is putting on the whole of society. Frustration with the perceived lack of progress is then expressed through inter-ethnic violence and increasing criminality, with Islamic fundamentalism reportedly on the rise. Aid agency personnel are caught in the middle, seeking to carry out their tasks on behalf of the population but apprehensive about what the future holds.

The final status issue of Kosovo is intimately linked to whether the international community can overcome ethnocentrism through the imposition of principles of democracy and human rights. To most interviewees, concepts of 'security' and of 'peace' are relatively clear at a basic level. However, the underlying issue of ethnocentricity underscores the reality that both 'security' and 'peace' need conceptualisation at a more fundamental level.

Sierra Leone: "We are security for ourselves"

Sierra Leone's "rebel war" began in 1991 and officially ended in 2002. An estimated 75,000 people were killed, often under conditions of horrific brutality. An estimated 2.5 million people – half the population – were displaced or became refugees. The war was unique in the annals of African conflict in that it had no Cold War antecedents and no ethnic basis. It grew out of decades of corrupt, one-party rule and economic collapse. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) purported to be fighting for democracy but

did so by waging war against civilians. The RUF had no political ideology or popular support and paid for itself through the sale of "blood diamonds." The war attracted little humanitarian or international political attention until a peace agreement was signed between the RUF and the Government in 2000, after earlier agreements failed. A large UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), was then sanctioned and eventually reached a troop strength of 17,500.

The Sierra Leone war and the overall security situation must be seen in a regional context of cross-border incursions, large movements of displaced people and refugees, and of continued political uncertainty. While Sierra Leone was a completely failed state and the least stable country in the region during the latter half of the 1990s, that situation has changed. But Sierra Leone remains a desperately poor country. It never received much foreign aid, and emergency appeals during the war – always low in comparison to others – rarely met more than half their target.

PSO perceptions of security

PSO operations at the beginning of 2005 were varied. The largest was UNAMSIL. An international military training operation, the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), was rebuilding the Sierra Leone military – the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), and a Commonwealth police training program, present since 1998, has been involved in a complete overhaul of the police force. At the time this study was carried out, PSO security considerations focused primarily on military and police-related issues.

UNAMSIL's troop strength had declined gradually during 2004, to about 3500 troops in January 2005. Most border patrolling and other military responsibilities had devolved to the Sierra Leone army. UNAMSIL is expected to pull out completely by December 2005, although a battalion will likely remain behind, in part to protect the Special Court, which will not complete its work until mid-2006, or possibly later.

Comments about the army were made more frequently by international military advisers and NGOs than by Sierra Leoneans. The most dramatic, by an insider: *"The army is itself the biggest threat to security. The* RSLAF *has not yet found its niche in the new democratic Sierra Leone: There have been real problems in adjusting; they have not settled down. The army should have been downsized more vigorously from the start. You don't need more than* 3000-6000*, as it was in the* 1960s*. That level could be adequately funded as well, avoiding the resentment that you currently find. There has been a lot of training and reorganization, but attitudinal change is harder to achieve."*

AA perceptions

AA representatives in most interviews begin the discussion of security with the same sorts of issues posed by PSO representatives: the planned departure of UNAMSIL; the role of IMATT and the loyalty of the RSLAF; plus potential security threats from Guinea and Liberia. Several commented on the widespread incidence of robbery, although all noted that incidents of armed robbery are rare.

These issues – robbery, the military, potential cross-border threats – were generally, however, not regarded by AAs as the most important security threats. For most, the main security issues revolve around the economy, a related issue – unemployed youth – and around perceptions of mismanagement and corruption in government.

Local perceptions of security

Typically, a discussion with Sierra Leoneans about security begins with a statement about how peace has at last come to Sierra Leone. In almost every case, however, this is followed quickly with

a series of qualifiers. Robbery is raised as the most common security problem today. This leads to a discussion about the police, justice and the courts, and inevitably to the deeper underlying causes of crime – and ultimately of the war: the economy, poverty, youth unemployment, corruption and mismanagement.

Every conversation emphasizes the economy and the lack of viable livelihoods. Sierra Leone has been last on the UN Human Development Index since the year the index was inaugurated. The poverty – both rural and urban – is palpable. Poor wages and high prices are a part of every conversation, and are a backdrop to every discussion about corruption. The leader of a local NGO says, *"The real security issue is the economy, and people's livelihoods. Opportunities are very limited. There has been a lot of talk about food security, but so far it has not been translated into anything very meaningful."*

Conclusions

People who live in Sierra Leone, citizens and expatriates alike, have high expectations of a country coming out of war. There are common refrains about corruption and the government "doing nothing." The nature and frequency of these comments has not changed much in the past 10 years, although for the occasional visitor, objective changes are clearly evident.

The most striking thing about Sierra Leone is the indivisibility for local people of military security and human security. For PSOs, military issues are, not surprisingly, their first areas of concern. They too, however, recognize the threats to long-term peace posed by a weak economy and poor governance. AA representatives are further along the continuum between military and human security. For them, the economy is a prime security issue, especially as it translates into unemployed youth and acts as a catalyst for corruption and mismanagement.

For Sierra Leoneans – and this view emerges from almost all interviews – the economy is the number one security issue. Everything flows from poverty: corruption and mismanagement; the dangers posed by unemployed youth; the dependability of the police; the loyalty of the army. Ending the war and securing the peace was a top priority for everyone during the late 1990s and through to the formal peace in 2002. Three years later, however, very large amounts are still being spent by donors on security and governance-related programming, while economic development spending lags behind.

1. Introduction

Background

The commissioners of this report were the UK NGO–Military Contact Group (NMCG), based in London. The group is composed of individuals from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and St Andrew's University. The overall purpose of the NMCG is to facilitate better communication between the military and aid organizations, as well as to organize events and projects that will build towards an increased level of mutual understanding. Funds for the undertaking were provided by DFID in the form of a grant administered by the BRCS; the project was managed in the UK by a Steering Committee[1] of the NMCG. Additional funds were provided by the MOD to organize a seminar held on 19 April 2005 to consider the study's findings. The undertaking is an outgrowth of an NMCG meeting held in March 2004 to consider competing visions of security and how it is measured and to formulate a research agenda to seek to define security as an operational concept.

The report is based on research conducted by a team from Tufts University's Feinstein International Famine Center in Medford, Massachusetts. The team, interdisciplinary and international in nature, was composed of Antonio Donini (team leader), Ian Smillie, Ted van Baarda, Anthony C. Welch, and Larry Minear. (See Appendix 6 for brief biographies.) The team members brought a great deal of experience to the case studies, which were selected by the designers of the research. Each of the case studies was carried out by an individual who had lived and worked in the areas in question and had written extensively about the conflicts and reconstruction issues.

The research was conducted during the period January–March 2005 in Afghanistan (Donini), Kosovo (Welch/van Baarda) and Sierra Leone (Smillie). (See Box 1 for an overview of the case studies.) In each country, the research utilized survey instruments designed by the Tufts team in individual and focus group interviews conducted on an off-the-record basis. (The Survey Instruments are reproduced in Appendix 2.) The three case studies that make up Chapter 2 were drafted by the researchers and refined following discussions among the team. Chapters 1 and 3 are the product of an exchange of views among team members. The team met in Boston on 9–10 March to discuss its findings and conclusions and to prepare for the London seminar.

Box 1. Overview of case studies

Case Study	Dates	Total Interviewees	Team Members
Afghanistan	February 7–20, 2005	153	Antonio Donini
Kosovo	January 21–31, 2005	63	Anthony Welch, Ted van Baarda
Sierra Leone	January 27–February 7, 2005	~130	Ian Smillie

The research team met with the stakeholders at a pre-research seminar held at DFID on 29 November 2004 and attended by some 60 participants from the UK military, DFID, NGOs, and academia. The seminar provided an opportunity for the team to present its approach for comment and for the participants to refine further the undertaking's terms of reference. The team was asked to give priority to the views of local communities; the views of the military contingents of peace support operations (PSOs) and assistance agencies (AAs), while of interest, were already better known. The study's basic purpose (see Box 2) was to analyze and understand the varying perspectives on security of each of the three sets of institutions. The objective, the stakeholders clarified, was not necessarily to promote closer cooperation or integration of activities between military and civilian institutions.

The team views one of the major functions of the research as being to identify and analyze to the views of local communities. In fact, this may, on balance, be one of the major contributions of the report. With that in mind, we have taken the rather unusual step of reproducing all of the quotations from interviews of local communities – and for that matter, of PSO and AA officials as well – in italics so that they will be readily apparent to readers. We are also making arrangements to ensure that those who contributed to the study will receive copies of the finished product.

The stakeholders did not expect comprehensive quantitative data from the report but sought instead "an intelligent probing of the issues" and "a fresh perspective" on them. The team updated the stakeholders and sought their input at regular intervals during the conduct of the study.

Methodological issues are discussed in Appendix 3 and the survey instruments used by the team appear in Appendix 2.

The results of the research were presented at an international seminar sponsored by the MOD in London on 19 April 2005. The seminar drew together a group of some 100 persons, comprised of military personnel from the UK, NATO, and NATO-member countries; from DFID and the Foreign Office; European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the Red Cross Movement, NGOs and the UN system; and several academics. Appendix 4 provides information on the scope of the seminar as well as its participants.

Box 2. Research Terms of Reference: A secure environment for whom?

The initiative will look "at specific situations where a UN-mandated PSO is in place alongside an ongoing/developing humanitarian response. The research should also be framed so as to maximize the benefits of the possibility of engagement with the UK military afforded by the cooperation of members of the NMCG. Within this specific context, the following questions could be asked:

1. How does/did the PSO military force define security – for itself and for the wider context? What were the indicators by which changes in security levels were measured?
2. How does/did the humanitarian community (and/or individual humanitarian actors) define and measure security? How far was security seen in terms of humanitarian operations as opposed to the wider situation for the population of the country/area as a whole?
3. How do/did the communities affected by conflict organize, define and seek to enhance their own security? To what extent did/do communities understand or see as relevant the definitions and implementation of security described above?
4. How can community perceptions and definitions of security contribute towards the efforts of all actors in the creation and maintenance of a secure environment?"

Box 3. Terminology

In this study the term **local community** is used as shorthand for individuals and groups interviewed at the local level. The communities referenced are not necessarily structured or homogenous in a demographic or anthropological sense. Some were individuals or members of pre-existing groups such as school teachers or tribal elders; others were assembled for purposes of the study. A given local community often spoke with many voices.

The term **assistance agencies** (AAs) is used in preference to the more restrictive term humanitarian organizations in recognition of the fact that in each of the three cases surveyed, the conflict is partially or fully past, with the assistance actors that are now present on the ground engaged in reconstruction and development as well as emergency relief activities. Most of the AAs interviewed were international; however, some were indigenous. "Assistance" and "aid" are used interchangeably throughout this report.

An official definition, internationally agreed, of the term **peace support operation** (PSO) does not exist. The term is used informally by the British military; the US military instead uses "military operations other than war (MOOTW)". In practice, the abbreviation PSO refers to an operation wholly or mainly military, in support of peace-making or peace-building efforts mandated by the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Steering Committee clarified for the research team that although individual PSOs often include non-military elements, for purposes of the study this category was intended to be comprised solely of military forces. Thus the report does not consider either the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) or UNMIK in Kosovo within the PSO category, strictly defined.[2]

Box 5 provides an overview of the major categories of PSO and AA personnel interviewed in each of the three countries. While this report refers to "countries" visited or "country studies", it should be noted that the entity referred to as "Kosovo" is legally a part of Serbia and Montenegro. The team takes no position as to the future legal status of Kosovo.

Appendix 5 contains a selection of entries for further reference. It is not intended to be inclusive either of all works on peace and security or of all resources on each of the three countries studied. It focuses instead on the more limited number of documents available on local perceptions of these issues and includes not only grey literature but also relevant websites and other information sources. Some of the most helpful entries are annotated with brief comments.

As is often the case in such undertakings, the research raises as many issues as it addresses. The Feinstein International Famine Center (FIFC) at Tufts stands ready to pursue issues that merit further exploration. As the FIFC will continue to be engaged in monitoring developments in this area, we welcome comment and feedback on the report itself, which should be conveyed to Antonio Donini at: antonio.donini@tufts.edu.

Conceptual framework

The basic concepts examined in this study are those of security and peace as seen through the eyes of three distinct sets of actors: PSO forces, AAs, and local populations. These concepts have different connotations for each of the three sets of actors surveyed. There are also differences in understandings within each set of actors. This study uses the term "physical security" to describe protection from violence and abuse, as contrasted with (but also contained within) the idea of "human security",

a much broader concept that encompasses economic, social well-being and cultural identity. Similarly, the report speaks of "negative peace"[3] to describe the absence of active armed conflict as distinct from "positive peace", which connotes a situation in which the structural conditions that gave rise to conflict are being addressed and local people have a sense of empowerment, participation, and accountability.

Thanks to a wider literature on the subject, these concepts can be further refined to provide a general framework for interpreting the data generated. The concept of "security" involves several sub-categories.

- There may be a dimension of military security, i.e. the absence of a hostile power or destabilising influence that has the capability to weaken the defences of one's own nation. By the same token, the presence of such a hostile power or destabilising influence suggests the presence of military insecurity. Examples are the global war on terror leading to the US attack on Afghanistan, but also in the case of Kosovo, when NATO decided that its southern flank could be endangered by the possible spill-over of insurgents and/or refugees into other nations.

- Security can also imply ideological/cultural security, i.e. the absence of a (perceived) threat to a certain ideology or culture, while ideological/cultural insecurity connotes this threat. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for instance, communism was superimposed on a traditionally Islamic culture, thus creating a threat to deeply ingrained beliefs and mores. A less draconian example would be attempts to impose Western-style democracy, including elections, in nations that have traditionally been organised on a tribal basis. Such attempts could upset a delicate balance of power and cause cultural insecurity and resistance.

- Economic security focuses on the uninterrupted flow of commodities of a given nation, as well as opportunities to engage in equitable international trade. Uncertainties concerning the access to commodities or trade opportunities would suggest economic insecurity. At the London seminar mentioned above, the example was given of rice imports into Sierra Leone: although the country is capable of producing its own rice, the import of cheap, subsidised rice from the US undercuts local production to the detriment of economic security.

- The concept of human security[4] is of particular importance for this study, since it focuses on the perceptions of the members of the local population rather than security considerations at the strategic level. Of course, developments in one aspect of security are likely to influence other areas.

Peace needs a minimum of justice.[5] Peace and stability cannot coexist with structural violence on a large scale. Structural violence is distinguished from personal violence – it refers to the 'structures of society', its repressive laws, customs, economic usages which impede the development of human potential in a meaningful way. The stark difference between rich and poor or the unequal distribution of foodstuffs are frequently mentioned as examples of structural violence. Likewise a situation in which structural injustice is so widespread that virtually no means exist to effect change through peaceful means. However, the converse is also true: there will be no peace without a minimum of tolerance for perceived injustice. For the sake of peace, a measure of tolerance for (perceived) injustice remains essential, even for societies in transition from ruthless regimes or civil wars.

Box 4. Sources of data: Local communities

Country	Number of Individuals Interviewed	Number of Focus Groups / Number of FG Participants	Number of Locations	Categories of Persons
Afghanistan	32 (+ 21 electronic responses)	10/ 102	10 (2 in Logar province, 3 in rural Kabul province, 5 in urban Kabul)	Tribal elders; university students; rural aid beneficiaries; urban water and sanitation committee; small businessmen; female professionals; destitute widows; day laborers. Only one group (students) was mixed in gender, all other groups were of either exclusively male or exclusively female make-up.
Kosovo	35	4/ 28	4 (Pristina, Zubin Potok and Mitrovica North and South)	Kosovo Serbs; Kosovar Albanians; students; employed and unemployed workers; teachers; lawyers; doctors; newspaper editor; senior politician; businessmen; representatives of a displaced community; farmers; housewives; inter-ethnic dialogue group. Groups were all mixed gender and generally reflected the province's gender balance.
Sierra Leone	25	10/ 104	7 (Freetown and six other towns)	National and district level officials; police; Sierra Leonean civil society organizations; representatives of Special Court for Sierra Leone; students at all levels; teachers; youth; village elders; war-wounded. Groups were of mixed gender, exclusively male, and exclusively female make-up.
Totals	113	24/ 234	21	

Box 5. Sources of data: PSOs/ AAs

Case Study	PSOs	AAs
Afghanistan	ISAF; CIMIC; Coalition Forces; UK military	Red Cross/Red Crescent; UNAMA and other UN agencies; international and national NGOs; international research institutes; donors; Afghan senior officials
Kosovo	KFOR; UNMIK; European Agency for Reconstruction; OSCE	Local NGOs; CARE; DFID; Kosovan Nansen Dialogue
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL; IMATT; Special Court for Sierra Leone	Local and international NGOs; donor organizations

There is an intimate relationship between peace and development.[6] The term development is frequently interpreted in the context of development assistance, with peace an essential prerequisite. Yet development has a more fundamental meaning. As expressed in a UN document, "Development is not … an aim that our societies are free to adopt or reject; it is their very substance and link between the past, present and future generations. If rightly understood, it is not just one particular social duty amongst others, not even the primary duty: development is the condition of all social life and therefore an inherent requirement of every obligation. Individuals and nations can only be united with each other it they first exist. Individual experiences and the existence of human societies are a function of progress, in other words of the expansion of human potentialities and of a corresponding increase of material goods. To reject development as a primary obligation would be to reject the humanisation of man and therefore the possibility of a moral system."[7]

The final goal would, in all likelihood, be sustainable peace, the key element sustainability. Sustainability refers to the ability of a society to resolve potential conflicts and infringements of the law on an impartial and transparent basis in accordance with the law. It also refers to a propensity for peaceful change, i.e. to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts towards a society within which positive peace can exist. Total peace however, will never exist; there will always be a gap between the present and the aspired. As former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Affairs Brian Urquhart noted: "Struggle is the essence of life. The problem is to draw a line between struggle, which is stimulating, and conflict, which is often lethal." Of the United Nations … Dag Hammarskjold said that "the constant struggle to close the gap between aspiration and performance now, as always, makes the difference between civilization and chaos."[8]

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In Sierra Leone, special thanks are owed to several organizations and individuals who helped to make the trip both possible and productive. SCF–UK arranged some of the early logistical support and meetings in Freetown and arranged for a full programme of meetings in several towns of Kambia District. UNDP provided transportation for the 5-day trip to the field. The Network Movement for Justice and Development helped with additional meetings in Freetown, and the Talking Drum Studio helped with transportation in Freetown. Many individuals also helped: Paul Roberts, Abu Kokofele, Anita Yamba, Abu Brima, Sallieu Kamara, William Dauda, Frances Fortune, Sylvia Fletcher, and drivers Henry Turay and Simeon Conteh. Many thanks to all.

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2. Case Studies

Afghanistan: "Peace is jobs and electricity"

The big picture

Afghans seem to be holding their breath. Three and a half years after the fall of the Taliban regime, peace, stability and a better life seem finally to be within grasp, at least in Kabul. The feeling of optimism is palpable and clearly linked to the "B52 factor" and the presence of ISAF. At the same time, as Afghans start to look beyond immediate survival, new needs and challenges come into focus.

The Afghan crisis spans a 25 year period that has seen the demise of the Cold War, the ensuing reshuffling of political and military agendas in Central and South Asia, and the tentative emergence of a new approach to world ordering centered around the global war on terror and the promotion of liberal peace. The crisis can be divided into four distinct phases – each with its own deadly mix of suffering affecting the Afghan people. First, the period from the Soviet invasion to the fall of the Najibullah regime (1979–92), which resulted in bitter conflict, one of the largest exoduses of refugees and massive internal displacement. Second, the civil war among the *mujahedin* factions and the triumph of warlordism (1992–96), which led to a total breakdown of state institutions, widespread fighting and destruction in the cities and further displacement. This was followed, third, by the emergence of the Taliban, and their authoritarian rule (1996–September 2001), the imposition of abusive measures, rigid Islamic orthodoxy and support for Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan progressively drifted from "failed" to "rogue" state and was held at bay by the international community.

Finally, post 9/11, with the heavy involvement of the US and other international actors, Afghanistan has entered a period of rapid change where the promise of peace, accountable governance and socio-economic development has given rise to a wave of optimism. Pitfalls on the road to peace and justice are, however, deep and wide. After more than two decades of war, destruction, displacement and human rights abuses, coupled with the consequences of the most severe drought in living memory, Afghans are still struggling to survive. Access to employment, services and respect for human rights are tenuous at best; governance remains fragmented and contested and the economy largely criminalized. The return of some two million refugees from Pakistan and Iran, mainly to Kabul and other urban areas, adds to the stress of an already fragile transition process.

The processes set in motion by the UN-sponsored Bonn Agreement of December 2001 are more or less on track, with the exception of transitional justice. Presidential elections were held in October 2004 with an unexpectedly high level of participation and a low level of violence. They have legitimized President Karzai and his government and generated a sense of buoyancy in the population at large, as well as fueling massive expectations. The challenge for the government and the assistance community is to respond to these expectations and to demonstrate, visibly, that things are changing for the better. This is a tall order. The dividends of peace are still a distant mirage for the vast majority of Afghans and the road ahead is littered with obstacles.

As of the winter of 2004/5 – a bitterly cold one, which perhaps explains a protracted lull in insurgency activity – Afghanistan remains a weak, fragmented, and fragile state. The international and de jure legitimacy of the central government has been considerably strengthened by the successful

Map of Afghanistan

Source: United Nations

presidential elections, but its de facto legitimacy remains weak throughout the country. It is possible to divide the country into three zones with corresponding levels of legitimacy. In the "Kabul bubble," legitimacy and security are strong thanks to the combined presence of Coalition Forces (CF) and to patrolling by ISAF. In the northern half of the country, where the government is struggling to extend its authority, pockets of insecurity remain. The insurgency is not a serious problem but large- and small-scale warlordism, as well as the criminalized economy linked to drugs and smuggling, continue to challenge the authority of the central government. Finally, there is the vast Pashtun belt from Kunar to Helmand provinces where the government has little or no presence outside the main towns, where tribal structures remain the main form of social organization and where, particularly in the south and south-west, AAs can only operate with great difficulty because of continuing insurgency and counter-insurgency activities and widespread insecurity. The high price paid by national staff of NGOs in the south and south-west testifies to the risks that staff are prepared to take to deliver much needed services.

The presence and functions of the international military forces in the three zones are clearly differentiated: they are benign and well accepted in Kabul, where 8,000 ISAF troops enhance the security of the local population. They are light and sparse through the small ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that provide a range of conflict mediation, dissuasion, and reconstruction services in the provinces of the north-east, north, and west. Finally, they are menacing and aggressive throughout the remaining areas where the CF are actively engaged in combat as they strive, simultaneously, to win hearts and minds through the CF PRTs.

While the presence of international forces constitutes a key element in the Afghan security equation, other variables are at play which, arguably, may ultimately have a deeper impact on the success or failure of the overall transition process. These are, in roughly descending order of importance:

- the extent to which the government is able to deliver a visible peace dividend that meets the high expectations of the population;
- the manner in which the issue of warlords, large and small, is addressed and whether the issue of accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is effectively put on the agenda;
- whether the issues of structural violence that affect the livelihoods of the vast majority of Afghans are acknowledged and addressed (corruption, abusive authorities, conflicts over land, property and water, violence against women and girls, marginalization of the poor);
- whether the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process succeeds in taking the guns away and provides a modicum of livelihoods for ex-gun holders;
- the issue of poppy cultivation, the strategy for its eradication and the sheer magnitude of the criminalized as compared to the legitimate economy;
- the nature and remit of institutions of governance and whether they will be able to foster a process of reconciliation or, on the contrary, lead to further polarization in Afghan society; and, perhaps most importantly,
- whether a balance will be maintained between tradition and modernization or instead, as so often in the past, a backlash occurs against externally induced transformative processes.

Afghans remain at the bottom of the heap in the statistics of human misery.[9] While a cautious sense of optimism is perceptible, at least in Kabul, Afghanistan is still a "nation at odds with itself."[10] Unless the human needs and grievances of the population are met, the country could easily slide back into chaos. It is not just grinding poverty and underdevelopment, the criminalized poppy economy, the corruption that it generates, and the weak legitimacy of the state that threaten the success of the peace process. The overwhelming majority of Afghans also want redress for the abuses they have endured. A recent country-wide survey undertaken by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has shown that fully 80% of the more than 6,000 respondents say that "there can be no peace without justice". Another study concludes that a similar proportion believes that unless the guns are taken away and the warlords are held to account, there will be no durable peace.[11]

The issue of whether there can be peace without justice, which for all intents and purposes had been buried by the government, the UN, and the international community during the first two and a half years of the post-Bonn period, has now come centre stage. Thanks to the efforts of the AIHRC and human rights NGOs, it is unlikely that the government and donors will be able to continue to ignore it. Linked to this is the issue of the nature of the democratization process. Unless legitimacy, the rule of law, and the protection of citizens' rights extend to the local level, elections may well satisfy the international community's calendar but do little to respond to popular aspirations for protection against abusive commanders, warlords, druglords or oppressive aspects of the culture.[12] Moreover, the Bonn agreement was an agreement among victors. It did not foresee the need for a process of reckoning or reconciliation. Hence the risk of a growing disconnect between the formality of the democratic process resulting from Bonn and the reality of power and socio-economic relations at the village or district level. Combined with the multiple factors of instability mentioned above, the lack of traction on justice and rights could well contribute to a dangerous human security crisis – even if the presence of international forces is able to prevent the overall security situation from spinning out of control.

The "Kabul bubble"

As much of the data collected for this case study is based on interviews held in and around Kabul, it may be useful to provide a snapshot of what Kabul looked like in February 2005. In three years the population of the city has more than doubled, reaching a staggering estimated 3.4 million, thanks in particular to the massive return of refugees. A murky pall of pollution hangs over the congested capital. Foreigners and locals alike are affected by the "Kabul cough". Housing is a very serious problem: corruption, land-grabbing and speculation are pushing the poorest segments of the population out of the center and into progressively more insalubrious shelter. At the same time, Klondike-style construction fever is gripping the city. Garish marble-covered luxury houses are replacing traditional bungalows; concrete and glass office blocks and car dealerships are incongruously sprouting among the drab mud houses of urban misery. Large buildings stand unfinished or occupied by internally displaced persons (IDPs), the vast expanses of poverty branch out from the city center to squalid squatter settlements in bombed-out neighbourhoods and up the barren hills where the drudgery of carrying water, securing some protection against the bitter cold, and basic human survival are not much different from what they were in Taliban times.

The city is patrolled and secure, outwardly at least. Coalition and ISAF vehicles speed around from one heavily bunkerized military complex to another. Concrete blocks, razor wire and aggressive armed men protect every civil or military foreign installation. Entire neighbourhoods have been occupied and secured by the vast array of CF, ISAF, UN, embassy, private security company, business and other expatriate concerns and their multitude of guards. NGOs have increased the height of their walls and restricted access to their compounds, but have until now resisted the employment of armed guards.

Kabul is also a somewhat surreal place, and not only because of the familiar contrast between extreme wealth and abject poverty that one finds in many Third World capitals. The expatriate community is numerous and highly conspicuous. It has its own alcohol-serving restaurants, shopping centers and medical services. NGOs tend to drive in un-marked vehicles, which makes the luxury SUVs of the UN, embassies and private companies all the more visible. Because of security concerns – and massive traffic jams – expat driving has become more aggressive. CF, ISAF and security company vehicles are frequently involved in accidents (a few respondents mentioned that this was the highest security risk that they, or their children, were facing).[13] Surprisingly, there is little open resentment vis-à-vis the foreign military presence – most Kabulis are thankful for it. Not so vis-à-vis the assistance community: resentment is growing partly due to high profile statements by the former Minister of Planning who in early 2005 had accused NGOs of being "thieves." A similar view was expressed by President Karzai himself when he issued a stinging rebuke to NGOs "for squandering the precious resources that Afghanistan received in aid from the international community."[14]

As in many post-conflict situations, crime is on the rise, or is perceived to be so. Burglaries are a big concern. Often these are seen to be committed by "men in uniform" or by people who are protected by the police. Stories abound of people fleeced at official or unofficial checkposts. Rumours are also rife about gangs kidnapping children and girls (plausible) or trafficking in human organs for resale in Pakistan and the Gulf (less plausible). True or not, the impact is real. Parents are wary of the movements of their children and are often reluctant to let them go out to play. Thanks to functioning mobile phone systems, however, the elite are more able to check on the whereabouts of their young ones. Many people have commented that "being rich" is tantamount to being insecure as wealth attracts crime. Taxi drivers are equally if not more vulnerable.

The following paragraphs present the findings of the research in Afghanistan. First the perspectives of PSOs and AAs on their own security and that of the population are examined. This is followed by

a discussion of the perspectives of communities as they emerged from the focus group meetings and related interviews.

PSOs and security

Understanding the perceptions of the international military contingents on matters of security and relating these to the perceptions of communities is a tall order. The PSO community in Afghanistan is perhaps more diverse and confusing than even the variegated aid community. ISAF and the Coalition do not constitute homogenous blocs. The CF is both a fighting force actively engaged in an anti-insurgency shooting war and a "hearts and minds" operation that provides relief and services to the local population in a manner that is functional to its military objectives. Both the CF and ISAF operate PRTs. These relatively small bases with mixed security and civilian support functions (including in some cases direct assistance) constitute an important innovation in the way in which PSOs conduct their business in crisis environments. So far this experiment is limited to Afghanistan, but it is safe to assume that the Afghan experience will be closely studied for possible application elsewhere.

PRTs do not come in a one-size-fits all model. The Coalition PRTs (with the exception of the New Zealand PRT in Bamiyan) are located in the more insecure areas of the country in the vast Pashtun belt from Kunar province to Helmand. ISAF, based in Kabul, where it has broadly been successful in "stabilizing" the security situation, is not a fighting force. It has its own PRTs in the north and west of the country and is establishing new ones working westwards with the ultimate stated objective of taking over the CF PRTs when the security situation permits. ISAF PRTs are run by individual national contingents and although there is a plan, a coordination mechanism, and agreed TOR for all CF and ISAF PRTs, huge differences, dictated by national cultural traditions, history, and different security postures, exist both within and among the two groupings.[15]

PRTs do different things in different geographical areas. While an overall policy mechanism exists at the central level – the Steering Committee for the PRTs in which CF, ISAF, donors and the government are represented at high levels – actual policy is vague and activities disparate. As one officer put it, reflecting not only on the PRTs but on the overall lack of Coalition strategy for nation-building in Afghanistan: "*Policy is being invented as we go along. All planning is short term.*" Another ISAF officer defined the role of the PRTs as "*to bring stability and security by nurturing the creation of functioning local government structures. We assist, but ideally the government people are in charge.*" The US/CF approach is much more interventionist, with visible projects happening on the ground.

Decisions on what the PRTs do are made within national contingents and cultural or political considerations apply. The Maimana PRT (UK/ISAF) and the Bamyan PRT (New Zealand/CF) do not do assistance projects. They see their role as providing an enabling environment for aid agencies, supporting government and governance structures, and defusing local conflicts. As one officer put it: "*We talk to the* NGO*s but don't tread on their turf. The only project the* PRT *did was to rebuild the jail because no* NGO *wanted to touch it.*" The CF PRTs in the south, south-east, and east have a much more activist role. The commanders have funds at their disposal and discretion for projects. They have embedded bilateral aid representatives, work with local government representatives, and function like military-relief hybrids. They constitute perhaps the ideal type of a military model of securitization of aid to be replicated elsewhere. In Gardez, it is said that the PRT aims to take over aid coordination on behalf of the government. As one observer noted: "*The merging of the military and assistance agendas will be General Barno's lasting contribution to* US *military history.*"[16]

To complicate matters further, the security postures of the PRTs vary widely and do not seem to bear much relation to the actual security threat they face. Predictably, force protection is a key concern in

any military deployment, especially in areas where there are armed insurgents. But even in relatively peaceful areas there are wide differences. The German (ISAF) PRT in Kunduz is said to have a large 300-strong military contingent to protect it. The Dutch PRT in Baghlan (also ISAF), working in an equally benign security environment is much more modestly guarded.

Decisions on where to set up a PRT seem to be donor-driven. According to one high ranking Dutch officer, the Dutch Government chose Baghlan because security assessments had identified this province as benign. The ethnic mix was limited and it did not appear to be volatile in nature. Because of the low risks involved in Baghlan, it was expected that parliament would approve a Dutch mission there while it might not have approved a mission in a more volatile region. "*In Baghlan, getting mugged is the greatest security risk.*"

A senior ISAF officer summarized the situation as follows:

"*Approaches to security vary enormously from* PRT *to* PRT. *Some are more concerned with their own force protection. They drive around in armoured vehicles with flak jackets and weapons at the ready while others go mainly on foot with floppy hats and no visible weapons. Some* PRTs *are guarded by Coalition Forces. The* ISAF PRT *in Maimana is guarded by local guards. It's more a question of culture than of security on the ground.*"

The security posture is reflective of how the PRTs and the CIMIC teams relate to the local population. Early on, CF PRTs seemed to have a policy of linking assistance to the provision or collection of intelligence information on the insurgency. While blatant examples of direct conditionality – "*we will provide you with assistance if you tell us where the Taliban are*" – seem now to be less frequent, the CF PRTs clearly see themselves as part of the CF combat team. As one US officer put it: "*Their role is to provide reconstruction and security in one organization.*" Interestingly, senior US military officers seemed to see the role of the PRTs in human security terms: "*The campaign plan of the Coalition encompasses a wide definition of security: if people have jobs, this encourages a stable environment.*"

At the opposite end of the PRT scale of diversity, the UK approach is to separate, to the maximum extent possible, security from assistance. The role of the PRTs and of CIMIC in general is "to build consent" for the international military presence so that it can operate without being attacked by hostile forces. There is a clearer understanding based, reportedly, on the UK military's experience of patrolling in Northern Ireland, that without nurturing such consent the PRTs cannot operate. This implies also analyzing the situation and defining indicators to measure consent. Such indicators have been drawn up (and are presumably monitored) by ISAF. The list is classified but includes a number of indicators of local perceptions of security, the rates of criminality and unemployment, shooting incidents, the presence or not of armed elements, warlords, the effectiveness of the police, and the like. When asked how they "measured security", a UK CIMIC officer explained that ISAF looked at both objective indicators (number of shooting incidents; whether there are armed people around or illegal checkposts on the roads; whether children or civilians were intimidated by ISAF patrols) and more qualitative ones based on local perspectives that they would pick up in discussions with the local population.

Needless to say, the current confusion regarding the roles and functions of the PRTs is a hot topic of discussion in Kabul among donors, UN agencies, NGOs and of course the military. While the topic is still hot, the debate between the aid community and the CF/ISAF on the issue of PRTs is less acrimonious and ideological than it was in the early days of PRTs when aid agencies were up in arms because sometimes PRT troops, or their CIMIC predecessors, moved around in civilian clothes (they no longer do so). Concerns still abound, including with respect to the issue of the "dress

code": several officers confirmed that despite assurances earlier provided in Washington to NGOs, US special forces still move around in civilian clothes and un-marked, NGO-style vehicles. But, by and large, both sides have become more pragmatic and more open. The fact that the military are prepared to listen to NGO concerns has helped. NGOs have also been invited to speak at coordination meetings for PRTs and there is a bi-weekly CIMIC meeting in Kabul at which concerns can be raised. NGOs have come to accept that, whether they like it or not, PRTs will remain an important part of the Afghan scene for many years to come.

AAs and security

The following section draws on over 50 interviews (held in person and received electronically) with aid workers based in Kabul and other duty stations and including some 20 'context interviews' with Kabul-based assistance agency officials (UN agency heads, NGO directors, NGO security staff, and NGO agency staff at different levels). Compared to focus group participants who mostly reflected their personal and local experiences, aid agency staff tended to have a broader view of security issues as they travelled to, or had access to information on security conditions in, different parts of the country.

The majority of aid workers felt that the overall security situation had improved in recent months, particularly since the elections.[17] The numbers of attacks was down in 2005, though the overall totals were still worryingly high (13 aid workers killed in 2003; 24 in 2004; 13 electoral staff killed in 2004; 6, as of April, in 2005).[18] The post-elections lull in attacks was variously attributed to the harsh winter, progress in pushing back the insurgency and in cutting it off from its supporters in Pakistan, and to the fact that AAs were more cautious and no longer ventured into high risk areas. As a UN official put it: "*The most insecure areas are the most neglected by the aid community*".

Security concerns were high on the agenda of all senior UN and NGO staff interviewed. In fact, several used as a yardstick of improvement the fact that they "spent less time" on security management issues. That said, despite the well established procedures for data collection on security incidents (by the Afghanistan NGO Security Office – ANSO – and by the UN), the impression is that the data is largely anecdotal with little effort to analyze trends or to link these trends to other political and socio-economic factors. In the words of a seasoned international NGO director: "*There is an atmosphere of anti-empiricism in Afghanistan. Policy is being made on anecdote and perception. There is very little real analysis.*" A few people mentioned the potentially explosive implications of the combination of DDR, botched poppy eradication, unemployment, and the disintegration of both insurgent forces and warlords into smaller entities, but there was scant analysis to back this up.

The security postures of the UN and NGOs are very different. While both sets of players have significantly tightened their rules, "*the* UN *has thickened its armour, while the* NGOs *have gone local.*" This was brought home during a visit to rural Logar province. The author was travelling with Afghan staff who knew the area well in an unmarked NGO vehicle with no radio. We stumbled on a UN agency convoy of two white land cruisers and two pick-ups full of Afghan armed guards. As one observer noted: "*The* UN *protects itself but this dramatically reduces its access to the local population. It relies heavily on its* NGO *implementing partners and in a sense has passed on the risk to them.*" Many NGOs have drastically limited international staff travel by road. This allows projects to continue but limits the range of programming possibilities (especially when donors, like ECHO, insist that projects be monitored by international staff). Not a few interviewees mentioned the risks of a creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: less access means less assistance for the most vulnerable areas, which will lead in turn to growing resentment and an even more fragile security environment.

Not surprisingly, a range of views were advanced on how best to work in insecure environments. Most respondents were of the view that "*It's not working there, it's getting there, that is problematic.*" The implication is that once a relationship of mutual trust has been established, communities will protect aid workers in the project area, but that they are at risk when travelling through territory where they do not have a relationship with the locals. This may be more or less true depending on the area, but it does indicate that the social contract that aid agencies relied upon to work in a particular community or area is directly challenged by some who believe that it is acceptable to attack aid workers, a very rare event in the preceding 25 years of conflict.

"I *think the more the aid agencies stay away because of bad security, the more the insurgents will benefit. If agencies continue to support the needy communities this will enable aid agencies to build trust amongst communities. Once we are trusted by the community then I am sure that security will slowly start to improve because the people will always want us but not the insurgents. If we do not empower communities they will never be able to fight against bad elements or even distinguish between good and bad especially in rural areas.*" (Afghan male aid worker referring to the situation in the south)

Some, like the Tribal Liaison Office, a civil society NGO that works mainly in the south-east, take this argument a step further and attempt to leverage the tribal structures both as implementers and as guarantors of security. "*We can travel practically everywhere in the south-east simply by working through the tribal elders. Not even the Taliban would dare to touch the grey beards.*" Other interlocutors were more cautious about the protection factor of communities: "*One should be careful not to overstate this issue: communities often have very little influence on local dynamics of power – particularly if there is a warlord around.*" At the other extreme, a few agencies and donor representatives choose to embed themselves with the PRTs or to travel alongside CF convoys for their protection. This approach was chastised as dangerous by most assistance agencies. One national NGO staffer noted: "*Mixing soldiers with aid workers is just asking for trouble. You are just attracting an attack.*"

In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, all politics tends to be local. The situation on the ground is evolving and approaches that worked in past dispensations are no longer necessarily effective today. One impression that would need to be confirmed by further study is that NGOs as vectors of social transformation remain largely faithful to conceptual frameworks that are rapidly becoming outdated. NGOs are no longer automatically and uncritically accepted as they were during the *mujahedin* and Taliban years. In those parts of the country that are already in a 'post-conflict mode', the humanitarian framework is no longer valid, but a transition or development framework has not really been put on the agenda. There has as yet been little debate among government, donor and NGO stakeholders on the role of civil society institutions and how they relate to the State in the current phase and in the future. Issues of the rights of, and accountability to, beneficiaries are still in their infancy. Similarly, debates on the capacity-building of local institutions seem to have moved little beyond formulaic declarations of intent.

The survey instruments specifically asked aid workers to describe the threats faced by the communities in the area and those faced by themselves and their agencies. The request made for interesting comparisons. The highest threat faced by communities is perceived to be related to militias and warlords, followed by the presence of weapons and crime/robberies. The risks faced by individual aid workers and their agencies are different. The issue cited most often is the physical security of staff, i.e. direct attacks on aid workers, fighting in the area and "being at the wrong place at the wrong time." Travelling with armed escorts, and being associated with the Coalition, were also mentioned. And so were traffic accidents and the arrogant behaviour of heavily armed private security companies.

Interestingly, the concern that was foremost in the minds of focus group (FG) participants – employment and access to services/welfare (see below) – hardly figures in the way aid workers look at the security of the communities in which they work even though most respondents, including relatively junior local agency staff, seem to have a good grasp of the distinctions between physical and human security. This area – the perceived disconnect between aid workers' perceptions and those of communities – would well deserve further study. It is important to note, however, that this study is about perceptions rather than realities and that much deeper investigation than was possible in the current relatively short study would be required in order to unscramble what these realities actually are.

How communities look at security

The key finding is that the Afghans citizens interviewed in Kabul, and in the relatively secure rural areas visited in Logar and Kabul provinces, tend to have a much wider understanding of security than physical security alone.[19] Security is a multilayered concept in which the socio-economic aspects – human security – play a key, if not preponderant, role. Typically, the focus group discussions would start by identifying physical security issues, usually with an acknowledgement that there has been a significant improvement in recent months. This would be followed by debate within the group on the "elements" of peace. After some preliminary scratching the surface, issues of employment, access to services and welfare would come to the fore. In sum, in the relatively secure physical environment of Kabul and the adjoining rural areas, negative peace – the absence of armed conflict – is an important consideration, but the absence of positive peace – stable and secure livelihoods – is the key determinant in the security perceptions of local communities.

What does peace mean?

This was the opening question and normally elicited generic responses: "*peace is Islam*", "*peace is happiness*". Acceptance of each other, freedom from fear and from guns, freedom of movement were other common responses. When asked to be more specific, the FG participants would often discuss among themselves and socio-economic issues would start to emerge:

"*Peace is having a piece of bread and feeling free*" (villager, Logar)[20]
"*Peace is when there is no poverty*" (village elder, Logar)
"*Peace is children going to school*" (villager, Paghman)

Employment as a component of peace and security came up over and over again, particularly among the most disadvantaged participants. The clearest formulation, echoing Lenin's slogan, was given by an illiterate shopkeeper in Kabul's District 6: "*Peace is jobs and electricity.*" Often, as soon as a one participant mentioned employment, the others chimed in with their own definitions. As a farmer in Paghman put it: "*Now we have security but no jobs – so the peace is not complete.*"

There were some rural-urban differences worth noting. In the villages, tribal structures are an important element in security ("*security is the tribe*", "*when there is a security problem, the tribal shura deals with it*"). The tribes are also directly engaged in the provision of security. The village elders in Chenar contribute men to the tribal police that patrols the Kabul–Jalalabad (old) road. The fact that the tribe is "united" and that there are no longer any "commanders from outside" is a guarantee of security, at least from the perspective of the grey beards (out of deference, more junior members of the tribe would not speak up in front of their elders). Urban respondents were more concerned about crime and corruption but seemed to be more passive, with no direct involvement in the management of their own security. The exception was an impoverished Kabul neighbourhood where the residents organize night patrols: "*For every 10/15 houses residents take turns of 2 hours at night to patrol the street. If there is a problem, the patrol makes a lot of noise to wake everyone up and scare the robbers away.*"

Unsurprisingly, the journalism students (male and female) were articulate advocates of freedom of expression as an ingredient of security. They and the professional female FG were the only ones to directly invoke human rights as a component of peace and security (more or less on a par with employment). Women also had gender-specific concerns: girls were at risk of kidnapping on the way to school, women who were no longer in purdah faced more harassment by young men in the street. They also clearly saw peace as an issue of governance and failure of services: the judicial system is not functioning, the hospitals are not working, the police is in cahoots with the thieves. A female aid worker recalled the Afghan proverb: *"God save us from the hospital and from the courts."*

Do you feel safe in your area?
When asked to elaborate on the relative security or insecurity or their own neighbourhood or village, an overwhelming proportion of respondents answered that they felt secure and that security had improved over the last couple of years. The villagers felt most secure: *"You can leave a piece of gold in the street and no-one will touch it"* (elder, Chenar village). They felt comfortable, presumably, because the tribe was providing security. That security provided by the State was absent did not seem to be a problem. Urban residents also agreed that thanks to the Coalition intervention and the presence of ISAF, security had improved, but there were a few dissenting voices. Some women and unemployed youth felt that two years ago people were more hopeful but that their expectations had not been met. Jobs were now harder to find and less well paid and there was increasing competition with returning refugees who had picked up skills abroad.

Despite the training that had been provided by the international community in the context of the Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Afghan National Army (ANA) and especially the police were consistently singled out as a source of concern. The frequency and amounts of bribes that businessmen and even vegetable stall vendors had to pay was seen to be increasing. Taxi drivers seemed particularly vulnerable to police bribery and brutality; several instances of taxi drivers killed at checkposts were mentioned. Conflicts over property, and the bribes that had to be paid to have rights of ownership restored, were also frequently mentioned. Both in urban and rural settings, the link between joblessness, crime and warlordism came up:

"If young people don't have jobs, they will go and steal" (teacher, Paghman),
"When people are jobless, they go to the warlords" (unemployed tailor, Paghman).

A few people noted that under the Taliban, security was very tight because of the repressive tactics used, but there were no regrets that the former rulers had been defeated. In both rural and urban settings, the fear of the "reign of the commanders" was present. Some, like the elders in Chenar, had been subjected to successive waves of warlordism to the extent that at one point only two out of several hundred families had remained in the village. The problems of today seemed slight in comparison.

The improvements in the security situation in Kabul are overwhelmingly attributed to the presence of ISAF. This is not surprising given its 8,000 strong presence in and around Kabul. ISAF (which patrols regularly) and the Coalition (which does not) are not clearly distinguished. As one resident of District 6 put it: *"Since America is here we have security"*. When asked about the ISAF patrols, they generally get high marks (*"They put out fires and solve local conflicts"*), except for their driving skills ("ISAF *people drive around as if they are drunk"*) and they warn you against attempting to overtake their vehicles (*"They will shoot at you"*). A female aid worker said: *"They create traffic jams and accidents. Lots of kids have been run over and they don't even bother to stop."* Another noted that the ISAF people must be very afraid of Afghans *"because they build wall after wall to protect themselves,"* before adding, realistically, and interpreting the views of the entire group: *"War will start again if they leave. We want them to stay."*

Karzai's election, the DDR process that has started to take the guns away, and the relative reduction in the power of "commanders" who re-appeared on the scene after the demise of the Taliban regime are also credited for the improvement of the security situation. Conversely, the return of the *jang salar* and the *tofang salar* (warlords and gun lords) is perceived as a possible threat to security. Interestingly, in the rural areas of Logar (the closest area visited to where insurgents are operating), the Taliban are not particularly feared, but the spectre of the warlords still hovers. A village elder in Isarak (Logar) put it this way:

"Warlords are our biggest problem. The villagers are not afraid of the Taliban but they fear the warlords. They steal from the people, they threaten the village elders. During the election period warlords threatened the election workers saying they would kill them. A school was burned down. I don't think it was the Taliban but 'tofang salar' working for the Government (…) If Karzai removes the warlords, things will improve, but if he does not fulfill his promises we will hate him. Under the Taliban, if you committed a crime you were punished but the big warlords allied to the government have not been punished. They deserve to have their hands and tongues chopped off."

Questions on what were the most important things to do to improve security elicited predictable answers centered around jobs, welfare and the extension of the remit of government. Physical security issues – maintaining the ISAF presence and neutralizing the warlords (including through the provision of jobs) – came second. The issue of the corrupt police merits a special mention because it is both a physical security and a human security issue, especially for urban residents.

Are some people in the community more insecure than others?

An attempt to discriminate between different types of vulnerability yielded interesting results. The first reaction in the FGs was to say "everybody is the same," perhaps fearing that the interviewer was hinting at ethnic differences. Upon further probing, two expected and two unexpected groups were singled out. Returnees were seen to face a number of specific problems both in terms of complicated land rights issues and because, particularly in the rural and peri-urban areas, they faced discrimination from local residents: they have received assistance from the international community while the local jobless youth have not. The other group is the urban destitute, which includes widows and female-headed households, impoverished families that are pushed out of their houses by sky-rocketing rents and IDPs or migrants attracted by the city and living in derelict houses or slums. The two unexpected groups are money dealers, shopkeepers and taxi drivers – vulnerable to robbery and extortion – and good looking girls – because they no longer benefit from the protection of the burqa and are preyed upon by ne'er-do-wells or potential kidnappers.

The role of outsiders

The last set of questions posed centred on the role of the international community. As mentioned above, views of ISAF were generally positive. Without ISAF, the security situation would rapidly deteriorate. Or, as an illiterate daily labourer from Baghlan province put it: *"If ISAF wasn't here, the police would eat people."* The police are not only universally seen as corrupt, they are also seen as being part of the warlord culture (and indeed many police units are composed of former fighters or under the command of former militia commanders).

The Coalition forces were not really an issue in Kabul because they do not patrol in the capital and, in any case the locals (and most internationals) have difficulty distinguishing between a CF or ISAF convoy. In the rural areas, some resentment against the CF was clearly discernible. Pashtun elders in Logar, where CF forces had conducted operations in the past, were quick to recall incidents where the CF had "*bombed the wrong people*" or "*sent innocent people to Guantanamo*". Cultural insensitivity and disrespect for tribal structures was another issue mentioned: *"The women and children were scared when they came and*

searched the houses. Instead, they should have checked with the white beards first and the elders could have accompanied the military. This damaged the peace."

Perceptions of the aid community were complex to unscramble. The urban educated – the journalism students and the professional women – were mostly critical, reflecting the widespread disenchantment with the aid community and perhaps also influenced by the recent negative outbursts in the local media following the former Minister of Planning's broadsides against aid agencies:

"NGO*s are corrupt. The money does not go to the people*" (female NGO aid worker)
"A *lot of money is wasted on expensive salaries*" (male journalism student)
"*The aid system is corrupt. The needy people get nothing while the* Ministers' *families get rich*" (Kabul radio employee).

Focus group—Chenar Village, Sarobi District, Kabul Province

The perceptions of outsiders in rural areas were generally more positive though there was a widespread lamentation that "nothing visible" was being done with the aid money. This confirms recent data collected by Sayara for ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) which shows increasing and worrying levels of disaffection vis-à-vis the aid effort, possibly with very negative security implications for aid workers.[21] Perhaps the most surprising finding, however, was the level of denial: when asked if they had received any assistance from the international community, most respondents said that they had not seen any, even if this was obviously not the case. The journalism students, for example, had been the direct beneficiaries of a project that provided them with international trainers, books and other support but they simply did not make the connection. When pressed, they admitted that their sisters were now going to school thanks to UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) or that their parents had received subsidized bread during the Taliban period, but their gut reaction seemed to be to portray themselves as needy and dispossessed.

Such attitudes are a worrying development both because they show a remarkable gap in credibility and communication on the part of aid agencies who seem incapable of projecting effectively an

understanding of what they do, and because they are symptomatic of a growing culture of aid-induced dependency. Perhaps the issue is also one of a disconnect between the beneficiaries' perceived needs as compared to what they are actually receiving, i.e. hand-outs versus partnership and empowerment.

A senior Afghan official in a local NGO summarized the perception of the aid effort thus:

"NGOs *and the* UN *were accustomed to doing what they wanted in Afghanistan with little reference to impact or accountability. When they were the only show around they were respected. The erosion of support for the* NGO *community started in Taliban times when the Taliban started behaving like a government.* NGOs *are not adapting to the new situation: they are still cashing in on the credit they accumulated during the past* 20 *years. But the situation has changed now and their credit is rapidly shrinking.*"

A key change is the existence of an elected government. Many NGOs do not seem to have adapted to this new situation and still adopt the duck-and-weave approaches typical of the Taliban period or, on the contrary, have jumped uncritically onto the governmental bandwagon. Some NGOs are still operating in a humanitarian mode because that is what they know and are having trouble internalizing a more long-term modus operandi and the standards of accountability – to donors, government and, importantly, beneficiaries – that go with it. What seems lacking is an open debate on what the role of NGOs (and the UN) should be in the new dispensation. The government is also giving mixed signals by pouring cold water on the government–NGO relationship. Ideally, the preparation of the law regulating NGO operations would have been an opportunity for such a debate. Unfortunately, a very restrictive law was promulgated from above with no consultation with those most concerned – only to be withdrawn in light of NGO and donor protestations.

Conclusions

The key finding of this case study is that communities, AAs, and PSOs perceive and understand security in ways that are different yet functional to their modus operandi. It is difficult to generalize on the basis of a short visit limited to the "Kabul bubble" and its rural environs, and further research would be required to put together a more accurate and nuanced picture of how these three groups look at security issues and what operational lessons one could draw from such an analysis.

Nevertheless, it is possible to say that, broadly speaking, the communities whose views were tapped in this study seem to have a much wider working definition of the concepts of peace and security than the other two sets of players. Peace is much more than the absence of war, Afghan citizens are saying. Positive peace – employment, education, health, electricity and a better life – is high on their agenda. They are also quick to define what is preventing positive peace from being achieved: a corrupt police force, criminality and a pervasive sense that unless the warlords are reigned in and if, Allah forbid, ISAF and the Coalition should leave, chaos could well ensue. This seems to be the central message.

A second important finding is that the three sets of actors build up their perceptions of security in relative isolation. Communities have their own ways of 'reading' the security situation, which have little to do with the readings of PSOs and AAs. The two outside groups look at security from their respective vantage points which are functional to their mandates or strategic objectives. That there is some tension between PSOs and AAs on security matters is no surprise given culture, doctrine and the very different nature of their respective responsibilities. That said, an important corollary should be mentioned here: AAs and PSOs, separately, and possibly in cooperation with each other, need to much better understand what the local people are saying about their own security, what affects it and what enhances it. This is

not only essential for the security of AAs and PSOs operating in a sometimes volatile environment, it is crucial for ensuring that security sector and reconstruction activities meet the needs and aspirations of the people on the ground rather than the requirements of the outsiders.

Although it was not possible in the circumstances to conduct a proper longitudinal study of perceptions, there is a clear sense that the overall security situation has improved. This has allowed the communities interviewed to shift their sights, progressively, from physical security issues – freedom from fear and violence – to a range of human security concerns. The extent to which communities in other parts of the country have made similar shifts along this security perception axis is unknown. This is an area for further study. As for PSOs and AAs, their progression on the axis is notably slower. This reflects the nature of their work, in the case of the former, and, for the latter, real-time security concerns as well as a certain sluggishness in adapting to a situation that presents many post-conflict aspects. It should be recognized, of course, that there are great variations within the PSO and AA communities.

The level of analysis of the security situation by outside actors lacks depth and focuses mainly on incidents rather than on the contexts (political, social, economic) that make the incidents possible. This observation is valid for the NGOs. It may or may not be valid for the PSOs as, presumably, considerable intelligence gathering of a classified nature is taking place, including within communities.[22] Aid agencies and PSOs could usefully develop and calibrate their own analyses to take the population's hopes for human security more into account. Understandably, AAs and PSOs are preoccupied with their own physical security. But the overall security situation is unlikely to improve significantly if the human security needs of the population are not addressed in a visible, credible and systematic manner.

Kosovo: "Living in a bubble"

The big picture

No large-scale organized armed violence resulting from the war exists at present in Kosovo. Generally speaking, physical security in Kosovo is reasonably assured in those areas where one of the two major ethnic communities makes up the majority: that is to say, for Kosovar Albanians in areas south of the Ibar River and for Kosovo Serbs in areas north thereof. In contrast to the general picture, however, security is patchy in the enclaves where an ethnic minority lives: that is, for Serbs in Kosovar Albanian areas and vice versa. Inhabitants of the enclaves experience strong restrictions on their freedom of movement, fearing harassment once they walk outside their enclave. Members of the opposite ethnic group are reluctant to visit or even drive through an enclave. Serb enclaves, many of them south of the Ibar River, need to be guarded 24/7 by KFOR and the international police against arson attacks and other forms of loosely organized violence. A few enclaves of ethnic Albanians exist north of the river. Enclaves of Roma (gypsies) exist to the North and South of the river; Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike despise the Roma, making their situation particularly precarious.

For the ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo, peace exists only to a limited extent. NATO and KFOR are perceived as liberators and guarantors that the area will never again be ruled by Belgrade. Committed to the independence of Kosovo as a sovereign nation, they view nationhood both as a form of moral recognition – and hence vindication – and also as a vital option to boost the stagnant economy. A jump-start of the economy would be a major contributor to peace. By contrast, the ethnic Serbian minority of Kosovo sees itself as living under enemy occupation and is wary of a continuing KFOR presence or of Kosovo becoming an independent nation. Desperately poor, this population expects little help from the international community, which they resent for its perceived scapegoating of them for the bloody disintegration of the defunct Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Map of Kosovo

Source: United Nations

Box 6. The final status of Kosovo

The international community has left the issue of final status open ever since its first public declaration on the subject in 1997. The Contact Group stated in September of that year, "*We do not support independence and we do not support maintenance of the status quo. We support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)*." It added, however, "*Such a status should fully protect the rights of the Albanian population in accordance with OSCE standards and the UN Charter.*" Later statements of the international community, including resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1244 (1999) of the Security Council, have been in line with this ambiguous statement. Despite several pronouncements by the international community to the contrary, the political aim of the ethnic Albanians remains independence for Kosovo as a sovereign nation. They view nationhood both as a form of moral recognition – and hence vindication – but also as a vital option to boost the stagnant economy. The ethnic Serbs view the issue entirely differently. Any thought of Kosovo becoming an independent nation causes anger. For them, the area is not only an integral apart of the Yugoslav nation; the plains of Kosovo Polje are virtually holy ground, for historical reasons. In short, the underlying ethnic tensions that erupted into war in the late 1990s have changed little in the intervening years.

Paradoxically, the Kosovar Albanian majority and the Kosovo Serb minority share a concern about the lack of progress on the twin issues of the final status of Kosovo and economic recovery, which may result in a flare-up of violence on a larger scale than in the riots of March 2004. The indefinite delays in resolving the two issues are beginning to play in the hands of fundamentalist Islamic organizations from abroad who are attempting to gain a foothold in Kosovo.[23]

To complicate matters, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is investigating the alleged war crimes of the recently elected ethnic Albanian Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, who was a KLA commander during the war of 1998–99. His indictment on 8 March 2005 is perceived by many as a sensitive, even explosive issue. Virtually all interviews confirmed that unless the international community meets the political and economic expectations it has raised, matters could spin out of control within less than twelve months. His arrest could affect the talks on the final status of Kosovo, because the ethnic Albanian side has now lost one of its most important representatives.

PSO perceptions of peace and security

The current PSO in Kosovo is conducted by the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR). Together with the Operations Allied Force (AFOR) and Allied Harbour, KFOR is an expression of NATO's gradual involvement which began during 1997–99.[24] The involvement reflected the fear among NATO member governments of a spill-over of the ethnic violence in Kosovo to elsewhere in the Balkans, thus threatening NATO's southern flank. Governments also feared the potentially destabilizing influence of the gathering humanitarian crisis, with the potential for large numbers of refugees fleeing into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), an influx that would upset delicate existing ethnic balances.[25] Following the air campaign by ten NATO members, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) authorized "an international security presence" in Kosovo to deter renewed hostilities, ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, establish and maintain a secure environment, enforce a cease-fire and demilitarize the KLA.

The first elements of KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of the security force was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from Kosovo.[26] By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was established in

the Province. At full strength KFOR was comprised of some 50,000 personnel. It was a multinational force under unified command and control with substantial NATO participation. Agreement was also reached on the arrangements for participation by the Russian Federation. More than twelve other non-NATO nations have contributed to KFOR over the last six years.

An Albanian child encounters an American patrol in Mitrovica during the riots of 2001

Since 1999, NATO forces have been at the forefront of humanitarian efforts to relieve the suffering of the many thousands of refugees forced to flee Kosovo by the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign. In FYROM, NATO troops built refugee camps, refugee reception centres and emergency feeding stations, as well as moving many hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid to those in need. In Albania, NATO deployed substantial forces – known by the acronym AFOR – to provide similar forms of assistance. NATO also assisted the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with co-ordination of humanitarian aid flights as well as supplementing these flights by using aircraft from member countries. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC), established at NATO in May 1998, also played an important role in the coordination of support to UNHCR relief operations.[27]

Since June 1999, the headquarters of KFOR has been located in Pristina, its commander reporting the NATO's Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. It now supports a NATO-led mission of four multinational brigades, 34 nations and some 17,000 peacekeepers in their effort to provide a safe and secure environment for all citizens living in Kosovo.

Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) gives the United Nations responsibility for the civilian population through its Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Under para. 10, it has the responsibility "to provide an interim administration for Kosovo (…), overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to secure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of



Maps showing Serb populations in Kosovo pre- and post-war

Source: http://www.kosovo.com/news/archive/2004/April_03/5.html

Kosovo." Under para 9d, KFOR is to ensure public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task. UNMIK assumed this responsibility in the fall of 1999.

UNMIK initially brought together four 'pillars' under its leadership.[28] At the end of the emergency stage in June 2000, Pillar I (humanitarian assistance), led by the UNHCR, was phased out. In May 2001, a new Pillar I was established. The UN has assumed direct responsibility for police and justice (Pillar I) and civil administration (Pillar II). The OSCE is tasked with democracy and institution-building (Pillar III), encompassing efforts to re-establish a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo with the return of all those who were forced to leave the Province before, during and since the conflict. It also deals with the efforts to build a democratic society with all the benefits deriving from a regime of good governance. The European Union (EU) has the lead on reconstruction and economic development (Pillar IV). The head of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. As the most senior international civilian official in Kosovo, he presides over the work of the pillars and facilitates the political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status.[29]

The Security Council resolution establishing UNMIK makes repeated reference to the need for economic reconstruction, urging "a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (…) in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional co-operation."

While both were expressions of the international community, KFOR and UNMIK had different approaches to security and to their responsibility to ensure it. Given the fact that KFOR is a military organization and UNMIK is a civilian one, this should not be surprising. UNMIK has, pursuant of its mandate,

maintained "civil law and order, including establishing local police forces." This implies that the battle against "ordinary" crime is the primary responsibility of UNMIK. KFOR's responsibility includes the deterrence of hostilities. During the first years of its presence, this responsibility gained urgency. Armed ethnic Albanian gangs had been operating in the demilitarized zone in the South of Serbia proper, terrorizing the local population. During 2001, ethnic strife in Macedonia (FYROM) between ethnic Slavs and ethnic Albanians complicated the peace process in both Macedonia and Kosovo considerably. Cross-border raids and supply lines had to be cut, a task that was, and remains, KFOR's responsibility.

Box 7. Selected views from the scene

"*Peace is the absence of Serbian police, militia and army on the streets,*"
(unemployed ethnic Albanian father in Pristina).

"*There is no peace on an empty stomach,*"
(ethnic Albanian doctor from Pristina).

"*Now at least, we have a police– not the Serbs,*"
(ethnic Albanian interviewee from Pristina).

"*Only five persons are left from a population of 600. KFOR came and told us that we had to leave with almost nothing. KFOR and UNMIK have failed us. We have no freedom and are always afraid. Our community is dead.*"
(a Serb, referring to the riots of March 2004 in the village of Svinjare just south of Mitrovica when, with the exception of five, all Serbs were "expelled.")

"*The aid agencies stayed too short a time and many of their projects have died. They were too quick to give small amounts which only helped for a while,*"
(ethnic Albanian housewife, from Lipejan).

While both KFOR and UNMIK acknowledge the tensions that could spark further violence in the community and are well aware of the ongoing ethnic divide which both fuels and results from these tensions, the two organizations approach the matter of security from different directions. KFOR seeks to keep tensions in check by closely monitoring the ongoing situation and looking for indicators of future violence. It then takes measures to ensure that KFOR security and the security of the populace are maintained. By contrast, UNMIK needs, because of its mandate, to look for ways of drawing the divided communities together and creating a climate for the re-establishment of a multi-ethnic society. In addition, UNMIK must try and re-establish a working economy and a social structure for all inhabitants. At times, these aims are not mutually supportive. The re-establishment of a multi-ethnic society runs at odds with the desires of large sections of the population and efforts to establish it can, and do, lead to a rise in tensions. These tensions are then countered by measures taken by KFOR which can in turn also raise the pressure, manifesting itself by attacks across the ethnic divide which further inflames the situation.

This complex dynamic became apparent from interviews conducted in Mitrovica, a city that can itself be regarded as a microcosm of Kosovo as a whole. The Ibar River, which flows through it, has also become

the ethnic dividing line of the city since the end of the 1999 conflict. Major inter-ethnic riots occurred in 2001. The accidental drowning of a boy in the river dividing the city sparked off another round of riots in March 2004. Television reports quickly misrepresented the boy's death as the result of attacks by the Serbs. Tensions grew out of control when a protest march the next day turned violent, leading to attacks against Serbs throughout Kosovo. Three days later, 29 people were dead, hundreds were injured and several hundred homes of Serbs and other minorities had been burnt or looted, churches and other cultural sites ransacked and some 4,000 people were sheltering at KFOR bases or other secure areas. A senior KFOR officer in the area described the present situation as relatively calm, but believes that it could deteriorate rapidly if there is another incident that could motivate people (or their leaders) to take to the streets.

Members of an inter-ethnic dialogue group interviewed by the team in Mitrovica acknowledged the courage required for them even to gather: their meeting place is on the southern embankment and hence on the ethnic Albanian side. Serbs who want to participate in the meetings have to cross the bridge. When doing so, they are likely to be questioned by "bridge-watchers." Formed out of a lack of confidence in KFOR, loosely organized groups of bridge-watchers on both sides approach – and at times – intimidate people who wish to enter the opposite ethnic zone. Such groups easily stray into forms of vigilante justice.

As dramatized by the drowning incident, PSO personnel view the continuation of ethnic tensions as a serious threat to security in the shorter term and to peace in the longer term. A senior KFOR officer, asked about relations with the local population, argued that: *"we are here to ensure stability in Kosovo and safety for all the population. Sometimes, the population does not view it like this but see us as the enemy."* It follows, he added, that KFOR must work to build confidence with people of all ethnic origins. In this context, the perception that the PSO institutions were operating with an agenda inimical to Kosovo Serb interests was of major concern to their staffs.

The 'double standards' issue north of the Ibar River remained particularly sensitive. The reluctance of UNMIK to assert itself in the North was widely perceived as a weakness. It resulted in an unclear situation in which the rule of Belgrade and UNMIK could apply concurrently. Inhabitants in North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and the Serbian enclaves have to pay taxes to both Belgrade and UNMIK. Other decisions by UNMIK often also have differential impacts. The recent decision of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to grant local authorities larger economic powers has been well received by the ethnic Albanians. For their part, the Kosovo Serbs continue to reject all moves by the international community to integrate them into the governance of Kosovo and the much diminished Serb population has withdrawn its support for UNMIK's democratic process. In the elections of October 2004, less than 1% of the Serbs eligible to vote did so, following calls from some political parties in Belgrade and from the Serbian Orthodox Church for a boycott.[30] The SRSG went as far as suggesting that Kosovo Serbs were deterred from voting through intimidation.[31] The elections and the preceding campaigns went off peacefully, which was a major feat in itself.

Both KFOR and UNMIK personnel also viewed the present uncertainty with regard to a final settlement of the political status of Kosovo as an invitation to destabilization by radical elements. A senior KFOR officer expressed the view that trouble-makers now know that through violence they can draw international attention back to Kosovo, believing that this is the way to advance their twin objectives: better conditions for the economy and independence. According to his view, the cleverer politicians see that this is not to be the case and realize that violence will be counter-productive. However, an eruption of fresh violence is perceived always as a distinct possibility. The situation in Kosovo remains close to the knife edge; all ethnic communities fear that their aspirations will not be achieved and

that the international community may flinch from taking the final step on deciding the status of the province. This fear is as real for the Kosovo Serbs as it is for the Kosovar Albanians.

AAs perceptions of peace and security

AA personnel interviewed had no articulated concept of either security or peace. Instead, they referred loosely to freedom of movement, the absence of intimidation, and an environment that allowed them to work according to plan. As of early 2005, no general threats to AAs existed related to armed conflict, either past or present. Working as they did among a population divided into enclaves, however, the agencies were continuously aware that tensions might and would surface. Quite apart from their specific missions in the region but nonetheless impinging upon them, agencies also realized that the rise of crime, burglary, looting and theft had been considerable. The few AAs remaining in Kosovo in 2005 had been forced to have their offices protected by private security guards, closed-circuit cameras, and other special measures. One development agency mentioned that during an inter-ethnic dialogue project in the enclave of Shtërpce/Strpçe, the tyres of its vehicles had been punctured and its staff intimidated by local residents. This kind of targeted violence against such agencies and activities, however, was rare.

All AAs interviewees perceived the state of the economy as a serious threat to security and peace. Interviewees from Mitrovica North mentioned that hardship had led to cases of malnutrition, the effects of lack of hygiene and mental problems. The view was articulated, among others, by a senior representative of a Western aid agency, who added that the state of the economy was also responsible for poorly funded education and health care systems. That view was reinforced by a May 2004 World Bank study which found 37% of Kosovars living in poverty, 15% in extreme poverty (up from 12% in 2002). Kosovo's rising poverty, the Bank concluded, was a function of lack of economic growth and the downsizing of aid flows. Only 4% of Kosovo imports were covered by exports, a trade deficit of 96%.[32]

Aid personnel also pointed out a connection between the lethargic economy and lingering inter-ethnic animosities. Because of ethnic tensions, opportunities for commercial trade of the enclaves are severely curtailed and almost exclusively limited to the members within an enclave. Some enclaves number less than 300 inhabitants. This implies that minorities living in de facto ghettoes are to a high degree dependent on aid from outside the enclave to survive. Enclave inhabitants can be regarded as a vulnerable group, both in terms of physical as well as economic insecurity.

Agencies also viewed the presence of large numbers of refugees and IDPs, unable to return to their former homes, as a destabilizing element because of the associated uncertainty and resentment. The war of 1998/1999 had displaced some 900.000 ethnic Albanians and 220.000 ethnic Serbs. While most of the former have returned, the latter have not, again an example of perceived unequal treatment. While about half of the ethnic Serbs are said to be unwilling to return, the others, still living in abject conditions in northern Kosovo or Serbia proper six years after the war, would apparently return to Kosovo if they felt safe. According to one report, "Kosovo Serbs must endure insults, physical violence, stoning and attempted murder every time they step out of their ghettos, leading most respondents in a recent opinion poll to say they would gladly return home to Kosovo if accorded military protection against the KLA."[33]

UNHCR organizes small-scale "go-and-see" visits for a day to former homes in Kosovo to assess the situation and decide whether the refugees wish to return permanently. To date, some 5.4% of the total of displaced Kosovar Serbs have returned.[34] People are still attempting to leave Kosovo, however. As one administrative worker in Pristina put it: "B*efore the war, people* [*i.e. ethnic Albanians*] *were leaving for fear*

of the Yugoslav National Army; now people are leaving for economic reasons." He was referring to undocumented economic migrants who attempt to enter the EU illegally via Italy.

Assistance personnel were very aware not only of the volatility of the current situation but of its artificiality. "*Kosovo is secure but we are living in a bubble*," stated the female director of a local NGO. She was referring to the restrictions imposed on travel outside Kosovo.[35] However, her comment expressed a sense of apprehension shared by many in the aid community that the current stability on the surface is really calm between storms.

Towards KFOR, the attitude among the aid community is relatively relaxed. At this point in the post-war rebuilding process, few aid agencies have direct dealings, but no complaints were cited either. The highly charged discussions that took place during the war and immediate post-war period among aid personnel concerning the perceived encroachment of KFOR into humanitarian space did not surface in interviews conducted for this study.[36] Three reasons appear to account for the change. KFOR has, in the main, retreated from reconstruction activities after the most urgent humanitarian needs (giving houses a roof, repairing water wells, etc.) had been addressed. Several recent examples of humanitarian activities by KFOR, however, did surface.[37] Moreover, the security situation is now such that humanitarian and development agencies do not need a KFOR detachment in their immediate vicinity in order to do their work. Finally, few humanitarian agencies remain in Kosovo and the sensitive issue of cooperation between humanitarian groups and the military has moved on to other crises, notably Iraq and Afghanistan.[38]

Local perceptions of peace and security

Interviewees often made a distinction between the 'negative peace' which exists and the more positive peace for which they longed. Most of the ethnic Albanians consulted expressed the view that negative peace exists in Kosovo, with the exception of the area north of the Ibar River, the enclaves, Gratcinica, Podujevo and other villages near the Serbian border. Teenage girls from the latter two villages claimed they were in fear of walking the road to school, as the road is sometimes blocked by the Serbs and kidnapping does happen in the mountains. The presence of KFOR was seen to deter large-scale organized violence but not in itself to bring peace. Serbian interviewees also expressed their sense of the absence of peace, reflecting a perception of living under enemy occupation and having to cope with economic deprivation. They felt physically insecure during the first years of KFOR's 'occupation', but the feeling of insecurity had become acute after the riots of March 2004 made hundreds – mostly Serbs – homeless. Few Serbs south of the Ibar River had meaningful employment: farmers, for instance, were reluctant to tend to their lands in the absence of KFOR protection.

Ethnic Albanian respondents, by contrast, spoke of aspects of peace associated with the freedom from fear, the freedom of movement, and the opportunity to live a decent life. Their answers to interview questions did not emphasise physical security but rather the economic, educational and political changes necessary to bring positive peace about. The vast majority stressed large-scale job insecurity, downright hardship, and deep feelings of helplessness borne of the sober realization that no major foreign investment creating jobs and industry will be forthcoming unless the future status of Kosovo is resolved, with a well-planned economic reconstruction package attached to it. Humanitarian aid had dried up, with little reconstruction assistance to make up for the loss. They craved the 'human security' that they lacked, although the term itself was never used.

As for their sense of peace, few ethnic Albanians mentioned human rights issues such as freedom of worship or of speech, or, despite the recent elections, political freedom. Even more remarkably, the only group of interviewees that articulated the underlying ingredients of peace was a group composed

of persons in the 15–20 year age bracket. They had a lively discussion on the relation between peace, human dignity, equality, respect for minorities, and freedom of speech. Affirming that one's neighbour's right not to be harmed imposed a limit on one's own freedom, this group also agreed that no peace could exist if the individual members of the group did not have spiritual freedom, including achieving peace of mind.

Box 8. Inter-Albanian violence in the Western region of Pec/Peja.

After Ramush Haradinaj stepped down as Prime Minister and was rendered into custody in The Hague on 8 March 2005 his brother, Enver Haradinaj, was shot dead in a drive-by shooting on 15 April 2005. The violence is reportedly due to a feud between two ethnic Albanian families and rival smuggling operations in the Western region of Peç/Peja. However, there is also a link to the war of 1998/1999. During an internationally run trial in Pristina in December 2002, five former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), were convicted of abducting, torturing and killing four members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) which had been a rival to the KLA during the war. One of those convicted was Daut Haradinaj, a brother of the former Prime Minister. Of the five prosecution witnesses in the case, three have been murdered, leading to accusations that the police is not doing enough to find the perpetrators.

Asked whether they felt safer today than a year ago, the answers of interviewees were mixed. Most ethnic Albanian interviewees perceive a gradual but very slow increase in safety, almost exclusively attributed to the local police force (KPS). The training of local police officers had belatedly improved but was still not perceived as satisfactory. Reports of crime were acted upon by the local police, and people felt safe to go out in the evenings. Some interviewees added that after the riots of March 2004, the public had become aware that such incidents diminish their prospects for a better future. Hence members of the public were generally more willing to call the police when necessary. In comparison with the situation before the war, this willingness was seen as a major improvement. Serbs felt less safe after the riots of March 2004.

Concerned about their own security and future, people's perceptions of KFOR and UNMIK tended to mirror the ethnic divisions of the country. Ethnic Albanians spoke of KFOR in glowingly positive terms as "*excellent*", "*our life-line*", "*our saviour*", or "*very good*." They viewed KFOR and NATO not only as their liberators in the war of 1998/1999 but as their guarantor that Belgrade would not make a "*last ditch attempt to retake Kosovo*", as one interviewee put it. In stark contrast, Kosovo Serbs perceived NATO as the enemy and KFOR as an occupying force that had failed to protect them during the riots of March 2004. More fundamentally, they perceived themselves as the last bastion of the forces that during medieval times had protected Christianity in Europe from the Islamic encroachment emanating from Istanbul. Hence, the Serbs felt betrayed by Christian European nations during the war which for them had been a domestic counter-insurgency effort against the KLA.

Kosovo Serbs outside Mitrovica were more outspoken in their opinion of KFOR. Members of the Kosovo Force were the brothers of those who had bombed Serbia and who had driven the Serbian Army from Serbian soil. "*We remember that our old allies bombed us and are now in alliance with our enemies the Albanians*," remarked one Kosovo Serb. KFOR was, in short, an army of occupation. However, interviewees in Zubin Potok acknowledged that KFOR was their shield against attack by the Kosovar Albanians and had to be tolerated because of this role. This, however, did not endear KFOR to the Serbs who would much prefer that they went away, taking the Kosovar Albanians with them. Their

perceptions, of course, had some basis in reality. A number of NATO member states who bombed the FRY during the spring of 1999 contribute major components to KFOR's strength. In any event, it was clear that KFOR was not perceived as neutral by either community and that, particularly on the Kosovo Serb side, KFOR's presence represented a source of tension by itself.

Local people, it was clear from interviews, drew distinctions between KFOR and UNMIK and, more specifically, between the perceived roles and contributions of each. This differentiation contrasted with their descriptions of aid agencies, which they tended to lump together under the term, "*the internationals*." As noted earlier, among Kosovar Albanians the perception of KFOR is universally good. They are seen to be the "saviours of Kosovo" and continue to be welcome in the province. A frequently expressed view is that they were the Kosovar Albanians' shield against the return of the Serbs and therefore should stay as long as possible. Differences were also expressed about the relative abilities of the component parts of KFOR; high on the list for praise are the British Army with the Scandinavians following on close behind.

Paradoxically, confidence in KFOR in the Mitrovica area was markedly low on both sides of the ethnic divide. French soldiers were claimed often to be drunk and insensitive toward local women. French KFOR patrols, we were told, had not intervened to prevent arson, molestation, or intimidation on the grounds that the patrols concerned "had no orders". During the riots of March 2004, one of the few ethnic Albanian families remaining in North Mitrovica had been escorted by French troops to safety, but with the troops making no attempt to protect their house. Days after the riots when the situation had calmed down, this family was prevented by French KFOR from returning to what remained of their home and forced to look on helplessly as a looter removed their refrigerator. In another case, French soldiers had reportedly been harassing a female inhabitant, while two nearby members of the international police refused to intervene, even when requested by a passer-by. It was emphatically pointed out that as a result of the swift troop rotations (every four months for the French, as contrasted with every six months for other KFOR contingents), the French not only lacked the necessary intelligence on local issues but were also unable to establish reliable CIMIC channels of communications. When a complaint or a request had been filed by an inhabitant, we were told, it would sometimes take months to have it processed, by which time the case-officer had been rotated and the process had to start all over again.[39]

Perceptions among the local population of UNMIK varied but were frequently damning. UNMIK was widely viewed as an arrogant bureaucracy, which was seen as feeding on itself. Its international civil servants were accused of a "don't rock the boat attitude," avoiding the necessary hard decisions and giving priority to their own salaries and promotions. The widespread sense of economic stagnation described earlier among aid personnel was perceived by local people as a failure of UNMIK. With the elections of October 2004 past, some anticipated tension between the elected interim government and UNMIK.[40] "*The* UN *is getting in the way now*," argued a female ethnic Albanian student. The Serbs blamed UNMIK for failing to look after their interests and blamed both UNMIK and KFOR for a lack of protection, resulting in the forced departure of many Serbs who remained behind in the area south of the Ibar River after the war.

Since UNMIK holds responsibility for both the international as well as the local police, the team solicited the opinions of local communities on both. Virtually all those interviewed gave the international police mixed reviews. Police officers from Europe and North America generally received positive reactions for their professionalism, while police officers from the developing countries were regarded as useless. "*Many of them still have to learn how to drive a car*," said one interviewee in Pristina. Others complained that the international police frequently did not speak English or had

poor writing abilities, as became clear when a ticket had to be given to a traffic violator. At Zubin Potok it was mentioned by ethnic Serb interviewees that international police officers were corrupt and that they found ways to be elsewhere when incidents occurred. None of the interviewees mentioned the killing of a Nigerian police officer only a week before our survey by a bomb in Prizren while driving his car.

Positive comments regarding UNMIK's policing functions would seem at odds with the widely expressed fear of extortion and burglary, which particularly those interviewees who were better off perceived to be on the rise. The extreme poverty and lack of prospects for Kosovars in general was viewed as pushing people into criminal activities. Asked about police patrols by ethnically mixed officers, none of the interviewees cited negative incidents, suggesting the possibility that they conducted their work professionally and provided the local population with useful examples of inter-ethnic cooperation.

One barometer of human security in popular perceptions was the availability of dependable electricity, particularly during the winter months when it is sorely needed for heating. Acting under the authority of UNMIK, the Kosovo Electricity Company (KEK) cuts off power to those households or communities in arrears on their payments. On several occasions, electricity had been cut off to whole neighbourhoods because one household did not pay its bill. Serbs regard this as a form of collective punishment and a violation of human rights. While KEK allows people to pay off their debts gradually, this policy is not well received. Kosovar Serbs in the enclaves of Lipjan and Kosovo Polje complained that they cannot pay if some 90% of their community is unemployed. In January 2005, the issue escalated. The President of Serbia, Boris Tadiç, in a letter to the SRSG charged that the power cuts amounted "to a silent form of ethnic cleansing". The SRSG rejected the appeal: consumers must pay up or get cut off. The fact that the supply was more dependable in communities with Kosovar Albanian majorities underscored the perceived politicization of international engagement.

Another frequently cited barometer was the availability of jobs. Interviewees drew a connection between the high levels of unemployment and the possibility of a new outbreak of violence. If such violence erupted, it is likely that the opposite ethnic group would be targeted, although the violence may have the lack of opportunities as its underlying cause. Several ethnic Albanians suggested that all Kosovars felt that they had severely damaged their own credibility in the eyes of the West during the riots of 2004 and would not make the mistake again. However, some ordinary men and women did not see it that way: young in age and maturity, they seemed quite prepared to try through their own devices to re-attract the attention of the outside world.

In this context, some of those interviewed were critical about the lack of a transition in internationally funded programs from emergency relief to reconstruction and development. Furthermore, development projects were viewed as unsustainable after the departure of "the internationals". Many rural Kosovar households that used to produce goods such as eggs, wool, and meat no longer do so as livestock was systematically killed during the war. In the absence of successful agricultural development projects, however, Kosovo is now seen as having to import more than it would have needed if self-sustenance among the rural community had been promoted. The reconstruction pillar of UNMIK was conspicuous by its lack of mention among those interviewed. A senior manager of ethnic Albanian descent working with an international development agency noted that there exists "general dissatisfaction" among her community with the number of jobs taken up by the internationals. Why could more local people not be hired?

A third barometer was faltering international attention, and here uncertainty prevailed on both sides of the ethnic divide. A number of those interviewed expressed uneasiness about the haste with which humanitarian NGOs had departed within a year of the end of the war. OCHA no longer has an office in Kosovo, and since 2002 the province has not been included in OCHA's Consolidated Appeals Process. At issue were both the loss of jobs in aid agencies and the perceived erosion of international concern, at least in the humanitarian and developmental portfolios.

In a broader sense, many interviewees expressed a certain cynicism about international aid activities. "*The internationals talk a lot with us, but nothing changes*," said one ethnic Albanian youth who summarized a focus group conversation. Reconstruction was viewed by some as proceeding without taking the needs of the local population into account. Programs are seen to be set up, organized, and closed down with little apparent attention to local needs. One example involved the reconstruction and painting of a former school building that was to become a center for inter-ethnic dialogue. The repairs received a go-ahead, despite the fact that the interviewees had already found a building more accessible to both sides of the ethnic divide. The school building, once finished, suffered from disuse. Members of the multi-ethnic focus group in Mitrovica expressed the view that poor planning of reconstruction had been detrimental to projects that could have contributed to inter-ethnic understanding. The activities of NGOs in particular received mixed reviews. Some were credited with positive contributions vis à vis the most needy while others were seen as pursuing their own agendas, including proselytism.

"1999 *was ground zero for the Serbs and now, six years later, we are well below ground. This has got worse for us in the last six years both in terms of security and in terms of living conditions. The international community has had six years to establish a multi-cultural society and all they have managed to create is an Albanian national state*," (Serbian interviewee, Mitrovica North).

With the exception of the inter-ethnic dialogue group in Mitrovica, the research team did not encounter individuals or groups actively engaged in peace initiatives aimed at bridging the ethnic divide. This does not imply that there would not be a willingness among people to engage in such activities. The youth group (aged 15–19) commenced a lively discussion when we asked why they did not transform themselves into a youth peace-movement. They had apparently not thought of the idea but when suggested, it appeared appealing.

Box 9. Tensions in the Prishtinë/ Pristina area

In the Pristina area, ethnic Albanians point out that the tensions are relaxing. In contrast to two or three years ago, Serbs could generally live and work in the city without being molested. To emphasize the point, two ethnic Albanian interviewees stated that they maintained contacts with Serbs whom they had befriended before the war. Both lowered their voices when they mentioned this, apparently anticipating difficulties if it became known among their colleagues. Serbs living in Kosovo are welcome to stay in a multi-ethnic, democratic society, according to most ethnic Albanian respondents in Pristina. Provided a Serb had no committed any war crimes, he or she could take up ordinary life. It was also pointed out, however, that this was mostly not possible, either because the Serbs wanted "*the whole of Kosovo*" or because they were not prepared to live next to ethnic Albanians on the basis of full equality. One ethnic Albanian respondent qualified this optimistic view by admitting that the security in Pristina was "*fragile because of the continuing presence of Serbs in the community*." Certainly no Serb was willing to confirm the optimistic view. Indeed, if Serbs from the north wish to visit their relatives living in the South, this still has to be done by means of an armoured UN convoy.

Perceptions of peace and security were seen to be influenced, in the view of a number of those interviewed, by the media, which projected negative images of the other community. The inter-ethnic dialogue group in Mitrovica gave this theme considerable attention. Mass media were viewed as fuelling negative stereotypes. "*People only see the beast in others and the media feeds the beast by predicting more violence and more hardship*," commented one participant. There appeared to be a consensus that the constant negative imaging of the opposite ethnic community, reinforced by repeated warnings of the imminence of the next armed conflict, might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The international community is blamed by this group, six years after the war, for not commencing bridge-building activities sooner. The group felt it faced an up-hill struggle since negative imaging is mainly a habit of adults: "*Young people don't care about the ethnic divide but their parents do and interfere if* [*we young people*] *try to improve the situation*." Given the political extremism in the media and in education, international agencies had not done enough to nurture a moderate center.

Conclusions

One of the hypotheses tested by the research is the existence of a mismatch between the perspectives on security among PSOs, AAs, and local communities. The data generated by the team's interviews in Kosovo confirms a significant disconnect in perspectives between NATO's primary strategic goal of preventing a spill-over of instability and those of the inhabitants of Kosovo, for whom freedom from fear remains a crucial issue in their daily lives. NATO succeeded in achieving its primary security goal: the destabilizing impact of the ethnic tensions was curtailed, although Macedonia experienced a term of ethnic strife in 2001. However, freedom from fear, a task entrusted to KFOR and UNMIK, has proved more elusive. True, the flow of refugees was reversed in the immediate aftermath of the war, with ethnic Albanians returning home in a buoyant mood. However, at the same time the Kosovo Serbs were suffering revenge attacks and fleeing to the area north of the Ibar River or even to Serbia proper. The result is a province now configured along ethnic boundaries, with future clashes remaining a possibility to be reckoned with. (The map on p. 25 shows the consolidation of the ethnic Serb population.)

As regards governance, the international community has articulated its general support for the goal of a multi-ethnic society. However, the feasibility of this objective and the path by which it is to be reached remain unclear. The final status issue has remained unsettled and unsettling ever since the initial ambiguous statement of the Contact Group in 1997. Furthermore, it appears that the international community has not lived up sufficiently to the commitments made in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 to promote stability in the region through economic development. Many of the inhabitants interviewed perceive the lack of progress on the political and economic fronts as a threat to their human security.

Generally, the population of Kosovo holds the PSOs, particularly the military, in high esteem. This is particularly true of the Kosovar Albanians who consider KFOR as their saviours and their shield. The Kosovo Serbs are less complimentary, seeing KFOR as the cousins of those who bombed them and drove their army from the province. However, even with these reservations, the Serb population acknowledge that, in terms of physical security, KFOR, although not their saviours, are certainly their shield.

The International Police, however, come in for far more criticism and are not seen, by any of those interviewed; both Albanian or Serb, as contributing to the security of the province. They are held in low esteem, with racial undertones to the comments made, which indicate that both ethnic groups feel that the imposed International Police Force contributes little to their sense of security.

In the perception of AAs, the fact of continuing insecurity is brought home not by the exposure of aid personnel and material to the targeted violence of war but rather by the potential of harm from 'ordinary' crime. The agencies that remain in Kosovo today, however, continue to be on the alert, realizing that resentment among the local population concerning the lack of human security, the doldrums of the economy, and the reduction of aid flows may turn against them. Solutions to the twin conundrums of the final political status and an energized economy seem largely beyond the power of Kosovars and their international peace support and assistance counterparts to resolve. While aid field staff remain seized with Kosovo's unfinished business, the attention of their headquarters has shifted to other theatres. As the world itself has moved on to other crises, most recently the Asian tsunami, Kosovo is yesterday's disaster. The prevailing sense conveyed in interviews with aid officials in the field was a sense of resignation to these realities.

None of the interviewees of any of the three sets of institutional actors presented us with an articulated concept of either 'peace' or of 'security'. In each instance, perceptions of both realities were driven by subjective factors. As a result, the question framed in the Terms of Reference about how each 'defines' security cannot be answered with precision. The term security was used loosely and mainly at the level of the proverbial nuts and bolts. Views more philosophical in nature were mentioned only sporadically; the members of the youth group were the most explicit on this point.

In broader compass, the unresolved twin issues of the future political status of Kosovo as well as the dire circumstances of its economy are indicators of a deeper reality, that of structural violence. They block the realization of human potential, the starting-point for human development under the Bill of Rights. Blockage of this potential – be it by legal, political, cultural, or economic factors – provides an instance of structural violence. With the physical violence in Kosovo now largely quelled, structural violence requires attention. With physical security now generally ensured, human security should move to the top of the agenda. The untapped potential of Kosovars to push political and economic processes forward needs to be tapped. Their continued underutilization will only deepen the existing sense of despair and cynicism, which, in a somewhat extreme form, is reflected in the comment of an ethnic Serb interviewed in Zubin Potok, "*Our hopes are drowned. We are now like animals in the jungle. We kill and eat each other. I would rather live on Mars than like this.*"

Ethnically inspired animosity in Kosovo between Serbs and ethnic Albanians during the 1990s led to the attempted redrawing of the map by violent means and to the engagement of the international community and its political, military, and humanitarian institutions in response. Continued ethnic tensions keep the situation unstable today. Where members of both communities used to live next to each other – or even intermarry – ethnic boundaries have, since the war, become de facto coterminous with geographical boundaries. This result runs counter to the expressed purpose of the international community to create a democratic multi-ethnic state in which freedom and equality are enjoyed by all ethnicities. It also runs counter to the universal ideals of humanitarianism. The final status issue of Kosovo is intimately linked to whether the international community can overcome an ethnocentrism that is centuries old through the imposition of principles of democracy and human rights. To virtually all interviewees, concepts of 'security' and of 'peace' may be relatively clear at the level of nuts and bolts. However, the underlying issue of ethnocentricity underscores the reality that both 'security' and 'peace' need conceptualization at a more fundamental level.

Sierra Leone: "We are security for ourselves"

The big picture

Sierra Leone's "rebel war" began in 1991 and officially ended in 2002. An estimated 75,000 people were killed during the war, often under conditions of horrific brutality.[41] An estimated 2.5 million people – half the population – were displaced or became refugees. The war was unique in the annals of African conflict in that it had no Cold War antecedents and no ethnic basis. It grew, however, out of two decades of corrupt, one-party rule and complete economic collapse. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) purported to be fighting for democracy, but did so by waging war against civilians and persisting long after a return to democratic civilian rule. The RUF had no political ideology or popular support and paid for itself through the sale of "blood diamonds."

The war attracted little humanitarian or international political attention until a peace agreement was signed between the RUF and the government in 2000, after earlier agreements had failed. A large UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), was then sanctioned and eventually reached a troop strength of 17,500. UNAMSIL replaced an earlier regional peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group(ECOMOG), which had limited experience in holding the rebels at bay. Through most of the war, an informal Civilian Defence Force (CDF) made up of traditional hunters known as *kamajors* served as the only effective Sierra Leonean deterrent to the rebels. The Sierra Leone Army (RSLAF), long associated with coups, corruption and incompetence, had been largely ineffective throughout the war, staging its last coup in 1997 – a brutal power-sharing arrangement with the RUF that lasted six months before the civilian government was forcefully restored by ECOMOG.

The peace agreement of 2000 – which appeared to end the war – was severely flawed, and when 500 UN peacekeepers were kidnapped by rebel troops in May 2000, it became apparent that the RUF did not intend to honour the agreement. With UNAMSIL in disarray, Britain sent in a small military force and halted a rebel advance on Freetown. It later attacked a rump group of disaffected army personnel who had kidnapped six British troops, freeing all of them and demonstrating two things: that Britain had decided to meet force with force, and that Britain intended to stay until the peace had been won and consolidated. UNAMSIL was widely criticized among Sierra Leoneans at the time for its size, cost and ineffectual start, while Britain was widely praised for its timely and effective response to a real threat.

There were complex regional dimensions to the war. Liberian President Charles Taylor sponsored the RUF with training, weapons and a base. Payment was made in the form of diamonds looted from the occupied diamond fields of Sierra Leone. Taylor had come to power in Liberia in 1997 after seven horrific years of civil war that had virtually destroyed his country. Through the latter half of the 1990s and as late as 2003, Taylor sponsored incursions into Guinea in an attempt to neutralize disaffected Liberian forces that had been given sanctuary across that border. In 2002 the conflict spilled into Côte d'Ivoire, with RUF and Liberian forces playing a role in what has become a de facto division of that country. Liberian rebel forces, supported by Guinean President Lansana Conté in retaliation for Taylor's incursions into Guinea, finally reached Monrovia in the summer of 2003, and in a complicated peace arrangement, Charles Taylor went in to exile in Nigeria, and a new UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), was mandated for Liberia, only reaching a meaningful troop strength by about mid-2004.

The Sierra Leone war, therefore, and the overall security situation must be seen in a regional context of cross-border incursions, large movements of displaced people and refugees, and of continued

Map of Sierra Leone

Source: United Nations

political uncertainty. While Sierra Leone was a completely failed state and the least stable country in the region during the latter half of the 1990s, that situation has changed. The government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, first elected in 1996, was returned with a large majority in the 2002 elections which were widely regarded as free and fair. The RUF, which contested the elections, received no votes and virtually disappeared.

Box 10. International resource flows to Sierra Leone

The UNAMSIL budget for 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 was US$302 million. The largest bilateral donor, DFID has committed approximately £40 million per annum for programming in governance, public administration, public financial management, anti-corruption programmes and support for civil society. It is also assisting with debt relief and trade-related programming. £10 million is in direct budgetary support, and a further £10 million is being devoted to police, army, and intelligence spending. The second largest bilateral donor, the US, committed US$13.6 million to Sierra Leone in 2005, of which $5.3 million was in food aid. Non food aid was committed to resettlement and integration programs, stimulation of the agricultural sector, income generation, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) democracy objective. Additional support was available through regional funds. Most other bilateral assistance was very small in nature.

On the multilateral side, World Bank activities in Sierra Leone have focused on sectoral programs and projects in the agriculture, education, infrastructure, and health sectors. The Bank has also worked with the IMF in its consultations with the government on economic reform. As of May 2004 the World Bank had approved a total of five IBRD loans and forty IDA credits and grants for Sierra Leone, for a total amount of approximately US$686.2 million. The commitment value of eight ongoing World Bank operations is approximately US$184 million. These cover a period of several years.

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2004–07) envisages spending of about US$35 million per annum by UN agencies over a four year period.

The European Commission signed a four year program of support to Sierra Leone in 2003 which aimed to provide £144 million, all but £5 million of which was allocated to the rehabilitation of priority infrastructure, good governance and institutional support, and macro-economic assistance. A further unallocated sum of £76 million was set aside for emergency assistance, debt relief, instability in export earnings, and projects under development.

It is likely that in 2004–05, the budget of UNAMSIL – which had declined in size to 20% of its original troop strength – was almost as high as all other bilateral and multilateral donor inputs combined, including grants and loans. Given that much of the donor support is related to security sector and governance reform, it is safe to say that this side of the international contribution to Sierra Leone outweighs, perhaps by a significant margin, investments in the long-term social and economic development of the country.

A UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone has indicted and is trying war criminals, including individuals from the army, the Civilian Defense Force (CDF)[42] and the RUF. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission completed its work in 2004. A Commonwealth Police Development Task Force has revamped the largely moribund police force, and an International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) has been restructuring and retraining the RSLAF, bringing it under clear civilian oversight. Most of these efforts are led by the UK, which is the country's largest bilateral donor. (In fact with the exception of the US, there are no other large bilateral donor operations in Sierra Leone.) IMATT has 114 international officers and men, 95 of them from the UK.

Sierra Leone is a desperately poor country. It never received much foreign aid, and emergency appeals during the war – always low in comparison to others – rarely met more than half their target. Sierra Leone has ranked last on the UN Human Development Index since the index was created.

Definitions of security

Definitions of security in Sierra Leone have changed over time. The original 1999 mandate of UNAMSIL was to "cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties… in the implementation of the [Lomé Peace] Agreement." This was to include assistance with the planned disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, to monitor the cease fire then in place, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to assist in elections that were planned for 2002. As security deteriorated, the mandate was enhanced in February 2000 to include the provision of greater security at key locations, including government buildings and airports, at DDR camps and weapons collection centres. Stronger language about the protection of UN personnel and civilians was also added. Following the resumption of hostilities and the kidnapping of some 500 UN peacekeepers, a further Security Council resolution in 2001 stated that "The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remains to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed DDR program and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections."[43] These objectives have now been substantially achieved, which accounts – in large measure – for the reduction and planned withdrawal of UNAMSIL at the end of 2005.

IMATT has a mandate to train the Sierra Leone military, but it does more. According to one description, "It deals directly with virtually every aspect of security sector reform… it involves a complete reconstruction of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the military apparatus. This means building a culture of loyalty, service and respect for human rights within the armed forces. It also means a complete departmental overhaul to ensure appropriate civilian oversight and probity: this is necessary because senior Sierra Leone MOD officials and officers have been removed on grounds of corruption. Also policies have had to be introduced to cover the performance of such essential functions as, procurement, the payment of salaries and benefits and the removal of 'ghost soldiers' from the payroll."[44] What started as a five-year endeavor has now been extended through to 2010, making IMATT a decade-long initiative.

As notes on PSO *perceptions* of security in Sierra Leone will indicate, the definitions and mandate of both UNAMSIL and IMATT are not totally congruent with the views about security of those on the ground.

As with UNAMSIL, AA definitions of security have changed in the three years that have elapsed since the declaration of peace in Sierra Leone. During the war, the personal security of AA personnel was a major priority, along with concerns about the security in humanitarian access to affected populations. Civilian aid workers had been killed or kidnapped, and hijackings were commonplace on the highway. Some towns were accessible only by helicopter, and others were completely cut off for years. After the arrival of UNAMSIL, AA personnel attended weekly UNAMSIL security briefings (although sometimes NGO security information was better than that of UNAMSIL), and virtually all agency vehicles were equipped with radios. As noted below, virtually all of these concerns have subsequently abated or disappeared. Many agency vehicles are still equipped with radios, but these are useful mainly as a general communications tool, and with much of the country covered by new cell phone networks, even this usefulness has declined.

PSO perceptions of security

PSOs in Sierra Leone at the beginning of 2005 were a diverse set of organizations. The largest PSO remained UNAMSIL. IMATT continued to serve in a training capacity with the Sierra Leone military, and a Commonwealth police training program, present since 1998, was involved in a complete overhaul of

the police force throughout the country. At the time this study was carried out, PSO security-related considerations focused primarily on military and police-related issues.

UNAMSIL's troop strength had declined gradually during 2004 to about 3500 troops in January 2005. Most border patrolling and other military responsibilities had already devolved to the RSLAF. In May 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that UNAMSIL would pull out completely by December 2005, although a battalion will likely remain behind under a different mandate, in part to protect the Special Court, which will not complete its work until mid-2006, or possibly later. The IMATT training effort will continue through 2010, although there are questions about the loyalty of the army, which includes not only officers from the pre-election coup period, but also men drawn – as part of the reconciliation process – from the RUF and CDF forces.

Comments about the RSLAF were made more frequently by international military advisers and NGOs than by Sierra Leoneans. The most dramatic, by an insider: *"The* RSLAF *is itself the biggest threat to security. The* RSLAF *has not yet found its niche in the new democratic Sierra Leone: There have been real problems in adjusting; they have not settled down. The army should have been downsized more vigorously from the start. You don't need more than* 3000–6000, *as it was in the* 1960s. *That level could be adequately funded as well, avoiding the resentment that you currently find. There has been a lot of training and reorganization, but attitudinal change is harder to achieve. A lot of the old guard was retained, and people were taken into the army from the ranks of the* RUF. *Attitudes have not changed. They should have got rid of everyone above the rank of lieutenant colonel. The* RSLAF *is the bastard child of the* UK."

The President is also the Minister of Defence, but he has no direct, detailed or day-to-day knowledge of the issues confronting the armed forces. The military, therefore, has no voice in the cabinet in the way the education or health sectors do. The disjuncture between the cabinet and the military is seen to be problematic, and it is not helpful that the cabinet is unsympathetic to the military. *"They have an idea that the* UK *and* IMATT *will bail them out, as the* UK *did twice in* 2004 *when they ran out of cash,"* says a British military training officer. This kind of observation is sometimes combined with comments about government mismanagement and a culture of corruption that runs through the government, including the army. PSO commentators noted that the weak economy was a major contributor to the problem of corruption.

UNAMSIL's planned withdrawal is a concern for many international observers. The army had run out of food in January 2005, and UNAMSIL would not give them any. There is disquiet in the army about their poor housing and about the fact that the police are getting much more attention from donors and government.

"IMATT *or* UNAMSIL *could never prevent a coup, says one observer, but they are "embedded", and they represent foreign powers that have shown they can and will intervene militarily. And* UNAMSIL *could always come back – they will not be far away in Liberia."* A PSO commentator says, *"The military vote for Johnny Paul Koroma during the* 2002 *elections was very disturbing – it showed how little the leopard had changed its spots. The military dislike the Sierra Leone People's Party (the ruling party) – it feels they don't really care; they are the enemy of the army."*

The view is not all gloomy. *"There have been improvements in the accountability of the military – there is a long way to go, but there has been progress. Nevertheless, there is still a degree of public mistrust. People grew up – a whole generation – fearing anyone in a uniform; it takes time to change this."*
The British and IMATT have done more than revamp the army; they have created a proper MOD, with civilian oversight. There was, in fact, no MOD before the war – it was only a procurement and supply operation, with no policy role.

Other security concerns expressed by PSO representatives relate to Guinea and Liberia. There was an apparent coup attempt in Guinea in January 2005 and some cross-border activity in the eastern part of Sierra Leone. It is not clear what this represented, although instability in Guinea is predicted if and when the elderly and ailing President Conté leaves the scene. This could have a spillover effect into Sierra Leone. Liberia poses no immediate apparent threat to Sierra Leone, but the UNMIL still has much work to do in consolidating the peace in that country, and Charles Taylor remains a wild card.

AA perceptions of security

AA representatives in most interviews begin the discussion of security with the same sorts of issues posed by PSO representatives: the planned departure of UNAMSIL; the role of IMATT and the loyalty of the RSLAF; potential security threats from Guinea and Liberia. Several commented on the widespread incidence of robbery, although all noted that very little of this was violent, and incidents of armed robbery are rare. Sierra Leone is, in fact, not worse than anywhere else in West Africa, and Freetown is actually a much safer city than many on the continent. It is certainly much safer than Conakry, Lagos or Nairobi. The absence of widespread armed robbery is, says one international NGO (INGO) manager, *"one of the mysteries – a really strange phenomenon… Sierra Leone has been very fortunate."*

"There have been some big changes in policing", says a donor representative. *"Community policing is a new thing entirely. People are much more free with the police than they once were; community policing in the main towns has been good, but it needs to be pushed out to all towns and border areas."*

These issues – robbery, the military, potential cross-border threats – were generally, however, not regarded by AAs as the most important security threats. For most, the main security issues revolve around the economy, a related issue – unemployed youth – and around perceptions of mismanagement and corruption in government.

The economy of Sierra Leone remains weak and the government is highly dependent upon donor assistance. In February 2005, the government was said to be "broke" and important obligations, such as the provision of food for the army, were not being met. Unemployment is very high, and the prices of basic goods rose sharply in the last quarter of 2004. In January 2005 there was a general strike in Freetown, with labour protesting against higher prices, and government backtracking on a promised 40% wage increase for civil servants and others. A public unveiling of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was postponed in April for fear of public demonstrations against the government. Many saw these as potential flashpoints and precursors to future instability.

An INGO manager says:

"Seventy percent of the population live below the poverty line. Shelter is a huge issue; there are big problems in agriculture; people are hungry and they don't see much improvement. When the District Councils were formed in May 2004 [as part of government decentralization], people thought there would be improvements, but there is a real problem in managing expectations. Roads are still impassable, which is a big problem for farmers. Infant mortality is number one. Half of the government's operating budget comes from outside, but the World Bank and the EC are very slow. They are doing health and road reconstruction, but not much on feeder roads – the World Bank said it would work on this but has not. The PRSP says there is a funding gap of between US$800 million and US$1 billion over three years."

The head of another INGO asks, "Is *there a real will to deal with the underlying causes – patronage, corruption, a bad justice system, government meddling in traditional processes of governance*? Are *they going down the same road as in the past*? Where *is the collective will*? Where *can they get innovative, charismatic, progressive leadership*? The *political parties can't look beyond their own noses and their own greed*."

The answer to the question, "What makes people nervous today?" is often "unemployed youth". Many are educated, says an INGO official, but there are few new jobs; just a lot of old jobs being recycled.

Another INGO official says, "*The biggest threat is youth unemployment and government's complacency. Donors and NGOs are doing a lot of micro credit, but this is not serious job creation. There is no serious targeting of youth, and not much is going on in agriculture.*"

"A *lasting peace has not been achieved by any stretch of the imagination. Governance is bad and the economy is weak, and that is the crux of the issue. You have a very young population with unrealistic expectations of the peace dividend, and a psychology of people wanting a much better standard of living. The opportunities are simply not there, and so everyone is looking for a short cut. You sense something in the psychology and motivation: people are tired and they are hard to motivate. People sit back and hope it will come to them. It is not laziness, but there has been an impact from the war on motivation and people's sense of well-being*".

Local perceptions of security

Typically, a discussion with Sierra Leoneans about security begins with a statement about peace – how peace has at last come to Sierra Leone. In almost every case, however, this is followed quickly with a series of qualifiers. Robbery – more like petty theft than armed robbery – is raised as the most common security problem today. This leads to a discussion about the police, justice and the courts, and inevitably to the deeper underlying causes of crime – and ultimately of the war: the economy, poverty, youth unemployment, corruption and mismanagement.

This section of the report has been written in this sequence. Other issues, such as the role of the army and the withdrawal of the UNAMSIL peacekeeping force, are regarded by many as important subjects, but they were seldom "top of mind" considerations in the interviews. These issues have therefore been left to the end.

Forgiveness

That such a brutal and protracted war should have ended with so little rancour and without the upsurge in violence and armed robbery so typical of other conflicts raises questions about the nature of Sierra Leoneans. A high school principal tries to explain it this way:

"*Ordinary people are sick of violence, and Sierra Leoneans are not a violent people. Sierra Leoneans are quick to forgive and forget. The way the perpetrators have been received is unbeatable – "Everything na God" – people don't nurse grudges. They want to put it behind them; they help one another. If you have been traumatized, there will be someone from the community to help you. It is astonishing the way people embrace one another, and this has had a major impact on security. Awareness is an issue in this – people are not very knowledgeable about things beyond their own town or village, and if the head man says we have to forget about it, people do. Although the more educated people are, the less regard they have for traditional methods.*"

A primary school teacher says "*We need to love one another. We need to learn and to forgive, and forget about the past. We need to commit ourselves to prayer. Only God can console us.*"

Comments like these shape the received wisdom among outsiders about Sierra Leoneans – a somewhat naïve and fatalistic people. But among the worst-affected victims (and probably among a much broader segment of the population), the story is actually very different. The following comments are from amputees and war wounded living in slum-like conditions in camps in Freetown, Hastings and Grafton:

"We were told to forgive, but forgiveness doesn't hold any water without restitution, and we are not getting any. We continue to suffer, we can't afford education for our children, and our families scatter because we can't look after them… The ones who did this to us are getting support – training, kits, money, and jobs. They actually got compensation for what they did. The security everyone talks about is at risk, not just for us but also for our children, the next generation. I am supposed to forgive, but what about my children – deprived of education and a life? For us, if there is to be security, this matter has to be settled."

One says he knows the man who cut off both his hands – a former rebel, he is now a provost sergeant at Wilberforce, and he did the same to many others. *"How can a person like that be in the security forces? What kind of security is that?"*

They were promised self-help opportunities and they were asked to forgive, but there have been few opportunities, even for those with skills. Ten of those who were resettled here have died in the past two years. *"Peace has come, but we have pain in our hearts. We don't see the peace. Look at these families, the children, the women who can never be with a man again: our husbands were killed and we were damaged – no one will have us. We have gone to several* NGOs *for help, but nothing happens. Peace, peace! Yes, but we no feel free, for true."*

They have constructed a primary school out of poles and plastic sheets. 875 children attend, and there are ten teachers who are all volunteers. They get no pay at all. The school is worse than a pigsty. A woman pulls a boy forward and shows me his hand – a botched chopping job when he was five. An old man shows two bad gashes. Another describes how he was stabbed…

Robbery and the police

Almost every conversation about security begins with the issue of robbery. This is a common phenomenon throughout the country. Although there has been some armed robbery in Freetown, and two recent incidents on the highway near Bo, mostly the issue is one of petty theft. A teacher says, *"There is a lot of theft, but it is mainly the poor that get robbed – the poor rob the poor."*

The police are usually identified as the first line of defence against robbery. The revamping of the police force, the opening of new police stations across the country, the Commonwealth police training program and the equipment and vehicles provided by Britain have all had a positive effect. Many interviews described the positive impact of "community policing", the establishment of police-community boards, and the creation of family support units in the police department. Communities have also initiated "youth patrols" at night. Sometimes these are voluntary; sometimes the youth are given small payments by the community and business leaders. One neighbourhood in Freetown bought 50 whistles, one for each house. In the event of an intruder, the whistle is blown and all the men rush to the scene.

While there is considerable praise for the police, there are also concerns:

"The police? The character and attitude are the same – they have better logistics, equipment and uniforms, and there are younger men and women now, but the bribery is still there. They are just becoming smarter and less obvious. They are, however, better at policing. In the past, they might actually have been the thieves. Now they show interest in people's problems. At the end of the investigation [of a theft we had], all they asked for was a letter of commendation.

[All of the training and reorganization] has not stopped corruption – you cannot stop it over night. People are infuriated when they see police in a British government-supplied Land Rover extorting Le2000 (70¢) from a taxi driver for overloading his vehicle."

Many conversations about the police raise the need for adequate salaries and accommodation: *"The military and the police have to get better salaries if you want them to be honest."*

Justice and the judiciary

Many link good policing with a good justice system and an independent judiciary.

"The police are not really a threat, but they still have to be bribed. The judicial system is key, however. If you arrest someone, you have to be able to make it stick. We need better police work, and justice needs to be seen to be done. It has to move a lot faster – you can't have cases dragging on for three years when the ultimate sentence is only three months. Judges need better salaries."

Another interviewee echoes the same theme. He had an accident the day before the interview with a careless motorcycle driver and didn't bother to report it. *"The courts are useless – a huge waste of time. A bad justice system is a breeding ground for insecurity. There is no justice, especially for the poor. Lawyers are not willing to become magistrates when they will never earn more than Le 300,000 or 400,000 a month."*

The amputees are very bitter about the justice they have received. They are angry that the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is still not available, except in summary form, five months after it was completed. They believe it is because there were recommendations that amputees and war wounded should receive free medical attention, free schooling for their children, and a small pension.

"We are told that the government is broke. The government was not broke when it gave the perpetrators training and cash. A tiny pittance of this would have been enough to get us organized. We are dismissed as "traumatized people" while others drive around in their cars and live in big houses."

A civil society leader expresses concern that the government will use its authority to clamp down on NGOs and the media. The law reform process is weak, he says (although secondary school students said in a separate interview that the juvenile law reform process has gone very well). The fact that the government retains the death penalty for treason is problematic. *"When the judiciary is really independent and free, then we will know that good governance is on the way."*

People are generally supportive of the Special Court: *"The Special Court is a very great blessing; our own courts would not come down hard on these people. This will end impunity. It is important that the western world gives a cold shoulder to coup-makers."* Some worry, however, about the prosecution of CDF leader Hinga Norman. One interviewee asks, *"If Hinga Norman goes down, what does this say about all the others who fought with him? Many will think, 'I fought for my country and now I am being punished'."* The Special Court and the Hinga Norman case in particular are given as justifications for the likely continuation of a small, renamed UNAMSIL force after December 2005.

The economy and poverty

Sooner or later (and usually sooner), every conversation turns to the economy and the lack of viable livelihoods. Sierra Leone has been last on the UN Human Development Index since the year the index was inaugurated. The poverty – in villages, in towns and in the capital – is palpable. Poor wages and high prices are a part of every conversation, and are a backdrop to every discussion about corruption.

The leader of a local NGO says, *"The real security issue is the economy, and people's livelihoods. Opportunities are very limited. There has been a lot of talk about food security, but so far it has not been translated into anything very meaningful. A lot of the current situation relates to the 2007 elections, and the plans that individual politicians are making for themselves."*

Mismanagement and corruption

Sierra Leoneans complain bitterly about corruption and mismanagement. A primary school teacher says,

"There is a leadership problem – we give our leaders power but they don't perform. You have to be an example for those below you. Today the law is not being enforced; corruption is everywhere and blame-shifting is rampant. Change has to begin at the top. Attitudes are a real problem. Nobody is exempt from corruption – at the top or the bottom. There is no honesty."

A university student responds to a question about the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC). *"They have limits of staff and logistics, and simply can't cover everything. In addition, there is a stumbling block in the Attorney General's office. If the ACC ever bites, they know the government will be the victim, so they limit the effectives of the ACC."* A colleague disagrees: *"It is not all political, and they are now working on a bill that will give the ACC its own court. Ministers have been prosecuted; an appeals court judge was prosecuted. The ACC has good intentions."*

A high school principal is more optimistic: *"There is,"* he says, *"much more awareness of these issues today. There is willingness by women to challenge old ways and old-style village leadership; democracy is now much more embedded, and there are a lot of new ideas about how things should be done."*

But pessimism is more widespread than optimism. One man says, *"The mismanagement and corruption of the leaders is terrible. Our diamonds should have led to development, not this. Look at Freetown – the City Council can't even clean the streets [the issue of the moment in Freetown was the absence of garbage collection which was creating a health problem and massive public frustration]. The corruption problem is everywhere. The government makes promises to us, and we hear of NGOs and others who want to help us, but it all gets diverted. This is heartbreaking,"* he says. *"The generation after us… I am afraid."*

Youth

A teacher says that youth make up 60% of the population, and many of them have come from a background of bearing arms. There was some training in the DDR program, but now most of them are just "roaming around." The government has a youth policy, but it hasn't taken off. *"It is not yet over."*

Another teacher says that discipline among students is problematic after the years of anarchy and war. Kids are unruly and many have lost respect for their parents. The government has run special crash courses to get children back up to speed so they can get back into the education mainstream. Drugs are mentioned in interviews with Sierra Leoneans as a problem in connection with youth.[45]

"Unemployed youth? Yes, this is a problem," says another educator, *"but the government is coming out of war, and it simply doesn't have jobs to hand out. Many youth have developed coping strategies. Some have taken to making bricks and selling them by the roadside for construction contractors. But when opportunities are offered, they are not always accepted."*

Sierra Leonean writer Lansana Gberie says that *"the problem of unemployed and discontented youth is one of the most urgent and troubling issues facing West African States…For a country like Sierra Leone, which was*

severely wracked by warfare, with well over half of its educational infrastructure, as well as its economy, destroyed, this is more than a problem of under-development: it is a serious national crisis that demands urgent and methodical action. Part of this urgency has to do with the almost universally accepted fact that Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war was partly a crisis of youth."[46]

Gberie cites a 2004 report on the DDR process – *What the Fighters say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, June–August* 2003 – as providing insight into the problems of unemployment and disillusionment still prevalent after the war. The report found that the fighters, many of them very young, were largely underprivileged individuals "who had been failed by the state". It found as well that many remained unemployed after their DDR training, and that "more than 50% [of those surveyed] think things are the same or worse than before the war, a pattern similar to their attitude to corruption in the country."[47]

A 90-minute conversation with a group of girls and boys in Kambia puts a different light on the youth issue. These children are part of a series of clubs that were established after the war by Save the Children, Caritas, the Ministry of Youth and others to help children take care of their own rights and responsibilities, to deal with gender issues, violence and HIV/AIDS. What made the discussion special was that the children were so articulate, so determined and so bright. The level of English was remarkable, and only a couple who were more nervous lapsed into Krio. They spent a lot of the time talking about what they do – attending meetings, a youngster's parliament, meeting with elders. They have representatives in all the chiefdoms of Kambia, and they meet regularly with the police. "*Not all police know much about juveniles.*"

UNAMSIL started radio programs for children, but these are now more widespread, so children know a lot more than they once did. Security? "*We are security for ourselves,*" one says, but there is now a family support unit within the police force, which is a big help. There is a community approach to security now, so they are not completely dependent on the police and army. People are much more aware of human rights today than ever before. Parents can be fined if they do not send their children to school – a new thing, but important.

Focus group with students in Kambi

The judicial aspects of security have improved. The government has improved, in part because so many organizations have come to teach human rights – UNICEF, UNHCHR, Caritas, Save the Children. The young people have a library on human rights, and they have visited the Special Court to see what is going on there. They offer to recite the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. What about the adult reaction to all this? *"Yes, there was some negative feeling at first, but it wasn't bad."*

From the viewpoint of the children, the number one security issue is thieves. The number two issue is child trafficking: they know of several cases. They work on gender-based violence, *"for this generation and the next one"*. Someone says gender violence is a Muslim thing. One of the boys says *"No, it comes from illiteracy."* He quotes, perhaps from the Koran, *"It is better to train boys than to repair men."*

At the end of the meeting, they each say what they want to be when they leave school. All want to be professionals – nurses, doctors, two accountants, two lawyers, an agricultural engineer, and a human rights worker. They hope some organization will be able to help them to buy some footballs and other sports equipment.

The RSLAF

Sierra Leonean views of the military range from cautiously optimistic to cynical. *"The government,"* says a female teacher, *"has to pay the soldiers properly so they won't take bribes. The reason the soldiers did not fight back against the rebels at the beginning of the war was because they were so badly paid. All the forces have to be properly paid and housed, and they need proper medical attention. And let them all stay in the barracks."*

Several comment that the army is now rarely seen in public with weapons. That is something new and positive.

A local NGO leader says, *"It is all about economics; incomes are deteriorating, the country is getting worse. The military have had no increase in salaries in two years, while in May 2004 a bag of rice cost Le 33,000 (US$11.40), it now costs Le 57,000 (US$20). The basic wage for a soldier is Le 100,000 (US$34.50). The level of hardship for the ordinary soldier is getting much worse."*

Another says, *"The problem is that they all want the standard of their bosses. Government is trying to deal with this. There is less sectionalism and better training in the army. But they should move the battalions around – scatter the paddy business"* (i.e. break up military cliques). *"What do you expect of a soldier who is living on the border on Le 200,000 ($70) a month? Adequate salaries are essential to any kind of security.* UNAMSIL: *They are a reminder of what happened to us, and they are a safety mechanism in case something happens. They have been a big economic boost to the country, they built a lot of infrastructure – schools, churches, mosques. In some cases when they leave an area, the teachers in that school also leave. 99% of the people think* UNAMSIL *should stay. People are very worried about* UNAMSIL *leaving, especially in the border areas. The Nigerians were womanizers and worse, but the Indians and Pakistanis, especially in Koidu and Kailahun, have been very good. A lot of the Nigerians and Guineans were just selling food and fuel and a lot of people knew it – it was obvious."*

Not everyone is concerned about UNAMSIL going. A university student says, *"The battle with the RUF has been won. The loyalty of the army, however, is worrisome. In both elections they voted for Johnny Paul Koroma, who led the disastrous 1997 coup. There may be a better balance now, however. The new recruits are better and don't have that blind loyalty; also they have no direct link to Johnny Paul."*

The early disillusionment with UNAMSIL has changed. They have constructed mosques, peace gardens, and children's centers. The people really welcomed that. The average Sierra Leonean sees nothing wrong with such activity. The Pakistanis had the best reputations in all of their locations. The Nigerians and Guineans had the worst, especially where girls were concerned. *"The Ukrainians drank a lot."*

People think that without the British, UNAMSIL would have failed. The Okra Hills incident, in which they rescued British troops and killed two dozen West Side Boys affiliated with Johnny Paul Koroma, and the rescue of the UN peacekeepers demonstrated their skills and their commitment. As soon as the West Side Boys were put down, car hijackings on the roads stopped.

Conclusions

People who live in Sierra Leone, citizens and expatriates alike, have high expectations of a country coming out of war. There is also a deeply embedded culture of complaint, and there are common refrains about corruption and the government "doing nothing". The nature and frequency of these comments has not changed much in the past ten years, although for the infrequent visitor, objective changes are clearly evident.

Over the past 18 months there have been significant objective changes in infrastructure, notwithstanding severe problems with electricity, water and sanitation throughout the country. The new road from Port Loko to Conakry, for example, looks to be about 75% complete, and even in its unfinished state, the time required for travel between Freetown and Conakry has been halved. While Kambia District (where some of the interviews for this report were done) may not be typical, all along the road between Freetown and Kambia there are primary schools and secondary schools that have been reconstructed and are working. Secondary schools in Kambia town have been rebuilt, and the District Council compound has been rebuilt and is functioning. The Kambia hospital has been completely rebuilt, complete with extensive staff quarters. Every chiefdom in Kambia District has a new police station, something that never existed before. While not completely equipped, they are as well equipped as many in Africa, with radios and access to transportation if it is needed.

The main hospital in Freetown, the Connaught Hospital – long dilapidated – is undergoing complete reconstruction. Other large infrastructure projects are under way. There is an open and vibrant press, and there are some 20 private radio stations, many of them based in towns away from Freetown. Public debate on the government and economy is lively and free, and there is a burgeoning civil society that engages government at all levels. The general strike in January 2005 was seen by some not as a sign of insecurity, but of the opposite. The strike was peaceful and orderly, and it accomplished at least part of what it intended – getting government to the bargaining table.

Rice prices have risen, and in Kambia they are twice what they were a year ago, but this is because of shortages in Guinea, not Sierra Leone, and the presence of Guinean buyers in the Sierra Leone market place. While this may lead to shortages in Sierra Leone in the months to come, higher prices for farmers are not a bad thing, and the phenomenon suggests a healthier agricultural situation in Sierra Leone than in Guinea.

The government has welcomed donor involvement in all levels of the reconstruction process, including a significant, British-led security sector reform, involvement in an Anti Corruption Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the UN-backed Special Court, and a wide range of legal reform and major policy initiatives. Governance itself has been completely reorganized with the creation of elected district councils and a reversal of more than 30 years of centralized government.

One of the most striking post-war phenomena in Sierra Leone has been the almost complete absence of the armed violence that so often follows civil war. If combatants have retained their weapons, they are not in evidence, even anecdotally. While complaints of robbery are widespread, very little of this, with a few exceptions, has been of the armed variety.

The observations included in this report are obviously selective, and are derived from those who were interviewed, rather than those who were not. A wider set of interviews in other provinces might have yielded different results or a different emphasis. A deeper cross-section of interviews with government officials might have provided more insight into what is actually being accomplished in a difficult post-war environment. After all, opinions and attitudes are not necessarily reflective of all the facts.

But this study is not about "all the facts." It is about *perceptions* of security. And while other perceptions and issues might have arisen in interviews conducted, say, along the Liberian border or in the diamond areas, or with the private sector, the basic emphasis in almost every interview with Sierra Leoneans on the economy, justice and governance would likely have been repeated elsewhere.

The most striking thing about Sierra Leone is the indivisibility for local people of military security and human security. For PSOs, military issues are, not surprisingly, their first areas of concern. They too, however, recognize the threats to long-term peace posed by a weak economy and poor governance. Aid agency representatives are further along in their thinking about what might be called a continuum between military and human security. For them, the economy is a primary security issue, especially as it translates into unemployed youth and acts as a catalyst for corruption and mismanagement.

For Sierra Leoneans – and this view emerges from almost all interviews – the economy is the number one security issue. Everything flows from poverty: corruption and mismanagement; the dangers posed by unemployed youth; the dependability of the police; the loyalty of the army. Political leaders are not absolved of responsibility for the country's economic woes, but there is surprisingly little impromptu reference to donors, positive or negative. Sierra Leoneans appreciate external assistance and wish there was more of it. Few complained about inappropriate foreign aid.[48]

As a general rule, aid agencies – especially NGOs – argue that the military should avoid involvement in emergency and development activities. As in other conflict and post-war situations, these debates have taken place in Sierra Leone, but the argument does not manifest itself in discussions with Sierra Leoneans. They welcome UNAMSIL's radio programs on governance, corruption, health, education and children. They speak favourably about some of UNAMSIL's quick impact projects – school, bridge and road reconstruction. Many speak very highly of the Pakistani army's reconstruction of mosques, something that no aid agency would consider under any circumstances. Others worry about the negative impact on the economy when UNAMSIL, a customer for many goods and services, finally withdraws.[49]

It is beyond the scope of this report to comment on the division of aid allocations between what might be called 'physical' security and 'human security' of the sort described by Sierra Leoneans. Certainly ending the war and securing the peace was a top priority for everyone during the late 1990s and through to the formal peace that was declared in 2002. Three years later, however, very large amounts are still being spent on security and governance-related programming, while economic development spending lags behind. The evident disconnect between local perceptions of security and international strategies clearly requires attention.

3. Findings and Conclusions

This chapter sets out the main findings of the research, drawing together recurrent themes from the three case studies. The findings are summarized here in thematic form, using as a guide the research questions contained in the study's terms of reference (see Box 2 , page 2). The chapter also identifies gaps in how PSOs and AAs look at security issues and suggests areas for future policy development and research.

Two caveats are in order, both of them discussed at the seminar in November 2004 at which the research was launched. First, the data is not the result of rigorous scientific investigation. It is important and solid but has distinct limitations in terms of geographical coverage and representativeness. It is based on soundings taken among three sets of actors, PSOs, AAs, and local communities, with an emphasis on the latter. Had the views of other actors such as the private sector or national government officials in the three cases been sought out, the findings might have been somewhat different. Had more communities been interviewed in a wider spread of locations, additional nuances would undoubtedly have been possible, though probably not significantly altering the overall conclusions. This qualifier notwithstanding, the team is confident that the persons interviewed and the inductive methodology utilized have generated useful and informative findings.

The second caveat is that this study is about perceptions – in fact, it is about the team's perceptions of other peoples' perceptions of issues related to security. It is not about objective security rigourously measured, but rather about subjective security as perceived by those involved. In most cases, the degree of variance between the perceptions recorded here and the actual realities is not known. In some cases the two may be congruent; in others that have been noted, they are far from it. Getting at the realities may well be a useful endeavour – we shall return to this issue at the end of this chapter – but it was not the primary objective of this study. Moreover, given the time and resources available, the team's approach had necessarily to be selective. That selectivity was in part offset by the team members' prior experience in the three cases studied, which has provided additional context and perspectives within which to frame the perceptions conveyed by the interviews.

Basic concepts

The data collected by the team, drawn from some 350 interviews of members of PSOs, AAs, and local communities in widely dispersed geographical locations, is remarkable in its heterogeneity. As a framework for organizing and interpreting this data, the team has found it helpful to distinguish between *positive* and *negative* peace. As summarized in Chapter 1, peace may serve as a shorthand to describe the absence of war: that is, negative peace. It is also used in a broader sense to describe situations in which political, social, economic and cultural processes are perceived to be moving in the right direction, thereby providing an enabling environment for development, good governance, the rule of law and a vibrant civil society. Positive peace is thus associated with the fulfilment of human potential. Similarly, security may be conceptualized narrowly in terms of *physical security* and more broadly in terms of *human security*. The former describes a situation in which the physical protection of individuals and groups is guaranteed against threats to life and limb: in effect, freedom from fear. The latter encompasses a much wider range of rights and aspirations. These extend beyond freedom from fear to the entire gamut of social, economic and cultural rights that are sometimes encapsulated in the term freedom from want.

Box 11. Comparability issues

In designing the research, the NMCG selected one case a few years away from conflict (Kosovo), one in the midst of an attempt to end its conflict (Afghanistan), and a half-way house (Sierra Leone). Implicit in this choice was the assumption that distance in time from armed conflict would offer the most interesting opportunities for comparison. In view of the fact that the securitisation of aid is becoming a dominant issue, the political nature of the international response to selected crises might also offer an intriguing topic for comparison.

The international response to Kosovo might be better compared to the response to Bosnia after the Dayton accords: the blue-helmeted and lightly armed UN Protection Force was replaced by a green-helmeted and heavily armed Stabilisation Force. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the warring parties were coerced into signing a cease-fire agreement, which in turn, was a cornerstone for the functioning of both SFOR and KFOR. In a clear change of military doctrine, the international community entered these areas with such a force that it discouraged even the thought of resistance.[50] Dayton also established an international civilian authority with far reaching powers, which included the power to dismiss democratically elected local politicians. In effect, it introduced the concept of locally elected politicians being subordinate to appointed international civil servants. Another aspect that separates the Balkans from Sierra Leone is the level of reconstruction aid. While Kosovo received US$526 per capita in reconstruction assistance during the first two years, comparable figures were US$25 for Sierra Leone and US$57 for Afghanistan.[51]

In Sierra Leone, one could argue that it was "a poor man's war" or a "black man's war" with little strategic value to the Western powers. Media interest was limited and the international peacekeeping force arrived belatedly with initially virtually no logistical support from the West. Given the horrendous nature of the war crimes committed, considerations of humanitarian protection and physical security ought to have been the compelling argument for the speedy establishment of a strong peacekeeping force. Perhaps the international response to Sierra Leone is better than that of Rwanda. Although in Rwanda a peace-keeping force was in place before the genocidal war of 1994 commenced, it was hopelessly understaffed and underequipped, only to be withdrawn almost completely when it was most needed. Samantha Power has demonstrated that, for US foreign policy, arguments concerning humanitarian protection have little or no impact and considerations of *Realpolitik* carry the day.[52] After his retirement, Canadian General Dallaire compared the international response to Rwanda to Bosnia in much the same words as Boutros-Ghali compared the Bosnian case to Somalia.

The case of Afghanistan cannot be understood properly without reference to the global war on terror. In that sense, the possibilities of comparison with Iraq are obvious. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, American preparedness to accept US casualties has increased. The Bush administration has repeatedly argued that the US military presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan is based on the policy "to keep America safe." Here as well, *Realpolitik* takes precedence over considerations of humanitarian protection. In another change of doctrine, US troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are markedly lower than the number of troops of SFOR or KFOR when they entered Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. The troop-to-population ratio in Afghanistan is one-fortieth compared to what it was in Bosnia, while in Iraq the troop-to-population ratio is less than one-third of what it is in Kosovo. The smaller forces proved unable to establish a secure environment; the troop levels had to be increased.[53] On a military level, US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Bahrein conducts the US forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the commander of CENTCOM, General Abizaid, contributed to the securitization of aid by including humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population in his operational plans to attack Iraq.[54]

While recent policy discussions in the international community have highlighted and advanced the notion of human security, there is still no widely agreed definition of the concept. It is generally understood to involve a broadening of traditional state-centric concepts of security to include greater emphasis on individuals, the circumstances that threaten their survival, and the conditions and protections needed to ensure their fulfilment. In a 2003 article in *Global Governance*, human security was summarized as "protecting and empowering people" so that the safety and well-being of individuals and marginalized communities are not subordinated to narrowly defined "state security" agendas.[55] For the purposes of the study, we understand human security in the same broad terms.

During our discussions with focus groups and in interviews in local communities, we had some difficulty in separating perceptions of security from those relating to peace. The terms were used somewhat interchangeably, as indeed they are in this report. That said, "security" often refers to the immediate concerns of the community while "peace" is an overarching and wider aspiration. An example of the latter was the comment of one respondent: "*Peace is Islam*." While the terms of reference for the research request the report to specify the "definitions" used by each of the three sets of actors, we found that as we reflected upon our data, what people had articulated were "understandings" rather than definitions. The absence of conceptual precision is specifically noted in the Kosovo case study, but it is evident to one degree or another in the research in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone as well.

This report uses the term 'assistance agency' rather than 'humanitarian organization', a modest change in relation to the terms of reference that merits explanation. Our interviews confirmed that, in each of the three situations, while residual humanitarian needs remain, the assistance community is currently providing a range of services and activities, many of which fall within the rubric of rehabilitation and development. Limiting the focus to "humanitarian" organizations and the provision of emergency aid would have misread perceptions of current needs and priorities and left out a large segment of current assistance activities.

The overarching finding

The team was asked to verify the hypothesis of the research stakeholders that both the military contingents of PSOs (the missions of which are often framed in terms of security) and AAs (which stand to benefit from a secure environment) "tend to define security in their own terms, with little cross-referral, and that the security needs, aspirations and priorities of the local communities are imperfectly understood by both the military and humanitarians".[56]

The research fully confirms this working hypothesis. In fact, it goes further. In the three places surveyed, PSOs, AAs and local communities constitute three distinct but overlapping worlds, with significantly different understandings of peace and security. As regards the outside actors – that is, PSOs and AAs – some of these differences, as would be expected, are due to institutional mandates, agendas, and functions. Others are due to their limited interest in, and analysis of, local community perceptions. Local communities have their own histories, agendas, idiosyncrasies and perceived needs as well.

Given the great variations of perceptions within each group, generalizations are difficult to make and sustain. However, it is possible to say that, by and large:

- PSOs are mainly concerned about physical security, given their task of protecting human life and promoting freedom from fear. Their understandings of local community perspectives are derivative of their mandates, which invariably give priority attention to force protection.

- AAs, too, have physical security concerns for themselves (especially in Afghanistan) and, in a broader sense, for the communities in which they work. However, they tend to frame their programmes in terms of human security and generally have a better grasp than do PSOs of the human security concerns of local populations.
- Communities tend to have a holistic understanding of security, encompassing both physical and human security concerns such as jobs, access to services, and freedom of expression. The latter concerns gain prominence as conflict recedes into the past but, conversely, are kept alive by the prospects that unaddressed needs or grievances may again flare into active hostilities.
- For communities, human security is a precondition for physical security: unless young people have jobs, they will resort to crime; or as one respondent said, *"There is no peace without bread"*. In the words of one Sierra Leonean, *"The real security issue is the economy and people's livelihoods."* For aid agencies, it is the other way around: unless conditions are reasonably secure, they will have difficulty carrying out their assistance mandates.
- Although each set of actors is concerned about self-preservation, each operates with its own understanding of peace and security and accordingly has its own priorities. PSOs and AAs tend to think top-down; local communities are more focused on immediate concerns and less worried about how these relate to the larger context. Local people have their own ways of 'reading' the security situation which have little to do with the readings of PSOs and AAs.
- Disconnects between perceptions of the three sets of actors have major implications. Were the perceptions of local communities to be utilized as the entry point for outside actor engagement or as the benchmark for judging the effectiveness of international assistance or peace support, a major re-thinking of the ways PSOs and AAs operate would be required.
- Debates on the 'blurring of lines' that often pre-occupy PSOs and AAs have little importance for local communities. Such questions as whether military or humanitarian personnel should carry out reconstruction programs are not at the top of the lists of local actors. Rather, their primary concern is human security; their secondary concern is not being abandoned, lest conflict reignites. They also worry that key issues like justice and impunity are not being addressed and that aid is not making enough of a difference. In short, they are more concerned about *what* is provided than about *who* provides it.

The findings of the research also underscore significant differences within each actor set. There are great variations between various PSOs and, within individual PSOs, among various national contingents. The national military contingents in ISAF and the Coalition in Afghanistan, in KFOR in Kosovo, and in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone have different understandings of security, different institutional cultures, and different approaches to local communities. Similarly, some AAs are more prepared to take calculated security risks in pursuit of their humanitarian and development objectives than others, although aid agencies as a group are more venturesome than PSOs as a group. Finally, local communities have multiple perspectives on security. Many of their concerns are local, community or even profession-based. The most insecure people in Afghanistan are taxi drivers and others with valuables subject to robbery; others feel more secure. In Kosovo, a frequently stated fear is that, if you had money or property, you were a target for petty criminals. Business people fear kidnapping and extortion as a bi-product of the failed economy and high unemployment rate. In Sierra Leone there is a different perception of robbery: *"It is the poor stealing from the poor."*

The evolution of security and perceptions thereof

Understandings of security are partly a function of the stage of conflict or post-conflict that pertains in a given setting. As the 'hot' phase of a conflict recedes, understandings and emphases of the three

communities with respect to security evolve. Among our case studies, there appears to be a kind of continuum between physical and human security: Kosovo is farthest away from a hot conflict; Afghanistan is closest (there is still active warfare in parts of the country); and Sierra Leone is somewhere in between. As conflict abates, physical/force protection issues for PSOs give way to governance and security sector reform preoccupations. For aid agencies, emergency assistance and protection issues fade into the background as rehabilitation, reconstruction and the furtherance of good governance take center stage. For local communities, protection, involuntary displacement and basic survival issues give way to employment and social security concerns.

For all three groups, the issues and challenges become, if anything, progressively *more* difficult over time as the situation moves, even by fits and starts, along the continuum. For a PSO, in a paradoxical sense, 'suppressing the enemy' is relatively straightforward, but picking up the garbage or unsnarling traffic jams is more complicated. The former are the bread-and-butter work of the military; the latter are hardly traditional military tasks. Speaking of a post-conflict situation, one of our PSO interviewees observed, "*You don't know who the enemy is anymore*," meaning that the traditional role of the military in such situations has changed, and there is, in fact, no 'enemy' in situations where no peace enforcement has to take place. For an AA, providing emergency health care may be more straight-forward than nurturing the growth of a health care infrastructure.

The research data also confirm the changing comparative advantages of external actors over time. What should be the contributions of military contingents once they have succeeded in encouraging the return of a volatile situation back to basic stability? Should they turn their attention to reconstruction, or leave that to AAs? How should agencies interface with PSOs who are carrying out functions such as security sector reform or police training in which they themselves have little contribution to make? Some outside institutions, the data suggests, have difficulty in evolving in tandem with the changes that are taking place in the settings in which they work. There is some evidence to suggest that PSOs have done better at adapting than AAs.

This study demonstrates as well that meeting-room discussions on the need for a clear separation between the military and the aid establishments are by no means as clear-cut on the ground as they are made out to be. In some cases, PSOs have been more active in peace-building initiatives – human rights education, child protection, democracy training – than AAs for which these would ostensibly constitute bread-and-butter issues. The rebuilding of mosques by Pakistani UNAMSIL troops in Sierra Leone may be dismissed by outsiders as little more than a make-work, hearts-and-minds activity, but Sierra Leoneans are genuinely grateful. The same is true in Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan, where Dutch troops from the local PRT rebuilt a mosque, which was also gratefully received. These initiatives may well have won hearts and minds, but they also got mosques rebuilt, something AAs would never have considered.

The evolving security situation on the ground thus unmasks serious institutional turf issues. PSOs have a monopoly on the provision of security through the application of external force. However, when in a more peaceful clime they undertake assistance activities, they encroach on the traditional territory of aid agencies. This encroachment, which appears to a lesser extent in Kosovo and to a greater extent in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, is admittedly more of a concern for aid agencies than for local communities. But communities may also have legitimate concerns about encroachment, especially if the approaches with which humanitarian agencies operate – top-down, supply-driven, expatriate-intensive – fail to give way over time to more participatory forms of rehabilitation and development assistance. The fluidity of situations on the ground argues for more flexibility on the part of outsiders and more attention to home-grown coping strategies and capabilities. From a local perspective, it is often difficult to make these strategies 'fit' into the top-down mold of the outsiders' ways of doing

business. An experienced NGO director calls this "*the tyranny of the project*". Indeed, the tyranny and the mentality that goes with it may require urgent examination.

Securitization of aid

Another major finding concerns the fact that the security perceptions and agendas of outside actors are generally more controlling of activities than the perceptions, needs, and agendas of local communities. The data suggests that to a significant degree, security has become a donor-driven concept, with budgets out of all proportion to the long-term human security problems that contributed to insecurity in the first place. Accordingly, humanitarian and development assistance have become expressions of the security agendas of Western governments rather than, in the first instance, responses to the felt needs of local communities. Box 12 makes for some interesting and sobering comparisons. Although it uses numbers of troops deployed as a proxy for expenditures on PSOs, it gives an idea of the remarkable disproportion between the international responses to crises.[57]

Box 12. Security and economic assistance in peace-building operations



Sources:
James Dobbins, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, and Richard Teltschik, "The UN's role in nation-building: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq", *Survival*, Winter 2004. Also Barnett R. Rubin, *Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry* Center for American Progress/Center on International Cooperation, October 2004

The most glaring instance of securitization of aid comes from Afghanistan, where innovative but contested examples of the merging of military and assistance processes are taking place through the Coalition and ISAF PRTs. Military presence and derivative assistance strategies are an expression of the 'world ordering' agendas of powerful governments in the post 9/11 context of the global war on terror. Donor-driven concerns are also colouring military/assistance relationships in more subtle

ways. Intervention in Sierra Leone and Kosovo is aimed at preventing these crises from spinning out of control and engulfing neighbouring states. In all three cases studied, aid, humanitarian and developmental alike, has become functional to this larger global agenda, although Sierra Leone has a lower political profile than Afghanistan, or, a few years back, Kosovo.

To a certain extent, securitization also impacts on justice. Expensive international war crimes tribunals have been set up for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, though not Afghanistan. A proper understanding of the proceedings of such tribunals is well beyond the grasp of the local population. In the case of the former Yugoslavia the tribunal has lost some of its credibility as it is seen by the Serbs as biased against them. Interestingly, in Rwanda a system of local justice – the *gacaca* system – has been set up in parallel to the international tribunal, aiming to achieve justice as well as reconciliation.[58]

The implications of this securitization approach, as opposed to one that puts the needs and aspirations of the local populations at the core, are serious.[59] The issue under discussion is not only one of the possible cooperation between humanitarian agencies and the international military, and to what extent that co-operation could exist with mutual respect for each other's mandates in the context of a benign interpretation of civil–military affairs. Rather, the abuse of humanitarian assistance has itself become a method of warfare. In Afghanistan, in late 2001, the superpower used B-52's to drop yellow coloured food packages (cluster-bombs were similarly packaged) despite protests from a major coalition partner and humanitarian agencies alike. Referring to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, Joseph Collins, observed that the insurgents had begun to realize that encouraging instability was the key to undermining Karzai's regime – and the way to do it was "*not to fight our soldiers but* UN *officials and aid workers*."[60] Emergency assistance designed to meet security needs was thus caught in the crossfire if not preempted in the service of larger strategic objectives.

For PSOs and the donor states that fund them, the security of communities and those communities' perceptions of security are secondary to PSO operational requirements. Local security may thus become hostage to the fortune of a given PSO mission and the evolution of its mandate over time. This is not to call into question the importance of PSOs in their own right. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL was and remains essential, while violence in Kosovo and Afghanistan would re-ignite if PSO forces were to leave precipitously. But the balance has been tipped so heavily away from human security, i.e. from recipient-driven to donor-driven concerns, that the gains made by the PSO agenda themselves may very well be threatened in the long term. There is a danger that, from the vantage point of outside actors, "*our cars*" will upstage "*their roads*." A good example of such a disconnect comes from Afghanistan. As many a seasoned aid worker points out, the Coalition's idea of security was to get rid of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but they never provided real security for ordinary people, which allowed the warlords and others to develop the poppy-based criminalized economy. This is a physical security failure that has helped to create the human security problem that affects the lives and livelihoods of ordinary people.

As with the terms of engagement of international institutions, so too disengagement strategies, or the lack thereof, have security implications for local communities. In all three case studies, ambiguities about the future role of the international community, and particularly of PSOs, are themselves a factor in the local security equation. In Kosovo, a lack of clarity on how the future political status of Kosovo will be resolved affects the very tenor of inter-ethnic relations. In Afghanistan, different PSOs pursuing different mandates and operating with differing approaches to security are sending mixed messages to the government and local communities. In Sierra Leone, the large disparity between

the costs of the PSO operation (routinely met by assessments against UN member states) and funds provided toward assistance needs (dependent on voluntary contributions and hence largely unmet) underscores a serious disconnect. Communities in all three cases fear that an abrupt PSO withdrawal could re-ignite conflicts whose root causes have not been fully addressed or, in the case of Kosovo, hardly addressed at all.

How do PSOs look at security?

PSOs, as noted above, approach security from the vantage point of force protection and mission military objectives. Negative peace and physical security are thus very high on their agenda. The NATO doctrine within which its PSOs function frames as operational objectives the suppression of the enemy, promoting good governance, security sector reform and the creation of an enabling environment for reconstruction and development. These do not necessarily represent a linear progression; several 'phases' may be active concurrently, as in Afghanistan today. While PSOs in the three case studies would generally fit in this mould, it was not possible to elicit clarity regarding how each defines security, whether because the military do not have ready definitions of 'security' as such or because, as we were told in several interviews with military officials, the indicators used to measure security are classified. One Dutch officer, when asked what concept of security was applicable, answered: "*We bring stability, and security is part of that, albeit the most pertinent part for the military.*" The aim of stability is to create a (local) government which can sustain itself for an indefinite period of time, after the departure of international forces.

Although one would expect the PSOs to have an articulate concept of security, this was not so in the cases surveyed. Members of PSOs interviewed tended to refer loosely to an absence of organized armed violence, threats to force protection, or the absence of gross, large-scale human rights violations. Our findings were confirmed by those of one of the participants at the London seminar of April 2005. "Implicitly," he writes, "UK military forces adopt a narrow definition of security in PSOs, focusing on overt armed violence or the threat of it. The military approach can be likened to defining the spectrum of light by the visible segment: there is much more to the security of people than overt violence just as there is much more to light than can be seen with the naked eye." He then argues that what is needed, first, is a definition of a secure environment, and second, a definition that takes account of the wider security concerns of the local population "as these are likely to be shared by other components of the international response to complex emergencies."[61] This last assumption, however, that the wider security concerns are shared between the local population and the AAs, is not borne out by our research. A current NATO unclassified draft document, *Allied Joint Land Operations*, does not offer a definition of security either. It does appear to indicate, however, some awareness of wider security considerations when it points out that "long-term stability is likely to depend on other governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with issues such as reconstruction, humanitarian disaster and inter-communal tension."[62]

One of the striking features of PSOs that emerged from our research is the wide range of approaches adopted to interacting with local communities, even within the same country and within the same PSO. Taking as a given the need to ensure force protection, some PSOs assume greater - and some lesser - risk in order to provide protection to the local citizenry. The situation in Afghanistan is particularly confusing to the outsider unfamiliar with the intricacies of military planning. The Coalition – Operation Enduring Freedom – is both a fighting force and a peace support operation; it interacts with communities differently depending on the local situation. ISAF, which is composed of some 15

This photograph, taken by a French peacekeeper, of an MSF vehicle passing a KFOR tank in Kosovo, became a subject of controversy when the NGO objected to its use for publicity purposes by the French military.

NATO contingents and is a 'stabilization' rather than fighting force, demonstrates surprisingly large internal variances in security posture. The latter holds true for peacekeeping contingents in Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

Approaches to security are dictated more by the cultural background and traditions of national contingents than by the actual security situation on the ground. Coalition forces, regardless of the security environment, tend to adopt a more aggressive posture than ISAF, as would be expected, moving in armoured vehicles with weapons at the ready. Their bases and staff are heavily protected and generally have an "ask questions later" approach that has created tension with local communities. But then the New Zealand PRT, which is part of the Coalition, has a much more relaxed posture in its area of operations in Bamiyan: foot patrols, floppy hats, no body armour, and no visible weapons on most occasions.

In interactions with local populations, the UK forces in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone and the Dutch and New Zealand contingents in Afghanistan get generally the highest marks from local communities for their constructive and non-threatening approaches. In Sierra Leone the UK military also get high praise for having defeated the rebels. They have explicit rules ranging from never wearing sunglasses when talking to the locals (in the case of the UK) to relatively sophisticated mechanisms for collecting and analyzing data on local security conditions and perceptions. Much of such information is classified, as it falls under 'intelligence gathering'. However, the team was able to ascertain that, at least in Afghanistan, the ISAF military does have a set of indicators to measure security which include the obvious (shooting incidents, presence of armed elements) and the less obvious (socio-economic conditions, employment and even gender considerations).

One of the factors that explains the relatively more sophisticated approach of the UK military as compared to the US is pre-deployment training. Another is the length of the tours of duty; these tend to be shorter for US military with less elaborate handover procedures than the UK military. There is a larger point here as well: while military forces by and large concentrate on promoting negative peace, some

contingents inform their strategies with attention to factors that can help promote positive peace. Again, the British in Kosovo have had a very active campaign of civil–military co-operation. Early in the post-conflict period the MOD worked closely with DFID, undertaking assistance programmes aimed at getting businesses, schools and clinics back to work. As time progressed, this work has concentrated on aspects that enhance the ability of the population to return to normal life.[63]

How do AAs look at security?

AAs have a mix of physical security and human security preoccupations. The first relate to personal safety of staff and agency assets, the second to the security of the persons and communities with whom the agencies interact. These twin concerns are multi-layered, with significant differences both within and between country situations.

In Afghanistan, personal safety of aid workers is high on the agenda, an understandable reflection of the price paid by aid workers, particularly national staffs, since the demise of the Taliban. Being at the wrong place at the wrong time, landmines, abusive armed elements, criminality (both poppy-related and general), and the hazards created by speeding PSO vehicles were the frequent subject of comment in our interviews. The UN has adopted a very risk-averse posture, requiring that its aid personnel, if they venture outside the Kabul security bubble, travel with armed escorts in two-way radio-equipped vehicles. This posture impedes the nurturing of relationships with local communities. These precautions are themselves seen as 'passing the security buck' and considerably increasing the security risk for NGOs, most of whom adopt a more informal and risk-taking posture.

In Kosovo and Sierra Leone, such threats against AAs are not an issue, or no longer an issue. Agencies these days are not specifically targeted by political or criminal elements. As in Afghanistan, crime (mainly petty theft), traffic accidents and the unavailability of emergency medical care weigh heavily on the minds of aid workers. An additional factor of insecurity in Afghanistan, and to some extent in Kosovo, is the risk associated with inappropriate (that is, perceived 'un-Islamic') behaviour of aid workers. A number of security incidents in Afghanistan have been traced to such provocations as distinct from insurgent activity.

Not surprisingly, AAs consider providing assistance as a factor contributing to improved security. Conversely, the denial or withholding of assistance is viewed as creating insecurity. This is clearly the case in Afghanistan where large swathes of the countryside are off-limits to aid workers because of unacceptable risks.[64] In contested environments such as south-eastern Afghanistan or mixed Albanian Serb communities in Kosovo, the development of close and continuing relations with affected communities is seen as an investment in staff security and protection. Risks are perceived as being elevated in areas in which AAs have not established a track record of community acceptance.

Aid workers also perceive the short attention span of the international community as in itself constituting a security hazard. While their relations with PSOs vary in closeness and friendliness, many AAs acknowledge that premature departure of international military presence could wreak havoc and re-energize sleeping demons. Moreover, aid personnel tend to be articulate in defining geopolitical risks that would affect the human security of communities: the deadly combination of drugs, weak governance and warlordism in Afghanistan; the lack of a viable political solution to the issue of the future status of the province in Kosovo; and in Sierra Leone, the vulnerability of the peace process to regional instability in West Africa.

Because of the nature of their work, AAs tend to be more familiar with, and more solicitous of, the perceptions and aspirations of the communities in which they work than are the PSOs. For example, concerns regarding the inadequacy of the levels of humanitarian and development assistance, as compared to the costs of the PSOs, is frequently raised in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, as well as the implications of the overall lack of a clear exit strategy or the security vacuum that might ensue. In Afghanistan, NGOs (but not the UN) have been involved in a passionate debate concerning the functions performed by PSOs and their implications (often arguably negative) for the acceptability and security of AAs at the local level.

One of the strategies adopted by NGOs to counter perceptions that they are 'tainted' by their association with the international military forces and intervention is to 'go local.' By this they mean that expatriate staff seek to become a part of local communities or rely much more heavily on local staff and national implementing partners to sustain programmes. This makes sense both from a security and sustainability perspective, although there may be something incongruous about western aid workers seeking to blend into other cultures. The downside, however, is the possibility that international institutions are thereby passing the risk to their national NGO colleagues, who in Afghanistan have paid a particularly high price for their exposure.[65] In Sierra Leone, by contrast, the issue of expatriate vulnerability was less pronounced.

As personal security is not currently a particularly critical issue for AA staff in Sierra Leone and Kosovo (except as it relates to petty crime), the team did not come across any systematic attempts to measure or analyze security. That was true both of their assistance activities and of the wider situation of the population. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the UN and NGOs have elaborate systems in place, with specialized staff in some ten duty stations, to monitor the security situation and provide advice to staff (or, in the case of the UN, instructions). These offices provide an essential service, although their analytical capacity is weak. Information tends to be anecdotal, with little effort to link it with political and socio-economic factors affecting the life of the population. While these offices do not gather information from communities to inform their perceptions, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the NGO coordination body, has launched a study to collect data on how individuals and communities perceive aid agencies. NGOs are alarmed by the evidence that is beginning to amass of a high degree of popular disaffection vis-à-vis the aid community. Some of these suspicions are fuelled by government officials for their own reasons. Nevertheless, NGOs sense the need for a better strategy to communicate their objectives and to separate out agencies with an established track record from the growing plethora of local and international 'ambulance chasers'. Disaffection also points to the need for heightened security awareness. Negative local perceptions could well become outright hostility toward outsiders over time.

How do local communities look at security?

Understanding local perceptions on security and how communities deal with security issues was the central focus of our study. Wherever it went, the team found that views were shared spontaneously and eagerly. A number of those interviewed commented that their views had not been solicited before or had otherwise not been taken into account. Of course, as noted above, the views shared may not have been deeply held or, for that matter, an accurate reflection of reality. In some cases, one suspects, communities may have told us what they thought we wanted to hear. In other cases, views seemed patently inaccurate, as in the instance noted in the Afghanistan case study in which people whose families were benefiting from international programmes complained that they had seen no outside assistance.

The perceptions obtained from individual interviews and focus groups varied across the three countries studied. The common thread is the importance of human security, especially when conflict and the physical security concerns associated with conflict are no longer the most pressing issue. In fact, in an interesting reversal of perceptions, once the conflict has receded from every day life, human security is seen as a precondition for the solution to remaining physical security issues, mainly related to crime. Human security is also viewed as essential to the prevention of recurring physical security problems.

In Afghanistan, overall physical security is guaranteed by the 'B-52 factor'. At the local level, crime and corruption among the police remain a concern. However, the main preoccupation of communities is human security, with a heavy emphasis on employment. The lack of services (transport, electricity) and of functioning institutions of governance affects human security. While the international military contingents are mostly perceived as playing a useful role (at least in Kabul, where only a couple of intellectuals mentioned their presence as a problem), views of the AAs are more jaded, ranging from "*not enough is being done*" to "*they are all thieves*". In the minds of the communities interviewed, the link between assistance and improved human security is generally not made. Views of security differ according to economic status and gender, with the wealthiest in the community being the least secure. Women as a group had specific concerns: increased harassment because they are no longer burqa-clad; fears of child kidnapping, for example.

In Kosovo, there is negative peace but little evidence of positive peace. Insecurity, rooted in inter-ethnic tensions and a moribund economy, continues. Fear was thus giving way to uncertainty, reflecting the political impasse and confusion about the intentions of the international community regarding the final status of Kosovo. This is a case of negative peace potentially breeding physical insecurity. There is some resentment among the local population against AAs in that it is felt that too much attention has been paid to refugees and IDPs and not enough to those who stayed and weathered the storm. This is coupled with the feeling that many AAs have departed too early and had failed to leave behind them sustainable projects which could enhance the economy, and therefore, the security of the population.

There are two pressing problems in Kosovo in 2005. Firstly, there is the lack of a viable economy, with some 74% of those under 30 years of age out of work.[66] Given the young population in Kosovo, this is a ticking bomb and fuels the resentments that flare into violence from time to time. It also contributes to the rising petty crime rate which is the major concern, among the population, in terms of physical security. Secondly, there are grave doubts about the future of the province among the population. The lack of a determination of final status for the province means that there is reluctance in the international business community to invest. This exacerbates the economic woes of the area and signals very clearly to the majority population that they are not yet accepted as entities in their own right. The lack of final status also raises fears of the return of Serbian rule among the Kosovar Albanians and, conversely, fears of further intimidation in Kosovo Serbs.

In Sierra Leone, people perceive robbery as the major threat to physical security (a notable change after much larger concerns of a life-and-death nature during the war). However, petty crime is connected with poverty, which is an issue for poorly paid police as well. This leads to discussions about corruption and to the larger issues of justice and accountability. For Sierra Leoneans the economy is by far the number one security issue. Everything flows from poverty, ranging from corruption and mismanagement to the dangers posed by the large numbers of unemployed youth, to the loyalty of the army. Unlike Afghanistan, there is no explicit criticism of external assistance. While AAs may

be uncomfortable with the role played by the foreign military in humanitarian and development assistance, communities do not seem to have a problem. The quick impact projects implemented by UNAMSIL get high marks – including, as noted above, the Pakistani army's reconstruction of mosques, something no AA would have considered undertaking.

In the three cases studied, the security perceptions of local communities differ significantly from those of AAs and PSOs. Communities 'read' the security situation according to their own criteria. They do not feel that their preoccupations are being given consideration by the outsiders. Some feel forsaken. When asked what they had done to improve their own security, the team was often met with blank stares, particularly in urban areas. People often felt powerless to confront corrupt police and petty criminality and often made a direct link between the two. Some interesting examples of communities taking security in their own hands did, however, emerge. In Afghanistan, tribal structures often have their own tribal police which is effective against intruders and in patrolling roads; in peri-urban Kabul, groups organize night watches and make noise if robbers approach. In Sierra Leone there are experiments with community-based policing, youth patrols, and alert systems. Youth clubs have made young people much more aware of human rights, gender violence and their own security. None came to the team's notice in Kosovo. On the contrary, in Kosovo, it was suggested that more use be made of the Kosovo Protection Corps (the transformed KLA) in dealing with civil unrest and crime. Kosovar Albanians suggested that the corps would command more respect than the International Police. Obviously, the effect of such an initiative on the Kosovo Serbian population would be entirely negative.

Are the voices of local communities being heard?

The preceding paragraphs will have shown that local voices are, for the most part, not being heard or heeded, much less 'privileged' by outside actors. The dominant voices in post-conflict and transition environments are those of PSOs and AAs. Even the voice of government is often muffled; its remit does not always extend beyond the capital. Many of the Sierra Leoneans interviewed attributed the fact that they are breathing somewhat easier nowadays to decisive British military action against the RUF and to the beginnings of a visible infrastructure for improved services in policing, education and health. By and large, however, what the communities interviewed for this study are telling us quite emphatically is that although some progress has been made in tackling their immediate physical security concerns, the real issues that create insecurity have not been addressed with adequate seriousness or urgency.

There is substantial cause for hope in the fact that in each of the countries studied, some individuals and groups were asserting responsibility for their own security. Such was the case of tribal elders in Afghanistan who put in place an elementary community watch system. It was the case of youth in Kosovo who, at some personal risk, met with counterparts across the ethnic divide. It was the case of children in Sierra Leone who affirmed that they themselves were their future. In fact, the potential of local youth to play progressive roles in promoting human security and positive peace recurs throughout various interviews. The challenge for outside actors is clearly to facilitate, reinforce and protect such local initiatives and resources rather than to minimize or even exacerbate the conditions that such efforts seek to change.

In summary, our conclusions are:

- that there are serious disconnects between the perceptions of PSOs, AAs and communities on issues of peace and security;
- that the views of local communities, which have their own perceptions of and approaches to security, receive too little consideration from outside actors;

- that within communities there exist significant variations in such perceptions: i.e. youth, elders, women and girls have different concerns;
- that in each setting there is progress to show for international presence and resources but also, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo, recurrent criticism of aid priorities and programmes. People are generally more critical of AAs than of PSOs;
- that local communities have high expectations of international actors that are often poorly managed by the outsiders;
- that while in some settings local people differentiate among international actors, they are generally more concerned with what is being provided than with who are the chosen agents of assistance and protection; and
- that the political–security situation in conflict and post-conflict situations is often a dynamic one, evolving more rapidly than international actors are able to adapt.

The road ahead

In its terms of reference, the team was not tasked with making specific recommendations, it being understood that the study itself was a first stab at a series of complicated issues which lie at the core of communities' coping strategies and of international actors' roles and functions in countries in and recovering from crisis. Nevertheless, during the course of the study and at the London seminar a number of ideas for further research or policy development were put forward. Some of these are outlined below; a more detailed list appears in Appendix 4. It will be for the commissioners of this study to carry these and other ideas forward with its own networks. For its part, the research team and the Feinstein International Famine Center will do their best to ensure that the report is disseminated widely as well.

Taking its cue from a metaphor in the terms of reference of the study, which ask provocatively whether security is about "*their cars or our roads*," the team's suggestions for further action can be grouped as follows:

Their cars and our roads

- The key finding of this study is that while PSOs and AAs share the same roads with local communities, they are concerned by very different aspects of security. If local perceptions are to become an entry point for outsider interventions, for program planning, or for judging the effectiveness of assistance and peace support activities, a major re-thinking of the ways PSOs and AAs operate is required.
- More research should be conducted into local perceptions of security in other countries (Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo are examples) using more in-depth and rigorous social science methodologies. Research should be aimed at finding specific ways of incorporating the views of local populations into the programming of outside agencies.
- The dramatic disconnect between local perceptions of security, on the one hand, and comparative investments in international military and human needs assistance needs further review and redress.
- Turf issues between PSOs and AAs can undermine the security and resilience of local communities. Rather than seeking to protect their traditional mandates, those agencies should review their respective comparative advantages in enhancing security. Donors should take those advantages into account in reaching funding decisions.
- The NMCG approach, which has narrowed misunderstandings between the two sets of players, should be extended to other countries that contribute troops to PSOs as well as NATO and the EU.
- NGOs, the UN, OCHA and Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) and donors should continue to be seized with the issue of the disconnect between inside and outside perspectives

through further research, training, conferences and policy development. Training materials for PSO and AA staff should be developed to improve interactions with local communities.

How's my driving?

Another area flagged in this report is the perceptions gap between communities and outsiders on the effectiveness of assistance interventions. Many respondents noted that this was the first time they were consulted about their views on their current situation or hopes and fears for their future. At the same time misconceptions and unrealistic expectations abound.

- Ongoing and systematic consultation of affected groups and communities on their aspirations should become the norm rather than the exception.
- Both PSOs and AAs should devote more effort in their respective communications strategies to ensure that their functions and activities are better understood by their purported beneficiaries.
- Accountability, and in particular accountability to beneficiaries, should be systematically promoted as a vehicle to empower local communities.
- The respective cost-effectiveness and impact (sustainability) of military and assistance agency involvement in assistance projects should be researched; more information and analysis is needed on the cost-effectiveness and impact of the different models of PRTs or similar approaches to integrated military-assistance endeavors.

Getting out of the Land Cruiser

The processes of social transformation that accompany transitions in countries recovering from conflict are extremely delicate. They are also generally poorly understood by outsiders, especially AAs with no track record of working with communities in a given context and by the military contingents who are culturally diverse, sometimes insensitive to local realities and mores, and subject to frequent rotations. In a broader sense, processes that produce and sustain long-term positive change are rarely successful when imposed from the outside.

Such considerations argue for a more thoughtful and long-term approach toward international interventions. Such an approach would require much more investment in research and understanding of local structures, power relations, forms of governance and socio-economic processes. It argues for much more ground-truthing, for sharing the road – in fact, for getting out of the capital and off the tarmac. In the end, human security and durable peace will not become a reality for those who contribute troops and assistance personnel until it meets the expressed needs of local communities.

Endnotes

[1] The Steering Committee consisted of individuals from BRCS, Save the Children – UK (SCF–UK), Oxfam, MOD, and DFID

[2] Current British military doctrine offers a remarkably wide definition of a PSO: "an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peace-keeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations." The definition appears to include the foreign military, civil administration and even neutral humanitarian organizations that would prefer to keep the military at an arm's length.

[3] For an elaboration of the concept, see Johann Galtung, "Violence, peace and peace research" in *Journal of Peace Research*, Oslo, 1969, pp. 167–191.

[4] The Commission on Human Security describes the challenge of human security as "to protect the vital core of all human activities in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity", *Human Security Now*, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html>

[5] B.V.A. Röling, *Volkenrecht en vrede*, Deventer (1982), 20 and ff; *ibid*, *Vredeswetenschap*, Utrecht (1981), 20 and ff. Marcia Byrom Hartwell, "The role of forgiveness in reconstructing society after conflict," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, www.jha.ac (first posted May 1999, re-posted June 2000); Giandomenico Picco et al., *Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilisations*, (2001), 198 et ff.

[6] Des Gasper, *The Ethics of Development*, Edinburgh, 2004, 117.

[7] Jean-Marie Domenach, *Our Moral Involvement in Development*, United Nations Center for Economic and Social Information, New York, (1971) 14.

[8] Brian Urquhart, *A life in Peace and War*, 1987, Toronto/New York, p. 378; Th. A. van Baarda, "Freedom fighters, terrorists and lawful combatants. The violent quest for moral certainty and social change," conference paper, 2003, published at <www.usafa.af.mil/jscope>

[9] See *Afghanistan National Human Development Report: Security with a Human Face*, Kabul, February 2005. Afghanistan ranks173rd out of 178 nations on the UNDP's 2004 Human Development Index. Only a few sub-Saharan nations rank lower. Life expectancy, at 44.5 years, is at least 20 years lower than in neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, expectations are high: the report found that "the overwhelming majority of people hold a sense of pessimism and fear that reconstruction is bypassing them."

[10] Human Development report, op. cit.

[11] Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) study *A Call for Justice*, Kabul, (January 2005) and NGO Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), *Take the Guns Away*, Kabul, (2004).

[12] Another recent study found that rural women saw aspects of their culture as damaging and threatening to them: Mazurana, Dyan, et.al, *Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans*, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, June 2004.

[13] A study conducted by Save the Children US in 2003 (*The Children of Kabul. Discussions with Afghan Families*, SCF(US), Kabul, June 2003), identifies traffic accidents as a major concern and security threat for children.

[14] "Afghan aid row flares ahead of donor forum: Lots of fanfare, billions of dollars spent and not much to show," Reuters, Kabul, 4 April 2005.

[15] The mission was unable to visit a PRT due to bad weather and roads. A DFID-funded evaluation team was in Kabul at the same time looking at DFID's role within the PRTs.

[16] Lieutenant-General David Barno is Overall Commander of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

[17] Since the research was conducted, a resurgence of attacks, including the killing of over a dozen national staff, the kidnapping of an international aid worker and the killing of an international official working for the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (early March 2005) has considerably dampened this perception.

[18] Numbers provided by the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO).

[19] This emphasis on human rather than physical security is undoubtedly a function of the relatively good security situation in the areas visited. This does not mean that similar perceptions would be registered elsewhere in the country, especially in areas where insecurity is more tenuous because of insurgency, warlordism or other factors of structural violence. It thus would be inappropriate to extrapolate on the basis of data collected in the geographical areas visited for the purposes of this study.

[20] Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from male respondents.

[21] According to the NGO Perception Assessment study carried out by Sayara in early 2005: "We found that negative opinions [of NGOs] were expressed in a vast majority. The views were expressed by people from all sexes, areas, ages, social backgrounds, levels of education, etc. Of course, we would like to reemphasize the fact that the focus groups were conducted in areas where we knew that criticism was already strong. Although we heard many different point of views, they all led to the same conclusion: those who criticized NGOs seemed to be very suspicious and resentful of what NGOs were doing (or not)."

[22] It was intimated to the team that the UK military were collecting information on security issues directly from communities. However, it was not possible to verify this.

[23] A study published in 2003 by the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development concluded that neglect by international administrators who have "rigid stereotypes" about the Islamic faith and its practitioners, threatens the "tolerant Islamic traditions" of Kosovo. With the neglect of the educational system, conservative Islamic traditions funded by groups from Saudi Arabia, may gain a foothold in Kosovo. According to this study, UNMIK bears a large share of the blame. One example the study gives concerns the Islamic Endowment Foundation support for 30 Koranic schools in Kosovo's rural areas. Isa Blumi, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, paper # 2, *Political Islam among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans*? Pristina, July 2003 <www.kipred.org>. This view, has received support from an interviewee of Western background who has a senior managerial position with an NGO. In her view, however, the indefinite delays in reaching a final settlement of the twin issues which have remained unresolved, should also be seen as an important cause. On a limited scale, ethnic Albanian women have been paid by Islamic organizations to wear a veil and to observe Ramadan.

[24] *Operation Allied Force* (AFOR) concerned the air campaign of ten NATO member states rump-Yugoslavia; *Operation Allied Harbour*, which included AFOR, dealt with the refugee crisis in Albania.

[25] Dick Leurdijk, Dick Zandee, *Kosovo, van crisis tot crisis*, Institute Clingendael, The Hague, November 1999, 37-38; Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs, letter to the Second Chamber of Parliament, March 2000.

[26] The Military Technical Agreement is in effect the cease-fire agreement between NATO and the Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of air campaign. Further details can be found at: *Kosovo Force* (KFOR) (2005) http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq.htm

[27] For a detailed account, see Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda, and Marc Sommers, NATO *and humanitarian action in the Kosovo crisis*, February 2000 <hwproject.tufts.edu/publications>

[28] While as explained earlier, UNMIK for the purposes of this study is not a PSO, it is mentioned here because it is pertinent to understanding the security context in Kosovo.

[29] United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (2005) http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm

[30] United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (2004). Press Release October 2004, http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#2501

[31] UNMIK press releases, UNMIK/PR/1247, 18 October 2004 and UNMIK/PR/1254, 23 October 2004.

[32] "Kosovo Economic Memorandum," <www.oneworld.net> (visited on 4 Feb. 2005).

[33] V. Illic, Struggles of the Invisible Refugees, in: Vincent, M. & Sorensen, B. (Eds), *Caught between Borders: Response strategies of the Internally Displaced*. London: Pluto Press (2001).

[34] Source: <www.unhcr.ch> at UNHCR news stories, 21 Dec. 2004 (visited 30 Jan. 2005).

[35] UNMIK issues travel documents to Kosovars which are accepted by some western governments while others require an additional visa. Again, Kosovar views divide largely along ethnic lines. Ethnic Albanians see the opportunity to travel to Europe and the United States as an essential element of a "sense of belonging", i.e. of Kosovo being a member of the group of free nations. By contrast, none of the Serbs interviewed expressed the wish to travel to the West. One felt so humiliated by EU immigration laws that he refused to apply for a visa. None of the Serbian interviewees expressed the wish to travel to Serbia proper either.

[36] Members of the research team had examined the earlier issues in a previous report. See Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda, and Marc Sommers, NATO *and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis*, February 2000. <hwproject.tufts.edu/publications>

[37] As recently as February 2005, KFOR troops, after having spotted civilians in extreme poverty, walking in sandals in the snow, donated humanitarian items to 500 individuals in 113 families in both communities of Plementina and Azotikut. More examples of humanitarian activities conducted by KFOR can be found at KFOR's website.

[38] Stuart Gordon, "Military-humanitarian relationships and the invasion of Iraq: Reforging Uncertainties?" In: *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <www.jha.ac> posted July 2004; Anouk Delafortie, "Why Médecins sans Frontières has pulled out of Afghanistan", *Forced Migration Review*, September 2004, no. 21, p. 46; Ted van Baarda and Larry Minear, "Military Haberdashery in Afghanistan" in *Forced Migration Review*, January 2003, no. 16, 47 <www.fmreview.org>

[39] Although not verified by the team, there were indications that the conduct of German troops in Prizren, during the 2004 riots, left much to be desired and could rebound on KFOR sometime in the future.

[40] Their view is shared by the International Crisis Group. "UNMIK's structure and mandate are now exposed as inappropriate to prepare Kosovo for the transition from war to peace, from socialism to the market economy, and from international political limbo to final status. The international community had beguiled itself into believing that the patchy half-promises of its undertaking to begin reviewing Kosovo's final status by mid-2005 represented a complete policy. Unable to agree on what that final status should be, it relied on the naïve assumption that delaying the decision would allow passions to cool. It also failed to take security concerns seriously and deal with parallel structures and criminal groups. This lack of resolve left the majority Albanian and minority Serb communities locked in a confrontation that was suppressed, never resolved." International Crisis Group (2004), *Collapse in Kosovo*. (Europe Report No: 155). Retrieved January 20, 2005, from http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&l=1

[41] Estimates of the number of dead vary. Given the fact that more than 2.5 million people were displaced and several hundred thousand became refugees, it is likely that the number of deaths that resulted indirectly from ten years of war is significantly higher.

[42] The man who organized and managed the CDF, former Deputy Minister of Defence, Sam Hinga Norman, is one of the most prominent among those charged. This indictment, widely unpopular among his supporters, is considered by many to pose an on-going security threat.

[43] Information on UNAMSIL can be found at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html

[44] "Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone", Monograph 69, Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chap8.html

[45] In fact drug abuse, the growth of HIV/AIDS, human trafficking and prostitution are described in detail as major youth problems in Lansana Gberie, *The Youth Crisis in Sierra Leone: Lessons for West Africa*, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, 2005.

[46] Gberie, op.cit.

[47] Macartan Humphries and Jeremey M. Weinstein, *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, June–August* 2003. Interim Report, quoted in Gberie, op.cit.

[48] Apart from the police and local government officials in Kambia, few of the interviews for this report involved government personnel. Additionally, 'aid' was not raised by the interviewer. Different questions and different respondents might have elicited wider comments on the role of aid and aid agencies.

[49] It is sometimes argued that military reconstruction efforts are more costly than those of NGOs, and that peacekeepers bring little to the local economy. This may be true of Western armies, but it has not been the case in Sierra Leone, where virtually all of the UN peacekeepers were provided by other developing countries.

[50] Rand Corporation, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq*, (2005), 243 and 228, <www.rand.org>

[51] Ibid, 239. However, we cannot confirm the Rand Corporation's conclusion on page 240 that Kosovo is witnessing economic growth. As we have pointed out in the Kosovo chapter, Kosovo is currently experiencing negative growth and its population is suffering from massive unemployment and hardship despite the presence of KFOR. There was a brief but artificial revival of the economy in the immediate aftermath of the war as the result of a high level of humanitarian aid pouring in.

[52] She not only describes the decision to send US troops to Kigali to protect the expatriate – not the local – community, but also a phone call received by Major General Dallaire, the Force Commander of UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda. It was from the Pentagon while the genocidal war was well under way: "A US officer was wondering precisely how many Rwandans had died. Dallaire was puzzled and asked why he wanted to know. 'We are doing calculations back here,' the US officer said, 'and one American casualty is worth about 85.000 Rwandan dead'." In other words, considerations of domestic politics rather than the safety of the local population were dominant. Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide*, New York, (2002), 381.

[53] Rand Corporation, op.cit., 244.

[54] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, New York/London, (2004), 55.

[55] See Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, "Human Security – Protecting and Empowering the People", *Global Governance*, Volume 9, No.3, July–September 2003, 273–282. Advocates of a human security approach to crises favor an integrated or holistic approach, both in terms of diagnosis and response, so that there is due recognition of, and attention to, the way in which divergent or complementary interventions impact on individuals whose lives or livelihoods are under threat.

[56] Call for proposals, 2.

[57] Despite its best efforts, the team was unable to find any reliable figures for expenditures on PSO forces in the three countries studied. In the case of Afghanistan, some "rule of thumb' figures were aired: the Coalition expenditures are said to be in the order of $1 billion per month and the ISAF expenditures perhaps an additional US$200 million/month. This compares with expenditures on assistance, all sources combined, which have averaged less than US$1.2 billion per year in the last couple of years.

[58] Marcia Byrom Hartwell, op. cit.; G. Picco, op.cit, 203: "Reconciliation is hardly a process that can be imposed or forced upon anyone from top to bottom, and it is a process that becomes successful only when it is carried out at the grassroots level." Note 5 above refers.

[59] For a wide ranging analysis of the implications of the interventions in Afghanistan (and Iraq) for the future of humanitarianism see the papers produced in 2004 by the FIFC available at famine.tufts.edu

[60] Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command. The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib*, New York, (2004), 147.

[61] Major R.M. Nichols, *Whose Security is it Anyway? Techniques and Processes for a Secure Environment on Peace Support Operations*, MDA dissertation, July 2001, The Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University, at 5.

[62] NATO, AJP 3.2 *Allied Joint Land Operations*, at para. 0114 (e).

[63] Randall, T.(2000) *The Civil–Military Relationship and International Co-ordination during the Kosovo Emergency*. Cranfield Disaster Management Center

[64] In this context, the provision of assistance by Coalition forces to communities that have provided information regarding the whereabouts of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and its withholding should they refuse to do so, has caused alarm among NGOs and UN officials.

[65] More than 60 national staff have been killed since 9/11.

[66] United Nations Development Programme (2003). UNDP Factsheet No.1: Unemployment. http//:www.kosovo.undp.org/Factsheets/factsheets/unemployment_may2003.pdf

Appendix 1: Acronyms

AA	Assistance Agency
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Security Office
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CDF	Civilian Defence Force (Sierra Leone)
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CF	Coalition Forces (Afghanistan)
CIMIC	Civil–Military Cooperation
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (of combatants)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group
FARK	Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo
FG	Focus Group
FIFC	Feinstein International Famine Center (Tufts University)
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HRRAC	NGO Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Team
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KEK	Kosovo Electricity Company
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Protection Service
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MSF	Médicins sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NMCG	NGO–Military Contact Group
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SCF–UK	Save the Children Fund–UK
SCF–US	Save the Children Fund–US
SRSG	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Appendix 2: Survey Instruments

SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR PERSONNEL FROM PEACE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (PSOs) AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS (HOs) IN AFGHANISTAN, KOSOVO, AND SIERRA LEONE

Tufts Security Study

Note to Interviewer: This survey instrument seeks to elicit both quantitative and qualitative data for analysis. Please begin by providing your interviewee(s) with a copy of the Letter of Introduction to the research. Explain the purposes of the study, the groundrules for the interview, and the availability of the results. Answer whatever questions arise about the initiative before proceeding with the interview. To the extent possible, please interview peace support and humanitarian personnel after having sampled the perceptions of individuals and organizations in local communities. Proceeding in that sequence affords prominence to the views of local communities, as requested by the stakeholders of the research. Please write up your notes with as much detail as possible for the benefit of other team members.

Part I: Quantitative Survey Information

Date of Interview:_____
Name(s) of Interviewee(s) _____
Name of Interviewer:_____
Name of Interpreter (if any):_____
Language(s) in which interview conducted: _____
Place of interview (place name): _____
☐ in PSO or HO office ☐ in public space ☐ in home ☐ other
Length of interview (approx):
☐ less than 15 minutes ☐ about 30 minutes ☐ about 45 minutes
☐ about an hour ☐ 60–90 minutes ☐ 90–120 minutes ☐ more than 2 hrs.
Age of interviewee: ☐ 20s ☐ 30s ☐ 40s ☐ 50s ☐ 60s
Gender: ☐ M ☐ F
Institutional affiliation of interviewee: ☐ PSO ☐ HO
For PSOs: ☐ UN ☐ regional (EU, ECOMOG, NATO) ☐ other
For HOs: ☐ local NGO ☐ international NGO ☐ UN organization
☐ RCM ☐ governmental
Level: ☐ Senior ☐ Mid career ☐ Junior
Status: ☐ Local ☐ International
(For internationals:) Years in Country: ☐ less than 1 yr ☐ 1–3 yrs ☐ more than 3 yrs

Part II: Open-ended Questions

1. What are the main security threats faced by communities in the location where you work?
[*List up to 5 in descending order of importance*]

2. What are the main security threats faced by your organization in the location where you work?
[*List up to 5 in descending order of importance*]

3. Do PSOs and HOs face basically the same threats or are they different? Please explain.

4. Have there been changes in the security environment for members of the local community in the location where you work in the past 12 months:

☐ improved ☐ worsened ☐ roughly the same ☐ don't know

5. What are the indicators of the improving or worsening situation?

6. What is/are the cause(s) of the changes?

7. Have there been changes in the security environment of your organization in the past 12 months?

8. What are the indicators of change?

9. What are the causes of these changes?

10. How do you define security/insecurity? Do you distinguish between physical and human security?

11. In your security assessments, do you factor in the perceptions of:
    - ☐ local civil authorities
    - ☐ local police/military authorities
    - ☐ local communities
    - ☐ traders/business people
    - ☐ PSOs
    - ☐ HOs
    - ☐ other (explain)

12. Has your organization tabulated security data or done studies on security?
    ☐ yes ☐ no
    Please provide examples of data, documents, maps etc. used to assess security situation.

13. Have there been any particular security incidents that have affected the lives of ordinary people in your area or your own work? Please provide dates and relevant details.

14. Have there been particular events that have resulted in improvements in the security situation? Please explain.

15. What are the most important things that need to be done to improve security for the local community in your area?

16. What are the most important things that need to be done to improve the security of PSOs and HOs, if it needs improvement?
    [*Please record any differences between the response as it relates to* PSOs *and* HOs]

17. Do you sense any different understandings of security among (or within) local communities, PSOs, and HOs? If so, please explain.

18. Are there other observations or comments that you would like to make on security or related issues?

SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS REGARDING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Tufts Security Study

Note to Interviewers: This survey instrument is designed as a template for interviews with communities. It combines (a) specific questions geared to generating data that will lend themselves to quantitative tabulation with (b) open-ended questions of a more qualitative nature. In the latter category, it identifies broad issue areas or themes which should be kept in mind by interviewers, whether they be members of the research team itself or others collaborating in the interview process. The open-ended questions are framed in such a way as to avoid prejudging the issues or suggesting possible answers. The interviewer is asked to provide as detailed a write-up of each interview as possible, maximizing the information that will then be available to the research team for analysis.

Before conducting an interview, please explain the purposes of the study and the applicable groundrules, obtaining verbal consent from the person or persons. Then begin with Part I, *recording the date and location (name of village, town, province, and whether rural/urban). Note age, gender, ethnicity, education, and occupation. It would also be useful to know whether the person is the head of household (or who is), and whether he/she is a returnee,* IDP, *or ongoing resident of the community. The interviewer's name and language of interview should also be entered. Then proceed to* Part II.

Part I: Quantitative Survey Information

Date of Interview:_____
Name(s) of Interviewee(s) _____
Name of Interviewer:_____
Name of Interpreter (if any):_____
Language(s) in which interview conducted: _____
Place of interview : _____
Length of interview (approx):
☐ less than 15 minutes ☐ about 30 minutes ☐ about 45 minutes
☐ about an hour ☐ 60–90 minutes ☐ 90–120 minutes ☐ more than 2 hrs.
Age: ☐ 18–24 ☐ 25–34 ☐ 35–49 ☐ 50 or above
Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female
Ethnicity: _____
Years of education: check highest level completed:
☐ None ☐ Primary school ☐ Secondary school
☐ Graduate school ☐ Post-graduate
Length of residence in community: ☐ less than 1 year ☐ 1–5 yrs ☐ more than 5 yrs
Occupation: _____
Head of household? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If not, who is? ☐ Husband ☐ Wife ☐ Mother ☐ Father ☐ Uncle ☐ Aunt
_____Other (specify)

Part II: Open-ended Questions

Before you start the interview, it may be useful to break the ice with some chit-chat or ask generic questions about life in the village or community, e.g.: How are things these days? How are the crops doing? Have there been any natural disasters? How are the prices of basic items in the bazaar? Is there work for young people? You should note the answers if they give you interesting context information. Try to ensure that the interviewee feels comfortable with you.

1. Is there peace in your area these days? ☐ Y ☐ N

2. What does peace mean for you? How would you define peace?
   [*Note to interviewers: the purpose of the first two questions is to get an idea of how the individual or the community define peace and its opposite. Allow the respondent(s) some time to think about this and encourage him/her/them to provide different or tentative answers. Try not to prompt, at least initially. Pls. note the terminology used in the local language to define peace/absence of peace.*]

3. Generally speaking, do you feel safe in your village/area? ☐ Y ☐ N

4. More specifically, how would you describe the relative security or insecurity of your community at present?
   [*Note: pls. identify the benchmarks used or implied to describe the situation, asking the interviewee to elaborate where appropriate. Please be alert to any particular local descriptors or shorthands for the situation.*]

5. What are the biggest obstacles you and your family face in feeling secure?
   [*Please list the individual obstacles cited, such as natural disasters, conflicts, presence of armed factions, banditry, lack of economic opportunities, etc.*]

6. How would you compare the present situation with an earlier time (one year ago, two years ago), whether better or worse?
   [*Please ask them to identify rough dates for comparative purposes and also the points of comparison.*]

7. What factors, in your opinion, account for the change?
   [*Rank in order of importance.*]

8. What steps have you and others in your community taken to enhance security? How successful have these steps been?

9. What would be the most important thing to do to improve security in your area?
   [*Please note the major items mentioned – e.g., disarming the militia, strengthening the police and local authorities – but identify the single-most important item. If the interviewee is reluctant to answer, ask the question again and give some examples to choose from in an effort to get the respondent's view on "the most important" factor*]

10. Are some members of your community more secure, or insecure, than others?
    [*You may need to prompt people to disaggregate the relative security of various groups by income, social grouping, gender, age (e.g., their own children), racial/ethnic make-up, etc.*]

11. To what extent have people or factors outside your local community played a role in enhancing, or undercutting security?
    [*The interviewee may mention political or military authorities at the district or province level, persons in neighbouring communities or countries, etc. Pls note in particular whether international humanitarian or military institutions or personnel are identified, either positively or negatively. If the respondent has difficulty with this question, explain that you would like to know if "outsiders" and "foreigners" have had a role in security issues. Be careful not to create expectations of more assistance in return for a positive response.*]

12. What is your perception of the role of international military personnel and aid agencies in your community's security?
[*This question is designed to elicit information on the overarching topic of the research which may not be forthcoming in response to* #9.]

International military: ☐ positive ☐ negative

International aid agencies: ☐ positive ☐ negative

13. Are there any other comments on issues of security you would like to make?

End the interview by thanking the interviewee(s) and repeating the assurance that the answers and identities of respondents will be kept confidential.

GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUPS

A Survey Instrument for the Tufts Security Study

A Focus Group is a mechanism to collect information in group settings less suited to the use of other more individualized survey instruments. Group dynamics serve as a mechanism to allow information and viewpoints to 'emerge,' both for the group as a whole and for individuals. While useful, focus groups have drawbacks of which researchers must be aware. Individuals often will not behave the same way or say the same things if in a group, especially if community leaders or people who may be perceived as threatening (e.g. police informers) are present. In fact, the dialogue may reflect some of the very insecurity that the research is trying to identify and gauge. Getting the composition of the group right and conducting a few follow-up individual interviews afterwards can help offset some of the drawbacks.

The following suggestions are designed to make the use of focus groups in the research productive in the data generated and consistent in approach across the three case study settings. Since focus groups may be conducted not only by members of the Tufts team but also by their local partners in individual countries, it is important that all those using this device adhere to the same approach. For the benefit of other researchers, please make your write-ups as detailed as possible.

1. *Getting the group right*. There are no hard and fast rules. Homogenous groups (e.g. teachers in a secondary school, small farmers from the same village, unemployed youth attending a training course, women queueing up at a clinic) tend to work better than ad hoc groups (randomly selected people in a particular street) or groups where hierarchical considerations may skew the dynamics (e.g. a group where the village leader or local politician is present).

2. *Size*. Groups of more than 10 to 15 people tend to become unmanageable in terms of the dynamics of eliciting useful information. Try to agree on group composition and groundrules in order to avoid stragglers coming in and out. At some point during the discussion, circulate a list for people to sign so that you have the names of those participating, unless for some reason this procedure seems ill-advised.

3. *The role of the interviewer*. Typically you will be working through an interpreter who may have been instrumental in setting up the group and will undoubtedly have his/her own biases and agenda. You should therefore start by clarifying the groundrules. Explain the purpose of the study: that the meeting

is for you to understand their perspectives, that what they say will be treated as confidential, that the final report will be made public, and that you are not an employee of any assistance or military agency. If asked about the rationale of the study, explain that you think it is very important to listen to what communities have to say in order to build trust regarding the respective roles of the various actors. Be careful not to create expectations (e.g., saying that you are writing a report for aid agencies may link you in their mind to the provision of assistance). Be aware that most people have some experience in dealing with 'foreigners' and that some are masters in telling you what you want to hear. As far as possible your role should be low key: observe, listen and record. If one or two people monopolize the conversation, intervene to ensure that everyone present has a chance to speak. If you identify someone who is shy, reserved or disagrees a lot, you may want to select him/her for a separate interview.

4. P*rocess*. Having explained who you are, what you do, and where you are from, ask members to identify themselves (although not necessarily by name). Explain that you want to understand their perspectives on security/insecurity. If the group is literate, you could ask them to write down on a post-it or sheet of paper "three things that make you feel secure." If the group is not literate, you may want to approach the issue more indirectly, e.g. from a human security angle (what are the main problems today? how does this compare with one year ago?) and then move on to physical security issues (what are the main dangers you face? can the kids go out alone? are there mines in the area?). Try to summarize (or record on paper, if appropriate) points of agreement and disagreement as you go along. Use the survey instrument for communities as a guide for the questions to ask, but don't be surprised if extraneous issues crop up. These may be interesting in their own right so don't be too directive in getting back to the security agenda. If there are arguments within the group and/or the interpreter has trouble keeping up, explain that you need to know what the group's views are and ask for time out so the interpreter can summarize things for you.

5. S*ensitivities and vulnerabilities*. Please keep in mind that in some settings, the expression of personal opinions may expose a participant to pressure or even risk of reprisals. Thus while as a group facilitator you should try to draw people out, there may be limits to the appropriateness of doing so. Keep in mind that from the standpoint of the research, we would like to identify perceptions of security/insecurity and the roles of international military and humanitarian personnel in facilitating or undermining it. At the same time, we need to avoid giving such personnel more prominence than local communities accord them. If necessary, repeat that what is said will remain confidential,

6. L*ength of the session*. Let the group dynamics dictate this but do not let things drag on beyond an hour or 90 minutes max. Be aware that participants may have limited time to contribute and at the end of the session be sure to thank them for their involvement. Toward the end, you might attempt a summary of what you have heard and ask people to indicate whether you got the gist of things right. Areas of disagreement as well as of consensus should be noted. After the meeting, be alert to the possibility of several one-to-one interviews with participants using the standard survey instrument.

7. N*ote-taking* is very important – if everything has to be translated you will have more time to take notes! Try to write up your notes as soon as possible after the meeting. Please try to capture any particularly illustrative comments that might be quoted in the report. For follow-up purposes (e.g., to share the finished report), please note who should be contacted. Feel free to leave a copy of the Letter of Introduction with one or more of the community leaders.

Appendix 3: Methodological Issues

A number of methodological issues have been discussed at one point or another in the process by the team and/or stakeholders. With regard to *country selection*, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone were selected by the NMCG. While a wider number of countries would have produced a more representative set of data, the stakeholders felt there was value in the choice of one post-conflict setting from each of three continents. With respect to *the number of persons interviewed* in each country, constraints on time and resources imposed limits on the depth and comprehensiveness of the research. Within those limitations, however, the team interviewed the widest possible range of persons, whether individually or in focus groups. Regarding the *selection of persons* to be interviewed, the team cast the net widely as possible but relied on institutional and personal contacts for assistance. The use of interpreters for some interviews may have introduced an element of distortion; cultural constraints against males interviewing females were also an issue. The team acknowledged in advance that the research would provide snapshots at a given point of time, the situations in each of the three settings differing according to the individual stage of conflict or post-conflict involved. While research more extensive and longitudinal in nature might have yielded more and perhaps somewhat different results, the team believes that the data generated is informative and provides in broad outline the essential input for analysis. Methodological issues are also discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3.

Afghanistan

This information presented is the result of widespread consultations and discussions held in and around Kabul between 7 and 20 February 2005. The mission coincided with an unprecedented cold snap and a series of snow storms. As a result, data collection was unfortunately limited to Kabul and Logar provinces. Plans to fly to Maimana in north-west Afghanistan had to be scuttled because of bad weather and the risk of being stranded there. A road trip to Gardez in the south-east had to be aborted a few kilometers from destination because of snow drifts on a mountain pass and advice from the governor of the neighbouring province not to proceed on foot for security reasons. Data is therefore skewed in favour of a limited area that is perceived as relatively secure. However, an effort was made to interview assistance agency and other informants with a wider knowledge of conditions around the country, through the circulation of an electronic questionnaire, thus helping to broaden the overall picture

The focus of data collection was on the perceptions of communities. Ten focus group (FG) meetings were organized with adult Afghans from a range of socio-economic backgrounds (journalism students at the university, rural beneficiaries of aid projects, an urban water and sanitation committee, 'grey beards' from a tribal village, small businessmen, a group of female professionals, destitute widows and day labourers). Three FGs were held in tribal/rural settings, two in Logar province and one in a small village in eastern Kabul province. Participants ranged from illiterate villagers to sophisticated urban intellectuals. Five group discussions were conducted by the author, the others by CARE and Sayara, a local NGO that specializes in polling and civil society research. In all, 102 people participated in the FGs (including 28 females). A few in-depth interviews were also conducted with FG members, though these did not yield particularly interesting results. All FGs were conducted along the same format, using the survey tool for communities designed by the research team. They ranged in size from 4 to 20 participants. As a general rule, the best quality of FG interaction was achieved in the smaller groups; FGs with more than 10 participants were difficult to handle. Most

FGs lasted well over 90 minutes (the exception was the widows FG which became too large and unwieldy and had to be cut short).

Interacting with women in the Afghan context presents difficulties for a male researcher. Only one of the FGs was mixed in gender (the journalism students) and two included only women (widows and professional women). As expected, it was impossible for a man to interview women in rural and peri-urban settings. All the FGs save one (professional women) were conducted in Dari (Persian) or Pashto and required the presence of a translator. This inhibited the spontaneity of the discussions to some extent.

The survey instrument for PSOs/AAs was used as the framework for interviews with AA and PSO staff. This was sent out in electronic form to a selection of agencies (5 NGOs, 1 Red Cross/Red Crescent, 3 UN agencies and ISAF/CIMIC) with a request that 3 staff from each agency with a mix of seniority and experience respond. Only 21 questionnaires were returned (10 NGO, 3 Red Cross, 3 UN and 5 CIMIC). Though the response rate was low, the quality of the responses was good. Thirty two additional individuals from the three constituencies were interviewed in person. In these interviews the survey instrument was used as a guide rather than a rigid tool. These interviews were invaluable because although they centered on security, they also provided context on a range of other issues as well as perspectives from around the country. The case study thus builds on the views expressed by over 150 respondents ranging from government ministers, deputy UN Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), and intellectuals to a vast array of urban and rural poor, including destitute women. More than three quarters of the respondents were Afghans.

Box 13. Summary table of interviews

	Male	Female	Local	International	Total
Oral Interviews					
UN agencies	5	1		6	6
NGOs	7	5	2	10	12
PSOs	6			6	6
Donors	1	1		2	2
Senior Afghan Officials	3		3		3
Others (academics, advisors)	2	1		3	3
Electronic interviews					
UN agencies	1	2		3	3
Red Cross Movement	2	1		3	3
NGOs	8	2	7	3	10
PSOs	4	1	2	3	5
Total	39	14	14	39	53

Kosovo

The interviews in Kosovo were conducted between 21–31 January 2005. They were hampered by bad weather which grounded aircraft and made road travel difficult and, at times, dangerous. However, the team was able to conduct 63 interviews with a cross-section of the community, from teenagers to people in their seventies and with a representative distribution of women and men. These interviews spanned the ethnic divide of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, although conditions prevented seeking out the Roma community.

The data collection focused on the perceptions of the communities. Four focus group meetings were organised with both Albanians and Serbs, with the Serb participants coming from Zubin Potok, a community to the south of Mitrovica, and with representatives of Serbs living in Mitrovica and communities to the north of the Ibar river. The Kosovar Albanian groups consisted of one group of students drawn from all over the Province and the other from persons living in Mitrovica, both north and south of the dividing river line. The interviewees, both individual and in groups, came from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, including students, employed and unemployed workers, teachers, lawyers, doctors, a newspaper editor, a senior politician, small businessmen and representatives of a community who had been driven from their homes during the rioting of 2004. We spoke to employees of UNMIK, DFID and CARE and to officers from KFOR. All interviews were conducted along the same lines, using the survey tool for both individuals and communities as the template. Most individual interviews lasted about an hour; the FGs, well over 90 minutes.

Interviews in the areas of Pristina and Mitrovica demonstrated a marked contrast. The former is the capital of Kosovo, which has in relative terms a relaxed security situation. The latter is divided by the Ibar river, the unofficial boundary that separates the ethnic Serbian minority in the north from the ethnic Albanian majority. A divided city, Mitrovica is more tense than Pristina. Due to time constraints, we were unable to interview persons who had lived in the Prizren area, as hoped.

Sierra Leone

This report's findings are based on a wide range of discussions held between 27 January and 7 February 2005 in Sierra Leone with individuals representing PSOs, international AAs, and local civil society. Ten interviews were conducted with selected representatives of the Sierra Leone police, educators and officials at national and district levels. Fifteen interviews were conducted with representatives of donor organizations, international and local NGOs, international advisors on security and governance, and officials of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Ten focus group discussions comprising 104 individuals were carried out with students (primary, secondary and university), teachers, youth, village elders, and war-wounded. Six of the focus group discussions included both women and men, three were exclusively male, and one was exclusively made up of women. Interviews were carried out in Freetown, in two towns on the outskirts of Freetown, and in four towns of Kambia District near the border with Guinea. This represents discussions in seven different geographic settings with about 130 individuals, most of them Sierra Leonean.

Nobody, including primary school students, had any difficulty with the concept of security, and most of the issues covered in the survey instrument emerged organically. Where they did not, comments were prompted by asking very simple questions about the police, military or the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Although there was a translator present for about half of the interviews – a woman during the Kambia field trip and a man in Freetown – 80% of the discussions were in English, or in a Krio that could be readily understood. This meant that the flow was in most cases not slowed by the awkwardness of translation.

Appendix 4: Research Seminar

The terms of reference of the research included the convening of a seminar. Its purposes would be to familiarize humanitarian and PSOs personnel and institutions with the findings of the study; to contribute to the current debate about security issues, with particular attention to highlighting the viewpoints of local communities; and to explore ways of encouraging follow-up discussions by and among the various professional communities involved, in the UK and beyond.

The seminar was held at the Royal College of Defence Studies in Belgrave Square, London on 19 April 2005, following a reception for participants on the previous evening. The seminar was hosted by the UK Ministry of Defence and chaired by Group Captain Andrew Steele of the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center. The 100 participants included wide representation from the British military, Department for International Development (DFID), intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the Red Cross movement, and think tanks, academics and private consultants.

The research team presented its findings, both in aggregate and for each of the three case studies. These were the subject of commentary by Hugo Slim of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Major General Tim Cross, and Samantha Reynolds, an independent consultant. The team's presentations and the commentary by the speakers elicited active back-and-forth with the participants, both in plenary and in three sets of syndicates or break-out groups. The emphasis throughout was on identifying practical steps that might be taken to improve the attentiveness of outside actors, both PSOs and AAs, to local voice on security concerns. These points, which were put forward during the discussion, but on which no attempt was made to reach consensus, are itemized below.

PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

RECORD OF PRACTICAL STEPS RECOMMENDED FROM THE FLOOR DURING SYNDICATE DISCUSSIONS AND "WHERE NEXT" PANEL (or the 30-Point Plan)

Research Report

- Expose and advocate the Research Report to key international organizations.
- Ensure that the findings are noted in the UK response to the UN High Level Panel Report.
- Conduct similar research in Iraq now (with DFID funding).
- Continue to collect this type of evidence from other emergencies and at different phases of the 'recovery'.

Funding/Cost Effectiveness

- Seek greater transparency of the funding applied by military and civil agencies to these missions.
- The UK should show greater leadership by being fully transparent in its financial commitments to these missions.
- Develop ways of illustrating the comparative cost-effectiveness of different forms of assistance and between the different types of providers.

Planning

- Ensure greater inclusivity in planning for missions.
- Formalize the process of gaining a consensus. Develop a methodology for consultation with local actors.
- Conduct Joint Needs Assessments (triangulated) and assess comparative advantages of potential providers.
- Positively identify local expectations and check they are legitimate.
- Seek greater clarity and transparency of the legal mandates associated with the operations of military forces, especially in respect of their responsibilities for protection of human rights.
- Avoid excessive focus on input planning. Concentrate on the effects generated.
- Identify the key characteristics of various well-functioning states in order to be able to offer a 'menu' of options for consideration by local agencies and authorities.

Operations

- Devote greater effort to identifying what the local communities have to offer.
- Focus less on 'who' and more on 'what' and 'how' assistance is delivered.
- Seek ways to reduce the conduct of sporadic and inconsistent assistance initiatives.
- The behaviour of international actors must be exemplary.

Assessment

- Develop ways to measure/ record perceptions and changes to them
- Ensure greater transparency in Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) used by various military and civil agencies.
- Institutionalize the process of identifying 'lessons' and learning from them.
- Develop basic joint indicators that recognize the different agendas of the various agencies involved.
- Develop comprehensive joint MOE.
- Dare to ask the communities "how are we doing?"
- Find ways of evaluating the economic impact of assistance missions.

Doctrine

- Define what is meant by a Peace Support Operation (to the wider civil communities involved).
- Bring military doctrine up to date in respect of issues of perception and consultation with local communities.
- Seek to reduce the variation in different national approaches to CIMIC. Define a 'benchmark' standard for CIMIC.

General

- Need a better understanding of acceptable language e.g. be wary of statements such as "we are all in the same boat".
- Individual organizations should recognize and positively act on their responsibilities to better understand and incorporate local perceptions in their approach to support missions.

List of Participants

NAME	Organization
Mr Hugo Slim	Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva
Major General Tim Cross	General Officer Commanding Theatre Troops at the UK Ministry of Defence
Ms Samantha Reynolds	Independent Consultant
Mr Matthias Schmale	British Red Cross Society
Mr Larry Minear	Tufts University, Medford USA
Mr Antonio Donini	Tufts Research Team
Mr Tony Welch	Tufts Research Team
Mr Ian Smillie	Tufts Research Team
Mr Ted van Baarda	Tufts Research Team
Group Captain Andrew Steele	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Commander Gareth Derrick	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Marriott	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Gossage	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Mrs Vivien Cringle	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Mrs Sarah Forsyth	MOD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
Ms Clare Harkin	DFID/ Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
Mr Steve Ray	DFID/ Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
Dr Barbara Hendrie	DFID
Ms Camilla Sugden	DFID
Mr David Belgrove	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ms Amanda Bute	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ms Anna Jefferys	Save the Children
Ms Lola Gostelow	Save the Children
Ms C Archer	Save the Children
Mr Richard Luff	Oxfam
Mr Kevin Studds	British Red Cross
Ms Moira Reddick	British Red Cross
Ms M Harroff-Tavel	International Committee of the Red Cross
Mr Patrick Brugger	International Committee of the Red Cross
Mr Peter Marsden	British Refugee Council
Ms Rachel Goldwyn	CARE International (UK)
Titon Mitra	Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief- International Health Exchange
Ms Maret Laev	Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief- International Health Exchange
Ms Vickie Hawkins	Médicins sans Frontières
Ms Kate Mackintosh	Médicins sans Frontières
Ms Katherine Derderian	Médicins sans Frontières
Ms Victoria Wheeler	Humanitarian Policy Group
Ms Susan Hay	European Community Humanitarian Office
Mr Paul Flaherty	UK Delegation to NATO
Major Nick Campbell	HQ Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force, NATO SHAPE
Lieutenant Colonel Tim Russell	MOD, Rep: Director Strategic Plans
Mr Andrew Matthewson	MOD Department for Policy (International Organisations)

Ms Alicia Forsyth	MOD, Policy Planning
Air Commodore M Leakey	Permanent Joint Headquarters J5
Major Dale Garwood	Permanent Joint Headquarters J3 Ops Sp
Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Venn	Permanent Joint Headquarters J3
Major Edwards	Joint CIMIC Group
Lieutenant Colonel Mathew Jackson	Joint CIMIC Group
Major Adam Wills	Joint CIMIC Group
Commander Richard Powell	MOD Directorate of Joint Capability
Colonel Tim Martin	ADJW
Colonel N H W Fenn	CO29 Engineering Brigade
Asa Bohlin	MOD Department for Policy (International Organisations)
Wing Commander Sheila Haughton	Service Personnel Policy
Lieutenant Colonel Angus Taverner	Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations
Group Captain Aroop Mozumder	Medical Operations HQ Strike Command
Mr Ian Richardson	Defence Academy
Ms Jane Barry	Human Rights and Humanitarian Policy
Ms Catherine Day	DFID
Dr Babu Rahman	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
Mr Howard Mollett	British Overseas NGOs for Development
Mr David Wardrop	United Nations Association
Mr Matt Vaccaro	NPS
Mr Tim Symonds	Project Parity Partnerships for Peace
Mr Nicholas Parham	Disaster Preparedness and Response Consultant
Commander Mike Riley	UK Defence Academy, JSCSC
Lieutenant Colonel Ross Nichols	MOD
Ms Annabel Taylor	Kings College London
Miss Lisa Waldek	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
Mr J Stickings	DFID
Ms Emeline Saunier	DFID
Mr Matthew Forman	DFID
Major Alistair Mack	3 (UN) Division S03 J3 (CIMIC)
Major Mark Hazelton	3 (UN) Division S03 J3 (CIMIC)
Group Captain La Forte	Permanent Joint Headquarters
Lieutenant Colonel G Olley	UK Defence Academy
Mr James Brown	Control Risks Group
Lieutenant Colonel M Slade	MOD Directorate of Medical and Environmental Threat Assessment
Ms Gina Rivas Pattugalan	World Food Programme
Mr Nicholas Crawford	World Food Programme
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Francis RN	J3 Permanent Joint Headquarters
Captain J Handley RN	J3 Permanent Joint Headquarters
Mr P Wilson	MOD Defence Advisory Team
Dr C Guicherd	MOD Department for Policy (International Organisations)
Colonel Doug Morrison	US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Mr Peter Sweetnam	Mercy Corps
Mr Mark White	DFID
Mr Ian Gray	World Vision
Ms Jacqui Muyuvo	British Red Cross

Mr Mark Malan	Kofi Annan Peace Training Centre
Mr Michel Noureddine Kassa	OCHA
Lt Col P Marks	York University
Ms Victoria Basham	Bristol University
Mr Paul Schulte	Head of Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit
Rev'd Flora Winfield	
Mr Kevin Harris	
Dr John MacKinlay	War Studies Dept, Kings College
Ms E Winter	British Agencies Afghanistan Group
Mr Dan Silvey	DFID
Mr Simon Springett	Oxfam
Mr Tony Craig	UN
Ms Claire Lockhart	Overseas Development Institute
Ms Olga Bornemisza	London School of Health and Tropical Medicine
Mr Nick Leader	DFID

Appendix 5: For Further Reference

The following pages provide a selective bibliography of entries of relevance to the issues examined in this report. This section is not intended to be inclusive either of all works on peace and security globally or of all the resources on each of the three areas studied. Instead, the section lists some recent works on the issues at the global level, followed by a selected number of readings on local perceptions of issues of peace and security in each of the case study areas. The listing includes not only grey literature but also relevant websites and other information sources. Some of the most helpful entries are annotated with brief comments.

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4. Sierra Leone

There is a growing body of literature on Sierra Leone, although it is notable that until the seventh or eighth year of its decade-long war, there was very little in the public domain. Sierra Leone's "forgotten war" and "forgotten emergency" were also largely forgotten by writers and academics. The following bibliography is representative of the existing literature and includes titles and web sites that contains at least some reference to perceptions of security. It should be noted, however, that so far this is not a topic that has been specifically addressed by many observers of Sierra Leone.

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Samuels, K. "*Jus Ad Bellum* and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community's Approach to Violence in the Conflict in Sierra Leone." *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 8, no. 2, (October 2003): 315-338. www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/jconsl/2003 [*This paper investigates the principles governing*

the response of states, regional organizations, and the Security Council to the recent conflict in Sierra Leone. It argues that the practice challenges the traditional perspective on civil conflicts as matters predominantly within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and places them instead within the sphere of responsibility of international law.]

"War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone." http://www.phrusa.org/research/sierra_leone/report.html

Zack-Williams, Alfred. "Sierra Leone: the political economy of civil war, 1991-98." *Third World Quarterly*. 20, No. 1, (Feb. 1, 1999): 143-162. [*This article looks at the causal factors for the May 1997 military intervention in Sierra Leone which unleashed complex political emergencies engulfing the entire country. The paper argues that the causal factors are historical, reflecting the political economy of underdevelopment in that country.*]

5. Useful Websites

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU): www.areu.org.af
Afghanistan Research and Information Center (ARIC): www.afghanresources.org
Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS): www.aims.org.af
ISAF: www.afnorth.nato.int
Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC): www.afghanadvocacy.org
Afghanistan Online: www.afghan-web.com
Reliefweb: www.reliefweb.int

OSCE: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/
KFOR—official website: http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html
Kosovo Force (KFOR) (2005): http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq.htm
United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo: http://www.unmikonline.org/
UNHCR: www.unhcr.ch

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights: http://www.mnadvocates.org/Sierra_Leone.html
Sierra Leone Presidential website: http://www.statehouse-sl.org/
Sierra Leone Web: http://www.sierra-leone.org/
Special Court for Sierra Leone: http://www.sc-sl.org/
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/index.html

Appendix 6: Biographical Information on Tufts Team Members

Research team

Antonio Donini is a senior researcher at the Feinstein International Famine Center (FIFC) at Tufts University, where he is working on issues relating to the future of humanitarian action. From 2002 to 2004 he was Visiting Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. He has worked for 26 years in the United Nations in research, evaluation, and humanitarian capacities. His last post was as Director of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (1999–2002). Before going to Afghanistan he was chief of the Lessons Learned Unit at OCHA, where he managed a programme of independent studies on the effectiveness of relief efforts in complex emergencies. He has published widely on evaluation, humanitarian and UN reform issues. In 2004 he co-edited a volume on *Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan* (Kumarian Press) as well as several articles exploring the implications of the crises in Afghanistan and Iraq for the future of humanitarian action (see FIFC website at famine.tufts.edu).

Larry Minear is director of the Humanitarianism and War Project at the Feinstein International Famine Center in the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University, a research initiative he co-founded in 1991. He has worked on humanitarian and development issues since 1972, managing a post-conflict reconstruction program in the Sudan for an NGO, conducting advocacy activities in Washington DC, and serving as a consultant to NGOs, governments and UN organizations. He has conducted research on many humanitarian emergencies and has written extensively for specialized and general audiences. His most recent books are *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries* (Kumarian, 2002), a review of the work of the Humanitarianism and War Project, and, with Ian Smillie, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World* (Kumarian, 2004), a study of the political economy of international assistance and protection activities.

Ian Smillie has lived and worked in Africa and Asia. He was a founder of the Canadian development organization Inter Pares and Executive Director of CUSO from 1979 to 1983. He was an adjunct professor at Tulane University in New Orleans from 1998 to 2001. During 2000 he served on a UN Security Council Panel investigating the links between illicit weapons and the diamond trade in Sierra Leone. His latest books are *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises* (Kumarian, 2001); *Managing for Change: Leadership, Strategy and Management in Asian NGOs* (with John Hailey, London, 2001) and *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World* (with Larry Minear, Kumarian, 2004). Ian Smillie serves as research coordinator on Partnership Africa Canada's 'Diamonds and Human Security Project' and is an NGO participant in the intergovernmental 'Kimberley Process' that is developing a global certification system for rough diamonds.

Ted van Baarda is head of the Bureau of Ethics and the Armed Forces, Faculty of Military Sciences, at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. He teaches and publishes regularly on the moral education of the military, including humanitarian issues and the dilemmas confronted in crisis areas. He was general secretary of the Conference on the Rights of Children in Armed Conflict before founding the Humanitarian Law Consultancy in 1995 and serving as its director through 2002. The Consultancy advised governmental and non-governmental organizations, educational institutions and members of parliament on issues concerning humanitarian law. He has co-edited two books on military ethics, "*Militaire ethiek - Morele dilemma's van militairen in theorie en praktijk*" (2002) and "*Praktijkboek militaire*

ethiek – Ethische vraagstukken, morele vorming, dilemmatraining" (2004). In 1999–2000, he took part in the research referred to in the Kosovo case study on NATO and humanitarian action in the Kosovo crisis. He is a registered election observer with the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which has included an assignment in Pakistan.

Anthony C. Welch served in the British Army for 28 years. He saw combat in Northern Ireland, the Falklands, with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, and in the First Gulf War. He left the Army as a Brigadier in 1994, joining the United Nations as Head of Joint Policy, Planning and Co-ordination for the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia. He later managed the EU Monitor Missions in Albania and Serbia and, in 1996–1998, he headed the OSCE/ODIHR Missions monitoring elections throughout the Eastern Adriatic region. In 1999 he was appointed Head of the British Government's Aid and Development Mission in Kosovo and FYROM. In 2001 he became the UN Regional Administrator of Northern Kosovo, including the divided city of Mitrovica. He is a trustee of the Center for South-east European Studies, based in Sofia, Bulgaria.

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