# Germany After Schmidt: The Origins and Implications of Foreign Policy under A CDU/CSU Government

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Helmut Schmidt's government has been in an advanced state of decay for more than a year. Confronted by pressing foreign policy and economic problems, Schmidt's coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) has fallen prey to bitter intramural bickering. Political experts expect the disintegration to intensify over the next few months, and many believe it will continue to undermine the government's credibility, already weak in the minds of German voters. The question is no longer if, but merely when, Bonn's current parliamentary opposition — the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) — will topple Schmidt.[1] The odds heavily favor a CDU/CSU government taking control by 1984, if not sooner.

More than a decade in opposition has reduced the CDU/CSU's visibility outside West Germany; Schmidt's image as a world leader and the reputation of his SPD predecessor, Willy Brandt, often overshadow the Union. Given the likelihood of a change in government, 1982 seems a propitious time to examine the CDU/CSU and its outlook on foreign policy. Although the Union shares many of Schmidt's personal perspectives on foreign policy, its views have been shaped by a distinct set of historical and political factors. An understanding of how a future CDU/CSU government will conduct foreign policy necessitates a look into the Union's first years in power (1949-1969) and its initial experience in opposition (1969-1972). Also important is a familiarity with more contemporary themes in CDU/CSU foreign policy, as well as intramural pressures certain to affect the Union once it regains power.

## *The Origins of CDU/CSU Foreign Policy: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik*

In 1982 the CDU/CSU faces the same stark reality of a divided Germany which confronted the Party's postwar leader and Bonn's first chancellor,

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1. Although its political appeal has historically been made along inter-confessional lines, the CDU/CSU leadership and voting base remain disproportionately Catholic; this applies in particular to the CSU, which, by agreement, has operated exclusively in conservative, traditionalist, and predominantly Catholic Bavaria for the past three decades.

Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer's *Westpolitik* — initially a strategy for overcoming the division — is today the CDU/CSU's most vital legacy from the past.

Recognizing that a united, independent Germany would be unacceptable to the Allies in the immediate aftermath of the war, Adenauer believed that the way forward was to anchor western Germany firmly in the evolving political structures of Europe and the Atlantic Community. He aimed to win the trust of Britain, France, and the United States by setting his government on a pro-Western course and strengthening its democratic institutions. Adenauer believed that eventually Germany's vital geographic position and economic potential would elevate his regime to the status of an equal partner in the Western Alliance; once this was achieved, Adenauer would have the leverage to bring Western pressure against Moscow, compelling the Soviets to make concessions which would undermine their puppet regime in the east, and thereby loosen the Communist grip on Germany.

Cold War events initially accelerated Germany's drive towards entry into the Western community: Adenauer became Chancellor in 1949, and within six years his provisional West German state had regained sovereignty and membership in NATO. For all appearances, this was the equal partnership Adenauer sought.[2] But Adenauer's *Westpolitik* — still the hallmark of German foreign policy — carried an inherent risk: as Cold War tensions lessened, Alliance members might be more willing to "cement" the territorial status quo in Europe and even begin to consider Soviet proposals for the West's abandonment of Berlin and international recognition of East Germany (the DDR) and Poland's Oder-Neisse boundary. As at Potsdam, Germany would merely be an object, not a subject, of European affairs.

To preserve Bonn's newly-won equal partnership in the 1950s, Adenauer settled into what William Griffith calls a "holding policy."[3] First he attempted to cultivate even stronger personal ties with Western leaders already sympathetic to Bonn's anti-Communism, such as US Secretary of State Dulles. At the same time, Adenauer sought to pre-empt any potential Allied rapprochement with the Kremlin by initiating a very limited eastern policy: formal diplomatic relations with Moscow, established in 1955, and expanded trade served to remind the Soviet Union that Bonn was still master of its own destiny. Adenauer nonetheless clung to the contention that full normalization of relations with the East bloc in the future

2. James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 11-23.
3. William Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 62.

could come about only after the German question had been settled. To reinforce that position, Bonn adopted the Hallstein Doctrine, forbidding diplomatic ties with any state — except the USSR — which recognized the DDR.

Adenauer's fear that Western desire for a rapprochement with Moscow would harm Germany's chances for unification was reinforced in the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration began negotiating the Nuclear Test Ban treaty and when America failed to challenge East German construction of the Berlin Wall. In frustration, he sought reinsurance for his *Westpolitik* by courting a new ally — Gaullist France. Adenauer and De Gaulle shared a desire for greater European assertiveness in the Atlantic Alliance and a mutual suspicion of multilateral arms control agreements. Despite their obvious differences over the practicality of European integration, the two leaders saw short-term advantages in cooperation, and signed a Friendship Treaty in 1963. Franco-German rapprochement was particularly popular with CSU leaders, many of whom became known as "German Gaullists."

But during the same period — the early 1960s — a second CDU/CSU foreign policy was emerging to challenge Adenauer, who had exhausted his reserves of personal popularity in the party. Rival leaders like Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and Ludwig Erhard, (Adenauer's successor as Chancellor after 1963), suspected that Franco-German rapprochement would alienate the United States by bolstering De Gaulle's quest for greater European autonomy in NATO. Schroeder also suggested that Adenauer's continuing inflexibility vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc diverged too much from Washington's policy of pursuing detente with Moscow. Some writers have suggested that Schroeder and Erhard, as the CDU's most prominent Protestant politicians, were philosophically more nationalistic than integrationist, and thus gave primacy to German relations with the Superpowers as opposed to its strictly West European ties.[4]

Even before Adenauer's 1963 resignation, Schroeder had begun to implement his "policy of movement." While maintaining smooth relations with the US, he expanded trade and pursued diplomatic relations with all of Moscow's clients except the DDR, effectively mocking the Hallstein Doctrine. He hoped to isolate East Germany by using West Germany's new economic leverage in the Soviet bloc to win influence for Bonn. Schroeder's limited *Ostpolitik* still clung to the traditional CDU/CSU argument that any full normalization of relations in Central Europe only come after a settlement of the German question which did not bind Bonn to neutralism or otherwise restrict its sovereignty.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Schroeder's Atlanticism combined with *Ostpolitik* did not wholly succeed. The pro-French "German Gaullists," led by the CSU under Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, opposed further dealings with the East bloc. But more instrumental in Schroeder's failure was Moscow's refusal to allow Bonn's trade policies and diplomacy to isolate the DDR: Soviet leaders insisted on at least a de facto West German acceptance of the European status quo — that is, Soviet hegemony in the East — before they would compel the DDR to settle the German problem.[5]

Schroeder's policies were continued after 1966 by the new German government, the "Grand Coalition" of the CDU/CSU and their long-time rivals, the Social Democrats (SPD). Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and his CDU/CSU still hoped to squeeze concessions from the Kremlin on the German issue through a carrot and stick approach of trade and diplomatic pressure, while retaining the Union's traditional policy that West Germany would not accept the territorial status quo. This placed them at odds with Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and the SPD, who advocated conciliatory gestures by Bonn — including recognition of Poland's Oder Neisse boundary — as a preliminary step to discussions with Moscow on Germany and Berlin.[6]

Uneasy partners from the outset, the CDU/CSU and SPD never agreed upon a common aim for the Coalition's foreign policy. After the 1969 election, Brandt formed a new government with the centrist Free Democrats, and the Union was out of power for the first time. Unconstrained by the CDU/CSU, Brandt began to implement his version of *Ostpolitik.*

The SPD's *Ostpolitik* between 1969 and 1972 overturned major premises of the traditional CDU/CSU argument against formal rapprochement with the East bloc. Chancellor Brandt maintained that accepting "two German states in one nation" — a formula for de facto if not de jure recognition of the DDR — would substantially reduce contention over the territorial status quo and remove Moscow's main objection to agreements reducing tensions between East and West. Particularly desirable was a modus vivendi for both the German question and the status of Berlin.

CDU leaders universally held that the new *Ostpolitik* demanded permanent German concessions in exchange for retractable East-bloc concessions. Strauss, the CSU, and some more conservative members of the CDU characterized Brandt's accommodation with Moscow as appeasement and

5. Detlef Bischoff, *Franz Josef Strauss, die CSU und die Aussenpolitik: Konzeption und Realität am Beispiel der Grossen Koalition* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1973), pp. 131-148, 244-281.

6. Thomas P. Koppel, *Sources of Change in West German Ostpolitik: The Grand Coalition, 1966-1969* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972).

a sell-out of the German people. These "absolute opponents" of the *Ostpolitik* argued that Brandt would place forever at risk the German quest for self-determination — in their parlance, reunification — by formally accepting the territorial satus quo.[7]

Most other leaders of the CDU similarly suspected Brandt's policy to be imprudent, and stood by their traditional claim that Bonn alone could represent all Germans in international affairs; they also charged that Brandt's unnecessary concessions in search of formal agreements would only cement the status quo while weakening West Germany's bond with the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, many CDU leaders — although they vacillated — displayed some flexibility in the name of "foreign policy consensus": they agreed not to block the initial eastern treaties (with Moscow and Warsaw) if Brandt first won substantial concessions from the Kremlin in ongoing discussions about the future status of Berlin, *and* if the SPD–FDP formally recommitted the Bonn government to an eventual reunification of Germany.[8]

The *Ostpolitik* debate came to a head in May 1972, as the *Bundestag* prepared to vote on Brandt's Renunciation of Force Agreement with Moscow and a second treaty with Warsaw, recognizing Poland's Oder-Neisse boundary. The CDU/CSU had won assurances from Brandt that the Berlin talks would secure free access to the divided city and, on May 10, all major West German political parties backed a resolution formally reaffirming Bonn's desire for reunification. Though such moves were designed to remove major CDU/CSU doubts about the effect of Brandt's *Ostpolitik,* the Union parliamentary delegation, under strong pressure from Strauss, did not in the end vote for ratification: instead, it abstained, weakly arguing that the CDU/CSU was thereby not responsible for either obstructing government legislation or supporting Brandt's imprudent policy.[9]

In 1973, the CDU/CSU unsuccessfully resisted the next major component of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* — the Basic Treaty with East Germany, which effectively normalized relations between the two states and secured some concessions from the DDR on transit rights for West German citizens entering the East. The agreement did not formally recognize East German statehood, but its de facto acceptance of the DDR conflicted with traditional CDU/CSU policy. Consequently, only a handful of Union de-

7. Geoffrey Pridham, "The Ostpolitik and the Opposition in West Germany", in *The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany,* edited by Roger Tilford (Westmead, England: Saxon Books, 1975), pp. 49-50.
8. Christian Hacke, *Die Ost-und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969* (Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbeck), pp. 46-50.
9. Hacke, *Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU,* pp. 50-57.

puties, led by Walter Leisler Kiep, voted for the Basic Treaty, claiming that the time had come to recognize the reality of a divided Germany.[10]

Willy Brandt had thoroughly defeated the CDU/CSU. In gaining formal ratification of the Moscow, Warsaw and Basic treaties, he altered long-standing West German policy — formulated by the Union — that Bonn should neither accept the territorial status quo nor normalize relations with the East until after a settlement of the German problem. Moreover, the SPD Chancellor's use of accommodation overrode CDU/CSU protests against West German concessions and Union warnings that this *Ostpolitik* would alienate Bonn's Western allies. Sealing their victory, the Social Democrats won a relative majority for the first time since World War II in the 1972 *Bundestag* elections.

The election defeat of 1972 marked a major turning point in the CDU/CSU's foreign policy outlook.[11] For two decades, its *Westpolitik* had offered European integration and Atlantic security arrangements as the best way to overcome Germany's division; Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in contrast stressed that detente would ultimately resolve the German problem, and his approach earned public approval as evidenced by the 1972 election. Today the CDU/CSU foreign policy reflects an attempt to reconcile its traditional precepts with political reality, to remain consistent in principle but flexible in practice.

### *Current Themes in CDU/CSU Foreign Policy Statements*

During a speech to the *Bundestag* shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the CSU, turned to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and declared "The opponents of a reasonable detente policy, the opponents of a realistic security policy, sit in your own [SPD] rows."[12] Strauss's gibe expressed the CDU/CSU opposition's formula for treating foreign policy issues after 1972: detente and security are compatible goals, but must be defined properly and implemented effectively — something the current government can not ensure. This synthesis of *Ostpolitik* with *Westpolitik* permits the Union to criticize SPD-FDP policy without appearing inflexible or inconsistent. Foes of the CDU/CSU charge that the party uses this synthesis of German foreign policy issues to advance its fortunes without committing itself or advancing concrete alternatives.

The CDU/CSU's formal acceptance of detente reflects a willingness on

10. Pridham, "The Ostpolitik and the Opposition," pp. 51-52.
11. Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition*, 1945-1976 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 198-203.
12. BRD, Bundestag, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 8. Wahlperiode Stenographische Berichte [Hereafter cited as Bundestag/8.], 28 February, 1980, p. 16198.

its part to live with the original eastern agreements negotiated by Willy Brandt. Domestic political considerations partly accounted for this softening in the Union's attitude; after 1972, CDU/CSU politicians hoped to distract public attention from their unpopular campaign against Brandt's treaties and draw that attention to their social and domestic proposals.[13] Aside from those expedient shifts in emphasis, Union leaders have also genuinely come to believe that the eastern agreements alleviate the human suffering caused by Germany's division. Formerly, staunch opponents of the *Ostpolitik* like CDU foreign policy spokesman Alois Mertes concede, "It keeps Berlin calm. It has opened the way for more visits to East Germany."[14] Formal CDU/CSU recognition of the treaties appears in most party programs of the 1970's and 1980's. The reference is usually explicit, if terse: ". . . all treaties of the Federal Republic with foreign states and the DDR are binding."[15]

The Union has by no means abandoned the cause of German reunification. While "living with the eastern agreements fairly comfortably", the Union at the same time pressures Bonn's Social Democrats for assurances that they will abide by the various formal and informal reaffirmations of the ultimate goal of German unity which Brandt made in order to secure ratification of his treaties. CDU Chief Helmut Kohl and his party's chief spokesman on the German question, Richard von Weizsäcker, described reunification as the "mission" of German foreign policy.[16]

But for the CDU/CSU, "reasonable detente" does not mean merely a passive acceptance of the eastern agreements as a fait accompli. On the political offensive, Union leaders charge that the government has failed to verify Soviet bloc compliance with the treaties. The CDU/CSU's insistence that the East bloc countries be held to their word is most vigorous where the rights of East German citizens are concerned. The Union continually argues that as long as the SPD-FDP coalition consented to de facto recognition of the DDR, Bonn is obligated to monitor that regime's treatment of dissidents, would-be emigrés, and church groups. The CDU/CSU bases its claims on the human rights' standards outlined in the Helsinki Accords. Similarly, the Union has charged that Bonn permits East Germany wide latitude for a "delimitation" policy — restrictions on transit between East and West, harassment of Western journalists in

13. Pridham, *Christian Democracy*, pp. 207-11.
14. *Boston Globe*, 23 February 1982, p. 9.
15. *Grundsatzprogramm der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands* (Bonn: CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1978), p. 52.
16. Helmut Kohl und Richard von Weizsäcker, "Die deutsche Einheit bleibt unser Auftrag — Reden vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 17. Juni 1980", (Bonn: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle).

the East, and higher rates for the exchanqe of currency for West Germans visiting the DDR.[17]

Union spokesmen also fault the SPD-FDP government for not adequately reproaching the DDR for its military involvement in the Third World at Soviet bidding. East German leader Erich Honecker, according to one CDU official, resurrected the Afrika Korps without much protest from Bonn. Christian Democrats also prompted the current government to denounce the DDR's reported pressure on Poland which helped bring about the imposition of martial law in 1981.

In the CDU/CSU's definition, "reasonable detente" is not just verifiable, but indivisible as well. The Union believes Brandt's original *Ostpolitik* succeeded largely because warmer East-West relations permitted it; moreover, Bonn's good standing in the Western bloc enhanced its credibility in those earlier negotiations. Pursuing detente at the expense of Western unity destroys the very basis on which detente is possible. Thus a strictly "regional" detente was and is impossible, and Union leaders resist the SPD's argument that "European detente" must be preserved from the effects of Superpower tensions. For the CDU/CSU, Soviet involvement in the Yom Kippur War, Indochina and Angola threatened East-West detente as a whole, and the SPD-FDP persistence with business as usual only created the impression of a divided Western camp, increasing Moscow's boldness.

Events in 1980 further reflected the CDU/CSU's emphasis on detente's indivisibility. During the Iran hostage affair and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Union leaders harshly criticized the SPD for its reluctance to declare solidarity with the US and back American sanctions unequivocally. The Union was outraged that elements within the SPD, if not Helmut Schmidt himself, hoped to carve out "a special role" — perhaps even as a mediator — for Germany in relations between Moscow and Washington. Kohl said that by claiming for West Germany "a monopoly on understanding and detente," the SPD would exacerbate American isolationist tendencies. Responding sarcastically to the government's assertion that in the Afghanistan crisis Bonn must work toward a solution which would allow Moscow to save face, the CDU-chief remarked, "Which face can the Soviets now lose?"[18]

Much the same pattern obtains in the current debate over Polish martial law; the Union sharply rebuked Schmidt for his mild reaction to the Jaruzelski coup and introduced a *Bundestag* resolution condemning it. Yet in this case, the CDU/CSU has tiptoed around US proposals for sanctions

17. *Menschenrechte für alle Deutschen — Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik* (Bonn: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle).
18. Bundestag/8., 28 February 1980, p. 16179.

against Moscow and Warsaw, particularly the American suggestion that Bonn withdraw from the Kremlin's gas pipeline project.[19]

The Union leaders' call for "reasonable detente" counters the perceived accomodation policy of the SPD-FDP government. Bonn's overzealous guardianship of detente, they argue, is designed to sustain the image of a successful SPD-FDP foreign policy, even as Moscow mocks that policy. The SPD's policy only alienates Germany's Western allies and might isolate the Federal Republic, perpetuating Germany's division.

For the CDU/CSU, nothing more clearly illustrates the SPD-FDP's inability to ensure "realistic security" than the present debate over theater nuclear forces. Opposition leaders applaud Schmidt for initiating the NATO modernization plan, but question his ability to sustain support for it among his own party and even the FDP. However sound the Chancellor's plan, they feel it will succumb to leftwing resistance in the SPD. Kohl constantly cites "anti-Americanism" within the SPD as a major constraint upon the Chancellor, and CDU Defense spokesman Manfred Wörner charges that the government lacks the "courage and decisiveness" to press ahead.[20] They charge that the SPD left forced Schmidt to equivocate on the Theater-Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernization issue and as a result, the Chancellor overemphasized the possibilities for arms control as an alternative to modernization.

On issues other than TNF, the Union also challenges the Bonn coalition's ability to maintain "equal partnership" in the Alliance — the foundation of any "realistic security policy." West Germany could expand its defense budget: the Union pushed for the 3 percent hike in spending endorsed by NATO in 1978, and argued that Bonn should increase the defense share of its total outlays to more than 20 percent. The party also supported an extension of the alternative service period for conscientious objectors in order to weed out draft dodgers and strengthen the German armed forces.[21] In the same spirit, the Union also commits itself to a more equitable sharing of military burdens within the Alliance in order to alleviate overcommitment of American forces in Europe.

Mild criticism of the US has not been entirely excluded by the CDU/CSU conception of Atlantic partnership. Party spokesmen occasionally express frustration with the lack of continuity in American policy between Presidential administrations. In nuclear matters, the Union hints that American politicians might tread more softly on German sensitivities. Although it rejects the image of a "new neutralism" in the Federal Republic, Union spokesmen use Schmidt's own "Oregon analogy" to remind

19. *Boston Globe*, 23 February 1982, p. 9.
20. Bundestag/8., 8 March 1979, p. 11203.
21. *Economist*, 13 February 1982, p. 46.

the US how sixty million people sharing a territory the size of Oregon with 5000 nuclear weapons react to careless comments about NATO doctrine and strategy.

Such relatively gentle admonitions aside, pro-Atlantic sentiment pervades CDU/CSU statements on foreign policy. At the same time, the Union stresses Bonn's integration into Western Europe. Close ties between Bonn and Paris remain an essential ingredient in the Union's foreign policy formula, although Union leaders mistrusted French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing's enthusiasm for detente during periods of intense East-West tension. Kohl criticized Schmidt's purported effort to preserve "European detente" in the Afghanistan crisis by aligning Bonn with Giscard's placatory policy, as opposed to Jimmy Carter's more firm response to Soviet adventurism. Important as Bonn's tie with France may be, Kohl warned, German detente policy can never treat its American and French connections as alternatives — an "either-or" approach can not truly substitute for an "as well as" approach, the best means of avoiding isolation.[22]

*Intramural Pressures on a Future CDU/CSU Government's Foreign Policy*

A political cartoon in 1981 depicted Helmut Schmidt as Gulliver strapped helplessly to the sand by swarming Lilliputians strangely resembling the SPD-left activists who oppose his policies, particularly on theater nuclear weapons. With high unemployment and further antinuclear protests, the Chancellor's plight seems certain to worsen in 1982, and the prime beneficiary will be the CDU/CSU. Poor showings by the SPD in *Land* (state) elections could enable the Union to gain control of the German parliament's second chamber; in that position, Kohl's party could theoretically block all government legislation and force its way back into political power. But CDU/CSU leaders publicly eschew the notion of entering government through "the back door." They are willing to wait until the regularly scheduled federal elections in 1984, when the party expects to earn a mandate at the polls for four full years of power.

The CDU/CSU's conduct of foreign policy as a governmental party will draw heavily upon the themes and strategies it has espoused for the past decade. Yet, as Schmidt's current woes indicate, exercising power often involves "intramural" pressures which can at the very least affect questions of emphasis and implementation. Some critics believe Kohl has forged an artificial unity within the CDU/CSU as opposition leader, unity that may erode once actual policy must be made. Others suggest the party's cohesion will be strengthened by the need to exercise power effectively.

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22. Bundestag/8., 28 February 1980, p. 16177.

Strauss and the CSU will be the most vigorous centrifugal force in a future Union government. Still skeptical of the eastern treaties and detente as a whole, the Bavarian chief will push for the strongest possible stand against Moscow. Although Strauss did not bring the CDU/CSU victory in the 1980 federal election and consequently lost some prestige in the Union, the Polish crisis has lent credibility to his firm foreign policy. Critics claim the CSU leaders will try to undercut what would be a moderate chancellory under Kohl, and some even believe that Strauss has designs on the top job himself.[23]

There is also a possibility that CDU "liberals" will assert themselves in a future Union government. Leisler Kiep, Berlin Mayor von Weizsäcker and Lower Saxony's Minister-President Ernst Albrecht (fresh from a convincing election victory in his own *Land* this spring) are generally given the liberal label. All three stress that a CDU/CSU government's decision to downplay too heavily relations with the East could polarize German society. They insist an active detente need not be inconsistent with strong pro-Western and security policies. All three men are possible candidates for Cabinet ministries, although Kiep suffers from the whiff of scandal in his past financial dealings.[24]

Strauss and CDU liberals will be influential, but Helmut Kohl currently holds the highest cards. Despite his often lackluster image as "the lowest common denominator" in a broad party, Kohl will almost certainly be the party choice for Chancellor. He has long emphasized the need to maintain a consensus within the CDU/CSU on all important issues, especially foreign policy matters. It was Kohl who pointed out the wisdom of living with the eastern agreements, and he supports a "reasonable detente."[25] At the same time, he is a vigorous advocate of close Atlantic ties and strong security measures, including German deployment of NATO theater nuclear forces.

In the name of party unity, Kohl as Chancellor will resist pressure from either Strauss on the one hand or CDU liberals on the other. He acknowledges the political risks involved in Strauss's relatively "hard line" position; polls show that most Germans strongly support the present eastern agreements and would resist any attempt by Bonn to de-emphasize them.[26] Moreover, the Union will owe its ascendancy after 1984 largely to the desertion of moderate SPD-FDP supporters to its own ranks. To retain these supporters, the CDU/CSU government will have to steer much the same course it did while in opposition.

23. *Der Spiegel,* 8 March 1982, p. 23.
24. *Die Zeit,* 5 February 1982, p. W7.
25. Pridham, *Christian Democracy,* p. 228.
26. *Economist,* 22 August 1981, p. 37.

Kohl will also oppose any suggestions by CDU liberals that the Union government formally incorporate an active detente into its own policy. There will be no debate over "a change of course à la Godesberg," Kohl has said — a reference to the major policy shift taken by the SPD in 1959 which allowed that party to endorse NATO.[27] Ever mindful of party cohesion, Kohl fears that too warm a CDU embrace of detente would alienate Strauss and the CSU. In short, both political calculations and honest convictions about the best path to follow in foreign affairs will bring Kohl the Chancellor to pursue the same policies advocated by Kohl the opposition leader.

Not all possible intramural pressures on a CDU/CSU government will emanate from within the Union itself. Closely related to the question of potential CDU-liberal influence over foreign policy is the larger matter of whether or not the CDU/CSU could govern alone or share power with the FDP, led by Schmidt's Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher. If the Union does try to gain power before 1984, or in 1984 fails to win half the seats in parliament, it will indeed need Genscher's support, making him one of the key figures in Germany's political future. Continually worried that close association with the divided, leftward drifting SPD might endanger his party's popularity, Genscher and the FDP often drop hints of their willingness to form a Christian-Liberal coalition in 1984 or earlier.[28] Staunchly pro-European and pro-Atlantic, the FDP's participation in foreign policy formulation in a Union-led government would create little disharmony on most issues. Yet the FDP has staked considerable prestige on Schmidt's foreign policy and is likely to resist a clear rhetorical de-emphasis of detente. A small party to begin with, the FDP could hardly afford to alienate its voters by appearing to make concessions on foreign policy decisions: its struggle to retain 5 percent of the vote at each federal election — the statutory minimum for participation in the *Bundestag* — confronts the party with possible extinction every four years. A CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, then, is certain to emphasize detente more heavily than a CDU/CSU government alone.

A separate issue bound to affect the CDU/CSU's handling of German foreign policy is its relationship with political movements outside of parliament, and youth groups in particular. Although Union foreign policy precepts clash sharply with those of the anti-nuclear movement, and although neither the ecological Green Party nor the splinter Democratic Socialists could prevent the Union from governing with a safe parliamentary majority, some CDU politicians feel compelled to refurbish the

27. *Der Spiegel*, 3 November 1980, p. 26.
28. *Die Zeit*, 11 September 1981, p. 3.

party's image among young Germans. Geissler cited a CDU report documenting the decline in the party's electoral appeal for younger voters;[29] Kohl invited several hundred young party members to a CDU congress for an exchange of views on policy questions; Baden-Wurttemberg Minister-President Lothar Späth suggested a CDU/CSU grassroots campaign to raise funds for Third World development projects which, as a side benefit, would attract young Germans to the party.[30] Ultimately, however, the outlook of the Union on such matters as theater-nuclear modernization is anathema to the peace movement, just as the Union's support for nuclear power runs up against ecological opposition. In governnent, the CDU/CSU will certainly prove even less able to placate such groups, least of all by effecting major changes in government foreign policy.

Finally, the CDU/CSU's ability to implement certain plans once in government, such as increasing the federal budgets's defense share to 20 plus percent, will depend on the party's success in reviving the German economy. High unemployment would lead to pressure for different government expenditures. Similarly, a CDU/CSU government's ability to manipulate trade with the Soviet bloc for the ends of foreign policy would also hinge on economic factors.

## *Conclusion: Bonn's Foreign Policy Under the CDU/CSU*

At the height of his frustration with the strains in German-American relations during 1981, Helmut Schmidt reportedly confided to an aide his suspicion that Ronald Reagan's administration would like to see a change of government in Bonn; according to the Chancellor, America's conservative President wanted a CDU/CSU Chancellor who would "eat out of his hand."

So demeaning a characterization of the Union unquestionably reflected Schmidt's personal bitterness at his misfortune, but it falsely implied that a future CDU/CSU government will be willingly dependent upon and subservient to Washington. From Adenauer to Kohl, the Union's faithful support of the Atlantic Alliance has not been a plea for protection, but a call for cooperation and "equal partnership." The party's underlying motives in preaching Atlantic solidarity have been both a genuine desire to help preserve America's security guarantee for Europe and a fear that isolation from the US would doom Germany to permanent division. This faith in *Westpolitik* as the only way to overcome the German problem set

29. *Jugend und Union: Studie der CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle über das Wahlverhaltensder jungen Generation und ihr Verhältnis zur CDU* (Bonn: CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1981).

30. Comments by Lothar Späth to an audience at Harvard University, 5 February 1982.

the CDU/CSU squarely at odds with Willy Brandt's initial *Ostpolitik*. Yet the strong public support for certain tangible benefits which have resulted from the eastern agreements compels Union leaders to live with the treaties; Germany's unique stake in detente, so often stressed by the SPD-FDP, is something the Union itself can not ignore, and thus its call for reasonable and indivisible detente is more than a pro forma appeal for reduced tensions so often heard in Europe.

Intramural pressures within a future CDU/CSU-led government will affect its policy, if only in matters of emphasis. The party leadership will resist any calls for fundamental revisions from Strauss on the one side or CDU liberals on the other. Given Kohl's ascendancy, CDU/CSU government policy will closely reflect CDU/CSU opposition policy statements — although sharing power with the FDP would lead to a greater emphasis on detente.

The Union's foreign policy, then, will be directed toward "reasonable detente" and "realistic security," a formula that in fact represents only modest divergence from Helmut Schmidt's course. The party will adapt an unabashedly pro-Atlantic, pro-NATO orientation, and will press for TNF deployment in accordance with Bonn's Alliance partners. To this end, CDU/CSU will "mobilize the silent majority" of Germans it claims support the missile plan. Traditionally pro-European sentiments will manifest themselves in an active and cooperative relationship with Germany's neighbors. In a Union government, an emphasis on the indivisibility of detente will replace Schmidt's relatively more accommodating rhetoric about East-West relations. In any future negotiations with the Soviet bloc, CDU/CSU leaders pledge to press for greater concessions from Moscow. But the CDU/CSU may be substantially less willing to take steps which will jeopardize current agreements with the East bloc. Even in opposition, no Union leader has unambiguously called for Bonn's withdrawal from the Soviet-sponsored gas pipeline project in protest over Polish martial law.

The frequently repeated quip that Helmut Schmidt has been the CDU/CSU's best Chancellor underscores the relatively modest differences between Schmidt and his opposition when it comes to foreign policy matters: they usually clash over problems of emphasis, rhetoric, and the current government's admitted inability to push through its own policies against leftwing opposition in the SPD itself. In short, the continuity in foreign policy under a new CDU/CSU government will be substantial — Union member Peter von der Heydt suggests any actual change will only amount to a fifteen degree shift in the course of German policy.[31]

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31. *Boston Globe*, 23 February 1982, p. 9.

Although the CDU/CSU can be expected to persist with most of the Schmidt government's policies, there is a valuable lesson to be learned from the historical and political sources of Union views on foreign policy. However compatible its conduct might be with US and Western designs, CDU/CSU policy will stem less from broad strategic concepts than from uniquely German realities. The party's Atlanticism, its limited acceptance of *Ostpolitik*, its belief in an indivisible detente, and finally its strong security policy all arise from a desire both to overcome the effects of Germany's division and preserve the country's role as an active participant in East-West affairs. These are considerations that Bonn's future allies and adversaries alike should bear in mind.