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# Reflections on U.S. Policy in Africa, 2001–2009

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Bold leadership, innovative initiatives, and unprecedented engagement and assistance defined the George W. Bush administration's policies toward Africa. From 2001 to 2008, U.S. efforts helped Africa enjoy significant progress on economic, health, and political fronts. This progress was made possible through a powerful combination of presidential leadership and cabinet-level engagement in the United States with uniquely African ideas, strategies, and solutions to meet challenges on the continent. Going forward, President Obama would do well to use these achievements as a roadmap for his own policies in the region.

Under the George W. Bush administration, Africa policy priorities were derived from the President's charge to make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous. Specifically, Africa policy aimed to support the spread of political freedom throughout the continent, expand economic opportunity and growth, address the unique challenges of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases, and reinforce African initiatives to end conflict and fight terrorism. The Bush administration shared responsibilities in reaching these goals with Africans, especially with strategic allies and governments that have had strong records on democracy and the rule of law, and with the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional organizations.

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*Jendayi E. Frazer was the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 2005–2009.*

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U.S. government initiatives reflected the President's philosophy that Africa should not be an object of our policy, but rather a partner in solving its own problems and securing a brighter future. This philosophy underscored Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's approach of transformational diplomacy, which emphasized working with foreign governments and people to help them meet their own challenges, create their own opportunities, and build their own nations. President Bush succinctly explained the administration's philosophy to rock star Bob Geldolf during Bush's second trip to Africa in 2008: "U.S. solutions should not be imposed on African leaders."<sup>1</sup>

### **PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP**

U.S. Africa policy has seen significant continuity across presidential administrations, including attention to good governance, economic development, and stable peace as core U.S. interests. President Bush and his cabinet, however, made Africa a larger priority in U.S. foreign policy and set a new precedent for U.S. engagement on the continent. The President set the tone and nearly all cabinet secretaries followed his interest in Africa, most notably the secretaries of state, commerce, defense, treasury, health and human services, and labor, and the U.S. trade representative, all taking multiple official trips to Africa. President Bush's first secretary of state, Colin Powell, embraced his African heritage and demonstrated his keen interest in the region by traveling to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on one of his earliest official international trips. Condoleezza Rice, both as national security advisor and later as secretary of state, also elevated Africa policy as a strategic interest. When campaigning for George W. Bush in 2000, Rice was adamant that Africa would no longer be relegated to a humanitarian concern in U.S. foreign policy.

President Bush remained engaged in Africa throughout his eight-year tenure. He met with at least thirty-six heads of state of SSA's forty-eight countries—many of them multiple times—and was the first U.S. president to include Africa on multi-country travel itineraries during both his terms. With his bold and well-financed initiatives to advance economic development, combat contagious diseases, and reduce conflict, President Bush significantly raised the bar for future presidential engagement in Africa.

### **BOOSTING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC INITIATIVES**

A central priority in President Bush's Africa policy was expanding economic growth and development on the continent. In 2007, SSA

experienced an overall growth rate of 6.5 percent—one of its highest in decades—and more than twenty countries registered consistent annual growth from 2002 to 2008. The Bush administration quadrupled the 2001 level of official development assistance (ODA) to SSA to \$6.7 billion in 2008, putting the United States on track to meet its G8 commitment to provide \$8.7 billion to SSA by 2010. African leaders attended all G8 meetings over the eight years and helped shape the assistance targets and initiatives coming out of the summits. More importantly, the administration transformed development mechanisms through initiatives focusing on countries that have demonstrated their commitment to developing responsibly and achieving results.

The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), launched in 2004, is one such foreign assistance program. The MCA seeks to reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth by awarding sizeable grants—not loans—to governments that rule justly, invest in their people, encourage economic freedom, and institute good macroeconomic policies. Of the eighteen compacts signed by the end of 2008, ten, totaling \$3.9 billion, were signed with SSA countries. The innovative compacts emphasize ownership by enlisting the government and country stakeholders to determine how the resources will contribute to development. Grants could fund industrial parks, transform agriculture, build schools, establish road and rail networks, revise land tenure, and allow property ownership. From 2003 to 2008 the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) granted an additional \$149.8 million to nine “threshold” African countries to help them qualify for MCA assistance. Projects in threshold countries include developing audit systems to help government ministries better tackle corruption and revising laws to support press freedom. In short, MCA revolutionized development assistance and is one of the key new institutions passed on to the Obama administration.

The Bush administration heeded African calls to expand the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), originally passed by the Clinton administration, to allow more than 6,000 African products to enter the \$15 trillion U.S. market duty-free. By 2007, more than 98 percent of African exports to the United States were duty-free, enjoying preferential access intended to help boost and diversify Africa’s economies and to create jobs and prosperity for Africans. In 2007, AGOA exports to the United States totaled \$50 billion, more than six times the level when AGOA was first implemented in 2001. Two-way trade between the United States and SSA increased from \$82 billion in 2007 to \$104.6 billion in 2008. Although petroleum products constituted 92.3 percent of AGOA imports in 2008,

an additional \$5.1 billion in non-petroleum African exports entered the U.S. market because of the duty-free preference. By the end of 2008, forty-one countries qualified for AGOA benefits, and the initiative became the cornerstone of U.S. trade and investment policy in SSA.

Other key Bush administration initiatives focused on building trade capacity (\$1.6 billion over the last seven years), increasing global trade competitiveness (\$200 million over five years), and developing the agricultural sector (\$195 million in 2006). Of note is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's Africa Financial Sector Initiative, launched in 2007 to create seven new investment funds and mobilize more than \$1.6 billion in new capital for African entrepreneurs to support growth in profitable African enterprises and job creation. At the end of 2006, U.S. direct investment in Africa was roughly \$13.8 billion, a 52 percent increase from its 2001 level.

Finally, President Bush was acutely aware of the debt burden impeding the economic progress of many African countries. On the eve of his first G8 meeting in July 2001, President Bush launched a "Stop the Debt" initiative in a speech at the World Bank. The Bush administration, working with the United Kingdom, secured international agreement on the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, which forgave a total of \$34 billion in debt for nineteen African countries, with a total of thirty-three African countries that are heavily indebted poor countries remaining eligible for full debt cancellation in the future. The key challenge, of which President Obama should be cognizant, is to prevent the re-accumulation of unsustainable debt by increasing grants to Africa, both bilaterally and through international financial institutions. The Obama administration should maintain the comprehensive strategy adopted by the Bush administration that focused on increasing official development assistance centered on country-driven development programs, stimulating private equity investment, removing trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, and eliminating unsustainable debt.

### **COMBATING DISEASE: HEALTH INITIATIVES**

Recognizing the gravity of disease in Africa, the Bush administration took its boldest and most dramatic action in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Within four months of his inauguration, President Bush, standing in the White House Rose Garden with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, pledged \$200 million to a prospective global fund for HIV/AIDS, which would pool international resources to tackle the pandemic, and he announced an additional \$100 million prior to the July 2001 G8 meeting in Genoa. By the end of

President Bush's second term, the United States had contributed more than \$3.3 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, launched in 2002, making the United States the Fund's biggest single donor.

With his 2003 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), targeting the prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS, President Bush led the world into action against the disease. PEPFAR is the largest commitment ever made by a single nation to an international health initiative, with \$18.8 billion in

U.S. contributions to combating HIV/AIDS between 2003 and 2008. The Bush administration secured a reauthorization of \$48 billion for PEPFAR over the next five years. According to a 2009 Stanford University study, PEPFAR is credited with saving over one million lives since its launch.<sup>2</sup> President Bush's discussions with Botswana President Festus Mogae and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni heavily influenced his thinking about the necessity of presi-

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dential and senior-level leadership in all realms of society to tackle stigma, and the potential of the ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, Use Condoms) message for preventing HIV/AIDS.

Transcending HIV/AIDS, President Bush launched the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) in 2005, to which the United States committed \$1.2 billion. By 2007, PMI had delivered effective prevention and treatment interventions to more than 25 million people. During his second trip to Africa in February 2008, the President announced a \$350 million initiative to eliminate the burden of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). The initiative aims to provide integrated treatment for more than 300 million people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suffering from seven major NTDs over a course of five years.

#### PURSUING PEACE: INITIATIVES TO REDUCE CONFLICT

In seven of Africa's deadliest civil wars—Angola, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, North-South Sudan, and Sierra Leone—conflicting forces reached peace agreements during the Bush administration. Although peace remains fragile in several of these countries, and conflict persists in Darfur, Eastern Congo, and Somalia, Africa

demonstrated a trend toward reduced conflict between 2001 and 2009. By working multilaterally with regional and international mediators, the Bush administration sought to establish a sustainable infrastructure for ending wars. To support peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations, the Bush administration worked closely with leading African nations, relevant sub-regional organizations, and the AU and the United Nations. The full story of the Bush administration's approach to conflict resolution cannot be written here, but Sudan, the Congo, and Liberia provide telling examples.

### *Consistent Engagement in Sudan*

In negotiating the North-South peace agreement in Sudan, the Bush administration worked with Kenya as the lead mediator and with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sub-regional organization. The administration appointed Senator John Danforth as the President's special envoy to Sudan, and on President Bush's orders, the African Affairs Bureau established a Sudan Programs Office, which was led by Danforth's chief operating officer, Ambassador Michael Ranneberger. The U.S. team helped facilitate and structure the negotiations, drafted proposals to break deadlocks, and deployed diplomats to support Kenya's mediator, General Lazarus Sumbweiyi. The United States also provided the crucial carrots and sticks to change the interest calculations of the National

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Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. U.S. and Kenyan leadership was central to facilitating the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended a twenty-two-year war that caused the deaths of two million people.

Tragically, in the midst of CPA negotiations in 2003, another rebellion broke out in Darfur, led by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM). The Government of Sudan resorted to its old divide-and-conquer and scorched-earth tactics, using tribal and other militias—including the Janjaweed, a militia composed mostly of nomadic Arab Muslims—to combat the rebellion. In September 2004, Secretary Colin Powell declared genocide in Darfur after an investigation

revealed that Janjaweed attacks on civilians, often directly supported by government forces, were intended to wipe out the non-Arab *Fur* and *Zaghawa* tribes. The Darfur conflict has resulted in 200,000 to 300,000 deaths and has caused the internal displacement of millions of Darfurians, some of whom sought refuge in such neighboring countries such as Chad.

The Bush administration backed a UN- and AU-led Darfur mediation process while focusing on partnerships with African countries, especially Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa, to deploy peacekeepers to protect civilians. The first deployment of AU forces in early 2005 significantly reduced the violence but did not end the war. From 2004 to 2008, the United States spent more than \$15 million to airlift 11,400 African peacekeepers and their equipment to and from Darfur. Direct and indirect U.S. support provided to the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur totaled more than \$600 million.

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick led U.S. efforts to bolster the AU's negotiation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Agreement was signed in May 2006 between the Government of Sudan and the SLM/A's Minni Minawi, the leader of one of the three largest Darfuran rebel movements at the time. However, the war resumed and escalated in September 2006 when the Sudanese government launched a new offensive against the non-signatory SLM/Wahid and the JEM.

The United States led the international community in preparing peacekeepers for deployment to Darfur under a UN Security Council resolution that authorized 26,000 troops for the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which in 2008 included \$100 million to train and equip African troops for the operation. From 2006 to 2008, U.S. contributions to UNAMID amounted to roughly \$880 million. The United States also spent more than \$450 million to build, operate, and maintain thirty-four peacekeeping base camps for AU forces, which were turned over to UNAMID control. The Darfur conflict was still ongoing at the end of 2008, largely as a result of the fragmentation of the rebel movements, the intransigence of the Sudanese government, and the lack of international consensus on how to end the crisis. Despite this, Sudan is significantly more stable today as a result of direct and consistent U.S. engagement and African peacekeeping operations under the most challenging and extreme conditions in Darfur.

### *A Multilateral Approach to the Congo*

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the United States convinced Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their forces and supported

mediation by South Africa to end the civil war between the Congolese government and the rebel groups. The DRC's second war ended with the signing of the Sun City Agreement in April 2002 and the subsequent Pretoria Agreement in December 2002. The UN played a central role in helping the country hold its successful multi-party election in July 2006 and its October 2006 runoff that resulted in Joseph Kabila's election. The United States supported the November 2007 Nairobi Agreement in which Rwanda and the DRC pledged to pursue a common approach to the threat posed by Rwandan *genocidaires* in the Congo. The United States also endorsed the January 2008 Goma Agreement, which called for the disengagement of every Congolese armed group present in the Kivus. Finally, the Bush administration initiated the multilateral Tripartite Plus process in 2004 to build confidence, produce greater cooperation between the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and move toward ending conflict in the Great Lakes region. Despite the agreements and the presence of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world in the DRC, civilians in the east remain vulnerable to instability, insecurity, and rampant violations of human rights. Training a disciplined and capable Congolese national armed force that respects the rule of law is a necessary condition to end militia fighting, including that of brutal foreign rebel groups, and most importantly to stop the Congolese military itself from acting as a predatory force against Congolese citizens.

### *Encouraging Democratic Transition in Liberia*

President Bush's June 2003 call for Charles Taylor to relinquish power was vital to ending Liberia's fourteen-year civil war. The demand was also backed by the Liberian people, who called for U.S. intervention. The presidents of Nigeria and South Africa accompanied Mozambican President Chissano, chairman of the African Union, and Mohammed Chambas, representing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to travel to Liberia to set the terms of Taylor's exit. The United States leveraged its influence in the UN Security Council to impose diamond and timber sanctions on Taylor's government, and pressured Libya, Taylor's main regional supporter, to cease its financial and weapons exports to Liberia. President Bush also ended thirteen years of de facto policy against U.S. military operations in Africa dating to the Clinton administration's reaction to American soldiers dying in Somalia in the 1990s.

The war ended in 2003 when U.S. diplomats and U.S. marines joined with African leaders and Nigerian troops operating under the ECOWAS



banner. The United States was a member of the International Contact Group on Liberia, and sent an envoy to Accra to support the Ghanaian-led mediation and help broker a comprehensive peace settlement. The 2003 peace accord paved the way for a transitional government under interim President Gyude Bryant and for the democratic elections held in late 2005.

In January 2006, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated as Liberia's—and Africa's—first elected female president. The country successfully moved from a civil war to consolidating a democratic transition. In February 2007, Secretary Rice announced the U.S. government's intention to forgive 100 percent of Liberia's \$391 million debt to the United States. The Bush administration also increased U.S. annual Liberian assistance to more than \$150 million to help the country rebuild and achieve sustainable peace.

A key element in strengthening Africa's peace infrastructure was to train, equip, and deploy African forces for peacekeeping operations. The United States has trained more than 80 percent of African peacekeepers currently deployed on AU and UN missions. The Bush administration also partnered with the AU and its member states to assist with establishing an African standby force that will be composed of sub-regional brigades. Between 2006 and 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense transferred \$41 million to the State Department to work with United States African Command (AFRICOM) on several coastal and border security programs and maritime security train-and-equip programs. These programs enhance Africa's ability to defend its vast coastal, marine, and border regions from terrorist and criminal activities, and to better protect fisheries, oil, and environmental resources.

#### COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES

After September 11, 2001, President Bush pushed for the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. UNSCR 1373 obligates states to pursue policies that, among other activities, defeat, deter, and deny sanctuary to terrorists by blocking their financing, sharing intelligence, denying safe haven, suppressing recruitment by terrorist groups, encouraging cooperation in law enforcement, preventing arms transfers, and increasing prosecutions of terrorists. African countries undertook UNSCR 1373, but required greater capacity to meet their new international obligations. The Bush administration thus focused on building state capabilities and facilitating regional cooperation to hinder terrorists' ability to exploit Africa's highly permeable borders and vast open spaces, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

In 2002, the Bush administration launched the \$100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) to bolster vulnerable states' defenses against al-Qaeda's East Africa cell in Somalia. EACTI became the East Africa Regional Security Initiative (EARS), designed to unite several agencies' resources and expertise to increase East African countries' border security, immigration control, aviation security, and regional intelligence sharing. EARS also constructed social and economic development programs intended to offer alternatives to terrorism and thus reduce terrorists' recruitment capacity.

The relatively small \$6.5 million Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), launched in November 2002 in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, trained and equipped a rapid-reaction company of about 150 soldiers in each of the four Saharan states. From 2002 to 2004, PSI aimed to enhance border capabilities against arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the movement of transnational terrorists, particularly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which in January 2007 changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2005, PSI was transformed into a five-year Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which included the original four PSI members and also extended to Nigeria, Senegal, and the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. With an annual operating budget of \$80 million, TSCTP undermines terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing cooperation among the region's security forces, employing public diplomacy to discredit terrorist ideology, and supporting democratic governance and economic development to bolster TSCTP countries' resistance to internal threats. Counterterrorism assistance to Mauritania was suspended when its military overthrew the civilian authority in 2005 and again in 2008, reflecting the administration's view that democracy promotion is a key ingredient for successfully fighting terrorism.

## DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Like its predecessors, the Bush administration nurtured democratic development in Africa by supporting the institutions essential for democracy—press freedom, strong civil societies, independent judiciaries, responsible legislatures, and vibrant political parties. In fiscal year 2007, the United States provided more than \$186 million for programs to promote democratic governance in African nations. Since 2000, more than two-thirds of SSA nations held democratic elections and the majority resulted in peaceful transitions, even when power shifted from governing to opposition parties,

as seen in Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. In 2001, Freedom House classified 45.8 percent of SSA countries as free and partly free; by 2008, the figure had risen to 71 percent.

While progress has been remarkable, key challenges persist. Non-credible elections and fraudulent vote counting, whether actual or perceived, are major sources of instability and violence, as seen in Nigeria's flawed 2007 national election and Kenya's post-election violence in January 2008. An increasing number of African presidents have overturned term limits in desperate attempts to remain in power, which has critically eroded public confidence in governance and has heightened social tension. Recognizing the potential of conflict surrounding African elections, the United States increased resources and support for national election commissions, civil society groups, and national, regional, and international monitors working to better manage Africa's polls.

African nations continue to struggle with establishing and reforming progressive democratic institutions that are also adapted to local values, customs, and practices. The Bush administration's approach to democracy promotion dovetailed with Africa's growing emphasis on freedom, the rule of law, and collective security, as embedded in the AU's New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) program and in the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism. The Bush administration's commitment to transformational diplomacy was evident in manifold initiatives designed to reinforce African leaders' own efforts to promote democracy and good governance.

## THE CHINA CHALLENGE

China's increasing involvement in the African continent is a testament to Africa's growing importance in the world. China's primary interests in Africa revolve around fueling Chinese growth by acquiring Africa's natural resources. Chinese officials regularly downplay their economic interests and insist they are pursuing a "Mutually Beneficial Development" approach based on a long—and non-colonial—history of interaction with Africa. African countries generally welcome China's growing involvement, seeing its investment and assistance as vital for Africa's development and as an opportunity to reduce dependence on Western assistance and its accompanying conditionality.

China's strong focus on Africa creates challenges for U.S. interests in Africa, particularly its efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and transparency. For example, China blocked a UN Security Council measure to sanction Zimbabwe and shields Sudan for their massive human rights viola-

tions. Chinese companies have been known to bribe African officials without consequence, and the Chinese government, failing to endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, has conducted opaque deals with Angola and the DRC for oil and mineral concessions. Many observers assume that competition between the United States and China revolves around Africa's oil and minerals; in reality, the primary competition is over business practices and the values that will govern Africa. Ultimately, that reality is in Africa's hands.

The U.S. approach to China's role in Africa was guided by the broader U.S. agenda. Led by successive Deputy Secretaries of State Robert Zoellick and John Negroponte, the Bush administration employed the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue to encourage China to act as a responsible global stakeholder. Between November 2005 and October 2008, three U.S.-China sub-dialogues about Africa were held to improve understanding and communication. Concrete outcomes of the dialogue included agreement to work together with the Liberian government on malaria treatment and eradication. China also agreed to take over U.S. efforts to build camps to house UNAMID peacekeepers in Darfur. The two countries also agreed to work together with the Ethiopian government in the agricultural sector. The Bush administration Africa policy aimed to work with China just as it worked with other countries, such as France, whose interests in Africa may sometimes deviate from U.S. interests. This approach was partly driven by the need for enhanced donor coordination that included China to avoid duplication of efforts and to optimize all sources of assistance in working toward mutual objectives.

U.S. policy going forward should encourage China to support international financial institutions in promoting good economic management and should prevent African countries from accumulating unsustainable debt to China. The United States should also identify ways to work with China to advance African peace, stability, and economic development while encouraging China to support good governance, the rule of law, and access to free and transparent markets in Africa.

## LOOKING AHEAD

The Bush administration's Africa team demonstrated keen leadership and diplomatic skill in achieving the most dramatic transformation to date of U.S. policy on the African continent. More wars were ended, more successful elections were held, more sustained growth was achieved, and more lives were saved from pandemic diseases than during any previous U.S. presidency.

The legacy of the Bush administration's Africa policy is also evident in the institutionalization of abundant economic, health, and political initiatives, including MCA, MCC, PEPFAR, PMI, and AFRICOM. The administration also established the U.S. – AU mission in Addis Ababa that accredited the first non-African Ambassador to the African Union. In perhaps its most marked departure from previous administrations, President Bush's Africa team transcended outdated methods of dictating policy to Africans and instead embraced transformational diplomacy. This approach emphasized respect for all Africans and recognized that the continent's destiny is in its own hands; the United States played only a supporting role to advance mutual interests. By employing transformational diplomacy, the United States sought to empower a network of well-governed sovereign states that acted responsibly and demonstrated the capacity to protect their citizens and to contribute to regional security.

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Ultimately, given prudent policy and meaningful partnership, these states can enhance the international system with sustained progress on good governance, economic development, and social equality. President Bush engaged more deeply with Africa than his predecessors and developed myriad initiatives to support African interests. In formulating his own Africa policies, President Obama would be well advised to heed President Bush's successes as guideposts for the way forward in an increasingly complex world. Africa—from its relationship with such emerging global powers as China to its quest to attain sustainable peace—will play a critical role in twenty-first century global stability and must remain a key priority for U.S. presidential administrations. ■

#### ENDNOTES

- 1 Bob Geldof, “With Bush In Africa: A journey across a continent and into the soul of a President,” *Time*, March 10, 2008, 21-25.
- 2 Eran Benavid, MD and Jayanta Bhattacharya, MD, “The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa: An Evaluation of Outcomes,” *Annals of International Medicine*, vol. 150 Spring 2009, 688-695.


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