

ALEXANDER'S FINAL ARMY

An Honors Thesis for the Department of History

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Alexander the Great is a man with whom many great leaders throughout history have been compared, a model of excellence whose achievements can never quite be matched.

My introduction to his legacy occurred in the third grade. Reading a biography of Julius Caesar for a class project, I happened across Plutarch's famous description of Caesar's reaction to reading a history of Alexander: "he was lost in thought for a long time, and then burst into tears. His friends were astonished, and asked the reason for his tears. 'Do you not think,' said he, 'that it is a matter of sorrow that while Alexander, at my age, was already king of so many peoples, I have as yet achieved no brilliant success?'"¹

This story captivated my imagination and stuck with me throughout my middle and high school years. Once at college, I decided to write a thesis on Alexander to better understand the one man capable of breeding thoughts of inadequacy in Caesar. This work is in many ways a tribute to both Caesar and Alexander. More pointedly, it is an exploration into the designs of a man at the feet of whom lay the whole world.

This paper has meant a lot to me. I want to thank all those who made it possible.

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I also want to thank my parents for listening to me vent when the process caused me excess stress. In this same vein I would like to thank my roommate of four years, Alexander Nectow, for putting up with me for so long. The encouragement of these people, and my other friends, has been much appreciated throughout.

ABBREVIATIONS

This thesis cites ancient works according to the established model laid out in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. The relevant abbreviations are listed below:

Ath.....	Athenaeus
Arr.....	Arrian
<i>Anab</i>	Anabasis
<i>Ind</i>	Indica
Dem.....	Demosthenes
<i>Phil</i>	Philippics
Diod.....	Diodorus Siculus

¹ Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 11.3.

Isoc.....	Isocrates
<i>Orat</i>	Orations
Just. <i>Epit</i>	Justin, Epitome (of Trogus)
Plut.....	Plutarch
<i>Vit</i>	Parallel Lives
<i>Alex</i>	Alexander
<i>Caes</i>	Caesar
<i>Phoc</i>	Phocion
<i>Mor</i>	Moralia
<i>De Alex. fort</i>	On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander
Polyaenus, <i>Strat</i>	Polyaenus, <i>Strategemata</i> .
QC.....	Quintus Curtius Rufus
Thuc.....	Thucydides

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INTRODUCTION

During the reigns of Philip II and his son Alexander the Great, the kingdom of Macedonia grew to encompass an area stretching from the Danube to the Indus, and from Egypt to Uzbekistan. This period of expansion was the product of a newly reformed Macedonian army. However, at the time of Alexander's death in 323 B.C. the army was undergoing significant changes, not only in structure but also in composition. The ancient historians of Alexander name specific barbarian units, made up of subjects from the conquered Achaemenid Persian Empire, being incorporated into the army around 324/3 as Alexander prepared to expand his dominion westward. The new contingents were deliberate creations, the products of planning and intent. However, the sources are largely silent on the origins and importance of Alexander's enrollment of barbarians.

How Alexander chose to incorporate the various peoples of the Persian Empire

into his new realm has been the subject of debate for decades. Scholars have primarily focused on Alexander's political actions in Asia to draw conclusions about where, specifically, the Iranians were to fit. Some argued that they were meant to jointly control the empire, or even that Alexander had in mind a stoic model whereby equality would extend to all mankind. Those arguing either point draw attention to Alexander's apparent Medizing—his adoption of Persian customs, including the infamous *proskynesis*, or bowing before the king, a staple of the Achaemenid court; his wearing of Persian clothes; his appointment of Persians as high-ranking officials; and even his “learning to wield a bow and mount a chariot,” two Persian traditions quite foreign to Macedonia.²

Others maintain that these steps were symbolic, and nothing more. Alexander's true intent was really to keep the Persians from rebelling while he firmly fixed Macedonians as the true and lone power holders.

These analyses ignore much of the evidence relevant to Alexander's military relationships with the barbarians. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how and why Alexander enrolled Iranians into his army. The term ‘Iranian’ must be used to include both ethnic Persians and other speakers of Iranian languages in northern and eastern Iran and central Asia, such as Bactrians, Sogdians, etc. All of these groups had been tied into the Achaemenid Empire far more directly than any of the subjects further west, forming part of the Achaemenid political hierarchy. The ancient sources often use Persian to mean Iranian, as will become apparent later in the thesis, and one of the challenges is to identify when this is the case, and when the authors really mean ethnic Persians.

This thesis will show that Alexander made a distinction in his treatment of the Iranians and the non-Iranians of the Persian Empire. The ways in which he tied both groups to him, through the military, and the consequential results of these relationships, shed light on exactly what roles both groups were to play in Alexander's empire.

To accomplish this end, an examination will first be made of the precedents and

² Plut. *De Alex. fort.* 4.338d.

traditions available to Alexander as a Macedonian king. Macedonia had, for centuries, been a kingdom where politics and the military were tied together in a unique relationship. Philip II extended this style of governance, connecting various Balkan and Greek states to Macedonia to create a European empire. The military relationships forged by him created paradigms available to Alexander. Against these relationships we may compare the steps taken by Alexander in Asia.

Alexander's plans were only beginning to take shape when he died after a mere twelve years on the Macedonian throne. The processes he had set in motion across the empire were far from complete. Given this, and the fact that Macedonia linked political rights to military obligations, Alexander's true plans for his empire can best be viewed from an analysis of how he brought the Iranians into the army.

SOURCES USED

The problem common to all studies of the ancient world is, of course, the scarcity of sources. This creates tremendous gaps in understanding the larger context of events and produces questions of reliability, with few extant sources discussing the same topic. In the case of Alexander the Great, five histories remain in a complete, or near-complete, state. These are the works of Arrian, Diodorus, Justin, Plutarch and Quintus Curtius. None of these men wrote as a witness to the events they describe, but rather used now-lost primary sources to create histories. All of them wrote several centuries after Alexander's death, and at times differ in chronology, detail, and analysis of the events they relate.

These authors will be discussed individually, with the goal of understanding where their information originated and how to interpret their writings. Following this, I will discuss the modern sources used to both supplement the history of Alexander and, more importantly, to provide a history of Macedonia up through the assassination of Alexander's father, Philip II.

Arrian

Arrian was a Greek with Roman citizenship living under Roman rule in the second century AD. He was advanced to the position of governor, taking control of Cappadocia at the request of Hadrian—a rare responsibility for a Greek at the time. Arrian wrote two books on Alexander, the *Anabasis of Alexander*, in which he describes all of Alexander's exploits, and the *Indica*, which covers some of Alexander's India campaign as well as the naval voyage of Alexander's back to the Persian Gulf, which Alexander did not accompany.

In the *Anabasis*, Arrian helpfully explains his reasons for writing about Alexander, and the sources from which he draws. He opens his narrative by saying:

Wherever Ptolemy and Aristobulus in their histories of Alexander, the son of Philip, have given the same account, I have followed it on the assumption of its accuracy; where their facts differ I have chosen what I feel to be the more probable and interesting. There are other accounts of Alexander's life—more of them, indeed, and more mutually conflicting than any other historical character; it seems to me, however, that Ptolemy and Aristobulus are the most trustworthy writers on this subject, because the latter shared in Alexander's campaigns, and the former—Ptolemy—in addition to this advantage, was himself a King, and it is more disgraceful for a King to tell lies than anyone else. Moreover, Alexander was dead when these men wrote; so there was no sort of pressure upon either of them, and they could not profit from falsification of the facts. Certain statements by other writers upon Alexander may be taken to represent popular tradition: some of these, which are interesting in themselves and may well be true I have included in my work. If anyone should wonder why I should have wished to write this history when so many other men have done the same, I would ask him to reserve judgment until he has first read my predecessor's work and then become acquainted with my own.³

With this statement, Arrian lays out, in detail, his concerns for writing—to create an accurate portrayal of Alexander—and his main sources—Aristobolus and Ptolemy (who later founded the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt). However Arrian's assertion that neither man would possibly present manipulated histories is naïve, to say the least.

In his *Indica*, Arrian uses the account of Nearchus, admiral of the fleet. Lionel Pearson, who wrote a book examining all of the remaining sources for Alexander, including those only surviving in fragmentary form, examined Arrian's two books and

³ Arr. *Anab. praef.* 1-3.

concluded:

In comparing the two works Arrian does not often quote other authorities by name in the *Anabasis*; what he has learnt from Nearchus is mostly to be found in the *Indica*; when he mentions Callisthenes, Medeios, and Onesicritus, he is not concerned with their literary work but with their behavior. Plutarch, by contrast, cites quite a number of writers, though he makes no critical remarks about them. Both Plutarch and Arrian, however, quote a long passage from the 'Royal Diary' describing the last days of Alexander's life, without making it clear where they found it. [...] Since Arrian makes no reference to the Diary in discussing the sources he used, modern critics have been ready to believe that he found the quotation in Ptolemy.⁴

Arrian seems to truly follow only the historians that he presents to the reader. These men, having served in the upper echelons of the military, would have had close proximity to Alexander. Arrian's writing is by far the most detailed, especially in describing battles (thanks to Ptolemy). Arrian also differentiates between the various peoples of the Persian Empire, a helpful characteristic of his work, particularly for this thesis.

Diodorus

Diodorus of Sicily (or Diodorus Siculus) wrote his account of Alexander as part of a series chronicling the history of the world from mythic times to his own. He, too, was a Greek in the Roman world, writing sometime in the first century BC. Unlike Arrian, Diodorus does not present us with much insight into his process for researching and writing his history.

Little is known about the author himself, making analysis of his sources and writing more difficult. His account of Alexander is nonetheless quite full, and he also provides us with much of the primary evidence on the reign of Philip II. Diodorus is often found to be copying from a single source. However, in his Alexander history (Book 17), he never quotes any author or gives any evidence as to the identity of his sources. Modern scholars therefore disagree over whose narrative he is copying.⁵

In comparing his history of Alexander with those of the four other authors, no serious deviation in fact is to be found; indeed, the overall picture painted by all five men

⁴ Lionel Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, Ltd., 1960), 3.

⁵ Welles' notes in Diodorus: *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. 8 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 6-7.

is factually similar, if sometimes inconsistent in date, minor detail, or opinion.

Justin

Little is known about M. Junianus Justinus, except that he was a teacher of rhetoric who, in roughly 200 AD, condensed the *Philippic Histories* of Pompeius Trogus. Trogus had evidently written a full history of Alexander in the early first century AD, but this no longer exists. All we know about how much Justin changed this account is from what is found in Justin's introduction, where he states "I omitted what did not make pleasurable reading or serve to provide a moral, and I produced a brief anthology of sorts to refresh the memory of those who had studied history in Greek, and to provide instruction for those who had not."⁶ Justin's summary of Trogus provides us with the briefest account of Alexander, but includes important details that supplement the other works.

Plutarch

Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus is perhaps the most famous of the writers whose accounts of Alexander survive. He lived during the late first/early second century AD and was also a Greek living under Roman rule. His *Life of Alexander* was part of his series called *Parallel Lives*, in which he compared famous Greeks to famous Romans.

Alexander was paired with Caesar; the passage comparing the two men, however, is lost.

Plutarch was a biographer, and he makes clear early on his objective in writing on

Alexander. He states:

It is the life of Alexander, the king, and of Caesar, who overthrew Pompey, that I am writing in this book, and the multitude of the deeds to be treated is so great that I shall make no other preface than to entreat my readers, in case I do not tell of all the famous actions of these men, nor even speak exhaustively at all in each particular case, but in epitome for the most part, not to complain. For it is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives.⁷

Plutarch's primary goal is to examine the character of Alexander. Details relevant to this

⁶ Justin *Epit. Praef.* 4-6

⁷ Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 1.1-2.

thesis are therefore passed over at times.

The sources Plutarch drew upon are known. They are numerous and he cites them often, but an exhaustive study of his and the other authors' sources will not be included in this thesis. Again, what is important is that he often agrees with the other four authors, and he displays a tremendous list of sources to back up his (and their) narratives.

One feature does stand out: Plutarch's apparent access to letters written by Alexander. Several times he references these letters. Such is the case when, after writing about a speech made by Alexander, he states, "This is almost word for word what he wrote in his letter to Antipater."⁸ Other examples of this abound in his writing, but how he gained access to these letters, why he chooses to summarize and not quote them, and why they are not more prominently featured in other histories, is unclear.

Plutarch's opinions of Alexander are well known. He saw the king as a philosopher-general, and his admiration for Alexander's policies, which Plutarch sees as in line with Stoic dogma, permeates much of the *Life of Alexander* and is the defining theme of Plutarch's *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, part of his *Moralia* volumes. Pearson writes:

Plutarch was bound to take note of literary work written in Roman times and to be influenced by the attitudes of the philosophic and rhetorical schools. For Stoics and Peripatetics in particular Alexander became a useful figure for the illustration of moral lessons; so also in schools of rhetoric, where pupils debated whether a man's success was due mainly to chance or personal merit, as well as more specific themes such as the chances of Alexander if he had attempted to conquer Italy. All this must be taken into account in any evaluation of Plutarch's biography or an investigation of his sources.⁹

Again, as this thesis is intended to look at Alexander's political considerations entirely as evidenced by his reforms to the army, Plutarch's opinions are not as relevant since they don't impact his reporting of such details.

Quintus Curtius

Quintus Curtius Rufus, although providing us with one of the longest and most

⁸ Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 47.2

⁹ Pearson, *Lost Histories*, 6.

detailed accounts of Alexander, is problematic in two areas. First, a number of lacunae exist in his text. Some of the most important details relevant to this thesis are therefore not included in his work. Additionally, Books 1 and 2 of his *History of Alexander* are totally lost. We therefore know almost nothing about the author. Pearson summarizes: “The rhetorical interests of Quintus Curtius and his familiarity with Livy’s work are obvious, but we do not know enough about him personally to say whether he had any professional pretensions as a philosopher.”¹⁰ Whether we should consider Quintus Curtius as we do Plutarch is therefore uncertain.

Quintus Curtius, like Justin, writes his book in Latin. This, combined with his later proconsulship of Africa, which he held until the time of his death in 53 AD, give almost sure proof that he was an actual Roman, though besides this we can say little.

Likewise, we can surmise little about the date of his writing aside from the fact that it was completed before 53 AD. It is also unknown exactly which sources he used in his history. Like Arrian, however, he is generally good about differentiating amongst the various peoples of the Persian Empire.

Modern Sources

Regarding the modern sources, I wish only to discuss two volumes from *A History of Macedonia*. These, parts two and three of the same three-part series, were undertaken by N.G. L. Hammond, working with G.T. Griffith on the second volume and F.W. Walbank on the third. They are exhaustive reads. Eugene Borza, critiquing the series, calls it “a handbook—a compendium of valuable analyses of the sources—not to be read at length but to be consulted on details.”¹¹ On Hammond’s approach to the writing of the enormous tomes, Borza further states, “Hammond’s regional history technique was to combine topography, historical geography, and archaeology with the traditional analysis of the surviving literary and epigraphical texts.”¹² In his works, Hammond fits in

¹⁰ Pearson, *Lost Histories*, 7.

¹¹ Eugene N. Borza, *Before Alexander: Constructing Early Macedonia* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999), 24.

¹² Borza, *Before Alexander*, 24.

all relevant sources to ancient Macedonia in one context or another. For this reason, *A History of Macedonia* figures prominently in this thesis.

PART I: INHERITED MODELS

1. THE MACEDONIAN FOUNDATION

The imperial structure and military innovations developed by Alexander can only be properly analyzed after their roots have been dug up and exposed. To this end, the kingdom of Macedonia and the military institutions in place before his accession have an integral place in this thesis. Many of Alexander's political decisions regarding his relationships with his conquered subjects actually follow from a model established by earlier kings and expanded by his father. Similarly, despite the apparent resistance from the Macedonian rank and file to Alexander's integration of Iranians into the army, his actions followed a path that had precedents in his father's reforms.

That the Macedonian army resisted many of Alexander's initiatives is not surprising; that they cloaked their mutinous actions in a veil of upholding tradition, particularly in the military structures of Macedonia, is similarly not surprising. However, it was not necessarily because all of Alexander's arrangements regarding incorporating Persian barbarians into the military were shocking to traditional sensibilities. It was a select bundle of reforms, targeted at the Iranians, which really prompted Macedonian resistance. The following sections will lay out what political and military relationships existed between the king of Macedonia and his subjects, as well as with the barbarians of the Balkans and the Greeks, by the time Alexander came to the throne, and how they were cemented in military service.

Early Macedonia was really two separate entities: Lower Macedonia, consisting of the coastal lowlands immediately north of the Aegean, and Upper Macedonia,

composed of the interior highlands. Lower Macedonia was the seat of the kingdom.¹³ It was under the direct control of the king, whose powers of administration were virtually limitless here. All residents of Lower Macedonia had citizenship within their districts (or, in the minority of cases, cities). Macedonian subjects also enjoyed differing status levels in the state, which were conferred at the king's discretion. By Philip's accession, enough evidence exists to conclude:

that the subjects of the king were now registered as members of a city, e.g. 'Pellaios', or an area, e.g. Eordaios, each having its own citizenship and therefore its own form of local government. A number of persons selected by the king without consideration of tribal or even racial origins were made 'Macedones', thus obtaining a second and superior citizenship.¹⁴

Exactly when this process of local regions bestowing citizenship on inhabitants began is somewhat unclear. Its universality by the fourth century, however, makes the exact date of its inception irrelevant. It is the second, more prestigious level of citizenship—by which one was linked directly to the state—that mattered politically. Being a 'Macedon' conferred on holders a significant amount of power. Though the king selected recipients for this honor, it was, conversely, they who wielded the only checks on his authority in the state.

No formal senate or governing organ existed in Macedonia. In fact, upon the king's absence, a deputy had to be appointed, as no apparatus existed to exercise power on behalf of the king, regardless of the duration of his absence.¹⁵ In Plutarch's biography of Alexander the Great, evidence of Macedonia's informal procedure for deputizing power is apparent. Plutarch writes:

While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium, Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, was left behind as a regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal, and during this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi, and after taking their city, drove out the barbarians, settled there a mixed population, and renamed the city Alexandropolis, (*Life of Alexander* 9.1).¹⁶

¹³ Thuc. 2.99.1-6.

¹⁴ N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia, 550-336 B.C.*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 163.

¹⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 384.

¹⁶ Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 9.1.

It appears that, in the absence of the king, his appointed deputy acted with all the traditional powers of a king. Alexander fulfilled the royal duties of keeping the subjects loyal and could apparently also found cities. For all intents and purposes, the deputy was the king of the region while the real monarch was off campaigning.

Such powers are also to be seen in the actions of Alexander's own deputy, Antipater, who controlled Macedonia for the duration of Alexander's campaigns in Asia. Antipater received deputations from the Greek cities with whom Alexander alone officially had a relationship. He acted on the king's orders to raise and dispatch reinforcements, while he acted independently in putting down rebellions and keeping order in Macedonia.

Clearly, the state was completely centered around the king. The holders of the title 'Macedones,' however, did form a clique of kingmakers termed the Assembly of Macedones. The powers of this Assembly were not of governance, but rather of legitimization:

when the king died, the succession was determined by the Assembly of the Macedones. The choice might be obvious, as it was when Alexander I followed Amyntas or when Alexander III [the Great] followed Philip II; or it might be contested, as it evidently was after the death of Alexander I; or, if the choice fell on a minor, a regent had to be appointed, usually from the Royal family, as in the case of Aeropus. The Assembly's right was inalienable.¹⁷

Membership in the Assembly was a mark of considerable prestige because of the power invested in it. The ultimate and uncontested jurisdiction of the Assembly meant that all kings owed their position to it, and to it alone. The Assembly also had the power to depose kings, and there is evidence that this right was exercised in the early fourth century at least once.¹⁸ The Assembly had the power to bypass the direct line of succession if it so desired.

Philip II came to power from outside the direct line of succession (he was the uncle of Amyntas IV, the young son of the previous king), yet his reign was not seen as

¹⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 153.

¹⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 175.

illegitimate. Alexander nonetheless owed his position directly to the Assembly, as well, for it could have chosen to reinvest power in the now-mature Amyntas upon Philip's death. Instead, it elevated Alexander, who then had Amyntas murdered. Alexander was careful not to alienate the Assembly until near the end of his life¹⁹.

The king did not, constitutionally speaking, need the Assembly to approve his every decision. Tradition, however, dictated that he embrace their suggestions and counsel. "The Assembly chose who was to be king. Once he was chosen he governed by consent; but if he lost that consent he was deposed by the body which had created him king."²⁰ In essence, then, both the king and the members of the Assembly owed their elevated status to each other. Precedent formalized this relationship, in which the king's consultation with the Assembly was the most sacred and ingrained political feature.

Ultimately, however, the relationship between the king and the Macedones was military at base. The Macedones were the kingdom's infantry warriors. On campaign, the Assembly functioned as a means for the soldiers to shape strategy and voice their interests and desires to the king.²¹ The king bestowed men with these rights, which in turn created military obligations. Macedonia lacked a federal governmental structure. "That the state was the Macedones under arms is clear."²² Rather than create a distinct civil service, the Macedonian kingdom developed a semi-feudalistic paradigm, in which power and prestige were distributed by the king in return for commitments of military service. This model, embedded early in Macedonian society, set all precedents regarding military or state reforms. This was the tradition upon which Philip and Alexander were to build new relationships with other peoples in Europe and Asia, respectively.

The connection between power and military service had to develop early. Macedonia was situated in a strategic location bordering the Aegean, and became a target for many nearby enemies. Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War references

¹⁹ See the Opis Mutiny, discussed below.

²⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 158.

²¹ Arr. *Anab.* 5.25.2.

²² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 162.

Macedonia as being militarily underdeveloped in the fifth century and forced onto the defensive upon its entry into the War.²³ Early in its history, Macedonia had a highly decentralized military structure comprised largely of gathered militias controlled by regional lords and supplemented by a small core army (the Macedones) directly under the king's control.

The state could not rely on a potent force of infantry since Macedonia lacked the middle-class society necessary to provide hoplites. The earliest kings, therefore, focused on developing a small core of heavy cavalry to supplement their weak infantry. Yet, all evidence points to “a complete absence of any tribal nobility in the [Lower] Macedonian state of the fourth century.”²⁴ The lack of an imbedded, empowered aristocracy gave the king significant freedom to elevate whomever he wished within the state, but required that he give some political powers to anyone he wished to serve as heavy cavalry, as had been done with the Macedones in the infantry.

Macedonian kings used their powers of granting privilege to create a third category of citizenship—one completely necessitated by, and linked to, military needs. Although evidence for the date of the formation of a heavy cavalry corps is slim, Hammond believes it can be traced back at least into the fifth century.²⁵ In this system, the elites were selected by the king and raised to positions of power in the state. They were known as Companions. Part of this elevation included land grants. These were quite important, since the individual towns of Macedonia practiced some self-governance, and large landholders likely played a considerable role in this.²⁶ However, by creating elites within various towns and districts, the king still maintained control over the localities, and the Companions (likely) had significant influence over the regions in which their vast estates sat.

In return for elevation into the Companions, the elites provided teeth to the royal

²³ Thuc. 2.100.1

²⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 163.

²⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 31.

²⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 649.

army through incorporation into a body of horse known as the Companion cavalry. This group did not comprise medieval-style knights; they owed their status to the king alone, and not to inheritance or royal bloodlines. They were unique among nobilities at the time: “whereas the Persian king Darius III had his ‘kindred’ cavalymen, recruited by ties of kinship, the king of Macedonia had his Companion cavalymen, chosen on grounds of personal merit.”²⁷ Thus the king had the power to create elites and assign positions of power to whomever he chose, beginning early in Macedonia’s history.

The original function and numbers, as well as the later nomenclature applied to the Companions, suggest that they initially functioned as a royal bodyguard. Because the kingdom had no centralized bureaucracy or administration, this proximity allowed for greater power through access to, and influence over, the king. Just as the Macedones formed an Assembly which elevated kings and offered counsel, so his Companions formed his court and retinue. There were no bureaucrats or civil servants in Macedonia; it was the Companions who helped monarchs with the minutia of governance to a far greater degree than the Assembly.

Evidence that the corps was originally quite small can be found in the histories of Alexander. At one time, all simply formed a large bodyguard. This element was:

preserved through the expansion of the corps under Philip, and can be seen clearly in Alexander’s Royal Squadron of the Companions (*ile basilike*), sometimes called the *agema*. Its strength of 300 (which continued as the traditional number after his death), can be thought of perhaps as a possible strength of the Companions as a fighting force, before and into Philip’s early years.²⁸

Great wealth did not automatically ensure a place in the Companions, especially when the corps was limited in size to only the *agema*. Even after the cavalry was expanded, first by Philip and then again by Alexander, “what decided the king’s choice [for Companions] was clearly their ability to fight well at his side as cavalymen. It was from this corps of cavalry Companions that he selected those best fitted to advise him.”²⁹ The relationship

²⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 163.

²⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 409.

²⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 159.

between subject and king was always military at its core. The advisors to the king had to also prove their mettle in battle. Advancement in the kingdom depended as much on fighting skill as on wealth or wisdom.

Philip II came to the throne following a colossal Macedonian defeat at the hands of the Illyrians. In this catastrophe, the Macedonian king Perdiccas III and several thousand of his troops perished; most of his Companions probably fell with him. Macedonia's enemies were overrunning her frontiers when the Assembly elevated Philip to the position of regent over his young nephew, Perdiccas' son Amyntas, and then to king³⁰. Philip's immediate objective, upon accepting the salutes of the Macedones, was to rapidly mobilize a powerful army. In order to create a larger body of cavalry, he took the radical step of enrolling many non-Macedones into the Companions. He could do this because there was a precedent and an understanding that, "Macedonian citizenship was in the gift of the king. Nearchus [Alexander's admiral], for instance, was a Cretan by origin; he was given not only Macedonian citizenship but also the citizenship of Amphipolis, where 'he resided'."³¹ No Macedonians balked at Alexander the Great's enlistment of Nearchus as a Companion, just as they did not when Philip began including many Greeks among his Companions. Griffith, in examining the trend, notes that Berve:

has a list of sixty-one Companions of this high status, including thirteen Greeks, whose provenance (where known) he gives in the Prosopography. To these thirteen I [Griffith] add the six Greeks who were trierarchs in 325 (*Indica* 18.7f), whom he agrees to have been almost certainly Companions of the retinue, though not attested as such (*ibid.*); also Onesicritus, and Androstenes of Thasos (and Amphipolis) (*ibid.*).³²

The ability of Macedonian kings to draw foreign elites into the Companion cavalry, and through this channel into the kingdom, was established by the time Philip came to power. It expanded significantly under him, but there can be no doubt that, had no precedent existed, Philip—a regent appointed by the Assembly—would quickly have been deposed.

³⁰ The sources are somewhat unclear on Philip's accession, and he may also have immediately been appointed king; if not, he attained the position not long after being appointed regent.

³¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 647-8.

³² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 375 n.1.

More important even than the rapid rise in the number of foreign Companions under Philip was the result that expanding the cavalry's numbers had on its traditional power. As previously noted, all Companions had been pulled into an *agema* of 300 men who formed an elite in the king's army and his administration. Philip modified this significantly to accommodate his plans for Upper Macedonia.

The potential for the king to assign power at will provided Philip with more than just troops. It allowed the Macedonian kingdom to expand. Traditionally, Upper Macedonia was linked rather loosely to the Macedonian king. It had its own tribal polities, which possessed significant autonomy within the state. "That each tribe had its own monarch was noted by Thucydides (2.99.2). However, the monarch was not an absolute despot but the head of a tribal state which had its own organs of administration."³³ This relationship was shaken by Macedon's great defeat in 360, after which northern barbarians began invading Upper Macedonia along multiple fronts. Philip not only retook the north, he also expanded Macedonia's frontier significantly. At the same time, he began consolidating Upper Macedonia more directly into the state.

Philip's desire to completely unify this region with Lower Macedonia resulted in comprehensive reforms. During his reign, "no more 'kings' are heard of in [the major northern regions of] Orestis, Lyncestis, Pelagonia, or the rest. The 'new men' from Upper Macedonia were brought into the Court and to the king's retinue."³⁴ In the cases of the Upper Macedonian tribes, the kingships were abolished but the nobles were not executed or exiled; they were brought into the power structure of the south through incorporation into the Companions.

Just how closely incorporated the elites became is evident in the proximity to Alexander of many Upper Macedonians. "Indeed some of Alexander's senior officers were members of royal houses—Polyperchon (Tymphaea), Perdikkas son of Orontes (Orestis), and Leonnatus son of Eunous (Lyncus)—and they were 'Macedones' and one,

³³ Thuc. in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 650.

³⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 396.

Leonnatus, was a citizen of Pella.”³⁵ All of these men were Companions. and their placement in Alexander’s retinue and the trust Alexander placed in them shows how well integrated some of the Upper Macedonian elites were into this new, more unified Macedonian state.

Another grouping of Upper Macedonians in cavalry units outside of the Companions may be found in the four squadrons of Scouts (later referred to as Lancers) who accompanied Alexander in his campaigns. Griffith concludes that, “though nothing at all is known of their social any more than their local origins, it could be suggested that they were drawn perhaps from the least affluent of the Macedonian gentry, and this would give Upper Macedonia a strong representation in these four squadrons.”³⁶ Although these men gained a less prestigious and less powerful status in the army and kingdom, their presence shows, again, how Philip chose to connect lands to the crown through the military.

The infantry provided another channel for this type of relationship to expand and incorporate more peoples into the state. Little is known about Macedonia’s foot soldiers prior to the reforms of Philip. They were apparently few in number, and made up only of Macedones from Lower Macedonia. The core of the royal army’s infantry centered around the hypaspists, whose title of Foot Companions accurately implies their traditions. Theopompus, one of the few authors to discuss the army prior to Philip’s reforms, describes the Foot Companions as elites enrolled in a similar manner as the cavalry. He “says that picked men out of all the Macedonians, the tallest and strongest, served as the King’s Guards, and they were called Foot Companions’.”³⁷

Despite this unit’s long traditions and preferential treatment by Alexander during his campaigns, little is known about how they were armed or organized. Their numbers seem to be relatively small, and Alexander, at least, often included them on missions he

³⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 650.

³⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 411-2.

³⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 405-6.

led.³⁸ Whether their status was equivalent to that of the Companions is unclear, but seems unlikely, since references to hypaspists advising the king are nonexistent in the narratives of Alexander. The rest of the infantry may have originally been levies, provided by towns, and perhaps elements from the local militias kept by various districts.

Philip reformed the infantry into the famed Macedonian phalanx.³⁹ These troops were not Greek hoplites, and were armed and armored in a different manner. This was a direct consequence of the fact that heavy hoplites required middle-class citizenry, of which Macedonia had little. The dearth of such citizens is revealed in a later description of the equipment worn by Philip's new infantry. Polyaeus describes the Macedonian foot soldier as being "'fully armed, with helmets, shields, greaves, sarissas [18 foot pikes], and as well as their arms, rations, and the gear they needed from day to day'."⁴⁰ Evidently these troops did not wear breastplates, and this is most likely explained by the lack of resources available to the majority of the army.

As will be discussed shortly, Macedonia's annexation of mines later in Philip's reign allowed the kingdom to employ huge numbers of mercenaries not seen in this period. Philip managed to create a strong core of phalangites out of the existing state resources. They made up for their lack of armor in flexibility and capacity to wield pikes that were almost twice as long as the spears carried by Greek hoplites. These men, when combined with Philip's and Alexander's strategic brilliance, would prove more than capable of defeating the heavier infantry of southern Greece.

That Philip was able to reform the infantry so completely reveals how much freedom the king possessed in military matters. Granted, Philip ascended at a time of crisis for Macedonia; but he radically altered the relationship between the infantry of Macedones and the kingdom. The following quote is of great importance:

When we recall that Philip's entire army in 359 numbered 10,000 Macedones, it is remarkable that within three years Alexander could muster four times as many

³⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 5.13.4, for instance.

³⁹ See Figure 1.1.

⁴⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 422.

men. The explanation is that the kingdom in 334 was more than twice as large as in 359, and that the birth-rate of boys born in 359 to 350 was much higher than it had been in 377, because conditions and prospects had improved in Philip's early years. Moreover, in 359 Macedones had come only from Lower Macedonia and Eordae, whereas now they came from Upper Macedonia as well.⁴¹

Disregarding birthrates, with which one can only account for a small percentage increase in soldiers available, the major reason for the rapid expansion of the infantry is the policies of Philip regarding the north.

He extended Macedonian state citizenship to the commoners of Upper Macedonia. With this citizenship came obligations to serve in the army as phalangites: "the levies of Tymphaea, Lyncestis, Orestis, Elimeia, [were] incorporated in the brigades of the Macedonian phalanx."⁴² Recruitment in this period was regional, and continued to be even decades later:

Under Alexander in Asia it can be seen that the tactical unit that mattered in the phalanx was the *taxis*, a brigade of at least 1,500 men, and that these brigades were drawn from the different regions of Macedonia. Since this regional organization seems the only practical method by which the army of an extensive kingdom made up largely of regional principalities could be mobilized, it seems certain that it must have existed from the start, and that Philip made no change in it.⁴³

The new recruits drawn into the phalanx were considered Macedones. No distinction of any kind between their status, loyalty, fighting techniques, and those of the Lower Macedonian battalions, is present in the histories of Alexander.

Philip also began to use another Macedonian institution to assimilate the nobles of Upper Macedonia more directly into the state. This was the College of Pages, a body wherein the children of high-ranking Macedonians became close to the king by acting as his servants. A Page was almost guaranteed a future as a Companion, associating the holders of the position with significant respect and honor.⁴⁴ Traditionally, it had been a small college limited to the children of Lower Macedonian elites. Philip introduced it to

⁴¹ N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia, 336-167 B.C.*, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 87.

⁴² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 396.

⁴³ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 419.

⁴⁴ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 14.

Upper Macedonians and increased the number of Pages.⁴⁵ Most of Alexander's close friends (and Companions), such as Hephaestion, Nearchus, etc. were Pages. The existence of this group also allowed the king to keep hostages from the area, further weakening Upper Macedonian tribal elites.⁴⁶

So it was that, in order to create an army strong enough to destroy the myriad threats to Macedonia and incorporate Upper Macedonia more directly into the kingdom, Philip embraced existing Lower Macedonian politico-military traditions, and expanded the pool from which it was acceptable to draw applicants for state citizenship. Evidently, Philip understood that his kingdom was easier to consolidate through the creation of tighter military, rather than political, relationships. This attitude was an outgrowth of traditional Macedonian practices.

Interestingly, although Philip had tremendous freedom in his choice of whom citizenship could now include, he had to follow established policies of assigning Companions from outside Lower Macedonia to a town in which they theoretically resided, and which granted them local citizenship. Such a process is evident in the assignment of Nearchus, a Greek, to citizenship in Amphipolis (as shown above). Philip used this practice to further solidify his control of the new lands he conquered by giving loyal Companions large estates in them. This is concluded from an analysis of the composition of the cavalry in Alexander's invasion force of 334:

Of the eight squadrons of Companion cavalry with Alexander, we learn of the territorial associations of four (perhaps five), though one of the five names defies identification. The names are: Bottiaea (Lower Macedonia, coastal); Amphipolis (annexed by Philip, 357); Apollonia (Chalcidice, annexed 348); Anthemus (northern Chalcidice, Macedonian but in Chalcidian hands till re-annexed 348); 'Leugaian' (unidentified). Striking here is the prominence of the 'new' territories, which in this context points clearly to a policy of settlement by Philip, whereby he introduced Companions into these areas by granting them estates on newly conquered lands.⁴⁷

Rather than divide up royal lands among the Companions, Philip settled these men out in

⁴⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 650.

⁴⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 401.

⁴⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 411

new territories. His desire for a stronger cavalry arm allowed him to pursue consolidation of his kingdom in this way, and draw northerners into the ranks of the Companions.

This limited traditional local power by creating a landed gentry in Upper Macedonia and other regions who had no links to the tribal states, and who owed their status entirely to Philip. This political power was, again, the result of the king's control over the military and Macedonia's status as a kingdom defined by military obligation. Thus this power also translated into a freedom of action in expanding citizenship within the state and forging new political realities in the kingdom. Even though some tribal hierarchies did remain somewhat autonomous, their actual political clout was disintegrating. Land was power, and it was increasingly consolidated in the hands of those linked solely to the Macedonian king. At the same time Upper Macedonians were directly placed into the royal armies at a rapid pace, to serve as soldiers of the unified kingdom.

However, there were other consequences to Philip's actions. By recruiting so widely and consequently expanding citizenship, he also began to lessen the power of the positions conferred on Companions and Macedones. Two names began to be applied to the Companions, denoting different levels of closeness with the king, and essentially differentiating the *agema* from the Companions as a whole:

In the historians of Alexander [the Great] we find two names for those who were called upon to advise the king: 'friends' which stresses the fact that that the choice of them was made by the king for personal reasons, and 'commanders', which indicates a function, possessed in common by the king as commander-in-chief and by those to whom he deposes command.⁴⁸

The *agema*, though still officially constituting the king's bodyguard of Companions, kept its traditional powers of advising, and actually gained more power as the army grew in size, requiring more commanders to lead it. The rest of the Companions kept their political power in theory, but in practice their real abilities became synonymous with those of the Assembly (that is, roles of approval and some counsel) due to the sheer

⁴⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 159.

numbers being enrolled. They could still advise the king but their access to him became quite restricted.

The infantry phalanx, composed only of Macedones, also saw their powers of consultation wane. Numerous mutinies are attested during the reign of Alexander, most of which seem to have originated among the infantry. The mutinies consistently seem to reflect the Assembly's dissatisfaction with Alexander's increasing refusal to consult this body on matters regarding the course of the campaign.

Finally, one more idea needs to be considered. Hammond, in examining the king's position within Macedonia, discovered that there was one trend of considerable importance to this thesis. He states: "Whether the king owned all land within the kingdom is not clear. What is clear is that he owned all 'spear-won' land from the time of the expansion beyond the homeland of 'Macedonis', and that he sequestered very considerable areas of land for his own estate."⁴⁹ In this interpretation, Philip's need to act according to traditional Macedonian precedents in reorganizing the lands within the boundaries of the kingdom can be explained by the fact that such lands were not entirely 'his'. Indeed, Justin states that, as Alexander departed for Asia, "All his ancestral domains in Macedonia and Europe he distributed amongst his friends, declaring that Asia was enough for him."⁵⁰ This suggests that the lands Philip could and did manipulate directly within Macedonia's traditional borders were only the royal lands.

These were the occurrences within Macedonia's borders. The state was consolidated by expanding military obligations to more subjects, who then gained elevated statuses within the kingdom. The process flowed from traditional Macedonian practices, which is why it met with great success.

That Philip was also able to act more freely in the far Balkans and among the Greek lands annexed along the Aegean (discussed below) further suggests such a relationship existed, in which the king was limited in direct powers over the political

⁴⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 156.

⁵⁰ Just. *Epit.* 11.5.5.

entities and lands of Macedonia. Beyond Macedonia, Philip created new towns in conquered lands and shifted populations into them at will. Hammond describes how, “as the kingdom of Macedonia grew larger, the king secured his control of new territory by founding cities in which he placed a population of his own choosing.”⁵¹ The process had precedents, but was reformed by Philip.

The cities were settled with natives, but garrisoned by mercenaries. That the local citizenry was not utilized to protect their own cities can only be explained by the fact that Philip wanted an end to local citizen militias and was hesitant to expand citizenship to these peoples that would make them the equals of the Macedonians.

This setup limited the ability of the king to control the areas beyond the cities he founded. However, in order to keep a monopoly on military power in these dominions as well, without enrolling natives as Macedones or Companions, Philip instead decided to use mercenaries, who had obligations to him alone, to protect the new regions.

2. THE NORTHERN BARBARIANS⁵²

Philip’s actions in the north shall be first examined before his use of mercenaries is analyzed in more detail. In the non-Macedonian regions of the Balkans, Philip did not destroy the existing tribal administrations or autonomy. The peoples of the north were not part of the Macedonian kingdom. Some—Paeonians and Agrianes—had traditionally paid homage to Macedonian suzerainty. Others—Getae, Triballi, Illyrians, and Thracians—were completely independent. In the aftermath of Perdiccas’ crushing defeat many overran the frontiers and occupied parts of Upper Macedonia. In dealing with these threats, Philip made clear that total conquest of his enemies was not his goal. In 358

⁵¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 163.

⁵² For a map of the empire created by Philip, See Figure 1.2.

Philip “conducted an expedition into Paeonia and having defeated the barbarians in a battle, he compelled the tribe to acknowledge allegiance to the Macedonians.”⁵³ Philip did not trust the Paeonians to remain passive and hoped that humbling the tribe in battle would deter future raids. He did not seek to destroy their state, but rather to gain their cooperation.

Philip then turned to his next challenger, demanding that “the Illyrians should withdraw from all the Macedonian cities,” which they had captured after defeating Perdiccas.⁵⁴ When the Illyrians refused, the king attacked and defeated them. Despite beating the Illyrian army decisively, Philip’s terms remained limited to Illyrian abandonment of all Macedonian lands.⁵⁵ These early interactions served merely to reset relations with the northerners to the status which they had held before Perdiccas’ defeat. The political situation created, however, could not assure lasting peace for Macedonia.

In 356, “three kings combined against Philip—the kings of the Thracians, Paeonians, and Illyrians. For these people, inasmuch as they bordered upon Macedonia, eyed with suspicion the aggrandizement of Philip.”⁵⁶ The third member of this coalition was the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace, which held territories along the western coast of the Black Sea, the Hellespont region, and northeast coast of the Aegean. Interestingly, in the same passage Diodorus claims that Thrace had also recently suffered a defeat at the hands of Macedonia. It is a telling sign of the weaknesses inherent in the initial agreements forged by Philip that three states, all of which he had already defeated, were now able to combine against him. No apparatus had been put in place to ensure their loyalty, and Philip was once more forced to march his armies northward.

Diodorus states that Philip struck first, arriving in the Balkans before any of the enemies had time to raise a strong army, and “struck terror into them, and compelled

⁵³ Diod. 16.4.2.

⁵⁴ Diod. 16.4.4.

⁵⁵ Diod. 16.4.7.

⁵⁶ Diod. 16.22.3.

them to join the Macedonians.”⁵⁷ In combating the coalition, “Philip demonstrated the success of what was to become a characteristic method. He moved quickly against real potential military danger; dealt with individual opponents in quick succession but avoided getting involved in a long-term trial of strength.”⁵⁸

Once more, however, it seems that the terms imposed didn’t produce any concrete impositions on the Illyrians or the Thracians. Philip allowed these kingdoms to continue governing themselves without Macedonian interference or loss of territory. The Macedonians instead forced the two kingdoms into an “alliance” with Philip, by which they basically pledged not to attack Macedonia again.

It may be, however, that it was with this victory that Philip pulled the Paeonians back into Macedonia’s orbit. Unfortunately, exactly how and when he dealt with this tribe remains unclear. Some inferences must again be read back from the relationship that Alexander later held with each of the northern polities. What is clear is that the Paeonians and Agrianes were firmly under Macedonian hegemony by Philip’s death.

Yet in both cases Philip apparently did not annihilate the existing political structures, for Macedonia did not possess the mechanisms or structure to replace existing tribal governance. It was, in fact, “characteristic of their situation that the Paeonian king was allowed to keep his mines and coin in his own name.”⁵⁹ The Agrianian king, too, retained tremendous autonomy, and “Philip seems to have left Langarus, the king of the Agrianes, in a position almost of independence.”⁶⁰

However, the two peoples were not left independent. They were connected to Philip through military obligations, just as the king had bound the Upper Macedonians to his person. Alexander’s friendship with the Agrianian king was even closer than Philip’s, and he even offered Langarus the hand of his half-sister. Despite this closeness, when Alexander campaigned in the Balkans, “Langarus was accompanying Alexander, rather

⁵⁷ Diod. 16.22.3.

⁵⁸ Z.H. Archibald, *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 232.

⁵⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 672.

⁶⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 672.

as an associate than as a subject; for Langarus had his own Royal Guard, consisting of the most handsome and most well-armed of his subjects, whom Arrian called ‘his Hypaspists’ (1.5.2). When it came to armed actions, he accepted the orders of Alexander as the supreme commander (1.5.3).”⁶¹ Again, the relationship between these two kings was fixed in military obligations. The Agrianian king retained autonomy but had to serve with the Macedonian army when called on to do so.

The rebellions in the north, for which the Agrianian support recounted above was utilized, were sparked by Philip’s assassination in 336. The nature of these revolts, and the way in which Alexander’s Balkan campaign unfolded and ended, sheds the most light on the relationships forged by Philip up north. Diodorus recounts that:

Alexander shifted his field of operation into Thrace. Many of the tribes in the region had risen but, terrified by his appearance, felt constrained to make their submission. Then he swung west to Paeonia and Illyria and the territories that bordered on them. Many of the local tribesmen had revolted, but these he overpowered, and established his control over all the natives in the area. This task was not yet finished when messengers reached him reporting that many of the Greeks were in revolt.⁶²

This passage suggests several things. First, Philip’s control over the region was indirect. Alexander’s inability to finish establishing control over the area because he was called away seems to indicate that no Macedonian authority existed to finish the task in Alexander’s absence. Diodorus also seems to indicate that it was not the regional kings who revolted, but rather “local tribesmen”. This provides some evidence that the local royalties had already been linked to the Macedonian king, and therefore did not join in the revolt.

Arrian, however, makes clear the real situation. He states that Alexander first fought a number of tribes: the “free Thracians,” the Triballi, and the Getae. None of these had been pacified by Philip⁶³. He then specifically states that Alexander:

made for the territory of the Agrianes and Paeonians, where a message reached him that Cleitus, [king of the Illyrians], was in revolt, and had been joined by

⁶¹ Arr. *Anab.* in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 39-40.

⁶² Diod. 17.8.2.

⁶³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.4-6.

Glaucias, the prince of the Taulantians [an Illyrian tribe], and further, that the Autariates [another Illyrian tribe] intended to attack him on the march. [But] Langarus, King of the Agrianes, who made no secret of his respect for Alexander even in Philip's lifetime, had already been on an embassy to him in person, and on the present occasion attended him with his bodyguard.⁶⁴

Thus Diodorus is slightly confused. Arrian reveals that the tribes against whom Alexander fought were not the ones connected to Macedonia by Philip. Rather, it was the Illyrians who stirred up revolt in the territories of the Paeonians and Agrianes. The Paeonian and Agrianian monarchies remained loyal to Macedonia. The Odrysians, no longer in power (see below), similarly did not revolt.

This rebellion is of great importance in understanding the otherwise unclear role of Philip in the north. Alexander appears not to have altered any of the existing relationships established there by his father. Despite defeating the Getae, Triballi, free Thracians, and various Illyrian tribes, he did not pull any of these people into his kingdom. Philip, who had interacted with the Getae, had established a close connection to their king and they “were treated with respect and deference by Philip. He concluded an alliance and married the Getic princess Meda.”⁶⁵ Alexander's decision only to reestablish an alliance with this tribe following their defeat does point to the conclusion that in the north he sought to confirm, not alter, the relationships Philip had put in place.

Regarding the Triballi and free-Thracians, whom Philip had also failed to pull into Macedonia's empire, Alexander continued to keep them only loosely connected to him:

As he intended to use Triballian troops for his impending campaign in Asia, he made arrangements now with Syrmus [the king of the Triballi] for the selection and training of these men. Whereas Philip had exacted from the Thracians subjugated in 344 a tribute of one-tenth of their produce payable to the Macedones (Diodorus 16.71.2), it seems that Alexander did not impose any tribute on the Triballi or the [non-Odrysian] Thracians [...] He hoped rather to tie them to Macedonia by the bond of common interest in maintaining a common peace and a common defense.⁶⁶

Alexander, in his first political dealings with vanquished foes, used the precedents set by his father to incorporate the tribes into Macedonia's empire through military

⁶⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.1-2.

⁶⁵ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 237.

⁶⁶ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 38.

obligation only.

It seems that Alexander's goals after overcoming the Balkan tribes was to reassert the extant relationships over the tribes his father had defeated, and expand the same type of bond to the tribes newly defeated by Macedonia. It can be assumed, based on this, that Alexander didn't alter the relationships Philip put in place with the Odrysians, Agrianes and Paeonians. These peoples were already linked to Macedonia through military obligations, had remained loyal during the Balkan uprisings, and could and were called upon to provide soldiers to serve in Alexander's Asian campaign. They were securely under Macedonian control, and for this reason Alexander confirmed his position over them and chose to tie new tribes to his state following this model.

The question is, of course, why did these tribes not also turn on Macedonia and break any obligations altogether? For the Odrysians, the situation requires some explanation. Throughout his life, Philip's interest centered on his position within the Greek world. In Thrace lay both the Odrysian kingdom and independent Greek colonies. Both entities proved troublesome to Philip. The former encroached on traditional Macedonian lands, held Greek cities under its control and periodically threatened the free Greek cities of the north. The latter often brought outside Greek powers, such as Athens, into the region to check Thracian or Macedonian power. To fix Macedonia's security and dominance in the region, Philip chose to destroy the Odrysian monarchy. This proved a brilliant stroke, given Philip's aims. "Diodorus reports that after the fall of the Odrysian kings, many of the west Pontic cities [i.e. the Greek cities along the Black Sea] expressed their support for Philip (16. 71)."⁶⁷

Philip's goal had long been to unify Greece under his leadership in support of an invasion of Asia. By destroying the Thracians, he 'liberated' the Greeks of the north, who then fell under his influence, as will be discussed in the Greek Section below. To this end, "Philip had posed as an enlightened arbiter with respect to the cities concerned, though

⁶⁷ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 338.

significantly, these were all on the Black Sea. [...] By championing the colonies Philip had no need to excuse his presence or justify his actions,” and so he could dispatch the Odrysians without fearing involvement from the Greeks of the north or south.⁶⁸ Although Philip did attack and destroy some Greek cities in the north for various reasons, these actions need not detract from the common pattern Philip employed in settling affairs in Thrace.

How Philip planned to administer the Odrysian realm is not completely clear. What is known is that he gave extensive land grants to Greek and Macedonian Companions in the region.⁶⁹ This solidified his control because the Companions were (militarily) connected directly to him. A Macedonian governor was appointed to control the region, probably under Philip and certainly under Alexander. This officer remained in place even when Alexander elevated Antipater to regent of Europe upon his embarkation to Asia. However, the powers given to this man were, once again, limited. Hamilton says that giving Alexander of Lyncestes, who served in this post, the title of “‘general of Thrace’ (QC 1.25.2), shows that he commanded a standing army which was probably based on cities founded by Philip and Alexander in the interior, and one of his functions was to train and equip Thracian forces of infantry and cavalry for Alexander.”⁷⁰ Even in the Odrysian kingdom, where Macedonia removed the royalty and chose to more-or-less annex the province, authority on the local level remained vested in the natives. Macedonia’s primary relationship was once again driven by, and cemented through, military obligation.

Although many troops were levied from the region, the annexation of Thrace did not reduce its inhabitants to second-class citizens. Although a tithe was placed on the region, local rulers continued to administer their own towns and people.⁷¹ “It is fair to say that Philip would not have found it easy to recruit enough reliable men on the scale

⁶⁸ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 334-5.

⁶⁹ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 232-3.

⁷⁰ QC in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 54.

⁷¹ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 306.

required and a level of forced recruitment probably followed.”⁷² That being the case, propping up various existing low-level nobles and officials would have ensured that Thrace was well run. During his conquest of the kingdom, Philip allowed local leaders to keep power. By negotiating with each community individually as he marched through them on his way towards the centers of Odrysian resistance, “he made sure that his armies would have maximum tactical capability by drafting in all kinds of auxiliary forces.”⁷³ Even on the local level Philip established a relationship limiting his influence in local affairs but granting him access to soldiers from these same localities and hence linking the area to him with military service. Alexander would follow a very similar model in western Asia.

Once the Odrysian kingdom was annexed, the elites were not wiped out. They were brought into the Macedonian military, with some even commanding their own units, but most seemingly under Macedonian generalship. Importantly, the Thracians don’t seem to have become Companions. Looking at Alexander’s army, which likely kept the same structure as Philip’s:

the Odrysian cavalry [was] led by a Macedonian Agathon, [the Thracian] infantry [was] under Sitalces who is presumed to be a prince of the Odrysian royal family, and [there was] a second [Thracian] infantry unit whose commander we never learn, unless he is ‘Ptolemaeus the general of the Thracians’ who appears a few months later. More probably, however, the Macedonian Ptolemaeus was commander of all the Thracians of the army, responsible for their discipline and administration.⁷⁴

Again, the Thracian cavalry was not an element of the Companions. It was a separate unit, with none of the powers that the Companions enjoyed. Remarkable, too, is the continued segregation of Thracians into units separate from the Macedonians. This relationship between the Macedonian king and the former Odrysian regions of Thrace, established by Philip, created a situation whereby stability and loyalty to Alexander remained in 336, even as other tribes of the north sought to weaken Macedonia.

⁷² Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 336.

⁷³ Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 335.

⁷⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 433.

The Paeonians, too, seem to have been firmly connected to Philip and Alexander through military ties. As shown above, Philip left their rulers in place, but apparently asked them to provide soldiers to serve in his army. Certainly by 334, when Alexander crossed into Asia, many of this tribe's elites had already been pulled into cavalry units serving in the Macedonian army, but led by a Paeonian prince. As with the Thracians, none of these horsemen became Companions under Philip. They remained organized in a separate ethnic unit. "The only other unit that we see commanded by its own prince is the squadron of Paeonian light horse, under Ariston; the smallest unit of them all, this, and one which tactically was integrated closely with the Macedonian squadrons of light cavalry (*prodromoi*)."⁷⁵ Although the Paeonians evidently were close enough in composition and equipment that they often functioned alongside the *prodromoi* (the Scouts/Lancers), Arrian mentions them separately from these Macedonian cavalrymen throughout Alexander's early campaigning, indicating that originally they were not integrated into Macedonian units.

The Agrianians were also asked to provide soldiers in return for retaining control of local affairs. Alexander had with his forces "a special group of Agrianian soldiers which was to win as many battle honors as any unit of the Macedonian army."⁷⁶ Again, important to understanding the relationships forged with the northerners is the fact that, despite winning so many honors, the Agrianes remained a distinct ethnic unit, never integrated with Macedonians, though they fought under the command of a Macedonian officer.⁷⁷ This situation, in which the Paeonians and Agrianes continued to rule their own lands—and this for the Paeonians despite two defeats at Macedonian hands—in return for sending soldiers to serve in Macedonian armies, probably persuaded these tribes to retain their friendship with Alexander and not rebel when his father was assassinated.

Despite the autonomy granted to most of the Thracians, the Paeonians, and the

⁷⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 433.

⁷⁶ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 50.

⁷⁷ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 433-4.

Agrianes, the tradeoff was that none of their elites (who doubtless formed the cavalry), or even the members of their royal houses who served with the Macedonian army, attained the status of Companion. The members of the royal lines were given some positions of leadership among their own contingents, but even these men were ultimately subordinated to Macedonian generals. This points to a very interesting conclusion: Philip and Alexander used the Companions to incorporate men from Upper and Lower Macedonia, and also Greece, into the kingdom, but not northern barbarians. Apparently neither desired, nor needed, to give these peoples political rights within the Macedonian kingdom. Instead, both preferred to allow the tribes of the Balkans to retain autonomy within the empire, in exchange for having no power in its central administration.

To be sure, the relationship established by Philip only slightly resembled the taking of hostages. This may be surmised from how the Macedonians dealt with a Thracian rebellion in 331. “Diodorus alone discusses this revolt, in connection with upheavals in Greece [...] The historian states clearly that the revolt was aimed at Alexander, not at Antipater ([Diod.] 16.62.4).”⁷⁸ Ultimately Antipater and Memnon came to terms, but despite the rebellion Alexander did not execute or punish the Thracians in his army; rather he continued to draw heavily on them throughout the rest of his campaigning. The service of men from these tribes in the military was more than just a way of assuring the good behavior of their homelands; they were seen as having a place in the empire, though it was a far more limited place than that of the Macedonians.

The situation described above shows that neither Philip nor Alexander cared to attempt a direct conquest of the north. Both seem to have intervened in the region when the bonds established by earlier Macedonian kings were severed. Ultimately, Philip found it necessary and practical to employ a relationship between himself and the barbarians defined by military obligations. Necessity may have originally prompted these actions—Philip’s early involvement in Greece saw several Macedonian armies crushed, as will be

⁷⁸ Diod. in Archibald, *Odrysian Thrace*, 306.

discussed below. Whatever his reasons, the models for incorporating new peoples under Macedonian control lasted, and were therefore embraced by Alexander.

The strength of this setup is evident from the fact that, when Alexander mustered his full army at Amphipolis in 334, the initial 7,500 northern troops accompanying him “were more numerous, slightly, than the Greek infantrymen who were sent to Amphipolis by the Greek League [of Corinth], and they were more often to be entrusted with front-line positions in battle.”⁷⁹ These men, unlike the Greeks, were never sent home, but most were also never integrated into Macedonian units, an important insight into how Alexander viewed these men. They were his to command, but politically he did not see them as subjects deserving of a status in the empire equal to that of the Macedonians.

3. GREEK MERCENARIES

With Macedonia’s enemies brought low before him, a unified and enlarged

⁷⁹ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 53.

kingdom rapidly building beneath him, and an expanded, revamped and battle-tested army marching behind him, Philip had become the most powerful man in the Mediterranean world. The Greek city-states to the south were soon to enter Macedonia's orbit, but in drawing them in, Philip would need to forge new relationships confined by strict Greek traditions opposing kings.

By the time Philip became seriously involved in Greek affairs, a precedent for dealing with Greeks was already established, somewhat, in Macedonia's interactions with Greek mercenaries. This precedent, however, was a recent occurrence. It appears that mercenaries were a limited feature in Macedonian militaries before Philip. They were expensive to maintain, and the Macedonian state was not rich. Yet the annexation of Crenidas by Philip proved to be a decisive event:

Philip came to the city of Crenidas and greatly adding to the number of its inhabitants he changed its name to Philippi, calling it after himself. The gold mines in its vicinity had low productivity and were of little significance. He so improved them so that they yielded a revenue of more than one thousand talents. From this source he quickly piled up wealth and because of his riches he brought the Macedonian kingdom to the highest eminence. He struck gold coins called Philippei and assembled a considerable force of mercenaries, many of them Greeks who were led by money to become traitors to their homelands.⁸⁰

The Greeks certainly believed that it was a novel development for mercenaries to serve under the banner of Macedonia. Demosthenes states, in his attack on Philip, that, "he goes where he wants to, not at the head of a hoplite phalanx but because he is furnished with a force of light-armed troops, cavalry, archers and mercenaries."⁸¹ The importance of the archers and light-armed troops under Alexander will be discussed in the section on the Decads. As Demosthenes states, mercenaries were used on a large scale by Philip, but in a more limited capacity than he likely understood. They did, however, allow him more flexibility in military expertise, as many mercenaries specialized in a specific weapon, such as the javelin. Yet his relationship with the mercenaries was limited and passed largely unchanged to Alexander, and for this reason deserves scrutiny.

⁸⁰ Diod. 16.8.7.

⁸¹ Dem. *Phil.* 9.49.

The mercenary in Greek society was, from the outset, an outsider. He was not a citizen, and in a region where belonging—legally—to a polity mattered greatly, this set mercenaries outside the realm of subjects in their dealings with states. The Greek word for mercenary, *xenos*, also meant foreigner. These were not men welcomed among most Greek polities. “The Athenian political orators produced speeches in the democratic context of late fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Demosthenes (6.46, 12.27) and Isocrates (5.96, 121, 6.168) both expressed their concerns about mercenary service and [...] feared the itinerant wanderer as a threat to *status quo* of the community (Isoc. 8.44).”⁸² These men gave voice to concerns prevalent in the Greek world regarding mercenaries. These men could disrupt or destroy societies at the whim of an employer, and would do so for pay, not out of allegiance to a man or a cause. Despite the dislike for mercenaries among settled Greeks, soldiers-for-hire established their place as key components to most Greek armies during the fourth century.

With the excess money at his disposal from the annexations of various mining regions north of the Aegean, among them Crenidas, Philip enrolled large numbers of mercenaries. He did not, however, elevate these professionals alongside his own troops:

They were used for three types of duty. Firstly, they manned expeditions designed for limited and definite objectives such as the Euboean expedition of 342/341 or in the formation of a bridgehead in northwestern Asia Minor against the Persians in 336; they usually served in detachments of two or three thousand, although on one occasion a force of ten thousand is mentioned. Secondly, mercenaries were used as permanent garrisons at important points, as at Thermopylae. Thirdly, they were hired for special skills such as the Cretan archers who were hired for their expertise in archery.⁸³

These three roles are essential to understanding the place that mercenaries took in the Macedonian empire. They remained ‘others,’ used for specialization to supplement the citizen armies. Their political rights were nonexistent. Therefore, their roles socially and politically were contractually limited. Besides fighting for pay, they had no relation to the Macedonian state under which they served.

⁸² Dem. *Phil.* and Isoc. *Orat.* in Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 31.

⁸³ Michael Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 178.

Philip's decision to use mercenaries for the three functions listed above allowed him to achieve his aims, however. His first objective was the rapid mobilization of a professional force. He reformed his entire kingdom to achieve this purpose. However, there were only so many Macedonians available to fill the ranks of his new army. When Alexander invaded Asia in 334, the total number of Macedonian troops present in either his expeditionary force or in the standing army left under Antipater in Europe numbered just 27,300 men.⁸⁴ However, the fourth-century Greek mainland was teeming with professional soldiers willing to serve the highest bidder.⁸⁵ Once Philip secured a means of paying these troops, he quickly added them to his military, allowing him to defeat his enemies and expand his hegemonic control into Greece and the Balkans more rapidly and extensively than might otherwise have been possible.

In some places, Macedonian authority required a permanent military presence. Philip understood and embraced the potential for mercenaries to serve this purpose. Macedonians could not easily be resettled (without their consent), but mercenaries could. Without giving them land grants, Philip could place mercenaries in cities of his choosing, while ensuring that, regardless of their identity as inhabitants, they had no political rights, and hence were not really citizens. Perhaps it was also the case that Greek garrison forces angered occupied Greek cities less than would Macedonian forces.

This usage kept them separate from the Macedonians in the army, as illustrated in the context of the fall of the Greek city of Pharcedon. Looking to the text of Polyaeus, Griffith notes, "When Pharcedon surrendered, [Philip] sent in 'the mercenaries' not the Macedonians present, presumably to occupy it as a garrison."⁸⁶ The garrisoning duties of mercenaries, as discussed above, shows the limited relationship between themselves and the king; they were disposable professionals who could keep order on the frontiers in exchange for high rates of pay, but who weren't eligible for rights within the kingdom.

⁸⁴ Diod. 17.17.3-5.

⁸⁵ Sage, *Warfare in Greece*, 149.

⁸⁶ Polyaeus, *Strat.* 4.2.18 in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 439 n.2.

These garrisons allowed the king to retain extensive control over the cities he founded. His relationship with the mercenaries, contractually built upon serving the king (and only the king) in a strictly military capacity, ensured this. Given the difficulties Macedonian kings had in controlling their nobles, this exclusive loyalty of mercenaries could be useful.

The final impetus for the enrollment of mercenaries is perhaps the most significant. Though heavy infantry phalanxes still dominated Greek warfare, they no longer did so exclusively. Lighter units, such as archers, peltasts (javelin-throwers), slingers, etc. had increasingly risen to prominence in mainland Greece. The Peloponnesian War had witnessed several successes of these troops against even the feared Spartan hoplites, and since the war's conclusion in 404, the enrollment of light troops gradually expanded, accounting for larger and larger proportions of armies.⁸⁷

The leaders of the time recognized the potential for mercenaries to reshape conflicts. The majority of mercenaries continued to wield heavy hoplite arms and armor, but a considerable number also took up specialty weapons such as bows, slings and javelins. The need for these lighter troops is inescapable:

Demosthenes once, in a well-known passage, generalized about the changed character of the warfare of his day (he was speaking in 341). Decisions were no longer reached by pitched battles so much as by political warfare, and for Philip it was not so much his phalanx of hoplites that enabled him to go where he pleased, but more because of his light-armed troops, his cavalry, his archers, and his mercenaries—that sort of army that he had got together [...] It has its value as a piece of impressionism, by a contemporary for contemporaries [...] these remarks do entitle us to conclude that well-informed Greeks at this time did see Philip's army as a well-balanced combination of arms, in which not only the cavalry but also the less spectacular auxiliaries were of importance.⁸⁸

Macedonians could provide phalangites and cavalry, but with few traditions in place to train lighter troops, such men had to be found from outside the kingdom. In order to remedy the situation, Philip relied on both northerners, such as Thracians, and mercenaries, such as Cretan archers.

⁸⁷ Sage, *Warfare in Greece*, 141.

⁸⁸ Dem. *Phil.* 9.49 in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 428.

In fact, the sources on Philip greatly limit any greater understanding of mercenaries' place in the empire. "The other references to mercenaries, however (ten altogether), all are concerned either with garrisons or occupation forces (four), or else with forces sent abroad with limited objectives."⁸⁹ How Philip used the mercenaries in battle is unclear. So too are their numbers and makeup, which can only be guessed at from the composition of the army under Alexander.

Another point worth examination: though nothing concrete is known about how Philip used his mercenaries in battle, they seem to have maintained their identity as separate units. This, too, is gleaned from how they appeared in the army of Alexander. Nevertheless, it isn't much of a reach to believe that, had any radical reorganization occurred under Alexander, in which the place for mercenaries in the army changed, the historians would almost certainly have mentioned it.

Moreover, upon his accession Alexander did not have time to devote to such an enterprise, first having to battle threats in the north and south, and then immediately crossing into Asia. Therefore it is almost certain that the structure for the mercenaries under Philip was the same as that under Alexander. In this paradigm, the mercenaries were not drafted into Macedonian units, nor were they attached to them. Rather, because their arms and armor were different, they were formed into separate units. Importantly, these units were placed under Macedonian leadership. "In Alexander's army later the command of mercenaries above brigade level lay always with Macedonian generals. One Greek officer is known, probably brigadier (*hegemon*), Lycidas an Aetolian."⁹⁰ This last is, of course, simply an exception to the general rule.

The mercenaries served as important soldiers in the armies of Macedonia. They did not, however, hold any positions of command when in battle. It was their Macedonian officers, then, and not the mercenaries, who took part in strategic planning. Mercenaries did not fight with Macedonian arms and weren't placed among Macedonian units. They

⁸⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 439, analyzing Diod., Book 16.

⁹⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 441.

had no political rights when sent to garrison cities. The lack of all of these privileges, held by Macedonians, suggests that overall the Macedonians understood mercenaries to hold a very low position within the empire. They were seen as garrison forces, supplemental light troops, and Greeks—but not as members (or potential members) of a Macedonian state. They were men whose sole stake in an enterprise was pay and loot.

The motivations driving mercenaries was complex, but helps explain their place in the empire. They were not driven by ideology, but rather by commercial interest, fighting for the highest bidder. While mercenaries provided a dependable backbone on the battlefield, they were never enamored with their leaders, and could only be expected to perform certain functions. For this reason they never gained prominent roles in Alexander's army, despite their heavy presence, while other, favored groups, such as the Agrianes, did.

The single motivator of pay allowed thousands of Greek soldiers to seek employ under the kings of Persia—kings who took over numerous Greek cities in Asia Minor; it was this ideology that allowed them to fight for Philip against the Greek cities of the northern Aegean; and it was this same ideology that caused the mercenaries to eventually be thrown out of the system by Alexander after his return from the east (discussed in the Conclusions section).

Even in the limited accounts of mercenaries in Macedonian employ before Alexander, there is evidence of a rough relationship between the Macedonians and their hired compatriots. In Quintus Curtius' history of Alexander, there is a reference to a possible mercenary mutiny against Philip during the key battle of Chaeronea in 338. He writes that:

A great quarrel had arisen between the Macedonian forces and the Greek mercenaries, [Alexander] explained, and Philip had been put out of action by a wound he had received in the melee. He lay on the ground, finding that to play dead was his safest course of action, and Alexander had protected him with his shield and killed with his own hand the men attacking his father.⁹¹

⁹¹ QC 8.1.24

What prompted this sudden fracas (and whether it is true at all) is unclear. It probably did not stem from any feelings of patriotism among the mercenaries towards their fellow Greeks, against whom the Macedonians fought the main actions of the battle. Greek mercenaries under Persian contract had fought against other Greeks for decades. Nor is it likely due to matters of pay, for there appears to be no hesitation at any point in the continued and voluntary enlistment of other mercenaries under Philip or Alexander. Perhaps Alexander's "boast," as Quintus Curtius identifies it, is just that. Certainly Diodorus, who recounts the battle (though not in great detail) makes no reference to the incident.⁹²

This event does not prove that mercenaries weren't trusted—they evidently were, and continued to comprise a significant portion of Macedonian armies under Philip and Alexander. Indeed, the kingdom was only able to expand rapidly and secure its borders effectively thanks, in large part, to the services of these men. Instead, the passage points to the conclusion that there existed no method for incorporating mercenaries into the state or into the military alongside Macedonians. Even decades after their heavy enrollment under Philip, mercenaries still did not have a well-defined place in Macedonia and continued to see Philip as an employer, not their king. The most Philip could do to incorporate mercenaries into his empire was to settle them in new cities as garrisons. This compromise still allowed Philip to put a strong Greek imprint on the cities he founded. It did not, however, allow him to rework his relationship with mercenaries in any way.

Alexander would expand this relationship with the mercenaries somewhat by embracing the Cretan archers serving under him in Asia. In general, though, an analysis of his interactions with the mercenaries shows that he faced the same problems as Philip. Though he trusted the mercenaries to fight for him, he never figured out how to integrate them into his state. The inability of Philip and Alexander to politically restructure the place for mercenaries in Macedonia would ultimately come to a head towards the end of

⁹² Diod.16.86.1-4.

Alexander's life, during which time he attempted to more directly consolidate his conquered lands. In so doing, he would finally demand the dismissal of all mercenaries employed by his officials. These events will be covered in the Conclusions section, but they are final proof of Alexander's recognition that no change could ever be effected to bring the mercenaries into the state. By 323, they were still nothing more, nor less, than hired soldiers.

4. THE GREEK CITIES

Philip's entrance into Greek affairs came not from the fruition of strategic planning, but rather at opportunity's fortuitous knock. Greece in the fourth century was a region of extreme turmoil. Starting in the mid-fifth century, Athens became the dominant power across the Aegean world. In so doing, she "ushered into Greek political relations the quest for *hegemonia*, hegemony, that so characterizes Greek interstate relations for the next [full] century. During this period Sparta, Athens, and Thebes sometimes challenged each other while at other times allying with one against the other in a bid to

control and dominate Greece.”⁹³ Toward the end of this period of squabbling and incessant warfare, Macedonia’s power was seen as a potential stabilizing factor. Philip possessed the army and wealth necessary to tip the political balance in one direction or another. Recognizing this situation, the Greeks themselves were responsible for requesting Philip’s entrance into Greek affairs.

In 356 the Greek state of Phocis seized the sacred compound at Delphi, using the treasures stored therein to field a powerful army and consolidate hegemony in central Greece. Most of the members of the Amphictyonic League—charged with safeguarding the Delphic Oracle—then fielded armies against Phocis and her allies, launching the Third Sacred War. A number of Thessalian states, repulsed by Phocian attacks northward, asked for Macedonian assistance.

The once-grand Thessalian League had fallen to pieces during the fourth century. Tyrants now held power in certain cities, many allied with the Phocians who faced little unified resistance as they pushed further north. Philip lost no time in obliging the Thessalians seeking help, and marched his reformed army into the region. He expelled the Thessalian tyrants and finally checked the Phocian advance at the crucial Battle of Crocus Field in 352.

Philip was now able to build his position in Greece from a model firmly rooted in Greek history. In saving Thessaly from tyrants and the Phocian advance, he learned that “one of the Greek reactions to extreme political pressures was the extravagant gratitude and admiration paid to the charismatic liberator-figure or to the benefactor whose support in a revolutionary crisis had been decisive. [...] Philip had entered a local scene in some sense a liberator,” and the populace rejoiced at his defense and restoration of their cities and safety.⁹⁴ Liberator figures had dominated Greek politics since the end of the Peloponnesian War, when the Spartan admiral Lysander had first attained such a position.

⁹³ Lawrence A. Tritle, ed., *The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the fall of the Athenian Empire to the successors of Alexander* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 1.

⁹⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 692.

They were respected actors in an era defined, politically and militarily, by the rise and fall of Athenian, Spartan, Theban, and Phocian hegemonies.

Importantly, liberators in Greece held a regulated position of power. Just as Lysander had not become ruler of the cities he freed from the Athenian yoke, so Philip was careful to restore Thessalian governments and not attempt to bring the cities formally into his kingdom. However, this did not mean Macedonia was expected to withdraw northward and remove itself from involvement in Thessalian affairs. Rather, building off other Greek traditions, it was understood that, throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, “Athens and Sparta had ‘liberated’ Greek cities from Persian rule, not in order that they should become free members of the Hellenic League or the Peloponnesian League, but in order that they should enter the power system of the ‘liberator’.”⁹⁵ This ‘power system’ in essence meant that the liberated cities became allied to the liberator and fell under her hegemony, providing military support when called upon to do so, and following the liberator’s lead in foreign policy. They also allowed no one but the liberator to have any influence in domestic affairs. This was the power to which Philip was now entitled and expected to take.

In keeping with this tradition, Philip was elected *archon* of the revitalized Thessalian League. This title gave him complete control of the League’s armed forces and, for all intents and purposes, complete control over Thessaly’s foreign affairs. Though such a relationship between liberating states and liberated regions had precedents in Greek history, Philip’s elevation to ruler of the Thessalian League cannot be underestimated in importance. Most southern Greeks classified Macedonia as not quite Greek; rather it was seen as a semi-barbaric kingdom. Further, he was a monarch:

The election of a foreign king by a League of Greek cities as their head of state is something so extraordinary that it requires some ‘special occasion’ to explain it. [...] The year 352 contains the special occasion, the great victory [at Crocus Field], bringing the reunification of Thessaly. It was the glory and the euphoria from all this, it is suggested, that helped to carry the architect and hero of the

⁹⁵ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 75.

victory through the ethnic barrier and into the office of *archon*, for life.⁹⁶ Herein lies the foundation of the relationship Philip was to hold with all Greeks, a relationship inherited unchanged by Alexander. His position as ‘liberator’ for defeating the Phocians created the opportunity to hold a relationship with ‘liberated’ Greek cities centered on military obligations.

As *archon* of the Thessalian League, Philip’s capacity to affect domestic arrangements in Thessaly—the judicial and legislative practices of the individual cities, the training of soldiers for defense, the religious traditions of the cities, etc.—was limited. He did reinstitute old Thessalian constitutions, empowering traditional aristocracies and dividing the region into four parts to prevent tyrants from regaining power.⁹⁷ However, although these governments were closely tied to Philip, they were not directly under his control. The Thessalian League was an apparatus of foreign policy, and nothing more; its leader, therefore, had control of foreign policy, and nothing more. A direct annexation of Thessaly into the Macedonian kingdom was out of the question. Command of Thessaly’s army, in particular its superb cavalry, was Philip’s primary prerogative as *archon*.

Diodorus, curiously, does not reference the Thessalian League by name at any point, nor does he directly discuss the circumstances surrounding Philip’s election as *archon*. In speaking about Philip’s position within Thessaly he uses vague language to suggest relationships built on alliances and friendship, as he does in other instances when Philip obtained power over Greek regions.

Nonetheless Diodorus does choose words that ensure the reader does not confuse Philip’s position in Thessaly with that of a conqueror. He states that, when the Thessalian League is “won over” by Philip, other Greek cities nearby “straight away associated themselves with the decision of the Thessalians and became his enthusiastic allies” as well.⁹⁸ Yet the English word ‘ally’ is a term that does not properly convey the relationship

⁹⁶ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 221.

⁹⁷ Tritle, *Greek World* 99.

⁹⁸ Diod. 16.98.8.

between Philip and the Thessalians. Philip called the states under his power ‘*symmachoi*’, or ‘those who fight together’, just like the Athenians had in the fifth century. This was, once again, a military bond.

The preeminent role that Philip enjoyed in Thessalian affairs is hinted at by other passages in Diodorus, such as a passage which states, “not only Philip himself but his son Alexander after him had the Thessalians always as confederates.”⁹⁹ Hence the liberator’s prerogatives were not only bestowed for life, but also passed on to the liberator’s heir. As with the northern barbarians, the Thessalians were essentially ‘compelled’ to join with the Macedonians in a relationship defined by military obligation.

However, whereas Philip consolidated power in the Balkans by defeating those tribes he wished to control, in Thessaly the Greek cities invested him with power. His authority in this region was sweeping militarily, and limited with respect to internal political processes, just as it was with the Paeonians and other barbarians of the north. The similarities are clear: the Thessalian League placed its troops under Philip’s command, but they remained in separate units within the army. These soldiers were trusted and relied upon. The superb cavalry from Thessaly supplemented the Companions, and in many respects were their equals in capability. In the crucial battle at Crocus Field, it was apparently these men, fighting under Philip’s command, who won the battle: “A severe battle took place and since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour, Philip won.”¹⁰⁰ This cavalry contingent was “normally the second most important heavy cavalry unit in the Macedonian army.”¹⁰¹ The Thessalian cavalry formed a key component of Philip’s armies, a circumstance that strengthened the bonds between the king and the Thessalian League. Yet the cavalrymen serving in the army through the Thessalian League’s obligations to Philip did not become his Companions; those Companions who were Greek were enrolled at the king’s discretion from people

⁹⁹ Diod. 16.14.2.

¹⁰⁰ Diod. 16.35.5.

¹⁰¹ Sage, *Warfare in Greece*, 175.

outside of this relationship.

Philip's position in the region continued to strengthen over time. Among the Greek cities of the Balkans, links similar to those established between himself and the Thessalians formed. In one instance, Philip defeated Thracian forces threatening Greek cities, and "the Greek cities were freed from this fear and gladly joined Philip's alliance."¹⁰² Again, the relationship between Macedonia and these cities arose from Philip's ability to present himself as a liberator. The situation this created for Philip was one in which the liberated cities joined "Philip's alliance," a circumstance which actually means that they accepted Philip as their commander-in-chief and granted him control of their foreign policy, entering into his power system.

In central and southern Greece, such a relationship took longer to develop, but did eventually form. The Third Sacred War dragged on until 346, at which time the Phocians, unable to withstand Macedonia any longer, sued for peace. As the victorious savior of the Amphictyonic Council, Philip gained another foothold in Greek affairs. The "members of the Council passed a decree admitting Philip and his descendants to the Amphictyonic Council and according him two votes which formerly had been held by the Phocians," and then decreed that he, in partnership with the Boeotians and Thessalians, should take charge of the Pythian games, formerly entrusted to the Corinthians who had joined the wrong side in the Sacred War.¹⁰³ Here again, Philip, as a reward for rescuing Greek cities from an enemy power, was elected to a position for life, and the position was made hereditary.

It was understood that Philip was the guardian of the Amphictyonic League; he was the liberator and the Amphictyons were under his hegemony. In 339 a dispute between Thebes and Thessaly built to such a point that the "pro-Thessalian Amphictyons felt they had just cause to summon Philip to enforce their decrees, and Philip felt the time was ripe for intervention in the south," sparking a conflict which ended with the decisive

¹⁰² Diod. 16.71.2.

¹⁰³ Diod. 16.60.1; 3.

battle of Chaeronea in 338.¹⁰⁴ Here, clearly, Philip is shown to be de facto commander-in-chief of the League's troops. Importantly, although he is also shown to be limited in his ability to act without the Council's blessing, that blessing was easy to obtain because of the overwhelming presence of Philip's allies on the Council. Nonetheless, his position was still limited to running the military affairs of the Council.

Macedonia's decisive victory over both Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea elevated Philip's position among the Greeks to a new level. Diodorus states, in typical fashion, that after the battle Philip "won most of the Greeks over to friendship with him."¹⁰⁵ This passage, like others in Diodorus, contains deceptively simplistic language regarding the relationship that developed between the two groups. Philip could not as easily claim to have liberated southern Greece as he had the north, even with powerful friends and bribed allies in many cities. That the Greeks of this region joined with Macedonia in any union indicates that those opposed to Philip understood immediate resistance to Macedonia to be unwise. However, Philip's place as a constant presence in Greek affairs was far from guaranteed.

Certainly Philip knew that full-scale subjugation of Greece was impossible. Nothing united the south like the threat of foreign conquest. Additionally, the Third Sacred War, though ultimately won by Macedonia, had shown the kingdom's limitations. In the lead up to Crocus Field, Phocis had twice crushed Macedonian armies under Philip's personal command.¹⁰⁶ Should all Greece rise against Macedonia, the only question would be how quickly Macedonia would fall. However, the conquest of Greece was not the only way Philip could ensure hegemony. For hegemony is what he actually wanted. His dreams of conquest lay not to the south but rather to the east, with Persia.

Deciding to cement his current relationship as liberator of the Greeks for good, Philip convened a meeting at Corinth. There, the king asked to be vested with the

¹⁰⁴ Tritle, *Greek World*, 99.

¹⁰⁵ Diod. 16.84.1.

¹⁰⁶ Diod. 16.35.2.

authority to launch a Hellenic war of revenge against the Achaemenid Persian Empire. Giving voice to a plan more ambitious than any previously undertaken by the Greeks, he “spoke about the war against Persia and by raising great expectations won the representatives over to war. The Greeks elected him the general plenipotentiary of Greece, and he began accumulating supplies for his campaign. He prescribed the number of soldiers that each city should send for the joint effort.”¹⁰⁷ Diodorus slightly oversimplifies the situation. Philip first asked that a League be created for the dual purposes of creating peace in Greece and for launching a grand Hellenic campaign against Persia. Once formed, he asked to be elected leader, or *hegemon* of the League, with powers of command over a new army to be raised from the League members. He did not seek control over all of Greece’s armies. However, this meeting and its resultant formation of the new League of Corinth were milestones in the relationship between the king and the Greeks.

First and foremost, a new Common Peace was created among the members of the League. Such a Peace had precedents in Greece. Following the Peloponnesian War, Sparta’s attempt to exert hegemony over Greece caused a period of warfare that finally ended with terms imposed in a Common Peace called the King’s Peace (after its sponsor, Persia’s King Artaxerxes II). Its signatories pledged to uphold the principle of autonomy for Greek city-states, while also accepting Sparta’s hegemony over southern Greece. The same principles were reestablished in this new Peace, with the roles previously taken by Sparta and Persia now combined and concentrated in Macedonia:

In the first place the oath of the Greeks included a clause naming Philip as the opposite party with whom this contract was being made, and also an undertaking not to subvert the kingdom of Philip and his descendants. This Peace was designed to last, evidently, sponsored by kings of Macedonia for the foreseeable future. Secondly, it was supported by institutions. The new *sunedrion* [council of League states] is named in the oath as something that will always be there, able at any time to make decisions if the Peace should be endangered. Likewise ‘the Hegemon’ will always be there.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Diod. 16.80.3.

¹⁰⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 625-6.

The League now had a governing body with which to ensure that its members adhered to the terms of the Common Peace, which included abstaining from attacking the Macedonian empire of Philip and, again, his heirs.

Additionally, in the Common Peace itself were measures “designed to prevent revolutionary outbreaks in the cities, or the harboring of exiles who might return to their own places and overthrow governments there by force.”¹⁰⁹ This treaty did not allow Philip direct control over the Greeks, but it did ensure peace and stability for the region. This system ensured that Greece no longer posed a threat to the Macedonian kingdom, either by directly threatening its new boundaries, or indirectly by engaging in new wars that would spread north.

Philip’s role as League *hegemon* was, therefore, just as limited as his position as *archon* of the Thessalian League. He could exert influence to ensure that governments did not have the capabilities to legally challenge his preeminent position, but otherwise he relied on the Greeks to police Greece and keep League members loyal. Philip’s interactions with the Greek members of the League were to continue adhering to the paradigm of liberator and liberated. His election to the position of *hegemon* confirmed his relationship with the Greeks as one governed by foreign policy and military obligation, not the annexation or control over the internal politics of individual Greek cities.

However, the League’s creation dictated the form that Philip’s invasion of Asia was to take. His campaign was constitutionally bound as one designed to rescue the Greeks of the east from Persian control.

This setup suited Philip. It allowed him to finally turn to Persia, where real Macedonian gains could be made in the non-Greek lands of the east. For years he had been unable to launch an expedition against Persia because of the threat that a warring and divided Greece posed to Macedonia:

Isocrates in 346 had known that a precondition of invading Asia was to be able to count on a strict neutrality of the Greeks, and preferably on their active

¹⁰⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 634.

cooperation: and Philip was at least as good a strategist as Isocrates. It is natural now to think of the League of Corinth as primarily an item in his strategy, and a means to his end.¹¹⁰

Whether Philip's primary motivation was the conquest of Persia or the domination of the Greek states, the League created a situation in Greece amenable to both goals.

Proof of the strength of the new League created by Philip is to be found in the events that followed his assassination by a jealous lover in late 336, only months after his election as *hegemon*. Hoping Macedonia would be distracted by questions of succession and revolts further north, the Thebans broke away from Macedonia and opened hostilities, besieging the small Macedonian garrison housed on their acropolis. This power play failed, as a combined Macedonian and League force quickly besieged and defeated the rebellious city. Rather than take vengeance against Thebes immediately, Alexander decided to let the League mete out punishment to the vanquished enemy. The member states "voted to raze the city, to sell the captives, to outlaw the Theban exiles from all Greece, and to allow no Greek to offer shelter to a Theban. Alexander, in accordance with the decree of the council [*sunedrion*], destroyed the city."¹¹¹

That most of the League cities remained resolutely allied to Alexander and fought with him against Thebes' rebellion, and then decided to enact such a harsh punishment on Thebes, shows a couple of things. First, it is a testament to the strength of the relationship created by Philip between Greeks and Macedonians. Second, it also shows that Greek rivalries were still burning. This was actually a benefit to Macedonia. In 331 Sparta, which had not joined the League of Corinth, allied with Persia against Alexander and launched a war across mainland Greece. In so doing, the Spartans framed their campaign as a liberation of Greece.¹¹² However, few states joined with Sparta, which was eventually defeated by a combined Macedonian-League army commanded by Antipater, Alexander's regent in Europe.

¹¹⁰ Isoc. *Orat.* 5.86 in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 624.

¹¹¹ Diod. 17.14.3-4.

¹¹² Paul Cartledge and Antony Spawforth, *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 21.

However, after the war Sparta was not obliterated, “For the course of the war had showed that the existence of Sparta was a source of disunity among those Greek states which might otherwise combine against [Macedonia].”¹¹³ The bitter rivalries still prevalent between various Greek cities ensured that the League would not become a source of unity among Greeks against Macedonia—too much bad blood and mistrust existed for Greeks to want the overthrow the existing order. Therefore Alexander, like Philip, was comfortable in allowing Greece to police itself, and League members were willing to keep their men serving in Alexander’s army rather than risk upsetting the status quo.

The formation of the League may appear to favor Philip considerably, but many Greeks also benefited from this Common Peace and the Macedonian hegemony. The smaller Greek states were probably supportive of Philip and the League checking the power of the greater Greek cities which had caused the fourth century to be a period of almost incessant warfare¹¹⁴. As for the larger states, all were humbled by the crushing defeat of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea, and were more than willing to enter a Common Peace settlement with the battle’s victor—an inexpensive price for peace.

Importantly, some states didn’t really understand what they were getting into. Athens, for instance, was quick to agree to the apparently lenient terms spelled out in the League’s formation. Plutarch’s biography of the Athenian Phocion contains evidence of this. Phocion “spoke against their joining before they knew what Philip would actually require the Greeks to do for him. In the circumstances Phocion’s view was overruled, and presently he found the Athenians wishing they hadn’t joined, because now they had to supply Philip with triremes and cavalry.”¹¹⁵ In Athens, at least, it is clear that the obligations inherent in League membership were not understood. Its status as an instrument capable of ending the wars in Greece nevertheless caused states like Athens to

¹¹³ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 78.

¹¹⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 633.

¹¹⁵ Plut. *Vit. Phoc.* 16.4 in Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 632.

quickly embrace its formation.

Perhaps, too, many states agreed with the goals Philip presented for his formation of the League. These included avenging the Persian invasions of Greece a century and a half earlier, which had culminated in the sack of the Athenian acropolis and the destruction of numerous temples, and reversing the negative terms of the King's Peace, by which Sparta had allowed Persia to retake all the Greek cities of Asia Minor.

That such an objective governed the strategy of the war can be seen in the methods with which Philip opened hostilities. Before leaving Europe with the bulk of the army, Philip ordered two of his generals to go to Asia Minor and establish a foothold, and "to liberate the Greek cities" under Persian control.¹¹⁶ Certainly Philip hoped to conquer vast new lands, but this was what Philip intended to be the driving mission behind his campaign. His and Alexander's early campaigning was defined by this objective. For most Greeks, the prospect of Philip (and later Alexander) liberating Greek cities and humbling the Persian Empire was quite appealing.

Although Philip, as *hegemon*, was granted the power to call on Greek troops at will, and although some states may have griped about such terms, the numbers of troops Greece ultimately provided for the expedition shows that they joined the war with great enthusiasm. It is proof of "the genuine interest of the states in this war that they provided 2,400 cavalry, 7,000 infantry, and 32,000 naval personnel (manning 160 triremes)."¹¹⁷ Diodorus also states that 5,000 Greek mercenaries accompanied the army, along with 8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry from the northern barbarians; Macedonia provided just 12,000 foot soldiers and 1,800 horsemen.¹¹⁸ The League's contingent in this army therefore made up more than two-eighths of the infantry, to Macedonia's three-eighths, and more than half of the cavalry, to Macedonia's one-third. Although the navy was to take a less prominent position in the Asian campaign, its numbers, too, were still vast.

¹¹⁶ Diod. 16.91.2.

¹¹⁷ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 66.

¹¹⁸ Diod. 17.17.3-4.

For many Greeks, the coming conflict offered considerably more than it asked. Mercenaries gained employ, Greek soldiers got to avenge Persian wrongs, and both groups were promised booty and new lands. By maintaining his position as liberator, Philip managed to not only keep most Greek cities acquiescent in Macedonian hegemony, but also gained their active support.

The union thus established between Greece and Macedonia was not really a partnership. The League and Common Peace were checks on both Greek states and Macedonian influence over Greek domestic affairs. Militarily, Macedonia continued to exercise indisputable control over League troops, as may be surmised from the command structure in Alexander's army, in which:

the cavalry was commanded by Philippus son of Menelaus, later by Erigyus when Philippus was promoted to command the Thessalians [both of whom were Macedonians...] The 7,000 Greek infantry were commanded by Macedonian generals Antigonus, Balacrus, and Calanus in succession. They had subordinate commanders, *hegemones*, corresponding in function probably to the taxiarchs of the Macedonian phalanx. The *hegemones* attended the councils-of-war summoned by Alexander before Issus and Gaugamela and were probably though not certainly Macedonians.¹¹⁹

The fleet, as will be discussed in the section on the Navy, was also commanded by a Macedonian. This command structure demonstrates that this was the Macedonian king's army, and as such was expected to act in all ways according to Macedonian standards and desires. Although the inclusion of League troops in the invasion force partially shaped how Philip and then Alexander had to conduct the war against Persia, the Greek forces were under Macedonian control. Philip's final relationship with the Greeks was firmly and unalterably fixed as that of hegemon, as it had always been.

The Greeks, like the barbarians of the Balkans, gained no significant place in the Macedonian state. They served in the army, and through this mechanism their homelands were connected to the Macedonian empire. Yet, even in the army, they remained in separate units, under Macedonian commanders, carrying their own weapons. The sections above have demonstrated the connections between politics and the military in all the

¹¹⁹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 435.

models used by Macedonian kings to connect various peoples to their state. When Alexander conquered the lands of the Persian Empire, these were the paradigms available for him to incorporate new peoples into Macedonia's empire.

Alexander pulled many of the peoples of the Persian Empire into the military, continuing to follow the Macedonian precedents which dictated that political status in the Macedonian state be linked to military obligation. The ways in which these peoples were placed in various military bodies has definite ramifications for where they were to fit in the state. The places and ways subjects of the Persian Empire—both non-Iranian barbarians and Iranians—related to the Macedonian king will now be individually examined against the backdrop of the models already established in Europe.

PART II: EXPANDING THE EMPIRE¹²⁰

1. THE NAVY

When Alexander led his vast, multi-national force into Asia in 334, he had to adhere to the rules and strategy defined by his partnership with the League of Corinth. His first steps, taken among the Greeks of Ionia, reflected this arrangement. Alexander dispatched representatives “to the Aeolian cities and any Ionian towns still subject to Persia. He ordered the oligarchies everywhere to be broken up, democracies to be established, each to have their own laws and continue paying the same taxes as they had

¹²⁰ For a map of Alexander's empire, see Figure 2.1.

paid to the Persians.”¹²¹ Alexander’s only action taken in the cities’ domestic affairs was to strip the pro-Persian oligarchies of power. The cities then fell under his hegemony, in that they paid him taxes, but they remained, by and large, independent.

However, Alexander sought to do more than just liberate the Greeks from Persian control. Conquest of the non-Greek lands of the empire had always, unabashedly, been Alexander’s goal. Before the new king left Europe, Justin informs us that,

All his ancestral domains in Macedonia and Europe he distributed amongst his friends, declaring that Asia was enough for him [...] On reaching the mainland Alexander first hurled his spear into the soil which was his enemy [...] He then offered up sacrificial victims, praying that those lands be not unwilling to accept him as their king [...] He barred his men from pillaging Asia, telling them that they should spare their own property and not destroy the things which they had come to possess.¹²²

Diodorus further confirms this tale. He writes that Alexander, “flung his spear from his ship and fixed it in the ground, and then leapt ashore himself the first of the Macedonians, signifying that he received Asia from the gods as a spear-won prize.”¹²³ This quote is significant in shedding light on the nature of the expedition from a Macedonian viewpoint. Macedonian tradition held that the king “owned all ‘spear-won’ land from the time of the expansion beyond the homeland.”¹²⁴ The casting of the spear had tremendous symbolic meaning, showing, from the beginning, that although the League Army came to avenge Persian offences, Alexander came to conquer.

Further, in his dealings with the Persian king, Darius III, Alexander made clear his objective in the invasion. After the Persian army was crushed in the Battle of Issus:

Darius entreated Alexander by letter to grant him leave to ransom his female prisoners, offering him a large amount of money. As the price of these prisoners, however, Alexander demanded not money, but all Darius’ kingdom. Some time later, further letters from Darius reached Alexander, offering him marriage to Darius’ daughter and a portion of the kingdom. Alexander, however, wrote back that he was being offered what was already his, and he told Darius to come to him as a suppliant and leave to the victor all decisions about the empire.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.1-2.

¹²² Just. *Epit.* 11.5.5-6.1.

¹²³ Diod. 17.17.2.

¹²⁴ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 156.

¹²⁵ Just. *Epit.* 11.12.1-4.

In his responses to the Persian king, Alexander did not frame his purpose or reason for attacking as punitive; rather, he set it out plainly as conquest. Arrian fleshes out this correspondence in even greater detail, claiming Alexander told Darius, “‘By God’s help I am master of your country, and I have made myself responsible for the survivors of your army who fled to me for refuge: far from being detained by force, they are serving of their own free will under my command’.”¹²⁶ The reliability of any of these letters, and how they came into the possession of even Ptolemy or Aristobolus, it must be admitted, is somewhat suspect. If they do, in fact, report or reflect the truth, then Alexander’s desire to bring the dominions of Persia into his own Empire is undeniable. Alexander would claim the full Persian Empire for himself, as Darius’ legitimate successor, when the former was assassinated by his own men in 330.

With this goal governing his campaigns, he had to form a policy for dealing with the non-Greek lands of the Empire after moving on from Ionia. Many non-Greek cities in Asia Minor surrendered to him, especially after his victory in the Battle of Issus.¹²⁷ So, too, did rulers of lands further inland: “Alexander then set out for Syria where he met many of the eastern kings who came to him wearing the fillets of suppliants. He accepted a number of them as allies, according to the deserts of each, while others he deprived of their thrones, replacing them with new rulers.”¹²⁸ Alexander could incorporate these peoples into his empire as he saw fit. He did so by first confirming or changing the rulers of each area.

The most famous case of this shows the extent to which Alexander sought to order his new empire:

Again in Paphos when the reigning king was seen to be unjust and wicked, Alexander expelled him and searched for another, since the family of Cinyradae appeared to be already passing away or extinct. However, they told him that there still survived one poor and obscure person, who eked out a forsaken existence in a certain garden. Men were sent to fetch him and, when they arrived, he was found watering his garden-plots; and he was much perturbed when the soldiers laid

¹²⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.6-7.

¹²⁷ Just. *Epit.* 11.10.6.

¹²⁸ Just. *Epit.* 11.10.6-7.

hands on him and ordered him to come with them. He was brought before Alexander and, dressed as he was in a single cheap garment, he was proclaimed king, and received the royal purple, and became one of those who are styled the king's 'Companions.' His name was Abdalonymus.¹²⁹

Paphos lies in Cyprus. Although Alexander never landed on the island, which did surrender to him (see below), he still acted here, and in western Asia in general, as his father had in the north: removing some kings and legitimizing others, while remaining aloof from all other local affairs.

Importantly, Alexander took pains to link his new dominions to his person not just through political channels, but through military ones as well—just as Philip had done. The first such action revolved around his navy. Persian ships dominated the eastern Mediterranean in this period, whereas “Macedonia herself had a relatively small fleet.”¹³⁰ Yet Alexander understood the need for a navy in order to prevent Macedonian troops in Asia from being cut off, and to keep the Persians from attacking or fomenting rebellion in Europe. He used the League of Corinth to initially fill this gap:

There is no doubt that the 160 triremes of *Anab.* 1.11.6 is what was later called ‘the Greek fleet’. It appears under that name at Lade and it is stated to consist of 160 ships (*Anab.* 1.18.4). Although Alexander disbanded the navy there, he decided later, in 333, to reconstitute the navy. He ordered ‘the allies to provide ships in accordance with the treaty (QC 3.1.20). As Alexander’s treaty with the Greeks had not changed in the meanwhile, we should expect the Greeks to provide 160 triremes. This is what we find: in 332 the Aegean islands had been brought under control by ‘a fleet of 160 ships’ (QC 4.5.14). In the same year Alexander referred to this fleet as ‘the fleet of the Greeks’ (*GHI* 192, 10-11). As regards the Macedonian fleet we may make an inference from a statement in Just. [*Epit.*] 11.6.2, a passage for which the ultimate source is probably Cleitarchus. Just as he produced idiosyncratic figures for the army, so he gave his own figure for the ships in the expeditionary force: 182 ships. [...] We infer, then, that the Macedonian fleet consisted of twenty-two triremes and thirty-eight penteconters and triaconters.¹³¹

The Macedonian military, possessing so few ships, was reliant on foreign auxiliaries to keep the huge fleets of Persia at bay. Most interesting in this setup, though, was the fact that the Greek fleet was initially disbanded, but the Macedonian one maintained:

¹²⁹ Plut. *Mor. De Alex. fort.* 10.340D.

¹³⁰ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 24.

¹³¹ Arr. *Anab.*, QC and GHI [M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946)] in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 25.

It seems that the Macedonian fleet was based on the Hellespont in 334, and it was there again in 333 (QC 3.1.19, while the Greek fleet was about to reassemble; and 4.1.36 in action in the Hellespont). The triaconters and one penteconter of which we hear in these early years were evidently units of the Macedonian fleet (*Anabasis* 2.7.2, 21.6, and 20.2). That Alexander distinguishes the Macedonian fleet and the Greek fleet by name and that he used them separately is not surprising, for he did the same with the army. The former was used mainly to guard the lines of communication, and it was doubtful whether it was ever disbanded. Some of its smaller ships accompanied Alexander in his advance. The Greek fleet was used for the naval offensive, whenever Alexander wished to conduct such an offensive, and its ships were organized in city-state squadrons (Diod. 17.22.5, based on Diyllus).¹³²

The Greek ships were far more powerful and numerous than those of Macedonia, and they won many victories against the Persians. Despite the inferiority of his own ships, Alexander kept the Greek fleet separate from Macedonia's, even though, as in the army, Macedonians retained overall control of the Greek navy.

Alexander does not seem to have placed much significance in the Greek ships, however. Not long after his victory at the Granicus River, he dismissed it, even while keeping his Macedonian fleet at sea. Arrian relates how:

Alexander now decided to disband his fleet. He had not, at the moment, the money for maintaining it; he knew that it was no match for the Persian navy, and he had no wish to subject any part of his strength, in ships or men, to the risk of disaster. Moreover, now that his army was master of the continent, he was well aware that a fleet was no longer of any use to him: by seizing the coastal towns he could reduce the Persian navy to impotence.¹³³

This is a surprising claim that seems to contradict a number of facts. Arrian, only a few lines earlier, had detailed a Greek naval victory over the Persians.¹³⁴ Moreover, Alexander needed a sizeable naval contingent to supply his army with provisions throughout his conquest of the Levant.¹³⁵

It also seems unlikely that his initial dismissal of the fleet was due to a lack of funds, though Diodorus, too, suggested this.¹³⁶ A mere 6 months later the Greek fleet was

¹³² QC, Diod. and Arr. *Anab.* in Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 25.

¹³³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.20.1.

¹³⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.19.3-4.

¹³⁵ Donald W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd., 1978), 112.

¹³⁶ Diod. 17.22.5.

recalled for service due to Persian naval attacks against Europe and Greek islands.¹³⁷ Perhaps Diodorus is correct when he links the dismissal, in part, to Alexander's belief that his men would fight harder if no fleet offered an easy route of retreat.¹³⁸ Or maybe Arrian is closer to the mark when he suggests that it was from a desire to defeat the fleet himself—making it a Macedonian, not League, victory—that explains his actions.

Whatever the case, Alexander again dismissed the fleet after defeating the Persian naval threat to Europe. During this same period he also began the process of using barbarians from the Persian Empire to supplement his forces. When the Persian garrison at Chios was captured, Quintus Curtius details how the garrison commanders:

were handed over in shackles to the Macedonians, along with twelve triremes complete with marines and crews, thirty crewless ships and pirate boats, and 3,000 Greek mercenaries hired by the Persians. The Macedonians distributed the latter among their troops to augment their numbers, executed the pirates, and added the captured crews to their fleet.¹³⁹

They evidently stayed with the Macedonian navy even as Alexander limited his use of Greek ships and sailors.

Although the king twice more required a navy to aid his campaigns during this period, he never again recalled the League fleet. In the first case, the island-city of Tyre proved extraordinarily difficult for Alexander's army to capture. Most disruptive to the assault was the Tyrian navy, which continuously and effectively disrupted Macedonian siege efforts. Arrian reports that it was now that a new fleet was formed, consisting of "a reinforcement of about eighty Phoenician vessels [led by local monarchs...] ten from Lycia [...] and the Cypriot kings," commanding an impressive one hundred twenty ships.¹⁴⁰ This fleet proved instrumental in defeating Tyre, and it also caused Alexander to honor the kings who put it at his disposal.¹⁴¹ This fleet effectively linked the people of Lycia, Cyprus, and Phoenicia—non-Iranian subjects of the Persian Empire, whose leaders

¹³⁷ QC 3.1.19.

¹³⁸ Diod. 17.23.1

¹³⁹ QC 4.5.17-18.

¹⁴⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.1-3.

¹⁴¹ QC 4.8.14.

were confirmed or changed by Alexander—to Macedonia in much the same way that Philip had tied the north to his empire: through military ties.

We can see how strongly Alexander felt that Cyprus was now clearly within his dominion by contrasting his use of Cypriot forces with his dismissal of the League of Corinth's navy. In 331 Sparta, never a member of the League, revolted against Macedonian hegemony in Europe. Alexander did not call up his Greek fleet to contain the threat, even though Antipater relied heavily on Greek armies to defeat the Spartan land army. Instead, Alexander raised a naval force from among his new subjects. He dictated that "Phoenicia and Cyprus were to furnish 100 ships for the Peloponnese, in addition to the fleet which was being dispatched with Amphoterus."¹⁴²

This Macedonian admiral is important. Previously, we find him "dispatched with sixty ships to Cos," at the same time Alexander is in Egypt.¹⁴³ Before leaving Egypt, Alexander had posted "Polemon son of Theramenes to command of the fleet."¹⁴⁴ According to Quintus Curtius, Polemon's task was "to police the mouth of the Nile, and [Alexander] gave him 30 triremes for the job."¹⁴⁵ Alexander then moved to Tyre, where "he found the fleet awaiting him."¹⁴⁶ Given the course of events just related, and what is known about the scarcity of Macedonian (and the non-existence of Greek) ships, it seems quite likely that at least one of these fleets included Egyptians. Certainly Hammond believes this to be the case.¹⁴⁷ In any case, Alexander chose to follow a policy that entailed his Asian subjects taking on functions previously given to the League. The nautical traditions of this region, while strong, were no better than those found in many of the League's member states.

So it was that Alexander took the first steps linking his new conquests concretely to the Macedonian empire. Like his father, he confirmed or replaced kings and governors

¹⁴² Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.3.

¹⁴³ Arr. *Anab.* 3.2.6.

¹⁴⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.5.

¹⁴⁵ QC 4.8.4.

¹⁴⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.1.

¹⁴⁷ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3, 72.

throughout the area, letting them continue to govern their own affairs. Although Cyprus had both Greeks and barbarians, Alexander extended this same relationship to the rulers, not seeking to bring them into the League, nor leaving them largely independent, as he had the Ionian Greeks. Even in Egypt, which had been governed directly by Persian satraps for years, Alexander chose to appoint an Egyptian to run the civil affairs of state, posting Macedonians only to control the garrisons Alexander left in the country and ensure the tribute they customarily sent Darius now went to Macedonia.¹⁴⁸ Alexander, though he could have placed Macedonian rulers directly over any of the non-Greek regions of Asia Minor and the Levant, left local leaders in place, with Macedonians only there to ensure the smooth functioning and loyalty of these localities. The king preferred to incorporate these regions into his empire mainly through ties of military obligation.

What's more, Alexander continued to rely on these barbarians for sailors and marines throughout his campaign. After the Spartan uprising was defeated, Alexander's admiral, Amphoterus, was "especially ordered to rid the sea of pirate fleets, since it had been at the mercy of buccaneers while the two kings were locked in war with each other."¹⁴⁹ The ships at his disposal were, of course, the Macedonian fleet and the numerous barbarian vessels he had taken to the Peloponnese. In Egypt Alexander had also appointed a "Secretary of Foreign Troops" presumably to oversee recruitment and maintenance of these forces, among others.¹⁵⁰ And whether or not Egypt supplied sailors for the earlier expeditions, they certainly did, along with Cyprus and Phoenicia, in India.

Arrian, basing his account on Nearchus, Alexander's admiral, states that, in 326, many of these peoples were present to man the fleet Alexander dispatched to sail home from the east while he marched overland. Arrian says:

When the fleet was made ready for Alexander on the banks of the Hydaspes, he picked out all the Phoenicians, Cypriotes and Egyptians who had followed the expedition up-country and used them to man the ships, picking out for their crews and rowers all who were skilled in seafaring. There were also a good many

¹⁴⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.2-7.

¹⁴⁹ QC 4.8.15.

¹⁵⁰ Arr. *Anab.* .5.3.

islanders in the army, practiced in these things, and Ionians and Hellespontines.¹⁵¹ This quote suggests, first, that numerous troops from the non-Greek regions of the Persian Empire were attached to the army at least since it entered India. As with the northerners, Alexander's control of these men was absolute. Apparently they, too, were expected, to serve under him for any part of the campaign that he demanded. This was not a relationship formed on a League model.

Arrian's quote also tells us that Alexander had attached to the army Greeks from cities outside of the League of Corinth; that is, from islands and regions previously under Persian control. These troops could have been mercenaries, who happened to come from these cities, but it seems unlikely that Alexander would have enrolled mercenaries whose primary specialty was the sea to serve in his army. Additionally, had he dipped into his mercenary contingents for sailors, we would expect to hear also of mercenaries from mainland Greece asked to man the fleet.

In addition to the peoples already mentioned in Arrian's *Indica* passage quoted above, the author also listed Carians among the sailors in his *Anabasis*.¹⁵² Alexander had appointed over Caria a queen, the legitimate heir of former king whose power had been usurped on Darius' orders.¹⁵³ She was another local leader asked to supply Alexander with soldiers in return for power. The evidence, taken together, suggests that Alexander pulled into his military non-Iranian barbarians from polities across the Persian Empire, using most of them in the same capacity as he used the northern barbarians.

The role of these people in the army during Alexander's inland campaigning is unclear. The only mention of any of these foreigners occurs in Arrian's *Anabasis*, wherein it is simply reported that in India, "the Phoenicians, who accompanied the expedition for what they could make out of it, used to collect the [myrrh] gum and load their pack-animals with it."¹⁵⁴ This, unfortunately, tells us little about the functions, size or origins of

¹⁵¹ Arr. *Ind.* 18.1-2.

¹⁵² Arr. *Anab.* 6.1.6.

¹⁵³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.23.7-8.

¹⁵⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 6.22.4.

the Phoenician contingent. P.A. Brunt rightly recognizes that none of these peoples were with Alexander during the hard-fought campaigns in Bactria and Sogdiana. He argues that they had never been attached to the army as mercenaries or light troops, but were called upon specifically when needed for their naval skills:

The availability of seamen from the Mediterranean (*Anab.* 6.1, 6.6; *Ind.* 18.2; 31.3), who had no role to perform earlier in [Alexander's] expedition, suggests that they had been summoned for this purpose; they could have arrived as late as autumn 326 under escort of reinforcements and in that case must have been sent for before Alexander entered India, when he still did not realize that India was washed by the Ocean and thought of reaching Egypt by river; he had been detained in Sogdiana long after he had decided on the invasion of India in 329/8 (*Ind.* 4.15.6).¹⁵⁵

This implies that the men mentioned by Arrian were summoned expressly to man the fleet. The limited nature of the evidence prevents us from conjecturing beyond this.

However, judging by the numbers of men required, Brunt's argument seems most likely correct. The quantity of ships constructed is considerable. Apparently the "whole fleet was eight hundred, including ships of war, merchantmen and horse transports, besides others carrying provisions as well as troops."¹⁵⁶ Quintus Curtius states that, including the supply boats, the armada comprised one thousand ships.¹⁵⁷ To man a naval force of this size, Engels estimates it would have required "at least 12,500 men in the fleet excluding the troops aboard the vessels, and an estimate of 7,000 to 8,000 for these will not be unreasonable."¹⁵⁸ Macedonians evidently made up a large part of this second component.¹⁵⁹ Yet it still seems that a considerable force of barbarian sailors from the Persian Empire took part in this enterprise, becoming tied to Alexander in the process.

Like the northerners, these men were specifically used in ways that did not incorporate them directly into the traditional Macedonian military system. In specifically calling on the Phoenicians, Cypriots, Egyptians, etc. for naval purposes, Alexander kept them separate from the Macedonians in their functions and brigading. As mentioned

¹⁵⁵ Brunt's notes in Arrian, *Arrian*, vol. 2, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 518-9.

¹⁵⁶ Arr. *Ind.* 19.7.

¹⁵⁷ QC 9.3.22.

¹⁵⁸ Engels, *Logistics*, 112.

¹⁵⁹ Arr. *Ind.* 24.5-8; 28.4.

above, even when the Macedonians sailed on the same ships as these peoples, the Macedonians functioned as soldiers, the others as sailors and rowers.

Additionally, the Macedonians remained in command, even though the fleets were overwhelmingly barbarian. Arrian provides a list of each of the trierarchs, or naval squadron leaders. All of the men named are Companions, and only one is not a Macedonian or Greek.¹⁶⁰ This man is Persian, and not Phoenician, Cypriot, Egyptian, etc. P.A. Brunt points out that these command positions were “presumably honorific [...] The men named include many of the most eminent Companions, some of whom marched by land throughout.”¹⁶¹ It seems quite likely that on board each ship a barbarian would have had to at least be a junior officer, in order to translate orders. Nevertheless, these appointments raise an interesting point. Even while these non-Iranians of the Persian Empire remained locked out of positions of control within Alexander’s imperial system, some Iranians were being pulled into it.

So it was that Alexander extended Macedonian power over Cyprus, Phoenicia, Egypt, Caria, and possibly Lycia and other areas, by not only appointing and approving governors and local rulers, but by requesting naval levies. These bonds held throughout his campaigns, and evidently were to remain in place in the future. Once back in Babylon, Alexander laid plans for his next campaign. The historians of Alexander differ on specifics, and both Diodorus and Justin omit references to these arrangements, but Plutarch, Arrian, and Quintus Curtius detail the preparations of a huge fleet intended to sail around Arabia and then circle the southern coast of Africa.¹⁶²

Once more, the same ties Alexander had cemented with the inhabitants of the western lands of the Persian Empire bound them to help in the construction and manning of this fleet. Quintus Curtius explains that for this endeavor, “Alexander instructed the governors in Mesopotamia to cut timber on Mt. Libanus, transport it down to the Syrian

¹⁶⁰ Arr. *Ind.* 18.3-10.

¹⁶¹ Brunt’s notes in *Arrian*, vol. 2, 359 n.2.

¹⁶² See Figure 2.2.

city of Thapascus, and there lay down keels for 700 ships. These were all to be septemremes [i.e. boats considerably larger than the traditional triremes], which were to be transported to Babylon. The kings of Cyprus were instructed to furnish bronze, hemp and sails.”¹⁶³ Here, plainly, the relationship between the Cypriot kings and Alexander has not changed from what it was several years before, when Alexander had evidently induced the kings to keep their fleet at sea under his commanders, and then later to send men directly to him for his Indian expedition.

Plutarch states, simply, that, “sailors and pilots were assembled from all parts.”¹⁶⁴ Arrian, writing with the benefit of Nearchus’ account, provides us with the greatest detail. He first says that once back in Babylon, “Nearchus’ squadron had sailed up the Euphrates from the Persian Gulf, the others—two Phoenician quinqueremes, three quadriremes, twelve triremes, and about thirty light galleys—had come over the Phoenician coast,” presumably disassembled and hauled overland from the Mediterranean to Babylon, where they were reassembled.¹⁶⁵ This proves that, even in Alexander’s absence, his Phoenician subjects had maintained a fleet to protect his empire. Arrian then goes on to say, regarding the huge fleet Alexander intended to use to circle Africa:

Manpower and crews for the new vessels were supplied by shell-divers and others whose work was connected with the sea, from Phoenicia and the neighboring seaboard. He also by dredging operations had begun the construction of a harbor at Babylon, large enough for 1,000 warships to lie in, and equipped with yards. Miccalus of Clazomenae was sent to Phoenicia and Syria with a sum of 500 talents to hire or purchase more men familiar with ships and the sea. The fact is, Alexander had ideas of settling the seaboard of the Persian Gulf and the offshore islands; for he fancied it might become as prosperous a country as Phoenicia. The naval operations were directed against the Arabs of the coast, ostensibly because they were the only people in that part of the country who had sent no delegation to wait upon him, or shown their respect by any normal act of courtesy; actually, however, the reason for the preparations was, in my opinion, Alexander’s insatiable thirst for extending his possessions.¹⁶⁶

Alexander expected to retain the Phoenicians, Cypriots, and (probably) Egyptians, Carians, Lydians, Syrians, etc.—the men of the seaboard—as he had previously: bound to

¹⁶³ QC 10.1.19.

¹⁶⁴ Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 68.1.

¹⁶⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7.19.3.

¹⁶⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 7.19.5-6.

him through military service akin to what was fostered on the northern barbarians by Philip.

The relationship established by Alexander with the non-Iranian barbarians of Asia Minor and the Levant mirrored that created by his father among the tribes of the Balkans. Locals kept control of their own domestic affairs, but had to furnish Alexander with soldiers who served in units separate from the Macedonians, under the command of Macedonians. These peoples were not militarily integrated into the army, nor politically integrated into the imperial administration.

They were, however, clearly a part of the empire, for their treatment stands in contrast to Alexander's dismissal of the Greek navy, and his later dismissal of the League land forces at Ecbatana, as will be discussed later. These western, non-Iranian peoples of the Persian Empire were largely confirmed in their place as subjects in an empire controlled by other peoples. This was a reality that the Iranians were not to experience, as will be shown.

2. NON-IRANIAN LAND AUXILIARIES

More evidence emerges of Alexander's desire to incorporate the non-Iranian barbarians into his empire in this manner from the land reinforcements they furnished for the king's army. As early as 333, Persians were likely serving under Alexander, in a limited capacity. The army required modes of transportation, and: "At first, only horses and mules were used; camels may have been first introduced in Egypt (where they are first mentioned as being used by the Macedonians) or perhaps after the battle of Issus where Darius' baggage train, which contained camels, was captured."¹⁶⁷ Alexander would

¹⁶⁷ Engels, *Logistics*, 14-15.

doubtless have relied on Persians from the region to lead and care for these animals. Also, as demonstrated by the letter Alexander wrote to Darius, the Macedonian king made claim to Persians serving under his banner around this time.

In 330, when Alexander left the Persian capital of Persepolis, he apparently drew on forces from the western Asian regions of his empire. Quintus Curtius relates that the king “was met by fresh reinforcements from Cilicia, 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, both under the command of the Athenian Plato.”¹⁶⁸ The wording of the passage makes the exact composition of the force unclear. They could have been Greek mercenaries, but Quintus Curtius is usually explicit in reporting when this is the case.

Not long after these soldiers arrived, another batch of soldiers arrived: “from Lydia came 2,600 foreign infantry and with them 300 cavalry of the same race.”¹⁶⁹ Certainly these men were not Greek mercenaries. They came as part of their military obligation as members of Alexander’s empire.

Even as the number of soldiers like these, drawn from the conquered regions of the Persian Empire, increased within the army, the Greek contingent was dwindling. Alexander decided that the League of Corinth’s mission was fulfilled by the capture of the Persian capitals and the decisive victory over Darius at Gaugamela. Therefore:

At Ecbatana Alexander dismissed his Thessalian cavalry and the other allied contingents and ordered them back to the Aegean. The agreed amount of pay was settled in full, with a sum of 2,000 talents added by Alexander in gratuity. Any man who wished on his own account to continue his service as paid soldier was to have his name entered on the pay-roll, and a considerable number thus voluntarily enlisted.¹⁷⁰

The allied troops mentioned here are League forces, not the northern barbarians. This move severed for good Alexander’s relationship with the League. The Common Peace still bound the Greek states in a close alliance with Macedonia, but Alexander no longer wished to use soldiers or sailors levied through this relationship. Those Greeks who remained were officially transformed into mercenaries.

¹⁶⁸ QC 5.7.12.

¹⁶⁹ QC 6.6.35.

¹⁷⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.5-6.

Thus the context of the influx into Alexander's forces of barbarians from western Asia is remarkable, for it highlights that Alexander was pleased with their relationship and position in his empire. Additionally, "Soon after Gaugamela Alexander received strong reinforcements of Macedonian troops, no fewer than 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. This enabled him to create a seventh battalion of infantry, which was certainly operating in 330. The other battalions must have remained over strength for some time."¹⁷¹ The summoning of substantial barbarian forces at this time cannot be explained away as a response to a critical shortage of troops—the dismissal of the Greeks and heavy mustering of Macedonians proves that. Rather, it was a deliberate choice to call upon men from regions only recently conquered and place them into the Macedonian army, incorporating them and their homelands into the Macedonian state in this way.

Like their cohorts in the navy, these non-Iranians were not elevated to positions of equality with the Macedonians, but placed under the latter's command. This arrangement did not change, even when the Iranians began to be pulled into a much closer bond with the Macedonians, as will be discussed later.

After the Macedonian reinforcements arrived in Persepolis, no new soldiers from there are thought to have arrived until Alexander returned to Babylon.¹⁷² During this same period, however, the king levied large numbers of barbarians. Quintus Curtius relates how, during Alexander's campaigns in Bactria and Sogdiana, "Ptolemaeus and Maenidas brought 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, all mercenary fighters. Asander also came from Lycia with as many infantry and 500 cavalry. The same number came with Asclepiodorus from Syria."¹⁷³ Again, the composition of these forces is vague. However, Quintus Curtius' choice to specify the first group's makeup as consisting entirely of mercenaries, without naming the region from which they set out while doing the opposite when naming the second two detachments, is noteworthy. In describing these, he names the

¹⁷¹ Hamilton's notes in Arrian, *The Campaigns of Alexander*, trans. Aubrey De Sélincourt, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1982) 37-8.

¹⁷² Hamilton's notes in Arrian, *Alexander*, trans. De Sélincourt, 38.

¹⁷³ QC 7.10.12.

regions from which they arrive, but not who they are. It is entirely possible, and likely, that the men coming from Lycia and Syria were natives and not mercenaries.

Out east, Alexander appears to have taken numerous steps towards incorporating more barbarians into the army. It was probably now, as already argued, that he called for the Phoenician, Egyptian, Cypriot, and Carian mariners who would serve in his navy. He also took another, more significant step towards integrating barbarians into his forces.

3. THE PHALANX

The Iranians, unlike the western Asian barbarians, were eventually pulled into a much closer relationship with Alexander. This process began with drafting Iranians into the Companion cavalry, discussed next, and into a new phalanx. The phalanx had always been a strictly Macedonian construct, manned by the Macedones. Many of the phalangites with Alexander throughout his campaign were men recruited by Philip to fill the ranks of the original phalanx. The traditions of this institution were quite strong, and Alexander's desire to open its ranks to non-Macedonians is revolutionary. Its political implications are equally significant.

The context surrounding the barbarian phalanx's creation is not agreed upon; the date of its inception differs among the sources, as does its composition. Quintus Curtius concludes that it was formed in reaction to the brutal uprisings in Bactria and Sogdiana, stating, "It was now Alexander's intention to head for India, then the Ocean. To obviate any difficulties behind him that could interfere with his plans, he gave orders for 30,000 men of military age to be selected from all the provinces and brought to him in arms, to serve simultaneously as hostages and as soldiers."¹⁷⁴ The creation of the phalanx, in Quintus Curtius' analysis, originated to serve a few functions. First, by placing barbarians, presumably selected from upper-class families, under the control of Macedonians, the loyalty of the various regions from which they were drawn could better be ensured.

¹⁷⁴ QC 8.5.1.

Accordingly, an element of hostage taking certainly cannot be dismissed from this situation. However, the men, as it turned out, did not go with Alexander into India, and even if they had, they would have served no more or less as hostages than any of the Thracians, Paeonians, Agrianes, etc., already in Alexander's army.

Quintus Curtius also mentions the training of this body of troops as a way of garrisoning the eastern edge of the empire. This claim is hard to stomach. Alexander founded numerous cities especially in Bactria and Sogdiana, and fortified them with discharged Macedonian veterans and Greek mercenaries. Training the barbarians in phalanx warfare and equipping them with Macedonian weapons makes little sense if they were merely to serve as a mobile police force for the region. Surely Alexander would have preferred cavalry and light infantry for such a purpose.

Alexander seems actually to have left the corps in Bactria to hide it from the Macedonians. Arrian tells us that the existence of the unit was first revealed to the majority of Macedonians after the army returned from India. He reports:

Here in Susa, Alexander received the various officials in charge of affairs in the newly built towns and the governors of the territories he had previously overrun. They brought with them some 30,000 young fellows, all boys of the same age, all wearing Macedonian battle-dress and trained on the Macedonian lines. Alexander called them the *Epigoni*—‘inheritors’—and it is said that their coming caused much bad feeling among the Macedonians, who felt it was an indication of his many efforts to lessen his dependence for the future upon his own countrymen.¹⁷⁵

Arrian doesn't mention when Alexander initiated the training of these men, but their apparent proficiency in phalanx tactics suggests that their training began some time before, as Quintus Curtius asserted. Alexander's summons to the group to join the army at Susa may have stemmed from a desire simply to review the troops. It seems more likely, however, given the reformations of the army taking place during this time, which will be discussed in detail later, and the preparations of the new fleet to sail against Arabia and southern Africa, that the barbarian phalanx was meant to join the army and not head back east to police the locals.

¹⁷⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7.6.1-2.

Arrian's wording does not reveal the exact identity of these men. However, he does say that the officials who arrived came from areas with "newly built towns" and "territories he had previously overrun". It was primarily the eastern extremities of the empire to which both aspects of this description could be applied.

Justin sheds some light on the topic. His only reference to the matter is to say that Alexander "incorporated in his army a group of auxiliaries who had received Macedonian training."¹⁷⁶ He identifies these auxiliaries as Persian.¹⁷⁷ Had this meant that they were, ethnically, strictly Persian, both Arrian and Quintus Curtius, always more diligent in reporting such details, would have said so. The name is therefore most likely a catchall term used by Justin, who is indicating that the new phalangites are inhabitants of the Persian Empire.

Plutarch, like Quintus Curtius and Arrian, specifically fails to mention the ethnicity of the force. Instead, he writes that Alexander "chose thirty thousand boys and gave orders that they should learn the Greek language and be trained to use Macedonian weapons, appointing many instructors to this work."¹⁷⁸ His phrasing once more does not show these men to be just ethnic Persians. He also says Alexander undertook this action before he embarked for India, while he was still in Hyrcania in the far northeastern extremity of the Persian Empire. This means that these men may have come from all over the east, making them specifically Iranians.

Diodorus' account confuses the chronology. Similarly he first presents the unit when it arrived at Susa, but says:

Now there came to Susa at this time a body of thirty thousand Persians, all very young and selected for their bodily grace and strength. They had been enrolled in compliance with the king's orders and had been under supervisors and teachers of the arts of war for as long as necessary. They were splendidly equipped in the full Macedonian armament and encamped before the city, where they were warmly commended by the king after demonstrating their skill and discipline in the use of their weapon. The Macedonians had not only mutinied when ordered to cross the Ganges River but were frequently unruly when called into an assembly and

¹⁷⁶ Just. *Epit.* 12.12.4.

¹⁷⁷ Just. *Epit.* 12.12.1.

¹⁷⁸ Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 18.4.

ridiculed Alexander's pretense that Ammon was his father. For these reasons Alexander had formed this unit from a single age-group of Persians which was capable of serving as a counter-balance to the Macedonian phalanx. These were the concerns of Alexander.¹⁷⁹

Like Justin, Diodorus' assertion that these levies were specifically Persians is probably a generalization to mean they were former subjects of the Persian Empire. His phrasing suggests that the phalanx formed after the mutiny in India, which is probably also incorrect.

What is important is Diodorus' insistence that Alexander meant for the barbarian phalangites to be the equals of their Macedonian counterparts. Their training as phalangites favors this idea. The Macedonians specifically named Alexander's giving of Macedonian arms to these men as one of their principle grievances during their mutiny at Opis (see below).¹⁸⁰

This new phalanx, created to mimic a strictly Macedonian corps, may have consisted exclusively of Iranians. This would make sense since they, unlike the barbarians of western Asia, had no surviving kings or political hierarchy. Bessus, Darius' murderer and would-be successor, had previously governed Bactria, and his co-conspirators had controlled the other satrapies in the area. They were all Persians, directly serving the Persian monarch. By revolting against Alexander, these leaders forfeited their ability to be brought into Alexander's empire and continue their governance under their new king. Like Macedonia and the satrapy of Persia, these districts were now exclusively under Alexander's direct control.

If, as seems possible, Alexander indeed filled this phalanx strictly with Iranians, this further argues in favor of his elevating these people to positions above those offered to other barbarians. If, however, the ranks were opened to barbarians from across the Persian Empire, this argument still holds, but the phalanx is not a part of the evidence for it. As will be discussed, the process of separating barbarians from Iranians really took

¹⁷⁹ Diod. 17.108.1-3.

¹⁸⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 7.8.2.

shape later, and it is possible that Alexander had not, at this time, decided on that policy. This was, nonetheless, the first time that Alexander connected Iranians to his army in any way—for doubtless there were some Iranians in this unit. It was a lofty position for them to begin their incorporation into Alexander's army and empire.

4. THE IRANIAN COMPANIONS

The Iranians eventually came to hold powerful places in the Companion cavalry. However, the process leading up to this final relationship started slowly and evolved over time. When considered alongside other steps taken by Alexander, both at the same time and later, a pattern becomes evident of integration and equality forming up between the Macedonians and Iranians under Alexander's direction.

As discussed earlier, the Companions increasingly lost their access to the king during Alexander's campaigning as their numbers spiked. He "had not doubled or trebled the number of cavalry in the short time between his accession and his crossing to Asia; he had merely given the name Companions a wider application than before."¹⁸¹ More and more, the title simply denoted the heavy cavalry. However, select members of the Companions continued to enjoy considerable contact with Alexander and were appointed

¹⁸¹ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 408.

to governorships and commands. Additionally, the rank was still bestowed at the king's discretion, and brought with it significant honor.

In looking at how the Iranians fit into this body, it is first necessary to see its tactical evolution under Alexander. Beginning at Babylon, he overhauled and reformed the cavalry to serve his needs. The king always had an eye open to maximizing the effectiveness of his armed forces, in addition to creating political ties through them. Hence the western Asians—traditionally strong seafarers—were largely sent to serve in the navy. Tactical as well as political considerations also shaped the process of incorporating Iranians into the Companion cavalry.

Overhauls to the organization of the cavalry began with a restructuring of the units after Gaugamela. Horsemen were traditionally organized into *ilai*, or squadrons. In 330, Arrian says that Alexander “formed two companies in each cavalry *ile* and put them under the command of such officers of the Companions who had distinguished themselves.”¹⁸² After the leader of the Companions was implicated in a conspiracy against the king,¹⁸³ the command structure was further split up. Arrian states that in the aftermath of this attempted coup:

Alexander split the Companions into two separate divisions and appointed, respectively, Hephaestion son of Amyntor and Cleitus son of Dropidas to command them. The reason for this step was that he did not think it advisable that one man—even a personal friend—should have control over so large a body of cavalry—especially as the Companions were the most famous and formidable of all his mounted troops.¹⁸⁴

Here, already, the force proved to be malleable to the king's wishes. Also important is the fact that these changes affected the average Companion very little. It was the powers of command that Alexander saw as significant, and it was therefore this area specifically that he altered.

At some point between his victory at Gaugamela in 331 and the arrival of the

¹⁸² Arr. *Anab.* 3.66.11.

¹⁸³ The innocence or guilt of the man, Philotas, continues to generate controversy, as it did among the ancient historians of Alexander.

¹⁸⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.4.

army at the Jaxartes River in 329, Alexander took the radical step of completely altering the system of *ilai*, replacing these groupings with *hipparchies*, or regiments. During Alexander's battle with the Scythians at the Jaxartes River, this term is indisputably applied to denote new formations. Arrian writes:

a hipparchy of mercenaries and four *ilai* of *sarissophoroi* [Lancers] were ordered forward to lead the attack [...] Alexander ordered an advance by a mixed force consisting of the cavalry together with archers, the Agrianians, and the other light troops under Balacrus, and, when they were almost within striking distance, gave the word for three hipparchies of the Companions and all the mounted javelinmen to charge, while he himself at the head of the remaining cavalry came on at the gallop with his *ilai* in column.¹⁸⁵

This battle description is crucial for several reasons. It shows that the *hipparchies* were now in existence, and used in battle. The Companions remain divided in these groupings for the remainder of Alexander's campaigns, except for Alexander's *ile*, the Royal Squadron, or *agema*, which apparently maintained its structure.

The creation of *hipparchies* allowed Alexander to further alter the powers of the cavalry commanders. Brunt notes:

There is on the whole a marked contrast between the distinction of the former *ilarchs* [squadron leaders] and the later commanders of the *hipparchies*. Of the eight *ilarchs* named at the battle of Gaugamela (*Anab.* 3.11.8) only Black Clitus, who commanded the *agema* [royal bodyguard squadron] itself, Hegelochus (who had formerly been one of Alexander's admirals and Demitrius, who was himself one of the later *hipparchs* [regiment leaders], were persons of note. Though the *ilarchs* were admitted to councils of war (*Anab.* 2.7.3; 10.2; 16.8; 3.9.3), they were mostly nonentities. The commanders of the *hipparchies*, on the other hand, included some of the most powerful men in Alexander's entourage.¹⁸⁶

His assessment is important in showing that, although there were tactical reasons behind the structural change from *ile* to *hipparchy*, Alexander was also concerned with command. He recognized it as important, and it was here that he made the greatest alterations of the cavalry, replacing all the commanders except Demitrius, whereas among the rank-and-file the overhaul did not result in the dismissal of any horsemen.

The change is therefore not limited to the adoption of a new unit title. Hamilton

¹⁸⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 4.4.6-7.

¹⁸⁶ P.A. Brunt, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 83 (1963): 30-31, accessed November 30, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/628452>.

states, “This is a careful and detailed description, evidently based on Ptolemy, and it is inconceivable that Arrian confused ‘squadrons’ and ‘regiments’.”¹⁸⁷ Both Arrian and Ptolemy were, after all, generals.

The reworking of the Companions hierarchy was the most important change, but not the only one. The basic structure changed as well, with the *hipparchies* becoming larger than the *ilai*.¹⁸⁸ (Brunt 45). There are two possible explanations for why this occurred. Griffith argues that it resulted from Iranians entering the ranks of the Companions. Looking at Arrian’s description of the battle on the Jaxartes, he concludes:

This passage tells us much. (1) The *prodomoi* [Scouts] (= *sarissophoroi* [Lancers]: for the equation, see Brunt, 27) are still here [...] separate from the Companions, and have not yet been included in the *hipparchies* with them. (2) The idea that *hipparchy* = *ile* in this passage can only be maintained by taking the lowest possible view of Arrian as a writer. Not once but twice in the passage the two words occur closely juxtaposed: only a Diodorus could be using them as synonyms. (3) The ‘one *hipparchy* of mercenaries’ shows again that *hipparchy* = ‘group of *ilai*’. This was the start of a *big* cavalry battle, for which one *ile* would have been not worth Alexander’s while to detail, nor Arrian’s to record. The ‘three *hipparchies* of Companions’, with *hipparchies* now established (I hope) as ‘groups of *ilai*’, raises again the question, Why did Arrian or his source not write ‘x *ilai* of the Companions’, like ‘4 *ilai* of *sarissophoroi*’ just above? Is it because not all the *ilai* in this force were Macedonians, so that ‘*hipparchies*’ has become an economical way of describing a mixed force in which the Companions were the most important element? Incidentally if 3 *hipparchies* = 3 groups of *ilai*, then this detachment amounts to 6 or more *ilai*, and this is probably less than half of the Companions, since the rest are being led by Alexander himself. We are thus led to think in terms of 12 or more *ilai* altogether, with the total much likelier to be near 20 than near 12. This is becoming too many *ilai* for them all to be Macedonian Companions even allowing for the known reinforcements (Brunt 36f). There would seem to be surplus *ilai* here, for the Iranians, if that suggestion were adopted.¹⁸⁹

Griffith, noting the lack of Western or Central Iranian forces among Alexander’s troops until the return from India, despite the heavy presence of Eastern Iranian cavalry later on, believes that the change from *ilai* to *hipparchies* reflects a change in the composition of the Companions. He pushes his argument farther, stating:

Is the silence of the sources on this matter to be taken as proving that no Oriental cavalry did serve in Alexander’s army at all before the final reorganization of 324,

¹⁸⁷ Hamilton’s notes in Arrian, *Alexander*, trans. De Sélincourt, 399-400.

¹⁸⁸ Brunt, “Macedonian Cavalry,” 45.

¹⁸⁹ G.T. Griffith, “A Note on the *Hipparchies* of Alexander,” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 83 (1963): 71, accessed November 30, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/628454>.

except those troops whom we have noticed as mentioned by name in units outside the *hipparchies*? [...] Moreover, the absence from our sources of all reference by name to the more westerly Iranians suggests very strongly that these peoples probably never served, like the Bactrians and Sogdians and others who are mentioned by name, in separate units outside the *hipparchies*. It remains to be considered whether it is impossible that they should have served inside the *hipparchies*, achieving anonymity in this way.¹⁹⁰

This is an interesting hypothesis, but it is ultimately incorrect. There is absolutely no evidence of any Iranians in the ranks of the Companions at this time. Griffith is correct in the points he makes regarding the battle of the Jaxartes, but wrong in his final conclusion.

The same is ultimately true of Brunt. He argues that the *hipparchies* were still purely Macedonian. Agreeing with Griffith's basic premise that the main distinction between *ilai* and *hipparchies* was size—the latter being larger—he conjectures two possible explanations for how the *hipparchies* may have expanded to include more Macedonian cavalry than the *ilai*. First, he claims some reinforcements of Macedonian horse, although not named by any of the sources, arrived sometime around 328/327, and that this was when the *hipparchies* formed.¹⁹¹ This is difficult to believe. The sources are all quite good at mentioning reinforcements, and a substantial increase in Macedonian Companions would not have been overlooked.

Brunt also posits that that the squadrons of light-cavalry Scouts/Lancers were pulled into the new *hipparchies* of Companions. Griffith, pointing to Arrian's description of the battle, has shown this to be false. Both the *hipparchies* and the Scouts/Lancers are extant, in separate, discernible units at this battle.

Griffith and Brunt actually miss important evidence. Quintus Curtius tells us exactly how the ranks of the *hipparchies* were brought up to strength. He does say that Alexander pulled non-Macedonians into the Companions; but these non-Macedonians were northern barbarians, not Iranians. He records: "To traditional military organization Alexander also introduced several very serviceable innovations. Formerly, cavalymen were enrolled in separate units according to their nationality, but he now abolished tribal

¹⁹⁰ Griffith, "Hipparchies," 68.

¹⁹¹ Brunt, "Macedonian Cavalry," 31.

distinctions and gave command of the units to men of his own choosing without regard to race.”¹⁹² This statement shows that it was men already with Alexander who were now pulled into the *hipparchies*, augmenting the size of Companions. These men included, as will be discussed shortly, the Paeonians and Thracians.

Additionally, Diodorus makes clear that before the battle against the Scythians, the king had been met by many new reinforcements. He lists their composition as being:

five hundred Macedonian cavalry and six thousand infantry, six hundred Thracian cavalry and three thousand five hundred Trallians, and from the Peloponnese four thousand infantry and little less than a thousand cavalry. [... Alexander] also examined the situation of the individual soldiers and introduced many improvements by considering what was useful. He brought the whole force up to a high devotion to its commander and obedience to his commands, and to a high degree of effectiveness, looking toward the battles to come.¹⁹³

Arrian specifically detailed two separate methods for attaching these new forces to the existing army. Turning to a fuller quotation of a passage mentioned earlier, which details the arrival of the reinforcements Diodorus mentioned, we find Arrian writing that Alexander received “both horse and foot, the former he attached to the Companion cavalry and distributed the latter according to nationality among the various infantry units. He also—and this was an innovation—formed two companies in each cavalry squadron and put them under the command of such officers of the Companions who had distinguished themselves.”¹⁹⁴ It was his placing of this group of reinforcements directly into the Companions that necessitated Alexander’s modification of the units therein.

The use of Western and Central Iranians in the army is not necessary to explain the transformation of the *ilai* into *hipparchies*. Instead, for the first time, it appears that significant numbers of European barbarian troops were pulled into the Companion cavalry. After this period, the only references we find to the Thracians is collectively, usually performing garrison duties, suggesting it is only the infantry being talked about. The Paeonians completely disappear, despite their frequent mention before this period.

¹⁹² QC 5.2.6.

¹⁹³ Diod. 17.65.1; 3.

¹⁹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.11.

These forces, along with the Peloponnesian (mercenary?) cavalry, now served alongside the Macedonians in the Companion *hipparchies*.

This was part of a process during which the Companions came to simply denote heavy cavalry. A select group of favorites, chosen from the Companions, continued to retain power and privilege with the king, and neither Thracians nor Paeonians appear within this circle. The Iranians, however, eventually were pulled into both circles.

Although the Western and Central Iranians were not at this time integrated into the Companions, they were, apparently, attached to the army for the first time.

Many scholars suggest that the unit of mounted javelin-men that suddenly appears with Alexander after these reforms is evidence of Western Iranian presence. Hamilton identifies them as such.¹⁹⁵ Griffith, tackling his own and Berve's beliefs, says:

Berve's conjecture that Alexander's unit of mounted javelin-men since it first appears in Hyrcania, consisted of survivors from the troops with Darius at his death seems unnecessary; any or all the satrapies most recently occupied (Susiana, Persis, perhaps even Carmania, Media), could have supplied this cavalry, and one or more of them probably did.¹⁹⁶

Although the three men disagree slightly on the details of this unit, all agree that it was Iranian. The evidence supports them. The Macedonian cavalry—including the Scouts/Lancers—did not use javelins.

Glenn Bugh notes that scouts in many Greek states, such as Athens, often functioned as mounted javelin-men. Looking specifically at Alexander's cavalry, however, he concludes:

We also hear of *prodromoi* [scouts] serving in Alexander's army, but it is difficult to know whether there is any direct connection between the two other than the name. [...] Apparently they [Alexander's] carried a *sarissa* [lance] and are referred to in our sources as *sarissophoroi* [lancers]. The use of this special weapon should distinguish them from the Athenian *prodromoi*, who were customarily equipped with the javelin.¹⁹⁷

Had the Scouts/Lancers suddenly started using javelins in combat, we must question why

¹⁹⁵ Hamilton's notes in Arrian, *Alexander*, trans. De Sélincourt, 38.

¹⁹⁶ Griffith, "Hipparchies," 69-70.

¹⁹⁷ Glenn Bugh, "Hellenistic Military Developments," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Ancient World*, ed. Glenn Bugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 273.

Arrian would have stopped calling them by either name, and referred to them specifically as mounted javelin-men. More to the point, Arrian lists both the Scouts/Lancers and the mounted javelin-men units separately in describing the battle with the Scythians.

It is possible that the men were Thracians, for the Thracian infantry with the army did primarily wield javelins. However, there is no indication that the Thracian cavalry up to this point used any missile weapon, and the way in which Arrian introduces the unit also argues in favor of their being Iranian. He says, Alexander “now marched for Mardia, his force consisting of the Guards, the archers, the Agrianians, the battalions of Coenus and Amyntas, half the Companions, and the mounted javelin-men, a brigade of which had by now been formed.”¹⁹⁸ The fact that this brigade had “been formed,” and not “arrived” suggests it was created in Asia out of the forces available to Alexander at the time. The skill necessary to throw the javelin while mounted should cause us to rule out any Companions suddenly taking on this new role. Many Iranian horsemen, however, did use this weapon.

What this all seems to suggest is that incorporation of Western and Central Iranians occurred slowly, and began with them serving as light cavalry, separated from the Macedonians like the other barbarians. Their final integration was not a set plan initiated immediately by Alexander, but an eventuality that developed over time. Presented with the possibility of using Iranians as light missile cavalry, Alexander decided soon after creating the javelin-men that the Scouts should be placed as heavy cavalry with the Companions in the hipparchies, and Iranians used for lighter horse. This made sense, tactically, because the Iranians, according to Griffith, had little experience in using Macedonian close-quarters weapons: “the evidence seems strong in favor of the missile spear (or the bow) as the weapon *par excellence* of the Iranian horseman, and in the absence of evidence for Iranian lancers of any consequence, I should hesitate to build on this hypothesis.”¹⁹⁹ The Scouts/Lancers and the northern barbarian cavalry did fight

¹⁹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.1.

¹⁹⁹ Griffith, “Hipparchies,” 72.

with close-quarter weapons, making their incorporation into the *hipparchies* sensible and possible.

Politically, Alexander was not at the present in a rush to elevate the Iranians to the status of equality they would later obtain. Doing so at the time would have unnecessarily antagonized the Macedonians. Instead, he continued to use Iranians as supplemental light cavalry. He attached eastern Iranians in large numbers to his army to function in this capacity. It was only later that they began to be integrated into the Companion regiments.

Having already created a group of Western Iranian mounted javelin-men, Alexander expanded the process as he traveled further east. The tremendous numbers of Iranians he now summoned to serve in the army as light cavalry partially reflects the type of warfare he faced in Central Asia. This came in the form of lightning raids and skirmishes from superb enemy missile cavalry under Spitamenes.

To counter this potent threat, Alexander began to rely more heavily on light cavalry to respond to Spitamenes' raids and pursue his forces. Engels concludes, "Alexander's own cavalry forces did not have sufficient numbers for this strategy to be effective, and he recruited powerful units of Sogdian, Bactrian, and Dahaeian cavalry, which remained with the army throughout the rest of the expedition."²⁰⁰

He is correct in his statement. After Spitamenes inflicts a bloody defeat on a Macedonian force that included no Iranians, we find Alexander garrisoning a key region with a force under Coenus of, "his own and Meleager's [infantry] battalions, about 400 Companions, all the javelin-men, and such troops from Bactria and Sogdiana as were attached to Amyntas."²⁰¹ Alexander recruited Iranian cavalry, initially, as much out of necessity for their tactical skills as out of a desire to incorporate them and their homelands into his empire.

By the time the king had entered India and was facing the Indian king Porus on the Hydaspes River in 326, many Iranians were enrolled in the military. We find Craterus

²⁰⁰ Engels, *Logistics*, 105-6.

²⁰¹ Arr. *Anab.* 4.17.3.

being left with, among other units, “the mounted contingents from Arachosia and Parapamisadae,” regions in the far east of the Persian Empire. Alexander commanded a force that included, “the [mounted] contingents from Bactria and Sogdiana, the Scythian cavalry, and the mounted archers of the Dahae.”²⁰² In just a couple of years, Alexander had swelled his army with Iranian cavalry. In the description of how the battle on the Hydaspes against Porus opened, evidence emerges as to the numbers and uses of the Iranians at this point:

Alexander launched his mounted archers, 1,000 strong, against the enemy’s left wing, hoping to shake it by the hail of their arrows and the weight of their charge, and immediately afterwards himself advanced with the Companions against the Indian left, intent upon making his assault while they were still reeling under the attack of the mounted archers.²⁰³

This indicates a considerable number of Iranians among the army. It also points to the fact that many were not placed among the Companions, at least initially. This may be a reflection of their sheer size—too large a number to be easily incorporated among the existing hipparchies—or Alexander’s desire to keep them separated for tactical purposes.

However, this arrangement does not automatically exclude the possibility of some Iranians having been integrated into the Companion regiments. Badian believes that “if [Iranian] units are mentioned separately from the Companion cavalry, this in no way implies that members of the same tribes could not also serve in the latter.”²⁰⁴ The evidence presented during the Opis mutiny in 324 suggests that Alexander actually did begin to integrate the Iranians into the Companions in India.

During the mutiny, the discontented Macedonians specifically mention that:

they resented the inclusion of foreign mounted troops in the regiments of Companions. Bactrians, Sogdians, Arachosians; Drangians, Arians, Parthians, and the so-called Euacae from Persia were all introduced into crack Macedonian cavalry regiments, provided they had some outstanding personal recommendation, such as good looks, or whatever it might be. Besides this, a fifth mounted regiment was formed; it did not consist entirely of oriental troops, but the total cavalry strength was increased and a certain number of foreign troops were posted

²⁰² Arr. *Anab.* 5.11.3; 12.2.

²⁰³ Arr. *Anab.* 5.16.4.

²⁰⁴ E. Badian, “Orientals in Alexander’s Army,” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 85 (1965): 161, accessed November 30, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/628816>.

to it. Foreign officers were also posted to the special squadron [the *agema*]—Cophen son of Artabazus, Hydarnes and Artiboles sons of Mazaeus, Sisines and Phradasmenes, sons of Phrataphernes, the satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, Histanes, son of Oxyartes and brother of Alexander's wife Roxane, Autobares and his brother Mithrobaeus. The command over them was given to Hystaspes, a Bactrian, and the Orientals were all equipped with the Macedonian spear in place of their native javelin.²⁰⁵

This is an important and complex passage. Starting with the first two lines, Badian recognizes that they do more than randomly catalog the peoples included in the *hipparchies*:

The list, apart from Drangians, Arians and Parthians, whom Alexander had only recently drafted into service (Brunt, 43— rightly adding that the Euacae probably came even later), includes Bactrians, Sogdians and Arachosians—duly placed at the beginning and confirming that the list is in chronological order. They, however, we know served Alexander before the Indian expedition. So the obvious answer is that integration went on as the army proceeded; that, at least by the time Clitus was dead and freedom had disappeared (Curt viii 4.30), Bactrians and Sogdians, by then serving the new King (Arr. *Anab.* 4.17.3), gained entrance to the Companions. Others followed as they came to be drafted into service.²⁰⁶

Bosworth also recognizes the logic of this argument. He adds further strength to it by bringing up the point that, for the Bactrians and Sogdians:

We have noted that they fought at the Hydaspes in separate national units and it is striking that they are never again mentioned in the campaign narrative of Southern India. Once more it is possible that the omission is purely fortuitous, but there is nothing against the hypothesis that some of the Iranian cavalry had been brigaded in *hipparchies* as early as 326.²⁰⁷ (Bosworth 16).

Their disappearance in the middle of a campaign, like the disappearance of the Paeonian and Thracian cavalry earlier, is a sign of their integration into the Companions. Thus the Iranians began as supplemental auxiliary forces, much like the other barbarians linked to the army, and ended up as Companions. This was a bold move, but must be taken in context. The northern barbarians had already been incorporated into the Companion regiments well before 324. Was it really this step alone that now prompted outcry from the Macedonians?

A closer examination of the grievances voiced by Alexander's troops shows that

²⁰⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7.6.3-5.

²⁰⁶ Badian, "Orientals," 160-1.

²⁰⁷ A.B. Bosworth, "Alexander and the Iranians," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100 (1980): 16, accessed December 7, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/630729>.

integration of Iranians was more extensive than it might at first seem. This was what angered the Macedonians regarding the first four *hipparchies*. Bosworth understands Arrian to be demonstrating that a structured process was beginning to take shape:

In the first place [Arrian] mentions that certain Iranians, selected for their social distinction and physique, were assigned to the Companion cavalry. There were three categories, carefully marked off: first Bactrians, Sogdians and Arachosians; next Drangians, Arians and Parthians; and finally an obscure group of Persians termed the 'Euacae'. As Brunt saw, these groups corresponded to the cavalry taken from Bactria in 327, the troops which arrived in Carmania in late 325, and finally cavalry levied in Persis in early 324. The incorporation of the last two groups was a relatively recent occurrence.²⁰⁸

In southern India, Alexander had finally and formally shifted the Bactrians, Sogdians and Arachosians into the Companion cavalry. These men had fought for years with the army. It may have seemed to the Macedonians that this move was justified, rewarding them for their service, as the Paeonians and Thracians seem to have been rewarded earlier. However, returning west, Alexander apparently drafted large numbers of other Iranians and turned them into Companions before they had fought a single battle. It was now dawning on the Macedonians that this process was designed to create greater equality between themselves and these barbarians. Up until this point, it is apparently only the Macedonians who were automatically considered Companions, as the reinforcements from Macedonia throughout Alexander's campaigns shows. That is the real importance of Arrian's passages, not simply that Iranians became Companions.

Brunt advocates the theory that, although Alexander led eight regiments in India, the difficulties of the campaigns in that region and of the journey back through the Gedrosian desert effectively forced him to consolidate the remaining Macedonians into four regiments.²⁰⁹ These regiments already had Iranians attached to them, and now gained more, perhaps to replace Iranian losses in the campaign, perhaps to simply increase the barbarian presence in the ranks. Arrian then says a fifth regiment was created when more troops arrived. Brunt analyzes the confusing wording as follows:

²⁰⁸ Bosworth, "Iranians," 16.

²⁰⁹ Brunt, "Macedonian Cavalry," 45.

The Greek is clumsy and perhaps it is corrupt. We are told of the fifth hipparchy that it was not wholly barbarian; that might mean it was more or less Oriental than the other four. One would expect some more precise statement to follow. But what does follow is a statement that relates to the whole cavalry force and repeats that barbarians were enrolled in it, with the slight addition that this occurred when the force was augmented.²¹⁰

It seems most likely that Arrian's meaning in describing the fifth *hipparchy* as not being wholly barbarian means that it was still overwhelmingly Iranian. In fact, Brunt himself, in later writing, agrees with this view.²¹¹ The Macedonians were therefore irritated that from its inception it was formed as a predominantly Iranian *hipparchy*.

Brunt's examination of the text also raises another possibility. Perhaps what bothered the Macedonians regarding the first four *hipparchies* was the fact that Iranians were levied and placed into these units before Macedonian reinforcements were. This could have antagonized Macedonians who believed that the Iranian losses in India and Gedrosia should not be replaced, now that the king was back west and able to access Macedonians. Thus, they were bothered by the fact that one of Alexander's first actions was to confirm that Iranians would have a permanent place in the Companion regiments.

Certainly, Macedonian horse was available. A considerable detachment came to Alexander from Persepolis. Quintus Curtius says: "There arrived at about this time Cleander, Sitalces, Hracon and Agathon, the men who had assassinated Parmenion on the king's orders. Five thousand infantry and 1,000 cavalry came with them."²¹² Previously, Quintus Curtius had noted "three thousand Macedonians" left in the city.²¹³ It seems quite likely that many of the cavalrymen now coming from that city were Macedonians. Arrian has already shown, though, that Alexander first used these men to boost the number of Companions currently with him in Susa, and then added additional Iranian Companions.

Again, since the Macedonians were not peeved with the earlier incorporation of

²¹⁰ Brunt, "Macedonian Cavalry," 44.

²¹¹ Brunt's notes in *Arrian*, vol. 2, 221 n.6.

²¹² QC 10.1.1.

²¹³ QC 5.6.11.

Thracians and Paeonians into the regiments, this later process must be unique for other reasons as well. Most likely, the northern barbarians were not mixed in large numbers into the *hipparchies*, whereas the Iranians were, even forming a majority in one regiment.

The most serious offense identified by the Macedonians was not placing Iranian heavy cavalry in the army, or even mixing Iranians directly into the hipparchies (although both steps did produce poor feeling). It was Alexander's elevation of some Iranians to the most elite positions in the cavalry that really infuriated the Macedonians. Iranians were pulled into Alexander's bodyguard squadron, the *agema*, granted command over themselves within it, and armed as Macedonians. It was an unprecedented move, not just for allowing Iranians to wear Macedonian armor and carry Macedonian weapons, but, more significantly, because a barbarian now held a position of command, and in the *agema* of all units. The Iranians were gaining a relationship with Alexander that did not mimic any ties created previously with barbarians.

The placement of Iranians in the Companions was not in itself a major indication of elevation of status. Philip had previously elevated many Greeks to the position. Alexander, too, apparently opened the force to Paeonians and Thracians, as well as to a number of politically important elites from the Persian Empire throughout the campaign. Yet Alexander's decisions to enroll so many Iranians into the Companions, to allow them to dominate one entire *hipparchy*, and to advance a number of them into his bodyguard mirrored processes only otherwise accessible to Macedonians. This was a profound elevation of the Iranians to a status approaching equality.

Additionally, although Scythians and Dahae are mentioned in the army during the Indian expedition, they are notably absent in the list of peoples integrated into the Companions. Why this should be the case is open to speculation. Perhaps they were merely overlooked by the ancient historians, or perhaps enough of them died in India and on the march back that their numbers were not significant. Perhaps Alexander did not want to integrate them in the Companions, and either dismissed them or kept them in

separate squadrons, perhaps because they used bows and the others used javelins. Perhaps they were not considered Iranians or subjects of Alexander's empire, hailing from towns and polities outside Alexander's control. This is a problem which the sources are unhelpful in solving, but is worthy of note.

It was not long before the Macedonian infantry mutinied. At Opis they protested the Iranian integration into the Companions, the barbarian phalanx, and certain other political actions that the men deemed too favorable towards the barbarians they had just fought so hard to conquer. Alexander's reaction to this insubordination was to further push the Iranians into a position of equality with the Macedonians. Arrian tells us that the king dismissed his Macedones from their assembly, refusing to acknowledge the validity of their arguments. Then:

he sent for the Persian officers who were in the highest favor and divided among them the command of the various units of the army [...] But when [the Macedonians] were told about the Persians and Medes—how command was given to Persian officers, foreign troops drafted into Macedonian units, a Persian Corps of Guards called by a Macedonian name, Persian infantry units given the coveted title of Companions, Persian Silver Shields and Persian mounted Companions, including even a new Royal Squadron, in process of formation—they could contain themselves no longer.²¹⁴

Arrian is incorrect in applying the name of the “Silver Shields” to a unit of infantry—the formal creation of such a battalion occurred after Alexander's death—and he actually means that the Persians and Medes were formed into an elite infantry heavy battalion.²¹⁵ The sheer breadth of Alexander's steps in elevating Iranians, however, is clear—as is the fact that it was not just Persians, but Persians and Medes (Iranians) who were the recipients of these new posts and honors. They now exclusively formed a second *agema*. They gained many more positions of command, and apparently also formed an elite foot battalion, probably similar to the hypaspists (the Foot Companions), which (and this most shocking of all) was given a Macedonian name (this perhaps also being the unit that Arrian dubbed Silver Shields).

²¹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 7.11.1; 3-4.

²¹⁵ Heckel's notes in Justin, *Justin: Epitome of the Phillipic History of Pomperius Trogus*, Vol. 1, trans. J.C. Yardley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 237.

Arrian later hints at the exact identity of some of the Iranians now enrolled either in the bodyguard or the Iranian hypaspist unit. In trying to explain Alexander's increasing adoption of Persian habits, he writes in his conclusion:

Surely, too, his adoption of Persian dress, was, like his claim to divine birth, a matter of policy; by it he hoped to bring the Eastern nations to feel that they had a king who was not wholly a foreigner, and to indicate to his own countrymen his desire to move away from the harsh traditional arrogance of Macedonia. That was also, no doubt, the reason why he included a proportion of Persian troops (the so-called 'Golden Apples', for instance) in Macedonian units, and made Persian noblemen officers in his crack native regiments.²¹⁶

The identity of these "Golden Apples" remains unclear. They are never discussed in detail by Arrian or any of the other sources, but it seems likely, based simply on their name, that these were the Immortals, the Persian king's elite bodyguards, who traditionally bore spears with golden apples adorning the base.²¹⁷ These men had been present at Gaugamela, charged with protecting Darius and his personal entourage.²¹⁸

These moves show a clear preferential treatment of the Iranians. They were now treated in a manner previously reserved for the Macedonians and never extended to other barbarians. Diodorus places the number of Iranian bodyguards Alexander enrolled as one thousand.²¹⁹ Hence these reforms were extensive in both the number of Iranians utilized and in the prestige of the duties to which Iranians were assigned. Diodorus agrees, too, that it was now that "the king appointed generals from specially selected Persians and advanced others into positions of responsibility."²²⁰ Putting Iranians into command positions is an important step; never before did barbarians exercise command over any but their own subunits peoples in the army, and they were always subordinated to Macedonian officers.

Plutarch and Justin include briefer descriptions of these events, but both confirm the basic premise that Iranians were now elevated to bodyguard and command

²¹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 7.29.4.

²¹⁷ Bosworth, "Iranians," 8.

²¹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.5.

²¹⁹ Diod. 17.110.1.

²²⁰ Diod. 17.109.3.

positions.²²¹ In Quintus Curtius, a large lacuna likely causes the narrative to jump over a description of this period.

The integration of Iranians into the Companions, together with the momentous steps just described, show that, at the very least, the Iranian elites were given positions of equality with the Macedonians, while Alexander opened up none of the same opportunities to the other barbarians. During the Macedonian mutiny at Opis, however, Alexander proved that the lower-level Iranian soldiers would also be equal to their Macedonian counterparts in status. He called them into an assembly, separate from the Macedonians.²²² Assemblies, as we have seen, bringing together the common soldiers and king, were a strictly Macedonian tradition. This was the first time that any barbarians were extended the same honor, and, once more, it was apparently not paralleled in Alexander's dealings with any of the other barbarians.

The integration of Iranian foot did not stop here. One more unit was created that fully blended these men and Macedonians into a potent formation that, had Alexander lived, would probably have played a key role in his expeditions into the west.

5. THE MIXED DECADS

After the mutiny at Opis, many Macedonians were discharged due to old age. At the same time, a large force of Iranians and non-Iranian barbarians was summoned. Although a lacuna occurs in Quintus Curtius at this point, Arrian and Diodorus are clear on what happens. Arrian reports the following:

Returning to Babylon Alexander found Peucestas back from Persia with 20,000 Persian troops; the force also included a considerable number of Cossaeon and Tapurian fighting men, as it was generally supposed that of all Persia's neighbors these peoples produced the best soldiers. Here too he was joined by Philoxenus with troops from Caria, by Menander from Lydia, and by Menidas with the

²²¹ Just. *Epit.* 12.12.4; Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 71.3.

²²² QC 10.3.6; Just. *Epit.* 12.12.1.

cavalry which had been serving under his command [i.e. Macedonians].²²³

The Cossaeans are an interesting people to show up on this list. Just months earlier, they apparently remained outside of Alexander's control, despite their central position in the Zagros mountains between Assyria and Media.

The king, unwilling to allow them to retain complete independence, "undertook an expedition against the Cossaeans. These people, neighbors of the Uxians, were a warlike tribe of mountaineers, living in village strongholds high in the hills [...]. Alexander, however, destroyed them."²²⁴ Diodorus adds that "the Cossaeans were utterly defeated, and, distressed at the number of their captives, were constrained to buy their recovery at the price of national submission. They placed themselves in Alexander's hands and were granted peace on condition that they should do Alexander's bidding."²²⁵ Even now, nearly ten years after he had first begun conquering the Persian Empire, the terms Alexander placed on these people largely matched those placed on the other non-Iranian barbarians. They were forced to send troops to Alexander to serve in his army. This was the method used to cement their incorporation into the empire.

What can be surmised about how the Cossaeans and others barbarians fit into the army at this time is based largely on a comparison with how the Iranians were incorporated. Those Iranians summoned along with the other barbarians to Babylon began to be integrated directly along with Macedonian troops, forming a new type of unit. Arrian details how Alexander:

took the opportunity of thanking the Persian troops for their loyalty and obedience to Peucestas, and of congratulating Peucestas himself on his orderly and successful government [as Alexander's satrap of Persia]. The Persians were then enrolled in the various Macedonian units, so that the 'decad'—or section—now consisted of a Macedonian leader, two of his compatriots, one of them a 'double-pay' man, the other a 'ten-stater' man (so called from the pay he received, which was less than that of the 'double-pay' soldiers but more than that of the ordinary rank and file), twelve Persians, and, last, another Macedonian 'ten-stater'. Four Macedonians, that is—the section-leader and three others on extra pay—and twelve Persians. The Macedonians wore native equipment; the Persians were

²²³ Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1.

²²⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 7.15.2-3.

²²⁵ Diod. 17.111.5-6.

armed either with bows or light javelins.²²⁶

Diodorus, too, mentions this new creation, stating, “At this time Peucestes arrived with twenty thousand Persian bowmen and slingers. Alexander placed these in units with his other soldiers, and by the novelty of this idea, created a force blended and adjusted to his own idea.”²²⁷

This new military unit was Alexander’s most innovative to date. By placing missile units in the ranks of the phalanx he formed a powerful, elite unit designed to lead his future assaults into Arabia, Africa, and beyond. This battalion demonstrated, again, Alexander’s tactical genius, and his continued desire to integrate Iranians directly alongside Macedonians in military units.

The new units were based on the old Macedonian “decad”, a column of ten men which had, presumably, once made up the most basic division of the infantry phalanx. By Alexander’s time, the columns had been refined to depths of either eight or sixteen men, depending on the situation.²²⁸ The name, however, remained, and it is by this title that I shall refer to Alexander’s new creation.

Before this final product can be analyzed, Alexander’s use of archers requires examination. Bosworth has tried to dismiss the mixed decads as a product of necessity, at a time when Alexander had dismissed many Macedonians and was waiting for more to come from Europe. He argues, “The mixture was patently forced upon Alexander by military necessity. Had the fresh levies ever arrived, he would certainly have removed the Iranian rank and file and replaced them with the trained [Macedonian] manpower.”²²⁹ This conclusion is based on a faulty analysis of the decads. It ignores the fact that the Iranians used by Alexander were specifically carrying missile weapons. Furthermore, with the addition of 30,000 barbarian phalangites, and fresh Macedonians on the way, why should Alexander have gone to all the trouble of creating this new decad system if it

²²⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.3-4.

²²⁷ Diod. 17.110.2.

²²⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 419.

²²⁹ Bosworth, “Iranians,” 20.

wasn't to last? Finally, why did Alexander sandwich the Iranians between Macedonians, and not simply place them in front of or behind them? The most reasonable answer is, of course, that the design was intentional, and meant to last.

Macedonia was not a land with a strong tradition of ranged weapons. Hammond accurately conveys the dearth of missile troops hailing from the kingdom when he writes:

The light infantry most in evidence in Asia however were the archers, though they were not a large force. 'The archers and the Agrianes' played a distinguished part, usually together, in the fighting of the early years. Yet together they numbered only 1,000 men (2,000 in the Balkan campaign of 335). If the number of the archers is about 500, this means perhaps only about 200 Macedonians, since 'the archers' included a force of Cretans too, who are mentioned four times by Arrian (the Macedonians only twice). If the same sort of number (or even twice as many) was left behind with Antipater, this probably gives a fair idea of the relative weakness in this arm of Macedonia itself. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that Cretans had been recruited at all.²³⁰

The need for archers had caused Alexander, if not Philip, to invest in Cretan mercenaries to supplement his small native force.

These men, as Hammond points out, played a disproportionately important role in Alexander's battles. Time and again, we find references to Alexander specifically selecting the archers to go on missions often led by the king in person. Detailing all of these instances would be tedious and ultimately distract from the purpose of this thesis.²³¹ Hammond, summing up their place in the army, aptly and simply describes their place in the army as "indispensable."²³²

Their tactical usage in battle is worth analyzing, however. As Hammond states, they are often to be found pulled for missions alongside the Agrianians. In many actual battles, however, they are closely linked to the phalanx. During an engagement in the Balkans campaigns, the king deployed the two units thusly:

Alexander brought his archers across from the right wing to a more convenient position in front of the main body of his troops, and instructed them to meet with a volley any attack that the Thracians might make [...] Then the archers checked the Thracian attacks, and the infantry [phalanx] battalions, moving up to close quarters, had no difficulty in dislodging the inadequately armed and equipped

²³⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 431.

²³¹ However, for an example, see Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.1.

²³² Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 433.

enemy.²³³

In the next battle in the Balkans, Alexander again deployed the two units so that they functioned closely together:

Alexander, forming his infantry in column, advanced against [the enemy], with orders to the archers and slingers to proceed in front at the double and discharge their missiles, in the hope of drawing the enemy from the shelter of the wood into the open ground. The tribesmen, once they felt the effect of the missiles, came surging forward to get to grips with the lightly armed Macedonian archers, whereupon [...] the main body of infantry, preceded by the rest of his cavalry, he led against the enemy center.²³⁴

These battle descriptions present an interesting picture. Despite the scarcity of archers and other missile troops, they figured prominently in Alexander's tactics and were used in close conjunction with the phalanx battalions.

Even on water the two units were linked. At the Danube, Alexander "manned [ships] with heavy infantry and archers, and, sailing for the island to which the Triballians and Thracians had fled for refuge, attempted to force a landing."²³⁵ The majority of Alexander's decisive fighting took place across rivers. The battles at the Granicus, Issus, the Jaxartes, and the Hydaspes Rivers all entailed Alexander dislodging enemies from defended riverbanks. In the battle at the Jaxartes against the Scythians, Alexander was forced to use rafts to effect an amphibious landing against mounted archers. His own missile troops proved invaluable during the crossing:

What saved them was the slings, which effectively discharged their missiles against an enemy massed together and exposing itself to danger in a foolhardy manner. The barbarians in their turn rained huge quantities of arrows on the rafts, and there was barely a shield not penetrated by a number of arrowheads. As the rafts began to touch shore, the troops equipped with bucklers rose to their feet and hurled their spears from the rafts, with accuracy now because their throw was unimpeded. As soon as they saw that the Scythians were alarmed, and pulling back their horses, they leapt ashore.²³⁶

Arrian's account of the battle agrees that now the Scythians pulled back from the immediate edge of the river, giving Alexander the space he needed. "First to be put

²³³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.11-12.

²³⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.2.4-6.

²³⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1.3.3.

²³⁶ QC 7.9.7-9.

ashore were the archers and slingers, who were then ordered to open up on the enemy to prevent them from closing on the main infantry units before the mounted troops were all safely over.”²³⁷ The “main infantry units” were, of course, the phalanx battalions, whose survival throughout this battle was dependent on the missile troops. Alexander could only expect more battles with enemies on rivers; missile troops were indispensable in allowing him to cross and come to grips with the enemy, since they were on land.

Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that Alexander embraced a tactical partnership between the phalanx and the missile troops from an early stage, and continued to use it throughout his campaigning. Placing three Macedonian phalangites in front of a column, twelve-deep, of such troops is not an accidental arrangement, nor one built out of manpower shortages. It is a conscious decision to allow the phalanx to advance and form up under the cover of ranged weapons, the formalization of a relationship already utilized numerous times.

Regarding the final row of Macedonians, their placement may have been a step towards preserving the traditional Greek-style phalanx, in which the best troops were in the front and rear. The arrangement also made tactical sense. At the battle of Gaugamela, conscious of his numerical inferiority, Alexander had worried about the safety of his slower units. “To prevent an encircling movement by the numerically superior Persians, Alexander had enclosed his rear with a strong division.”²³⁸ In other words, he had placed phalangites in a second line behind his main force to prevent attacks from the rear.²³⁹ The final row of phalangites in the decads most likely served the same function, as well as ensuring the untested Iranians did not flee.

This unit was integrated, with both Iranians and Macedonians. Arrian specifically mentions the Persians as the missile troops used, and not the other non-Iranian barbarians who arrived in camp at the same time. Diodorus also claims them to be Persian, and both

²³⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 4.4.5.

²³⁸ QC 4.13.30.

²³⁹ See Figure 2.2.

writers identify Peucestes, the governor of Persia, as the man who brought the troops placed in the decads. Integrating these Iranians among the Macedonians created a new relationship between the two peoples, one that went a step further towards making them equals. The same relationship was not extended to the other barbarians of the empire.

All of these changes do not reflect a shortage of Macedonians for the army. This much is clear in Alexander's ability to call for fresh reinforcements from his homeland after returning west.²⁴⁰ How many men he levied is uncertain, but the Macedonian general Leonatus was able to raise a considerable force of Macedonians immediately after Alexander's death. These men were needed to supplement those already under Antipater's command in defeating an all-out Greek revolt, known as the Lamian War. Diodorus says Leonatus "went on to Macedonia, where he enlisted many Macedonian soldiers. When he had gathered together in all more than twenty thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, he led them through Thessaly against the enemy."²⁴¹ Alexander's decision to integrate Iranians into the army was therefore not a simple remedy for a dearth of Macedonian manpower, for no such shortage existed. Rather it was a decision made to bring greater equality between the two peoples solely for the sake of equality.

What makes the uniqueness of the relationship between Macedonians and Iranians most clear is the fact that, at the very time integration began, in India, the local peoples who surrendered to the king were not tied to the army in this way.

6. THE INDIANS

In India Alexander established a relationship with the locals that largely paralleled what he and his father had set in place with the Agrianians. He asked his Indian allies for troops to supplement his own forces, but most of these soldiers were only temporarily retained. At Nysa, Alexander "asked that 300 of their mounted troops should be sent to join him."²⁴² He left the city completely autonomous but allied to him. Before he even left

²⁴⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4.

²⁴¹ Diod. 18.14.5.

²⁴² Arr. *Anab.* 5.2.2.

India, these same auxiliaries were detached from the main army: “The mounted troops from Nysa were sent home,” Arrian tells us, well before the return west.²⁴³ The Indians did not even obtain the type of relationship given to the northern barbarians or non-Iranian Persians, whose troops remained with Alexander throughout his campaigns.

Nonetheless, the number of Indians attached to the army during this expedition was considerable. When he faced Porus at the Hydaspes, Alexander had with him an army that included “5,000 Indian troops under [king] Taxiles.”²⁴⁴ After defeating Porus he requisitioned troops from his defeated foe. “Porus was then sent back to his people with instructions to rejoin later with the pick of his troops and any elephants he happened to have.”²⁴⁵ As a result of this order, an additional 5,000 men and numerous elephants were attached to the army. These men, though present in large numbers, served under their own commanders, as the Agrianians had in Europe. Porus’ troops were also used to garrison Indian cities which surrendered to Alexander.²⁴⁶ They remained in separate units under Alexander’s overall command, but as their own kings led them, these troops are best thought of simply as allies.

The nature of Alexander’s Indian policy is most evident in the terms he imposed on some of the villages of Oxydracae:

they were willing, if that were his pleasure, to accept any governor he should appoint, pay any tribute he should please to demand, and give as many hostages as he should require. Alexander asked for a thousand of their leading men and said he would either keep them as hostages or, if it proved more convenient, make them serve in the army until the end of his Indian campaign. The men were duly sent, all being chosen for their influence and importance, and with them, as an unsolicited gift, 500 war chariots with their drivers. Alexander then appointed Philip as governor of these people and of the surviving Malians. The hostages he returned, but he retained the chariots.²⁴⁷

The king’s treatment of these was quite limited. Although they offered full submission to his rule, Alexander instead chose to appoint a governor over them and levy a number of

²⁴³ Arr. *Anab.* 6.2.3.

²⁴⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 5.8.5.

²⁴⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 5.21.2.

²⁴⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 5.24.8.

²⁴⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 6.14.2-3.

their soldiers. We need not believe his governor here was vested with powers any greater than, say, those given to Alexander the Lyncestian, the “general of Thrace”. Throughout the rest of his stay in India, Alexander continued to deal directly with the local leaders he had ostensibly placed under Philip’s governorship.

Regarding the soldiers Alexander did extract from these Oxydracae towns, they were told from the beginning that their service was to be temporary, and Alexander only kept a small detachment of elite units with him for even this brief period. The primary purpose for asking for these and other Indians to join the army was not to serve as fighters, but to ensure the good behavior of the Indians while Alexander was in the region, and to create a situation whereby the kings and chiefs confirmed by Alexander remained loyal and submissive to his hegemony, and did not fight each other—functions probably later entrusted to his governor, Philip.

The creation of stability in the area was Alexander’s primary concern. As he was preparing to head into the southern Punjab, his actions prove this: “The Indian kings, Porus and Taxiles, had been at variance and reviving their old animosity, but Alexander strengthened their friendship by a marriage alliance and left them in their kingdoms, for he had benefited from the unqualified support of the two of them in the construction of the fleet.”²⁴⁸ He hoped to create client kingdoms in India which, while remaining largely autonomous, would help him when called on to do so, and who would not fight any of the other Indians linked to the Macedonian empire in a similar manner.

The nature of these relationships stands in stark contrast to the king’s retention of Iranians. The Indians gained no permanent place in the empire. It seems that almost all their forces, which at one point numbered over ten thousand, were left behind in India.

Only a select group of them remained attached to the army after it left India. Again and again in the descriptions of Alexander’s return west, the histories detail elephants accompanying the land forces. About 200 of these animals marched,

²⁴⁸ QC 9.3.22.

presumably with their Indian mahouts, all the way to Susa.²⁴⁹ Arrian tells us that on the journey back, “After [Alexander’s] arrival in Carmania, he was rejoined by Craterus with the troops under his command, and the elephants.”²⁵⁰ These animals survive the journey through the Gedrosian desert and are present back in Persia as well.²⁵¹

Alexander’s decision to retain some Indian troops with his army, but none of the local leaders, created a relationship with the tribes and kingdoms of this region similar to that between the king and his Balkan possessions. The local kings remained in charge of their own affairs, while Alexander kept with him a small force of their finest units (cavalry from Paeonia and Thrace, elite infantry from the Agrianians, elephants from the Indians, etc.), which established his position as overall master of the area and linked the localities to his empire through the traditional bond of military service. Needless to say, the elephants were not integrated into any Macedonian force, remaining a separate, distinct unit, unlike the Iranians.

As he had appointed Antipater and another governor to control the Balkans and Thrace, so Alexander placed a governor over India to ensure overall stability, but not to interfere in the running of the local kingdoms’ domestic affairs. He chose to extend to the Indians this relationship even at a time when he was integrating the Iranians more closely with the Macedonians. This further highlights the exceptional nature of Alexander’s treatment of the Iranians. Two more events back up this assertion.

²⁴⁹ Arr. *Ind.* 19.1.

²⁵⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 6.27.3.

²⁵¹ Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.7.

7. THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY AND THE BANQUET OF RECONCILIATION

The marriage ceremony of Alexander and his top generals to numerous Iranian women will only be touched on briefly. Bosworth has made a great deal of the supposed arrangement of Macedonian and Persian soldiers in this ceremony, with the two peoples kept rigidly distinct.²⁵² However, no such description of the ceremony exists in any of the main historians of Alexander. Bosworth instead draws on a fragment of writing of Chares of Mytilene, Alexander's chamberlain, found in Athenaeus. There is some reason to doubt the reliability of this evidence. Ptolemy, who was present at the ceremony as a groom, does not provide any of the details found in Chares, and the two also disagree about the number of weddings held.²⁵³

Regardless, even if the ceremony were as Chares describes it, we should not be fooled into drawing excessive conclusions from it. It was a formal occasion marking marriages between Macedonians and Persians. The division of both peoples and their wearing of traditional garb could be explained away as background to remind everyone present that this was a blending of both cultures, not just the marriage of the Macedonians who fought with Alexander and the Persian royalty that had opposed them.

Bosworth's overemphasis on the arrangement of attendees (if such an

²⁵² Bosworth, "Iranians," 8-9.

²⁵³ Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6 and Ath.12.538b-339a noted in Arrian, *Alexander*, trans. De Sélincourt, 354 n.16.

arrangement existed) misses another key factor. Arrian describes how it was not just Persian women who were given as brides. After listing the brides of Alexander and six top marshals, he reports “Seleucus [was given] the daughter of Spitamenes of Bactria. Similarly, the other officers—to the number of eighty all told—were given as brides young women of the noblest Persian and Median blood.”²⁵⁴ Spitamenes had been one of the many Iranians to rebel against Alexander in the east; he was not an ethnic Persian. The selection of his daughter to marry a top-ranking Macedonian like Seleucus, and the inclusion of Median women, shows that Alexander saw Iranians, and not just the ethnic Persians, as worthy of marrying his top marshals. In fact, we must also remember that Roxane, Alexander’s wife since 327, was a Sogdian Iranian, not an ethnic Persian.

The six brides listed before Seleucus’ were Persian, but this was only a reflection of their closeness to the Persian royal house, not simply their being Persian. As Arrian fails to list the other seventy-three brides, it is possible that even more were Iranian from other areas and not just Persians or Medians.

Another ceremony also deserves attention. After Alexander and his Macedonian troops reached an agreement to end the mutiny at Opis, the king issued orders which provide us with our last look at his intentions for the Iranians, since Alexander died not long afterwards. Arrian describes how:

To mark the restoration of harmony, Alexander offered sacrifice to the gods he was accustomed to honor, and gave a public banquet which he himself attended, sitting among the Macedonians, all of whom were present. Next to them the Persians had their places, and next to the Persians distinguished foreigners of other nations; Alexander and his friends dipped their wine from the same bowl and poured the same libations, following the lead of the Greek seers and the Magi. The chief object of this prayer was that Persians and Macedonians might rule together in harmony as an imperial power. It is said that 9,000 people attended the banquet; they unanimously drank the same toast, and followed it by the paean of victory.²⁵⁵

This banquet was held, as Hamilton notes, mainly to reconcile Alexander with his Macedonian soldiers.²⁵⁶ They sat in the seats of honor next to the king, not because of

²⁵⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6.

²⁵⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7.11.8-9.

²⁵⁶ Hamilton’s notes in Arrian, *Alexander*, trans. De Sélincourt, 366 n.39.

their ethnicity, but because they were the soldiers with whom Alexander had conquered so many lands. Their principle arguments during the mutiny had been that the king was relying too heavily on Iranians; the separation of these two peoples at this banquet is only to be expected.

What matters is the division of the Persians from other “distinguished foreigners,” and Alexander’s appeal for the “Persians” and Macedonians to rule jointly. With this act Alexander made his intentions clear: the Macedonians were to only jointly administer their new empire. But who was the other party with whom they were to share this honor—was it just Persians, or Iranians in general?

Arrian’s terminology is unusually precise in this passage. As to whether his use of the word Persian was really meant to include other Iranians in either context of the quote (that is, the seating arrangement and the prayer), Bosworth provides some evidence that, yes, they were:

There was certainly Macedonian fear and resentment of the Persians around Alexander and the king played upon these emotions to destroy the mutiny [at Opis]. There was every reason under the circumstances for a ceremony of reconciliation and a prayer for concord. Concord is associated with community in empire, and there is no doubt that Arrian means the sharing of command in Alexander’s empire. [...] Alexander may be referring to the satrapies of the empire that had been and were to continue to be governed both by Macedonians and Iranians. There may even be a reference to the army commands recently conferred upon Persians [...] The prayer and its context are primary evidence for bad blood between Macedonians and Iranians and Alexander’s desire to use some at least of both races in the administration of the empire.²⁵⁷

The term “Persian” is always problematic, as the historians could be using it to refer either to ethnic Persians or to Iranians. Assuming Bosworth is correct in his inference that Alexander was referencing the satrapies under joint control and the new barbarian commands, it must, in this instance, refer to the latter definition. The number of Iranian satraps appointed or confirmed in their positions of power is extensive, and better left for another paper, but many were not ethnic Persians. Similarly, as we have seen, at least some Iranians who were not specifically Persians gained positions of command (such as

²⁵⁷ Bosworth, “Iranians,” 2.

the Bactrian leader of the Iranians in the *agema*). This prayer—administered, importantly, by both Greek priests and Iranian Magi—once more suggests that Alexander placed the Iranians above other barbarians, intending for them to jointly rule his empire with other Macedonians.

CONCLUSIONS

When Alexander returned from India, he began rapidly and forcefully consolidating his new empire. Among the steps taken towards this end was the creation of new relationships with the Iranians. The elevation of these people to a point of equality militarily with the Macedonians—a process giving them a place in the new empire politically equal to that of the Macedonians, as well—is especially interesting when compared to the king's severing of other ties for good.

Turning to Greece, Alexander destroyed, once and for all, the military ties his

father had established with the city-states and the mercenaries that gave them a place in the empire. As we have seen, the League had long ago been dismissed from the campaign, but many mercenaries remained with Alexander. Some were settled in various cities across Asia. In India, Alexander learned that:

unrest had arisen among the soldiers recently settled by the king in colonies around Bactria, and they had revolted against Alexander [...] After murdering some of their compatriots, the stronger party began to contemplate armed insurrection. [...] They] returned home with the others who had deserted the colonies allotted them by the king.²⁵⁸

As if revolt by the Greek mercenaries weren't enough, many more deserted with various satraps and governors who feared punishment when Alexander returned to the Middle East. The Greek mercenaries of India also assassinated Alexander's governor, Philip. These events infuriated Alexander. He "wrote to all his generals and satraps in Asia, ordering them, as soon as they had read his letter, to disband all their mercenaries instantly."²⁵⁹ As to where the Greek soldiers were to go, Alexander decided on a radical plan of action.

It was now that Alexander began rapidly altering his relationship with the Greek states, which had remained static even after the League forces had been dismissed at Ecbatana. Macedonia's relationship with Greece had remained locked in the Common Peace provisions of the League's charter, keeping the former from interfering in the latter's internal politics. Yet now Alexander "ordered the restoration of exiles (except those with the blood of citizens on their hands) by all the cities which had expelled them. The Greeks dared not disobey this order, despite their belief that it constituted the first step towards the collapse of their laws, and even restored what remained of their property to the condemned men."²⁶⁰ No longer happy with the existing relationship between Macedonia and Greece, by which the latter remained largely autonomous, the king took steps to assert his authority over all of Greece and ordered all cities to accept exiles back

²⁵⁸ QC 9.7.1-2; 11.

²⁵⁹ Diod. 17.106.3

²⁶⁰ QC 10.2.4-5.

into their communities.

This was important not just for his apparent desire to remove Greeks from any semblance of equality or partnership in the empire. Now, apparently, Alexander was also addressing all of Greece and not just the members of the League. This was only the beginning:

Alexander addressed two further requests to the Greek states in general. First he asked that they should establish cults in honor of his dead friend Hephaestion as 'hero'. Such heroization [sic.] of a dead man had been granted in the past, for instance to Brasidias and Timoleon. Alexander's request was accepted. Some cults were established in 323. Second, he asked that he himself should be granted 'divine honors'. Precedents were rare [...] But it was unique that the request was made by the would-be recipient. What were Alexander's motives? His chief motive was the desire for glory: to be recognized by the Greeks as a benefactor of exceptional degree. To this may be added a political motive. A request from so powerful a person was likely to be accepted as a veiled order, and the general acceptance of him as a god would enhance his authority in the Greek world. This request, then, may be seen as a first, perhaps tentative step on the road towards establishing a ruler cult in the Greek world.²⁶¹

As Alexander reshaped his place in the Greek world, unwilling to keep the current relationship, he was reducing the status of the Greeks. No longer did any freely serve in his army, either as members of the League or as mercenaries. Those who remained came from cities in the Balkans (and possibly Ionia) who were bound to the king in ways similar to the barbarians of Asia and the north.

What Alexander's future plans held for Greece is, of course, unknown. The Greeks themselves certainly believed that their freedom was about to disappear, and, upon Alexander's death just months later, revolted against Macedonia.

Alexander's definitive steps to rework his relations with Greece were part of a broader push towards consolidation. The same desire caused him, at this very time, to dismiss all the over-aged Macedonian veterans, retaining 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, and levying a fresh force of Macedonian soldiers.²⁶² Construction of docks in India had already begun, "as it was Alexander's intention to leave a considerable fleet stationed at Pattala, at the junction of the two estuaries of the Indus," and Nearchus'

²⁶¹ Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2, 82.

²⁶² QC 10.2.8; Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4.

voyage was aimed at exploring the best places along Alexander's southern coasts for building more ports.²⁶³

The most dramatic and decisive steps to integrate the Iranians into the Macedonian ranks took place against this backdrop. The elevation of Iranians within the army, therefore, should not be taken as a unique action detached from any larger goal. Alexander was consolidating his empire as he saw fit, and elevating the Iranians to equality was a distinctive step in this process.

As we have seen, the Macedonian state was set up through a partnering of political power with military obligation. Access to any power exercised above the local level was certainly a product of this relationship, which Philip expanded to incorporate northern barbarians and Greeks into his new European empire. With Philip's assassination occurring just weeks before his planned embarkation to lead the war against Persia, Alexander inherited both the traditions for establishing empire and the war with which to gain one.

Alexander initially established ties to the various nations within the Persian Empire through a system similar to that used by Philip in the Balkans, leaving natives in charge of their own local affairs, while requisitioning from them auxiliaries to serve in the army. However, over time Alexander began showing preferential treatment for the Iranians in the military. This process began slowly and then accelerated in southern India and back in western Asia. Although Alexander died soon after his return from the east, he had taken enough concrete steps towards military reform that his intentions for the Iranians in this sphere are unmistakable.

Alexander placed Iranians in positions of equality with the Macedonians in the army, the first time any such relationship was presented to anyone outside the kingdom. The political implications of this process cannot be overlooked or underestimated. Destroying the distinctions between Iranians and Macedonians in the army destroyed the

²⁶³ Arr. *Anab.* 6.20.1.

political distinctions between the two peoples in the empire. Alexander foresaw joint control over, and membership in, his empire, based on a relationship still cemented through military service.

Alexander's vision was truly revolutionary. His tutor, Aristotle, had long preached the superiority of the Greeks over barbarians and the need to keep the races separate.²⁶⁴ Philip had largely adhered to this policy, caring far more about earning the backing of the Greeks than conquering them. Alexander deviated from these courses and established an empire based on a partnership between conquering Greco-Macedonians and conquered barbarian Iranians. Not even the Achaemenid Persians, though they incorporated the Medes into their imperial hierarchy, extended equality to their defeated foes. Had Alexander lived longer, we can only imagine how far his empire may have extended; the political structure that would have driven it, however, is already evident.

Although on the surface much of Alexander's life seems to be defined by war and conquest, the evidence laid out above suggests his accomplishments ought to be reevaluated. He was both more concerned about, and more gifted in, issues of administration than the credit usually given to him reflects.

The study of Alexander the Great should continue to cause debate and spur future research. It is my sincere hope that this thesis may in some way contribute to these lofty goals. It has been, for me, a pleasure to both research and write, and an excellent way for me to cap my academic pursuits as an undergraduate.

FIGURES

Figure 1.1: The Macedonian Phalanx.

²⁶⁴ Plut. *Mor. De Alex. fort.* 6.329b.

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

(Image found at http://www.wildfiregames.com/~art/history/hellenes/images/01_macedonian_phalanx.jpg.)

Figure 1.2: Philip II's Macedonian Empire, 336 BC.

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

(Image found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Macedonia_336_BC-en.svg.)

Figure 2.1: Alexander's Empire, 323 BC (with his route highlighted).

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

(Image found at http://www.newgenevacenter.org/02_The-West-to-1900/maps/MHH_323-BC_Alexander%27s-Empire.gif.)

Figure 2.2: The world, as it was known to the Ancient Greeks.

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

(Image found at <http://0.tqn.com/d/ancienthistory/1/7/X/M/2/HerodotusWorldMap.jpg>.)

Figure 2.3: The Battle of Gaugamela, 331 BC. (Note Alexander's reserve phalanx line.)

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

(Image found at: <http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=battle+of+gaugamela&view=detail&id=571BC625633E5BA057B5932BE85AFC7E4E0856A5&first=1&FORM=IDFRIR.>)

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