CIVIL WAR IN ALGERIA (1991-2002) AND ITS AFTERMATH:
ANALYZING THE EMERGENCE & EVOLUTION OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

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Abstract

The Algerian civil war (1991-2002) and its aftermath represent a rich case study to analyze the formation and evolution of non-state armed groups. While the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN, National Liberation Front) built its legitimacy through a war of liberation to end French colonial rule, the regime's authority began to wane in the late 1980s and was ultimately threatened by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) through elections in December 1991. In order to protect its authority, the Algerian military intervened in January 1992 to cancel the electoral process and suppress the FIS, radicalizing the political opposition and touching off a bloody civil war that raged for more than a decade and featured a variety of armed Islamist groups challenging the FLN-military regime. Through a strategy of intense manipulation and infiltration of the militant organizations, as well as an amnesty program, the Algerian government remained in power and has bolstered its position since 2002. However, despite the Algerian administration's resurgence, the last remaining armed group in the civil conflict – the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) – evolved into Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the mid-2000s. AQIM does not pose an existential threat to the Algerian government or military, but constitutes a security risk inside Algeria and throughout the Sahara-Sahel region, particularly in northern Mali, based on the group's transnational operations, shift to a decentralized organizational structure, exploitation of ungoverned areas, foreign relationships, strengthening due to instability in Libya and Mali, and criminal activities. This assessment traces the development of Algeria's security environment from the late 1980s to the present, analyzing the government's declining legitimacy in the late 1980s that led to the outbreak of the civil war, the regime's effective policies that enabled it to maintain power and subdue its armed challengers, and the organizational innovations pursued by AQIM allowing it to endure.

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List of Acronyms

AFRICOM: United States Africa Command
AIS: Armée Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Army)
AQ: Al-Qaeda
AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI: Al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb
ATT: Amadou Toumani Touré
DHS: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DoD: U.S. Department of Defense
DRS: Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (Department of Intelligence and Security)
ECOWAS: Economic Community Of West African States
FIDA: Front Islamique du Djihad Armé (Islamic Front of the Armed Jihad)
FIS: Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)
FLN: Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)
FTOs: Foreign Terrorist Organizations
GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)
GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)
GWOT: Global War on Terror
HDS: Houmat Al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya (Guardians of the Salafi Call)
ICG: International Crisis Group
LAX: Los Angeles International Airport
LIDD: Ligue Islamique pour le Da'wa et le Djihad (Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad)
LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
MANPADs: man-portable air-defense systems
MEI: Mouvement pour un État Islamique (Movement for an Islamic State)
MIA: Mouvement Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Movement)
MNLA: Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
MOJWA: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NAM: Non-Aligned Movement
NDU: National Defense University
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSAGs: non-state armed groups
NTC: National Transitional Council
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
PSI: Pan-Sahel Initiative
SAMs: surface-to-air missiles
TRACFIN: Traitement du Renseignement et Action Contre Les Circuits Financiers Clandestins (Financial Information Processing Cell and Combating Illicit Financial Activities)
TSCTI: Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative
UN: United Nations
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSG: United Nations Secretary-General

Introduction: Overview of the Algerian Civil War & Its Aftermath

Between 1991 and 2002, Algeria experienced a devastating civil war that resulted in an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 deaths. The protracted armed internal conflict pitted the Algerian military against a host of radical Islamist militant groups. The civil war was launched after the Algerian military annulled the December 1991 national elections, in which an Islamist opposition movement known as the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) performed strongly and threatened the regime's hold on power. In addition to invalidating the 1991 electoral results, the military canceled the planned second round of elections in January 1992 due to fears of a FIS victory, and expanded the repression of political opposition personnel and groups.[1]

Figure 1.
A map of Algeria

Throughout the course of the civil war, numerous militant organizations, including the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA, Armed Islamic Group), the *Armée Islamique du Salut* (AIS, Islamic Salvation Army), the *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat* (GSPC, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), the *Mouvement Islamique Armé* (MIA, Armed Islamic Movement), the *Mouvement pour un État Islamique* (MEI, Movement for an Islamic State), the *Front Islamique du Djihad Armé* (FIDA, Islamic Front of the Armed Jihad), the *Ligue Islamique pour le Da'wa et le Djihad* (LIDD, Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad), the *Houmat Al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya* (HDS, Guardians of the Salafi Call), and others, waged a violent campaign that

[1] "Algeria Profile: Timeline," BBC, January 20, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856 (accessed April 2013).

challenged the Algerian state dominated by the military-backed *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN, National Liberation Front).[2] The GIA, AIS, GSPC, and MIA served as the core of the Islamist militant groups battling the Algerian state. Through an intense counterterrorism campaign and a national reconciliation program to disarm large numbers of militants, the Algerian military eventually emerged victorious in 2002 and concluded large-scale fighting.[3]

However, low-level violence has persisted since 2002 and the GSPC has evolved into Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), serving to bring a more significant transnational component to the Algerian conflict. Though AQIM does not currently pose an existential threat to the Algerian state, it has systematically targeted the Algerian government and security forces, Western workers and tourists in Algeria, and international assets throughout North Africa and the Sahel.[4] The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 and a military coup in Mali in 2012 have

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[2] For a more detailed description of each of the Islamist militant groups involved in the Algerian civil war, see "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group," July 30, 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Algeria/Islamism%20Violence%20and%20Reform%20in%20Algeria%20Turning%20the%20Page.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[3] Rachid Tlemçani, "Algeria Under Bouteflika: Civil Strife and National Reconciliation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec7_tlemcani_algeria_final.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[4] Stephen Ulph, "Declining In Algeria, GSPC Enters International Theater," *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor,* January 9, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=634&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1 (accessed April 2013); "Country Reports on Terrorism 2011," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, July 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[4] "Terror in the Maghreb: The Long Arm of al-Qaeda," *The Economist,* April 12, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/8994446 (accessed April 2013); Andrew Black, "The Reconstituted Al-Qaeda Threat in the Maghreb," *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, February 21, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1006&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1 (accessed April 2013); Jonathan Masters, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), January 24, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 (accessed April 2013); "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *The New York Times*, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_the_islamic_maghreb/index.html (accessed April 2013).

served to destabilize the security situation in North Africa, and presented AQIM and its affiliates with increased operating space and weapons supplies.[5]

Part I: The Formation & Development of Non-State Armed Groups in the Algerian Civil War

The Algerian civil war and its aftermath present a series of analytical questions related to the topic of how armed groups emerge during the course of a civil war, develop their capabilities, and decline (or persist in new and adapted forms) during the war and after the conflict has concluded.

Section 1.1 of this analysis examines four theoretical concepts to identify the most important factors influencing the formation, development, and weakening or endurance of armed groups in the context of civil wars. These four independent variables include: weak states and ungoverned areas, religious extremism and popular grievances, external relationships and inter-organizational ties with relevant actors, and the internal structures of armed groups and consequences for the strategy of state security institutions.[6]

Section 1.2 applies each of these independent variables to the Algerian case study and assesses their ability to account for the emergence, evolution, and decline or persistence of the various armed groups in Algeria's civil war. In this context, several important questions are addressed.

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[5] Yahia H. Zoubir, "Qaddafi's Spawn: What the Dictator's Demise Unleashed in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July 24, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137796/yahia-h-zoubir/qaddafis-spawn?page=show (accessed April 2013).

[6] As analyzed in both Section 1.1 and Section 1.2 of this paper, these independent variables and their application in the case study of Algeria's civil war often have significant overlap and should not be regarded as completely distinct concepts. Thus, for example, there are common characteristics, both theoretically and practically, between weak states that have lost their political legitimacy, and the rise of religious extremism. Additionally, this list of variables is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather focuses on the most significant factors in explaining Algeria's civil war.

First, what factors account for the outbreak of large-scale violence in Algeria in 1992? Related, what enabled a rash of armed groups to develop and challenge the Algerian state? As the civil war evolved, why were some groups, such as GIA, AIS, and others, ultimately suppressed and disbanded by the Algerian military, while the GSPC was able to survive after the civil war concluded and ultimately evolve into AQIM? Finally, what formula has the Algerian government and military used to prevent the resurgence of large-scale violence since the conclusion of the civil war? Why has this strategy been essentially successful?

Part II: The Transformation to AQIM & the Internationalization of Algeria's Internal Conflict

As represented by the GSPC's transformation into AQIM, the remaining armed group in Algeria's internal conflict has adopted a much more pronounced international agenda,[7] essentially AQIM's focus on a regional program in addition to its Algeria-centric objectives. Within this shifting context from a civil war to an international dynamic, an important question arises: how has AQIM persisted and evolved as a NSAG and security threat since the end of the Algerian conflict in 2002?

Section 2.1 first discusses the organizational change of the GSPC into AQIM, including the motivations that prompted this shift, AQIM's international targeting, the group's reconstituted structure, exploitation of ungoverned areas, and inter-organizational relationships. Section 2.2 addresses the consequences of the Libyan revolution in 2011, the military coup in Mali in 2012, and broader security issues brought about by the Arab Spring, focusing on how these trends have

[7] Jean-Pierre Filiu, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/al-qaeda_islamic_maghreb.pdf (accessed April 2013).

impacted Algeria's security and political environments, and AQIM's operations and capabilities in particular. Finally, Section 2.3 addresses the issue of NSAG financing, namely the informal and illicit activities that serve to finance the operational capabilities of militant organizations, as represented in the case study of AQIM.

These components form an analytical argument regarding the shift in Algeria's security setting following the end of the civil war in 2002, suggesting that AQIM's pursuit of transnational operations and attacks; transformed organizational structure; utilization of ungoverned areas; foreign linkages; a more permissive regional environment due to instability in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere; and criminal operations have been the most important factors in the group's persistence. However, despite the endurance of AQIM as a security risk inside Algeria and its expansion throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions, the Algerian state has been strengthened since the end of the civil war in 2002 and is no longer faced with the existential threat of NSAGs.

Part I: The Formation & Development of Non-State Armed Groups in the Algerian Civil War

Section 1.1: Theoretical Frameworks on the Formation, Development, and Persistence of Armed Groups

This section examines several theoretical concepts that may serve as independent variables to explain the establishment, evolution, and endurance or decline of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the context of Algeria's civil war.

Weak States & Ungoverned Areas

The framework of weak states encompasses a variety of characteristics, including states with political legitimacy problems, insufficient bureaucratic and institutional structures, and territories outside of their control. Such features often provide favorable conditions for the emergence and growth of NSAGs.

K.J. Holsti argues that there are three key indicators of state weakness. First, weak states have low levels of vertical legitimacy, in which large portions of the population do not give their consent and loyalty to the state and its institutions to govern over the society. Second, weak states also have low levels of horizontal legitimacy, meaning that the internal political community is highly fractured and there is a lack of an agreed upon social contract or set of political principles among the population. In this concept, states with low horizontal legitimacy are exclusive and often do not incorporate different identity groups within the state structures. Finally, weak states are characterized by patrimonial or personalized rule, in which the leaders, political elites, and dominant institutions act as if they are the state and seek to tightly control the

population, rather than represent society. Holsti argues that states with these three traits of state weakness often display several additional characteristics. These include: a significant deficiency of personal and human security, the ruthless operation of coercive institutions, a lack of balance between extraction and services, the absence of accepted political rules of the game, pervasive corruption with elites that act as predatory actors, and state control by an individual or small group of people.[8]

Donald Snow elaborates on Holsti's criteria of weak states in his authority-legitimacy framework, in which he argues that internal wars are the result of a crisis of both authority and legitimacy within a state. Legitimacy refers to a shared set of political values and beliefs regarding the nature of government, and involves the population willingly granting its consent to the government the right to rule. In the absence of legitimacy, the state derives its authority from coercive power and institutions. In many cases, however, the state relies on a mix of legitimacy and coercion to establish and maintain its authority over the population. Snow's framework thus focuses on the strength/weakness of both the state and society, giving importance to the power of the state's coercive institutions and society's acceptance of the government's authority. When a state's coercive capabilities become weak and the society rejects the government's legitimacy, Snow argues that the state faces a crisis of both authority and legitimacy and is susceptible to challengers, including those using armed resistance. States confronting such a crisis are often categorized as failing or failed states.[9]

Building on Holsti's and Snow's frameworks, weak states with significant problems of authority and legitimacy are often unable to fully control their territories, leading to the emergence of

[8] Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[9] Donald Snow, *Uncivil Wars*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

ungoverned areas. As discussed in *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, ungoverned territory is defined "as an area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control."[10] Ungoverned territories exist not only in failed states, but also in weak states in which the central government's authority often does not extend throughout the entire territory of the country. Within this RAND model, there are four key indicators of ungovernability – the degree to which an area is difficult for a state to exercise coercive control. These indicators include lack of state penetration, lack of state monopoly on the use of force, lack of state control over its borders, and high levels of external interference from neighboring states and other foreign actors.[11]

Indicators of Ungovernability
Variable
Lack of state penetration
Absence of state institutions
Lack of physical infrastructure
Corruption and the prevalence of the informal economy
Social/cultural resistance
Lack of monopoly of force
Illegal armed groups
Criminal networks
Population with access to arms
Lack of border controls
External interference

Indicators of Conduciveness to Terrorist Presence
Variable
Adequacy of infrastructure and operational access
Transportation and communications
Financial
Sources of income
Favorable demographics
Presence of extremist groups
Supporting social norms
Preexisting state of violence
Presence of favorably disposed NGOs or social assistance programs open to exploitation
Criminal syndicates available for hire
Invisibility

Figures 2 & 3.
Indicators of Ungovernability & Conduciveness to Terrorist Presence
Source: Rabasa and Peters, "Understanding Lack of Governance."

However, a state fulfilling some or all four of these indicators does not automatically mean that NSAGs will exploit this ungovernability in order to operate. Instead, there are four sub-variables, regarded as indicators of conduciveness, that impact whether an ungoverned territory is likely to serve as a safe haven for armed groups. These measures of conduciveness include: the adequacy of infrastructure and operational access, sources of income, favorable demographics, and invisibility. Thus,

[10] *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.
[11] Angel Rabasa and John E. Peters, "Understanding Lack of Governance" in *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, pp. 1- 5.

ungovernability in it of itself does not mean that an area will become a base for NSAGs. Rather, a territory must also be conducive.[12]

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) offers another definition of an ungoverned area:

> "A place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population…due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior…In this sense, ungoverned areas are considered potential safe havens."[13]

The last portion of this DoD definition is particularly significant, as ungoverned territories can serve as bases of operation for NSAGs seeking to challenge the central government in that state, or in a neighboring country. The DoD definition also focuses on the manner of governance and a state's legitimacy as key variables determining the prevalence of ungoverned areas.[14] As discussed by Wahlert, NSAGs can take advantage of these power vacuums and lack of government authority within these ungoverned areas, and are often able to thrive by recruiting and training personnel, planning militant operations, building up their resource base, and deploying fighters.[15] However, Patrick makes an important distinction between weak, but functioning states, which have basic levels of infrastructure that can be utilized by armed groups, and completely failed states, where the wholesale absence of services creates a difficult operating environment for NSAGs.[16]

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[12] Rabasa and Peters, "Understanding Lack of Governance."
[13] Robert D. Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens," U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/ugash_report_final.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[14] Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens."
[15] Matthew H. Wahlert, "The Failed State," in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Volume 2), edited by James J.F. Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.
[16] Stewart Patrick, "Failed States: The Brutal Truth," *Foreign* Policy, July/August 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/the_brutal_truth?page=full (accessed April 2013).

Religious Extremism & Popular Grievances

This framework builds on the earlier discussion of political legitimacy in the section on weak states, and examines grievances among society that precipitate a crisis of governance for the state and gives popular support to NSAGs. As the issue of radical ethnonationalism is not relevant in the case study of Algeria, this section focuses on religious extremism.

Violent religious extremists argue that religion, which includes a code of behavior governing the lives of individuals and society, should become the basis of the state's governing system, and use armed means to pursue this objective. Religious extremist movements are frequently transnational in nature, meaning that the religious cause and objectives often extend beyond the political borders of the state where that organization may be based or is active, in contrast to ethnic movements, which are usually more localized in their orientation. Violent religious extremism is distinct from legitimate political parties that are organized on the basis of religion, but this division is often blurred in practice, especially by incumbent regimes that regard both violent religious extremist groups and non-violent religious political parties as similar challengers to the state's supremacy.[17]

Both violent and non-violent religious extremist movements often seek to exploit the ideological shortcomings of the government(s) that they are challenging. In the context of the Middle East and North Africa, religious extremist organizations have often alleged that sitting regimes are secular or un-Islamic, despite being ruled by Muslims, since their government structures and institutions are not modeled after Islamic law, *shariah*. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 that ousted the Western-backed Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi provided a template for the

[17] Richard Shultz and Wm. J. Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threats and U.S. Security*. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1994, chapters 1-2.

overthrow of 'secular' governments and served to popularize Islamist opposition movements across the Muslim world, including in Algeria. Following the Iranian framework, Islamism gained increased traction as a viable ideology that both violent and non-violent opposition movements could use to organize around and topple the state that is perceived by religious extremist movements as both corrupt and illegitimate.[18]

As many states in the Arab and Muslim worlds experienced rapid population growth, worsening economic conditions, stresses due to population shifts from rural to urban areas, and an inability to provide housing, healthcare, and other services, Islamist movements effectively tapped into these grievances and advocated a political alternative based on Islam that sought to address these policy failures. Historical state repression of Islamists added to the narrative that 'secular', autocratic governments were illegitimate and necessitated replacement.[19] Moreover, the experience of large numbers of Arab fighters within the *mujahideen* movement that sought to expel the USSR from Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of that country from 1979-1989, provided a generation of militants with extensive ideological and battlefield training, much of which later became directed against their home Arab governments after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.[20]

However, in the context of Islamism, it is important to note that only a particular strain of the Sunni Islamist movement adheres to the *jihadi* agenda that advocates and legitimizes the use of violence. Distinct from the *jihadi* variant, political Islamist movements generally accept the nation-state and constitutional frameworks, reject the use of violence, and work within existing

[18] Fred Halliday, "The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the Challenge to the Secular State," in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002, pp. 91-113.
[19] Shultz and Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threats and U.S. Security*.
[20] John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism*. London, UK: Sterling, 2000.

political structures to advance their Islamist agenda. The second strain, missionary Islam, seeks the preservation of Islamic identity and faith through preaching and other religious activities, but does not seek political power as an objective. Finally, the *jihadi* wing promotes the use of armed struggle against a diverse set of opponents, including internal enemies (nominally Muslim regimes deemed impious), those forces occupying Muslim lands, and global adversaries (such as the West).[21] The writings and theoretical concepts of Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb are fundamental in providing religious legitimation for the *jihadi* use of violence.[22] However, incumbent governments often disregard such neat analytical divisions between political, missionary, and *jihadi* variations of Islamist groups when faced with political or security threats to their dominance of the existing systems.

External Relationships & Inter-Organizational Ties

Many NSAGs cultivate and maintain relationships with a variety of foreign states, militant organizations, criminal networks, diaspora communities, powerful individuals, and other actors. These connections, referred to as external relationships and inter-organizational ties, explain how and why NSAGs develop, uphold, and benefit from ties to a range of relevant players. Such linkages between NSAGs and state and non-state actors may be pursued for a variety of tactical and strategic reasons, as well as ideological motivations, in order to secure political, intelligence, financial, military, logistical, and other types of resources. Bond, Chenoweth, and Karmon all

[21] "Understanding Islamism," International Crisis Group, March 2, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Understanding%20Islamism.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[22] John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks," *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Summer 2004, pp. 222-252.

suggest that the primary drivers behind NSAGs' pursuit of external relationships are basic survival and operational continuity.[23]

Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan focus on why a variety of external actors establish relationships with NSAGs. State support for armed groups, they argue, is primarily driven by geopolitical objectives, rather than ideological affiliations, ethnic affinities, or religious sentiments. State-level sponsorship can include supplying arms, money, materiel, safe havens, diplomatic backing, and other forms of support. Diaspora communities may also provide assistance to NSAGs in their homelands, and are largely motivated by nationalist and/or ethnic ties, particularly a sense of sympathy for the conflict that the militant organization is engaged in. Diaspora aid most commonly takes the form of financial contributions, but can also include political support. Finally, refugees may assist NSAGs based on their motivation to regain their homeland or reestablish their nation's control over a certain territory. Refugee support can include physical protection and manpower.[24]

Horowitz and Potter examine the topic of strategic alliances between armed groups, and argue that these dynamics are critical in understanding the effectiveness of militant organizations. They offer an analytical framework that links group alliances with lethality, arguing that those NSAGs that have deep alliances with other militant organizations have the capacity to carry out more complex and lethal attacks as compared to groups with weak or no ties to other armed networks. In this context, Horowitz and Potter define deep relationships as those linkages that extend to the

[23] Kanisha D. Bond, "Power, Identity, Credibility, & Cooperation: Examining the Development of Cooperative Arrangements Among Violent Non-State Actors," PhD Dissertation, Penn State University, State College, PA, 2010; Erica Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," *The Journal of Politics*, No. 72, Vol. 1, January 2010, pp. 16-30; Ely Karmon, *Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and Islamists*. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005.
[24] Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.

inner, core structures of other NSAGs, rather than the sheer number of ties an armed group has to other militant organizations. Thus, when seeking to build such ties, NSAGs search for potential allies with both substantial and complimentary capabilities in order to pursue the end-goal of bolstering their own operational effectiveness.[25] Jeffrey Record's work supports this framework, arguing that there are strong correlations between external assistance and insurgent victory on the one hand, and a lack of foreign intervention and insurgent defeat on the other.[26]

However, NSAGs are also careful in the development and maintenance of such connections in order to preserve operational secrecy and security. Moreover, the leadership of NSAGs thoroughly assesses the risks with regards to reduced autonomy and diluted ideological purity when considering the formation, continuation, expansion, or severance of these external relationships. Because the depth of effective alliances between armed groups correlates to lethality, Horowitz and Potter argue that comprehensive analysis of these linkages is essential in any successful counterterrorism strategy.[27]

Finally, the dynamics of globalization are also relevant to the external relationships of NSAGs. As discussed by John Mackinlay, globalization has helped facilitate a significant increase in international communications and cooperation between a number of actors, and enabled NSAGs to develop new relationships and gain access to advanced technologies and materiel that were previously only available to states. Globalization has also sped up "the transmission of ideas, goods, information and capital" between states, non-state groups, and individuals, serving to

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[25] Michael C. Horowitz and Philip B. K. Potter, "Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality," Social Science Research Network, November 21, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2018302_code1147966.pdf?abstractid=1787599&mirid=1 (accessed April 2013).
[26] Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success," *Parameters* (Autumn 2006), pp. 36-49.
[27] Horowitz and Potter, "Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality."

bolster the capabilities of NSAGs.[28] Additionally, Hanlon argues that globalization has facilitated the transformation of many NSAGs from local or regional concerns to major, strategic threats with global consequences.[29]

Internal Structures & Organizational Dynamics of Armed Groups

This section on the makeup and dynamics of NSAGs focuses on how militant organizations are internally structured, as well as how such groups plan, coordinate, and execute their operations. The organizational design of a group is also important for how it performs its instrumental functions, including training, combat, logistics, communications, and other activities. In this context, two different types of armed group structures are examined: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. As analyzed in Section 1.2 of this project on the case study of Algeria's civil war, the makeup and organization of NSAGs significantly shapes the counterinsurgency or counterterrorism policies that militaries, security services, and intelligence agencies employ in their efforts to combat such threats.

Hierarchical organizations include a vertically aligned structured set of personnel. Such groups maintain a highly disciplined, clearly delineated command and control structure. In these organizations, positions are connected through a ranked, rigid chain of command, with instructions going down from supervisors and compliance reports going up from subordinates. Supervisors maintain a fixed number of subordinates, and subordinates have clearly identified supervisors to whom each is responsible. The levers of power and high-level decision-making rest with a strong leader, or small group of top officials, who exert centralized authority over the

[28] John Mackinlay, "Globalization and Insurgency," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 352, November 2002, pp. 9-29.
[29] Querine H. Hanlon, "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups," in *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Counterinsurgency,* Jeffrey Norwitz, ed. Newport: Naval War College Press, 2008, pp. 137-147.

group. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and particularly the Fatah faction, led by Yasser Arafat, is an example of a hierarchical NSAG, in which the group's overall strategy and tactics, including its militant operations, were organized and executed in a top-down fashion as Arafat and other top leadership directed all major activities.[30] Hierarchical groups may prove easier for state penetration, as security services can capitalize on a lack of cohesion, factionalism, and disunity to infiltrate the organization and disrupt its operations. However, O'Neil suggests that complex organizational hierarchies are ultimately necessary for NSAGs to achieve their objectives.[31]

Non-hierarchical organizations, also known as networks, by contrast maintain a horizontal collection of personnel linked through some means of communication. Such groups are decentralized, and possibly physically dispersed, and are much more effectively able to operate across large territories, or in a deterritorialized fashion. Non-hierarchical organizations still often include top leadership that set the group's general strategy, but localized, self-sufficient power structures, resident military commanders, operatives, and other personnel have the autonomy to engage in independent initiatives and operations. This self-sufficiency and flatter structure within the group's ranks often helps NSAGs weather numerous arrests and assassinations of top leadership and maintain operational continuity. As discussed by Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, non-hierarchical groups display much more resilience and adaptability when faced with traditional state counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, which are typically not well designed to neutralize these decentralized networks.[32] Hamas, in contrast to the PLO, is largely a

[30] John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism," in Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings, and Interpretations.* New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2006.
[31] Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990, chapters 1- 2, 6.
[32] Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism."

decentralized, non-hierarchical organization,[33] which is one factor in its continued operation despite Israeli military assassinations of many of the group's top leadership, mostly recently Ahmed al-Jabari in November 2012.[34] Despite the differences between these two general categories of group dynamics, some NSAGs may maintain a hybrid organizational structure that includes both hierarchical and non-hierarchical elements.

Section 1.2: Explaining Algeria's Civil War

This section applies each of the four previously analyzed independent variables to the Algerian case study and evaluates their capacity to explain the formation, development, and decline or persistence of the various NSAGs in Algeria's civil war.

Weak States & Ungoverned Areas

Figure 4.
The FLN's organizational logo
Source: http://www.pfln.dz/

Based on the FLN's insurgent campaign and successful war of liberation (1954-1962) that resulted in the end of French colonial rule in Algeria, the FLN had built high levels of both vertical and horizontal legitimacy. In *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, Horne describes how the FLN conducted a skillful insurgency against the French colonial occupation with the aim of winning Algerian popular support. The FLN's strategy, which involved carrying out attacks against French targets in order to elicit massive French counter-attacks, aimed to create a stark

[33] Shaul Mishal, "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4, Summer 2003, pp. 569–589, http://shaulmishal.com/pdf/sm_academic_10.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[34] Jodi Rudoren, "Brigades That Fire on Israel Are Showing a New Discipline," *The New York Times*, November 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/world/middleeast/brigades-that-fire-on-israel-show-a-deadly-new-discipline.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013).

polarization between the brutal French colonial oppression and the FLN's liberation struggle. Despite losing the war to the French in conventional military terms, this policy proved effective in garnering popular Algerian support for the FLN against the French occupation and left the FLN as the undisputed ruling power of the country upon French departure in 1962.[35] In this context, the key analytical question arises: how did the Algerian state, represented by the FLN and its military backers, evolve from a position of supremacy after independence in the 1960s, to a crisis of legitimacy in the early 1990s that facilitated the outbreak of major armed hostilities?



Figure 5.
Algerian President Houari Boumediène (1965-1978)

The Algerian state under President Ahmed Ben Bella (1963-1965) and President Houari Boumediène (1965-1978) pursued policies of Arabization (Arab nationalism), in order to build a strong national identity following colonialism,[36] and state-led industrialization, to finance development. Under a policy of state socialism, Boumediène nationalized Algeria's oil and gas industries in 1971, garnering the regime massive amounts of revenue.[37] Algeria was also very active in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Boumediène period. While the Boumediène regime was undoubtedly repressive and stifled any political opposition, the FLN government, backed by the country's military, enjoyed high levels of domestic legitimacy due to its achievements in state-building in the post-independence period.[38] Roberts

[35] Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York, NY: New York Review of Books, 2006.
[36] "Algeria's Liberation, Terrorism, and Arabization," *The New York Times*, November 19, 2008, http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/algerias-liberation-terrorism-and-arabization/ (accessed April 2013).
[37] John P. Entelis, "Sonatrach: The Political Economy of an Algerian State Institution," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No.1, Winter 1999, pp. 9-27.
[38] Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield: Algeria 1988-2002, Studies in a Broken Polity*. New York, NY: Verso, 2003.

characterizes Boumediène's rule as paternalistic,[39] in which a military strong man imposed order and acquired popular legitimacy through the distribution of hydrocarbon revenues.[40] Despite an emphasis on Algeria's Arab character and a socialist agenda under Boumediène, Laremont notes that the Algerian state during this period also sought to control the religious sphere and used Islam to extend its base of popular support.[41]

Figure 6.
Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid (1979-1992)

The administration of President Chadli Bendjedid (1979-1992), however, governed Algeria with a different set of policies within the framework of FLN-military domination that ultimately led to a crisis of legitimacy for the regime. Bendjedid moved Algeria away from Boumediène's socialist, Arab nationalist program to a more Western-oriented approach that included a rapprochement with France. Bendjedid also introduced liberal economic policies, which resulted in rising economic disparities and corruption. During this period of economic liberalization, the Algerian government continued to heavily rely on revenues from hydrocarbons, and thus experienced an economic crisis in the 1980s with the decline in the global price of oil. As a result, Algerian state revenue from oil and natural gas fell from $13 billion in 1985, to $7.7 billion in 1986. During this time of economic downturn, Algeria's population significantly increased from 12 million in 1965, to 25.7 million in 1991,

[39] Hugh Roberts, "Moral Economy or Moral Polity? The Political Anthropology of Algerian Riots," Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), October 2002, http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57557/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/8ff94f61-6f4c-4d9c-a155-fdb742929d4d/en/WP17HRoberts.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[40] Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algeria's Multi-Dimensional Crisis: The Story of a Failed State-Building Process," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1994, pp. 741-747.
[41] Ricardo Rene Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000.

leading to massive unemployment and increased burdens on the state to provide housing, education, and other services that it could not afford.[42]

In this context of rising discontent over Algeria's economic difficulties, Islamist opposition figures and movements grew in influence, bolstered by support from the Bendjedid regime. Similar to Anwar Sadat's strategy in Egypt in the 1970s, Bendjedid enlisted Islamists as supporters as part of his 'de-Boumediènization' campaign to weaken highly placed figures loyal to the previous government and establish his own base of support.[43] The rise of the FIS in the late 1980s and radical Islamist armed groups in the 1990s is analyzed in greater detail in the section on '*Religious Extremism & Popular Grievances'*, but it is important to understand that this rising Islamist movement – that featured both political and armed elements – took place in the context of a growing crisis of legitimacy for the Algerian state in the late 1980s.

Algeria's economic problems and altered demographics came to a head in October 1988, when mass protests took place in Algiers, which were without precedent in this tightly controlled authoritarian country. Hundreds of Algerians were killed by the military during these riots,[44] which featured large numbers of unemployed urban youth, young men called *hittistes* – 'those who hold up the walls' – reflective of strong social and economic undercurrents, specifically that the state had failed to deliver on its promised social contract.[45] In the aftermath of these deadly

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[42] Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992*; William B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
[43] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[44] Paul Delaney, "Toll is Put at 200 in Algerian Riots," *The New York Times*, October 10, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/10/world/toll-is-put-at-200-in-algerian-riots.html (accessed April 2013).
[45] Alexis Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues," Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 18, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21532.pdf (accessed April 2013); Jeremy Harding, "The Great Unleashing," *London Review of Books* (LRB), Vol. 24, No. 14, July 25, 2002, pp. 6-9, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n14/jeremy-harding/the-great-unleashing (accessed April 2013); Michael Slackman, "A Quiet Revolution in Algeria: Gains by Women," *The New York Times*, May 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/26/world/africa/26algeria.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (accessed April 2013).

demonstrations, the FIS was founded in March 1989 by Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj, and following a new constitution allowing for political parties outside the FLN, the FIS was legalized in September 1989. In December 1991, the first round of national-level elections were held, and the FIS won 188 out of 232 seats, and seemed poised to win the second round of elections in January 1992 by a similar margin. Responding to this electoral victory, the Algerian military intervened in January 1992 forcing President Chadli Bendjedid to resign, then cancelled the second round of elections and banned the FIS, arresting thousands of the organization's activists.[46]

Figure 7.
FIS founders Ali Ben Hadj (left) and Abassi Madani (right)

In this political context, the FLN-military regime was a dealt a serious blow to its popular legitimacy. Using Holsti's framework, Algeria in the late 1980s and early 1990s had developed into a weak state. Based on the December 1991 elections in which the FIS won over 80%[47] of the seats, a significant majority of Algeria's population no longer gave their consent to the FLN-military regime, meaning it had low levels of vertical legitimacy. The Algerian political community was also highly fractured at this stage, represented by the rise of the FIS and its Islamist political program that advocated a new political, social, and economic order for the Algerian state, signifying that the regime also had low levels of

[46] Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992*; Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism*.
[47] Quandt argues that this 80% figure is significantly inflated because the December 1991 vote employed a winner-take-all electoral system. Quandt suggests that if a proportional representation system would instead had been used, the FIS would have only won about 30% of the vote, rather than 188/232 seats, or over 80% of the vote. Nevertheless, 30% support for the FIS still indicated that a large portion of the Algerian population did not support the FLN-military regime.

horizontal legitimacy. Finally, the military's direct intervention into politics in January 1992 and its brutal repression of FIS personnel reflected the military's efforts to control, rather than represent, the population.[48] The Algerian state also fits into Snow's authority-legitimacy framework, as large portions of society rejected the government's authority, and despite the military's intrusion into the political sphere, the country's coercive institutions lacked the preparation and capabilities to deal with the rising NSAG threat that gained steam in the 1990s.[49]

Finally, Algeria's state of affairs in the early 1990s and beyond featured ungoverned areas. The diverse set of NSAGs that were active during the Algerian civil war took refuge in a variety of areas around the geographically large country, mostly in northern Algeria. The GSPC, for example, was significantly active in the mountainous and heavily forested Kabylia region east of Algiers, in northern Algeria, regarded as Algeria's traditional guerrilla stronghold, and known during the civil war as the 'Triangle of Death,' comprising the provinces of Bouira, Tizi Ouzou, and Boumerdès.[50] However, as analyzed in the section on '*Internal Structures & Organizational Dynamics of Armed Groups'*, the significant diversity and fragmentation of NSAGs that operated during the Algerian civil war meant that ungoverned areas as described in the RAND definition – territories in which there is a serious lack of governability, coupled with high levels of conduciveness – never really fully developed to the extent where the government lost absolute control, though its authority was seriously challenged.[51]

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[48] Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*; Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."
[49] Snow, *Uncivil Wars*; Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."
[50] Andrew Lebovich, "AQIM Returns in Force in Northern Algeria," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 26, 2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqim-returns-in-force-in-northern-algeria (accessed April 2013).
[51] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page"; Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."

Moreover, as discussed by Hagelstein based on his research on drawing a geographic model of the location and the course of violence in the Algerian civil war, the large-scale incidents of violence during the conflict took place in areas in northern Algeria around the vicinity of Algiers where the capabilities of government forces and NSAGs were relatively equal.[52] While NSAGs were able to set up bases of operation with local support in parts of northern Algeria and challenge the government's control, the concept of ungoverned areas only partially fits in the Algerian context and does not fully apply, since the military campaign was eventually able to crush most of the NSAGs and reestablish effective control of the country.[53] The GSPC's transition to AQIM, as will be analyzed in greater detail in Part II of this study on *'The Transformation to AQIM & the Internationalization of Algeria's Internal Conflict'*, however, more fully meets the requirements of the RAND and DoD frameworks of ungoverned areas, given AQIM's operation in the Sahel, specifically in the Algeria-Mali-Niger border region, where central governments exercise little or no authority.[54]

Religious Extremism & Popular Grievances

As discussed previously, the Algerian state under Boumediène incorporated Islam as a key component of its nationalist program, highlighting the regime's Islamist credentials to shore up its legitimacy. During the Bendjedid era, the government actively employed Islamists as backers in its 'de-Boumediènization' drive, prompting a significant growth in the Algerian Islamist

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[52] Roman Hagelstein, "Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War," University of Sussex, Households in Conflict Network, The Institute of Development Studies, March 2008, http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wp43.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[53] William B. Quandt, "Algeria's Uneasy Peace," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4, October 2002, pp. 15-23, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v013/13.4quandt.html (accessed April 2013).
[54] "Extremism Spreads Across West Africa and the Sahel," International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), October 2012, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/october/extremism-spreads-across-west-africa-and-the-sahel/ (accessed April 2013); Felipe Pathé Duarte, "Maghrebian Militant Maneuvers: AQIM as a Strategic Challenge," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 28, 2011, http://csis.org/publication/maghrebian-militant-maneuvers-aqim-strategic-challenge (accessed April 2013).

movement. Under Bendjedid, the Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs allowed the construction of thousands of mosques, operated by private imams unconstrained by ministerial supervision. While the Boumediène administration had tightly controlled the religious sphere, Bendjedid's policy facilitated the rise of an Islamist movement outside of state control.[55]

The rise of Algeria's Islamist movement was also promoted by regional trends. Laremont argues that various developments and trends across the Middle East and North Africa helped bolster religio-political groups in Algeria. Specifically, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran that overthrew the Western-supported Shah and installed an Islamist government provided a framework for religious movements fomenting political change and assuming power. Moreover, the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon and the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and its affiliates in Jordan, Sudan, and elsewhere in the 1980s, energized the development of an Islamist movement in Algeria.[56]

Figure 8.
The FIS's organizational logo

In these local and regional contexts, Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj founded the FIS in March 1989, operating in the immediate aftermath of the October 1988 riots in Algiers. Responding to social and economic drivers of the protests and Algeria's state of affairs in the 1980s, the FIS advanced a narrative that the FLN mismanaged the economy, and emphasized that the FLN's socialist

[55] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group. In addition to this political context in which the FIS was formed in the 1980s, Laremont argues that Islamic political resistance has a long organizational history in Algeria. While Laremont does emphasize that Islamic political movements in Algeria over the last 200 years have had a very diverse set of ideological principles and political objectives, he argues that these movements have historically sought to counter what they saw as social, political, and economic inequalities in the country. For more information, see: Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992*.
[56] Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992*.

program and transition to a liberal, market economy had been an undeniable failure. In the run-up to the December 1991 elections, the FIS ran on a campaign that promised employment, education, and healthcare services, winning over key constituencies among the urban youth, working, and poor classes.[57]

However, despite operating purely as a political party, the FIS's actions and public statements shaped the Algerian military's perceptions of the group and its objectives. The International Crisis Group (ICG) describes that "the FIS tended to subvert the 1989 constitution to which it owed its own legal existence, not only by advocating an Islamic state (*dawla Islamiyya*), but equally by denouncing democracy as 'infidel' (*kufr*)."[58] The FIS called for an unlimited general strike in May-June 1991 in a bid to change the country's electoral laws, signaling to the military that the group sought power without elections.[59] The FIS also articulated what the military perceived to be a revolutionary challenge to the state, fearing that another electoral victory following its strong showing in December 1991 would lead to the establishment of an Islamic dictatorship. In this context, FIS leaders stated that their conception of an Islamic state was rooted in the sovereignty of God, and that popular democracy based on the will of the people was inherently un-Islamic. These dynamics molded the military's perspective of the FIS to the point where the regime saw no distinction between a political Islamist movement and a potential *jihadi* organization, causing the military to worry that its dominant position was comprised and

[57] "The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet," International Crisis Group, October 20, 2000, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Algeria/The%20Algerian%20Crisis%20Not%20Over%20Yet.pdf (accessed April 2013); Ray Takeyh, "Islamism in Algeria: A Struggle Between Hope and Agony," Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Summer 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/islamism-algeria-struggle-between-hope-agony/p7335 (accessed April 2013).
[58] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[59] Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism*; "Algeria Profile: Timeline," BBC.

prompting it to intervene in the political process in January 1992 and cancel the second round of elections.[60]

Upon cancelling the electoral process in January 1992, the military banned the FIS and arrested its leadership and thousands of its activists. Madani and Ben Hadj had been arrested earlier in June 1991 during the group's general strike.[61] By repressing the FIS, the Algerian military effectively placed the organization's personnel and many of its popular supporters outside the political system and rule of law, serving to drive them into the ranks of the rapidly forming NSAGs, which may have otherwise remained marginal if the FIS had been allowed to operate legally in the political sphere.[62]

The constellation of Islamist NSAGs that subsequently developed after January 1992 was diverse and highly fragmented, but can be divided into three main camps regarding their objectives and strategy. First, the MIA, led by Abdelkader Chebouti, and the MEI, led by Saïd Makhloufi, sought the overthrow of the FLN-military regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place. The MIA and MEI primarily targeted the Algerian security forces and some civilians regarded as 'collaborators' in order to achieve these goals. The second vision was led by the AIS and emerged in 1994, seeking not to overthrow the state, but to use violence to induce the regime to alter its behavior, particularly seeking the re-legalization of the FIS. The AIS presented itself as the armed branch of the FIS, pledging allegiance to the imprisoned Madani and Ben Hadj.[63]

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[60] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[61] "Defense Boycotts Key Algerian Trial," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 13, 1992, http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0713/13083.html (accessed April 2013).
[62] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[63] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.

Figure 9.
The GIA's organizational logo

The third faction was led by the GIA and took a more hardline approach. The GIA and its supporters sought the imposition of strict Islamic practices based on the *Salafi* dogma, and utilized a coercive strategy in order to overthrow the FLN-military regime that featured extensive violence against the Algerian populace through large-scale massacres of civilians, in addition to attacks against the military, security services, and foreigners.[64] 'Algerian-Afghans', Algerian nationals who spent time in Afghanistan in the 1980s fighting the Soviet occupation, formed the core of the GIA;[65] an estimated 1,500 'Algerian-Afghans' returned home in the 1990s to battle the Algerian government, many of whom joined the GIA.[66] The GIA was particularly influenced by the *jihadi* concepts advanced by Sayyid Qutb, and viewed itself as part of a transnational Islamist movement.[67] In 1996, the new emir of the GIA, Antar Zouabri, issued a *fatwa* that charged all of Algerian society with apostasy and authorized:

> "Attacks against any Algerian who refused to join or aid the GIA (including other armed Islamist groups)… the GIA argued that any Algerian who did not support the GIA was tacitly supporting the regime, thereby removing their noncombatant immunity."[68]

The GSPC was founded in 1998 as a breakaway splinter group of the GIA, rejecting the GIA's targeting of civilians, and instead focused only on attacking military and security targets.[69] Even within these three broad camps, however, there were further schisms and disagreements

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[64] Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998*. London, UK: Hurst & Co., 2000.
[65] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[66] Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino, and Margot Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline," *The New York Times*, June 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013).
[67] Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks."
[68] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, March-April 2005, pp. 75-97.
[69] Jonathan Schanzer, "Algeria's GSPC and America's 'War on Terror'," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2, 2002, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/algerias-gspc-and-americas-war-on-terror (accessed April 2013).

regarding the overall goals, strategy, and tactics of the militant campaign that challenged the Algerian state.[70]

External Relationships & Inter-Organizational Ties

While the NSAGs involved in Algeria's civil war were based within the country, there were some important linkages to outside organizations and actors. The issue of external ties begins with the role of the 'Algerian-Afghans' in the Algerian civil war, who formed the core of the GIA and fueled the most radical element of the NSAGs active during the conflict. Despite reporting that suggests that most of the Algerian militants never left the training camps in Pakistan during the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, these fighters returned to Algeria advocating armed violence to topple the apostate FLN-military regime. The 'Algerian-Afghans' rejected the political approach of the FIS, and capitalized on the repression of the FIS by Algerian state authorities in January 1992, by forming the GIA.[71]

Despite being based in Algeria, the GIA also conducted operations and maintained bases of support outside the country, particularly within Europe. The GIA boasted support networks in the UK, which helped publish the first issue of the group's newsletter, *Al-Ansar* (the supporters), in London in July 1993.[72] The GIA also possessed a robust operational capability within France. On December 24, 1994, GIA operatives hijacked Air France Flight 8989 while at Houari Boumediène Airport in Algiers. Though the four hijackers were killed by French special operations forces at the Marseille Provence Airport, the GIA militants intended to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris, in retaliation for French support of the Algerian government and

[70] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[71] Filiu, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?"
[72] Filiu, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?"

its historical colonial rule of Algeria. The group also carried out a bombing campaign in France in 1995, including a spate of attacks targeting the Paris railway network that killed eight people and wounded over 200.[73] Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national convicted of attempting to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) on New Year's Eve in 1999, part of the foiled 2000 millennium plot, has also been linked to the GIA.[74] These capabilities, most significantly the 1995 Paris bombing campaign, were partly facilitated by members of the Algerian diaspora population in France and the UK, among other European countries, that provided important financial, logistical, and recruitment support for the GIA's capacity to operate in Europe.[75] The GIA's European operations are also reflective of the group's global reach and strategic impact, as described by Mackinlay and Hanlon.[76]

The question of the role of Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the Algerian civil war, and the GSPC's eventual transformation into AQIM in 2007 is also relevant. While some reporting indicates that AQ, including former leader Osama Bin Laden, provided financial support, personnel, and theological backing to the GIA through Qamareddin Kharban, a key leader of the 'Algerian-Afghans',[77] AQ support for Algerian NSAGs during the civil war is believed to have been fairly limited. In fact, the AQ link to members of the Algerian diaspora is believed to be much more substantial than to

[73] Jon Boyle, "French Court Convicts Algerian of Paris Bombings," Reuters, October 26, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/26/us-france-trial-ramda-idUSL2622616820071026 (accessed April 2013); Peter Taylor, "The Paris Plot," BBC, May 8, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2008/05/080617_age_of_terror_three.shtml (accessed April 2013); Peter Taylor, "Algeria and the Rise of Islamist Extremism," BBC, April 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/age_of_terror/7371008.stm (accessed April 2013).
[74] "Ahmed Ressam's Millennium Plot," PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/inside/cron.html (accessed April 2013).
[75] "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Armed Islamic Group," United Nations Security Council (UNSC), http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE00601E.shtml (accessed April 2013); Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, Andrew J. Curiel, and Doron Zimmermann, *The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.
[76] Mackinlay, "Globalization and Insurgency"; Hanlon, "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups."
[77] Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam."

NSAGs that operated in Algeria during the civil war.[78] Part II of this study on *'The Transformation to AQIM & the Internationalization of Algeria's Internal Conflict'*, will analyze the circumstances of the GSPC's transition to AQIM after the Algerian civil war in 2007, from which point both the material and ideological support of AQ to AQIM has significantly increased.[79] On the whole, however, while outside influences did play an important role in the GIA's strategy and tactics, as represented by the 'Algerian-Afghans', external partnerships and forces were never a decisive factor in the operations of NSAGs during the Algerian civil war.

Internal Structures & Organizational Dynamics of Armed Groups

In sharp contrast to the mostly cohesive revolutionary struggle of the FLN against the French colonial occupation, the armed challenge to the Algerian state in the 1990s was heavily divided into a diverse set of organizations. These NSAGs maintained independent command and control structures, and differed in their strategy and tactics. As argued by the ICG, this lack of unity not only made it difficult for the collection of NSAGs to ever garner the critical mass of popular support necessary to seriously threaten the downfall of the FLN-military regime, but it also made it very challenging for the Algerian state to completely eradicate the militant threat.[80]

Regarding the organizational dynamics within the various NSAGs involved in the Algerian civil war, an in-depth assessment of these internal structures is challenging to glean from purely open-source information. However, based on the strategy and operations of Algeria's state security apparatus and intelligence organizations, as well as the survival of the GSPC and its evolution into AQIM, it is possible to argue that most of the NSAGs active in the civil conflict were likely

[78] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[79] Filiu, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?"
[80] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.

hierarchically structured. A core component of the Algerian military and intelligence strategy in countering the NSAG threat during the civil war was the extensive infiltration of these militant organizations. The ICG contends that the Algerian military's ongoing, deep, and effective organizational penetration and manipulation of these NSAGs, particularly the GIA, was the most important "factor that prevented the rebellion from uniting under a stable leadership and in support of a clear, constant and intelligible objective."[81]

The GIA was undoubtedly the most extreme of the NSAGs, repeatedly rejecting any negotiated settlement to the conflict, indiscriminately attacking civilians, abducting and killing foreigners, and carrying out numerous massacres, among other atrocities.[82] The GIA's extreme brutality has led many analysts, including Jeremy Keenan, Habib Souaïdia, and others, to argue that the GIA's use of such violence, seemingly counter-productive to building the necessary popular support to overthrow the state, reflected the military's extensive infiltration and manipulation of the GIA. To this end, Keenan and Souaïdia hold the Algerian military and intelligence services responsible for many of the massacres allegedly carried out by the GIA and other NSAGs. This strategy, referred to as *La Sale Guerre* (the dirty war) by Souaïdia and state-sponsored terrorism or 'dirty tricks' by Keenan, aimed to erode popular support for the GIA and other NSAGs, and garner diplomatic and financial support from France and the West for the Algerian regime's counterterrorism campaign.[83] Fully assessing such claims, particularly the potential role of the Algerian state in perpetrating such violence, through only open-source information is extremely difficult, but the broader and widely acknowledged military infiltration of the GIA and other

[81] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[82] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[83] Jeremy Keenan, *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*. New York, NY: Pluto Press, 2009; Habib Souaïdia, *La Sale Guerre*. Paris, France: La Découverte, 2001.

groups was certainly a key success factor in the regime's ability to significantly weaken the NSAG threat.[84]

In addition to the strategy of infiltration and manipulation, the Algerian regime used negotiations and an amnesty program to neutralize other segments of the NSAG threat.[85] In September 1997, AIS commander Madani Mezrag announced that the organization had agreed to a nation-wide ceasefire after months of secret negotiations with the military. This proved to be a strategic defeat for the FIS, the AIS's political affiliate. This effective demilitarization[86] had a snowball effect and prompted high-level defections from the GIA to join the ceasefire, as well as the further splintering of the GIA through the formation of the GSPC in September 1998.[87]

Figure 10.
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-present)

Following the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the Algerian presidency in April 1999, the regime adopted the Law on Civil Concord in July 1999, "which encouraged members of armed groups to give themselves up in return for certain guarantees, and by promulgating a decree in January 2000 providing for a qualified amnesty for the AIS and associated armed groups in return for their dissolution."[88] The GSPC, however, was not offered amnesty within this framework. Finally, the regime effectively exploited the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. to forge a partnership with the U.S.,

[84] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[85] Sofiane Khatib, "Spoiler Management During Algeria's Civil War," *Stanford Journal of International Relations* (SJIR), June 1, 2006, http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.06_khatib.html (accessed April 2013).
[86] Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures," Middle East Institute (MEI), November 2008, http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/94111/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/0609edb1-7cc1-4998-9ff5-3510472d6f89/en/No_21_Islamist_De-Radicalization.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[87] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[88] Hugh Roberts, "Demilitarizing Algeria," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_86_final1.pdf (accessed April 2013); Hagelstein, "Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War."

France, and other Western partners in the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), and has benefitted from rising oil and gas prices on the international market to replenish the state budget, which had been severely depleted during the course of the civil war.[89]

Part II of this study on *'The Transformation to AQIM & the Internationalization of Algeria's Internal Conflict'* will analyze in greater detail the GSPC's shift to AQIM, identifying the motivations that prompted this organizational change, as well as AQIM's strategy and mode of operations. However, in terms of the GSPC's (and later AQIM's) internal organizational makeup, the effective counterterrorism strategy of the Algerian military and intelligence services through infiltration and manipulation required the GSPC to shed its traditional hierarchical structure in favor of a decentralized approach.[90] While this structural transformation was forced on the GSPC through the decapitation of its top leadership,[91] it has allowed the organization to persist and pose an ongoing threat to the Algerian state, though through a very different approach.

Conclusion: Assessing the Rise & Fall of Civil War in Algeria

Part I of this analysis examined the circumstances of the Algerian civil war (1991-2002), focusing on the factors that led to a political crisis for the FLN-military regime, the outbreak of mass violence in the early 1990s, the rise of a diverse set of NSAGs that challenged the Algerian state, and the government's effective counterterrorism campaign that brought about the demise of every NSAG except the GSPC. This discussion utilized four theoretical frameworks to explain

[89] Roberts, "Demilitarizing Algeria"; Hagelstein, "Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War."
[90] "Counter-Terrorism Successes Force Algerian Militants to Evolve," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 18, 2006, https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1193247&Pubabbrev=JIR (accessed April 2013).
[91] Jean-Luc Marret, "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A 'Glocal' Organization," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 6, 2008, pp. 541-552, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/articles/Studies_in_Conflict_and_Terrorism.pdf (accessed April 2013).

the formation, evolution, and weakening or persistence of the NSAGs involved in the civil war. These models included weak states, religious extremism, external relationships, and the internal structures of armed groups. Rather than individually fully explaining the NSAG dynamic, each of these variables offers an important component to understand the Algerian conflict. Thus, these four analytical concepts should be analyzed on their own merits, but also collectively, in order to provide a nuanced study of the trends of the Algerian civil war. Part II will build on this research by analyzing the transition of the GSPC into AQIM, the group's foreign linkages, the impact of regional security developments, and its financing through criminal operations.

Part II: The Transformation to AQIM & the Internationalization of Algeria's Internal Conflict

Part II of this study focuses on Algeria's political and security trends following the conclusion of the civil war in 2002. It examines the evolution of the GSPC into AQIM, the group's foreign relationships, the consequences of regional security changes, and its financing through criminal activities. Within this context, this chapter argues that AQIM's emphasis on international targets and operations; overhauled organizational structure from a hierarchical to a non-hierarchical model; usage of ungoverned areas; global associations; a more favorable regional setting due to volatility in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere; and criminal enterprises have been the most significant elements facilitating the group's endurance. However, despite the persistence of AQIM as a source of instability within Algeria and its spread throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions, the Algerian state has been bolstered since the end of the civil war in 2002 and is no longer challenged by NSAGs that threaten the regime's survival.

Section 2.1: The GSPC to AQIM

Figure 11.
The GSPC's organizational logo

Factors Behind the Rebranding of the GSPC as AQIM

By the early 2000s, the GSPC was reeling as the lone NSAG remaining in Algeria's internal conflict. Outside of the GSPC, the diverse set of militant organizations involved in the Algerian civil war had been infiltrated, crushed, and disbanded through the military's effective counterterrorism strategy and the government's amnesty program. The GSPC was suffering from a

shortage of weapons and militant personnel, as well as popular support in Algeria and abroad due to its prior linkages to the GIA, which carried out large-scale killings of civilians in the 1990s. The September 11, 2001, attacks also led to the formation of a strategic partnership between the U.S. and Algerian governments in the GWOT, resulting in the addition of the GSPC to the U.S. Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in March 2002.[92] Moreover, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began to draw in foreign Sunni fighters from around the world to fight the U.S. presence there, bringing GSPC militants to Iraq and away from the Algerian conflict.[93]

Figure 12.
AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdelouadoud

The GSPC's transition to AQIM should be seen as a process that was launched in the early 2000s and finally completed in 2007 based on efforts to revive the group's capabilities, legitimacy, and overall reputation in response to years of organizational decline in its membership, support base, and operational abilities.[94] Beginning in 2004, GSPC leader Abu Musab Abdelouadoud (also known as Abdelmalek Droukdal) initiated contact with former Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was reportedly instrumental in forging the GSPC-AQ alliance. Al-Zarqawi convinced Abdelouadoud that AQ could help the GSPC resurrect its militant activities in the Maghreb. In January 2005, al-Zarqawi began including Abdelouadoud in his public declarations lauding AQ leaders. Abdelouadoud also began communications with North African militants who had become high-level AQ leaders, including Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior Libyan

[92] "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, September 28, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (accessed April 2013).
[93] Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline."
[94] Ulph, "Declining In Algeria, GSPC Enters International Theater."

official in AQ who was also linked to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a radical Sunni Islamist militant group that sought to overthrow the Qaddafi regime in Libya.[95] Abdelouadoud reportedly sent emissaries to Iraq to meet with a top AQ deputy, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, a Libyan who had fought in the armed campaign against the Algerian government in the 1990s, to cement the GSPC-AQ alliance. In September 2006, AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (then the top deputy to Osama Bin Laden) issued a statement announcing the merger of his group and the GSPC, and in January 2007 Abdelouadoud officially announced that the new name for his organization would be al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM.[96]

Figure 13.
AQIM's organizational logo

With the transformation to AQIM, the organization has adopted a more international approach, particularly evidenced by its targeting of a range of foreign assets and personnel throughout North Africa and its use of suicide bombings, a tactic rarely used previously in Algeria. Since its 2007 rebranding as an AQ affiliate, AQIM has continued to strike Algerian government and security targets, but has also carried out numerous large-scale attacks against foreign installations in Algeria and throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions. In December 2007, AQIM claimed responsibility for two coordinated suicide car-bomb attacks against United Nations (UN) offices in Algiers that killed 41 people and wounded 170. These were the deadliest attacks against a UN target since the Baghdad bombings in August 2003. A

[95] Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline."
[96] Craig Whitlock, "Group in Algeria Turned to Al-Qaeda for Assistance," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901978.html (accessed April 2013); Geoff D. Porter, "The Impact of Bin Ladin's Death on AQIM in North Africa," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 1, 2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-impact-of-bin-ladin%E2%80%99s-death-on-aqim-in-north-africa (accessed April 2013).

statement, allegedly posted to an Islamist Web site by AQIM, called the UN offices an "international infidels' den," indicating that the group decided that UN staff are viable targets in its armed campaign.[97] Both the GSPC and AQIM have engaged in the kidnapping, holding, ransom collection, and in some cases execution of European tourists and aid workers, employees of multinational corporations, Canadian diplomats, and others, operating across the region in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia.[98] This AQIM tactic of hostage-taking, as well as the group's extensive smuggling activities, is analyzed in greater detail in Section 2.3 on NSAG financing, but reflects the group's increased focus on foreign targets, expanded operational capacity outside of Algeria, and organizational innovation.[99]

AQIM has also targeted Western commercial interests and foreign workers in Algeria, in addition to the FLN government's political leadership. In August 2008, an AQIM suicide bomber struck a bus carrying employees of the Canadian engineering firm SNC-Lavalin outside of Algiers, killing 12 people and wounding 15. According to a statement released by the group, AQIM targeted the bus because it was known to be carrying Canadian citizens, not fellow Muslims, as AQIM declared that "we are choosing our targets carefully and we are always careful with your blood. We do not target the innocent." However, all of the victims in the attack were Algerian nationals employed by the Canadian company, rather than Canadian citizens.[100] In January 2013, an AQIM splinter group and other militants carried out a coordinated attack and hostage crisis at the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas in southeastern Algeria that resulted in the deaths of

[97] "Algiers Bomb Shatters UN Office," BBC, December 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7139627.stm (accessed April 2013); Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline."
[98] "Country Reports on Terrorism 2011," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism.
[99] Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[100] "Algeria Bus Bombing Deliberately Targeted Canada, al-Qaida Says," *National Post* (Canada), August 22, 2008, http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=3ba4afab-356d-42b1-8b9c-a5ce2c67c232 (accessed April 2013).

at least 37 foreign workers.[101] In September 2007, an AQIM-linked suicide bomber targeted Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and while the assassination attempt failed, the blast left 22 people dead and more than 100 injured.[102]

Resurgence of the Algerian State

Figure 14.
A map of northwestern Africa, where AQIM has expanded its operations

Source: Stratfor

AQIM's persistence as a security threat in Algeria and its expanded capabilities throughout the Maghreb and Sahel regions, however, have taken place in conjunction with the strengthening of the Algerian state since the end of the civil war in 2002. In the context of Holsti's framework of legitimacy and weak states, Algeria in the post-2002 era has increased its levels of both vertical and horizontal legitimacy, and is no longer a weak state in which NSAGs threaten its control. While Algeria lacks a truly competitive democratic political system with free and fair elections that could seriously challenge the supremacy of the FLN and its military backers, Bouteflika's regime has effectively regained popular support, ended the large-scale violence of the civil war, and pacified major demands for political reform. Algeria's security institutions are still incredibly powerful and wield extensive influence, one indicator of a lack of legitimacy

[101] "Algeria Siege: 37 Foreigners Died, PM Says," BBC, January 21, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21127646 (accessed April 2013); Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Credit for Kidnappings in Algeria," *Long War Journal*, January 16, 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/al_qaeda_commander_c.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29 (accessed April 2013).
[102] "Algerian Town Buries Dead after Suicide Bombing," Agence France-Presse (AFP), September 7, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gnhm0Dbx7D0kxIZgI_669cn8Wq5Q (accessed April 2013).

according to Holsti,[103] but the FLN administration has used large state revenues from hydrocarbons to placate a popular uprising and maintain a sufficient level of public backing. Within Snow's model, the Algerian government since 2002 has recovered both its authority and legitimacy, with the regime's dominance in the security realm and at least resigned public acceptance[104] of the FLN's continued governance.[105] While AQIM poses an ongoing security risk in Algeria, the organization's operations do not constitute an existential threat to the regime's persistence.[106] The revival of the Algerian state and its ability to weather political and security threats, such as those brought about by the Libyan revolution and the Arab Spring, are examined in greater detail in Section 2.2.

Changing Internal Structures & Organizational Dynamics of the GSPC & AQIM

The GSPC's transition to AQIM has also involved a shift in its organizational structure from a hierarchical to a non-hierarchical composition. The GSPC initially adopted a hierarchical organizational model stemming from the Algerian military backgrounds of many of its members. As the civil war waned in the late 1990s and concluded by 2002, however, pressure from the Algerian security services, the government-sponsored amnesty program, and internal rivalries forced a change in the group's structure and approach. By 2006, the GSPC had evolved into a decentralized entity, organized into nine regional *katibats* (departments or brigades), with GSPC

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[103] Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*.
[104] "Low Voter Turnout Anticipated in Algerian Elections," Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), May 9, 2012, http://pomed.org/blog/2012/05/algerian-elections-greeted-by-low-voter-turnout-2.html/ (accessed April 2013); "Low Voter Turnout Plagues Algerian Vote," VOA News, May 10, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/low_voter_turnout_plagues_algerian_vote/539099.html (accessed April 2013).
[105] Snow, *Uncivil Wars*.
[106] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues"; Stephen Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region," *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin,* No. 85, pp. 12-29, Spring 2010, http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/bulletin85harmon.pdf (accessed April 2013).

officials such as Abu Musab Abdelouadoud also forging relationships with foreign militants based outside of Algeria.[107]

This organizational shift continued with the rebranding of the GSPC as AQIM in 2007. Within AQIM, a regional commander leads each *katibat*, and all the *katibats* are united under a national leadership council nominally controlled by Abdelouadoud. The *katibats* are highly mobile in order to evade the Algerian security services, and each has its own autonomous command structure and training camps. This more diffuse distribution of authority has allowed individual commanders to have increased operational autonomy in both their target selection and mission execution, but has also led to a great deal of disagreement and factionalism among the *katibat*s, with the national leadership only able to exert limited control over the brigades, as communication and coordination between them has been undermined.[108] Arieff describes that "AQIM appears to refer to a loose affiliation of actors, who may not be bound by command or shared goals, and whose motivations and capabilities may diverge significantly."[109] While this renovated AQIM network may pose less of a strategic threat to the Algerian government and the broader region than a more cohesively organized NSAG would, as noted by O'Neil,[110] this less consolidated configuration is also harder to combat.[111] Moreover, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini argue that non-hierarchical groups like AQIM

[107] "Counter-Terrorism Successes Force Algerian Militants to Evolve," *Jane's Intelligence Review*.
[108] Lianne Kennedy Boudali, "The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 2, 2007, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-gspc-newest-franchise-in-al-qaidas-global-jihad (accessed April 2013); Pascale Combelles Siegel, "AQIM's Playbook in Mali," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, March 27, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqims-playbook-in-mali (accessed April 2013).
[109] Alexis Arieff, "Crisis In Mali," Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 14, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[110] O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism*.
[111] Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline"; "Counter-Terrorism Successes Force Algerian Militants to Evolve," *Jane's Intelligence Review*.

demonstrate higher levels of resilience and adaptability when challenged by traditional state counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies.[112]

Ungoverned Areas: the GSPC's Move to the South

In contrast to the NSAGs active during the Algerian civil war, AQIM has worked extensively to exploit ungoverned areas in the Sahara and Sahel regions, particularly in northern Mali. Since its formation in 1998 and due to its previous association with the GIA, the GSPC was based in the mountainous Kabylia region east of Algiers, in northern Algeria. But by the early 2000s, the GSPC leadership was facing increasing pressure from the Algerian security forces and sought to expand the group's safe havens and areas of operation.[113]



Figure 15.
A map of northwestern Africa, and select attacks attributed to AQIM in the region

Source: *The Wall Street Journal*

The ICG describes that beginning in about 2002, the GSPC began to develop a web of social, economic, and political relationships within Mali, both with local groups in the north and national-level officials based in the capital Bamako in the south. Malian state officials saw covert dealings with AQIM as an opportunity to make profits, especially from transborder smuggling and kickbacks from large ransoms

[112] Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism."
[113] Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline."

generated by the kidnappings of Western nationals,[114] amounting to what some referred to as a 'non-aggression pact' between Malian authorities and AQIM operatives. A February 2010 U.S. diplomatic cable quoted an Algerian ambassador as accusing Malian officials of being "willfully complicit" in AQIM's operations.[115] Lacher extends this argument by stating that "up until Mali's military coup of March 2012, [Malian] state complicity with organized crime was the main factor enabling AQIM's growth and a driver of conflict in the north of the country."[116] While AQIM has had a relatively entrenched position in Mali since about 2002,[117] the organization's presence there has been amplified by the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, the subsequent return of Tuareg rebels from Libya to northern Mali, and its cooperation with the constellation of active militant groups in the region,[118] dynamics that are addressed in Section 2.2. Outside of northern Mali, GSPC and later AQIM personnel also set up bases of operation in eastern Mauritania and northern Niger.[119] By 2010, AQIM's operations in northern Algeria had significantly declined, and the organization is currently considered to be a primarily Saharan-based network.[120]

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[114] Adam Nossiter, "Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants' Clout in West Africa," *The New York Times*, December 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-africa.html?ref=africa&pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013); "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group (ICG), July 18, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/189-mali-avoiding-escalation-english.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[115] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

[116] Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region."

[117] While AQIM was not officially formed until 2007, GSPC personnel were active in Mali beginning in about 2002. For more information, see "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

[118] "Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action," International Crisis Group (ICG), September 24, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/b090-mali-the-need-for-determined-and-coordinated-international-action-english.pdf (accessed April 2013); Claire Spencer, "Strategic Posture Review: Algeria," *World Politics Review*, Chatham House, July 25, 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/0712wpr_spencer.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[119] Masters, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)"; William Thornberry and Jaclyn Levy, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110901_Thornberry_AQIM_WEB.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[120] Geoff D. Porter, "AQIM's Objectives in North Africa," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 1, 2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqim%E2%80%99s-objectives-in-north-africa (accessed April 2013).

The GSPC's move south in 2002 and its establishment of active safe havens in the Sahara-Sahel region, inherited by AQIM, fulfills the requirements of the RAND and DoD frameworks of ungoverned areas. Within the RAND model, the Sahara-Sahel region incorporating Mali, Mauritania, and Niger are areas where the relevant state actors confront major obstacles in asserting their authority. In terms of the indicators of ungovernability,[121] in northern Mali and northern Niger, there is a notable lack of state penetration and monopoly on the use of force, largely due to a history of discrimination against and rebellion by Tuareg minorities in both states. There is also a lack of border controls in the region, with militants and smugglers regularly moving across state boundaries and trafficking goods outside of state regulation.[122]

Figure 16.
AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar

Within the RAND concept, these areas, northern Mali in particular, have been conducive[123] to the presence of NSAGs, including AQIM. This conduciveness is based on the existence of sufficient levels of infrastructure, as well as sources of income through regional smuggling and the netting of large ransoms from the kidnappings of Western citizens. The GSPC and later AQIM also worked to forge relationships with corrupt government officials in the region, Tuareg rebel groups in northern Mali, and local communities. AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who led the group's Ninth *katibat* that encompasses southern Algeria, married several Malian Tuareg

[121] Rabasa and Peters, "Understanding Lack of Governance."
[122] Boudali, "The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad"; Geoffrey York, "Diplomat Robert Fowler's Kidnapper has Powerful Terrorist Links," *The Globe and Mail* (Canada), August 23, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/diplomat-robert-fowlers-kidnapper-has-powerful-terrorist-links/article1203952/ (accessed April 2013); "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar," BBC, March 3, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21061480 (accessed April 2013); "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.
[123] Rabasa and Peters, "Understanding Lack of Governance."

women as a means to build cooperation with local tribes in the region, which provided Belmokhtar with invisibility or refuge within the population.[124] Finally, AQIM's presence in the Sahara-Sahel meets the DoD definition of ungoverned areas, as the territory has served as a safe haven[125] for the organization to continue its attacks inside Algeria and against targets throughout the region.[126]

AQIM's Expanded External Relationships & Inter-Organizational Ties

This subsection examines AQIM's relationships with AQ core and other NSAGs, arguing that these inter-organizational ties have been a key element in AQIM's continued operations and relevance as a security threat in Algeria and beyond. As analyzed earlier in Section 2.1 on the transformation of the GSPC to AQIM, this organizational renovation was born out of the need to rebuild the GSPC's capabilities and credibility, and was forged through the development of relations between Abdelouadoud, al-Zarqawi, and top AQ officials. In line with AQ's affiliate or 'franchise' strategy, the relationship between AQIM and AQ features strategic and ideological ties between the two organizations, with limited formal communication or operational coordination. From the perspective of AQ, an alliance with the GSPC and its rebranding as AQIM in January 2007 was and continues to expand AQ's international reach, offering the organization entrée into the Sahara-Sahel region and a major role in the conflict seeking to oust the Algerian government, in line with AQ's global strategy and ultimate objective of establishing a transnational Islamic caliphate. From the outlook of the GSPC, coming under AQ's organizational umbrella offered the group the ability to bolster its reputation, attract future recruits, and raise much-needed funds,

[124] Boudali, "The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad"; York, "Diplomat Robert Fowler's Kidnapper has Powerful Terrorist Links"; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar," BBC; "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.
[125] Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens."
[126] Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region"; Arieff, "Crisis In Mali."

which would in turn strengthen its operational capacity and ability to challenge the Algerian regime.[127]

As part of the AQ-AQIM compact, AQIM praises AQ through direct references in publicized statements, elevating AQ's global stature and legitimizing its place as the vanguard of the global radical Islamist revolution.[128] AQIM figures prominently in AQ's strategy of inspiring like-minded regional groups to mobilize and take up arms against their own governments and U.S. interests around the globe.[129] Beginning with the September 2006 al-Zawahiri announcement of the 'merger' of AQ and the GSPC, top AQ officials have also issued public statements praising and supporting AQIM and calling for the overthrow of the Algerian regime, the core objective of the GSPC during the Algerian civil war.[130]

While the bulk of the AQ-AQIM relationship is rooted in a cooperative arrangement that benefits both groups, as well as ideological compatibility, there are also likely operational connections between the two networks. Based on the central role of al-Zarqawi in bringing about the GSPC-AQ affiliation, AQIM funneled fighters and materiel to the Iraqi insurgency, drawing on its supply of trained and experienced militants to support the Iraqi conflict against the U.S. occupation and the Shiite-led government in Baghdad. After the initiation of contact between Abdelouadoud and al-

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[127] Craig Whitlock, "Al-Qaeda's Far-Reaching New Partner," *The Washington Post*, October 5, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006100402006_pf.html (accessed April 2013).

[128] "Al-Qaeda Group Claims Osama bin Laden Triumph in Arab Revolts," Agence France-Presse (AFP), May 8, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAvXAwO6Q1qSwUmlwtn25zapO1ZA?docId=CNG.42018502043ba9252f3fa2fe6c31dce7.ed1 (accessed April 2013).

[129] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, December 7, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/al_qaedas_m_and_a_strategy?page=full (accessed April 2013).

[130] David H. Gray and Erik Stockham, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the Evolution from Algerian Islamism to Transnational Terror," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 91-97, http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir/pdf/pdf2008/Dec/Gray%20and%20Stockham.pdf (accessed April 2013).

Zarqawi in 2004, a September 2005 study estimated that Algerians made up about 20% of the Sunni foreign fighters in Iraq, totaling 600 Algerian nationals who had traveled to Iraq to fight in the insurgency there.[131] While many of these Algerian combatants in Iraq may not have been formal members of AQIM, the significant presence of Algerian militants among the foreign fighters in Iraq is likely partly due to the burgeoning Abdelouadoud-Zarqawi relationship, and AQ-AQIM ties more broadly. Moreover, the AQ-AQIM partnership and the Abdelouadoud-Zarqawi link enabled AQIM to assume greater influence and control over the Algerian fighters in Iraq.[132]



Figure 17.
A breakdown by country of the foreign Sunni militants in Iraq as of September 2005, with Algerians constituting 20% of the fighters

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

With the success of the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces in combating insurgent activities post-2007 that resulted in many foreign fighters returning from Iraq to their native countries, Algerian militants shifted back to the Maghreb. These Algerian veterans of the Iraqi insurgency brought back to Algeria with them new tactics, specifically suicide bombings, and extensive battlefield experience, using their skills to perpetrate attacks inside Algeria and throughout the

[131] Dan Murphy, "Iraq's Foreign Fighters: Few But Deadly," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 27, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0927/p01s03-woiq.html (accessed April 2013); Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, "Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom's Response," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 19, 2005, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[132] Mekhennet, Moss, Schmitt, Sciolino, and Williams, "A Threat Renewed: A Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Qaeda Lifeline."

Sahara-Sahel region.[133] In this context, the AQ-AQIM partnership exceeded mere ideological affinity and helped facilitate the movement of militants back and forth between the Maghreb and Iraq.

Figure 18.
Officials survey the damage to a UN building in Algiers after the AQIM attack on December 11, 2007

Source: *Time*

The AQ-AQIM alliance has also been a major factor in driving AQIM's increased attacks on foreign targets in Algeria, expanded operations throughout the Sahara-Sahel, and recruitment of non-Algerian militants into the organization's ranks. However, despite these organizational changes that have involved AQIM adding international initiatives to its Algerian objectives, AQIM's relationship with AQ should not be confused as a formal merger between the two groups. Byman argues that AQIM maintains a high degree of operational autonomy and works "with al Qaeda's core more as partners than as proxies."[134] Moreover, AQIM still systematically attacks targets of the Algerian regime, particularly the security forces, reflective of the group's continuity with the GSPC's priorities.[135] AQIM has also failed to execute AQ's goals of unifying the various radical Islamist militant groups active in North Africa, or carry out attacks on the European continent (as the GIA perpetrated in France in the 1990s). Additionally, AQIM remains directed by Algerian

[133] Craig Whitlock, "From Iraq to Algeria, Al-Qaeda's Long Reach," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052901967_pf.html (accessed April 2013); "Counter-Terrorism Successes Force Algerian Militants to Evolve," *Jane's Intelligence Review*.
[134] Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy."
[135] Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy"; Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region."

nationals, starting with Abdelouadoud in command,[136] and has not developed into a federation of the Maghreb's radical Islamist organizations with diverse national leadership.[137] Byman articulates the inability of AQIM thus far to truly adopt AQ's global targeting strategy:

> "AQIM can be considered a weak al-Qa'ida affiliate. While AQIM has changed its targeting priorities somewhat since affiliating with al-Qa'ida, it has not engaged in extra-regional attacks on the United States or taken its war to the West in any comprehensive way."[138]



Figure 19.
A map detailing al-Qaeda and its affiliates, including AQIM

Outside of AQ, AQIM has pursued inter-organizational relationships with a variety of radical Sunni Islamist armed groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and a collection of militant organizations based in northern Mali. On several occasions, General Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has alleged that Boko Haram and AQIM are sharing finances, engaging in joint training exercises, and providing each other with explosive materials.[139] This

[136] Jean-Pierre Filiu, "Could Al-Qaeda Turn African in the Sahel?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al_qaeda_sahel.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[137] Jean-Pierre Filiu, "Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb: A Case Study in the Opportunism of Global Jihad," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 3, 2010, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghreb-a-case-study-in-the-opportunism-of-global-jihad (accessed April 2013).
[138] Daniel Byman, "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and its Affiliate Organizations," Brookings Institution, August 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/7/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman.pdf (accessed April 2012).
[139] Adam Nossiter, "Islamist Group With Possible Qaeda Links Upends Nigeria," *The New York Times*, August 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/africa/18nigeria.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013); Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Three Terrorist Groups in Africa Pose Threat to U.S., American Commander Says," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/three-terrorist-groups-in-africa-pose-threat-to-us-general-ham-says.html (accessed April 2013); Sean M. Gourley, "Linkages

Boko Haram-AQIM cooperation likely accelerated in AQIM's safe haven in northern Mali following the military coup in Bamako in March 2012,[140] addressed in Section 2.2. In April 2012, Daniel Benjamin, a former U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, stated that the U.S. "remain[s] concerned by reported communications, training, and weapons links between AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula."[141] As detailed in Section 2.2, AQIM has cooperated with several different NSAGs that are active in northern Mali beginning in 2012.[142] Finally, AQIM has built extensive relations with smuggling organizations in the region, discussed in Section 2.3.[143]



Figure 20.
A map of northwestern Africa, detailing the operations of AQIM and other militant groups

Source: Stratfor

The GSPC's evolution to AQIM and its parallel development of ties to numerous NSAGs can be explained through the arguments of Bond, Chenoweth, and Karmon. Bond, Chenoweth, and Karmon contend that NSAGs forge external relationships in order to ensure their

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Between Boko Haram and al Qaeda: A Potential Deadly Synergy," *Global Security Studies*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Summer 2012, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Gourley%20Boko%20Haram.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[140] Mark Doyle, "Africa's Islamist Militants 'Co-ordinate Efforts'," BBC, June 26, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18592789 (accessed April 2013); Jim Garamone, "Collaborating Extremist Groups Worry AFRICOM Commander," U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), December 4, 2012, http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/10117/collaborating-extremist-groups-worry-africom-comma (accessed April 2013).

[141] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa," Testimony by Coordinator Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 25, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm (accessed April 2013).

[142] "Mali Crisis: Key Players," BBC, March 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909 (accessed April 2013).

[143] Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region."

organizational survival and operational persistence.[144] In this context, the chief motivation behind the GSPC's partnership with AQ and its rebranding as AQIM in January 2007 was based on the group's steady decline in the early 2000s and aspirations that an alliance with AQ could help revive its credibility, attract new funding sources and recruits, and bolster its overall capabilities.[145]

Horowitz and Potter's framework that links the strength of group alliances with lethality, in which those groups that establish deep associations with other NSAGs become increasingly operationally effective,[146] is also relevant to AQIM. Since its transition to AQIM that was completed in January 2007, AQIM has developed connections with not only AQ, but also with Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQAP, groups in northern Mali, and organized criminal outfits throughout the Sahara-Sahel.[147] These inter-organizational ties have been a major factor in the rise of AQIM as a security threat inside Algeria and its expansion throughout region, in contrast to the GSPC's decline and that group's more internal focus on Algeria. However, the threat of AQIM to the Algerian state is far from existential and the FLN-military regime has been strengthened since the end of the civil war in 2002.[148] Moreover, as noted by Byman, AQIM's affiliation with AQ and other armed groups is rooted primarily in instrumental objectives and gains, so while AQIM has surely expanded its international operations and partnerships, such

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[144] Bond, "Power, Identity, Credibility, & Cooperation: Examining the Development of Cooperative Arrangements Among Violent Non-State Actors"; Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity"; Karmon, *Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and Islamists*.
[145] Boudali, "The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad."
[146] Horowitz and Potter, "Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality."
[147] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Other Sources of Instability in Africa"; Arieff, "Crisis In Mali."
[148] Andre Le Sage, "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), July 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20268%20Le%20Sage.pdf (accessed April 2013); Anouar Boukhars, "The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 22, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/22/paranoid-neighbor-algeria-and-conflict-in-mali/e4kt# (accessed April 2013); Boudali, "The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad."

transnational linkages have not eroded the organization's ability and will to consistently target the Algerian regime.[149]

Section 2.2: The Regional Impact of the Fall of Qaddafi & Consequences of the Arab Spring for Algeria

The rather quick and unexpected fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 has had a significant impact on regional political dynamics and security in North Africa and the Sahel. The precipitous collapse of the Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyya* (state of the masses), which under Qaddafi was closely tied to affairs in the Maghreb and exerted extensive influence in sub-Saharan Africa, unraveled Libya's robust Africa policy, deeply affecting political and security trends in a variety of neighboring states, including in Mali and Algeria. Beginning with the overthrow of Colonel Qaddafi's administration in 2011, this section analyzes the consequences of this pivotal event for both Mali and Algeria, explaining why the outcomes were fundamentally different in each state, but also heavily intertwined to impact Algeria's security and political environments, and AQIM's operations and capabilities in particular.

Qaddafi's Ouster & the Crisis in Mali

Rejected by the Arab world as a pariah and dangerous, destabilizing force who's efforts to become a dominant power in the Arab region had failed, Qaddafi turned south to the African continent in a bid to exert the *Jamahiriyya*'s regional hegemony. Within Qaddafi's Africa policy, Mali was a key country of focus. During the 1970s and 1980s, Qaddafi supported a variety of Malian rebel movements and dissidents who aimed to dislodge the authoritarian regime of

[149] Byman, "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and its Affiliate Organizations."

Malian President Moussa Traoré (1968-1991).[150] Malian-Libyan relations during the *Jamahiriyya* were also characterized by Qaddafi's involvement in the Tuareg question in Mali, as well as in neighboring Niger.[151] Tuaregs are an ethnic Berber, semi-nomadic community inhabiting parts of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya, totaling about 3 million people.[152] Representing a small minority in Mali, likely fewer than 10% of Mali's 15.5 million inhabitants,[153] Malian Tuaregs have launched several armed rebellions against the Malian state, including major uprisings in 1963, the 1990s, 2006-08, and 2012.[154] Malian Tuaregs have cited various motivations for their opposition to Bamako's authority, including neglect and discrimination by the Malian government that is dominated by southern ethnic groups, the lack of implementation by Malian authorities of north-south political agreements, and efforts to establish an independent Tuareg homeland, referred to as Azawad.[155]



Figure 21.
A map of the Tuareg population spread across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya

Source: BBC

In the context of Tuareg unrest within Mali, as well as in Niger, numerous Tuaregs sought refuge in Libya in the mid 1970s. Qaddafi offered many of these Tuaregs military and financial

[150] Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart, "Libya's Foreign Policy in Flux," *African Affairs*, Vol. 104, No. 416, July 2005, pp. 469-492, http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/104/416/469.full.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[151] Hugh Roberts, "Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go?" *London Review of Books* (LRB), Vol. 33, No. 22, November 17, 2011, pp. 8-18, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n22/hugh-roberts/who-said-gaddafi-had-to-go (accessed April 2013).
[152] Monica Mark, "Mali Rebel Groups Agree [to] Ceasefire," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/05/malian-rebel-groups-agree-ceasefire (accessed April 2013).
[153] "Mali," The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), April 8, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html (accessed April 2013).
[154] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group; "Tuareg Rebels Ready to Help French Forces in Mali," Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia), January 14, 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/14/260337.html (accessed April 2013).
[155] Arieff, "Crisis In Mali."

assistance in order to develop a source of influence over both the Malian and Nigerien states.[156] Qaddafi hired thousands of Malian and Nigerien Tuaregs in the Libyan armed forces, including within his Islamic Legion and other specialized military units. These fighters participated in the Tuareg rebellion in Mali in the 1990s, as well as in Libyan military operations in Chad, Lebanon, and other locations. Many of these forces were based in Fezzan in southwestern Libya. As the financier of armed Malian and Nigerien Tuareg rebels, Qaddafi gained significant leverage over political dealings in Mali and Niger with respect to the relations between the central governments in Bamako and Niamey and the Tuareg uprisings.[157] Qaddafi also sheltered large numbers of economic migrants that fled the southern Sahara as a result of drought and the collapse of the pastoral economy, building up powerful patronage networks.[158]

The Libyan-sponsored Malian and Nigerien Tuareg fighters provided support to Qaddafi's regime in the early days of the Libyan uprising in February 2011. However, once the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign of Libya, known as Operation Unified Protector, began in late March 2011, with NATO supporting the efforts of the National Transitional Council (NTC) to counter Qaddafi, the Tuareg rebels made a strategic decision to leave Libya, calculating that their alliance with Qaddafi would not bode well as the civil war intensified. By the end of March 2011, 3,000 Tuareg fighters had fled Libya, traveled across northern Niger and into northern Mali, taking with them large supplies of pillaged arms from Libya, including light and heavy arms, ammunition, explosives, and possibly man-portable air-

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[156] Lesley Anne Warner, "Libya's Pan-African Policy," Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), October 25, 2010, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Libyas%20Pan-Africa%20Policy%20%28CNA%20Conference%20Report%29.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[157] "Africa Without Qaddafi: The Case of Chad," International Crisis Group (ICG), October 21, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/180%20LAfrique%20sans%20Kadhafi%20-%20le%20cas%20du%20Tchad%20ENGLISH.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[158] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

defense systems (MANPADs) – portable missile launchers able to strike aircraft. The arms and weapons transited Niger en route to Mali, with porous borders, thousands of kilometers of desert, and corrupt Nigerien state officials facilitating this transfer.[159] The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that between 10,000-20,000 firearms flowed out of Libya as the Qaddafi regime disintegrated, ending up in Mali, among many other locations.[160]



Figure 22.
The flow of firearms in northwestern Africa, including from Libya to Mali

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The departure of these Tuareg fighters from Libya and their arrival in Mali provided the trigger for rising instability in northern Mali beginning in January 2012 and the March 2012 military coup in Bamako. Aligned with a constellation of other militant groups, including AQIM, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad, MNLA, formed in October 2011), a Tuareg Islamist militant group known as Ansar Dine (Ançar Eddine), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA),[161] and others, the Malian Tuareg 'returnee' fighters from Libya launched a campaign in northern Mali against the Malian military in January 2012.[162] Despite this rising threat that had been foreseen with the

[159] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group; Zoubir, "Qaddafi's Spawn: What the Dictator's Demise Unleashed in the Middle East."
[160] "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), February 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[161] "Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action," International Crisis Group.
[162] While the MNLA was initially allied with AQIM, Ansar Dine, and other radical Islamist groups in northern Mali in early 2012, this alliance was severed in late 2012 and the MNLA is nominally aligned with the Malian government and French military forces as of 2013. For more information, see "Tuareg Rebels 'Ready to Help

unraveling of the *Jamahiriyya* in mid-2011, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) had directed a deteriorating, weak, and corrupt set of military and political institutions that did little to prepare for the consequences of Qaddafi's decline and the flight of the Tuareg fighters from Libya.[163]

Under the rule of ATT, Bamako nominally controlled the north through a low-cost system of governance that "rested on a loose network of personal, clientelistic, even mafia-style alliances with regional elites with reversible loyalties rather than on robust democratic institutions."[164] This arrangement was previously largely able to contain Tuareg opposition figures and groups, who had limited military capabilities, but quickly collapsed when dealt an external shock with the return of the well-armed Tuareg fighters from Libya. These Tuareg 'returnees' were backed by AQIM and other well-financed actors, who were flush with funds from trans-Saharan trafficking operations and ransoms collected from the kidnappings of Western hostages.[165] Within a period of two months, rebel forces in the north dislodged the Malian army from several key positions, including Ménaka, Aguel Hoc, Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao, among other locations. In response to the Malian military's poor preparation to control the returning Tuareg fighters, and the resulting deterioration of the security situation in the north in favor of the MNLA and other armed groups, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo led a group of junior military officers that ousted ATT in a coup in late March 2012.[166]

French Forces in Mali'," Agence France-Presse (AFP), January 14, 2013, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jM4gyqOfL2l2RevWD94KQD4hzFKQ?docId=CNG.afb2e4cc107eca1cb2a505ab662acece.3e1 (accessed April 2013); "Mali Crisis: Key Players," BBC.

[163] Alex de Waal, "'My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded:' Africa's Responses to the Libya Conflict," August 31, 2012; Scott Stewart, "Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya," *Security Weekly*, Stratfor, February 2, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya (accessed April 2013); Arieff, "Crisis In Mali."

[164] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

[165] Nossiter, "Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants' Clout in West Africa."

[166] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group; Arieff, "Crisis In Mali."

However, while the fall of Qaddafi and the subsequent exodus of the Tuareg fighters to Mali provided the spark for the Malian coup and ongoing instability, it should not be considered the cause.[167] Rather, the origins of the Malian crisis are internal, intrinsic to the Malian state, and rooted in the failure of the state since independence in 1960 to develop an effective political framework that incorporates the Tuaregs and other disenfranchised groups in the north, and serves the needs of Malian citizens in the south.[168] The Malian state under ATT had received significant military supplies and anti-terrorism training from the U.S. within the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) beginning in 2002, which became the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005,[169] and later was integrated into AFRICOM in 2007. Despite this large-scale assistance, Mali appears to have ineffectively used these resources, with the state institutions breaking down in early 2012 when faced with instability in the north.[170]

As political instability in Bamako continues[171] and a collection of armed groups based in northern Mali pushed south, France led a military intervention in Mali in January 2013 to halt the advance of these militant organizations, reestablish the territorial integrity of the Malian state, and combat regional smuggling and terrorism.[172] The French-led military operation is ongoing[173]

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[167] Alex de Waal, "Putting Mali Together Again," *The New York Times*, December 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/global/putting-mali-together-again.html?_r=0 (accessed April 2013).
[168] "Libya in its African Context," World Peace Foundation (WPF), The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, November 15-16, 2012, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/World-Peace-Foundation/Activities/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/World%20Peace%20Foundation/Libya%20in%20the%20African%20Context.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[169] "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" International Crisis Group (ICG), March 31, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/Islamist%20Terrorism%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Fact%20or%20Fiction.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[170] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group; "Libya in its African Context," World Peace Foundation.
[171] Adam Nossiter, "Mali's Prime Minister Resigns After Arrest, Muddling Plans to Retake North," *The New York Times*, December 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/africa/malis-prime-minister-arrested-by-military.html?ref=africa (accessed April 2013).
[172] "Mali," *The New York Times*, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mali/index.html (accessed April 2013); "Mali Profile," BBC, April 9, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978 (accessed April 2013).

and supported by troops from African states including Chad,[174] and will likely transition to an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-led, UN-approved peacekeeping force in Mali.[175] However as United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon emphasized in late November 2012, foreign military intervention does not replace the need for a political dialogue in order to forge a national consensus that addresses the grievances of the Malian Tuaregs, among other issues.[176] The fall of Qaddafi and resulting instability in Mali have served to expose deep structural problems within the Malian state, and significantly exacerbated threats of terrorism and crime in northern Mali. While Qaddafi's demise was not the cause of these developments, the collapse of his regime functioned as the trigger by prompting the flight of armed Malian Tuaregs who returned to Mali from Libya, revealing and aggravating Mali's serious political, economic, security, and humanitarian issues.[177]

With respect to Algeria, the destruction of Qaddafi's *Jamahiriyya* in 2011 not only created massive insecurity and political instability on Algeria's eastern border, but also facilitated the strengthening of militant groups on its southern frontier in northern Mali. As analyzed in Section 2.1 on ungoverned areas, the GSPC began establishing its presence in northern Mali as early as

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[173] As of April 2013, France has started the phased withdrawal of its 4,000 troops in Mali, but hopes to leave a 'support force' of 1,000 French soldiers in the country to support a future UN-mandated peacekeeping operation. For more information, see Adama Diarra and John Irish, "France Wants to Keep 1,000 Soldiers in Mali Permanently," Reuters, April 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE93711I20130408 (accessed April 2013); "Suicide Bomber Kills at Least Two Chadian Soldiers in Mali," Agence France-Presse (AFP), April 12, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130412/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-two-chadian-soldiers-mali (accessed April 2013).

[174] Madjiasra Nako and Joe Penney, "Ten Chadian Soldiers Killed Fighting Islamists in Mali," Reuters, February 24, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/24/us-mali-rebels-chad-idUSBRE91N09A20130224 (accessed April 2013). As of April 2013, Chad also started the withdrawal of its 2,000 troops in Mali. For more information, see "Chad: Troops to Leave Mali," Associated Press (AP), April 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/africa/chad-troops-to-leave-mali.html?ref=africa (accessed April 2013).

[175] Ange Aboa, "African Leaders Call for U.N. Mandate for Mali Mission," Reuters, February 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-mali-rebels-summit-idUSBRE91R18O20130228 (accessed April 2013).

[176] "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali," United Nations Security Council (UNSC), November 29, 2012, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/894 (accessed April 2013).

[177] De Waal, "'My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded:' Africa's Responses to the Libya Conflict."

2002. However, while AQIM developed a robust operational base in northern Mali, likely with some cooperation or at least acquiescence from Malian government officials, the group's strength there was limited, as it could never directly threaten Bamako's authority and regime survival.[178] But with the Libyan revolution and the influx of Tuareg fighters into northern Mali in 2011, AQIM was presented with new allies and opportunities to expand its influence. AQIM may have overreached in this context, attempting to impose its radical Islamist program in northern Mali and undertaking efforts in cooperation with other NSAGs to actually take over the Malian state itself by moving south toward Bamako in January 2013, prompting French military intervention,[179] but the net effect has served to degrade the security situation on Algeria's southern border for years to come.[180]

Algeria: Managing the Impact of Qaddafi's Overthrow

Following the swift toppling of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia in January 2011, the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, and the rise of protests in Libya challenging Qaddafi in February 2011, the Algerian government grew increasingly nervous of the potential that a popular uprising could unseat the FLN military-supported regime that has ruled Algeria since its independence in 1962.[181] Specifically regarding Libya, Algeria adopted a strong anti-

[178] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.
[179] "Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform," International Crisis Group (ICG), April 11, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/201-mali-security-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform.aspx (accessed April 2013).
[180] Jonathan Marcus, "Can France Achieve its Goals in Mali?" BBC, January 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21058512 (accessed April 2013); Arieff, "Crisis In Mali"; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response," Testimony by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, February 14, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20130214/100248/HHRG-113-FA00-Wstate-CarsonJ-20130214.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[181] Hugh Roberts, "Algeria's National 'Protesta'," *Foreign Policy*, January 10, 2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/09/algeria_s_national_protesta (accessed April 2013); Anouar Boukhars, "Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 14, 2013, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/algerian-foreign-policy-in-the-context-of-the-arab-spring (accessed April 2013).

interventionist policy, rejecting foreign military involvement to halt Qaddafi's military suppression of the Libyan uprising. This Algerian position that opposed NATO's military intervention in Libya beginning in March 2011 was based on Algeria's own long, violent colonial occupation by France, as well as the experience of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, when the FLN-military regime fiercely resisted any foreign interference.[182]

Based on this Algerian stance, some analysts have leveled extensive accusations that the Algerian military and intelligence services provided significant armed and financial support to the Qaddafi regime beginning in late February 2011. Keenan details the substantial security assistance that the Algerian regime allegedly gave to Qaddafi, including the Algerian Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité's (DRS, Department of Intelligence and Security) coordination of private security personnel, including former members of Ben Ali's disbanded Republican Guard, who were airlifted to Libya on Algerian military transport planes in order to shore up Qaddafi's forces. Keenan also accuses Algiers of delivering ammunition, weapons, armored military vehicles, and other supplies to Qaddafi.[183] Algerian officials, however, vehemently denied claims that the country provided any military assistance, including mercenaries, to the Qaddafi regime during the revolution.[184] While it is difficult to verify or discredit Keenan's claims from solely open-source information, Algeria's public and political support for the Qaddafi administration was apparent, and Algeria recognized the NTC as the

[182] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."
[183] Jeremy Keenan, "Algeria's 'One-Eyed' American General," Al Jazeera (Qatar), June 26, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/briefings/2011/06/201162610308392526.html (accessed April 2013).
[184] "Algeria Denies Libyan Rebel Claims on Mercenaries," Associated Press (AP), April 12, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/algeria-denies-libyan-rebel-claims-mercenaries-20110412-115112-922.html (accessed April 2013); "Algeria Denies Implication in Mercenary Activities in Libya," Xinhua (China), April 11, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/11/c_13824004.htm (accessed April 2013).

legitimate government of Libya only in September 2011, months after other states had backed the NTC.[185]

While the effects of Qaddafi's ouster on Algeria are numerous, this analysis focuses on the political and security consequences for Algeria regarding the Libyan uprising, descent into civil war, and toppling of the *Jamahiriyya* after the fall of Tripoli to the NTC in August 2011. On the political level, Algiers feared that the collapse of the Qaddafi regime would give massive support to the protests that began in Algeria in late December 2010. However, these concerns have largely been unfounded thus far. Algeria did experience a series of protests that extended through January 2012, triggered by a rise in food prices. Demonstrations were also motivated by discontent among unemployed, urban youth populations, who were alienated by what Roberts characterizes as "'la hogra', that is, the contempt with which they feel they are treated by the state, and who see only a future of despair."[186] Other grievances driving the protests included a desire for a more democratic political system, the lifting of the 1992 state of emergency imposed by the Algerian military after the December 1991 electoral victory of the FIS, the release of individuals detained during previous protests, a relaxing of restrictions over the state media, and increased employment opportunities.[187]

However, these protests failed to gather in size or intensity, and did not threaten the Algerian regime's hold on power for several reasons. In contrast to more tightly-controlled authoritarian states such as Libya under Qaddafi or Syria under Assad rule, small forms of civil unrest,

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[185] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."
[186] Michelle Lee Maalouf, "Dr. Hugh Roberts on the Recent Unrest in Algeria, in Light of Tunisia and Egypt," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 10, 2011, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/20709/dr_hugh_roberts_on_the_recent_unrest_in_algeria_in_light_of_tunisia_and_egypt.html (accessed April 2013).
[187] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."

particularly protests led by unemployed youth, are fairly common in Algeria and are often allowed by the authorities as a way to control disturbances, keep them localized in scope, and gain insight as to the pressing issues that the regime needs to address. At the first signs of major unrest in Algeria in early 2011, which was partly a contagion effect based on successes in Tunisia and Egypt,[188] but also driven by local grievances, Algerian authorities deployed large numbers of security forces to ensure that the protests remained small. Moreover, these security personnel dispatched by the government were well-trained and employed only very limited force against protesters, unlike their counterparts in Egypt and Libya, serving to contain the demonstrations and prevent them from escalating.[189] Another line of argument contends that Algeria's brief democratic experience in the late 1980s and early 1990s, culminating with the FIS's electoral victory in December 1991 and the military's intervention in January 1992 to cancel the electoral process, touching off the decade-long civil war, has made many Algerians averse to large-scale political mobilization for fear of ushering in renewed violence.[190]

Figure 23.
Protesters confront Algerian policemen during a demonstration in Algiers in February 2011

Source: *The Huffington Post*

Algerian authorities were also proactive in limiting the unrest by addressing some of the economic grievances by lowering prices for key food commodities, raising wages, and initiating new social programs. With

[188] "Algeria Protesters Push for Change," Al Jazeera (Qatar), February 12, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121235130627461.html (accessed April 2013).
[189] Spencer, "Strategic Posture Review: Algeria."
[190] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues"; "Libya in its African Context," World Peace Foundation (WPF); Robert P. Parks, "Arab Uprisings and the Algerian Elections: Ghosts from the Past?" Jadaliyya, April 10, 2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4979/arab-uprisings-and-the-algerian-elections_ghosts-f (accessed April 2013).

large state revenues from hydrocarbons, Algerian authorities have the ability to use economic subsidies to mollify potential political unrest. Additionally, in February 2011, the Algerian government repealed the state of emergency that had been in place since 1992, addressing a key grievance of the protesters. Next, as an oligarchy boasting various factions of elites in the regime, each of these cliques has reach into members of the opposition, effectively serving to infiltrate and contain any threatening form of opposition politics.[191] Finally, the vast majority of the Algerian protests themselves were significantly divorced from any well-articulated, formulated political demands or program, as well as Algeria's political opposition parties, and thus were unable to gain traction in fomenting political change.[192]

While Algeria has thus far weathered the political repercussions of Qaddafi's ouster, as well as the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, and thwarted political change at home, the security implications for Algeria resulting from Qaddafi's overthrow are far more muddled, and shrouded in significant controversy. The unseating of the *Jamahiriyya*, which involved the plundering of sizeable weapons caches formerly owned by the Qaddafi regime, led to a massive dispersal of arms to both militias inside Libya and actors outside of the country, including to Algeria.[193] A precise estimate of the quantity of weapons that have been transferred from Libya to Algeria is extremely difficult to assess given the proliferation of arms within Libya, the lack of Libyan state control of weapons and the use of force more broadly, and the long, porous Libyan-Algerian border, along which numerous smuggling enterprises and armed groups operate. However, many reports indicate that large numbers of light and heavy arms, ammunition, rocket-propelled

[191] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues"; "Libya in its African Context," World Peace Foundation (WPF); Andrea Dessi, "Algeria at the Crossroads, Between Continuity and Change," Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy), September 2011, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1128.pdf (accessed April 2013).
[192] Roberts, "Algeria's National 'Protesta'."
[193] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

grenades, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), MANPADs, and other sophisticated weaponry have been transported from Libya to other countries in the region, including Algeria.[194] In February 2012, Algerian authorities reportedly discovered 15 Libyan MANPADs and 28 SAM-7s in the southeastern city of In Amenas, near the Libyan border.[195]

In this security context, Algerian authorities have repeatedly expressed alarm that the capabilities of AQIM have been bolstered not only within Algeria, but also in Libya and Mali, feeding off of the instability created by Qaddafi's ouster to garner more militants and weapons, and benefiting from increased operating space, or ungoverned areas. Several security sources have reported that AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar was in southern Libya in early 2012 seeking to build alliances and purchase military equipment.[196] In assessing AQIM, Keenan and other analysts accuse the Algerian government of deliberately distorting the threat of the organization, including its increased danger since the fall of Qaddafi, as a means to acquire international support, particularly from the U.S. and France, and give legitimacy to the robust security apparatus and operations maintained by the Algerian military and intelligence services.[197] Harking back to the sophisticated and deep Algerian intelligence infiltration and manipulation of the GIA during the Algerian civil war that was a key element of the military's eventual victory, Keenan claims that AQIM was effectively established by the DRS in the Sahara-Sahel region in

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[194] C.J. Chivers, "Antiaircraft Missiles on the Loose in Libya," *The New York Times*, July 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/world/africa/15libya.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013); Damien McElroy, "Libya: Algeria Closes Borders as Row Rages over Weapons Smuggling," *The Telegraph*, September 4, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8740487/Libya-Algeria-closes-borders-as-row-rages-over-weapons-smuggling.html (accessed April 2013).

[195] Zoubir, "Qaddafi's Spawn: What the Dictator's Demise Unleashed in the Middle East"; Lamine Chikhi, "Exclusive: Algeria Seizes Missiles Smuggled from Libya: Source," Reuters, February 18, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/18/us-algeria-libya-security-idUSTRE81H0OP20120218 (accessed April 2013).

[196] "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," International Crisis Group.

[197] Jeremy Keenan, "Al-Qaeda in the Sahel," Al Jazeera (Qatar), August 29, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/07/201071994556568918.html (accessed April 2013); Spencer, "Strategic Posture Review: Algeria."

2006 as part of Algeria's strategy of serving as an essential U.S. ally in the GWOT.[198] Following the overthrow of Qaddafi, Keenan argues that the DRS has continued to use the specter of AQIM in order to justify and augment its influence in the Sahel.[199]

These charges, like Keenan's claims about Algerian military support to Qaddafi during the Libyan civil war, are difficult to confirm or refute solely based on open-source information, but do shed light on possible Algerian motivations. To this end, Ansar Dine leader Iyad Ag Ghali is known to have maintained longstanding relations with Algerian intelligence agencies, reflective of Algeria's reach into the collection of armed groups active in northern Mali.[200] However, despite obvious incentives for the Algerian government to amplify the danger of AQIM, this does not mean that the militant group and its allies do not pose a security threat to the Algerian state and other governments in the region. This militant threat is reflected through AQIM's operational history of attacking the Algerian state,[201] recently demonstrated by the March 2012 suicide car bomb attack conducted by MOJWA at



Figure 24.
The Layout of the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas in southeastern Algeria, which was attacked by AQIM-linked militants in January 2013

Source: BBC

[198] Keenan, *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*; Jeremy Keenan, "'Secret Hand' in French Sahel Raid," Al Jazeera (Qatar), August 29, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/08/201085183329292214.html (accessed April 2013).
[199] Jeremy Keenan, "Libya and the Sahel's Nightmare Scenario," Al Jazeera (Qatar), September 28, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/2011921142949286466.html (accessed April 2013).
[200] "Mali: The Need for Determined and Coordinated International Action," International Crisis Group.
[201] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues."

an Algerian military base in Tamanrasset in southern Algeria,[202] and the January 2013 coordinated attack and hostage crisis perpetrated by an AQIM splinter group and other militants at the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas in southeastern Algeria.[203]

Section 2.3: Non-Stated Armed Group Financing

This section analyzes the topic of NSAG financing, focusing on the informal and illicit activities that fund the operational capacities of militant organizations, examining the case study of AQIM.

Militant Financing through Informal & Illicit Operations

NSAGs acquire their funding sources through a diverse set of operations. While some armed groups receive support from state sponsorship, diaspora populations, licit ventures, informal economies, and other means, many NSAGs obtain funds through involvement in smuggling, criminal projects, and other illicit activities that serve to finance their capabilities and militant operations.

Naghshpour, St. Marie, and Stanton, Jr. focus on shadow economies, in which NSAGs utilize informal and/or illicit economic activities in order to fund their militancy. In this framework, NSAGs employ the capabilities, infrastructure, and networks of both informal economic operations (legal) and criminal organizations (illegal) in order to carry out their own financial functions. Thus, NSAG funding sources in shadow economies are incredibly diverse, and on one end of the spectrum can include activities such as tax evasion:

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[202] Spencer, "Strategic Posture Review: Algeria"; "Al-Qaeda Offshoot Claims Algeria Attack," Al Jazeera (Qatar), March 3, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/20123313292332857.html (accessed April 2013).
[203] "Algeria Siege: 37 Foreigners Died, PM Says," BBC; Joscelyn and Roggio, "Al Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Credit for Kidnappings in Algeria."

> "Where individuals who sympathize with (or are part of) a terrorist organization redirect some of their income while underreporting their total income…Unreported income can come from legal sources, but is redirected to terrorist organizations."[204]

On the other end of the spectrum, illicit operations in shadow economies include the "trade of stolen goods, drug production and distribution, prostitution, gambling, smuggling of all types and fraud" and other activities.[205] However, despite armed groups significantly benefiting from their use of shadow economies, the structures of the NSAGs and its financial partners remain largely separate in this context.

Larsson discusses the concept of hybrid networks, which he defines as the interaction between criminal and armed groups "where no real distinction can be seen, and activities are conducted 'jointly' or using the same structures."[206] In Larsson's framework, the operations of criminal organizations and NSAGs become so intertwined that they can be indistinguishable. NSAGs may draw on the expertise of specialist professionals, including accountants, bankers, forgers, and counterfeiters, and actually incorporate these personnel into their organizational structures. In this context, a NSAG may become so involved in criminal operations that it actually ceases acting as an insurgency, terrorist group, or militia, and instead becomes primarily a criminal organization that may sometimes use insurgent or terrorist tactics. Larsson cites drug cartels in South America and warlords in Pakistan's tribal areas as examples of criminal actors that occasionally employ terrorist tactics.[207] Sanderson supports Larsson's work by arguing that since the September 11, 2001, attacks "transnational terrorist organizations are moving deeper into

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[204] Shahdad Naghshpour, Joseph J. St. Marie, and Samuel S. Stanton, Jr., "The Shadow Economy and Terrorist Infrastructure" in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Volume 2), edited by James J.F. Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.
[205] Naghshpour, St. Marie, and Stanton, Jr., "The Shadow Economy and Terrorist Infrastructure."
[206] J.P. Larsson, "Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism" in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Volume 2), edited by James J.F. Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.
[207] Larsson, "Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism."

organized criminal activity…by creating 'in-house' criminal capabilities in order to generate revenue" in response to counterterrorism initiatives included within the GWOT that have limited the flow of financial support to armed groups.[208]

AQIM's Financing & Criminal Operations

AQIM's financing and particularly its illicit economic activities have historical roots in the operations of the GSPC. The ICG describes that the GSPC engaged in smuggling, protection rackets, and money laundering. The GSPC was closely tied to criminal organizations in Kabylia, including 'la mafia du sable' (the sand mafia). Former GSPC commander Amari Saïfi "controlled the illicit movement of livestock and containers throughout the Tebessa-Bir El Ater region [in northeastern Algeria] close to the Tunisian" border.[209] Former GIA, GSPC, and later AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar also monopolized the smuggling of Marlboro cigarettes from West Africa to North Africa via Mali,[210] earning the informal title of 'Mr. Marlboro.'[211] As a member of the GSPC, Belmokhtar also trafficked cannabis and household goods such as milk and cooking oil throughout the region.[212]

AQIM relies primarily, if not exclusively, on organized criminal activity, including kidnapping, smuggling, and drug trafficking, to finance its operations.[213] Kidnapping has proven very lucrative for the group. Beginning in 2003, the GSPC and later AQIM have consistently perpetrated the kidnapping of foreign nationals, mostly European tourists, as well as aid workers, employees of

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[208] Thomas Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines," *SAIS Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2004, pp. 49-61.
[209] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[210] "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page," International Crisis Group.
[211] "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar," BBC.
[212] "Counter-Terrorism Successes Force Algerian Militants to Evolve," *Jane's Intelligence Review*.
[213] Le Sage, "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."

multinational corporations, Canadian diplomats, and others in the Sahara-Sahel region.[214] AQIM is not always directly involved in the kidnapping operations, but has allegedly hired other armed groups to capture the hostages and deliver them to AQIM operatives.[215]

GSPC militants kidnapped 32 European tourists (Austrian, Dutch, German, Swedish, and Swiss nationals) in southern Algeria in February and March 2003 and allegedly received $6 million from the German government for their release in August 2003. This ransom payment to the GSPC helped fund the group's operations, and was reportedly used to purchase weapons and ammunition[216] that had been seized by Algerian security forces.[217] AQIM operatives kidnapped two Austrian nationals in February 2008 in Tunisia, eventually releasing them in Mali in October 2008 in return for a ransom paid by the Austrian government.[218] The group kidnapped two Canadian diplomats who were working for the UN, Robert Fowler and Louis Guay, outside of Niamey, Niger, in December

Figure 25.
Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler (center) and Louis Guay (right), who were held by AQIM in northern Mali from December 2008 through April 2009

Source: *The Globe and Mail*

[214] Tiemoko Diallo, "Al Qaeda Holding Europeans Taken in Mali—Military," Reuters, January 29, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/29/idUSLT774538 (accessed April 2013).
[215] Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, "Exclusive: Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Air Network: U.S. Official," Reuters, January 14, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-drugs-security-aviation-exclusive-idUSTRE60D3Z720100114 (accessed April 2013); Le Sage, "The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."
[216] 17 of the tourists were freed in May 2003 in a rescue operation conducted by Algerian security forces, 1 died in captivity, and the remaining 14 were freed in August 2003 after the German government paid a ransom to the GSPC. For more information, see: "Newspaper: Berlin Paid Ransom to Free Hostages," Deutsche Welle, August 6, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1289545,00.html (accessed April 2013).
[217] Olivier Guitta, "AQIM's New Kidnapping Strategy," *Middle East Times*, March 24, 2008, http://www.metransparent.com/spip.php?article3585 (accessed April 2013).
[218] "Austrian Hostages Released in Mali," Al-Jazeera (Qatar), October 31, 2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/10/20081031145281633385.html (accessed April 2013).

2008 and released them in Mali in April 2009; there are allegations that the governments of Burkina Faso and Mali paid ransoms to the captors.[219]

AQIM also kidnapped four European tourists, Edwin Dyer (British), Marianne Petzold (German), Gabriella Burco Greiner (Swiss), and Werner Greiner (Swiss) in January 2009 in the border region of eastern Mali and western Niger. While the two female tourists, Petzold and Burco Greiner, were released in Mali in April 2009, Dyer and Werner Greiner remained in captivity.[220] In return for Dyer's release, AQIM demanded that the British government release imprisoned Jordanian-born Palestinian cleric Abu Qatada. In early June 2009, AQIM announced on a radical Islamist Web site called *Al Falojah* that it had executed Dyer on May 31, 2009, one day after the second deadline for its demand of Qatada's release had expired.[221] Several reports indicated that Dyer was killed by Abu Zeid (also known as Abid Hammadou), a regional deputy commander of AQIM who was based in northern Mali until his killing in February 2013.[222] The Swiss government allegedly paid AQIM $4 million for the release of Swiss national Werner Greiner in July 2009 in Mali, though the Swiss Foreign Ministry has denied this claim.[223]

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[219] "Canadian Diplomats Freed in Mali Appear to be in Good Health," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), April 23, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/04/23/fowler-guay-harper684.html (accessed April 2013).
[220] "British Hostage Executed by Islamists in Mali," Agence France-Presse (AFP), June 3, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmTcQ3leR9EEwoRTrdMeOlZFZK8A (accessed April 2013); "Swiss Man Arrives Home after Mali Kidnap Ordeal," Agence France-Presse (AFP), July 14, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jY6z0JKOsCMVEW-ITmO9H30nlCiA (accessed April 2013).
[221] Alan Cowell and Souad Mekhennet, "Al Qaeda Says it has Killed Briton," *The New York Times*, June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/world/africa/04hostage.html?_r=1&hp (accessed April 2013).
[222] "British Hostage Executed by Islamists in Mali," Agence France-Presse (AFP); "Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria," U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx (accessed April 2013); Steven Erlanger, "France Confirms the Death of a Qaeda Leader in Mali," *The New York Times*, March 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/world/africa/france-confirms-death-of-abdelhamid-abu-zeid.html (accessed April 2013).
[223] "Swiss Pay $4M for AQIM Hostage Release," United Press International (UPI), July 16, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/07/16/Swiss-pay-4M-for-AQIM-hostage-release/UPI-78831247773842/ (accessed April 2013); Serge Daniel, "Al-Qaeda Group Releases Swiss Hostage in Mali," Agence

The National Defense University (NDU) estimates that AQIM received $70 million in kidnapping ransoms from 2006 through February 2011,[224] while *The New York Times* calculates that AQIM netted about $90 million from such payments from 2002-2012.[225] Moreover, while the hostages have been kidnapped across the region in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia, they were nearly all detained and eventually released in northern Mali by AQIM, further evidence of the tacit alliance between AQIM and Malian authorities under the administration of ATT.[226]



Figure 26.
Smuggling operations in the Sahara and Sahel regions of Africa, where AQIM is active

Source: BBC

Smuggling has also been a lucrative source of income for the group, and is likely its primary method of acquiring weapons and other supplies. Often using established smuggling channels and ancient trading routes that run for thousands of miles across the Sahara and Sahel, AQIM exploits the porous, largely un-policed borders of the region to smuggle vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, people, and

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France-Presse (AFP), July 12, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gF3xcevXfOpBQT-gvcxgn9_yFFKg (accessed April 2013).

[224] Modibo Goïta, "West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy," *Africa Security Brief*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), February 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/Africa-Security-Brief/ASB-11.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[225] Nossiter, "Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants' Clout in West Africa."

[226] Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region."

arms.[227] In the Sahara region of southern Algeria and in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, AQIM operatives have charged protection fees to smugglers who use the routes, and sometimes confiscated goods and then resold them.[228]

As part of its smuggling activities, AQIM is involved in large-scale drug trafficking operations in the region, and has been linked with the cocaine trade originating in South America, transported via Africa, and ultimately arriving in Europe.[229] In 2008, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report stated that drug smugglers had established a trans-Atlantic cocaine pipeline between South America and West Africa, transporting cocaine shipments from various South American countries on airplanes to West Africa. Once in Africa, the drugs are funneled to Europe through two different overland routes via Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. AQIM is implicated in the report regarding the drug trafficking across northwestern Africa, and is believed to be using the profits from its involvement in the drug-smuggling operation to purchase weapons and other resources.[230] Illustrative of this trend, Moroccan authorities arrested a network of 34 individuals allegedly linked to AQIM in October 2010 who were smuggling 1,300 pounds of cocaine from Algeria and Mauritania via Morocco, destined for Europe.[231] However, some analysts such as Lacher argue that there is little evidence to substantiate claims about AQIM's direct involvement in drug trafficking in

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[227] Andrew Hansen, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (aka Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)," *The Washington Post*, December 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/11/AR2007121101404.html (accessed April 2013); Alistair Thomson, "Analysis – Rally Cancellation Highlights Lawlessness of Sahara," Reuters, January 6, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/01/06/idUKL0529108020080106 (accessed April 2013).

[228] Emily Hunt, "Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A 'Thorn in the Neck' of the United States?" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus65.pdf (accessed April 2013).

[229] "Algeria 2012 Crime and Safety Report," U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Bureau of Diplomatic Security, February 16, 2012, https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=11999 (accessed April 2013).

[230] Gaynor and Diallo, "Exclusive: Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Air Network: U.S. Official."

[231] Goïta, "West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy"; Aida Alami, "Morocco Battles Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," GlobalPost, November 2, 2010, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/morocco/101101/morocco-battles-al-qaeda-the-islamic-maghreb (accessed April 2013).

the region, suggesting that these allegations have been exaggerated and that AQIM's operations in this sphere are more likely limited to imposing transit fees on other narcotics smugglers.[232] At the very least, however, AQIM is profiting from regional drug trafficking.[233]

AQIM: A Hybrid Terrorist-Criminal Organization

As part of the GSPC's transition to AQIM and the rise of AQIM's extensive criminal activities, this subsection argues that AQIM has developed into a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization, exhibiting notable characteristics of both types of groups. With the significant increase in AQIM's criminal operations, the organization fits within Larsson's framework of hybrid networks. In this context, AQIM's militant and criminal components have become significantly interwoven, as the same personnel and structures conduct both of these functional activities.[234] In line with Sanderson's work, AQIM has continued to attack the Algerian state and other targets in the region, while also building 'in-house' criminal capabilities.[235]

Described by numerous sources as a hybrid group,[236] Gray and Stockham assert that AQIM's southern factions, particularly those based in northern Mali, are potentially more motivated by financial gains than any political-religious objectives.[237] Jean-Baptiste Carpentier, the Director of the Financial Information Processing Cell and Combating Illicit Financial Activities (Traitement

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[232] Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region."
[233] Goïta, "West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy; David Lewis, "Al Qaeda's Richest Faction Dominant in North Mali: U.S.," Reuters, July 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/us-mali-usa-africom-idUSBRE86P1IC20120726 (accessed April 2013).
[234] Larsson, "Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism."
[235] Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines."
[236] Arieff, "Algeria: Current Issues"; "The Dynamics of North African Terrorism," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2010, http://csis.org/files/attachments/100216_NorthAfricaConferenceReport.pdf (accessed April 2013); Dina Temple-Raston, "New Threat Emerges At Intersection Of Terrorism, Syndicated Crime," NPR, January 28, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/01/28/170494494/new-threat-emerges-at-intersection-of-terrorism-syndicated-crime (accessed April 2013).
[237] Gray and Stockham, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the Evolution from Algerian Islamism to Transnational Terror."

du Renseignement et Action Contre Les Circuits Financiers Clandestins, or TRACFIN), an arm of the French Ministry of Finance that works to combat money laundering, went as far as stating in December 2010 that AQIM "no longer relies on crime to finance terrorism. Now, terrorism is used as a cover-up for crime, the sole purpose of which is to make a fortune."[238]

Harmon agrees with Gray and Stockham's assessment that AQIM's operations in the Sahel qualify it as a hybrid organization, but emphasizes that it is also important to consider the personal history of many top AQIM commanders that reflects both their militant and criminal actions. Harmon notes Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who trained with the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, served as a high-level official in the GIA and the GSPC who engaged in significant violence during the Algerian civil war, and later carried out attacks as an AQIM leader as recently as the January 2013 coordinated assault against a gas facility in southeastern Algeria.[239] According to Harmon, Belmokhtar's militant résumé must be considered in addition to his extensive criminal activities.[240]

The operational history of former senior AQIM commander Abu Zeid also reflects AQIM's status as a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization. A former GIA member, GSPC official, and

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[238] Mawassi Lahcen, "Kidnapping, Drug Trafficking Dominate AQIM Activities," Magharebia, December 8, 2010, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2010/12/08/feature-01 (accessed April 2013).

[239] During the January 2013 attack against the Tigantourine gas facility in southeastern Algeria, however, Belmokhtar likely conducted the operation as the commander of an AQIM splinter group known as *al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima* ('Those Who Sign with Blood', or the Signed-in-Blood Battalion), rather than AQIM itself. For more information, see Max Fisher, "Looking for al-Qaeda in Algeria," *The Washington Post*, January 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/22/looking-for-al-qaeda-in-algeria/ (accessed April 2013); Andrew Lebovich, "What's Old is New Again: The Legacy of Algeria's Civil War in Today's Jihad," Jihadica, January 21, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/what%E2%80%99s-old-is-new-again-the-legacy-of-algeria%E2%80%99s-civil-war-in-today%E2%80%99s-jihad/ (accessed April 2013); Steven Erlanger and Adam Nossiter, "Jihad 'Prince,' a Kidnapper, is Tied to Raid," *The New York Times*, January 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/world/africa/mokhtar-belmokhtar-thought-to-be-kidnappings-mastermind.html (accessed April 2013).

[240] Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region"; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar," BBC.

senior regional commander for AQIM in southern Algerian and northern Mali, Abu Zeid assisted in the 2003 GSPC kidnapping of 32 European tourists in southern Algeria. He led the June 2005 GSPC attack on the Lemgheity military barracks in Mauritania that killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers.[241] After joining AQIM, Abu Zeid established a camp for new "recruits in northern Mali that included training in combat techniques, making and defusing bombs, and guerilla tactics."[242] In addition to the 2003 hostage crisis in southern Algeria, Abu Zeid orchestrated the kidnappings of more than 20 Western citizens in the Sahara-Sahel region from 2008-2013, netting the group millions of dollars in ransom payments and personally carrying out the executions of British national Edwin Dyer in 2009 and Frenchman Michel Germaneau in 2010. Abu Zeid also led AQIM's brief control over the city of Timbuktu in northern Mali in 2012 until the French military intervention in January 2013. In Timbuktu, he instituted AQIM's enforcement of its rigid and violent conception of Islamic law (*shariah*), ordering amputations as punishments for criminals and the destruction of Sufi shrines. Abu Zeid was killed by French and Chadian forces in February 2013 in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[243]

Figure 27.
Former AQIM commander Abu Zeid

[241] Andrew Black, "Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad's Southern Amir," *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, May 8, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34964&cHash=97db6f12bc (accessed April 2013).
[242] "Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria," U.S. Department of the Treasury.
[243] Lamine Chikhi and John Irish, "Al Qaeda Commander Abou Zeid Killed in Mali – Algeria's Ennahar TV," Reuters, February 28, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/uk-mali-rebels-qaeda-idUKBRE91R1L820130228 (accessed April 2013); "France Confirms Death of Al-Qaida Chief Abou Zeid," Associated Press (AP), March 23, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-abou-zeid-20130323,0,6473195.story (accessed April 2013); Edward Cody, "'Emir of the South' Abu Zeid Poised to Take Over al-Qaeda in NW Africa," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/20/AR2010102005252_pf.html (accessed April 2013).

Byman argues that AQIM's expanded involvement in criminal activities is driven by financial necessity, and specifically the lack of economic support that the group receives from AQ core. Byman describes that:

> "Without sustained financial resources, groups may revert to criminal activity. For instance, after AQIM spent the money it had received for affiliating with al-Qa'ida and did not receive another burst, it primarily (though not entirely) focused, as before, on low-level crime and kidnapping more than on attacking global targets."[244]

Dell Dailey, a former U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism endorses Byman's position and contends that AQIM's criminal endeavors are partly the result of the minimal direct communication and assistance between AQIM and AQ core. Dailey specifically notes that Western counterterrorism efforts have increasingly weakened the ability of AQ core to bankroll militants around the globe, pushing AQIM and other armed groups to engage in criminal actions as a means of financial survival.[245] While AQIM continues to function as a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization, Harmon suggests that "the question that remains to be answered as AQIM moves into its second decade of organized Islamist struggle is which side of the group will become more important, the jihad side or the contraband trafficking side."[246]

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[244] Byman, "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and its Affiliate Organizations."
[245] Nicholas Schmidle, "The Saharan Conundrum," *The New York Times*, February 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/magazine/15Africa-t.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 2013).
[246] Harmon, "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qa'ida Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region."

Conclusion

The Algerian civil war and its outcome serve as a useful and understudied case study to assess the establishment and development of non-state armed groups. While the FLN constructed its popular credibility through a protracted war of liberation to terminate French colonial governance over Algeria, the regime's domination started to decline in the late 1980s and was eventually challenged by the FIS through elections in December 1991. To safeguard its supremacy, the Algerian military subverted the democratic process and suppressed the FIS in January 1992, pushing the political challengers toward violence and igniting a vicious internal conflict that continued for over 10 years and pitted an assortment of militant Islamist organizations against the FLN-military administration. By deeply infiltrating the armed groups and promoting an amnesty program, however, the Algerian government maintained authority and has improved its standing since 2002.

Nevertheless, even with the Algerian regime's comeback, the lone persisting militant organization in the civil war, the GSPC, rebranded itself as AQIM in the mid-2000s. AQIM does not threaten the survival of the Algerian government or military, but presents a security hazard inside Algeria and throughout the Sahara-Sahel region, specifically in northern Mali, due to the group's regional operations, transition to a dispersed organizational model, utilization of ungoverned areas, foreign linkages, bolstering as a result of insecurity in Libya and Mali, and criminal actions. This analysis evaluated the transformation of Algeria's security conditions from the late 1980s to the present, examining the government's diminishing authority in the late 1980s that brought about the internal conflict, the regime's successful strategy that it employed to maintain power, and the organizational adaptations implemented by AQIM facilitating its

sustainment. In this context, while AQIM has failed to achieve its core objective of overthrowing the Algerian government, a goal pursued by its predecessors in the GIA and the GSPC, the group has demonstrated significant organizational innovation and poses an ongoing security threat as an influential force in the Sahara-Sahel region.[247]

[247] Thornberry and Levy, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb."

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