TALKING TO THE OTHER:
THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP CONTACT ON RECONCILIATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty

of

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

by

RACHEL SCHILLER

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

April/2012

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Eileen Babbitt, Chair
Professor of International Conflict Management Practice
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Dr. Nadim Rouhana
Professor of International Negotiation and Conflict Studies
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Dr. Peter Uvin
Henry J. Leir Professor of International Humanitarian Studies and Academic Dean
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

ABSTRACT: *This dissertation seeks to contribute to both the theory and practice of reconciliation by offering a theoretical framework for reconciliation that can be used by scholars to test the effects of various interventions designed to promote reconciliation, and by implementing the first randomized field experiment to test the effects of facilitated intergroup contact in a post-conflict society. In Aceh, Indonesia, 108 ex-combatants and persons affected by conflict participated in one of six three-day workshops or in a control group to assess the effects of dialogue-based, training-based and mixed-method conflict resolution techniques on prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing, which served as proxies for reconciliation. While the results of this study are modest, they provide the first empirical evidence that intergroup contact programs can reduce prejudice, and increase trust, forgiveness and healing in the highly charged context of post-conflict societies, suggesting that contact programs may over time become an effective means of encouraging reconciliation in conflict-affected societies.*

RACHEL SCHILLER

EDUCATION

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Boston, MA

PhD Candidate: International Conflict Resolution, 2007-2012

- Dissertation title--Talking to the Other: The Effects of Intergroup Contact on Reconciliation in Post-conflict Societies

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD), 2004-2007

- International Conflict Resolution, Public International Law, Human Rights
- Masters thesis: The Factors that Led to the Signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)

University of Pennsylvania, 1995-1999 Philadelphia, PA

Bachelor of Arts with Honors Distinction, *Magna Cum Laude*

Majors: International Relations, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

Minor: French

Ecole Supérieure de Commerce/Lyon III, Jan-June 1998 Lyon, France

Nanjing University, Aug-Dec 1997 Nanjing, China

WORK EXPERIENCE

Rachel has spent over 10 years working in the field of humanitarian aid, development and conflict resolution. Most recently she served as the Peacebuilding Advisor to the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) on behalf of the World Bank.

FELLOWSHIPS/GRANTS:

- Harvard Law School's Program on Negotiation, Dissertation Fellowship, September 2011- May 2012
- Morris Abrams Award in International Relations, June 2011
- Fletcher Summer Research Funds Grant Recipient, June 2011
- Aceh Research Training Institute (ARTI) Travel Grant Recipient, March-June 2009.
- Tufts Provost Fellow, 2007-2009
- Harvard Law School's Program on Negotiations (PON) 2006 Summer Fellow

PUBLICATIONS:

- Schiller, Rachel. 2012. Using Dialogue to Advance Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Societies: A Field Experiment in Aceh, Indonesia. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2012, San Diego, CA
- Schiller, Rachel. 2011. Reconciliation in Aceh: Addressing the social effects of prolonged armed conflict. *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39: 489-507.
- Schiller, Rachel. 2010. Promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Paper presented at the 9th ASEAN Inter-University Seminar on Social Development: Wars, Displacement and Financial Tsunamis: Remaking Society and Economy, Banda Aceh, Indonesia.
- Schiller, Rachel. 2009. Reflecting on Peace Practice: Lessons Learned from Comparative Analysis of Peacebuilding Work. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies hosted by the National University of Singapore's Asia Research Institute and the International Center for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, Banda Aceh, Indonesia.
- Schiller, Rachel. 2008. BRA Capacity-Building Materials and Reports. In *The Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh.* Available at https://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/
- Schiller, Rachel. 2008. The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Aceh Conflict. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Available at http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20Peace%20Practice.
- Schiller, Rachel. 2007. Aceh Mission Review. In *The Annual Review of Global Peacekeeping Operations.* Center on International Cooperation. New York, NY.
- Schiller, Rachel. 2005. Building a Prosperous Aceh. *The Jakarta Post.* December 18, 2005.

DEDICATIONS:

To my husband Michael who makes everything possible.

And to the many people throughout Indonesia whose struggle has been a source of inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support I received from the Program on Negotiation (PON) at Harvard Law School as a Graduate Research Fellow, the Morris Abrams Foundation for the Morris Abrams Award in International Relations, and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for a Summer Research Grant, all of which made it possible to complete this research.

I would also like to acknowledge the expert advice and guidance of my committee—Eileen Babbitt, Nadim Rouhana and Peter Uvin—who individually and collectively helped me expand my thinking at every stage of this endeavor and have made this process both challenging and enjoyable.

I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor Eileen Babbitt, whose own practice and teaching has been a constant source of inspiration for me. I couldn't have done this without your unwavering support and encouragement.

I would also like to acknowledge Jenifer Burckett-Picker, whose has been an invaluable resource in navigating the PhD process. Thank you!

A hearty thanks to Reid Offringa for his expert statistical advice and generous willingness to answer my seemingly unending questions.

A tremendous thanks to my sister, Erica, who has taken amazing care of me during my time in Boston.

And many thanks to those in Aceh whose courage made this project possible. Salam damai dan salam perjuangan.

Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
The Case of Aceh, Indonesia 7
Background to the Aceh conflict: 8
Intergroup relations in Aceh: 13
Reconciliation in Aceh: 21

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 25
Reconciliation 28
Transitional Justice 32
Intergroup Relations Theory 45
A Theoretical Framework for Reconciliation 49
Operationalizing the Dependent Variables 51
Conclusion 60

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 62
Field Experimentation 62
Study Design 65
Implementing the study 77
The Workshops 87
Conclusion 109

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 111
Understanding the Data Analysis 112
Findings 117
Sociodemographic characteristics of participants 117
Prejudice 122
Empathy 127
Trust 134
Tolerance 138
Forgiveness 139
Healing 150
Attitudes Toward Reconciliation 160

Contact 165
Conclusion 167

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 169
Prejudice 170
Empathy 172
Forgiveness 175
Trust 177
Healing 181
Tolerance 184
Conclusion 186

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FIRST INTERVIEW 194
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECOND/THIRD INTERVIEW 209
BIBLIOGRAPHY 226

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

With over half of the conflict-affected countries in the world relapsing into violence within ten years, post-conflict peacebuilding remains one of the greatest challenges facing both scholars and practitioners.[1] This dissertation therefore seeks to address the core peacebuilding dilemma of how to prevent a resumption of violence in post-conflict societies by advancing work on the concept of reconciliation, which is now recognized as a key piece of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, essential to ensuring an equitable and stable peace,[2] and to the prevention of future conflict.[3]

However, as no comprehensive theory of reconciliation exists, there has been no consensus or conceptual clarity on what reconciliation means and even less on how to achieve it.[4] Moreover, a lack of empirical evidence surrounding the efficacy of interventions designed to promote reconciliation has left practitioners with little information about how to create the conditions for reconciliation in conflict-affected societies.

---

[1] Paul Collier et al., "Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy," in *World Bank Policy Research Report* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003); Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, "Natural resources and violent conflict: options and actions," (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003).

[2] A.M. Kacowicz et al., *Stable peace among nations* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); John Paul Lederach, *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997); H.C. Kelman, "Reconciliation as identity change: A social-psychological perspective," in *From conflict resolution to reconciliation*, ed. Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004); D. Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process," in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, ed. Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[3] L. Huyse, "The Process of Reconciliation," in *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook* ed. P. Bloomfield, T. Barnes, and L. Huyse (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2003), 28.

[4] Jens Meierhenrich, "Varieties of Reconciliation," *Law and Social Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (2008); Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly, "Too many quesitons, too few answers: Reconciliation in transitional societies," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 35(2004); Nadim Rouhana, N., "Key issues in reconciliation: Challenging traditional assumptions on conflict resolution and power dynamics," in *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective*, ed. D. Bar-Tal (New York: Psychology Press, 2011).

In the absence of a theory of reconciliation, transitional justice, with its primary emphasis on truth-telling mechanisms such as prosecutions and truth commissions, has become the dominant paradigm for promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies. This is demonstrated by the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) compiled by the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, which compares data on 29 comprehensive peace agreements signed since 1989.[5] The database shows that fewer than 40% of peace agreements have included an explicit mechanism for encouraging reconciliation, but 100% of those that did included a truth and reconciliation mechanism that established a temporary and officially sanctioned body to investigate and report on patterns of human rights abuses.[6] None of these agreements included any other type of program aimed at addressing reconciliation. While there are numerous examples of initiatives undertaken by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and scholar-practitioners designed to promote reconciliation, none have ever been officially sanctioned in a peace agreement or scaled up to develop national reach.[7]

Problematically, evidence is emerging demonstrating that while transitional justice may achieve some of the claims of its proponents such as establishing a historical record, educating the public, providing a basis for institutional reform and reparations, and establishing a sense of

[5] A comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) is defined as a written document produced through a process of negotiation in which the major parties to the conflict are involved in the negotiations, and substantive issues underlying the dispute are included in the negotiation process. PAM defines a CPA by the process and product of negotiations, not the implementation or impact of the document. As such, a comprehensive peace is not necessary for a comprehensive peace agreement to be included in the list. The Kroc Institute sites more than 35 such agreements since 1989. http://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes

[6] El Salvador, South Africa, Sierra Leone (1996 Abidjan Agreement), Sierra Leone (1999 Lomé Agreement), Indonesia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Guatemala, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda. Available at http://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes.

[7] Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and Rezarta Bilali, "Psychological recovery, reconciliation and the prevention of new violence: an approach and its uses in Rwanda," in *Peacebuilding in Traumatized Societies*, ed. B. Hart (American University Press, 2008); Joseph Albeck, Sami Adwan, and Dan Bar-On, "Dialogue groups: TRT's guidelines for working through intractable conflicts by personal storytelling," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8, no. 4 (2002).

justice and rule of law,[8] it does not appear to be successful at promoting psychological healing or reconciliation.[9]

Given the emerging evidence on the limitations of transitional justice to promote reconciliation, this dissertation argues that while truth-telling may be a necessary part of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, it is not independently sufficient for achieving reconciliation. As such, I do not argue that transitional justice should not be an integral part of post-conflict peacebuilding, but rather that it should not be the sole focus of practitioners who seek to create the conditions for reconciliation. This dissertation therefore seeks to identify mechanisms that may be complementary to transitional justice in the pursuit of the psychological changes that embody reconciliation.

As such, I turn to the social psychological literature on intergroup relations and intergroup contact, which for more than 50 years has been indicating that contact between groups can produce psychological changes such as a reduction of prejudice, and an increase in empathy, trust, and forgiveness.[10]

---

[8] Jonathan D. Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002); James Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation?* (New York: Russell Sage, 2004); Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Inclusive Justice: The Limitations of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions," in *Peace versus justice?: The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa*, ed. Chandra Lekha; Pillay Sriram, Suren (Suffolk: James Currey/University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010).

[9] Karen Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 23 (2010); Phuong N. Pham, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Timothy Longman, "Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for attitudes toward justice and reconciliation," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 292(2004); Metin Başoğlu et al., "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 294, no. 5 (2005).

[10] Thomas Pettigrew, F. and Linda R. Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90, no. 5 (2006); M. Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Social Issues* 62, no. 1 (2006); M. Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of "The Troubles"," in *Collective guilt: International perspectives*, ed. N.R. Branscombe and B. Doosje (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation*; Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954).

However, limitations in existing research require additional inquiry to increase the body of case studies in non-Western and conflict-affected contexts such that we are better able to understand whether the effects found in previous studies transfer to the highly-charged political context of intergroup contact between social groups with "a history of conflict and hostility, inequalities of status and power, and political struggle."[11]

As such, this dissertation seeks to contribute to both the theory and practice of reconciliation by first positing a theoretical framework for reconciliation that can be used by scholars to test the effects of various interventions that may contribute to achieving reconciliation. This framework proposes that the essence of reconciliation is about improving intergroup relations to the extent that conflict is resolved through dialogue rather than violence, and operationalizes reconciliation as a combination of psychological changes that may include a reduction of prejudice, and an increase in empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing—variables which scholars have proposed as key elements of reconciliation.[12] Conceptualizing reconciliation in this way allows scholars to test the effect of various interventions designed to promote reconciliation on the psychological changes that indicate reconciliation is taking place.

To that end, after positing a theoretical framework for reconciliation, this study uses a field experimental methodology to begin to establish empirical evidence about the interventions that

[11] " Marilynn B. Brewer and Samuel L. Gaertner, "Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization," in *Self and Social Identity*, ed. Marilynn B. Brewer and Miles Hewstone (Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 301.

[12] Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation*; Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."; Jens Meierhenrich, "Varieties of Reconciliation," *Law and Social Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (2008); Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954); Miles Hewstone et al., "Stepping stones to reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup contact, forgiveness and trust," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, ed. Arie Nadler, Thomas Malloy, E., and Jeffrey D. Fisher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

may lead to the psychological changes that embody reconciliation. Specifically, I will test the effects intergroup contact on reconciliation by asking the following questions:

Q1: Does dialogue-based contact reduce intergroup prejudice in a post-conflict context?

Q2: Does dialogue-based contact increase intergroup empathy in a post-conflict context?

Q3: Does dialogue-based contact increase intergroup trust in a post-conflict context?

Q4: Does dialogue-based contact increase intergroup tolerance in a post-conflict context?

Q5: Does dialogue-based contact increase intergroup forgiveness in a post-conflict context?

Q6: Does dialogue-based contact increase individual healing in a post-conflict context?

I hypothesize that dialogue-based intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice, while increasing intergroup empathy, trust, tolerance, healing and forgiveness.

In answering these questions, this dissertation offers the first case study that employs a rigorously-designed randomized field experiment to test the effects of facilitated intergroup contact in a non-Western, highly-charged post-conflict society. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, 108 ex-combatants and persons affected by conflict in the post-conflict context of Aceh, Indonesia participated in one of six three-day workshops or in a control group that did not attend the workshops. In order to determine the optimal conditions for facilitating reconciliation, three distinct treatments were applied: dialogue-based contact workshops, training-based contact workshops, and mixed-method contact workshops that combined both dialogue and training techniques. The effects of the workshops were measured using psychometric scales for each of the dependent variables--prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing.

I focus on the case of Aceh, Indonesia because while the 2005 peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has brought about

significant structural and political change, little has been done to address reconciliation in Aceh. This is largely because reconciliation has been conceptualized solely as the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Court mandated in the peace agreement, both of which have been delayed indefinitely due to political realities. In the meantime, relations between the national and provincial governments have improved, but relations between groups within the province remain tense and in some cases continue to deteriorate, a phenomenon that will be discussed in more detail below. As such, Aceh is a relatively clean slate to work with given the absence of large-scale reconciliation initiatives to date and offers an ideal situation in which to study the effects of interventions designed to promote reconciliation.

This dissertation begins with an introduction to the context of intergroup relations in Aceh, in particular in the Central Highlands region of Aceh where this research takes place. Chapter two then examines the literature on reconciliation, transitional justice and intergroup relations in an effort to lay the theoretical foundations that form the backbone of this work and to examine the variables that scholars have suggested are key components of reconciliation. Chapter three discusses the renaissance of field experimentation, particularly for political scientists, and explains the field experimental methodology used in this study. Chapter four presents the findings from the study, while chapter five discusses the implications of these findings for scholars and peacebuilding practitioners.

In sum, this applied research argues that while the jury is still out on the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms for promoting reconciliation, other constructs are available that may prove to be effective alternatives or complements to transitional justice in the pursuit of reconciliation in post-conflict societies. As such, this dissertation seeks to test the effectiveness of intergroup

contact to determine whether it might offer a parallel or complementary approach to promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

The Case of Aceh, Indonesia

On August 15, 2005, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ending more than 30 years of violent conflict that claimed over 15,000 lives in Indonesia's northernmost province of Aceh. While by most accounts, the implementation of the MoU is considered a success, many challenges remain to ensuring Aceh continues down the road to sustainable peace.[13] Among them, lingering and growing tensions between groups within the province pose a significant challenge for efforts aimed at improving intergroup relations and promoting reconciliation.

These tensions will be discussed at length below following a brief introduction to the background of the Aceh conflict that will first explain the origins and causes of the separatist movement, and will then lay out the structural and political changes that have taken place since the signing of the peace agreement, which have served to significantly improve relations between the national and provincial governments. I will then turn to what is perhaps the most challenging problem facing the peace process today—the deterioration of relations of groups within the province, which will highlight the need for initiatives designed to promote reconciliation.

While divisions between groups within Aceh can be seen across political, economic and religious dimensions at both the provincial and district levels, I will focus on divisions at the political level reflected in the ongoing gubernatorial elections and relations between former anti-separatist

[13] Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

forces (PETA, *Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Homeland*) and former GAM combatants in the Central Highlands region of Aceh as important examples of the myriad tensions that exist between groups in post-conflict Aceh.

Background to the Aceh conflict: In 1945, after more than 350 years of colonization by the Dutch, Indonesia, with the help of the Acehnese, declared independence. At the time, Hasan di Tiro and his colleagues who would later found the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), were calling for a federated Indonesia with Islam as its base.[14] "When Aceh agreed to join the newly independent Indonesian state in 1945, it was based on the twin assumptions that Aceh's important contribution to the nationalist struggle against the Dutch would entitle it to an equal stake in the Republic's future, and that Indonesia would be founded on, and strive to uphold, the principles of Islam."[15]

In 1949, Indonesia honored this demand for federation and established a separate "Province of Aceh." However, in August 1950, shortly after the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty to the "Republic of the United States of Indonesia," the government revoked Aceh's status as a province and incorporated it into the province of North Sumatra as part of a national plan that reorganized Indonesia into only 10 provinces.[16] Over the next decade, Indonesia would continue to centralize authority with the Javanese government in Jakarta, creating a strong sense of betrayal and resentment on the part of those in Aceh who had fought for independence.[17]

---

[14] Isa M. Sulaiman, "From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist Movement," in *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 131.
[15] Michelle Ann Miller, "What's Special About Special Autonomy in Aceh?," in *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 293.
[16] Ibid.
[17] "The strong sense of betrayal in Aceh that resulted from this decision was exacerbated by the subsequent influx of non-Muslim, non-Acehnese workers and military troops into the region, as well as declining local socio-economic

Subsequently, by the early 1960s, di Tiro had given up calling for a federated state of Aceh within Indonesia and began calling for independence.

The global movement for self-determination and decolonization strongly influenced GAM's discourse during this period and helped shape the formulation of the conflict as a continuation of Aceh's historical struggle to repel attempts first by the Dutch and then by the Indonesians to colonize an independent Aceh.[18] As such, GAM claimed that the Dutch annexation of Aceh and the subsequent transfer of power to Indonesia in 1949 was illegal and demanded independence based on the restoration of sovereignty to the independent nation of Aceh, as it was before the Dutch invasion of March 26, 1873.[19]

Economic grievances also served as a root cause of the conflict. Aceh is a province rich in natural resources, including agriculture, fishing, rubber, coffee, palm oil and coconuts, as well as manufacturing resources such as cement and fertilizer plants. But perhaps most importantly, Aceh is rich in liquefied natural gas (LNG), which was discovered by the Mobil Corporation in 1971 in North Aceh. Mobil subsequently contracted with the Indonesian government for the sole rights to produce the natural gas as well as with the PT Arun company, a joint venture that is majority owned by Indonesia's state oil and gas company (Pertamina), to provide natural gas.[20]

---

conditions after Aceh's special foreign exchange agreement with the national government was terminated and a greater portion of the national budget began to be allocated to Java than to the outer islands." Ibid.

[18] Hasan di Tiro's writing and speeches frequently referred to General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as well as General Assembly Resolution 2621 (XXV): Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. "The Acehnese felt they were legally entitled to be an independent state as they had never been legally colonized." Damien Kingsbury and Lesley McCulloch, "Military Business in Aceh," in *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 21.

[19] Sulaiman, "From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist Movement," 135.

[20] PT Arun is a joint venture owned by three partner companies: 55% by Indonesia's state owned oil and gas company, Pertamina; 35% by Exxon-Mobil; and 10% by a Japanese company, Japan Indonesia LNG Company, Ltd.

The extraction and liquefaction processes combined are known as the "Arun Project," which is one of the largest and most profitable natural gas projects in the world and secured Indonesia's position as the global leader in natural gas exports.[21] Prior to the 2005 peace agreement, approximately 30% of Indonesia's GDP was derived from the sale of liquefied natural gas extracted from the PT Arun plant in Aceh, however it is estimated that less than 1% of the revenues remained in the province.[22] Moreover, despite these resources, in 2003, approximately 40% of the population of Aceh lived below the poverty line, fueling economic grievances.[23]

As the conflict gained momentum throughout the 1980's and 1990's, human rights abuses and a culture of impunity also became key sources of grievance. From 1989-1998, the GoI placed Aceh under DOM (*Daerah Operasi Militer*), a period of intensified military operations during which "widespread and systematic abuses including humiliation, torture, kidnapping, rape, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and collective punishment" took place.[24] These abuses were compounded by road-side extortion, theft and the destruction of property by the military and police forces, which served to alienate the population.

In addition to these historical, political, economic and human rights grievances, a series of dramatic events served as catalysts for the increasing momentum that perpetuated the Aceh conflict from 1998-2005. In 1998, President Soeharto, Indonesia's military dictator of 30 years, was deposed, paving the way for the *Reformasi*, or period of democratic reform throughout

[21] *District of Columbia Circuit United States Court of Appeals, "DOE v. EXXON MOBIL CORP. 654 F.3d 11 (2011)," in Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135, ed. United States Court of Appeals (http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FCO%2020110708139.xmlDecided July 8, 2011).* In 1999, Exxon-Mobil was created by the merger of Exxon Corporation and Mobil Corporation, and the Arun Project is now owned by Exxon-Mobil.

[22] Rizal Sukma, "Resolving the Aceh Conflict: the Helsinki Peace Agreement," in *Background Paper 4a* (Jakarta, Indonesia: CSIS Jakarta, 2005), 7.

[23] Kingsbury and McCulloch, "Military Business in Aceh," 212.

[24] Kirsten E. Schulze, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976-May 2004," in *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 261.

Indonesia. Soeharto's successor, B.J. Habibie, declared an end to DOM and military Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto issued a public apology for the trauma experienced at the hands of the security forces.[25]

Nearly simultaneously, East Timor's successful bid for independence in 1999 "provided GAM with a "blueprint" for its struggle" and led GAM to demand an East Timor-style referendum in which the people of Aceh would vote either for independence or to remain part of Indonesia.[26] This momentum was paralleled by the formation of SIRA, the Center for a Referendum on Aceh, an umbrella organization for 104 civil society organizations, including student, religious, social and human rights groups that provided a non-violent counterpart to GAM's call for a referendum.[27]

Both GAM and SIRA were at the height of their popularity and power when, in November 1999, Habibie's successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid announced that Aceh would be allowed to hold a referendum, leading to an increase of demonstrations and strikes organized by SIRA and GAM. Ultimately, Wahid was forced to renege on this offer under pressure from the central government and the military, both of whom were unsettled by GAM's growing popularity and increasing control of the province and responded by increasing military operations. As the violence between GAM and the military intensified amidst a crack-down on civil society activists, the conflict became more entrenched.

[25] Ibid., 259.
[26] Ibid., 237.
[27] In June 1999, a national newspaper reported that 56 per cent of Acehnese wanted a referendum on independence, while 25.3 per cent preferred broad autonomy within the Indonesian Republic. Miller, "What's Special About Special Autonomy in Aceh?," 299. "Hasil Lengkap Jajak Pendapat Waspada: 56% Referendum Dan 25.3% Otonomi Luas," *Waspada* 1999.

In 2000, negotiations under the auspices of the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC) began between GAM and the GOI. The process produced a Humanitarian Pause in 2000, followed by a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. However, the security situation continued to worsen throughout the first half of 2003 until the government unilaterally pulled out of negotiations at a meeting in Tokyo in May 2003 and declared martial law in the province. The period of martial law, which was officially downgraded in September 2005 with no effective change in the security situation, accompanied an unprecedented rise in violence, displacement and human rights abuses, furthering Acehnese grievances against the state.

Following the collapse of the CoHA, in the midst of escalating violence, a series of pre-negotiations took place between GAM and the central government. However, it was the December 26, 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, which claimed the lives of approximately 200,000 people in Aceh and displaced nearly half a million, that finally brought the parties to the negotiating table.[28] On January 27, 2006, formal talks were opened in Helsinki, Finland mediated by former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari under the auspices of his non-governmental organization, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). The talks were quietly supported by the European Union and over the next eight months, five rounds of talks produced the August 15,

[28] The GoI had previously agreed to attend negotiations in Helsinki, but it was not until after the tsunami that GAM agreed to attend the negotiations. In interviews with the author in 2006, GAM representatives cited the following reasons the tsunami led them to the negotiating table: 1. the extent of suffering in Aceh was so great that GAM found it morally unconscionable to impose further suffering through violence; 2. GAM lost its logistic base due to the economic losses imposed on the civilian population; 3. the physical presence of the international community on the ground in Aceh and their stated commitment to remain in Aceh to support the long-term reconstruction effort gave GAM confidence that the international community was serious about peace in Aceh and could apply significant pressure to Indonesia to uphold the peace and 4. the international community was pressuring both GAM and the GoI to reach a peaceful settlement by threatening to withhold reconstruction funds if the violence continued and GAM recognized the importance of securing this aid. Rachel Schiller, "The factors that lead to the signing of peace agreements: The case of Aceh, Indonesia," in *Unpublished Master's Thesis* (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2007).

2005 Memorandum of Understanding between GAM and the GoI that has to date formed the backbone of the Aceh peace process.[29]

The MoU provides a framework for self-government in Aceh within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. It gives Aceh the right to govern all sectors of public affairs with the exception of foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, and justice and freedom of religion. It calls for the withdrawal of 'non-organic' Indonesian military and police forces from Aceh and for the demobilization and disarmament of GAM.[30] It also grants Aceh the right to establish local political parties that can contest elections in the province, calls for gubernatorial and parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2009 respectively, grants Aceh 70 percent of oil and gas revenues, grants amnesty to all persons who have participated in GAM activities, provides for reparations to be paid by the central government, calls for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Human Rights Court, as well as an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which ultimately was led by the European Union with participation from Norway, Switzerland and five contributing ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Singapore) and was present in Aceh until its withdrawal on December 15, 2006.

Intergroup relations in Aceh: Six years into the implementation of the MoU, the peace process has brought about significant political and economic change in Aceh. However, much remains to be done to achieve sustainable peace. As in many post-conflict societies, the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda has consisted mainly of trying to rectify political and economic grievances by focusing on implementation of the political and economic provisions of the

[29] "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement," in *http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf* (August 15, 2005).
[30] Non-organic refers to all troops that are not regularly based in Aceh.

MoU.[31] However, initiatives focusing on intergroup reconciliation have been few and far between, and while relations between central and provincial actors have improved, relations between groups within the province remain tense.

To be sure, many structural changes have been made, which have served to increase trust between Jakarta and Aceh. National legislation on Aceh's self-government—The Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA)—was passed and elections for the Governor's seat as well as parliamentary seats were held, bringing to power an ex-combatant Governor and a provincial parliament in which representatives of GAM's political party, Partai Aceh (PA), hold 33 of the 69 seats.[32] The Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA) was established to administer reparation and compensation payments to former combatants, amnestied political prisoners and civilians affected by conflict, the central government transferred funds to the Aceh administration for oil and gas profits, and numerous economic development programs have been launched in the province.

However, tensions between various groups *within* the province remain high. For example, political splits have occurred within GAM itself, as various factions have emerged and expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership for issues such as the distribution of wealth that stems largely from provision of government contracts and is seen as predominantly benefiting the top commanders and elite politicians, as well as a sense of political disenfranchisement as former GAM leaders have consolidated power in political roles. Nowhere are these internal divisions better evidenced than in the ongoing round of gubernatorial elections in which the governor,

[31] Huyse notes that reconciliation is often postponed in post-conflict societies as it is only one of the many challenges countries face. As post-conflict societies are forced to direct their efforts in several directions at once, insufficient attention is often allocated to the building of coexistence, trust and empathy. Past experience shows that this has often led to politics and economics being put first, at the expense of reconciliation programs. Huyse, "The Process of Reconciliation," 27.

[32] While SIRA's candidate became the Vice Governor, SIRA did not win any seats in the provincial parliament.

Irwandi Yusuf, himself an ex-combatant who was backed by GAM to run for office in 2006, now finds himself running in opposition to PA's candidates of choice--GAM's former foreign minister who served from exile in Sweden, Zaini Abdullah, and GAM's former military commander, Muzakkir Manaf. Far from being an indication that Aceh is democratizing, the split has been plagued by violence and intimidation and threatens to jeopardize the peace process.

The election was originally scheduled to take place in October 2011, but was delayed four times amidst controversy raised by PA over whether it was illegal for Irwandi to run as an independent candidate for the second time after the peace agreement.[33] With PA boycotting the election, Indonesia's Constitutional Court found it legal for the governor to run as an independent candidate. Following diplomatic intervention from Indonesia's Home Ministry, which negotiated an extension of the registration period with Aceh's Independent Election Commission (KIP) to prevent a breakdown of the peace process, PA agreed to participate in the election, which is now scheduled to take place on April 9, 2012.[34] Moreover, this election cycle has not been without serious violence. Since December 2011, acts of pre-election terror have left 10 people dead and 13 injured.[35]

While intergroup tensions at the political level often overshadow tensions at the district level, several districts also remain hotbeds of intergroup tension. Chief among them are two of the districts that make up the Central Highlands region of Aceh, Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah,

[33] The election was first delayed to 14 November, then to 24 December, then to 16 February and finally to 9 April, 2012.
[34] Kartika Candra and Adi Warsidi, "A heated grapple for power," *Tempo* January 18, 2012.
[35] "Pre-election Terror," *Tempo* January 18, 2012.

where relations between former anti-separatist forces (PETA) and former GAM combatants remain strained, and have led to infrequent, yet serious outbursts of violence (see map below).[36]

[36] Map from ICG, "Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh," in *Asia Program Briefing* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 29, 2012), 10.


ACEH
MALAYSIA
MALAKA STRAIT
SINGAPURA
SUMATRA
INDIAN OCEAN
SABANG (CITY)
BANDA ACEH (CITY)
ACEH BESAR
PIDIE
BIREUEN
LHOKSUMAWE (CITY)
ACEH UTARA (NORTH ACEH)
ACEH JAYA
BENER MERIAH
ACEH TIMUR (EAST ACEH)
ACEH BARAT (WEST ACEH)
ACEH TENGAH (CENTRAL ACEH)
LANGSA (CITY)
ACEH TAMIANG
NAGAN RAYA
GAYO LUWES
MEDAN (CITY)
ACEH BARAT DAYA (SOUTHWEST ACEH)
INDIAN OCEAN
NORTH SUMATRA
ACEH TENGGARA (SOUTHEAST ACEH)
ACEH SELATAN (SOUTH ACEH)
NORTH
SIMEULUE
ACEH SINGKIL
NOTE :
Simeulue, Sabang, Lhokseumawe, and Langsa all have district status.
Two more districts were officially established on 15 June 2007 but maps are not yet available :
1. District of Pidie Jaya, carved out of Pidie district, and
2. City of Subulussalam, carved out of Aceh Singkil district.

PETA, believed by many to be militia groups organized by Indonesia's military to oppose GAM forces during the conflict, are headquartered in this region.[37] Its membership is largely drawn from migrants of Javanese ethnicity who moved to the province in the late 20th century or were transmigrated by the government of Indonesia in the 1960's and 1970's to relieve population pressures in Java. Membership in GAM and PETA does not entirely break down along ethnic lines due to the swing votes of the native Gayo population, some of whom are pro-PETA nationalists, some who are pro-GAM and others who remain neutral. However the majority of GAM members are ethnically Acehnese and hail from the coastal regions of the province, while members of PETA are largely of Javanese decent and migrated to the Central Highlands from the island of Java.

The politics of this region are extremely contentious, as the Indonesian government denies the existence of militias that were trained and armed by the Indonesian military. However, they do acknowledge the existence of self-defense forces that were formed by villagers to protect themselves against attacks by GAM. As such, both sides are willing to acknowledge the presence of these forces when they are referred to as PETA, or self-defense forces. However, they are not mentioned in the MoU, nor were they ever demobilized or disarmed. Despite this, the central government has provided funds for reparations to the group.

One of the key issues between the respective supporters of GAM and PETA is a movement that began during the conflict, but gained steam following the signing of the peace agreement to separate Aceh into three provinces: the current capital and northern coastal areas; the Central

[37] Kirsten E. Schulze, *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a separatist organization*, Policy Studies 2 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004), 43.

Highlands region, which would be known as ALA (Aceh Leuser Antara); and the south western region of Aceh, which would be called ABAS (Aceh Barat Selatan).[38] Those who advocate the formation of these new provinces largely align with PETA and cite underdevelopment and marginalization of the Central Highlands and Southwest regions by the Acehnese-dominated provincial government, which they believe would be alleviated by controlling their own resources and funds. Opponents of the movement, who largely identify with GAM, claim this *pemekaran*, or splitting, of Aceh is a ploy by Jakarta to dilute the significance of Aceh's self-government that will not in fact address the development challenges of these districts. Since the President of Indonesia declared a national moratorium on further *pemekaran* in 2010, tension over the issue has somewhat receded, but the issue remains a source of contention between supporters of GAM and PETA.

This tension in intergroup relations throughout Aceh can be seen in data on social cohesion that emerged following the signing of the MoU. For example, a joint assessment conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2006 showed that levels of inter-ethnic trust in Aceh were low, with 43.5% of respondents indicating they did not trust people from other ethnic groups.[39] While the data was not broken down by district, the level of trust held toward other ethnic groups was lowest among the majority ethnic Acehnese population (25.8%) and highest among the minority Javanese population (53.7%).

---

[38] Stefan Ehrentraut, "Dividing Aceh? Minorities, partition movements and state-reform in Aceh province," in *Asia Research Institute Working Paper No. 137* (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716587: Asia Research Institute, May 1, 2010); Stephan Kitzbichler, "Pemekaran in Aceh: A way to development, or to conflict?," in *Aceh Development International Conference 2011* (UKM-Bangi-Malaysia: http://www.acehpublication.com/adic2011/ADIC2011-132.pdf, March 26-28, 2011).

[39] IOM, "Meta analysis vulnerability, stability, displacement and reintegration: Issues facing the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia," (http://reliefweb.int/node/313442: International Organization for Migration, August 2008), Annex C, 174.

Data from the Psychosocial Needs Assessments (PNA) conducted in 2006 and 2007 by the Harvard Medical School in partnership with the University of Syiah Kuala with support from IOM and the World Bank also show that just under 15% of the population in Aceh felt a need for revenge.[40] The districts of Aceh Utara (44.7%), Bireuen (20.8%), Aceh Selatan (18.8%) and Bener Meriah (18.4%) had above average percentages of the population who reported they felt this way. 14.6% of the population also reported they felt others were hostile toward them, with Aceh Utara (40.6%), Bireuen (24.2%) and Benar Meriah (19.3%) again ranking above average.

The data also highlight tensions in the Central Highlands. For example, data from the PNA show that 19.9 percent of respondents in Bener Meriah and 8.9 percent in Aceh Tengah reported that they always feel a lack of trust in others, a response rate higher than any other district and much higher than the provincial average of 5.3 percent.[41]

Tension in the Central Highlands can also be seen in the Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) conducted by the World Bank between July and September 2008, which indicate that social cohesion in the Central Highlands may be weaker than in other parts of the province.[42] For example, a higher percentage of people in the Central Highlands, regardless of ethnic or identity group, reported differences between their village and neighboring villages as well as relations between different ethnic groups to be a source of division. 25% of people in the Central Highlands report relations between their village and neighboring villages, and relations between different ethnic groups as a major or minor source of division. This is compared to 11%

[40] Ibid., Annex C, 175.
[41] Ibid., Annex C, 174.
[42] The ARLS collected livelihood and reintegration data on a representative sample of ex-combatants, and a control group of civilian males in 754 villages throughout Aceh. MSR, "The multistakeholder review of post-conflict programming in Aceh: Identifying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in Aceh," (https://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=282&Itemid=4&lang=en2009), 106.

for all of Aceh, including 9% of the North Coast districts and 7% of the South-western districts and suggests that intergroup divisions in the Central Highlands may be greater than in other regions of the province.

Table 7.3: Sources of Division by Region

Difference between [...] is a 'minor' or 'major' source of division (%)	All of Aceh n=1,794	Central Highlands n=319	South-Western Districts n=318	North Coast n=1,157
Received government assistance	44	55	57	38
Rich and poor	22	30	40	17
Village and neighbouring villages	7	18	6	5
Men and women	6	7	3	6
Younger and older	5	7	6	4
Ex-combatants and villagers	4	2	4	4
Different ethnic groups	4	7	1	4
New migrants and villagers	3	6	1	3
Returnees/IDPs and villagers	2	6	0	1

Source: ARLS. †Male civilian respondents only for geographic representativeness.

As such, it is evident from both events on the ground as well as data that have emerged since the signing of the MoU that reconciliation has not yet been achieved in Aceh. In the early days following the MoU, indicators such as lack of trust and feelings of revenge in the northern coastal districts of Bireuen, Aceh Utara and Aceh Timur likely reflected tensions over whether the central government would indeed follow through on commitments made in the MoU. Today, tensions largely reflect political splits that have emerged within GAM itself. In the Central Highlands, such indicators likely reflect tension between ex-combatants from both GAM and PETA, as the groups continue to vie for political and economic power amidst the reality that PETA was not formally part of the peace process. Absent a concerted effort to put a process in place to encourage reconciliation, intergroup tensions in the province are likely to persist.

Reconciliation in Aceh: Despite a clear need, reconciliation has been a contentious issue in Aceh and little progress has been made toward improving intergroup relations. This is largely

because the discourse in Aceh on reconciliation has been shaped by the language of the MoU, which refers solely to reconciliation in Provision 2 on human rights that calls for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Human Rights Court for Aceh. Subsequently, reconciliation has to date been viewed as a means of addressing human rights violations committed during the conflict via establishment of the traditional transitional justice mechanisms of the TRC and Human Rights Court.[43]

However, neither of these instruments has yet come to fruition, nor is there any indication that this will change in the near future. Progress on establishing the TRC ground to a halt on December 7, 2006 when Indonesia's Constitutional Court *(Mahkamah Konstitusi)* struck down law No. 27/2004, which established the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[44] Because Article 229(2) of law No. 11/2006, the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA), specifies that Aceh's TRC will be established as an "inseparable part" of the National TRC, there is currently no legal foundation at the national level for the formation of Aceh's TRC. While a new law has been drafted and is scheduled for discussion in Parliament in 2011-2014, it was not prioritized for inclusion in the 2012 legislative agenda.

Subsequently, discussion about the TRC in Aceh has gravitated toward a focus on whether the government of Aceh should establish a *qanun*, a provincial law that would create a TRC for Aceh absent a national law. However, as many of the perpetrators of violence reside outside of

[43] Iskandar Zulkarnaen et al., "Rekonsiliasi dan Reintegrasi Aceh: Studi kasus Aceh Timur," *Seumiké: Journal of Aceh Studies* 4, no. 1 (2009); Ross Clarke, Galuh Wandita, and Samsidar, *Considering victims: The Aceh peace process from a transitional justice perspective*, Occassional Paper Series (Indonesia: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008); Amirrudin al Rahab and Raimondus Arwalembun, "Menormalkan Aceh: Mungkinkah Tanpa Pengungkapan Kebenaran (Normalizing Aceh: Is it possible without truth-telling?)."; BRA, "Follow up on the Helsinki peace framework: A comprehensive action plan," (Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, 2009).

[44] The court claimed that an article which provided reparation for victims only after they agreed to an amnesty for the perpetrator was unconstitutional. Amnesty International, "Indonesia: Victims still waiting for truth and justice for past human rights violations " (http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA21/012/2012/en: Amnesty International, March 24, 2012).

Aceh, many within the provincial government are hesitant to establish a TRC without a national umbrella, as it may not have the legal gravitas to require participation from actors in Jakarta. While human rights activists continue to advocate for the establishment of the TRC, it may be years before any significant forward movement is made toward its establishment. In the meantime, discourse on reconciliation remains consumed by how to establish the TRC and there remains a vacuum of meaningful progress toward reconciliation in Aceh.

However, reconciliation need not be stalled by a lack of progress toward the TRC and Human Rights Court as a deeper understanding of the meaning of reconciliation can lead to other options for its advancement. While an agreed upon definition of reconciliation remains elusive, I argue that at its core, reconciliation is about improving intergroup relations to the extent that differences are resolved through dialogue and negotiation, rather than violence. If we adopt this notion of reconciliation, then the essence of reconciliation becomes about improving intergroup relations, which, from a social psychological lens, can be characterized as reducing prejudice and increasing attitudes such as empathy, trust and tolerance between individuals and groups.

As it will likely be years before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Court for Aceh become politically viable, it is important that reconciliation is not delayed indefinitely. With baseline data already available and a relatively clean slate to work with given the absence of large-scale reconciliation initiatives to date, Aceh is an ideal situation in which to test alternative methods designed to promote reconciliation. As such, this dissertation will adopt the case of the Central Highlands region in Aceh to test the effects of intergroup dialogue on reconciliation, as measured by a decrease in prejudice and an increase in variables such as empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing.

This chapter has demonstrated the need for reconciliation initiatives to improve intergroup relations in Aceh. The next chapter will explore the literature on reconciliation, transitional justice and intergroup relations theory in order to demonstrate the growing body of evidence indicating that intergroup contact initiatives should become an important starting point for promoting reconciliation in Aceh. Chapter three will then explain the methods used to implement this study. Chapter four will present the empirical results, and Chapter five will conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results for scholars and practitioners alike.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Archbishop Desmond Tutu: "You don't get reconciled with someone [with whom] you agree. You get reconciled with someone with whom you disagree; otherwise there would be no point in having reconciliation."[45]

Over the past few decades, reconciliation has become an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. However, while there's agreement that reconciliation is important for the prevention of future conflict, there is no consensus or conceptual clarity on what reconciliation means. Both the conceptualization of reconciliation as well as the operationalization, or measurement, of the construct remain vague. As Meierhenrich notes, "no general conceptual map has ever been drawn—let alone accepted."[46]

Disciplines ranging from anthropology to law and from literature to sociology have incorporated the term, in widely divergent ways, into their professional discourse.[47] Over the past decade the study of reconciliation has emerged as a defined area of interest in political science and political psychology,[48] as well as in the field of intergroup relations.[49] Yet the problem of

[45] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 5 (London: Macmillan, 1999), 412.
[46] Meierhenrich, "Varieties of Reconciliation," 217.
[47] Ibid.
[48] M. Krepon and A. Sevak, *Crisis prevention, confidence building and reconciliation in south asia* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995); K. Asmal, L. Asmal, and R.S. Roberts, *Reconciliation through truth: reckoning of apartheid's criminal governance* (Capetown: David Phillips, 1997); Lederach, *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*; C.J. Arnson, *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); R.L. Rothstein, "After the peace: Getting past maybe," in *After the peace: Resistance and reconciliation*, ed. R.L. Rothstein (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Bar-Tal and Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process."
[49] Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher, "Intergroup reconciliation: Dimensions and themes," in *Social psychology of intergroup reconciliation*, ed. Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

conceptualization has been neglected in the study of reconciliation—to the detriment of theory and practice.[50]

Rouhana echoes this sentiment, stating "The widespread use of the term reconciliation, its novelty in academic and political discourse, and its link to other concepts such as apology and forgiveness overload the term with multiple meanings and at the same time contribute to ambiguity about its precise meaning."[51] Sarkin and Daly concur, "If reconciliation is going to make a meaningful contribution to societies in transition, it is going to have to be understood in much better terms than is currently the case."[52]

While several scholars have attempted to provide a definition or description of reconciliation, some of the most basic questions remain unanswered.[53] For example, what is reconciliation and how do we know when we've achieved it? Does it occur between individuals, groups, political elites, or nations? And how can it be measured? Indeed, when it comes to reconciliation, the lack of empirical evidence about post-conflict peacebuilding leaves scholars and practitioners with more questions than answers.

---

[50] Meierhenrich, "Varieties of Reconciliation," 224.
[51] Nadim Rouhana, N., "Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict," in *The social psychology of group identity and social conflict: Theory, application and practice*, ed. A.H. Eagly, V.L. Hamilton, and R.M. Baron (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004), 173.
[52] Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly, "Too many quesitons, too few answers: Reconciliation in transitional societies," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 35(2004): 725.
[53] L. Kriesberg, "Comparing reconciliation actions within and between countries," in *From conflict resolution to reconciliation*, ed. Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Huyse, "The Process of Reconciliation."; Kelman, "Reconciliation as identity change: A social-psychological perspective."; Lederach, *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*; Rouhana, "Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict."; Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel, "Instrumental and socioemotional paths to intergroup reconciliation and the needs-based model of socioemotional reconciliation," in *The social psychology of intergroup reconciliation*, ed. Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Nadim Rouhana, N., "Key issues in reconciliation: Challenging traditional assumptions on conflict resolution and power dynamics," in *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective*, ed. D. Bar-Tal (New York: Psychology Press, 2011).

As will be shown in the section on reconciliation below, there is general agreement among scholars that psychological changes are the essence of reconciliation.[54] However, there is no consensus on which psychological changes are indicative of reconciliation, and little empirical evidence demonstrating which interventions lead to these psychological changes. As such, this chapter will review the literature surrounding reconciliation to identify the interventions that scholars and practitioners have proposed may lead to reconciliation, as well as the psychological changes that these interventions have been credited with producing.

It will then compile all of these variables into a theoretical framework for reconciliation such that the effects of each intervention can be tested on the proposed psychological changes, allowing a comprehensive theory of reconciliation to be developed over time. To that end, I will turn first to the scholarly debate over the meaning of reconciliation, which while fraught with lack of conceptual clarity, proposes various structural and political components of reconciliation such as truth, justice, and restructuring of the social and political relationship between the parties, as well as psychological components such as forgiveness. I will then explore the literature on transitional justice, which focuses largely on mechanisms for truth-telling that proponents have claimed seek to promote justice, psychological healing and reconciliation.

After challenging the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms for promoting healing and reconciliation, this review will turn to the literature on intergroup relations, which explicitly focuses on promoting the psychological components of reconciliation such as a reduction of prejudice, and an increase in trust and forgiveness. It will conclude that while a large body of

[54] ———, "Key issues in reconciliation: Challenging traditional assumptions on conflict resolution and power dynamics."; Bar-Tal and Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process."; Staub, Pearlman, and Bilali, "Psychological recovery, reconciliation and the prevention of new violence: an approach and its uses in Rwanda."

research indicates that intergroup contact may be effective at promoting reconciliation, research in highly-charged, non-Western, post-conflict contexts is still lacking.

The final section concludes with the theoretical framework for reconciliation that incorporates the range of proposed structural and political interventions, as well as the psychological changes they are claimed to promote. As such, the dependent variables for this study, which represent the range of proposed psychological changes necessary for reconciliation, will be identified, along with the psychometric scales that will be used to measure change in these variables.

Reconciliation

The debate in the literature about the concept of reconciliation largely revolves around how to catalyze the psychological changes necessary for reconciliation. Most scholars agree that psychological change is an important element of reconciliation, though it is not clear what type of psychological change or how much psychological change is sufficient to determine that reconciliation has occurred. Despite this lack of clarity, scholars debate the different factors that may be necessary to achieve this psychological change. Some argue that structural and political changes are necessary, others call for truth, and yet others claim that forgiveness is necessary.

For example, Rouhana argues that psychological change will be a product of structural and political changes that address power asymmetries.[55] He writes that reconciliation is essentially a politically driven process that entails a transformation of the power relations between the parties complete with constitutional and institutional changes. He claims that for genuine reconciliation to take root, four key issues must be addressed: justice, truth, historical responsibility for human

[55] Rouhana, "Key issues in reconciliation: Challenging traditional assumptions on conflict resolution and power dynamics."

rights abuses, and restructuring of the social and political relationship between the parties to reflect the universal standards of equality, human rights and human dignity.[56] He notes that intergroup reconciliation is characterized by widespread cognitive and affective transformations that parallel the political transformation of all parties involved. However, these psychological changes are not *required* for the process to launch, but rather *the outcome* of a political transformation.

Bar-Tal and Bennink take a similar view, claiming that "*the essence of reconciliation is a psychological process, which consists of changes of the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the majority of society members"* (emphasis in original).[57] However, they note that structural measures such as political integration, the establishment of structural equality and justice, and the observance of human and civil rights as well as democratic rules of political governance both contribute to its evolvement and are among its consequences.[58]

Similar to those who believe that structural changes are necessary to achieve reconciliation, proponents of transitional justice argue that truth is a necessary component of reconciliation[59] and that "justice and reconciliation are inherently intertwined."[60] Advocating truth-telling and truth-seeking mechanisms, supporters of transitional justice argue that only by establishing a historical record can the healing take place that will ultimately allow individuals to engage in reconciliation. The validity of these claims will be evaluated at length in the next section, but

---

[56] _____, "Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict."
[57] Bar-Tal and Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process," 17.
[58] Ibid., 15-16; 37.
[59] Desmond Tutu, *No future without forgiveness* (New York: Doubleday, 1999); Martha Minow, *Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and mass violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Susan Dwyer, "Reconciliation for Realists," *Ethics and International Affairs* 13(1999); D. Little, "A different kind of justice: Dealing with human rights violations in transitional societies," *Ethics and International Affairs* 13(1999); Prescilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity* (New York: Routledge, 2001).
[60] intertwined Charles Villa-Vicencio, "The Politics of Reconciliation," in *Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies*, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).

healing has been included as a dependent variable in this study in order to determine whether intergroup contact can affect individual healing.

Forgiveness is the final, and perhaps most controversial component that has been proposed as a condition of reconciliation. While the precise meaning of the term forgiveness is not often specified, there is a significant debate about whether it is necessary for reconciliation. On the one hand, Staub and Pearlman argue that forgiveness is a necessary condition for reconciliation, writing "Reconciliation means coming to accept one another and developing mutual trust. This requires forgiving."[61]

However, others such as Dwyer strongly disagree that forgiveness is a necessary condition for reconciliation. She argues that any conception of reconciliation that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasizes interpersonal harmony and positive fellow-feeling, will fail to be a realistic model of reconciliation because arriving at an accommodation need not and perhaps should not involve the excusing of a wrong, and may or may not involve an apology or the offer of forgiveness.[62] This is because reconciliation might be psychologically possible where forgiveness is not.[63]

Yet, Meierhenrich posits exactly the opposite—"forgiveness might be psychologically possible where reconciliation is not. This is so because forgiveness is epistemologically less demanding than reconciliation, which, in addition to forgiveness, requires the accommodation of former adversaries, thus demanding action (and credible commitments) from perpetrators *as well as*

[61] Ervin Staub and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "Healing, Reconciliation, and Forgiving after Genocide and Other Collective Violence," in *Forgiveness and reconciliation: religion, public policy and conflict transformation*, ed. R.G. Helmick and R.L. Peterson (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001).
[62] Dwyer, "Reconciliation for Realists," 97-98.
[63] Ibid., 96.

victims."[64] In the case of forgiveness…the action resides solely with those who have been wronged. Whereas forgiveness involves *unilateral action*, reconciliation necessitates *bilateral action.*[65] As such, he concludes that forgiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reconciliation.[66]

Beyond the debate over whether forgiveness is more or less psychologically demanding than reconciliation, scholars such as Rouhana criticize definitions of reconciliation for focusing too much on forgiveness and personal healing because they neglect the power asymmetries that caused the conflict.[67] In his analysis, forgiveness and healing are not essential to reconciliation because forgiveness is a personal component of the post-conflict process that individuals are entitled to deal with in a manner of their own choosing without the imposition of religious imperatives or cultural paradigms.[68] He sees healing as both a social and personal process that is the outcome of structural and political change, not a substitute for it. He notes that the social context of healing is achieved by having the collective truth validated and responsibility assigned to perpetrators, while the individual part of healing—work with victims who underwent traumatic experiences—is facilitated by trained professionals working within that social context.[69]

While scholars have different reasons for suggesting that forgiveness may or may not be an integral component of reconciliation, little empirical evidence exists to validate any of these claims. This dissertation will therefore adopt forgiveness as a key dependent variable to measure whether intergroup contact can catalyze changes in forgiveness toward the outgroup.

---

[64] Meierhenrich, "Varieties of Reconciliation," 206.
[65] Ibid., 207.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Rouhana, "Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict."
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid., 180.

Finally, as scholars and practitioners continue to debate the necessary and sufficient conditions for reconciliation, it is important to consider whether reconciliation is in fact a realistic possibility to expect of those who have suffered gross inequalities and human rights abuses. In some cases, the answer may be no. Hayner reports the response of Horatio Verbitsky, an Argentinean journalist, when asked about reconciliation: "Reconciliation by who? After someone takes away your daughter, tortures her, disappears her, and then denies ever having done it—would you want to "reconcile" with those responsible? That word makes no sense here. The political discourse of reconciliation is profoundly immoral because it denies the reality of what people have experienced. It isn't reasonable to expect someone to reconcile after what happened here."[70] With such a wide range of perspectives about the nature of reconciliation, it is essential that scholars begin to establish empirical data that provide evidence about what psychological changes take place in post-conflict societies, the interventions that precipitate these changes, and whether these changes in fact amount to reconciliation.

Transitional Justice

Since the Nuremberg Trials following World War II, transitional justice has been the dominant paradigm for seeking reconciliation in post-conflict societies. At least forty truth commissions and hundreds of prosecutions have taken place in countries including South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Timor Leste and Liberia, and as was shown in Chapter 1, these transitional justice mechanisms have been the main tool of efforts to encourage reconciliation included in peace agreements for over two decades.[71]

[70] Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity*: 188.
[71] See the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) compiled by the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies available at http://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes.

Throughout, proponents of transitional justice have made sweeping claims about the impact of truth-telling and truth-seeking, including that they lead to psychological healing and reconciliation. Yet, recent literature has begun to refute claims that transitional justice contributes to reconciliation and psychological healing, calling into question the direction the international community has taken by allowing transitional justice mechanisms to dominate the agenda for promoting reconciliation in conflict-affected societies.[72]

This section will therefore examine the empirical evidence surrounding the transitional justice mechanisms of tribunals and truth commissions in light of the claims made by proponents of transitional justice and will conclude that insufficient evidence exists to substantiate claims that truth-telling and truth-seeking lead to reconciliation. While truth-telling may be effective at establishing a historical record for a country, providing a basis for acknowledgement of past wrongs, administering reparations to victims and their families, and perhaps even for providing a sense of justice and democracy to victims, research is showing that these mechanisms may actually hinder psychological recovery and reconciliation.[73]

As such, this section will not argue that truth-telling and truth-seeking are not important components of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, but rather that they should not be seen as

[72] Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."; Oskar Thoms, N.T., James Ron, and Roland Paris, "The effects of transitional justice mechanisms: A summary of empirical research findings and implications for analysts and practitioners," (Ottawa: Center for International Policy Studies, 2008).,

[73] Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."; Phuong N. Pham, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Timothy Longman, "Trauma and PTSD: Their Implication for Attitudes towards Justice and Reconciliation," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 292, no. 5 (2004); Başoğlu et al., "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions."; Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences."; Alfred Allan and Marietjie M. Allan, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool," *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 18(2000); Debra Kaminer et al., "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation to psychiatric status and forgiveness among survivors of human rights abuses," *British Journal of Psychiatry* 178(2001).

tools for promoting psychological healing or reconciliation. Instead, this section will conclude that in light of growing research supporting the efficacy of intergroup contact, transitional justice mechanisms should be seen only as one piece of a larger and more comprehensive agenda toward promoting post-conflict reconciliation that may also include intergroup contact initiatives.

The Logic of truth-telling and truth-seeking: The post-conflict justice literature is dominated by a debate over alternative truth-telling mechanisms—namely, the relative merits of retributive versus restorative justice approaches.[74] Advocates of both sides share the same core belief that public accounting for wartime misconduct is necessary for peace and stability. They differ only over the mechanisms by which the truth is uncovered and how that information is used—either to punish those found guilty of abuses or merely to expose such actions in the court of public opinion.[75]

Truth commissions, it is said, work toward these ends through the process of "restorative justice," which is defined as societal healing of damages resulting from past crimes. Restorative justice focuses on victims and perpetrators and tries to restore their dignity not through recrimination but by "mediation and dialogue" so as "to generate the space for expressions of approbation, remorse, and pardon, as well as the resolution of conflicts."[76] Operating without judges, courtrooms, and the cumbersome trappings (and safeguards) of legal procedure, they do not seek punishment or retribution. While the strongest commissions have been endowed with

[74] David Mendeloff, "Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice," *Human Rights Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2009).
[75] ———, "Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?," *International Studies Review* 6, no. 3 (2004).
[76] Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

search-and-seizure powers, the right to issue court-backed subpoenas, and most controversially, the power to grant individual amnesties, their task is to uncover just what happened to whom in the past, and why. Who did it is rarely stressed. Few truth commissions name names of violators, and when they do it is for purposes of moral and perhaps social censure—but never legal retribution.[77]

The retributive approach views justice largely as a means of taming vengeance by transferring the responsibility for apportioning blame and punishment from victims to a court that acts according to the rule of law. Retributive justice, it is said, promotes reconciliation by holding individuals accountable for past crimes, not entire groups or communities, and thus reducing the desire to exact revenge against entire groups. By establishing individual guilt in the immediate aftermath of war and ethnic cleansing, it is theorized that retributive justice helps dispel the notion of collective blame for war crimes and acts of genocide.[78]

Proponents of transitional justice offer myriad claims about the peace-promoting effects of truth-telling. They claim that truth-telling 1) encourages social healing and reconciliation, 2) promotes justice, 3) allows for the establishment of an official historical record, 4) serves a public education function, 5) aids institutional reform, 6) helps promote democracy, and 7) preempts as well as 8) deters future atrocities.[79] While transitional justice scholars increasingly view both truth-telling approaches as complementary, rather than competing,[80] there remains a tendency to

[77] Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences."
[78] Stover and Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*.
[79] Mendeloff, "Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?."
[80] Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "The New Landscape of Transitional Justice," in *Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice*, ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (2006); Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, "The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice," *Human Rights Quarterly* 30(2008).

see "victim-centered" truth commissions as more "therapeutic" and beneficial to victims than an adversarial criminal tribunal.[81]

In the next section, I will examine only the claim that transitional justice encourages social healing and reconciliation. I will ask whether the literature substantiates claims that "After an international conflict or civil war in which grave human rights abuses have been committed the truth must be told before there can be a successful reconciliation."[82] Does it hold that "by exposing the truth of past crimes, victims and survivors can begin to heal from the trauma of war and receive closure?" And that "Once they have begun to heal, they can then work toward reconciling with their former adversaries."[83] Are "remembering and telling the truth about terrible events prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims?[84] Is truth-telling in fact therapeutic? And as the South African TRC proclaimed, is truth the road to reconciliation?

The Evidence on truth-telling and truth-seeking: Neither the evidence from truth commissions nor tribunals substantiates claims that post-conflict justice leads to healing and/or reconciliation. While there is some evidence that truth-telling and truth-seeking are effective at producing a historical record,[85] at creating awareness of past atrocities,[86] at promoting the rule of law and

[81] Mendeloff, "Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice."
[82] IDEA, "Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook," ed. David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2003); Michael P. Scharf, "The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission," *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7(1997).
[83] Minow, *Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and mass violence*: 61-87; Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity*: 133-53.
[84] Judith Lewis Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
[85] Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences."
[86] Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation*; Villa-Vicencio, "Inclusive Justice: The Limitations of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions."

even at instilling a sense of justice, there is little evidence that these mechanisms lead to psychological healing or reconciliation.[87]

Looking first at the literature on truth commissions, a growing body of research demonstrates that the evidence is insufficient to conclude that truth-telling is beneficial for either healing or reconciliation. While Gibson found greater tolerance and a larger propensity toward reconciliation among South Africans, particularly white South Africans, following the South African TRC, Tepperman reports that a poll of South Africans following the conclusion of the TRC found that two-thirds of South Africans felt the commission's revelations had only made them angrier and contributed to a worsening of race relations.[88] A mere 17 percent of those polled predicted that people would become more forgiving as a result of the TRC.[89] This contradictory evidence indicates that more empirical work is necessary to draw firm conclusions about whether the South African TRC was indeed beneficial for reconciliation. As such, Gibson's definition of tolerance as the commitment of people to put up with each other, even those whose political ideas they thoroughly detest is included as a dependent variable in this study.

The evidence from South Africa also calls into question claims that truth-telling leads to healing. Allan and Allan find no empirical or other data suggesting that any long-term healing followed for witnesses who experienced catharsis while giving testimony to the South African TRC.[90] In fact, they cite anecdotal evidence that the experience sometimes caused immediate and perhaps

[87] Başoğlu et al., "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions."; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman, "Trauma and PTSD: Their Implication for Attitudes towards Justice and Reconciliation."
[88] Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation*; Tepperman, "Truth and Consequences."
[89] ———, "Truth and Consequences."
[90] Allan and Allan, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool."

enduring trauma for those who testified. Kaminer et al. report a similar finding from a nonrandomized epidemiological study assessing psychological health in 134 survivors who had or had not given testimony in the South African TRC.[91] They report that testifying had no effect on mental health, either positive or negative.

The evidence from Rwanda does not seem to differ from that of South Africa. In an important effort to contribute empirical evidence to the debate surrounding transitional justice, Brounéus examined the psychological effects of the gacaca process in Rwanda, the largest officially driven truth and reconciliation process in the world today.[92] She conducted a multistage, stratified cluster random survey of 1,200 Rwandans in four provinces that operationalized healing as "psychological health" measuring clinically significant symptoms of depression and PTSD. Brounéus's work demonstrates that gacaca witnesses suffer from higher levels of depression and PTSD than do non-witnesses. She also found that longer exposure to truth telling did not lower the levels of psychological ill health, nor reduce the prevalence of depression and PTSD over time. That witnesses suffer from higher levels of depression and PTSD than nonwitnesses suggests that truth-telling may be more distressing than healing.[93]

Additionally, survivors who had witnessed in the gacaca had a 20 percent higher relative risk of having depression and a 40 percent higher relative risk of having PTSD compared to survivors

[91] Kaminer et al., "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation to psychiatric status and forgiveness among survivors of human rights abuses."
[92] Gacaca were initiated by the Government of Rwanda in 2002 as a pilot in certain communities, then launched nationwide three years later in 2005. More than fifteen thousand gacaca courts are presently underway, conducted by locally elected lay judges and *unyangamugayo* and involving the entire population by mandatory participation. The gacaca takes place once a week in every village in Rwanda. The proceedings are held in a schoolroom or most often outdoors with a panel of nine judges, the accused perpetrator, the witness, and the assembled villagers as audience. At least one hundred people must have gathered before the proceedings begin. Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."
[93] Ibid.

who had not witnessed.[94] The situation was even worse for *inyangamugayo* (judges in the gacaca) and neighbors who witnessed with the relative risk of having depression 60 percent higher and PTSD 75 percent higher than those who did not witness in the gacaca. Brounéus suggests this may be because witnessing involved even greater distress for this group as they may be seen and felt as if they were betraying their own group. A similar study conducted in 2002 in Rwanda demonstrated that respondents who had experienced high levels of trauma or met the criteria for PTSD were less likely to support the gacaca and less open to reconciliation.[95]

The literature on clinical psychology partially explains these findings. While there is no consensus among psychologists on how best to treat victims of emotional trauma,[96] psychological research has shown that exposure to the traumatic event, through either imagery (thinking of the event) or in vivo exposure (going to places or situations that strongly remind of the trauma), is an essential component in psychological treatment of PTSD.[97] While treatment of PTSD is highly individualized and there is debate over whether cognitive behavioral or exposure therapies work best, most psychologists agree that gradual exposure to the traumatic event over time leads to decreased levels of anxiety and fear.

---

[94] Survivors are in a small minority at the gacaca, surrounded by a majority Hutu (85 percent). Tutsi constitute 14 percent of the total population. Ibid.

[95] Pham, Weinstein, and Longman, "Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for attitudes toward justice and reconciliation."

[96] E.B. Foa and E.A. Meadows, "Psychosocial Treatments for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Review," *Annual Review of Psychology* 48(1997); Neil W. Boris, Alan C. Ou, and Rohini Singh, "Preventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder After Mass Exposure to Violence," *Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science* 3, no. 2 (2005); Jonathan I. Bisson and M. Andrew, "Psychological Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)," *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 3(2007); Jonathan I. Bisson et al., "Psychological Treatments for Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder," *British Journal of Psychiatry* 190(2007).

[97] Chris R. Brewin, "A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and its treatment," *Behavior Research and Therapy* 39, no. 4 (2001); Nenad Paunovic and Öst Lars-Göran, "Cognitive-behavior therapy vs exposure therapy in the treatment of PTSD in refugees," *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 39(2001); Suzanna Rose, Jonathan Bisson, and Simon Wessely, "Psychological debriefing for preventing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)," (Cochrane Library 1 2003); Arnold A.P. van Emmerik et al., "Single session debriefing after psychological trauma: A meta-analysis," *The Lancet* 360(2002).

However, the research emphasizes that the exposure should be gradual rather than short and intense. A 2002 Cochrane Review of a one-session debriefing, a type of early psychological intervention after a traumatic experience with the aim of preventing subsequent psychological ill health, found no evidence that one-session debriefing is useful in preventing or reducing the severity of depression, PTSD, anxiety, or general psychological morbidity and was recommended to cease.[98] Brounéus notes that both one-session debriefing and witnessing in a TRC involve short and intensive trauma exposure, which research shows has risks of increasing trauma reactions because there is no time for desensitization or relearning.[99]

While research shows that exposure to the traumatic event gradually leads to habituation or desensitization such that the traumatic stressor will no longer evoke high levels of anxiety and fear, it also shows that if the exposure is too short, this learning process cannot be made and the trauma is maintained or intensified.[100] Brounéus suggests that the protraction of the truth-telling process may involve an ineffective, repetitive exposure to suffering similar to rumination, the incessant, repetitive thinking about past trauma, which is frequently reported in individuals with PTSD and which has been found to be not only a strategy to cope with intrusive memories of trauma but also a trigger of such memoires, resulting in a cyclical process.[101] Michael et al. suggest that instead of leading to successful emotional processing of trauma, rumination becomes a type of avoidance strategy, prolonging PTSD and depression.[102] As such, psychologists generally concur that cathartic experiences should be avoided except under highly

[98] Rose, Bisson, and Wessely, "Psychological debriefing for preventing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)."
[99] Brewin, "A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and its treatment."; Rose, Bisson, and Wessely, "Psychological debriefing for preventing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)."; Paunovic and Lars-Göran, "Cognitive-behavior therapy vs exposure therapy in the treatment of PTSD in refugees."; van Emmerik et al., "Single session debriefing after psychological trauma: A meta-analysis."
[100] Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."
[101] Tanja Michael et al., "Rumination in posttraumatic stress disorder," *Depression and Anxiety* 24(2007).
[102] Ibid.

controlled conditions because the dangers of retraumatization could be much greater than the potential benefits.[103] Given the short, intense, public exposure of witnesses to a truth-telling process, there is reason for concern that the process may be detrimental to psychological healing and potentially to reconciliation.

Accordingly, interviews by Hamber et al. with twenty survivors who were involved with the South African TRC found that while 60 percent of the respondents reported optimism about the benefits of truth-telling before they gave or submitted testimony, only 10 percent had a positive view after the fact.[104] Thirty-five percent actually had a negative view of the experience and 55 percent were "ambivalent" about it. Seventy percent reported feeling "let down" and disappointed with the outcome. Of those who testified (eight out of twenty), half felt regret for doing so or felt cheated by the process, while the other half felt relief and comfort. A similar study by Byrne interviewed thirty survivors who participated in the TRC found that 23.3 percent of those who participated in the study "felt they benefited from and shared positive reactions regarding the experience of testifying.[105] However, eighty percent felt "the process involved considerable emotional pain." The variance in reactions to truth-telling reflects the highly individualized nature of trauma recovery and suggests that while truth-telling may have positive effects for some, in many cases it has no effect or even negative effect for victims.

The evidence on the psychological outcomes of truth-seeking tribunals is similarly bleak. Herman writes "if one set out intentionally to design a system for provoking symptoms of

[103] Allan and Allan, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool.":472-473; Minow, *Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and mass violence*; Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting state terror and atrocity*.
[104] Brandon Hamber, Dineo Negeng, and Gabriel O'Malley, "Telling It Like It Is: Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission from the Perspective of Survivors," *Psychology in Society* 26(2000).
[105] Catherine C. Byrne, "Benefit or Burden: Victims' Reflections on TRC Participation," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10, no. 3 (2004).

posttraumatic stress disorder, it might look very much like a court of law."[106] Accordingly, Stover's study of eighty-seven witnesses who appeared at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that most victims derived some benefit from testifying, but none reported psychological relief.[107] "The few participants who experienced cathartic feelings immediately or soon after testifying before the ICTY found that the glow quickly faded once they returned home to their shattered villages and towns."

Based on interviews with therapists who have counseled survivors of human rights violations, O'Connell found that for some there may be therapeutic benefit from participating in trials, such as a sense of acknowledgment and empowerment, but for many it is a negative experience.[108] For victims who do not participate directly in litigation, "there is some evidence that trials may be psychologically counterproductive if they result in judgments for the alleged human rights violators or in penalities that a victim considers incommensurate with the atrocities.[109] For those who are directly involved as litigants, the evidence indicates that there are more risks than benefits. For many victims, the criminal justice system is profoundly disappointing and can be potentially damaging to victims. High expectations are frequently dashed, and generate feelings of resentment, anger and betrayal.[110] In some cases, testifying may retraumatize victims, though some studies have disputed that finding.[111]

---

[106] Judith Herman, "The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 16, no. 2 (2003).
[107] Stover and Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*.
[108] Jamie O'Connell, "Gambling with the psyche: Does prosecuting human rights violators console their victims?," *Harvard International Law Journal* 46, no. 2 (2005).
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ulrich Orth and Andreas Maercher, "Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Crime Victims?," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 19(2004).

Similar to questionable effects of truth commissions on reconciliation, researchers are also questioning claims that tribunals are beneficial for reconciliation. Meernik found that arrests or judgments against war criminals in the ICTY were correlated with increased hostility between ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and concluded that the ICTY has not had a meaningful effect on societal peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[112] Likewise, Corkalo et al. describe how all national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina—Bosniak, Croat, and Serb—felt that their own national group was the greatest victim in the war and that the ICTY was prejudiced against their own group.[113]

As such, it seems that in reality, judicial mechanisms contribute far less to the social reconstruction of post-conflict societies than was previously assumed.[114] As Stover points out, "Many of the assumptions about the effects that justice has on individuals and societies have gone unexamined and unchallenged far too long. Seldom are the assertions grounded in empirical data. The pursuit of criminal justice, as important as it is, should not be held up as some kind of panacea for righting past wrongs or as a "magic bullet" for "healing" victims and war-torn societies."[115]

Scholars such as O'Connell have therefore concluded "policymakers, activists, and survivors themselves should hesitate to pursue judicial action against human rights violators as a means for helping victims psychologically, until and unless further research shows that judicial actions have a net therapeutic effect on most survivors…Generally, however, those seeking to help

[112] James Meernik, "Justice and Peace? How the international criminal tribunal affects societal peace in Bosnia," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 3 (2005).
[113] Dinka Corkalo et al., "Neighbors Again? Intercommunity relations after ethnic cleansing," in *My Neighbor, My Enemy*, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."
[114] Mendeloff, "Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice."
[115] Stover and Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*.

traumatized survivors heal should put less faith in trials. Instead, they should devote greater attention to non-judicial initiatives that may address psychological aftereffects of human rights violations more reliably."[116]

However, it is worth noting that despite evidence that truth-telling and truth-seeking can be harmful to witnesses' psychological health and may not be beneficial for reconciliation, research finds strong demands among survivors for post-conflict justice and accountability. Empirical work in Bosnia and Croatia,[117] and Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa and Uganda have documented these demands in the aftermath of violent conflict.[118] Moreover, Backer found that the majority of witnesses in the South African TRC would testify again even if they had known the anguish it entailed beforehand.[119] Even though 56 percent reported that giving a statement was "very upsetting," an even higher number (64 percent) "believed they gained something positive" from the experience. As such, there is reason to believe that the process of truth-telling and truth-seeking may have benefits other than psychological healing and reconciliation for victims.

Given the above discussion, it is likely that truth commissions and prosecutions may have some benefits for conflict-affected societies, but there remains insufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate that psychological healing and reconciliation are among them. As such, it is

---

[116] O'Connell, "Gambling with the psyche: Does prosecuting human rights violators console their victims?," 340.
[117] Metin et al. Başoğlu, "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions," *JAMA* 294(2005).
[118] Victor Espinoza Cuevas, María Luisa Ortiz Rojas, and Paz Rojas Baeza, "Truth Commissions: An Uncertain Path? Comparative Study of Truth Commissions in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa From the Perspectives of Victims, Their Relatives, Human Rights Organizations and Experts," (2002); Pham Phuong et al., "Forgotten Voices: A population-based survey of attitudes about peace and justice in Northern Uganda," (International Center on Transitional Justice; Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley, 2005).
[119] David Backer, "Victims' responses to truth commissions: Evidence from South Africa," in *Security, reconstruction, and reconciliation: When the wars end*, ed. Muna Ndulo (London: University College London, 2007).

important that peacebuilding practitioners consider other approaches that may be complementary to transitional justice mechanisms to ensure that reconciliation takes place in post-conflict contexts. To that end, the next section provides a review of the social psychological literature on intergroup relations theory, the foundation for intergroup contact programs, which this dissertation will test as a potential complementary approach to transitional justice.

Moreover, this dissertation includes healing as a dependent variable in an effort to measure the effects of alternative interventions on healing and reconciliation. Similar to the work of Brounéus, psychological healing will be operationalized by changes in anxiety, depression and PTSD. The psychometric scales used to measure these constructs are discussed below. As will be explained in the theoretical framework proposed in the final section of this chapter, this methodology can also be used to measure the effects of other interventions proposed to contribute to reconciliation, including transitional justice mechanisms, in order that a comprehensive theory of reconciliation can ultimately be established.

Intergroup Relations Theory

Steeped in the contact hypothesis originally posited by Gordan Allport in 1954, decades of social psychological research have now developed into a robust theory of intergroup relations, which demonstrates that intergroup contact can promote reductions in intergroup prejudice in a wide range of situations.[120] As scholars and practitioners continue to experiment with intergroup contact, they are finding that contact not only reduces prejudice, but has also been linked to

[120] Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."

increases in intergroup trust, empathy and forgiveness.[121] This section will briefly review these findings, explaining why these variables have been adopted as dependent variables in this study.

The idea behind the contact hypothesis is that hostility between groups is fed by unfamiliarity and separation and that under the right conditions, contact among members of different groups will reduce hostility and promote more positive intergroup attitudes.[122] Allport originally noted four optimal conditions that were necessary for contact to lead to a reduction in prejudice: 1) the contact should take place between equal status members of groups; 2) it should have the support of the relevant authorities; 3) it should produce opportunities for intimate contact, and; 4) the conditions of contact should facilitate intergroup cooperation. He hypothesized that these conditions may provide positive experiences with outgroup members that disconfirm or undermine previous negative attitudes and ultimately change attitudes toward and beliefs about the group as a whole.[123]

Today, groundbreaking research is confirming that contact can indeed reduce intergroup prejudice. In an important meta-analytic study, Pettigrew and Tropp rigorously reviewed 515 studies of intergroup contact.[124] The results clearly indicate that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice. In fact, 94% of the samples in the analysis showed an inverse relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice.[125]

The study has also shown that intergroup contact effects typically generalize beyond participants

---

[121] M. Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'," in *Collective guilt: International perspectives*, ed. N.R. Branscombe and B. Doosje (Cambridge: University Press, 2004); Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."
[122] Brewer and Gaertner, "Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization," 298-99.
[123] Ibid., 302.
[124] Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."
[125] Ibid., 766.

in the immediate contact situation.[126] Not only do attitudes toward immediate participants usually become more favorable, but so do attitudes toward the entire outgroup, outgroup members in other situations, and even outgroups not involved in the contact.

Additionally, the study finds that Allport's conditions are not essential for intergroup contact to achieve positive outcomes, showing that samples with no claim to these conditions still show significant relationships between contact and prejudice. The authors conclude that Allport's conditions should not be regarded as necessary for producing positive contact outcomes, however they act as facilitating conditions that enhance the tendency for positive contact outcomes to emerge.

A third finding of this important work is that intergroup contact may be useful in a variety of situations beyond racial and ethnic conflicts. The study showed that the relationships between contact and prejudice remained significant across samples involving different target groups, age groups, geographical areas, and contact settings. This provides substantial evidence that intergroup contact can contribute meaningfully to reductions in prejudice across a broad range of groups and contexts.

However, while Pettigrew & Tropp's meta-analytic study shows that contact can reduce intergroup prejudice in a variety of contexts, little work has been done to demonstrate the effects of contact in a highly charged conflict or post-conflict setting.[127] While 51% of the samples in Pettigrew & Tropp's meta-analytic study represent cases of contact between racial and ethnic

[126] Ibid.
[127] _____, "How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 38(2008).

groups, only 7.6% of the samples are cases of intergroup contact experiences that take place in Africa, Asia or Latin-America between adults.

While Pettigrew & Tropp show that no significant differences in effects are found in different geographical locations, it is important that researchers increase the body of case knowledge in non-Western and post-conflict contexts so that we are better able to understand whether intergroup contact can reduce prejudice between social groups with "a history of conflict and hostility, inequalities of status and power, and political struggle."[128] As such, this dissertation will contribute to the literature by adding a rigorous analysis of the effects of intergroup contact on prejudice in an Asian country, as well as a highly charged post-conflict context.

In addition to studies demonstrating that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice, Hewstone et al. have shown that contact with outgroup friends between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland corresponds to a greater willingness to forgive and trust the outgroup.[129] This may be because having a close outgroup friend promotes perspective taking, the cognitive component of empathy, which seems to be a mediator in predicting outgroup attitudes including prejudice, trust and forgiveness.

However, these studies are based on observational data in which survey research asked respondents about their previous contact with members of the outgroup and their prevailing attitudes toward that group. They are not based on experimental research in which a treatment such as facilitated intergroup contact was applied to subjects and the outcome measured. As such, it is uncertain whether the conclusion that intergroup contact enhances outgroup attitudes

[128] " Brewer and Gaertner, "Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization," 301.
[129] Hewstone et al., "Stepping stones to reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup contact, forgiveness and trust."; Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of "The Troubles"."; Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."

such as trust and forgiveness applies to situations of facilitated intergroup contact or only to existing contact with members of the outgroup. This study therefore includes trust, forgiveness and empathy as dependent variables in order to test whether the observational findings of previous studies apply to facilitated intergroup contact.

A Theoretical Framework for Reconciliation

It is clear from the literature that there is not yet an agreed upon concept of reconciliation, nor a definitive understanding of the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to achieve reconciliation. As such, this dissertation seeks to contribute to theory-building by developing a theoretical framework that allows these conditions to be tested. To that end, I propose that reconciliation *is* the psychological change that takes place at the individual level (indicated by variables such as prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and/or healing) in a post-conflict context, which is *caused* by some combination of interventions that may include structural and political change, truth, justice, historical responsibility for human rights abuses, intergroup contact, etc.[130]

[130] A post-conflict context, environment or society refers to situations in which the population has experienced violent inter-group conflict and has already achieved a political settlement via a peace agreement. The scope of this dissertation is limited to post-conflict societies and will not make claims about conflicts in which a political settlement has not yet been reached.



Because this conceptualization of reconciliation allows various interventions to be categorized as independent variables and psychological changes to be categorized as dependent variables and measured at the individual level using psychometric scales, it enables the use of field experimental methodologies to measure the impact of each of the proposed interventions. While this does not answer the question 'How do we know when we've achieved reconciliation,' it is theoretically possible that 'reconciliation scores' established over time in post conflict societies could ultimately be used to determine the threshold at which post-conflict societies resolve conflict through dialogue rather than violence, which I propose is the threshold at which reconciliation has been sufficiently achieved.

For example, by comparing scores across conflicts over time on the various scales that measure the psychological changes that serve as proxies for reconciliation, it would be possible to determine the level or scores at which violence does not recur. Practitioners could therefore

continue reconciliation initiatives until that threshold was reached. As such, this research would ultimately indicate which combination of variables lead to reconciliation and how much reconciliation is minimally sufficient to prevent a return to violence.

While it is not within the scope of this dissertation to test the full theory, I will contribute to theory-building by positing a clear concept of reconciliation and testing one part of the theory: the effect of intergroup contact on reconciliation, which will be measured by changes in the dependent variables prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing. The next section provides a detailed account of the psychometric scales that were used in this study to measure each of the variables, while the complete surveys administered to respondents are included in Appendices A and B. If similar techniques are used by other scholars to measure the effects of interventions aimed at reconciliation such as truth commissions, prosecutions, structural and political change, etc., we will begin to gather enough empirical evidence to build a comprehensive theory of reconciliation.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variables

Prejudice: Prejudice is defined in this study as a negative attitude toward members of a social outgroup.[131] Social psychologists have distinguished between three components of prejudice: affective components (negative feelings); cognitive components (negative stereotypes); and behavioral components.[132] This dissertation will therefore examine how contact affects all three components of prejudice.

[131] Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*; J. Harding et al., "On the fading of social stereotypes: Studies in three generations of college students," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13(1969); R.D. Ashmore, "The problem of intergroup prejudice," in *Social psychology*, ed. B. Collins (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1970); W.G. Stephan and C.W. Stephan, "Intergroup Anxiety," *Journal of Social Issues* 41(1985).
[132] John Duckitt, "Prejudice and intergroup hostility," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Affective prejudice: The affective component of prejudice was measured by combining the items developed by Stephan and Stephan, [133] also used by Tropp and Pettigrew,[134] and the items developed by Stangor, Sullivan & Ford .[135] Respondents were asked to report the extent to which they would expect to feel ten different emotional states (five positive and five negative) when interacting with the outgroup. Item responses included 1 (not at all), 2 (a little), 3 (average), 4 (a lot).

When I think about the outgroup, I feel…

- Positive emotions:
    - Respect
    - Comfortable
    - Relaxed
    - Accepted
    - Sympathetic
- Negative emotions:
    - Afraid
    - Angry
    - Suspicious

[133] Items developed by Stephan and Stephan include: Positive emotions (confident, accepted, secure, comfortable, relaxed); Negative emotions (suspicious, awkward, threatened, nervous, apprehensive).
[134] Linda R. Tropp and Thomas L. Pettigrew, "Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31(2005).
[135] C. Stangor, L.A. Sullivan, and T.E. Ford, "Affective and Cognitive Determinants of Prejudice," *Social Cognition* 9, no. 4 (1991): 364. Stangor, Sullivan and Ford asked subjects to check either yes or no to each emotion. They instructed subjects to think about the outgroup, then think about their feelings about the outgroup. They asked "has the outgroup ever, because of something they have done or something you know about them, ever made you feel: Positive emotions (hopeful, inspired, proud, respectful, sympathetic); Negative emotions (afraid, angry, disgusted, frustrated, uneasy)."

- Vengeance/the need for revenge
- Hatred

Cognitive prejudice: The cognitive component of prejudice was measured by adapting the warmth and competence scales developed by Fiske et al.[136] Participants were asked to rate the following questions on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very). Fiske's warmth scale initially included two additional questions that asked about perceptions of good-naturedness and sincerity, but we ultimately deleted these questions after field testing the questionnaire because translations of these terms into Indonesian was redundant with other terms.

Competence:

- As viewed by members of society, how *competent* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *confident* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *capable* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *efficient/useful* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *intelligent* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *skillful* are members of outgroup?

Warmth:

- As viewed by members of society, how *friendly* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *well-intentioned* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *trustworthy* are members of outgroup?
- As viewed by members of society, how *warm* are members of outgroup?

Status:

[136] Susan T. Fiske et al., "A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition " *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82, no. 6 (2002).

- How prestigious are jobs typically achieved by members of the outgroup?
- How economically successful have members of the outgroup been?

Competition:

- If members of the outgroup get special breaks (such as priority in hiring decisions), this is likely to make things more difficult for people like me.
- Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the resources of people like me. (We ultimately translated this as Do you feel disappointed if resources go to members of their group and you don't get any?)

Behavioral prejudice: The behavioral component of prejudice was measured by adapting Bogardus' social distance scale, which was designed to measure the extent to which people wish to maintain social distance and avoid increasing levels of intimate contact between themselves and members of different social, racial, ethnic, or national groups.[137] Respondents are asked whether they would be willing to admit members of the outgroup to their country as visitors (farthest social distance), as citizens, into employment in their occupation, into residence in their neighborhood, as friends, and into close kinship by marriage (closest social distance). I adapted this scale as follows:

If given the opportunity, I would…

	Yes	No
7. Exclude members of the outgroup from my country	___	___
6. Admit members of the outgroup only as visitors to my country	___	___

[137] E.S. Bogardus, "The measurement of social distance," in *Readings in social psychology*, ed. T.M. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley (New York: Holt, 1928); Monica Biernat and Christian S. Crandall, "Racial Attitudes," in *Measures of Political Attitudes*, ed. John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence Wrightsman, S., *Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999).

5. Admit members of the outgroup as citizens to my country ___ ___

4. Allow members of the outgroup to be employed in my occupation ___ ___

3. Allow members of the outgroup to live in my village ___ ___

2. Allow members of the outgroup to join my group/club as friends ___ ___

1. Allow an outgroup member to marry into my family ___ ___

Empathy: Unlike the well-developed and highly validated scales used to measure prejudice that have been developed over fifty plus years of research, the notions of empathy, trust and forgiveness are relatively new and the psychometric scales used to measure them are still under construction. Hewstone et al. have been extremely influential in adapting and developing scales to measure empathy, trust and forgiveness. As such, this study adapted the scale developed for use in Northern Ireland by Hewstone et al., which was adapted from Davis' 1994 Interpersonal Reactivity Index.[138] It measures both the affective and cognitive components of empathy.

For translation reasons, we used only three of the original four questions to measure the affective component of empathy. Participants were asked to rate the answers to the following questions on a four-point Likert scale (1-never; 2-rarely; 3-sometimes; 4-often).

1. If you hear about their misfortunes, do you often feel upset?
2. When you see them being treated unfairly, do you often feel pity for them?

[138] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."; M.H. Davis, *Empathy: A social psychological approach* (Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark, 1994); Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'."; Miles Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact in a Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland," in *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion*, ed. D. Abrams, J.M. Marques, and M.A. Hogg (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2005); C.D. Batson et al., "Is empathy-induced helping due to self-other merging? ," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73(1997).

3. How often do you feel concerned about people from their group who are less fortunate than you?

The scale also measured the cognitive component of empathy or perspective-taking, which can be understood as the ability to see the point of view of the other. Participants were also asked to rate the answers to the following questions on a four-point Likert scale (1-never; 2-rarely; 3-sometimes; 4-often).

1. Do you often find it difficult to see things from their point of view?
2. Do you often try to think about the conflict from their perspective as well as yours?
3. If there's a problem or misunderstanding, do you often try to see things from their perspective?

Trust: This study measured trust by adopting the scale used by Hewstone et al., which was developed based on the work of Brehm and Rahn and worded to assess outgroup trust.[139] It used three items on a 4-point Likert scale (1-disagree strongly; 2-disagree; 3-agree; 4-agree strongly):

1. Do you think most members of the other community would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance instead of being fair?
2. Do you agree that most of the time members of the other community try to be helpful, and are not just looking out for themselves?
3. Do you agree that most members of the other community can be trusted?

Tolerance: This study used James Gibson's definition of tolerance developed for his work studying reconciliation in South Africa.[140] Gibson defined tolerance as the commitment of

[139] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'."; John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital," *American Jounral of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997).

people to put up with each other, even those whose political ideas they thoroughly detest and asked participants to respond to the three questions below. Similarly, this study asked participants to rate the answers to the following questions used by Gibson on a 4-point Likert scale (1-disagree strongly; 2-disagree; 3-agree; 4-agree strongly):

- Do you agree that members of the outgroup should be prohibited from standing as a candidate for an elected position in Aceh?
- Do you agree that members of the outgroup should be allowed to hold street demonstrations in your community?
- Do you agree that they should be officially banned from your community?

Forgiveness: This study adapted the Intergroup Forgiveness Scale developed by Hewstone et al. to assess forgiveness in Northern Ireland.[141] Their scale was based on a short form of the Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI), a widely used measure of interpersonal forgiveness, adapted to measure intergroup forgiveness.[142] For translation reasons, we adapted their eight question scale to become a seven question scale. On a 4-point Likert scale (1-disagree strongly; 2-disagree; 3-agree; 4-agree strongly), participants were asked to answer the following seven questions designed to tap the affective, cognitive and behavioral components of forgiveness:

1. Do you agree that the two communities must learn not to retaliate when there is a problem?
2. Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgets the wrongs done by the other community?

---

[140] Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation?*
[141] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'."
[142] R.D. Enright, S. Freedman, and J. Rique, "The psychology of interpersonal forgiveness," in *Exploring forgiveness*, ed. R.D. Enright and J. Noah (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).

3. Do you agree that both parties should forgive each other to maintain the peace?
4. Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgives the wrongs done to you by their group?
5. Do you agree that if you forgive them, your group will appear weak?
6. Do you agree that your group should apologize to them?
7. Do you agree that Aceh will never move from the past to the future until the two communities learn to forget about the past?

Healing: The healing portion of this study was designed to complement research done in 2006-2007 by the International Organization on Migration (IOM) and the World Bank in partnership with researchers from the Harvard Medical School and Syiah Kuala University assessing mental health and psychosocial needs throughout Aceh.[143] This dissertation used these same measures to assess symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety in order to produce results that could be meaningfully compared.

As such, I used a 25 question version of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire to measure symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and a 25 question version of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist for Depression and Anxiety.[144] Both scales are used widely in disaster and trauma community assessments of emotional distress. The questions I used at the beginning of survey 1

[143] IOM, "Psychosocial needs assessment of communities affected by conflict in the districts of Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara," (http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/pdf/good_M_PNA1.pdf: International Organization for Migration, 2006); ———, "A psychosocial needs assessment of communities in 14 conflict affects districts in Aceh," (http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/pdf/good_M_PNA1.pdf: International Organization for Migration, 2007).

[144] R.F. Mollica, Caspi-Yavin Y., Bollini P., Truong T., Tor S., Lavelle J, "The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. Validating a cross-cultural instrument for measuring torture, trauma, and posttraumatic stress disorder in Indochinese refugees," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders* 180, no. 2 (1992); M.B.; Kelman Parloff, H.C.; Frank, J.D., "Comfort, effectiveness, and self-awareness as criteria for improvement in psychotherapy," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 3(1954).

to measure exposure to wartime and traumatic events as well as current stressors were also drawn from the scales used by the IOM team and were based on the previously validated Harvard Trauma Events Scale.[145] These scales included a yes/no checklist of traumatic events experienced during the conflict and a yes/no checklist of current stressors and traumatic events in the post-conflict period. See questionairre 1 and 2 in Appendixes A and B for a full list of questions.

Additional measures: The questionnaire also measured several additional variables including preexisting contact with outgroup members and perceptions of current political issues. The questions for measuring contact were drawn from Tropp and Pettigrew's measure of intergroup closeness in which the answers to the following questions were averaged to create an overall measure of intergroup closeness:[146]

- Quantity
    - How many people of the other group do you know at least as acquaintances?
    - How many people of the other group do you consider to be friends?
- Quality
    - How close do you feel to the members of the other group that you know?
    - How close do you feel to the one person of the other group with whom you have the closest relationship?

Participants were also asked to respond on a 4-point Likert scale to the following six questions regarding perceptions of societal and political issues. These questions were designed to reflect contentious topics of political debate within the target communities in order that I could

[145] IOM, "A psychosocial needs assessment of communities in 14 conflict affects districts in Aceh," 11.
[146] Tropp and Pettigrew, "Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice."

determine whether the workshops had any effect on participants' political and societal views. I was also curious whether the workshops would give participants a greater sense of political efficacy so I included the last question on whether participants feel their opinion is heard by political leaders.

- Do you agree that refugees/IDPs from their group who fled the region during the conflict should return?
- Do you agree that the return of refugees/IDPs to the region will cause violence?
- Do you agree that people should keep weapons in their homes in case they need them?
- Do you agree that violence/intimidation is a way to get what you want?
- Do you believe reconciliation between groups is important?
- Do you feel your opinion is heard and respected by political leaders?

Conclusion

As research continues to weaken the link between reconciliation and the traditional transitional justice mechanisms of prosecutions and truth-telling,[147] social psychological work on intergroup contact may offer a promising alternative with far reaching implications for peacebuilding practitioners.[148]

However, limitations in existing social psychological research require additional inquiry in order to provide answers to many of the most pressing questions regarding the resolution of violent

[147] Mendeloff, "Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice."; O'Connell, "Gambling with the psyche: Does prosecuting human rights violators console their victims?."; Thoms, Ron, and Paris, "The effects of transitional justice mechanisms: A summary of empirical research findings and implications for analysts and practitioners."; Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."

[148] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'."; Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."; Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."

conflict including, How can we create the conditions for reconciliation in post-conflict societies? How can reconciliation be conceptualized and measured? What role can intergroup contact play in promoting reconciliation and supporting sustainable peace?

This dissertation therefore contributes to building a theory of reconciliation by consolidating scholarship from a range of disciplines including political science, law, political and social psychology, into a theoretical framework in which the effect of various proposed interventions can be operationalized and tested. It then uses a field experimental methodology to test one part of the theory--the effects of intergroup contact on reconciliation, as measured by the dependent variables prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing. Chapter 3 will discuss the study methodology in detail.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This chapter will discuss the methodology used to test the hypothesis that dialogue-based intergroup contact can promote reconciliation in post-conflict societies. It will discuss the field experimental methodology used to identify the causal impact of facilitated intergroup contact on theoretically meaningful proxies for reconciliation. These include prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing, which have been drawn from literature in various disciplines including political science, law, political and social psychology. Before explaining the methods used in this study, section one will first provide a brief overview of the concept of field experimentation, highlighting the potential of this methodology to answer some of the most challenging causal questions faced by social scientists and peacebuilding practitioners. Section two will explain the study design, section three will explain the various components of implementing the study including selection of facilitators, partners and participants, and section four will conclude with an in depth look at the content of the workshops.

Field Experimentation

Field experimentation is a rapidly growing form of social science research that encompasses hundreds of studies on topics like education, crime, employment, savings, discrimination, charitable giving, conservation and political participation.[149] It has long been employed as a methodology to answer key questions regarding health, education, agriculture and more recently development economics.[150] However, field experimentation remains relatively uncharted

[149] Alan S. Gerber and Donald Green, *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis and Interpretation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 15.
[150] Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(2009).

territory for social scientists and practitioners seeking to implement interventions that change political processes.[151]

As deRooij, Green and Gerber note, one of the key challenges in social science is to measure causal effects accurately.[152] Field experiments, randomized trials conducted in a naturalistic setting, attempt to approximate as closely as possible the conditions under which a causal process occurs. The interventions are similar or identical to the interventions subjects would experience in everyday life, and the outcome measures are the behavioral or institutional consequences of real-world significance.[153] In the contentious world of causal claims, randomized experimentation represents an evenhanded method for assessing what works.[154]

The key to field experimentation is the random allocation of subjects to treatment. Random allocation, a process by which units of analysis are assigned to experimental groups with equal probability, is the dividing line that separates experimental from non-experimental research.[155] The goal of field experimentation is to control assignment to treatment, insofar as possible, such that treated and untreated units are identical except that one group receives the treatment while the other does not.[156] The procedure of assigning treatments at random ensures that there is no systematic tendency for either the treatment or control group to have an advantage. This implies that the observed and *unobserved* factors that affect outcomes are equally likely to be present in the treatment and control groups.[157]

---

[151] Ibid.
[152] Eline A. deRooij, Donald Green, and Alan S. Gerber, "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(2009): 390.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Gerber and Green, *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis and Interpretation*: 7-8.
[155] Ibid; deRooij, Green, and Gerber, "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action."
[156] Humphreys and Weinstein, "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development."
[157] Gerber and Green, *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis and Interpretation*: 7-8.

Today, practitioners face increasing demands from donors to strengthen the evidence-base on which policy prescriptions rest.[158] As such, there is increasing pressure on practitioners to adopt evidence-based approaches that identify the most effective strategies and interventions for promoting development.[159] As the interests of donors, implementing agencies and social scientists converge to demand research that can figure out what works, when and why, field experiments are well placed to generate evidence-based policy recommendations.[160]

While there is cause for optimism about the potential of field experimentation to shed light on some of the most challenging questions in social science, the myriad challenges associated with navigating and manipulating the realities of conflict-affected societies required for successful field experimentation cannot be underestimated. Contrary to the relatively neat science of laboratory experiments, field experiments confront practitioners with the distinct challenges of operating in foreign cultures and languages, and highly charged political environments often fret with bureaucratic obstacles and corruption that comingle with intimidation and violence. These realities make implementing tightly designed randomized field experiments a significant challenge.

As such, this chapter will describe the methodology used in conducting this study and will acknowledge where political realities faced during implementation required adaptations to the original experimental design. I will discuss how these challenges were addressed and where appropriate, I will suggest ways of overcoming these obstacles in future experiments. This chapter concludes that while field experimentation in post-conflict societies will continue to pose

[158] L. Savedoff et al., "When will we ever learn? Improving lives through impact evaluation," in *Report of the Evaluation Gap Working Group* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006).
[159] Humphreys and Weinstein, "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development."
[160] Ibid.

significant challenges for researchers and practitioners, it holds tremendous promise to advance knowledge of how to resolve violent conflict and support sustainable peace in conflict-affected societies.

Study Design

This study used a randomized field experimental design to test the hypothesis that dialogue-based contact could reduce prejudice and increase empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing in a post-conflict context. 108 participants who identified as either members of or sympathizers with one of the two major combatant groups in the Central Highlands region of Aceh, GAM and PETA, were randomly assigned to one of nine treatment groups that included three training-based workshop groups, three dialogue-based workshop groups and three control groups in which respondents did not participate in any workshops.

The three control groups were designed to shadow the three rounds of workshop groups such that one control group would be tested during the week that the first dialogue and training workshops were ongoing; the second control group would be tested during the week that the second dialogue and training workshops were ongoing; and the third control group would be tested during the week that the third dialogue and training groups were ongoing. However, as described below, the enumerators encountered problems finding all of the control group participants in their villages during the specified weeks so ultimately we lumped all control group respondents into a single control group that was tested during the three week workshop period and used a single control group (labeled group 9) to control for all workshop groups. As no major exogenous events occurred during the three week workshop period, we consider this sufficient to control for the workshop groups.

Participant selection: There were two stages of participant identification in this study. First, through lengthy discussions with the local NGO partner that began in December 2010, a list of villages was identified that would at once be home to significant numbers of GAM and/or PETA members/sympathizers while being geographically accessible to NGO staff given budget limitations. Ultimately, we selected the 13 villages shown below based on the following criteria:

- The head of the village was willing to participate in the program;
- We were able to identify participants who met the study criteria in those villages;
- Staff of the local NGO had previous experience working in these villages or specific knowledge of the political make-up of the village;
- The village was located in a sub-district that received a low ranking on the Conflict Intensity Index developed by the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA).[161] We selected this criteria not because we thought the workshops wouldn't work in other more high intensity villages, but rather to keep the selection criteria uniform. In addition, staff felt that the commanders or higher-ups in the respective chains of command of GAM and PETA were located in sub-districts with low intensity rankings as these villages often served as bases for planning attacks on higher intensity villages further away from command centers, but did not often come under attack. As such, we decided to prioritize lower intensity villages in order to target a larger pool of ex-combatants within the chain

[161] The conflict intensity index was developed in 2006 with technical assistance from the World Bank and other partners as part of the design and development of the Community-Based Assistance for Conflict Victims program. It categorizes 227 rural sub-districts in Aceh into three categories of conflict intensity (high, medium and low) based on nine indicators drawn from various government data sources including: the Social Welfare Department's number of conflict victims for 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively; the Indonesian military's information on conflict intensity; estimates of GAM returnees from the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM and the World Bank); data on political prisoner returnees from the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 2005 GAM-GoI conflict incidents from the World Bank's newspaper dataset; and World Bank surveys on perceptions of conflict that pre-date the MoU.

of command rather than villages with higher intensity conflict that are home to more conflict-affected civilians than ex-combatants.

We recognized that many villages in the Central Highlands would meet these criteria, however due to budget limitations we could only select 108 participants. In addition, we were working with a limited transportation budget that restricted the distance staff were able to travel to conduct fieldwork. As a result, we selected villages that were located within approximately one hour of the provincial capital of Takengon. The benefit of this was that the relatively close proximity of the villages selected increased the chances that participants would interact with each other following the workshops. Moreover, we had no reason to believe that the effects of the workshops would be any different for participants in these villages versus other low intensity conflict villages given similar socio-economic and demographic factors.

Table 1: Village and Participant Selection

No.	Village	Sub-District	District	Total	Identifies w PETA	Identifies w GAM	Identifies w Other
1	Arul Kumer Induk	Silinara	Aceh Tengah	17	10	7	
2	Arul Kumer Timur	Silinara	Aceh Tengah	25	7	17	1
3	Arul Latong	Bies	Aceh Tengah	8	1	7	
4	Bies Mulye	Bies	Aceh Tengah	2	1	1	
5	Getting Bulen	Ketol	Aceh Tengah	6	4	2	
6	Kalanareh	Pegasing	Aceh Tengah	8	6	2	
7	Karang Bayur	Bies	Aceh Tengah	2	1	1	
8	Pucuk Deku	Bies	Aceh Tengah	1	1	0	
9	Tebes Lues	Bies	Aceh Tengah	5	5	0	
10	Uning Niken	Bies	Aceh Tengah	1	1	0	
11	Wihnidurin	Silinara	Aceh Tengah	6	6	0	
12	Suka Ramai Atas	Wih Pesam	Bener Meriah	11	0	11	
13	Syura Jadi	Wih Pesam	Bener Meriah	15	0	15	

As both GAM and PETA members are hidden populations with no available sampling frame, participants were identified in each village through snowball sampling. Staff of the local NGO first visited the head of the village, explained that they were trying to identify participants for a peacebuilding program through which participants would come to Banda Aceh for a three-day training on conflict resolution, and asked for assistance identifying members of or sympathizers with either PETA or GAM to participate in the program. In the district of Bener Meriah, several village heads declined to participate in the program as we were not able to secure a letter of support from the head of the district (*Bupati*) due to demands for an exorbitant bribe. Because the head of the district in Bener Meriah is a known PETA leader who has maintained an atmosphere of fear and intimidation throughout his political tenure, many within the district are

afraid to act without his explicit support. As such, several village heads declined to participate so the NGO staff concluded the process and went on to the next village. We felt that villages that declined to participate did not reflect those with greater intergroup tensions, but rather reflected a fear on the part of the head of village to act without the official sanction of the head of the district. Ultimately, the majority of villages selected were in the district of Central Aceh, where the various layers of government bureaucracy provided the necessary letters of support through regular administrative procedures.

In the event that the village head was willing to be of assistance, the staff scheduled a time to come back to pick up the list of names of people who they would then interview using the first questionnaire (see Appendix B). Respondents received 25,000 Rupiah (approximately $3 US, slightly less than a daily wage for unskilled labor) for participation in the survey, which took an average of 25 minutes. Informed consent to participate in the study was obtained during this initial survey.

On several occasions, the staff returned to find that the head of the village had already gathered the people he had identified in his home or in a public meeting place in the village. In these cases, it was difficult for interviewers to get accurate information as people often gave politically correct responses rather than giving information about sensitive topics in public. The staff also found that many times the village head had identified his friends and family (likely because of the monetary compensation), rather than members of or sympathizers with GAM or PETA. In the case that the respondent appeared to be a potential study participant, the interviewers attempted to conduct a follow-up interview at a later time at the person's home. In cases where the respondent was clearly not a target for the study, the interviewer politely completed the interview, but the respondent was not selected for participation in the program. In total, 171

interviews were conducted before we were able to identify 108 participants who met the study criteria.

The 108 participants were selected based on the criteria of membership in or sympathizing with GAM or PETA. We initially intended to include an additional criteria of a score of 15 or higher on the prejudice scale, but realized early on that some people were not entirely honest given that they were being interviewed by someone they didn't know and had no reason to trust. As such, we were suspicious that people were underreporting the extent of their prejudice and ultimately decided to accept responders with membership in one of the target identity groups and a minimum score of 11 on the prejudice scale.

Randomization: The randomization procedure was originally designed to assign participants to treatment groups after all 108 participants were identified. However, given that the unanticipated difficulties explained below with identifying study participants from a hidden population threatened to prolong the project timeline such that significant additional costs would have been incurred, we decided to execute the randomization procedure in three phases.

When the first 36 participants were identified, they were randomly assigned to the first three groups (dialogue, training and control) and the workshops began.[162] While this first phase was being implemented, staff from the local NGO partner continued to identify participants. When the next 36 participants were identified, they were randomly assigned to the next three groups and the second round of workshops took place. Phase three was completed when the final 36 participants were identified and randomly assigned to the final three groups. In this way, we

[162] I randomly assigned participants by going down the list and allocating every third person to one of the groups. As I was not familiar with any of the participants, I considered this random allocation.

were able to compensate for unexpected challenges in identifying participants, and implement the program on time and budget.

In hindsight, I would have allocated more time and money for participant selection. If the experiment were repeated, I would allow approximately three months to identify participants, instead of the one month allocated in this experiment, in order that all 108 participants could be identified before they were assigned to treatment or control groups. Additionally, I have since learned that a better way to implement my randomization procedure such that my randomization procedure would be easily replicable by other researchers would be to use a statistics package to to generate a random number for each subject. I would then sort all subjects in ascending order and finally assign them randomly to treatment and control groups.[163]

Challenges with participant selection: Two significant problems occurred during the process of participant selection. The first was that we initially tried to identify 54 participants who identified with GAM and the same number who identified with PETA. When we randomly assigned people to groups, we thought we had achieved this. However, it turned out that approximately 10 of the people selected for participation in the study said they identified with PETA in the initial interview, but when they arrived at the workshop, it turned out that they were members of or sympathizers with GAM. In at least three of these cases, people explained that they had once identified with PETA, but had become angry at the group for various reasons following the peace agreement and were now GAM sympathizers. The other cases seem to be people who were afraid during the initial interview that the interviewer was actually a member of the intelligence community and was trying to trick him into divulging that he was an affiliate of GAM. When these people arrived at the workshops and realized they were in a safe space, they

[163] This process is suggested by Green and Gerber, p. 37.

reported their identity as GAM members. Because of these unanticipated problems, we wound up with unequal numbers of participants from GAM and PETA, with 63 people who identified with GAM and 43 who identified with PETA. To compensate for this, we included the identity group of the participant in our statistical analysis in order to determine if and when the identity group of the participant influenced the outcome. This is further explained in Chapter Four, which covers data analysis. The number of participants in each workshop group is shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Workshop Groups

		PETA	GAM	Other	Total
Group 1	Training	4	8		12
Group 2	Dialogue	5	6	1	12
Group 4	Training	5	7		12
Group 5	Dialogue	5	7		12
Group 7	Mixed Methods	2	8		10
Group 8	Mixed Methods	4	11		15
Group 9	Control	18	16		34
	TOTAL	43	63	1	107

The second problem was that one of the senior staff at the local NGO turned out to be corrupt and was caught conducting the first interview with GAM or PETA members, splitting the fee with them and making a deal that a third person, who may or may not have had a group affiliation, would attend the workshop instead of the group member himself. The scam was that the third person would report to the workshop using the member's name and then all three would split the workshop per diem. Unfortunately, we did not find out about this problem until the second workshop when we realized that the responses of two participants on the second survey did not match the responses they gave on the first survey.

Ultimately, a member of the local NGO staff uncovered the problem, the corrupt staff member was fired and any surveys he had done were rejected. We determined that this had not been a problem in the first workshop and corrected the problem with the two participants in the second workshop by having the enumerators conduct the first demographic survey with the people who were actually participating in the workshop so we had accurate demographics on the actual workshop participants. Ultimately, one of the two did not have a group affiliation. He continued to participate actively in the workshop, but we threw out his data when conducting data analysis. While these challenges do not negate the results of the study, they introduce an additional source of bias that may affect the precision of the results. I acknowledge these sources of bias here in order that future research can anticipate the myriad challenges inherent in conducting field experiments in conflict-affected settings and adjust for these problems in the design phase.

Finally, it is important to note that given the sensitive nature of the program, many layers of management and bureaucracy had to be navigated before the team could enter the villages. Letters of support were received from the district police, military and mayor's offices and verbal clearance was given by the commanders of the respective combatant groups. These negotiations were an extremely challenging part of the program that required ongoing negotiations at different phases of the project and repeatedly threatened the success of the program. However, skillful negotiation on the part of the local NGO ensured the program was able to proceed. Implementing contact programs on a provincial or national scale with authorization and direction from the Governor or President's office would help avoid this problem in the future. However, as seen through the experience described above, working with a government agency (in this case the BRA) posed its own political and public relations challenges. Ultimately, navigating the political

and security environment will be an unavoidable challenge for all intergroup contact programs and time should be built into program timelines and budgets to manage unanticipated obstacles.

Measurement: Each subject participated in a total of three interviews throughout the study. An initial interview was conducted in the subject's village in the Central Highlands, which collected basic demographic information about the subjects' experience during the conflict, current experiences, identity group and an initial measure of prejudice. As explained in the section above on participant selection, the measure of prejudice was used to select participants for the study. None of the other dependent variables were measured in the first survey. The English version of survey 1 is included in Appendix A.

For those assigned to the dialogue or training treatment groups, the second interview was conducted when the participants arrived at the workshop site the day before the workshops began. The third interview was also conducted at the workshop site immediately following the conclusion of the workshops. Surveys two and three included measures of all of the dependent variables—prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing. The English version of surveys two and three is provided in Appendix B.

For those assigned to the control group, the second and third surveys were conducted in their respective villages. Enumerators tried to interview the first twelve people in the control group during the week of the first training and dialogue workshops; the second group of twelve during the week of the second training and dialogue workshops; and the third group of twelve during the week that the third training and dialogue were conducted. However, in some cases, participants were not available during that week and the interviews were conducted shortly thereafter.

Ultimately, all control group interviews were conducted within the month that the workshops were being implemented.

The study enumerators consisted of twelve staff members from the local NGO partner (four full time and seven recruited as enumerators) who were responsible for conducting the first interview and the interviews for the control group in the Central Highlands, as well as six independently recruited enumerators based in Banda Aceh who conducted interviews two and three with participants at the workshop site.[164] As explained below in the section on selecting and training partners, I worked with enumerators from the local NGO to field test and revise the surveys for several weeks, and to ensure a common understanding of the consent form and survey questions. I then conducted a one-day training with the Banda Aceh enumerators to familiarize them with the project, the consent form and the questionnaires, which proved sufficient as the survey language had already been finalized and literacy and education levels were much higher than with the staff in Central Aceh.

In a future experiment, I would attempt to reduce sources of bias by allocating more time and money to data collection for the third interview. This would allow enumerators to conduct the third interview with participants from both the treatment and control groups in their villages after the workshops, meaning the same procedure would be used to collect data from both the treatment and control groups. As it is, my study is exposed to the fact that my treatment effects may be overestimated as subjects may have experienced a sense of euphoria immediately following the trainings that may or may not last when they return to their villages. Another way

[164] The Banda Aceh-based enumerators included several PhD students at the local university and several people who had previously worked as enumerators for the Red Cross. While the trainings were conducted comfortably in Indonesian, some participants were more comfortable being interviewed in Acehnese or Gayonese so we ensured that two of the enumerators spoke Gayonese and four spoke Acehnese. Generally, participants who preferred Acehnese identified with GAM, while those who spoke Gayonese identified with both GAM and PETA.

of accounting for this would be to conduct follow up interviews with all subjects to determine if there is a difference in participant responses immediately following the training versus several months later.

Partnership: The workshops were originally designed to be implemented in partnership with the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA), the agency established by the governor of Aceh to implement the peace agreement. I worked with the Chairman of the agency for over a year to design the program and secure funding in BRA's 2010 budget.[165] The program was originally designed to begin with a training of facilitators and include 90 participants in three groups of 30 people each. Each group was scheduled to meet three times for three days each time in order to test the effects of repeated contact. The first group would participate in three training sessions, the second group in three dialogue sessions, and the third group would not participate in any workshops and would serve as the control group. The program was designed such that the BRA office in the Central Highlands would assist with the logistics of participant selection and data collection. In December 2009, the Governor and parliament approved BRA's 2010 budget with approximately US $90,000 allocated to BRA's conflict resolution program.

However, in April 2010, the newly elected parliament comprised for the first time of a majority from the ex-combatant political party, Partai Aceh, pressured the Governor to replace the Chairman of the BRA with their own representative, who was not favorable to a program that brought together ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict. As will be explained below, the facilitators training was implemented in August 2010, but the new Chairman ultimately shut down the program a month later and allocated the funds elsewhere.

[165] The BRA is jointly funded by the central and provincial governments, and has served as the main vehicle for transferring over 200 million USD in reparations and compensation payments to former combatants, amnestied political prisoners and civilians affected by conflict.

After a significant restructuring, the project was reincarnated in partnership with a local NGO based in the Central Highlands, two independent facilitators and six independent enumerators. It was finally implemented in early 2012 with a budget of $20,000 and the revamped design described above. The next section will describe how these partners were selected and trained, and how subjects were identified for participation in the study.

Implementing the study

This section will dissect the numerous components of the study that were necessary to arrive at the final workshops. It will cover training and selecting the facilitators, the implementing partner and selecting study participants. Section four will describe the workshops themselves in detail.

Training and selecting facilitators: In August 2010, I co-facilitated a six-day workshop sponsored by the BRA on methods for facilitating intergroup contact.[166] The training was attended by thirty participants who were members of Aceh's professional facilitator's network, IMPACT. As members of IMACT, participants had previously been trained in facilitation techniques, and most had also been trained in techniques for facilitating community development. Nearly all had previous facilitation experience.

My co-facilitator, Fajran Zain, is an intellectual leader in the activist community in Aceh, and helped found the Aceh Institute, a prominent Aceh-based think-tank publishing opinion pieces and research on the Aceh peace process. He holds a master's degree in social psychology from Ball State University and was teaching conflict resolution at a university in Banda Aceh. As such, he was familiar with material on prejudice reduction and comfortable facilitating discussion about the Aceh peace process.

[166] The first three days took place from August 18-20 and the second three days from August 24-26.



Figure 1: Cover of "Conflict Resolution Training Manual" developed for BRA's 6-day facilitator's training

The training material was based on a conflict resolution manual I developed while working at the World Bank in Aceh in early 2011. The goal of the training was for the participants to understand the concept of reconciliation and develop a toolbox of techniques with which to facilitate reconciliation. The training focused on the techniques of storytelling and interactive problem-solving, both of which will be discussed in detail in section four on the implementation of the workshops.

The facilitator's training had the following agenda:

Day 1	
9:00-10:30	Opening Introductions Goal of the workshop Workshop schedule BRA's 2010 Conflict Resolution Program
10:30-11:00	Break
11:00-12:30	What is reconciliation?
12:30-1:30	Lunch/prayer
1:30-3:00	Understanding reconciliation
3:00-3:30	Break
3:30-4:00	Reflections on Day 1
Day 2	
9:00-10:00	Recap of Day 1
10:00-10:30	Break
10:30-12:00	How can we overcome prejudice?

12:00-1:00	Lunch/prayer
1:00-3:00	Intergroup Contact Methodologies
3:00-3:30	Break
3:30-4:00	Reflection on Day 2
Day 3	
9:00-10:00	Recap of Day 2
10:00-10:30	Break
10:30-12:00	The Storytelling Methodology
12:00-1:00	Lunch/prayer
1:00-3:00	Simulation: Storytelling Methodology
3:00-3:30	Break
3:30-4:00	Reflection on Day 3

Day 4	
9:00-10:30	Opening Goal of the workshop Workshop schedule Recap of Day 1-3
10:30-11:00	Break
11:00-12:30	The Interactive problem-solving Methodology
12:30-1:30	Lunch/prayer
1:30-3:00	The Interactive problem-solving Methodology
3:00-3:30	Break
3:30-4:00	Reflection on Day 4
Day 5	
8:30-10:00	Recap of Day 4

	Discussion: Can these methods be adapted for use in Aceh? How? What other methods are you using for facilitation in Aceh? Can these methods be combined/integrated into other facilitation methods you're using?
10:00-10:30	Break
10:30-12:00	Discussion cont'd
12:00-1:00	Lunch/prayer
1:00-3:00	Discussion: Evaluating reconciliation and peacebuilding in Aceh
3:00-3:30	Break
3:30-4:00	Discussion: Evaluating reconciliation and peacebuilding in Aceh Reflection on Day 5
Day 6	
8:30-10:00	Recap Day 5 Discussion of BRA/NGO relationship
10:00-10:30	Break
10:30-12:00	Closing by BRA
12:00-1:00	Lunch/prayer

As shown in the slides in Figure 2, we initially framed reconciliation from a social psychological perspective, explaining reconciliation as an improvement in relations between groups to the extent that conflicts would be resolved through dialogue rather than violence. We said that the



Figure 2: Original slides (translated into English) explaining reconciliation

essence of reconciliation was about fostering psychological change such that prejudice is reduced, while trust, tolerance and empathy are increased.



Figure 3: Slide developed with participants to illustrate their understanding of reconciliation.

However, through discussion with participants on the first day, we quickly came to realize that while participants understood this explanation, they had previously addressed the concept of reconciliation through the frame of transitional justice for two main reasons. First, the Aceh peace agreement frames reconciliation as a human rights provision that would be addressed through the transitional justice mechanisms of a Truth and Reconciliation

Commission and a Human Rights Court. Subsequently, bringing these bodies to fruition has been the focus of NGO efforts to encourage reconciliation in Aceh. Second, as participants explained, they had been taught by organizations such as the International Center on Transitional Justice (ICTJ), which has been actively engaged in bringing about these bodies, that there are four components to transitional justice: truth-telling, justice, institutional reform and reparations. As such, they understood reconciliation through the lens of transitional justice. To reflect our understanding of participants' notion of reconciliation, we developed the visual shown in Figure 3.



Figure 4: Model of Reconciliation developed with participants in facilitator's workshop

We then developed a second slide that integrated this concept of reconciliation with the concept we were explaining. Figure 4 shows the resulting visual, which illustrates how intergroup contact can complement truth-telling, institutional reform, justice and reparations to produce the desired psychological changes that result in reconciliation. We found this more holistic concept resonated well with participants and agreed that we would teach the concept in this way in future trainings.

Additionally, the process of adapting the concept of reconciliation with participants served the important function of trust-building between the facilitators and the participants. When we arrived at the training, we were met with a barrage of hostility from participants that was directed

at the BRA and strongly affected the initial dynamics of the workshop. Two days before the workshop was scheduled to begin, IMPACT had come into confrontation with the BRA when IMPACT's Chairman requested a formal invitation to attend the training signed by the Chairman of the BRA. When the Chairman of the BRA refused this request, IMPACT took the position that it would not send its members to the training. Through much backdoor diplomacy, IMPACT ultimately agreed to attend the training, but there was bad blood on both sides when the training began.

The tension between the two organizations was rooted in the perception on the part of the NGO community that the BRA had not done a satisfactory job of including NGO's and the activist community in Aceh in planning and implementing reintegration programs, and that the process had been unsatisfactory at best. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the new BRA Chairman was appointed by Partai Aceh (PA), the political party representing the ex-combatant military structure, which had won a majority in parliament the previous year and was perceived to be governing Aceh in an undemocratic manner that excluded participation from the activist community. As such, participants had developed a long list of grievances toward the BRA, and Partai Aceh more generally, and were seeking recognition from the BRA as a means of addressing the disenfranchisement they felt from the political process.

As the training opened, these issues quickly came to the floor and dominated the initial sessions of the training. It took us several sessions to begin to diffuse this hostility and to reassure the participants that as facilitators we were not representing BRA or PA, but rather were there to address the larger issue of building sustainable peace in Aceh. We did our best to remain calm as participants coldly received our initial material, and found our opening when we were able to bring some of the key leaders to the front of the room to share their concept of reconciliation. As

we acknowledged their concept of reconciliation and worked through building a joint concept, the tension diffused and we were able to proceed in a constructive manner with the rest of the workshop. We returned to these issues at the end of the workshop with a session facilitated by a senior official from the BRA that allowed participants to voice their concerns and recommendations directly to the BRA.

At the end of the workshop, we passed around a sign-up sheet that gave participants the opportunity to express whether they were interested in facilitating the BRA workshops, and to note which method (storytelling, interactive problem-solving, or both) they felt comfortable facilitating. They were told that the BRA would then hold interviews to select those who would become the facilitators for the dialogues and trainings. Approximately half of all participants expressed an interest in facilitating these sessions. The majority of those who did not express interest said they were reluctant to work on behalf of the BRA, which they felt could not guarantee their security during highly sensitive meetings between GAM and PETA representatives that had the potential to result in violence. Moreover, they were concerned that negative perceptions of the BRA in the field might jeopardize the success of the workshops.

Selecting and training partners: Following the facilitators training, there were several months of negotiations before the BRA officially terminated its conflict resolution program. The Chairman of the BRA was ultimately fired by the Governor in December 2010, but the Deputy Chairman

who took over as Chairman was under strong pressure from parliament to continue the policies of the previous Chairman. As such, BRA became mired in political controversy, and continuing to work with the agency was no longer a constructive option.

Instead, I decided to partner directly with two of the facilitators from the training and a local NGO based in the Central Highlands to implement the workshops. In November 2010, I approached one of the facilitators who had shown the most interest in and potential to facilitate the techniques taught during the facilitators training to see if he would be willing to partner with me to implement the workshops. He agreed, and brought on board the second facilitator. He also accompanied me on a week-long assessment to Central Aceh in December 2010 to evaluate potential partners and project sites. On this trip, he introduced me to a close friend and colleague who headed a local NGO with a respected reputation and significant experience working in conflict-affected communities in the highlands.

After exploring several partnership options, including working directly with GAM and PETA commanders to implement the program, I ultimately decided to partner with the local NGO because 1. The NGO was viewed as neutral by both sides; 2. The NGO had previous experience implementing peacebuilding programs in highly conflict-affected communities that were home to both identity groups, which made it easier for them to approach community leaders; 3. They had strong political connections that would make it easier to garner the necessary political support for the project; and 4. I felt that the close relationship between the facilitators and the head of the NGO would help the facilitators understand the context the participants were coming from and

stay motivated despite concerns about security as they would be collaborating with and learning from a respected senior colleague.[167]

Between December 2010 and March 2011, I worked closely with the facilitators to develop the training manuals and slides that would guide the training-based and dialogue-based workshops. Based on the training manual from the six-day facilitator's training, the facilitators produced an initial draft of the workshop material that integrated the concepts of storytelling and interactive problem-solving with appropriate religious and spiritual concepts they felt would diffuse tension between the participants as well as games and icebreakers to keep participants relaxed and energetic. We worked through several iterations of this material until we felt confident with the final product. The results are presented in section four of this chapter, which explains the content of the workshops in detail.

In March 2011, I returned to the Central Highlands for several weeks of training with the local NGO. By that time, they had selected four full-time staff to work on the project and seven others to serve as enumerators. We spent several days going over the design of the study, ensuring everyone understood the objectives of the study and preparing a project timeline. We then spent several more days going over the informed consent form and the questionnaires, initially reading through them together and correcting language that was unclear or concepts that required explanation. Once we agreed on the translations, staff then practiced interviewing other staff members, which was followed by another group session in which we revised the language and format of the questionnaires to ensure a common understanding and approach. We then did a dry run of the survey forms by having staff and enumerators interview 12 ex-combatants who agreed to come into the office for the interviews. Following these interviews, we finalized the consent

[167] To help ensure the security of the facilitators and the local NGO staff, I have opted not to disclose their names.

form and questionnaires and determined that they were ready to begin recruiting participants in the field.

The Workshops

Figure 5: Banner welcoming participants, "Welcome Participants of the Workshop for Peace. Together we can build, maintain and safeguard peace."

This section will discuss the workshops themselves, and will detail the methodologies used in the dialogue-based, training-based and mixed methods workshops. It will begin with an explanation of the elements common to all workshops, then will describe the segments that were unique to each of the workshop techniques. Ultimately, the content of the workshops was handcrafted by the facilitators by combining conflict resolution methodologies that were taught in the BRA-sponsored facilitator's training with locally appropriate notions of spirituality and religion. The workshops were therefore informed but not constrained by the methodologies of interactive problem-solving (IPS),[168] historical narrative/storytelling,[169] and general conflict resolution techniques such as negotiation and mediation.

In general, the dialogue-based workshops were designed to create an intimate environment between the participants in which they had the opportunity to share their experiences and learn from the perspectives of others. The storytelling component of the workshop was based on the To Reflect and Trust (TRT) model developed by psychologist Dan Bar-On that was used in

[168] H.C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem-Solving: A social-psychological approach to conflict resolution," in *Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution*, ed. John; Duke Burton, Frank (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
[169] Albeck, Adwan, and Bar-On, "Dialogue groups: TRT's guidelines for working through intractable conflicts by personal storytelling."

workshops between Jewish descendants of Holocaust survivors and German descendants of Nazi perpetrators. However, the workshops diverged from a traditional storytelling methodology following the storytelling sessions to combine elements of IPS in which participants identified the needs and fears of the other based on the stories they heard and tried to develop ways in which they could address these needs and fears.[170] In contrast, the training workshops were designed to teach participants skills that would be useful for resolving conflict within their own communities and test the effects of a less intimate environment in which participants are exposed to the other simply by learning together in the same classroom. The mixed method workshops combined both the storytelling and training models to test whether training immediately following storytelling might help participants resolve some of the emotions aroused by the storytelling. Details of the workshops are explained below.

Common elements of all workshops

Transportation and arrival on Day 1: All participants travelled to Banda Aceh via a night bus from the Central Highlands. We used the night bus due to road construction that closed the road from the district capital, Takengon, to the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, sporadically during the day. Travelling at night also allowed participants to complete a full work day before departing. The bus left the highlands at approximately 10pm for the 7-10 hour journey down the mountain to Banda Aceh. A staff member of the local NGO accompanied participants on the bus, which made several bathroom, smoking and food stops along the way. Participants were provided 25,000 rupiah (US $3) each for meals on the one-way trip.

[170] Ibid.

They arrived at the hotel in Banda Aceh around 6am and were assigned a room that was shared with two other participants. Rooms were mixed with participants from different identity groups wherever possible. Participants rested until the opening ceremony and lunch commenced at 12:30. One of the facilitators was responsible for each opening ceremony in which participants were welcomed and given the schedule and a brief overview of the next three days. The interview process was also explained and the enumerators were introduced. Following lunch, participants were interviewed one-on-one and dinner was provided that evening. The hotel was several kilometers outside of town, so few participants left the workshop venue. Instead, many spent the afternoon chatting in the hotel or in the open air coffee shop next to the hotel.

The facilitators: The workshops benefited tremendously from the skill and experience of two of Aceh's best facilitators, both of whom demonstrated an enormous amount of courage and dedication in accepting the risks inherently involved in this project. As these workshops were the first of their kind in Aceh, there was much uncertainty about what would happen when ex-combatants from different parties came together. There was a risk that violence would occur or that the facilitators and organizers would come under scrutiny from the authorities given the political sensitivity of facilitating interaction between the parties.




To manage some of these risks, the facilitators incorporated religious, spiritual and historical elements into the

workshops intended to diffuse tension between participants and foster a sense of common ground. As is common practice in Aceh, all workshops were opened and closed with prayer. In addition, the facilitators also added religious teachings that invoked a common sense of humanity and duty. For example, they discussed their interpretation of the Quranic passage *Al Fatiha* as meaning to "*kasih sayang*" or give love and care to those around you. Similarly, they invoked passages from the religious teachings of the Hadith to discuss the role god intended for humanity and to foster good will among participants.



The facilitators also used the notion of "*rukun Islam*," the community of Islam, to invoke a sense of solidarity among participants. The flipchart picture to the left shows a drawing done by the facilitators in the shape of a mosque to represent their interpretation of the pillars or foundational concepts of Islam. The four large vertical pillars read "justice, forgiveness, love and unity." The seven horizontal pillars read economy, education, health, politics, security, etc." Finally on top are just and prosperous people who are created by god. Facilitators reminded participants that they were all part of the community of Islam, which served not only to evoke a sense of common ground but also to establish a sense of proper decorum for the workshops.



The history of Aceh was also used as a way to connect participants to a broader sense of a shared past rather than focusing only on the recent history of several decades of conflict. The facilitators discussed the history of Aceh, reminding participants of Aceh's historic role as a crossroads for people of all nations. The attached flipchart shows a "History Tree," reminding participants that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began in 1976, but that the various ethnicities and regions of Aceh (Gayo, Perlak, Pase, etc.) were united hundreds

of years earlier under Aceh's great sultan Iskandar Muda. They used a familiar acronym in Aceh using the old spelling of "Atjeh" with the A for Arab, T for Turkey, J for German, E for Europe, and H for India to remind participants that Aceh has a long tradition of multiculturalism, acceptance and inclusion of others.

In addition, the facilitators drew on lessons they had learned from motivational speaking, incorporating inspirational vignettes designed to help participants reflect on their attitudes and state of mind. For example, one slide read "If we are able to erase thoughts of impossibility, our potential will flow like water." Another read "If we think we can't, then we will automatically look for the truth in this way of thinking that we have planted. The actions we take will therefore be the result of the impossibility we created ourselves." The facilitators combined these phrases with energizers and games designed to inspire and motivate participants. For example, they would ask for a volunteer, have him sit in a chair and hold his arm out straight. They would then ask him to think of a bad experience and push his arm down, which proved easy when he was thinking negative thoughts. They would then ask the participant to think of a positive experience and show that his arm was much stronger and resistant to their force when he was thinking positive thoughts. Facilitators also frequently had participants on their feet for exercises or games that kept people motivated and energized.

These religious, spiritual, historic and motivational approaches set a tone of cooperation and solidarity between participants from the beginning of the workshops that helped diffuse much of

the initial tension and provided a strong platform from which to discuss reconciliation. The commitment and skill of the facilitators was surely a key factor to the success of the workshops. Their creativity, enthusiasm, knowledge and courage made this study possible.

Informal Time: Throughout the four days that participants attended the workshop, informal time was very important. Participants shared meals and rooms together, and many cups of coffee in the open air coffee shop next door to the hotel. Hotel rooms frequently became gathering places for late night discussions, as men in Aceh have a tradition of staying up until the wee hours of the morning drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, and often talking politics. For many participants, this was a rare opportunity to get to know members of the outgroup in an informal setting, and seemed to have a significant impact on participant perceptions of both the workshop and the outgroup.

Introductions: A similar technique was used in all workshops to facilitate participant introductions. Each person was asked to write his name, assigning one word that describes a characteristic of the participant to each letter of his name. Participants were also asked to write or draw something that represents their strengths, fears and the expectations they feel others have of them. The picture below shows a participant who identified his strength as peace, his fear as a return to war and the expectation others have of him as providing comfort such as a home.

Ground Rules: Following introductions, all workshops asked participants to identify ground rules for the sessions. Groups frequently identified drinking, asking questions, discussing, speaking and praying as allowable, and smoking, fighting, making fun of people and bringing weapons, sharp objects or bombs as prohibited.

Reconciliation: At the beginning of all workshops, the facilitators explained that the workshops would emphasize the importance of reconciliation. They acknowledged that thirty years of conflict had left a legacy of anger, hate and violence between groups that would not serve Aceh well in building a better future. Facilitators explained their view of reconciliation as repairing relations between groups such that people no longer view members of the other group as the enemy, or harbor suspicion toward their intentions and actions. They explained that reconciliation is about reestablishing trust in order that conflicts could be resolved through dialogue rather than violence when they occur.

They acknowledged the different identity groups in the room and clarified that the workshop intended to give people an opportunity to interact with and get to know members of the other group with whom they might not otherwise have the opportunity to interact. They discussed how years of conflict had often led to negative perceptions about the other and segregation such that people from different groups rarely had meaningful personal interactions. They explained how when conflicts occurred, this lack of interaction often led people to assume the worst and turn to violence, rather than communicating with members of the other group to clarify intentions and actions and resolve disputes through negotiation. As such, they stressed the importance of intergroup contact and getting to know members of the other group for improving relations between groups in Aceh and ultimately ensuring sustainable peace.

Visioning: All workshops ended with a session on visioning. Participants worked in groups of 4-6 to develop answers to the following questions: 1) What do you hope life will be like ten years from now? 2) What needs to happen to achieve that vision? 3) What needs to happen to strengthen intergroup relations in your community? 4) Identify who in your community (person, group or organization) is supporting peace and how.

After the first few workshops, we observed that many of the groups were drawing village maps like the two shown below that showed visions of better roads, an airport, coffee factories, cell towers, etc.

In the debriefing sessions that were held between me and the facilitators after each workshop, we discussed ways of moving the visioning sessions away from a focus on visions of community development toward a deeper conversation about what needs to happen to improve intergroup relations in the communities of the Central Highlands.

As such, in later workshops, facilitators asked participants to give recommendations for concrete actions that could be taken by participants, the government or other actors to improve intergroup relations. However, while it seemed that participants understood the importance of improving intergroup relations, they found it difficult to translate this understanding into ideas about what they could do to improve intergroup relations. For example, many participants said that NGOs

should continue to hold these intergroup workshops so that a majority of the population had a chance to participate. Others placed responsibility on BRA for implementing reparations in a more transparent and fair manner. Still others felt it was the responsibility of the government to eradicate “money politics” and corruption in order that the highlands could become more democratic.

Few participants put forward ideas about how, as individuals, they could build on what they learned in the workshops to improve relations between groups within their own communities. We agreed that it was important that participants see themselves as change agents or actors in reconciliation. We therefore decided that in future workshops, we would alter the reconciliation material slightly to give examples of individual efficacy in repairing intergroup relations and suggest ways participants might share their workshop experience with their communities.

The Training-based Workshops

In addition to the elements common to all workshops described above, the training-based workshops included material on perceptions and prejudice, understanding conflict, communication skills, negotiation and mediation, all of which will be described in detail below. The training workshops had the following agenda.

Day 1	
06:00-07:00	Arrive at hotel; rest
12:30-14:00	Opening, Lunch
14:00-17:00	Interviews
19:00	Dinner

Day 2	
08.30-010:15	Opening, Introductions and Ground Rules
10.15-10-30	*Break*
10.30-12.30	What is Reconciliation?
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*
14.00-15.50	Perceptions and Prejudice
15.50-16.20	*Break*
16.20-17.00	Review and Reflection
Day 3	
08.30-09.00	Review of Day 1
09.00-10.15	Understanding Conflict
10.15-10-30	*Break*
10.30-12.30	Communication skills and Introduction to Negotiation
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/Break*
14.00-15:50	Negotiation cont'd
15.50-16.20	*Break*
16.20-17.00	Negotiation cont'd Introduction to Mediation Reflection
Day 4	
08.45-09:00	Review Day 2
09.00-10.15	Mediation
10.15-10-30	*Break*
10.30-12.30	Mediation Simulation
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*

14.00-15.00	Visioning/Recommendations
15.00-17.00	Final interviews
17.00	*Closing*

Perceptions and prejudice: Following the session on reconciliation, the training workshops continued with a session on perceptions and prejudice. The facilitators explained to participants that prejudice is a negative attitude toward a person or group that manifests as negative beliefs, feelings or actions toward an individual or group.[171] They explained that prejudice often leads people to assume the worst of others, thinking "they" have bad intentions and are not acting in good faith, and therefore reject their perspective as wrong or irrational.

As such, the goal of the session was to help participants understand that people often interpret the same situation differently and that these differences in perception often frustrate communication and cause conflict to escalate. If we understand that people come from different backgrounds and experiences that inform their perceptions and prejudices, and that perceptions that differ from our own are not necessarily wrong, we can avoid miscommunication and peacefully resolve conflicts as they occur. To illustrate the point, the facilitators showed the following picture and asked participants to identify what they thought was happening in the scene, how many objects or people they see, and which objects are the tallest and shortest.



As expected, participants described the scene differently, with explanations ranging from a girl sitting at a table looking at a painting of a scene of women to a group of

[171]Duckitt, "Prejudice and intergroup hostility."

sculptors putting the finishing touches on a large bust. Facilitators then asked participants how they felt when they first saw the picture, how they figured out what the picture was, what influenced their perceptions, if they could see the picture from the perspective of others and what lessons they learned from this experience. They drove home the point that people have different perceptions of the same thing given their different backgrounds and experiences, even when they are all working toward the same goal, which in this case was to identify what was going on in the picture. As such, they stressed that it is important to consider the different perspectives of others when resolving conflict.

Understanding conflict: This session sought to contextualize participants as agents of peace in their villages who could help resolve conflicts as they arise. As such, the facilitators explained that it is important for participants to have a strong understanding of the factors causing the conflict before deciding on a course of action, and focused on basic conflict analysis tools to help participants analyze conflict.[172] They asked participants for an example of a conflict that took place in their village and used this to illustrate a stakeholder analysis in which participants identified the various primary (the parties in conflict) and secondary (people who may have become involved in the conflict or are necessary to resolve it such as village heads or religious leaders) actors to the story, and their role in the conflict. They then worked through an example of a problem tree to help participants identify the root and proximate causes of the conflict.

Communication skills: This session focused on nonverbal communication and active listening skills.[173] The facilitators showed a short video of two men arguing with the sound off and asked

[172] Wahjudin Sumpeno, *Membangun Perdamaian: Modul Pelatihan Mediasi dan Resolusi Konflik untuk Fasilitator* (Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Kementerian Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) bekerjasama dengan World Bank, 2008).
[173] UNDESA, UNDP, and The Centre for Conflict Resolution, *Skills development for conflict transformation: A training manual on understanding conflict, negotiation and mediation*, ed. Conflict Management Capacity Building

participants to comment on what was going on in the video based on the body language they observed. They later asked participants to break into groups of two and have one person tell a story about something that was very important to them. The listener was first instructed to do a poor job of active listening, which was followed by a group discussion of what actions indicated the person was not listening actively. The listener was then instructed to do an excellent job of active listening, which was also followed by a group discussion of what actions indicate good listening skills. Participants were reminded to bring these skills to the following sessions on negotiation and mediation.

Negotiation: In this session, facilitators emphasized that negotiation is a normal part of daily interactions such as meeting with family members and neighbors, marketing or attending village meetings. They stressed that negotiation is a skill that can be learned and that the most successful negotiations result in win-win solutions. They explained the difference between positions and interests and used the story of the father splitting the orange between two daughters from Roger Fisher's Getting to Yes to illustrate how participants can ask "Why is this important to you" in order to better understand the underlying interests of the person with whom they are negotiating.[174]

Participants then participated in a two-person role play that I developed for a negotiation training that had been conducted by BRA the previous year as part of its peace education program in which Zul was a young man who had purchased a piece of land from Meli, who had sold it under duress after her husband died to support her four children. Zul was now planning to get married

---

Project of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and Division for Public Administration and Development Management (Available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan001363.pdf), 23-31.

[174] Roger; Ury Fisher, William, *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in*, ed. Bruce Patton (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

and needed money to support his sick mother in law so he was selling the house. Meli, anxious to get her family land back and have an extra room for her now 13 year old daughter, made a low offer on the house. Zul became angry because he felt that he told Meli he was selling the house to get married and instead of saying congratulations, she made an offensively low offer. Zul felt that he had paid more than what the land was worth when he purchased it to help Meli due to her difficult circumstances. Subsequently, he thought it only right that she now try to help him when he was in need. Zul also knows that it will be difficult to find another buyer for the house because the only access to the house is via Meli's land. She has been kind enough to let him park there all these years, but he is worried that he will not find another buyer who is willing to put up with this arrangement. The two have had excellent relations until this point, but exchanged some unfortunate words as both were stressed and frustrated. They are now meeting to discuss the situation.

After participants negotiated, the facilitators asked the group to explain the solutions they negotiated. They then worked with the group to identify the positions and interests of both Zul and Meli. The take home point was that if you can understand the underlying interest of the person or group you are negotiating with, you can devise win-win solutions that meet the needs of both parties.

Mediation: This session explained that mediation is negotiation with the assistance of a third party.[175] Facilitators discussed the role of a mediator as a person who remains neutral, does not take sides with either party, and helps the parties identify their options and choose the best one.

[175] Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Mediation in Theory," in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, ed. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985); Dean G. Pruitt, "Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation," in *Studies in International Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, vol. Third Edition (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003).

They conducted a simulation in which participants were split into groups of three to four, with each group representing one village council. Two mediators were also identified who represented sub-district level officials. The scenario was one that participants were quite familiar with in which the government had identified several villages located far from the new road for relocation closer to the road. In theory, people from these villages supported this relocation, as being closer to the road would make selling products like coffee and rubber much easier. However, after the government identified the new locations, conflict broke out between villages over which village would get the best spot along the road, which was not only the most strategically located, but also the closest to a water source. The dispute had become quite intense, with threats of violence occurring regularly between villages and youth who had begun to set up road blocks to neighboring villages that were causing the situation to escalate. It was the job of the mediators to help the three village councils work through this problem and reach an acceptable solution if possible. If a solution could not be reached, the decision would be brought before the head of the sub-district for final arbitration.

While the village councils prepared their positions and interests, the facilitators briefed the mediators, instructing them in the following procedure: 1) give an opening statement welcoming the participants, explaining the procedure that would be followed, and that as the mediator, they would help the participants to reach an acceptable agreement, but would not make decisions on their behalf; 2) ask the parties for their consent to participate in the mediation and agree on a time frame; 3) Ask each party for their opening statement and try to reframe back to them the issues and interests they have identified; 4) Clarify the issues that will be discussed by producing an agenda; 5) Facilitate a discussion on each agenda item and try to help participants identify

options for solutions; 6) If they reach agreement on an issue, help them write up the details of that agreement.

Following the simulation, the facilitators debriefed the session with the participants, asking about the solutions they had reached and what they had learned about the role of the mediator.

The Dialogue-based Workshops

In addition to the common elements described above, the dialogue-based workshops included the following:

Day 1	
06:00-07:00	Arrive at hotel; rest
12:30-14:00	Opening, Lunch
14:00-17:00	Interviews
19:00	Dinner
Day 2	
08.30-010:30	Opening, Introductions and Ground Rules What is Reconciliation? History of Aceh
10.30-11-00	*Break*
11.00-12.00	Understanding storytelling
12.00-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*
14.00-16.00	Storytelling: 4 people
16.00-16.30	*Break*
16.30-17.30	Storytelling: 2 people
17.30-18.00	Reflection

Day 3	
08.30-09.00	Review of Day 2
09.00-10.30	Storytelling: 3 people
10.30-11-00	*Break*
11.30-12.30	Storytelling: 3 people
12.30-14.00	Lunch/prayer
14.00-16:00	Challenges for Intergroup Relations What are the needs of each group?
16.00-16.30	*Break*
16.30-17.30	Reflection on Day 3
Day 4	
08.30-09:00	Review Day 3
09.00-10.30	Visioning
10.30-11.00	*Break*
11.00-12.30	Recommendations for building peace between groups
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*
14.00-14.30	Reflection and ideas for follow-up
14.30-16.30	Final interviews
16.30	*Closing*

Storytelling: Following the common session on reconciliation, the facilitators introduced the concept of storytelling by explaining it as an opportunity for participants to learn about the

experience of others and share their own perspectives and experiences with others.[176] They explained that storytelling was an opportunity for learning, rather than judging or criticizing and encouraged participants to keep open minds and hearts when listening to others. They explained that storytelling had been used by people experiencing conflict in many areas of the world including between Palestinians and Israeli's, Germans and Jews, Turks and Armenians, etc. as a means of increasing understanding between groups. They explained that the format for storytelling in which each participant would get 20 minutes to respond to any or all of the following questions:

- Explain your perceptions and feelings about the other group?
- Have you had personal experiences (either good or bad) with members of the other group?
- What did your parents or family members teach you about members of the other group when you were little?
- Do you trust the other group? Why or why not?
- What is your perception about relations between groups in Aceh today?

We chose these questions to orient participants toward thinking about relations between groups today. As expected, we found that they evoked many difficult stories about negative and often violent interactions with members of the other group during the conflict coupled with strong feelings of distrust today. While many participants were quite vocal and could have continued well past their 20 minutes, others were more reserved and required more assistance from

[176] Albeck, Adwan, and Bar-On, "Dialogue groups: TRT's guidelines for working through intractable conflicts by personal storytelling."

facilitators, who skillfully asked open-ended questions such as “Can you say more about that?” or “How did that experience make you feel?” to encourage participants.

This individual storytelling was followed by 10 minutes for the group to ask questions that clarified anything the speaker said or comment on how they felt when hearing the story. Facilitators were firm that this was not time to dispute facts or advocate partisan perspectives, but rather time to better understand the perspective of the speaker. They consistently reminded participants that the point of storytelling was to understand the speaker, not to engage in a debate about facts or issues.

For the facilitators, storytelling was the most taxing portion of the workshop, as they reflected that they had to be fully engaged with each participant and constantly creative in asking questions and framing participant experiences in the context of improving group understanding of the experiences of others. In large part due to their skill in introducing and facilitating these sessions, storytelling remained free of violence and stayed focused on understanding the perspective of others.

Facilitators initially expressed anxiety about facilitating the storytelling workshops, and chose to begin the workshops with a training-based workshop to give them time to assess the interaction and level of tension between participants. However, following the first dialogue-based workshop, facilitators expressed how surprised they were at the power of storytelling and how successful it had been in creating an intimate environment and meaningful interaction between the participants. As their confidence grew following the second dialogue-based workshop, they began advocating for integrating storytelling into the last two workshops, creating mixed-method workshops that included storytelling sessions. Given their strong feelings about the beneficial

effects of the storytelling workshops, we decided to revise the format for the last two workshops, which were intended to be a training-based and a dialogue-based workshop. Instead, we implemented two mixed methodology workshops that combined storytelling and training techniques. The last section will discuss the agenda for the mixed-method workshops that resulted.

Needs and fears, visioning and recommendations: Drawing upon the notion from human needs theory that all human beings have innate, insuppressible, non-negotiable ontological needs such as acknowledgment, recognition, autonomy and dignity that are preconditions for individual development,[177] interactive problem-solving posits that conflict is caused not only by divergent interests, but is also a process driven by collective needs and fears.[178] When these needs are not met, conflict takes on an existential dimension, turning the conflict into a struggle over group survival, and often frustrating conflict resolution efforts based solely on models of negotiation and consensus building.

As originally designed, interactive problem-solving includes sessions in which participants identify their collective needs and fears. However, during the facilitator's workshop, we found that this concept did not resonate with participants in Aceh and that they had much confusion trying to identify collective needs and fears. Rather than get bogged down in replicating the interactive problem-solving methodology, we adapted the concept such that it would fit with storytelling and resonate with participants. As such, the session following storytelling asked participants to identify the challenges each group faced in improving intergroup relations and what each group would need to overcome these challenges. We found that even this version of

[177] John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
[178] Kelman, "Interactive Problem-Solving: A social-psychological approach to conflict resolution."

"needs and fears" was a bit abstract for participants, and the notion of identifying challenges for improving intergroup relations was easier to grasp.

As such, participants identified challenges such as a lack of opportunity to interact with members of the other group, lack of formal communication between the groups, lack of transparency on the part of the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) in administering reintegration aid, lack of attention to the Central Highlands region from the provincial government, etc. Identifying these challenges made it easier for participants to enter into visioning and make recommendations for improving intergroup relations, sessions that lasted longer in the dialogue-based workshops than in the training-based or mixed-methods workshops.

While this session on "needs and fears" helped transition the workshop from storytelling to sessions on visioning and recommendations, we were left with the impression that it was difficult for participants to conceptualize themselves as having agency in changing the larger political system that is sustaining conflict in Aceh, and as such difficult to conceptualize what their group would need to affect change in relations between groups. In future workshops, it might be more constructive to focus this session on obstacles that exist to improving intergroup relations in the Central Highlands, rather than asking specifically about the challenges and needs of each group.

The Mixed-method Workshops

The content of the mixed-method workshops was similar to that of the dialogue workshops for the first one and a half days. However, following the storytelling sessions, the facilitators shifted back toward the methodology for the training workshop with sessions on understanding conflict, negotiation and a short mediation simulation. This differs from the dialogue-based workshops, which resolved the storytelling sessions with sessions on challenges for improving intergroup

relations and identifying the needs of each group. The agenda for the mixed-method sessions follows:

Day 1	
06:00-07:00	Arrive at hotel; rest
12:30-14:00	Opening, Lunch
14:00-17:00	Interviews
19:00	Dinner
Day 2	
08.30-10:30	Opening, Introductions and Ground Rules What is Reconciliation? History of Aceh
10.30-11-00	*Break*
11.00-12.30	Understanding storytelling
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*
14.00-16.00	Storytelling: 4 people
16.00-16.30	*Break*
16.30-17.30	Storytelling: 2 people
17.30-18.00	Reflection
Day 3	
08.30-09.00	Review of Day 2
09.00-10.30	Storytelling: 3 people
10.30-11-00	*Break*
11.30-12.30	Storytelling: 3 people
12.30-14.00	Lunch/prayer
14.00-16:00	Reflections on storytelling Conflict, negotiation and mediation

16.00-16.30	*Break*
16.30-17.30	Conflict, negotiation and mediation cont'd Reflection on Day 3
Day 4	
08.30-09:00	Review Day 3
09.00-10.30	Mediation simulation
10.30-11.00	*Break*
11.00-12.30	Visioning
12.30-14.00	*Lunch/prayer*
14.00-15.00	Recommendations
15.00-17.00	Final interviews
17.00	*Closing*

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that it is possible to use field experimentation to study some of the most pressing questions regarding the resolution of violent conflict and the promotion of sustainable peace and development, despite the myriad challenges of implementing randomized studies amidst the difficult realities of conflict-affected societies. This chapter has identified the methodology used to implement this study, and has tried to acknowledge the weaknesses of the randomization procedure where they exist in order that readers can take into account the possible effects on outcomes that will be discussed in chapters four and five, and perhaps most importantly, correct for these shortcomings in future studies. I have also tried to detail the treatments such that they can be replicated by other researchers and practitioners in the future as it is only through a sustained research agenda that we will be able to definitely conclude whether

social-psychological techniques can positively contribute to reconciliation across a broad range of conflict-affected societies.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter will discuss the findings of the field experiment.[179] As statistical techniques were used to evaluate the results, I have attempted to present the results in such a way that they can be understood by both a technical and non-technical audience. I will begin by explaining the methods used for data analysis and will give the reader a basic explanation of how to interpret the statistical results. I will then present the findings for the sociodemographic characteristics of participants followed by the findings for each of the dependent variables (prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing).

At the beginning of the section for each variable, I present a summary that will serve as a guide to help the reader understand the important results for each variable. The information in the summary will be the focus of the discussion for that variable in Chapter 5. For the non-technical reader, you may find it sufficient to read the summary and go on to the next variable. For the technical reader, I present the statistical results following the summary with an explanation of the steps we followed to produce those results in order that future researchers will be able to replicate these steps. To that end, both significant and non-significant results are reported. While following basic convention for reporting statistical results, I have tried to simplify and explain the technical language as much as possible to make it accessible to both the technical and non-technical reader. While Chapter 4 will focus on presenting the statistical results of the study,

[179] I would like to thank the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for its generous gift of a Summer Research Funds Grant that supported the statistical analysis presented here. I would also like to thank Reid Offringa for the enormous amount of time and energy he spent helping me analyze and understand the results of this data. Where I refer to "we" or "us" I am referring to Reid and me, as he was an integral part of ensuring the quality of this data analysis.

Chapter 5 will conclude with a discussion of how these findings relate to the literature and what they mean for both theory and practice.

Understanding the Data Analysis

We analyzed the effects of the dialogue, training and mixed method workshops on the dependent variables (prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing) using a statistical technique known as a mixed model ANOVA, or an analysis of variance. This technique allows us to determine which factors best explain the changes in our dependent variables.

The type of ANOVA we used is referred to as a 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA. The '2's represent the following:

- *The technique used in the workshop (dialogue, training or mixed methods):* The first '2' refers to whether the workshop used the dialogue technique; The second '2' refers to whether the workshop used the training technique. Building the ANOVA in this way allowed us to evaluate the effect of both the training and dialogue techniques as well as the effect of the mixed method workshops in which the dialogue and training techniques were both used. I will explain below how to interpret the results of the ANOVA to understand which of the three techniques best explain the change in the dependent variable.
- *The change in the dependent variable before and after the workshops:* The *session* variable represents the change between the participant's survey responses before the workshops (Q2), and after the workshops (Q3).

- *The participant's identity group:* The identity group of participants was included in the ANOVA in order to determine if the workshops had differential effects for members of different identity groups.

We therefore evaluated the results of the experiment using what is known as a 2 (dialogue technique: dialogue technique used, no dialogue technique used) x 2(training technique: training technique used, no training technique used) x 2(identity group: GAM, PETA) x 2(session: Q2, Q3) mixed model ANOVA in which the session variable was a within-subjects measure evaluating change from before undergoing the workshops (Q2) to after the workshops (Q3).

Interpreting the Results of the ANOVA:

We ran the ANOVA's using SPSS (version PASW Statistics 18). When you run the ANOVA's the following outputs are possible:

- An *interaction* between either the dialogue or the training technique and the *session* variable: When we see this result, we know that it is either the dialogue or training technique that best explains the change in the dependent variable before and after the workshops. For example, if we are looking at prejudice and we see an interaction between the dialogue technique and the session variable, we can conclude that the dialogue technique caused the change in prejudice to occur. When we report this interaction, we say that we found a significant interaction between the dialogue technique and session, followed by the F-statistic and p-value, which looks like $F(2,92)=5.42$; $p=.002$. For the non-technical reader, focus on the p-value, which represents the level of statistical significance of the finding, or the confidence we have in the result. A p-value of less than .05 is considered significant and robust, a p-value

between .05 and 1 is said to be “at trend level” and is a good but not overwhelmingly strong result, while p-values over 1 are not considered significant. The F-statistic is a value that shows the degrees of freedom and is used to calculate the p-value. I report it to comply with convention, but the p-value is what we’re really interested in.

- A *three-way interaction* between training, dialogue and session: This is also an excellent result that means that one of our workshop techniques (dialogue, training or mixed methods) best explains the change in our dependent variable. However, because of the way we designed our ANOVA, a three-way interaction requires us to do some statistical follow-up tests to determine which of the three methods best explains the change in the dependent variable. I will not attempt to explain the statistics behind these follow up tests, but I will note in the text when we are conducting following up tests and will detail the steps we take to do this so that others can replicate these results in the future. The non-technical reader can peruse these explanations of the follow-up tests and focus on the results at the end, which will conclude which of the three techniques is responsible for the change in the dependent variable. You will also see the F-statistic and p-values reported.
- A *main effect of session:* A main effect of session means there has been a change in the dependent variable from before and after the workshops. However, a main effect of session is only a meaningful result for our purposes if there is also an *interaction* or a *three-way interaction* that goes with it. When we get a main effect of session absent an *interaction*, it means that it is not the workshops that are causing the change. This change is generally explained by what is known as *regression toward the mean*, or a natural tendency over time for variables that were extreme to start with to drift toward the

average. As such, we report main effects of session when we find them, but the results do not indicate that our workshops explain the change.

- *A main effect of workshop technique:* This means that participants in one of the workshop groups (either dialogue or training) had higher means on the average of before and after workshop scores on the variable being measured (for example, prejudice). Similar to the main effect of session, absent a significant *interaction,* this does not indicate that the workshops explain the improvement in the dependent variable.
- *A main effect of identity group:* This is the same concept as the main effect of session and workshop technique, but means that one of the identity groups, either GAM or PETA, had higher scores on the dependent variable. Absent a significant *interaction,* a main effect of identity group does not indicate that the workshops differentially improved our dependent variables. However, if we see a main effect of identity group with a significant *interaction,* we conclude that the workshop had a different effect on GAM than PETA participants.

In order to determine that one of our workshops is responsible for the change in the dependent variable, we are looking for either an *interaction* or a *three-way interaction*. If we get a *main effect of session, main effect of workshop technique,* or *main effect of identity group* without an *interaction,* we report it, but the results do not indicate that our workshops are responsible for the change so we do not consider them important findings for the purposes of this study.

Regression Analysis:

The last step in our data analysis was to use a linear regression model to try to identify the conditions or variables that predict the changes in our dependent variables. We only used

regressions for the dependent variables that showed a significant change in order to explore what was driving this change.

We therefore explored the hypotheses that wartime experiences/exposure to traumatic events, PTSD, depression and anxiety symptoms, contact with members of the outgroup before the workshops, number of dependents, income, amount of education and/or improvement in other dependent variables significantly predict the improvement we saw in a particular dependent variable.

We chose these variables in an effort to understand what kind of people respond best to which kind of workshop. For example, you will see below that we were able to determine that people who entered the workshops highly symptomatic of PTSD were less likely to believe that reconciliation is important after the workshops or that dialogue workshops work best in reducing prejudice for people who enter the workshops with high initial levels of prejudice. As such, our regressions focus on practical predictions to help make recommendations about how to maximize the effect of future workshops.

When reporting the results of regressions, you will see two possible results:

1. *The regression did not predict the variables we were testing.* In this case, we report the findings like this: "Neither contact, number of dependents, income nor amount of education significantly predicted behavioral prejudice improvement. When all of the variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 94)= 0.502$, $p=0.743$." You can see from the fact that the p-value was over .05 that the model was not significant. As it is standard practice to report the F-statistic with the p-value, I

do so here, but the non-technical reader need only notice that the p-value shows that the model is not significant.

2. *The regression predicts the variables we were testing.* In this case, we use standard convention for reporting significant regression results, which looks like this: "We found that the number of dependents significantly predicted improvement in affective prejudice. The overall model was significant, $F(1, 96)= 5.949$, $p=0.017$, $r^2=0.058$, with beta values ($B=0.461$), indicating that the number of dependents positively predicted affective prejudice improvement." This means that the more dependents a person has, the more he improved on affective prejudice during the workshops. Again, the p-value tells you that the model is significant. The $r^{2,}$ or r-squared, tells you the percent of the dependent variable you are explaining with the independent variable. In the example above, the r^2 indicates that 5.8% of the change in affective prejudice is explained by the number of dependents a participant has. Finally, the beta value tells you the direction of the relationship. If the beta value is positive like in the example above, you interpret the results to mean that people with more dependents will improve more on affective prejudice.

With that discussion on how to interpret the results of our statistical analysis, I now turn to the findings below.

Findings

Sociodemographic characteristics of participants

This section explains the background characteristics of the study participants. It highlights similarities and differences between participants who identify with GAM and PETA with respect

to levels of education, income, access to basic needs and wartime experiences/exposure to trauma. While these variables do not necessarily predict the changes in our dependent variables, they are useful for understanding the context in which the two groups enter the workshops.

As seen in Table 2, participants who identified with PETA had a higher level of education, with 56% of participants graduating from high school, as compared to only 33% of participants who identified with GAM. While we did not find that level of education was a significant predictor of any of our dependent variables, this finding confirms previous research on Aceh that suggests that GAM members have lower levels of educational attainment than the civilian population as they dropped out of school at an early age to join the struggle for independence.[180]

As such, it might be expected that current incomes for GAM members would be lower than those for PETA members', however, the data suggests that incomes do not differ substantially between the two groups. While 78% of participants who identify with GAM earn below 800,000Rp (USD 95) per month, 72% of participants who identify with PETA are in a similar situation. Moreover, while 23% of those who identify with GAM earn over 800,000Rp per month, only a slightly larger 29% of participants who identify with PETA earn the same. The data suggest that six years after the signing of the peace agreement, incomes for GAM members are approaching those of PETA members.

Table 2: Sociodemographic Characteristics of Participants

	PETA (n= 43)	**GAM (n=63)**	**Total (n= 106*)**
Participants	41%	59%	100%
Sex			
Men	40%	59%	99%

[180] Yukhi Tajima, "Understanding the Livelihoods of Former Insurgents: Aceh, Indonesia," (www.conflictanddevelopment.org: The World Bank, 2010), ii.

Women	1%	0%	1%
Education			
None	5%	0%	2%
Elementary School	9%	22%	17%
Middle School	28%	41%	36%
High School	56%	33%	42%
Associates or Professional Degree	0%	3%	2%
Monthly Income			
0-250,000Rp ($0-25)	7%	5%	6%
251,000-500,000Rp ($26-50)	28%	40%	35%
501,000-800,000Rp ($51-80)	37%	33%	35%
801,000-1,500,000Rp ($81-150)	19%	10%	13%
1,501,000-2,500,000Rp ($151-250)	5%	10%	8%
2,501,000Rp+ ($251+)	5%	3%	4%
Aid Recipient			
Yes	35%	29%	31%

Moreover, while similar percentages of participants who identified with GAM and PETA reported difficulty finding work and meeting the needs of their families, a larger percentage of participants who identified with GAM expressed a lack of shelter, water and sanitation, and food. This is due in part to the significantly higher percentages of GAM members who were displaced and had their homes damaged or destroyed during the conflict (see Table 4).

Table 3: Current Conditions

Current Condition	PETA (n= 43)	GAM (n= 63)	Total (n=106)
Lack of adequate shelter	47%	57%	53%
Lack of water and sanitation	40%	51%	46%
Lack of food	40%	48%	44%
Difficulty meeting the needs of your family	74%	79%	77%
Difficulty finding work	77%	78%	77%
Feels rejected by family or community	16%	8%	11%

Fear of living among family or community members	33%	29%	30%
Perception of current security situation			
Very dangerous	7%	6%	7%
Not secure	12%	11%	11%
Secure	44%	49%	47%
Very safe and secure	35%	30%	32%
Do you agree with the signing of the peace agreement?			
Strongly Disagree	0%	0%	0%
Disagree	0%	2%	1%
Agree	49%	51%	50%
Strongly Agree	49%	46%	47%
Have previously attended a peace ceremony	28%	33%	31%

Additionally, while high percentages of participants from both groups reported exposure to traumatic events during the conflict, participants who identified with GAM reported greater exposure to traumatic events than participants who identified with PETA (see Table 4).

Using a linear regression, we explored the hypothesis that wartime experiences predicted pre-workshop levels of PTSD, depression or anxiety. The overall model was not significant, indicating that wartime experiences do not predict these symptoms. This is not surprising given that PTSD symptoms are predicted not only by a person's exposure to trauma or stress but by his or her personal predisposition to developing PTSD.[181] Similarly, we did not find that wartime experiences predicted improvement in any of our dependent variables.

[181] Victoria M. McKeever and Maureen E. Huff, "A diathesis-stress model of post-traumatic stress disorder: Ecological, biological and residual stress pathways," *Review of General Psychology* 7, no. 3 (2003).

Table 4: Wartime experiences/Exposure to Traumatic Events			
Traumatic Event	**PETA (n= 43)**	**GAM (n= 63)**	**Total (n=106)**
Bombing or Shooting in Village	28%	46%	39%
Displaced	21%	46%	36%
House damaged/destroyed	16%	35%	27%
Lost belongings	35%	46%	42%
Experienced physical violence	28%	48%	40%
Experienced sexual assault	7%	13%	10%
Captured or kidnapped	12%	33%	25%
Beating on the head	16%	25%	22%
Choked or suffocated	9%	19%	15%
Nearly drowned	23%	21%	22%
Other kind of head injury (bullet, burned, electrocution)	7%	13%	10%
Lost consciousness	5%	10%	8%
Spouse killed	0%	3%	2%
Child killed	5%	3%	4%
Family member or friend killed	40%	51%	46%
Spouse kidnapped	2%	6%	5%
Child kidnapped	0%	6%	4%
Family member or friend kidnapped	26%	41%	35%
Witnessed physical punishment	40%	54%	48%
Humiliated or shamed in public	40%	29%	33%
Forced to humiliate another person	12%	10%	10%
Forced to injure family member or friend	9%	13%	11%
Forced to injure someone who is not a family member or friend	19%	17%	18%

With this background information in mind, I now turn to the effect of the workshops on each of the dependent variables: prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing. As mentioned above, we have included identity group in the mixed model ANOVA to allow us to determine if the workshops had the same effect on those who identified with GAM or PETA.

Prejudice

Summary: The initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that dialogue-based contact would reduce prejudice in a post-conflict context. The results of this experiment confirm this hypothesis by demonstrating that the dialogue workshops were most effective at reducing prejudice for both GAM and PETA participants. This change applies only to affective prejudice, however, as we saw no change in cognitive or behavioral prejudice. As will be discussed at length in Chapter 5, these results confirm our hypothesis and support findings from other research on the relationship between contact and prejudice.[182]

Results-Affective prejudice: As discussed in Chapter 2, we used a 10-question scale of 5 positive and 5 negative emotional states to measure affective prejudice. Participants ranked each question on a 4-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (not at all), 2 (a little), 3 (average), 4 (a lot). To calculate each participant's score, we reverse scored the positive traits, meaning if the participant selected 1 indicating I do not hate members of the other group at all, we calculated a score of 4. We likewise scored a 2 as a 3, a 3 as a 2 and a 4 as a 1. The lowest possible score, indicating the lowest amount of affective prejudice was 10, while the highest possible score was 40. After reverse scoring the positive traits and adding up the before (Q2) and after (Q3) workshop scores for each individual, we conducted the mixed model ANOVA as described above.

The ANOVA revealed an overall decrease in prejudice scores with a mean score of 18.41 before the workshops and a mean score of 17.78 after the workshops. This change is referred to as a

[182] Stephan and Stephan, "Intergroup Anxiety."; A. Voci and M. Hewstone, "Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in Italy: The mediational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6(2003); Pettigrew and Tropp, "How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators."

main effect of session, F(1, 96)= 5.280, p=0.024. In addition, there was also a three-way interaction between the training technique, the dialogue technique and the session, F(1, 96)=11.185, p=0.001, which means that either the mixed technique, the training technique or the dialogue technique explains this change.

As explained above, when we find a three-way interaction we have to conduct follow-up statistical tests to determine which technique is driving the change. To do this, we went through the following steps:

1. Created a new grouping variable with four levels (training only, dialogue only, mixed techniques, and control).
2. Created a new dependent variable called affective prejudice improvement, which was computed by subtracting the Q3 affective prejudice scores from those in Q2.
3. Ran a univariate ANOVA with the new workshop grouping variable and perceived enemy group, using affective prejudice improvement as the dependent variable (DV). The overall ANOVA was significant F(7, 95)=2.638, p=0.015, as was the main effect of the new workshop grouping variable, F(3, 95)=3.837, p=0.012.
4. Used Scheffe post-hoc tests on the new workshop grouping variable, which indicated that the dialogue group (mean change=2.625) improved significantly more than the control group (mean change=-0.104), p=0.036 and the mixed group (mean change=-0.444), p=0.010. The dialogue group did improve more than the training group (mean change=1.578), p=0.828, but the training group did not differ from the control group, p=0.250 or the mixed group, p=0.085. The mixed group also did not differ from the control group, p=0.893.

The follow-up analyses therefore indicate that the workshop groups that used the dialogue technique were most effective in changing participant's affective prejudice scores, with a 2.63 point change on the prejudice scale from before to after the workshops.

Regressions: We ran linear regressions on a variety of variables to determine if we could find additional variables that predict, or explain the reduction of affective prejudice. Overall, we did not find any variables that further explained the above findings with the exception of the number of dependents, which significantly predicted improvement in affective prejudice.[183] The overall model was significant, $F(1, 96)= 5.949$, $p=0.017$, $r^2=0.058$, with beta values ($B=0.461$) indicating that the number of dependents positively predicted affective prejudice improvement. This means that people with more dependents responded more positively to the workshops in terms of affective prejudice, perhaps because having more children gives people a greater stake in ensuring reconciliation and sustainable peace.

We also explored the hypothesis that wartime experiences significantly predicted improvement in affective prejudice. The only groups for which this was the case was the training groups, where the regression model was significant, $F(1, 21)=7.977$, $p=0.010$ and the Beta values indicate that wartime experiences positively predicted affective prejudice improvement within the training group, $B=0.536$.[184]

Finally, we decided to add pre-workshop PTSD scores to the model as a second step in the regression to determine if the combination of wartime experiences and PTSD had any predictive

[183] Neither contact, income or amount of education significantly predicted affective prejudice improvement. When all of these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(3, 99)=1.178$, $p=0.322$.

[184] In the control group, $F(1, 28)=0.051$, $p=0.823$, dialogue group, $F(1, 17)=0.092$, $p=0.765$, and mixed groups, $F(1, 19) = 1.314$, $p=0.266$, the regression model was not significant, meaning that wartime experiences did not have any predictive power within these groups.

power. Within the control group, the first step of the regression model was not significant, but in the second step, when HTQ scores were added, the model became significant, $F(2, 26)=4.206$, $p=0.026$. This was a significant change from step 1 to step 2, F change = 8.347, $p=0.008$. Beta values revealed that Q2 HTQ scores negatively predicted improvement for the control group, $B=-0.082$, $p=0.008$, while wartime experiences were not a significant predictor of improvement, $B=0.158$, $p=0.104$. This finding is interesting because it suggests that PTSD symptoms contribute to a natural enhancement of affective prejudice.

Cognitive Prejudice: The cognitive prejudice scale included 6 measures of competence, 4 measures of warmth, 2 measures of status and 2 measures of competition. Only the measure of competition was reverse scored as described in the section on affective prejudice above. As such, the minimum score for the scale was 14, indicating the most prejudice, while the maximum was 56.

We then ran the mixed model ANOVA as described above and found no significant effects from this analysis, supporting the idea that none of the workshop techniques significantly affected cognitive prejudice.

Similarly, neither previous contact, number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly predicted cognitive prejudice improvement. When all of these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 88)= 0.511$, $p=0.728$. Likewise, none of the other dependent variables significantly predicted improvement in cognitive prejudice.

Behavioral Prejudice: The behavioral prejudice scale was scored by reverse coding questions 29-33 (see Appendix B for questionnaire) and throwing out question 28, "If given the opportunity I would admit members of the outgroup only as visitors to my country" because of a translation error that caused participants to understand the question differently. As such, the least prejudice score was 1, while the most prejudice score was 5.

We then ran the mixed model ANOVA and found no results to indicate that our workshops had any effect on behavioral prejudice with the exception of the relatively weak result of a significant main effect of identity group, $F(1, 98)= 7.658$, $p=0.007$, combined with a trend toward a significant interaction between session, identity group and the training technique, $F(1, 98)= 3.020$, $p=0.085$. This means that the training technique was the only technique that produced a change in behavioral prejudice, but it was only for either GAM or PETA, and only at trend level (the p value was between 0.05 and 1 so the result is significant, but not terribly robust). To explore which group was driving the change, we conducted follow up analyses according to the following steps:

1. We split the file by identity group (GAM or PETA)
2. We ran a 2(training technique) x2(dialogue technique) x2(session) mixed model ANOVA for each identity group.

We found that it was the participants who identify with PETA whose behavioral prejudice scores decreased in the training group.[185] However, we don't think these results mean very much given that they are a) only at trend level and b) the means for behavioral prejudice scores in the training

[185] We found no significant effects for participants who identify with GAM. For participants who identify with PETA, we found an interaction between the training technique and the session variable, or the change in behavioral prejudice before and after the workshop, $F(1, 39)= 2.919$, $p=0.095$.

groups decreased from 1.061 before the workshops and moved to 0.833 after the workshops, while the means for behavioral prejudice scores in the other workshop groups increased from 0.472 to 0.861. Because all of the groups ended up with means of about 0.8, we think these results may be best explained by regression toward the mean. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the workshops significantly decreased behavioral prejudice.

Regressions: After conducting the linear regression described above, we did not find that any of our variables significantly predicted change in behavioral prejudice. Neither previous contact, number of dependents, income nor amount of education significantly predicted behavioral prejudice improvement. When all of the variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 94)= 0.502$, $p=0.743$. Similarly, none of the dependent variables significantly predicted improvement in behavioral prejudice.

Empathy

Summary: The original hypothesis of this dissertation was that dialogue-based contact would increase empathy in a post-conflict context. However, the results of this experiment disconfirm this hypothesis, as we saw no significant change in empathy as a result of the workshops.

However, we did find evidence to support the claims of previous research that initial levels of empathy are correlated with initial levels of contact, prejudice, trust and forgiveness. Based on these claims, we expected increased contact through the workshops to lead to an increase in empathy. Yet, we found that these correlations did not translate into a significant improvement in empathy during the workshops. In fact, we found initial levels of empathy to be negatively correlated with improvement in both affective and cognitive empathy, meaning that people who enter the workshops with high levels of empathy did *worse* in empathy improvement than other

participants. This suggests that there may be a ceiling effect, whereby participants who enter the workshops with high levels of empathy will not be expected to develop more empathy for the outgroup. This work implies that participants with lower initials levels of empathy, and therefore less previous contact with members of the outgroup, may be better suited to facilitated intergroup contact programs.

Finally, we found that improvement in affective empathy is positively correlated with improvement in all forms of prejudice (affective, cognitive and behavioral), as well as in all forms of healing (PTSD, depression and anxiety). This suggests that those who did improve in affective empathy during the workshops (participants who entered the workshops with low initial levels of empathy) also improved in prejudice and healing. These findings imply that either affective empathy improvement is moderating improvement in prejudice and healing, or that affective empathy improvement is secondary to the improvement of these variables and can be expected to follow suit if participants engage in repeated contact.

Results-Affective Empathy: After scoring the empathy scale, we repeated the 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA described above and found that affective empathy scores did not significantly change as a result of the workshops as evidenced by the fact that we saw no *interactions* between any of the variables.[186]

[186] We did find the following *main effects* but, they do not indicate any effects of the workshops themselves:

- A trend toward a significant main effect of workshop group for the dialogue technique, F(1, 94)= 3.213, p=0.076. The means indicate that regardless of session, affective empathy was higher in the dialogue technique (11.679) compared to the non-dialogue groups (10.718). This merely indicates that participants in the dialogue group entered the workshops with slightly higher affective empathy scores.
- A main effect of group for the identity group, F(1, 94)= 9,986, p=0.002, with means indicating that PETA had higher affective empathy scores (12.045) than GAM (10.352). We also found a significant interaction between the dialogue technique and identity group, F(1, 94)= 4.664, p=0.033, with the means indicating that PETA participants who underwent the dialogue technique had higher affective empathy scores (mean=13.104) compared to GAM participants (mean=10.253). In the non-dialogue groups, there was no difference between identity groups: GAM participants (mean=10.986) were comparable to PETA participants (mean=10.450).

Regressions: While the workshops did not produce a direct improvement in empathy, our regressions reveal interesting results about the relationship between contact and empathy.[187] First, our regressions find support for previous research showing that empathy may be mediating the relationship between preexisting contact with members of the outgroup and prejudice, trust and forgiveness.[188] We reach this conclusion because we find initial levels of contact positively predict initial levels of affective empathy, $F(1,103)=8.232$, $p=0.005$, $r^2=0.74$, $B=0.411$, which in turn predict less affective, cognitive and behavioral prejudice, as well as more trust and forgiveness (see table 5 below). Because contact does not predict prejudice, trust and forgiveness directly, but does predict affective empathy, which then predicts prejudice, trust and forgiveness, we conclude that empathy may be mediating the relationship between contact, prejudice, trust and forgiveness.

Because contact predicts empathy, we hypothesized that facilitated contact would lead to an increase in empathy. However, as explained above, it did not. Instead, we saw that facilitated contact led to a decrease in affective prejudice and an increase in trust, forgiveness and PTSD symptoms as described throughout this chapter. Yet despite the fact that facilitated contact did not lead to a direct improvement in empathy, we find that improvement in affective empathy positively predicted improvements in all forms of prejudice and healing (see table 7 below). This suggests once again that empathy may be mediating the relationship between facilitated contact, prejudice and healing. We did not find this relationship to be true for trust or forgiveness, however, which we expected given that initial levels of contact predicted higher initial levels of trust and forgiveness. Chapter 5 will discuss the possible explanations for this.

---

[188] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."

Additionally, we found that people who enter the workshops with high initial levels of affective empathy did not respond as well to the workshops as those with lower initial levels of empathy, as evidenced by the fact that initial levels of affective empathy (Q2) are negatively correlated with improvement in PTSD, anxiety, forgiveness and affective empathy in the training groups (though it is positively correlated with trust improvement in the training groups); negatively correlated with improvement in depression, affective and cognitive prejudice and affective empathy in the dialogue group; and negatively correlated with improvement in behavioral prejudice and affective empathy in the mixed groups (see table 6 below).

These results suggest that structured intergroup contact may not be the best avenue for promoting empathy for people who already have high levels of empathy for the outgroup. However, in the training groups, those with high initial levels of affective empathy did well in terms of improvement in trust, suggesting empathy may be required to increase trust.

Overall, these results suggest that intergroup contact is most effective for those who have lower initial levels of empathy with the outgroup, which is associated with less intergroup contact, more prejudice, less trust and less forgiveness. It is possible in the future that empathy could be used as the main criteria on the first survey to select people for participation in the program. More research is needed to confirm this however, as it raises the question of whether low empathy participants would respond as well to the workshops if high empathy participants were not also present.

Finally, we report that neither contact, income, nor amount of education significantly predicted affective empathy improvement. When all of these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(3,98) = 0.178$, $p=0.911$. However, similar to improvement

in affective prejudice, we did find that number of dependents significantly predicted improvement in affective empathy. The overall model was significant, $F(1, 95)= 4.821$, $p=0.031$, $r^2=0.048$, with beta values ($B= -0.248$) indicating that the number of dependents negatively predicted affective empathy improvement.

Table 5: Correlations between Q2 Empathy and Other Variables at Q2

Measure	Q2 Affective Empathy	Q2 Cognitive Empathy	Q2 Affective Prejudice	Q2 Cognitive Prejudice	Q2 Behavioral Prejudice	Q2 Trust	Q2 Tolerance	Q2 Forgiveness	Q2 Contact	Q2 PTSD	Q2 Depression	Q2 Anxiety
Q2 Affective Empathy		0.154	**-0.533****	**.381****	**-.577****	**.404****	.173	**.470****	**.272****	.061	-.039	-.117
Q2 Cognitive Empathy	0.134		0.011	0.137	-.080	0.143	-.051	-.030	**.378****	.028	.079	.040

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.0001

Table 6: Correlations between Q2 Empathy and Improvement Scores

Measure	Affective Empathy Improvement	Cognitive Empathy Improvement	Affective Prejudice Improvement	Cognitive Prejudice Improvement	Behavioral Prejudice Improvement	Tolerance Improvement	Trust Improvement	Forgiveness Improvement	PTSD Improvement	Depression Improvement	Anxiety Improvement
Q2 Affective Empathy	**-.437****	-.002	-.066	.031	**-.216***	.046	-.123	-.185	-.190	-.113	-.092
Training	**-.583****	-.012	-.338	.213	-.127	.177	**.482***	-.345	**-0.445***	-.066	-.403
Dialogue	**-.546****	-.013	**-.465***	**.453***	.028	.029	-.287	-.206	-.322	**-.480***	-.425
Mixed Methods	**-.466***	.025	.118	-.364	**-.551****	-.012	-.215	-.223	-.062	.046	-.005
Q2 Cognitive Empathy	.052	**-.572****	.116	-.058	-.088	**.243***	**-.378****	.020	-.080	.199	.070
Training	-.122	**-.743****	.051	**-.437***	-.299	.133	.137	.180	-.268	.060	-.064
Dialogue	.304	**-.569****	**.501***	-.067	.081	.283	**-.513***	.340	.421	.366	.276
Mixed Methods	-.217	**-.803****	-.286	.360	-.074	.321	-.403	-.381	-.290	.233	-.172

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.0001

Table 7: Correlations between Empathy Improvement and Improvement in Other Variables

Measure	Affective Empathy Improvement	Cognitive Empathy Improvement	Affective Prejudice Improvement	Cognitive Prejudice Improvement	Behavioral Prejudice Improvement	Tolerance Improvement	Trust Improvement	Forgiveness Improvement	PTSD Improvement	Depression Improvement	Anxiety Improvement
Affective Empathy Improvement		.050	**.329****	**-.317****	**.251***	.123	.081	.067	**.301****	**.296****	**.256****
Training		-.125	**.555***	.294	.301	.040	-.121	.270	.418	**.524****	**.470***
Dialogue		-.099	**.462***	**-.680****	.188	.224	-.019	.037	.395	**.639****	.417
Mixed Methods		.303	.292	-.049	.211	-.076	.298	-.016	.244	-.132	.107
Cognitive Empathy Improvement	.050		.144	-.107	**.210***	-.152	**.385****	.054	**.256***	-.049	.015
Training	-.125		-.140	**.433***	.295	-.127	.269	-.233	.277	-.024	-.047
Dialogue	-.099		-.047	-.315	.251	-.131	**.498***	-.165	.113	-.091	-.165
Mixed Methods	.303		**.484***	**-.462***	.156	-.313	**.478***	.337	.285	-.219	.172

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.0001

Cognitive Empathy: Similar to affective empathy, we repeated the 2x2x2x2 ANOVA described above, but did not find any significant effects of any of the workshops.[189] However, we did find several main effects that we report here, though none of these are caused by the workshops:

- A trend toward a significant main effect of session, indicating a change for all subjects regardless of group, $F(1, 94)= 3.604$, $p=0.061$. The means indicate that overall, cognitive empathy increased from Q2 (4.136) to Q3 (4.533).
- A main effect of workshop technique for the training technique, $F(1, 94)= 4.444$, $p=0.038$, with means indicating that the training technique had higher cognitive empathy scores (4.663) than the non-training groups (4.007).
- A trend toward a significant main effect of group for the dialogue technique, $F(1, 94)= 3.221$, $p=0.076$, with means indicating that the dialogue technique had higher cognitive empathy scores (4.614) compared to the non-dialogue groups (4.056).

Regressions: Similar to affective empathy, we found that initial levels of cognitive empathy were positively correlated with initial levels of outgroup contact (see table 5). However, unlike affective empathy, cognitive empathy does not appear to be positively correlated with other variables such as prejudice, trust and forgiveness. This may suggest that it is affective, rather than cognitive empathy that is mediating the relationship between contact and prejudice, trust and forgiveness.

[189] We found no significant interaction between either of the workshop techniques and session or between identity group and session. This indicates that neither the enemy group, nor the training technique or dialogue technique affected the change in cognitive empathy from Q2 to Q3. We also did not find any significant main effect of group for either the identity group, or the interaction between training and dialogue technique, nor was there a significant interaction between any of the workshop techniques with identity group.

Moreover, we also found that those with high initial levels of cognitive empathy did not respond well to the workshops in terms of improvement in cognitive empathy. Somewhat unsurprisingly then, improvement in cognitive empathy was not as strongly linked to improvement in prejudice and healing as was affective empathy. Overall, improvement in cognitive empathy was positively correlated with improvement in behavioral prejudice, trust and PTSD symptoms.

Finally, we note that neither income nor amount of education significantly predicted affective prejudice improvement. When these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(1,95)=1.453$, $p=0.231$. However, we did find that contact and number of dependents significantly predicted improvement in cognitive empathy. The overall model was significant, $F(2, 93)= 4.404$, $p=0.015$, $r^2=0.087$. The beta values indicate that contact negatively ($B= -0.109$, $p=0.010$) predicted cognitive empathy improvement, while the number of dependents exhibited a trend toward positively predicting ($B=0.165$, $p=0.090$) cognitive empathy improvement.

Trust

Summary: The initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that dialogue-based contact would increase trust in a post-conflict context. However, this hypothesis is not supported given that we found that only the training groups produced a slight improvement in trust, while the dialogue technique and the mixed methods technique produced no change. Moreover, while the change in the training group was statistically significant, the change may not be clinically significant as the means improved by only 0.54 points on the trust scale.

Results: To explore this hypothesis, we added up the answer to the three questions on the trust scale and ran the 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA as described above.

The ANOVA results showed that trust scores improved most when participants underwent the training technique by revealing a significant *interaction* between *session* and training technique, $F(1, 98)= 7.928$, $p=0.006$. Examination of the means revealed that participants who underwent the training technique improved slightly from a mean trust score of 7.43 at Q2 to 7.97 at Q3 (0.54 points), while participants in workshops that did not use the training technique changed from a mean trust score of 7.86 at Q2 to 7.37 at Q3, a decrease of 0.49 points. No other significant effects were found for the mixed model ANOVA.

Because the above means indicated that the training groups improved while the non-training groups declined, it was not clear if the above *interaction* was driven by the improvement in the training groups or the decline in the non-training groups. We therefore conducted follow-up tests to determine what was driving this interaction. To do this, we split the file into training groups and non-training groups, and ran two follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs using trust scores as the dependent variable.

We found that the *interaction* was driven by the improvement in trust scores in the training groups because the groups that did not use the training technique did not significantly change from before (Q2) to after the workshops (Q3), $F(1, 56)=2.748$, $p=0.103$, while the training technique groups improved from Q2 to Q3, $F(1, 48)=6.605$, $p=0.013$.

To further explore trust improvement, we chose to look at each workshop group, 1-9, independently to determine if a particular group was driving our results. We did this by conducting a univariate ANOVA, considering each group (1-9) separately and

including participant identity group.[190] The results showed that the overall model was not significant, F(14, 92)=0.893, p=0.569, nor was the effect of identity group, F(1, 92)-.164, p=0.687, or workshop group, F(6, 92)= 5.074, p=0.167. The interaction between identity and workshop group, F(6, 92)=0.244, p=0.961 was also not significant. It is likely that considering each workshop group separately reduced our ability to find a significant effect of the workshop groups due to low power.

To further explore the relationship between trust and individual workshop groups, we also tried running an LSD post-hoc analysis on the workshop groups. This revealed that training group 4 improved more than dialogue groups 2 (p=0.052) and 5 (p=0.057) at trend level, while mixed group 7 did better than dialogue groups 2 (p=0.016) and 5 (p=0.017), as well as control group 9 (p=0.029). These data suggest that the improvement is primarily being driven by training group 4 and mixed group 7. While group 4 used only the training technique, group 7 was a mixed-method group that used both the dialogue and training techniques. Overall, these data support the idea that trust levels improve more from undergoing workshops that incorporate training methods. Furthermore, they may suggest a learning curve on the part of the facilitators as the effect was more pronounced in later workshops.

Regressions: Unfortunately, our regressions did not give us much additional information about what is driving trust improvement. We did find that initial levels of contact significantly predicted improvement in trust, as the overall regression model was significant, F(1, 102)= 4.846, p=0.030, r^2=0.045 with beta values (B= -0.081) indicating that contact negatively predicted trust improvement. However, we found that neither the number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly

[190] This required us to compute a new dependent variable measuring trust improvement by subtracting trust scores before the workshops (Q2) from trust scores after the workshops (Q3).

predicted trust improvement given that when all of these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant.

We also explored the hypothesis that wartime experiences and initial PTSD scores significantly predicted improvement in trust scores. While a simple regression showed that wartime-experiences did not predict improvement in trust scores, initial PTSD scores did significantly predict trust improvement, as the overall model was significant $F(1, 96)=4.832$, $p=0.030$, $r^2=0.048$. The Beta value ($B=0.022$) shows that higher PTSD scores positively predict improvement in trust, meaning that participants who were more highly symptomatic of PTSD before the workshops improved more on trust than other participants. However, the overall r-value of the model suggests that PTSD scores explained a relatively low amount of the variance in trust improvement.

Given that the original ANOVA revealed different degrees of trust improvement differed for different workshop techniques, we decided to look at each workshop technique separately in our regression analysis. We therefore re-ran our regressions after splitting our file into 4 groups: the control group, the training group, the dialogue group and the mixed technique group.

We found that wartime experiences did not significantly predict trust improvement for any of the four groups. However initial PTSD scores positively predicted improvement in the mixed technique group, as the overall model was significant, $F(1, 21)=4.571$, $p=0.044$, $r^2=0.179$, with the beta values suggesting a positive relationship between PTSD scores and trust improvement, $B=0.034$, $p=0.044$. This means that people with a high number of PTSD symptoms before the workshops showed the most improvement in trust in the mixed technique workshops. We also explored the

hypothesis that this relationship would be modulated by wartime experiences, but it was not.

These results therefore suggest that the mixed methods workshops were able to differentially improve trust scores in participants with high PTSD symptoms. However, this does not appear to give us much meaningful information.

Tolerance

Summary: The initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that dialogue-based contact would increase tolerance in a post-conflict context. However, this hypothesis is not supported given that we found no significant improvement in tolerance scores.

Results: After scoring the tolerance scale, we ran the 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA described above and found that the workshops had no significant effect on tolerance scores, as we saw no *interaction* between either of the workshop techniques and *session*.

However, we report the following significant findings, but note that these findings cannot be attributed to an effect of the workshops:

- A trend toward a significant *main effect of session*, indicating a change for all subjects from before (Q2) to after (Q3) the workshops regardless of workshop group, $F(1, 94)= 4.028$, $p=0.082$. The means indicate that overall, tolerance increased from Q2 (6.852) to Q3 (7.154), though this change cannot be said to be due to the workshops.
- A trend toward a significant *interaction between session and identity group*, $F(1, 94)= 4.612$, $p=0.063$. The means indicate that participants who identify with PETA improved more from Q2 (7.028) to Q3 (7.653) than participants

who identify with GAM, Q2 (6.675) to Q3 (6.654). Again, this slight effect cannot be attributed to the workshops.

- A significant *main effect of identity group*, F(1, 94)= 7.640, p=0.007, with means indicating that PETA had higher tolerance scores (7.340) compared to GAM (6.665).
- *A main effect of workshop group* for the training technique, F(1, 94)= 8.880, p=0.004, with means indicating that participants in the training groups had higher tolerance scores (7.367) than participants in the non-training groups (6.638).

Regressions: Neither the number of dependents, income, or amount of education significantly predicted tolerance improvement. When all of these variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant.

However, we did find that contact significantly predicted improvement in tolerance. The overall model was significant, F(1, 99)= 4.404, p=0.038, r^2=0.043, with beta values (B=0.074) indicating that levels of preexisting contact with the outgroup positively predicted tolerance improvement. No other significant results were found.

Forgiveness

Summary: The initial hypothesis of this dissertation was that dialogue-based contact would increase forgiveness in a post-conflict context. This hypothesis is supported by data showing that the dialogue technique produced the greatest improvement in forgiveness for both GAM and PETA participants, though GAM participants showed more improvement. The mixed methods workshops also worked well for both groups, though not as well as the dialogue workshops. The training workshops produced an increase in forgiveness for GAM participants, but PETA participants got slightly

worse in terms of forgiveness in the training workshops, suggesting that at least some elements of the dialogue workshops are necessary for PETA participants to improve in forgiveness. Chapter 5 will discuss the possible explanations for this difference.

Results: To examine the original hypothesis, we scored the forgiveness scale by reverse scoring questions 54) Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgets the wrongs done by the other community? 56) Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgives the wrongs done to you by their group? and 57) Do you agree that if you forgive them, your group will appear weak? The maximum score on the 7-point forgiveness scale was therefore 28 and the minimum score was 7.[191]

We then repeated the 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA described above. We found that the groups that incorporated the dialogue technique (both the dialogue and mixed-method workshops) did better than the training groups, producing a significant improvement in forgiveness of 1.4 points on the forgiveness scale. The following data support this conclusion:

- We found a significant main effect of session, $F(1, 93)=4.225$, $p=0.043$, with means that all participants improved over time from Q2 (mean=21.60) to Q3 (mean=22.22). We also found a significant interaction between session and dialogue technique, $F(1, 93)=6.250$, $p=0.014$, in which the means revealed that

[191] It is worth noting that both questions 54 and 59 (Do you agree that Aceh will never move from the past to the future until the two communities learn to forget about the past?) both assume that by answering that they strongly agree that their community should not forget about the past, participants receive a score that indicates that they are the least forgiving. While I decided to use the questions as developed by Hewstone et al. in order that my results would be comparable to theirs, I do not agree that a belief that a group should not forget about the past indicates that they are not forgiving.[191] I therefore recommend that the scale be revised to focus solely on questions pertaining directly to forgiveness.

the dialogue group improved over time from Q2 (mean=21.08) to Q3 (mean=22.445), and significantly more than those who were not exposed to the dialogue technique, whose forgiveness scores did not change much from Q2(mean=22.13) to Q3 (mean=22.00).

We also found that while the dialogue and mixed method workshops increased forgiveness for all participants, the training workshops did not increase forgiveness for PETA participants, who actually became non-significantly less forgiving in the training groups. This decrease in forgiveness effectively lowered the comparative baselines within our analysis and partially drove our previously reported improvement within the dialogue groups across sessions. However, the effect of the dialogue group was also partially driven by improvement for GAM participants within the dialogue groups.

Given that this effect is somewhat inconsistent, we have preliminary evidence suggesting that the dialogue technique exhibits more forgiveness improvement overall, or at least protects from a decrease in forgiveness. This suggests that it is necessary to incorporate at least some element of the dialogue workshops in order to increase forgiveness for both GAM and PETA participants. However, more research is necessary before more definitive conclusions can be reached. Our reasoning is based on the following evidence:

- The mixed model ANOVA also revealed a four way interaction between session, training technique, dialogue technique and identity group, F(1, 93)=9.779, p=0.002. We examined this four-way interaction with a follow-up mixed model ANOVA, split by identity group. For GAM, there was a main

effect of session, but no other effects were significant. Comparatively, for PETA, there was no main effect of session, nor was there an interaction between session and training group.

- We also found an interaction between session and dialogue group, with the means indicating that groups that utilized the dialogue technique (dialogue and mixed methods) improved more from Q2 (mean=21.963) to Q3 (mean=23.175), more than the non-dialogue groups, whose scores declined from Q2 (mean=22.86) to Q3 (mean=21.86).
- We also found a three-way interaction between session, training group and dialogue group. To examine the three-way interaction further, we used the same new workgroup variable described above, with four levels: dialogue group, training group, mixed methods group, and control group. We also computed a new dependent variable measuring forgiveness improvement by subtracting the forgiveness scores at Q2 from the scores at Q3. We then ran a one-way ANOVA with the new workgroup variable as the independent variable (IV) and forgiveness improvement as the dependent variable (DV). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of the new workshop group, $F(3, 36)=5.219$, $p=0.004$. Post hoc Scheffe tests revealed that the mixed techniques group improved the most (mean=2.800) and improved significantly more than the training group (mean=-2.00), $p=0.005$. The mixed group did not significantly change more than the control group (mean=0.0), $p=0.113$, or the dialogue group (mean=-0.375), $p=0.110$. No other groups significantly differed from one another.
- We further examined the relationship between mixed techniques and forgiveness improvement with a univariate ANOVA, considering each

workshop group 1-9 separately with the file split by identity group, using forgiveness improvement as our dependent variable. Similar to the above analyses, we knew that we would reduce our power by dividing our participants into such small groups, so we chose to use the LSD post-hoc test. For PETA, the effect of the individual groups was significant, $F(6, 40) = 3.928$, $p=0.005$. Similar to the above analyses, we ran LSD post-hoc analyses due to the reduced power of this follow up analysis. The LSD post-hoc tests revealed that training group 1 did significantly worse compared to mixed group 8, $p=0.004$, but did not significantly differ from the other groups. Similarly, dialogue group 2 did significantly worse than mixed group 8, $p=0.002$, but did not differ from any other groups. Training group 4 did significantly worse than dialogue group 5, $p=0.016$, training group 7, $p=0.037$, and mixed group 8, $p<0.001$. Dialogue group 5 did significantly worse than mixed group 8, $p=0.050$, but better than training group 4, $p=0.016$. This meant that mixed group 8 did significantly better than training group 1, dialogue group 2, training group 4, dialogue group 5, but not mixed group 7.

- These results support the earlier analyses, which indicated that for PETA, the mixed group improved slightly, while the training group did slightly worse. Our analysis of the individual workshop groups suggests that this trend was primarily driven by mixed group 8, which improved the most and training group 4, which did significantly worse compared to many of the other groups. However, this analysis should be regarded as preliminary, due to the drastically reduced number of subjects in each group. For PETA, group 1 (n=4), 2 (n=4), 3 (n=5), 5 (n=4), 7(n=2), 8 (n=3) and 9 (n=18).

- Comparatively the univariate ANOVA for GAM did not have a main effect of individual workshop group and did not have any significant differences between groups 1-9.
- These analyses indicated that the mixed groups did significantly better than the training groups for PETA. Comparatively, there were no significant differences in improvement in GAM. We chose to explore this relationship further by evaluating the difference in improvement between the identity groups, for each workshop technique. We split the dataset into four groups: training only, dialogue only, mixed technique and control group. Within each of these groups, we ran a one-way ANOVA using improvement in forgiveness scores as the dependent variable, with identity groups as the independent variable. We found that GAM improved significantly more (mean=1.27) than PETA (mean=-2.00) in the training only workshop group, $F(1, 22) = 12.829$, $p=0.002$. We also report a trend toward a significant difference between identity groups for the dialogue only workshop group, $F(1, 19)=3.109$, $p=0.094$. Here, PETA did not improve during the dialogue workshops, (mean=-0.38) as much as GAM, (mean=2.15). There was no significant difference between the identity groups in the mixed technique workshops, $F(1, 21)=.842$, $p=0.369$.

Regressions: To better understand what was driving the change in forgiveness, we ran a number of regressions, which gave us the information below.

Neither contact, number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly predicted forgiveness improvement. When all of the variables were included in the

regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 90)= 0.732$, $p=0.473$. None of the individual variables significantly predicted improvement in forgiveness.

We also explored the hypothesis that wartime experiences significantly predicted improvement in forgiveness, but they did not. We determined this by splitting the file into 4 groups: the control group, the training group, the dialogue group and the mixed technique group. Within these groups, we ran a linear regression, using all wartime experiences, except for head injuries. Wartime experiences did not significantly predict forgiveness improvement in any of the groups, as indicated by the overall model in the control group, $F(1, 26)=0.014$, $p=0.906$; the training groups, $F(1,19)=3.407$, $p=.081$; the dialogue groups, $F(1,14)=.397$, $p=0.539$; or the mixed groups, $F(1,18)=0.003$, $p=.960$.

However, when we added pre-workshop (Q2) PTSD scores to the model as a second step to the regression, we found that those who entered the workshops highly symptomatic of PTSD improved more on forgiveness than others. We reached this conclusion because while the overall model of wartime experiences and HTQ scores at Q2 did not significantly predict forgiveness improvement, $F(2, 25)=2.294$, $p=0.122$, the addition of the pre-workshop (Q2) HTQ scores significantly added to the model, $Fchange(1, 25)=4.567$, $p=0.043$. Moreover, the coefficients indicate that although wartime experiences were still not a significant predictor, ($B=-0.084$, $p=0.317$), PTSD scores at Q2 positively predicted ($B=0.046$, $p=0.043$) forgiveness improvement.

We also found a relationship between pre-workshop affective prejudice scores, affective prejudice improvement, and forgiveness improvement, which seems to indicate that improvement in forgiveness was greater for participants who had higher affective prejudice scores before undergoing the workshops, as well as for those who

showed the most improvement in affective prejudice during the workshops. We found this in the following evidence:

- We explored the hypothesis that affective prejudice scores at Q2 significantly predicted improvement in forgiveness. Using a simple regression, affective prejudice significantly predicted forgiveness scores, $F(1, 99)=12.195$, $p=0.001$, $r^2=0.110$. However, we acknowledge that the degree of forgiveness improvement differed, depending on which combination of workshop techniques were utilized. We therefore re-ran our analyses after splitting our file into 4 groups: the control group, the training group, the dialogue group and the mixed technique group.
- Affective prejudice scores at Q2 did not significantly predict forgiveness in the control group, $F(1, 31)=0.028$, $p=0.869$. However, affective prejudice significantly predicted forgiveness improvement in the training group $F(1, 22)=12.229$, $p=0.002$, $r^2=0.357$, and the dialogue group $F(1, 19)=5.766$, $p=0.027$, $r^2=0.233$. The beta values indicate that high affective prejudice scores at Q2 positively predict forgiveness improvement for both the training, $B=0.322$, and dialogue group, $B=0.313$. Surprisingly, affective prejudice did not predict improvement in the mixed group, $F(1, 21)=2.239$, $p=0.149$.
- These results suggest that improvement in forgiveness was greater for participants who had higher affective prejudice scores before undergoing the workshops. This was true for the groups that underwent the training technique or the dialogue technique, but not for the groups that underwent the mixed techniques. Because this pattern was so similar to the improvement observed in the affective prejudice scores, we hypothesized that improvement in

forgiveness scores was driven by affective prejudice improvement, rather than affective prejudice scores at Q2.

- First, we explored the hypothesis that Q2 affective prejudice, affective prejudice improvement and forgiveness improvement were correlated. Again, we split the file into the four groups described above and for each group we ran a 3x3 Pearson correlation matrix using Q2 affective prejudice, affective prejudice improvement and forgiveness improvement.
- For the control group, only forgiveness improvement and affective prejudice improvement exhibited a significant, negative relationship with one another, $r(31)= -0.552$, $p=0.001$. For the training group, affective prejudice improvement positively correlated with both Q2 affective prejudice, $r(22)=0.604$, $p=0.002$ and forgiveness improvement, $r(22)=0.512$, $p=0.011$. In confirmation of our previously mentioned regression, Q2 affective prejudice positively correlated with forgiveness improvement. In the dialogue group, affective prejudice improvement positively correlated with Q2 affective prejudice, $r(20)=0.735$, $p<0.001$, but not forgiveness improvement, $p=0.222$. However, in confirmation of the previously mentioned regression, Q2 affective prejudice positively correlated with forgiveness improvement, $r(19)=0.482$, $p=0.027$. In the mixed technique group, affective prejudice improvement did not correlate with Q2 affective prejudice, $p=0.133$, but it did correlate with forgiveness improvement, $r(21)=0.436$, $p=0.038$.
- We then chose to re-run the regression predicting forgiveness with both affective prejudice at Q2 and affective prejudice improvement. Affective prejudice improvement was entered into the model first and the Q2 scores were entered second. For the control group, affective prejudice improvement

negatively (B=-0.403) predicted forgiveness improvement, as in the previously reported correlation, F(1, 31)=13.613, p=0.001, r^2=0.305. Affective prejudice scores from Q2 did not significantly add to the overall model, F change = 0.129, p=0.722 and while the overall model remained significant, the F value decreased and the p-value increased, F(2, 30)=6.679, p=0.004. For the training group, affective prejudice improvement positively (B=0.388) predicted forgiveness improvement, F(1, 22)=7.818, p=0.011, r^2=0.262. Affective prejudice Q2 scores significantly added to the model, F change = 4.533, p=0.045, positively predicting improvement in forgiveness, B=0.244. However, when the Q2 scores were added to the model, the effect of affective prejudice became non-significant, p=0.278. This indicated that affective prejudice Q2 scores explained more variance than the affective prejudice improvement scores. Some of the variance explained by the Q2 scores overlapped with the improvement scores, which is why the effect of improvement was reduced in the second step of the regression.

- For the dialogue group, the affective prejudice improvement did not significantly predict forgiveness improvement, with the overall model below our threshold for significance F(1, 19)=1.591, p=0.222. In the second step, Q2 affective prejudice scores trended toward a significant addition to the model, F change =4.007, p=0.061 and the overall model became a non-significant trend, F(2, 18)=2.925, p=0.079 r^2=0.245. The effect of affective prejudice improvement remained non-significant, but Q2 affective prejudice trended toward a positive prediction of forgiveness improvement, B=0.391, p=0.061.
- For the mixed technique group, affective prejudice improvement positively (B=0.480) predicted forgiveness improvement as indicated in the overall

model, F(1, 21)=4.919, p=0.038, r^2=0.190. In the second step, Q2 affective prejudice scores did not significantly contribute to the model p-change = 0.305. The overall model was reduced to a non-significant trend, F(2, 20)=3.026, p=0.071, r^2=0.232. The effect of Q2 affective prejudice scores was not significant, p=0.305 and the effect of affective prejudice improvement was reduced to a trend, B=0.420, p=0.074.

- The regressions indicate that affective prejudice improvement significantly predicts forgiveness improvement in the training group and the mixed technique group. This suggests that the training technique may be changing forgiveness scores via affective prejudice or vice versa. Furthermore, Q2 affective prejudice scores predict improvement in the training group and dialogue group. This suggests that, for the training and dialogue groups, participants with high affective prejudice scores before entering into the workshops will increase their forgiveness scores to a greater extent than those with low affective prejudice scores. In the training group, Q2 affective prejudice scores were correlated with affective prejudice improvement scores, meaning that participants with high affective prejudice scores improved more in the training groups. This relationship makes it difficult to disentangle the three-way relationship between affective prejudice improvement, pre-workshop affective prejudice scores and forgiveness improvement. However, in one of our regressions, Q2 affective prejudice scores were entered as a second step and explained significantly more variance in the training group. This suggests that Q2 affective prejudice scores are a better predictor of forgiveness improvement, compared to affective prejudice improvement.

Healing

Summary: The original hypothesis was that dialogue-based contact would increase individual healing as measured by PTSD, depression and anxiety symptoms, in a post-conflict context. The results of this experiment disconfirm this hypothesis, as we found that workshops that incorporated the training technique, including both training and mixed method workshops, were most effective at improving PTSD symptoms, while the dialogue workshops produced no significant improvement. Moreover, we saw no change in depression or anxiety symptoms as a result of the workshops, suggesting that the training and mixed method workshops specifically improved PTSD symptoms, but not other measures of psychological distress. Chapter 5 will explore why this may be the case.

Results-Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Given that the dialogue-based workshops encourage story-telling elements that resemble conventional psychotherapy, we chose to examine the hypothesis that some of the workshop groups would alleviate the symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as measured by the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ). We therefore ran the 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA described above.

The results of the mixed model ANOVA and the follow-up tests described below provide strong evidence that the workshops that incorporated the training technique (including both the training and mixed-method workshops) produced the greatest reduction in symptoms of PTSD. This is evident from the following:

- The mixed model ANOVA showed a *main effect of session*, $F(1, 86)=8.875$, $p=0.004$, in which the means indicate that PTSD scores decreased from before

the workshops (Q2 mean=42.62) to after the workshops (Q3 mean=39.02). Additionally, we found a significant *interaction between session and training technique*, F(1, 86)=7.417, p=0.008, in which the means indicate that the training groups improved more from before the workshops (Q2 mean=46.56) to after the workshops (Q3 mean=39.67) than groups that did not employ the training technique, which did not improve from before (Q2 mean=38.68) to after the workshops (Q3 mean=38.37).

- We then examined each of the 7 individual workshop groups separately, and explored the hypothesis that one individual group was driving this effect. We used a univariate ANOVA to further test for effects of the individual workshop groups 1-9 using the same process that we used to look at the effect of trust on each individual workshop group. We first calculated a new variable measuring PTSD improvement by subtracting PTSD scores at Q3 from PTSD scores at Q2. We then ran the univariate ANOVA on the improvement in PTSD, including individual workshop groups 1-9 and participant identity group in the model. We found that the overall model was significant, F(13, 80)=1.900, p=0.042, indicating that our independent variables (the independent workshop groups) explained a significant amount of variance overall, but the *main effect of workshop group* was reduced to a non-significant trend, F(6, 80) = 2.059, p=0.067. The *main effect of identity group* was not significant, F(1, 80) = 2.159, p=0.146. Similarly, the *interaction between identity group and workshop group* was not significant, F(6, 80)=1.349, p=0.246. We hypothesize that the *main effect of workshop group* was reduced to a non-significant trend because of the reduced power that occurred when we broke down our larger technique groups. These results

indicate that no single group was driving the overall effect of the training group. However, because we had previously stated that all of the groups that used the training technique (training and mixed method groups) exhibited a significant change in PTSD symptoms, we still continued to explore the differences between the workshop groups.

- To that end, we then ran an LSD post-hoc test to examine the differences in PTSD improvement for the individual workshop groups (1-9). Our results indicate that training group 1 (mean=4.119, p=0.023), training group 4 (mean=6.343, p=0.031), mixed group 7 (mean=12.786, p=0.004) and mixed group 8 (mean=4.697, p=0.010) all significantly differed from control group 9 (mean=-1.482), indicating that these treatments (the training and mixed method workshops) were all effective at reducing PTSD symptoms. No dialogue only group significantly differed from the control group or any of the training groups.

These data suggest that PTSD scores improved the most within the groups that incorporated the training methodology, i.e., training groups (groups 1 and 4) and mixed method groups (groups 7 and 8). This effect was not mitigated in groups 7 and 8, which also utilized the dialogue technique, suggesting that while a pure dialogue workshop is not effective for reducing PTSD, workshops that combine dialogue and training methods are effective. This indicates that at least some training techniques are necessary for reducing PTSD.

Regressions: Overall, the most robust finding of the PTSD regressions is that participants with high initial levels of empathy do worse on PTSD improvement than others, while individuals with low affective empathy seem to be improving in the

workshops, though this is true only in the training workshops. Given that affective empathy did not significantly improve in any of the groups, we hypothesize that improvement in PTSD symptoms may be driving some secondary improvement in affective empathy. We reached these conclusions based on the following:

- We first explored the hypothesis that pre-workshop affective empathy scores predicted PTSD improvement. After running a linear regression, the model trended toward significance, $F(1, 92)=3.439$, $p=0.067$, $r^2=0.036$ with beta values indicating that affective empathy negatively predicts PTSD improvement, $B=-0.725$, suggesting that participants with high initial levels of empathy do worse on PTSD improvement than others.
- We then split the file by the technique used in each workshop group (dialogue, training, mixed methods and control) to explore the possibility that this trend was being driven by one or more workshop groups. We re-ran a regression with affective empathy predicting improvement in PTSD symptoms.
- We found that affective empathy did not predict PTSD improvement in the control group, dialogue groups or mixed method groups. However, affective empathy did predict PTSD improvement in the training group, $F(1, 20)=4.935$, $p=0.038$, $r^2=0.198$, with beta values indicating that affective empathy negatively predicted PTSD improvement. This indicates that the participants who are improving within the training workshop are individuals with low affective empathy.
- We then hypothesized that PTSD symptom improvement may also effect change in affective empathy. We therefore chose to explore the hypothesis that affective empathy improvement scores could predict PTSD improvement scores. To test this we ran a regression predicting PTSD improvement with

affective empathy improvement. The overall model was significant, F(1, 92)=9.147, p=0.003, r^2=0.090, with beta values suggesting that affective empathy improvement positively predicted PTSD improvement, B=1.636.

- We then split the file into four groups (training, dialogue, mixed methods and control groups), and examined the possibility that affective empathy improvement as predicting improvement for each technique. For the dialogue group and mixed technique groups, the models were not significant. However, the control group exhibited a trend toward a significant model, F(1, 30)=3.673, p=0.065, r^2=0.109, with beta values suggesting a negative relationship between the two values, B=-2.225. The training group also exhibited a trend toward a significant model, F(1, 20)=4.226, p=0.053 with beta values suggesting a positive relationship between these two values, B=2.498.
- Based on previous analyses, we knew that PTSD symptoms differentially improved in groups 1, 4 and 7, where training was the predominant technique utilized. We therefore chose to re-divide our groups to analyze only groups 1, 4 and 7 and re-ran the regression with affective empathy improvement predicting PTSD improvement. It is important to point out that the "training only" group included only groups 1 and 4, so the power of this analysis should increase modestly.
- The overall model was significant, F(1, 29)=8.768, p=0.006, r^2=0.232, with beta values suggesting a positive relationship between improvement in empathy and improvement in PTSD, B=3.432. This suggests that affective empathy improvement is related to PTSD improvement. Given that affective empathy did not significantly improve in any of the groups, we hypothesize

that improvement in PTSD symptoms may be driving some secondary improvement in affective empathy.

Finally, we also found the following weak or non-significant results:

- Neither contact, number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly predicted PTSD improvement. When all of the variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 84)= 0.682$, $p=0.607$. Nor did any of the dependent variables significantly predict improvement in PTSD.
- Wartime experiences did not predict improvement in PTSD symptoms as overall regression model was not significant.
- Wartime experiences also did not predict pre-workshop PTSD scores, as the overall model was also not significant.
- Pre-workshop affective prejudice scores predict improvement in PTSD scores, an effect that seems to be primarily driven by the training group. This suggests that those who enter the workshops with high affective prejudice show more improvement in PTSD symptoms. We found evidence of this by exploring the hypothesis that pre-workshop (Q2) affective prejudice scores significantly predict improvement in PTSD scores. After running a linear regression, the overall model was significant, $F(1, 92)=5.186$, $p=0.025$, $r^2=0.043$, but the r-value was low indicating that the model does not explain much of the variation. Despite the low r-value, we chose to investigate the possibility that one workshop technique was driving this relationship more than the other. However, when we split the file into 4 groups to account for the dialogue, training, mixed methods and control groups, and ran a regression predicting

PTSD improvement with pre-workshop affective prejudice scores, none of the regressions reached the threshold for significance, but the training group exhibited a non-significant trend, $F(1, 20)=3.312$, $p=0.084$. Here, pre-workshop affective prejudice scores positively predicted PTSD improvement, $B=0.956$.

Depression: We examined the hypothesis that some of the workshop groups would alleviate symptoms of depression, as measured by questions 11-25 on the Hopkins Symptom Checklist. To do so, we ran the mixed model ANOVA described above.

We found no significant interaction between either of the workshop techniques and session, indicating that none of the workshop techniques affected depression symptoms. We also did not find any significant main effect of group for either the dialogue technique or the interaction between training and dialogue technique, nor was there a significant interaction between any of the workshop techniques with identity group. However, we did find a main effect of session, indicating a change for all subjects regardless of group, $F(1,82)=8.111$, $p=0.006$, which cannot be attributed to the workshop techniques themselves because the control group also showed improvement.

Regressions: Our most interesting finding is that depression scores improved more in participants who had higher initial rankings of psychopathology (PTSD, depression and anxiety). As seen below, this is evidenced by the fact that pre-workshop measurements of PTSD, depression and anxiety predicted improvement in depression.

- Pre-workshop PTSD scores significantly predicted depression improvement $F(1, 84)= 6.542$, $p=0.012$, $r^2=0.072$, with beta values ($B=0.095$) indicating a positive relationship.

- Additionally, pre-workshop depression scores significantly predicted depression improvement $F(1, 89)= 14.006$, $p<0.001$, $r^2=0.136$, with beta values ($B=0.247$) indicating a positive relationship.
- Pre-workshop anxiety scores also trended toward a significant prediction of depression improvement, $F(1, 89)= 2.947$, $p=0.090$, $r^2=0.032$, with beta values ($B=0.123$) indicating a positive relationship.

Additionally, we found that improvement in depression is positively correlated with improvement in affective empathy and to a lesser extent with pre-workshop cognitive empathy. Similar to improvement in PTSD symptoms, improvement in affective empathy significantly predicted improvement in depression symptoms, as shown by the model, $F(1, 89)= 8.553$, $p=0.004$, $r^2=0.088$, with the beta values ($B=0.904$) indicating a positive relationship. Pre-workshop cognitive empathy trended toward a significant prediction of improvement in depression, as shown by the model, $F(1, 89)= 3.657$, $p=0.059$, $r^2=0.039$, with the beta values ($B=0.752$) indicating a positive relationship.

We also found the following non-significant results:

- Neither contact, number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly predicted depression improvement. When all of the variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 80)= 0.494$, $p=0.740$. None of the individual variables significantly predicted improvement in depression.
- None of our dependent variables predicted improvement in depression. Using a linear regression, we determined that improvement in behavioral, affective and cognitive prejudice did not predict improvement in depression.

Furthermore, improvement in tolerance, trust, and forgiveness also failed to predict improvement in depression. Similarly pre-workshop affective empathy, tolerance, trust, and forgiveness failed to predict depression improvement; neither did behavioral, affective or cognitive prejudice.

Anxiety: After adding up the positive responses on questions 1-10 of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist, we examined the hypothesis that some of the workshop groups would alleviate symptoms of anxiety by running the mixed model ANOVA described above.

Overall, we did not see improvement in anxiety symptoms due to the workshop groups as evidenced by the fact that there was no interaction between session and workshop group, nor any interaction between session and identity group. Also, there was no three-way interaction between session, treatment group and identity group.

The results from the Depression and Anxiety scores were surprising because depression, anxiety and PTSD symptoms are usually correlated with one another, but instead we found an improvement in PTSD scores, but not in depression and anxiety. To check this, we ran three Pearson correlations to examine the possibility that our scales did not correlate. Using the pre-workshop scores for each scale, PTSD positively correlated with both anxiety, $r=.617$, $p<0.001$, and depression, $r=.788$, $p<0.001$. Additionally, the anxiety scale positively correlated with depression, $r=0.583$, $p<0.001$. This means that all three of our measures of psychological distress positively correlate with one another.

Subsequently, we would expect the workshops to improve “healing” because we would expect all three scales to improve. However, only PTSD scores differentially improved in the workshop groups over the control group. These results suggest that

the workshop groups, especially the training based workshop groups, specifically improved PTSD symptoms and not other measures of psychological distress. Chapter 5 will discuss why this may be the case.

Regressions: Similar to the regressions for depression, we found that anxiety scores improved more in participants who had higher initial rankings of psychopathology (higher PTSD, depression and anxiety scores before the workshops). We found that pre-workshop measurements of psychopathology predicted improvement in anxiety as shown below:

- Pre-workshop PTSD scores significantly predicted anxiety improvement $F(1, 92)= 14.589$, $p<0.001$, $r^2=0.137$, with beta values ($B=0.176$) indicating a positive relationship.
- Pre-workshop depression scores also predicted anxiety improvement, $F(1, 91)= 5.320$, $p=0.023$, $r^2=0.055$, with beta values ($B=0.180$) indicating a positive relationship.
- Pre-workshop anxiety scores also predicted anxiety improvement $F(1, 99)= 88.970$, $p<0.001$, $r^2=0.473$, with beta values ($B=0.587$) indicating a positive relationship.

Additionally, as was the case for PTSD and depression symptoms, we found improvement in anxiety to be positively correlated with improvement in affective empathy and to a lesser extent with improvement in forgiveness based on the following evidence:

- Improvement in affective empathy significantly predicted improvement in anxiety, as indicated by the model, $F(1, 99)= 6.944$, $p=0.010$, $r^2=0.066$, with

the beta values (B=0.957) indicating a positive relationship. This means that people who improved in affective empathy also improved in anxiety.

- Additionally, improvement in forgiveness trended toward a significant prediction of improvement in anxiety, as indicated by the model, $F(1, 97)= 3.181$, $p=0.078$, $r^2=0.032$, with the beta values (B=0.502) indicating a positive relationship, suggesting that people who improved in forgiveness also improved in anxiety.

Finally, we found the following non-significant results:

- Neither contact, number of dependents, income or amount of education significantly predicted anxiety improvement. When all of the variables were included in the regression, the overall model was not significant, $F(4, 90)= 0.147$, $p=0.964$. None of the individual variables significantly predicted improvement in anxiety.
- Improvement in other dependent variables did not predict improvement in anxiety. Using a linear regression, we determined that improvement in affective, cognitive and behavioral prejudice did not predict improvement in anxiety. Furthermore, improvement in tolerance, trust and cognitive empathy also failed to predict improvement in anxiety. Similarly pre-workshop affective empathy, cognitive empathy, tolerance, trust, and forgiveness also failed to predict depression improvement, as did affective, cognitive and behavioral prejudice.

Attitudes Toward Reconciliation

Summary: As part of a short series of questions designed to capture any shifts in opinions participants hold about current events and political issues, we examined

whether participants' opinions about the importance of reconciliation changed during the workshops. We found a trend toward a significant improvement in participant opinions about the importance of reconciliation. However, we were surprised to find that eight participants decreased the importance they placed on reconciliation following the workshops. After probing to understand the characteristics of these negative responders, we found that participants with higher initial depression and PTSD symptoms, but not necessarily anxiety symptoms, are more likely to believe that reconciliation is less important after participating in the workshop groups.

Results: In an effort to capture any potential societal effects of the workshops, we asked participants several questions about their views on current events and political issues. Of those questions, the only one that showed improvement was the question about reconciliation, which asked participants "Do you think it's important to repair relationships between groups?"

We used a Wilcoxon sign rank test to evaluate the change in participants and found a trend toward a significant improvement over time, $Z = -1.860$, $p = 0.063$, with 18 participants increasing their rank, 8 decreasing their rank and 76 participants reporting the same rank of importance. Although only a minority of participants decided that reconciliation was less important after the workshops, we found it surprising that there were any. We therefore tried to identify any psychometric assessments that may distinguish these participants from those who were positively or neutrally influenced by the workshops with regard to reconciliation.

We found that the participants who ranked reconciliation as less important after the workshops entered the workshops with higher PTSD and depression scores. We reached this conclusion based on the steps and the evidence detailed below:

- We first created a new grouping variable based on whether a participant regarded reconciliation as more important (positive responders), less important (negative responders) or those who did not change (non-responders).
- We then hypothesized that the reconciliation responder groups may differ in pre-workshop group psychopathology ratings. We therefore assessed symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety using a one-way ANOVA and Scheffe post-hoc tests.

PTSD:

- To assess the impact of PTSD symptoms, we ran a one-way ANOVA using the above-defined reconciliation groups as a grouping variable and PTSD scores as a dependent variable. The ANOVA was significant, $F(2, 94)= 5.316$, $p=0.007$, with Scheffe post hoc tests indicating that the negative responders ($M=60.57$) exhibited higher PTSD symptoms than both the non-responders ($M=41.25$), $p=0.015$ and the positive responders ($M=36.87$), $p=0.008$. There was no significant difference between positive responders and non-responders, $p=0.631$.
- We then hypothesized that PTSD symptoms at Q2 may directly predict the change in reconciliation, so we ran a simple linear regression, predicting reconciliation change from Q2 to Q3 with PTSD symptoms. The overall ANOVA was significant, $F(1, 93)=9.665$, $p=0.002$, $r^2=0.094$, with the beta values ($B= -0.011$) suggesting an inverse relationship between PTSD symptoms at Q2 and change in the perceived importance of reconciliation.
- We further hypothesized that PTSD symptoms could predict the initial perceived importance of reconciliation, which we examined with a linear

regression. However, the overall model was not significant, F(1, 96)=0.168, p=0.469. This suggests that PTSD symptoms are a good predictor of the change in perceived reconciliation importance, but not initial rankings of the same measure.

Depression:

- To assess the impact of depression symptoms, we ran a one-way ANOVA using the above-defined reconciliation groups as a grouping variable and depression scores as a dependent variable. The ANOVA was significant, F(2, 92)= 5.587, p=0.005, with Scheffe post hoc tests indicating that the negative responders (M=35.28) exhibited higher depression symptoms than both non responders, (M=24.19) p=0.014 and (M=21.61) positive responders, p=0.006. There was no significant difference between positive responders and negative responders, p=0.582.
- We then hypothesized that depression at Q2 may directly predict the change in reconciliation, so we ran a simple linear regression, predicting reconciliation change from Q2 to Q3 with depression symptoms. The overall ANOVA was significant, F(1, 91)=6.242, p=0.014, r^2=0.064, with the beta values (B= -0.016) suggesting an inverse relationship between depression symptoms at Q2 and change in the perceived importance of reconciliation, suggesting that people with higher levels of depression symptoms responded negatively to the workshops.
- We further hypothesized that depression symptoms could predict the initial perceived importance of reconciliation, which we examined with a linear regression. However, the overall model was not significant, F(1, 94)=0.266,

p=0.607. This suggests that depression symptoms are a good predictor of the change in perceived reconciliation importance, but not initial rankings of the same measure.

Anxiety:

- To assess the impact of anxiety symptoms, we ran a one-way ANOVA using the above-defined reconciliation groups as a grouping variable and anxiety scores as a dependent variable. The ANOVA was not significant, $F(2, 98)= 2.148$, $p=0.122$.
- It is possible that we did not find increased Q2 anxiety scores in negative responders because the low N in the negative responders group decreased the power of our analysis. So, we explored the possibility that the anxiety scores can predict the change in the perceived importance of reconciliation. We therefore ran a simple linear regression, predicting reconciliation change from Q2 to Q3 with anxiety symptoms. The overall ANOVA was not significant, $F(1, 99)=2.417$, $p=0.123$, suggesting that there is no relationship between anxiety symptoms at Q2 and change in the perceived importance of reconciliation.
- We further hypothesized that anxiety symptoms could predict the initial perceived importance of reconciliation, which we examined with a linear regression. However, the overall model was not significant, $F(1, 102)=0.059$, $p=0.808$. This suggests that anxiety symptoms are not a good overall predictor of the initial scores of, or the change in, the perceived importance of reconciliation.

Overall, these results suggest that participants with higher initial depression and PTSD symptoms, but not necessarily anxiety symptoms, are more likely to believe that reconciliation is less important after participating in the workshop groups.

Regressions: We chose to explore the hypothesis that we could predict participant's change in opinion about the importance of reconciliation using our dependent variables. Using a linear regression, we determined that improvement in behavioral and cognitive prejudice did not predict improvement in anxiety. Furthermore, improvement in tolerance, trust, affective empathy and cognitive empathy also failed to predict change in reconciliation. Additionally, no pre-workshop scores significantly predicted reconciliation improvement.

However, improvement in affective prejudice significantly predicted change in reconciliation opinion, as indicated by the model, $F(1, 100)= 5.627$, $p=0.020$, $r^2=0.053$, with the beta values ($B=0.039$) indicating a positive relationship. Additionally, improvement in affective empathy trended toward a significant prediction of change in reconciliation opinion, as indicated by the model, $F(1, 100)= 3.469$, $p=0.065$, $r^2=0.034$, with the beta values ($B=0.052$) indicating a positive relationship. Overall, these results suggest that reconciliation scores improved more in participants who also improved in affective prejudice or affective empathy.

Contact

Summary: Because of the large volume of research suggesting that intergroup contact leads to lower prejudice, and higher trust and forgiveness, we examined the relationship between initial levels of contact and our dependent variables—both before and after the workshops. Surprisingly, we found no relationship between initial levels of contact and prejudice, trust, tolerance, forgiveness or healing. However, we

found a strong relationship between contact and empathy. As discussed in the section on empathy above, we therefore expected to see a similar relationship between contact in the workshop setting and improvement in empathy scores, but instead we found that people who enter the workshops with higher levels of contact and therefore empathy, do worse in empathy improvement than those who enter with less interaction with members of the outgroup. While more research is needed to determine the precise meaning of these results, one explanation may be that empathy is a moderator of other variables such as prejudice and healing.

Results: We explored the hypothesis that the quality and quantity of contact with members of the outgroup before the workshop would predict initial levels of our dependent variables (prejudice, empathy, trust, tolerance, forgiveness and healing) or the improvement in these variables. Using a linear regression, we found that contact at Q2 did not predict *initial levels* of affective prejudice, $F(1,103)=1.888$, $p=0.172$; cognitive prejudice, $F(1,100)=0.586$, $p=0.446$; behavioral prejudice, $F(1,103)= 1.782$, $p=0.185$; trust, $F(1,103)=1.234$, $p=0.269$; tolerance, $F(1,103)=1.603$, $p=0.208$; forgiveness, $F(1,101)=0.004$, $p=0.950$; depression, $F(1,95)=0.427$, $p=0.515$; PTSD, $F(1,96)=0.085$, $p=0.771$; or anxiety, $F (1,103)=0.039$, $p=0.844$.

We also found that contact did not predict *improvement* in affective prejudice, $F(1,101)=0.001$, $p=0.976$; cognitive prejudice, $F(1,95)=0.028$, $p=0.868$; behavioral prejudice, $F(1,103)=0.742$, $p=0.391$; affective empathy, $F(1,100)=0.019$, $p=0.890$; forgiveness, $F(1,98)=0.391$, $p=0.533$; PTSD, $F(1,92)=0.710$, $p=0.402$; depression, $F(1,89)=1.507$, $p=0.223$; or anxiety, $F(1,99)=0.313$, $p=0.577$.

However, as described above in the section on empathy, we found that Q2 contact scores positively predicted Q2 cognitive empathy, $F(1,103)=17.134$, $p<0.001$, r^2

=0.143, B=0.922, and Q2 affective empathy scores before the workshops, F(1,103)=8.232, p=0.005, r^2 =0.74, B=0.411 with a stronger relationship toward cognitive over affective empathy. As discussed in the section on empathy above, this suggests that people with more contact with the outgroup, have more affective and cognitive empathy for that group.

However, we also found that contact measures positively predicted *improvement* in tolerance, F(1,100)=4.317, p=0.040, r^2 =0.041, B=0.570, but negatively predicted trust F(1,103)=4.450, p=0.037, r^2 =0.041, B=-0.539, and cognitive empathy, F(1,100)=7.122, p=0.009, r^2 =0.066, B=-0.609.These results suggest that while more initial contact with members of the outgroup predicts improvement in tolerance during the workshops, it does not predict a reduction of prejudice, or an increase in empathy, forgiveness or healing. Moreover, initial levels of contact negatively predict improvement in trust and cognitive empathy, meaning that people who have more contact with members of the outgroup before the workshops improve less on trust and cognitive empathy in the workshops.

Conclusion

Overall, the results of this study confirm previous research suggesting that intergroup contact can increase prejudice, trust, forgiveness and healing in a post-conflict context. As shown in Table 8 below, we found that a dialogue technique that integrates elements of participant storytelling is most effective at decreasing prejudice and increasing forgiveness, while the training technique was most effective at reducing symptoms of PTSD and modestly increasing trust.

Table 8:
Summary of Experimental Results

Dependent Variable	Results
Prejudice	• Dialogue-based contact reduced prejudice 2.64 points • No Δ in cognitive or behavioral prejudice
Empathy	• No Δ
Trust	• Training-based contact increased trust 0.54 points
Tolerance	• No Δ
Forgiveness	• Dialogue-based contact increased forgiveness 1.4 points
Healing	• Training-based contact reduced symptoms of PTSD 3.6 points • No Δ in depression or anxiety

However, these findings should be treated with cautious optimism as the effect sizes are relatively small and the study was subject to several sources of bias as described in Chapter 3. Because this is the first study to explicitly test the effects of a variety of contact techniques on a broad range of dependent variables in a post-conflict society, more research is needed to confirm these findings and determine which methods are most effective at promoting intergroup reconciliation.

To that end, Chapter 5 will discuss these results in the context of existing research and will suggest avenues for work that will help scholars and practitioners better understand how to promote the conditions for reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

This chapter will discuss the statistical results presented in chapter four in light of existing literature for each variable including prejudice, empathy, forgiveness, trust, healing and tolerance. It will attempt to explain the results of the study and identify gaps in the literature where uncertainty remains. The conclusion will discuss the implications of these results for both theory and practice, and suggest an agenda for future research.

Throughout, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that while the results of this experiment are modest, there is reason for cautious optimism that intergroup contact programs may have an important role to play in encouraging post-conflict reconciliation. As seen in chapter four, the dialogue methodology was the most effective at reducing prejudice and increasing forgiveness for participants regardless of identity group. The training workshops also saw moderate success in increasing trust and significant success at improving symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Moreover, while we did not see a significant improvement in empathy as a result of the workshops, improvement in affective empathy positively predicted improvement in prejudice and healing, suggesting that empathy may be mediating the relationship between facilitated contact and improvement in prejudice and healing. Tolerance was the only variable for which we have no significant findings.

While this chapter will seek to explain the nuance of these results, the overall findings suggest that facilitated intergroup contact has the potential not only to reduce prejudice, but to increase trust, forgiveness and healing. To be sure, more research is needed to determine the best methods for maximizing the effects of this work.

However, this study provides some of the first evidence that the effects of facilitated intergroup contact can translate into the highly-charged context of post-conflict societies and that "the findings obtained under relatively benign conditions of intergroup relations between experimentally created groups in the laboratory can be generalized to real-world social groups with a history of conflict and hostility, inequalities of status and power, and political struggle".[192]

Prejudice

This study shows that all three contact techniques—training, dialogue and mixed-methods-- were effective in reducing affective prejudice, regardless of the participant's identity group. However, we saw no corresponding change in cognitive or behavioral prejudice. These results strongly reinforce existing literature, which suggests that affective dimensions of prejudice (feelings and emotional responses toward the outgroup) may be more strongly affected by contact than cognitive dimensions of prejudice (perceptions and beliefs about the outgroup).

When Allport originally posited the contact hypothesis, he proposed that knowledge was the mediating factor linking contact to a reduction of prejudice.[193] He claimed that intergroup contact facilitated learning about the outgroup, and this new knowledge in turn reduced prejudice. However, as contact research continues to grow, new research indicates that affective components of prejudice such as liking, anxiety and empathy/perspective-taking may be more strongly affected by contact than the perceptions, judgments, and beliefs that form the basis of cognitive prejudice.[194]

---

[192] Brewer and Gaertner, "Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization," 301.
[193] Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*.
[194] R.D. Ashmore and F.K. Del Boca, "Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping," in *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior*, ed. D.L. Hamilton (Hillsdale, NJ:

For example, social psychology has repeatedly shown that greater exposure to targets can, in and of itself, significantly enhance liking for those targets, a main component of affective prejudice.[195] Moreover, studies with social targets have shown that the enhanced liking that results from exposure can generalize to greater liking for other related, yet previously unknown, social targets.[196] Pettigrew and Tropp note that if this work on exposure is applied to contact theory, it implies that all things being equal, greater contact and familiarity with members of other groups should enhance liking for those groups, possibly explaining why Allport's conditions of contact do not prove to be essential for positive effects of contact to emerge.[197]

Moreover, Stangor et al. have posited that affective components may be stronger determinants of prejudice than cognitive components because affective responses are based on direct and therefore highly self-relevant experiences with the target group members, whereas stereotypes may often be learned from secondary sources.[198] To the extent that direct, self-relevant experiences produce stronger attitudinal responses in comparison to indirect experience, then affect would be expected to be a strong predictor of prejudice.[199] This may explain why the dialogue technique produced greater improvements in affective prejudice than either the training or mixed method

---

Erlbaum, 1981); I. Katz and R. Hass, "Racial Ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32(1988).

[195] R.F. Bornstein, "Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968-1987," *Psychological Bulletin* 106(1989); E. Harmon-Jones and J.J.B. Allen, "The role of affect in the mere exposure effect: Evidence from physiological and individual differences approaches," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27(2001); A.Y. Lee, "The mere exposure effect: An uncertainty reduction explanation revisited," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27(2001); R.B. Zajonc, "Attitudinal effects of mere exposure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 9 (Monograph Suppl. 2(1968); G.C. Homans, *The human group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1950); Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."

[196] G. Rhodes, J. Halberstadt, and G. Brajkovich, "Generalization of mere exposure effects to averaged composite faces," *Social Cognition* 19(2001); Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory," 753.

[197] ———, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."

[198] Stangor, Sullivan, and Ford, "Affective and Cognitive Determinants of Prejudice."

[199] Ibid.

workshops as it is likely that the more intimate, interpersonal process of storytelling was a more direct, self-relevant experience for participants than training-based methodologies in which there was less opportunity for direct interaction of a personal nature.

The results of this study therefore lend strong support to research showing that contact has a more significant effect on affective rather than cognitive components of prejudice. It also supports research suggesting that affective components of prejudice are reduced through direct, self-relevant experiences with members of the outgroup. While it is the work of future research to demonstrate whether sustained contact, or repeated contact in a facilitated setting can begin to break down the cognitive and behavioral components of prejudice, this work suggests that the more intimate environment of a dialogue-based workshop is likely to produce greater gains on prejudice reduction than less personal training-based methodologies.

Empathy

This study hypothesized that facilitated contact would lead to an increase in empathy, both affective and cognitive, for participants. However, we found no evidence of any significant increase in empathy as a result of the workshops. Yet, we found that empathy may be mediating, or enabling, the relationship between contact and variables such as prejudice, forgiveness, trust, tolerance and healing.

Specifically, we found evidence that empathy may be mediating the relationship between prejudice and healing in the fact that while the workshops did not produce a significant improvement in empathy, they did lead to significant improvements in prejudice and healing, which in turn were predicted by improvement in affective empathy. This linkage supports the idea that affective empathy may be mediating the

relationship between facilitated contact and improvement in prejudice and healing, and is in line with previous studies, which show that affective factors such as empathy and anxiety mediate the contact-prejudice relationship.[200]

Other research is also showing that contact with the outgroup in the form of close cross-group relationships can be highly effective in reducing intergroup prejudice[201] to the extent that these relationships encourage empathy with outgroup members.[202] For example, Voci and Hewstone have shown intergroup contact with immigrants in Italy to be positively associated with empathy for immigrants, which in turn was positively associated with outgroup attitudes toward immigrants and negatively associated with subtle prejudice against immigrants.[203] Other work has demonstrated that empathy mediates the contact-prejudice relationship in post-conflict societies such as Northern Ireland[204] and South Africa.[205]

In addition, Hewstone et al. have found significant positive correlations not only between contact and prejudice, but between contact with outgroup friends and

---

[200] Miles Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact in a Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland," in *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion*, ed. D. Abrams, J.M. Marques, and M.A. Hogg (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2005).

[201] Thomas Pettigrew, F., "Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 23(1997); S.C. Wright et al., "The extended contact effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73(1997); S. Levin, C. Van Laar, and J. Sidanius, "The effects of ingroup and outgroup friendships on ethnic attitudes in college: A longitudinal study," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6(2003); Stefania Paolini et al., "Effects of direct and indirect cross-group friendships on judgments of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of an anxiety-reduction mechanism," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30(2004).

[202] K. Finlay and W.G. Stephan, "Reducing prejudice: The effects of empathy on intergroup attitudes," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 30(2000); Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact in a Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland."

[203] Voci and Hewstone, "Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in Italy: The mediational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience."

[204] E. Myers, M. Hewstone, and E. Cairns, "Impact of conflict on mental health in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of intergroup forgiveness and collective guilt.," *Political Psychology* 30(2009).

[205] Hermann Swart et al., "Achieving forgiveness and trust in postconflict societies: The importance of self-disclosure and empathy," in *Moving Beyond Prejudice Reduction: Pathways to Positive Intergroup Relations*, ed. Linda R. Tropp and Robyn K. Mallett (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2011); ibid.

forgiveness, trust, and perspective-taking (the cognitive component of empathy).[206] They suggest that this may be because having a close outgroup friend promotes perspective taking, which seems to be a mediator in predicting outgroup attitudes, trust and forgiveness.[207]

While we did not find any evidence that the quantity or quality of contact with members of the outgroup before the workshops predicted initial levels of prejudice, trust, tolerance, forgiveness, PTSD, depression or anxiety, we found that contact scores before the workshops did positively predict both cognitive and affective empathy scores before the workshops, with a stronger relationship toward cognitive over affective empathy. This implies that people with more contact with the outgroup have greater initial levels of empathy for that group. Further, we found that initial levels of empathy predicted initial levels of contact, prejudice, trust and forgiveness, providing further support for the idea that empathy may be mediating the relationship between contact and prejudice, trust and forgiveness.

Finally, we found that initial levels of outgroup contact did not predict *improvement* in prejudice, affective empathy, forgiveness, PTSD, depression or anxiety. However, we found that initial levels of outgroup contact positively predicted improvement in tolerance, but negatively predicted improvement in trust and cognitive empathy. Similarly, we also found that initial levels of empathy for the outgroup negatively predicted improvement in both cognitive and affective empathy during the workshops.

This means that people who entered the workshops with higher initial levels of

[206] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland."
[207] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact in a Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland."

outgroup contact and greater empathy toward the outgroup, improved on tolerance toward the outgroup, but got slightly worse on measures of trust, affective and cognitive empathy as a result of the workshops. These results suggest that there may be a ceiling effect occurring with regard to empathy and trust for participants who enter the workshops with high levels of preexisting contact, and therefore high levels of empathy for the outgroup such that we should not expect high empathy individuals to become more empathetic or trusting as a result of contact. This indicates that facilitated intergroup contact may be better suited to participants with less preexisting contact, and therefore lower initial levels of empathy for the outgroup.

While more research is needed to determine whether empathy is indeed mediating the relationship between contact and *improvement* in variables such as prejudice, trust, forgiveness and healing, this study supports the growing body of research suggesting that empathy may play a strong mediating role in the relationship between contact and variables thought to contribute to reconciliation. Moreover, it suggests that while empathy may not change directly as a result of contact interventions, it may be mediating, or supporting an erosion of prejudice and an improvement of trust, forgiveness and healing.

Forgiveness

In contrast to Hewstone et al., who found that forgiveness was positively associated with trust, perspective taking, outgroup attitudes, and contact with outgroup friends in the context of Northern Ireland, we did not find a relationship between pre-workshop

levels of forgiveness, trust, empathy (perspective taking) or contact with the outgroup.[208]

However, we did find a relationship between facilitated contact and forgiveness, as the dialogue and mixed methods workshops lead to a significant improvement in forgiveness for both GAM and PETA participants.[209] In addition, we found that participants who had higher affective prejudice scores before undergoing the workshops improved more on forgiveness scores in the dialogue and training groups, suggesting that participants with higher initial levels of prejudice may benefit most from intergroup workshops in terms of improving forgiveness.

The psychological link between forgiveness and prejudice is perhaps unsurprising as forgiveness requires a modification of attitude or emotional responses, and prejudice is considered an attitude.[210] While more research is needed to disentangle the precise relationship between forgiveness and outgroup attitudes, the fact that affective prejudice improvement significantly predicts forgiveness improvement in the training and mixed technique groups suggests that the training technique may be changing forgiveness scores via affective prejudice or vice versa.

One possible explanation of why the workshops increased forgiveness is that they were facilitating a reduction of anger. While we did not measure anger directly in this study, previous studies have shown that the decision to forgive is associated with the

[208] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland.": 114
[209] The training workshops resulted in an improvement in forgiveness for GAM, but not for PETA.
[210] E.D. Scobie and G.E.W. Scobie, "Damaging events: The Perceived need for forgiveness," *Journal for the theory of social behavior* 28(1998); Janice Haaken, "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Psychoanalytic and cultural perspectives on forgiveness," in *Before forgiving: cautionary views of forgiveness in psychotherapy*, ed. Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie G. Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 182.

release of feelings of anger and revenge towards the offender.[211] Čehajić, Brown et al. also similarly found that intergroup forgiveness involves a reduction of feelings of revenge, anger and mistrust toward the perpetrator group and intentions to understand, approach and engage with its members.[212] As will be seen in the section on healing, a reduction of anger may be mediating not only improvement in forgiveness, but a reduction of PTSD symptoms as well.

Trust

While we found that the training groups produced a statistically significant improvement in trust, this change may not be clinically significant as the means improved by only 0.54 points on the trust scale. While previous research in Northern Ireland has indicated that both direct and indirect intergroup contact are positively associated with outgroup trust[213] and outgroup trust is positively associated with positive behavioral action tendencies toward the outgroup, we found only moderate evidence to support this.[214]

One explanation for this difference may be the fact that the research in Northern Ireland focused solely on preexisting contact with members of the outgroup, while this study looks at the effects of both preexisting as well as facilitated intergroup contact. As such, it is possible that the effects of preexisting contact are more potent

---

[211] Michael E.; Fincham McCullough, Frank D.; Tsang, Jo-Ann "Forgiveness, forbearance, and time: The temporal unfolding of transgression-related interpersonal motivations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84, no. 3 (2003); R.D. & the Human Development Study Group Enright, "The moral development of forgiveness," in *Handbook of moral behavior and development*, ed. W. Kurtines and J. Gerwitz (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991).

[212] Sabina Čehajić, Rupert Brown, and Emanuele Castano, "Forgive and forget? Antecedents and consequences of intergroup forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 3 (2008).

[213] Myers, Hewstone, and Cairns, "Impact of conflict on mental health in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of intergroup forgiveness and collective guilt.."; T. Tam et al., "Intergroup trust in Northern Ireland," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35(2009).

[214] ———, "Intergroup trust in Northern Ireland."

than those of facilitated contact and that it cannot be assumed that facilitated contact will have the same trust-enhancing effects as preexisting contact.

It is also possible that the observational methodology used in the Northern Ireland studies introduced a significant amount of bias into the study, such that the study results are overestimated. As Gerber, Green and Kaplan have suggested, the risk of bias in observational research is typically much greater than in experimental studies because while observational studies also examine the effects of variation in a set of independent variables, this variation is not generated through randomization procedures.[215] Subsequently, researchers have to make assumptions about the statistical relationship between observed and unobserved causes of the dependent variable, which increases the likelihood of producing inaccurate results. It is therefore possible that the Northern Ireland studies overestimated the effect of contact on trust and that the results we obtained under the experimental conditions of this study are a more precise measure of the effect of contact on trust.

A third explanation may be that we should expect to see fewer gains in trust as this study was conducted in the context of a developing country, Indonesia, while the Northern Ireland study is a case of a developed country with a more established rule of law and less corruption. As Bo Rothstein explains, "The problem of low interpersonal trust comes from discriminated groups having been forced to live under public institutions that have been, or which they have believed to be, deeply dysfunctional for them."[216] He further notes that "people who interpret life in terms of

[215] Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Edward H. Kaplan, "The illusion of learning from observational research," in *Problems and methods in the study of politics*, ed. Ian Shapiro, Rogers Smith, and Tarek Massoud (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 251.
[216] Bo Rothstein, "Social trust and honesty in government: A causal mechanisms approach," in *Creating social trust in post-socialist transitions*, ed. János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 23.

corruption are not only likely to mistrust public authorities; they are also unlikely to trust other people in general. The corruption of the authorities can thus be seen as a main source of social distrust."[217] It is possible that this theory explains why contact produced less trust in the context of Indonesia than Northern Ireland.

A final explanation for the slight improvement in trust is that it is perhaps not surprising that we saw greater gains in prejudice and forgiveness than in trust given that it may be easier to improve outgroup attitudes than it is to build trust. While prejudice and forgiveness may be considered outgroup attitudes, outgroup trust has been defined as a positive expectation about the intentions and behavior of an outgroup toward the ingroup.[218] Outgroup trust therefore requires ingroup members to make themselves vulnerable to the intentions of the outgroup, while outgroup attitudes such as prejudice and forgiveness do not.[219] As such, outgroup trust might be regarded as distinct from one's outgroup attitudes and far more difficult to achieve than out-group liking, a key component of prejudice.[220]

One particular reason why outgroup trust may be more difficult to achieve than outgroup liking, or a reduction of prejudice, is that more effort is often required to establish trust than is required to destroy it.[221] Where it may require multiple positive encounters, or "trustworthy" behaviors, to build trust, it often requires only one "untrustworthy" act or betrayal to arouse distrust that is very resistant to change.[222] For this reason, the outgroup distrust stemming from a history of intergroup conflict

[217] Ibid., 14.
[218] R.J. Lewicki, D.J. McAllister, and R.J. Bies, "Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities," *Academy of Management Review* 23(1998).
[219] Tam et al., "Intergroup trust in Northern Ireland."
[220] Hewstone et al., "Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of "The Troubles"."
[221] Swart et al., "Achieving forgiveness and trust in postconflict societies: The importance of self-disclosure and empathy.": 192
[222] M. Rothbart and B. Park, "On the confirmability and disconfirmability of trait concepts," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50(1986).

often remains evident in post-conflict societies long after the conflict itself has ended.[223] As such, it is possible to enhance outgroup liking, or reduce prejudice, while distrust of the outgroup remains prevalent.

Lewicki and Wiethoff have argued that creating and maintaining mutual trust is essential for the establishment of positive intergroup relations because, as a process, trust building is capable of replacing suspicion, fear, and anger with benevolence and cooperation.[224] Trust allows suspicion and distrust of the outgroup, which is often characterized by self-imposed segregation or negative behaviors toward the outgroup, to be replaced with a greater willingness to engage with the outgroup in a cooperative, constructive manner.[225]

Lewicki and Wiethoff distinguish between calculus-based trust and identification-based trust.[226] Calculus-based trust is generally non-intimate and task-oriented, whereas identification-based trust is often more intimate in nature, relying on a greater understanding and appreciation of the two parties' needs. Calculus-based trust is often witnessed in the early stages of intimate, personal relationships, whereas identification-based trust comes to the fore in relationships characterized by greater closeness as the result of repeated self-disclosure, or the voluntary sharing of personal information, which by its very nature requires a certain degree of trust in the person with whom this personal information is being shared.[227] While initial self-disclosures between individuals who are only beginning to get to know one another are bound to

[223] e.g., Gibson, *Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation?*
[224] R.J. Lewicki and C. Wiethoff, "Trust, trust development, and trust repair," in *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*, ed. M. Deutsch and P.T. Coleman (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000).
[225] R.M. Kramer and P.J. Carnevale, "Trust and intergroup negotiation," in *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes*, ed. R. Brown and S. Gaertner (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001); Lewicki and Wiethoff, "Trust, trust development, and trust repair."
[226] _____, "Trust, trust development, and trust repair."
[227] R.E. Petty and H.L. Mirels, "Intimacy and scarcity of self-disclosure: Effects on interpersonal attraction for males and females," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 7(1981).

be relatively superficial, requiring minimal trust, these self-disclosures will become more intimate as the interpersonal relationship develops, requiring increasingly more trust.

It is therefore possible that the three-day workshop period was insufficient for participants to build identification-based trust, and that the small statistical gains we saw are attributable to an increase in calculus-based trust, but a continued lack of identification-based trust. This theory would suggest that repeated encounters with the same members of the outgroup would eventually result in an increase in trust scores. This theory strongly supports a second phase of this study that would bring participants together for a second and third round of contact to evaluate further changes to outgroup attitudes and trust. Moreover, while this study did not include separate measures of calculus-based or identification-based trust, future studies could use a measure of trust that seeks to disaggregate the two to enhance understanding of how to increase trust.

Healing

Given that the dialogue-based workshops encourage story-telling elements that resemble conventional psychotherapy, I expected the dialogue groups to help alleviate symptoms of PTSD, depression and anxiety. Yet, surprisingly, it was the groups that used the training or mixed methods that alleviated some PTSD symptoms, with no significant difference between participants who identified with GAM or PETA. Also surprising was the fact that the training and mixed methods workshops alleviated PTSD symptoms but not depression or anxiety symptoms.

This may be because the training and mixed methods workshops were tapping into constructs of anger management through a focus on conflict resolution techniques that

helped alleviate symptoms of anger for those suffering from PTSD. Anger is a distinct symptom of PTSD that exists less for those suffering from depression and is absent in those suffering from anxiety, which may explain why we saw a significant improvement in symptoms of PTSD, but not in symptoms of depression or anxiety.

In his work treating Cambodian refugees, Devon Hinton, M.D., Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, has shown that anger plays an important role in the psychopathology of refugees suffering from PTSD, with patients with PTSD scoring significantly higher on the Anger Reaction Index.[228] In his clinical work, he has found that among other treatments, patients should be taught anger-management skills, including culturally consonant methods such as meditation and religious approaches.[229] It may be that the strong focus on conflict resolution techniques such as communication skills and "local wisdom," or religious and cultural approaches used by the facilitators to encourage a sense of commonality between the participants served in part as anger management training.

Interestingly, Hewstone et al. have found that intergroup contact positively predicted empathy and out-group attitude, but negatively predicted a distinct intergroup emotions factor of anger-related emotions (angry, hatred, furious, irritated), meaning that more contact predicted less anger.[230] In turn, anger negatively predicted, and empathy positively predicted, forgiveness. These findings are in line with the explanation by Hinton that the training and mixed method workshops were tapping into constructs of anger management, and therefore alleviating symptoms of PTSD. However, this does not explain why the dialogue workshops did not produce the same

[228] Devon E. Hinton et al., "Anger, PTSD, and the nuclear family: A study of Cambodian refugees," *Social Science and Medicine* 69(2009).
[229] Ibid.: 1393
[230] Hewstone et al., "Stepping stones to reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup contact, forgiveness and trust."

effect.

The fact that the dialogue-based workshops did not lead to an increase in healing for participants or alleviation of symptoms of PTSD, depression or anxiety may be explained by some key differences between the dialogue-based workshop and prolonged exposure therapy. Prolonged exposure therapy mainly consists of repeated imaginal exposure to the traumatic memory until the patient becomes distressed. After months of weekly exposure the strong emotions associated with the traumatic event become extinguished. However, the treatment can be arduous and studies are beginning to show that ethnic minorities and refugees are even less tolerant of this therapy than more educated Western populations.[231] Comparatively, the dialogue-based workshop groups may have exposed participants to traumatic memories, but not allowed for complete extinction of the strong emotions associated with the traumatic event.

Another possible explanation may be that the storytelling methods used in the dialogue workshops invoked anxiety toward the outgroup, which acted as a counterweight to gains made in anger management. Storytelling relies heavily on reciprocal self-disclosure in which participants share information about their experiences during the conflict or with the outgroup. While self-disclosure is an important friendship-developing and trust-building mechanism[232] and proved to be effective at reducing prejudice and increasing forgiveness in this study, the danger of entering into group-level self-disclosure too early in the initial interactions is that it may evoke negative responses, such as intergroup anxiety, that would lower the

[231] K.; Resick Lester, P.A.; Young-Xu, Y.; Artz, C., "Impact of race on early treatment termination and outcomes in posttraumatic stress disorder treatment," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 78(2010).
[232] Thomas Pettigrew, F., "Intergroup contact theory," *Annual Review of Psychology* 49(1998).

perceived quality of the contact experience.[233] While this does not seem to have been a problem for prejudice reduction, it may have had a negative impact on healing. It is possible that by incorporating more therapeutic principles into the dialogue workshops we can invoke an outcome that is positive for prejudice, forgiveness and healing. However more work is needed to determine the best methods for incorporating these principles.

Tolerance

The study showed no significant change in tolerance for any of the participants, regardless of group or workshop method. I thought perhaps this was due to the limited scale we used to measure tolerance, which used only three questions based on James Gibson's conceptualization of tolerance in South Africa as the commitment of people to put up with each other, even those whose political ideas they thoroughly detest. On a four-point Likert scale, I therefore asked participants to rate the following statements:

- Members of the outgroup should be prohibited from standing as a candidate for an elected position
- Members of the outgroup should be allowed to hold street demonstrations in your community
- The outgroup should be officially banned in your community

However, the fact that responses to these questions did not significantly change throughout the workshops is reinforced by the fact that participant responses to the questions regarding social and political issues also did not show a significant change. While these questions were initially intended to serve as a proxy for potential societal-

[233] R. Brown and M. Hewstone, "An integrative theory of intergroup contact," *Advances in Experimental Psychology* 37(2005).

level impact of the workshops, they could also be interpreted as an alternative way of measuring tolerance. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements:

1. Do you agree that refugees/IDPs who fled the region during the conflict should return?

2. Do you agree that the return of refugees/IDPs to the region will cause violence?

3. Do you believe reconciliation between groups is important?

Of these three questions, only opinions about the importance of reconciliation between groups showed a significant improvement as a result of the workshops. Indeed, the fact that attitudes toward reconciliation improved is not surprising, given that in all workshops, facilitators discussed the concept of reconciliation and repeatedly reiterated its importance. Moreover, all workshops ended with a discussion of what participants could do within their own communities to encourage reconciliation. As such, it would have been surprising if we didn't see significant gains on attitudes toward reconciliation. However, the fact that we didn't see any significant gains on the other two questions seems to confirm that there was no change in tolerance as a result of the workshops.

One interesting caveat to our findings on reconciliation is that participants with higher initial depression and PTSD symptoms were more likely to believe that reconciliation is *less* important after participating in the workshops. This finding is similar to that of Stover and Weinstein who also found that individuals who reported a high number of

traumatic experiences and had negative pre-war relationships with the opposing group were less open to reconciliation.[234]

However, we also found that individuals who entered the workshops highly symptomatic of PTSD showed improvement in trust, PTSD, depression and anxiety scores.[235] On balance, it therefore seems that highly symptomatic individuals benefit from the workshops with the exception of improvement in attitudes toward reconciliation. As such, it may be that incorporating more of the training methodology into the dialogue technique, with a particular focus on anger management techniques, would help improve attitudes toward reconciliation.

Conclusion

While the results of this study are modest, they do demonstrate that intergroup contact can not only reduce prejudice, but increase trust, forgiveness and healing in post-conflict contexts. While it appears that dialogue-based facilitation methodologies are the most effective for changing outgroup attitudes (prejudice and forgiveness), training-based or mixed method workshops may be more effective at improving trust and alleviating PTSD symptoms. This suggests that in the future, a single workshop that incorporates elements of training, particularly those focused on anger management techniques may be able to produce a reduction of prejudice as well as an increase in forgiveness, trust and healing.

Importantly, this work also provides initial evidence that may contribute to building a theory of reconciliation as it a) provides the first empirical data on the effects of

[234] Stover and Weinstein, *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*.
[235] We know this because pre-workshop PTSD, depression and anxiety scores are correlated with post-workshop improvement in trust, forgiveness, PTSD, depression and anxiety scores.

contact which can be built upon by other scholars to flesh out a theoretical framework for reconciliation, and b) indicates a potential sequencing of psychological changes that may occur as a result of contact. As discussed above, variables that require a modification of outgroup attitudes such as prejudice and forgiveness improved more after one contact session than trust. While this study found the effects of contact on trust to be minimal, it is possible that repeated contact between groups may deepen gains in trust. As such, future contact studies should attempt to measure the effect of multiple meetings between groups that may allow participants the time and space to develop intimate or identification-based trust and deepen gains in prejudice, forgiveness and healing.

To reflect these theoretical contributions, I have modified the model developed in Chapter 2 to include a continuum of contact over time. Based on this research, it is possible that we should expect to see variables such as prejudice, forgiveness and healing change following initial contact sessions, and continue to improve with each additional experience of intergroup contact. Given the findings on trust, I propose that we might expect that trust would begin to improve slightly in the first contact session, but would gain momentum in subsequent interactions as calculus-based trust evolves into identification-based trust. As such, a theoretical model of reconciliation might look like this:



While this diagram presents a proposed theoretical framework for reconciliation, more questions than answers remain and a robust research agenda will be the key to developing a better understanding of how to create the conditions for reconciliation. As such, I would like to propose several themes on which future research should focus:

1. Continue to examine the effects of intergroup contact not only on prejudice reduction, but on a range of variables that may prove critical to reconciliation such as forgiveness, empathy, trust, tolerance and healing. In particular, the relationship between empathy and contact needs to be better understood;
2. Expand the body of case studies that examine the effects of contact in conflict-affected societies;
3. Determine the best methods for facilitating intergroup contact. This should include testing the effect of incorporating more therapeutic methodologies into dialogue workshops to explore whether a mixed method workshop that is heavily based on dialogue can simultaneously produce a reduction of prejudice as well as an increase in forgiveness and improvement in PTSD symptoms. Therapeutic approaches that provide additional support for participants following storytelling sessions as well as a focus on anger management

techniques could be incorporated to produce an effect that captures the benefits of both dialogue and training workshops;

4. Test the effect of repeated interaction between participants through subsequent contact in facilitated settings, particularly to determine whether trust increases as a result of repeated exposure to the outgroup;
5. Develop innovative ways to capture societal level effects of the workshops, possibly by tracking participant progress in their home villages following the workshops;
6. Use similar field experimental methodology to assess the impact of other non-contact based interventions on reconciliation such as political and structural changes, truth-telling, etc. The accumulation of data will help confirm the relationship between various interventions and the psychological changes necessary for reconciliation;
7. Finally, a long-term agenda would begin to compare all of the above findings from various conflict-affected contexts to understand the threshold at which enough reconciliation has occurred such that societies no longer relapse into violence. This would ultimately provide practitioners with a guideline for when to initiate and discontinue interventions designed to create the conditions for reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

In addition, I would like to highlight several implications of this study for practitioners seeking to replicate or adapt this research in various conflict-affected contexts:

1. ***Field experiments:*** While in theory, field experiments present a rigorous methodology for exploring causal claims, the reality of working in conflict-

affected settings often poses unanticipated challenges that introduce bias into the most well-planned study design, which in turn jeopardizes the precision of the results. As such, while field experimentation should be an important tool for making empirical gains regarding the causal effects of peacebuilding interventions, the challenges associated with this methodology should be well understood by those both designing future experimental studies, as well as those seeking to interpret their results.

As such, it is important to note that the key challenge in field experimentation is ensuring the random allocation of subjects to treatment. Insofar as possible, it is essential to control assignment to treatment, such that treated and untreated units are identical except that one group receives the treatment while the other does not. This has several implications for practitioners:

- Allocate sufficient time and money to the process of selecting participants and assigning them to treatment groups. Problems such as those described in Chapter 3 in which participants are misidentified, drop out of the study, and/or participate but their data cannot be used introduce bias into the study and should be avoided wherever possible.
- "Randomization" in the context of field experiments has a different meaning than its colloquial usage. To ensure proper statistical randomization, ideally you would complete the participant selection, send all data to a statistician and have them randomly assign individuals to treatment. This "double-blind design" avoids introducing bias that may be present if the researcher assigns individuals to treatment or control based on known characteristics of participants. It also ensures that the participants will be properly assigned to

treatment or control based on sound statistical logic. If you do not have access to a statistician, use a statistics package to generate a random number for each subject, then sort all subjects in ascending order. Finally assign them randomly to treatment and control groups. This allows your work to be replicated by other researchers and is perhaps the most important methodological step in a field experiment.

- The method of data collection for the treatment and control groups should be identical. In this study, lack of financial resources lead me to choose to collect data from workshop participants in the workshop venue before and after the workshops, while data collection for control group members was done in their villages. Additionally, different enumerators were used to collect data in the workshops versus in the field to avoid additional transportation costs. Ideally, future experiments would allocate sufficient funds to implement a uniform method of data collection for all study participants. This implies that the same enumerators would collect data in the same manner for all participants.
- Additionally, it would be ideal to collect participant data several weeks after the trainings rather than immediately following the workshops to capture whether the effects of the workshops remain or whether a sense of euphoria was driving the post-workshop results.
- Finally, navigating the political and security environment will be an unavoidable challenge for all intergroup contact programs and time should be built into program timelines and budgets to manage unanticipated obstacles. Where possible, securing high level political support for the project can be helpful, though relying on this support for program implementation may prove fatal if the political mood changes. As such, securing political buy-in may be

helpful, but weigh carefully the risks associated with partnering with high-level political or government agencies.

2. ***Participant Selection:***

- In this study, we aimed to select participants who were either members of, or sympathizers with, GAM or PETA, and scored 15 or higher on the measure of affective prejudice included in Survey 1 (Appendix A). However, in future experiments, it may be more effective to use the measure of affective empathy on the first survey and select study participants who have low initial levels of empathy for the outgroup, rather than selecting those who have high levels of prejudice. The reason for this is that we found initial levels of empathy to be correlated with less intergroup contact, more prejudice, less trust and less forgiveness, so highly prejudiced people would still be selected by using the empathy scale instead of the prejudice scale.

  In addition, improvement in affective empathy was associated with those who entered the workshops with low levels of empathy, and this improvement was positively correlated with improvement in all forms of prejudice (affective, cognitive and behavioral), as well as in all forms of healing (PTSD, depression and anxiety). Therefore, using the empathy scale to select participants would focus selection on people who will benefit most from the workshops and target highly prejudiced individuals with low empathy, less trust, less forgiveness and fewer contact experiences with members of the outgroup.

3. ***Workshop Design***

- In future experiments, I recommend testing a single hybrid workshop method

that enhances the dialogue methodology used in this study to incorporate a) more therapeutic methodology that aims to better prepare participants for storytelling and help them resolve outstanding emotions; and b) elements of the training workshops such as anger management techniques that may be responsible for reducing symptoms of PTSD. This may require either lengthening the workshops or, ideally holding repeated workshops with the same participants. In theory, this hybrid model would be expected to produce a reduction of prejudice, as well as an increase in forgiveness, trust and healing.

Finally, as research continues to weaken the link between reconciliation and the transitional justice mechanisms of truth-telling, it is important for peacebuilding practitioners to consider other means of achieving reconciliation.[236] While the results of this study are modest, they provide the first empirical evidence that intergroup contact programs may offer an effective complement for encouraging reconciliation in conflict-affected societies. However, as more questions than answers remain, it is essential that scholars and practitioners develop a robust research agenda that seeks to advance both the theory and practice of reconciliation.

[236] Mendeloff, "Trauma and vengeance: Assessing the psychological and emotional effects of post-conflict justice."; O'Connell, "Gambling with the psyche: Does prosecuting human rights violators console their victims?."; Thoms, Ron, and Paris, "The effects of transitional justice mechanisms: A summary of empirical research findings and implications for analysts and practitioners."; Brounéus, "The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan gacaca courts on psychological health."

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FIRST INTERVIEW

I. INTERVIEWER IDENTIFICATION

Enumerator:
Date:
Participant #:
Start time:

II. CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH STUDY

You are being asked to take part in a research project that will evaluate the conflict resolution program being implemented by . The evaluation is being supported by Rachel Schiller, a PhD student from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, USA and will ensure that the information needed to evaluate the success of the program is obtained.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this research project is to learn more about how contact between groups in a post-conflict society effects intergroup relations. As a participant in the program, you are in a position to provide us with valuable insight about your experience throughout the process. We would therefore appreciate if you would be willing to complete a questionnaire about your experience three times throughout the program—once today, once at the beginning of the program, and once after the final session of the program. You may also be asked to participate in an interview following the conclusion of the program.

PROCEDURES: We expect that each interview will take approximately 1-2 hours and will be conducted by a staff member from X. Each person who participates in this study is extremely important to the outcome of the study. Two thirds of the people who fill out the first questionnaire will be invited to come to Banda Aceh to participate in some training sessions. One third will participate in the study by filling out questionnaires. The selection of who will come to the training will be made completely randomly by Ms. Rachel Schiller. Your answers on the questionnaire do not influence the likelihood that you will be selected to attend the trainings. We would therefore appreciate if you can answer the questions as honestly as possible.

Confidentiality is very important to us. Your name will not appear on the questionnaire and the questionnaires will be placed in a sealed envelope at the end of the interview. Your responses will only be known by X staff.

The first questionnaire will be administered today in your village. You will receive 50,000 Rupiah for filling out the questionnaire. Approximately two weeks after completing the first survey, you will be contacted by a X staff member who will inform you whether you have been selected in the random process to attend a three day training session in Banda Aceh. If you are selected to attend a training in Banda Aceh, the staff member will provide you with dates and travel information. Your transportation, hotel and food costs will be covered by the program. A total of six trainings are expected to take place between April 1 and April 30, 2011.

During the interview, if you are tired or need a break, please take as much time as you need to rest so that you are able to give your full attention to answering the questions on the questionnaire.

If you do not understand the questions, please ask the X staff member to clarify the questions.

Finally, with your permission we would like to take photographs. The photographs will be used in program reports and to present our research at various conferences in order that others can learn from this experience.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND RISK: There is some risk of discomfort when discussing topics that could bring to mind distressing or emotional memories. Please know though that you do not have to answer any questions or discuss any topics that make you feel uncomfortable. Should you require assistance as a result of any distress occurring during the program or wish to discuss your feelings or experiences with a professional, the facilitators will be able to provide you with references for qualified mental health professionals in Aceh.

Additionally, there is also risk involved if you divulge information regarding human rights abuses within the program setting as this information may not be safeguarded by other study participants and may become public information. Program facilitators will try to minimize this risk by requesting information shared in the sessions to remain confidential, but you should be aware that the facilitators may be unable to control the actions of participants.

WITHDRAWAL OF PARTICIPATION: Should you decide at any time during the program, questionnaires or interviews that you no longer wish to participate, you may withdraw your consent by informing the facilitators that you no longer wish to participate without any penalty to you. Your participation throughout the program is however very important and we certainly hope that you will be able to attend all of the sessions.

COSTS AND BENEFITS: If you are part of the third of participants who are randomly selected to participate in three questionnaires you will receive Rp. 50,000 for each questionnaire that you complete for a total of Rp. 150,000.
If you are part of the two thirds of participants who are randomly selected to participate in the trainings in Banda Aceh you will receive Rp. 50,000 for filling out the first questionnaire and the following items will be paid for you:

- Transport to Banda Aceh from your village by mini bus organized by X. The mini bus will travel at night and you will arrive in Banda Aceh in the morning on the day before your training allowing you a day to rest in Banda Aceh.
- A cash-payment of a total of 40,000 Rp made to you by X to pay for snacks on the ride to (20,000 Rupiah) and from (20,000 Rupiah) Banda Aceh.
- Three nights of accommodation in Banda Aceh sharing a room with two other people.
- Lunch and dinner for the day before the training.
- Breakfast, lunch and dinner for the three days of the training.
- Return transportation to your village from Banda Aceh in a mini bus organized by X, which will leave in the afternoon of the third day of training after the completion of the training.

While there are no guaranteed benefits for you, your participation will contribute to greater awareness about how to foster reconciliation in post-conflict societies, and about how to proceed with reconciliation in Aceh.

It is hoped that there will be benefits from your participation for others as well

because this research will be published in academic journals and will be formed into policy recommendations for the government of Aceh and donors supporting the Aceh peace process as well as other peace processes around the world. As such, your opinion and perspective are very valuable.

REQUEST FOR MORE INFORMATION: You may ask more questions about the study at any time. Please contact the research team by sending a text message to X at 0821-6836-9603.

SIGNATURE: I confirm that the purpose of the research, the study procedures, the possible risks and discomforts as well as benefits have been explained to me. All my questions have been answered. My signature below indicates my willingness to participate in this study.

_____ _____

Participant Signature Date

_____ _____

Participant Name Printed

I agree to be photographed YES NO Initial _____

_____ _____

Signature of Person Obtaining Consent Date

SECTION I:

1. Sex of Respondent: 1. Male 2. Female
2. How old are you? _____
3. What is your ethnicity?
4.
5.
    1. Acehnese
    2. Javanese
    3. Gayonese
    4. Alas
    5. Padang
    6. Batak
    7. Other; Please specify _____
6. What is your religion?
    1. Islam
    2. Catholic
    3. Protestant
    4. Buddhist
    5. Hindu
7. What is your marital status?
    1. Unmarried
    2. Married
    3. Separated (but not divorced)
    4. Divorced
    5. Widow / widower
    6. Other _____
8. How many children do you have?
    1. 0
    2. 1
    3. 2
    4. 3
    5. 4
    6. 5+
7. How many dependents do you have?
    1. 0
    2. 1
    3. 2
    4. 3
    5. 4
    6. 5+

8. What level of schooling have you completed?

    1. Never attended school
    2. Elementary school
    3. Middle School
    4. High School
    5. Associates Degree or Professional
    6. Bachelor's Degree
    7. Masters or PhD

9. What is your occupation?
    1. Farmer: I own my own land
    2. Farmer: I rent land
    3. Farm labor
    4. Business owner
    5. Agent
    6. Employee at a business
    7. Politics
    8. Government employee
    9. NGO
    10. Don't work
    11. Other. Please specify: _____

10. Do you have a supplementary job?
    1. Farmer: I own my own land
    2. Farmer: I rent land
    3. Farm labor
    4. Business owner
    5. Agent
    6. Employee at a business
    7. Politics
    8. Government employee
    9. NGO
    10. Don't work
    11. Other. Please specify: _____

11. If you have a spouse, does s/he work?

    1. Yes 2. No

12. Approximately how much money did your family earn last month?

1. 0-250,000 Rp
2. 250,001 – 500,000 Rp
3. 501,000 – 800,000 Rp
4. 801,000 – 1.5 million Rp
5. 1.51 million – 2.5 million Rp
6. 2.51 million Rp

13. What is your current housing situation?

1. living in my own house
2. renting a house
3. living with friends or relatives
4. living in barracks

14. Have you ever received assistance because you were affected by the conflict?

1. Never 2. Yes

14a. If yes, from whom?

1. NGO (please specify): _____
2. BRA
3. Government (please specify) _____
4. Other (please specify)_____

14b. If yes, in what form?

1. House
2.Economic Empowerment Assistance
3. Diyat
4. Training (please specify the type of training):_____
5. Other (please specify): _____

15. What is your role in your village?

1. Village government
2. Religious leader
3. KPA leader
4. PETA leader
5. FORKAB leader
6. Youth Leader
7. Women's leader
8. Other: please specify: _____
9. None

16. Have you ever participated in an inter-village organization?

1. Yes 2. No

16a. If yes, which organization?

1. Association of village leaders
2. Religious group
3. Cooperative/Farmer's group
4. Youth group
5. Women's group
6. Women's economic group
7. Other: Please specify: _____

16b. Where do the members in the group come from:

1. Inter-village
2. Inter-sub-district
3. Inter-district
4. Inter-province

17. The formation of community organizations in Indonesia is now recognized by law. Have you ever participated in any of the following organizations?

1. Member of KPA
2. KPA sympathizer
3. Member of PETA
4. PETA Sympathizer
5. Member of FORKAB
6. FORKAB sympathizer
7. None of the above

SECTION II:

I'M NOW GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT SOME DIFFICULT EXPERIENCES YOU MAY HAVE HAD IN THE PAST.

Mark YES or NO

	During the conflict…		
18	Was your village ever been bombed or did it experience fighting?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No
19	Were you ever displaced?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No
20	Was your house destroyed or heavily damaged?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No
21	Did you lose belongings?	☐ (1)Yes	☐(0) No
22	Did you ever experience physical violence?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No
23	Were you ever sexually assaulted?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No
24	Were you ever captured or kidnapped?	☐(1)Yes	☐(0) No

	Did you ever experience beatings on the head, suffocation, or forced in the water and nearly drowned?		
25	Beating on the head	(1) Yes	(0) No
26	Choked or suffocated	(1) Yes	(0) No
27	Nearly drowned	(1) Yes	(0) No
28	Other kind of head injury (bullet, burned, electrocution etc.)	(1) Yes	(0) No
29	If yes, did you lose consciousness when this happened?	(1) Yes	(0) No
30	If yes, for how long did you lose consciousness?	…….minutes	

	Was your spouse, child, family member or friends killed or disappeared during the conflict?		
31	Spouse killed	(1) Yes	(0) No
32	Child killed	(1) Yes	(0) No
33	Family member or friend killed	(1) Yes	(0) No
34	Spouse disappeared, kidnapped	(1) Yes	(0) No
35	Child disappeared, kidnapped	(1) Yes	(0) No

36	Family member or friend disappeared	(1) Yes	(0) No

	Have you ever experienced the following?		
37	Witnessed physical punishment	(1) Yes	(0) No
38	Humiliated or shamed in public	(1) Yes	(0) No
39	Forced to humiliate another person	(1) Yes	(0) No

	Have you ever been forced to:		
40	Forced to injure family member or friend	(1) Yes	(0) No
41	Forced to injure someone who is not a family member or friend	(1) Yes	(0) No

SECTION III:

WE ARE NOW GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR CURRENT EXPERIENCES. PLEASE ANSWER YES OR NO AS TO WHETHER YOU CURRENTLY EXPERIENCE THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

	During the past year, have you experienced any of the following?		
42	Lack of adequate shelter	(1) Yes	(0) No
43	Lack of water or sanitation facilities	(1) Yes	(0) No
44	Hunger or lack of food	(1) Yes	(0) No
45	Difficulty providing for your family	(1) Yes	(0) No
46	Difficult finding or keeping a job	(1) Yes	(0) No
47	Rejection by family and community members	(1) Yes	(0) No
48	Fear of living among family and community members	(1) Yes	(0) No

49. How do you feel about the current security situation?
    1. Very dangerous
    2. Not secure
    3. Secure (just the usual)
    4. Very safe and secure
    9. Don't know/refuse

50. Do you agree with the peace agreement?
    1. strongly agree
    2. agree
    3. disagree
    4. strongly disagree

51. Since the peace agreement, have you ever attended a traditional ceremony in your village for peace?

    1. Yes 2. No

52. If yes, how many times?

    1. Never
    2. 1 time
    3. 2 times
    4. 3+ times

SECTION IV:

PLEASE THINK ABOUT THE GROUP OF PEOPLE YOU CONSIDERED TO BE YOUR ENEMY DURING THE CONFLICT. WHICH GROUP ARE THEY FROM?

1. GAM
2. TNI/POLRI/PETA
3. OTHER _____

NOW, PLEASE THINK ABOUT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS GROUP TODAY.

54. Currently, do you feel respect for them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. A lot

55. Currently, do you feel comfortable when they are around?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. A lot

56. Currently, do you feel suspicious of them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. A lot

57. Currently, do you feel acceptance toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

58. Currently, do you feel relaxed when they are around?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

59. Currently, do you feel afraid of them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

60. Currently, do you feel anger toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

61. Currently, do you care about or sympathize with them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

62. Currently, do you feel hatred toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

63. Currently, do you feel vengeance/the need for revenge?

1. No vengeance
2. Not much vengeance
3. Vengeance
4. Alot of vengeance

End time: _____

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECOND/THIRD INTERVIEW

I. IDENTIFICATION

Enumerator:
Date:
Participant #:
Location:
Start time:

SECTION I:

PLEASE THINK ABOUT THE GROUP OF PEOPLE YOU CONSIDERED TO BE YOUR ENEMY DURING THE CONFLICT. WHICH GROUP ARE THEY FROM?

1.

1. GAM
2. TNI/POLRI/PETA
3. OTHER _____

NOW, PLEASE THINK ABOUT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS GROUP TODAY.

2. Currently, do you feel respect for them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

3. Currently, do you feel comfortable when they are around?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

4. Currently, do you feel suspicious of them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

5. Currently, do you feel acceptance toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

6. Currently, do you feel relaxed when they are around?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

7. Currently, do you feel afraid of them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

8. Currently, do you feel anger toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

9. Currently, do you care about or sympathize with them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

10. Currently, do you feel hatred toward them?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

11. Currently, do you feel vengeance/the need for revenge?

1. Not at all
2. A little
3. Average
4. Alot

12. As viewed by members of society, how competent are they?

1. Not competent
2. A little competent
3. Competent
4. Very competent

13. As viewed by members of society, how confident are they?

1. Not confident
2. A little confident
3. Confident
4. Very confident

14. As viewed by members of society, how capable are they?

1. Not capable
2. A little capable
3. Capable
4. Very capable

15. As viewed by members of society, how efficient (useful) are they?

1. Not useful
2. A little useful
3. Useful
4. Very useful

16. As viewed by members of society, how intelligent are they?

1. Not intelligent
2. A little intelligent
3. Intelligent
4. Very intelligent

17. As viewed by members of society, how skillful are they?

1. Not skillful
2. A little skillful
3. Skillful
4. Very skillful

18. As viewed by members of society, how friendly are they?

1. Not friendly
2. A little friendly
3. Friendly
4. Very friendly

19. As viewed by members of society, how well-intentioned are they?

1. Not well-intentioned
2. A little well-intentioned
3. Well-intentioned
4. Very well-intentioned

20. As viewed by members of society, how trustworthy are they?

1. Not trustworthy
2. A little trustworthy
3. Trustworthy
4. Very trustworthy

21. As viewed by members of society, how warm are they?

1. Not warm
2. A little warm
3. Warm
4. Very warm

22. As viewed by members of society, how sincere are they?

1. Not sincere
2. A little sincere
3. Sincere
4. Very sincere

23. How prestigious are jobs typically achieved by members of their group?

1. Not prestigious
2. A little prestigious
3. Prestigious
4. Very prestigious

24. How economically successful have members of their group been**?**

1. Not successful
2. A little successful
3. Successful
4. Very successful

25. If members of their group get special breaks (such as priority in hiring decisions or projects), does this make life more difficult for you?

1. No, this doesn't make life more difficult for me.
2. This makes life a bit more difficult for me.
3. This makes things more difficult for me.
4. This makes things much more difficult for me.

26. Do you feel disappointed if resources go to members of their group and you don't get any?

1. Not disappointed
2. A little disappointed

3. Disappointed
4. Very disappointed

	If given the opportunity, I would…		
27.	Exclude members of the outgroup from my country	(1) Yes	(0) No
28.	Admit members of the outgroup only as visitors to my country	(1) Yes	(0) No
29.	Admit members of the outgroup as citizens to my country	(1) Yes	(0) No
30.	Allow members of the outgroup to be employed in my occupation	(1) Yes	(0) No
31.	Allow members of the outgroup to live in my neighborhood	(1) Yes	(0) No
32.	Allow members of the outgroup to join my group/club as friends	(1) Yes	(0) No
33.	Allow an outgroup member to marry into my family	(1) Yes	(0) No

34. Do you agree that refugees/IDPs from their group who fled the region during the conflict should return?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

35. Do you agree that the return of refugees/IDPs to the region will cause violence?

1. Strongly disagree (No it will not cause violence)
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree (Yes, it will cause violence)

36. Do you agree that people should keep weapons in their homes in case they need them

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

37. Do you agree that violence/intimidation is a way to get what you want?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

38. Do you believe reconciliation between groups is important?

1. Not important
2. A little important
3. It's important
4. It's very important

39. Do you feel your opinion is heard and respected by political leaders?

1. Not at all
2. Not really
3. A little
4. A lot

40. How many people of the other group do you know at least as acquaintances?

1. 0
2. 1-2
3. 3-5
4. 5-10
5. 10+

41. How many people of the other group do you consider to be friends?

1. 0
2. 1-2
3. 3-5
4. 5-10
5. 10+

		1. Very distant	2. Somewhat distant	3. Somewhat close	4. Very close
42.	How close do you feel to the members of the other group that you know?				
43.	How close do you feel to the one person of the other group with whom you have the closest relationship?				

44. If you hear about their misfortunes, do you often feel upset?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

45. When you see them being treated unfairly, do you often feel pity for them?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

46. How often do you feel concerned about people from their group who are less fortunate than you?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

47. Do you often find it difficult to see things from their point of view?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

48. Do you often try to think about the conflict from their perspective as well as yours?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

49. If there's a problem or misunderstanding, do you often try to see things from their perspective?

1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Often

50. Do you agree that most members of the other community would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance instead of being fair?

1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Agree strongly

51. Do you agree that most of the time members of the other community try to be helpful, and are not just looking out for themselves?

1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Agree strongly

52. Do you agree that most members of the other community can be trusted?

1. Disagree strongly (Most members of their community cannot be trusted.)
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Agree strongly

53. Do you agree that the two communities must learn not to retaliate when there is a problem?

1. Disagree strongly (We should retaliate)
2. Disagree (We should retaliate)
3. Agree (We should not retaliate)
4. Agree strongly (We should not retaliate)

54. Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgets the wrongs done by the other community?

1. Disagree strongly (We should forget about the wrongs they did to us)
2. Disagree (At some point, we should forget about the wrongs they did to us)
3. Agree (We should never forget about the wrongs they did to us)
4. Agree strongly (We should never forget about the wrongs they did to us)

55. Do you agree that both parties should forgive each other to maintain the peace?

1. Strongly disagree that the two parties should forgive each other
2. Disagree that the parties should forgive each other.
3. Agree that the parties should forgive each other.
4. Strongly agree that the parties should forgive each other

56. Do you agree that it is important that your community never forgives the wrongs done to you by their group?

1. Strongly disagree. We should definitely forgive them.
2. Disagree. At some point we should forgive them.
3. Agree. We should never forgive them.
4. Strongly agree. We should never forgive them.

57. Do you agree that if you forgive them, your group will appear weak?

1. Strongly disagree that we would appear weak if we forgive them.
2. Disagree that we would appear weak if we forgive them.
3. Agree that we would look weak if we forgive them.
4. Strongly agree that we would look weak if we forgive them.

58. Do you agree that your group should apologize to them?

1. Strongly disagree. We should definitely not apologize to them.
2. Disagree. We should not apologize to them.
3. Agree that we should apologize to them.
4. Strongly agree. We should definitely apologize to them.

59. Do you agree that Aceh will never move from the past to the future until the two communities learn to forget about the past?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

60. Do you agree that members of their group should be prohibited from standing as a candidate for an elected position in Aceh?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

61. Do you agree that members of their group should be allowed to hold demonstrations in the street in your community?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

62. Do you agree that they should be officially banned from your community?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree

SECTION 2:

IN THE PAST WEEK OR TODAY, HAVE YOU FELT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SYMPTOMS?

No.		Past week, including today			
		(0) Not at all	(1) A little	(2) Sometimes	(3) Often
1.	Suddenly scared for no reason				
2.	Feeling fearful				
3.	Faintness, dizziness, or weakness				
4.	Nervousness or shakiness inside				
5.	Heart pounding or racing (heart beating very fast)				
6.	Trembling				
7.	Feeling tense or keyed up				
8.	Headaches				
9.	Spells of terror or panic				
10.	Feeling restless, can't sit still				
No.		**(0) Not at all**	**(1) A little**	**(2) Sometimes**	**(3) Often**
11.	Feeling low in energy, slowed down				
12.	Blaming yourself for things				
13.	Crying easily				
14.	Loss of sexual interest or pleasure				
15.	Poor appetite				
16.	Difficulty falling asleep, staying asleep				
17.	Feeling hopeless about the future				
18.	Feeling sad				
19.	Feeling lonely				
20.	Thought of ending your life				
21.	Feeling of being trapped or caught				

22.	Worry too much about things				
23.	Feeling no interest in things				
24.	Feeling everything is an effort				
25.	Feeling of worthlessness				

SECTION 3:

IN THE PAST WEEK OR TODAY, HAVE YOU FELT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SYMPTOMS?

No.		Past Week, Including Today			
		(0) Not at all	(1) A little	(2) Sometimes	(3) Often
1.	Recurrent thoughts or memories of the most hurtful or terrifying events				
2.	Feeling as though the event is happening again				
3.	Recurrent nightmares				
4.	Feeling detached or withdrawn from people				
5.	Unable to feel emotions				
6.	Feeling jumpy, easily startled				
7.	Difficulty concentrating				
8.	Trouble Sleeping				
9.	Feeling on guard				
10.	Feeling irritable or having outburst of anger				
11.	Avoiding activities that remind you of the most hurtful or traumatic events				
12.	Inability to remember parts of the most hurtful or traumatic events				
13.	Less interest in daily activities				
14.	Feeling as if you don't have a future				
15.	Avoiding thoughts or feelings associated with the traumatic or hurtful events				
16.	Sudden emotional or physical reaction when reminded of the most hurtful or traumatic events				
17.	Feeling that you have cannot do some things that you used to do before				
18.	Having difficulty dealing with new situations				
19.	Feeling plenty tired				
20.	Bodily pain				
21.	Troubled by physical problems				

22.	Poor memory				
23.	Finding out or being told by other people that you have done something you cannot remember				
24.	Difficulty paying attention				
25.	Feeling as if you are split into two people and one of you is watching what the other is doing				

End time: _____

SECTION 4: Only administered to workshop participants at the end of the workshop as part of Survey 3.

1. Before you attended this workshop, did you talk to other people in your village who had already attended the workshop?

    1. Yes 2. No

		1. Agree strongly	**2. Agree Somewhat**	**3. Disagree Somewhat**	**4. Disagree Strongly**	**5. Don't know**
2.	I feel this workshop had benefit for me.					
3.	I would recommend participating in this workshop to other people in my village.					
4.	After the workshop, I plan to keep in touch with the people I met here.					
5.	I feel that I learned more about the perspective and experiences of others through this workshop.					
6.	I would like to participate in other workshops like this one.					
7.	The facilitators were knowledgeable and capable.					
8.	The hotel was comfortable.					
9.	The travel arrangements were adequate.					
10.	I found it difficult to fill in all the surveys.					

BIBLIOGRAPHY

al Rahab, Amirrudin , and Raimondus Arwalembun. "Menormalkan Aceh: Mungkinkah Tanpa Pengungkapan Kebenaran (Normalizing Aceh: Is It Possible without Truth-Telling?)."

Albeck, Joseph, Sami Adwan, and Dan Bar-On. "Dialogue Groups: Trt's Guidelines for Working through Intractable Conflicts by Personal Storytelling." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8, no. 4 (2002): 301-22.

Allan, Alfred, and Marietjie M. Allan. "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool." *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 18 (2000): 459-77.

Allport, Gordon. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954.

Allport, Gordon W. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

Arnson, C.J. *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Ashmore, R.D. "The Problem of Intergroup Prejudice." In *Social Psychology*, edited by B. Collins. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1970.

Ashmore, R.D., and F.K. Del Boca. "Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes and Stereotyping." In *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior*, edited by D.L. Hamilton. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981.

Asmal, K., L. Asmal, and R.S. Roberts. *Reconciliation through Truth: Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance*. Capetown: David Phillips, 1997.

Aspinall, Edward. *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Backer, David. "Victims' Responses to Truth Commissions: Evidence from South Africa." In *Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the Wars End*, edited by Muna Ndulo. London: University College London, 2007.

Bannon, Ian , and Paul Collier. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions." Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.

Bar-Tal, D., and Gemma H. Bennink. "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process." In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, edited by Y. Bar-Siman-Tov. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Başoğlu, Metin , Maria Livanou, Cvetana Crnobarić, Tanja Frančišković, Enra Suljić, Dijana Đurić, and Melin Vranešić. "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions." *Journal of the American Medical Association* 294, no. 5 (2005): 580-90.

Başoğlu, Metin et al. "Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions." *JAMA* 294 (2005): 580.

Batson, C.D., K. Sager, E. Garst, M. Kang, K. Rubchinsky, and K. Dawson. "Is Empathy-Induced Helping Due to Self-Other Merging? ." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73 (1997): 459-509.

Biernat, Monica, and Christian S. Crandall. "Racial Attitudes." In *Measures of Political Attitudes*, edited by John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver and Lawrence Wrightsman, S. San Diego: Academic Press, 1999.

Bisson, Jonathan I., and M. Andrew. "Psychological Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Ptsd)." *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 3 (2007).

Bisson, Jonathan I., Anke Ehlers, Matthews Matthews, Rosa, Stephen Pilling, David Richards, and Stuart Turner. "Psychological Treatments for Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." *British Journal of Psychiatry* 190 (2007): 97.

Bogardus, E.S. "The Measurement of Social Distance." In *Readings in Social Psychology*, edited by T.M. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley, 503-07. New York: Holt, 1928.

Boris, Neil W., Alan C. Ou, and Rohini Singh. "Preventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder after Mass Exposure to Violence." *Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science* 3, no. 2 (2005): 154-63.

Bornstein, R.F. "Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987." *Psychological Bulletin* 106 (1989): 263-89.

BRA. "Follow up on the Helsinki Peace Framework: A Comprehensive Action Plan." Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, 2009.

Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital." *American Jounral of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997): 999-1023.

Brewer, Marilynn B. , and Samuel L. Gaertner. "Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization." In *Self and Social Identity*, edited by Marilynn B. Brewer and Miles Hewstone, 301. Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Brewin, Chris R. "A Cognitive Neuroscience Account of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Its Treatment." *Behavior Research and Therapy* 39, no. 4 (2001): 373-93.

Brounéus, Karen. "The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 23 (2010): 408-37.

Brown, R., and M. Hewstone. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact." *Advances in Experimental Psychology* 37 (2005): 255-343.

Burton, John. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Byrne, Catherine C. "Benefit or Burden: Victims' Reflections on Trc Participation." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 10, no. 3 (2004): 237-56.

Candra, Kartika, and Adi Warsidi. "A Heated Grapple for Power." *Tempo,* January 18, 2012.

Čehajić, Sabina, Rupert Brown, and Emanuele Castano. "Forgive and Forget? Antecedents and Consequences of Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Political Psychology* 29, no. 3 (2008): 351-67.

Clarke, Ross, Galuh Wandita, and Samsidar. *Considering Victims: The Aceh Peace Process from a Transitional Justice Perspective*, Occassional Paper Series. Indonesia: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008.

Collier, Paul , Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy." In *World Bank Policy Research Report*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.

Corkalo, Dinka, Dean Adjukovic, Harvey Weinstein, Eric Stover, Dino Djipa, and Miklos Biro. "Neighbors Again? Intercommunity Relations after Ethnic Cleansing." In *My Neighbor, My Enemy*, edited by Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Cuevas, Victor Espinoza, María Luisa Ortiz Rojas, and Paz Rojas Baeza. "Truth Commissions: An Uncertain Path? Comparative Study of Truth Commissions in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa from the Perspectives of Victims, Their Relatives, Human Rights Organizations and Experts." 2002.

Davis, M.H. *Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach*. Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark, 1994.

deRooij, Eline A., Donald Green, and Alan S. Gerber. "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 389-95.

Duckitt, John. "Prejudice and Intergroup Hostility." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis, 559-600. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Dwyer, Susan. "Reconciliation for Realists." *Ethics and International Affairs* 13 (1999): 82-98.

Ehrentraut, Stefan. "Dividing Aceh? Minorities, Partition Movements and State-Reform in Aceh Province." In *Asia Research Institute Working Paper No. 137*. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716587: Asia Research Institute, May 1, 2010.

Enright, R.D. & the Human Development Study Group. "The Moral Development of Forgiveness." In *Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development*, edited by W. Kurtines and J. Gerwitz, 123-52. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1991.

Enright, R.D., S. Freedman, and J. Rique. "The Psychology of Interpersonal Forgiveness." In *Exploring Forgiveness*, edited by R.D. Enright and J. Noah, 46-62. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.

Finlay, K., and W.G. Stephan. "Reducing Prejudice: The Effects of Empathy on Intergroup Attitudes." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 30 (2000): 1720-37.

Fisher, Roger; Ury, William. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In*. Edited by Bruce Patton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991.

Fiske, Susan T. , Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick, and Jun Xu. "A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition " *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82, no. 6 (2002): 878 –902

Foa, E.B., and E.A. Meadows. "Psychosocial Treatments for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Review." *Annual Review of Psychology* 48 (1997): 449.

Gerber, Alan S., and Donald Green. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis and Interpretation*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2012.

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Edward H. Kaplan. "The Illusion of Learning from Observational Research." In *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers Smith and Tarek Massoud, 251-73. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Gibson, James. *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* New York: Russell Sage, 2004.

Haaken, Janice. "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural Perspectives on Forgiveness." In *Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy*, edited by Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie G. Murphy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Hamber, Brandon, Dineo Negeng, and Gabriel O'Malley. "Telling It Like It Is: Understanding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission from the Perspective of Survivors." *Psychology in Society* 26 (2000): 18.

Harding, J., H. Proshansky, B. Kutner, and I. Chein. "On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Generations of College Students." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13 (1969): 1-16.

Harmon-Jones, E., and J.J.B. Allen. "The Role of Affect in the Mere Exposure Effect: Evidence from Physiological and Individual Differences Approaches." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27 (2001): 889-98.

"Hasil Lengkap Jajak Pendapat Waspada: 56% Referendum Dan 25.3% Otonomi Luas." *Waspada*, 1999.

Hayner, Prescilla B. *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Herman, Judith. "The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention." *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 16, no. 2 (2003): 159-66.

Herman, Judith Lewis. *Trauma and Recovery*. New York: Basic Books, 1994.

Hewstone, M., E. Cairns, A. Voci, F. McLernon, U. Niens, and M. Noor. "Intergroup Forgiveness and Guilt in Northern Ireland: Social Psychological Dimensions of "the Troubles"." In *Collective Guilt: International Perspectives*, edited by N.R. Branscombe and B. Doosje, 193-215. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Hewstone, M., Ed Cairns, A. Voci, Juergen Hamberger, and Ulrike Niens. "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland." *Journal of Social Issues* 62, no. 1 (2006): 99-120.

Hewstone, M., Ed Cairns, A. Voci, Frances McLernon, Ulrike Niens, and M. Noor. "Intergroup Forgiveness and Guilt in Northern Ireland: Social Psychological Dimensions of 'the Troubles'." In *Collective Guilt: International Perspectives*, edited by N.R. Branscombe and B. Doosje, 193-215. Cambridge: University Press, 2004.

Hewstone, Miles, Ed Cairns, Alberto Voci, Stefania Paolini, Frances McLernon, Richard J. Crisp, Ulrike Niens, and Jean Craig. "Intergroup Contact in a Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland." In *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion*, edited by D. Abrams, J.M. Marques and M.A. Hogg. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2005.

Hewstone, Miles, Jared B. Kenworthy, Ed Cairns, Nicole Tausch, Joanne Hughes, Tania Tam, Alberto Voci, Ulrich von Hecker, and Catherine Pinder. "Stepping Stones to Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness and Trust." In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, edited by Arie Nadler, Thomas Malloy, E. and Jeffrey D. Fisher. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Hinton, Devon E., Andrew Rasmussen, Leakhena Nou, Mark H. Pollack, and Mary-Jo Good. "Anger, Ptsd, and the Nuclear Family: A Study of Cambodian Refugees." *Social Science and Medicine* 69 (2009): 1387-94.

Homans, G.C. *The Human Group*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1950.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 367-78.

Huyse, L. "The Process of Reconciliation." In *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook* edited by P. Bloomfield, T. Barnes and L. Huyse, 19-33. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2003.

ICG. "Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in Aceh." In *Asia Program Briefing* Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 29, 2012.

IDEA. "Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook." edited by David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2003.

International, Amnesty. "Indonesia: Victims Still Waiting for Truth and Justice for Past Human Rights Violations ". http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA21/012/2012/en: Amnesty International, March 24, 2012.

IOM. "Meta Analysis Vulnerability, Stability, Displacement and Reintegration: Issues Facing the Peace Process in Aceh, Indonesia." http://reliefweb.int/node/313442: International Organization for Migration, August 2008.

———. "Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities Affected by Conflict in the Districts of Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara." http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/pdf/good_M_PNA1.pdf: International Organization for Migration, 2006.

———. "A Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities in 14 Conflict Affects Districts in Aceh." http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/pdf/good_M_PNA1.pdf: International Organization for Migration, 2007.

Kacowicz, A.M., Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, O. Elgstrom, and M. Jerneck. *Stable Peace among Nations*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Kaminer, Debra, Dan J. Stein, Irene Mbanga, and Nompumelelo Zungu-Dirwayi. "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation to Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness among Survivors of Human Rights Abuses." *British Journal of Psychiatry* 178 (2001): 373-77.

Katz, I., and R. Hass. "Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32 (1988): 964-70.

Kelman, H.C. "Interactive Problem-Solving: A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution." In *Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution*, edited by John; Duke Burton, Frank, 199-215. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

———. "Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective." In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, edited by Y. Bar-Siman-Tov. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004.

Kingsbury, Damien, and Lesley McCulloch. "Military Business in Aceh." In *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, edited by Anthony Reid, 199-224. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006.

Kitzbichler, Stephan. "Pemekaran in Aceh: A Way to Development, or to Conflict?" In *Aceh Development International Conference 2011*. UKM-Bangi-Malaysia: http://www.acehpublication.com/adic2011/ADIC2011-132.pdf, March 26-28, 2011.

Kramer, R.M., and P.J. Carnevale. "Trust and Intergroup Negotiation." In *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes*, edited by R. Brown and S. Gaertner, 431-50. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001.

Krepon, M. , and A. Sevak. *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.

Kriesberg, L. . "Comparing Reconciliation Actions within and between Countries." In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, edited by Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, 81-110. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Lederach, John Paul. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997.

Lee, A.Y. "The Mere Exposure Effect: An Uncertainty Reduction Explanation Revisited." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27 (2001): 1255-66.

Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. "The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice." *Human Rights Quarterly* 30 (2008): 95.

Lester, K.; Resick, P.A.; Young-Xu, Y.; Artz, C. "Impact of Race on Early Treatment Termination and Outcomes in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Treatment." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 78 (2010): 480-89.

Levin, S., C. Van Laar, and J. Sidanius. "The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal Study." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6 (2003): 76-92.

Lewicki, R.J., D.J. McAllister, and R.J. Bies. "Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities." *Academy of Management Review* 23 (1998): 438-58.

Lewicki, R.J., and C. Wiethoff. "Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair." In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, edited by M. Deutsch and P.T. Coleman, 86-107. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000.

Little, D. "A Different Kind of Justice: Dealing with Human Rights Violations in Transitional Societies." *Ethics and International Affairs* 13 (1999): 65-80.

McCullough, Michael E.; Fincham, Frank D.; Tsang, Jo-Ann "Forgiveness, Forbearance, and Time: The Temporal Unfolding of Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84, no. 3 (2003): 540-57.

McKeever, Victoria M., and Maureen E. Huff. "A Diathesis-Stress Model of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Ecological, Biological and Residual Stress Pathways." *Review of General Psychology* 7, no. 3 (2003): 237-50.

Meernik, James. "Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia." *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 3 (2005): 271-89.

Meierhenrich, Jens. "Varieties of Reconciliation." *Law and Social Inquiry* 33, no. 1 (2008): 195-231.

"Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement." In *http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf*, August 15, 2005.

Mendeloff, David. "Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice." *Human Rights Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2009): 592-623.

———. "Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?" *International Studies Review* 6, no. 3 (2004): 355-80.

Michael, Tanja, Sarah L. Halligan, David M. Clark, and Anke Ehlers. "Rumination in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder." *Depression and Anxiety* 24 (2007): 307-17.

Miller, Michelle Ann. "What's Special About Special Autonomy in Aceh?" In *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, edited by Anthony Reid, 292-310. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006.

Minow, Martha. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998.

Mollica, R.F., Caspi-Yavin Y., Bollini P., Truong T., Tor S., Lavelle J. "The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. Validating a Cross-Cultural Instrument for Measuring Torture, Trauma, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Indochinese Refugees." *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders* 180, no. 2 (1992): 111-16.

Moore, Christopher W. *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*. Vol. Third Edition. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003.

MSR. "The Multistakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh." https://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=282&Itemid=4&lang=en, 2009.

Myers, E., M. Hewstone, and E. Cairns. "Impact of Conflict on Mental Health in Northern Ireland: The Mediating Role of Intergroup Forgiveness and Collective Guilt." *Political Psychology* 30 (2009): 269-90.

Nadler, Arie, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher. "Intergroup Reconciliation: Dimensions and Themes." In *Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, edited by Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy and Jeffrey D. Fisher. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Nadler, Arie, and Nurit Shnabel. "Instrumental and Socioemotional Paths to Intergroup Reconciliation and the Needs-Based Model of Socioemotional Reconciliation." In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, edited by Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy and Jeffrey D. Fisher. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

O'Connell, Jamie. "Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?" *Harvard International Law Journal* 46, no. 2 (2005): 295-345.

Orth, Ulrich, and Andreas Maercher. "Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Crime Victims?" *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 19 (2004): 212.

Paolini, Stefania, Miles Hewstone, Ed Cairns, and A. Voci. "Effects of Direct and Indirect Cross-Group Friendships on Judgments of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland: The Mediating Role of an Anxiety-Reduction Mechanism." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30 (2004): 770-86.

Parloff, M.B.; Kelman, H.C.; Frank, J.D. "Comfort, Effectiveness, and Self-Awareness as Criteria for Improvement in Psychotherapy." *American Journal of Psychiatry* 3 (1954): 343-51.

Paunovic, Nenad, and Öst Lars-Göran. "Cognitive-Behavior Therapy Vs Exposure Therapy in the Treatment of Ptsd in Refugees." *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 39 (2001): 1183-97.

Pettigrew, Thomas, F. "Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 23 (1997): 173-85.

———. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49 (1998): 65-85.

Pettigrew, Thomas, F., and Linda R. Tropp. "How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 38 (2008): 922-34.

———. "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90, no. 5 (2006): 751-83.

Petty, R.E., and H.L. Mirels. "Intimacy and Scarcity of Self-Disclosure: Effects on Interpersonal Attraction for Males and Females." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 7 (1981): 493-503.

Pham, Phuong N. , Harvey M. Weinstein, and Timothy Longman. "Trauma and Ptsd: Their Implication for Attitudes Towards Justice and Reconciliation." *Journal of the American Medical Association* 292, no. 5 (2004): 602-12.

Pham, Phuong N., Harvey M. Weinstein, and Timothy Longman. "Trauma and Ptsd Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes toward Justice and Reconciliation." *Journal of the American Medical Association* 292 (2004): 602-12.

Phuong, Pham, Patrick Vinck, Marieke Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di Giovanni. "Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes About Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda." International Center on Transitional Justice; Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley, 2005.

"Pre-Election Terror." *Tempo*, January 18, 2012.

Pruitt, Dean G. "Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation." In *Studies in International Mediation*, edited by Jacob Bercovitch. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.

Rhodes, G., J. Halberstadt, and G. Brajkovich. "Generalization of Mere Exposure Effects to Averaged Composite Faces." *Social Cognition* 19 (2001): 57-70.

Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. "The New Landscape of Transitional Justice." In *Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice*, edited by Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, 2006.

Rose, Suzanna, Jonathan Bisson, and Simon Wessely. "Psychological Debriefing for Preventing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (Ptsd)." Cochrane Library 1 2003.

Rothbart, M., and B. Park. "On the Confirmability and Disconfirmability of Trait Concepts." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50 (1986): 131-42.

Rothstein, Bo. "Social Trust and Honesty in Government: A Causal Mechanisms Approach." In *Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transitions*, edited by János Kornai, Bo Rothstein and Susan Rose-Ackerman. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Rothstein, R.L. "After the Peace: Getting Past Maybe." In *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, edited by R.L. Rothstein, 1-25. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

Rouhana, Nadim, N. "Identity and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict." In *The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application and Practice*, edited by A.H. Eagly, V.L. Hamilton and R.M. Baron. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004.

———. "Key Issues in Reconciliation: Challenging Traditional Assumptions on Conflict Resolution and Power Dynamics." In *Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: Social Psychological Perspective*, edited by D. Bar-Tal. New York: Psychology Press, 2011.

Sarkin, Jeremy, and Erin Daly. "Too Many Quesitons, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional Societies." *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 35 (2004): 661-728.

Savedoff, L., R. Levine, Birdsall N., and et al. "When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives through Impact Evaluation." In *Report of the Evaluation Gap Working Group*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2006.

Scharf, Michael P. "The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission." *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 7 (1997): 375-403.

Schiller, Rachel "The Factors That Lead to the Signing of Peace Agreements: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia." In *Unpublished Master's Thesis*, 53-59: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2007.

Schulze, Kirsten E. *The Free Aceh Movement (Gam): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies 2. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004.

———. "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976-May 2004." In *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, edited by Anthony Reid, 225-71. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006.

Scobie, E.D., and G.E.W. Scobie. "Damaging Events: The Perceived Need for Forgiveness." *Journal for the theory of social behavior* 28 (1998): 373-401.

Stangor, C., L.A. Sullivan, and T.E. Ford. "Affective and Cognitive Determinants of Prejudice." *Social Cognition* 9, no. 4 (1991): 359-80.

Staub, Ervin, and Laurie Anne Pearlman. "Healing, Reconciliation, and Forgiving after Genocide and Other Collective Violence." In *Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation*, edited by R.G. Helmick and R.L. Peterson. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001.

Staub, Ervin, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and Rezarta Bilali. "Psychological Recovery, Reconciliation and the Prevention of New Violence: An Approach and Its Uses in

Rwanda." In *Peacebuilding in Traumatized Societies*, edited by B. Hart: American University Press, 2008.

Stephan, W.G. "Intergroup Relations." In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by G. Lindzey and E. Aronson. New York: Random House, 1985.

Stephan, W.G., and C.W. Stephan. "Intergroup Anxiety." *Journal of Social Issues* 41 (1985): 157-75.

Stover, Eric, and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds. *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Sukma, Rizal. "Resolving the Aceh Conflict: The Helsinki Peace Agreement." In *Background Paper 4a*. Jakarta, Indonesia: CSIS Jakarta, 2005.

Sulaiman, Isa M. "From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist Movement." In *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, edited by Anthony Reid, 121-48. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006.

Sumpeno, Wahjudin. *Membangun Perdamaian: Modul Pelatihan Mediasi Dan Resolusi Konflik Untuk Fasilitator*. Banda Aceh, Indonesia: Kementerian Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) bekerjasama dengan World Bank, 2008.

Swart, Hermann, Rhiannon Turner, Miles Hewstone, and Alberto Voci. "Achieving Forgiveness and Trust in Postconflict Societies: The Importance of Self-Disclosure and Empathy." In *Moving Beyond Prejudice Reduction: Pathways to Positive Intergroup Relations*, edited by Linda R. Tropp and Robyn K. Mallett. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2011.

Tajima, Yukhi. "Understanding the Livelihoods of Former Insurgents: Aceh, Indonesia." www.conflictanddevelopment.org: The World Bank, 2010.

Tam, T., M. Hewstone, J. Kenworthy, and E. Cairns. "Intergroup Trust in Northern Ireland." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35 (2009): 45-59.

Tepperman, Jonathan D. "Truth and Consequences." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 128-45.

Thoms, Oskar, N.T., James Ron, and Roland Paris. "The Effects of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: A Summary of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for Analysts and Practitioners." Ottawa: Center for International Policy Studies, 2008.

Touval, Saadia, and I. William Zartman. "Mediation in Theory." In *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, edited by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985.

Tropp, Linda R., and Thomas L. Pettigrew. "Differential Relationships between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31 (2005).

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*. Vol. 5. London: Macmillan, 1999.

Tutu, Desmond. *No Future without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday, 1999.

UNDESA, UNDP, and The Centre for Conflict Resolution. *Skills Development for Conflict Transformation: A Training Manual on Understanding Conflict, Negotiation and Mediation*. Edited by Conflict Management Capacity Building Project of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and Division for Public Administration and Development Management. Available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan001363.pdf.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. "Doe V. Exxon Mobil Corp. 654 F.3d 11 (2011)." In *Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135*, edited by United States Court of Appeals. http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FCO%2020110708139.xml, Decided July 8, 2011.

van Emmerik, Arnold A.P., Jan H. Kamphuis, Alexander M. Hulsbosch, and Paul M.G. Emmelkamp. "Single Session Debriefing after Psychological Trauma: A Meta-Analysis." *The Lancet* 360 (2002): 766-71.

Villa-Vicencio, Charles. "Inclusive Justice: The Limitations of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions." In *Peace Versus Justice?: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa*, edited by Chandra Lekha; Pillay Sriram, Suren Suffolk: James Currey/University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010.

———. "The Politics of Reconciliation." In *Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies*, edited by Tristan Anne Borer. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.

Voci, A., and M. Hewstone. "Intergroup Contact and Prejudice toward Immigrants in Italy: The Mediational Role of Anxiety and the Moderational Role of Group Salience." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6 (2003): 37-54.

Wright, S.C., A. Aron, T. McLaughlin-Volpe, and S.A. Ropp. "The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73 (1997): 73-90.

Zajonc, R.B. "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 9 (Monograph Suppl. 2 (1968): 1-27.

Zulkarnaen, Iskandar, Tubagus Erif Faturrahman, Muntasir A. Kadir, Taufik Abdullah, and Mulyadi Makmuman. "Rekonsiliasi Dan Reintegrasi Aceh: Studi Kasus Aceh Timur." *Seumiké: Journal of Aceh Studies* 4, no. 1 (2009).