Canada in NATO: The Perceptions of a Middle Power in Alliance

JOEL J. SOKOLSKY

Within the NATO alliance Canada has long held an ambiguous position. Although its security is not directly threatened by the Soviet Union, Canada has chosen to adhere to an anti-Soviet military alliance. Joel Sokolsky here outlines the ups and downs of Canada's NATO participation over the years and points out the underlying reasons for its continuing membership.

In its historically brief tenure in office,[1] the Conservative government of Prime Minister Joe Clark placed what was, given the generally low priority accorded to foreign affairs in Canadian politics, an unusual emphasis on defense policy. The new leadership in Ottawa pledged to halt and reverse what it called the shameful "retreat" of Canada from its military obligations. In particular, the Conservatives planned to bolster the country's contribution to collective security through further support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The alliance, Mr. Clark declared shortly after taking office in May 1979, would be Canada's "first line of defence."[2] In the wake of the Iran and Afghanistan crises, the Prime Minister reiterated his government's commitment to defense, and attempted to make defense an issue in the recent elections.

Although Clark's strong support for NATO was certainly welcomed in allied military circles (not to mention within the Canadian military), Canada had in

Mr. Sokolsky is a Ph.D. candidate in Government at Harvard University and a graduate student associate of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. For the past three years he has been studying under a scholarship from the Canadian Department of National Defence. The views expressed are his own.

1. In May 1979, the Liberal government of Pierre Eliot Trudeau was defeated after eleven years in office and replaced by a minority Conservative government headed by Joe Clark. In late December, however, the "Tories" were defeated on a confidence motion in the House of Commons. Trudeau, who had retired, accepted the urgings of his Party and returned to lead it in the campaign. In the February elections the Liberals won a majority, ending Mr. Clark's ill-fated tenure as Prime Minister.
2. Canadian Department of External Affairs, *Canada Weekly*, vol. 7, no. 24 (13 June 1979), p. 1.

fact been improving its standing contribution to the alliance during the last years of the Trudeau government. The effort to disengage from NATO in the early 1970s had been reversed by mid-decade, and a large scale re-equipment program had been undertaken. In 1977, the Minister of National Defence defended this build-up on the grounds that NATO constituted the "key" element in the country's defense posture, declaring that: "We can't have a free North America without a free Western Europe."[3]

While it seems as true today as it did in 1949 that the security of North America is indeed tied to that of Western Europe, it is not at all as evident, nor was it in 1949, that Canada makes either North America or Western Europe more secure through its active participation in the Atlantic alliance. Nevertheless, Canadian leaders have always perceived participation in NATO as a fundamental part of the country's foreign and defense policy. It is likely that Canada's NATO allies will continue to perceive a role for Canada in the alliance despite the marginal contribution Canadian forces make to the overall balance of power.

It is with these perceptions, both domestic and external, of Canada's role in NATO that this paper deals. Several questions thus need to be considered: How have successive Canadian governments viewed Canada's place in the alliance? What benefits did they hope to obtain and what costs were they prepared to assume? Were their perceptions altered in response to changes in the political and military environment, and if so, in what ways? And to what extent have alliance partners' perceptions influenced, reinforced or clashed with those of Canadian leaders?

This analysis of Canada's role in NATO begins with a brief discussion of alliance theory, concentrating on the part played by so-called 'middle powers'. Having drawn attention to the importance of perceptions in understanding Canada's role in the NATO alliance, the paper concludes with an assessment of Canada's current position in light of the recent return to power of the Trudeau Liberals.

The traditional balance-of-power or "realistic" view of alliances implies that the degree of influence a state can exercise in alliance decisionmaking will depend above all on a state's real strategic assets: size, wealth, location and deployable and potential military power. What the traditional approach also implies, but does not make sufficiently explicit, is that lesser powers are something more than great powers writ small. That is, in addition to having fewer strategic assets, lesser powers also perceive their place in the international system, and hence in alliances, differently than great powers.[4]

3. Address by the Hon. B. Danson, Minister of National Defence, to the Canadian Conference of Defence Associations, 13 January 1977.
4. Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 1.

By adding a psychological dimension to the more traditional method of ordering states, it is possible to distinguish relative power positions. A great power, like the United States, is one whose leaders consider that the nation, acting alone, can exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact on the international system. Secondary powers, like Great Britain and West Germany, are those whose leaders consider that by acting singly they are able to exercise some impact, although never itself decisive, on that system. A middle power, such as Canada, is one which believes that while it cannot act effectively alone, it may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international organization. And small powers, like Iceland, are those whose leaders do not even seek to make a systematic impact, though they may use international organizations to further their own narrower interests.

Of course, in arriving at these different perceptions, national leaders must take into consideration their states' economic and strategic assets, as well as those of other states. Given this, the psychological approach is not inconsistent with the more traditional balance-of-power approach. Taken together, they will enable us to arrive at a proper understanding of the position of the middle power in alliances, and to make the important distinction between small and middle powers.

Because of the perceptions of its leaders a middle power will be more inclined to use alliance membership to influence the overall policies of the alliance, not just those that might bear upon its own particular interests. A small power, on the other hand, may ally itself with a great power and several lesser states in order to pursue a specific objective. Iceland, for example, has shown that it views membership in NATO almost exclusively as a means toward furthering its own specific goals in fishing rights, and has used its main strategic asset, the naval base at Keflavik, as a bargaining chip. As Robert Keohane has noted, Iceland demonstrates how the "big influence of small allies" results from their ability to use their strategic assets to bargain for a particular interest.[5]

A middle power, given its lack of strategic assets but with a perceived adversary common to it and a great power, will be prone to seek an alliance. However, the middle power must have *some* strategic asset which is considered to be important by the alliance partners if it hopes to exercise some influence. This asset could be significant in terms of manpower, i.e., a large number of ordinary foot soldiers; or economically, such as oil reserves; or geographically, such as control over crucial straits or canals.

Like the small power, a middle power's leaders consider that it cannot further most of its own interests sufficiently by acting alone. By itself, it cannot

5. Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1974), p. 295.

alter the behavior of the great and secondary powers. But in an alliance with these powers, to which it adds some strategic asset, it may be able to alter their behavior, as they seek to moderate the behavior of the common adversary. What this suggests is that a middle power need not see the adversary as a direct threat to its own security, although this may be the case. The threat may be secondary; that is, a confrontation between the great power and its rival may inevitably involve the middle power. Unable to prevent this on its own, the middle power seeks an alliance wherein it may be able to moderate the policies of the great and secondary powers who do regard the adversary as a direct threat. For the middle power then, the desire for a particular role within the alliance, perhaps more than the need for external military security, will tend to shape its leaders' attitudes toward alliances.[6]

The middle power's leaders may also calculate that their economic interests can be better served through cooperation with a small group of states. This may be because the economy of the middle power is particularly vulnerable to shifts in other states' external as well as internal economic policies. To be sure, not even the great powers are immune from such changes, but the middle power will tend to place a high priority on multilateral cooperation in the economic field. Its leaders may also see in a security alliance a means to foster this cooperation. In those cases where the middle power is not facing a direct security threat, it may place a particularly high value on expanding the terms of alliance to further its own economic interests.

Canada In NATO

The Canada which joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 had been evolving into an autonomous and distinct international actor since 1867. In that year, by an act of the British Parliament,[7] the colonies of Canada (now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were joined into a federal union under the British crown. Confederation, as it was called, gave the new Dominion full internal powers which were distributed between the central government and the governments of the provinces.[8]

In matters of foreign policy, however, the new nation was considered part of the British Empire and therefore it was London and not Ottawa which handled Canadian relations abroad. For example, during the early years of Confedera-

6. *Ibid.*
7. The British North America Act, as amended, still serves as Canada's constitution. It promises Canadians a government similar in kind to that of Great Britain, meaning a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.
8. Britain gradually gave Canada most of its remaining territories in North America. Other colonies joined Confederation so that by 1948 there were ten provinces and two far northern territories.

tion, Canadian dealings with its neighbor the United States were channeled through the British embassy in Washington. Nevertheless, the Canadian government gradually took over the management of its own foreign interests, and in 1909 a Department of External Affairs was established to improve the machinery for conducting Canadian foreign affairs. In the years prior to the First World War, Canadian dealings abroad involved mainly the more mundane matters of immigration, fisheries, boundaries and trade. Matters of "high politics," i.e., great power rivalries and strategic affairs, either did not concern Canada, or were handled in London.

As part of the British Empire, Canada was involved in high politics to the extent that when Britain was at war, Canada (as well as the other self-governing Dominions: Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) was also at war. This was the case in August 1914 when Britain declared war on Germany. Some half-a-million Canadians (mostly volunteers) served with the British in Europe during World War I. The heavy casualties suffered by Canadian forces prompted Ottawa to demand a greater say in the war effort. In 1917 the Imperial War Cabinet, which included the prime ministers of all the Dominions, met for the first time, marking the beginning of Canadian autonomy in external affairs. Canada signed the Versailles Treaty separately from Britain, although as part of the British Empire delegation.

During the interwar years, Canada increasingly asserted its right to act abroad on its own. Relations with the United States grew in importance in the years following the war as Canadian economic and strategic dependence shifted from Britain to the U.S. In 1924 Canada signed its first treaty with Washington, and in 1927 opened a mission in the American capital. In 1931 the British Parliament's Statute of Westminister formalized the transfer of foreign policy responsibilities from London to Ottawa (and to all Dominion governments) by confirming full external as well as internal autonomy.

In World War II, as in the First World War, Canada contributed to the allied effort far out of proportion to its population and resources. The country emerged from the war with a heightened sense of national identity supported by world-wide recognition of Canada as an independent actor on the international stage. Ironically, as Canada stepped out upon this stage in 1945, it stepped into the shadow of the United States. In North America, Canada sought to benefit from economic links with the United States but also to ensure that increasing economic integration, as well as cultural penetration, would not lead to an erosion of political independence and national identity. The effort to maintain a distinct and independent nation was complicated by the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as antagonistic global powers. Canada generally supported the broad outlines of U.S. policy at the beginning of the Cold War. However, this meant an acceptance of American leadership in

the West. With the formation of the postwar system, Canada, which had evolved into a distinct international actor with a highly industrialized economy, had to resign itself to pursuing its interests from a position as something less than a great power. Yet, given its acknowledged economic strength, outstanding wartime contribution, and the internationalist outlook of its diplomats, it was not to be expected that Canada would regard its role in the new international order as only that of a small power.

In the early years of the postwar era Canada became synonymous with the term 'middle power.' It is an image Canadian leaders have cultivated with as much zeal as other leaders have encouraged the perception of their states as great powers. At the end of the Second World War, the Canadian government saw the new United Nations as a means whereby Canada could play a greater role in international politics than it could by acting alone. In particular, it was interested in the UN as an instrument of collective security, and in the opportunity that it would give Canada to promote the establishment of a more stable international order.

No less than their American or European counterparts, Canadian leaders such as Lester Pearson and Louis St. Laurent of the ruling Liberal Party drew from Munich the lesson that would-be aggressors had to be deterred. Drawing upon the experience of the First World War, these men concluded that bipolar and even multilateral alliances were not adequate to prevent the outbreak of war. What was required instead was a collective security system in which all states would join forces to oppose any aggressor. In a speech to the first General Assembly, External Affairs Minister St. Laurent declared that "international security depends primarily upon the maintenance of a preponderance of power on the side of peace. The Government and the people of Canada," he continued, "are anxious to know what armed forces ... Canada should maintain as part of putting force behind world law."[9]

The government was anxious to make a material contribution to the cause of collective security because of its faith in the idea of "functionalism." This concept held that a nation's influence at the United Nations would be commensurate with its ability to contribute to collective deterrence. In 1945, with Europe and Russia devastated, and only Canada and the United States left with healthy economies, the potential Canadian contribution was relatively significant. Furthermore, the Canadian leaders, perhaps looking toward the future, also wanted to ensure the continued ability of middle powers to influence decisionmaking at the UN on security matters. Accordingly Canada, although supporting permanent membership for the great powers on the Security Council, initially opposed giving them the veto right.

9. Robert Mackay, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971), pp. 13-14.

Within a few years, Canadian hopes that the UN would serve as an effective collective security agency had proved ephemeral. Canada joined the U.S. and other Western nations in placing the blame on the Soviet Union, citing Russia's repeated use of the veto. By 1947, the Canadian government was already serving notice to the General Assembly that it could no longer "accept an unaltered [Security] Council. If forced to," St. Laurent declared, "Canada would seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept greater international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security."[10]

Canada thus became the first Western nation to suggest the idea of a regional security pact. Within a year of the St. Laurent speech, the British government approached Canadian leaders with the idea that Canada and the United States should join the European democracies in a transatlantic alliance. While mostly concerned about securing American participation, British leaders also saw an important place for Canada in such an alliance, for political as well as economic reasons. The inclusion of Canada would convert what otherwise would be an American-aid-to-Europe scheme into a "transatlantic community."[11] The then Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, was himself initially opposed to any Canadian participation in military alliances. Drawing on his own wartime experience, when he and Canada stood in the shadow of the Grand Alliance's "Big Three," Mr. King discounted any potentially influential role for Canada.[12] But British interest in securing Canadian participation bolstered the view of those in the Canadian government who thought that such an alliance would afford the country not only a measure of security, but also a chance to play a greater role in international affairs.

In 1948, the Prime Minister was nearing the end of his long term. Foreign and defense policy was under the control of a small group of "internationalists." Men such as Lester Pearson, Escott Reid, Norman Roberston and Louis St. Laurent, who became Prime Minister after King in 1949, viewed a transatlantic alliance as a necessity. These men believed in a strong Western deterrent to meet the Soviets, and they perceived an important role for Canada in such an alliance. Accordingly, Canada joined with Britain and the United States in the secret negotiations which resulted in the Atlantic Treaty in 1949.[13] Canadian diplomats, such as Lester Pearson, worked with members of the Truman Administration to secure congressional support for the alliance.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
11. John Holmes, Foreword to Charles Pentland, "The Canadian Dilemma," in Peter Ludz, ed., *Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance,* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 155.
12. Escott Reid, "The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance," *International Journal,* vol. 22, no. 3 (Summer 1967), p. 430.
13. _____, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949,* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), p. 11.

It is important to dwell at some length on the initial Canadian perceptions of NATO, because these were to translate into policies and defense commitments that would become permanent features of Canadian external conduct. Moreover, these original perceptions soon became accepted truths against which any policy revisions had to be judged.

As noted, Canadian leaders did perceive the Soviet Union as a security threat, and therefore openly equated Canadian security with that of Western Europe.[14] This threat, however, was indirect. Even at the beginning of the alliance, there was no attempt to argue that Russia might attack Canada. The problem was the possibility of another European war. Canadian leaders knew that they would be drawn into such a war, as they had been twice before. Thus, the best defense against such a possibility was to encourage the formation of an alliance whose aggregate strategic assets, mostly American, would create the necessary balance of power to prevent a Soviet attack:

> We feel that should war break out that affected the United Kingdom and the United States we would inevitably be involved and that there might be great value in having consummated a regional pact . . . whereby these West European democracies, the U.K., the U.S. and ourselves agreed to pool for defence purposes our respective potentials and to co-ordinate right away our forces, so that, it would appear to any possible aggressor that he would have to overcome us all if he attempted any aggression.[15]

Canada also saw the alliance as a means to ensure domestic stability in the European countries. Of key importance in the minds of those Canadians who helped fashion NATO, recalls Escott Reid, was the "threat of Stalinism to the virtue and values of western civilization." It was believed that a weak and demoralized Europe would be easy prey for Soviet agitation, and for Soviet coercive diplomacy. By giving Europe an explicit formal guarantee of protection, Canada and the U.S. would help the region regain the confidence it needed to resist communism and maintain its political independence.

While the military and political threat to Canada itself was indirect, Canadian leaders perceived NATO as a means to enhance the pursuit of more immediate Canadian objectives. One such objective was to forestall U.S. attempts at bilateral military cooperation. In 1940, Canada and the United States had established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), which in effect meant that for defensive purposes North America was to be considered a strategic unity. But the PJBD was not an alliance; there was no integration of military planning, no specific undertakings as to roles in the event of war. Prior

14. R.B. Byers, "Defence and Foreign Policy in the 1970s: The Demise of the Trudeau Doctrine," *International Journal*, vol. 33, no. 2, (Spring 1978), pp. 316-17.
15. Reid, "The Birth," pp. 431-32.

to the NATO negotiations, the U.S. military, in particular the Air Force, had been pressing Canada for a peacetime integration of continental defenses.

Canadian leaders rejected these overtures. They were concerned about the drift toward continental integration in general, especially in the economic and cultural areas. Adding an integrated defense structure would only further undermine Canadian efforts to maintain a distinct and, as far as possible, independent nation in North America. The policies adopted since Confederation in 1867, and indeed Confederation itself, had been directed toward creating a separate nation despite the pull of continental integration. Although Canadian leaders tried to avoid being caught up in Britain's imperial interests, they viewed the British connection as a counterweight to the pull of the Americans. As Britain's power declined, there came about a transfer of dependence from the mother country to the U.S. Thus NATO seemed to offer Canada an opportunity to "restore a degree of continental balance which had been destroyed by the partial erosion of the British counterweight."[16]

While Canadian leaders had employed the British counterweight to offset continental integration, they had also been concerned that a clash of British and American interests might result in difficulties in North America. Given the American-Japanese naval rivalry and the British alliance with Japan, there was potential for an Anglo-American confrontation. It was for this reason that Canada persuaded Britain to abandon the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in the early 1920s. At the end of the Second World War, Canadian leaders continued to believe that Britain would still be an important power and that a conflict of British and American interests might place Canada in an awkward position. Therefore, when the British and the Europeans indicated a desire for Canada to join in an alliance which included themselves and the U.S., Canadian leaders perceived a solution to a potential foreign policy problem. As Norman Robertson cabled from London in 1948:

> A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationship with the other European countries in Western Europe, in which the United States will be providing a firm basis both economically and probably militarily for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems ... that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and insure our proper place in this new alliance.[17]

Canada was prepared to incur some risks and to share obligations and

16. Harald von Riekhoff, *NATO Issues and Prospects,* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1967), p. 119.
17. Reid, *Time of Fear,* p. 132.

resources, but it was also determined to take its "proper place" in the alliance. That is, Canadian leaders did not want to be frozen out within NATO as they had been at the United Nations Security Council. Lester Pearson declared after the treaty signing: "If obligations and resources are to be shared, it is obvious that some sort of constitutional machinery must be established under which each participating country will have a fair share in determining the policies of all which affect all. Otherwise, without their consent, the policy of one or two or three may increase the risks and therefore the obligations of all.[18]

Canadian leaders, therefore, saw the alliance not only as an aggregation of strategic assets in the service of deterrence, but also as an instrument within which they could influence the policies of the other alliance members. In particular, Canadian leaders wanted to moderate those policies which they believed would increase tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is evident as well that Canada regarded the right of consultation and joint decisionmaking as essential to the maintenance of Canadian prestige abroad.

The importance attached by Canadian leaders to intra-alliance politics was in part responsible for their opposition to the "two-pillar" concept of NATO. The Americans and Canadians both believed that further European wars could be avoided only if Western Europe moved toward greater unity. But the Americans, due in part to congressional pressure, wanted the Europeans to create their own separate security pact before joining NATO; this would be a precondition for U.S. participation in a transatlantic alliance. European unity, according to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "would be a centripetal force, [bringing] Britain across the channel and Canada and the United States across the ocean."[19]

The Canadians believed that European unity would evolve after the creation of an alliance which included the U.S. They were opposed, however, to the creation of a European bloc *within* NATO. Such a two-pillar system would not draw Canada across the Atlantic, but rather would leave it aligned with the U.S., isolated as a small part of the second pillar. In 1949 the government believed that such a situation would constrain Canada's influence in the alliance, which, as a middle power, Canada was particularly anxious to obtain in return for its material contributions. "If Canada was not to be left alone to deal with the United States on matters of concern to the alliance," notes Escott Reid, "it needed to be able to form a common front with European members." He goes on to point out that, "The alliance had not been in existence for long when Canada found that on most important issues it was on the

18. Lester Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. II (1948-1957),* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 53.
19. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 710.

same side as Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands and on the same side as those countries and Britain."[20]

While Canadian leaders were anxious to use NATO as a means to participate in crucial decisions affecting its destiny, they also wanted NATO to be "more than an old fashion military alliance." Rather, it was to be a community of nations, "an enduring association of nations which share the same aims and aspirations."[21] In the Canadian view the key to this community concept was to be economic cooperation among the alliance partners. For Canada, this was important for a number of reasons. First, as a trading nation, it was interested in seeking out new markets. Secondly, with an economy particularly vulnerable to other countries' external economic activities, Canada wanted more coordination in the formulation of external economic policies. Finally, it would appear that Canadian leaders wanted to offset somewhat their growing economic dependency on the U.S. This could be done both through the opening of new markets and through the inclusion of the U.S. in a multilateral effort at interdependency, as opposed to a straight bilateral approach.

Canadian diplomats pressed for, and obtained, Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, which became known as the Canadian Article. It pledged the alliance members to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and . . . encourage economic collaboration." Dean Acheson at first opposed this proposal but eventually conceded. Yet as he makes clear in his memoirs, he and Truman regarded the idea of NATO being anything more than a military alliance as "unrealistic."[22]

Canadian hopes for Article II were never fulfilled, and Canada turned to other multilateral organizations to press for greater economic cooperation. In the meantime, NATO was becoming even more of a military alliance with the outbreak of the Korean war and the subsequent creation of a unified command under a Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Canada was called upon to contribute standing forces to NATO in Europe. So long as the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat, albeit indirect, to Canadian security, and Europe as the front line, the government was prepared to make these contributions. Having pressed for the creation of NATO, it could hardly refuse to live up to its obligations. The first years of the alliance had also seen active Canadian involvement in allied decisionmaking on matters concerning Germany and the admission of new members. Thus the government wanted to preserve its standing in allied councils. Moreover, in 1951 Canada was still one of the few NATO members capable of making such contributions. Important as well

20. Reid, *Time of Fear*, p. 131.
21. Riekhoff, *NATO Issues*, p. 15.
22. Acheson, *Present*, p. 277.

was the belief during the early years of the Cold War that Canada had a stake in allied cohesion. "We and our allies believe," the Minister of National Defence told the House of Commons, "that the fact of participation by the Canadian army will show more emphatically ... that we stand together with our allies."[23]

Standing together, however, was to be an expensive undertaking. Part of the reason for this was that the allies wanted the Canadian contribution to be qualitatively similar to that of the U.S. That is, they were more interested in the quantity of forces Canada could supply to NATO's land, sea and air components than in some other, more distinctive contribution. For example, during the Second World War the Royal Canadian Navy had supplied over half the allied escort ships and Canada had developed an expertise in anti-submarine warfare. Given Canada's geographic position vis-à-vis the Atlantic sea lanes, there was thus the potential for a concentrated Canadian contribution in the naval sphere. While Canada did make a standing contribution to SACLANT (Supreme Allied Command Atlantic), the bulk of its effort went into ground and air forces in Europe. From 1951 to 1969 Canada maintained 10,000 mechanized troops and six tactical air squadrons as part of the British Army of the Rhine.[24]

Ironically, the decision to forward-base Canadian forces in Europe came at a time when concern was also mounting over the defense of North America. In the 1950s, the major threat to the United States was perceived to be an over-the-pole bomber attack from the Soviet Union, an attack that would come directly over Canadian territory. The Canadian government could not ignore American concern on this matter, nor was it unconcerned itself, given the country's proximity to the U.S. But Canadian leaders were also wary about an expanded American military presence in Canada. For this reason, Canada had attempted to construct and maintain as many of the advance radar stations necessary to counter such an attack as it could.

The United States continued to press for a fully integrated continental air defense arrangement and in 1957 such a system, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), was established. During the negotiations, the Canadians attempted to make NORAD part of the NATO framework in order to preserve the European counterweight. The Americans, however, were unwilling to let the Europeans become involved in the direct defense of the United States, and the Europeans themselves were not anxious to become involved, nor were they particularly sympathetic to Canada's concern for its independence, given the importance to NATO of a secure American deterrent.

23. John Gellner, *Canada in NATO: A Documentary History*, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), p. 26.
24. Gerald Porter, *In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years*, (Montreal: Duneau & Greenberg, 1978), pp. 139-40.

It was the same Liberal government which agreed to the establishment of NORAD that had led Canada into NATO in 1949. The leaders of this government perceived an important role for Canada in both defense pacts, as long as Canada was prepared to take up its proper share of the common deterrence effort. This was especially the case in North America where any Canadian contribution, i.e., fighter jets, reduced the American presence, secured Canadian access to the information and command structures of NORAD, and assisted Canadian prestige. The Liberals, drawing on Canada's NATO contributions, had used Canada's position to facilitate its diplomatic initiatives during the Suez Crisis. In fact, the idea of a large-scale peacekeeping force originated with Lester Pearson (an initiative which won him the Nobel Prize).

When the Conservatives came to power in 1958, under John Diefenbaker, there was a marked change in Canadian perceptions. Diefenbaker was less inclined to believe that the level of Canadian contributions was important in terms of affording Canada influence in allied councils. Moreover, he was not as convinced as the Liberals had been that Canadian independence and prestige would be served by close military cooperation with the United States. His Minister of External Affairs shared these perceptions. As a result, the government began to place more emphasis on Canada's role in other international organizations, including the UN and the Commonwealth. Diefenbaker even pledged to divert 15 percent of Canada's trade with the U.S. to trade with the Commonwealth.

The issue which convinced Diefenbaker that Canada was not playing an influential role in NATO was that of nuclear weapons. Although one of the collaborators in the development of the first atomic bomb, Canada had renounced the deployment of nuclear weapons in its own forces in the interest of nonproliferation, and had become active in the UN's Disarmament Agency. In the late 1950s, however, the Liberal government had committed Canada to acquiring five weapons systems, all of which required nuclear warheads, in order to maintain the effectiveness of Canada's NATO contributions. The Conservative government under Diefenbaker did not move quickly to accept the warheads from the U.S. As the Minister of External Affairs explained at the time, it was in the area of disarmament that Canada would concentrate its efforts towards peace: "This is where effort is most worthwhile."[25]

The United States began to pressure Canada into accepting the nuclear role. General Norstad, the American Supreme Commander in Europe, voiced his opposition to the Canadian government's position at an open meeting in Ottawa. The U.S. State Department went further and directly contradicted the Prime Minister when he told the House of Commons in 1962 that the U.S. and

25. Jon McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance,* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 213-14.

the other allies had doubts about a nuclear role for Canada.[26] Canadian-American relations had already been strained by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Worried that President Kennedy had acted too recklessly, and angered over the U.S. failure to consult Canada, Diefenbaker at first refused to put all Canadian forces on alert. In Cabinet, the External Affairs Minister argued that the government should not simply follow the U.S. blindly, particularly since the President had not lived up to the commitment to consult. "If we go along with the Americans now," he said, "we'll be their vassals forever."[27]

A number of Diefenbaker's ministers, including the Minister of National Defence, did not support the Prime Minister's perceptions of Canada's role in NATO and NORAD. They viewed it as essential in terms of Canada's influence and prestige that the country accept nuclear weapons, and do all it could to contribute to Western defense. Three ministers resigned over the defense issue and in the elections that followed, the Conservatives were defeated.

The return of the Liberals under Lester Pearson in 1963 brought about a quick acceptance of the nuclear role for Canada in North American and European defense. The new government argued that Canada had to live up to its obligations as a member of NATO: "Having accepted responsibility for membership in a nuclear armed alliance, the question of nuclear weapons for Canadian Armed Forces is a subordinate issue."[28] Pearson was concerned both with the maintenance of Canadian influence in the alliance and with allied cohesion, recently shaken by the withdrawal of France from SACEUR.

While the Liberals continued to perceive an important role for Canada in NATO, they could not ignore certain changes in objective conditions. As important as the Europeans might still regard the Canadian contributions, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Canada to keep up with the rapid changes in weapons technology, and to maintain a contribution similar in kind to that of the U.S. and Britain. Moreover, with the rebuilding of the German and European armies, the significance of the 10,000-man Canadian force on the Rhine declined and Canada could not afford to increase it.

In 1964, the Liberal government set forth a new defense policy. Canada would continue to contribute to NATO, but the government gave up any pretext of maintaining Canadian influence by making contributions on a scale comparable to that of the U.S. and the secondary powers. There was instead an implied emphasis on the benefits which could be derived from certain distinctive aspects of the Canadian forces.[29] The Canadian forces were to be unified

26. Peter Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years,* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), p. 26.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
28. Canadian Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence,* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1964), p. 13.
29. McLin, *Changing Policy,* pp. 217-18.

into a single service, and separate units containing both ground and air capabilities were to be formed with sufficient mobility to be moved anywhere in the world. The level of Canadian forces in Europe was not reduced, but emphasis was placed on the newly created Mobile Command, a force of some 12,000 which would remain in Canada, but could be moved to Europe in an emergency.[30]

It was, in fact, this mobile force that Canada offered as its distinctive contribution to NATO defense. However, its usefulness to the alliance was not to stem so much from its ability to be moved to Europe, but rather from its ability to perform peacekeeping functions. The 1964 policy made international peacekeeping the number one priority of the Canadian forces. It was contended that Canada's greatest contribution to collective security could be made through United Nations peacekeeping operations, in which Canada had been involved since the Suez Crisis.

During the Cyprus Crisis in 1965, Canada was given the chance to prove the importance of its peacekeeping forces to NATO. The government explained its decision to send troops to Cyprus on the grounds that Canada was anxious to prevent a confrontation between two NATO members, "... thus exposing the eastern flank of the alliance to Soviet advantage and perhaps, the island itself to overt Soviet intervention."[31]

The emphasis on peacekeeping was also an indication that the government, although ready to remain in NATO, was returning to its immediate postwar perception that perhaps Canada could play a greater role in international politics through the UN. Canadian forces were more significant in UN peacekeeping operations than in the East-West balance of power. This coincided with a growing nationalist sentiment in Canada, a search for distinctiveness, exemplified by the adoption of a new flag in 1965. Unlike their contribution to the Army of the Rhine, peacekeeping offered Canadians a highly visible and distinctive defense role for their tax dollars. Moreover, there was growing public disenchantment with the close military cooperation between Canada and the U.S. in view of the American involvement in Vietnam and the inability of the Canadians to influence United States policy. If Canada really wanted to contribute to world peace, it was argued, it ought to concentrate on building a multinational force with "like-minded countries" that would "clear up trouble spots"[32] and maintain "the rule of law in the world."[33]

In addition, throughout the 1960s it was becoming evident that not only was the alliance not serving as a forum for economic cooperation between the allies,

30. *White Paper,* pp. 17-23.
31. Arthur Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents,* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), p. 42.
32. *Globe and Mail,* 14 July 1960.
33. Canada, *House of Commons Debates,* 26th Parliament 1st Session, vol. 1, p. 919.

but that the rise of the European Economic Community (EEC) was effectively freezing Canada out of transatlantic economic relations. The U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 had resulted in tariff reductions between the Community and the United States, but because Canada was not an important producer of many of the goods affected, these reductions had a limited effect on Canada. As one of Jean Monnet's closest advisors remarked later about the Act, "Incidentally, Canada has been forgotten as one of the possible partners in computing the Atlantic share of world exports."[34]

Indeed, the rise of the EEC and the Eurogroup within NATO was bringing into reality the "two-pillar" approach to the alliance which Canadians had opposed in 1949. The Europeans, who were working painstakingly toward greater unity, were hardly sensitive to Canadian concern about the drift toward continental integration in North America and Canada's desire to appear as a more or less independent actor within NATO. According to Jean Monnet, Canada had to "recognize facts." Militarily it was part of North American defense plans, as exemplified by the Canada-U.S. planning group in NATO.[35] John Holmes, Director-General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, relates how a Dutch banker visiting Canada was dismayed to find so much nationalistic, anti-American sentiment among civilized people. "Europeans," he maintained, "had overcome this primitive attitude." He was asked how he would regard a European Economic Community which consisted solely of the Netherlands and Germany. "That would be different," he said, "but nationalism was still wicked."[36]

Despite these trends, the Liberal government of Lester Pearson continued to maintain the same level of Canadian contribution to NATO, although placing more emphasis on peacekeeping as a means to serve the alliance in a distinct way. However, in 1967 President Nasser ordered UN forces out of the Sinai, and international peacekeeping — and Canadian defense policy — reached a new low.

When Prime Minister Trudeau took over the Liberal government in 1968, he ordered a complete review of Canadian foreign and defense policy, to be grounded upon a "realistic" approach to the national interest. In 1969, a new set of defense priorities emerged. The first priority was to be the defense of national sovereignty, meaning in fact Canada's newly expanded territorial waters. Second was continental defense, then NATO, and finally peacekeeping. Along with the new priorities came a reduction in defense spending, and decisions to cut the forces stationed in Europe by two-thirds and to abandon the nuclear role.

34. Elliot Goodman, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community,* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 146.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
36. Pentland, "The Canadian Dilemma," p. 153.

The decision to cut the standing forces was the most significant change in Canada's NATO policy since 1949. Trudeau defended his action on the simple grounds that the essential nuclear deterrent rested with the U.S. and that on the conventional level, "the magnificent recovery" of Western Europe had given those countries the ability to provide for their own conventional defense.[37] Although reducing its standing commitment in Europe, Canada would maintain forces at home to be sent to Europe in case of emergency. Trudeau, like past Canadian leaders, still believed that "NATO continues to contribute to peace by reducing the likelihood of a major conflict breaking out in Europe."[38] He also rejected a complete withdrawal from the alliance on the grounds that Canada could continue to play a "vital role . . . in the promotion of detente and arms reduction" only by remaining within the allied councils.[39] But he rejected the view, held by previous Canadian leaders (with the exception of Diefenbaker) and voiced by the Europeans, that ". . . our acts . . . will have profound international consequences."[40] His decision to leave some troops in Europe was mainly for symbolic purposes and to give "visible evidence of Canada's continuing commitment to the alliance."[41]

The European allies were also concerned with symbolism, as well as with their own defense budgets. Shortly after the Trudeau decision, the Minister of National Defence was met with a "well coordinated" attack at the NATO Planning Committee meeting. The British and the Germans, who would have to cover the Canadian withdrawal, accused Canada of "passing the buck."[42] They were also concerned that the Canadian decision would encourage other lesser allies to reduce their commitments. Pressure by the Europeans induced Trudeau to reduce the cutback to 50 percent, but the government continued to resist German demands that Canada upgrade its forces in Europe with new tanks and jets.

It would appear that Trudeau was able to resist European pressure because at the time the Americans—principally Henry Kissinger—did not join the other allies in opposing the Canadian move. "We were not made to feel," the Prime Minister reported of his talks with Kissinger, "that if we were nice on the military strategic problems, they would be nice on the bilateral problems."[43]

Kissinger shared Trudeau's perceptions of Canada's place within the Atlantic alliance. As he recorded in *White House Years,* Canada's relations with NATO

37. Prime Minister's Office, Press Conference, 3 April 1969.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making,* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 145.
40. *Globe and Mail,* 28 March 1969, p. 6.
41. Prime Minister's Office, Press Conference.
42. Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy,* p. 141.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 144.

had always possessed a "special character." "Unlike the European countries it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States it could not be decisive in the common defense; the Canadian defense contribution would be marginal ... Canada's ties, therefore, had above all a strong symbolic character." Canada was willing to maintain the principle of collective security by supplying some military forces; "... at the same time it strongly favored measures for the relaxation of tensions." Kissinger, who was personally identified with such efforts at relaxation, also drew attention to the fact that the Canadian contribution to improving East-West relations had always been dependent upon "the high quality of its leadership" rather than its military contributions.[44]

Thus as Canada, under Pierre Trudeau, sought to adjust its relations with NATO, it faced, for the first time, an American administration which was prepared to accept a reduced Canadian standing commitment to NATO because it partially shared the new perceptions held in Ottawa. The Prime Minister, in turn, came to support detente, a U.S. policy which meshed well with his own views, and used it as a further justification for his NATO decision. To be sure, previous Canadian governments had also perceived a role for Canada in the pursuit of East-West harmony. However, Trudeau, like Kissinger, did not believe that Canada's standing contributions afforded Ottawa greater influence in allied decisionmaking. His decision to remain in NATO would allow Canada to exercise its traditional policy of seeking to moderate U.S.-Soviet relations, but Trudeau was not willing to maintain costly forces in Europe merely to have a seat at the table.

While the Prime Minister's view of the external environment influenced his decision, the main impetus was domestic. Foreign policy was the extension abroad of domestic priorities, and defense policy was shaped accordingly. The domestic priorities were: economic growth; sovereignty and independence; social justice; peace and security; and a harmonious natural environment.[45] In deciding to reduce the Canadian commitment to Europe and place more emphasis on the military's role as protector of sovereignty, Trudeau responded to the second priority. For example, Canada had to have the capability to patrol its own coastal waters, including the Arctic regions, in order to protect its mineral and fishing resources. Thus his government, unlike earlier Liberal administrations, did not view participation in NATO as a means to assert Canadian independence, or project an image as a distinct actor apart from the U.S. Nor did Trudeau regard membership in the alliance as a means to further economic growth.

Trudeau's view of NATO, therefore, only partially reflected the middle

44. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years,* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 383.
45. Canadian Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians,* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 14.

power perceptions of previous governments. He did not doubt that Canada had some interest in the alliance, but he did seriously doubt whether the alliance was serving those Canadian interests in the pursuit of which membership had been sought. The security threat seemed more remote than ever. The idea that NATO served to reconcile British and American interests had gone the way of British power. And, in any case, Britain was moving toward Europe. As counterweights to the U.S., or as collaborators in opposing American decisions, the European allies were of no help. Indeed, in 1969 it was they, and Germany in particular, who brought pressure to bear on Canadian policy. With the loss of France, NATO developed into a two-pillar alliance and by the twentieth anniversary of the pact, Canada was more isolated and more integrated with the U.S. than it had ever been. The Trudeau foreign policy review declared that the maintenance of Canadian distinctiveness and independence in North America should be the major goal of Canadian foreign policy. In the Prime Minister's view, membership in NATO did not further this objective.

In 1972, the Trudeau government turned its attention to ways to offset growing continental integration. It developed a conceptual approach, called the "Third Option." Rejecting the other two options—maintaining the status quo and increasing integration (essentially strawmen)—the government stated that henceforth Canada would seek to strengthen its ties to areas of the world beyond North America.[46] In concrete terms, what this meant was expanding trade and economic links with other areas. Aside from Japan, the only region capable of serving this objective was Europe and especially the EEC. In other words, the government continued to see Europe as a counterweight to the U.S., but apart from NATO. The original decision to join NATO had been made on the grounds that, as a middle power, Canada could influence allied decision-making and expand its economic ties through the alliance. Having only partially achieved the former, and failing to achieve the latter, Canada now determined to pursue its economic goals outside NATO. However, when it came time to actually negotiate a contractual link with the EEC, Canada found the Europeans, in particular the Germans, eager to tie economic links to the upgrading of Canadian forces in Europe.[47] "No tanks, no trade" was what German Chancellor Schmidt reportedly told Trudeau.[48]

The Canadian foreign policy and defense expert, Professor R.B. Byers, has argued that Mr. Trudeau was mistaken in assuming that "other interests could be pursued irrespective of defence posture."[49] In other words, Trudeau should have known that the Europeans would not give Canada a contractual link with

46. Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives,* (Autumn 1972).
47. R.B. Byers, "The Canadian Military," *Current History* (April 1977), p. 182.
48. Porter, *In Retreat,* p. 164.
49. Byers, "Defence and Foreign Policy," p. 320.

the EEC while Ottawa was in the process of reducing its standing commitment to NATO. But Trudeau may simply have been acting on the basis of Canada's past experience. After all, since the economic rebirth of Europe, the European members of NATO had conducted their military relations vis-à-vis Canada "irrespective" of its economic posture. Throughout the two decades that Canada had maintained troops in Europe, the provisions of Article II had been completely ignored, as had Canada itself with regard to transatlantic trade. However, Trudeau found that, now that the Canadians had something the European allies wanted, the latter were eager to resurrect the ghost of Lester Pearson in order to link the economic and military spheres.

This time, in 1975, the U.S. joined its European allies in urging Canada to upgrade its forces in Europe. Speaking in Ottawa, Defense Secretary Schlesinger said: "The basic premise, I believe, is that unless we are prepared to defend parts of the world other than the North American continent, we will soon have nothing more than the North American continent to defend, and that would be a calamity from the standpoint of both our nations."[50]

Canada has agreed to upgrade its land, sea and air forces. The troops in Europe, although not to be increased, are to acquire over 100 new German Leopard tanks at a cost of $187 million. A new fighter aircraft, to be deployed both in Europe and North America, is to be bought at a cost of $2.34 billion, and $1.8 billion will be spent for 18 new long-range patrol/anti-submarine warfare planes. The Trudeau regime, just before its defeat in May 1979, announced plans to spend over $2.3 billion to construct six new frigates.

The pressure brought to bear upon Canada by the Europeans and the Americans in the late 1970s reflected their own concern over the growing imbalance in conventional weaponry in Europe. However, it is difficult to believe that either the U.S. or the European allies still regard the Canadian contribution as militarily significant, even allowing for the new equipment and the acknowledged high quality of Canadian soldiers. It is also difficult to accept the argument that Germany was concerned over the possible effect of further Canadian reductions on public support for the alliance within the FRG. Nor can one accept the rather novel suggestion recently made by a Canadian scholar that, "The presence of five thousand Canadian troops in Europe ... makes more palatable the presence of the much larger American forces."[51]

What seems more likely, and is more revealing about allied perceptions of Canada's role in NATO, is that Canada's partners were simply not going to allow it to get off with the free ride it could easily enjoy in terms of its own

50. United States Department of Defense, "Joint Press Conference of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Canadian Minister of National Defence James Richardson," held in Ottawa, Canada, 16 September 1975.

51. Peyton V. Lyon and Brian Tomlin, *Canada as an International Actor,* (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1979), p. 19.

security. It is perceived to be unacceptable, whatever the military calculations may indicate, for Canada, given its wealth, not to contribute more to the alliance. Knowing that Canada wanted a contractual link with the EEC in order to further its efforts at economic independence from the U.S., but really completely indifferent to Canada's North American dilemma, the Europeans were ready to extract the payment they wanted. Canadian leaders were not prepared to respond to Schmidt's "no tanks, no trade" with a firm "no thanks."

Unfortunately for Canada, the contractual link with the Common Market has not resulted in increased trade. So that while the decision to upgrade the standing contribution to NATO may have initially been made in hopes of finally using the alliance to further economic cooperation and to offset the growing economic dependence on the U.S., it does not appear likely that Canada's leaders still maintain such hopes. Indeed Canada, because of the June 1979 Tokyo round of GATT agreements, may see its trade with the United States increase. Under these agreements, more than 90 percent of current Canadian exports to the U.S. enter at an import tariff of 5 percent or less.[52]

Yet, there is no telling what potentially adverse effects a Canadian decision to withdraw from NATO or even to further reduce its commitment is likely to have on relations with Western Europe, and the EEC in particular. While participation in the alliance may not serve to further economic cooperation, failure to fulfill NATO obligations may create difficulties in Canadian-European relations outside the strategic sphere. By now, Canada is surely part of NATO's North American pillar and, more importantly, is regarded as such in Europe. A reduction in standing contributions to the alliance will not resolve Canada's North American dilemma, but rather add to its strained relations with Europe.

In his short stay in power, Prime Minister Joe Clark gave strong rhetorical support to a stronger defense policy, although he did not move to acquire new fighter aircraft. The return to power of Pierre Trudeau has raised concern, particularly in Washington, that he will continue where he left off in the mid-seventies and further reduce Canada's standing commitment to NATO as part of an overall cutback in defense expenditures. On election night (18 February 1980), he assured the U.S. that it would remain Canada's "greatest friend," but went on to note that Canada's geographical location between the Soviet Union and the United States means that Canada "is very interested in the preservation of peace between these two powers."[53] In the Speech From The Throne opening the new session of Parliament (15 April 1980), it was announced that a new post, that of Ambassador for Disarmament, would be created within the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Trudeau seems, then, to be suggesting a return to his early policies which stressed a role for Canada in

52. Canadian Department of External Affairs, *Canada Weekly*, vol. 7, no. 18 (2 May 1979), p. 8.
53. *Canada Weekly*, vol. 8, no. 10 (5 March 1980), p. 2.

the pursuit of East-West harmony independent of, and perhaps secondary to, military contributions in support of collective security.

Whatever its future implications, Trudeau's election night statement and the decision to create the disarmament post seem to have been made in response to the increased tensions in Soviet-American relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. From the Prime Minister's perspective, the Carter administration's new toughness may not be that convincing nor wise in the long run and certainly does not demand unquestioned approval and support from Canada. After all, Pierre Trudeau has now been in power twelve years. He saw the U.S. call off the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1968 in protest over the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, followed by the commencement of the detente policy under Nixon and Kissinger, followed by the move away from detente under the Ford administration, followed by Carter's initially conciliatory approach which was succeeded, finally, by the new hard line of the same administration. In short, Trudeau, along with some European leaders, may be just a little skeptical about any "rally-around-the-NATO-flag" call issued by the White House. At the same time, Trudeau, perhaps unlike the Europeans, will not initiate any effort at easing East-West tensions on his own, whatever his personal beliefs. He cannot desire to antagonize the U.S. at this time, nor could he realistically perceive an important role for Canada as an East-West mediator. Although during the election campaign Trudeau expressed misgivings about an Olympic boycott that did not include developing countries, the Liberal government chose to follow President Carter's call for a boycott. Canada has announced that it will follow the lead of the EEC countries in imposing economic sanctions against Iran.

The Prime Minister's apparent acquiescence to American demands seems to be the result not only of his estimation of the external environment, but also, and perhaps more importantly, of Canadian internal politics. The country is once again facing critical domestic problems. As has been the case before, these difficulties are likely to be reflected in a less activist foreign policy. At this time the French-speaking province of Quebec has just held a referendum on the question of political separation from the rest of Canada. The measure was barely defeated, and separatist sentiments are likely to surface again. Canada also faces serious energy difficulties compounded by the inability of the federal government in Ottawa to reach agreement on oil pricing with the province of Alberta. Alberta's differences with the federal government, and the disenchantment of the western provinces in general, is particularly troublesome for Trudeau since his Liberal Party, although it holds a majority in Parliament, has almost no representation from the west. Reflecting upon the problems of unity and energy, Trudeau told the House of Commons recently that: "The greatest

enemy is the enemy within, not the enemy without. We have met the enemy and they are us."[54]

In light of these domestic problems, and given the narrow scope of any kind of activist foreign or defense policy, it is likely there will be no new initiatives with regard to Canada's role in NATO. The simplest forecast would be for a status quo defense policy. Military matters will be overshadowed by other issues. Trudeau will go ahead with the major defense acquisitions announced in the closing months of his previous administration (and indeed has already selected the F-18A as the new Canadian fighter aircraft), but will go no further.

Such an approach by the new Trudeau regime would seem to be consistent with what Canada can realistically perceive about its role in NATO, and the costs and benefits it can expect from alliance membership. There is, first of all, a continuing interest in access to information and intelligence not otherwise available to a lesser power. Canada recently announced its participation in the development of a NATO global communications network.[55] Access to this intelligence, and a seat at NATO councils, can no longer be perceived as an opportunity to influence crucial decisions. The Canadian experiences during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and later during the 1973 "Cease-Fire Alert," have demonstrated that as a great power the U.S. is prepared, and indeed may be obligated, to act decisively alone. If, in 1938, one Canadian author could write: "Whatever our fate, it is to be hoped that our government shall decide it,"[56] the best that a Canadian can say today is: "Whatever our fate, it is to be hoped that it will not come as a complete surprise to our government."

While Canada can no longer hope for an important role within the overall balance of power or within NATO councils, it is almost certain that the current government, and those that will follow, be they Liberal or Conservative, will regard the alliance itself as a necessary instrument of deterrence. The Soviet Union will be viewed in Ottawa as an indirect threat to Canadian security, a threat which is manifest in the potential escalation of a European conflict into a global nuclear war. NATO will thus be viewed as the best available means to maintain the essential balance of power that will prevent war in Europe. By its deterrent effect, the alliance serves to negate the political influence the USSR seeks to exercise over Western Europe and introduces a measure of stability into the international system that is surely in Canada's best interest.

Given the continuation of these perceptions, Canada will maintain its symbolic commitments to NATO standing forces, a contribution upon which the

54. *Globe and Mail,* 16 April 1980, p. 2.
55. *Canada Weekly,* vol. 6, no. 44 (6 November 1978), p. 2.
56. Arthur R. M. Lower, "Canada Can Defend Herself," *Canadian Forum,* no. 17 (January 1938), p. 335.

other allies will certainly insist. Such military efforts will represent a significant, although manageable, burden upon Canadian resources in view of the lack of conscription, traditionally low defense budgets and the necessity of protecting its territorial seas. It is possible that this burden could be eased somewhat by a concentration of Canada's NATO commitment in the naval sphere. Expenditures in this area, e.g., long-range patrol aircraft and anti-submarine destroyers, would enable Canada to contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic while at the same time providing the wherewithal for sovereignty protection.[57]

To be sure, a continuance of Canada's standing military contributions, in whatever form, will not mean a total abandonment of efforts, particularly under a Trudeau government, to ease East-West tensions. Thus we have the decision to move ahead with the new fighter aircraft coming at the same time as the creation of a new ambassadorial post for disarmament. Even this approach, however, represents a continuation of past practices. As Kissinger notes, there has always been a certain ambivalence in Canada's role in NATO which arises from a conflict between Canada's "instinct in favor of common defense ... [and] its temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter."[58]

As a middle power in an alliance, Canada sought to exercise a measure of influence it could not obtain acting on its own, while at the same time advancing its particular objectives. But Canada possesses neither of the prerequisites that allow lesser powers to influence greater ones within an alliance structure. In terms of European security it has no particular strategic asset that would afford it the opportunity to bargain for a greater voice, or to secure its own particular interests. Even Iceland, occupying a critical position in the North Atlantic, may be said to exercise more influence than Canada. Nor is there a Canadian lobby in Washington. Experts in the U.S. government, especially in the Pentagon, simply want Canada to do more, spend more, contribute more. Hence Canadians can no longer realistically aspire to the role which middle powers in alliances have traditionally played, but neither can they see their country as a small power. To paraphrase Robert Keohane: Canada in NATO represents the not so big influence of a not so small ally.

57. For a detailed argument in favor of a greater role for Canada in SACLANT, *see:* Joel Sokolsky, "Canada's Future in NATO," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* 106/1/923 (January 1980); Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Emphasizing The Assets: A Proposal for the Restructuring of Canada's Commitment to NATO," *Canadian Defence Quarterly,* vol. 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1979); Franklyn Griffiths, *A Northern Foreign Policy,* Wellesley Paper 7/1979, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979), p. 51.
58. Kissinger, *White House Years,* p. 383.