South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order

By Marina Ottaway

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993, 250 pp., with notes and index, $14.95 cloth.

Reviewed by David Bryan Sullivan

South Africa is experiencing tremendous political upheaval, which makes a book such as this one, a snapshot of the country's internal politics, both well and poorly timed. Previous descriptions of political institutions and relationships are out of date, so that anyone watching events in South Africa from a distance needs a new scorecard. However, the situation is still changing; only a few months after its publication, some of the author's predictions invite second-guessing.

The author, Marina Ottaway, is a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and has written about Ethiopia, Algeria, and African communism. She divides her description and analysis of contemporary South African politics into three sections, laying out the actors in South African politics, the major subjects over which they disagree, and the process of transition through which they hope to resolve their differences.

One fault of this organization is that the book is frequently repetitive. The first time she observes that the National Party (N.P.), which has ruled South Africa since 1948, fits an African model of the party-as-state, her insight seems fresh and provocative. When she raises this suggestion for the third time, it loses something. She similarly repeats her assertion that the "Inkathagate" scandal was a pivotal event in South African politics. The same repetition occurs with her observations that procedural decisions about constitutional negotiations will shape their outcome, and that the National Party received only 48 percent of the white vote in 1989.

This book is useful as a guide to the political landscape of contemporary South Africa. Even Americans who follow events in that country can have trouble keeping track of distinctions among the three branches of the Dutch Reformed Church, the differences between the Pretoria Minute and the Groote Schuur Minute, or the political and philosophical differences which led to the

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break between the Pan-Africanist Congress and African National Congress (A.N.C.). Ottaway summarizes such facts succinctly.

Unfortunately, however, her survey is frequently superficial. She mentions only members of the very highest echelon, naming older leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Alfred Nzo and Joe Slovo, and the three younger leaders considered Mandela's most likely successors: Chris Hani (since assassinated), Cyril Ramaphosa, and Thabo Mbeki. Ottaway neglects other prominent young A.N.C. leaders: such "rising stars" as Tokyo Sexwale, Joe Modise, and Peter Mokaba. The book also fails to identify the A.N.C.'s leading constitutional thinkers, such as Albie Sachs (who is cited in the footnotes) and Kader Asmal. In addition, it ignores a major component of the A.N.C.: the loose constellation of intellectuals at South African universities who write discussion documents and policy papers for the party. Instead she describes the South African Communist Party as the A.N.C.'s "hidden intelligentsia."

Ottaway equally underestimates the role of civil society in political change. Because of the highly visible and all-encompassing nature of South African politics, nearly every civil institution in South Africa, including trade unions, universities, and newspapers, is forced into some political alignment. Ottaway does cite the political role of churches, unions, and civic organizations, particularly the broad-based, democratic, A.N.C.-aligned organizations which she lumps together under the rubric of "the mass democratic movement." Aside from references in her footnotes, however, she virtually ignores the political roles played by foreign and domestic business, academics, and a vast array of nongovernmental organizations which have assumed many traditional governmental functions such as providing legal aid, often with foreign financial support. Ottaway also reduces the role of the international community to a few inconclusive pages at the end of the book.

Ottaway's analysis is most successful in describing the breakdown of negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The problems were fundamental, she argues: The A.N.C. and N.P. had different definitions of "negotiations," entirely incompatible expectations, and had no ability to compromise.

Other analyses invite disagreement. For example, she describes Mandela as an uninspiring speaker, with slow and wooden oratory. Yet many South Africans consider Mandela's style of speech to be dignified and highly appropriate for such an elder statesmen. Similarly, Ottaway dismisses the Democratic Party (D.P.) and the homeland governments as trivial and unimportant players. While it may become less significant in the future, the D.P. has been a vital source of ideas and possible compromise solutions in the transition. It has also been a voice of the English-speaking white business community, and the only political participant in the negotiations whose hands seem entirely clean of human rights violations.

An analytical strength of this book is that Ottaway examines the major political parties, the National Party and the African National Congress, on similar terms. She notes that, ironically, while the N.P. proclaimed itself a defender of free market virtues against the onslaught of communism, it estab-

lished a heavily state-centered economy, with economic power concentrated in a handful of conglomerates. As Ottaway points out, with its single-party government, attempts at social engineering, huge bureaucracies, state intervention, and public ownership of assets, the N.P. government was comparable to socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. While demands from A.N.C. factions for socialism, big government, and market intervention are anachronistic and potentially disastrous, the greatest difference from previous government programs may be in the race of their intended beneficiaries.

As an African scholar, Ottaway views the N.P. as the entrenched party of an African one-party state, held together by patronage and nationality more than by ideology.

> It was more than just a political party: it had become the state as well, a party-state, to borrow the term used by President Sekou Touré of Guinea in the 1970s. Despite the outward trappings of democracy, the N.P. had de facto consolidated the single-party system many African leaders had tried to erect, to little avail. Ironically, the South African government cited the attempts to create single-party regimes elsewhere on the continent as one reason the black majority could not be allowed to rule South Africa (p.24).

She sees the A.N.C. and its allies as an anticolonial liberation movement, united more by a common enemy than by a shared vision of how to replace that foe. While she realizes that South African nuances and distinctions partly vitiate them, her comparisons to other African countries illuminate South African politics.

Both the N.P. and the A.N.C. may resist ideas of political pluralism and opposition parties. Moreover, both are undergoing wrenching transitions, albeit in opposite directions: The N.P. is moving from near synonymity with the state toward opposition party status, and the A.N.C. is changing from a liberation movement to a potential governing party. Her comparison between the two parties, in places explicit and elsewhere implicit, sheds light on both.

While provocative, Ottaway's comparison nevertheless misses an essential point: It downplays the immorality of apartheid. She describes the way in which the N.P. government, for example, developed racially separate health, education, and local government establishments, as well as a large administrative apparatus for racial classification. She identifies the bureaucratic inefficiencies of such arrangements without noting their inhuman and undemocratic flaws. Her comparison between the N.P. and the A.N.C. ignores the fundamental difference between those parties. While the A.N.C.'s hands are not entirely clean, as demonstrated by recent allegations of corruption and confirmations of internal human rights abuses, the history of N.P. oppression and A.N.C. resistance makes the A.N.C. deeply and essentially different from the N.P.

Ottaway's vision of the future of South Africa is vague and pessimistic. Her predictions of strains in the "tripartite alliance" between the A.N.C., the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions are

being confirmed, particularly by friction between the A.N.C. and the most progressive labor unions. Her analyses also predicted the current escalation in political violence. However, based on the 1992 breakdown of CODESA, she suggests that a negotiated settlement between the A.N.C. and the N.P. would be extremely difficult. The rapid pace of the multiparty negotiations at Kempton Park this year belie that prediction. While the parties have cleared this early hurdle, many longer-term difficulties remain.

The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of Hungary

By Ágnes Horváth and Árpád Szakolczai

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1992, 254 pp., with index, notes, and bibliography, $55.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Evelyn Farkas

When communism fell in Eastern Europe, it fell hard and fast, leaving academics and policymakers alike wondering how the Communist Party apparatus could crumble so quickly. What inherent weakness caused it to shatter so? *The Dissolution of Communist Power* attempts to answer this question by examining the structure and daily operation of communism in Hungary at the twilight of its reign.

Ágnes Horváth and Árpád Szakolczai conducted a sociological survey of the Communist Party apparatus in Budapest at the district party level in 1988. In that study, they concluded that the structure of the system was on the brink of collapse. In *The Dissolution of Communist Power*, they apply Michel Foucault's analytic methods to an extensive series of surveys and interviews with district-level party officials to discover the logic of daily existence under communism.

Horváth and Szakolczai are interested in analyzing the connections among the Communist Party, society, and the individual. They adopt Foucault's empirical and philosophical approach to power as government, i.e., that the relationships between human beings are not explained by structural constants but by understanding the specific rationality built into that structure. In order to examine power and the extent to which government influences groups and individuals, one must study not the state, but the links among government rationality, social networks of power, and behavior. The true power of a regime is reflected in the dynamic network of relationships. The reader's acceptance of Horváth and Szakolczai's conclusions regarding the causes for the downfall of communism is conditional upon agreement with Foucault's theory of government and power.

The authors surveyed officials to obtain a profile of their activities, as well as their backgrounds and personalities. Their data reveal that the district party had a function in almost every aspect of daily life. District party officials played a number of roles based on an intricate system of personal, non-bureaucratic ties. The "central characteristic of the former communist system was not the homogeneity of state ownership, nor the power of the state bureaucracy, but the

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sphere of activity of the regional party committee" (p.208). The authors conclude that this system of personal ties caused the failure of efforts in the 1980s to transform the Hungarian Communist Party into a political party that could operate within a democratic polity. Questioning this system of personal ties, which had become central to the Communist Party, immediately threatened the existence of the intermediate party apparatus.

According to Horváth and Szakolczai, the party replaced the depersonalized modern state with a clientelistic network, and functioned as a "quasi-military machine" which governed in times of peace. It relied on police repression to fulfill its mission. So, while claiming to represent modern progress toward liberalism, it adopted the methods of a fascist state. The oppressive nature of the party was reinforced by the legacy of Bolshevism, which mandated the referral of even minor issues to party committees.

Compelling ideology was effectively replaced by the police. Police terror was employed not to conceal the secret essence of communism, but to prevent the people from realizing that there was no such essence. Once this "absurdity" of communism was exposed to the ruling elite during the party self-introspection of 1988-89, the demise of communism as a political reality in Hungary quickly followed. "The party apparatus eliminated itself with a shy, sorrowful, contorted smile, colored with a feeling of shame" (p.213). Thus, the authors assert, while external factors were the immediate cause of the fall of communism in Hungary, the collapse of the system was inevitable.

Although Horváth and Szakolczai apply a new methodology and additional data to the existing body of literature, theorists examining the fall of communism have already accepted their conclusions. As early as 1969 the Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik wrote in his book *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* that communist 'economic reform' was, "in essence a half-measure and [was] in practice being sabotaged by the party machine, because if such a reform were carried to its logical end, it would threaten the power of the machine" (p.30).

Horváth and Szakolczai also note that the end of an authoritarian system does not automatically result in democracy. They concur with Samuel Huntington, who holds that the factors responsible for bringing about the end of non-democratic regimes are not those necessary for the establishment of democracy. Indeed, in order to make a successful transition to democracy, nations must cope with what Huntington calls "contextual" problems: those conflicts that stem from the nature of the society, economy, culture, history, regional antagonisms, and debts. Even a country with a plethora of contextual problems can consolidate democracy if those problems are addressed in an efficient manner. The underlying requirement, then, for democratic consolidation in a country like Hungary, according to Huntington, is the ability of elites to cooperate and of the public to distinguish between the democratic regime and temporary governments. For this reason, the 1994 elections, Hungary's second democratic elections, will be a crucial test. Istvan Csurka and his Hungarian Justice Party have forced the issue of nationalism onto the political landscape, while the troubles associated with the national debt and state economic intervention have

yet to be resolved. The issue of voter turnout is significant, but a more crucial question is whether a viable coalition can be created with a responsible opposition. Regrettably, Horváth and Szakolczai do not attempt to make any predictions or recommendations on this point.

The authors emphatically state that communism in Hungary is finished forever, but its end could lead to a "balkanised Americanization, for which the communist legacy provides a particularly fertile breeding ground" (p.221). The authors fail, however, to define this Americanization, to explain why it is dangerous, as they imply, and to address how the communist system renders nations susceptible to Americanization. It is unclear what the authors are trying to warn us about, and thus, whether or how such a phenomenon can be prevented.

Horváth and Szakolczai believe that the legacy of communism complicates the transition to democracy in Hungary. Patterns of complacency and inefficiency persist. The lack of a clear separation between the party-state system and society under communism means that although the communist system has collapsed, elements of it still permeate society. As the Hungarian writer Peter Eszterházy wrote in the 1980s, "Even if it were true . . . that the country shook off communism in 1956 as a dog shakes off water, today it is not at all clear where the dog ends and where the water begins" (p.8).

The Dissolution of Communist Power contains a useful inventory of the activities and attitudes of intermediate party officials during a pivotal time in the history of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. This book should be of particular interest to the academic exploring the dynamic of communist party power. However, the authors' reluctance to draw firm conclusions from their findings will leave the policymaker significantly less satisfied than the analyst.

The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace [Expanded Edition]

Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller

Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1993, 397 pp., with notes and selected bibliography, $16.95 paper.

Reviewed by Darren Kew

The academic struggle to pick up the theoretical pieces left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War continues. Indeed, the rerelease of *The Cold War and After* (with a number of new chapters added to the 1991 edition) indicates that the debate to explain why the Cold War ended and to predict the subsequent evolution of the international system has yet to be resolved.

The Cold War and After, a collection of essays that originally appeared in the journal *International Security*, revolves around the premise that the Cold War was a "remarkably stable" era because the United States and the Soviet Union avoided a direct armed conflict. The first seven authors examine this stability to suggest why a "hot" war did not break out and differ in their conclusions regarding several issues. These differences focus on whether the character of the international system or the nature of domestic political orders was more responsible for the sustained peace, and which of these two perspectives more adequately explains present circumstances in order to ensure continued stability. The essays also debate whether nuclear weapons supported or detracted from the long peace, as well as the theory that interdependence prevents international conflict.

In general, the contributors agree that bipolarity was responsible for the relative placidity of the Cold War system, but disagree on the nature of a future multipolar world, which they all seem to forecast following a relative decline of the United States in the coming years. John Mearsheimer goes so far as to say that the West "has an interest in the continuation of the Cold War confrontation" (p.188) and yearns for the paradoxical security of bipolarity. The more convincing argument, however, is Stephen Van Evera's idea that in reality, the effects of polarity are indeterminate, and that the answer to preventing future wars lies elsewhere. Theories regarding the international effects of domestic political orders, which center on the hypothesis that democracies do not fight one another, seem to hold much more promise for useful analysis of future trends.

Further chapters debate the roles of nuclear weapons and of interdependence in stabilizing the international system, yet the essays assessing the desirability

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of U.S. unipolar dominance of the international system are far more interesting for present policy considerations. Christopher Layne warns that the present U.S. strategy of maintaining a hegemonic position will backfire. History shows that unipolar moments are fleeting and that new challengers always arise, such that the more the hegemon tries to restrict these rivals, the greater their subsequent threat to that hegemon. Samuel Huntington, on the other hand, argues that American primacy is good for the United States and the world, because only the United States possesses the power and values to promote a stable global order.

In the key chapter of the book, John Lewis Gaddis examines the reasons behind the conspicuous failure of international relations theory to predict the end of the Cold War. The soul-searching presently gripping the field is similar to that experienced by U.S. political scientists following the Vietnam War, when many theories were intensely criticized for not having foreseen the transformations that swept the country. According to Gaddis, excessively scientific Cold War theories relied on sterile methodologies that avoided more holistic approaches such as narrative, irony, intuition, and imagination that address the non-rational aspects of human behavior.

It is fitting, if not ironic, that Gaddis' lament over the stale methodologies of the Cold War appears at the end of the book, since his logic aptly exposes the weaknesses of the preceding chapters. *The Cold War and After* attempts to view the post-Cold War world through the lenses of Cold War theory. It often reads like an attempt to justify posthumously analyses that during the Cold War were more useful for promoting academic debate than for offering adequate explanations of international phenomena. The historical applications of these theories are informative, but the attempts to extend their logic into the future prove hollow in light of the dynamic world of the 1990s.

Specifically, the one-dimensional view of the world as a nation-state system, combined with the standard obsession with identifying threats from "them" against "us," fails to explain many of the primary trends characterizing the present era. Revolutions in technology and communications, mass migrations, refugees flows, the growth of nongovernmental organizations, issues in economic and political development, ethnicity, religion, and other factors are transforming the very nature of international politics such that theories of polarity and nuclear proliferation do not offer an adequate analysis of international security. The attempts of some of the authors to incorporate the idea of changing national attitudes regarding war is a useful first step toward improving theory, but more fundamental shifts in security thinking are necessary.

Theory must begin to consider that the modern state is being torn in two directions: the global pressures of economic integration, transnational business, environmental deterioration, and more "traditional" security issues are pushing states toward supernational arrangements, while local pressures for ethnic autonomy, control of resources, and changes in civil society are dividing countries from within. Can one really speak of a clear "us" and "them" when those labels change with each issue and often do not correlate with national boundaries? For instance, if economics is now the primary security concern of the United States, where exactly can one draw and defend the boundary of the U.S.

economy? Are U.S. interests really served by viewing crucial trading partners as potential challengers for global hegemony?

While the nation-state will continue to function as the primary mechanism of governance, to limit security theory to the systemic behavior of states is to ignore the transformations within those states, and to miss many of the extra-systemic phenomena that figured into the end of the Cold War and that will play an increasingly influential role in future security issues. A multilayered conception of global entities that incorporates non-state actors, employing theory along the outline provided by Gaddis, would be useful for analysis.

A second failing of the security theory presented in *The Cold War and After* is its Eurocentric focus, with only some consideration made for the possible roles of China and Japan. The developing world is still viewed as being on the periphery of the European theater, despite the growing likelihood that many security issues will originate outside Europe. In addition, none of the authors discusses the new role played by the United Nations as it attempts to address security concerns in the vacuum created by the collapse of the bipolar structure. The book relates all analysis to the interaction of the "Great" powers and assumes that the circumstances facing lesser powers and international organizations can be seen within this context.

The Cold War and After is, however, an excellent treatise on current international security theory, offering an open appraisal of its own shortcomings as well as its successes. The book offers some foundations for making the theory relevant to post-Cold War phenomena, if analysis can rise above the flat perspectives of the past and incorporate new ways of examining behavior in the global realm.

Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy

By Joel Kotkin

New York: Random House, 1993, 343 pp., with endnotes and index, $24.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Warren Cohen

Obsessed by the interplay between nation-states, scholars and politicians have more or less ignored the tribal links that bind individuals. Now that the simplistic, bipolar Cold War perspective is defunct, it seems as though everyone has suddenly realized that the globe is rent with ethnic factionalism, religious fundamentalism, and racial hatred. To some, such strife seems to portend a dark era of intolerance, discrimination, and bloodshed leading to the splintering of civilizations into warring factions.

Joel Kotkin disagrees. A Senior Fellow at the Center for the New West and an International Fellow at the Pepperdine University School of Business and Management, Kotkin argues that networks of global tribes are poised to play the essential role in fueling future prosperity in the world economy. Kotkin defines a modern tribe as a highly mobile, mostly urbanized people which still clings to its ethnic and religious roots. It exhibits what the philosopher Martin Buber called a 'vocation of uniqueness,' a shared historical memory that keeps a culture distinct.

Kotkin claims that the history of modern society and commerce is actually the history of these global tribes — nomad traders or imperialists who spread innovation, entrepreneurialism, and wealth across borders. Tribes have mastered the rules of the game, inculcating economic success among their members by providing a strong ethnic identity, a tradition of cooperation in business, cosmopolitan savvy, and a belief in scientific and material progress. This trend will continue as modern communications and travel further interconnect the world and the imperatives for nation-state groupings weaken in a global marketplace without any ideological challenges to capitalism. Says Kotkin, "it is likely such dispersed peoples — and their worldwide business and cultural networks — will increasingly shape the economic destiny of mankind" (p. 4).

After a brief introduction, Kotkin devotes the rest of his book to an historical portrait of five model tribes. He profiles Jewish financiers, British imperialists, Japanese corporate executives, Chinese investors, and Indian traders and links the cultural attributes of these groups to their commercial achievements through time. What these seemingly dissimilar tribes share are values often deemed essential to prosperity in a modern capitalist world: "a belief in self-help, hard

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work, thrift, education and the family" (p. 9). Combined with these key traits is the importance of ethnic networking. One example is the credit associations formed by Asian-Americans to aid newly arrived immigrants in establishing small businesses. When members of these migrant ethnic groups live and work in various countries, economies tend to flourish. When these countries evict ethnic groups due to envy or intolerance, such as Spanish Jews in the 15th century or the Indians in East Africa in the 1970s, their economies suffer.

The most compelling part of Kotkin's argument is his novel and provocative thesis that the world benefits from retained cultural identities because of the potential links between such affiliations and future global affluence. Kotkin challenges social critics like Karl Marx, sociologist Daniel Bell, and scholar Francis Fukuyama who postulated that future societies would liberate humankind from parochial and exclusive cultures and universalize human experience. Today, honesty about the powerful and lasting influence of ethnicity is vital in light of world tragedies such as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, which cry out for new paradigms for the peaceful coexistence of peoples and clans. Social harmony certainly seems to be a necessary precursor to any kind of shared economic prosperity.

Instinct may suggest that culture plays some role in fostering economic gains. Consider the relative economic success of Asian-Americans in the United States, a phenomenon that has been the subject of recent public attention. For example, the comic strip *Doonesbury* last year satirized Caucasian parents who beg Asian-American neighbors not to make their children study so much. Statistics seem to bear out these anecdotal tales. Kotkin cites figures showing that Asian immigrants in the United States are two and one half times more likely than natives to hold postgraduate degrees. At famed research institutions, such as IBM's Yorktown Heights facility, Asians account for one in four researchers. At AT&T's Bell Labs, they comprise as many as two in five.

Yet upon deeper scrutiny, Kotkin's viewpoint seems less convincing. His argument would be more compelling if he could specifically isolate the relevant ethnic ingredients contributing to economic success, beyond the general mantras of "work hard, study hard and save." Kotkin avoids the corollary question about why certain groups have not succeeded. For example, Romanies, or "Gypsies," have been wanderers and outcasts for centuries. But why, in contrast to the Romanies, were the Jews gifted money-makers? Mexican families are characterized as strong, extended networks, but the Chinese have generated more wealth.

There is no single combination of cultural traits that constitutes a key to prosperity. This explains why members of Kotkin's exemplary tribes can have poor cousins. And since almost every immigrant ethnic or minority group can count successful business people among its ranks, this proves that even members of tribes whose cultures are broadly lacking in Kotkin's required values can achieve commercial success. Furthermore, two of Kotkin's successful tribes, Jews and Indians, have underdeveloped economies in their home countries. Kotkin explains that this is due to socialism, regulation, and protectionism by their respective governments, which tend to inhibit the initiative of otherwise

ambitious ethnic groups. Even so, with such prodigious networks, both inside and outside the countries, one would expect to see entrepreneurial endeavors flourish.

Another issue that Kotkin fails to address adequately is whether ethnic bonds will remain strong in a changing world economy. In fact, global trends seem to sever rather than enhance ethnic networks. Investment capital now flows around the world at a rate well beyond the scope of any government regulation, reaching $1 trillion a day. Without any barriers to the exchange of money and with vastly improved telecommunications, ethnic groups have expanded avenues by which to gather information, find cooperative partners, and lure prospective customers. While a tightly knit family will always help a relative in need, in the global economy the lowest price wins. Kotkin cites an unintentionally telling quote from an Israeli diamond cutter: "Jews don't come here to do business because they're Jews but because we do it better and cheaper. . . . There's no room for sentiment in business, even among Jews" (p. 54).

Kotkin is also overly sanguine in his belief that tribes will enhance the future labor marketplace, writing that "the world has become a single market for labor and talent, a market perfectly suited for the development of new global tribes" (p. 235). But whereas individuals have traditionally been the wanderers, today industries also migrate. Labor-intensive industries are likely to move to countries like China, India, and Ireland where they can find technically trained but unemployed populations willing to work for low wages. Such dramatic shifts in the world economy are likely to exacerbate, rather than reduce, tensions between competing economic groups.

Furthering this possibility is the mounting domination of world markets by Asian industries. Kotkin claims that Japan has more scientific researchers than does the European Economic Community. And a potential economic network of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore would have combined foreign currency reserves two and one half times those of Japan. Kotkin writes, "From a position of almost total economic backwardness less than 150 years ago, Japanese, Chinese and Indians have now broken forever the Euro-American lock on posterity" (p. 262). In contrast, the century of American hegemony is ending prematurely. Racial enmity is palpable and anti-immigration candidates campaign without apology in a land that boasts the Statue of Liberty. In Europe labor forces are aging, population growth is flat, and workers have the highest number of sick days among their global counterparts. Meanwhile, ultranationalist and exclusionary political movements are gaining strength in European parliaments, most dramatically at the local level. The slaughter in the Balkans ominously illustrates the limits of tolerance. Against such a backdrop of escalating ethnic violence and intolerance, the reader may find Kotkin's thesis of global tribes assisting in international economic salvation slightly unrealistic.

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited

Edited by James A. Nathan

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 302 pp., with notes and index, $39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Philip Nash

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the point during the Cold War at which the United States and the Soviet Union came closest to crossing the nuclear threshold. One can understand why an episode of such gravity would inspire more study than any other topic related to John F. Kennedy's presidency, save his assassination. Unfortunately, the quantity of biographical work up to now has been no indication of its quality. Even recent works such as Blight and Welch's *On the Brink* (1989), Brugioni's *Eyeball to Eyeball* (1991), and Thompson's *The Missiles of October* (1992), written with a wealth of newly available documents, have contributed disappointingly little to missile crisis historiography.

In contrast, James Nathan has edited a volume that, despite certain flaws such as a lack of a bibliography and occasional sloppy editing, represents real progress. He has assembled eight essays by historians and political scientists, which examine the crisis from various angles.

The contributors fully exploit the latest U.S. archival sources and recollections of crisis veterans. President Kennedy (with perhaps only his brother Robert's knowledge) tape-recorded most meetings of the now famous "ExComm," a body of experts who advised him during the crisis; transcripts of five meetings on the 16th and 27th of October are now available. Scholars will benefit from the endnotes alone, although Raymond Garthoff unfortunately documents his chapter by referring readers only to his own book. The other authors acknowledge the debt owed by historians to the National Security Archives, the private organization in Washington, D.C. responsible for uncovering thousands of official documents on the crisis.

In applying this evidence, the authors challenge long-held assumptions about the crisis and maintain a critical approach rarely seen in recent discussions. In a brief chapter on the decision to blockade Cuba, for example, Elizabeth Cohn suggests that ExComm was not the skillful deliberative body portrayed by most historians, but the means by which the president built consensus for decisions which he himself had already reached.

Richard Ned Lebow also applies the new documentary evidence to both the traditional and revisionist interpretations to analyzing the way in which domestic politics affected Kennedy's resolve and his decision to pursue the blockade. Most striking is Lebow's finding that revisionist claims surrounding the impor-

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tance of domestic politics in Kennedy's decisions are largely supported by the latest documents.

However, in the chapter by James Nathan, the author's determination to fault Kennedy for replacing diplomacy with the threat of force collides with the new evidence revealed in recently released documents. Many of these documents, which Nathan himself cites, demonstrate J.F.K.'s heavy reliance on negotiation before, during, and after the crisis. The president and his subordinates went to great lengths to conceal this diplomacy, cultivating thereafter an image of steadfastness. This pose included leaking the accusation soon after the crisis that U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who advocated negotiation, had "wanted a Munich," although several officials, including Kennedy himself, had supported this approach. Nathan may be justified in criticizing this deception, but it does not follow that Kennedy was a nuclear sabre rattler who refused to pursue diplomacy to resolve the crisis. Nathan thus mistakenly creates an artificial distinction between diplomacy and the threat of force.

The collection provides a thoughtful analysis of the perceptions and motivations of the Cuban and Soviet parties to the confrontation. In a speculative yet insightful essay, Philip Brenner examines Cuba's role in the crisis, which ironically plays almost no part in most historical analyses. He discusses Fidel Castro's perception of the U.S. threat, his acceptance of the Soviet missiles, his relations with Moscow, and his role at the end of the crisis.

Similarly, Garthoff summarizes the latest findings from Soviet sources, which unfortunately are not yet fully documented. Soviets who took part in the crisis have reviewed several documents and provided certain insights into the event. For example, Soviet ground forces in Cuba at the time were far larger than believed by U.S. policymakers and were equipped with tactical nuclear missiles, which could be launched by local Soviet commanders in response to a U.S. invasion. With studies such as those by Garthoff and Brenner, historical analyses are finally beginning to transcend the limited perspective of U.S. officialdom.

Laurence Chang examines this point fully in his historiographical essay. "The understandable tendency of Western scholars to equate Washington's knowledge, estimates, and assumptions with the totality of empirical fact," he writes, "has led to underestimation of the extent to which decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis was conducted in the dark" (p. 153). Along with much of the material throughout the collection, his argument further undermines exaggerated notions of "crisis management."

The contributors to this collection often recognize and explore neglected aspects of the crisis. The volume's most refreshing, provocative essay is James Hershberg's analysis of U.S. actions prior to the missile crisis. He first explores the widespread U.S. covert action campaign against Cuba, including the infamous Operation Mongoose, and finds that this campaign was tied to U.S. military contingency planning, which was stepped up markedly beginning in early 1962. Hershberg cites documented evidence stating that this increased planning resulted not from the Soviet conventional buildup in Cuba, "but from covert program's internal momentum and perhaps from the increased hopes of the program's overseers that they might get an opportunity to assist an anti-

Castro revolt in Cuba" (p. 247). The military planning, moreover, encompassed decidedly unroutine maneuvers and redeployment of forces. These points lead Hershberg to hypothesize that the Kennedy Administration intended to invade Cuba before its discovery of the Soviet missiles on the island.

Thirty years after the Cuban missile crisis, we still lack a definitive history of the event based on primary sources. With the evidence currently available and with new information emerging from sources as unlikely as the Central Intelligence Agency, recording and interpreting such a history is a formidable undertaking. *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* does not pretend to accomplish this task, yet with the breadth and depth of its innovation and documentation, it comes closer to doing so than any previous study. One hopes the publisher will issue a paperback edition, for it deserves a wide audience among historians, political scientists, and their students.

The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?

By John E. Peters

Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993, 176 pp., $46.00 cloth.

Reviewed by John Tashjean

If you have the slightest interest in alternative futures of the American military system, you must read this book. It connects the recent past to the foreseeable future more thoroughly than any other book and alerts the reader to key budgetary constraints, alternative defense postures, and multiservice force compositions. The author draws on his experience as a Vietnam veteran in the grim but politically instructive period of extrication and on his recent Pentagon experience. Although he covers all of the services, Peters places emphasis on the general purpose forces — especially the army.

Peters' main thesis is a criticism of the nearsightedness of the U.S. military establishment. He states that in the past 50 years, the joint strategic planning process at the Pentagon became myopic, "only capable of small, incremental changes." Thus, "innovation comes only when organizations fail, when pressured from the outside, or when they wish to expand" (p.154). Left on its own, the Pentagon planning system "attempts to build forces for the worst case and treats all other contingencies as lesser included cases" (p.154). This lack of parity of defense planning with U.S. security needs was most clearly demonstrated in America's defeat in Vietnam. Yet, years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States remains encumbered by a defense establishment that has only partially adapted to the post-Cold War era and has only minimally downsized its armed forces.

In response, Peters proposes streamlining the Pentagon and advocates a new approach to force development. Such reorganization would include a drastic reallocation of duties within the Pentagon: the creation of a National Defense Staff directly answerable to the Secretary of Defense, the elimination of the services from force planning, and a concomitant reduction of service headquarters and the joint staff (p.102). Reform of the kind Peters has suggested appears likely, in light of the recent reorganization of the U.S. Air Force, proposals for joint American-Russian military exercises, and recent decisions by the U.S. Congress to close scores of military bases. Peters, however, fails to acknowledge such reform efforts. This absence may be partly explained by the fact that his book is based on his doctoral dissertation completed in 1990.

The institutional defects at work in the Pentagon are laid bare in several case studies in Chapter 3; a critique of the joint and service planning process and

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Gulf War performance alone is worth the price of the book. It includes a very critical account of Army and Air Force implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The strength of the book lies in its early chapters, which set the stage through discussions of global high-technology contexts, domestic and budgetary factors, and relevant international relations theory. Peters' style is systematic and deductive, always remaining within the bounds of mainstream American public opinion, with the essential objective of performing the type of global forecasting from which one can derive points of departure for force composition and even for operational military planning.

Yet this is not a simple task. A few questions about Washington's military perspective may be in order. For instance, why is there a grand ambition of global forecasting? Although global scope may be inscribed upon the banner of the Defense Intelligence Agency, such scope may no longer be appropriate given that the Department of Defense has foregone the Bush-era "Base Force" for an allegedly more searching "bottom-up" review. Global scope in these matters is merely the military smile left behind by the Cheshire Cat of Rooseveltian internationalism.

This deficit of military finesse is particularly blatant where it is absolutely indispensable to sound forecasting: in the defining of the present. To say, in accordance with conventional wisdom, that we are now at the beginning of the post-Cold War world is only to define our current situation in retrospect. Such labels beg all the important questions: what was the Cold War, and what brought about its end? The end of the Cold War is often explained in terms of the exhaustion of Marxism-Leninism, Reagan's economic warfare by means of a massive military build-up, the Afghan war, and pressure from human rights groups. Depending on which explanation one chooses, the initial condition for serious forecasting will vary substantially.

There was a lack of historical insight in the Cold War decades during which the current American system of defense was constructed. Take, for example, the Cold War grand Panjandrum of Strategic Deterrence and the lesser Panjandrum of tactical nuclear weapons for NATO. According to former Secretary of Defense Herbert York, speaking on P.B.S. on 6 August 1982, America's chief deterrent, the Minuteman missile force, was sized at roughly 1,000 because a mere costing estimate was transformed into Washington doctrine. The force remains at this excess level to this day (pp.147-148). Those readers familiar with Freeman Dyson's *Weapons and Hope* will recall that tactical nuclear weapons were added to NATO, not based on any prudent and humane consideration of risk, but because Robert Oppenheimer was convinced of their utility in his campaign against the Strategic Air Command. If such was the quality of Europe's protector, perhaps it is no wonder that NATO now seems moribund.

A third error of the Washington perspective is a reflection of politicians' lack of finesse concerning military matters, as they receive no basic (or refresher) course in defense policy and military analysis. This explains the present chorus of self-congratulation about Operation Desert Storm. Of this victory, as of all others, one may say with the Germans that *der Sieg versummt* (victory stultifies).

These three fundamental errors of the Washington military perspective are not criticized by the author, and rightly so. The first two are peripheral to his concerns, however important they may be to the citizen and to the student of policy. The third error, illustrated by the Gulf War, is the major focus of Peters' book. He presents an original and incisive critique of the Gulf War as an old-fashioned "coordinated" campaign, not a truly joint campaign (p.86). Focusing on past and alternative methods of force composition, Peters delivers what he promised, amply documenting his book and providing a substantial bibliography.