Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Capstone Doctrine in Addressing UN Peacekeeping Challenges

COLIN CHRISTENSEN

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Introduction

The United Nations originally developed the concept of peacekeeping and has far more experience with the practice than any other international or multi-lateral body. While it possesses substantial expertise in carrying out peacekeeping missions, it now faces a range of serious challenges to its capacity to continue doing so effectively. These challenges are not new, however, and in its long history with peacekeeping the UN has progressively evolved in its approach to the practice. In January, 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) approved the Capstone Doctrine (Capstone) as a way of helping to bring the lessons-learned of past peacekeeping operations under one conceptual roof (Capstone is officially titled the "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines").

In this paper I will examine the challenges faced by contemporary peacekeeping and look at how Capstone attempts to respond to these challenges. I conclude that Capstone addresses most, but not all of these challenges. In doing so, it presents a fundamentally conservative vision of peacekeeping, although it also leaves conceptual room open for some expansive interpretations of particular peacekeeping activities. I find that Capstone's direct impact is fairly limited to educational materials and as a potential reference tool for peacekeeping policymakers.

My first chapter provides background information to help explain the context that facilitated the creation of Capstone. I present an overview of the history of peacekeeping by describing three distinct challenges that the practice has faced: the challenge of managing expansion, of creating appropriate mandates, and of interpreting the principles of peacekeeping. My second chapter, which begins with a background section explaining the history of the documents leading up to Capstone, analyzes the ways in which Capstone addresses the core challenges laid out in chapter 1. I will conclude by using the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a case study in how successfully the lessons incorporated in Capstone are or are not being implemented in the field.

Chapter 1: The Challenges of Peacekeeping

The development of UN peacekeeping

The concept of peacekeeping is never mentioned in the United Nations (UN) Charter; both the practice and the terminology used to describe it evolved progressively over the more than half a century in which peacekeepers have been deployed. In this time, peacekeeping has become one of the most high-profile facets of the institution's global footprint. While it is not unprecedented for armed forces to be used as a way of keeping apart conflicting parties, the UN developed the modern concept of peacekeeping as a way of fulfilling a unique and demanding mandate. The founders of the UN tasked the newly minted, post-World War II Security Council (SC) with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, article 24)." They stressed the primacy of the need to achieve this goal through peaceful, collaborative means with conflicting states (outlined in chapter VI). If these efforts did not succeed, however, under chapter VII they tasked it with determining the response to any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (UN Charter, article 39)," including the use of coercive actions such as sanctions and even force.

The capacity to apply force was initially enabled through article 43, which outlined the responsibility of member states to "make available" to the SC the armed forces necessary to ensure military action, essentially outlining a system of collective security.

This vision of a militarily proactive security council was stillborn, however, when confronted with the reality of Cold War politics. In that era, no major power wanted to donate its military forces to an international body that gave equal voice to its ideological rivals. While the US-led forces during the Korean War operated under a UN flag and with a SC mandate, this was passed only through the absence of the Soviet Union, which was boycotting the session at the time the mission was voted on. No veto-wielding power would make this mistake again. The split within the SC, which would remain until the Soviet Union collapsed, demonstrated that armed forces -- under control of the UN and primed to embark on military offensives -- would not represent the envisioned international consensus against aggression.

This political paralysis meant that troops would no longer conduct war under a UN flag (although this restriction is currently being tested, as will be discussed below). Regardless of this stalemate, the SC continued to have a mandated duty to mitigate threats to and breaches of international peace. It was in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956, coming only three years after the end of the Korean War, that the first major peacekeeping mission was born as a method of using armed forces to fulfill this duty (although there had been some small observer missions before this). The UK, France and Israel militarily acting outside of SC authorization (in response to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal), the SC requested the deployment of the UNEF peacekeeping force as a politically tenable means of supporting the cease-fire. As one analyst concludes, "Just at the moment when the framework of the United Nations was

brutally cast aside, (UN Secretary-General) Hammarskjöld re-established a role for the world organization (Frohlich 2001, p.195)."

The multi-national forces tasked with monitoring the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt represented a fairly unique and novel application of military force and based their actions on principles that can be described as "classical" or "traditional" peacekeeping. In this case, "Peacekeeping… was about consent, neutral interposition and moral presence rather than enforcement (Macqueen 2002, p.7)." Despite their overtly military posture, this type of peacekeeping operation (PKO) was actually seen through the prism of the SC's chapter VI responsibility to respond to the requests of member states for assistance in maintaining peaceful relations. The job of the peacekeepers in these deployments, which made up the dominant form of the practice during the Cold War, was to interpose a neutral military force between two armed foes, and monitor their compliance of a peace agreement. They were guided by three key principles: the need to ensure the *consent* of the governments involved, the need to treat all parties *impartially*, and the observance of a strict prohibition on the *use of force*, except in self-defense.

UNEF represented the beginning of a dynamic new facet to the work of the UN. Including this initial deployment, around $61 billion has been spent on a total of 63 UN peacekeeping missions (UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet 2010). PKOs have expanded the scope of their activities to include what are now termed "multi-dimensional" missions

that involve more technical support through programs such as security sector reform and human rights monitoring. The UN has even taken temporary control of governments, creating transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. UN peacekeeping mandates have also stretched the limits of the traditional principles of peacekeeping, as missions have had to forcefully respond to attacks by "spoilers" to peace processes, and prioritize the protection of civilians in their care. These new responsibilities have required more assertive mandates, which have forced the SC to rely on its more coercive chapter VII functions.

Peacekeeping missions have become an increasingly well-used tool of international diplomacy and conflict resolution. Globally, the deployment of military personnel in PKOs "surpassed record highs" in 2009, rising by about 9% over the year, with a total of more than 200,000 military, police and civilians in the field (CIC 2010, p.2). PKOs tend to be established as part of a delicate political balancing act. When countries, especially the permanent members of the SC (P5), determine that it is in their interest to stop or prevent a given conflict, but have no interest in direct military invasion, a PKO from the UN or a major regional organization presents a practical step that can be taken with a minimal commitment of financial and political capital.

After 60 years of trial-and-error development, peacekeeping is now one of the most prominent activities of the UN. Although peacekeeping represents only a part of the total work of the institution, it has a substantially larger budget. The UN budget for

2008-2009 was $4.171 billion not including peacekeeping operations (UN at a glance 2010); the UN runs on a two-year cycle on its budgets, and while the 2010-2011 budget has not been finalized yet, a proposed draft version has it at $5.2 billion (UN Department of Information 2010). In comparison, the peacekeeping budget for 2009-2010 is $7.87 billion (UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet 2010). Beyond its budgetary significance, peacekeeping also leaves a disproportionately large footprint in the public's eye. Indeed, Richard Holbrooke, the former United States UN Ambassador has been quoted as saying that, "The UN will ultimately be judged by its peace-keeping scorecard more than anything else (Frohlich 2001, p.192)."

As more has become expected of peacekeepers the strain on the system has increased, making the need for clearer doctrine to guide the process more apparent. Over the past few years it has become clear that the UN's ability to field successful peacekeeping missions faces a range of challenges, which can be summarized into three broad categories: the challenge of managing expansion, the challenge of creating appropriate mandates, and the challenge of interpreting principles.

The challenge of managing expansion

UN peacekeeping has gone through several years of expansion in parallel with the global trend; in 2008, UN forces grew by about 9% (CIC 2010). The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) now runs or supports 16 peacekeeping missions, and

is in charge of 85,044 troops, 12,920 police, 2,447 military observers, and thousands of civilians in the field (UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet 2010).

The UN is by no means the sole organization that deploys peacekeepers. In 2009, NATO had more than 83,861 peacekeepers under its command, representing 88% of non-UN peacekeepers, and other regional organizations like the AU and the EU deployed several thousand peacekeepers (NATO and the UN combined account for 93% of all deployed peacekeepers). The vast majority of the NATO forces (71,030 troops), however, were part of one mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (CIC 2010). Some commentators such as Gowan and Johnstone (2007) and Maloney (2005) have questioned whether this mission is a peacekeeping force in the classical sense, given their more overt war-fighting role (an issue discussed more in the section below on peacekeeping principles). However, whether or not the ISAF numbers should be included in the final tally of peacekeeping troops, the UN is still clearly a dominant player in the field.



Image courtesy of UN DPKO: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/chart.pdf

As indicated in the graph above, after a dramatic bump in the number of UN PKOs in the early 1990s, they fell off in the second half of the decade; but the number has been rising steadily since, and is now at its highest level in the post-Cold War period. The general expansion of peacekeeping will require significant resources to sustain. This is a problem for all organizations involved with the practice, but is a particularly challenge for the UN's DPKO, which must negotiate force levels with a number of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) with markedly different force and command structures. DPKO also faces the dilemma that more than 40% of UN military personnel come from its top five troop contributors – Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Egypt (out of a total of 114 TCCs) (DPKO A 2010). This fact results in several potential future problems for UN peacekeeping. Firstly, any future change in this source of personnel (for example,

a war between India and Pakistan) would severely restrict the available troop levels. It also points to a deep division that has been established between those countries, mainly members of the P5, that make the decision to send peacekeepers, and those that do the implementing. As previous Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno said in a recent interview:

> The countries that implement are more and more tired and resentful that they are expected to take the risk for those that make the decision but do not want to take the risk…And Western countries do not see how deep the resentment is, and take for granted that (countries like) Pakistan, Bangladesh and India will be an inexhaustible resource that (the West) can send to tougher and tougher places, and that they won't complain. At best they will go but they won't perform, as they won't want to take the risk, as we have seen in Congo recently. (Guéhenno 2009)

UN peacekeeping also faces a range of persistent logistical challenges, and missions continue to struggle to deploy rapidly and with adequate resources. Analyzing this capabilities-expectations gap, Bures concludes that, while there have been significant improvements in DPKO's internal capacity since 1994, they continue to face the external challenge of procuring troops and equipment from member states. He remarks that, "On average, it still takes the UN 4-5 months to put peacekeeping troops on the ground and many national contingents continue to come without the equipment they promised

(Bures 2007, p.13).” This difficulty in procuring adequate funds and equipment for missions is illustrated by the well-publicized struggle of the UNAMID force in Darfur to acquire enough troops and equipment (VOA 2008). Guéhenno warned reporters of the challenges that this “unprecedented surge” in peacekeeping will create:

> But I also see, and it's my duty to see it, the enormous challenge that this represents: the managerial challenge, to make sure that on all those 18 different operations, 18 different political processes, we are attentive to them, and we support them adequately; [and] the very practical challenges of supporting that number of people, making sure that they have the right quality, that they have the professionalism that we want them to have, that there is a proper oversight in all areas. (Guehenno 2006)

The challenge of creating appropriate mandates

Beyond the perennial struggle to find resources, UN peacekeeping missions can be hamstrung by poorly conceived mandates. In some situations, PKOs are used to fill the gaps where the P5 and strategic regional powers are reluctant or unable to become directly involved. It is much easier to order the deployment of a mission into an intractable conflict situation if it involves other countries’ troops. Arguably, DPKO was pushed into deploying UNAMID in Darfur because of domestic political pressure on the US, and many within the organization are concerned that they will be pushed into

deploying a mission into Somalia. There are some examples of internal resistance to SC pressure to deploy a PKO that is viewed as unwise. For example, Durch and England (2009) claim that the UN Secretariat managed to push back against the proposal for the UN to lead international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan in 2001, and authorized the NATO-led ISAF instead.

This raises the question of what criteria should be used to determine peacekeeping deployments. This problem can be traced back to the UN charter itself, which does not define what a threat to or a breach of the peace actually is, even though these are conditions that peacekeeping mandates (coming from the SC) explicitly refer to and are designed to address. In addition to this conceptual difficulty, given the inherently difficult nature of their missions, PKOs require a clear sense of mission if they are to achieve operational success.

One of the most important criteria for any peacekeeping deployment should be the determination that there is an actual "peace to keep". It is unrealistic to expect a PKO to force conflicting parties to reconcile if they do not actually want to. As Brahimi and Ahmed argue, the lessons from the 1990s show that peacekeeping will fail in situations where "mediation efforts have not advanced the discussion very far on core political issues, where there is only a partial peace to keep, and consent of the parties is ambiguous (2008, p.12)." Demonstrating the difficulty of setting strict deployment criteria that would limit SC action, however, they also conclude that it is "wishful

thinking" to believe that a lack of a comprehensive peace settlement will prevent the deployment of a PKO.

Even if a mission is deployed for strategically sound reasons -- including both thoughtful deliberations by the SC and with a clear peace process to support -- it must also operate from a well-crafted mandate. These are found in Security Council Resolutions. As these resolutions represent the result of complex political discussion and compromise, they include many clauses (each preceded by some action verb, such as "welcomes" or "deplores") that relate to different aspects of the conflict in question, including a recognition of the history of past actions by the UN and regional organizations. The mandate itself is not set aside from these other clauses, but follows a relatively standard format, including using a term such as "decides to establish (said force) with a mandate to (perform certain functions)." If acting under the more robust Chapter VII, the mandate will explicitly say so. The DPKO, as a department of the Secretariat, is given responsibility for contacting the TCC's and constituting the mission.

Mandates represent an important part of the political horse-trading that gives birth to any peacekeeping mission. Beyond their operational utility, they also become a valuable part of securing, and managing, the commitment of the broader international community (and not just the SC) to trying to end a conflict. As Durch and England write:

> A regional or UN mandate can be reassuring both to the host state (as a political barrier to unlimited outside interference) and to the provider (as a tool to prevent mission creep or the growth of unrealistic local expectations regarding outside aid). If and when the going gets rough, an international mandate is also a license to canvass for additional international help. (2009, p.4)

The challenge for the SC is to ensure that these mandates create achievable goals and lend themselves to candid interpretation. Defining success is one of the harder tasks that a PKO must address, especially given that their fundamental mission – intervening in a conflict to put an end to it – is incredibly difficult to achieve. Call (2008) argues that defining a successful intervention is a murky process, but traces four broad standards that can be used: no recurrence of war; addressing root causes; creating legitimate regimes and effective states; and ensuring economic recovery. While stopping war might be fairly achievable, preventing a *recurrence* of war in part relies on success in the other three areas, which can be very hard for a PKO to carry out. Overall, a PKO must be clear about its objective, and whether it seeks to simply prevent an immediate relapse into war (as a cease-fire monitoring mission would aim for), or if it intends to address more underlying issues to help create longer-term stability. The initial mandate provides the indispensable scaffolding needed to build the envisioned end state of the mission.

If the SC gives impossible and vague mandates to its PKOs -- which they therefore struggle to translate into successful peacekeeping precedent -- than the overall prestige of UN peacekeeping suffers, and it will be called on less and less. This erosion in the stature of UN peacekeeping is a definite concern, and could potentially restrict the organization's use of the practice. In an article about the challenges that Alain Le Roy, the new Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations faces, Gowan (2008) expresses concern regarding the "trend towards bigger peace operations with ever-more ambitious, perhaps unrealistic, mandates to rebuild shattered states," and concludes that, "In private, many of the (UN's) experts worry that they cannot fulfill these mandates – almost all would prefer less expansive alternatives with realistic targets (Gowen 2008)."

The challenge of interpreting principles

Beyond the need to adjust to expansion, and to craft appropriate mandates, UN PKOs face the broader challenge of accurately defining their role in missions where the traditional principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense have been tested to their limits. The manner that peacekeepers interpret these principles has evolved steadily over the more than 50 years that they have been deployed, and understanding this historical process is key to understanding their interpretation today.

The notion of consent is perhaps the peacekeeping principle most rooted in the UN's legal framework. The responsibility of the Security Council to determine and address breaches of the peace has always been limited by its parallel responsibility -- outlined in article 2(7) of the UN Charter-- to respect the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of states. While the SC can always authorize member states to take military action against a sovereign nation (if they determine that there is a threat to or a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39, Chapter VII of the Charter), this is a rare occurrence, and the need to honor state sovereignty placed clear parameters on the development of peacekeeping. PKOs could not deploy without the consent of the host government, and ideally of the other conflicting parties, otherwise they would be essentially operating as an invasion force.

As mentioned above, the UNEF mission in the Suez was the first example of a UN peacekeeping mission, and illustrates the necessity of the consent principle. Situated in Egyptian territory, UNEF could only fulfill its monitoring mandate as long as Egypt's President Nasser agreed to host them on his territory. The composition of the force, its size and its freedom of movement were dependent on the good-will of the armies it was separating (Hillen, Traditional Peacekeeping, 2000), and when Nasser prepared to go back to war with Israel in 1967 he simply expelled the peacekeepers.

In future missions, however, the granting of consent was not as clearly achieved, and the murkiness of the principle soon became apparent. When UNIFIL deployed in 1978 in

Lebanon it technically had the consent of the major parties (Israel and the government of Lebanon), but it soon became apparent that local non-state actors like Hezbollah and the PLO never definitively gave their own consent, and they continuously harassed the peacekeepers as a result, limiting their ability to achieve their monitoring mandate. In addition, the position of Israel itself in relation to the mission was far from clear. Throughout its existence, UNIFIL struggled in its relationship with the warring parties, and ultimately "was left to hope for cooperation from the belligerents(Hillen 2000, p.137)."

The subsequently apparent need to secure the consent of local actors that played a significant role in the conflict, and not just the national government, become a common challenge in PKOs after the Cold War ended. As peacekeepers became increasingly used to help end intra-state conflicts, the parties that peacekeepers separated were often not strong state actors, such as those dealt with by UNEF – who gave (and took away) consent so clearly – but rather weak states and non-state actors who would look much more like those UNIFIL faced, and whos actions would demonstrate further the difficulty of securing consent.

Beyond the issue of consent, this new set of missions also raised concerns relating to the second peacekeeping principle: impartiality. Impartiality had always been a pre-requisite for the successful completion of a traditional peacekeeping mandate, but in these missions it tended to be seen as meaning neutrality. The trust of both parties, and

their willingness to permit peacekeepers to inspect their positions, was crucial in the monitoring of a peace agreement. If one faction felt that the peacekeepers favored the other faction, they would shut out the mission, and the agreement would collapse. This need to project an aura of neutrality extended beyond simply the actions of the peacekeepers, and included ensuring that the troops making up the mission came from countries neutral to the conflict. (For example, UNEF I was carefully constructed so as to exclude British and French troops, as they had been active parties to the conflict (Frohlich 2001).)

Post-Cold War PKOs found that the strict observance of this type of neutrality was a complex process in missions that were threatened by the recalcitrance of "spoilers" to the peace process, and the concept of impartiality had to evolve to allow for actions against spoilers. Small, non-state militias played a dominant roll in many of the wars of this era that involved peacekeeping forces, and PKOs had a mixed record in determining how to successfully respond to violent resistance from these groups. Most infamously, in Somalia UNOSOM II fought explicitly against the warlord leader Mohamed Aideed, leading it to become involved in "inter-clan skirmishes" and thus seemingly compromising its impartiality (Jan 2002). UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone also took an aggressive stand against Foday Sankoh's RUF rebels, combining dialogue and negotiation with "credible military deterrence" (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003). However, while in Somalia, UNOSOM II's military action essentially ended in military defeat (or at least political defeat, as the mission withdrew without putting an end to

the threat posed by Aideed), Sankoh was successfully captured in Sierra Leone and the RUF rebels were eventually routed.

It is up for debate if these specific military actions, which involved at least the appearance of "taking sides", were impartial or not. What is clear is that they were not neutral. A new way of interpreting the principle was established in the 1990s, opening the door for PKOs to designate a party as a spoiler, and thus deal with them differently than they would other, more cooperative, parties. Part of this shift was the realization that the issue of impartiality should not be confused with neutrality, which implies a much more hands-off approach.

This new understanding of impartiality also meant a redefining of the third classic peacekeeping principle: non-use of force except in self-defense. At the crux of this issue was the development of the concept of 'peace enforcement' as more assertive version of peacekeeping. As Mats Berdal explains, the tenability of peace enforcement rests on several assumptions:

> The first of these is that military force, even though it involves coercion, can be used *impartially* to ensure compliance with a given mandate without designating an enemy…The second assumption flows directly from the first: using force in this manner, precisely because it is 'impartial and even-handed', will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict in question. (2000, p.56)

NATO peacekeeping doctrine discusses peace enforcement as taking place under a more assertive Chapter VII mandate and, being coercive in nature, it is, "Conducted when the consent of all Parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain….The aim of (peace enforcement) is not defeat/destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and persuade them to comply with a course of action (NATO 2001, para.2(4))."

The idea that you can use force against a target, while not designating them an enemy and thus not seek their destruction, requires a fundamental re-evaluation of how militaries are usually employed. As Berdal concludes about the UN PKOs in Somalia and Bosnia, these missions were "designed to *create* military realities on the ground that would, in theory at any rate, facilitate the search for more lasting political solutions to the conflict at hand. The decision to take coercive action arose out of a conviction that relying on the consent and good will of the parties would only prolong an unacceptable situation (2000, p.58)."

It is far from clear if PKOs are the appropriate vehicle for these missions. At a basic level, PKOs are simply not constructed with the goal of conducting offensive military operations. As Durch and England conclude, peacekeeping forces are poor templates for the unified command called for in successful military operations because, at a basic level, peacekeeping operations "function in a realm of partial control and competing priorities that is intrinsic to multi-national or multi-lateral organization (2009, p.4)."

One solution to this dilemma is to make peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement missions distinct, operationally separate activities. Achieving this distinction, given the practical challenges of securing the deployment of military forces, is difficult to do. The NATO peacekeeping doctrine concludes that, "Any transition to (peace enforcement) from a mission only mandated for (peacekeeping) therefore requires a conscious political decision, a new mandate and more robust (rules of engagement)(NATO 2001, , para.2(5))." As mentioned above, however, NATO's own forces are struggling with this distinction in Afghanistan, where ISAF forces are finding it difficult to construct the conceptual boundaries between peacekeeping and outright warfare in their operations against the Taliban.

The emergence of the civilian protection norm

The broadening of the boundaries on the permissible use of force, as well as on the principles of consent and impartiality, have paralleled the growth of the controversial concept of "humanitarian intervention". This idea developed in the 1990s as the peacekeeping missions referenced above, as well as international military engagements in conflicts such as Kosovo and Haiti, seemed to indicate the development of a new norm in international politics that accepted the impingement of state sovereignty in order to achieve humanitarian goals, including through the use of force.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty eventually refined this idea into the concept of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). R2P encapsulated the conditional nature of state sovereignty and the international community's responsibility to protect populations under direct threat from their government, or whose plight was being neglected (it also emphasized the need to empower weak governments before taking more aggressive actions). A diluted version of R2P was codified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document(UN General Assembly 2005, para. 138-139). Although it is debatable if the language used in the resolution changed the status quo drastically, as it made SC authorization a requirement of any intervention (a power the body already possessed), the fact that the UN endorsed R2P-sounding language at all became a rallying point for advocates of the norm.

Cottey (2008) argues that support for humanitarian intervention has significantly dropped in the post-9/11 world, especially as Western powers re-evaluated their strategic priorities. (Although not discussed by Cottey, another factor contributing to this drop in support has been resistance from Southern countries suspicious of what they see as the norm's neo-colonial implications (Ayoob 2004).) However, Cottey also points out that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen the West increasingly involved in nation-building reminiscent of the 1990s, and that, "The UN's endorsement of the responsibility to protect and the new generation of peace operations…indicate that the picture is more nuanced than a complete abandonment of humanitarian intervention….We are therefore currently witnessing a testing of the political and

military boundaries of how far and in what ways states and international organizations may be willing and able to intervene militarily in response to internal conflicts (p.444)."

As part of this testing of the bounds of military intervention, peacekeeping missions are increasingly expected to more actively protect civilians. Bah and Johnstone (2007) argue that the current notion of civilian protection has become a normative expectation and is now standard language in SC resolutions. They link civilian protection to the R2P norm, stating that the while the limited World Summit Outcome endorsement might "not stimulate humanitarian intervention in a place like Darfur, at a minimum it means peacekeepers are expected to protect civilians when and where they can(p.4)."

Moving towards doctrine

Peacekeeping has become a vital tool to enable the UN to fulfill its conflict resolution responsibilities. It is clear, however, that the practice faces serious challenges. The institution has had to determine how to adapt to the increased global demand for peacekeeping, while improving the creation of effective and realistic mandates and developing guiding principles that allow peacekeepers to successfully confront the complex dynamics of the internal wars they are now mostly deployed in. These challenges have confronted UN peacekeeping staff for well over a decade, and they have progressively adapted to them. The development of the Capstone doctrine, along with a broader trend of peacekeeping reform, represents a significant step in creating a

clearer peacekeeping strategy for the upcoming decade. The next chapter will explore the process of creating Capstone, examine where it fits in the debate on peacekeeping reform, and determine the ways in which it does or does not address the challenges the practice faces.

Chapter 2: Does Capstone Address These Challenges?

The Capstone Doctrine attempts to address the challenges facing UN peacekeeping in very specific ways. This chapter will analyze the manner in which its drafters tried to achieve this goal, and explore why they made the decisions they did on its content. It will begin, however, with a brief overview of the peacekeeping guidance documents that preceded Capstone.

Key documents leading up to the Capstone Doctrine

The challenges confronting peacekeeping demonstrate the difficulty of perfecting it. The development of Capstone serves as an important step in the improvement of the practice. It also represents a level of formal guidance that is relatively new in DPKO's history. Traditionally, peacekeeping has been an ad hoc process, and staff have shared their knowledge and lesson's learned at a personal level as they rotated from mission to mission (Eklou-Assogbavi 2009). The primary documentary basis for peacekeeping in the 1990s and early 2000s came from the periodic issuance of official UN reports that attempted to clarify the role of the organization's peace-related operational activities.

The first of these was the 1992 Agenda for Peace (Agenda). It was written by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in response to an SC request for him to explore ways to strengthen the UN's response to conflict in the post-Cold War world. Agenda painted a

picture of a new world order where ideological barriers to cooperation had collapsed and democracy was on the march. Recognizing the continued threat of conflict, Agenda outlined a reinvigorated role for the UN in preventing and ending war (UN Secretary-General 1992, para. 13-15). It described four key roles for the UN: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking (involving high-level mediation and negotiation), peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding).

The section of Agenda that discussed peacekeeping focused primarily on the logistical challenges of securing adequate personnel, equipment and financial support (paras. 50-54). It also opened up theoretical room for multi-dimensional peacekeeping by emphasizing the utility of peacebuilding activities such as disarmament and security sector reform(para. 55). While these suggestions were fairly uncontroversial, Agenda pushed the envelope in its discussion of peacemaking. While it saw this task as a primarily Chapter VI (consent-based) activity, Agenda reiterated the Chapter VII authority of the SC to address breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. It called for member states to put their armed forces at the disposal of the SC, thereby executing the provisions of the UN Charter's moribund Article 43 (para. 43). Separate from these forces, Agenda also introduced the concept of "peace enforcement" units, which would be distinct from peacekeeping units, and would be specially trained to "restore and maintain the cease-fire (para. 44)." Indicative of its implicit broadening of traditional peacekeeping principles, Agenda also argued that peacekeeping was a deployment

"hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned" – implying that consent was no longer an absolute requirement, unlike in traditional peacekeeping missions (para. 20).

This new philosophy of more proactive PKOs ran straight into the harsh realities of Bosnia and Somalia. In both cases, local non-state actors withdrew consent (or never gave it), and peacekeepers took casualties and struggled to achieve their mandate as a result. The case of Somalia, as discussed in chapter 1, showed the danger of PKOs overreaching in their application of military force. The experiences of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, with its haphazard decisions on when to engage the Serb forces (which ultimately climaxed in the massacres at Srebrenica), demonstrated the fundamental challenge of accurately determining the degree of force used and the appropriate designation of enemies (Berdal 2000, p. 64-66).

In response to these failures, Boutros-Ghali wrote the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (Supplement) and revived a more restrictive reading of the peacekeeping principles, including a more limiting concept of consent, determining that it was needed from all local parties (UN Secretary-General 1995, para. 33). Supplement also backtracked on the idea of peace enforcement, saying that the UN was not ready to carry these missions against spoilers and that only member states with sufficient military capacity be authorized to do so (paras. 77-80). It argued that, "The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate (para. 35)."

The years immediately after Supplement saw a precipitous drop in PKOs (see graph in chapter 1) as the UN retreated from the practice. This lull would not last long, as conflicts at the tail-end of the 1990s in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and the DRC threatened regional security, and thus demanded action by the SC. UN peacekeeping was once again called on as PKOs were sent to these conflicts, alongside UN-authorized military deployments from major powers aimed at confronting spoilers (a key recommendation of Supplement) such as Britain in Sierra Leone, and Australia in East Timor.

In August 2000, as these new PKO deployments put UN peacekeeping at the center of the international agenda once again, Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a "High-Level Panel on UN Peace Operations" that was chaired by the former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi, and produced an influential report that became known as the Brahimi report (Brahimi). It transformed the way the UN approached its role in conflict resolution and post-conflict work. Brahimi addressed all elements of the conflict resolution process, including peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, and ended with the expansive conclusion that, "The key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy (United Nations 2000, para. 4)."

Brahimi addressed many of the principle concerns that were laid out in chapter 1 of this paper, demonstrative of the fact that, in one form or another, these challenges have plagued UN peacekeeping for decades. It reaffirmed the three bedrock principles of peacekeeping, but argued that while consent of local parties is important, spoilers should not be permitted to derail a PKO and that "UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate (para. 48)." In the same spirit, it qualified impartiality as being different from strict neutrality, "which can amount to a policy of appeasement" with parties acting as aggressors (para. 49). This conclusion, and the report in general, was released in the shadow of failure from the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica killings, where UN peacekeepers had stood by as the massacres were committed. Brahimi tackled the issue of civilian protection directly, concluding that "peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles (para. 62)."

Brahimi also called for important organizational changes that would improve the efficiency of PKOs, including the development of Integrated Mission Task Forces that would be the first point of contact for all mission-specific planning and support (para. 217). It also called for the creation of "clear, credible and achievable mandates," arguing that resolutions requiring large numbers of troops should remain in draft form until firm commitments for troops have been given, and outlined the need to insure a clear chain of command and unity of effort (para. 64).

On the specific issue of crafting effective mandates, another key document in shaping the normative debate was a report from the Secretary-General entitled "No exit without strategy" (No Exit). No Exit explored the issue of the termination of a PKO, laying out the criteria to determine the successful completion of their mandate, and explaining what partial success and failure look like. While recognizing that comprehensive strategies are not always possible, it envisioned a broad peacebuilding agenda as a general requirement of success, and argued that the three key objectives of this process were: consolidating internal and external security; strengthening political institutions and good governance; and promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation (UN Secretary-General 2001, para. 20).

The final major report addressing peacekeeping before Capstone was the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (Panel). Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the Panel in preparation for the 2005 World Summit to explore the vision of collective security in the 21st century. Addressing six clusters of threats to peace (inter-state war, civil war, poverty, WMD proliferation, terrorism and transnational crime), the Panel's report included a detailed section on how force should be used by the SC in response to these threats, including a section on peacekeeping, peace enforcement and the long-term need for peacebuilding. It also dedicated a section to discuss the protection of civilians.

The Panel reiterated many of the lessons from Brahimi, but also addressed at more length the global strain on peacekeeping, and the need to increase the operational capacity of the endeavor (United Nations 2004, p. 67-69). As part of this general capacity building, the Panel called for the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission that would help prevent conflicts from developing, and would marshal resources to sustain peacebuilding (p.83). These suggestions were subsequently embraced in the Secretary General's report, "In Larger Freedom (UN Secretary-General 2005, p.30-31)."

What does Capstone add to this process?

The Capstone Doctrine "aims to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.8)." It is an internal publication of the Secretariat, and is intended to serve as a guide for UN peacekeeping staff and peacebuilding "partners" (such as TCCs). It is intended to address the fact that "peacekeeping practitioners in the field are often faced with a confusing and contradictory set of imperatives and pressures (p.8)."

In a broad sense, Capstone adds clarity to the concepts that were developed in the key documents outlined above. For example, it discusses the spectrum of peace and security activities (which Agenda and Brahimi also both also focused on), but importantly shed's light on the blurring of the lines between these activities. It succinctly concludes that the "core business of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping missions" is to create a secure

and stable environment, to facilitate the political process and to provide a framework for the actions for all UN and other international actors (p.23). To further guide the thinking behind mission design, Capstone also lists only the most-relevant peacebuilding activities that PKOs should undertake (p.26).

Articulating a distinct set of principles

The pertinent question for this paper, however, is to ask how Capstone addresses the three broad categories of challenges that UN peacekeeping now faces. On the issue of peacekeeping principles, Capstone continues with Brahimi's general support of the traditional principles. It argues that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate have "traditionally served and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.31)." Capstone also goes into much more detail and uses much more space in discussing the principles than does Brahimi. While Only 7 out of 280 paragraphs of Brahimi explicitly addressed the principles, Capstone reserves an entire chapter to them. This indicates the relative importance placed on the principles in Capstone, and suggests that the authors believe that those individuals pushing for the creation of PKOs, and leading them on the ground, need to have a solid grasp of the real world implications of these principles.

In relation to the issue of consent, Capstone introduces a broader picture than have previous documents. Agenda essentially approached the issue of consent from the

perspective of the state, by emphasizing that peacekeeping does not infringe on sovereignty (stating explicitly that it was not a violation of article 2(7) of the UN Charter) (UN Secretary-General 1992, para. 30). Brahimi, on the other hand, addressed the complexities of securing consent from local parties (often sub-state), focusing on the challenge of dealing with spoilers by much more definitively stating the need to confront them, as opposed to the more qualified stance of Supplement (United Nations 2000, para. 48-49). Capstone makes it clear that there is a difference between the two. Consent from the "main parties to the conflict" is necessary if the UN is to avoid being dragged into the conflict. At the same time, this does not necessarily mean that "local consent" will be secured, and PKOs must have the skills and will to confront breakdowns in local consent (including through the use of force). It is unclear, however, if this distinction between the consent of main parties and local parties is as clear in the field as it is in the doctrine. As will be illustrated in the next chapter (in the discussion on MONUC's cooperation with the Congolese national army), armed groups are often multi-faceted and complex, and it is not always possible to act against the unwelcome actions of a group at the local level if they are closely linked to a major party whose consent is required.

In regards to the principle of impartiality, Capstone builds closely on Brahimi, which referred to the danger of confusing this concept with neutrality. Brahimi brought up the specter of UN peacekeeper's failure to stop the Rwanda genocide to drive home the necessity of this distinction. Capstone also makes this point, and illustrates it by

introducing the image of a referee, who is impartial but still penalizes infractions. It also addresses the most efficient way of putting this perspective of impartiality into practice, arguing that when taking action against infractions it is vital for a PKO to do so with "transparency, openness and effective communication as to the rationale and appropriate nature of the response (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.33)." While this sets a laudable goal, presenting a local population with an honest and open rationale for taking action against a given armed group over another by no means automatically means they will accept this argument (especially if they support the group, or feel that they are personally threatened more by another group).

The difficulty of actually confronting spoilers is historically one of most difficult tasks that PKO's confront, and the third traditional peacekeeping principle – non-use of force except in self-defense – has evolved considerably through a difficult process of trial and error. The idea that a peacekeeping mission can use force to defend its mandate dates back well before Capstone. Indeed, Brahimi, in its discussion of the complexities related to the use of force principle, argues that PKO military units "must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate (United Nations 2000, para.49)." However, Brahimi still only *labels* this principle as "use of force only in self-defense (para.48)." Capstone makes a nuanced use of a slightly broader rhetorical device by making "defense of the mandate" an explicit part of the principle's language (so that it reads "non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate"). This new language has potentially far-reaching implications. Peacekeeping

mandates now often include assertive language relating to civilian protection. In these cases, Capstone would potentially increase support for an interpretation of "use of force" which goes well beyond self-defense, as PKOs such as MONUC employ offensive military operations as well as static defense in their attempts to fulfill their civilian protection mandate.

Capstone also adds to the use of force debate by differentiating between peace enforcement and "robust peacekeeping". The former involves the SC authorizing member states to use force, often at the strategic level, and often doesn't require consent of the main parties. It clarifies that UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool (the same point that Supplement makes). However, it recognizes that the use of force at the tactical level might be necessary as a last resort against spoilers and criminals. Once again, civilian protection mandates illustrate the difficulty in making this distinction. In cases where the only way to protect a civilian population is to seek the military defeat of a specific armed group, PKOs might have to embark on large scale military operations (as MONUC has done recently) that fall closer to peace enforcement than robust peacekeeping on the continuum of military operations, but for which the SC will not have the political will or ability to authorize a separate member-state military intervention. (It is important to note here that while Capstone does not discuss civilian protection in great depth, it does confirm that the concept "must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of (UN peacekeeping's) core activities (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.24).")

Finally, Capstone expands on the principles by adding "other success factors": legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership. These ideas are not conceptually new, but Capstone codifies them as distinctly important for the first time. Legitimacy must be secured both internationally (derived from a SC mandate) and "on the ground", which is based on how the PKO conducts itself and shows respect to local customs and institutions. Credibility "is a function of a mission's capability, effectiveness and ability to manage and meet expectations (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.38)." Finally, the promotion of national and local ownership is a vital part of long-term peacebuilding, and necessary to ensure continued peace after a PKO withdraws.

These success factors are closely linked to the peacekeeping principles, and together they should be seen as being inter-related rather than representing a distinct checklist of criteria. For example, a local spoiler might initially be reluctant to consent to a PKO until the threat of force is presented. However, this threat of force will only be taken seriously if the mission has sufficient capabilities to be seen as a "credible" force. Furthermore, the extent to which the PKO maintains high ethical conduct, and demonstrates respect for the culture and people it is protecting, will have a profound effect on whether the population views the mission as "legitimate", and thus whether they pressure their political leaders to give their consent to the mission. This support then becomes a crucial component in the mission's ability to promote local and national

ownership, essential in the long-term so that the population can ultimately take over the responsibly of promoting peace and security in their community.

Guiding the creation and implementation of mandates

As discussed earlier, creating effective mandates for PKOs is a difficult process to perfect. In an indication of the seriousness with which DPKO takes this issue, more than half of Capstone's chapters are dedicated to the challenge of crafting, implementing and successfully completing PKO mandates.

Capstone affirms that it is the prerogative of the SC to determine if a PKO should be deployed, and that this comes as part of its peace and security duties. It clearly states that the Secretariat's role is to support the SC in making this decision, and to "ensure that (the PKO's) mandate and capabilities are tailored to the requirements of the situation (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.49)." While Capstone emphasizes that the Secretariat should be honest with the SC about the risks involved with deploying a given PKO, this is certainly not a novel suggestion. Both Brahimi and No Exit highlighted this need, and the Secretariat already expends considerable resources detailing recommendations for PKO deployment and expansion to the SC.

As part of its discussion on risk assessment, Capstone highlights the historical linkage of peacekeeping failure to a lack of sufficient pre-requisites for success. It argues that a PKO is likely to fail if certain conditions are not met, including: the commitment of all

parties to resolve the conflict through a political process; positive regional engagement; the full backing of a united Security Council; and clear and achievable mandates with resources to match. Capstone builds on No Exit in its conditions for success, as No Exit emphasized the need for the members of the SC to share a common understanding of the conflict and to be cognizant of the challenges that will confront the PKO. No Exit concluded that a "good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy (UN Secretary-General 2001, para.44)." Capstone implicitly recognizes that the SC might face unavoidable political pressures to deploy missions in situations where these conditions are absent, and frames the conditions for success as goals that the Secretariat and SC can work to achieve throughout the life of a PKO even if they are not immediately present (as the MONUC case study illustrates is often the case).

Capstone spends its entire third section exploring the "art of successful mandate implementation". This includes chapters on deploying PKOs, managing relationships between headquarters and the field, sustaining an operation and preparing for its termination. The final chapter discusses how to plan a transition. It explores the need to work with the UN country team, explaining that they represent the UN's long-term engagement with a country. It also suggests a series of benchmarks to "determine at which point the process of peace consolidation is sufficiently advanced to allow for the hand-over of certain mission responsibilities (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.88),"

These benchmarks appear to expand on what Capstone's authors view as the core business of peacekeeping. Earlier in the document, Capstone directly addresses this issue, explaining the difference between traditional and multi-dimensional PKOs, which it suggests are now the norm. It suggests three "core functions" of these multi-dimensional missions: the creation of security, the facilitation of a political process, and support to the coordination efforts of international actors (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.23). The benchmarks for success link closely with these core functions. Although Capstone also emphasizes that they not a check-list applicable to all situations, it does highlight a fairly focused list, including: the absence of violence, the reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform, and the reestablishment of both a political process and government authority (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.89).

It is interesting to compare this limited focus to No Exit, which linked PKO success to a much broader peacebuilding agenda (including economic development initiatives). No Exit argues that "the ultimate purpose of a peace operation is the achievement of a sustainable peace (UN Secretary-General 2001, para.8)." While it certainly does not argue that a PKO can achieve this alone (and explicitly discusses the role of other UN agencies, international and local actors in this process), No Exit does imply that a PKO could only be judged to be completely effective if it leads to both the security and political progress mentioned in Capstone, as well as the promotion of "economic and social rehabilitation and transformation (UN Secretary-General 2001, para.20)." At the end of the day, Capstone implies that a PKO could declare success, and exit a country,

after meeting only security and governance goals as long as other agencies are addressing broader economic and social transformation agendas.

Mitigating the challenges of expansion

Capstone does not directly tackle the challenge of peacekeeping expansion, but it does provide suggestions that would improve the efficiency of missions. For example, it addresses ways of ensuring adequate logistic and administrative support to missions, and of improving the ways that the various components (civilian, military, police and support) work together.

Capstone also advocates for the creation of integrated missions as a way of improving efficiency. It argues that, "A multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is likely to be far more effective when it is deployed as part of a United Nations system-wide response based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities, and on a willingness on the part of all United Nations actors to contribute to the achievement of common objectives (p.53)." To help achieve this goal, Capstone suggests that PKOs, where appropriate, employ an Integrated Mission Planning Process, a formal method of engaging all relevant parts of the UN system in understanding strategic objects in a particular country (p.54).

These suggestions aim to help PKOs make better use of their resources, and to garner support from other UN agencies. If achieved, these goals would make the overall

expansion of peacekeeping more manageable. Many of these issues were brought up in Brahimi (such as its discussion on Integrated Mission Task Forces), often at more length, and reports such as the Panel give more concrete suggestions regarding peacekeeping expansion (like suggesting the now adopted Peacebuilding Commission). What Capstone does do, as with the issue of mandates, is neatly and accessibly packages them together. It does not, however, suggest a future direction to guide the growth of peacekeeping (arguably though, the sections relating to mandates do attempt to lay down guidelines that impose outer limits to peacekeeping expansion). This focus is, however, entirely understandable. Unlike the reports that led up to it, Capstone is not intended to be a transformative document that suggests major changes to peacekeeping practice, but rather a codification document, bringing together peacekeeping best practices in a way that policy makers can easily access to guide the creation and implementation of PKOs.

The politics of writing Capstone

Capstone represents the culmination of several years of direct discussions on the need to create a more coherent set of guidelines for peacekeeping. Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007) point out that, after Brahimi, instead of focusing on a doctrinal debate about peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the UN Secretariat rather focused on getting Brahimi's abundant recommendations implemented. They argue that the totality of guidance given from Agenda in 1992 to In Larger Freedom in 2005 made a definite impact on how PKOs were carried out, but did not constitute a comprehensive doctrine

per se, but rather a "*de facto* doctrine representing an amalgamation of lessons learned over the previous decade (p.11)." They conclude that this sequence of lessons "must at last be learnt by wiring them back into the doctrine that underpins decision-making in Member State capitals, at UN headquarters and in the field. And then sufficient investment must be made in keeping these lessons updated (p.17)."

This paper added to calls for DPKO to create more concrete guidance for peacekeepers. The authors of Capstone made clear from the beginning that they were not aiming to produce an official UN document, but rather an internal document to guide the Secretariat. They began by holding several "expert-level" workshops, where drafts of the document were debated. These forums provided an opportunity for different parties to express their concerns with Capstone. For example, the US did not want "criteria for deployment" to constrain the SC, but they indicated they would support language that could define the "conditions for success" (Salinas 2009).

The main political challenge the authors confronted focused on the peacekeeping principles, especially on the use of force. This debate centered on the topical issue of armed intervention (as military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were fresh in the minds of those debating Capstone). The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM, a cold-war era grouping comprised of countries from the global South) at first "came down hard" against some of the language on the principles, and their main concern was to avoid any language that could be read as sanctioning military intervention by the global North.

They wanted to “keep peacekeeping in its box” and feared that Capstone would expand it too much (Salinas 2009).

This resistance was rooted in deep unease from the South about the idea of humanitarian intervention. As Ayoob (2004) has written, concerns from these parts of the world come from concerns that their own sovereignty -- still protectively viewed from the perspective of colonial relationships with the North -- will be eroded. Ayoob points out the suspicion that the “third world” feels towards any sort of armed intervention, regardless of professed altruistic intent. He argues that, “Many also perceive the recent decisions of the (Security Council) and, especially, (NATO) to engage in international intervention as a revival of the ‘standard of civilization’ yardstick that was used in the nineteenth century to justify colonial subjugation (p.101).”

Operating in this context, the debate over the principles focused largely on the wording behind the use of force. The third draft of Capstone actual named the principle “the restraint in the use of force (UN DPKO and DFS 2007, p.25),” which appears to be a subtly more permissive choice of words, as it takes away the “in self defense” qualifier (implying that force can be used more proactively). This language was switched back to the more conventional language for the final version. Ironically, it could be argued that the final language, including “in defense of the mandate”, might actually be more permissive. As discussed above, PKO mandates now often include requirements to perform tasks like civilian protection that might require offensive military operations.

The “restraint” language in the draft version would conceivable apply to *any* use of force, including these operations. The final version only presents a choice between using force in self-defense or using it to defend a mandate. In this later case, which might include offensive operations, there are no obvious rhetorical constraints on how much force is appropriate. While Capstone provides limits to the use of force in its discussion of the principle, the language of the principle itself might actually be seen as more expansive in the final version than in the draft.

An additional manner in which the humanitarian intervention concerns were assuaged was to use the word “robust” to indicate more aggressive peacekeepers, as this still involved consent, instead of the more implicitly unilateral “peace enforcement”. However, while this might appear to minimize the chances that countries from the North will send their soldiers to the South, Capstone explicitly leaves the door open for this to occur through a separate SC authorization (which it still labels peace enforcement). It is unclear if robust PKOs such as MONUC, that participate in expansive military operations, look all that different from the types of humanitarian intervention missions that some from the South feared when they pushed back against Capstone. While the pilots of the attack helicopters might be Indian airmen rather than French, at some level there is still an international force conducting offensive military operations in a sovereign territory with the expressed intent of stopping atrocities. While peacekeepers might be able to claim clear consent from the national government, the challenges of local consent already discussed raise the question of whether PKO-driven

robust peacekeeping is all that different from the humanitarian intervention feared by the South, and thus whether Capstone's final version really limits PKOs in the ways they might have hoped.

This pushback from the South, especially illustrated in the changes made between the drafts of Capstone, is demonstrative of the conservative *intent* behind the discussions surrounding the document (even if elements of the final language actually might give more freedom of action to PKOs). They illustrate the slow – albeit deliberate – manner in which UN peacekeeping evolves. Indeed, the concerns raised in the debate over Capstone are far from settled. At a conference in Oslo discussing the document, including researchers representing all major regions of the world, many of the same issues were discussed as in the original debate over Capstone (De Coning, Detzel and Hojem 2008). The report from this conference underlines the "North-South" tension that seems to dominate UN peacekeeping. The South is concerned that PKOs represents a Trojan horse for the North's agenda, while the North sees PKOs as a policy prescription to address conflict and instability.

Participants at this conference focused heavily on many of the issues related to the military duties of PKOs discussed above. They also expressed doubts about whether Capstone's "distinction between the use of force at the tactical and strategic level was tenable in the real world (De Coning, Detzel and Hojem 2008, p.4)," arguing that the relevant boundaries are not clear or static. Beyond this, they also felt that the issue of

civilian protection was not adequately addressed in Capstone. While this is a fair criticism, it is clear that no one has managed to crack the code on how to "operationalize" civilian protection, and that the relevant challenges essentially relate to how to interpret the use of force principle, which Capstone certainly attempts to achieve. That being said, as the experience of MONUC outlined in the next chapter shows, the issue of civilian protection is now often one of the most high-profiles elements of a PKO's mandate, and future versions of Capstone should more explicitly outline how a mission might address related challenges.

As far as implications for the scope of UN peacekeeping go, the participants recognized that Capstone views peacekeeping as needing to be part of a larger peace process, and welcomed the "clear focus it brings to the role of UN peacekeeping (p.3)" while at the same time raising the concern that it did not actually allow for the breadth of activities that multidimensional PKOs are currently undertaking in places like the DRC. There was some concern that Capstone tried to create too great a division between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and that it did not necessarily come up with the right balance. This diagnosis of Capstone is fundamentally accurate: it does outline a relatively limited set of goals for PKOs. However, in doing so it still allows for a relatively wide range of activities, as supporting the building of good governance and security implies a pretty expansive list of possible actions. Capstone also discusses at length how to seamlessly work with other UN and international actors who engage in peacebuilding efforts, and it doesn't divorce peacebuilding completely from peacekeeping, but rather tries to outline

a more clear sequence of responsibilities between those working in countries where both are required.

Debating the need for doctrine

These concerns touch on the broader issue of what Capstone can and cannot achieve as a "doctrine". Traditionally, member states (of the UN) have been reluctant to accept the concept of peacekeeping doctrine. After Brahimi, member states chose to adopt the operational aspects of the report but didn't engage with the more abstract doctrinal recommendations, like those that dealt with the principles, or the concept of robust peacekeeping (Salinas 2009). Resistance to the concept of doctrine stems from the fact that it can be seen as a way of putting boundaries on permissible actions, and member states are reluctant to have their hands tied. Capstone explicitly states that it "does not seek to override the national military doctrines of individual Member States participating in (peacekeeping) operations (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.8)" and that military tactics remains the prerogative of these states. It does, however, suggest that TCCs draw on it in the development of "their respective doctrines, training and pre-deployment programmes (p.9)."

It is important to question whether Capstone is actually a doctrine in the traditional sense. From a military perspective, doctrine is a pretty straightforward concept, with a consistent meaning across different cultures and bureaucracies (Benner, Mergenthaler

and Rotmann 2008, p.3). Doctrine represents a toolset that guides operations, helping to frame choices that are made. In the US air force, for example, doctrine refers to "commonly held beliefs on how to conduct operations" and is closely based on a historical reading of experiences, often using case studies (Rhoades 2008). In this broad, strategic sense, Capstone can be considered a doctrine. However, military doctrine is designed to be relevant at the tactical level as well, while Capstone deals mostly with the macro issues. That being said, military doctrine is mostly useful in pre-deployment training scenarios, and involves referring back to field manuals and regulations as part of the training process. It is less useful during action on the ground, when there is less time to refer to it (Junior-Army-Officer 2009). (Broader-based doctrine should not be confused with "rules of engagement", which give very specific guidelines on the use of force, and are often tailored to individual missions.)

As one example of existing peacekeeping doctrine, NATO's doctrine of "peace operations" (which it refers to as PSOs) deals with the broad strategic issues, including discussing principles and the fundamentals of peace support operations. At the same time, it also goes into detail on more operational components of PSOs, discussing command styles, planning requirements at different phases of an operation, and a detailed look at the actual military tasks that its peacekeepers would perform (such as instructions on managing a cease-fire) (NATO 2001).

There are obviously different operational requirements between peacekeeping and warfighting. Durch and England (2009) argue that while peacekeeping and war-fighting doctrines of the major powers used to be kept separate, today "major power doctrines, including those of the United States, United Kingdom, France and India, give peacekeeping a place on a continuous spectrum of tension that has war fighting at the other end (p.6)." The difficulty they point to, however, comes in when you ask soldiers to shift their roles as drastically at the tactical level as this new format of doctrine would seem to imply is necessary. Specifically focusing on Capstone's differentiation between UN peacekeeping guided by the Secretariat, and member state-led peace enforcement, they argue that the UN has actually tacked *against* this evolution in great power doctrine, and that Capstone represents a much more conservative approach that fences "off peace operations as a distinctive enterprise with distinctive purposes (p.6)." While it is certainly accurate to highlight the conservative nature of Capstone relative to the militaries of member states (that don't share its doctrinal creation of distinct peacekeeping missions), it is important to note that this does not represent a new idea in UN peacekeeping. This distinction actually can be directly linked back to the separation of peacekeeping and peace enforcement outlined in Supplement in 1995. Even before this document, traditional peacekeeping missions always operated on the premise that there was a fundamental difference between the work of peacekeepers and military operations conducted by member states at the behest of the SC.

Capstone is clearly not the same as NATO's PSO doctrine, as it focuses almost exclusively at the strategic level. What is important to recognize about Capstone, however, is that it is part of a larger framework (of which it is the "capstone", or highest level). The UN peacekeeping doctrine framework is split into six "series" of guidelines, with Capstone at the top. This includes expansions on themes covered in Capstone, such as the management and integration of operations. It also involves much more tactically relevant subjects that look much more like the NATO doctrine. Several of these are incorporated under the "multi-dimensional operation series," and include tasks such as law enforcement, the military, and post-conflict recovery tasks such as security sector reform (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.92-93). Many of these lower-level doctrines are currently being developed, and the relevant sections of DPKO have set up doctrine creating bodies to expedite this process (Salinas 2009). These lower-level areas provide an opportunity to expand on important themes not discussed in Capstone, such as civilian protection.

Within this broad organizational framework, however, the term "doctrine" to describe Capstone should not confuse its purpose. It is important to note that Capstone's official name refers to it as "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines" and does not use the word "doctrine". At its core, Capstone sets the outer-limits of what peacekeeping can achieve, and traces out the basic roadmap for a PKO to achieve success. As Salinas concludes:

> Doctrine is something of a misnomer for (Capstone); it has military, religious connotations, and some of the old-school members of DPKO (resisted the term); the document itself isn't really a doctrine in the way that military organizations intend; its not a catechism, and its not a military doctrine because it speaks to the entire spectrum of activities in a peacekeeping operation. It really is about how an institution attempts to clearly articulate and define the activity that it's engaged in. It's almost more of a mission statement; its doctrine in a high, philosophical way. It's about the transmission of institutional memory. (Salinas 2009)

The impact of Capstone

In the major debates surrounding peacekeeping, the Capstone Doctrine represents only one part of the discussion. While it was the subject of several conferences after its release, and continues to be referenced, peacekeeping is far too complex an endeavor, involving far too many actors, to be able to see major results coming from just one document. The New Horizons report, which was the culmination of a major initiative of the Secretariat, including an SC meeting, and a series of seminars, prominently refers to Brahimi. It is notable that New Horizons actually mentions Capstone only once in the entire document, even though one of the drafter's of Capstone (Paul Keating) was involved with writing New Horizons. At some level this indicates that Capstone is not viewed as highly as Brahimi, or is simply not well known enough to refer back to as a

reference point; in discussions on peacekeeping reform, Brahimi appears to remain the gold standard for strategy documents. However, given that New Horizons deals mostly with the issue of strategic overstretch, it might not be correct to read too much into this fact, given that, as mentioned above, this issue is not something that Capstone addresses at length (and where Capstone is mentioned in New Horizons, it's suggestions on defining operational success are cited). Given that much of the recent reform discussions on UN Peacekeeping have focused on the issue of strategic overstretch though, this raises the question of where Capstone's lessons *are* being applied.

Capstone itself has a prominent place on the DPKO website, and Salinas makes the point that academic programs can use it in classes on peacekeeping operations (it is now a regular part of the syllabus of such a class at the Fletcher School). There is also some indication of Capstone providing a demonstration effect on other regional initiatives to improve peacekeeping. For example, in a paper on the lessons that a potential African Standby Force (ASF) might learn from the AU/UN mission in Darfur, Aboagye (2007) discusses the need for pre-deployment training. To help achieve this goal, he suggests that, "In the wake of the UN's attempt, the AU system should undertake efforts at developing an ASF Capstone Doctrine that is consistent with the UN document (p.10)." The biggest direct use of Capstone appears to be its incorporation into training manuals. According to Katja Hemmerich, the head of the UN Integrated Training Service, the UN has undertaken a massive evaluation of its predeployment training standards in the past few years, based on what was actually being used in the field. The Core-Predeployment

Training Materials (CPTM) that have resulted are now largely built around Capstone (Hemmerich 2009).

Ultimately, Capstone presents a codification of lessons learned on how best to create, implement and terminate a PKO. It provides this information in a clear and accessible way, and should be a useful resource to policy makers, as well as those that want to integrate its advise into training manuals, educational courses or simply informational workshops. It does represent a fundamentally conservative view of UN peacekeeping, a position taken in part because of push back its drafters received during the drafting process. This is especially true in its discussions on the core business of peacekeeping, which it essentially limits to the provision of security and support to governance. However, some of its language relating to the principles of peacekeeping leaves plenty of interpretive room open, as the boundaries on issues such as robust peacekeeping, or the use of force to protect a mandate, are relatively fluid.

While this chapter has described the broad context and impact of Capstone, it is useful to examine how its central ideas and principles play out in the field. As such, the last chapter will look at the MONUC mission in the DRC, and will look at how effectively the boundaries to peacekeeping practice laid out in Capstone translate to operations on the ground.

Chapter 3: Applying Capstone to MONUC

Few places provide a better example of the challenges that UN peacekeeping faces than the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (MONUC) has been deployed for more than a decade. The relatively long history of MONUC, which was being run while Capstone was being debated, also offers a rich case study of the challenge of applying Capstone's concepts in the field. MONUC is testing the outer limits of what Capstone seeks to address, especially around the issue of principle interpretation. In this final chapter I will use selected examples from the MONUC mission to explore if and how the ideas suggested in Capstone are being implemented in the field.

History of MONUC

Since the Belgians left the Congo in 1960, the central government in Kinshasa has struggled to effectively exercise control over the vast country, and its people have suffered through chronic instability and underdevelopment as a result (the first UN peacekeeping mission, ONUC, deployed in the chaos following the Belgian hand-over power to the Congolese). The latest round of conflict began in 1996, when Hutu militia forces (the *interahamwe)*, who had fled Rwanda after committing the 1994 genocide,

continued to destabilize eastern Zaire along with government forces. A rebellion was born in response, and with the help of Rwanda and Uganda the central government was overthrown, forcing long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to flee the country. Rather than bring peace, however, conflict soon erupted again when the new president, Laurent Kabila, began to fight his erstwhile Rwandan and Ugandan allies. The war drew in a total of six African countries, as each faction attempted to control the vast resources of the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

MONUC was established in November 1999 following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed in July 1999 between Kinshasa, the regional states involved in the fighting and eventually their proxy militias. The UN's primary task was to monitor the disengagement of the regional states and to track down and forcibly disarm foreign and armed groups, including the *interahamwe*. However, "The Lusaka signatories thrust upon the United Nations, which had little direct involvement in the peace talks, a burden that it was not prepared to accept: namely, full responsibility for implementing and enforcing the peace agreement (Roessler and Prendergast 2006, p.230)."

But the SC did accept the mission, and MONUC was born. From this difficult initial mandate, MONUC has faced a rocky decade. The Lusaka ceasefire did not hold, and it was only in 2002 that a series of peace accords brought an end to the regional dimension of the conflict, as the conflicting countries extracted their soldiers, and MONUC's primary role became the monitoring of this disengagement. In return for

leaving eastern Congo, however, Rwanda extracted a promise that the ex-*interahamwe*, soon to be known as the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), would be demobilized and sent back to Rwanda (therefore nullifying the security threat they posed). MONUC was given the responsibility of supervising the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process of all rebel groups, which proved to be extremely difficult given the complicated array of armed actors, and the continued support many received from external actors.

As MONUC struggled to implement the DDR program, conflict between armed actors in east Congo continued. The violence escalated dramatically in Ituri province in 2003, when Uganda's withdrawal of their army led to a security vacuum, especially in the provincial capital of Bunia, where violent clashes broke out between two ethnic groups, the Lendu and the Hema. MONUC peacekeepers struggled to contain the violence and the SC authorized the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) under the auspices of Chapter VII and with the right to deploy "all necessary means." A French-led force named Operation Artemis, involving 1,500 mostly French soldiers and heavy equipment, carried out this mandate. IEMF succeeded in bringing security back to Bunia and handed off its responsibilities to MONUC. When it was immediately attacked by militias, MONUC responded with a much more aggressive stance than it had previously, "showing signs…of becoming the force it should have been over the previous four years – one that could protect civilians, support the delivery of relief aid, and undertake DDR (Roessler and Prendergast 2006, p.287)."

MONUC increasingly viewed its mission as being to support the government's efforts to extend its control over the east, and the mission supported the training and deployment of Congolese police and army units. This collaboration, however, was only one part of MONUC's efforts to help Kinshasa extend its control over the vast country. It also spent significant resources to help carry out the 2005 national elections, an effort that was hailed as largely peaceful, free and fair; a remarkable achievement for a country that had only experienced one election in its history (International Crisis Group 2007). However, while focused on this broader goal, MONUC forces still had to contend with instability in the east. This escalated in June 2004 when the provisional capital Bukavu fell to a group of army mutineers, which proved to be, "a blow to the credibility not only of the transitional government but also of MONUC, whose ability to support the transition was thrown into doubt after it was unable or unwilling to stop the capture of the city (International Crisis Group 2004)." In response to this failure, riots broke out in Kinshasa and several other cities, resulting in MONUC forces shooting to death several people.

Just as the Bukavu crisis sapped MONUC's credibility, a new scandal rocked the mission. In early 2004 media reports began to surface alleging serious allegations of sexual abuse by MONUC personnel. A subsequent investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services found that the abuses were "serious and ongoing", involving some victims who were abandoned orphans (UN News Centre 2005). While the UN has aggressively tried

to deal with this crisis, allegations have sporadically continued, creating a serious public relations problem for MONUC (beyond the obvious humanitarian toll this abuse has exacted on the local population).

MONUC continued to face a range of violent actors in the east, and consistently found itself in a position where it needed to take more and more aggressive postures. To a large extent this instability resulted from its struggle to disarm or defeat the FDLR, and MONUC began to more directly work alongside the Congolese army (FARDC) to achieve this vital task. An additional actor complicated the picture in 2008, when the CNDP – a group purporting to protect the interests of Rwandan Tutsis, primarily against the FDLR – began fighting the FARDC. (Ironically, this made the FARDC and the FDLR *de facto* allies, complicating MONUC's work with the national army.) In October, CNDP forces took over substantial territory, marching to the outskirts of the provisional capital of Goma and forcing the FARDC to flee (pillaging as they ran). MONUC's inability to stop the CNDP once again tested their credibility and "disarray in MONUC's leadership and confusion over its strategy led to the resignation…of the new force commander (International Crisis Group A 2009, p.3)."

Ultimately the CNDP was stopped when a deal was reached between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda (the clandestine backer of the CNDP). Rwanda agreed to force a transfer of leadership in the CNDP, while the DRC accepted joint military operations with Rwanda against the FDLR. CNDP troops were also integrated into the Congolese

army, and its members were given key military and political positions (International Crisis Group 2010). While MONUC did not participate in this process, or the subsequent military operations, they did continue to work closely with the FARDC. Direct support was stepped up dramatically in late 2009, when MONUC launched Operation Kimia II along with the FARDC to directly attempt the military defeat of the FDLR. This operation saw some of the closest military collaboration between the two organizations to date, and has met with controversy as FARDC units have been accused of committing human rights abuses. Kimia II ultimately failed to defeat the FDLR, and eastern DRC continues to remain one of the most unstable regions of the world. MONUC's mission there is by no means over.

Have Capstone's ideas been applied by MONUC?

When examining the impact of Capstone on peacekeeping in the DRC, it is important to emphasize that MONUC staff members do not directly refer to it. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Capstone is not a military doctrine in the conventional sense, and is therefore not found on the desk of MONUC field commanders. Rachel Eklou-Assogbavi, who worked with MONUC for several years, revealed that no one in the field thinks about Capstone, and that the document is mostly referred to at headquarters (Eklou-Assogbavi 2009). Kyoko Ono, the author of a best practices piece on MONUC, agrees with this sentiment, but also emphasizes that Capstone has directly fed into the training modules (as discussed in Chapter 2). In general, Ono concludes that while field

commanders on the ground focus on day-to-day operations and do not need Capstone to make tactical decisions, it does help to shape the big picture of peacekeeping, and that it can help mid-level or senior managers make strategic decisions, such as whether or not to support the FARDC (Ono 2009). In making these strategic decisions, Capstone's prescriptions fit the MONUC context perfectly. While it is difficult to trace specific decisions by policy makers to their referral to Capstone, it is possible to judge how its general ideas are reflected in MONUC's adaptations to the challenges it has faced on the ground.

Refining the mandate

Throughout its decade long history, MONUC has faced complex and evolving security threats, as well as a range of shifting expectations. From its initial mandate to monitor the Lusaka cease-fire, MONUC has progressively been called on to implement a wider range of tasks, including playing a leading role in the DDR process, aggressively protecting civilians, supporting nationwide elections, directly training the FARDC and conducting joint operations with them (MONUC A 2010). To achieve these goals, MONUC has expanded substantially, from an initial authorization of just over 6000 personnel, to a current deployment of more than 20,000 uniformed troops and over 1000 international civilian personnel (MONUC B 2010).

To achieve these tasks, MONUC has been given an evolving sequence of mandates in a series of SC resolutions. Some of these have represented significant expansions of standard PKO practice. For example, Resolution 1794 of December 2007 commanded MONUC to "use all necessary means…to support the FARDC with a view to disarming the recalcitrant foreign and Congolese armed groups (UN Security Council 2007)," setting the way for their unprecedented joint operations. In contrast, at other times MONUC's mandates have been too limited to meet its requirements. For example, Resolution 1445 of December 2002, authorized a phased increase in the mission's troop strength in Ituri as Ugandan forces departed. However, it left MONUC's mandate fundamentally unchanged (which was still focused on *voluntary* enforcement of the DDR process), even though the Council had been warned that the impending security vacuum would create serious security problems (DPKO B 2004, p.5, DPKO A 2010).

To the extent that mandates like 1445 have proven too limited, or are not relevant to the situation on the ground, the need to create mandates that follow Brahimi's extortion to be "clear, credible and achievable" becomes extremely important. For MONUC this problem is linked to expectations of the mission not matching reality on the ground. Eklou-Assogbavi (2009) expresses frustration at the shifting goalposts and lack of support that MONUC has faced throughout its history. Indeed, MONUC has gone through several periods where it has faced serious resource shortfalls, especially in competition with other growing missions such as UNAMID in Darfur. Various SC resolutions have increased its force size, requests that have been met partially at best.

Roessler and Prendergast (2006) conclude that, “MONUC best exemplifies what can go wrong with peace implementation when there is serious deficiency in local leader’s willingness to support the peace, marginal international political will to take risks for peace, and equally little willingness to expend the necessary resources to create it (p.301).”

This struggle to create realistic mandates cannot be attributed to a lack of information, however, as the SC has long been aware of the problems faced by MONUC. Capstone states that the Secretariat has a responsibility to both provide the SC with an accurate assessment of the risks involved with deploying a PKO, and ensure that every PKO has a “mandate and capabilities (that) are tailored to the requirements of the situation (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.49)." It is clear that the Secretary-General (SG) has consistently attempted to do this with MONUC. On the issue of troop strength, the SG cannot be faulted for not asking for adequate levels, but the SC has not always responded to its requests. For example, after the Bukavu crisis, the SG requested a major force increase (close to 12,000 new troops) but the SC only approved half this number in the next resolution (1565) while still giving MONUC an aggressive mandate to ensure the protection of civilians that would ultimately necessitate a larger force (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009, p.260). This disparity between the request for resources and the resources actually approved speaks fundamentally to a political inability to garner more money for peacekeeping in Congo, which is already one of the largest missions in the world with a an annual budget of $1.35 billion (MONUC B 2010).

Despite not all of its resource requests being met, however, the SG has played an active role in shaping SC policy towards MONUC. There have been a total of 30 SG reports on MONUC, and many of the suggestions in these reports have been incorporated into MONUC's mandates by the SC. For example, in the explanation of MONUC's mandate on the mission's website, suggestions from the SG's third report on how to support DDR efforts are directly referred to (MONUC A 2010). More recent SG reports have also detailed the manner in which MONUC-FARDC cooperation should look, recommendations that have been taken up in detail in MONUC's recent mandates (as discussed above). For example, the SG's twenty-third report suggests that MONUC should support FARDC operations to "compel recalcitrant local armed groups to join the (DDR) process (UN Secretary-General 2007)." These examples demonstrate both the importance of a close relationship between the SC and the SG when crafting mandates for missions like MONUC, as called for in Capstone, but also the political difficulties that the SC can face in fulfilling all the resource requirements that the SG lays out.

Another facet to the discussion on whether MONUC's mandates have been 'clear, credible and achievable' requires an analysis of the environment in the eastern DRC (where MONUC has faced its stiffest challenges) to determine if conditions there meet the conditions for success laid out by Capstone. As is clear from even a cursory reading of its history, MONUC's eastern forces are deployed in an incredibly difficult environment. Looking back at Capstone's criteria for PKO success, it quickly becomes

apparent that the situation in the DRC fulfills few of them outright. For example, Capstone argues that a PKO "can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.49)." One of the outstanding challenges to building peace in eastern DRC is how quickly and easily militia groups there turn to violence. While MONUC cannot manufacture a commitment to a peaceful political process, they have attempted to encourage this commitment through two major avenues: they have given substantial support to the national electoral process, helping to provide a political alternative to violence, and they have taken a proactive stance against spoilers (discussed in more detail below).

A similar dynamic can be found regarding the issue of positive regional engagement. Capstone explains that, "The attitude of neighbouring states can be as important a factor in determining the viability of a peace process, as the commitment of local parties, some of whom may even be acting as proxies for neighbouring states (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.50)." The DRC has been plagued by *negative* regional engagement for more than a decade, as its neighbors have participated in its wars and fought over its resources. This is especially true in the east, where Rwanda and Uganda have been extremely active in the DRC. As with the 'commitment to peace' issue, however, the SC has attempted to mitigate the effects of this criteria's absence by sustained and intense support to the various regional and national peace processes that have occurred since war broke out in the country in the 1990s.

The focus of MONUC's mandates also demonstrate a recognition of Capstone's guidance that a sustainable peace requires the restoration of state authority, the strengthening of the rule of law and support to legitimate political institutions (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.25). This is especially true regarding the mission's recent mandates that have emphasized support to the state security apparatus, as well as to the building of electoral processes. There are certainly important outstanding questions regarding whether these efforts will necessarily undergird sustainable peace as envisioned in Capstone. MONUC's close cooperation with government security forces that commit human rights abuses (especially in regards to its recent joint operations with the FARDC) demonstrate the challenge of finding effective ways of restoring state authority when the state is weak and guilty of abuses. It is also important to note that the fourth critical aspect to sustainable peace laid out by Capstone is the promotion of social and economic recovery and development. It is unclear how much MONUC, or any PKO for that matter, can do in this area. A PKO's major contribution to development *writ large* is to provide the necessary security (or help the government provide the security) so that other NGO actors can undertake development projects. Currently, eastern DRC is too volatile for most development actors to work, but ultimately their involvement will be vital for the creation of sustainable peace.

The history of MONUC, and the vigorous debates over its size and mandate, demonstrates that the SC will continue to authorize missions even if they must deploy

into environments that don't meet all the criteria for success laid out in Capstone. As long as these missions are seen as vital to regional security, or they meet some political goal of the SC members, they are likely to be created. However, even if deployed in sub-optimal environments, MONUC shows that with the help of a proactive and vocal Secretariat, mandates can be steadily refined and resources steadily ramped up (in whatever limited way) to try and mitigate some of the environmental challenges that might otherwise hamstring the success of the mission.

Aggressively interpreting the principles

Securing consent and legitimacy

MONUC presents a perfect test case of Capstone's theoretical separation of the issue of consent between "main parties" and "local actors". In the case of the DRC, there are not multiple main parties, but rather a host nation whose consent underpins the entire mission. In its close collaboration with Kinshasa, MONUC exemplifies the need to secure and maintain the consent of the host nation. If this consent was withdrawn it would, as Capstone discusses, "challenge the rationale for the United Nations peacekeeping operation (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.32)."

When it comes to local actors, MONUC's actions fall in line with Capstone's argument that a PKO must have the skills to manage a breakdown in local consent. This includes determining how to use force against spoilers impartially, while not allowing "even-

handedness towards the parties (to) become an excuse for inaction (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.33)." In its confrontation of spoilers, MONUC has shown that it is not a neutral party, in that it has been willing to 'pick sides' if necessary. This has been most obvious in its joint operations with the FARDC. At the most basic level, this alliance – which has been mandated repeatedly by the SC – inherently represents an endorsement of the FARDC, and conceivably makes MONUC peacekeepers appear like an enemy to any group that resists the Kinshasa government. MONUC has also focused its offensive operations more explicitly on some local spoilers more than on others, as it has made either the political or the military determination that these groups are the most important to stop or force into the peace process. For example, while a range of groups (such as the Mai Mai militia in the Kivus) are responsible for endemic violence, MONUC's mandate explicitly calls only on two local-level armed groups to stop their violence: the FDLR and the LRA (although it also makes a general call for "all armed groups" to cease violence) (UN Security Council 2009, para.10).

The recent military operations alongside the FARDC also demonstrate how complicated it can be to determine which armed groups are legitimate. The objective of these operations was to "dislodge foreign and residual Congolese armed groups from their strongholds and enable the Government to extend its control into previously inaccessible areas (UN Secretray-General 2009, para.2)." However, Operation Kimia II produced "catastrophic results" from a human rights perspective (UN Secretray-General 2009, para.41), as FARDC forces *themselves* killed civilians and raped women. What

does a mission do when the forces they support commit widespread human rights violations?

SC Resolution 1906 does try to correct this problem, explaining that MONUC's support is "strictly conditioned on FARDC's compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law," and specifically ordering MONUC's military leadership to "intercede with the FARDC command" if units are suspected of committing abuse (UN Security Council 2009). However, it is unclear the extent to which MONUC's commanders on the ground will be able to both determine which are the "good" and "bad" FARDC elements, as well as whether any admonitions will actually change the behavior of the targeted FARDC units.

As is apparent from this dilemma, it is unclear if Capstone's distinction between minor spoilers and major parties holds up in practice. While at one level, MONUC's close alliance with the FARDC is illustrative of the relative importance placed on relationships with major parties, it also presents serious problems. No armed group is monolithic, and as the experience of Kimia II demonstrates, a major party might contain within it smaller groups that commit atrocities and sow violence. Capstone has no clear guidance for what to do when the local affiliates of a major party, while continuing to consent to the presence of the peacekeepers, undermine its mandate by destabilizing the region and killing civilians. Unlike an unaffiliated local actor, which can be labeled a spoiler and attacked militarily, it is unclear what MONUC can do to sanction those local FARDC units

that commit atrocities other than admonish their commanders and stop working with them.

This uncertainty that abusive behavior by the FARDC will be stopped threatens to further undermine MONUC's legitimacy with the Congolese people (one of the key "other success factors" mentioned in Capstone). The perception of MONUC among the Congolese is ambivalent at best. Eklou-Assogbavi (2009) argues that securing local support has been a constant struggle for the mission, dating back to their arrival in 1999 when Kabila instilled fear in the population that the UN was coming back to control the DRC (claiming that MONUC would work with international powers to partition up the country). This fear comes up on a regular basis among the local population, and has only been exacerbated by anger related to the peacekeeper sex abuse scandals. On a positive note, there are indications that MONUC's forces have managed to garner more trust in some areas where they operate. For example, a recent Refugees International field report from North Kivu reported that while the relationship between MONUC and the local population had become "toxic" -- due to both a perceived lack of responsiveness to violence and political manipulation -- this was changing as "improvements in the speed and frequency with which MONUC soldiers in North Kivu are responding to security incidents has renewed trust in the mission (Refugees International 2009)."

Determining how best to use force in protecting civilians

In its collaboration with the FARDC, MONUC has stretched the limits of Capstone's suggestion that robust peacekeeping should only use force at a "tactical" level against spoilers or criminals (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.34). In its most recent operations this has occurred in two major ways. MONUC has at times directly participated in offensive actions, "on a few occasions provid(ing) fire support to FARDC operations when deemed essential by MONUC commanders (UN Secretray-General 2009, para.5)." However, its major contribution has been to provide a force-multiplier effect for the actions of the FARDC forces, as MONUC has helped them meet their logistical needs (which the SG lays out as helicopter lift, medical evacuation, fuel and rations). Although not always directly involved in violence, to the extent that MONUC facilitates FARDC military attacks, and is intimately involved in the strategic planning and support for these operations, the mission seems to have entered at least the outer reaches of "peace enforcement", which Capstone advices should only be carried out by an authorized member state when the violence has reached a "strategic or international level". While it is clear that MONUC is still operating within the confines of one country and with the host government's consent, the large-scale nature of these operations (and their regional dimension, given the involvement of Rwanda) makes it difficult to argue that they are simply tactical decisions.

As is apparent from a reading of its history, MONUC has not always embraced this expansive conception on the use of force. In a 2001 report that referred to MONUC's increasing role in the DDR process, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined a very

conservative vision of how it should confront spoilers, writing that, “The tracking down of armed groups and their disarmament by force are not peacekeeping functions…there (is) no military solution to the problems posed by the armed groups…. Any recommendation I make concerning the assistance MONUC can provide to the (DDR) process will be based on the assumption that MONUC will not be called upon to use enforcement action (UN Secretary-General 2001, para.103).” From many of MONUC’s earliest mandates, such as 1445, this reluctance to authorize a robust use of force was apparent.

This position is understandable in the context of a decade of PKO experiences that demonstrated the difficulties faced by peacekeepers who engage in military operations (and only changed as both political pressure mounted on MONUC to protect civilians more aggressively, and the military requirement to support the FARDC was mandated). As touched on in Chapter 1, PKOs simply lack many of the capabilities of a regular army, making it difficult for them to fight as efficiently. Former MONUC Commander Major General Patrick C. Cammaert, concludes that there were several important military capacities that MONUC lacked during his tenure. This included a shortage of adequate intelligence gathering facilities and Special Forces, resulting in part from the difficulty of maintaining “operational security in an environment where UN personnel know and demand to know what is going on (Cammaert 2007, p.5).” They also lacked some basic military logistical necessities, such as adequate maps, and he reveals that, “In the first five years of MONUC, the only maps that were available were those on a scale of 1:250

000, which are useful for aircraft, but are not precise enough for patrols navigating on the ground, since these soldiers need to be aware of every little track and river (p.5)." Finally, Cammaert found that the armed groups that MONUC was fighting were often interspersed with civilians, making it difficult to confront them without killing innocents.

The experience of US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan mirror many of these challenges. Like MONUC, they have also had to struggle with uncertainty regarding the identity of their enemy and determining an appropriate level of force that would minimize civilian casualties (which would undermine their political mission). In these contexts, one vital lesson that US forces learned was the importance of gathering intelligence. To create an accurate picture of who they were fighting, and where this enemy was located, army units needed to embed themselves in their operational area and build relationships with the community (Junior-Army-Officer 2009). MONUC's experience mirrors some of these lessons, through strategies such as the creation of Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs) made up of squadrons of soldiers based in a more remote location, theoretically connecting them more directly with the community under their protection (Belisle-Leclerc 2008). However, given MONUC's general lack of adequate intelligence gathering capacity, as well as its overall resource shortfalls, generating sufficient intelligence has proven difficult for the mission.

This is only one of MONUC's military deficiencies (albeit a major one), demonstrating why Cammaert ultimately suggests that PKOs should be limited in their military actions,

concluding that, “The main lesson for MONUC is that the UN is able to carry out robust peace enforcement actions within a limited scope – limited, because the DPKO is not structured to take the lead in fighting wars. The deployed peacekeeping units are not suited to carrying out prolonged offensive operations akin to war (2007, p.10).” This conclusion links well with Capstone’s limited goals for PKO military operations, but certainly does not mean that PKOs cannot engage in *any* form of military activity (Cammaert goes on to conclude that MONUC has been successful in some of its more robust functions).

In regards to MONUC, it is important to ask whether some of its larger military operations, such as its collaboration with the FARDC, meets this limited definition. In some sense MONUC has remained conservative in its actual participation in conflict. Even an offensive operation like Kimia II did not see broad counter-insurgency operations carried out by peacekeepers; rather, their actions were largely focused on logistical support to the FARDC. However, the large-scale and sustained nature of this operation, which itself comes as part of a much broader engagement with FARDC actions against the FDLR, certainly shares some characteristics of a “prolonged offensive operation akin to war.”

At the end of the day, a PKO has a fundamentally different mission objective than a standard army, and this reality should shape its decision on the level of force used. To guide this decision, Capstone outlines the principle of using “the minimum force

necessary to achieve the desired effect (UN DPKO and DFS 2008, p.35)," a vastly different standard than the requirements of a regular army, which seeks to apply the maximum force it is capable of applying. Capstone sets a "minimum use of force" benchmark because, as discussed in the first chapter, instead of trying to defeat an enemy a PKO is rather focused on using force to bring a party to the negotiating table. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former Under Secretary for Peacekeeping concludes, peacekeepers need to learn how to define and set limits to a political use of force. They need to determine an application of force that will foster a political process through which a critical mass of a population recognizes an existing political deal. If this balance is achieved, the mission only needs to use force to deal with spoilers at the margins, where it has its greatest chance of success (Guéhenno 2009). MONUC has implemented this concept first by providing substantial structural support to DRC governance – by supporting both elections and the capacity of the central government to control its territory in the east – and by then supporting military action against elements that seek to undermine this governance.

The major caveat to this discussion, however, is the issue of civilian protection. In addition to the political use of force, PKOs are increasingly expected to also use force to protect civilians under their care, a mandate MONUC has been repeatedly given. However, as Eklou-Assogbavi argues, it's relatively easy to state that civilian protection is your top priority, but much harder to figure out to "operationalize" this on the ground (Eklou-Assogbavi 2009). Many complications arise when you begin to make promises

that civilians will be protected. It can create expectations among a local population that might not be fulfilled, and it might require pre-emptive action that is politically distasteful. This point relates to a repeated concern faced by MONUC: that it does not present a credible deterrent against attacks on civilians. When MONUC Force Commander Lt.-Gen. Vincente Diaz de Villegas resigned in October 2008, three weeks into his tenure and just as the crisis with the CNDP was reaching a head, a news article exposed a report he had written that complained of, "the limited operational capacity of (MONUC)" which could only protect populations in major towns. Furthermore, he was concerned that MONUC lacked the offensive capability to respond to counterattacks against its remote forces, or against civilian populations outside of cities (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009, p.281). Indeed, MONUC has struggled repeatedly with the consequences of "…protective action in one location (leading) to reprisals against civilians elsewhere (Bah and Johnstone 2007, p.4)."

Beyond an inability to prevent reprisal attacks on civilians in remote areas, MONUC has also been plagued by cases where it has been unable to protect civilians near its bases. One of the most high profile of these was the Kiwanja massacre in November 2008, when an estimated 150 people were killed half a mile away from a MONUC base (mostly at the hands of the CNDP). A Human Rights Watch report concluded that several factors contributed to MONUC's failure to protect. Partly it faulted their reliance on cooperation with the FARDC, whose field commander was openly hostile to MONUC, further demonstrating the challenges of joint operations with problematic government

forces. In relation to MONUC's offensive capability, the report concludes that it was undermined by "logistical deficiencies and competing priorities faced by an over-stretched peacekeeping force (Human Rights Watch 2008, p.2)." This problem relates back to MONUC's fundamental challenge of finding the adequate resources and operational capacity to implement its assertive Chapter VII civilian protection mandates.

These notable failures aside, MONUC has also had successes in its attempts to protect civilians. In Kyoko Ono's research on MONUC's implementation of its civilian protection mandates, she concludes that the mission has actually made some good decisions. For example, they've been proactive in applying resources to civilian protection functions, and developed civilian protection directives for force commanders (Ono 2009). For example, as part of the Kimia II operation, MONUC fielded more than 65 "Joint Protection Teams…in order to augment the capacity of the MONUC military component to anticipate and prevent attacks on the population (UN Secretray-General 2009, para.30)." Efforts such of these, and the Secretariat's focus on reporting on these efforts, demonstrate the seriousness with which MONUC takes its civilian protection functions. Holt et al. conclude that, "For all of the high-profile failures, MONUC has proven remarkably innovative at the tactical level, and at times pushed the boundaries of peacekeeping in order to implement its (civilian protection) mandate (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009, p.286)."

However, Ono determines that MONUC's close work with the FARDC, accused of so many human rights violations, has ultimately undermined their civilian protection mission, especially in the eyes of the population. She also concludes that, at the end of the day, it is difficult to determine when a civilian protection mandate has been fulfilled, and when it can thus be handed over to the government (Ono 2009). Capstone does not actually add much explicitly to the civilian protection debate, other than contribute to the discussion on the use of force mentioned above. The number of agencies and institutions concerned with civilian protection has increased rapidly in the past few years, and more research and recommendations will surely come from these sources in the future that will guide MONUC's work in this area.

Conclusion

The experiences of MONUC outlined in this chapter demonstrate some of the challenges faced by PKOs that try to implement Capstone's peacekeeping framework in the field (whether they explicitly turn to Capstone or not). It provides several examples of ways in which Capstone imparts extremely actionable advice, and others that prove harder to execute in practice.

In regards to suggestions regarding the creation of effective mandates, MONUC's history shows that it can be difficult to both create realistic mandates and assign the resources that are needed to fulfill them successfully. It also shows the important role

that a proactive Secretariat can play in giving the SC clear and honest information about the challenges faced by a PKO (as called for in Capstone). In this process, it appears that suggestions that relate to expansions in mandated tasks are easier for the SC to implement than suggestions on expansions in the number of troops (and equipment), which are inhibited by resource constraints caused in part by the global expansion of peacekeeping discussed in Chapter 1.

The history of MONUC also suggests that if the SC feels that a PKO is vital it is unlikely to prevent its deployment (or end it prematurely) simply because conditions for success, such as those laid out in Capstone, are not present. Rather it will attempt to mitigate the consequences of the conditions' absence, and try to facilitate their creation through promoting activities like support to elections, governance and regional peace initiatives.

MONUC shows the difficulties faced by peacekeepers in the field as they attempt to interpret peacekeeping principles along lines laid out by Capstone. It is much easier to separate tactical and strategic military action in theory than in practice, and MONUC's struggles illustrate this problem. For example, while its close relationship with the FARDC makes up a vital part of its mandate, it also leads it to embark on large-scale military campaigns that are difficult for a PKO to undertake successfully. These activities raise the question of whether differentiating between major parties and minor spoilers makes sense when an element of a major party, like the armed forces of the host

government, can play the role of a local spoiler by participating in abuses that undermine a mission's mandate.

On the issue of civilian protection and the use of force, MONUC provides examples of both innovation and success, as well as dramatic failure. Its peacekeeping troops, plagued by a lack of resources, poor intelligence and command and control challenges common to most PKOs, have been dramatically unable at times to deter attacks on civilians, as illustrated in the Kiwanja massacre. However, MONUC also has been given some of the most assertive mandates to date of any PKO in history when it comes to the use of force to protect civilians. It has also made innovative use of tools such as Mobile Operating Bases to better project the threat of force beyond its major bases in the cities, and has developed civilian protection directives for force commanders.

While Capstone does not discuss civilian protection at length, it does address the issue of legitimacy, which for MONUC has been intimately tied to its ability to meet its implicit and explicit civilian protection guarantees. While MONUC has historically struggled with gaining both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, both of which Capstone rightly highlights as vital to the success of a mission, it appears to better succeed in achieving these goals when the local population trusts its protective capacity. It remains to be seen, however, if it will be able to negotiate the nuances of its close relationship with the FARDC, so that the local population does not see MONUC as

supporting elements of national army that commits abuses; if they perceive MONUC as at all responsible it will only contribute to the undermining of the mission's legitimacy.

The history of MONUC clearly demonstrates the struggles faced by a PKO in implementing the concepts and principles laid out in Capstone. However, it also slows how hard the SC and the Secretariat are working to addresses the challenges faced by PKOs, and how relevant Capstone's guidance is in this process. At the end of the day MONUC doesn't prove the Capstone doctrine wrong, it simply illustrates why peacekeeping is so hard to perfect.

Conclusion

Capstone deals with most of the major challenges facing peacekeeping outlined in Chapter 1 of this paper. It spends considerable time discussing the issue of mandate creation and execution. In doing this, it firmly recognizes the reality that most PKOs will now be called on to be multi-dimensional, and its "principles and guidelines" relate to these types of missions and not traditional peacekeeping, where peacekeepers are more simply charged with the monitoring of peace agreements. However, even as it explores these multi-dimensional missions, Capstone imparts a fundamentally conservative vision of what these missions should be called on to accomplish, focusing on the creation of security and the empowerment of national governance. While recognizing the need for a broader peacebuilding agenda if long-term peace is to be secured, Capstone suggests that PKOs should work with other international actors to achieve this goal, but not necessarily embark on peacebuilding themselves. The history of MONUC shows, however, that it can be difficult for the SC to adequately fund a PKO that is given a multi-dimensional mandate, even if the Secretariat is honest with them about the need, as suggested in Capstone. The continuing difficulty that MONUC faces in implementing its mandate, which focuses on security and governance, also demonstrates that even these relatively limited goals are incredibly difficult to achieve.

Capstone also highlights the importance of understanding the principles of peacekeeping by devoting an entire chapter to discussing them. As with its discussion of

mandates, it tries to place boundaries on how PKOs can interpret these principles. For example, it distinguishes between the need for PKOs to secure the consent of major actors, while being able to confront local spoilers. It also separates the legitimate use of force by a "robust peacekeeping" mission, with the need for the SC to authorize member states to deploy their own militaries if more strategic "peace enforcement" is called for. MONUC shows that these distinctions are difficult to maintain in the field, as peacekeepers in the DRC have struggled with the distinction between major parties and local spoilers, and have embarked on military offensives that look suspiciously like peace enforcement.

In creating boundaries for the principles, Capstone also leaves the door open for more assertive interpretations than some previous documents have, such as through its inclusion of "defense of the mandate" in the language to describe the use of force principle. Also, by creating the three additional success factors, Capstone attempts to give a more comprehensive picture of all the principles that a PKO must strive for in order to succeed. A PKO following Capstone's guidance could conceivably point to the need to achieve these success factors as leverage to lobby for assertive actions, such as needing to actively use force to protect civilians in order to achieve credibility with the local population.

There are some notable emissions from Capstone. It doesn't dig deep into the issue of civilian protection, which has become one of the hottest topics in the peacekeeping

debate, and it doesn't provide substantial recommendations for addressing resource shortfalls. In this gap have stepped reports like New Horizons, which provides much more concrete guidance on addressing the resource issue (and numerous reports have been written about civilian protection). According to Salinas however, Capstone is a "living document" and will be up for review in 2010 (Salinas 2009), and will perhaps integrate more of these issues into its revisions.

Capstone is ultimately not a document designed to lay out a transformative agenda for peacekeeping, but is rather a codification document. It does a good job of presenting clear and accessible information for policy makers to make use of. In doing this, however, it is a fundamentally conservative document that represents political compromise, much of which relates to the North-South tension inherent in contemporary UN peacekeeping. Given the long, iterative process that led to its creation, Capstone can be seen at some level as representing the consensus positions on some of the most important contemporary issues relating to peacekeeping (or it is the closest thing that exists representing this position).

Part of this compromise involved making it an unofficial document, which limits its potential to be integrated into field activities, and explains in part why Capstone's direct impact has been rather limited. This impact has been mostly confined to training or educational materials and the assumption that officials planning peacekeeping missions have read Capstone (and that it has affected their decision making). In support of these

types of impact, however, Capstone is a much more accessible document than anything else written about peacekeeping, clearly laying out guidelines for the practice in a far more succinct and readable format than its parent documents such as Brahimi .

The long-term relevance of Capstone will really only be clear if the document continues to be used by peacekeeping planners after the staff that have been involved in its creation have left. As Salinas himself concluded, the test of any system is its ability to outlive its creators, and his hope for Capstone is that managers within DPKO in the coming decades will continue to see its utility and, while constantly revising it, will apply its lessons to the peacekeeping challenges of tomorrow.

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