Food Security Resilience in Somalia:

A Critical Review and Conceptual Framework for Intervention

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Cover photo: Families queue for food in Badbado IDP camp, Mogadishu 2013, © Kate Holt/IRIN

Abstract

In the wake of the 2011 famine in Somalia, humanitarian organizations across the globe began to call for a renewed focus on the concept of resilience. Though lacking a commonly agreed upon definition, resilience is generally understood to be the ability of an individual, household, or community to respond to shocks without succumbing to them over time. The 2011 famine and the late and inadequate response of the humanitarian community that followed has prompted many humanitarian actors to develop an organizational focus on building resilience to food security crises, especially in Somalia. This paper attempts to respond to the current demand for resilience-building interventions by developing a better understanding of what a successful food security resilience program in Somalia should and could look like. This paper begins with an in-depth analysis of the concept of resilience and corresponding literature and policies, followed by an analysis of existing resilience programs being conducted in Somalia, before concluding with a recommended conceptual framework for building resilience in Somalia that incorporates the sectors and components that are critical in the design and implementation of food security resilience interventions specific to the Somali context. If resilience interventions are to be the future of food security programming in emergencies, their success will depend upon the effective incorporation of a wide variety of sectors into a holistic approach.

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Introduction

Over the course of the last ten years, the term "resilience" has entered into the parlance of humanitarian and development professionals and quickly grown in importance for many organizations and agencies. Though a commonly agreed upon definition does not exist, resilience is generally understood to be the concept of a society, group, or individual's ability to "avoid and escape from unacceptable standards of living—'poverty' for short—over time and in the face of myriad stressors and shocks."[1] The concept of resilience has been occasionally referenced in discussions surrounding food security interventions in Somalia since 2005, as well as in the Sahel and other areas with recurrent food insecurity.[2] However, it was not until the late and insufficient humanitarian response to the 2010/2011 food crises and famine in Somalia that resilience came to the fore of humanitarian dialogue. Following the 2011 response, almost all of the major actors in the response community launched new commitments to building food security resilience in Somalia and elsewhere, lauding the concept of resilience as key to the future of food security and humanitarian assistance in general.

This paper attempts to respond to the current demand for resilience-building interventions by developing a better understanding of what a successful food security resilience program in Somalia should and could look like. To accomplish this, I first conduct an in-depth analysis of the concept of resilience and corresponding literature and policies. I then turn to an analysis of existing resilience programs being conducted in Somalia, before concluding with a recommended conceptual framework for building resilience in Somalia that incorporates the

[1] Christopher B. Barrett and Mark A. Constas, "Toward a Theory of Resilience for International Development Applications," 2013: 1.
[2] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, "Promoting resiliency for at risk populations: lessons learned from recent experience in Somalia," *High-Level Expert Forum on Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises*, 13-14 September 2012, Rome: 7.

sectors and components that are critical in considering the design and implementation of food security resilience interventions specific to the Somali context.

Chapter I. What is resilience and how is it measured?

What is resilience?

The concept of resilience in the context of food security and development comes from the study of ecology, in which resilience refers to an ecosystem's ability to absorb, respond to, and recover from shocks and stresses.[3] The ecological definition of resilience places the emphasis on a system's ability to withstand shocks; when applying the concept of resilience to humans, the systems approach is somewhat problematic for programming because of its multi-sectoral nature. As a systems-based concept, programming to enhance resilience must by definition be integrated fully into all aspects of a system in which individuals, families, communities, countries, and regions are operating. This is a monumental undertaking, and one that cannot be accomplished without a holistic, unified approach.

Box 1, below, lists the multiple definitions of resilience used by major actors in food security. Although they are all slightly different, all the below definitions focus on a unit's (individual, household, community, country, etc.) ability to withstand shocks and not succumb to them. A number of these definitions address a unit's ability to not only withstand shocks, but also to transform systems when conditions change and "make the existing system untenable."[4] Examples of this need for transformation could include climate change making certain agricultural practices impossible, or increased globalization and enforcement of state borders making pastoralism impractical. Resilience is the ability to respond to and recover from changes in the operating environment, be they short-term shocks or long-term changes.

[3] Simon Levine, Adam Pain, Sarah Bailey and Lilianne Fan, "The relevance of 'resilience'?" *Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief* 49, September 2012: 1.
[4] International Food Policy Research Institute. *2013 Global Hunger Index: The Challenge of Hunger: Building Resilience to Achieve Food and Nutrition Security*, 2013:19.

Box 1. Definitions of Resilience

DFID	"The ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses—such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict—without compromising their long-term prospects."[5]
ECHO	"The ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks."[6]
USAID	"The ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth."[7]
IFPRI	Resilience "consists of three capacities that respond to different degrees of change or shocks: 1. "Absorptive capacity covers the coping strategies individuals, households, or communities use to moderate or buffer the impacts of shock on their livelihoods and basic needs. 2. "Adaptive capacity is the ability to learn from experience and adjust responses to changing external conditions, yet continue operating. 3. "Transformative capacity is the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, or social structures make the existing system untenable."[8]
FAO/ UNICEF/ WFP	"The ability of an individual/household/community to withstand shocks and stresses or to adapt to new options in a changing environment."[9]
Barrett and Constas	"The capacity over time of a person, household or other aggregate unit to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad shocks. If and only if that capacity remains high, then the unit is resilient."[10]

The recent proliferation of resilience policies and programs seems to indicate that resilience in the humanitarian-development continuum is a relatively new conceptualization of the term, and yet the concept of resilience has been a part of humanitarian and development theory for a long time, though couched in different terminology. For years, humanitarian and development workers have strived to reduce "vulnerability" to crises and shocks. Much like resilience is being continually redefined and debated today, vulnerability was subject to a

[5] DFID, *Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper*, 2012: 6.
[6] ECHO, *The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning From Food Security Crises*, 2012: 5.
[7] USAID, *Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance*, 2012: 5.
[8] IFPRI, 19.
[9] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, 3.
[10] Barrett and Constas, 3.

plethora of examinations and critiques in the late 1990s/early 2000s.[11] In writing for the World Bank in 2001, Jeffrey Alwang et al. synthesized existing literature on vulnerability and defined it as a "risk chain" composed of several components: "a) the risk, or risky events, b) the options for managing risk, or risk responses, and c) the outcome in terms of welfare loss."[12] A group that was vulnerable to food insecurity could be considered to be "living on the edge," where a single shock or significant change to any aspect of their livelihoods, asset base, or position in society could push them over the edge into crisis.[13]

There is significant debate going on as to the extent that "resilience" is different from "vulnerability," and if this is a useful distinction to make.[14] Like resilience, the humanitarian and development communities have struggled to create a unifying definition and reliable measure of vulnerability.[15] Vulnerability is a crucial component of current definitions of resilience, with many authors conceptualizing resilience as the ability to decrease vulnerability, or at least decrease the negative outcomes of vulnerability. This begs the question, is the heated ongoing debate surrounding resilience necessary, given that the same debate has already been played out with regards to vulnerability? Is there anything else to learn about the vulnerability/resilience conceptualizations? Some scholars argue yes, that the concept of resilience has a lot more to offer the field than does existing understandings of vulnerability, but this argument is not universally subscribed to.[16] What is perhaps even more interesting is the question of how any differences between resilience and vulnerability can be implemented programmatically, and if a

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[11] Frank Ellis, "Human Vulnerability and Food Insecurity: Policy Implications," *Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa*, 2003: 2.
[12] Jeffrey Alwang, Paul Siegel, and Steen Jorgenson, "Vulnerability: A View From Different Disciplines," World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0115, 2001: 2.
[13] Ellis, 2.
[14] Levine et al., 3.
[15] Alwang et al., 2.
[16] Levine et al., 3.

new understanding of the concept of resilience will transform how the international community responds to relief and development.[17]

Why resilience?

The reason for the emergence and growing popularity of the concept of resilience in the humanitarian-development context is multifold. Christopher Barrett and Mark Constas attribute the rise of resilience to three things: (1) the increasing number of people affected by disasters, (2) recurring crises that highlight the difficulty of solving underlying problems with humanitarian response, and (3) the growing recognition of development's link to natural phenomena.[18] Agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and many NGOs have developed their own resilience policies in an attempt to structure existing and future programming around a resilience framework. The 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa had a uniquely galvanizing affect on the humanitarian community by highlighting that a response-driven approach to food insecurity is not always sufficient to prevent massive mortality; instead, early response must be one component of a holistic approach. At the High-Level Forum of Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises, FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia argued that the 2011 crisis "highlighted the inadequacy of efforts in the years prior to the crisis to build people's resilience to future and recurrent shocks."[19] Consensus has grown around the belief that responding over and over again to the same kind of recurrent food security crises in the same regions could not

[17] Vanessa Tilstone, "Resilience in the Drylands of the Horn of Africa: What it means for practice?" Regional Learning & Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities, 2013: 4.
[18] Ibid.
[19] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, 5.

possibly save as many lives as a preventative approach, though "little solid evidence exists to support this claim."[20]

Despite the plethora of research and resources dedicated to the concept of resilience, considerable disagreement exists about the role and value of resilience as a programming objective. This lack of consensus stems, to some degree, from the absence of a universally acknowledged definition of resilience and the role that resilience may or may not play in bridging the gap between the humanitarian and development spheres. Simon Levine, Adam Pain, Sarah Bailey, and Lilianne Fan argue that resilience may be a useful concept for external mobilization, but question its validity as a central analytical concept.[21] Levine et al. posit that the concept of resilience is broad enough that almost any livelihood promotion, DRR, or vulnerability-reduction activities could be labeled "resilience-building," without necessitating real change in approach or implementation.[22] For example, DFID's "Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper" focuses on the agency's commitment to "embed resilience" in all existing programming through a focus on the assets pentagon described by the preexisting sustainable livelihoods framework.[23] An examination of the characteristics of DFID's "resilience-building" activities, as described in the approach paper, shows no significant departure from DFID's previous sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability-reduction activities. USAID's "Policy and Program Guidance for Resilience" also describes overarching operational principles that mirror previous guiding principles.[24] From an examination of donor agency

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[20] Courtenay Cabot Venton, Catherine Fitzgibbon, Tenna Shitarek, Lorraine Coulter, and Olivia Dooley, *The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia*, 2012: 9.
[21] Levine et al., 4.
[22] Ibid., 2.
[23] DFID, 11-15.
[24] USAID, *Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance*, 16.

operating principles, it is unclear that the concept of resilience has been implemented as anything more than a change in terminology.

National governments, UN agencies, and numerous NGOs have also implemented resilience frameworks and programming, though few (if any) seem to deviate largely from preexisting vulnerability-reducing guidance and programming. Even though many organizations agree on the importance and centrality of certain principles surrounding resilience, the concept is so amorphous that these principles are not implemented in any consistent manner.[25] Those organizations that do introduce resilience programming that is unique or innovative seem to do so on a scale that suggests a very limited understanding of the cross-cutting nature of resilience. For instance, the core components of many resilience programs are limited to social protection mechanisms like cash transfers, without addressing the larger, underlying issues that are key to resilience.[26] According to Vanessa Tilstone, if the humanitarian and development communities really care about building resilience, they must tackle the sticky issues of land, power, governance, and basic service provision that aid organizations have traditionally steered clear of.[27] These are the issues that will truly build resilience, but as of yet they are not being addressed on any large scale by the major humanitarian and development actors. As was argued above, resilience is by definition a holistic concept, and a true and effective resilience program must be implemented at a variety of levels, from household to community to state and region. It is the “sticky” issues Tilstone enumerates that have the capacity to truly influence resilience to food security, and yet humanitarian actors continue to divert resources away from these issues and towards traditional response mechanisms.

[25] Tilstone, 4.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

A bridge from relief to development?

Another reason that the concept of resilience has grown so much in popularity in recent years is the belief that resilience may provide a potential bridge between the relief and development paradigms. Many actors, including donors and UN agencies, have called for bridging this gap, as historically relief and development work has been strongly divided, to the detriment of effective programming. The relief-development continuum concept may be particularly detrimental when it comes to food security crises because it views crises as short, rapid disasters that can be responded to and overcome quickly. The problem with this approach to food insecurity, according to Peter Gubbels, is that many areas of the world in which food insecurity is a major problem experience consistent crisis-level food insecurity that is not recognized as critical by the relief sector for the very reason that it is constant.[28] This has the effect of "normalizing" crisis conditions, which leads to emergency situations being neglected by the relief community and relegated to the work of the development sector, even though the situation would benefit immensely from immediate, proactive response. Gubbels believes that a focus on resilience in food security programming and policy could alleviate this problem of normalizing crisis, by recognizing that crisis-level conditions anywhere, and for any period of time, need to be responded to consistently.

Despite the pro-resilience argument, it is questionable that resilience is the panacea to the relief-development divide that some are attesting it could be. Levine et al., among others, argue that stand-alone relief still has a role to play, and that viewing every crisis as an opportunity for transformation and building resilience could miss out on the important role of response.[29] The authors argue that even if the concept of resilience was defined well enough to be universally

[28] Peter Gubbels, "Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel," Sahel Working Group, 2011: 4.
[29] Levine et al., 3.

applicable and implemented, an over-reliance on resilience and an unrealistic perspective of what is possible in the aftermath of the crisis could lead to poor response. Levine et al. also ask the question of whether humanitarians should be concerned with building resilience at all, considering that scarce humanitarian resources are never sufficient to meet immediate needs, let alone address chronic, underlying causes.[30]

Measuring resilience

Besides the issue of how development actors can translate the concept of resilience into real programmatic change, another question surrounding resilience is how exactly it can be measured. Just as there is no commonly agreed-upon definition of resilience, nor is there a universally accepted method for measuring resilience. If we can't measure resilience, then how can it be an effective objective for humanitarian and development programs? According to Christopher Béné, most approaches to measure resilience rely on proxy indicators that are household/community characteristics assumed to be associated with resilience, but reliance on this methodology may contribute to a circular argument—that resilience is defined by those characteristics and that those characteristics define resilience.[31] Instead, Béné argues, it is necessary to develop independent indicators of resilience that are not derived from the households or communities being tested.[32] Béné identifies two major operational challenges of current resilience measurement: (1) the fact that most measures only operate on one level (i.e., the household), even though resilience operates across all levels of society; and (2) the fact that resilience is very

[30] Ibid.
[31] Christopher Béné, Towards a Quantifiable Measure of Resilience. Institute of Development Studies, 2013: 7.
[32] Ibid.

context-specific, but resilience measures must be generic enough to be able to be scaled to different situations.[33]

Béné's recommended measurement framework uses the cost a household incurs as a result of a shock as a way to quantify resilience. The formula he uses is resilience costs = anticipation costs + impact costs + recovery costs.[34] According to this formula, the lower the resilience costs, the more resilient the system is to a given shock. In other words, a household/community/system that has developed resilience will face lower costs to survive and recover from a shock than a household/community/system that is not resilient. Béné's work is one attempt to develop a reliable measurement framework for resilience that can be applied across all levels, and is in line with Frankenberger, Mueller, Spangler, and Alexander's philosophy that "process measures (i.e., those that assess interactions between individuals and/or community institutions) are more appropriate [for measuring resilience] than outcome measures (i.e., measures of food and livelihood security status)."[35] Frankenberger et al. agree with Béné's assertion that the common reliance on proxy indicators for measuring resilience is flawed, and that this approach "does not fully reflect the dynamic nature of resilience capacities and resources."[36] Frankenberger et al. propose a combination of both traditional outcome indicators (i.e., dietary diversity, malnutrition levels, etc.) and process indicators (i.e. preparedness, responsiveness, attitudes towards change) to best measure resilience.[37]

In a much more simplistic recommendation for measurement, Peter Gubbels argues for using the level of child malnutrition as the primary indicator of resilience in a community, country, or

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[33] Ibid.,10.
[34] Ibid., 12.
[35] Tim Frankenberger, Monica Mueller, Tom Spangler, and Sara Alexander, *Community Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Feed the Future Learning Agenda*, USAID, 2013: 27.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 27, 48.

region.[38] Based on his work in the Sahel, Gubbels is confident that a "sustainable reduction in child mortality" is a valuable indicator of resilient households.[39] Barrett and Constas argue for a methodology that "seeks to measure induced changes in the conditional well-being and/or resource moments—that thereby reduce the probability, intensity, and/or duration of poverty spells—that can be causally attributed to the intervention of interest."[40]

Clearly the issue of how to measure resilience reliably and quantifiably—and if doing so is even feasible in Somalia—remains a question with which many scholars of resilience struggle. The above examples represent multiple attempts to reconcile the multidimensional, multifaceted nature of resilience with the social scientists' need for measurable progress indicators. Some scholars, like Béné and Barrett and Constas, believe the best way to accurately measure changes in resilience is through the development of a complex measurement framework that takes into account as many components of resilience as possible. Others, like Gubbels, deal with the complexity of resilience by choosing one indicator to serve as a proxy for the measure of resilience; in this case, child malnutrition, which is undeniably influenced by a range of factors. One extremely problematic characteristic of resilience indicators is that some measurable factors may legitimately be considered both causes of resilience as well as indicators of resilience.[41] It is as of yet unclear which approach offers the most accurate and functional method of measurement; it is possible that no one solution will ever be agreed upon universally. However, it is widely recognized that the absence of a reliable method of measurement can significantly affect the applicability and appropriateness of reliance on the concept of resilience.

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[38] Gubbels, 12.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Barrett and Constas, 17-18.
[41] IFPRI, 27.

Implementation of resilience policies

The growing academic popularity of the concept of resilience has brought with it a sudden multiplicity of resilience policies, from the donor level to the level of individual implementing agencies. This section will analyze the resilience policies of the major humanitarian actors, both in Somalia and in other similar contexts.

Donor agencies: The UK Department for International Development (DFID), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the European Commission (ECHO) are three of the largest donors for relief in the Horn of Africa, and all three have launched comprehensive resilience policies. DFID has incorporated resilience as the core component of its handling of disasters, titling its humanitarian policy *Saving lives, preventing disasters, and building resilience*.[42] DFID's working definition of disaster resilience is "the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses—such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict—without compromising their long-term prospects."[43] DFID breaks resilience down into four common elements: context, disturbance, capacity and reaction. Context refers to the highly context-specific nature of resilience, and the need to identify what unit is being addressed (i.e., social groups, political systems, or state institutions).[44] Disturbance refers to the answer to the question "resilience to what?"—from short-term shocks to long-term stresses.[45] Capacity is the ability of the system or unit to respond to the shock or stress "based on the levels of *exposure*, the levels of *sensitivity* and *adaptive capacities*," which depend on the assets and resources available.[46] The

[42] DFID, 4.
[43] Ibid., 6.
[44] Ibid., 8.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

fourth and final component, reaction, refers to the response of the unit to the shock—is it able to "bounce back better" from the shock, to "bounce back" to the preexisting condition, to "recover, but worse than before," or to "collapse."[47] These are the possible reactions to a shock or stress, as conceptualized by DFID.

By incorporating resilience as a cornerstone of all its programming, DFID believes it has been able to better integrate different components of political, security, humanitarian, and development considerations into its programming. DFID's resilience-building interventions focus on activities aimed at building up social, human, physical, financial, and natural assets—as described by the sustainable livelihoods framework—in order to reduce vulnerability.[48] These vulnerability-reducing programs are described as being "specifically targeted at addressing resilience," which begs the question: are resilience-building and vulnerability-reducing the same thing?[49] In fact, little of DFID's resilience policy seems drastically different from previously defined vulnerability-decreasing policies. Certainly by incorporating an understanding of the multidimensional nature of resilience into all of its programming DFID is making some headway when it comes to sustainable programming, but it is unclear that this "new" focus on resilience is anything more than a change in nomenclature from previous vulnerability reduction policies.

The United States' counterpart to DFID, USAID, has devoted even more time and policy development to the concept of resilience. USAID's conceptualization of resilience is based on the intersection of chronic poverty with acute shocks and stresses that contributes to the production of recurrent crises that undermine development gains.[50] USAID utilizes a conceptual framework for resilience that is based on the idea that recurrent crises most commonly occur

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[47] Ibid., 8.
[48] Ibid., 11.
[49] Ibid., 12.
[50] USAID, *Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance*, 5.

where chronic poverty and exposure to shocks and stresses intersect. A community's resilience depends on its adaptive capacity and ability to address and reduce risk, and is influenced by underlying issues such as gender, good governance and accountability, and conflict dynamics.[51] USAID's approach to resilience differs from DFID's because it focuses on the need for a complex level of engagement with country partners, from the governmental to the NGO level. USAID's policy offers specific guidance on this level of engagement in fragile states, pointing to the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as a source of guidance on balancing the need for immediate response in times of crisis with the need for country ownership and addressing underlying issues that significantly impact resilience at the household and community level.[52] USAID's Agenda for Operational Change details steps necessary to foster operational and leadership capacity in order to improve resilience in programming by increasing coordination between disaster and development experts. These include joint problem analysis and objective setting, coordinated strategic planning, mutually informed project designs and procurement, and robust learning initiatives.[53]

In addition to USAID's general resilience policy, it also has a conceptual framework for community resilience designed to inform the Feed the Future initiative.[54] The objective of the framework is to "provide a comprehensive understanding of the factors and process influencing vulnerability and resilience at the community level. The main building blocks of community resilience include socioeconomic context, shocks, stresses, community livelihood assets, social capital, and community social dimensions."[55] This framework seeks to explain what makes some

[51] Ibid., 10.
[52] Ibid., 12.
[53] Ibid., 20-22.
[54] USAID, *Community Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Feed the Future Learning Agenda*, 2013.
[55] Ibid., iii.

communities resilient and some vulnerable. The framework places a strong emphasis on a community's social capital, specifically "bonding social capital," "bridging social capital," and "linking social capital."[56]

The value-added of USAID's approach to resilience generally and community resilience specifically is its focus on the underlying issues that contribute to resilience at every level: governance, land rights, conflict mitigation, natural resource management, and social services. This are the "sticky" issues that Vanessa Tilstone argues most humanitarian actors are loath to take on,[57] and yet USAID's resilience policies focus heavily on the role to be played by humanitarian actors in resolving issues within these sectors.[58] USAID's policies seem to tackle the issues that are critical to building resilience, but it remains to be seen if these policies translate to real change programmatically on the ground. Chapter II will analyze USAID's programmatic resilience work in Somalia, in an attempt to evaluate the real impact had by these lofty policy goals.

The European Commission, like donors DFID and USAID, has committed itself to a focus on building resilience as a means to address chronic vulnerability. Echoing other claims about resilience as the key to bridging the relief-development gap, *The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises* posits, "strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance."[59] ECHO's conceptualization of resilience focuses on three possible methods of increasing resilience, either by strengthening the unit of interest's capacity to resist shock, by reducing the intensity of a shock's impact, or a combination

[56] Ibid., iv.
[57] Tilstone, 4.
[58] USAID, *Community Resilience*, 8.
[59] ECHO, 5.

of the two.[60] ECHO's policy focuses on the need for programming in Sub-Saharan Africa that allows poor households to increase their capacity to recover from shocks, and specifically from the long-term effects of climate change. The EU Agenda for Change prioritizes "cooperation in sustainable agriculture, including the safeguarding of ecosystem services and food and nutrition security" through support to the agricultural sector and related national and regional policies, including land use.[61] Like USAID, ECHO's policy notes the affects that conflict and security issues have on food security resilience. The EU approach to resilience is informed by lessons learned from two EU resilience initiatives, Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) and l'Alliance Global pour l'Initiative Resilience Sahel (AGIR). Key takeaway messages from these initiatives include: improving early warning system functionality, focusing on prevention of crises by addressing underlying causes of vulnerability, and enhancing the effectiveness of crisis response by incorporating both humanitarian and development agendas.[62] Like USAID's policies, ECHO's policies call for increased attention to be paid to these "sticky" underlying causes of vulnerability. Whether or not these policies have been effectively implemented in Somalia will be addressed in Chapter II.

The donors described above are but a few of the many donors developing resilience frameworks and policies. Smaller donors, ranging from mid-size bilateral donors like the Scandinavian governments to less traditional actors such, like some Arab governments, have joined the larger donors in their reliance on the concept of resilience.

UN agencies: Three major implementing agencies in Somalia, FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, have developed a joint community resilience strategy in Somalia.[63]

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[60] Ibid., 5.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., 8-10.
[63] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia.

The joint strategy aims to provide a "comprehensive approach to support Somalia exposed to the ongoing protracted crisis…The strategy aims at delivering three integrated and complementary outcomes that provide the foundation to enhance household and community resilience—enhanced productive sectors, enhanced basic services and a minimal social protection mechanism."[64] The strategy is determinedly not a programmatic tool for each agency; it is a joint conceptual strategy that each agency will adhere to in its own programming, but it does not prescribe specific programmatic actions. Each agency will continue to be autonomous in programmatic decision-making, but will all adhere to implementation of the joint policy through three steps: (1) joint assessments to identify local resilience frameworks, (2) coordinated interventions, and (3) joint monitoring and evaluation.

The joint strategy argues that a number of characteristics of Somalia make the concept of resilience especially critical for food security interventions: the fact that Somalis rely on individual, household, and community resilience to protect their livelihoods more than other societies; and the relative absence of reliable public support systems. The FAO-UNICEF-WFP joint strategy purports to "help at-risk Somali society cope with crises on the basis of community initiatives" through multi-year programming "designed to strengthen asset bases, improve access to services—public, private, communal—create economic opportunities through livelihood diversification and intensification, deepen human and social capital and ensure basic needs are met for the seasonally-at-risk."[65] A key innovation of this strategy is a policy shift from crisis response to crisis prevention, through a "preventive, long-term, developmental approach" that empowers Somali people and collaborates with local governance and institutions when

[64] Ibid., 3.
[65] Ibid., 7.

possible.[66] The FAO-UNICEF-WFP joint strategy recognizes the multidimensional nature of resilience, and uses the livelihoods approach as a foundation for long-term, comprehensive programming. Importantly, the strategy highlights the UN's belief that it is "the responsibility of the international community to sustain livelihoods, basic services and social safety nets concomitantly and comprehensively to promote household and community resilience."[67] Given the extent of the nonfunctionality of the Somali government, this joint strategy relies on engagement on the local rather than national level with Somali stakeholders. In the absence of a reliable government (which the Somali government is decidedly not), FAO, UNICEF, and WFP commit themselves in this joint strategy to the care and upkeep of Somali households and communities. The feasibility of this undertaking, and its cost, are yet to be determined.

State governments: As referenced above, Somalia has been without a functioning state government for over twenty years, and as such there is no existing Somali governmental resilience strategy. In an attempt to provide a well-rounded understanding of resilience policies and to give an idea of what a Somali governmental resilience policy might look like, I here turn to an examination of the Kenya Drought Management Authority's (KDMA's) plan for Ending Drought Emergencies through building resilience of populations in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs).[68] I focus on Kenya as an example of a state approach because Kenya encompasses parts of the Somali region, meaning its population shares livelihoods and environments with Somalia. However, Kenya has a strong bureaucratic government with years of experience in this arena, so its approach is not one that will be necessarily immediately transferable to Somalia; instead it may serve as a future role model for Somalia.

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[66] Ibid., 9.
[67] Ibid., 18.
[68] Kenya Drought Management Authority, *Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies: Medium Term Plan*, 2013-2017.

A two-pronged approach, Kenya's strategy aims to take measures across all sectors to strengthen people's resilience to drought, and improve the way droughts are monitored and responded to.[69] In this strategy, the Kenyan government commits itself to ending drought emergencies in ten years through actions to build resilience. The KDMA takes a holistic approach to building resilience to drought emergencies, through an understanding of livelihood sustainability in the ASALs, the mutually reinforcing relationship between drought and conflict, the need for climate-proofed infrastructure, human capital development through education and health, gender and social analysis, drought preparedness and response, and coordination of drought management.[70]

Challenges to resilience policies/programs

Despite the growing popularity of the concept of resilience, there are a number of challenges to resilience policies and programming that call into question the utility of a resilience approach to food security. One of the most notable challenges is that the broadness of the concept of resilience means that almost any intervention can be termed "resilience" without necessarily contributing anything new. Because resilience is conceptualized as a holistic concept that incorporates many different underlying causes of poverty and food insecurity, interventions as diverse as information management, land tenure rights, and governance capacity building can be termed resilience-building.[71] As resilience becomes a highly prevalent buzzword, organizations are looking within their existing programming to identify activities that can be called resilience activities, and because the concept is so vague, it's possible for an organization to rename

[69] Ibid., 6.
[70] Ibid., 17.
[71] Levine at al., 2.

existing strategies "resilience-building" without developing any new programs.[72] As Levine et al. argue, the concept of resilience may be helpful for organizing external support, but without a clearer understanding of what exactly resilience entails and why it is a useful operational concept, how it can be measured, and whether it should serve as a bridge between relief and development, the sector's shift towards "resilience-building" activities may herald little actual programmatic change.[73]

In addition to encompassing a wide range of diverse interventions, the holistic nature of resilience programming is also challenging because it is multi-scale and multi-component. In order to effectively monitor resilience, implementing organizations must operate at all levels simultaneously, from the individual, to the household, the community, the country, and the region. Most monitoring and evaluation methodologies currently practiced allow for operation at only one level at once, meaning that a switch to multi-level simultaneous monitoring will necessitate an entirely new, as yet undefined methodology.[74] The fact that resilience is comprised of many influencing factors also means that monitoring and measurement will need to occur on more levels and at more regular time intervals than is often the case, costing more time and money on the part of implementing agencies. It is much easier to capture one indicator (i.e., child mortality) at one level (i.e., the country) at regularly spaced intervals of a few years, than it is to capture dozens of indicators, at many levels, continuously, which may be exactly what is required for a robust understanding of resilience over time.

Another inherent challenge to resilience programming is that it is founded on the conception of being community owned and driven, and yet humanitarian assistance has traditionally conducted in a decidedly external fashion, though this seems to be changing with

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[72] Ibid.
[73] Levine et al., 4.
[74] Béné, 8.

the rise of Southern humanitarian organizations. Tilstone argues that the characteristics of humanitarian work, including "development staff living away from communities, high staff turnover, lack of attention to critical listening and communication skills, a focus on projects rather than people and institutions, and short project time frames," discourages interventions from putting host communities and governments at the center of all work.[75] This is, of course, even more challenging in unstable contexts like Somalia, where security and access pose significant limitations to close engagement with local populations.[76] Sustainable community ownership is at the foundation of the concept of resilience, but humanitarian assistance—especially in crisis situations like famine—have traditionally done a poor job of integrating community ownership into response. A truly resilience-focused operating strategy therefore requires a new conceptualization of the roles of the international community, the local community, and local government in responding to crisis.

A final, but critical, challenge of resilience programming is its need for a consistent, long-term approach. Building resilience is never going to be accomplished in a one to two year timeframe, and yet the funding cycle of development and humanitarian donors operates exclusively on short-term contracts.[77] For resilience-building interventions to have a real impact, organizations must commit themselves to programming for up to twenty or more years, which is impossible within current funding procedures. A reconceptualization of the humanitarian and development funding system is necessary in order to facilitate effective resilience programming, and it must incorporate both the capacity for long-term commitment and the programmatic flexibility necessary to respond to changing contexts over time.[78] Without a renovated approach

[75] Tilstone, 2.
[76] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, 16.
[77] Tilstone, 4.
[78] FAO Somalia, UNICEF Somalia, and WFP Somalia, 16.

to humanitarian and development funding, an operational approach to resilience building is untenable.

Chapter II. What does resilience programming look like in Somalia?

The concept of resilience came to the limelight in Somalia during and following the 2010/2011 famine and food security crises. Both the enormity of the famine and the humanitarian community's delayed response in spite of ample early warning contributed to a shift in operational strategy towards an increased focus on resilience as a method to address delayed response. Although only a few years have passed since the famine and subsequent organizational focus on resilience in Somalia, a number of resilience-based interventions are already operational. This section reviews five major ongoing resilience interventions in Somalia, their successes, and their shortcomings.

IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI)

Launched by the Nairobi Summit in 2011, the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) was born out of a consensus among IGAD member states on the need for "adopting a long-term, resilience-focused regional approach."[79] IDDRSI envisioned a holistic approach to ending drought emergencies through a coordinated system characterized by subsidiarity, which "promotes the idea that decision-making, programming and delineation of responsibilities and resources is carried out by the level which is best suited to achieve results."[80] A consortium effort, IDDRSI has identified seven Priority Intervention Areas (PIAs), as follows:

- Natural resources and environment management;
- Market access, trade, and financial services;
- Livelihoods support and basic social services;
- Disaster risk management, preparedness and effective response;
- Research, knowledge management and technology transfer;
- Conflict prevention, resolution and peace building; and

[79] European Center for Development Policy Management, *Regional approaches to food security in Africa: Early lessons from the IGAD regional CAADP process*, Discussion Paper no. 128e, 2012: v.
[80] Ibid., 9.

- Coordination, institution strengthening and partnerships.[81]

Interventions in these PIAs are to be carried out in concert with the IGAD Regional Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) for the Horn of Africa, which focuses on "facilitating mobility across borders, and improving livestock trade within (and beyond) the region; trans-boundary animal disease control; management of natural resources; conflict prevention and resolution; disaster risk management, and; knowledge exchange and policy harmonization around the above mentioned policy areas."[82] The reference document for IDDRSI programming is the 2005-2008 IGAD Food Security Strategy, which focuses on "ensuring sufficient production, food access, nutrition, improved regional food trade and providing safety nets for the region."[83]

IDDRSI will serve both as an operational intervention and as a coordination mechanism through which actors within the IGAD region will develop and implement resilience strategies and programming in order to "complement each other to achieve the overall goals of the IDDRS Initiative."[84] IDDRSI is perhaps unique in its mechanisms in that it actively seeks to engage Non-State Actors (NSAs), which play a very important role in Somalia and the rest of the Horn, in order to determine and carry out appropriate resilience programming. The Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities highlight the importance of engagement with NSAa at the "regional, national and local levels…in the design,

[81] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, *IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative: The IDDRSI Strategy*, January 2013: 24.
[82] Ibid., 12.
[83] European Center for Development Policy Management, 22.
[84] European Center for Development Policy Management, vii.

implementation and monitoring of the evaluation."[85] IDDRSI's commitment to engagement with NSAs highlights IGAD's understanding of the realities of governance in the Horn.

It is too soon to say how successful the intervention will be in building resilience in the Horn, but initial indications point to concerns about the complex level of coordination required. IGAD has a significant amount of support and buy-in from actors within the region to act as a coordinating body, but the problem of how to translate IGAD policy into action on the ground is a significant barrier to implementation. For one thing, there is considerable confusion about actors within IGAD as to the relationship between IDDRSI, the CAADP, and other tools and bodies designed to help build resilience within the region.[86] Most actors agree that regional action is key to improving resilience in the Horn, but are unsure how to operationalize it due to the complexities of the number of actors involved.[87] Monitoring and evaluation of IDDRSI outcomes is designed to analyze the causality of project outputs and outcomes at three levels: efficiency testing, impact testing, and Economic and Value for Money analysis.[88] IDDRSI is designed to occur over three five-year programming cycles, at the end of which ex-post impact evaluations will be conducted.[89] Although no evaluations have yet been conducted of program outcomes, the Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities (REGLAP) has concerns that "the plans are insufficiently transformative in their content and do not address the underlying causes of vulnerability or ensure time bound progress on the fundamental building blocks for development and resilience."[90] Specifically, REGLAP is

[85] Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities, *Overview of the process and priorities for the IGAD Drought Resilience and Sustainability Initiative: The need for 'Community Engagement for Transformational Change*,' 2013: 2.
[86] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 7.
[87] Ibid., 3.
[88] Ibid., 38.
[89] Ibid., 39.
[90] Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme for Vulnerable Dryland Communities, 1.

concerned about a lack of consensus on how to tackle issues of land tenure, economic empowerment, and civic education; it also argues that IDRSSI does not have adequate mechanisms in place to ensure community engagement or transparency, accountability, and monitoring.[91]

Although its potential impact is unknown, it is clear that IDRSSI is the most comprehensive multilateral coordination mechanism in place for resilience building in Somalia, and as such will be a major actor in the promoting the resilience agenda. IDRSSI has the potential to be a great source of learning about resilience promotion in unstable, food insecure states, and to make a significant difference in the lives of Somalis if carried out effectively. What remains to be seen is if IDDRSSI will be successful at translating its capacity for coordination into actual policy and operational change in Somalia. Without an effective governing body to act as the local IDRSSI counterpart, its possibilities for success in Somalia are limited.

Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP)

The Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP) is a consortium of seven NGOs (ACF, ADRA, CARE, COOPI, Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam, and World Vision) aimed at improving resilience by "building livelihood viability; supporting livelihood innovation potential; improving preparedness, contingency resources; improving the health of the natural resource base; supporting community and government social response capacity."[92] SomReP is designed as a five-year program, currently headed by World Vision, with the objective to reach 420,000 people in the first three years to "build household and community resilience to drought and

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[91] Ibid.
[92] Somalia Resilience Program, "Enhancing resilience of households and communities in Somalia," UNOCHA, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Somalia/130319%20-%20SomRep.pdf: 4.

related risks in Somalia."[93] SomReP is a very new consortium with limited information available; however, as it is comprised of seven of the leading humanitarian and development agencies operating in Somalia, it is certain to be a major player in resilience promotion. Inspired by the Somalia Cash Consortium (a group of four NGOs that came together in mid-2011 to coordinate a cash response in South-Central Somalia[94]), SomReP aims to improve resilience programming through a "harmonized strategy" that will reduce overlap and encourage knowledge and cost sharing.[95]

In addition to its role as lead agency of SomReP, World Vision has undertaken two resilience initiatives in Somalia, the Area Rehabilitation Program (ARP), which "addresses immediate needs of children and community members, and transition to long-term development,"[96] and the Holistic Rangeland Management (HRM) program, which seeks to "reduce the impact of drought on chronically water-stressed pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and internally displaced communities."[97] The ARP brings multiple sector interventions together in a geographic area to promote resilience by tackling challenges on multiple fronts, while the HRM identified through Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (VCAs) "livestock markets, animal health care systems, livestock feeding and the availability of land for grazing, and water resources" as priority areas for intervention.[98] Through these interventions, World Vision is adopting a combined approach to both address immediate effects of drought and reduce vulnerability over the long-term by working across four sectors: social protection, disaster risk reduction, food security, and water

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[93] Ibid., 2.
[94] Betty Kweyu, "Lessons Learnt From A Consortium Approach: Cash Transfers in South Central Somalia," 2013: 9.
[95] Ibid., 6.
[96] World Vision, *Somalia 2013 Annual Report*, 2013: 9.
[97] Josh Folkema, Maggie Ibrahim and Emily Wilkinson, "World Vision's resilience programming: adding value to development," *ODI Working Paper*, 2013: 11
[98] Ibid., 11.

and sanitation.[99] Although evaluations of the two programs are only available for the first year of implementation, modest positive effects have been seen, especially in the percentage of beneficiaries with access to the Sphere Minimal Standard quantity of water per person per day (15 liters).[100]

Initial evaluations evidence that interventions are significantly hampered by unaddressed issues of governance. Specifically, World Vision interventions have been derailed by issues surrounding land tenure and ongoing deforestation (for the purpose of making charcoal).[101] External evaluation highlights the need to engage in "conflict sensitive and power analysis exercise" during the design phase of intervention in order to ensure programming is realistic based on existing relationships and access to resources.[102] The fact that ongoing charcoal production was hindering livelihood intervention success suggests that parts of the population in need of livelihood and income diversification was not being reached by the program. As a major implementing agency with a stake in the resilience agenda, World Vision has a lot to offer the humanitarian community in terms of lessons learned about the feasibility and appropriateness of resilience-building interventions in Somalia. The majority of SomRep's evidence has thus far been kept internal, though with time hopefully more information about its strategy and implementation will enter the public domain.

Save the Children: Livelihood Resilience in Somaliland

Save the Children has committed itself to livelihood and economic resilience promotion in Somalia through its Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) program. The program is comprised of two components: (1) "develop markets and create employment, with

[99] Ibid., 12.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid., 13.
[102] Ibid.

accompanying skills training, focusing on agriculture, fisheries, and livestock," and (2) "support the investment climate and regulatory framework in Somaliland to increase investment and growth."[103] Although the SEED program is too young for an in-depth understanding of its impact, an external evaluation conducted by Yohannes Gebre Michael concludes, "The outcome of the discussions with the stakeholders and differentiated community indicates already some positive outcomes."[104] Specifically, SEED had success with introducing new livelihood options (specifically beekeeping) into households without prior experience in that area.[105] The evaluation of the SEED program, commissioned by Save the Children, concluded that the overall impact of the program will undoubtedly contribute to "more resilient livelihood bases," but measuring the effect of the intervention "is very challenging" and requires better understanding of local practices and the interaction between the trainings and outcomes on many levels.[106] It's unclear if there is a value-add to some of the vocational training offered by SEED, especially in crop and fodder production. Overall, some of SEED's shortcomings could have been avoided by a better understanding of existing social and communal linkages, human induced hazards, and indigenous livelihood practices prior to the design of the interventions. The evaluation of SEED showed that human induces hazards (such as "private enclosures, invasive weeds, charcoal making and population pressure and resource base conflicts") have a significant negative impact on livelihood resilience; a better understanding of how best to tackle these obstacles before intervening would lead to more positive outcomes.[107]

[103] Yohannes Gebre Michael, *Resilience of households' livelihoods to hazards in Somaliland*, September 2012: 11.
[104] Ibid., 36.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid., 37.
[107] Ibid., 38.

Concern Worldwide: Strengthening Households' Economy and Reinforcing Resilience (SHERRIS)

In 2012, Concern implemented the 4-year program, Strengthening Households' Economy and Reinforcing Resilience (SHERRIS), "aiming at extreme poor households that include female headed households, marginal groups and child labourers to improve the quality of life of targeted beneficiaries through increased income, knowledge, voice and improved access to pro-poor basic services."[108] The intended impact is: "Increased resilience of targeted beneficiaries in Gabiley Region through improved food security, disaster preparedness and increased knowledge and voice."[109] Program objectives include diversification of livelihood options, increased household dietary diversity and crop production, improved access to safe water, and watershed management.

Effects of ongoing resilience programs

The programs highlighted above are included to serve as an example of ongoing food security resilience programs in Somalia. Unfortunately, given how nascent all of these programs are, no independent evaluations of their successes or failures are yet available to the public, so it is not yet known what effects (positive or negative) these programs may have on household food security resilience in Somalia. The next chapter delineates all of the sectors and components that are critical to a holistic food security resilience program in Somalia, some of which are not included in the existing programming described above.

[108] Concern Worldwide, *Somalia Programme Plan*, 2013: 2.
[109] Ibid., 7.

Chapter III. Conceptual Framework for Building Food Security Resilience in Somalia

A recurring theme throughout the above discussion of resilience has been the multi-sectoral nature of resilience, and the fact that building a resilient household, community, or state depends on interventions at a plethora of levels. Although multi-sectoral programming has been in existence for decades, the concept of resilience offers a unifying theme under which interventions that may at first seem unrelated can be grouped in order to maximize their impact. Proponents of resilience as a galvanizing concept point to the discussion surrounding resilience as proof of the significant progress that has been made in how we conceptualize the role of humanitarian assistance. Not long ago, humanitarian interventions were characterized by one-off transfers of goods deemed to be necessary for human survival in any context: i.e., temporary shelter, water, and food. The discussion surrounding resilience is proof of an evolution in the understanding of what it takes for households and communities to sustain themselves, which is a lot more than temporary shelter or other band-aid approaches. Resilience necessitates an understanding of the underlying societal and governance issues that contribute to a given household or community's ability to absorb and overcome shocks; these are sticky issues such as power relations, social stratifications, gender relations, land tenure, political representation, market forces, intra-household social positioning, racial and ethnic stratifications, and cultural understandings of food, work, and home. It is easy to understand why some humanitarian actors may shy away from these difficult issues, and why programming that incorporates all these facets may seem impossibly complex. However, there is a great deal of hope and optimism inherent in these conversations as well, because as the humanitarian and development community struggle with these issues, their conceptualization of their role and the effectiveness

of their programming will naturally improve. Although dauntingly complex, the programmatic implementation of the concept of resilience offers an exciting opportunity for the humanitarian and development communities to enact real change and impact in the lives of millions of people.

The conceptual framework proposed below is an attempt to delineate exactly what an effective programmatic approach to building resilience in Somalia must take into account, what actors must be involved, what potential challenges may arise and how they can be dealt with. In order to develop an intervention that builds household- and community-level resilience to food insecurity, the following sectors must be addressed: governance and insecurity, land tenure, water security, livelihoods promotion, gender dynamics, health, nutrition and hygiene, agriculture, market access, and regional state and border issues. The overarching theme of this conceptual framework is engagement with a variety of actors on a variety of issues that directly or indirectly influence a household's ability to withstand food security shocks, and the harnessing of preexisting informal institutions for new resilience promotion activities. What follows is solely the opinions and analysis of this author, as informed by my understanding of the Somali context and the concept of resilience.

Governance and insecurity

Somalia, especially South-Central Somalia, has been characterized as a failed state with minimal functioning formal government institutions for over twenty years. Governmental policies, when they have existed, have been primarily aimed at retaining governmental control of key strategic areas rather than providing services. In the absence of a functioning government, informal institutions—most notably the traditional clan system—have served as the main providers of social services, markets and trading, infrastructure, and societal structure. As much as the clan system has provided a semblance of governance in a failed state, it has also served as a force

multiplier for traditional inequalities and ongoing clan-based conflict and raids. Conflict and insecurity are major sources of vulnerability for Somali households, as conflict regularly disrupts planting and harvesting of crops, livestock migration patterns, recruits productive members of society away from contributing to their families, and prevents farmers and vendors from accessing markets.[110] Conflict affects households most profoundly when they are required to migrate for security reasons, leaving behind land, animals, and livelihoods. Internally displaced populations are among the most vulnerable in terms of livelihoods, because they are often forced to undertake dangerous tasks to generate income.[111]

The ongoing security situation in Somalia has significantly impacted the space available for humanitarian actors by limiting humanitarian access to vulnerable populations within Somalia due to ongoing conflict (which is increasingly targeted at humanitarian workers), and by making illegal the provision of any kind of support that could be diverted by the non-state actor Al Shabaab.[112] In order to negotiate the increasingly difficult operating environment within Somalia, aid organizations undertaking resilience programming must engage at a high-level with officials of the Somali government and governments operating within Somalia (most notably the United States) in order to facilitate possible negotiation with non-state actors, including Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is currently listed as a terrorist organization, and as such, any form of engagement with Al Shabaab by humanitarian organizations is prohibited. It is possible that

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[110] FEWS NET, "Somalia Food Security Outlook: October to March 2013," 3. Available at: http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Somalia_OL_2012_10.pdf.

[111] The conflict in Somalia has especially impacted displaced women, who are often left with multiple children to support with no means of generating income. Alexander Tyler, "Protection and Livelihoods in Somalia," *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* (40): October 2008. Available at: www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-40/protection-and-livelihoods-in-somalia.

[112] The 2008 designation by the US Secretary of State of Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization criminalized even the accidental provision of any goods or services to Al Shabaab, making humanitarian organizations liable for potential aid diversion. US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Somalia Sanctions: Information on Persons Listed in the Annex to E.O. 13536 of April 10, 2010," 2010: 5.

increasing high level pressure and negotiations with the US government and others may allow humanitarian organizations the opportunity to . Organizations aiming to build resilience at a household level will be unsuccessful unless they simultaneously build support among the governing actors in the area, which notably include foreign governments, the Somali governments, and many non-state actors, including the traditional clan system.

Land tenure

As a traditionally largely pastoral livelihood zone, with pockets of agricultural livelihood zones, land tenure in South-Central Somalia is mostly informal, and the formalization of land tenure has presented obstacles to traditional livestock migration patterns, which are essential for pastoral livelihoods. Engagement with land owning actors, as well as non-land-owning pastoralists, on the part of humanitarian organizations, may go a long way in building relationships that allow pastoralist livelihoods to remain intact. Engagement with local authorities on the issues of land tenure is also recommended, in order to formalize land-sharing agreements that will allow pastoralists to migrate semiannually across land they do not own. Given the difficulty of negotiating land tenure issues with unknown actors, humanitarian organizations may have a role to play as external negotiator and impartial promoter of land-sharing agreements.

Water security

Water is a significantly valuable commodity in South-Central Somalia, both for pastoralists and for agropastoralists. Most water is sourced from boreholes, shallow wells, or *berkads* (surface water catchments),[113] and many pastoralists rely exclusively on water trucking during the dry

[113] Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia, "Nugal Pastoral Livelihood Baseline Profile," September 2011: 4. Available at: http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports.

season and in emergencies.[114] In order for aid organizations to effectively promote food security resilience in these areas, they must take into account the many issues surrounding water security in the area. Promoting sustainable water catchment construction and drought-resistant agriculture are important components, but the establishment of a sustainable water-trucking model for cyclical drought emergencies is also crucial. A sustainable, effective water-trucking model is reliant upon community ownership, early-warning mechanisms, road and truck infrastructure and upkeep, and engagement with local and national governmental actors. Drought is, and will continue to be, an ongoing problem in South-Central Somalia, and mechanisms must be put in place that will provide sustainable solutions to drought emergencies, such as formalized, regulated, and self-sustaining water-trucking systems.

Livelihoods promotion

Any resilience program in South-Central Somalia must focus a component of its programming on the promotion of livelihoods and asset management. Mercy Corps' assessment following the 2011 famine found that asset and income diversity played an important role in the resilience of households to food security shocks, but only so far as the different income sources and assets were not susceptible to the same shocks.[115] It was diversity of risk, not of income sources, that was a true measure of a household's resilience. Therefore, in addition to traditional livelihoods promotion activities—such as diversifying income, vocational training, cash for work, and other interventions—humanitarians must focus on increasing the independence of a household's income sources in terms of susceptibility for shocks. An understanding of the dominant role that drought will continue to play in the Horn of Africa is essential, as simply increasing a family's

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[114] Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia, "Addun Livelihood Baseline Profile," June/July 2011: 3. Available at: http://www.fsnau.org/products/baseline-reports.
[115] Mercy Corps, "What Really Matters for Resilience? Exploratory Evidence from Southern Somalia," 2013: 4.

asset base to include a variety of assets that are all susceptible to drought will do nothing to position the family as resilient to drought.

Gender dynamics

A nuanced understanding of the gender dynamics of South-Central Somali households is critical for effective resilience-building. Women and men play very traditionally gendered roles in Somali households, with the majority of men working with the livestock and the women tending the home and raising the children. Increasing women's ability to space their births, earn income to provide for their families, and network across household and clan lines can all improve their ability to respond to food security shocks. Special attention should be paid to the roles played by adolescent girls in pastoral households; little is known about the roles they occupy in households, and yet they quickly become primary household decision-makers and providers. Accessing adolescent girls before they become mothers will contribute to improved educational attainment for women, improved nutrition for babies and children, and an increasingly equal position between men and women within marriage.

Another important component of Somali gender dynamics is the role played by young men in the ongoing conflict and historic livestock raids. Young men are increasingly leaving behind their families to join armed groups in search of reliable income and opportunity. By engaging boys at a young age in education about pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods, trade and marketing, and other vocational opportunities, humanitarian organizations have the opportunity to lessen the number of adolescent boys who join armed groups. An understanding of what drives these boys to leave home, and what could get them to stay, is necessary to build a foundation of sustainable, resilient households for future generations.

Health

The health sector often plays a smaller role in food security interventions than other sectors, but as a major driver of poverty, health must be a central focus of any resilience program. Poor health limits an individual's capacity to provide for him or herself, and one episode of poor health can push a borderline household into destitution. A humanitarian resilience intervention must both acknowledge the health environment in South-Central Somalia, and work to improve household access to regular health care, be it through the establishment and local health centers, the mobilization of community health workers, and/or through national-level engagement with governing institutions.

Nutrition and hygiene

In addition to health, resilience programming requires a significant focus on nutrition and hygiene. Improved food availability and access will have little effect if poor feeding practices and hygiene are in place that jeopardize a household's ability to avoid malnutrition in the face of shocks. In a context like South-Central Somalia, where the majority of the population lives in rural areas without access to potable water, hygiene is especially problematic and inextricably linked to malnutrition. An effective intervention must engage individuals at the household and community level with behavior change mechanisms to promote proper feeding and hygiene practices, but must also tackle the more complex issues of clean water availability, as discussed above. This requires significant engagement with both informal and formal governing institutions, in order to promote widely available water and sanitation facilities.

Like the arguments for the importance of health interventions in resilience programming, the treatment of acute malnutrition is also critical to ensuring a productive, resilient workforce and community. Effective resilience programming should have components of both the treatment

of acute malnutrition and the prevention of malnutrition through education on improved feeding practices, especially among adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and infants and young children. Like many of the other sectoral interventions proposed in this framework, this nutrition programming will be most effective when implemented through existing social structures, including the clan system, and with an understanding of the role of women in pastoral and agropastoral households. For instance, interventions in South-Central Somalia should aim to empower women within communities who practice effective feeding and hygiene behaviors to act as community mobilizers and knowledge managers for the promotion of good practices throughout the community. A community resilient to food security crises must be well educated in the practice of good nutrition and hygiene, and must be equipped to continue this practice even in the face of severe shocks.

Increased agricultural output

Increasing agricultural output is traditionally a major component of food security interventions, and it deserves a place in resilience programming in Somalia, though it should in no way be considered the primary objective of resilience programming. Practitioners of agropastoral livelihoods in South-Central Somalia face recurring drought that demolishes crop production. Increasing education and infrastructure around water conservation and drought-resistant agriculture, as discussed above, are critical components of both increasing agricultural production and protecting livelihoods.

Market access

Increasing household's access to markets is a critical component of ensuring food security is maintained through shocks. As drought in specific regions limits agricultural output in those regions, households become reliant on food produced elsewhere but available in markets. In

order to make this a feasible strategy, humanitarian organizations must work with local governing powers to increase the reliability of roads, bridges, and markets available to the majority of Somalis. Working through existing power structures to fund the development and maintenance of transportation infrastructure will help ensure access to food (when it is available).

Regional/border issues

The state of Somalia is actually only one piece of the larger Somali region of the Horn of Africa, with Somali populations located throughout Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. This multi-state population, along with the migratory nature of pastoralist Somali societies, necessitates the humanitarian sector's understanding of the region's complex border issues. This will involve advocacy and coordination with multinational organizations, national governments of bordering countries, and governing authorities within Somalia to ensure that traditional migratory patterns can be formalized and protected.

Mechanisms for action:

All of the sectoral interventions discussed above are dependent upon engagement with local actors to support resilience at the household and community level; engagement with the traditional clan system provides an avenue through which to accomplish this. The clan system offers a preexisting societal structure and network that can be harnessed by the humanitarian organization in order to reduce levels of inter-clan conflict. In an analysis of what allows some households to in Southern Somalia to be more resilient to food security shocks than others, Mercy Corps and TANGO International found evidence that households with more inter-clan network connections "were more likely to maintain food security throughout the crisis, or

recover it quickly afterwards."[116] This finding provides some evidence that inter-clan relationship building may contribute to food security resilience. Therefore, humanitarian agencies should work to increase the number of beneficial connections both within clans and between them. Effective resilience programming in South Central Somalia, as in other places, will depend up on the humanitarian community's ability to identify and adapt to the local context and use existing social and governmental structures to build a response that works with, rather than against, the targeted community. The clan system should be seen as an opportunity for growth and advancement in the cause of resilience, rather than an obstacle.

[116] Mercy Corps, 1.

V. Conclusion

As should be clear from Chapters I and II of this paper, it is almost impossible to talk about food security today without talking about resilience, and this is especially the case in Somalia. The concept of resilience is dominating the current dialogue surrounding humanitarian assistance and food security interventions, and many actors believe that the future of food security programming is rooted in the implementation of resilience building activities. In this paper, I have laid out the current understanding of the concept of resilience, how it is applied to food security, how it is being implemented in Somalia, and what a food security resilience intervention must incorporate in order to be effective in the Somali context. The effects of ongoing resilience programming in Somalia are not yet known, as the programs are too young to have been evaluated. Evaluations of current programming will hopefully be available in the coming years, and will undoubtedly provide significant insight into the positive and negative effects of resilience programming as it is currently conceptualized. In the absence of any real evaluations of existing programming, this paper has strived to make the most comprehensive conceptual framework possible for food security resilience programming based off of a nuanced understanding of the concept of resilience and the realities of life in Somalia. It is exactly this comprehensive, nuanced approach that is necessary for the effective application of the concept of resilience.

The concept of resilience offers a useful overarching framework through which to view the multi-sectoral underlying causes of food insecurity, and it has the potential to bring about important change in the way humanitarian assistance is delivered. Although it is not an entirely new concept, the value of resilience is the opportunity it creates to bring a unifying lens to all humanitarian and development work. An understanding of the varied components that affect a

single individual's resilience to food security crises can significantly improve the way in which the humanitarian and development communities both prepare for and respond to emergencies. However, the full potential of a resilience approach will only be realized if the humanitarian and development communities commit to a truly holistic, long-term, multi-sectoral approach that encompasses all of the myriad factors that combine create any given individual's reality; this is a complex undertaking indeed. There is cause for caution, but also optimism, in the future of food security interventions as informed by the concept of resilience.

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