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# The Fares Center

for Eastern  
Mediterranean  
Studies



**Tufts**  
UNIVERSITY

Foreign Policy  
Challenges for the  
New Administration:  
Iran and the  
Middle East

LIGHTING THE PATH  
TO UNDERSTANDING

Occasional Paper No. 5



Fifth occasional paper of  
the Fares Center for Eastern  
Mediterranean Studies,  
Tufts University, as part of the  
series on Lighting the Path  
to Understanding

# Foreign Policy Challenges for the New Administration: Iran and the Middle East

Occasional Paper No. 5

A report on the conference:

*Foreign Policy Challenges for the New Administration:  
Iran and the Middle East*

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Tufts University, Medford/Somerville, MA

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*Rapporteur and Writer:* **Amelia Cook**

Amelia Cook received a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School in 2008, where she studied international development, human rights, and environmental policy. Her thesis analyzed the status of human rights in the Republic of Botswana with specific regard to the San of the Kalahari. She is currently completing a Master's Degree in Resource Economics and Policy at the University of Maine, where she works as a graduate assistant in the School of Economics. She was a research assistant at the Fares Center while at Fletcher, and continues to work as an editor for the Fares Center and maintains the content of the Center's website. Amelia can be reached at [amelia.cook@tufts.edu](mailto:amelia.cook@tufts.edu).

# The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies

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## Preface

Some time ago, the United States could list Iran as one of its allies in the Middle East. A growing disconnect between the two countries over the years now places them at polar ends of an ongoing confrontation, heightened by Iran's emergent nuclear program. The enduring confrontation between the U.S. and Iran, in addition to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have dominated much of U.S. foreign policy since the turn of the century. Through its lectures, roundtables, workshops, and conferences, the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies offers a venue at Tufts University to debate these sorts of challenging issues. Our events benefit from the contributions of students, faculty, and many esteemed guest lecturers who together have broadened the scope of the analysis and allowed for the expression of a wide variety of viewpoints in a stimulating and positive environment.

Following the inauguration of a new President of the United States, the Fares Center held a conference entitled "Foreign Policy Challenges for the New Administration: Iran and the Middle East" on March 5-6, 2009. The conference brought to light important concerns plaguing the relationship between the U.S. and Iran and examined how this situation affects U.S. engagement in the region. Experts, including academics, policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and distinguished members of the military, gathered from around the world to reflect on this topic and to provide concrete policy recommendations to the new U.S. administration. It was gratifying to hear the participants themselves comment on the caliber of speakers in attendance this year. As always, audience members also enriched the dialogue with their insightful comments and questions.

This publication, the Fares Center's fifth occasional paper, summarizes the conference presentations. The synopses are preceded by an introduction, which offers an overview of the topics under review, several recurrent themes from the conference, and a list of the participant's prescriptions for U.S. policymakers on how to change the dynamic in the Middle East in a helpful way.

I have many outstanding people to thank for making a confer-

ence of this magnitude and this publication possible: H.E. Issam M. Fares, founder of the Fares Center and former Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon; Mr. Fares I. Fares, trustee and member of the Fares Center executive committee; President Lawrence S. Bacow and the Office of the President; Provost Jamshed Bharucha and the Office of the Provost; Dean Robert M. Hollister and the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service; Dean Stephen W. Bosworth and The Fletcher School; Dr. Malik Mufti and the International Relations Program at Tufts University; Dr. Richard H. Shultz and the International Security Studies Program at The Fletcher School; Dr. John L. Esposito and the Fares Center Academic Committee; The Honorable William A. Rugh, Edward R. Murrow Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School; Dr. Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School, and Dr. Ibrahim Warde, Adjunct Professor of International Business at The Fletcher School, both Fares Center Associate Directors, as well as the rest of our colleagues who work on related topics at Tufts University.

Dr. Leila Fawaz  
Founding Director  
The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies  
Tufts University

## Introduction

2009 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. It marks as well the thirtieth year in which the United States and Iran have had no formal diplomatic relationship with each other. This standoff has complicated U.S. foreign policy across the region. With the advent of a new administration in the United States and the unrest caused by the presidential elections in Iran on June 12, 2009, however, change in the American approach to the Middle East is likely.

At the forefront of American concern with Iran is its continued development of a nuclear program, a program about which the world knows very little. The previous administration's refusal to engage in talks with Iran proved more obstructive than not and it has become clear that the Obama administration's choice of a policy of engagement might be the only way to resolve tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear program. The protests sparked by the questioned legitimacy of the recent Iranian elections, in which the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad surfaced as the winner, has put the Iranian government on the defensive, and while the Obama administration has avoided open criticism of Iran, hoping not to shatter what little foundation for dialogue Washington has begun to build, the administration may have to wait until the tumult surrounding the elections settles before it can move forward with engagement. Otherwise, it risks endorsing Ahmadinejad by default before the Iranian public, and much of the world, has accepted his presidency. In the meantime, as the U.S. straddles the fence between containment and engagement, Iran is developing a deterrence strategy, which involves improvements to its weapons technology, specialization in low-intensity warfare, and further development of its nuclear program. The normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations may be a long-term goal, but addressing the nuclear issue is a pressing task.

Iran's disposition during this fragile period has broad implications far beyond the nuclear issue and its own borders. The impending withdrawal of American troops from Iraq will leave Iraq and surrounding areas vulnerable, and the temptation for Iran to take advantage of the situation will be great. The struggle

for stability in Afghanistan continues unabated. The U.S. needs Iran to cooperate with its efforts there, which are plagued now by the spread of conflict across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and into the northern reaches of Pakistan. Despite the recent success of Pakistani government forces in the Swat valley, a Taliban stronghold, the battle for this territory is ongoing and extremely problematic. South Waziristan is next on its list, and Pakistan will require U.S. support if its counterinsurgency strategy is to succeed. Stability in Afghanistan will be critical to reclaiming these troubled regions in Pakistan.

In its role as self-appointed representative of the dispossessed across the region, Iran has also involved itself in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and used the Palestinian cause to keep its revolutionary home fires burning. The U.S. must urgently re-engage in this peace process, which suffered during the last administration. The U.S. must help the Palestinians find common ground, urge the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu to accept a two-state solution, convince Israel to end its siege on Gaza, and provide assurances to Palestinian refugees. Resolution to this conflict is integral to deflating anti-American sentiments and increasing stability across the region.

Fortunately, Iran and the U.S. have many common objectives, which can offer a platform for initiating dialogue. Common interests include desires to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, to avoid Islamic Jihadist regimes from coming to power in either country, and to tackle drug trafficking in the region. Neither country will likely achieve these goals without the support of the other. Cooperation, however, will require concessions from both sides. Iran will not concede to a dialogue until it feels secure that the U.S. does not intend to pursue regime change in Tehran. The U.S. will require guarantees from Iran that it will limit its nuclear program and not impede U.S. efforts in pacifying the Middle East.

With these challenges in mind, the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies hosted the conference “Foreign Policy Challenges for the New Administration: Iran and the Middle East” at Tufts University in March 2009. While panelists reflected on the intricacies of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, the conference

proceedings were certainly not limited to a discussion of Iran. Participants discussed events across the region, including the future of the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, new developments in Pakistan, and the alliances Iran has forged with Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.

#### COMMON THEMES

A diverse group of experts tackled the many ways in which the situation in Iran has affected and is affected by a whole host of other events and dynamics at play across the region. The opening keynote address reviewed the major challenges in the Middle East awaiting the new Obama administration. Five panels covered such issues as historical relations between Iran and the U.S.; concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean; Iraq, the Gulf, and Afghanistan; the nuclear debate; and U.S. foreign policy options. The webcast keynote address offered a military perspective on the security challenges facing America in the region, while the concluding remarks synthesized the major questions that came out of the conference and presented potential avenues for progress.

Several common themes characterized the two-day conference:

- *Engagement is a better option than containment.*  
The most damaging aspect of the American relationship with Iran is how little the U.S. knows about Iran's objectives and intentions. The consensus at the conference was that engagement, in some form, is preferable to a strategy of containment. Thirty years without engagement, after all, has not moved the U.S. one step closer to resolving its tensions with Iran. Engagement will also symbolize a welcome foreign policy shift in which the U.S. attempts diplomacy before resorting to military action.
- *The perceived hypocrisy of American foreign policy in the Middle East, not an aversion to democratic ideals, prevents many people in the region from trusting U.S. democratization efforts.*

Surveys on public attitudes in the Middle East have shown that many people respect the core values that define a democracy, including human rights, transparency, and freedom, and desire

change in their own countries. However, anti-American sentiments persist and people are hesitant to trust the U.S. because it has made foreign policy decisions in the past in the name of democracy that were based far more on American interests than on democratic values. Such actions have threatened American legitimacy in the Middle East.

- *Don't forget Pakistan.*

While the U.S. has been embroiled in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, enclaves of Islamic extremism have taken hold in the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, where a porous border with Afghanistan allows Taliban insurgents to move freely between the two countries. Stabilizing Afghanistan will help neutralize this threat, as will efforts by government forces in Pakistan to regain these insurgent strongholds. Pakistan will, however, require support. It is crucial that the U.S. not lose sight of this region as it addresses other challenges.

- *Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is central to making advancements in most other regional stalemates.*

The Palestinian cause is symbolic to Muslims across the Middle East of the way in which many Muslims feel that the West respects them less than other people. As a result, it will be difficult to quell anti-Western sentiments in the region until this conflict is resolved. Without resolution, parties like Iran can continue to take advantage of the symbolism of this situation to bolster their own causes.

#### PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE

This conference took place six weeks after Barack Obama was inaugurated as the new President of the United States and several months before presidential elections in Iran. While in office, Obama will face a number of foreign policy challenges in the Middle East. Conference participants embraced the opportunity to offer advice on how the new administration should tackle some of these issues. Many provided counsel on how to restore America's image overseas. The focus among all was to move beyond cyclical conversation on the same old issues. To do so, speakers provided concrete recommendations that could pave the way for progress.

Conference participants recommended that the new U.S. administration:

- Reassume a position of leadership in the global community bearing a new attitude that reflects respect for all.
- Focus on building international partnerships and coalitions, rather than bilateral engagement.
- Address with renewed energy the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and engage both sides on the difficult issues that have for so long remained untouched by American politicians.
- Rebuild American legitimacy by sticking to core values and avoiding double standards.
- Engage in dialogue with Iran in order to determine its objectives and intentions.
- Stress common interests when initiating dialogue with Iran and work toward common goals in order to build a relationship with a solid foundation.
- Eliminate the “good-versus-evil” discourse.
- Do not lose sight of the importance of nation-building, good governance, strong civil societies, and the provision of services that must complement military endeavors.
- Avoid knee-jerk reactions to Iran; resolution will require patience and thought, and perhaps several different strategies at once.
- Do not ignore existing treaties and agreements that govern Iran’s nuclear program in developing a grand bargain, as this could open the door for other countries to follow suit.
- Seek input and involvement from the people of the region.
- Broaden contextual horizons, as issues in the Middle East are undeniably tied to circumstances in South and Central Asia.

\* \* \*

These recommendations are indicative of a pervasive desire expressed in the 2008 American presidential elections for change. Most conference participants commended Obama’s willingness to consider dialogue with nations such as Iran, and the symbolic gesture of his overtures to the Muslim world during his inaugural address. Their suggestions reiterate the importance of adhering to

core American values, which it was felt the U.S. has lost sight of in the last years. Fortunately, the election of a new President offers an opportunity to shift gears and move in new directions, and Obama has expressed every intention of doing so.

Amelia Cook  
MALD 2008  
The Fletcher School  
Tufts University

*Note: Conference participants did not review the summaries in the pages that follow. The author is responsible for the depiction of their presentations and views as they appear here.*

## Keynote Address: “War or Peace? Obama’s Challenges in the Middle East”

Speaker: **R. Nicholas Burns**, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Chair: **Jamshed Bharucha**, Provost, Senior Vice President, and Professor of Psychology, Tufts University

**Nicholas Burns** began his keynote remarks by emphasizing that the greatest challenge facing the Obama administration is the global economic crisis. The meltdown on Wall Street has caused the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, a credit market freeze, foreclosures across the country, and a climate of uncertainty around the world. The U.S. economy is the fundamental pillar of its national strength, Burns argued, and therefore the success of its foreign policy hinges upon the ability of the Obama administration to overcome the economic crisis. Fortunately, Burns said, the government is under “the fresh and very capable leadership of a new President.”

Beyond the financial crisis lies a number of staggering foreign policy challenges. These include the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat of terrorism, climate change, global poverty, food shortages, pandemics, nuclear proliferation, international criminal syndicates, and trafficking in women, children, and drugs. The scope and magnitude of these issues is such that the U.S. cannot tackle them alone. The U.S. must once again assume a position of global leadership, conveying a new attitude in which it sees itself not as *the* superpower but “as the leader of a tightly interwoven group of like-minded countries.” The U.S., Burns said, must lead by listening, and must encourage the strengthening of multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations. To do so, it must invite into the elite circle of global powers new guests, including regional powers such as Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Egypt, as well as rising powers such as

China, India, Brazil, Japan, and Russia. However, Burns noted, this transition in no way signifies the dissolution of the U.S. as a superpower; it is, and will continue to be for some time, the dominant global power. With this position comes responsibility.

While global in nature, these dominant foreign policy challenges are relevant to the Middle East precisely because they will assume the attention of the U.S. administration as it simultaneously tackles key concerns in Iran, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Middle East may not be the epicenter of America's strategic concerns over the next fifty years—a position likely to be assumed by Asia—but it certainly is the epicenter of its foreign policy over the next five to ten years. Furthermore, Burns stressed, it does not make sense to isolate foreign policy strategies in the Middle East from those in South Asia, as the two regions are and have long been intricately linked.

Noting a recent *Foreign Affairs* article by Robert Kaplan, in which Kaplan predicted that the Indian Ocean would be the center of both global conflict and opportunity in the near future, Burns suggested that the U.S. would be prudent to create a joint strategy encompassing both regions. This area would cover nearly the entire Muslim world. Obama has preempted such a strategy by sending “the right message” to the Muslim world in a speech in which he offered an open hand, promised dialogue with even the toughest regimes should they “unclench their fists,” and gave an ardent “we will defeat you” to the al-Qaeda of the world. Obama's appointment of George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as special envoys to the Middle East and to South Asia, respectively, is a clear demonstration that the new administration believes these two regions are critical to U.S. foreign policy.

In Burns' estimation, the three primary tasks awaiting the Obama administration in the Middle East are Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran. In Iraq, Burns recommended the development of a military withdrawal plan that would include a broader scheme to reintegrate Iraq into the region, a plan that would inevitably involve Iran. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. can no longer sit on the sidelines of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Burns argued. The Palestinians, on the one hand, must unite themselves, and convince Hamas to renounce terrorism and

recognize Israel so that it can join the dialogue. The new Israeli government, on the other hand, will have to maintain a commitment to a two-state solution.

Burns commended Obama's fortitude in arguing that it is self-defeating to boycott talks with certain governments. The absence of an Iranian-American dialogue over the last 30 years is lamentable, most crucially because the U.S. simply has no idea what Iran's motivations and intentions are, which does not serve America's interests. We cannot, Burns argued, go to war with Iran before attempting diplomacy. In facing a nuclear Iran, Obama is best served by a multilateral approach, which by its inclusive nature could lead to the success of stringent sanctions if negotiations fail. Ultimately, however, the U.S. and its partners may have to decide whether they should deploy military force or a containment strategy.

The U.S. has suffered a lapse of character in the eyes of the world, but the possibility for progress and the potential for a renewed global faith, Burns concluded, lie in the fact that the U.S. is the only country capable of bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians together, it is the key player in Iraq today, and it is the only country that can successfully assemble a coalition to confront Iran.



## Session I: America and Iran: The Historical Context

Speakers: **Gary G. Sick**, Senior Research Scholar and Adjunct Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

**Karim Sadjadpour**, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

**Shai Feldman**, Judith and Sidney Swartz Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University

Chair: **Vali Nasr**, Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School; Associate Director, The Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University

Gary Sick offered his insights on the history of U.S.-Iranian relations, which he sees as a series of missed opportunities. For example, the U.S.-Israeli offer of arms to Iran in exchange for assistance retrieving hostages from Lebanon was a strategic opening for Iran that failed. George H. W. Bush's statement that "goodwill begets goodwill" was an invitation to which, unfortunately, Iran did not respond until Bush was out of office. Madeleine Albright's speeches imploring for improved relations were met with stony silence. Then, in 2001, despite Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan, George W. Bush proclaimed Iran a part of the "axis of evil." And in March 2003, when Iran proposed a negotiating agenda, the Bush administration was too preoccupied in Baghdad to respond.

U.S.-Iranian relations have not always been sour. Following WWII, for example, the U.S. defended Iranian independence and helped rid northern Iran of the Soviets. But since 1953, when the U.S. intervened and put the Shah back on the throne, Iranians have assumed that the U.S. is yet another outside power trying to manipulate internal politics. When Nixon asked the Shah to look after American interests in the region, the Iranian public considered the Shah a puppet of America. This perception ultimately fueled the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Furthermore, the hostage crisis permanently scarred the American psyche, making wide-

spread public support for negotiations with Iran an uphill battle. The real problem between the two countries, Sick claimed, is not an issue of foreign policy so much as it is an issue of mistrust.

Sick does not share the common view that Iran is behind all mischievous activity in the Middle East. In fact, the U.S. effectively gave Iran the influence it appears to have today. The elimination by the U.S. of Iran's "worst enemy to the East," the Taliban, and its "worst enemy to the West," Saddam Hussein, followed by the installation of the first Shiite government in the history of Baghdad, have increased Iran's power without it having to lift a finger. As a result, the U.S. must now confront an Iran "that is pretty full of itself." The good news for the U.S. is that "Iran is a mid-level power with a largely unpopular and dysfunctional government," Sick argued, "that is headed by a fire-brand populist president with limited power." Thus, the U.S. must put the Iranian threat into perspective.

The U.S. cannot eliminate the nuclear enrichment knowledge that Iran already possesses nor can it prevent Iran from having any nuclear capacity. Instead, it should focus on the expansion of safeguards, and urge Iran to stop nuclear development as far away from a bomb as possible. Sick concluded that if Obama is willing to talk to Iran, the two countries have much to discuss.

**Karim Sadjadpour** proposed that "life in Iran is either tragedy or comedy," tragic because the nation has not fulfilled the potential it has, but comic in how its people respond to life with wit and humor. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, the hardliners in Tehran continue to see enmity towards the U.S. as a central pillar of the Revolution, but Sadjadpour argued that these people are a minority. Most Iranians feel that the "Death to America" culture is obsolete. Unfortunately, the remaining hardliners are powerful and they want to propagate this notion because it ensures their continued survival.

Moving forward, Sadjadpour claimed, U.S. policymakers should not forsake their values in order to strike a deal with Iran. U.S. support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, including presumed acquiescence to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, is what really irks Iranians today. A recent deal between

Libya and the U.S. has implied to Iranians that as long as you forsake a nuclear program you can continue to violate human rights. All of this talk of democracy therefore appears to be “hot air.” In the future, Sadjadpour advised, the U.S. should adhere to its values in order to gain credibility. He also pointed out that the U.S. is best served by not focusing too heavily on the nuclear issue, but rather it should divert attention to other issues and thus relieve Iran of its bargaining power. After all, the nuclear program was “never so important to Iran until it became so important to the United States.”

Sadjadpour offered several lessons for U.S. policymakers. First, the U.S. cannot neglect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran fills a vacuum left by the U.S. when it disengages in the conflict. It has spent billions of dollars on Hezbollah, money that it could have invested in education for Shiites from Hezbollah, or Palestinians from Hamas, but this would not do Iran any good. Iran knows it can be “the champions of the alienated, the downtrodden, and the dispossessed but it cannot be the champions of the upwardly mobile.” U.S. wars in the region have only amplified this contingent of the population, and therefore increased Iran’s bargaining power and status. In fact, Tehran believes that democracy is its friend because elections in many Middle Eastern countries would bring to power parties “more akin to Tehran than to Washington.” Interestingly, Sadjadpour noted, Iran might be the exception to this rule.

Engagement is the most effective course of action, Sadjadpour concluded. Initially, it should be built upon areas of common interest, and focus on rebuilding trust. Finally, Sadjadpour advised, the U.S. should not make any grand gestures before the Iranian elections that could offer Ahmadinejad a card to play in his campaign.

**Shai Feldman** suggested that in developing a strategy for Iran, the U.S. must determine its own interests, the strategic choices that it faces, and the challenges to achieving a grand bargain. The U.S. must attempt to stop Iran’s progress toward nuclear capabilities by suspending enrichment immediately and ultimately eliminating it over the long run, Feldman argued. It must also prevent Iran’s destabilizing behavior in places such as Lebanon and Palestine, and among groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.

Regarding the challenge of a nuclear Iran, the U.S. has two options: containment or a grand bargain. Containment would require that the U.S. strengthen economic sanctions. The U.S. would have to explore its options for limited military engagement and maintain a military presence in the Gulf, in part because the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states would want security guarantees. Withdrawal from Iraq, furthermore, will necessitate vigilance to ensure that Iran does not exploit the opportunity. The U.S. will need to push for an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation, and help Syria distance itself from Iran perhaps by assisting in the development of a treaty between Syria and Israel that will restore Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Containment, Feldman argued, is the optimal choice.

In a grand bargain, the U.S. would seek a long list of demands from Iran, including that it cease enrichment, stop support of Hezbollah and Hamas, vow not to pursue destabilization in Iraq when the U.S. withdraws, and commit its support in Afghanistan. It is unclear what Iran would seek in the bargain, but perhaps, Feldman hypothesized, its demands would include the lifting of sanctions, integration into the international community, recognition as a regional power, acceptance of its *right* to become a nuclear power, and that any limitations on its nuclear development come from a regional security framework in which Iran will play a key role.

The challenges to achieving a grand bargain are numerous. The U.S. does not even know if Iran is interested in negotiating a bargain, and it is unclear whether both parties will be able to reach a compromise that recognizes Iran's right to develop nuclear power without pursuing nuclear development. What will it mean for Iran to become a regional power, and how will this threaten the GCC states? Would Iran be willing to participate in regional talks on nuclear proliferation alongside Israel? In short, Feldman concluded, the U.S. should maintain tough sanctions, leave all options on the table, seek a coalition that includes China and Russia, set a time limit for negotiations, and be careful not to neglect non-nuclear threats from Iran in the process.

## Session II: Zones of War and Diplomacy: The Eastern Mediterranean

Speakers: **Farhad Kazemi**, Professor of Politics,  
New York University

**Uri Ben-Eliezer**, Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa

**Robert Malley**, Middle East and North Africa Program  
Director, International Crisis Group

Chair: **Malik Mufti**, Associate Professor of Political  
Science, Tufts University

**Farhad Kazemi** reflected on the relationship between Iran and Israel, which remains, as always, in a precarious equilibrium. Kazemi touched on several historic events regarding the lives of Jews in Iran. In the past, Iranian Jews for the most part were accepted and allowed to practice freely as a “protected minority.” When, in the sixteenth century, Shiism became the primary religion of Iran, Iranian leaders occasionally made derisive comments about non-Shiites, including Jews, which led to a rise in anti-Jewish sentiment. Reza Shah’s period of modernization, however, represented a golden age for minorities in Iran. Jews, in specific, benefited from the cordial relationship between the Shah and Israel, an association that developed out of regional and political considerations.

In August 1953, when the Shah was restored to the throne, the relationship between Iran and Israel blossomed once again, angering many Arab nations. Top officials from both countries visited one another, albeit often in secret, and cooperation developed in many areas, including trade, education, agriculture, and military intelligence. The Shah, Kazemi surmised, felt that a cooperative relationship between Israel, the U.S., and Iran was essential to Iran’s ascendancy to a position of power in the region. However, as the Shah’s confidence in Iran’s power grew, the threat Iran felt from surrounding Arab nations decreased, which altered Iran’s relationship with Israel.

The 1979 Revolution led to a severing of ties with Israel. Iran began to portray Israel as a corrupt regime that is a byproduct of American imperialism. The execution of a well-known Jewish businessman in Iran signaled a threat to Iranian Jews, many of whom emigrated to Israel, the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Australia at the time. The Iran-Iraq War, in which a resurgence of Iranian nationalism ignited negative attitudes towards Arabs, offered a brief opportunity to rekindle Iran's relationship with Israel. "The war," Kazemi proposed, "allowed for a limited, pragmatic, and indirect military relationship between the two sides."

The current relationship between Iran and Israel is characterized by hostility. Israel is threatened by Iran's nuclear program and its support of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. The number of Iranian Jewish émigrés to Israel has grown to roughly 250,000 since the Revolution. Domestic and regional pressures continue to swing the pendulum of Iran's relationship with Israel back and forth. However, Kazemi concluded, Iran is "unlikely to remain permanently at either extreme."

**Uri Ben-Eliezer** addressed Israel's role in the development of the discourse on the war on terror. The objective of analyzing any discourse, Ben-Eliezer claimed, is to gain an understanding of the meaning that people give to their perceptions of reality. Ben-Eliezer discussed how political and social processes create truths that eventually become quite powerful. For example, he argued, it was not the events of 9/11 but the way in which people perceived these events and the actions they took in response that changed the world. The terrorist attacks gave birth to the discourse on the war on terror, which various actors have manipulated to their advantage.

The opportunity to link the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became immediately apparent in Israel. Some Israeli leaders used the events to defend long-held beliefs of the dangers of certain factions of Islam. The new war-on-terror discourse, Ben-Eliezer proposed, provided the Israeli leadership with the ability to define a dichotomous world of good and evil in support of its claims. The U.S. administration, however, did not readily align itself with the dialogue coming out of Israel.

Instead, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed a desire to garner support from “friendly” Muslim states. Support shown by Muslims for the U.S. at the time, especially from Palestinians, led the U.S. to exclude Israel from the group of nations set to develop a military response to the terrorist attacks.

The capture by Israeli forces on January 3, 2002 of a ship that carried military equipment financed by Iran gave Israel further ammunition to decry an “axis of evil” at work in the region. From this moment, the Israeli discourse focused on two issues: the Palestinians and Iran. Over time, the U.S. has begun to see the Iranian threat through the Israeli lens, in which Iran poses an existential threat to the state of Israel.

Israel’s expansion of the boundaries of the war on terror to include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ben-Eliezer contended, allowed then-prime minister Sharon to forgo any progress toward a compromise with the Palestinians. Developments in the war-on-terror discourse lessened the bargaining power of the Palestinians, who were already hindered in reaching a settlement by internal differences. In summary, Israel was able to connect the Iranian threat to the Palestinian struggle within the discourse of the war on terror. Ben-Eliezer advised that the new U.S. administration eliminate this good-versus-evil discourse and separate the issue of Iran from that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is possible even that resolving the latter conflict could simultaneously diffuse the threat of a nuclear Iran.

**Robert Malley** focused his talk on U.S.-Iranian relations and Iran’s role in the Levant, specifically with regard to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria. Malley emphasized that tensions between the U.S. and Iran neither originated with nor will end with the nuclear issue. Both Iran and the U.S. are “revolutionary” forces in the region attempting to effect change. In many ways, the potential war that many foresee between these two parties has already begun, through existing regional conflicts and through the struggle for ideological control over the region.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Malley noted, “Iran has become an accidental regional superpower.” The Israeli-Palestinian conflict helped Iran rejuvenate its revolutionary identity, and provided it

with a means to make its message resonate with the disaffected and downtrodden across the region. The high percentage of Palestinians who voted for Hamas, Malley argued, reflected their defiance against the forces that have for so long ignored them, and was symbolic of the Palestinian quest for self-determination.

As for Iran's alliances in the Levant, Malley asserted that Hezbollah is Iran's most natural ally. Their relationship is not simply an alliance based on the financial and logistical support that Iran provides to Hezbollah. The actions of Hezbollah are a reflection of its ideals, which coincide with certain ideals from the Iranian revolution. Meanwhile, Iran's support of Hamas offered Iran a strategic opportunity to get to "the heart of the heart" of the Sunni cause in the region, and thus gain favor with this population. Syria's alliance with Iran, on the other hand, was born of circumstance. When Syria's relationship with Egypt collapsed, it was in need of another regional ally. Shared hostility towards Saddam Hussein helped Iran fill this gap. Interestingly, the alliance between Syria and Iran has been one of the most stable relationships in the region for several decades.

The relationships that have developed between Iran and Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah offer several relevant lessons for the new U.S. administration. First, Malley contended, these alliances do not represent a Shiite coalition; they are simply reactive partnerships formed in response to regional circumstances. Second, these associations are not static. As alliances of convenience, they can be altered. To do so, the U.S. should move forward on negotiations with Iran and Syria simultaneously, so that neither nation feels that it is taking action the other would not approve of. Finally, despite Iran's influence in the region, Malley concluded, the U.S. should not overemphasize its power.

## Session III: Zones of War and Diplomacy: Iraq, the Gulf, and Afghanistan

Speakers: **Robin Wright**, Author and Journalist  
**Michael R. Gordon**, Chief Military Correspondent,  
*The New York Times*  
**Barnett R. Rubin**, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow,  
Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Chair: **Stephen W. Van Evera**, Professor of Political  
Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Robin Wright** offered accounts of both historical and potential areas of common interest between the U.S. and Iran that could help re-ignite relations between them. In the past, both confronted the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and over the years, both have supported the Northern Alliance, the main challenger of the Taliban. During the 1990s, while Iran increasingly allied itself with factions from within Iraq against Saddam Hussein, U.S. intelligence increasingly depended upon many of these same groups for information.

Iran has also provided substantial development aid to Iraq, especially in comparison to Iraq's other neighbors. Because it does not approve of the U.S. military presence, Iran also creates trouble for American forces in Iraq, but stops short of provoking a real confrontation. Like the U.S., Iran wants neither a Saddam-style government nor an extremist government such as al-Qaeda in power in Iraq, Wright contended. It simply wants a stable, pro-Iran government.

Wright offered several areas for potential cooperation between the two nations. First, because drug trafficking is a major issue for Iran—it has lost roughly 3,500 security forces fighting an anti-narcotics campaign along its border—Iran desires international cooperation on this issue. Collaboration could offer the opportunity, Wright said, for a joint project that determines and develops an alternative crop to poppies, such as pomegranates. There are also prospects for cooperation in Iraq. Specifically, Iran might be

able to influence the Kurdish population in Kirkuk to move towards a resolution that would further U.S. stabilization efforts. Finally, 100,000 Iranians have died due to chemical weapons used by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, and many are still dying to this day. Cooperation on this front, Wright suggested, would offer an opportunity for both parties to work together on a humanitarian issue involving a weapon of mass destruction.

**Michael Gordon** compared and contrasted the U.S. wars in Iran and Afghanistan. The general consensus today seems to be that Iraq is a “bad” war, primarily because the U.S. did not find any weapons of mass destruction nor establish a believable link between Iraq and Bin Laden. Many, on the other hand, consider Afghanistan a “good” war because there was a clear link to Bin Laden, it involved an international military presence that was multilateral and desired by the Afghan population, and, initially, many thought it could be easily won.

Gordon’s view was just the opposite. He believed that Iraq was more “winnable” for several reasons. Iraq has 500,000 security forces that can assist U.S. efforts, while Afghanistan has an army of 70,000 and a relatively small police force. Pakistan offers a sanctuary for Afghan insurgents, while Iraq has no neighboring sanctuary. Differences in infrastructure are huge, as well, and it costs far more to sustain forces in Afghanistan than it does in Iraq. Finally, Iraq has oil to help fund its economy while Afghanistan has very little.

Fortunately, there are signs of progress in Iraq, Gordon noted, including the success of the surge and, despite doubts, progress in the political process. However, many concerns remain. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities and district and national elections mark major milestones. Outstanding issues include the divisions between Sunnis and Shiites and between Kurds and Arabs, budgetary concerns due to the fall in the price of oil, and the need to improve governance and the provision of services to the populace. The Obama administration has verbally committed itself to help Iraq address some of these concerns. Gordon’s opinion, however, is that plans to remove troops from Iraq are hurried and the U.S. should remain flexible on its timeline. He also advises that

reconstruction, reconciliation, and governance work should progress while U.S. combat brigades are still in the country, before American leverage there diminishes too greatly.

In reference to Afghanistan, Gordon questioned the strength of America's non-military strategy there. He senses a lowering of expectations on the part of the U.S. regarding the extent to which nation-building will progress. There appears to be a shift towards managing the war, rather than waging it. Although Gordon would argue that Iraq is a more important battleground than Afghanistan in the war on terror, he emphasized that progress in Afghanistan is crucial because even larger threats are emerging next door in Pakistan. Gordon closed by noting that there is no such thing as progress in the war in Afghanistan without progress in nation-building efforts as well.

**Barnett Rubin** laid out his thoughts on the American position with regards to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, remarking that Afghanistan is a far greater issue than the U.S. understands. War there has been going on for 30 years, and it continuously restructures the regional political landscape. The land now known as Afghanistan has been occupied for a very long time, yet the population still questions its political allegiance, vacillating between loyalty to a government ruled by Afghans, or Pashtuns, or to a state comprised of mostly Persian-speaking peoples. This struggle dictates the extent of power that either Pakistan or Iran has over Afghanistan at any given time.

Rubin noted his amazement that there is not more discussion of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has recently been departing Iraq for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Thus, it is crucial to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda from developing a base along this border. Rubin questioned, given the events transpiring on the border, why the U.S. treats Pakistan as an ally and Iran as an enemy.

In Iran, Tehran has long been preparing for the U.S. to pursue a policy of regime change. Given the regime changes the U.S. has already sought to Iran's East and to its West, Rubin noted, this assumption is not overly presumptuous. As a result, Iran has pursued a strategic partnership with Afghanistan in order to prevent

Afghanistan from functioning as a base from which the U.S. could further this perceived threat. Iranian fears are reinforced by what it sees as the irrational strategy of the U.S. in Pakistan, a country the U.S. has declared an ally despite the fact that it maintains connections to the very organization responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks that sent the U.S. to war in the first place. Thus, one of the most effective ways the new administration can stabilize Afghanistan is to make it clear that it does not intend to pursue regime change in Iran.

Pakistan, whose main security threat is India, was pressured into denouncing various extremist groups as it developed its relationship with the U.S. for fear that the U.S. would otherwise align itself with India. Many countries in the region now feel that Pakistan presents the most significant regional threat to them. Thus, the stabilization of this region, Rubin summarized, may ultimately depend upon convincing Pakistan that it can be secure without relying on irregular warfare. Doing so might require the U.S. to seek alternate routes into Afghanistan than through Pakistan in order to lessen Pakistan's leverage in this regard.

## Webcast Keynote Address: “Security Challenges in the Middle East”

Speaker: **General (Ret.) John P. Abizaid**, Former Commander of the United States Central Command (2003-2007); Distinguished Chair, West Point Combating Terrorism Center; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution

Chair: **Richard H. Shultz**, Professor of International Politics and Director, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School

**John Abizaid** offered his perspective on the security challenges facing the new U.S. administration in the Middle East during a time when both the region and the U.S. are experiencing periods of great strategic change. Abizaid emphasized the breadth and length of U.S. military engagement in the Middle East, where currently U.S. soldiers have been at combat for longer periods than soldiers were entrenched in the battles of WWII. This has placed tremendous pressure on a small portion of the U.S. population, who work in extreme conditions to address the strategic security concerns of the U.S., Abizaid noted.

At the beginning of Abizaid’s tenure as Commander of the U.S. Central Command in 2003, spending for military endeavors was more or less unconstrained. The U.S. entered into the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a drastically different financial environment. Commanders in the military today, however, who manage the same conflicts, are now shackled by severely constrained resources. Furthermore, American priorities have shifted. Today, resolution of conflicts in the Middle East, Abizaid pointed out, must compete with major issues such as the current economic crisis and the revamping of our national healthcare program.

Simultaneously, the strategic landscape is shifting. As global transitions of power take place, the U.S. must not let this region slip from its purview, Abizaid advised, lest the region snowball into greater calamity. American leadership in the Middle East, accord-

ing to Abizaid, should not be synonymous with American control, as no external player has ever truly controlled this region. The U.S. goal should be to shape, not control, the outcome of these crises to benefit both America and the people of the region.

Abizaid presented his ever-changing ranking of the four largest challenges facing the U.S. in the Middle East today. First is the rise of Sunni Islamic extremism, which is a powerful movement with “narrow appeal in the broader population, but great appeal among the disaffected population.” Over the years, the U.S. has barely made a dent in this movement. In fact, it is gaining influence especially along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Confrontation of radical Sunni extremism will require military engagement, Abizaid argued, and the use of precise military action that can limit the movement’s military effectiveness from its safe havens.

Second, the rise of Iranian power, or more specifically of Shiite power, presents another major challenge. The lack of communication between the U.S. and Iran threatens the unique possibility that the slightest miscalculation could lead to war. Nuclear proliferation in this part of the world is not in the best interest of the rest of the planet. Fortunately, Iran is deterrable, and the President of the U.S., Abizaid argued, must always have an array of options available in confronting a nuclear Iran, which stretch from doing nothing to going to war. However, effective action will require that the U.S. determines Iran’s objectives, and this entails dialogue.

Third, the inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict drives parties in the region to extremes and allows them to take advantage of the situation to their benefit. Thus, it is extremely important that the international community come together to push for a resolution. Finally, the U.S. must find ways to minimize its dependence on foreign oil if it wants to withdraw military engagement from the region.

Abizaid is optimistic about the possibility of resolving these four concerns because shared interest in their resolution exists within the region. “We can find ways together to bridge this lack of respect,” Abizaid concluded, “to figure out how to move forward together on these important issues.”

## Session IV: Nuclear Issues

Speakers: **Admiral (Ret.) William J. Fallon**, Former Commander of the United States Central Command (2007–2008); Robert F. Wilhelm Fellow, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Shahram Chubin**, Director of Studies, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

**George Perkovich**, Vice President for Studies and Director of the Nonproliferation Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

**Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.**, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School

Chair: **Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.**

**William Fallon** contended that the focus of world attention on Iran is aimed at its nuclear ambitions. Iran has claimed that it is furthering nuclear development for peaceful purposes, but Fallon, among others, questions this assertion. Generally, Iran's nuclear aspirations have been over-hyped, especially by the media, which have anointed the issue with an air of importance greater than it perhaps deserves. Nevertheless, it is an issue that requires attention and Fallon suggested that the U.S. involve other parties in the discussion, rather than pursue a strictly bilateral engagement.

Current strategies for addressing this concern focus on the military option, but Fallon expressed reservations about the appropriateness of this course of action. The U.S. is well versed in tactical military engagement, but what are the ultimate objectives of such an engagement and what are its consequences? A quick resolution in this case may not be possible, so the U.S. should avoid knee-jerk reactions and give pause to hastily pursuing a military response. Unfortunately, talk on this issue is not progressing and often appears to be cyclical. All parties, Fallon urged, must recognize that a single solution might not be attainable.

Reflecting further on the military option, Fallon was quick to point out that there is no comparison between the military prowess of the U.S. and that of Iran. Iran could take certain actions, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, which would complicate matters for the U.S., but not for long. Closing off an export channel for oil, in any event, would hurt Iran more than any other party it wants to affect. Iran is aware of the asymmetry of each country's respective military might, and thus understands that its use of nuclear weapons would not be wise.

The way forward begins with treating Iran with some measure of respect in order to initiate a dialogue that can bring everyone's intentions to light. The U.S. must build on its knowledge of Iran's intentions, Fallon claimed, before it can undertake any effective decision-making. There is general consensus that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, which provides a foundation for uniting major world powers on this issue in order to initiate dialogue. As stability increases in Iraq and neighboring Sunni strongholds settle down in the aftermath of conflict, these countries will also be in a position to support discussions. Ultimately, all parties must surrender the idea of a single solution and look instead at all of the options in order to move forward.

**Shahram Chubin** commended the focus of this conference on dialogue and engagement, but urged the audience to remember that engagement is not an end in itself. Engagement aims to learn more about the other party and ultimately to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation. The list of things we do not know about Iran is, unfortunately, very long. It includes their principal motivation in pursuing a nuclear program, and their ultimate goal. We do not know the price Iran is willing to pay to continue this program, nor how united the Iranian regime is on such answers. Nor does the U.S. understand the relative role of ideology versus pragmatism in the regime's course of action. The future of political leadership in Iran is also unclear.

Among the facts that we do know is that "the regime is factionalized and the hard-line is in the saddle." As well, the regime and the Iranian public are isolated from each other and it is not likely that their objectives mirror the other's. However, the

Iranian government has manipulated nationalism, populism, and the Shiite sense of victimhood, Chubin argued, very effectively. We know that the Iranian regime desires independence, respect, equality, status, and influence. It wants self-reliance in energy development, including the ability to pursue nuclear enrichment. It does not want to be singled out in its pursuit of nuclear enrichment by a double standard. Iran points to the nuclear proliferation treaty to defend this right.

The regional environment, and the Iranian sense of “entitlement and grievance mixed with ambition and vulnerability,” has empowered Iran far beyond its inherent strength. The U.S. should recognize this and understand as well that Iran’s involvement in destabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan has little to do with its strategic interests and far more to do with sending the U.S. a message. Iran understands the overall balance of power, yet it also at times appears to be “tone-deaf” to the international community.

In conclusion, Chubin pointed out that Iran should not urgently need to continue enrichment over the next year, as no nuclear reactors are being built. “The nuclear issue,” he concluded, “is a symptom of the problem that the West has with Iran.” Unfortunately, no agreement on the nuclear issue will occur without a grand bargain, Chubin added, and a grand bargain will only occur if Iran fears something or if it wants something.

**George Perkovich** drew attention to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) reports, which note that Iran is very close to having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Perkovich also pointed out that discussions regarding a grand bargain tend to ignore existing treaties and resolutions, which legally bind Iran to stop enrichment. A grand bargain, as various parties imagine it, offers a whole host of options, some of which might allow Iran to continue enrichment under various forms of supervision and/or limitations. For example, Iran might assist the U.S. with progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this should not preclude other parties from demanding a resolution to the nuclear issue. Stopping Iran’s nuclear enrichment is not simply a U.S. demand, and thus such a trade-off might not be worth it to other international players.

If Iran continues enrichment, Perkovich argued, the U.S. has no

incentive to offer it inducements. Offering positive incentives to deter Iran from creating nuclear weapons sends the wrong message, when Iran does not have the right to do so in the first place. On the other hand, the threat of war in response to continued enrichment for energy purposes should not be on the table. If enrichment continues, Iran must provide security assurances to its neighbors, including Israel, that it will not use its nuclear capabilities to create weapons. This would include recognition by Iran of Israel's right to exist, because Israel would neither support Iran's right to enrichment nor give up its own deterrence capabilities if Iran does not recognize this right.

The international community would be well served by reiterating Iran's own admission that it is not pursuing enrichment for nuclear weapons. The more this is openly recognized, the less it will seem as if Iran is giving up something if does not develop weapons. If Iran did break out, the UN Security Council could rightfully denounce this action as an impediment to international peace and security, and threaten consequences.

If the U.S. pursues a grand bargain that allows for further enrichment, in clear violation of existing resolutions and treaties, it will have to address the existing legal framework that precludes this right, perhaps by creating a new resolution recognizing Iran's right to enrich that supersedes the existing one. Ignoring existing agreements allows for other countries to follow suit. A final issue is Iran's lack of cooperation as promised with IAEA investigations. Without the appropriate information, the IAEA cannot certify that Iran's program is indeed peaceful. The international community, Perkovich concluded, must push Iran to cooperate in this regard if it wants the world to believe in its intentions.

**Robert Pfaltzgraff** postulated several future scenarios in which Iran possesses nuclear weapons. In research conducted with Jacquelyn Davis from the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Pfaltzgraff developed heuristic models aimed at determining the military and political challenges posed by a nuclear Iran. Three models, a defensive Iran, an aggressive Iran, and an unstable Iran, explore the implications of three possible scenarios.

The first model, a defensive Iran, assumes that Iran will commit to a minimal nuclear deterrence posture. In this scenario, Pfaltzgraff mused, Iran would perhaps eventually develop a declaratory policy in which it defines the circumstances under which it would use weapons. Nuclear weapons would be concealed and dispersed throughout the country to ensure their survival. Although this is the best possible scenario given an Iran with nuclear weapons technology, neighbors of Iran would still require assurances regarding their safety.

The second model is an aggressive Iran, in which it uses its nuclear weapons capabilities to acquire greater power in the Middle East. This could include transfer of nuclear technology to allies in the region, which would in turn embolden these parties to take actions of their own. In this scenario, Iran's nuclear capacity would be far more diversified and robust than in the defensive model. Iran would, as a result, have far more influence in the region, and the potential for regional destabilization would be greater.

The third model is an unstable Iran, in which the state of Iran has collapsed and various factions gain access to nuclear technology. This potentially could allow such information to fall into the hand of groups like Hezbollah or al-Qaeda. In this scenario, the American focus would be on preventing the transmission of such knowledge.

A nuclear Iran presents three major operational challenges to the U.S.: the potential for use of nuclear weapons against U.S. allies, U.S. forces in the region, or the U.S. itself; the deployment of Iranian conventional forces under the protection of its nuclear umbrella; and the transfer of nuclear knowledge to terrorist groups. The potential for any of these scenarios to exist, Pfaltzgraff pointed out, should lead the U.S. to develop deterrence forces with both offensive and defensive capabilities. In addition, the U.S. must address the fact that extended deterrence could lead to cascading proliferation. It must consider the implications of a nuclear Iran for its own security. Improving upon intelligence, Pfaltzgraff concluded, will require the U.S. to increase cooperation and information-sharing among allies and further develop bilateral relationships with key countries in the Middle East.



## Session V: American Policies and Options in the Region

Speakers: **John L. Esposito**, University Professor and Founding Director, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University  
**Jon B. Alterman**, Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies  
**David R. Ignatius**, Associate Editor and Columnist, *The Washington Post*  
**Rami G. Khouri**, Editor-at-Large, *The Daily Star* (Beirut); Director, Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut

Chair: **Robert M. Hollister**, Dean, Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service, Tufts University

**John Esposito** recollected President Obama's criticism of the previous administration's policies in the Middle East in his inaugural address, when Obama informed the people of the region that the U.S. "seeks a new way forward." Esposito believes that Obama intends to restore America's position of leadership, but warns that this will require the input of the people of the Middle East.

In his work with the Gallup polls, Esposito has found that the key issues across the Muslim world today are policy and political grievances, not clashes of religion or ideology. Many people with anti-American sentiments in fact want to improve relations, but believe that the U.S. is not invested in making this happen. Polls show that Middle Easterners admire many things about the West, including its freedoms and transparency, and that they desire assistance, only without interference or domination. Many people, as well, regard cynically America's democratization work due to double standards employed in the past.

In pursuing a "new way forward" the U.S. must specifically target the political extremists who, more than others, require convincing of America's good intentions. Smoothing over its history of hypocrisy will force the U.S. to rethink its policies

towards authoritarian regimes, and necessitate the use of diplomacy rather than the threat of force. The U.S. must support the creation of strong civil societies. Educational and economic development in war-torn countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories will be crucial. The U.S. must de-emphasize its military presence in the region by reducing arms sales and assuming a reduced military profile on the ground. Finally, the U.S. must enter into dialogue with opposition and reform movements, even Islamist ones, in order to prove America's support for the democratic process rather than confirm suspicions regarding American plans to manipulate regional politics.

Esposito emphasized both the practical and symbolic importance of addressing the crisis in Gaza. Gaza stands as a symbol of Muslim societies that exist on the periphery of American foreign policy, places where many people feel that the U.S. does not value the lives of Muslims as it does the lives of others. Gallup polls have shown that increased pressure by the U.S. on Israel would improve relations with Muslims "very significantly." To accomplish this, Obama would have to overcome political pressures that have prevented so many American politicians before him from confronting Israel on certain issues. It will require a combination of all of the above, Esposito concluded, to legitimize America's foreign policy agenda in the Middle East and ease the fears of those who have been scarred by double standards and hypocrisy in the past.

**Jon Alterman** pointed out that a shift in U.S. priorities in the Middle East now places Iran at the new geographic "center" of American foreign policy there. In part, this shift has to do with increasing financial opportunities in the Gulf; but also American forces today are far more likely to serve in the Eastern reaches of the Middle East rather than in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Iran occupies the center of U.S. attention because, perhaps more than any other country, it is determined to disturb the regional status quo that the U.S. attempts to preserve.

Given the differences in the relative power of Iran and the U.S., one would think that preventing Iran's destabilizing

behavior would be simple. Yet, Alterman noted, there has been no resolution. Despite consensus by many parties on the overall goal of stabilizing Iran, each party has its own intentions. Asia desires access to Iranian oil. Israel wants to eliminate what it believes is an existential threat. Europe hopes that an open dialogue with Iran will lead to changes in behavior. And many Arab countries continue to take issue with the historic threat of the Persian people. Furthermore, some regional partners have an interest in sustaining tensions between the U.S. and Iran because resolution would mean U.S. disengagement, thus increasing their vulnerability.

If the U.S. could resolve the situation with Iran by gaining the support of the international community, it could ultimately secure three major objectives of its foreign policy in the Middle East: no state in the region would actively oppose the U.S., the U.S. would have energy security, and no major threat to Israel would exist. Unfortunately, Alterman believes, such an outcome is not probable, as the international community and especially regional partners are not likely to provide the necessary support.

To move forward, the U.S. must enlist the help of the many countries that benefit from the security that American military presence in the region provides. Ultimately, America's goal is to have a docile Iran that no longer incites trouble. In reality, there will always be tensions between the two parties; thus, the goal should be to find a way to successfully manage differences. U.S. policy must take into account its own interests, capabilities, and alternatives. Doing so will help the U.S. solicit support from allies and perhaps eventually steer Iran in a more advantageous direction for the U.S. in the future. While Iran is a threat to some important American interests, Alterman concluded, in the greater picture the threat is only minor.

**David Ignatius** took note of the fact that there had been almost no mention at the conference of the events of September 11, 2001. He interpreted this as indicative of a shift to a new period in which diplomatic options have increased in importance over military options, which would have dominated this same discussion several years ago.

Ignatius discussed the importance of what he refers to as the “O factor” (for Obama) in salvaging perceptions of the U.S. around the world. He reiterated what others have said about the significance of the overtures Obama made to the Muslim world during his inaugural address. The U.S. will benefit from Obama’s focus on strategic, not impulsive, decision-making. Ignatius also praised Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emphasis on strategic listening as a foreign policy tool.

The policy debate in Washington no longer revolves around whether to engage with parties like Syria and Iran, but rather how to go about it and what the objectives should be. Ignatius recommended replacing the term “Grand Bargain” with the phrase “a new security architecture,” which would emphasize American objectives more accurately. He pointed out that the time frame for improving relations between the U.S. and Iran is long term, but the nuclear issue is a ticking time bomb. Having failed to prevent Iran from mastering the fuel cycle, Ignatius asked, should the U.S. now resort to pressuring Iran to stop at its current threshold and not develop nuclear weapons?

Ignatius highlighted several ways in which the U.S. could learn from Iran’s use of power. Iran has a tendency to “bet on multiples horses,” Ignatius claimed. For example, in Iraq, Iran has funded covertly nearly all of the major Shiite players in addition to some factions on other sides. Iran’s use of its power with regards to these parties in Iraq ebbs and flows depending on the tactical situation of the region and Iran’s objectives at a given time. The U.S. might benefit from emulating certain aspects of this use of power, according to Ignatius. When the outcome is unsure, it is a good idea to place several bets, or in this case to develop several tactical options. Iran’s use of surrogates, such as Syria and Hezbollah, to project its power is another tactic that the U.S. could imitate. And finally, it would do the U.S. good, Ignatius argued, to emulate Iran’s focus on maintaining legitimacy by sticking to its own values.

**Rami Khouri** urged the audience not to examine Iran in isolation. Iran, he said, represents a wider force at work in the region. Thirty years ago, when communication between the U.S. and the new Iranian Republic ceased, several important events occurred. In

addition to the Iranian Revolution, the Likud party came to power in Israel, signifying a shift towards the right wing, and Islamist movements began to rise up across the region, driven primarily by internal impulses. Today, these three forces, representing essentially three religious groups, the Jews, the Shiites, and the Sunnis, are linked in a cycle of confrontation and defiance that dominates much of the Middle East.

A century after the original “Arab Awakening,” a re-awakening of the people of the Middle East is taking place. Khouri argued that during Bush’s tenure a fourth group of “divinely inspired warriors,” emanating from the White House, joined the Sunnis, Shiites, and Jews in pursuing a divine mission in the region. Tensions between these four groups have caused an ongoing cycle of “polarization, militarization, and confrontation.” In this tumultuous period, four world orders are being challenged: the post-WWI borders of modern Arab states, the global economic order, the post-1970 Arab state security systems, and the post-eighteenth-century liberal democratic order. The Islamist movements have benefited more than most from the dissolution of and changes within these historic orders. They are growing ever stronger, while many of the more moderate Sunni Arab groups are collapsing.

Khouri sees signs today that the U.S. is prepared to engage with the people of the Middle East. He expressed hope that America will deal with them not as a dominating power, but as a negotiating power. If Iran represents a contingent of defiance, the U.S. must determine what this faction ultimately desires. Unfortunately, one impediment to achieving this is the fact that Islamist groups, in conjunction with Iran, are essentially “rewriting the rulebooks of diplomatic engagement,” but have not yet provided the new rules to the West. The result is a gap in understanding between the two parties.

In conclusion, Khouri proposed the five R’s that he believes characterize the current situation in the Middle East: respect, reciprocity, rights, re-birth, and resistance. A grand bargain, Khouri concluded, is like making a three-way trade between baseball teams: it takes a lot of time, compromise, and understanding to reach a deal. To get there, the U.S. must agree to forgo its practice of double standards and both sides will have to respect the five R’s.



## Concluding Remarks: “The U.S. and the Middle East: A New Dynamic?”

Speaker: **Mark Tessler**, Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Institute, and Vice Provost for International Affairs, University of Michigan

Chair: **William A. Rugh**, Adjunct Scholar, The Middle East Institute

Mark Tessler began his concluding remarks by noting that, with the entrance of new leadership, people around the world have a renewed hope for America. This hope, however, must be met with action.

Tessler synthesized the major questions that came out of the conference regarding relations between the U.S. and Iran. The consensus at the conference was for engagement rather than containment, but Tessler emphasized that the U.S. has not yet determined the nature of engagement. What will a grand bargain look like? Is the nuclear issue at the heart of the matter? Once the U.S. determines its objectives, how will it address the constraints against achieving those objectives, both from within the U.S. and among allies in the region? How much freedom does the U.S. have to pursue its objectives? America must also determine how serious Iran is about reaching an accommodation. It must consider how its actions will change the political landscape in the Middle East. Finally, the U.S. must think about how dynamic the situation is: will it look much the same a year from now, or will it drastically change?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Tessler proclaimed, is another major concern. The U.S. must determine the range of approaches available here, including specific actions that might lead to progress. It can think in the short term, and aim for goals such as achieving a ceasefire or lifting the blockade on Gaza. But this form of resolution would be fragile. On the other hand, the U.S. could return to the concept of a roadmap, inclusive of confidence

measures that lead to progress; yet it has already attempted such a path. Or, the U.S. can identify the core issues that remain unresolved. Concrete action might include an American endorsement of the Arab League Initiative, or pressure on the Palestinians to begin a conversation with Israel. The U.S. could also engage seriously with Israel on the issue of the settlements. Also, Tessler argued, the U.S. must engage in some fashion with Hamas, rather than demonizing it.

The future offers several potential outcomes. Israel could engage in a settlement freeze and enter into negotiations, and genuine progress towards a two-state solution might be possible. Alternatively, people might give up on a two-state solution, and Israel could capitulate to a bi-national state. Or, Israel could unilaterally disengage and simply declare the conflict over. Most likely, Tessler lamented, things will continue as they are, and either the situation will settle into relative stability over the long term or result in a continuous series of fragile ceasefires and renewed conflicts.

More generally, Tessler stressed, it is crucial for the international community to continue encouraging the democratization of countries in the Middle East. The lack of good governance creates instability. For the U.S., this is a practical objective as well as a reflection of its core ideals. To accomplish this, the U.S. could do several things, including supporting democratization activities conducted by organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute. Crucially, Tessler noted, it is not up to America to determine how these societies are governed. However, in many cases regional populations desire a different type of government from what they currently have.

Tessler used the example of the “Arab Democracy Barometer” project to emphasize the importance of opening lines of communication between leaders in the Middle East and their people. The project provides a snapshot of the Middle Eastern public’s views on leadership and democracy. The project’s surveys have found that people are overwhelmingly discontented with current regimes, and desire democratic governance. Tessler noted with interest that people in nearly all eight of the surveyed countries

were split down the middle regarding the role of Islam in the democratization process. The surveys also found that only 15-20% of people were accepting of the idea of acts of terrorism against the U.S. While demographic information could not predict whom this group would include, people's general interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in the region, in addition to their feelings regarding their own government, impacted whether they fell into the 15-20%.

In conclusion, Tessler recapitulated the many remaining questions the U.S. must answer with regards to Iran before progress can be made, and noted that neglecting both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of governance will inhibit U.S. progress at resolving foreign policy challenges in the Middle East.



## Participants

**John P. Abizaid** is a General (Ret.) in the United States Army and former Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2003 to 2007. In July 2003, he was elevated to a four-star general. General Abizaid retired in May 2007 after 34 years of military service, and was named the first Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in June 2007. He is also Distinguished Chair at the West Point Combating Terrorism Center. General Abizaid is a member of the Board of Directors of the George Olmstead Foundation, USAA, and RPM Inc., as well as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He speaks regularly on leadership and international security. General Abizaid earned an M.A. in Area Studies at Harvard University and was an Olmsted Scholar at the University of Jordan in Amman, Jordan, where he also studied Arabic.

**Jon B. Alterman** directs the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., where he is also a Senior Fellow. He has previously served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Additionally, he was an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group. From 1993 to 1997, Dr. Alterman taught at Harvard University. He also worked as a legislative aide to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) on foreign policy and defense. Currently, Dr. Alterman is on the Board of Advisory Editors of the *Middle East Journal* and is a former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is now a life member. His opinion pieces have been published in major newspapers around the globe, and he has authored or co-authored four books on the Middle East, and edited two others. Dr. Alterman received his A.B. from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University.

**Lawrence S. Bacow** became the twelfth President of Tufts University on September 1, 2001. A lawyer and economist whose research focuses on environmental policy, he holds five faculty appointments at Tufts: in the departments of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Economics, and Civil and Environmental Engineering; in Public Health and Family Medicine at the Medical School; and at The Fletcher School. Prior to his appointment as President of Tufts University, Dr. Bacow served in various capacities at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during his 24-year tenure, including as Chancellor, Lee and Geraldine Martin Professor of Environmental Studies, and Chairman of the Faculty. He received an S.B. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and an M.P.P. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

**Uri Ben-Eliezer** is a senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Haifa in Israel. His academic specializations are political sociology, historical sociology, military and society, and Israeli society. His recent publications include *In the Name of Security* (in Hebr.) (Haifa University Press, 2003, with Majid al-Haj), "Postmodern Armies and the Question of Peace and War: The Israeli Defense Forces in the 'New Times,'" in the *International Journal of Middle-East Studies*, *The Making of Israeli Militarism* (Indiana, 1998), and a forthcoming book on the Second Intifada. He is currently a visiting professor at San Diego State University.

**Jamshed Bharucha** is Provost, Senior Vice President, and Professor of Psychology at Tufts University. Previously, Dr. Bharucha spent his academic career at Dartmouth College, where he was the John Wentworth Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences. He held several leadership posts at Dartmouth, including most recently Deputy Provost and Dean of the Faculty. Dr. Bharucha has served as Editor of the interdisciplinary journal *Music Perception* and was a trustee of Vassar College from 1991 to 1999. He is currently a trustee of the

International Foundation of Music Research. As a psychologist, Dr. Bharucha's research has focused on the cognitive and neural basis of the perception of music. Among his many publications is "Activation of the Inferior Frontal Cortex in Musical Priming" in *Cognitive Brain Research* 16 (2003). Dr. Bharucha received an M.A. in Philosophy from Yale University and a Ph.D. in cognitive psychology from Harvard University.

**R. Nicholas Burns** is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He served in the U.S. Foreign Service for twenty-seven years until his retirement in April 2008, working as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2005 to 2008, the nation's highest-ranking career diplomat. Prior to that, he was U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2001 to 2005 and Ambassador to Greece from 1997 to 2001. Ambassador Burns served as State Department Spokesman for Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher. From 1990 and 1995, he was Special Assistant to President Clinton for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Affairs during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a member of the National Security Council staff. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Atlantic Council, the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, and the Appeal of Conscience Foundation. Ambassador Burns received an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

**Shahram Chubin**, born in Iran and also a Swiss national, was educated in the U.S. and Britain. Dr. Chubin was the Director of Studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Geneva, Switzerland from 1995 to 2009, as well as Director of Regional Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has taught at various universities, including the Graduate School of International Studies in Geneva and The Fletcher School, and lectured at Oxford, Harvard, and Columbia Universities, as well as military staff colleges. As a specialist in the security problems of the Middle East, Dr. Chubin has been a consultant *inter alia* to the U.S. Department of Defense,

RAND, and the UN. He has been a resident fellow at the Wilson Center, the Carnegie Endowment, and the Hudson Institute. Dr. Chubin has published widely in journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *The Middle East Journal*. His recent publications include *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Carnegie Endowment, 2006), "Iran's Risktaking in Perspective" (Paris: IFRI Papers, 2008), and "Debating Iran's Nuclear Aspirations" with Rob Litwak in *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003). Dr. Chubin received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and his B.A. from Oberlin College in Ohio.

**John L. Esposito** is the Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he is also Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies. He is currently President of the Executive Scientific Committee for La Maison de la Méditerranée's 2005-2010 project, "The Mediterranean, Europe and Islam: Actors in Dialogue," and a member of the World Economic Forum's Council of 100 Leaders and the High Level Group of the UN Alliance of Civilizations. Dr. Esposito is a recipient of the American Academy of Religion's 2005 Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion, of Pakistan's Quaid-i-Azzam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies, and of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Award for Outstanding Teaching. His more than thirty books include *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (Gallup Press, 2008, with Dalia Mogahed), *Islamic World: Past and Present* (Oxford University Press, 2004), *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2002), and *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2002). He is also Editor-in-Chief of the four-volume *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (Oxford University Press, 1995). Dr. Esposito obtained his Ph.D. from Temple University.

**William J. Fallon** retired in 2008 as a four-star Admiral after a distinguished, 40-year career of military and strategic leadership. In his last assignment as Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Fallon directed all U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa, focusing much of his time on combat efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also led the U.S. Pacific Command for two years. As Vice-Chief of the Navy at the Pentagon, he personally directed the recovery of the Navy staff in the wake of 9/11 and led in the planning of the retaliatory attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Admiral Fallon later commanded the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces Command, with responsibility for the readiness of U.S. Naval forces worldwide. Currently, he is a Robert F. Wilhelm fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies. Admiral Fallon is a graduate of Villanova University, the U.S. Naval War College, and the National War College, and has an M.A. in International Studies from Old Dominion University.

**Leila Fawaz** is Founding Director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies and Issam M. Fares Professor of Lebanese and Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. She is an Overseer at Harvard University, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Comité Scientifique of the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme at the University of Provence. Dr. Fawaz, a social historian of the Middle East, has published *Transformed Landscapes: Essays on Palestine and the Middle East in Honor of Walid Khalidi* (American University in Cairo, 2009, co-edited with Camille Mansour); *Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* (Columbia University Press, 2002, co-edited with C.A. Bayly and Robert Ilbert); *An Occasion for War: Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (I. B. Tauris, 1994 and University of California Press, 1995); *State and Society in Lebanon* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991); and *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut* (Harvard University Press, 1983). She is a Carnegie Scholar, currently working on the experience of war in the Middle East and South Asia ca. 1914–1920. Dr. Fawaz received her Ph.D. in History from Harvard University.

**Shai Feldman** holds the Judy and Sidney Swartz Director's Chair of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and is Professor of Politics at Brandeis University. He is also an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, and a member of the Board of Directors of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. From 2001-2003, Dr. Feldman served as a member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. From 1997 to 2005, he worked as the Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, where he was a Senior Research Associate since its establishment in 1977. Dr. Feldman was a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 1994 and a Senior Research Fellow at the Belfer Center from 1995 to 1997. Dr. Feldman's numerous publications include *The Future of U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation* (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996); *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East* (MIT Press, 1997); *Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, with Abdullah Toukan); and *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East* (MIT Press, 2003, with Hussein Agha, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff). Dr. Feldman received an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.

**Michael R. Gordon** is the chief military correspondent for *The New York Times*, where he has worked since 1985. He has covered the Iraq War, the American intervention in Afghanistan, the Kosovo conflict, the Russian intervention in Chechnya, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the American invasion of Panama. Gordon has spent considerable time in Iraq as an embedded correspondent and has reported from Baghdad, Mosul, Baqubah, Anbar province, Hawr Rajab, Nafaj, Diwaniyah, Karbala, and Kut, among other locations. During the first phase of the Iraq War, he was the only newspaper reporter with the allied land command under General Tommy Franks. In addition to his work for *The New York Times*, Gordon organized and reported an award-winning documentary on the conflict in Chechnya, "Deadlock: Russia's Forgotten War," which was

broadcast internationally by CNN Presents. He is the co-author of two critically acclaimed books, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Back Bay Books, 1995, with Bernard E. Trainor) and *Cobra II* (Vintage, 2007, with Bernard E. Trainor). Gordon is currently on leave from *The New York Times* to write his third book on Iraq and is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Gordon received a B.A. from Colgate University, an M.A. in philosophy from the Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and an M.S. from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

**Robert M. Hollister** is Dean of the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service and Pamela Omidyar Professor at Tufts University. Previously, Dr. Hollister was Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and Director of the Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University. A specialist in nonprofit organizations and public policy, he has been engaged in teaching graduate and undergraduate students, practicing professionals, and citizens for over 30 years. For the past 20 years, he has directed the Carol R. Goldberg seminar, an action-planning initiative co-sponsored by the Boston Foundation that brings together leaders from businesses, nonprofits, and governments to address community problems in the Boston area. He is the co-editor and contributing author of several books, including *Governing, Leading and Managing Nonprofit Organizations* (Jossey-Bass, 1993, co-edited with Dennis R. Young and Virginia A. Hodgkinson) and *Cities of the Mind: Images and Themes of the City in the Social Sciences* (Plenum Press, 1984, co-edited with Lloyd Rodwin). Dr. Hollister received a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

**David R. Ignatius** is a columnist for *The Washington Post*, who writes on global politics, economics, and international affairs. He is also creator and co-moderator of Post-Global, an online conversation about international affairs at washingtonpost.com. Ignatius joined *The Washington Post* in 1986 and served as Foreign Editor from 1990 to 1992. He became executive editor of the Paris-based *International Herald Tribune* in 2000 and

resumed writing twice a week for the op-ed page in 2003. He also worked for ten years as a reporter for *The Wall Street Journal*, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the U.S. Senate, the Middle East, and the State Department. Ignatius' column for *The Post* won the 2000 Gerald Loeb Award for Commentary, a 2005 Edward Weintal Special Citation, and the 1984 Edward Weintal Prize for Diplomatic Reporting. Additionally, Ignatius has published six novels including *Body of Lies* (W.W. Norton & Co., 2007) and *The Increment* (W.W. Norton & Co., 2009).

**Farhad Kazemi** is Professor of Politics and Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University. He has served as president of the Middle East Studies Association of North America and of the International Society for Iranian Studies. He is a member of several professional organizations including the Council on Foreign Relations and is currently a member of the Board of Trustees (Executive Committee) of the American University in Cairo. A specialist in comparative and international politics and Middle Eastern politics, Dr. Kazemi has been a Visiting Senior Fellow at Oxford University and a Visiting Professor at Princeton University. A former editor of *Iranian Studies*, he authored *Poverty and Revolution in Iran* (New York University Press, 1980) and *Culture and Politics in Iran* (University of Michigan, 1988), and edited *A Way Prepared: Studies on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder* (New York University Press, 1988, with R.D. McChesney) and *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (University Press of Florida, 1991, with John Waterbury), among other books. He has also contributed numerous articles to professional journals and edited volumes. Dr. Kazemi received an M.A. from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

**Rami G. Khouri** is a Palestinian-Jordanian and U.S. citizen whose family resides in Beirut, Amman, and Nazareth. An internationally syndicated political columnist and book author, he is the first director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy

and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, and also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and at the Dubai School of Government. He is editor-at-large, and former executive editor, of the Beirut-based *Daily Star* newspaper. In 2006, he was awarded the Pax Christi International Peace Prize. Khouri teaches annually at the American University of Beirut, the University of Chicago, and Northeastern University. He has been a fellow and visiting scholar at Harvard University, Mount Holyoke College, Syracuse University, and Stanford University, and is a member of the Brookings Institution Task Force on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. He is a Fellow of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (Jerusalem) and a member of the Leadership Council of the Harvard University Divinity School. He was editor-in-chief of the *Jordan Times* for seven years and for 18 years was general manager of Al Kutba, Publishers, in Amman, Jordan. Khouri has a B.A. in political science and an M.S. in mass communications from Syracuse University, NY.

**Robert Malley** is the Middle East and North Africa Program Director of the International Crisis Group in Washington, D.C, directing analysts based in Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Baghdad as they report on factors affecting the risk of conflict in these areas. Dr. Malley's team covers events from Iran to Morocco, with a heavy focus on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq, and Islamist movements throughout the region. From 1998 to 2001, Dr. Malley was a Special Assistant to President Bill Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs, during which period he was also a member of the U.S. peace team that helped to organize the 2000 Camp David Summit. He worked as Assistant to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger from 1996 to 1998, and was the director for Democracy, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council from 1994 to 1996. He is also a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Malley received his J.D. from Harvard Law School and his Ph.D. from Oxford University.

**Malik Mufti** is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Relations Program at Tufts University, where he teaches courses on international relations and Middle Eastern politics. His current projects include a comparison of Islamist political movements in Turkey and the Arab world, and a study of the political thought of Ibn Khaldun. Dr. Mufti is a recipient of the Lillian and Joseph Leibner Award for Distinguished Teaching and Advising. He is the author of *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (Cornell University Press, 1996) and several articles on the foreign and domestic policies of Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, including "A King's Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein's Jordan" in *Diplomacy and Statecraft 13* (2002) and "From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy" in *The Middle East Enters the 21st Century* (University Press of Florida, 2002, ed. Robert O. Freeman). His latest journal article, "The Art of Jihad," appeared in the summer 2007 issue of *History of Political Thought*. Dr. Mufti has a B.A. from Middlebury College, an M.A. from Yale University, and a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

**Vali Nasr** is Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School and Associate Director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. As a specialist on political Islam, Dr. Nasr has worked extensively on political and social developments in the Muslim world with a focus on the relation of religion to politics, violence, and democratization. In 2006, he was a Carnegie Scholar and has also been the recipient of grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. He is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Nasr's books include *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future* (W. W. Norton, 2006), *Democracy in Iran* (Oxford University Press, 2006, with Ali Gheissari), and *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (Oxford University Press, 2001). Dr. Nasr received a Master of Arts in

Law and Diplomacy from The Fletcher School at Tufts University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute for Technology.

**George Perkovich** is the Vice President for Studies, Global Security, and Economic Development and the Director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research has centered on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation, with a focus on South Asia and Iran, and on the problem of justice in the international political economy. From 1990 through 2001, Dr. Perkovich was director of the Secure World Program at the W. Alton Jones Foundation, a \$400 million philanthropic institution located in Charlottesville, Virginia. He served as a speechwriter and foreign policy advisor to Senator Joe Biden from 1989 to 1990. Dr. Perkovich is the author of the award-winning book *India's Nuclear Bomb* (University of California Press, 2001), and co-author of the path-breaking Adelphi Paper *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* (International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2008, with James M. Acton) and of a major Carnegie report, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*, a blueprint for rethinking the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Dr. Perkovich received an M.A. from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia.

**Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.** has been the Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, since 1983. He is also the founder and President of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, which has offices in Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Dr. Pfaltzgraff has published extensively and lectured widely at government, academic, and industry forums in the U.S. and overseas. He held a visiting appointment as the George C. Marshall Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium and a professorship at the National Defense College, Tokyo, Japan. In addition, he has served as an Honorary Professor at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He is currently a member of the Department of State's International Security Advisory

Board (ISAB). Dr. Pfaltzgraff's areas of academic specialization include international relations theory, crisis management, homeland security, alliance relationships, missile defense, space strategy, counterproliferation, and the war against terrorism. Dr. Pfaltzgraff holds an M.B.A from the Wharton School, and an M.A. in International Relations and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Barnett R. Rubin** is Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, where he directs the program on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan. His previous posts included Director of the Center for Preventive Action, Director of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. In 2001, Dr. Rubin served as special adviser to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement. He advised the UN on the drafting of the constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Dr. Rubin is the author of *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventing Violent Conflict* (The Century Foundation and the Council of Foreign Relations, 2002), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (Yale University Press, 2002; first edition 1995), and many other books and articles. Dr. Rubin received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

**William A. Rugh** is the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School and the Visiting Scholar at the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. Ambassador Rugh was a career Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Information Agency from 1964 to 1995. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic from 1984 to 1987 and to the United Arab Emirates from 1992 to 1995.

He is a Trustee of the American University in Cairo, a Board Member and past President of AMIDEAST, an Associate of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, an Adjunct Scholar of the Middle East Institute, and an Executive Committee member of the Public Diplomacy Council. His books include *American Encounters with Arabs: "The Soft Power" of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East* (Praeger, 2005), the edited anthology *Engaging the Arab and Islamic Worlds Through Public Diplomacy* (Public Diplomacy Council, 2004), *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics* (Praeger, 2004), and *Diplomacy and Defense Policy of the United Arab Emirates* (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2002). Ambassador Rugh holds an M.A. from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

**Karim Sadjadpour** is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prior to this, he was the chief Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group. A leading researcher on Iran, Sadjadpour has conducted dozens of interviews with senior Iranian officials, and hundreds with Iranian intellectuals, clerics, dissidents, paramilitaries, businessmen, students, activists, and youth, among others. Frequently called upon to brief U.S. and EU officials regarding Middle Eastern affairs, he has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has been the recipient of numerous academic awards, including a Fulbright scholarship. Sadjadpour was named a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum in Davos, and is a board member of the Banu Foundation. His publications include "Iran: Is Productive Engagement Possible?" (Carnegie Policy Brief, October 2008) and "Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader" (Carnegie Report, March 2008). Sadjadpour received his M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

**Richard H. Shultz** is Director of the International Security Studies Program and Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School, Tufts University. He has been the beneficiary of three chairs: the Olin Distinguished Professorship of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and Brigadier General H.L. Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps. Dr. Shultz has served as a consultant to a variety of government agencies, including the U.S. Department of Defense, Congress, the U.S. Information Agency, and the National Security Council. In 2001, he conducted a year-long study with the Pentagon, parts of which were later declassified and published in a 2004 *Weekly Standard* article entitled "Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda Before 9/11." Dr. Schultz's recent research under the auspices of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence's "Armed Groups Project" centers on how best to understand non-state armed groups. He is the author most recently of *Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement* (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2008) and *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (Columbia University Press, 2006, with Andrea J. Dew). Dr. Shultz has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Miami University.

**Gary G. Sick** is a senior research scholar at the Middle East Institute of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), and is also an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at SIPA. Dr. Sick served on the National Security Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. From 1982 to 1987, Dr. Sick was the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Ford Foundation, where he was responsible for programs relating to U.S. foreign policy. He is also a member of the board of Human Rights Watch in New York and the chairman of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. He was the Executive Director of Gulf/2000, an international research proj-

ect on political, economic, and security developments in the Persian Gulf, conducted at Columbia University from 1994 to 1995 on behalf of the W. Alton Jones and Rockefeller Foundations. Dr. Sick is the author of *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran* (Random House, 1985) and *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* (Random House, 1991). Dr. Sick received an M.S. from George Washington University and a Ph.D. from Columbia University.

**Mark Tessler** is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, where he is also Vice Provost for International Affairs and Director of the University's International Institute. Dr. Tessler has published widely on Middle Eastern politics, having authored or co-authored twelve books and over 100 scholarly articles. Among them is *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Indiana University Press, 2009; first edition 1994), a *New York Times* Notable Book of the year. He is also co-Director of the Arab Barometer project, which has recently carried out large political attitude surveys in seven Arab countries. Dr. Tessler is the General Editor of the Indiana University Press scholarly book series in Middle East Studies. Dr. Tessler's prior university administrative experience includes the direction of the University of Wisconsin's Joint Center for International Studies at Milwaukee and Madison, and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Arizona. Dr. Tessler received his Ph.D. from Northwestern University.

**Stephen W. Van Evera** is Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Van Evera researches several areas of international relations, including the causes and prevention of war, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. national security policy, U.S. intervention in the Third World, international relations of the Middle East, and international relations theory. He has authored several books including *The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell University Press, 2001; first edition 1999) and *Nuclear*

*Diplomacy and Crisis Management* (The MIT Press, 1990, with Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller). His recent articles include "A Farewell to Geopolitics," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (Oxford, 2008), "The War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons from WWII" in *Middle East Policy XIV* (2007), and "Bush Administration, Weak on Terror," *Middle East Policy XIII* (2006). Dr. Van Evera received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.

**Ibrahim Warde** is Adjunct Professor of International Business at The Fletcher School and Associate Director of Business Programs at the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University. In 2007, he was named a Carnegie Scholar in relation to his research on financial networks and practices in the Islamic world. He is also a course director for Euromoney Institutional Investor, London and an independent consultant specializing in global finance. He has taught at the University of California (Berkeley, Davis, and Santa Cruz) and at Saint Mary's College in California. Dr. Warde's books include *The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror* (University of California Press, 2007) and *Islamic Finance in the Global Economy* (Columbia University Press, 2000). He is a contributor to *Le Monde Diplomatique*, an author of monographs on banking regulation and international finance, and an author of policy papers on global technological change published by the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE). Dr. Warde received a degree in business from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), France, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.

**Robin Wright** is an American journalist and former Diplomatic Correspondent for *The Washington Post*. She has served as a foreign correspondent in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, reporting for *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Sunday Times*, CBS News, and *The Christian Science Monitor*, in addition to *The Post*. She has also written for *The New Yorker*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *The New York Times*,

and *The International Herald Tribune*. Wright has received the UN Correspondents Association Gold Medal for coverage of international affairs, the National Magazine Award for reportage from Iran in *The New Yorker*, and the Overseas Press Club Award for her coverage of African wars. For coverage of U.S. foreign policy, the American Academy of Diplomacy named Wright journalist of the year, and she also won the National Press Club Award and the Weintal Prize for diplomatic reporting. Wright has also been the recipient of a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation grant. She has been a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution, and many renowned universities. Wright is currently a Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She recently published *Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East* (Penguin Press, 2008).

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The Fares Center  
for Eastern Mediterranean Studies  
Cabot Intercultural Center  
160 Packard Avenue  
Medford, MA 02155  
Telephone: 617.627.6560  
Fax: 617.627.3461  
E-mail: [fares-center@tufts.edu](mailto:fares-center@tufts.edu)  
Web: <http://farescenter.tufts.edu>

