

# A Migration Story

## From Muslim Immigrants to European “Citizens of the Heart?”<sup>1</sup>

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Although a newcomer with regard to migration of a global scope, Europe has become a popular destination for Muslim immigrants, taking in more Muslims than the U.S. in recent years. It is currently home to more than 20 million Muslims. However, despite their large numbers, these immigrants are not integrated into European society. They are therefore susceptible to the political Islam that is making Europe its battlefield.

As the prominent *New York Times* journalist Richard Bernstein, who led the Berlin office of that paper for four years, wrote in his farewell column, Europeans believe they live in a Tuscan paradise and hate to see the problems in the “world beyond.”<sup>2</sup> Bernstein noted that this European sentiment can be described as “wealthy, soignée, [and] ecologically correct” and that European opinion leaders believe they are “distant from vexing problems like Muslim immigration.”<sup>3</sup> Stuck in this mindset, Europeans do not view themselves as confronted with what is perceived to be “Islam” or with its jihadist dimension. The perception that jihadist assaults by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were the result of an unsettled score between the Arabs and the United States was belied by a consistent series of events in Europe ranging from attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 to the foiled plot in London in August 2006. What is the underlying story?

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### FAILED INTEGRATION: SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION AND CULTURAL SELF-ETHNICIZATION

Unlike American Muslims, who are American citizens and identify themselves with the American way of life, Muslims in Europe are marginalized aliens. Born in Damascus, for 44 years I lived in Europe—and continue to be alien despite a German passport and full accommodation to the European lifestyle. Being familiar with both the U.S. and Europe, I have never seen any real incorporation or inclusion of aliens in any of the European countries resulting in a level of integration competitive to that in the United States. Europeans have to acknowledge their problems with an Islamic diaspora community of 20 million in the European Union. As an American-European expert on Islam phrases the issue, “Islamic communities form a sort of sectarian enclave...in the West, but not of it.”<sup>4</sup> What are the implications?

The European jihadist attacks are well known. On March 11, 2004, an assault took place in Madrid reminiscent of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. On November 2, 2004 the filmmaker Theo van Gogh was executed in Amsterdam with indescribable brutality on charges of being “infidel” by a Dutch-born Moroccan, Mohammed Bouyeri. It was proven that Bouyeri was not acting alone, but rather as an executioner embedded in an Islamist cross-European network. In 2005 London was the next scene for Islamist jihadists, who hit twice in July. Later the same year, the first Islamic-European *intifada*, or uprising, took place in Paris. Young Muslim French-born citizens living in the *banlieues de l'Islam* shouted the jihad call “*Allahu Akbar*” while they were torching cars and burning schools.

In 2006, the conflict over the distasteful Mohammed cartoons developed into an international crisis. Imams based in the Danish capital Copenhagen traveled throughout the Islamic world to fuel a propaganda war that multiplied the original twelve Mohammed cartoons into 120 more disturbing drawings, inciting hatred against Europe. The incitement was strategically successful and led to numerous assaults on European embassies and European Union representations throughout the Islamic world. Among Denmark's population of five million, there are one quarter million Muslim immigrants. However, Muslim leaders place their community amongst an imaginary Muslim *umma* of 1.6 billion Muslims. As a result of a conflict focusing on Denmark alone, they sought to mobilize against all of Europe. The cartoon crisis was a case of identity politics<sup>5</sup> as a source of conflict in the context of a “Global Migration Crisis.”<sup>6</sup>

On August 10, 2006, British authorities in London foiled a plot to blow up ten planes bound for the United States. In the same month, an-

other plot by Hezbollah proxies failed in Germany. All these events took place in Europe; so what is the issue? What is the story behind these assaults believed to be jihadist in nature? Not only jihadists but also moderate Muslims in Europe were among those denying the Pope his right to state in his "Regensburg Lecture" of September 2006 that Islam needs to dissociate religion from violence in the name of reason. Europeans are reluctant to acknowledge the links between migration and security and do not see, as Bernstein wrote, "that the main danger in the world today is a new, powerfully antidemocratic and messianic force in the world, an aggressive, wounded, literally death-defying Islamic totalitarianism."<sup>7</sup> Polls produced by the social-scientific Institute of the *Bundeswehr* show that 68 percent of Germans fear cuts in welfare payments by the state more than they fear jihadist terrorism.<sup>8</sup>

To support my argument that Europeans overlook the issue, I present one example: after the failed plot of August 10, 2006, a front page editorialist of the leading Swiss paper, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, remarked that, "The failed plot is a challenge to European societies...however, one barely finds in the coverage of BBC any reference to the Islamic background of the perpetrators despite the fact that this is the denominator of extremism under issue."<sup>9</sup> The same newspaper reported the following Monday, August 14, 2006 that the leading representative of the Muslim diaspora in the United Kingdom accused the British government, but not the perpetrators, of igniting extremism. Instead of asking in candor "why British Muslims do this" and working jointly with civil society to reach solutions, these leaders engage in blame-games and in endless talks about flawed European foreign policies, inevitably concluding by bashing the West and accusing Europeans of alleged Islamophobia based on the Islamist narrative of "Islam under siege." One party sticks to the rules of political correctness, and the other party sticks to blame-games and self-victimization as an effort to intimidate the other.

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Another problem to be acknowledged with candor is the unwillingness of Muslims to become Europeans. One of the leading opinion leaders of the Muslim youth in Europe, Tarriq Ramadan,<sup>10</sup> whose grandfather was the founder of the first fundamentalist Islamic movement in Islam, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, travels through Europe to give powerful

interviews to magazines like *Der Spiegel* and denies in his speeches the real problem of integration. He delivered a speech entitled "The Mission of Islam in Europe" at the Axel Johannsons Foundation in Sweden in June 2006. The Islamic understanding of "mission," or *da'waa*, is nothing more than proselytization. No doubt, the issue of "mission" concerns a minority of three to five percent of the Muslim diaspora of Europe. This concept is most significant, however, in places such as mosques, faith schools, and welfare institutions—in the representation of the community itself.<sup>11</sup>

In a Cornell project on transnational religion, I outlined the options for Europe in the following formula: "Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe."<sup>12</sup> As a Muslim immigrant and a social scientist, I see an offensive Islamist "missionarism" and a European sentiment of a Tuscan paradise unable to recognize the challenge; they are exposed to one another in a story of global world migration.

The overarching question of the present study is: can Muslim migrants embrace the "idea of Europe"<sup>13</sup> and become Europeans by choice? I refer to the "idea of Europe" as an inclusive concept of freedom and citizenship and inquire into the potential of Europeanizing Islam on those grounds. Is it possible to Europeanize Islam in order to extract Muslims living in Europe from their enclaves, which are parallel societies conceived as the world of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), and enable them to join in democratic polity?<sup>14</sup> What are the implications of concepts such as Euro-Islam, legal citizenship, and "citizens of the heart" for the integration of Muslim immigrants? In short, what needs to be done to make Muslims embrace more than the instrumental use of human rights and the benefits of democracy and the welfare state, so that they are attracted by the idea of Europe and consequently become true Europeans? Can Muslim immigrants become "citizens of the heart" in Europe?

A few years before his death in 1973, philosopher and social scientist Max Horkheimer, of the Frankfurt School, wrote what would remain as an intellectual legacy to his collected essays, *Kritische Theorie*. Horkheimer stated that Europe was, "in terms of time and space an island of freedom surrounded by an ocean of *Gewaltherrschaft* [rule of terror]," adding that it is "an obligation on those who subscribe to critical theory" to be as committed to Europe as the West and to defend it against all varieties of totalitarianism.<sup>15</sup> Are Europeans ready to meet the challenge of integration in light of the threat of political Islam, without alienating Muslims living in Europe?

Islamism is not merely a challenge to security, it is equally threatening to the civilizational identity of Europe.<sup>16</sup> In articles and lectures on

Islamism since 1993, leading to my book, *Der neue Totalitarismus*, I have been arguing that political Islam is the third variety of totalitarianism in Europe, materializing via the Islamist-jihadist cells in the European Islamic diaspora.<sup>17</sup> It is inappropriate to rebuke the reference to the appeal of totalitarian Islamism to non-integrated Muslims in the European diaspora as Islamophobia. Doing so allows the Islamists to camouflage themselves. Europe needs to be inclusive in its response to political Islam—neither by invoking self-denial, nor by succumbing to a clash of civilizations leading to a confrontation with Islam. Europe needs consistent strategies to come to terms with its predicament with the ever-growing Muslim diaspora on its soil.

#### THE ISSUES OF CONTENTION FOR MUSLIM INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

Who can change whom, and who will change whom? Will Europe prove able to give cultural shape to the incoming migration in order to maintain its identity, or will the migrants change the shape of Europe itself? Will Muslim migrants be Europeanized, or will there be an Islamization of Europe? Could such an approach assist Muslims in Europe to become Europeans in the sense of being citizens of the heart? If this were feasible, then it would follow that other immigrants of non-European cultures could also become Europeans by choice—and not only in the legal sense. There is a growing new absolutism among Muslims and a new cultural relativism spreading in Europe. These visions could never accommodate one another. Will these Muslim immigrants and Europeans be able to establish pluralism based on the Europeanization of Islam, and thus pursue a successful integration that dissolves the Islamic enclave understood as *Dar al-Islam*, or the abode of Islam, within Europe?

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Of course, Muslims have the right to freedom of religion. But could the expression of this freedom block the way to their becoming European citizens? Again, being citizens of the heart means something much more than mere legal citizenship. Simply holding a European passport does not turn a Muslim into a European. The first step of holding a European passport is followed by a second step that requires the recognition of difference,

potentially leading to a third step, to cultural basic rights. Can we apply this approach to Muslims living in Europe? And how about to Europeans themselves?

Fletcher School professor Lawrence Harrison coined the phrase “underdevelopment is a state of mind,”<sup>18</sup> by which he refers to a cultural attitude. Similarly, I argue that a commitment to democracy and to an open society, as well as belonging to a particular civilization, also reflect a state of mind. Based on this premise, I ask whether or not Europeans are aware of “the idea of Europe” as a “beautiful idea” with corresponding realities in their societies.<sup>19</sup> What will they do with immigrants who do not accept this

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idea as a way of life? No civilizational project can sustain itself without awareness of the self. Therefore, the idea of Europe needs citizens of the heart committed to its values, be they Europeans or Muslim immigrants. These citizens must be willing to make sacrifices on Europe's behalf if and when it is at per-

il. My contention is that in the twenty-first century, the idea of Europe is at peril, because neither post-modern Europeans nor Muslim immigrants subscribe to it, or to its values.

The Islamist Moroccan, Mohammed Bouyeri—the murderer of Theo van Gogh—was not only a Dutch citizen, he was also born in the Netherlands. He was by no means, however, a European. He executed van Gogh because he believed that he was practicing a *shari'a* duty of killing infidels. A letter attached to van Gogh's slain body included the phrase, “you, O Europe, will meet with disaster.”<sup>20</sup> Most European intellectuals are not sure about their civilizational identity, and they lack an awareness of the threat posed to that identity as pronounced in the cited letter. Does this gap in understanding point to a “clash of civilizations”<sup>21</sup>?

I do not subscribe to this dangerous formula. In my pursuit of Europeanizing Islam, I seek the establishment of a cross-cultural international morality inspired by the idea of Europe. It is possible, I believe, to avert the continued unfolding of the existing conflict to an outright clash, which is a scenario that could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If Europeans are not willing to address the conflict openly and instead remain silent in the name of political correctness and cultural-relativist multiculturalism, however, then a black future is ahead for Europe. Political Islam, in its radical forms of Salafist orthodoxy and totalitarian Islamism, is an example of new absolutism.

Salafist activists aim to map Europe into the *Dar al-Islam*, in other words, to achieve the Islamization of Europe through proselytization. There is clearly a conflict between this attitude and the very same idea of Europe; at issue is a war of ideas. In this context, the orthodox Salafist and Islamist challenge is juxtaposed against a European worldview of cultural relativism, and this cultural relativism denies Europe the very civilizational identity that it needs to survive. To argue that European culture is only one among others to be admitted in Europe is to have a self-defeating attitude. Identity politics becomes an instrument against the identity of Europe itself. Relativism, when exposed to neo-absolutism, becomes the worldview of the loser, because it does not defend itself against threats and obscure challenges.

Under these conditions the present "world time" of global migration puts the idea of Europe under a severe challenge. In earlier times, there were obvious civilizational and territorial boundaries. However, global migration is blurring these boundaries in the Mediterranean today.<sup>22</sup> John Kelsay notes that one is "forced to speak not simply of Islam *and* the West, but of Islam *in* the West."<sup>23</sup> It follows that Islam *and* Europe and Islam *in* Europe are two different issues: the former is pertinent to the way in which the historical structure of Islam has been affected by Islamic migration to Europe, and the latter is pertinent to Europe's Islamic environment. At present, migration is not only blurring frontiers but also the above to distinction to which I allude.<sup>24</sup> In my view, the middle road of multiculturalism, which some present as a vision of two different worlds expected to live peacefully side-by-side in Europe, is a deception. It is intriguing to see Islamists embracing multicultural communitarianism based on relativism—despite their clearly neo-absolutist views. For them, multiculturalism is only one transitory step on the road to Islamization.

In Europe, the foremost example of multiculturalism was the Netherlands. That status changed radically after the execution of van Gogh. In his "Dutch Diary," published as a series in *Die Welt*, the Dutch writer Leon de Winter rightly argues, "Is it so that Europe has no other option than either opening itself freely to Islam or opening itself unfreely through exposure to extremist jihadi violence? ... In the Netherlands, as well as throughout Europe, the pressure of intolerance on our tolerance is increasing... we must ask ourselves who are we and what we want and whether we are willing to sacrifice for what we are?"<sup>25</sup>

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This reminds us of the great Muslim fourteenth century philosopher, Ibn Khaldun, the first theorist in the history of mankind to write on *madaniyya*, or civilization.<sup>26</sup> In Ibn Khaldun's view, every civilization is based on the awareness of itself expressed in *Asabiyya*. *Asabiyya* can be translated as *esprit de corps*, summarized in a system of values and norms and the related worldview, or, in my phrasing, as *Leitkultur*. *Asabiyya*, is the identity of each civilization. Ibn Khaldun argues that civilizations are strong when they are based on a strong *Asabiyya* and they weaken along the erosion of their *Asabiyya*. Can there be a Euro-Islamic *Asabiyya*, namely a civilizational awareness shared by declining Europeans and the rocketing Islamic diaspora? For the sake of maintaining the identity of Europe, enhanced through the inclusion of Muslim immigrants, the major concern is the venture of Europeanizing Islam.

#### ISLAMIC IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE: ASSUMPTIONS INFORMING THE INQUIRY

Since the 1960s, Islamic migration has increased due to the labor migration that followed the once-booming European economies. Western European countries increasingly needed labor but lacked a sufficient labor force as a result of low birth rates. Since the loosening of border controls after the end of the Cold War, however, migrants both legal and illegal have increased and immigration policies have reversed. Europe must come to terms with the fact that as a continent it is a destination for migration. The reality of Europe is now enhanced through this migration, though Europeans have not adjusted culturally to the changed situation. On what assumptions can one deal with this issue of migration?

One of my central assumptions is that Islamic migration is changing the identity of Europe because newcomers are raising claims that are not consonant with the idea of Europe. In this context of identity politics, I recall my concept of Euro-Islam, inspired by the idea of Europe and by the historical experience of the Hellenization of Islam in the better days of Islamic civilization.<sup>27</sup> This proposition provides an opening for a positive response to the challenge of integration. Under the concept of Euro-Islam, I propose that Muslim immigrants accommodate Europe, first by opening their minds and souls to the idea of Europe, as their ancestors did vis-à-vis Hellenism, and second by rethinking Islam with regard to religion and politics.

Following the release of a report on church-state relations in France, the French debate over the issue of the Islamic headscarf is pertinent to our discussion. The report makes clear that an acceptance of *laïcité*, or the absence of religious interference in government affairs, is the bottom line



for the integration of Muslim migrants in France. At issue, therefore, is the notion of a Europe in which *laïcité* is part and parcel of oneself, and not simply a way of clothing oneself. As Elaine Sciolino states, the controversy highlights "the challenges that secular France—like much of Europe—faces in coming to grips with Islam...[where] organized groups are testing the secular French state."<sup>28</sup> This conflict also tests the grounds for a European *Asabiyya* to be shared with Muslims. Clearly, a civilization conflict is at work; as Nilüfer Göle states, "the contemporary veiling of Muslim women underscores the insurmountability of boundaries between Islamic and Western civilization...the conflictual encounter between civilizations."<sup>29</sup>

Migration brings people from different civilizations closer to one another to an extent yet unprecedented, which raises a variety of new issues<sup>30</sup> and creates a need for "controlling immigration."<sup>31</sup> In Europe there is a need for a cross-cultural consensus over which values can be seen as valid in the political culture in order to ensure inner peace. I respect "difference" and plead for tolerance to integrate it, however, into a framework of pluralism. Therefore, I situate political democracy above cultural difference, and cultural pluralism above the cultural relativism that was established by multiculturalism. There are entrenching differences in the context of migration, but there are no cultural rights to such an entrenchment. In this case the difference between *laïcité* and *shari'a* is insurmountable, and the two simply cannot exist side-by-side in Europe if European identity is to be maintained. If Europeans were to succumb to the request of accepting *shari'a* as a cultural right, they would be the losers.

Cultural relativism is the capitulation of Europe in the age of the "Global Migration Crisis," because it conspicuously allows for cultural differences without any limitations, not even boundaries attached to the civilizational identity of Europe. Cultural relativism applies only to Western values and stops short of proceeding in a similar manner with non-Western cultures, even with regard to those practices that are absolutist in nature, such as the *shari'a*. Moreover, any critique of non-Western cultures is often misconceived and qualified in a defamatory manner as "cultural racism." I maintain that the present attitudes of victimization and accusation on the Islamic side and self-accusation and self-denial on the European side are inappropriate for dealing with conflicts arising from cultural differences between the groups.

I argue that both parties need to share an inclusive *Asabiyya*, which would entail consensus over mutually accepted value orientations. The call for a de-ethnization of European identity must apply equally to the ethnic identity of the migrants. Otherwise, the situation in which we will find

ourselves will deal not only with a one-way-change, but also a one-way-tolerance. Likewise, the value system of Europe should provide the foundation for the future of Europe itself. From the point of view of democracy and an open society, remaking the club could never be accepted as a cover for the Islamization of Europe envisioned by the Islamists. Therefore, the basic assumption is that Muslim immigrants and Europeans need to re-establish a consensus over shared values.

Another assumption of the present inquiry is that due to the abuse of world migration channels, through the build-up of safe havens for

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Islamist networks Europe is becoming a battlefield of Islamism.<sup>32</sup> Islamists and Salafists live in Europe with claims to cultural rights, which implies that they do not want to integrate and do not have to change or accept citizen duties. This attitude is not reconcilable with the idea of Europe, not with its component of citizenship. Moreover, this Islamist approach demonizes and deprives Europe of its own identity, for despite its Muslim population, Europe is not *Dar al-Islam*. While Europeans

must overcome their arrogance, Muslim migrants must engage in the unfolding patterns of a Euro-Islamic identity by abandoning their universalistic absolutism. To become citizens of the heart, Muslims living in Europe need to find a commonality between themselves and European civilization, while recognizing the idea of Europe.

The historical relationship between the European and Islamic civilizations equally encompasses enmity and cordiality.<sup>33</sup> The dichotomies built up on this legacy, such as the struggle between East versus West, are based on artificial categories, as Nezar Al-Sayyad rightly argues. He says that "societies are constructed in relation to one another and are...perceived through the ideologies and narratives of situated discourse."<sup>34</sup> He argues that academics need to free themselves from their preoccupation with globalization and acknowledge that "each individual belongs to many cultures and people have multiple cultural identities ...Identity is always under construction and in constant evolution."<sup>35</sup> My vision of a Euro-Islamic identity as a new *Asabiyya* for Muslim migrants in Europe is constructed along lines that question constructed dichotomies. The *Asabiyya*, however, would not overlook truly existing value conflicts related to entrenched dif-

ferences and, of course, subsequent limits. If Muslims are honestly willing to become Europeans by embracing the idea of Europe, they need to disconnect their understanding of Islam from jihad, *shari'a* and *da'wah*.

The term "New Islamic Presence" has been established to describe the increasing contemporary migration from Muslim countries to Western Europe.<sup>36</sup> By the end of the Second World War, there were fewer than one million Muslims living in Western Europe, the majority based in France and the United Kingdom. By 2004, the Muslim diaspora in Europe had risen to 17 million, and the figure has already increased to 20 million in 2006. It is expected that the figure shall reach 40 million by 2030. Muslim migrants now reside in all European societies, from Scandinavia in the north to Italy in the south. With their increasing presence, they are beginning to raise claims, such as with regard to *shari'a* law, that challenge European core values.

The formula "Muslims in Europe" can be deconstructed by viewing the concerned community in a disaggregate manner. There are ethnic Europeans in Southeast Europe who are Muslims;<sup>37</sup> Muslim immigrants in Western Europe are ethnically multifaceted and also divided along sectarian lines. Muslims living in France were and still are predominantly migrants from the Maghreb. Experts speak of "Algeria in France" to describe the North African enclave that exists in France.<sup>38</sup> In the United Kingdom, Muslims originate largely from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Until the early 1960s, the Muslim presence in these European states had been related almost exclusively to French colonial rule in North Africa and to British colonial rule on the Indian subcontinent.

A relevant example is provided by the German Muslim community, which consists of about four million, 2.5 million of whom are Turks and Kurds. The German case reflects the fact that Islamists<sup>39</sup> benefit from lack of integration and are therefore against the notion of Euro-Islam.<sup>40</sup> This is a major assumption. The new citizenship law legislated in 2000 has barely promoted integration, because the simple granting of a German passport does not guarantee inclusion or cultural integration. Citizenship is more than receiving a passport, in that it resembles membership in a club with rules and a sense of belonging. These rules should be based on the idea of Europe: secular, non-ethnic, and characterized by civic values. Accordingly, becoming European must require from Muslims a willingness to be a citizen of the heart in return for status as a full member of the polity.

While European conservatives disfavor the integration of Muslim immigrants, some imams do not accept the very idea of Europe as characterized by freedom and openness. Within the framework of illegal migra-

tion, Islamists seeking political asylum gain access to Europe and make use of its civil rights to establish their safe havens in Europe. These people are among the varied enemies of the open society that is part and parcel of the concept of Europe. They use guaranteed rights to undermine the very society that protects them from prosecution in their own countries. In short, there is an Islamist challenge to Europe that is demonstrated in the context of Islamism, anti-Semitism, and multiculturalism.

#### **ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WESTERN MULTICULTURALISM, AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE MUSLIM DIASPORA**

In the context of identity politics, Muslims in the European diaspora face an ugly racism, but they also develop one of their own toward Jews. Anti-Semitism as a European ideology is one of the most obnoxious varieties of racism that has been transmitted as a virus to cultures outside Europe, primarily to the Arab world and to other countries of Islamic civilization, such as Iran. To be sure, anti-Semitism is a European disease that did not exist in classical Islam, despite some professed Judeophobic elements in Islamic history. The creation of the state of Israel, however, combined with imported nationalism, transformed Arab Judeophobia into anti-Semitism. This anti-Semitism is now returning to Europe via immigrants from the Middle East.<sup>41</sup> There it has been able to secure roots and become an indigenous phenomenon that no longer can be explained by mere reference to its origin as an import from Europe.

The context and sources of contemporary anti-Semitism are related to the ideology of Islamism as a variety of the global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism. The major precursor of this contemporary ideology and its *rector spiritus* is Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual father of political Islam. In his widely spread catechism "*Ma'rakatuma ma'a al-Yahud* [Our struggle against the Jews]," Qutb gave the ideology its basic shape.<sup>42</sup> Now reaching the Islamic diaspora in Europe, a transformation of Judeophobia into a distinct Islamist anti-Semitism is connected to the debate on European multiculturalism. This theme needs also to be considered within the debate on identity politics.

The embedment of the new anti-Semitism into Islamism is sustained by the argument that the Islamic diaspora in Europe is considered to be a symbol of multiculturalism. In this way, Islamism is viewed through the fashionable ideology of cultural relativism, presenting itself in a self-congratulatory manner as fulfilling a European outlook of tolerance and opening vis-à-vis non-Western cultures. Multiculturalism dismisses the universal validity of the European concept of individual human rights, as well as the

tradition of secular democracy. In this context, even the anti-Semitism of Muslim immigrants is viewed by some Europeans from a different angle and seems no longer to be regarded as evil. The European view that honors and claims "recognition of difference" is extended to give anti-Semitism another name, such as "resistance to oppression."

In Germany and Scandinavia, anti-Semitism is only condemned when it originates from local Europeans. When it is expressed by people of other cultures, however, then tolerance is granted and openly displayed, and rational explanations and terms such as "outrage of the despised" are applied to the practice. An example: when two synagogues in Germany were desecrated in October 2000, then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder assumed that the perpetrators were neo-Nazis calling for an "*Aufstand der Anständigen* [uprising of the decent people]." The police found, however, that the crime had been committed by Arab Muslim immigrants. The German response was then transformed into multicultural understanding for outrage expressed by the "despised" Palestinians, who were allegedly expressing their protest against the way "Jews treat Arabs."<sup>43</sup> These arguments were brought forward in court, and the sentences were accordingly very slight.

In France and Scandinavia, such practices have become normal, and police advise Jews to abandon all displays of their Jewishness as the best way to avoid assault. In early 2006, the Berlin-based newspaper *Tagesspiegel* reported on schools in city districts with predominant Arab-Muslim populations, quoting students who underlined their identity in terms of Judeophobia by shouting, "*Wenn ein Jude unsere*

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*Schule betreten würde, dann wird er kaputt geschlagen* [The Jew who dares to enter this school will be beaten to death]."<sup>44</sup> In Germany, anti-Semitism and incitement are by law a crime, but seemingly this does not apply to the Islamists. In the United Kingdom, human rights and pro-migration groups defend the right of expression of Islamists. Europe's contemporary multiculturalism has become a cover for the anti-Semitism now returning to Europe via Arab-Islamic migration. The recognition of cultural rights to difference has been extended indirectly to tolerating the Arab-Muslim Judeophobia now taking the shape of the new anti-Semitism.

The phenomenon of anti-Semitism within the Islamic diaspora signifies a connection between multiculturalism and identity politics. Multiculturalism is the indiscriminate tolerance of European cultur-

al relativists applied to the neo-absolutism of migrants' identity politics that is cultivated in parallel societies currently mushrooming throughout Europe.<sup>45</sup> The Islamist imams indoctrinating young Muslims born in Europe are committed to anti-Semitism. They make full instrumental use of civil rights; in the name of freedom of religion, they teach an exclusive Islamic identity characterized by hatred toward, and entrenched relations with, non-Muslims. This approach denies Muslims multiple identities and undermines their effort to integrate into European societies as citizens of the heart.

The notion of Islamophobia established for merely ideological reasons resembles the pursuit to place anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism on an equal footing.<sup>46</sup> This equation is used as propaganda by Islamists who strive to hijack the Muslim diaspora in Europe, and to protect themselves against any criticism by accusing their critics of Islamophobia. The downgrading of the vice of anti-Semitism and the upgrading of the allegation of an alleged Islamophobia are possible in an environment of multiculturalism and identity politics.

In conclusion, the multicultural tolerance extended to the Islamists of the diaspora creates threats of concern not only for Jews, but also for liberal Muslims like this writer. In the context of global migration, cultural relativism unwittingly promotes the validity of a society open to the views of Muslim immigrants and consequently tolerates anti-Semitism in the name of recognizing difference as a cultural right.

#### **A EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE COMBINED CHALLENGE OF ISLAM AND ISLAMISM**

Islam and its believers are no longer located only in the world beyond Europe, but also within. Ultimately there are second and third generations of Muslims who have been born in Europe, but are as yet neither integrated nor viewed as Europeans. What is the identity of these Muslims born in Europe, but as yet not committed to the idea of Europe? And do European policies go beyond providing legal citizenship, in order to enhance that citizenship, with an accompanying identity?

A cultural-relativist multiculturalism is not in a position to accommodate these new realities. The first question to be asked is whether Muslim migrants will integrate politically as European citizens of Muslim faith, or whether they will continue to live collectivity in Muslim ghettos divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. I propose a combination of the concept of Euro-Islam for the integration of ordinary Muslim immigrants, with another

concept of security for dealing with the challenge of Islamism, particularly in its jihadist form.<sup>47</sup> Competing options exist for future strategies concerning the risks and the opportunities related to Muslim migration to Western Europeans. It increasingly poses a challenge to the identity of Europe.

It is critical to analyze the threat to European identity posed by immigration by honoring the fact that Muslims living in Europe are there to stay and are not temporary residents. It is important to note that there are basically three major and comparable groups among the 20 million Muslim immigrants in Europe. The first is the Muslim Turks and Kurds, who number around four million, with 2.5 million living in Germany alone and the rest in other West European countries. The second group is the Maghrebis, which number 12 to 14 million in Europe, about eight million of which are concentrated in France. The final group is comprised of South Asians, two million of whom live predominantly in the United Kingdom, but who can be found as well in almost all other European countries.<sup>48</sup>

As this picture shows, there exists no coherent Muslim diaspora community in Europe. Rather, there are Muslim migrants of varied ethnic, national, and cultural backgrounds. Across these lines, diaspora Muslims subscribe to diverse political and social strategies for articulating their views and options concerning their status in society. In this regard, it is not a contradiction to distinguish cases of culturally distinct Arab, African, or South Asian notions of Islam. The identity of Muslims is thus the identity of culturally different people who nevertheless share the same religious faith. This reality of Muslim identity reflects the simultaneity of unity and diversity in Islam. In considering that Afro-Islam exists for African Muslims and that Indo-Islam exists for Indian Muslims, it is feasible to consider the existence of Euro-Islam in the context of the migration of Muslims to Western Europe.

What exactly would a concept of Euro-Islam entail? By exploring the possibility of Euro-Islam, I address the effort of devising a liberal variety of Islam acceptable both to Muslim migrants and to European societies. Yet, I reiterate that Euro-Islam is the exact same religion of Islam as that which exists anywhere. In the case of Europe, however, Islam needs to be adjusted to the civic culture of modernity in order to become Europeanized. The major features of the concept of Euro-Islam would include *laïcité*, cultural modernity, and an understanding of tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamic believers (*ahl al-kitab*).

*What exactly would a  
concept of Euro-Islam entail?*

In addition, Euro-Islam acknowledges cultural and religious pluralism and thus abandons the claim of Islamic dominance, which is, in any case, out of touch with reality. In sum, Euro-Islam is compatible with liberal democracy, individual human rights and the requirements of a civil society. Euro-Islam departs from *citoyennité* and represents a contrast to communitarian politics that result in ghettoization. I speak out in favor of an enlightened and open-minded Islamic identity that would be compatible with European civic culture. European civic values are not negotiable, and they are not compatible with Islamic law of *shari'a*.<sup>49</sup> There can be no tolerance for universalization of the *shari'a*. Euro-Islam is simply a commitment to individual human rights for Muslims living in Europe, in the form of a European *Leitkultur* dissociated from *shari'a*.

In light of the increasing Muslim community in Europe, the option of Euro-Islamic political and cultural integration as a response to pending challenges should be taken seriously. The proposition of Euro-Islam aims to make Muslims become members of the European body politic in which they live without sacrificing their Islamic faith. Islamic identity must be compatible with a European civil society based in multiple identities and citizenship. Neither imported Salafist and Islamist imams nor the cultural relativists of multiculturalism are friends to the idea of Europe. As Ernest Gellner has stated, "Logically, the religious fundamentalists are of course also in conflict with the relativists... The relativists in turn direct their attacks only at those within their own enlightened tradition, but play down... religious fundamentalism."<sup>50</sup> It follows that neither the totalitarian Islamists nor the European cultural relativist multiculturalists are friends of the open society, nor of the idea of Europe to which that open society is related.

#### ISLAM AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE: COMMONALITIES AND DISAGREEMENTS

If we may soon be forced to speak not simply of Islam *and* the West, but of Islam *in* the West, John Kelsay asks, "What difference will this make?"<sup>51</sup> The differences between Muslims and Europeans that are based on cultural divergences are becoming an inner-European issue. The intercivilizational interaction related to migration entails bringing these variations in worldviews to the fore. In public speech, European conflicts are often obscured and denied. This approach is a dishonest way of handling the challenges resulting from Muslim migration to Europe. We need to go beyond the censorship of dictatorial political correctness and address im-



pending issues. It is crucially important, however, that examination is conducted with an inclination towards reconciliation. Divergent views must not be antagonized but discussed clearly and without concealment.

It is unfortunate that the debate on migration is related to the incriminating and equally burdensome formula of a "clash of civilizations." The conflict of values between civilizations was not entirely invented, but it has been used and abused for other reasons, such as silencing related debates. It is possible to avert the clash and solve the conflict peacefully. The shift in Islam's importance for the West is at issue: a shift from being a neighbor to neighborhood within one's own Western society; and a shift from Islam and the West to Islam in the West. Given the increased importance of Islam for the West, there is a need to deal with persistent commonalities between both civilizations in a new manner. As John Kelsay remarks, "Perhaps such commonalities serve, in the main, to indicate the nature of disagreement between the West and Islam. . . . But there should be no doubt that in certain contexts, the common discourse about ethics...has the potential for creative and cooperative endeavor. Given the increased presence of Muslims in Europe and North America—a presence that makes for a more than intense interaction between the two traditions than ever before—it is important to see this."<sup>52</sup>

A common discourse about inter-cultural ethics needs to be linked to the migration debate.<sup>53</sup> The outcome could be a civic culture based on the idea of Europe and shared by all Europeans. With this concern in mind, the issue of Islam in Europe leads us to ask what our choices are. They are, as formulated in a French response to migration, "*Intégration ou Insertion Communautaire*."<sup>54</sup> In reviewing the French response, I would argue that integrated Muslims who accept the "beautiful idea" of Europe are part of the polity, whereas "communitarian ghettos," where civic values are not accepted, are a threat to both the civilizational idea of Europe and to the security of European societies.

In this regard, I draw on the Ibn Khaldunian notion of *Asabiyya*—a kind of *esprit de corps*, or civilization-awareness—as a highly pertinent notion in the process of opening oneself to others without self-denial. Global migration has generated a phenomenon of spiritual and ethical decline in the West, concealed as open-mindedness in terms of cultural relativism. It is a European misperception that respect can be earned through self-denial. In contrast, a shared Euro-Islamic *Asabiyya* could promote a shared civilizational awareness, a light at the end of the tunnel. In arguing that there is no such thing as an essentialist Islam, much as there is no such thing as

an essentialist Europe, it must be acknowledged that there exists no constant pattern of Islamic or European identity. Islam will always be an ever-changing cultural system designed by Muslims themselves, and similarly, Europe can be an open society in which there is a place for the "other." Both the exclusivist and the self-denying inclinations among Europeans are tremendous obstacles to an inter-cultural dialogue based on reason. These attitudes need to be overcome to sustain the variety of Islam in the West for which the inter-civilizational dialogue is essential. This contention is supported by referring to my own multiple identity of being both a Middle Eastern Sunni Muslim and a European citizen by choice, meaning a citizen of Europe not only in the legal sense, but also a citizen of the heart. This accomplishment has been the result of interaction with Europeans.

As much as I am concerned about the obstacle of European exclusiveness, I am equally concerned about the obstacle presented by the maintenance of certain orthodox Islamic views in parts of the European Muslim community. Specifically, I am worried by those views according to which migration is related to the *da'wah* and fulfilling the neo-absolutist notion of proselytization. Under this narrow understanding, Muslims in Europe consider themselves an outpost for the spread of Islam in Europe. Of course, there are other diaspora Muslims who present themselves as moderates, but they also insult the idea of Europe by depicting Europe as part of *Dar al-Islam*. Cultural relativist multiculturalism honors these related views as an expression of cultural communitarianism, failing to recognize the implied religious imperialism in the ideology.

#### **ESTABLISHING CULTURALLY PLURALIST EUROPEAN-MUSLIM ENCOUNTERS: LESSONS FROM THE PAST**

In the inter-civilizational dialogue between Europe and Islam, there is a desperate need to be equally honest and rational. This approach is aligned not only with the traditions of medieval Islamic rationalism and the European Enlightenment but also with the current political culture of democracy and human rights. In this pursuit, it is possible to learn from history. One of these lessons can be learned from the opening of the Islamic mind to Hellenism and the ensuing Hellenization of Islam in the medieval period, which led to the heights of Islamic civilization. In return, European adoptions from Islamic rationalism on the eve of the European Renaissance contributed to processes of rationalization in European civilization.

Muslim thinkers in the medieval Islamic period had combined reason-based methodology with their Islamic identities. Learning from

## FROM MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS TO EUROPEAN "CITIZENS OF THE HEART?"

Aristotle, they assigned the Greek philosopher the status of *mu'alim al-awwal*, or the first teacher. In the height of Islamic tolerance, the great Islamic philosopher al-Farabi was honored as second to Aristotle.

The reference to historical records must admit that history cannot repeat itself in our age of migration. In the shadow of still looming Christian-Muslim encounters, perceptions and misperceptions continue to prevail. Yet the reference to positive traditions remains both topical and relevant for Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. As Arab Muslims and Europeans have engaged in positive encounters with one another on the grounds of a spirit based on *aql* (reason) in the past, it must be equally possible to revive this tradition and its spirit as a framework for necessary dialogue today—rather than engaging in new varieties of jihad and crusade.

The commitment to a European civic culture that is shared by all citizens stands in opposition to a cultural relativism that negates common values. Multiculturalism is based on cultural relativism, and European multiculturalists look to other cultures with a sense of romantic mystification in the Eurocentric tradition of viewing aliens as *bons sauvages*. Muslims who are committed to their positions in European societies as citizens of the heart, rather, view themselves as both Muslims and Europeans, seeing no essential contradiction between those identities. If this enlightened Muslim position should fail in favor of demands for specific laws and treatment for people of various cultural communities, then Islamization will be the future of Europe. The story of such Islamization would begin with a romantic ideology against cultural pluralism and in favor of the cultural-relativist plea for minority rights as understood by multicultural communitarianism.

It is fruitful to conduct a comparison of the Muslim diaspora in Europe with Muslim minorities in non-European countries. The largest Islamic minority in the world resides in India, where its status stands in contrast to the national constitution, which prescribes secular personal law for all religious communities. Simply for political expediencies of luring Muslim votes, an early Congress government allowed the practice of "Muslim Personal Law."<sup>55</sup> The rise of Hindu fundamentalism, exemplified by the elections of 1996 and 1998, is one result of resentment over privileges being given to the Muslim minority.

Given existing evidence of a growing hatred toward foreigners and xenophobic radicalism within Europe, we should be very cautious in discussing minority rights as collective cultural rights in a multicultural understanding. Granting minority privileges and special rights to cultural and religious groups would be counter-productive, only impeding the political integration of these groups and enticing the growth of right-wing radicalism.

## ISLAM IN EUROPE IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WORLD MIGRATION

The question asked in the title of this essay refers to the tensions existing between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism. We must keep in mind that political integration does not have to mean assimilation. Without ceasing to be Muslims, migrants can become Europeans by accepting both the citizenship rights and duties that would smooth the way for their membership in the club. It is appropriate, however, to demand from them loyalty to the democratic polity in which they live. Only cultural and religious reforms would enable a Muslim migrant to accept living under the governance of a non-Muslim ruler and the related authority.<sup>56</sup>

On the part of the Europeans, religious reforms have already been accomplished and are no longer needed, but a change in cultural attitudes continues to be imperative. Changes are possible that could lead to an acceptance of Muslims as citizens of the heart. For both parties, culture matters, and cultural change on both sides is due. Islam in the diaspora of Europe is to be viewed among the developing cultures of a globalizing world.<sup>57</sup> ■

## ENDNOTES

- 1 The term "citizens of the heart" was coined by Charles Maier at Harvard during a symposium held there on this issue. To be sure, holders of European passports are not necessarily European "citizens of heart," to quote Maier.
- 2 Richard Bernstein, "The Tuscan Paradise and the World Beyond," *International Herald Tribune*, July 28, 2006, 2.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 John Kelsay, *Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), 118.
- 5 Michael Kenny, *The Politics of Identity: Liberal Theory and the Dilemma of Difference* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) and Bassam Tibi, "Islam: Between Religious-Cultural Practice and Identity Politics," in Raj Isar and Helmut Anheier, eds., *Culture, Conflict and Globalization* (London: Sage, 2007), forthcoming.
- 6 See Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), chapter 6, on security.
- 7 Bernstein, 2.
- 8 "Deutschland—ein Hort des Pazifismus," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 28, 2006, 5.
- 9 Editorial, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 12-13, 2006.
- 10 See Robert Spencer, *Onward Muslim Soldiers* (Washington, D. C.: Regnery Publishers, 2003), 64-67; Caroline Fourrest, *Frère Tareq* (Paris: Grosset, 2004); and Ralph Gadbam, *Tariq Ramadan und die Islamisierung Europas* (Berlin: Schiler, 2006). On the Muslim Brotherhood as a background see Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- 11 See J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins, *Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 10, "The Islamization of Europe," 237-262.
- 12 Bassam Tibi, "Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe," in Peter Katzenstein and Timothy Byrnes, eds., *Religion in an Expanding Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

- Press, 2006), 204-224.
- 13 See George Steiner, *The Idea of Europe* (Tilburg: The Nexus Institute, 2004).
- 14 Tibi, in Katzenstein and Byrnes, eds.
- 15 Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1998), Vol. I, xiii.
- 16 See Bassam Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität?* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1998).
- 17 Bassam Tibi, *Der neue Totalitarismus: Heiliger Krieg und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2004). In the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* report of May 6, 1993, 2: "Islamismus als neue Form des Totalitarismus," my Zurich lecture on this issue—11 years ahead of the book—was covered.
- 18 Lawrence Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
- 19 See again Steiner, *The Idea of Europe*. See also Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
- 20 From the letter found on the body of Theo Van Gogh, in Ronald Rovers, "The silencing of Theo Van Gogh," *Salon*, November 24, 2004 <archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/11/24/vangogh/index.html> (accessed December 23, 2006).
- 21 See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998).
- 22 See Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
- 23 John Kelsay, *Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics* (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), 118.
- 24 Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 127-150.
- 25 Leon de Winter, "Wir müssen für eine Weile die Tore schließen," *Die Welt*, December 15, 2004, 1 (translation by Bassam Tibi).
- 26 See Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, N. J. Dawood, ed., Franz Rosenthal, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). On Ibn Khaldun's views with extensive references, see Bassam Tibi, *Der wahre Imam: Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Piper, 1996), chapter 6.
- 27 Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage of Islam* (London: Routledge, 1994) and W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1979).
- 28 Elaine Sciolino, "School Scarf Ban in France: Official Report Calls for a Law," *International Herald Tribune*, December 12, 2003, 1 and 6. See also the report on the following day "Threat on Head Scarves Angers French Muslims," *International Herald Tribune*, December 13, 2003, 3.
- 29 Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 1. On the headscarf, see Bassam Tibi, *Aufbruch am Bosphorus: Die Türkei zwischen Europa und dem Islamismus* (Munich: Diana Press, 1998), chapter 10.
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- 33 See William M. Watt, *Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions* (London: Routledge, 1991) and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1993).
- 34 Nezar Al-Sayyad, "Culture, Identity, and Urbanism in a Changing World," in Michael Cohen, ed., *Preparing for the Urban Future* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 108-122, 109.
- 35 Ibid., 120; Bassam Tibi, "Euro-Islam: The Quest of Islamic Migrants and of Turkey to become European," in *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 3 (1) (Spring 2004): 13-28.

- 36 This is the term coined by Tomas Gerholm and Yngve G. Lithman, eds., *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe* (London: Mansell, 1988).
- 37 William G. Lockwood, *European Moslems* (New York: Academic Press, 1975) and Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 38 See Alec G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France* (London: Routledge, 1995) and Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam: Naissance d'une religion en France* (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1987) and, more recently, Paul Silverstein, *Algeria in France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).
- 39 Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, *Muslime in Deutschland* (Freiburg: Herder, 2002), 46-91 and Bassam Tibi, *Der Islam und Deutschland: Muslime in Deutschland* (Munich: DVA, 2000).
- 40 See Bassam Tibi, "Communitarianism and Euro-Islam," in Gerhard Fischer, ed., *Adventures of Identity: European Multicultural Experiences and Perspectives* (Tübingen: Stauffenberg Press, 2001), 45-60.
- 41 For more details, see Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and on contemporary Islamist anti-Semitism, see Bassam Tibi in Julius Schoeps et al., eds., *Neu-alter Judenhass: Antisemitismus, arabisch-israelischer Konflikt und europäische Politik* (Berlin: Verlag Brandenburg, 2006), 179-202.
- 42 Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'rakatuna ma'a al-Yahud!* Our fight against the Jews (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989).
- 43 On this "story," see Bassam Tibi, "Islamismus ist genauso gefährlich wie Rechtsradikalismus. Der Aufstand der Anständigen," *Die Welt*, January 15, 2001, 2. See also Phyllis Chesler, *The New Antisemitism* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2003).
- 44 *Tagesspiegel*, July 2, 2005, 9.
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- 46 See Bassam Tibi, "Foreigners - Today's Jews?" in Ulrich Wank, ed., *The Resurgence of Right-Wing Radicalism in Germany* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), 85-102.
- 47 See Bassam Tibi, "Between Islam and Islamism," in Tami A. Jacoby and Brent Sasley, eds., *Redefining Security in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 62-82.
- 48 See Philip Lewis, *Islamic Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).
- 49 See Josef Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
- 50 Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), 85.
- 51 Kelsay, 118.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Bassam Tibi, "International Morality and Cross-Cultural-Bridging," in Roman Herzog et al., *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 107-126.
- 54 François Zabbal and Robert Bistolfi, eds., *Islams d'Europe: Intégration ou Insertion Communautaire* (Paris: Édition de L'Aube, 1995), herein, Bassam Tibi on Euro-Islam, 230-234.
- 55 Mushrul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). See also Bassam Tibi, "Hinduism and the Limited Secularity in India: A Model for Muslim-European Relations in the Age of Migration?," in W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, eds., *Muslims in the Margin* (Kampen: Kak Pharos, 1996), 130-144.
- 56 See Bassam Tibi, "Authority and Legitimation," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 155-160.
- 57 See Bassam Tibi in Lawrence Harrison and Jerome Kagan, eds., *Developing Cultures: Essays on Cultural Change* (New York: Routledge, 2006), chapter 14; and in Lawrence Harrison and Peter L. Berger, eds., *Developing Cultures: Case Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2006), chapter 9.