

Women, War, and World Order

Gender Difference in Security Attitudes in Europe and the United States, 2002-2011

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Abstract

This paper focuses on a change in the politics of democratic societies with important implications for national security policy: the increasing political mobilization of women. This change takes several forms, including an increase in the political interest and engagement of women, a growing gender differentiation in policy preferences, and an increasing tendency of women to identify with parties of the left. Despite the importance of these changes, they have been neglected by scholars of national security. In this paper, I examine cross-national evidence on gender difference for a number of security policy issues. I draw on survey measures on a wide variety of issues, including support for international involvement, multilateral institutions, the NATO Alliance, opinions of military power and balance of power, international threats, defense spending, and the use of military force. The study covers up to 14 nations. The most important cross-national finding is that overall gender polarization on security policy issues is strongly correlated with the level of the political mobilization of women. Within nations, gender difference is most prominent on issues of military power, the cost of defense, the acceptability of war, and the use of military force. Gender difference toward international involvement and multilateral institutions are smaller. However, gender difference on each of these issues show variation by nation and over time, which suggests that particular contexts condition the degree of gender polarization. Hypotheses that cast gender difference as universal are therefore suspect. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings for theories of gender difference and for the politics of Western security.

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Introduction

This paper focuses on a change in the politics of democratic societies with important implications for national security policy: the increasing political mobilization of women. As Inglehart and Norris have observed, this change takes several forms, including an increase in the political interest and engagement of women, a growing gender differentiation in policy preferences, and an increasing tendency of women to identify with parties of the left, a reversal from a time when women in most democracies leaned slightly rightward in their political identifications.¹ Although they were writing to describe the recent transformation of American politics, the judgment of Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson may well apply to politics in most democratic societies: "Gender has moved from a position of irrelevance to American political behavior to one of now substantial import. The possibility exists that it may become central."²

Despite the prominence of these changes, their implications for security politics have been neglected. To be sure, there is substantial research on gender differences in the security attitudes of citizens in the US, but whether this evidence can be generalized is uncertain given the unique position of the US in world politics. It may also be that cultural and political debates

¹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For further evidence and analysis on these points, see also Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 335-355; and Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth, "The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 1-19.

² Robert S. Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, *The Macro Polity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 176.

surrounding the rights of women are a uniquely American phenomenon. Gender polarization on security policy issues may therefore be uniquely American as well.

This paper explores cross-national evidence on gender difference for a number of security policy issues. I draw on survey measures on a wide variety of issues, including support for international involvement, multilateral institutions, the NATO Alliance, opinions of military power and balance of power, international threats, defense spending, and the use of military force. The analysis draws on *Transatlantic Trends*, a series of public opinion surveys carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the United States during the period 2002-2011. As Table 1 shows, the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys have been administered in a maximum of fourteen countries since 2002. The yearly questionnaire is identical in the countries surveyed, and sampling occurs in all countries during June of each year. Surprisingly neglected by scholars, these surveys are a unique resource for the study of security politics, and they are the only available resource that allows a comprehensive, comparative assessment of gender difference on security issues.

My principal findings have important implications for the study of gender politics and for the study of security politics in democratic societies. The most important cross-national finding is that overall societal gender polarization on security policy issues is strongly correlated with the level of the political mobilization of women. Within nations, gender difference is most prominent on issues of military power, the cost of defense, and the use of military force. Gender difference toward international involvement and multilateral institutions are smaller. However, gender difference on each of these issues shows variation by nation and over time, which suggests that particular contexts condition the degree of gender polarization. Nonetheless, the

possibility of continuing or even increasing gender polarization on security issues has important implications both for scholarship and for the politics of Western security.

I proceed as follows. In the next section, I briefly document the growing political interest and political mobilization of women in Europe and the United States. Second, although it is not the primary purpose of this paper to test theories of gender difference, I provide context for the data analysis by briefly reviewing hypotheses that predict gender differences on specific issues of national security. Third, I provide a summary of the data and methodology that I employ. Subsequent sections of the paper form the heart of the analysis: I describe gender differences on a number of questions, beginning with the fundamental question of international involvements and proceeding to an examination of gender difference on opinions of military power, international institutions and legitimacy, defense spending, the acceptability of war, and the use of military force. I conclude the paper with summary thoughts on the extent and magnitude of gender differences and the implications for both gender theory and the politics of Western security.

The Increasing Political Importance of Women

Scholars have identified two sets of trends that have significant implications for gender difference in the politics of national security. The first is the increasing access of women to higher education and to the labor market outside the home. As late as the 1980s, women represented less than half of enrolled students in post-secondary education in Western Europe and exactly half in the United States. In some countries, it was much lower (for example, approximately 38 percent in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). By 2009, in contrast, well over half of post-secondary students in Europe and the United States were women, and in

some countries the increase was prodigious (for example, from about 38 percent to substantially over 50 percent in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). In Turkey, only a quarter of post-secondary students in 1980 were women; by 2009 the figure had reached 43 percent.³

Similar changes occurred in labor markets. In the 1970s, less than 50 percent of women were active in the labor force in most countries for which data are available. The exception is Sweden, where exactly half of women were employed. In the US, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, an average of 37 percent of women participated in the labor market during the 1970s.⁴ This translated into an average of 38 percent of the total labor force. By 2010, however, over half of women worked outside the home in many countries, and women represented over 45 percent of the labor force in most European countries and in the United States.⁵

There are several important implications of these changes in labor market participation and educational attainment among women. First, and most obviously, education and paid employment provide the material and cognitive resources that are known to be strongly correlated with political engagement and participation: the higher the level of educational attainment and material resources, the higher the rate of political engagement.⁶ Second, traditional patterns of patriarchy are weakened as women gain what Inglehart and Norris refer to

³Institute for Statistics, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, "Enrollment in Total Tertiary. Public and Private. Full and Part Time," accessed February 18, 2012, <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=3677>

⁴Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, "Labor Force Participation Rate for Women," <http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32285>, accessed February 18, 2012.

⁵Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Labor Force Statistics 1989-2009, 2010 Edition*, http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_34251_2023214_1_1_1_1,00.html#data, accessed February 18, 2012. In Turkey, the figures are lower. In 1980, 27 percent of the labor force were women, and in 2010 the figure had actually declined to 26 percent.

⁶Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), and Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*.

as economic and psychological autonomy.”⁷ To the extent that women have (or develop) distinct policy preferences, these are more likely to be expressed among educated, employed women. As Iversen and Rosenbluth put it, under conditions of traditional patriarchy “family members are assumed to have more or less identical preferences.” However, as women become more independent through paid employment (and the increasing incidence of divorce), “we have to treat family members as individuals with distinct and potentially conflicting preferences.”⁸

In fact, change in labor markets helps to explain a second pattern in industrial and postindustrial societies: women are more supportive of social service programs than men, and there is some evidence that they have shifted their partisan loyalties to the left. Taking the latter observation first, Inglehart and Norris show that women born in the early years of the twentieth century showed a slight preference for parties of the right. Over time, however, there has been a leftward shift, with younger women in many European countries now slightly more likely to prefer parties of the left.⁹ The same pattern is evident in the United States, where men have drifted toward the Republican Party, while women continue to exhibit a preference for the Democratic Party.¹⁰

These partisan shifts are understandable when we recognize that, on average, women in most democracies are more supportive of an expansive role for government in general and for social service programs specifically. The pattern has been amply documented in the United

⁷ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, p. 90.

⁸ Iversen and Rosenbluth, “The Political Economy of Gender,” p. 2. Iversen and Rosenbluth emphasize the change in women’s bargaining power that accompanies the increasing incidence of divorce, but their reasoning seems equally applicable to the increased autonomy of women described by Inglehart and Norris, and the implications are similar: women in paid employment may have distinct preferences.

⁹ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, pp. 83-88.

¹⁰ Karen M. Kaufmann and John R. Petrocik, “The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 864-887

States. In an early study, Shapiro and Mahajan found significant gender differences on what the authors called “compassion issues”: “women were more supportive of a guaranteed annual income, wage-price controls, equalizing wealth, guaranteeing jobs, government-provided health care, student loans, and rationing to deal with scarcer goods.”¹¹ The same patterns were found in a later analysis of policy items from election studies over the period 2000 to 2004. Crowder-Meyer found large, consistent gender differences when comparing defense issues (including defense spending) and social welfare issues. Furthermore, Crowder-Meyer also shows that men and women differ both in their prioritization of these issues and in their propensity to condition their voting behavior on these priorities. Men are more likely to give defense a higher priority and to base their evaluation of candidates on this issue. Women, in contrast, rank social welfare higher and are more likely to condition their votes on the issue.¹²

There is less research on gender differences in policy preferences outside the US, but the evidence that does exist suggests that women’s higher relative preference for social service programs is widespread in industrial and postindustrial societies. For example, analyzing a question from the World Values Survey that asks if “government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for,” Inglehart and Norris find that “the evidence supports the thesis that women are overwhelmingly more favorable to an active role for the state.”¹³

Similarly, studying a sample of 10 OECD democracies, Iversen and Rosenbluth find that “Women everywhere want the government to take a more active role in public employment

¹¹ Robert Y. Shapiro, and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1986), p. 51.

¹² Melody Crowder-Meyer, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences and Priorities," paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., April, 2007.

¹³ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, p. 83.

creation,” in part to support the “partial socialization of family work,” but also to increase women’s employment prospects outside the home.¹⁴

Figures 1A and 1B display the endpoint of the process of social, economic, and political mobilization that accompanies economic development and the increasing employment and educational achievements of women. Figure 1A shows the percentage of women who score in the highest category on an index of political engagement. The index is constructed from two separate questions, one inquiring how often the respondent discusses politics with family and friends, the second inquiring how often she tries to persuade others of her political opinion.¹⁵ As the figure shows, political engagement correlates closely with level of economic development, as we would expect from the scholarly literature.¹⁶ Most importantly for our purposes here, the figure suggests that, to the extent that the gender differentiation of attitudes is correlated with the increasing political mobilization of women, we would expect to find the highest gender differences in the countries toward the upper end of the charts. Note that the United States is at the top, an important fact given my earlier warning about the potentially unique aspects of American politics. Nonetheless, there are other countries in which the political engagement of women is not far behind.

¹⁴ Iversen and Rosenbluth, “The Political Economy of Gender,” p. 18.

¹⁵ For a fuller discussion of these survey questions and the evolution of responses over time, see Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, and Paolo Belucci and David Sanders, “Informal Political Engagement in Europe, 1975-2007,” in David Sanders, Pedro Magalhaes, and Gabor Toka, eds., *Citizens and the European Polity: Mass Attitudes Towards the European and National Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2012).

¹⁶ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, p. 34.

SUMMARY: THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN.

An increase in educational and employment opportunities has provided a growing number of women with the resources and skills to participate in politics, and the political engagement of women has increased. This has important implications for the politics of national security, since women have policy preferences that are to the left of men. Because women are also presumed to have distinct preferences on issues of national security, there is the potential that gender polarization will characterize this issue area as well.

Hypotheses on Gender, National Security, and War

While my purpose in this paper is not to test a general theory of gender difference on issues of national and international security, the literature on gender difference provides five sets of hypotheses that help to specify the issues on which men and women are likely to differ in their views.

THE PRAGMATIC POLITICS OF GENDER

Because of the increase in the labor force participation of women, it is not surprising that one prominent body of research builds on the premise that gender differences arise from the distinct material needs of men and women, that is to say from pragmatic considerations rather than from any particular worldview or differing conceptions of national security. As women have entered the workforce in growing numbers, their need for social services has grown as well, in particular in the areas of child care, elder care, and health care, all services that at one time were provided

by women in the home. In addition, women place a higher priority on public education than do men.¹⁷

The significance of this transformation is that the competition between “guns and butter” may be the most salient issue that evokes gender difference. As we saw above, the evidence from the US supports this view. Women are less supportive of defense spending than are men; they are more likely to place a higher priority on social services compared to defense; and they are more likely to vote on the basis of these priorities.¹⁸ The implication of the pragmatic hypothesis is that gender differences are most likely on the issue of defense spending.

THE ESSENTIALIST VIEW

Perhaps the largest body of literature on gender difference is based on the putative effect of biological difference, especially the fact that women bear children and have the largest responsibility for their nurture and survival. The hypotheses associated with this line of reasoning include the arguments that women are more empathetic, more caring and compassionate, and more sensitive to threats to human life, but these hypotheses are highly contested.¹⁹ A tentative assessment of the scholarship that evaluates this hypothesis would be that it is now discounted, for an important reason: hypotheses based on biological difference predict relatively invariant gender differences across time, issues, and cultures, but existing

¹⁷ Crowder-Meyer, “Gender Differences Policy Preferences and Priorities.”

¹⁸ Ibid. See also Shapiro and Mahajan, “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences.”

¹⁹ The literature here is vast. For an exhaustive review, see Joshua S. Goldstein, *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For insightful evaluations, see Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1993), pp. 1079-1099; Valerie M. Hudson *et. al.*, “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 7-45; and Deborah Jordan Brooks and Benjamin A. Valentino, “A War of One's Own: Understanding the Gender Gap in Support for War,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2011), pp. 270-286.

scholarship demonstrates that gender differences vary across all of these dimensions. Conover and Sapiro, for example, find large gender differences in the US on some issues related to the Gulf War of 1991, but small differences on other issues.²⁰ There is less cross-national research on support for using force, but the limited evidence suggests variation rather than uniformity.²¹ For example, gender differences on security issues and the Middle East peace process are quite small –and in some cases nonexistent—in Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Jordan, and Lebanon.²²

Nonetheless, any assessment of the degree of constancy or variation in gender differences must remain tentative, because the number of cross-national studies is small. In addition, to my knowledge there is no cross-national study that evaluates a wide range of identical issues across an identical time span. One virtue of the surveys studied here is that they allow precisely this sort of comparison.

²⁰ Conover and Sapiro, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War," pp. 1086-1095. On gender difference in other contexts, see Val Burris "From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in Between-Group Differences in Support for Military Action," *Social Problems*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2008), pp. 443-479; Miroslav Nincic and Donna J. Nincic, "Race, Gender, and War," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No.5, (September 2002), pp. 547-68; and Adam Berinsky, *In Time of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 52-57.

²¹ The single comparative study of which I am aware deals with US and British opinion on the Korean and Vietnam Wars: Lisa Catherine Olga Brandes . "Public opinion, international security policy, and gender : the United States and Great Britain since 1945," (PH.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1994). Two studies focus on security issues in single countries. On Denmark, see Lise Togeby, "The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 3, 1 No. 4 (November 1994) pp. 375-392; and on Germany, Bettina Westle, "immer noch in der Steinzeit? Gesellschaftliche und politische Gender-Orientierungen," in Steffen Kühnel, Oskar Niedermayer and Bettina Westle, eds., *Wähler in Deutschland: Sozialer und politischer Wandel, Gender und Wahlverhalten* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften , 2009), pp. 137-165.

²² Mark Tessler and Ina Warriner, "Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes Toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East," *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), pp. 250-281; and Mark Tessler, Jodi Nachtwey, and Audra Grant, "Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1999), pp. 519-531. In addition, the evidence that mothers (or fathers) have distinct views has been largely disconfirmed in research, although gender remains an important factor. See Conover and Sapiro, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War," and Laurel Elder and Steven Greene, "The Myth of "Security Moms" and "NASCAR Dads": Parenthood, Political Stereotypes, and the 2004 Election," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-19. For more recent evidence that supports the motherhood hypothesis, see Brooks and Valentino, "War of One's Own."

THREAT, RISK, AND VIOLENCE

Conover and Sapiro report an interesting finding in their study of gender differences during the Gulf crisis and war of 1990/91: women in the US were more likely to exhibit a “fear of war” and to express what the authors call “isolationist” sentiments, that is, they were more likely to agree that “this country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.”²³ While puzzling perhaps for students of international relations or political behavior, these results are in keeping with the literature on gender, threat perceptions, and anxiety. Specifically, there is substantial evidence that women perceive higher threat from their environment than do men in the same environments. For example, women are more likely to fear victimization by crime and to perceive external threats.²⁴ However, they are less likely to favor a forceful or violent reaction to threats. For example, women in the US felt more threatened than men by terrorism after September 11, 2001, but they were less likely than men to endorse retaliatory measures, such as the initiation of the war in Afghanistan.²⁵ The reason is that women are also more likely to experience anxiety at the prospect of forceful retaliation, and anxiety increases the perception of risk, uncertainty, and loss of control:

—Women express higher levels of anxiety and perceive greater risks associated with war and

²³ Conover and Sapiro, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War," p. 1088-1091. Berinsky finds a similar gender difference in US attitudes toward various types of assistance to Britain and France prior to World War II, versus the options of “staying out.” See *In Time of War*, pp. 53-54.

²⁴ Leonie Huddy et. al., "The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 485-509. For an extensive review of the literature on gender, threat and anxiety, including cross-cultural evidence, see Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese, “Gender Differences in Response to Terrorism and War,” paper presented to the Fourth General Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy, September 6-7, 2007, especially pp 2-4.

²⁵ Leonie Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 593-608., and Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, —Gender Differences in Response to Terrorism and War,” pp. 11-16.

terrorism.”²⁶ Furthermore, “anxious individuals are motivated to reduce anxiety, leading to a preference for less risky options.”²⁷

That women should perceive higher levels of risk from the violence of war is not hard to understand. Hudson and her colleagues demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between the level of violence against women in a society and the propensity of that society to engage in warlike behavior.²⁸ Further, although the subject was neglected by students of international relations and war until recently, scholarship now documents the historical regularity with which violence against women—especially sexual violence—has been employed as a tactic of warfare.²⁹

All of this suggests that risk and violence are most likely to produce gender differences on issues of international security. To the extent that international involvement evokes an implicit risk, we would expect to find that women are less supportive of involvement—in other parts of the world.” Most importantly, we would expect the threat or use of violent military force to produce the largest gender differences in public opinion. However, we might also expect to find

²⁶Huddy et al., “Threat, Anxiety, and Support,” pp. 594-595.

²⁷Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese, “Gender Differences in Response to Terrorism and War,” p. 4.

²⁸Hudson et al., “The Heart of the Matter.”

²⁹Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost note that the fear of rape almost completely explains women’s greater fear of personal crime, but they observe that it would not explain women’s greater fear of nuclear weapons or the risks posed by violent conflicts, such as terrorism: Huddy et al., “The Consequences of Terrorism,” p. 490. Yet given the correlation between violence against women and the violence of war that has been documented in recent scholarship, the connection does not seem surprising. Recent scholarship on violence against women in war includes Goldstein, *War and Gender*, pp. 332-402; Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Variation in Sexual Violence during War,” *Politics & Society*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 307-342; and Jeffrey Burds, “Sexual Violence in Europe in World War II, 1939-1945,” *Politics & Society*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 35-73.

that women are more supportive of military interventions that are designed to mitigate the effects of violence, as is the case in studies of citizen support for humanitarian intervention.³⁰

COMMUNITY AND CONSENSUAL DECISION MAKING

Empirical research on citizen support for the use of military force has produced an important finding: although both men and women are more likely to support the multilateral use of force, the effect is more pronounced among women. For example, one study of support for using force in 37 countries found that mention of UN participation increased support by 8 percentage points among women, but there was no significant increase among men.³¹ Similarly, Brooks and Valentino find that women are actually more likely than men to support the use of force when the action is approved by the UN.³²

At least three reasons might underlie the relatively higher sensitivity of women to military actions that are carried out by—or with the sanction of—multilateral organizations. First, multilateral actions collectivize both the human and financial cost of war. Thus, if women are sensitive to potential casualties in war, the pooling of effort with others might reduce the risk to the lives of a single country's soldiers. Similarly, to the extent that women are wary of the financial costs of war on pragmatic grounds (it threatens social and other programs of higher value to women), military actions in which the costs are shared should be more acceptable. Second, as I noted, women are more sensitive to the risk of violence, and multilateral actions usually delay the onset of violence because they require a substantial period of consensus

³⁰ Brooks and Valentino, —*War of One's Own*,” pp. 270-286.

³¹ Reference deleted.

³² Brooks and Valentino, —*War of One's Own*.”

building. For that reason, multilateral actions may appeal disproportionately to women who have been socialized to use violence only as a last resort.³³ A third hypothesis is offered by Brooks and Valentino, who reason that women may prefer a “consensus orientation” in decision-making that emphasizes “cooperation and compromise within groups over aggression as a means of settling disputes.” Their research demonstrates that the usual gender pattern (men being more favorable than women to the use of force) is reversed when the military action has UN approval.³⁴ The same reasoning might explain the higher level of support among women for international institutions more generally.³⁵

These latter observations are reminiscent of both normative and empirical versions of liberal theories of international relations, in particular the argument of liberal theorists that international institutions can mitigate the pathologies of an international system composed of autonomous sovereign states in a competitive balance of power. For example, in a 1917 peroration against the balance of power, President Woodrow Wilson argued that “There must be not a balance of power but a community of power... When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.”³⁶ Compare this to the feminist, cosmopolitan themes of Virginia Woolf’s

³³ Conover and Sapiro argue that “The point is not that women learn early in life never to engage in conflict nor use violence, but rather that they learn to put off the use of violence until later in the course of a conflict than do men, to escalate its use more slowly, and to be more emotionally upset by it.” Conover and Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War,” p. 1096.

³⁴ Brooks and Valentino, “War of One’s Own,” p. 273.

³⁵ Monica L. Wolford and Karin L. Johnston, “Gender and Support for International Institutions,” paper presented to the Convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, May, 2000.

³⁶ As cited in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 52.

Three Guineas, in which she observed that —A woman, I have no country. As a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world.”³⁷

In summary, it may be that the disproportionate support of women for multilateral military actions is part of a broader, largely liberal, worldview. If so, gender differences in security attitudes should also be evident on other core issues of international relations, especially the nature and utility of military power and the balance of power. For realists (men?), power and power balance among autonomous states are the keys to stability. For liberals (women?), power and balance of power are themselves the problem in a system of autonomous, competitive sovereign states. Stability is more likely in a community of states operating through multilateral organizations.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS

Sapiro reminds us that contextual factors mediate the extent to which gender difference emerges in political attitudes and behavior.³⁸ For example, as noted above, gender difference may be unique —or uniquely consistent— in the American context because social, cultural, and political issues with gender implications are both salient and polarizing. The international context may also mediate gender difference. The US clearly towers over other states in terms of military power, and it has frequently taken the lead in military actions during and after the Cold War. Gender difference may be heightened by this prominent role. Similarly, evidence shows that

³⁷ As cited in Goldstein, *War and Gender*, p. 44. A debate about the compatibility of feminist theories and liberal international relations theory can be found in two articles: J. Ann Tickner (1997), —You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1997), pp. 611–632; and Robert Keohane, —International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 245-253.

³⁸ Virginia Sapiro, "It's the Context, Situation, and Question, Stupid: The Gender Basis of Public Opinion," in Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *Understanding Public Opinion* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002), pp. 21-42.

societies in intractable conflicts are less polarized on security issues by gender or any other social division. This appears to be the case in Israel and Palestine, for example.³⁹ Thus, as I analyze gender difference on security issues, I will be attentive to the possibility that gender difference is conditioned by these contextual factors.

Data and Methodology

Most scholarship on gender difference on toward national security issues is focused on the US. One reason is the availability of numerous surveys in the US that employ identical question wording, thus allowing for comparisons of gender difference on a number of issues over many time points. Once we move beyond the US, however, the task becomes more difficult, as survey organizations in different countries each have their own preferred wording on specific issues; some do not focus on national security at all; and those that do administer the questions at different points in time.

Fortunately for scholars, the opinion surveys in the German Marshall Fund's *Transatlantic Trends* series offer an excellent opportunity to close the gap in comparative research on gender difference. Beginning in 2002, *Transatlantic Trends* has conducted a yearly survey on foreign and security policy issues in a minimum of 7 countries and now includes surveys in 14 countries. The questions are identically worded in each country, and sampling takes place at the same time each year (June). Further, the surveys cover precisely those issues relevant to gender difference that I reviewed above: international involvement, the nature of power and power balance, threats, multilateral institutions, alliance, defense spending, the acceptability of war, and the use of military force.

³⁹ Tessler and Warriner, "Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes Toward International Conflict," p. 250.

In summary, the *Transatlantic Trends* data series offers the unique opportunity to evaluate the generality of gender differences across countries, issues, and time. In this paper, the analysis is largely descriptive: for a number of issues, I first describe the extent and significance of gender difference –if any—and seek to ascertain whether any observed difference remains with statistical controls for a number of additional variables, including self-described ideology, level of education, level of political engagement, and measures of the acceptability of war and support for the United States. In some cases, I report regression analyses to supplement bivariate and other cross tabulations.

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

The question of statistical significance versus substantive significance deserves elaboration. Because the sample size for many of the countries and groups of countries numbers several thousand respondents, even small percentage gender differences may be statistically significant. However, statistical significance alone does not translate into political significance. For example, opinions towards international involvement –essentially a question on isolationism—show gender differences of about 5 percentage points in the United States, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (and about the same within each of the countries in these groups), and this is enough to qualify as statistically significant given the large sample size. However, these differences occur around an average above 70 percent who favor international involvement. This is a robust consensus that characterizes opinions across all categories of ideology, education, and political engagement. Given the near-unanimous consensus in favor of international involvements, small gender differences are unlikely to have a political impact. Thus, as I describe gender differences on this and other questions, I will be attentive to the likelihood that such differences will be politically relevant.

The Fabric of Global Politics: Gender Difference on International Involvement, Threats, and Military Power

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Some previous research reports that women are less supportive of international involvements than are men, a difference that might be attributed to the greater risk aversion of women.

However, this finding is confined to attitudes in the United States during the crisis that preceded the Persian Gulf War of 1991, a time when perception of risk might have been heightened.

Figure 2 reports gender difference in answers to a very similar question posed in *Transatlantic Trends* from 2002 through 2005. The question asked: —“Do you think it will be best for the future of [country] if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?”

Although the potential risks of involvement were also high during this time period —it included the years after September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq—Figure 2 shows a very high cross-national consensus among both men and women in favor of international involvement. Over 60 percent of women and over 70 percent of men favor involvement in all countries, and there is virtually no variation in this consensus by ideological orientation, by generational cohort, or in any specific country. Among those with higher education within both genders, there is even greater support for international involvement (over 75 percent), and this consensus is very stable over time.⁴⁰

On the question of international involvement, then, there is no controversy anywhere, let alone a gendered one. It may be that the question is so anodyne as to be of limited utility. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, international involvement of one kind or another may have

⁴⁰ Here and elsewhere, additional demographic breakdowns are not displayed unless they reveal a statistically or politically significant difference.

appeared unavoidable. On the other hand, that seems precisely the point. The involvements that were debated and undertaken from 2001 to 2005 included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and most of the countries analyzed here deployed troops to one or both of these theaters. In spite of this context, these data suggest that, at least on a general level, involvement in global affairs did not evoke controversy. Moreover, the data cast doubt on one specific hypothesis linking gender to global affairs. The fact that global involvement does not evoke gender difference suggests that it does not arise from a generalized aversion to international risks.

INTERNATIONAL THREAT

A repeated finding of social science research is that women perceive their environment as more threatening than do men. We would expect this tendency to be particularly evident during the last decade, which was characterized by major terrorist attacks in many parts of the world and by two major wars. Testing this proposition, however, is not as easy as one would like. In the case of *Transatlantic Trends*, there are many questions on “threats” over many years, but the wording of these questions suggests that one phenomenon or another (terrorism, climate change) is indeed a threat –it is simply a question of whether it is a “very important” or “somewhat important” threat. On most issues of international security (terrorism, Iranian nuclear program) the responses yield very high percentages indicating that the problem is indeed perceived as a very or somewhat important threat. On most of these questions, gender differences are very small.

However, there *are* some differences in the intensity with which respondents perceive threats, that is, in the percentage who find a threat “very important” rather than “somewhat important.” A selection of these threats is shown in Table 2, where responses are arranged not by the level of perceived threat (terrorism and Iranian nuclear weapons are the highest) but by

the size of gender differences. The table makes clear that “violence and instability in Iraq” evokes the strongest gender difference, but only in the United States and Western Europe. Gender differences are also large for the perceived threat from the “spread of disease,” again most so in the US and Western Europe. Significantly, there is not a general pattern in which women feel significantly more threatened by all international problems. Indeed, women feel *less* threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, gender differences in threat perception vary considerably across regions as well as issues. In the United States and Western Europe, there are some gender differences, and these are generally larger than those in Eastern Europe and Turkey (where women often feel less threatened than men).⁴¹

Why are gender differences largest on the issue of the threat from “violence and instability in Iraq” and secondarily the threat from the “spread of disease/avian flu?” One hypothesis is that the wording of these two threats most directly evokes physical harm to individuals. “Violence” in Iraq or “disease” seem much more personally immediate than the threat from an “economic downturn” or even “terrorism” in the abstract. The plausibility of this hypothesis is reinforced by the research findings reviewed earlier that suggested that gender differences are indeed highest on issues that directly imply violence. In any case, taken together with the results on international involvement discussed in the previous section, we would conclude that it is not so much involvement in world affairs that evokes gender difference, but rather the threat of violence and harm.

⁴¹ Simple regression models (ordered probit) of the Iraq violence and avian flu items reveal that these threats are most significantly influenced by gender in the US and Western Europe; in Eastern Europe, gender affects only the flu item. Educational attainment is also a significant influence in most cases; ideological self-placement is not.

MILITARY POWER AND BALANCE OF POWER

Gender difference on the question of the utility of military power should be high. I have reviewed three hypotheses that suggest why this should be the case. First, gender differences are generally high on issues of force and violence, and military power is the instrument of violence. Second, just as liberal theorists criticize balance of power as the path to an insoluble security dilemma or the cause of conflict itself, feminists criticize hierarchies of power. As I argued above, liberal and feminist theorists also criticize military power and balance of power for the same reason: peace or stability based on military power impedes the creation of community. Finally, military power is expensive. To the extent that gender difference on security issues is due to pragmatic considerations, we would expect military power to raise the specter of a guns/butter tradeoff and thus increase gender difference.

The utility of military power is raised squarely in the question displayed in Table 3. The question asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement that “The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.” Several things in Table 3 stand out. First, there is a chasm in the responses between the US and Turkey on the one hand, and Western and Eastern Europe on the other. In the former, a majority of the population agrees that military strength ensures peace, but in the latter this view is a distinct minority. Second, in separate analyses (not shown), I find rather unsurprisingly that these views are strongly correlated with ideological self-placement—the right is more supportive of military strength than the left. Nonetheless, given the overwhelming skepticism of Europeans toward military strength, this polarization may not be politically meaningful, as it is a view shared on all sides of the political spectrum. Finally, it is only in the United States that there is a gender difference, and it is significant both statistically and politically. In the US, a majority of men agrees that military strength ensures peace, but a

majority of women disagrees.⁴² Further, as the bottom of Table 3 shows, this gender difference is complicated but not removed by considering party identification. Military strength is more highly valued by both men and women in the Republican Party, but there is a gender division within the latter as well. The overall result in the US is a society that appears doubly divided on the issue of military power: by both party and gender.

A second evaluation of power occurs in a question about “superpowers.” Over the last twenty years, there has been a great deal of discussion in Europe about the US becoming a “hyper power” and the need to “balance” the US by enhancing European military capabilities.⁴³ *Transatlantic Trends* pursued this question during 2002-2005 by asking the following: “In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union:

- The US should remain the only superpower
- The European Union should become a superpower, like the United States
- No country should be a superpower [volunteered]”

The review of prior research presented above would lead us to expect one of two gender patterns in the response to this question. First, because of the hypothesized relative antipathy of women to power and hierarchy, we would expect women to favor the “no country should be a superpower”

⁴² In the US and Western Europe (less strongly), gender is a significant influence in a simple regression test (ordered probit) including ideological self-placement, educational attainment, and a variable representing the acceptability of war as an instrument of policy (described later in this paper). Ideological self-placement is the strongest influence in all four groups of countries shown in the table. Gender is insignificant in Eastern Europe and Turkey.

⁴³ Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2006), pp. 149-186.

response. Secondly, we might also expect women to favor the “Europe as a superpower” response, for it at least suggests that dominant power (hierarchy) should be balanced.

The responses in Table 4 indicate that neither of these patterns is present. In fact, gender differences are close to nonexistent in all countries but the US. American opinions on this issue are indeed divided, but gender plays a relatively minor role in that division. It is true that American women are slightly less favorable toward the idea of the US as a single superpower, and the gender divide does occur at a closely divided level of opinion that could be politically relevant. Nonetheless, the gender difference is dwarfed by the polarization by party and ideology. For example, on the left of the political spectrum in the US, only 26 percent of respondents believe in “unipolarity.” On the right, in contrast, it is 60 percent! These ideological divisions do not exist in other countries.⁴⁴

In contrast, in Europe there is a clear consensus in favor of the European Union becoming a superpower, while in Turkey there is a division between this point of view and the view that no country should be a superpower (a disparity that is surely relevant to the politics of Turkish foreign policy). What is important for my purpose here is the finding that there are virtually no gender differences of consequence on this issue in Europe or Turkey. Thus, although some hypotheses on gender difference would point to opinions of power as a likely fulcrum of gender cleavage, I find evidence for the hypothesis only in the US.

However, on one aspect of military power—its cost—there is more evidence of gender difference. Table 5 shows a follow-up to the immediately preceding question on the US and European Union as superpowers. The follow-up asks those who had favored the European Union

⁴⁴ Interestingly, when ideology does divide opinion in other countries, however weakly, it is usually the case that a European superpower is mildly preferred on the right of the political spectrum. The exception is the UK, where the ideological pattern more closely resembles US opinion.

becoming a superpower if they are ~~w~~illing to spend more on defense to achieve superpower status for Europe.” As Table 5 shows, Europeans’ aspiration to achieve superpower status is not matched by a desire to spend more in its pursuit. Indeed, opinions on the issue are closely divided, and gender difference on this question is both clear and politically relevant. In both Western and Eastern Europe, a majority of men would be willing to spend more, but a majority of women would not. Which view would prevail politically is a very close call, and the data suggest that any contest on the issue would evoke gender difference.⁴⁵

Table 6 shows that this pattern is present in all countries, although the absolute level of support for increased spending does vary. In all countries but one (Netherlands), a majority of men are willing to spend more. Among women, a majority exists in only five, and in Italy and France it is a very slim majority indeed. Further, these differences are politically as well as statistically significant, as there are essentially competing majorities by gender.⁴⁶

SUMMARY: GENDER DIFFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, THREATS, AND POWER

As Wittkopf once concluded with respect to American public opinion, the data reviewed to this point suggest that it is not international involvement itself that polarizes opinion, but rather the means and consequences.⁴⁷ International involvement is everywhere uncontroversial and evokes no gender difference. On the ~~th~~reat” of violence, however, there are indeed gender differences, and there are also indications that military power and especially its cost further divide the

⁴⁵ The bottom half of Table 5 shows that in Europe and Turkey there is also a strong left-right polarization on this issue, but the gender difference remains significant even in the presence of this polarization.

⁴⁶ Logistic regressions demonstrate that gender is a significant influence in all countries but Turkey and Slovakia, controlling for left-right self-placement, a measure representing the acceptability of war, support for US global leadership, and level of education.

⁴⁷ Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 376-401.

genders. However, the most significant finding to this point is that gender differences are not universal across issues, regions or nations. Cross-nationally, gender difference is most prominent in the US, which should alert us to the possibility that gender politics in the US have some unique qualities. Second, the fact that gender difference varies cross-nationally and across issues places initial doubt on any hypothesis that casts gender difference as universal.

Multilateral Institutions, Alliance, and Legitimacy

Citizens' opinions concerning the value and legitimizing role of multilateral institutions offer a particularly useful opportunity. As we have seen, several hypotheses based on previous research would suggest that women are more supportive of international institutions and more likely to support military actions if they are sanctioned by international or multilateral institutions. In addition, the logic of burden-sharing might suggest that women would also be more supportive of military actions carried out by or with the sanction of the NATO Alliance. In this section, I evaluate these hypotheses, with particular attention to four opinion measures: general favorability of the United Nations; the question of whether it is legitimate to bypass the United Nations; the question of whether multilateral endorsement or participation has any impact on support for those actions; and the questions of whether burden sharing within NATO or a joint decision by the European Union elicit a more positive response from women.

GENERAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

From 2003 through 2006, *Transatlantic Trends* asked respondents about their general level of favorability toward the United Nations. The question was: —“Would you say your overall opinion of the United Nations (UN) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” Although not terribly specific, the question does allow a rare comparative

evaluation of the hypothesis that women have more positive opinions of international institutions. Table 7 indicates that there is little evidence for this hypothesis. Two features of the data stand out. First, the overall results at the top of table show that citizens in both Western and Eastern Europe are highly favorable toward the UN, while those in the US and Turkey are less so. Although majorities in the latter two countries are favorable, one suspects that the reasons for the comparatively lower UN ratings are somewhat different in each country. In the US, there are those who fear that the UN will not do its job, while in Turkey there are those who fear it will.⁴⁸

The second finding is striking: gender differences exist only in the US, and they are substantial. In fact, American women reveal attitudes toward the UN that are closer to the average European than to those of American men. The middle and bottom portions of Table 7 show that gender polarization in the US characterizes all levels of political engagement and party identification (although not shown, there are also gender differences at all levels of educational attainment). Although it is clear that partisanship and political engagement are strongly correlated with support for the UN, there are also significant gender differences within these groups. In the US, then, general assessments of the UN are thoroughly polarized.⁴⁹

It is interesting that, uniquely in the US and Turkey, UN favorability is lowest among the most politically engaged men. Put differently, in both countries assessments of the UN are high among women at all levels of political engagement. Among men, however, the most politically engaged are the least supportive of the UN, so that the largest gender difference in the US and Turkey occurs at the highest level of political engagement. A similar pattern for the US is not shown in the table: men with higher education are least favorable toward the UN, and educated women are the most favorable. As a result, in the US the gender difference is greatest among

⁴⁸ The patterns are uniform for individual years and countries.

those with higher education. In summary, in the US and to some extent Turkey, gender polarization in attitudes toward the UN occurs among those who are presumably most informed and by their own reports most politically engaged.⁵⁰

IS IT JUSTIFIABLE TO BYPASS THE UNITED NATIONS?

General favorability toward the UN is one thing, but perhaps the more important question is whether favorable attitudes translate into a willingness to accept the UN's injunctions, or whether it is justifiable to ignore the UN altogether. In 2003-2005, *Transatlantic Trends* asked precisely this question: "Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following: When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN."

From the literature reviewed above, the hypothesis would be that women are more likely to reject this statement because it contradicts the presumed consensus building function of the United Nations, and it ignores the cost and risk sharing that UN actions or mandates can offer.

However convincing the hypothesis, Table 8 shows little supporting evidence.

The table shows that overall agreement with this sentiment is surprisingly strong, at least among Western and Eastern Europeans, who had shown UN favorability ratings of about 80 percent in the previous table. Nonetheless, here we see that more than a majority of Eastern Europeans and a sizable percentage of Western Europeans are prepared to bypass the UN. Citizens in the US and Turkey were less favorable to the UN to begin with, so they are understandably more ready to bypass the institution.

⁵⁰ Regression experiments (ordered probit) on the US data reveal that gender always has a significant influence on UN favorability ratings even after controlling for standard demographic variables, such as ideology and educational attainment.

There are significant gender differences in only four countries: the US, United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, but they are not all in the same direction. In the US and UK, women conform to the hypothesis: they are less willing to bypass the UN, especially those on the left of the political spectrum (shown at the bottom of Table 8). In Germany and the Netherlands, in contrast, women are more likely to favor bypassing the UN, a pattern also most pronounced on the political left. Why should women in these two countries display attitudes that are opposite those of women in the other two countries? The answer likely lies in the context in which citizens appraised UN action in the debate that led to the Iraq War in 2003. In the US and the UK, governments were pushing hard for a UN resolution that would authorize a coalition to use force in Iraq, but the US government in particular made clear that it would go to war in any case (thus bypassing the UN). This was an action that women on the left in these countries rejected. In Germany, by contrast, the government had made clear in 2002 that it would not participate in a war against Iraq under any circumstances. In this case women on the left in Germany were also gravitated toward the “anti war” position by endorsing the view that their country should bypass the UN (should it come to that).⁵¹

In short, in these four countries, one can interpret the attitudes of women (in particular) as essentially opposed to the use of force, but this opposition found expression in different ways depending on the different political context in each country. The important point is that the gender difference appears to be governed by opposition to the use of force. Attitudes toward the UN appear instrumental or secondary.

A similar result occurred in responses to a question in the 2005. Respondents were asked simply to agree or disagree with the following statement: “The use of military force is more

⁵¹A headline in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of February 13, 2003 illustrates the point: “Schröder emphasizes German sovereignty in the decision to send German troops.”

legitimate when the United Nations (UN) approves it.” The hypothesis would be that women will be more likely to agree with this statement, but with the exception of the United States, the opposite is actually true: men are slightly more likely to agree. In Germany and Italy, the difference is very large; about 70 percent of men agree with the statement, but among women the figure is 55 percent. As was true with the question on bypassing the United Nations, in these two countries approval by the United Nations is not enough to overcome skepticism among women about the use of military force. War—not institutions—is the issue.

THE UNITED NATIONS, THE NATO ALLIANCE, AND LEGITIMACY: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

The same pattern is again revealed in a more concrete set of questions in 2003 that probed respondents’ sensitivity to the participation of the UN or the NATO Alliance in a hypothetical attack to “eliminate weapons of mass destruction” in North Korea or Iran. Formulated in the shadow of events leading up to the war in Iraq, three variants of the question were offered to different portions of the sample: one variant described an attack by the United States, a second described an attack by NATO, and a third described an attack by the United Nations. Following the hypothesis that I have been pursuing here, the expectation is that women would be more sensitive to—and supportive of—multilateral actions.

Table 9 demonstrates that this is not the case. It is true that support for military action increases among both men and women in the multilateral versions of the question (labeled b. NATO and c. UN in the table). However, men are far more responsive to the multilateral cue than women. This is particularly clear in the case of Western and Eastern Europeans. Less than a

majority of men and women favor an attack carried out by the United States alone, but when NATO or the UN is mentioned as the agent of the attack, support increases to a majority of men in both cases. Among women, however, the increase is much less substantial. As a result, there is a majority in favor of a military action carried out by NATO or the UN among men in Western and Eastern Europe, but among women there is never a majority. Although women are somewhat influenced by the multilateral cue, they remain less supportive of a military attack.⁵² Note also that the percentage divisions in Europe have potential political relevance, as men and women are divided on the issue around a precarious majority.

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND BURDEN SHARING

I noted above that multilateral military actions have the advantage of sharing human risk and financial cost, perhaps one reason that women might be more supportive of military actions that have multilateral endorsement or participation. The questions on military action against Iran and North Korea reviewed immediately above cast some doubt on this thesis, but those questions do not explicitly mention burden-sharing considerations. Table 10 summarizes two questions that were designed specifically to test the proposition that all members of the NATO Alliance should share in the provision of the troops or the financial costs of military action. The first question simply elicits agreement or disagreement with the proposition that “all NATO member countries should contribute troops if the NATO alliance decides to take military action.” The second question asks if “[you] agree or disagree that all NATO member countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops?”

⁵² Responses to this question are patterned by ideology in Western Europe, but this correlation does not eliminate the significant gender effect shown in the table.

As Table 10 shows, the responses to these questions are generally responsive to the norm of burden-sharing. However, women are not more responsive than men. In fact, they are generally less so, especially in Western and Eastern Europe, and in some countries they are substantially less so. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, in fact, robust majorities of men agree with the statements, but women are closely divided. Thus, although it is true that both men and women are more supportive of these norms than they are in response to questions about specific military actions, there is no indication that the prospect of sharing the risk and cost of NATO actions reduces the difference between men and women in support of for these actions.⁵³

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

Finally, it is useful to examine a question that measures reactions to a military action by an important multilateral organization: the European Union. Designed in part to probe citizen support for an integrated approach to European security, the surveys included the following question in 2006 and 2007: "Some say that in order for the European Union to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things. To what extent do you agree with the following? If the European Union should decide to use military force, [our country] should abide by that decision, even if [our country] disagrees." Table 11 shows that a majority or strong minority of men in all but one country (Slovakia) would support a European Union decision to use force. Among women, in contrast, there is strong support in only three countries. In most countries, the gender difference is among the largest reported in this paper. Further, regression experiments

⁵³ This occurs despite the fact that women are actually more supportive of the NATO Alliance than men. For the period 2002-2011, 60 to 70 percent of both genders in all countries considered NATO "essential to our country's security." The figures for women average 4 percentage points higher than for men, and there are no countries in which women are less supportive. In two countries (France and the US), women are more supportive of NATO by a significant margin.

(not shown) demonstrate that gender remains a very significant predictor in the presence of controls for left-right ideology, the belief that war is necessary, support for a strong EU global role, and the belief that economic power is more important than military power.

Why are the differences so large? One explanation is that the question combines two considerations that evoke gendered responses: the first is military action, and the second is the process of European integration. We know that women are slightly more skeptical of European integration than men, presumably because of fears that market integration will lead to leveling or cuts in social programs.⁵⁴ Here we see that a supranational decision to use military force evokes an even stronger skepticism. The one thing we do not see is any indication that the relative aversion of women to the use of military force is mollified when the proposed action would be carried out jointly as the result of a European decision.

SUMMARY: MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, ALLIANCE, AND LEGITIMACY

The surveys discussed in this section cast doubt on the hypothesis that women will express a more generalized liberal vision of international relations. Only in the US is there a substantial gender difference in UN favorability. When the issue turns to the role of the UN, NATO, or the European Union in legitimizing or collectivizing military actions, women are less likely to express support than are men. These results suggest that the question of using military force is the most divisive. Multilateral endorsement or participation appears secondary.

⁵⁴ Brent F. Nelson and James L. Guth, "Exploring the Gender Gap: Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration," *European Union Politics*, vol. 1 no. 3 (October 2000), pp. 267-291.

Pragmatic Politics: Gender Difference in Support for Defense Spending

Past research on citizen attitudes in the US reports a consistent finding: women are on average less supportive of defense spending and place a higher priority on social service spending. In the US, the gender difference (with men more supportive) has averaged 9 percentage points since the mid-1960s, although it varies over time.⁵⁵ However, there is no comparative research on gender difference and defense spending, so it is difficult to say if this is a general pattern.

The *Transatlantic Trends* series contains a question about defense spending in five years: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, and 2011. The questions are variants on the familiar form of survey measures on government spending: “Do you think defense spending should be increased, kept the same, or decreased?” As Wlezien has argued, the interesting political question is the balance of sentiment about spending *change*, that is, the percentage favoring increases and decreases in spending (ignoring those who want spending to remain the same).⁵⁶ In the following analysis, therefore, support for defense spending is measured as follows:

$$\text{Net support} = \% \text{increase} / (\% \text{increase} + \% \text{decrease}) * 100$$

Net support for defense is thus the percentage who support an increase in spending relative to all who want a change from the current level of the defense budget.

⁵⁵ Crowder-Meyer, —Gender Differences in Policy Preferences and Priorities,”and Shapiro and Mahajan, —Gender Differences in Policy Preferences.”

⁵⁶ Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 981-1000. Wlezien emphasizes that it makes little difference how one measures net support, because empirically the “increase” and “decrease” responses are essentially mirrors. Adding either to the “remain the same” response also produces a measure that is strongly correlated with the net support measure presented here.

Figure 3 displays the gender difference in this measure of support (that is, net support among women minus net support among men). The signal characteristic of these differences is their variability. In the US and Europe, women are on average less supportive of defense spending, but in Turkey they are more so. In some years the differences are large, but in others they are small (and thus statistical significance varies as well). Clearly, contextual factors mediate gender difference on this measure. Following scholarship on the subject, the hypothesis would be that aggregate opinion and gender difference varies with the most recent direction of change in the defense budget itself, with economic factors, and with the balance of change in civilian and defense spending.⁵⁷

Both the graphic in Figure 3 and the tabular summary at the bottom show that gender difference was large in 2003 and largest in 2004. In fact, the difference is highly significant in ten of the thirteen countries for at least one of these years (and sometimes both). This suggests that one contextual factor was the war in Iraq, which of course began in 2003 and deteriorated into widespread violence during 2004 through 2006.⁵⁸ However, it seems unlikely that spending for the war was the most important factor. The gender difference is large in Germany and France, but these countries had no troops in Iraq and therefore no war-related spending. Thus, it seems likely that attitudes toward defense spending are not solely conditioned by change in spending itself. Rather, they are likely influenced by more general attitudes toward war and the use of force.

This reasoning is confirmed in a series of regression experiments (not shown) that I conducted on the responses in Figure 3. They demonstrate that attitudes towards defense

⁵⁷ Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat," and Paul M. Kellstedt, David A. M. Peterson, and Mark D. Ramirez, "The Macro Politics of a Gender Gap," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (2010), pp. 477-498.

⁵⁸ Thus, were surveys available for 2005 and 2006, we would expect to see large gender differences.

spending are indeed strongly related to basic attitudes toward war (the belief that war is sometimes a necessary instrument of policy), by support for the US and the NATO alliance, and by the individual's ideological orientation. However, in 2003 and 2004, gender is also a significant influence even when controlling for these other variables. This is also true for each country analyzed individually for 2003 and 2004. Further, as the national summaries at the bottom of Figure 3 indicate, there is also a gender effect for some countries in most years (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia). Finally, we saw in an earlier section of this paper that the European aspiration to be a global power was substantially reduced when the question of increased defense spending was mentioned, and this reduction was largest among women. In summary, although gender differences on defense spending vary by country and year, they characterize defense politics in all countries at one point in time or another.

It's Complicated: Gender Difference and the Use of Military Force

Gender differences on support for the use of military force are well studied, but for the most part only in US public opinion. In this section, I provide an overview of gender differences in the thirteen countries surveyed by *Transatlantic Trends*. I begin with a basic question on the acceptability of war, followed by an examination of gender difference on a number of actual or hypothetical military actions.

IS WAR NECESSARY TO OBTAIN JUSTICE?

Since 2003, *Transatlantic Trends* has included a question that attempts to measure support for the proposition that military force is sometimes necessary as an instrument of policy. The question asks: "Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following—Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice." The question is not without weakness for purposes

of policy analysis. The mention of “justice” is of particular concern, especially in the environment after September 11, 2001, when respondents might interpret the question as specifically inspired by the attacks on the US.

Yet the question has virtues as well. The first is the blunt invocation of war in a field of survey research that often employs rather imprecise words such as “military action.” This is a particular virtue for analyses of gender difference, given the centrality of hypotheses that ascribe difference to the violence of war. Second, the question subtly invokes the ambivalence that most citizens have about policy issues.⁵⁹ War may be necessary, but only “under some conditions.” The question for analysis is whether different groups of respondents resolve this ambivalence in different ways. A third virtue of the question is that it has proven to be a very robust discriminator of opinions on many other security issues.⁶⁰ As we saw in the previous section, this question is a very strong correlate of support for defense spending, which increases our confidence that it measures fundamental attitudes toward military force. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is also a very strong correlate of support for specific military actions. Finally, analysis of the question over time demonstrates that it is strongly and consistently related to fundamental domestic divisions, especially to ideology.⁶¹ In summary, whatever doubts one might have about the wording of the question, it seems to measure a fundamental toleration or rejection of war as an instrument of policy.

⁵⁹ John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, “A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (August 1992), pp. 579-616.

⁶⁰ Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, “Drifting Apart or Waltzing Together? The Atlantic Community and its Crises,” paper presented to the Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April, 2012.

⁶¹ Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, *Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in U.S.-European Relations* (Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004).

The evolution of responses to the question among men and women is shown in Figure 4. International context obviously conditions the overall responses. The United States, attacked in 2001 and involved in two major wars since then, shows a very high acceptance of war, but it is less accepted elsewhere. However, the difficulties of war that have plagued the US and other nations shown in the graphic have left their mark: acceptance of war declines everywhere, especially during 2003-2006, when the violence in Iraq was most intense. However, in all countries but Turkey, support is now slowly rising or stabilizing, possibly a result of the winding down of the war in Iraq or the more popular war in Libya.

Gender differences on the question are apparent everywhere, although less so in the US than elsewhere. These are seen most clearly in Figure 5. The differences in Western Europe are remarkable indeed, averaging well over 10 percentage points. Whether these differences are politically significant is another matter. In the US and Eastern Europe, the political impact of gender difference may be low, in the former because they occur at a high level of support for war among both genders, and in the latter because support is so low among both. However, for two reasons, the potential political significance of gender should not be underestimated. The first is that the attitudes –and gender difference—measured in this question strongly condition opinions on other security choices. The second reason is revealed in the gender polarization that characterized opinion in 2003 and 2004. In these years near the beginning of the war in Iraq, opinions outside the US were closely divided by gender, with majorities or close to majorities of men expressing support for war and women demonstrating far less. At this time, there was also pressure on many of the countries studied here to contribute or maintain military forces to the coalition of the willing. However, as Table 12 reveals, in many countries opinion was closely divided in 2003 and 2004, and gender division was a big part of the polarization. In Poland,

Portugal, Italy, Slovakia, France, and Germany, majorities or large minorities of men were tolerant of war, compared to distinct minorities of women. Indeed, in these latter cases, the gender differences of 13 to 17 percentage points are truly remarkable compared to the difference revealed in previous research.⁶²

The bottom portion of Table 12 shows that these gender differences exist within all ideological groupings, but the impact of gender is particularly strong in Europe and Turkey. Politically, the most significant division may be in Western Europe, where there is a center-right majority toleration for war among men, but this is not matched by similar support among women on the center and right. Indeed, the gender divisions on the center and right of the spectrum in Western Europe are deep –women on the right have opinions that more closely resemble those of their male compatriots on the left! The same is true among women in the center and on the right in Eastern Europe, who are even less tolerant of war than men on the left, but the impact of this polarization may be less relevant given the low levels of support among both genders. In Turkey, the situation is different: there is little gender difference on the right of the political spectrum, a significant fact given that the right constitutes over 50 percent of Turkish citizens.

Although I do not show the results here for reasons of space, the significance of gender for opinions of “war and justice” is confirmed in a number of regression experiments in which I aggressively controlled for variables that should as a matter of theory influence attitudes toward war (including support for US global leadership, support for the NATO alliance, left-right ideology, level of education, age, level of political engagement, and controls for year and country of sampling). The same results occur for each country taken separately. In fact, in some countries

⁶² According to the US State Department, the “coalition of the willing” in 2003 included the following that are listed in Table 11: Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom See: —US “coalition of the willing,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm>.

(Germany), gender is by far the strongest correlate of this attitude toward war. In summary, there is no question that gender has a significant influence on basic attitudes toward war.

GENDER DIFFERENCE ON REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL MILITARY ACTIONS

Does gender difference in basic dispositions toward war translate into significant differences on specific military actions? The answer is that it is complicated: in some cases it does and in other cases it does not. Depending on the objective for which force is used or proposed and the phase of the conflict, gender differences range from large to nonexistent, although in some cases they are politically significant.

Table 13 summarizes gender differences on three questions involving the use of military force by individual nations or ~~in~~ international forces.” The first concerns approval of the presence of each nation’s troops in Afghanistan (2004, question a. in Table 13) and subsequent opinions on whether troop levels should be increased, maintained, reduced, or withdrawn altogether (question b. in the table). In 2004, gender differences were apparent everywhere on the question of troop presence in Afghanistan, and in Western Europe and Turkey the difference occurs at levels of support that are politically tenuous (majorities of men and far lesser support among women). However, through 2009 and 2011, enthusiasm for the mission in Afghanistan declined, especially among men. By 2011, gender differences remained but were less significant, both statistically and politically. In every country except Turkey, support for troops in Afghanistan had all but collapsed. Nonetheless, gender remained a significant element of polarization as opinions changed.

However, opinions of stationing troops in the Middle East yield a different story (question c. in Table 13). The question asks about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and in

particular whether “The US and Europeans should send a peace-keeping force to separate the parties.” As the table shows, there is a gender difference only in the US, with women now in a strong supportive majority, compared to minority support among men. This replicates a finding discussed above: in past research, gender difference on the use of military force by the US are smaller when the objective for using force is humanitarian.⁶³ We now see that the pattern holds for Western Europe as well: there are large gender differences on the question of troops in Afghanistan, but virtually none on the issue of peace-keeping troops for the Middle East.

A similar pattern holds for opinions concerning the recent NATO-led military attack against the Qaddafi regime in Libya (question d. on the second page of Table 13). There is a great deal of variety in the national responses, but the level of support is fairly high compared to recent support for troops in Afghanistan (or indeed support for “war is necessary”). In addition, with the exception of four countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden), gender differences are smaller than those found for many other questions. Again, one suspects that the humanitarian justification for the attack in Libya is responsible for this pattern.⁶⁴

The final question in Table 13 concerns the use of force against Iran if all nonmilitary approaches have failed. The results are surprising. It seems clear that an attack against Iran would involve substantial violence and costs, precisely the consequences that have evinced large gender differences in past research. Yet on this question gender differences are muted. Only in Spain is the gender difference statistically significant, but in this case women are more supportive of using force.

⁶³ Brooks and Valentino, “War of One’s Own,” p. 270-286.

⁶⁴ In 2007, a series of questions tested support for using force in a number of hypothetical cases, including combat operations and humanitarian intervention. Gender difference on participating in combat was significant, but on humanitarian intervention it was small to nonexistent.

SUMMARY: GENDER DIFFERENCE AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

Earlier sections of this article have shown that gender difference often emerges when the use of military force appears in the question (for example concerning a UN action against Iran or North Korea). In this section, we see that basic predispositions towards war are also strongly divided along gender lines at levels that have potential political relevance. The same is true of early support for troops in Afghanistan. In both of these cases, gender divisions are among the largest and cross-nationally uniform of any reported in this paper. However, on some specific questions of using force, such as the Libya action and perhaps humanitarian action more broadly, gender differences are less in evidence, suggesting that the purpose for which force is used is a mediating influence.

Pulling It Together: the Political Mobilization of Women and Gender Difference on National Security Issues

I began this paper with the observation that the political mobilization of women has important implications for the politics of national security. Because of the fact that women in western democracies have different policy priorities and lean slightly toward parties of the left, the mobilization of women could add an important political division, one that has been neglected in scholarship on national security. Previous sections of this paper have demonstrated that this division is very real. Particularly on issues of military force and defense spending, gender is a significant influence, and this influence remains after controlling for other variables.

Figure 6 draws the evidence together by displaying the relationship between the level of political engagement expressed by women and the average gender difference on the security issues described in previous sections of this paper. Specifically, it shows the relationship between the percentage of women who frequently discuss politics and attempt to persuade

friends and family of their political views, and the average gender difference on the security issues described in earlier sections of this paper. The measure of average gender difference is particularly useful. Unlike most evidence in the existing scholarly literature, it is based not on a single question in a single year, but on many questions over many types of issues and years. It is therefore more robust, averaging out any fluctuations that might arise from a single question rooted in the events of a single point in time.

The correlation displayed in Figure 6 is a very strong one: countries with higher political engagement among women also display higher differences between men and women on security issues. The relationship is highly significant (.01), and the engagement of women explains 45 percent of the cross-national variation in gender difference on security issues. Clearly, the engagement of women is an important element in the politics of national security, although the graphic does reveal that other factors influence the magnitude of gender difference. For example, Sweden, Germany, and Spain have levels of gender difference that are higher than expected given their level of female engagement, while Romania, Bulgaria, France, and the Netherlands have less. Why this is the case is a matter of speculation. It is likely that some combination of historical experience, contemporary political practice, and strategic culture also influence gender difference in these countries. Nonetheless, it remains the case that the level of female political engagement is a very strong correlate of the magnitude of gender difference, and this has important implications both for theory and for the politics of Western security.

Conclusions and Implications

In this concluding section, I summarize patterns of gender difference and discuss the implications for hypotheses on gender difference and for the politics of security policy in the US and Europe.

GENDER DIFFERENCE: THE CENTRALITY OF POWER, COST, AND VIOLENCE

One of the important findings of this paper is that gender difference is not uniformly present across security issues, nations, or time. This has implications for hypotheses on gender difference, to be discussed below. From a policy perspective, the most important pattern is that gender difference is most prominent on issues of military power, the cost of defense, and the use of military force. In the US, views of military power as a factor that preserves peace are starkly divided. In Europe and also to some extent in Turkey, there is a strong gender divide on the question of spending more on defense to increase Europe's power in the world. At one time or another, there are signs in every country of a gender difference on the issue of defense spending more generally. Finally, there are strong gender differences surrounding the question of the acceptability of war and on some questions concerning the use of military force. Even questions that mention the endorsement or participation of multilateral organizations do not narrow the gender difference, although they do increase the level of support of both men and women.

It is also important to note where gender difference is muted or absent altogether. On the issue of international involvement and favorability of the UN, there are minor gender differences (with the exception of polarization in the US with regard to the UN). Even on issues where gender differences are sometimes present and large, they can vary over time. This is true of gender difference on defense spending, but it is also true of gender difference on the question of

using military force, which appears to vary according to the purpose for which force is used. In summary, gender difference is not constant across issues or even through time. Contextual factors mediate the extent and magnitude, a fact that has important implications for hypotheses on gender difference.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HYPOTHESES ON GENDER DIFFERENCE

It has been difficult to generalize about gender difference on the basis of past research because most findings have been limited to the US. This paper represents the only cross-national analysis based on identical survey questions, and the results offer insight into the plausibility of several hypotheses concerning gender difference on national security issues. For one, the finding that gender difference varies considerably across issues, nations, and time casts doubt on any hypothesis predicting universal gender difference. This is true, for example, of essentialist (biological) hypotheses that would predict similar gender differences across cultures and time. Similarly, theories based on the argument that women have —or have learned—a —liberal” outlook on national security, compared to the —realist” outlook of men, also finds little support. In fact, on some questions, such as the influence of multilateral participation in military actions, women are less —liberal” than men, and in most nations men are no less favorable to the UN than women.

My findings suggest that gender differences are rooted in pragmatic circumstance and the relative sensitivity of men and women to violence. The largest and most cross-nationally consistent gender difference occurs on issues of defense spending, spending on —power,” the acceptability of war, and the use of military force. However, it is important to add that these differences vary as well, which suggests that they are mediated by circumstances. Most

uniformly, the evidence is strong that gender difference is higher in societies that have undergone the economic and cultural changes of the modernization process—exactly the pattern predicted by Inglehart and Norris.⁶⁵ This suggests one of two models. First, it may be that women have always had security opinions that differed from men, but these were muted by the limited psychological and political autonomy that characterize traditional, patriarchal gender roles. Once women gained access to education and the labor market, their autonomy and interest in politics increased and their long-held views found expression.⁶⁶ A second model is that women’s opinions of security issues actually change during the process of modernization as their pragmatic interests (social and educational services) are transformed.

It is not possible to disentangle these two models on the basis of existing data, but as we saw in Figure 6, the result is nonetheless clear: societies at higher levels of economic development have higher levels of gender polarization on security issues. This fact, and the possibility of further gender polarization in the future, has important implications for the politics of Western security.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY POLITICS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Recent commentary on security politics has emphasized a growing gap between attitudes and policies in the US, on the one hand, and in Europe on the other. For example, Robert Gates, recently retired as US Secretary of Defense, observed shortly before his departure:

In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in —sdF humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking

⁶⁵ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*.

⁶⁶This is the model that seems to characterize the arguments of Ingehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, and Iversen and Rosenbluth, “The Political Economy of Gender.”

tasks, and those conducting the ~~hard~~” combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.”⁶⁷

It should be stressed that gender polarization is not the cause of the transatlantic gap described by Secretary Gates. For one, we have seen that men as well as women in Europe have views that diverge significantly from those of their American ally. A second reason is that on some security issues, gender polarization in the United States has created pockets of opinion that resemble the average European profile. This is true in particular on the American center-left.

Nonetheless, while gender polarization in Europe is not responsible for the transatlantic divide, it does complicate it, and this complication has been ignored by scholars. Briefly put, the analyses that I have presented suggest the possibility that the trends described by Gates will continue or increase rather than reverse. The reason is that in both the US and Europe, women have been mobilized to politics in increasing numbers. As we have seen, their preferences are to the left of men on many issues of national security. They are more favorable to ~~soft~~’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping” tasks, and less supportive of ~~hard~~ combat missions.” Should the political mobilization of women continue or increase, the relevance of gender politics to security politics will also increase.⁶⁸ It is therefore an issue that scholarship cannot ignore.

⁶⁷ ~~Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech on NATO’s Future,”~~ *Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 2011. For an analysis of Transatlantic Trends data that speaks to these issues, see Asmus, Everts, and Isernia, *Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle*.

⁶⁸ The analogy to American electoral politics seems apt. Before 1980, there was almost no scholarly attention to gender as a determinant of voting behavior because it was not a significant influence on the vote choice. Beginning in the Reagan years, however, gender differences began to appear, but scholars were left searching for explanations because little attention had been paid to the issue. What I am suggesting here is that the gender politics of security in Europe may become similarly prominent in the future, and like their colleagues who study voting, students of security policy must shift their attention as well.

Whether gender politics will increasingly characterize security politics depends on several factors. As each of them constitutes an agenda for future research, I confine my observations to an overview of the most important questions that must be addressed. The first is the mobilization and representation of women's views in the political process. We saw in Figure 1 that, in Western Europe and the United States in particular, women express a fairly high level of interest in politics or news about global affairs. Nonetheless, in both places, men continue to express even higher interest, although the gap does narrow at higher levels of economic development. Further, women also exhibit less traditional political activism than do men.⁶⁹ Two questions for the future, then, are whether the gap between the political engagement of women and men will continue to decrease and whether women will mobilize to express their preferences on national security issues.

An especially important question is the future trajectory of the political mobilization of women in Eastern Europe and Turkey. For the moment, the engagement of women in these societies is far lower than in Western Europe or among men in their own societies, and gender difference on security issues is lower as well. Should women in these societies become more mobilized—as theory as well as evidence would predict—gender difference on security issues should increase. An important task for research is therefore to explore the trajectory that gender politics in Eastern Europe and Turkey is likely to take.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action*, and Inglehart and Norris, *Rising Tide*, pp. 73-126. Both of these studies note that women exhibit *more* activism in some areas of civic engagement, including volunteerism and activism in educational and social policy areas.

⁷⁰ This is not to suggest that the mobilization of women in the US and Western Europe will not also continue to increase. Indeed, developments entirely independent of security politics may contribute to increasing women's mobilization. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suggested that productivity and growth in

A third issue is the representation of women's preferences. Of course, one avenue of representation is the vote, and we have seen that women in the US and Western Europe show a slight and perhaps increasing tendency to vote for parties of the left. Politicians are no doubt aware of this fact and will presumably adjust their behavior accordingly. Further, the direct representation of women in parliaments has increased. In the member states of the European Union, women constituted 16 percent of the members of parliamentary bodies in 1990. By 2011, it was 25 percent, but the percentage varies widely by country, as does the rate at which it is increasing (33 percent in Germany; 39 percent in the Netherlands; but 18 percent in France).⁷¹ Of course, whether women represent —women's views” any more than men represent —men's views” is very much an open question. To my knowledge, there is little cross-national research on this question in the area of security studies. Nonetheless, the dominant hypothesis of scholars of gender is that women do indeed represent a particular set of preferences once they arrive in legislatures, so additional research is very much needed.⁷²

IMPLICATIONS FOR GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

The recent past has seen increasingly blunt criticism of Germany's role within the NATO Alliance, coupled with a challenge to Germany to exercise the leadership within NATO that it

Europe (and particularly in Southern Europe) would be significantly enhanced through increased labor force participation of women. See Céline Allard and Luc Everaert, “Lifting Euro Area Growth: Priorities for Structural Reforms and Governance,” IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/19 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, November 22, 2010).

⁷¹ Figures are from United Nations, *Women's Indicators and Statistics Database*, which are computed from data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org).

⁷² A review in the US context is provided by Crowder-Meyer, “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences and Priorities.” A sampling of comparative works includes Lena Wängnerud, “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 12 (2009), pp. 51–69; Marian Sawer, Manon Tremblay and Linda Trimble, eds., *Representing Women in Parliament : A Comparative Study* (New York : Routledge, 2006); Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami, “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (Sept., 1999), pp. 235–268; and Pippa Norris, “Women's Legislative Participation in Western Europe,” *West European Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1985), pp. 90–101.

has demonstrated on the Eurozone economic crisis. Two criticisms have been expressed: that Germany has cut defense spending at a time when NATO needs increased capabilities from its European members, and that Germany has been too reticent in its support for NATO's military operations. Summarizing the results of a report issued by the Atlantic Council of the United States, R. Nicholas Burns argued that "Today, Germany is an economic powerhouse but a second-rate military power. Germany's military weakness is NATO's biggest problem. The alliance needs Germany, now reconciled with its history, to take on a more active leadership role and to raise its defense budget to share the burden that falls too much on the United States."⁷³

Whatever the substantive merits of these arguments, the data reviewed in this paper demonstrate that the policy changes proposed by Germany's critics will be a tough political sell, and gender polarization in Germany represents a major hurdle to consensus. As we have seen, Germany is near the top of European states in terms of women's political engagement, and it is the top-ranked state in terms of women's interest in global affairs (Figure 1). Not surprisingly, therefore, the average gender difference on security issues in Germany also ranks near the top (Figure 6). Simply reviewing the gender difference on the specific issues examined above reveals just how stark the political differences are. For example, on the following issues, a majority or plurality of German men expresses support, while a majority of women is opposed:

⁷³ R. Nicholas Burns, "Anchoring NATO with Leadership," Chicago Tribune, May 21, 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ct-oped-0521-leadershipnato-20120521_0.3868940.story. The full report of the Atlantic Council is available at <http://www.acus.org/event/anchoring-alliance-report-launch>. For a view from Germany, see Gregor Peter Schmitz, "US Think Tank Slams Germany's NATO Role," *Spiegel Online International*, May 15, 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/think-tank-criticizes-germany-s-role-in-nato-a-833797.html>.

spending more to achieve power for Europe; agreeing that all members of NATO should share the financial burden of military actions; agreeing that Germany should abide by an EU decision to use force; agreeing that “war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice”; and support for the military action in Libya. The average gender difference in support for defense spending is also higher in Germany than in any other country.

It is hardly new to highlight the fact that the average opinion of Germans (and other Europeans) on these issues diverge from the views of Americans.⁷⁴ However, the strong gender divide that accompanies the divergence has been neglected. Although the Alliance itself has devoted attention to issues of global women’s rights and gender mainstreaming within its own force structure, scholars of European security seem to have ignored the issue.⁷⁵ The evidence presented here suggests that increased attention to gender difference in security policy attitudes should be high on the agenda of scholars.

⁷⁴ See Asmus, Everts, and Isernia, *Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle*.

⁷⁵ The single exception is a study of Danish attitudes in the mid-1990’s; see Togeby, “The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes.” On NATO’s commitment to global women’s rights, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Women, peace and security: NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56984.htm. NATO is also committed to gender mainstreaming “as a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and military operations,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-62EDDF56-6C64B258/natolive/topics_50327.htm.

Reviewers Appendix 1

List of *Transatlantic Trends*

Datasets Available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research

ICPSR # 33021 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2010](#)
Kennedy, Craig; Nyiri, Zsolt; Isernia, Pierangelo; et al.
2010

ICPSR # 28462 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2009](#)
Kennedy, Craig; Nyiri, Zsolt; La Balme, Natalie; et al.
2009

ICPSR # 26501 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2008](#)
Kennedy, Craig; Glenn, John; La Balme, Natalie; et al.
2008

ICPSR # 20302 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2006](#)
Isernia, Pierangelo; Kennedy, Craig; La Balme, Natalie; et al.
2006

ICPSR # 4605 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2005](#)
Kennedy, Craig; La Balme, Natalie; Isernia, Pierangelo; et al.
2005

ICPSR # 4243 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2004](#)
Kennedy, Craig; La Balme, Natalie; Isernia, Pierangelo; et al.
2004

ICPSR # 4565 [Post-United States Elections Survey: A Survey of Public Opinion in France, Germany, and the United States, 2004](#)
La Balme, Natalie; Kennedy, Craig; Isernia, Pierangelo; et al.

ICPSR # 3972 [Transatlantic Trends Survey, 2003](#)
Kennedy, Craig; La Balme, Natalie; Isernia, Pierangelo; et al.
2003

ICPSR # 3730 [Worldviews 2002: European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy](#)
German Marshall Fund of the United States

Table 1. Nations and Years Covered in *Transatlantic Trends* Surveys

	Years Sampled	Total Responses
<i>Western Europe</i>		
France	2002-2011	11027
Germany	2002-2011	11012
Italy	2002-2011	10010
Netherlands	2002-2011	10042
United Kingdom	2002-2011	10017
Portugal	2003-2011	9004
Spain	2004-2011	8014
Sweden	2011	1003
<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
Poland	2002-2011	9999
Slovakia	2004-2011	8077
Bulgaria	2006-2011	6108
Romania	2006-2011	6093
Turkey	2004-2011	8037
United States	2002-2011	13266

Note: Sample size is 1,000 per country and year designed to be representative of the population 18 years or older. See Reviewer’s Appendix 1 for the list of datasets that are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Complete question wording, marginal percentages, and additional technical details are available at: <http://trends.gmfus.org/archives/>

Figure 1A. Percentage of Women Expressing a High Level of Political Engagement, 2006-2009






Figure 1B. Percentage of Women Who Follow News about Global Affairs “Very Closely,” 2011



Note: Figure 1A shows an index constructed from two survey questions. The first asks if respondent discusses politics with family and friends (1—never through 3—frequently). The second question asks if respondent attempts to persuade friends, relatives, or co-workers (1—never through 4—frequently). The figures shown in Figure 1A are the percentage that score on the top two categories in the simple addition of these two question (ie, 6 or 7). Figure 1B shows the percentage who respond “very closely” to a question that inquires how closely respondent follows news about “global affairs” (1 – not all through 4—very closely).

Figure 2. “Do you think it will be best for the future of [country] if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?” Percent “active part,” 2002-2005



Note: number of responses: USA (6363), Western Europe (25068), Eastern Europe (6018), Turkey (2027).

Table 2. Percent Assessing Selected Issues as a "Very Important" Threat in 2006

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
Violence/Instability in Iraq				
United States	56	75	19	498
Western Europe	48	64	16	3461
Eastern Europe	38	44	6	1881
Turkey	38	38	0	443
Spread of Disease/Avian Flu				
United States	46	55	9	493
Western Europe	40	50	10	3471
Eastern Europe	37	42	5	1952
Turkey	48	42	-6	457
Iran Acquiring Nuclear Weapons				
United States	79	82	3	498
Western Europe	68	74	6	3463
Eastern Europe	55	62	7	1896
Turkey	29	33	4	441
International Terrorism				
United States	81	84	3	495
Western Europe	74	81	7	3482
Eastern Europe	67	70	3	1974
Turkey	62	54	-8	466
Global Economic Downturn				
United States	52	61	9	489
Western Europe	54	59	5	3442
Eastern Europe	40	40	0	1876
Turkey	57	47	-10	452
Islamic Fundamentalism				
United States	67	60	-7	482
Western Europe	64	68	4	3401
Eastern Europe	50	48	-2	1775
Turkey	27	23	-4	420

Table 3. Percent who agree that "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength," by ideology and gender (2004-2005)

<i>ideology</i>	Left		Center		Right		Total		N
	<i>gender</i> Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
United States	35	26	60	44	73	62	58	46	1814
Western Europe	20	18	30	23	41	34	29	25	12368
Eastern Europe	22	20	27	16	33	28	28	22	2711
Turkey	45	53	52	64	66	65	56	60	1531

	Democrat		Independent		Republican		Total		N
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
United States	41	33	51	44	78	65	58	46	1953

Note: Ideological self-placement is a seven point scale (1-extreme left through 7-extreme right), here collapsed into a three-point scale (1-3=Left 4=Center 5-7= Right). This produces an ideological distribution of approximately 33 percent in each of the three groups (in the combined samples). In the US, Poland, and Turkey, the distribution leans further to the right. Party identification in the United States does not include "undecided" independents.

Table 4. Views of Superpowers by Gender (2002 - 2005)

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
United States				
US should be the only superpower	51	46	-5	1178
European Union should become a superpower	43	46	3	1248
no country should be a superpower	6	8	2	203
Western Europe				
US should be the only superpower	11	9	-2	2432
European Union should become a superpower	75	76	1	17736
no country should be a superpower	14	16	-2	3833
Eastern Europe				
US should be the only superpower	8	7	-1	484
European Union should become a superpower	61	61	0	3509
no country should be a superpower	30	32	2	1623
Turkey				
US should be the only superpower	8	7	-1	131
European Union should become a superpower	46	46	0	821
no country should be a superpower	47	47	0	839

Note: Full question wording is: ~~In~~ thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union:


-The US should remain the only superpower

-The European Union should become a superpower, like the United States

- No country should be a superpower [volunteered]”

Table 5. Percent Willing to Spend More on Defense to Achieve Superpower Status for Europe, 2003-2005

	Gender		Difference (women – men)	Total	N
	Men	Women			
Western Europe	57	45	-12	51	13707
Eastern Europe	52	44	-8	48	2585
Turkey	66	60	-6	63	726



Percent Willing to Spend More on Defense for Superpower Status by Left-Right Orientation (Eastern and Western Europe Combined), 2003-2005




Table 6. Gender Difference by Nation: Willingness to Spend More to Achieve Superpower Status for Europe, 2003-2005

	Men		Women		Gender Difference (women - men)	N
	Yes	No	Yes	No		
Germany	52	48	35	65	-17	2,524
Netherlands	44	56	33	67	-11	2,621
Italy	61	39	50	50	-11	2,811
Slovakia	52	48	42	58	-10	732
United Kingdom	63	37	54	46	-9	2,048
Portugal	63	37	54	46	-9	2,068
Turkey	64	36	57	43	-7	727
Spain	53	47	46	54	-7	1,392
France	58	42	51	49	-7	3,421
Poland	53	47	48	52	-5	2,412

Note: With the exception of Turkey, all cross tabulations are significant at the .01 level.





Table 7. Percent with a Favorable Opinion of the United Nations, 2003-2006

	Gender			N
	Men	Women	Difference (women – men)	
USA	53	70	17	3397
Western Europe	77	77	0	23130
Eastern Europe	80	82	2	7230
Turkey	57	59	2	2469

By level of Political Engagement, 2006

	Low		Medium		High		N
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
USA	57	74	53	71	47	73	943
Western Europe	75	77	77	78	74	78	6727
Eastern Europe	82	75	86	86	80	82	3378
Turkey	59	59	64	60	48	65	758

USA Only: Percent with Favorable Opinion of United Nations by Party Identification, 2003-2006



Note: Number of Democrats (1024), Republicans (926), Independents (1049). Party does not include “leaned” Democrats and Republicans. See Figure 2 for definition of political engagement.

Table 8. Percent Who Agree: "When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN," 2003-2005

			Gender Difference		N
	Men	Women	Total	(women -men)	
USA	70	55	62	-15	2877
Western Europe	46	48	47	2	18967
Eastern Europe	58	56	57	-2	4208
Turkey	77	76	76	-1	1384
USA	70	55	62	-15	2877
United Kingdom	58	50	54	-8	2843
Spain	46	42	44	-4	1824
Poland	54	50	52	-4	2467
Turkey	77	75	76	-2	1814
Slovakia	64	63	63	-1	1741
France	45	47	46	2	2908
Portugal	46	48	47	2	2680
Italy	40	43	42	3	2844
Netherlands	50	55	53	5	2944
Germany	37	46	42	9	2924

<i>ideology</i>	Left		Center		Right		N
	<i>gender</i> Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
United Kingdom	47	39	60	53	63	58	2565
United States	50	37	69	53	85	68	2657
Germany	29	41	38	47	50	51	2800
Netherlands	38	50	53	56	57	58	2845

Note: see Table 3 for definition of ideology.

Table 9. Percent Who Would Support a Hypothetical Attack by the USA, NATO, or United Nations, 2003

To eliminate weapons of mass destruction in *Iran* (an attack by...)

	a. USA		b. NATO		c. UN		<i>Increase due to mention of UN (c. minus a.)</i>	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	USA	79	70	81	84	90	75	11
Western Europe	45	37	57	44	65	46	20	9
Eastern Europe	49	38	69	44	50	44	1	6

To eliminate weapons of mass destruction in *North Korea* (an attack by...)

	a. USA		b. NATO		c. UN		<i>Increase due to mention of UN (c. minus a.)</i>	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	USA	66	65	78	68	77	73	11
Western Europe	37	27	53	35	56	37	19	10
Eastern Europe	52	34	54	30	47	26	-5	-8

Question wording: ~~Imagine~~ Iran [North Korea] has acquired weapons of mass destruction. The a.) United States government [b.) NATO, c.) the UN] has decided to attack Iran to force that country to give up these weapons. Would you support a [country] government decision to take part in this military action or not?"

Note: percentages based on a minimum of 113 responses for the USA, 721 for Western Europe, and 104 for Eastern Europe. The 2003 survey was not conducted in Turkey.

Table 10. Support for Sharing the Burden of NATO Military Action, 2008

	% Agree all members should contribute troops			% Agree all members should contribute to financial cost			N
	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	
United States	87	87	0	88	85	-3	951
Western Europe	71	64	-7	73	63	-10	6808
Eastern Europe	61	53	-8	62	53	-9	3555
Turkey	45	42	-3	42	43	+1	632
Germany	71	56	-15	65	49	-16	986
Spain	68	56	-12	65	51	-14	980
Italy	59	45	-14	57	46	-11	973
Portugal	75	63	-12	77	69	-8	934
Poland	69	61	-8	73	59	-14	890
Slovakia	48	39	-9	50	38	-12	905

Question wording: “To what extent do you tend to agree or disagree: that all NATO member countries should contribute troops if the NATO alliance decides to take military action?” – “To what extent do you tend to agree or disagree: that all NATO member countries should share in the financial costs of a NATO military action even when they do not contribute troops?”


Note: Nations shown individually are those for which the gender difference is statistically significant.

Table 11. Percent Agree/Disagree that country should abide by an EU decision to use military force, 2006-2007

	Men		Women		Agree	N
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Gender Difference (women – men)	
Germany	45	55	23	77	-22	1851
France	47	53	31	69	-16	1903
Italy	56	44	37	63	-19	1917
United Kingdom	49	51	38	62	-11	1777
Bulgaria	53	47	41	59	-12	1572
Spain	56	44	41	59	-15	1906
Netherlands	56	44	43	57	-13	1840
Portugal	63	37	44	56	-19	1806
Poland	61	39	51	49	-10	1664
Slovakia	38	62	29	71	-9	1472
Romania	64	36	58	42	-6	1470
Turkey	60	40	60	40	0	1149

Note: The full wording of the question is: –Some say that in order for the European Union to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things. To what extent do you agree with the following? If the European Union should decide to use military force, [country] should abide by that decision, even if [country] disagrees."

Figure 3. Gender Difference in Net Support for Defense Spending



Gender Difference in Net Support for Defense Spending by Year and Nation (women - men)

	USA	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Portugal	Spain	Sweden
2002	0	18	-5	-1	-2	8			
2003	-9	-1	-19	-8	-9	-8	1		
2004	-12	-9	-15	-14	-23	-10	-5	-13	
2008	4	-8	-14	-11	-11	-2	6	3	
2011	5	-2	-6	2	-3	4	5	0	-8
Average	-2	0	-12	-6	-9	-2	2	-3	-8

	Poland	Slovakia	Bulgaria	Romania	Turkey
2002	-5				
2003	-4				
2004	-9	-18			16
2008	-1	-17	-2	-2	9
2011	-1	-4	0	-6	-7
Average	-4	-13	-1	-4	6

Note: Support for defense spending is "net support" = %increase/(%increase + %decrease) *100.

Figure 4. Percent Agree "Under Some Conditions War is Necessary to Obtain Justice"
2003-2011




Figure 5. Gender Difference: percent Agree "War is Sometimes Necessary to Obtain Justice"




Table 12. Percentage Responses to "War is Necessary to Obtain Justice," 2003-2004
Responses by Nation and by Left-Right Ideological Orientation (gender difference = women – men)

	Men		Women		Agree Gender Difference
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	
USA	89	11	82	18	-6
United Kingdom	77	23	72	28	-5
Netherlands	64	36	51	49	-13
Turkey	59	41	52	48	-7
Poland	58	42	45	55	-13
Portugal	54	46	37	63	-17
Italy	49	51	32	68	-17
Slovakia	46	54	34	66	-12
France	44	56	31	69	-13
Germany	44	56	27	73	-17
Spain	36	64	18	82	-17

By Left-Right Ideological Orientation and Gender, 2003-2011

	USA				Western Europe		
	Men Agree	Women Agree	Gender Difference		Men Agree	Women Agree	Gender Difference
Left	76	68	-8	Left	35	24	-12
Center	82	77	-5	Center	46	31	-15
Right	88	83	-5	Right	53	36	-17
Total	82	76	-6	Total	45	30	-14

	Eastern Europe				Turkey		
	Men Agree	Women Agree	Gender Difference		Men Agree	Women Agree	Gender Difference
Left	34	25	-9	Left	53	42	-11
Center	35	24	-11	Center	50	39	-11
Right	39	27	-12	Right	57	54	-3
Total	36	25	-10	Total	53	45	-8

Note: See text for full wording of the "war and justice" question. Left-Right ideology is defined in Table 3.

Table 13. Support for Deployment and Use of Military Forces (Selected Cases)*a.) Percent approving of presence of troops in Afghanistan, 2004*

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	81	65	-16	950
Western Europe	65	51	-14	6509
Eastern Europe	37	20	-17	916
Turkey	57	35	-22	934

b.) Percent responding "maintain or increase troops in Afghanistan," 2009 and 2011

2009	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	73	61	-12	919
Western Europe	50	39	-11	6844
Eastern Europe	29	23	-6	3750
Turkey	47	35	-12	858

2011	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	34	30	-3	969
Western Europe	42	35	-6	7831
Eastern Europe	32	28	-4	3857
Turkey	54	48	-5	880

c.) Percent approving peace-keeping force in Israeli/Palestinian conflict, 2003

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	48	61	13	1001
Western Europe	70	70	0	6012

Note: Eastern Europe and Turkey were not yet part of the survey in 2003 (question c.).

Table continues on next page

Table 13 continued. Percent support for military actions


d.) Percent approving of military action in Libya, 2011

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
Sweden	79	67	-13	973
Netherlands	71	64	-8	962
USA	66	62	-5	955
Portugal	65	55	-10	959
France	62	58	-4	972
United Kingdom	61	54	-7	955
Spain	59	53	-6	944
Italy	56	43	-13	957
Bulgaria	52	45	-7	948
Germany	51	28	-24	967
Romania	47	41	-6	927
Poland	45	40	-5	828
Slovakia	35	29	-7	923
Turkey	25	25	-1	873

e.) Percent favoring military action against Iran if negotiations over nuclear program fail, 2011

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
Portugal	71	75	4	831
Spain	57	69	11	838
France	61	66	4	884
Sweden	53	59	7	808
Italy	55	58	3	735
United States	57	53	-4	849
Netherlands	46	52	6	893
Romania	52	49	-3	608
United Kingdom	43	44	1	860
Germany	40	43	4	872
Bulgaria	38	38	0	592
Poland	42	38	-4	681
Slovakia	33	32	0	602
Turkey	16	20	4	745

Figure 6. Relationship Between Women's Political Engagement and Gender Difference on Security Issues



Note:

The measure of political engagement is defined in Figure 1. The average gender difference displayed on the vertical axis is based on the following questions presented earlier in this paper: international involvement (Figure 2), Iraq violence threat (Table 2), peace through strength (Table 3), spending for European superpower (Table 6), UN favorability (Table 7, sign reversed), bypass UN (Table 8), defense spending 2004 (Figure 3), war is necessary 2002-2011 (Figure 4), approve troops Afghanistan 2004 (Table 13), maintain or increase troops Afghanistan 2009 (Table 13), approve Libya military action (Table 13), and abide by EU decision to use force (Table 11).