

Archbishop Makarios III as *Ethnarch* during Cyprus' Struggle for Decolonization

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Thomas P. Krush

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Advisor: Dr. David Proctor

Abstract

Much of the previous scholarship on Archbishop Makarios III has taken his leadership of the 1950s *enosis* movement for granted. The historic power of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus under Ottoman rule is used as justification for the archbishop's significant involvement in politics during British colonial rule. A deeper analysis of the nature of Makarios' power reveals that his role as *ethnarch* was not unquestioned but had to be actively asserted throughout the campaign for *enosis*. The challenged nature of *ethnarchic* power, which relied heavily on consensus, provides a more compelling explanation for Makarios' political leadership and his relationship with other actors in the *enosis* movement such as Georgios Grivas, the Greek government, the Cypriot political left, and the more dogmatic wing of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

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Introduction

“To Greeks religion and motherland are one in the same thing.”¹ Or so the British government of Cyprus claimed in a February 1957 pamphlet titled “The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus.” From the British Colonial Government’s perspective in Cyprus, this statement largely makes sense. During their 82 yearlong rule of the island, the fiercest anti-colonial resistance they faced came from the Cypriot Orthodox Church. At the head of this institution sat the archbishop, who since the Ottoman conquest of the island three centuries prior had also held the title of *ethnarch* and assumed political responsibility for the Orthodox Christians of Cyprus. Despite the best efforts of the British to extricate the archbishop from politics on Cyprus, in the end it was Archbishop Makarios III who spearheaded the campaign which ended British rule over (most of) Cyprus.

Archbishop Makarios III, birth name Michael Mouskos, was born in the small mountain village of Ano Panagia in western Cyprus on August 13th, 1913. A bright child from a poor family, at the age of 13 he was sent to the nearby Kykko Monastery as a novice to receive his primary education. In 1938, after being ordained a deacon and taking the name Makarios, he enrolled at the University of Athens as a theology student. Surviving Nazi occupied Athens, in 1946 Makarios was ordained a priest and traveled to Boston University on a scholarship to further pursue his theological studies. It is here

¹ “The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus: A Record of Complicity of the Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus in Political Violence.” (Nicosia: Government of Cyprus, 1957), 33.

where the news of his election to the Bishopric of Kition reached Makarios, and where this paper will begin.

A mere two years after his election as Bishop of Kition (and at only 37 years old) Makarios was elected Archbishop of Cyprus. During his 27 yearlong tenure in office, Makarios III was perhaps the greatest embodiment of the dual archbishop-*ethnarch* title. First as Bishop of Kition and later as Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios organized the political movement which sought an end to British colonial rule and the implementation of *enosis*, or the union of Cyprus with Greece. After Cyprus gained its independence from Britain in 1960, Makarios served the remaining 17 years of his life as the republic's first president while simultaneously retaining his position as archbishop.² Under Makarios III, the idea that the Archbishop of Cyprus was also the legitimate political voice of the Greek Cypriot people had never been more of a reality since the time of Ottoman rule.

This dual spiritual and political authority to which the Archbishops of Cyprus laid claim often proved difficult for the British colonial officials to accept, as “it was anathema for them that a religious leader should also be a political leader, owing to the separation of church and state in their own society.”³ Thus, it was begrudgingly that, in “The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus” pamphlet printed to justify the 1956-1957 forced exile of Makarios to the Seychelles, the British recognized that because “the Church usurped and monopolized political authority... the Government was prepared to

² Makarios was briefly deprived of the title of president in a 1974 coup, after which he was reinstated.

³ Andrekos Varnava & Michalis N. Michael, “Archbishop-Ethnarchs since 1767,” in *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics*, eds. Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 6.

accept Makarios as the *de facto ethnarch*, however dubious his claim to that title, but to accept him as a spokesman of the Greek Cypriots did not mean that Government thereby committed itself to giving him *carte blanche* to foster hatred or foment rebellion.”⁴ The position of *ethnarch* asserted by the Archbishops of Cyprus challenged the British colonial government’s control of Cyprus, who as a result sought to circumvent the Church’s role in politics.

While the British sought to undermine Makarios’ position of *ethnarch*, they held him to account as an archbishop. In particular, it was Makarios’ close collaboration with the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), a Greek Cypriot resistance organization which employed violent methods, that the British found most abhorrent. In a booklet titled “Terrorism in Cyprus: The Captured Documents” the British argue that “The most significant and surely one of the most culpable aspects of the archbishop’s conduct is his persistent failure, despite his position as the religious leader of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Christian community, to condemn the wickedness and brutality of EOKA’s methods... His silence has understandably been accepted among his community as not merely condoning, but even approving, assassination and bomb throwing. He has confirmed that interpretation by referring in sermons to convicted terrorists as patriots and by urging his fellow-countrymen to take the law into their own hands.”⁵ An archbishop involved in politics and supporting the use of violence was inappropriate to the Western perspective, and in a sense made him neither truly an archbishop nor truly a politician.

⁴ “The Church and Terrorism”, 34-36.

⁵ “Terrorism in Cyprus: The Captured Documents” (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), 81.

It seems that this same disconnect is present – albeit to a far, far lesser extent – in some of the scholarship surrounding Makarios. His title of *ethnarch* is sidelined to his title of archbishop, which in turn is only highlighted when it comes to the moral quandary of the archbishop's support of terrorism. In analysis of Makarios' fight for *enosis*, which to a large extent happened on the world stage of diplomacy, it seems that his character is sanitized of its historical context as *ethnarch*. Centering Makarios' decision making during the struggle for enosis on his role as *ethnarch* enables a more thorough analysis of his relationship with EOKA and the organization's leader Georgios Grivas, the Greek government, the Cypriot political left, and the more nationalistic faction of the Cypriot church. Key moments in the *enosis* campaign enable a natural division of this decade of struggle into three periods. The first lasted from Makarios' appointment as Bishop of Kition in 1948 to his arrest in March 1956. During this period, Makarios worked to reassert the *ethnarch*'s position as the sole political representative for all Greek Cypriots. His success in this endeavor was disrupted during the second period, which coincided with his imprisonment in the Seychelles from March 1956 to March 1957. The power of the *ethnarch* which Makarios had worked to centralize was fragmented among other members of the church, the Greek government, and Grivas. Finally, between his release from the Seychelles and the negotiations for an independent Cyprus in February 1959, Makarios was able to regain some control over the movement, although he proved unable to effectively control a more independent minded Grivas.

Foundational to the study of the position of *ethnarch* is Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michaels edited volume *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the*

Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics. Together with six other scholars, Varnava and Michael trace the evolution of the position of *ethnarch* between 1767 and 2006. They criticize previous scholarship for simply accepting the fact that the Archbishop of Cyprus was the voice of the Greek Cypriots without questioning how that came to be. In doing this they demonstrate how the *ethnarchs* of Cyprus were not always voices of nationalism. This work also succeeds at shifting focus away from Makarios and onto the other archbishop-*ethnarchs* who receive very little attention in English scholarship. However, this means that discussion of Makarios' relationship to his position of *ethnarch* is relegated to a single chapter, and the focus on Makarios and the decolonial movement to even less. Inspired by this edited volume, what follows will be an effort to take a closer look at Makarios and his relationship to the position of *ethnarch*, specifically regarding his role in the decolonization of Cyprus.

Another important work on this topic is Demetris Assos' *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus*. This is the most recent and comprehensive work written about Makarios during the period of Cypriot decolonization. Understandably, Assos focuses less on the position of *ethnarch*, and more on explaining Makarios' decision-making during this formative period. This is also an expertly researched book, drawing on sources such as the British Archives and primary and secondary sources in the Greek language. Not only was Assos' perspective insightful, but the primary source excerpts he cited throughout the text proved useful as well. Assos' work stands out compared to previous biographies on Makarios. Biographies written closer to Makarios' life, such as those by Stanley Mayes and P. N. Vanezis lacked both access to recently declassified British sources and the willingness to take

a more critical look at the decisions of Makarios. Assos' critical, although still sympathetic, analysis makes *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus* integral to any study of Makarios' life during the 1950s.

The most accessible English language primary sources for this topic are all memoirs. While many people involved in the decolonization of Cyprus chose to write memoirs, not all are currently available in English. For instance, although the memoirs of Makarios' companion in exile Papastavros Papagathagelou or Greek Consul to Cyprus Angelos Vlachos would have been especially useful, no English translations are yet available. Still, enough sources have been translated to allow for a sufficient understanding of Makarios' decision making and his relationship to the many factions within the Cypriot decolonial campaign. First, Georgios Grivas' self-aggrandizing *The Memoirs of General Grivas* needs to be read with a critical eye but is a key source for understanding Makarios' relationship to the campaign of EOKA violence and the organization's leader. Andreas Azinas elaborates on this relationship in a less biased manner with his *Fifty Years of Silence*, recounting his experience as a go-between for Makarios and Grivas and his role in the procurement of weapons which enabled EOKA violence. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza's *Lost Opportunities* sheds light on Makarios' relationship with the Greek government under Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis as well as Makarios' role in negotiating for Cypriot independence with the British. Captain P. S. Le Geyt's *Makarios In Exile* is a humanizing account of Makarios' year spent imprisoned on the Seychelles from the eyes of his captor. Notably absent from this picture is Makarios' own voice. Collections of his speeches and papers have been compiled into a multivolume work titled *Άπαντα Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου Μακαρίου Γ.* Machine

translation aided in the translation of Katharevousa Greek into English, while a rudimentary ability in Modern Greek helped to fill in the gaps. These key documents represent the majority of the primary sources consulted.

Before looking at Makarios III's relationship to the position of *ethnarch*, it is first necessary to more fully define the position and its history. Varnava and Michael trace the origins of this title back to the classical Levant, where it designated rulers of minor vassal kingdoms. During the early Byzantine Empire, the term changed to mean the ruler of a foreign kingdom, before evolving by the 10th century to mean a high-ranking commander of foreign mercenaries. It was under Ottoman rule that the title took on its final meaning, designating the leader of a non-Muslim religious community, known as a *millet*.⁶

Correspondingly, it was Ottoman, more than Byzantine rule, which instilled the Archbishops of Cyprus with political power. After nearly 400 years of Catholic rule in which the Cypriot Orthodox Church was repressed, in 1571 the Ottomans conquered the island. They brought with them the *millet* system, which structured the Ottoman subjects "along religious, as opposed to linguistic or racial lines."⁷ This involved the integration of "the prelates of the Church of Cyprus into the Ottoman administration and gave them the prestige, duties, and responsibilities of Ottoman officers."⁸ By 1660, "the church of Cyprus was involved in the system of farming tax revenues"⁹ and "In 1754,

⁶ Varnava & Michael, "Archbishop Ethnarchs since 1767", 2.

⁷ Demetris Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2018), 6.

⁸ Michalis N. Michael, "The Political Leadership of the Millet-i Rum in Cyprus Between the Ottoman and the British administrative system" in *Linguistic Minorities in Turkey and Turkic-Speaking Minorities of the Periphery*, ed. Christiane Bulut (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2018), 285.

⁹ Michael, "The Political Leadership", 285.

the bishops of Cyprus secured from the Sultan a firman (imperial decree) which recognized ‘the four prelates as Kojabashis or guardians and representatives of the rayahs, with direct access to the Porte.’”¹⁰ As the Ottoman Empire declined and power was increasingly decentralized, the power of the Cypriot Orthodox Church in Cyprus remained strong, so that “in 1815 it was remarked that; ‘Cyprus although nominally under the authority of a Bey... is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy.’”¹¹ Ottoman governance gave the Cypriot Orthodox church, with the *ethnarch* at its head, considerable political influence in Cyprus. This would change with British rule.

In 1878, the Ottoman government entrusted Britain with the administration of Cyprus, though it took until 1914 for the facade of Ottoman sovereignty to be done away with.¹² British rule meant a British governor, “which would operate as a powerful executive power... to impose a new understanding of the state and the administration. This new framework was in direct conflict with the political power that the high priests of the Church of Cyprus had secured during the period of Ottoman administration.”¹³ Though a small Legislative Council was established to advise the governor, its composition ensured that British and Turkish votes would always outnumber those of the Greek Cypriot community, who made up 80% of the population of Cyprus.¹⁴ Though the Greek representatives were primarily secular figures, occasionally bishops and abbots were elected to the council which forced the British to recognize these clergy as political representatives of the Greek

¹⁰ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 7.

¹¹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 7.

¹² George Horton Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus 1939-1955* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), 6.

¹³ Michael, “The Political Leadership”, 291.

¹⁴ Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 6; 1.

Cypriots. One *ethnarch*, Kyrillos II, even served on the council, first as a bishop and later as an archbishop-*ethnarch*.¹⁵ The number of bishops and lower-level clergy involved in politics indicates a system where power was not simply concentrated in the hands of the archbishop.

In 1931, with Cyprus suffering under economic recession, the British governor proposed drastic economic measures to balance the books. Although the Legislative Council rejected the governor's plan, their objections were ignored. This caused a small revolt, with rioting in Nicosia and two hundred locations across the island.¹⁶ In Nicosia, a mob clamoring for tax reduction and *enosis*, burned the Governor's house to the ground.¹⁷ As a result, the British abolished the Legislative Council and exiled those whom they considered to impede British governance, including two of the island's bishops.¹⁸ So in 1933 when the archbishop died, the election for his replacement could not be held with two bishops absent.¹⁹ Additionally, the British enacted laws to require government approval for the position of Archbishop, and to define the "ex-officio duties, or rights appertaining to the [office of] Archbishop", essentially in an attempt to 'divorce the church as much as possible from secular affairs.'²⁰ Thus, the Cypriot Orthodox Church was left weakened and disorganized throughout the 1930s.

¹⁵ Michael, "The Political Leadership", 292.

¹⁶ Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 8.

¹⁷ David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 28.

¹⁸ Alexis Rappas, "Leondios and the Archiepiscopal Question, 1933-1947: The Demise of an Apolitical Ethnarchy?" in *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics*, eds. Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 214.

¹⁹ Rappas, "Leondios and the Archiepiscopal Question", 216.

²⁰ Rappas, "Leondios and the Archiepiscopal Question", 226.

Makarios' election as Bishop of Kition in 1948 was a direct result of the liberalization of British colonial rule on the island, prompted by the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. World War II had shaken the world, and the British Empire was in the earliest stages of its dismantlement. In an effort to stave off anti-colonial sentiment in Cyprus, in 1946 the British Colonial secretary had permitted exiled Cypriot bishops to return to the island, and repealed laws which allowed the government of Cyprus to have a say in elections to the archiepiscopacy.²¹ These reforms enabled the election of an archbishop-*ethnarch* after 14 years without one, and ultimately set the stage for an increased presence of the church in politics.

²¹ Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 14.

Chapter 1: 1948-March 1956

On April 8th, 1948, during his second year studying the sociology of religion at Boston University, Makarios received a telegram from Cyprus. It informed him that he had been elected Bishop of Kition. Later, while imprisoned on the Seychelles, he would recount how on that fateful day “he continued quietly with his work... saying nothing to the staff or students. At 9 p.m. reporters appeared at the college and pounced on him... and asked him many curious questions; ‘Are you married?’, ‘Why haven’t you got a beard?’ etc.; and the next morning the news hit the headlines – ‘College Student Elected Bishop!’”²²

When he was first approached about running for bishop, however, Makarios had been hesitant. He harbored dreams of becoming a professor of theology at the University of Athens, or even serving as a priest for the Greek American diaspora.²³ So when contacted by the churchmen in Cyprus earlier in 1948, he recounted that, “‘I didn’t want to leave my studies, so I cabled back my wishes.’ The reply came back, ‘You have no choice – the people want you and the church needs you.’”²⁴ Ultimately, he relented and allowed for his name to be put forward in the election. So, upon receiving the news of his victory, Makarios telegraphed his reply to Cyprus, “‘Submitting to the calling of the Lord, expressed through the voting of the clergy and the people, I accept my election as Bishop of Kition.’”²⁵

²² P. S. Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, (Nicosia: Anagenisis Press, 1961), 95.

²³ Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (New York City: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 31.

²⁴ Carnegie Samuel Calian, “A Profile of Makarios,” *Theology Today* 31, no. 4 (1975): 356.

²⁵ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 242.

From the moment of his return to Cyprus in 1948 to his exile by the British government in March 1956, Makarios played a key role in re-establishing the political power of the church and the archbishop-*ethnarch* on the island of Cyprus. Makarios' concern over maintaining this power influenced his relationship with the left, the more nationalist wing of the Church, and EOKA. He was successfully able to reassert the power of the church by rebuffing the left and working with EOKA. In the short term, this strategy enabled Makarios to force the British to recognize his power as archbishop-*ethnarch* and to negotiate with him. However, his inability to control Grivas and the more nationalistic faction of the church hamstrung him during his negotiations with the British, and contributed to the British decision to exile Makarios, once again weakening the power of the *ethnarch*.

Makarios and the Cypriot Left:

On June 13th, 1948, Makarios was enthroned as Bishop of Kition. After a long consecration service, he gave his first speech of the day at the Cathedral of St. John in Nicosia, with the archbishop and other high clergy present.²⁶ In it, he recognized how the banishment of the previous Bishop of Kition and the ensuing absence of the archbishop-*ethnarch* had affected the Greek Cypriots. He stated that it would be a challenge for the Church to reassert itself “because the Cypriot Church has been in orphanhood for a long time, the work is still rough and arduous. Social unrest, turmoil, and confusion have been the natural consequence of this long orphanhood. Moral values have been disregarded in

²⁶ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 32.

many ways, and new and novel teachings have found acceptance in many cases.”²⁷ Makarios was referring to the political left, organized into the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), when he spoke of the ‘new teachings’ which had gained traction in the absence of the church. When in 1943, under the pressure of World War II, the British had permitted municipal elections on Cyprus for the first time since the 1920s, the left had rocketed to power due to its effective political organization in the form of labor unions. AKEL won control of all but two of the major towns in Cyprus in the 1946 municipal elections.²⁸ And with the wider British liberalization of 1946, AKEL helped to ensure the victory of their preferred candidate in the first election for Archbishop since the exile of the bishops in 1931, though he died after only 36 days in office.²⁹ To the other high clergy present at this ceremony, Makarios had expressed his awareness of the threat which AKEL posed to church power and his commitment to defeating this challenge.

During his second speech of the day, in front of the crowds who came to see him installed in his See in the city of Larnaca, Makarios outlined his vision of the Church’s place in Cypriot politics. He stated that “The Church of God, of which I was ordained Bishop, does not belong to any factions and does not follow right or left paths, nor does it obey slogans coming from any source, but follows its own line; the line that was drawn by its Divine Founder and which is clearly outlined in the holy Gospel. It gives its own slogans that come from the evangelical teaching. On the trail of this line, it sends out an invitation to all by trumpet blast... The Christian progress and unity in faith and love of

²⁷ Άπαντα Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου Μακαρίου Γ, vol. A (Nicosia, 1991) 28.

²⁸ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 15.

²⁹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 23.

my flock is one of my main concerns.”³⁰ Makarios saw the Cypriot Orthodox Church as being above factional politics and hoped that the church could bridge the left–right divide of the Greek Cypriot people in their call for *enosis*. The two speeches Makarios gave on the day of his consecration are indicative of Makarios’ belief that the Cypriot Orthodox Church was the rightful mediator between the entire Greek Cypriot community and their occupier, and his desire to make this a reality again.

In addition to allowing exiled bishops to return, the British also sought to liberalize their rule of Cyprus through the establishment of a Consultative Assembly. The goal of this assembly was to increase local participation in government and advise on a new constitution to regulate colonial rule.³¹ The formation of this committee on November 1st, 1947, proved to be a turning point in the rise of the left and the first test for a revived Cypriot church’s attempt to reestablish itself as the primary political voice of the Cypriot people. While AKEL agreed to participate in the assembly, ultimately providing eight of the ten Greek members in the forum, the Church boycotted the event.³² By doing this, the Church proved that it was not willing to accept anything less than *enosis*, and that they, not AKEL, were the true defenders of the cause popular across Greek Cypriot society.

Taking advantage of political momentum in the aftermath of the Consultative Assembly, the church began to organize itself to more effectively compete in the political arena against AKEL. On July 13th, 1948, one month after the election of Makarios, the Synod of the Church of Cyprus “resolved to establish an Ethnarchy Council to promote the National struggle for *enosis*,” which would

³⁰ Μακαριος, A: 33.

³¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 31.

³² Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 15.

be headed by the Archbishop of Cyprus.³³ At this council, Makarios “proposed the creation of a much more flexible executive instrument, in the model of a political party.”³⁴ This would become the Ethnarchy Bureau which would be headed by Bishop Makarios of Kition.³⁵ Although the church at large was working to reassert its political power, Makarios especially proved dedicated to this goal from early on in his tenure as bishop.

In order to affirm Greek Cypriots’ desire for *enosis* in the face of British attempts to establish a self-governing colony, the Ethnarchy Bureau organized a referendum on the political future of Cyprus. Even though Archbishop Makarios II was at the helm of the church during the plebiscite, “Makarios, Bishop of Kition and head of the Ethnarchy Bureau, had been instrumental in its organization.”³⁶ Although AKEL had suggested to the church that they jointly bring the *enosis* cause to the UN and administer a plebiscite, this offer was rejected.³⁷ Because of the rapid rise of the AKEL and the weakness of the church in the 1940s, Makarios recognized that AKEL could not be allowed to have a role equal to that of the church in the quest for *enosis*. So, between January 15th and 18th 1950, British officials watched as adult Orthodox Christians of both sexes entered churches to register their votes.

“Bells called the believers to their duty; whilst the more pious were said to have bowed before the *enosis*

³³ Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*, trans. Timothy Cullen & Susan Kyriakidis (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986), 7.

³⁴ Sia Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III, 1950-1977: Creating the Ethnarchic State,” in *The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics*, eds. Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 246.

³⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 32-33.

³⁶ Andrew R. Novo, “The God Dilemma: Faith, the Church, and Political Violence,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 31, no. 2 (2013): 199; Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 36.

³⁷ Novo, “The God Dilemma”, 199.

document as if it were an icon.”³⁸ In the end, 96.5% of votes cast were in favor of *enosis*. While the referendum was important in formally establishing national support for *enosis*, it was also “a decisive step in the political predominance of the Ethnarchy, around which was being unified the right of authoritarian and nationalist populism, which with the church made common cause, in order to consolidate a political role.”³⁹ The Church’s boycott of the Consultative Assembly and its organization of the *enosis* referendum were two key events which helped to cement the Church’s claim to be the protector of the *enosis* cause and people’s will. Makarios, as head of the Ethnarchy Bureau, played a significant role in this victory.

On June 28th, 1950, Archbishop Makarios II died. The ensuing election between Makarios Bishop of Kition and Kyprianos Bishop of Kyrenia revealed a division within the church and would produce something of a Sword of Damocles for Makarios’ future endeavors. Although Makarios ultimately won and was enthroned as Makarios III on October 18th, 1950 “the extreme right [had] lobbied hard in support for the Bishop of Kyrenia.”⁴⁰ Further, since the Bishop of Kyrenia was abroad raising awareness of the 1950 referendum at the time of Makarios II’s death and ensuing election, and because Makarios III could command the resources of the Ethnarchy Bureau, Kyprianos felt personally cheated. “Kyprianos never forgave him for this and later became one of Makarios’ most bitter opponents.”⁴¹ The election which brought Makarios to power just two years after he returned to

³⁸ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 18.

³⁹ Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III”, 247.

⁴⁰ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 39.

⁴¹ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 39.

Cyprus highlighted divisions within the church which would affect Makarios' ability to lead the *enosis* movement for his entire tenure as archbishop-*ethnarch*.

Upon ascending the throne, Archbishop Makarios III reiterated his predecessors' commitment to achieving *enosis*. In the speech he gave upon his enthronement, he stated that "I will continue with all my power and sacrifice the national struggle together with the patriotic Greek Cypriot people, marching towards an unbreakable unity line with the Sovereign, seeking nothing else but Unity with the Greek Motherland."⁴² Historian David French describes how "Makarios' commitment to *enosis* was more than just common form. He believed, and acted, as if politics and religion were inextricably linked."⁴³ From his first moments as *ethnarch*, Makarios' commitment to '*enosis* and only *enosis*' was clear, and it helped him to assert his position as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community. It would also, however, make the transition to independence more difficult when *enosis* would ultimately prove to be infeasible in the short-term.

The position of archbishop-*ethnarch* was one which Makarios, would eventually "lay claim to and placed even above that of President of the Republic of Cyprus."⁴⁴ Understanding both the importance Makarios placed on this position and how he defined the role is useful in shedding light on Makarios' political decision-making during the decolonial movement. As bishop and later archbishop, Makarios made a point of visiting rural village churches in his diocese. On one such Sunday visit in 1955, Makarios, accompanied by "flag-bearer with a large Greek flag," gave a sermon in which he

⁴² Μακαριος, A: 63.

⁴³ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 40.

⁴⁴ Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III", 240.

preached that “Cyprus has known many conquerors in the past. Now it is face-to-face with the last of its conquerors. Your church has preserved the flame of religion and nationalism through all these centuries. It will lead you to liberty and deliver you from foreign rule.”⁴⁵ Two years later, he spoke on the history of the Cypriot Orthodox Church at Columbia University and explained that Greek Cypriots’ “desire for freedom remained ardent in spite of the oppression and the severe measures which the Ottoman regime used. These feelings found their spokesman mainly in the Church of Cyprus, the Archbishop being by nature and tradition the national leader of the people”⁴⁶ and thus the role of “the church of Cyprus goes beyond its strictly religious functions, acquires a more substantial character through its activities in the social and national life as well as in the field of freedom and justice in accordance with the true spirit of Christianity.”⁴⁷ Throughout Cyprus’ struggle for decolonization, Makarios ardently believed that he, as *ethnarch*, had the historical legitimacy to act as a national and political leader for Greek Cypriots. In his eyes, the Cypriot Orthodox Church had always been a voice of national identity for the Greek Cypriot, and that thus, it was only natural that the church be so closely linked with the political movement for decolonization and *enosis*. Though this legitimacy had been weakened by the exile of the church and the rise of AKEL, Makarios worked hard to restore the church’s power and to fulfill what he saw as the traditional role of the *ethnarch* as a voice for nationalism.

⁴⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 40.

⁴⁶ “Crusade for Freedom,” (New York: Cyprus Federation of America, 1958), 42.

⁴⁷ “Crusade for Freedom,” 45.

While Makarios did disagree with Communism ideologically, his most immediate concern with the left was its attempt to wrest away control of the church's traditional role as the political voice of the Greek Cypriot people. During the early days of his tenure as Archbishop-*ethnarch*, AKEL occasionally approached Makarios about working together for *enosis* but, "Makarios always ignored their offers, not so much out of anti-communism as because he was unwilling to share leadership. He refrained from attacking the Communists as political opponents knowing that he needed their support, and left the invective to his more bigoted bishops and the ultra-nationalistic laymen who upheld the church."⁴⁸ Makarios' rebuffs of the AKEL should not be considered actions of extreme ideological hatred committed by Makarios. As historian Stanley Mayes writes "As a church man he could not accept the ideology of the left but he knew that many of those who voted for AKEL were far from being Marxists."⁴⁹ Ultimately, Makarios inability to work with AKEL can be more reasonably explained by the sense of the insecurity of church political power, than ideological bigotry.

Still, a balance must be struck between Makarios' tolerance for AKEL and recognizing his ideological opposition to communism. During his 1948 travels from Boston to Cyprus, Makarios stayed in Greece for a short time. During his stay, he visited the odious prison island of Makronisos where Communists captured in the Greek Civil war were subjected to Greek nationalist re-education. Makarios wrote in the island's guest book "It was a psychic rejuvenation for us the visit at Makronisos. We leave with the unshakable belief that our Hellas will never die.' He also traveled to northern Greece

⁴⁸ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 45.

⁴⁹ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 35.

where he praised the efforts of the Greek Army still chasing down the communist guerillas.”⁵⁰ As Makarios’ comment at Makronisos reveals, there can be no doubt about the fact that Makarios was opposed to Communism. At the same time, it is important to take into account the political situation at the time. Greece had just been ravaged by the Greek Civil War, which was very much a right wing – left wing conflict. Historian Demetrios Assos touches upon this, writing that even if Makarios’ comments “could be partly symptomatic of the greater struggle of life and death between anti-communist and communist forces in the Greek world and by extension Cyprus as well, it was clever that the Bishop of Kitium was entering the political scene with clear cut feelings about communism.”⁵¹ Ultimately, without undermining Makarios’ ideological opposition to communism, it is important to point out – especially in the context of this paper on the position of *ethnarch* – that political concerns over unity of the Greek Cypriot people influenced Makarios anti-AKEL actions.

What often unfairly strengthens Makarios’ anti-leftist characterization is his associations with those more ideologically dogmatic than he. For instance, Makarios’ tacit tolerance of AKEL was not reflected by everyone within the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Andreas Azinas, described how, “With the ascension of Makarios III, Kyrenia Bishopric circles gradually distanced themselves from the archbishop” for numerous reasons, including that he “did not cut off progressive people from the national body...”⁵² The division between Makarios and Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia cannot only be

⁵⁰ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 27.

⁵¹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 27-28.

⁵² Andreas Azinas, *50 Years of Silence: Cyprus’ struggle for freedom, my EOKA Secret File* (Nicosia: Airwaves, 2002), 1: 188-189.

explained by Kyprianos' personal resentment at losing the election to Makarios, but also because Makarios was more tolerant of the left. The fact that Makarios often sought consensus from Bishop Kyprianos does not mean that the two men saw eye to eye.

More often, it is Makarios' close collaboration with a man named Georgios Grivas which gets him characterized as a strong anti-leftist. Grivas was the leader of EOKA and collaborated closely with Makarios during the campaign for *enosis*. Throughout his life, Grivas was virulently anti-communist. Born in Cyprus in 1898, Grivas left the island in his youth to attend the Military Academy in Athens. He fought in the Greco-Turkish War, and when the Italian and German armies invaded Greece in World War Two, Grivas was serving as a lieutenant colonel. After the army collapsed Grivas set up a resistance organization called Chi.⁵³ This "organization directed its operations against Greek communists rather than the occupying powers, and earned a justified reputation for the brutality of its methods."⁵⁴ It was in Athens, during the chaos of the German retreat, that Makarios and Grivas first met. Makarios lived in the same house as the sister of a Chi member, and the church at which Makarios officiated as priest was in the neighborhood of Grivas' headquarters.⁵⁵ Makarios published an article in the Chi newsheets in which he attacked "communism 'from a Christian point of view.'"⁵⁶ Despite this association with the organization, "archival research ... corroborates the view that Makarios had not been a member of X [Chi] during occupation, even though his church was in proximity to Grivas'

⁵³ George Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, ed. Charles Foley (New York City: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 2-5.

⁵⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 46.

⁵⁵ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 321.

⁵⁶ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie *The Struggle For Cyprus* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), 8.

headquarters.”⁵⁷ Further, the two had no sustained contact, despite mutual acquaintances.⁵⁸ While the extreme nature of Grivas’ anti-communist beliefs are clear from his actions during World War II, Makarios’ relationship to Grivas prior to the *enosis* campaign was only brief. As will be shown throughout this paper, the two men’s relationship during the *enosis* campaign was tense, and the treatment of the left was not something on which the two men agreed.

Makarios Engages with Violent Resistance:

Makarios’s election as Archbishop would soon put him back in contact with Grivas, however. A central aspect of Makarios’ strategy for achieving *enosis* was to raise awareness of the cause abroad. As he later described “if we decided to use force it would have no effect, or little, since people in Greece knew next to nothing of the problem. I tried to create an issue, as Bishop and Archbishop, by making speeches at monasteries in the mountains, by visits to foreign countries and publicity generally.”⁵⁹ His primary target for international support was Greece, and he visited Athens every year between his enthronement and the start of the insurgency in April 1955.⁶⁰ The cause of *enosis* was widely popular in Greece, and “The archbishop’s siege of Athens was not a debate, nor was it an exercise of logic. It was, rather, an attempt to show each successive Greek government that its own citizens demanded *enosis*. More specifically, he wanted Greece to bring the issue to the UN.”⁶¹

⁵⁷ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 21.

⁵⁸ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 21.

⁵⁹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 9.

⁶⁰ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 41.

⁶¹ Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion*, 121.

Makarios' strategy for bringing about *enosis* was to force Greek governments to recognize the popularity for the cause among their constituents, thereby forcing the government to fight for Cyprus on the international stage.

Makarios first visited Greece as archbishop only five months after being elected, in March of 1951. He encountered immense support for *enosis* among the Greek population, along with a group of Cypriot expatriates especially committed to the cause. During this visit, Makarios was approached by two brothers, Savvas and Socrates Loizides, who had set up a committee with the goals of promoting *enosis*. This committee included notable figures such as former Greek Minister of Defense George Stratos.⁶² It appears that the Loizides brothers were the ones who took the initiative to create the organization with the intent of fostering a violent resistance in Cyprus.⁶³ Socrates inquired if Makarios would support a revolutionary organization, to which Makarios gave his assent.⁶⁴ Then, according to Azinas and Grivas, it was George Stratos who suggested Grivas as the commander of the organization.⁶⁵ Grivas describes how he had developed an interest in an armed revolt separate from the Loizides brothers, and had approached Stratos about the idea.⁶⁶ However, in Foley and Scobie's *The Struggle for Cyprus*, a book based upon interviews with numerous people involved in the Cyprus Emergency, it was Makarios who suggested using Grivas to lead the organization in April of 1951.⁶⁷ Regardless of how Grivas was brought into the plan, it was this first contact which set the ball into

⁶² Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 10.

⁶³ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 176.

⁶⁴ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 178.

⁶⁵ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 179; Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 13.

⁶⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 13.

⁶⁷ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 10.

motion. Grivas was sent to Cyprus to scout out areas from which to operate his armed resistance.⁶⁸

Upon Grivas' arrival and departure, he met briefly with Makarios, whom he described as "reserved and skeptical" in the face of Grivas' optimism and ambition for the scale of the armed resistance.⁶⁹ At this initial stage, Makarios hoped that "sabotage of British military installations might be sufficient to prompt some reconsiderations in London of the Cyprus question; and he was very dubious about the value of Grivas' scheme for action by mountain guerilla bands. Who would they fight there?... Where were the targets?"⁷⁰ From their earliest plans, Makarios and Grivas disagreed over the scale of violent resistance because to Makarios, the purpose of violent resistance was primarily to put pressure on the British to negotiate. Despite this, Makarios was willing to engage with those who sought to use violence to bring about the *enosis*.

On July 2nd, 1952, Makarios was once again in Athens and met again with the Loizides brother's organization, which had reorganized and renamed itself the Sacred Liberation Committee. When Grivas explained his plan for sabotage teams in towns accompanied by guerillas in the countryside, Makarios replied that, "Not fifty men will be found to follow you" to which Grivas replied "I know the Cypriots well. I am sure they will respond to our call."⁷¹ While not much was decided at this July 2nd meeting, the group met again on July 21st after Makarios' meetings with the Greek government had failed to convince them to raise the issue of Cyprus at the UN.⁷² At this

⁶⁸ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 13.

⁶⁹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 17.

⁷⁰ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 14-15.

⁷¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 18.

⁷² Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 15.

meeting two committees were set up to study the military and political plans for achieving *enosis*, and Grivas was sent to Cyprus for five months to conduct more reconnaissance.⁷³ Although the exact form violence was to take was still a contentious point between Makarios and Grivas, Makarios chose not back out of the plot.

In Greece once again, Makarios had the committee swear an oath of allegiance to the cause of *enosis* on March 7th, 1953.⁷⁴ Three days after this meeting Makarios and Grivas met in private, where Makarios still insisted on primarily using sabotage. Makarios later recounted how he insisted that Grivas' men "could only fight back in self defense if they found themselves in difficulties. I said that Grivas must take his orders from me as *Ethnarch* and leader of the political struggle. We would discuss everything, but I would have the final word. He promised this, and obeyed for as long as I was in Cyprus."⁷⁵ Makarios made this clear again on June 7th, 1953 through secret communication that he would only be willing to provide Grivas with "mines and grenades... not guns."⁷⁶ However, Grivas refused to go ahead with these tactics, and rallied support from the other members of the committee to support his plan.⁷⁷ "The Liberation Committee warmly supported him, and there was even talk of 'going ahead without Makarios.'"⁷⁸ Ultimately, Makarios relented, and authorized Grivas "to go ahead with preparations but on the thorny issue of the actual nature of the struggle it was decided that it

⁷³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 18.

⁷⁴ Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III", 253.

⁷⁵ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 20.

⁷⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 20.

⁷⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 21.

⁷⁸ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 20.

would depend on the political developments, thus fudging over the disparity of views.”⁷⁹ Makarios was aware that if the campaign of violence was to proceed without him, this would be a challenge to his claim to be the sole voice of Greek Cypriot people’s desire for *enosis*. Preferring to rule by consensus, Makarios ultimately acquiesced and agreed to the use of guerilla warfare.

While Makarios as Archbishop-*Ethnarch*, Makarios was constantly struggling to keep the many factions of Greek Cypriots in line, Grivas’ power base was more stable. EOKA was organized in a way to ensure the centrality of its leader, and as a result Grivas did not face the same internal factionalism as Makarios did. Grivas set up cells of fighters across the island, and “communicated his orders to each cell leader through courier and placed a premium on maintaining control; horizontal communication between cell leaders, was rare.”⁸⁰ Though this structure prevented the whole organization from collapsing if one group was compromised, it also ensured that cells could not coalesce in opposition to Grivas’ commands. This was made clear from the start, when “A first order went out to district commanders on February 8, stressing basic rules. Of these, the first and most important was that only Grivas gave orders.”⁸¹ As a result, “Grivas managed to exercise a great deal of personal control over the rebels and...maintained singular control of EOKA until 1959, exercising greater influence over the organization than did Archbishop Makarios.”⁸² As EOKA was the only Greek Cypriot group using violence, Grivas’ control over this organization gave him special ability to

⁷⁹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 81.

⁸⁰ Preston Jordan Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency During the Cyprus Revolt, 1955-1959* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 6-7.

⁸¹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 37.

⁸² Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 7.

challenge Makarios. This was recognized by Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, who described how “Grivas was ... [EOKA’s] undisputed leader. Without him EOKA would never have been built up into an organized body. Without him it would have soon withered and died.”⁸³ This power “brought out values of conspiratorial nationalism, which not only were anti-democratic, but also undermined the *ethnarchic* unity of the community...[and] radicalized it towards a direction which surpassed the capabilities of control by a religious authority.”⁸⁴ And thus, “EOKA molded a new reality, which surpassed the initial goals of the political authorities of Greece and Cyprus and forced them to change their stance, according to Grivas’ aims.”⁸⁵ The fact that Grivas held tight control over the only organization with the capabilities of violence proved to be a headache for Makarios, who had no such control over the larger *enosis* movement. While Grivas would obey Makarios early on in the struggle, once Makarios was exiled from the island Grivas had the power to proceed in favor of *enosis* as he saw fit.

The only moment in which Grivas’ control over EOKA was remotely threatened occurred at the very start of the organization’s campaign of violence, which would be termed the ‘Cyprus Emergency’ by the British. In accordance with his strategy of using violence to raise awareness of the Cypriot struggle, Makarios had ordered a campaign of sabotage to begin after Greece raised the issue of Cyprus at the UN in December 1954. Makarios had asked Azinas to tell Grivas to “start as soon as there is a negative resolution at the UN. Try to avoid bloodshed. Try sabotage only... I’ll see you with

⁸³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 39.

⁸⁴ Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III”, 257.

⁸⁵ Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III”, 257-258.

Grivas in a couple of days to speak with you both.”⁸⁶ However, after the UN debate, nothing happened, and when Makarios returned to Cyprus he confronted Andreas Azinas, asking him “Why didn’t you start action as had been agreed? I delayed my departure from America for a few days, waiting. Nothing happened. I wondered what the matter could be, and at the same time felt concerned.”⁸⁷ What had occurred was that Savvas Loizides, who had accompanied Makarios to the UN, had learned that his brother Socrates was in Cyprus with EOKA. Worried for his brother’s, Savvas had used the Greek embassy to send news to Cyprus to abort any violence. But Socrates refused to leave, as he “thought the Cypriot struggle was his baby and could not accept that leadership had been given to Grivas. He held confused opinions regarding a collective leadership”⁸⁸ Eventually, Makarios persuaded Socrates to leave Cyprus, and the only man to put up a weak challenge to Grivas’ leadership was defeated.

So, discussion resumed once again over when to initiate a campaign of violence, and it was a discussion in which Makarios was heavily involved. Especially during the period before his exile, Makarios and Grivas communicated frequently about issues regarding EOKA, even if they did not always see eye to eye. In a meeting on the 10th of January 1955, Azinas had proposed February,⁸⁹ Makarios suggested March 25th, but Grivas wanted an earlier date to catch the British by surprise. However, “the question was left undecided...”⁹⁰ until Grivas and Makarios met again on March 7th.

⁸⁶ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 264.

⁸⁷ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 299.

⁸⁸ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 299.

⁸⁹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 316.

⁹⁰ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 29.

Here, Makarios came around to the military realities which made Greek Independence Day, or March 25th, infeasible, and finally all parties agreed to start on the night of March 31st.⁹¹

The decision to proceed with the date in late March was driven by the issue of smuggling weapons into Cyprus. It is worth discussing the way EOKA weaponry was procured, as it reveals more about the dynamic between the Church and EOKA. From the start “the support of the armed struggle from its initial stage in 1951, was the Church, and more precisely the Archbishopric on behalf of the whole Church.”⁹² Makarios, as head of the church, had significant say in when to provide church finances, and for what. So when at the start of the campaign Makarios was hesitant to use guerilla warfare, he planned to only purchase mines and grenades. Only after he was convinced to support a wider use of violence in 1953, did Makarios provide money for Socrates Loizides to buy guns. The first shipment of arms arrived in Cyprus on March 2nd, 1954, and included 81 assorted rifles, revolvers, and sub machine guns with 32,150 rounds of ammunition, in addition to 290 hand grenades and 20 kilos of explosives.⁹³ A second shipment was sent in August of 1954, in which additional 38 guns were sent with hundreds of kilos of explosives, and a third shipment was supposed to arrive in late November 1954 but never arrived.⁹⁴ To make up for the lost shipment, after returning from the 1954 UN debate, Makarios purchased 1,275£ of arms and explosives in Athens. However, this was captured by the British on January 26th, 1955.⁹⁵ Between January 1955 and the outbreak of

⁹¹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 38.

⁹² Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 293.

⁹³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 22.

⁹⁴ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 28.

⁹⁵ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 29.

violence on April 1st, explosive material had to be looted from mines and from WWII weaponry dumped in the sea near Cyprus.⁹⁶ Even the money to pay the fishermen to retrieve the abandoned ordinance was provided by Makarios.⁹⁷ So in addition to his involvement in planning the campaign of violence with Grivas, Makarios also participated in the support of violence through financial means. Ultimately, while Makarios may not have had direct command over the violent resistance on Cyprus, he did have control over the money which armed EOKA.

It is clear that because of the church's financial resources, "without the support of the church, violent resistance on Cyprus was not viable."⁹⁸ However, this support was more than just financial, churchmen also took an active role in smuggling weapons. For instance, two students studying theology at the University of Athens, one of whom was related to Archbishop Makarios and the other who would later become Makarios' private secretary, smuggled weapons in suitcases into Cyprus. Then in October of 1955, Bishop Anthimos of Kition returned from Athens with fuses hidden inside his bishop staff, and a priest traveling with him hid more fuses within his cylindrical black priest hat. Later, Bishop Anthimos was given a teddy bear for an orphanage in Cyprus, in which fuses were stuffed. Finally, in late 1955, five crates of religious books were sent to Cyprus with explosives and weapons hidden under Bibles and theological works. This shipment was discovered by the British however.⁹⁹ The Church, led by Makarios, played a critical role in providing weapons to EOKA, both

⁹⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 30.

⁹⁷ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 36.

⁹⁸ Novo, "The God Dilemma", 211.

⁹⁹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 58.

by purchasing and by actively helping to smuggle the weaponry. Makarios, in charge of the Church's finances, had the authority to cut Grivas off from this supply, however this was not a power Makarios ever used prior to his exile.

With a fair number of weapons stockpiled, and more to trickle in throughout 1955, Grivas began his assault in the early hours of April 1st, 1955. On March 29th, Makarios had sent for Grivas, gave him his blessing and “insisted that there should be no use of arms and that every effort must be made to avoid casualties.”¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, the opening night of the campaign focused on sabotage, with EOKA men detonating bombs in 16 military, government, police, and broadcasting centers in Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Famagusta.¹⁰¹ On April 3rd Makarios wrote to Grivas in order to congratulate him, saying “you will certainly carry on the struggle with courage and confidence without being affected – although it is natural for you to be sorry – by acts of meanness which are completely temporary and will be surmounted soon. I am sending you my warmest wishes and sincere congratulations. One thousand bravos to you! The rulers have realized that we have entered upon a serious stage of the struggle.”¹⁰² Makarios complements were reflective of EOKA's focus on sabotage and were also meant to placate Grivas. On April 9th, Makarios ordered a stop to the attacks, “convinced that pinprick attacks were costing the insurgents popular support.”¹⁰³ Grivas, disagreed with this plan and was convinced that “Makarios was surrounded by ‘faint-hearted’ advisors who were

¹⁰⁰ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 60.

¹⁰¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 71.

¹⁰² Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 43.

¹⁰³ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 72.

‘afraid for their skins.’”¹⁰⁴ However, Grivas begrudgingly complied with the ceasefire request, at this point unwilling to challenge Makarios’ claim to the leadership of the movement.

It was after these initial attacks that Grivas’ identity was first revealed to the British Colonial Government. From his exile behind the Iron Curtain, the leader of the Greek communist movement released Grivas’ name to the public, although fortunately for Grivas the British did not take this announcement seriously. Already harboring hatred against the left, this act served to further solidify in Grivas mind that the left wing was traitorous to the national cause of *enosis*. AKEL had already denounced EOKA’s violence “as mere ‘fireworks’ and the action of irresponsible ‘adventurers’... and urged the people not to fall into this trap – fearing again that the Church had taken the initiative.”¹⁰⁵ In retaliation, Grivas set up a spy network to watch members of AKEL, warned the left against interfering with the campaign, and asked Makarios to request that Greece deny visas to known communists who wished to travel to Cyprus. However, “This concern with the Communist party was not shared by the Archbishop, although he was aware of its potentialities.”¹⁰⁶ In the midst of organizing a campaign of violence against the British, Grivas was showing the earliest signs of taking action against Greek leftists. This was an act which Makarios could not support as it divided the Greek Cypriot community which he claimed to represent.

Ultimately, the disagreement between Makarios and Grivas on the use of violence can be explained by the difference in their bases of power. As Archbishop-*Ethnarch*, Makarios always

¹⁰⁴ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 43.

¹⁰⁵ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 64.

¹⁰⁶ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 45.

advocated for a more limited use of violence than Grivas. In a conversation with Andreas Azinas, Makarios told him that, “You and Grivas have to realize that I am aware of my responsibilities towards the Cypriot people. I am no less of a patriot than you are, but the Church cannot ignore the sacrifices, the victims of the struggle. Every step throughout the whole spectrum of the struggle of the people must be thought out carefully. I bear that responsibility, because the archbishop and the Church feel that the eyes of the people are always focused on them.”¹⁰⁷ There was a tension in Makarios because as Archbishop, Makarios held an aversion to violence, but as *ethnarch* he felt a responsibility to lead the Greek Cypriot people, even if meant resorting to violence. As a result, Makarios wanted to limit violence to acts which fulfilled the purpose of raising awareness of Cyprus’ decolonial struggle abroad. Additionally, Makarios, was not a military man by training, so his grasp of guerilla and sabotage operations was unformed. For instance, he naively anticipated that the campaign of violence “could be over within three to six months, anticipating a swift political settlement with London.”¹⁰⁸ In contrast, “Grivas, with more understanding of the British, had no such expectations.”¹⁰⁹ The disparity of military knowledge between the two men only exacerbated their ideological differences on the purpose of the violence. Historian Andre Novo writes that “Makarios’s miscalculation concerning the scope of violence that would follow his decision to empower EOKA and Grivas to begin their fight can be justified based on his lack of military understanding. His failure to understand Grivas is a

¹⁰⁷ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 234.

¹⁰⁸ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 81.

¹⁰⁹ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 62.

greater fault.”¹¹⁰ It was his position as Archbishop and his military naiveté that caused Makarios to agree to proceed with violent resistance, but it was his position as archbishop and his overall strategy of settling the Cyprus issue at the UN which caused him to take a more conservative approach towards the use of violence than Grivas.

Comparatively, Grivas was more extreme in his support for violence and commitment to *enosis*. One Greek Cypriot politician characterized Grivas as “a national leader who believed in what he was doing, but... did not have a wide political vision of what was going on in the world. He believed that if something was right you should fight for it until you succeed; that is to say, he was not flexible...”¹¹¹ Grivas himself admitted as much, writing in his memoirs that “I am not a politician and I do not mix into politics. I am a soldier and I will remain as such.”¹¹² It was Grivas’ more simplistic attitude which would hamper Makarios efforts at compromise later in the *enosis* struggle. Despite this characterization, Grivas was realistic about the extent to which he was capable of successfully using violence. In his memoirs he describes how in 1955, against an unprepared British garrison “with 500 trained and properly armed men I could have driven them into the sea with a series of rapid blows... But my resources were meager and I could not hope to win a military victory.”¹¹³ Despite his aspirations, Grivas understood that he could not defeat the British in the field, and that the purpose of violence was “to arouse international public opinion, especially among the allies in Greece, by deeds of

¹¹⁰ Novo, “The God Dilemma”, 204.

¹¹¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 47.

¹¹² French, *Fighting EOKA*, 47-48.

¹¹³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 47.

heroism and self sacrifice which will focus attention on Cyprus until our aims are achieved. The British must be continuously harried and beset until they are obliged by international diplomacy exercised through the United Nations to examine the Cyprus problem and settle it in accordance with the desires of the Cypriot people and the Greek Nation.”¹¹⁴ Grivas, in line with the way his personality was described, thought that it would take inspirational, ‘heroic’ feats of EOKA commitment to *enosis* which would change world opinion. Makarios was more pragmatic and wanted the minimum amount of violence necessary to achieve their aim. While both Grivas and Makarios understood that violence was to be used to promote the cause on the international stage, they differed on the extent of the violence.

Makarios and Diplomatic Negotiations:

In April 1955, Makarios left Cyprus to attend the Bandung Conference. The day he left for the conference was Orthodox Good Friday, showing “how far political considerations had overridden the Archbishop’s more spiritual concern for his people.”¹¹⁵ The conference inspired hope in Makarios that the non-aligned countries would support Cyprus at the United Nations. So, after the conference ended Makarios sent written instructions to Grivas “that there should be no more EOKA activity until further notice because of ‘important national interests.’”¹¹⁶ As Makarios’ negotiating position was increasingly recognized on the world stage, he sought a limit to the use of violence. During his trip

¹¹⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 48.

¹¹⁵ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 64.

¹¹⁶ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 65.

back to Cyprus, Makarios stopped in Greece where he held rallies in support of *enosis*. In Athens on May 3rd, Makarios stated that “he had repeatedly advised the Cypriots not to use force. In a reference to the colonial government’s charge that he had failed to condemn or even comment on ‘a patently irreligious oath’ taken by Greek Cypriot schoolboys contemplating violence, the archbishop declared that, as he had not bound anyone by such an oath, he could not be expected to release them from it.”¹¹⁷ The inclusion of Cyprus, despite its colonial status, at the Bandung Conference increased Makarios’ confidence in his strategy of securing *enosis* on the world stage, thereby strengthening his conviction to limit EOKA violence.

On May 23rd, shortly after Makarios returned to Cyprus, Grivas wrote to inform him of his next plan of attack. This involved “acts of sabotage in the towns and in important communications centres, with simultaneous attacks on police stations, especially in mountainous areas, in order to compel the enemy to disperse its forces. If this effort is crowned with success, we shall go in with activity by small groups of armed men in mountainous areas, which will make sudden attacks and then hide themselves...”¹¹⁸ This plan was straying away from Makarios’ preferred strategy of sabotage, and towards a guerilla style resistance. Grivas declared his willingness to incorporate the campaign into Makarios’ broader diplomatic plan by fighting “in such a way that it will last at least until next October, when the Cyprus question will be discussed in the UNO,” but the only “thing which could not be altered was a continued armed struggle ‘because its abandonment will mean the internment of

¹¹⁷ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 65-66.

¹¹⁸ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 72.

the *enosis* question.”¹¹⁹ Although Grivas was willing to make short term cessations of violence, he was not prepared for any limitation of the actions of EOKA in the long term.

Makarios met Grivas in person on June 7th to discuss the future of the EOKA campaign. During this meeting Makarios “approved of Grivas’ plan to put a bomb in Government House on the Queen’s Birthday, provided it caused no casualties,” however, he vetoed Grivas’ plan to assassinate the Commander in Chief of Middle East land Forces during his travels in Cyprus.¹²⁰ Makarios came to a compromise with Grivas by limiting EOKA’s more extreme actions. On the night of June 19/20th, EOKA violence resumed with attacks on government facilities and individual policemen and soldiers. This offensive lasted only until the 28th of June as “EOKA still lacked the arms, explosives, and trained personnel to conduct a continuous campaign.”¹²¹ Attacks continued at a lesser pace against the police, and in total “Between 1 April and end of June EOKA mounted 208 attacks, and there were 71 arrests.”¹²² Grivas immediately set out a third phase of attack, explaining how “Sabotage groups in the towns will have the Police as their special target with a view of paralyzing and terrorizing them, They will be neutralized and the Army will have to reinforce them and thus scatter,” while simultaneously guerilla groups in the mountains would steal weapons from the police.¹²³ Grivas, in an attempt to “stretch British forces further” traveled to the Trodos mountains on July 6 1955, to personally lead a guerilla campaign.¹²⁴ With the rapid change in the nature of violence during the early summer of 1955,

¹¹⁹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 46.

¹²⁰ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 66.

¹²¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 72.

¹²² French, *Fighting EOKA*, 76.

¹²³ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 73.

¹²⁴ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 40.

Makarios sent a letter expressing his doubts about guerilla warfare to Grivas in late July. Grivas recorded in his diary that “The Archbishop’s attitude is strange... is he afraid of losses; or of responsibility for bloodshed?... Perhaps it is a matter of pride since he spoke against guerilla action from the start and did not want to bring in the arms necessary for this kind of war. Whatever the reason, I shall go forward.”¹²⁵ While Makarios still played a role in limiting some of Grivas’ more ambitious plan, he largely compromised his position on the nature of EOKA violence, allowing a shift from a sabotage focused campaign to one of guerilla warfare.

In July 1955, Makarios traveled to Greece in order to respond to a diplomatic emergency for the *enosis* cause. The British government had announced its plans to convene a three-party conference between Greece, Turkey and the UK. The British hoped his conference would help them to portray the situation in Cyprus as a conflict between Greece and Turkey, which required Britain’s continued presence on the island to keep peace. Makarios saw the intentions of the British as an effort to cut out the archbishop from any negotiations and to give both Greece and Turkey a greater say in the affairs of Cyprus. So, he wrote to the Greek government, expressing how “I feel that this move by the British Government, despite the fact that it could be taken at first sight as a British retreat and a Greek success, is in fact a dangerous maneuver at the expense of the Cyprus cause.... Because of the extreme seriousness of the matter, I would request that I be briefed in time on the thoughts and actions of the Greek Government regarding the handling of the matter.”¹²⁶ As archbishop-*ethnarch*, and the clear

¹²⁵ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 41.

¹²⁶ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 376.

leader of the *enosis* cause on Cyprus, Makarios continued his demands that the Greek government work with him on the international stage. Once in Greece, Makarios held a press conference where he “threatened to disown any action taken by the Greek government in the handling of the Cyprus question. ‘In conclusion, he said, ‘we should like to make it clear that the Cypriot people will not accept any decision of the Tripartite conference which does not accord to their wishes, even if the Greek government was a signatory to such decision.’”¹²⁷ Through the 1955 Tripartite Conference, Makarios made clear to the Greek government that as Archbishop-*ethnarch* of the church which had recently re-entrenched itself in the politics of Cyprus, Makarios’ approval was required on any decision regarding the status of Cyprus.

One of the means by which Makarios strengthened his position as the key for any negotiations about Cyprus was by adding a stamp of democratic legitimacy to his claim. This time, instead of organizing another referendum, Makarios revived an organization called the National Assembly. The first attempt to establish a national assembly came when in 1944, political leaders in Cyprus approached Bishop Leontios with the idea of an assembly. This assembly would have included both AKEL and right-wing organizations like Pancyprrian Farmers’ Union, and would have totaled 184 representatives with “70 farmers... 10 city workers, 6 mayors, 6 city representatives, 8 township mayors, 18 newspaper editors, representatives of lawyers, doctors, educationalists, and abbots of monasteries. They would elect 33 lay representatives to be supplemented by 3 church representatives

¹²⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 46.

and the [Bishop Leontios].”¹²⁸ However, the whole plan failed because an Archimandrite of the Kyrenia Bishopric persuaded Leontios that “the *Ethnarchic* right belonged exclusively to the Church, and could not be ceded to anyone.”¹²⁹ Makarios, confident in his re-assertion of the church’s *ethnarchic* power, convened the first National Assembly at St. John’s Cathedral in Nicosia on April 25 1952. The assembly “included representatives of urban and rural municipalities, clubs, Church figures and other personalities.”¹³⁰ However it was not until April 5th 1954, that Makarios suggested that the National Assembly become permanent. He summoned 555 representatives for a second Assembly in Nicosia on July 23rd 1954.¹³¹ At this meeting, Makarios had announced that “although the Cypriot struggle was a peaceful one, events in a neighboring country pointed to the conclusion that the British could be made to understand by force.”¹³² He elaborated that although violence might sometimes be necessary to resist oppression, he was in no hurry to embrace it, preferring to await the outcome of Greek efforts at the United Nations.¹³³ Though Makarios did declare outright his intention to use violence, this speech was an attempt to prepare Cypriot support for EOKA, which Makarios knew was soon to start its actions. Finally, in response to the Tripartite Conference, Makarios called a third national assembly which met at St John’s Cathedral on August 26th 1955, just three days before the Tripartite Conference was scheduled to meet. A resolution was passed, addressed to the British and Greek governments which stated that, “the people of Cyprus would accept no decision from the

¹²⁸ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 68.

¹²⁹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 68.

¹³⁰ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 246.

¹³¹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 1: 68.

¹³² Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 56.

¹³³ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 49.

Tripartite conference other than immediate self-determination.”¹³⁴ Makarios used the Third National Assembly in an attempt to force the Greek government to recognize Makarios' presence at the head of the *enosis* cause on Cyprus, and to allow him to shape the foreign policy of Greece in regards to Cyprus.

As Makarios had predicted, the Tripartite Conference “merely served as a platform for the restatement of conflicting and irreconcilable views which had been thoroughly aired already, for a display of obduracy and intransigence.”¹³⁵ The meeting was accompanied by anti-Greek pogroms in Istanbul and Izmir, which unintentionally served to create sympathy for the Greek cause on the international stage. Recognizing this, Britain used the pogroms as pretext to prevent a discussion of the Cyprus issue at the UN, arguing that it “would serve to heighten the tension between Greece and Turkey and aggravate the situation in Cyprus.”¹³⁶ Thus on September 21st, the UN political committee rejected Greece’s motion to put the Cyprus issue on the agenda, and two days later the General Assembly ratified this decision.

Since the UN was where Makarios had hoped to achieve *enosis*, the UN’s refusal to even discuss Cyprus’ status was a major blow. Grivas wrote to EOKA members, telling them that “Since international diplomacy has proved to be a coward, we shall show it that we know how to fight and die... Our watchword is: Let us throw the English into the sea. And we shall throw them in.”¹³⁷ This

¹³⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 49.

¹³⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 48.

¹³⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 53.

¹³⁷ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 82.

failure on the international stage only strengthened Grivas' belief in the importance of the violent struggle. Further strengthening this opinion was the announcement on September 25th, 1955, that the governor of Cyprus was to be replaced by John Harding, who Greek Cypriot newspapers described as “‘a war criminal’ fresh from ‘exterminating’ colonial peoples in Malaya and Kenya.”¹³⁸ Grivas' response to the failure at the UN and the more aggressive British counterinsurgency was to announce a new campaign. Called ‘Operation Forward to Victory’ it involved more direct attacks on the police and British Security Forces and commenced in October 1955. Once again, Makarios' preference for sabotage was replaced in favor of more open warfare.

The new governor Harding would take an unprecedented approach in dealing with the *enosis* campaign in Cyprus by open direct negotiations with the Archbishop-*Ethnarch* Makarios. Throughout British colonial rule, the “policy that most antagonized the church was the unwillingness of the British to continue recognizing the archbishop as *ethnarch*, or political representative of the Christian Hellenes.”¹³⁹ But finally, Makarios efforts to reassert the power of the Cypriot Orthodox Church had achieved “an important, if very belated, recognition of the *ethnarch*'s moral and political authority; no Governor had ever before considered negotiating with the Archbishop.”¹⁴⁰ The long standing British policy of avoiding negotiating with the Archbishop-*ethnarch* is due in part to the fact that no aspect of Cypriot “seemed so strange or so antipathetic, as the Orthodox Church. They did not appreciate its esoteric form of Christianity; they abhorred its pretension to the political leadership

¹³⁸ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 72-73.

¹³⁹ Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 6.

¹⁴⁰ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 73.

of the Cyprus people...”¹⁴¹ The political role to which the Archbishop of Cyprus laid claim proved difficult for the British to accept, based on ideas of separation of church and state in their own society. This held true especially with Makarios, who worked closely with those perpetrating violence, and as a result “those in the Anglo-Saxon world, could never forgive him his priesthood. As Robert Stephens wrote in an obituary article in *The Observer* (7.8.1977): The idea of an archbishop as a political leader of a militant nationalist movement employing terrorist methods, seemed strange and repellant to British minds.”¹⁴² The importance of Harding’s decision to recognize Makarios’ role as *ethnarch* by engaging in negotiations with him cannot be overstated, and it demonstrates the success of Makarios efforts from his earliest day as a bishop.

Harding met with Makarios on October 4th, just one day after he arrived in Cyprus. Before his meeting with Harding, “Makarios had convened the Ethnarchy Bureau for advice on how to handle the discussions with the Governor and the consensus was that ‘the principle of self determination must be recognized first and foremost.”¹⁴³ Throughout the negotiations, Makarios would check in with other members of the church, including the Bishop of Kyrenia, to gauge support for Makarios’ decisions. At this first meeting with Harding, however, no agreement could be reached, and Harding asked Makarios to submit in writing “on what basis he would ‘be prepared to cooperate towards the development of constitutional self government.”¹⁴⁴ Harding wrote about the meeting “that the

¹⁴¹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 3.

¹⁴² P. N. Vanezis, *Makarios: Life and Leadership* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1979), 3-4.

¹⁴³ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 103.

¹⁴⁴ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 103.

‘atmosphere was frank and cordial.’ He was impressed when Makarios used the words ‘in principle’ and ‘theoretical’ when referring to the right to self-determination.”¹⁴⁵ Makarios was keen on showing himself to be willing to negotiate during his meetings with Harding. When the pair met again, later that week, Harding pushed argued that Britain's proposal at the Tripartite Conference for self-governance “was an open door of opportunity, Makarios claimed that he could not ‘see such an open door.’”¹⁴⁶ Despite his willingness to find a workable solution, Makarios made clear the issues which he would not agree to, such as the involvement of Turkey in negotiations over Cyprus.

At a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council on October 10th, Makarios proposed the acceptance of self-determination on a delayed time scale, however this was instantly met with criticism “by the Kyrenia Circle for making too many concessions to the British. The opposition of the Kyrenia purists to any deviation from the line of *enosis* was to a certain degree predictable...”¹⁴⁷ According to a British Intelligence report, “the Archbishop was attacked by the Kyrenia faction ‘so vehemently even to the extent of calling him a ‘traitor’”¹⁴⁸ Similar to Makarios’ moderate stances on the treatment of the left and the use of violence, in negotiations with the British he was outflanked by a more zealous faction within the *enosis* movement. Averoff describes how from early in the negotiations “he was opposed by a group of hard-liners who had adopted Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia ... as their leader; and Dighenis¹⁴⁹ himself, though he still acknowledged Makarios as the leader of the Cypriot people, always worked

¹⁴⁵ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 102.

¹⁴⁶ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 104.

¹⁴⁷ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 110.

¹⁴⁸ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 111.

¹⁴⁹ Dighenis, the name of a mythical Byzantine warrior, was the codename Grivas was known by during EOKA’s campaign.

hand in glove with the ‘Kyrenia faction’¹⁵⁰ The opposition to Makarios came not only from within his own church, but also Grivas who controlled the violent resistance. Makarios’ desire for consensus from among the factions within the *enosis* movement but found this impeded his decision-making ability.

Ultimately, preliminary talks in October made no progress and Grivas initiated Operation Forward to Victory.¹⁵¹ When Harding arrived in Cyprus, “Makarios had ordered that there should be no EOKA attacks during this early phase of his negotiations with Harding, but small-scale raids and shootings went on sporadically. Grivas wanted to keep up the fighting morale not only of his organization but of the general public”¹⁵² The assault began the day Makarios returned from his trip to Greece where he met with the new Greek government, led by Konstantinos Karamanlis.

In November, Harding returned to London to discuss with Prime Minister Eden how to proceed with negotiations. Increasing EOKA activity and British strategic concerns regarding Jordan, Israel, and other Arab nations meant that Eden was more willing to compromise on Cyprus.¹⁵³ On November 21, Harding met with Makarios again. Optimistic about the coming negotiations, Harding presented Makarios with a statement which read, “It is not their [HMH Government’s] position that the principle of self-determination never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account

¹⁵⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 56.

¹⁵¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 49.

¹⁵² Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 61.

¹⁵³ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 101.

consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.”¹⁵⁴ Now, Britain had compromised by expressing willingness to officially recognize the right of Cyprus to self-determination. Makarios, however, was not impressed, as it did not address his concerns on the timeline of self-determination or the involvement of Turkey, and “criticized the formula ‘as vague and the negation of self-determination.’”¹⁵⁵ While he told Harding that he could not endorse the statement, Averoff writes that “Now I happen to know (from the Archbishop’s own lips) that Makarios immediately realized he had been presented with an opening which could lead to a solution... He was therefore inwardly determined to go ahead. However, hard bargainer that he was, he raised objections in the hope that he might from the British some rather more explicit commitments...”¹⁵⁶ Makarios again proved willing to find a negotiated solution with Harding. The day after this meeting, Makarios informed the Ethnarchy Council about the negotiations, but, “Their answer was that even to discuss Harding’s proposals amounted to betrayal. If immediate self-determination was not possible, the only solution open to discussion was self-determination ‘within a fixed and reasonable time’”¹⁵⁷ Recognizing that he must win more concessions, especially if he was to secure the support of all factions within the *enosis* movement, Makarios continued to communicate with Harding.

On the evening of December 13th, 1955, Harding ordered the closure of left-wing newspapers and the arrest of 139 leading members of AKEL and other left-wing organizations. Only a few months

¹⁵⁴ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 105.

¹⁵⁵ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 105.

¹⁵⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 60.

¹⁵⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 61.

later, however, he reversed these actions. Harding's intent "in taking this action was to ease the pressure on the archbishop at the crucial stage which had then been reached in the negotiations with him and to ensure that AKEL could not embarrass the archbishop and create difficulties for him if he did decide to co-operate in constitutional government."¹⁵⁸ AKEL had challenged Makarios' claim to the *ethnarchic* role by demanding a seat at the table during negotiations with Harding. When Makarios refused, "AKEL dismissed the talks as a series 'of unacceptable bargains' and accused Makarios of carrying 'secret negotiations behind the people's back.'"¹⁵⁹ Since Harding had already begun to negotiate with Makarios, it was in his interest to keep Makarios as the legitimate *ethnarchic* voice of Greek Cypriots so any decision that the two reached could be properly enforced.

Negotiations began anew in 1956, with Makarios meeting with Harding on January 9th and 13th. The British proposal had not changed in substance, and in the meetings Makarios declared the British proposition unacceptable until the words 'the political situation' and 'treaty obligations' were removed, but he refused to provide alternatives unless he could consult with his advisors.¹⁶⁰ Makarios was increasingly conscious during the negotiations of the need to please the Bishop of Kyrenia and his allies. After Harding consulted again with the British Government in London, on the 27th of January he provided Makarios with an only slightly altered statement and another, new statement about denouncing EOKA violence which Makarios was expected to sign. Makarios refused to sign the second statement denouncing violence because he thought it could "backfire and have the opposite

¹⁵⁸ John Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), 61.

¹⁵⁹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 112.

¹⁶⁰ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 107.

effect. It was not the first time that Makarios was professing weakness in coming out against violence. He was conscious of protecting his prestige which had come under attack by the 'Kyrenia Circle,' but it is possible that there was a genuine concern that his switch from *enosis* to self government and cooperation with the British would be lost on the more hot-headed Grivas."¹⁶¹ As *ethnarch*, Makarios was concerned about keeping consensus within the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement, and was not willing at this point to accept a solution which threatened that.

At the end of January, Makarios met with Grivas in secret at Kykko Monastery, where Grivas only reluctantly accepted the news of Makarios' desire to make a compromise.¹⁶² Makarios made clear his desire to find a solution with Harding to the Ethnarchy Council in a meeting on January 30th. He "distinguished between the desirability of *enosis* and what course of action was possible. He openly admitted that he had significant reservations and that the gap between his position and the government's proposal was 'great' but nevertheless invited the Ethnarchy members 'to see what we can best achieve.'"¹⁶³ Despite Makarios' efforts, the Bishop of Kyrenia still expressed his opposition to the plan, and in a sermon on February 5th 1956 stated "that 'We in Cyprus shall continue on a more intense level our campaign around our sole slogan – *Enosis*.' More worryingly, he denounced self-government when he told the cheering crowd that the constitution was 'the graveyard of *enosis*.'"¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 107-108.

¹⁶² Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 123.

¹⁶³ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 124.

¹⁶⁴ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 112.

Despite his efforts, Makarios had little effect in leading the more nationalist wing of the church towards a compromised solution.

In February, the Harding and Makarios negotiations had devolved into letter writing, rather than in-person discussions. During this time Makarios called on Grivas for a complete cessation of military activities, to which Grivas consented “and by the 18th of February the order had reached all relevant EOKA squads.”¹⁶⁵ Grivas, writing with the benefit of hindsight, casts aspersions on the potential success of the negotiations, writing that “Makarios seemed to think there was some chance of reaching an agreement and, although I personally did not believe this, I secretly ordered a suspension of all attacks on 15 February 1956. So that no one could accuse me of barring the way to peace...”¹⁶⁶ Grivas did send a list of demands for Makarios to make during negotiations with Harding, including “cast-iron guarantees” that the British will fulfill any terms they agree to, the evacuation of all British troops and police, complete amnesty for EOKA fighters, and no British military presence on Cyprus during any period of self government.¹⁶⁷ Grivas seemed less obstinate than Bishop Kyprianos over the issue of an interim period of independence, but added yet more demands for Makarios to consider in his negotiations,

On the 17th and 19th of February, representatives of Harding and Makarios met to hash out basic details for more in-depth negotiations. Shortly thereafter, Makarios and Harding met, with British Labour MP Francis Noel Baker serving as translator. Makarios wanted a general outline of the

¹⁶⁵ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 108.

¹⁶⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 64.

¹⁶⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 64.

constitution which would govern Cyprus as well assurances of amnesty for all EOKA fighters as “A Greek Cypriot campaign of ‘no cooperation without amnesty’ was turning the whole issue into a real deal breaker and Makarios felt the need to address this popular demand.”¹⁶⁸ Makarios, ever aware that he must please all factions in these negotiations, told Harding at one of their last meetings, “‘Sir John, I cannot lead my people where they do not wish to go.’ In exasperation the Field Marshal muttered under his breath: ‘A funny sort of leadership to my way of thinking.’”¹⁶⁹ It was with these key issues unresolved that the final round of negotiations would begin on February 29th.

For what would be the final meeting of the negotiations, Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd flew to Cyprus. Just one hour before Makarios, Harding, and Lennox-Boyd were scheduled to meet, 19 bombs detonated across Nicosia. Before the meeting, multiple EOKA groups had received an order telling them “after hearing the first explosion at 7 in the evening, [they] should do the same in empty lots in specific areas of Nicosia.”¹⁷⁰ In his memoirs, Grivas claims responsibility for the bombings and explains “I had little belief in British sincerity and scant hopes that they would fulfill these conditions. It was for these reasons that I decided to go against Makarios’s wishes and give a warning demonstration of our strength before the final rounds of talks.”¹⁷¹ Ultimately, it was Makarios’ inability to control the factions which he claimed to lead which led to the collapse of negotiations and the exile of Makarios.

¹⁶⁸ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 109.

¹⁶⁹ Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus*, 48.

¹⁷⁰ Andreas Azinas, *50 Years of Silence: Cyprus’ struggle for freedom, my EOKA Secret File* (Nicosia: Airwaves, 2002), 2: 446

¹⁷¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 64.

Makarios, however, had gone into the meeting with a significant amount of optimism. According to “Nikos Kranidiotis, the Archbishop’s close confidant...Makarios was prepared to accept the final British proposals. ‘He [Makarios] believed that he would be able to win still more improvements in the terms, secure agreement to an amnesty in advance and obtain an assurance that control over public security would be transferred to him within a short time. In this way he hoped to overcome the position of General Grivas and the Kyrenia faction, who rejected the proposals outright and regarded any sign of willingness to accept them as betrayal.’”¹⁷² Despite the many obstacles faced by Harding and Makarios during their months of negotiations, Makarios still intended to find a solution. Makarios “was acutely aware that by accepting he was at risk of appearing to ‘become an object of severe attack and criticism’ and ultimately lose a great deal of his authority,”¹⁷³ and his continuing the negotiation process shows that “contrary to subsequent British allegations, Makarios was committed to a political solution and was in fact wary of the continuation of the struggle.”¹⁷⁴

Despite Makarios’ intentions, the British saw the bombings as evidence that Makarios was acting in bad faith. Makarios later explained how “As for the explosions, I was very angry, I did not want the British to think I was so foolish as to try to put pressure on them in this way. I believe that the bombs hardened their view and contributed to my exile. I wrote an angry letter to Grivas the next day, saying that he spoilt everything, but the Abbot of Kykko, to whom I showed it, thought it was too

¹⁷² Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 68.

¹⁷³ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 128.

¹⁷⁴ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 5.

strong so I changed the wording.”¹⁷⁵ However, Harding had always believed that Makarios “secretly controlled the EOKA movement; and it seems obvious that if a military victory was to be won, the removal of the head of the conspiracy was vital.”¹⁷⁶ During their November 21st 1955 meeting, Harding had noted the increase of violence which had occurred upon Archbishop’s upon return from Athens earlier in the month, stating “ that Makarios ‘turns Terrorism on and off like a tap’”¹⁷⁷ Thus, after the eventful meeting Harding and Lennox-Boyd made the decision to exile Makarios. Although Grivas’ campaign had helped to bring the British to the negotiating table and to strengthen the position of the church power on Cyprus, it was also Grivas’ actions which shattered the British government’s faith in reaching an agreement with Makarios.

¹⁷⁵ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 79.

¹⁷⁶ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 79.

¹⁷⁷ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 116.

Chapter 2: March 1956-March 1957

In the midst of his negotiations with Harding, Makarios had made plans for a trip to Athens on March 9th, 1956. This trip was for personal, rather than political reasons, as Makarios was going to accompany his ill sister to a specialist in Athens. In the days leading up to this trip, Makarios was informed of rumors regarding British plans to deport him. He confidently told an editor of a Cypriot pro-*enosis* newspaper “that it was a thousand to one chance against” the British arresting him. However, as a precaution he slipped some extra clothes, vestments, and an Anglo-Greek dictionary into his suitcase before his flight.¹⁷⁸

In the early afternoon on March 9th, Makarios left the archbishop’s palace in a car bound for the Nicosia airport. As soon as his car left, British troops poured into the compound, cordoning it off with barbed wire.¹⁷⁹ As his car sped to the airport, the archbishop’s papers were searched for incriminating evidence of his ties to EOKA, none of which was found. At the airport’s main gate, Makarios’ car was stopped by a British army officer who took control of the vehicle and drove it to the military airport near Nicosia. Makarios was then forced onto a British airplane, where he waited patiently. Shortly thereafter, he was joined by Father Papastavros Papaganthelou, the head of an Orthodox Christian youth organization which served as a recruiting ground for EOKA, Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, and Bishop Kyprianos’ secretary Polycarpos Ioannides. After being read their

¹⁷⁸ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 84.

¹⁷⁹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 135.

rights, the plane took off to Mombasa, from where the party boarded a boat which took them to the Seychelles.¹⁸⁰

Once again, the British sought to extricate the Cypriot Orthodox Church from the politics of the island by exiling its leadership. While his isolation prevented Makarios from exercising his influence over the situation on Cyprus for the duration of his imprisonment, it did not stop EOKA violence or the support for *enosis* among the Greek Cypriots. In fact, with the *ethnarch* gone, Grivas' power to steer the course of the *enosis* movement increased, with only the distant Greek government in Athens and Makarios' deputy, the Bishop of Kition, having the power to influence him. For Makarios, his isolation in the Seychelles gave him plenty of time to reflect on his actions, and during this period he questioned the wisdom of continuing the use of violence. Thus, from March 1956 to March 1957, the power of the *ethnarch* was shattered, and Grivas and the Greek government were able to claim a significant share of this responsibility.

Leadership during Makarios' Absence:

Always aware of the possibility of exile or imprisonment from the earliest days of the *enosis* campaign, Makarios had planned in advance for the eventuality. In a January 1955 meeting with Grivas, Azinas, and Bishop Anthimos of Kition, Makarios had declared Bishop Anthimos his deputy in the case of his imprisonment. So, upon Makarios' exile Azinas wrote to the Archbishop of Kition reminding him that he had been selected as Makarios' successor and that "I expected him to get in

¹⁸⁰ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 79-80.

touch with me and to give me instructions for further moves... He asked me to intensify my effort, promising support.”¹⁸¹ Though he always recognized that he was not the true *ethnarch*, Bishop Anthimos helped to keep the cause of *enosis* alive in Makarios' absence. Averoff describes how Anthimos of Kition “from the very outset he took a tough line with everyone, including the Greek government.”¹⁸² In an effort to aid in Makarios' return, Anthimos ignored the Karamanlis' government and “appealed to the Greek Parliament to support the struggle of the Cypriots...”¹⁸³ Then, through the Ethnarchy newspaper *Ethnos*, criticism was laid against the Greek government for its handling of the Cyprus issue. Anthimos' criticism contributed to the resignation of Greek Foreign Minister Spyros Theotokis, and his replacement by Averoff-Tossizza.¹⁸⁴ Pushing for the return of the rightfulethnarch was key to Bishop Anthimos' strategy, as the longer Makarios was away the weaker his hold became over Grivas, the Greek Government, and other pro-*enosis* factions.

In addition to becoming a political voice for Makarios in his absence, Bishop Anthimos of Kition also took over Makarios' responsibility of pay master for the *enosis* cause. At one point during Makarios exile, Savvas Loizides requested 8,500 drachma, which Anthimos rejected. As a result, Savvas tried to raise money elsewhere, but upon hearing this Azinas rushed to tattle, ensuring that “the only source was the Panhellenic Committee under the Archbishop of Athens. Nobody else,”¹⁸⁵ as, “this Committee provided money in accordance with written instructions from Makarios and later from

¹⁸¹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 454.

¹⁸² Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 72.

¹⁸³ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 475.

¹⁸⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 75.

¹⁸⁵ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 516.

the Bishop of Kition...”¹⁸⁶ Thus, an attempt to further weaken the power of *ethnarch* was thwarted, and the financial power of the ethnarchy, which was one of its most important tools for influencing the *enosis* cause, was preserved.

A key event in August 1956 resulted in the imprisonment of the Bishop of Kition and further weakened the power of the *ethnarch*. Throughout the *enosis* campaign, Grivas had meticulously kept diaries and notes of his daily activities. Before the start of the campaign of EOKA violence on April 1st, 1955, Grivas had given “a section of the diary I was keeping to Gregoris Louka, my bodyguard, for safe-keeping. Louka, a completely trustworthy man... took the papers to his village, Lyssi, where he and his brother sealed them in glass jars and buried them in a field.”¹⁸⁷ These papers were discovered by the British and published on the 26th of August 1956. The diaries demonstrated close contact between Grivas and Makarios, which the British used to retroactively justify the imprisonment of Makarios. The diaries also implicated many other people, including the Bishop of Kition, who was arrested on 30th August and was placed under house arrest. This imprisonment of the Bishop of Kition limited his ability to keep the growing power of the Greek government and Grivas in check.

The exile of Makarios enabled Grivas to pursue a campaign of violence without having his plans limited by Makarios. As Grivas wrote in his autobiography, “After the deportations I saw no reason for restraint.”¹⁸⁸ In response to the archbishop’s deportation, EOKA notably increased its attacks in what Grivas called phase two of Operation Forward to Victory. During this time “the

¹⁸⁶ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 515.

¹⁸⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 90.

¹⁸⁸ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 69.

organization was responsible for about three incidents each day...”¹⁸⁹ One instance of a more extreme level of violence which occurred during this period was the execution of two British soldiers who EOKA held hostage, in response to the British execution of two EOKA fighters.¹⁹⁰ Based on previous instances of Makarios vetoing Grivas’ plans for assassinations, it can be speculated that this action would not have received the green light if Makarios had still been on Cyprus. Despite Grivas willingness to increase the centrality of violence in the *enosis* struggle during Makarios’ absence, he did not lose sight of the broader goal of the violence, which was to drive home the Cypriot desire for *enosis* on the world stage. EOKA’s attacks “peaked in March, in protest at the Archbishop’s deportation, in May and June, in retaliation for the executions of Michael Karaolis and Andreas Demetriou, in September, to demonstrate EOKA’s strength on the arrival of Lord Radcliffe, the British constitutional Commissioner, and finally in the first three weeks of November, in an effort to cause the British maximum embarrassment during the Suez operation.”¹⁹¹ Makarios’ absence and the Bishop of Kition’s imprisonment contributed to Grivas’ increased authority in plotting the direction of the *enosis* cause.

In August of 1956, around the time of the Bishop of Kition’s imprisonment, Makarios’ “place as the political voice of the insurgency was filled by PEKA [the Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle], which henceforth served as the political wing of EOKA.”¹⁹² This organization was an effort

¹⁸⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 109.

¹⁹⁰ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 88.

¹⁹¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 109.

¹⁹² French, *Fighting EOKA*, 58.

by Grivas to increase his influence over the political realm of *enosis*, a power which he had previously left to Makarios. Averoff describes how PEKA was organized “in separate sectors, each with its own leader personally chosen and advised by Grivas-Dighenis. Its functions were: (a) to coordinate the political and military struggle; (b) to preserve a united internal front among Greek Cypriots; (c) to keep public morale high; (d) to counter hostile propaganda.”¹⁹³ Recognizing Grivas’ increased control over both the political and violent fronts of the *enosis* campaign, the new Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff-Tossizza immediately set about establishing “a close working relationship with the leaderless Ethnarchy, which meant that as soon as possible I would have to make contact with Dighenis...”¹⁹⁴ Averoff was successful in establishing contact with Grivas during Makarios exile, although this also served to increase Grivas’ power as he now had a clear line to the very top of the Greek government.

Early in the summer of 1956, Grivas was aware that the British “were talking vaguely of releasing Makarios and negotiating with him, if ‘violence’... came to an end.”¹⁹⁵ However, with the Suez Crisis brewing and the possibility of decreased troop presence on the island, Grivas could not pass up the opportunity to take advantage of a weakened British resistance. It was only later in 1956 that Averoff’s establishment of direct communications had some impact on limiting Grivas’ actions. Averoff used the Greek Consul General in Nicosia to send a message to Grivas which proposed the idea of a temporary ceasefire. The strategy behind this proposal was to expose the British claim that EOKA activity was all that stood between them and negotiations as a lie. By this point Grivas was also

¹⁹³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 160.

¹⁹⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 79.

¹⁹⁵ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 85.

aware of EOKA's weakness and the infeasibility of an approach heavily reliant on violence, as "At the beginning of June Grivas admitted to the Bishop of Kitium... that he could not fulfill the promise he had made in launching Operation 'Forward to Victory' to 'throw the English into the sea.'" ¹⁹⁶

Realizing this, Grivas agreed to the temporary ceasefire proposed by Averoff, but to show that this offer was coming from a position of strength, EOKA activities were ramped up for a week in advance of the announcement. ¹⁹⁷ "During 'Black November' as it was called by the British, there were four hundred and sixteen incidents, the highest monthly figure to date, and of the forty people who lost their lives, twenty one were Britons." ¹⁹⁸ Grivas even agreed to let the Greek government write the announcement he would send out regarding a ceasefire. ¹⁹⁹ The statement read "I am ready to suspend operations and await the response of Britain to the demands of the Cypriot people as set out for by discussion by the *Ethnarch*, Archbishop Makarios. As proof of my unshakable will to press forward to that happy end, the completion of the work undertaken by the *Ethnarch* Makarios, and to provide him with an opportunity to solve our national question, I order from today, the suspension of operations by all sectors under me." ²⁰⁰ The British rejected this truce, as they "interpreted the truce as a sign of EOKA's weakness, which it was, and offered EOKA surrender terms while continuing their own operations." ²⁰¹ Harding's call for the complete surrender of EOKA was broadcast on the radio, to which Grivas responded "When the invader asked the Greek nation to surrender its arms at

¹⁹⁶ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 139.

¹⁹⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 87.

¹⁹⁸ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 112.

¹⁹⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 91.

²⁰⁰ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 87.

²⁰¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 140.

Thermopylae, he was told, come and get them, if you dare. As military leader of the fighting Cyprus people I reply to this demand for surrender, come and get them, if you dare.”²⁰² Despite the fact that the truce failed, Grivas’ willingness to accept the idea from the Greek government shows the success that Averoff had in cultivating a working relationship with Grivas, and the Greek government’s efforts to increase its control over the direction of the *enosis* movement.

With the end of the Suez operation and the return of British troops in December 1956, pressure on EOKA significantly increased. Between the end of Grivas’ rejected truce on November 23, 1956, and a second, unilateral EOKA truce on 14th March 1957, “EOKA could only manage to mount about one and a half attacks per day. This was about half the tempo it had maintained between October 1955 and November 1956...”²⁰³ Still, Grivas managed “a sharp rise in the number of EOKA attacks in February,” by encouraging his men with a message which read “I wish to see you displaying all your creativity in these days when the debate in the UNO is about to commence. This is a national necessity and you must not spare sacrifices, or labour or dangers.”²⁰⁴ Although EOKA was hard pressed by Harding’s counter insurgency, Grivas still managed to use EOKA violence to support the *enosis* cause on the international stage.

Ultimately, the state of the *enosis* movement without the archbishop present in Cyprus challenged the power Makarios had consolidated in the *ethnarchy*. Averoff criticized the British’s strategy in exiling Makarios by arguing that “there was no other spokesman for the Greek Cypriots

²⁰² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 88-89.

²⁰³ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 144.

²⁰⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 144

with anything like the prestige of Makarios, and after his arrest nobody would have dared to be seen parleying with his captors anyway.”²⁰⁵ Popular support for Makarios could be seen in the months after his deportation as “On 1 June all Greek mayors and deputy mayors convened at the Nicosia Town Hall to examine the situation on the island. The decision which was published two weeks later was that mayors ‘will never participate in any negotiations concerning the island’s political future and to reaffirm that there can be no possibility for the future of the problem so long as His Beatitude is held down in forced confinement.”²⁰⁶ Despite the respect given to Makarios’ position by those on Cyprus, during his exile, Grivas and the Greek government used his absence to increase their control of the *enosis* movement.

Makarios’ Seychelles Interlude:

Meanwhile, far away in the Seychelles, Makarios was isolated from all of these events. At the start of his stay, Makarios “complained about the lack of news and contact with the outside world.”²⁰⁷ In a letter he sent to a local newspaper in the Seychelles upon his release, Makarios reflected that the Seychelles was “a place where one can meditate in tranquility and find sanctuary away from the troubles of the outside world.”²⁰⁸ It was in this idyllic prison, unable to plan with those still in Cyprus, that Makarios had time to reflect on his leadership of the people of Cyprus prior to his exile.

²⁰⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 71.

²⁰⁶ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 138.

²⁰⁷ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 143.

²⁰⁸ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, xxii.

During his year in the Seychelles, it seems that Makarios sincerely reflected on the path the *enosis* movement was taking, especially regarding the use of violence. In the memoirs of Father Papastavros Papagathangleou, available only in Greek, Assos describes how the priest wrote “that toward the end of July, Makarios posed the question of whether the EOKA struggle was morally justified. Unfortunately, not enough details are provided, and we are only told that after a long discussion between Ioannides, Papagathangleou, and Makarios, the latter was satisfied that the struggle was indeed just.”²⁰⁹ Makarios’ concern over his support for violence grew as the summer wore on. After news of the release of the Grivas diaries reached the Seychelles, Le Geyt described how “I notice that the Cypriots’ typewriters are working overtime, and that occasional conferences take place. The Archbishop appears pale and worried, and their general demeanor is serious. Long silences follow the conferences and the clicking of typewriters, and they have discontinued their usual evening walks... I cannot help thinking that this is a direct result of the Grivas diaries.”²¹⁰ Makarios’ concern over the public release of his connection to violence clearly caused him stress. The effects of this can be seen on August 13th 1956, when Makarios was admitted to the local hospital, where he stayed under observation for a week. During this stay, the hospital became satisfied that “there was no duodenal ulcer, or other abdominal disease.”²¹¹ Assos argues that his dismissal “without being diagnosed with any particular condition... suggests that his discomfort may have been down to psychological stress

²⁰⁹ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 144-145.

²¹⁰ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 33.

²¹¹ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 34.

rather than something physical.”²¹² Makarios’ reflections over the use of violence were so genuine that it likely caused him physical stress. In September 1956, a few weeks after being released from the hospital, Makarios asked Le Geyt “for a tent to use as a place of retreat.” Le Geyt provided him with a tent set up on a hill above the house, under two mango trees and, “it was understood among the Internees that no one should disturb him when he was writing or studying in his tent.”²¹³ Makarios took the time exiled in the Seychelles to truly reflect on his prior support for violence.

Two later conversations between Makarios and his co-exiles are also indicative of Makarios’ reflections on violence. The first one occurred after the archbishop had composed a telegram to Harding in which he proposed calling an EOKA ceasefire. He presented it to the other exiles, but Papagathagelou and Ioannides forced him to redraft the telegram. Ultimately, it was all for naught as “the Bishop of Kyrenia refused to entertain any thought of ceasefire and spent four hours saying no to every single argument in favour of Makarios’ proposal. In the end, the telegram was never sent because Makarios wanted all exiles to sign and approve his initiative.”²¹⁴ While Makarios may have reflected on his support for EOKA’s violence, he clearly had not reflected on his style of leadership which prioritized consensus. Again, it was Makarios desire to have consensus from the Bishop of Kyrenia which hampered his decision making.

Finally, towards the end of their captivity, news of the death of Grigoris Afxentiou reached the island. On the 3rd of March 1957, the guerilla group led by Afxentiou had set up camp high in the

²¹² Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 148.

²¹³ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 36.

²¹⁴ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 149.

mountains around the Makheras Monastery, relying on the monks to bring them food and water. The British had been tipped off about their presence, and at dawn a British army patrol had surrounded the entrance to their hideout. All but Afxentiou surrendered. After a long standoff, in which one of the EOKA men rejoined Afxentiou, the British poured gasoline into the cave and set it alight. Afxentiou burned alive but his comrade escaped.²¹⁵ Though he was not in Cyprus at the time, “The death of Afxentiou affected [Makarios] deeply. Because of it, Makarios questioned his failure to push for a ceasefire in the Fall of 1956, a move that he thought could potentially have saved Afxentiou’s life”²¹⁶ Because of Afxentious’s gruesome death, on March 6th, 1957, Makarios had a conversation at breakfast with the other detainees in which he expressed his regrets. A debate broke out, in which “Makarios stressed the need for measure and realism arguing that sacrifice by itself, although admirable, was not necessarily going to lead to the desired outcome. The other exiles, with Ioannides as the principal proponent, counter-argued that realism and sacrifice were mutually exclusive terms.”²¹⁷ Though in his exile Makarios may have reflected on the benefit of violence, his co-exiles were a constant reminder of the vocal support for violence which existed, and he would have to overcome if he were to change the course of the *enosis* movement.

Securing Makarios’ Release:

²¹⁵ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 111-112

²¹⁶ Novo, “The God Dilemma”, 209.

²¹⁷ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 150.

While Makarios was in exile and his deputy Bishop Anthimos was under house arrest, Greece took the Cyprus issue to the UN in February 1957. Unlike previous years, Makarios was not present to push his agenda on the Greek government. However, they did not deviate from the goal of *enosis*, pushing for Cypriot self-determination while the British accused Greece of funding EOKA and decried Makarios' involvement with EOKA's violence.²¹⁸ In the end, a resolution proposed by India was passed which stated "The General Assembly, having considered the question of Cyprus, and believing that the solution of that problem requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end."²¹⁹ This was as much of a win as the Greek delegation could expect, and could be used to push for Makarios' release. Ultimately, while the Greek government checked Grivas' power and continued its diplomatic efforts to achieve *enosis*, it did change the direction of the *enosis* movement during Makarios' absence.

In the aftermath of the UN decision, the Greek government and the Bishop of Kition urged Grivas to call a ceasefire. On March 14th 1957, three weeks after the UN debate, Grivas sent out a flier which stated "In accordance with the spirit of the UN resolution, which expressed a desire for the just and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of UN Charter principles; and in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the British Government and the only representative

²¹⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 109; 113.

²¹⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 115-116.

of the Cypriot people, Archbishop Makarios, our organization declares that it is willing to order the suspension of operations as soon as the *Ethnarch* Makarios is released.”²²⁰ The significant time gap between the UN’s decision and Grivas’ ceasefire lends credence to the idea that the ceasefire was “a face-saving measure, with the intended implication being that Grivas has graciously elected to cease hostilities; the reality was that Grivas, following a string of Security Forces successes, had no choice but to order his men into hiding, since most of the EOKA mountain gangs had been wiped out.”²²¹ Ultimately, however, this helped to pave the way for Makarios’ release.

The Suez Crisis led to Harold Macmillan’s replacement of Eden as Prime Minister in Britain, and likewise brought a change of British policy towards Cyprus. After discussions with President Eisenhower, Macmillan decided that Makarios must be released, though prevented from returning to Cyprus.²²² Macmillan asked Makarios to condemn violence before he could be released. This condition seems to have been on the table from early on in Makarios’ imprisonment, as Le Geyt recounts in July 1956 that the prisoners “have animated conversations in Greek, probably due to the Prime Minister’s recent statement that the Archbishop would be released if he denounced terrorism. I have recently noticed that the Archbishop walks alone, and appears to be deep in thought.”²²³ While Makarios had shown interest in calling for EOKA to enact a ceasefire, condemning violence in its entirety was not something Makarios was willing to do. Rather, he “took a firm stand that he would

²²⁰ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 115.

²²¹ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 18.

²²² Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 129.

²²³ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 24.

not discuss the future of Cyprus while he was interned, and the British Government had no intention of releasing him unless he condemned terrorism. Concerned as he was about the effects of Grivas' erratic campaign of violence, Makarios still believed what he told the Archbishop of Canterbury eighteen months before, that to condemn EOKA would expose him unprofitably. He would be accused of abandoning *enosis*, and the leadership would pass to others."²²⁴ After a year in exile, with limited information about the situation of Cyprus, Makarios had even less confidence in his ability to survive in a position of leadership after condemning the use of violence and by extension EOKA. Upon receiving the Macmillan's telegram asking him to denounce violence, Le Geyt described how he "found the Archbishop looking pale and anxious... He seemed to be in a state of great strain, and said it was difficult for him to come to a decision on such a crucial matter without the advice and current knowledge of the representatives of the various factions of Cyprus."²²⁵ In the end, Makarios replied that he would appeal "to EOKA for a cessation of violence given that the British government would withdraw the Emergency Regulations in Cyprus. He also made it clear that he could not allow his release to be a bargaining point in these negotiations."²²⁶ In the end, despite all his reflections on the use of violence during his imprisonment, as *ethnarch* Makarios took political considerations into account and did not condemn EOKA, and Macmillan ultimately raised no objections.²²⁷

²²⁴ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 95.

²²⁵ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 52.

²²⁶ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 52.

²²⁷ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 237.

On March 28th, the British government announced that Makarios and his fellow detainees were free to leave the Seychelles and to travel anywhere but Cyprus. The four men had to remain on the Seychelles for a few additional days as Aristotle Onassis directed one of his tanker ships, the *Olympic Thunder*, to pick them up from the isolated islands.²²⁸ During this time, Makarios gave interviews to reporters, in which Makarios was asked, “Q. Do you regret the violence in Cyprus? A. Nobody would be pleased by the suffering caused by an anomalous situation.”²²⁹ Finally, after a year imprisoned on the Seychelles, Makarios and his companions were transported to Madagascar, from where they later boarded an airplane to Athens, arriving on April 17th.²³⁰

²²⁸ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 102.

²²⁹ Le Geyt, *Makarios in Exile*, 54.

²³⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 127.

Chapter 3: March 1957- March 1959

Landing in Athens just five days before Orthodox Easter, Makarios was met with roaring crowds on his drive through the city. Welcomed by the Archbishop of Athens, Averoff, and Cypriots in exile, his procession made its way to Syntagma Square. From the balcony of the Hotel Grande Bretagne, Makarios addressed the crowd. When he began to speak, “that memorable phrase ‘What shall I say, what shall I say...’ he could not go on because of the tumultuous applause. And when the crowd became silent again: ‘What shall I say about those who offered their lives? We are offering them myrtles of our tears and the laurels of our admiration.’”²³¹ Despite his personal reflections on the use of violence during his exile, Makarios the *ethnarch* had returned, and he knew that condemning Grivas or EOKA would only hinder him in his effort to reassert control over the other actors within the *enosis* movement.

From March 28th, 1957, until March 1st, 1959, Makarios, though freed from the Seychelles, was denied entry to Cyprus. Residing in Athens, he worked closely with the Greek government, sharing with them the *ethnarchic* responsibility of representing the Cypriot people on the international stage. Despite his continued exile, Makarios did have the ability to communicate with Grivas who was still leading EOKA on Cyprus. However, during this period their relationship broke down over disagreements over the treatment of the left wing and Turkish Cypriots, as well as Grivas’ efforts to organize a boycott of British goods. This tension only made Makarios’ decision to

²³¹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 612

compromise on *enosis*, by agreeing to an independent Cyprus, more difficult. Ultimately, Makarios counteracted Grivas' disapproval of independence by demonstrating the united Greek Cypriot front which he represented as *ethnarch*. He achieved this by taking a coalition of Greek Cypriots from across the political spectrum with him to sign the treaty which established an independent Cypriot republic.

Regaining the Ethnarchic Role:

Makarios' release changed the power dynamic of the *enosis* cause and created some confusion over the future of EOKA. In Grivas' memoirs, he claims that before Makarios arrived in Athens, the Greek government attempted to trick him into leaving the island, by telling him that his safety was paramount since he was such an inspirational symbol to Greek Cypriots.²³² Azinas backed up this claim, describing how in Athens he heard that the Greek Consul in Cyprus, Angelos Vlachos, was trying to push Grivas to declare a ceasefire and to announce conditions for his departure from the island. In response to this news, Azinas "wrote a very urgent letter to Dighenis telling him not to make the mistake of doing such a thing before Makarios arrived in Athens and he had consultations with him."²³³ According to Grivas and Azinas, in the confusion of Makarios return, the Greek government sought to use the ambiguity of Makarios' position to control the fate of the *enosis* movement. When Azinas met with Averoff on April 3rd, he told Averoff "that if anything should happen between Makarios and Karamanlis, he [Averoff] should adopt the Makarios line.... I knew that Averoff many

²³² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 116-117.

²³³ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 588.

times had his own views which were contrary to those of Karamanlis.”²³⁴ By lobbying Averoff to remain loyal to Makarios on all issues regarding Cyprus, Azinas helped to lay the groundwork for Makarios re-assertion of his power as *ethnarch*.

Averoff portrayed events differently, denying the claim that the Greek government sought to trick Grivas into leaving the island. He cited letters from Vlachos’ files, which Grivas omitted in his memoirs. These files reveal that after learning of Makarios’ release, Grivas inquired to Vlachos about whether this meant the British were ready to strike a final deal and if Makarios really wanted a ceasefire. The Greek government responded, telling him, “that they thought he should order the area commanders to desist from all activity but he should not proclaim a new cease-fire, as in any case a cease-fire had been in effect since 14th March.”²³⁵ To this, Grivas replied “I will comply with any recommendations made to me by Isaakios [Averoff] concerning the cessation of the struggle and my own position and that of the men of the Organization,” before listing demands he wanted the Greek government to make in any negotiations with Britain.²³⁶ These letters demonstrated how successfully Averoff had established a healthy working relationship between Grivas and the Greek government during Makarios’ exile, taking on the *ethnarch*’s role of directing the overall strategy of the *enosis* campaign.

Despite this history of clear communication, Grivas was nonetheless angered by what he interpreted as a Greek decision to dissolve EOKA without first consulting Makarios. In his memoirs,

²³⁴ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 593.

²³⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 124.

²³⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 124.

Grivas cites an April 2nd letter from Averoff as evidence for the Greek government's desire to disband EOKA. Averoff replies to this accusation in his memoirs by stating that he intended the April 2nd letter to be completely neutral on the topic of Grivas leaving. As evidence, he quotes a larger excerpt of the letter than Grivas did in his memoirs. It reads "If you consider it expedient, there is no objection on the part of the Foreign Ministry to a proclamation declaring the cessation of operations on the day of Makarios' arrival. You may perhaps prepare a proclamation simply announcing this decision of yours. On the question of departure I await consultation with Makarios."²³⁷ Averoff argues that Grivas misunderstood his letter and believed that "we wanted to leave it up to him to decide about ending the EOKA campaign. The truth was, however, that we would never have been willing to put such political responsibility in his hands, nor did I for a single instant believe at the time that EOKA should be disbanded."²³⁸ Although Averoff may not have intended to give Grivas significant say in the wider strategy of the *enosis* campaign, his close working relationship and conciliatory tone towards EOKA's leader may have given a different impression. Azinas, in his memoirs, cites page 187 of Vlachos' autobiography (which is not available in English) as expressing the complaint that "the Greek Government shifted to Dighenis the responsibility for taking a decision."²³⁹ Until Vlachos' autobiography is made available in English, the most likely conclusion which can be drawn about the confusion over Greek pressure to end EOKA's campaign of violence is that Averoff and Vlachos were giving Grivas different impressions of the Greek government's plans. On the consular level, Vlachos

²³⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 125.

²³⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 125.

²³⁹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 591.

may have been more interested in seeing a ceasefire than Averoff was, however this was not representative of an actual attempt by the Greek government to strip Grivas of his power. Regardless of how it came to be, Grivas' concern about the Greek government overstepping its bounds was real in April 1957, as it was corroborated by Azinas in his memoirs.

On April 9th, Grivas sent a letter to Azinas with the instructions to present it to Makarios upon his arrival in Athens. In it, he wrote that the Greek government “urged me to issue leaflets that should be circulated on Tuesday 9.4.57, that is the day before your originally planned arrival in Athens, announcing cessation of the struggle. I think the object was to present you with a fait accompli.”²⁴⁰ Eventually, Makarios replied to Grivas, telling him that “The cease-fire is an excellent idea and the one remaining question is whether it should be made permanent. I am not yet fully informed about Cyprus, but from what I hear it seems that we must find a means of bringing all fighting to an end...”²⁴¹ While in his speech upon his arrival in Athens, Makarios had heaped praise on the EOKA, in private he worked to limit EOKA. After a back and forth, on May 17th Makarios formally accepted Grivas' decision to remain in Cyprus and in charge of EOKA.²⁴² Still, Makarios limited Grivas in other ways. Soon after his release from the Seychelles, Makarios vetoed Grivas' plan to assassinate EOKA informers who were living in the UK. In his memoirs Grivas wrote that “If I had been able to obtain funds from any other source I should have ignored Makarios and gone ahead by

²⁴⁰ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 600.

²⁴¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 117.

²⁴² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 118.

myself.”²⁴³ Ultimately, upon his return Makarios did not totally remove Grivas from the *enosis* campaign nor push Grivas to end all violence. However, he continued to limit Grivas’ more extreme actions.

Although the British had freed Makarios partly in order to facilitate negotiations, they had no intention of negotiating with Makarios directly. French describes how after Makarios “was released, he insisted he would not talk to the British until they ended the emergency and agreed at least in principle to apply self-determination to the island. But the Archbishop was adept at taking a hard-line stance in public to ensure he was not outflanked by his far-right opposition, but pursuing more moderate aims in private... But when Makarios approached the British at the end of May with an offer of bilateral talks, they rebuffed him. They were intent on sidelining the archbishop...”²⁴⁴ The British government’s refusal to negotiate with Makarios served to undermine Makarios’s claim as *ethnarch* to speak for all Greek Cypriots. The British still retained their aversion to Makarios’ dual religious and political leadership, and their refusal to treat with him was shaped by “the strong dislike for Makarios which continued to run through the British Government. The idea of holding the Archbishop responsible for the troubles in Cyprus was too seductive to be relinquished even after his release. In fact Macmillan’s reasoning [was] ‘we let the Archbishop out not because we like him but because we are sick of him.’”²⁴⁵ The British returned to their original strategy of ignoring the *ethnarch*, weakening the power which Makarios had forced the British to recognize in the lead up to his imprisonment.

²⁴³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 106.

²⁴⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 239.

²⁴⁵ Assos, *Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest*, 162.

In order to retain his position as leader of the *enosis* campaign, Makarios worked with the Greek government to an even greater extent than he had been before the British government had begun to negotiate with him directly. The outpouring of support in Athens which Makarios received upon his release from the Seychelles demonstrated the weight his support carried for any Greek government dealing with the Cyprus issue. This is also indicative of how the importance of Makarios as an individual began to outweigh his position of *ethnarch*, as to the population of Greece, this title meant little. Upon his arrival in Athens every political actor in Athens sought Makarios' support, as "The Karamanlis government expected him in order to hear statements expressing thanks for the efforts it had made for his release from exile. The Opposition expected him to come and criticize the Karamanlis government as yielding and to ask for the election of a new militant government to wage an unyielding fight at all levels. The old friends of Grivas, together with other Cypriots, expected Makarios to assign them duties that were being carried out by others."²⁴⁶ The power to affect politics in Greece was one Makarios was not afraid to use, as Averoff recounts how in August 1958, Karamanlis received news from a political ally that Makarios "intended the next day 'to make a statement accusing the Government of handling the issue incompetently, to disclaim responsibility and to provoke a political crisis."²⁴⁷ This caused Karamanlis to confront Makarios, who admitted that his only major disagreement with the current government was its refusal to leave NATO, and ultimately agreed "they must carry on the common struggle without any further dissension."²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 586-587.

²⁴⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 250.

²⁴⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 251.

Though his exile had diminished his ability to negotiate directly with the British, it served to reaffirm his position in Greece as head of the *enosis* movement.

Recognizing the popularity Makarios had within Greece and Cyprus, Karamanlis and Averoff often brought Makarios into decision making regarding the Cyprus issue. For instance, when Britain proposed another three-power conference, Greece promptly rejected the proposal.²⁴⁹ This decision was made with Makarios. He outlined to the Greek government the only three acceptable solutions which could have to be the baseline for the talks, all of which involved self-determination and all of which were unacceptable to the British.²⁵⁰ So the Greek government presented these demands, and the conference did not proceed. Also, “The Greek government found itself obliged by the pressures of Makarios and Greek public opinion to bring 49 specific charges of brutality by British troops before the European Commission on Human Rights.”²⁵¹ While it cannot be said that the Greek Foreign Ministry served at Makarios’ bidding, Makarios’ close relationship with Averoff and Karamanlis provided him influence which the British had attempted to remove.

Makarios also brought his influence as *ethnarch* to bear on the UN. In September 1957, he traveled to New York City with the Greek UN envoys, “lobbying delegations, giving television interviews and using all his charm and persuasiveness in an effort to convince the world of the justice of the Greek Cypriot case.”²⁵² Unable to speak to the UN assembly directly, and with his power as

²⁴⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 240.

²⁵⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 168.

²⁵¹ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 108.

²⁵² Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 109.

ethnarch unrecognized in the West, Makarios used his charisma as an individual to push for *enosis* on the international stage. However, he was still cut out of official talks with Western powers as “all his efforts had failed to secure him an interview with either Eisenhower or Dulles, who said he represented no more than certain *Enosist* factions. He did succeed in meeting some leading figures, including Spaak, [NATO secretary general] most of them being people who already supported [Greece].”²⁵³ Throughout the 1950’s Makarios had also cultivated a strong relationship with Naser, and he used this connection to help the Greek UN team, as Naser promised that “At the United Nations you may consider our delegation an extension of your own as far as the Cyprus question is concerned.”²⁵⁴ Although Makarios had secured his position as leader of the *enosis* movement within Greece and Cyprus, on the international stage he was still forced to share his *ethnarchic* power with the Greek government.

While Makarios’ direct influence at the UN was limited to meeting with journalists and some friendly foreign dignitaries, he was also able to provide input on the content of the Greek Government’s diplomatic tactics. While Averoff wanted to avoid accusing the British of torture for fear of losing votes, Makarios “Was adamant that we should press for self-determination to the bitter end and bring in the torture charges, come what may.”²⁵⁵ Ultimately a compromise was agreed to in which “a ‘Black Book’ giving particulars of all the cases of torture and other atrocities” was sent to the delegations of each UN country a few days before the debate, while the manner in which Averoff

²⁵³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 174.

²⁵⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 173.

²⁵⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 186.

“handled the case would depend on the way the debate went.”²⁵⁶ At the 1957 UN assembly, the draft resolution proposed by the Greek government was fiercely attacked by Britain, the US and Turkey. So, allies among the decolonized peoples met with both Averoff and Makarios, to convince them to accept a compromise. However, the Greek delegation refused, as Averoff recounts how “this time, however, we all agreed with the Archbishop.”²⁵⁷ Although the Greek resolution failed to pass, Makarios lauded it as a victory, and in a statement to the press on December 14 “he stressed that despite the failure to achieve the two-thirds majority required by the rules of procedure, a clear majority of the United Nations, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly, had recognized the Cypriot people’s right to self-determination.”²⁵⁸ Through the Greek delegation in the UN, Makarios was able to assert his position as *ethnarch* and continue to be the voice of the Greek Cypriot people.

During the 1957 UN assembly, EOKA followed the wishes of Makarios and the Greek government by maintaining a truce. During September, when the initial Greek proposal was made, Averoff describes how he “was greatly helped by the fact that EOKA continued to refrain from armed actions, while Harding’s emergency measures were still being enforced.”²⁵⁹ Grivas’ reasons for keeping the truce were partly to support the Greek cause at the UN, but also because he needed the time to reorganize EOKA.²⁶⁰ Harding wrote in September that Grivas “was still exercising his full energies for a future resumption of violence.”²⁶¹ However, on the 21st and 26th of November, the eve of Averoff’s

²⁵⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 187.

²⁵⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 198.

²⁵⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 212.

²⁵⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 174.

²⁶⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 180.

²⁶¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 246.

departure for the UN, EOKA sabotaged a British ship and multiple airplanes. Averoff was confused by these actions, writing “Grivas never gave us any explanation for why he had carried out these two ill-timed acts of sabotage. Perhaps he thought it would be useful, before the United Nations debate, to make clear that EOKA was at all times ready for action. Perhaps, too, he wanted to give a similar warning to the new Governor.”²⁶² Although Makarios had managed to reassert his position as head of the *enosis* campaign in Greece, he was still unable to completely control Grivas in Cyprus.

Despite their timing, Grivas’ attacks were not done in an effort to scuttle the UN debate. Rather, they were done “to vent his displeasure at continuing British military operations and searches” under the new governor.²⁶³ French elaborates that these attacks “were intended to maintain pressure on the government, as retaliation for the continuation of security force operations, and to demonstrate to the UN that EOKA still existed and could conduct active operations.”²⁶⁴ Additionally, when the negative results from the UN caused disappointment in Cyprus, Grivas and PEKA and sent out a pamphlet which read “Even if we did not obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, we did win an absolute majority. Our voice was heard loud and clear ... Victory is ours at the United Nations. Our opponents are defeated.”²⁶⁵ Grivas then followed this up by sending letters to both Makarios and Averoff, expressing his support.²⁶⁶ Ultimately, the November 1957 bombings only

²⁶² Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 182.

²⁶³ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 129.

²⁶⁴ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 247.

²⁶⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 212.

²⁶⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 212.

showed that Makarios and the Greek government could not control Grivas' actions, not that Grivas was unsatisfied with the diplomatic strategy for achieving *enosis*.

On October 22nd, 1957, Harding retired as Governor of Cyprus and was replaced with Sir Hugh Foot, who arrived on the island on December 3rd, 1957. Hugh was a “professed liberal,”²⁶⁷ however Grivas wrote that he “regarded the self-created aura of ‘liberalism’ surrounding him with distaste: I was sure it was fraudulent.”²⁶⁸ Aware of Foot’s reputation, Grivas described how in an effort to prevent British liberalization of government on Cyprus, “I arranged an announcement by the island’s mayors, just before his arrival, in which they said they would not meet the Governor unless he wanted to discuss self-determination, in which case they would refer him to Archbishop Makarios for negotiations.”²⁶⁹ Though Makarios’ exile had increased Grivas’ autonomy, at this point in 1957 he was still willing to enforce the idea that *ethnarch* Makarios was the legitimate voice of Greek Cypriots. When Foot arrived in Cyprus, EOKA welcomed him by organizing riots and strikes.²⁷⁰ Five days after his arrival, Foot released 10 women and 12 priests from imprisonment, following this up with clemency for another 100 prisoners on Christmas. This caused Grivas to express to Averoff that “He is trying to win the people over and isolate EOKA.”²⁷¹ Despite all his displeasure, Grivas did allow Foot a grace period in which he could examine the Cyprus issue without the need to worry about EOKA action.²⁷² This resulted in the Foot Plan, which “provided for the return of Archbishop Makarios to

²⁶⁷ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 129.

²⁶⁸ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 129.

²⁶⁹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 129.

²⁷⁰ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 243.

²⁷¹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 217.

²⁷² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 129-130.

Cyprus and stipulated a period of five to seven years of limited self-government before any final decision as to self-determination was reached. To this the Turks raised ‘every possible objection,’²⁷³ and upon the failure of this plan Grivas announced on March 6 that “the new governor’s ‘credit of time’ had run out and that ‘the fight must go on.’”²⁷⁴ French writes that this “plan failed because almost no one who mattered wanted it, or thought it practicable” and in fact it went in the face of the British colonial secretary’s policy that “Makarios would not be allowed to return to Cyprus unless he condemned violence.”²⁷⁵ Thus, although the new British governor on Cyprus eased emergency restrictions, it did little to shake the support for Makarios or bring a resolution to the violence.

The Grivas-Makarios Split:

In early 1958, Grivas decided to organize a political resistance to British rule, in addition to the violent resistance he was already overseeing. Grivas’ plan was to enforce a boycott of British businesses and of the colonial government itself. On February 23rd, 1958, Grivas “called on Greek Cypriots to embark on ‘Total War! In other words we shall fight the occupant wherever we find him – in his economy and in his administration. There will be passive resistance and everyone will contribute what he can.’”²⁷⁶ The campaign went into effect March 4th with a spate of sabotage against government buildings and infrastructure.²⁷⁷ Previously, EOKA had sought to break village headmen away from

²⁷³ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 132.

²⁷⁴ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 132.

²⁷⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 242.

²⁷⁶ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 248.

²⁷⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 133.

collaborating with the British government through intimidation, but this was unpopular as it often hindered the everyday lives of the citizens. Despite this early sign of failure, Grivas doubled down with this strategy in early 1958. This involved not only “the boycotting of British local government institutions but also efforts to create a parallel EOKA state by, for example, establishing unofficial committees to arbitrate in civil legal disputes... This was to be coupled with two other campaigns, a boycott of British and Commonwealth imports, and interference with those aspects of education that were controlled by the government.”²⁷⁸ By organizing political resistance against the British, Grivas was expanding his purview within the *enosis* campaign. In the process, he was infringing on Makarios’ control of the political side of the *enosis* campaign. This action is also indicative of Grivas’ increased autonomy in Makarios’ absence, as this was developed and implemented without informing the archbishop.

The boycott upset many Cypriots, who Grivas characterized as “the handful of powerful business men whose profits suffered.”²⁷⁹ As a result, some Cypriots traveled to Athens in order to protest to Makarios, who, six weeks after the start of the boycott wrote to Grivas and expressed his disapproval for the policy.²⁸⁰ Grivas replied that he believed the Archbishop had been ‘in touch only with the dissatisfied rich, who have lost a small portion of the profits they make from the Cypriot people: these are the sharks who have been nibbling away at the brains of the Consul and the Bishop of Kitium ever since they were asked to make some negligible sacrifices. It is shameful to waste time or

²⁷⁸ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 249.

²⁷⁹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 134.

²⁸⁰ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 134.

thought on them.”²⁸¹ Makarios’ criticism of Grivas over the issue of a boycott was their first significant falling out in their time working together. Grivas explained how his “belief in the Archbishop’s leadership was badly shaken”²⁸² and that “There is a parting of the ways ahead and I must choose which way to follow.”²⁸³ In a letter to the Bishop of Kition he said that he “would no longer give [Makarios] *carte blanche* to express the opinion of, or represent the organization.”²⁸⁴ Grivas’ foray into political resistance challenged Makarios claim to control the political side of the *enosis* movement as *ethnarch*. Further, the division it caused between the two men weakened Makarios’ claim to lead a unified Greek Cypriot *enosis* front, as Grivas became more vocal in his criticism of Makarios’ leadership.

Further division between Makarios and Grivas occurred over Grivas’ treatment of the left. Though EOKA had assassinated what it viewed as traitors throughout its existence, in the period after March 1957 EOKA violence primarily targeted Greek informers and leftists. In March 1957, in the lead up to Makarios being released, “AKEL insisted that Makarios did not speak for the whole Cypriot people, and that in any negotiations with the British he must be accompanied by the Communist mayors who had won office in 1953... AKEL’s leaders then upped the stakes by threatening that if the right did not allow them representation alongside Makarios in any negotiations, they would reveal to the security forces everything they knew about EOKA.”²⁸⁵ AKEL’s attempt to force a seat at the

²⁸¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 134.

²⁸² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 135.

²⁸³ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 113.

²⁸⁴ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 147.

²⁸⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 165.

negotiating table was short lived, however. By June of 1957 AKEL had “distributed leaflets calling for the British government to resume negotiations with the archbishop.”²⁸⁶ Makarios’ popularity and close ties with the Greek government helped him to stave off a leftist challenge to his claim of *ethnarchic* power.

Although their attempt to gain power was only short lived, AKEL’s ‘treachery’ only fueled Grivas’ hate for them. In July 1957 Grivas “told EOKA that all communist offers of assistance must be spurned.”²⁸⁷ In August 1957, Grivas increased attacks against known leftists so that “by the middle of August left-wing supporters had been beaten up in no fewer than eleven separate incidents.”²⁸⁸ Additionally, the liberal attitude of Governor Foot concerned Grivas, as he worried that Foot might attempt negotiations with the leftists. As a result, EOKA continued its attacks against the left after Foot’s arrival in December. For instance, “On the 21st of January... masked men burst into coffeeshops in the villages of Kondea and Lysi, killing a carpenter and another man, Petrou and Dimitriou, and wounding two, all of whom were prominent members of left-wing trade unions. The days that followed brought a fierce resistance from PEO, the Pancyprian Federation of Labor, which called for a general strike and distributed leaflets demanding self-determination among other things.”²⁸⁹ Despite Grivas justifying the attacks against the left as an effort to defend Makarios’ power, the powerless nature of the victims prove that these actions were equally motivated by an ideological

²⁸⁶ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 47.

²⁸⁷ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 165.

²⁸⁸ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 165.

²⁸⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 158.

hatred. Averoff described how this attack in particular “had split the Greek-Cypriot community down the middle and given rise to much more adverse publicity. No one could understand why Dighenis was continuing his ill timed and politically inept activities.”²⁹⁰ Just as Grivas independently organized political resistance threatened Makarios’ political power as *ethnarch*, Grivas’ attacks against the Cypriot left only served to threaten the fragile *ethnarchic* unity which Makarios claimed to represent.

From his exile in Athens, Makarios called on Grivas to cease his attacks on the left. Azinas described how “because of the executions of some leftists a serious confrontation was triggered which forced Makarios to make an appeal for unity... He called me and insisted that ‘you should write... you should say... you should order.’”²⁹¹ Makarios used Azinas in order to communicate to Grivas indirectly because the publication of the Grivas diaries had made Makarios realize the importance of being “careful about what you say and what you write to this associate [Grivas].”²⁹² Makarios’ wariness in communicating with Grivas had been present since his return from the Seychelles, as he took his time in reaching out to Grivas.²⁹³ Commenting on the nature of communications between Makarios and Grivas, Azinas described how “the infrequent correspondence between Makarios and Dighenis had effects on me because Dighenis many times acted according to the proverb ‘I say it to your mother in law for the daughter in law to hear.’”²⁹⁴ With the disagreements between Makarios and Grivas over strategy for achieving *enosis* mounting, this infrequent communication only served to further strain

²⁹⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 225.

²⁹¹ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 647.

²⁹² Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 648.

²⁹³ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 614.

²⁹⁴ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 623.

their relationship. In regard to the treatment of the left, it was clear to “Both Averoff-Tossizza and Makarios... that opening a second front on the island against the left would only play into the hands of the British. But Grivas refused to listen...”²⁹⁵ Grivas responded to Makarios indirect communications by arguing that the leftists “were very active politically: if we persisted in ignoring them they would reap the benefits of the harvest sown by our fighters. This warning went unheeded, and when I went on to execute a few Left-wing tractors, the Communist Mayors rushed to Athens to protest to Makarios, while crowds of Reds demonstrated under the protection of British bayonets, but I saw no reason why traitors should be protected by a Communist trade union card.”²⁹⁶ Although Makarios realized the negative effects that Grivas’ attacks against leftists had on his ability to claim to speak for all Greek Cypriots, his position of *ethnarch* gave him little power in controlling an increasingly independent Grivas.

Makarios’ calls for unity ultimately had no effect, as even into May and June 1958, EOKA assassinations of leftists continued. Averoff describes how, “By this time AKEL had somewhat improved its position by recognizing Makarios as the sole representative of the Cypriots and by taking other steps which were politically helpful to the national cause.”²⁹⁷ Demonstrating their support for Makarios, in May 1958 AKEL released a pamphlet which “claimed that the EOKA was disobeying Makarios’ instructions and characterized EOKA aggression as contrary to Makarios’ calls for ‘concord

²⁹⁵ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 166.

²⁹⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 135.

²⁹⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 244.

and cohesion' among the people of Cyprus."²⁹⁸ The Cypriot left used the concept of *ethnarchic* unity to attack EOKA as they sought to attack fellow Greek Cypriots. Further, "demonstrators, including women dressed in black, marched through Famagusta carrying placards with slogans such as 'No more orphans' – 'EOKA killed our husbands, fathers' – 'They killed my father' – 'My father was an honest man, not a traitor'. Some rank and file members were 'itching for revenge and [there was] very secret talk within the party of the need to import arms and to prepare for a counter offensive."²⁹⁹ Again, the protestors took to the street against EOKA, and not Makarios, showing their tacit acceptance for Makarios' claim to speak for all Greek Cypriots as *ethnarch*. However, violence continued and "EOKA fared far more successfully in battles between the Right and the Left and continued to retain the initiative; as late as August 1958, the EOKA launched a fresh wave of killings and intimidation of Leftists."³⁰⁰ After the August attacks, however, "Mr. Ezekias Papaioannou, former General Secretary of the AKEL, pledged the Left's support for the Archbishop Makarios and reaffirmed that the Left had no intentions of cooperating with the government. Leftists may have despised Grivas and the EOKA rebels, but they supported the cause of *Enosis* and Makarios despite the EOKA violence."³⁰¹ As Grivas and Makarios increasingly disagreed on the strategy of EOKA and the *enosis* campaign more generally, it was the idea of *ethnarchic* unity which enabled Makarios to receive support for his leadership from Cypriot leftists.

²⁹⁸ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 49.

²⁹⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 167.

³⁰⁰ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 48.

³⁰¹ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 49.

In February of 1958, Grivas wrote letters to Makarios and Averoff in which he “started with the characteristic disclaimer to the effect that he had ‘no intention of forming a policy of his own,’” before proceeding to criticize the diplomatic handling of the *enosis* cause, demanding that Greece hold new elections, and “to make sure we took his words seriously he told us that he would wait until the end of February 1958, but if by then we had not changed our policy he would have no option but to launch an intensive propaganda campaign to enlighten the Greek people.”³⁰² With Makarios and Grivas increasingly at odds over strategy, Grivas made clear his willingness to challenge Makarios’ claim as *ethnarch* to lead the *enosis* movement. In response, Averoff replied with “a somewhat brusque letter” in which he warned Grivas that “he was abandoning his expressly chosen military role...”³⁰³ Makarios’ exile saw the breakdown of his relationship with Grivas, with Grivas posing more of a challenge to Makarios’ power. This split plagued Makarios for the rest of his exile, especially as he was forced into seeking a compromised solution to *enosis*.

It is also briefly important to note that the summer of 1958 was a time of heightened inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Grivas had, for the most part, avoided attacking the Turkish community, writing “I was also strongly opposed to any action which would affect the Turkish Cypriots, for I knew the British would seize on any chance to increase the division between the two communities.”³⁰⁴ However, “with hundreds of Turkish Cypriots employed as Auxiliary, Mobile, and Regular policemen... EOKA sometimes killed Turkish Cypriot Constables by

³⁰² Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 214-215.

³⁰³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 215.

³⁰⁴ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 73.

accident.”³⁰⁵ For instance, the killing of a Turkish policeman caused intercommunal riots in the spring and summer of 1956.³⁰⁶ The violence in the summer of 1958, however, was sparked on June 7 1958 when “a bomb exploded outside of the Turkish Government Information Office in Nicosia. It was intended to give the impression that this was a Greek Cypriot attack on a symbol of the Turkish Cypriot community, but the bomb had in fact been planted by the Turks themselves.”³⁰⁷ This bomb sparked the most intense period of conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the decolonization struggle. Governor Foot recounted how “I was woken in the middle of the night to see from the balcony of the Government House what looked like the whole of Nicosia aflame. There followed two months of what we had always most feared, civil war between the Greek and Turkish communities...”³⁰⁸ However, as Greek and Turkish mobs attacked each other, EOKA was restrained by Grivas, as he believed “the British were in collusion with the Turks in a plot to make him show his strength and ‘draw his fire.’ He could see no point in fighting a war on two fronts which might weaken Greek resistance and prove Ankara’s claim that ‘Greek and Turk could no longer live together.’”³⁰⁹ Ultimately, throughout EOKA’s campaign Grivas sought to avoid direct conflict with Turkish Cypriots, even if this meant leaving Greek Cypriot civilians vulnerable to attack. This approach stands in stark contrast to his treatment of the Cypriot left.

³⁰⁵ Lim, *The Evolution of British Counter-Insurgency*, 51.

³⁰⁶ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 258.

³⁰⁷ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 261.

³⁰⁸ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 140.

³⁰⁹ Foley & Scobie, *The Struggle For Cyprus*, 141.

Makarios strongly disagreed with Grivas' strategy towards the Turkish Cypriots during the summer of 1958. As intercommunal tension ratcheted during the early summer, Makarios had pressed Grivas to take a more aggressive stance, telling him "although we should not provoke the Turks, neither must we show weakness: 'My opinion is that we should throw a grenade or two from some balcony and give them a sharp lesson, so that they will not dare gather in mobs in the future.'" ³¹⁰ Though Makarios usually called on Grivas to limit violence, in this instance he saw EOKA as having a responsibility to use violence to prevent the formation of Turkish mobs. Grivas writes that after the June 7th bomb, "when Makarios again tried to interfere in the same manner I broke off all contact with him for a considerable period."³¹¹ Rather than obey Makarios' directives, on June 14th "Grivas decreed that 'it is the un-alienable right and duty of every Greek Cypriot to actively participate in every self-defence effort. Don't expect others to do everything for you. It is the duty of each and every one (of us) to organise the area of his residence and work.'" ³¹² As a result of Makarios' demands that Grivas attack Turkish Cypriot mobs and end his embargo of both British goods and the colonial government, Grivas decided to temporarily break off communication with Makarios. ³¹³ Makarios was troubled by, "This violence within the Greek-Cypriot community... Coupled with fighting between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, it spurred the need for a diplomatic resolution."³¹⁴ Ultimately, with Grivas' actions dividing the entire community of Greek Cypriots which Makarios' claimed to unify as

³¹⁰ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 135.

³¹¹ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 136.

³¹² French, *Fighting EOKA*, 264.

³¹³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 147.

³¹⁴ Novo, "The God Dilemma", 206.

as *ethnarch*, the two men broke contact. This would change when a greater threat to the goal of *enosis* emerged later that year.

Settling For Independence:

In the summer of 1958, the British proposal of the Macmillan Plan would change the political calculus for Makarios. The Macmillan plan was first announced on June 19th 1958, while the intercommunal violence was spiraling out of control. The plan included “a system of representative government with each community exercising autonomy in its own affairs” which included “a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities.”³¹⁵ Further, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be recognized as having their respective nationality in addition to their British nationality, and Greece and Turkey were each permitted to send a representative to consult with the British governor.³¹⁶ Though the British would retain sovereignty over the island, if the plan worked, they were open to the possibility of joint Greek and Turkish sovereignty later, so long as Britain maintained military bases on the island.³¹⁷ “The Turkish government initially hesitated, but then accepted the plan, hoping the offer of administrative partition would be a way-station on the road to political partition.”³¹⁸ To Makarios, and the Greek Government Greeks, the plan was tantamount to a soft

³¹⁵ Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus*, 109.

³¹⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 236.

³¹⁷ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 271.

³¹⁸ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 271.

partition of the island, and despite their protests the British remained committed to implementing the plan starting October 1st 1958.

Upon hearing the news of the Macmillan plan, Makarios held a meeting in Athens with “the mayors of the six main towns in Cyprus, the Bishop of Kition and Kyrenia and the Suffragan Bishop of Salamis, as well as fifteen of his advisers who were in Athens already” and after consulting with them notified the Governor of Cyprus that he found the plan unacceptable.³¹⁹ Makarios saw the unilateral implementation of the plan by the British as a real threat to Greek Cypriots, and realized that a compromised approach to *enosis* was increasingly necessary. As a result, Makarios increasingly used assemblies of Cypriots to legitimize his decisions which strayed from the path of ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*’. On September 7th, Makarios “Privately told the Greek government that, confronted by the British government’s determination to go ahead with the Macmillan plan, he would accept an interim period of self government followed by independence under United Nations auspices.”³²⁰ This compromise was accepted by Makarios because he recognized that the Macmillan plan though, “so deplorable from our point of view at best, would be even worse if we refused to participate... it would give the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government representatives a great many rights which we ourselves would forfeit by our absence.”³²¹ The Macmillan plan forced Makarios to accept a compromise which did not include a guarantee of future *enosis*. In regard to the position of *ethnarch*, Anagnostopoulou writes that “Makarios’ ‘shift’ towards independence do not signify a deep political

³¹⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 239.

³²⁰ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 272.

³²¹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 254.

break with the past, but *ethnarchism*'s adaptation to the needs of the present."³²² Although Makarios was departing from the popular goal of *enosis*, his ability to ultimately was able to gain the consensus of most the groups he claimed to unify.

On September 20th, 1958, Makarios met with Labour MP Barbara Castle and told her that if the British abandoned the McMillan plan, then "he would accept guaranteed independence as a solution to the Cyprus problem."³²³ To a certain degree, this action blindsided everyone in the *enosis* campaign, and was a rare example of Makarios striking out on his own without consulting others. Averoff derided Makarios for announcing the news in this way, claiming it weakened Greece's position in negotiations.³²⁴ He also explains that the announcement "provoked reactions which hampered and restricted the Archbishop's moves: within days he had been publicly denounced in the strongest terms by Gergios Papandreou, Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia and other prominent public figures for having forsaken the rightful demand for *enosis*."³²⁵ Grivas was also shocked, and wrote "it was a complete surprise to me, and I confess to being upset and shocked. The Archbishop had no mandate to depart from our basic claim for self-determination..."³²⁶ Aware that he needed to prevent Grivas from breaking totally from the rest of the *enosis* campaign, Makarios sent a letter to Grivas on September 28th, in which he explained that British public opinion "has turned very considerably against us" and that "We have to face up to the situation realistically and reach a decision before we

³²² Anagnostopoulou, "Makarios III", 264.

³²³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 254.

³²⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 254.

³²⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 255.

³²⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 162.

were presented with *fait accompli*, the imposition of the British plan...”³²⁷ Grivas responded with a scathing letter, “There is absolutely no coordination between the diplomatic and military struggle...” and that “At all events, I declare that my opposition to the overall policy which is being followed in the Cyprus question is final. This will not show itself in any specific external form, because I do not wish it to be thought that I want to exploit the situation for political reasons – I have none. Nor do I want it said that I am trying to block the way to a political solution. However, if I conclude that the struggles of the Cypriot people will go for nothing, then I will be obliged to address myself bluntly to the Greek and Cypriot people.”³²⁸ Makarios and Grivas’ existing disagreements were only exacerbated by Makarios’ acceptance of independence. While Grivas would not go so far as to rebel from Makarios’ leadership entirely, his protestations were a warning to Makarios that Grivas could in the future take such a drastic measure.

In response to the Macmillan Plan’s proposed implementation, on September 26th Grivas began a new offensive.³²⁹ The violence in the period was intense, and in October 1958 alone the total number of EOKA incidents rose to 226, from 70 the previous month.³³⁰ “Before Averoff and Makarios left to attend the United Nations both appealed to Grivas to help the Greek case by declaring a cease-fire. Grivas replied that he could not offer another truce that would be one-sided, but he promised to scale down EOKA’s actions and later ordered his men not to initiate any action.”³³¹ Grivas

³²⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 163.

³²⁸ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 165.

³²⁹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 273.

³³⁰ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 274.

³³¹ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 122.

responded to the initial request by stating that “neither the continuation of EOKA action nor a cease-fire was a matter for me to decide. I deeply regretted the loss of life in Cyprus, but the responsibility rested entirely with the British government.”³³² He explained in his memoirs how “I objected that people would not take us seriously if we kept offering one-sided truces, but I would be willing to limit my men to small-scale attacks which would suffice to keep the British on edge.”³³³ Grivas, despite having disagreed with Makarios “I decided to smooth the way for the UN appeal and on 22 November I issued a declaration that we would confine our action to retaliating against any British attacks while awaiting with calm the UN decisions.”³³⁴ While Grivas and Makarios were increasingly opposed to each other’s strategies for achieving *enosis*, the Macmillan plan helped to force a temporary truce between the two men.

Between October 2nd and 4th, Makarios met with Averoff, Karamanlis, and many other high Greek diplomatic officials to discuss a potential five party conference to secure independence. Makarios was instrumental in the meeting. Averoff writes how “the views of Makarios were more important than ever, as a decision from him on whether we should participate or not would resolve our dilemma from the outset.”³³⁵ It was Makarios who stipulated conditions on which the conference must proceed, and “since Makarios, who was the recognized spokesman for the Cypriot people, believed that we ought to give it a try, it was virtually impossible for us to object.”³³⁶ However, at the

³³² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 180.

³³³ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 180.

³³⁴ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 181.

³³⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 260.

³³⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 262.

last minute, “in the hope of deflecting the criticism leveled against him in Athens and Cyprus, the Archbishop stated that he would not take part in the conference, no matter what its composition or terms of reference.”³³⁷ Though Makarios was sharing leadership of the *enosis* campaign with the Greek government, Makarios was still key for any negotiations to proceed.

In the lead up to the November 1958 UN meeting, Makarios continued his heavy involvement in diplomacy, even though his position as *ethnarch* had no official recognition. During the summer of 1958, Makarios told Azinas that “Nasser would be leaving very shortly for Moscow and the Cyprus problem was one of the questions he would raise. The same would be done[with] Tito also.”³³⁸ After Nasser’s trip, Makarios traveled to Cairo independently of the Greek government to discuss the results. In New York City before the UN debate, Makarios gave an interview to the New York Times in which he stated that “he had taken his decision about independence at the instigation of the Americans; that independence did not rule out *enosis*, which could follow later; and that he could not guarantee that any British bases would remain in Cyprus.”³³⁹ Though he could not speak in the UN assembly itself, Makarios found alternate routes to influence negotiations. This interview came as a shock to both the British and Greek governments, as independence was Makarios’ own idea and he had also previously expressed willingness to grant the British bases in Cyprus. This interview was an example of Makarios saying one thing in public in order to placate more extreme nationalists, while taking a more compromised approach in private. Ultimately, despite Greek efforts to get a condemnation of the

³³⁷ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 267.

³³⁸ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 671.

³³⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 272.

Macmillan Plan at the UN, the assembly passed a neutral resolution. At the end of the UN session, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu approached Averoff and proposed private Greek-Turkish negotiations since they recognized the British were playing both sides.

As Greek Turkish talks continued outside of the UN in late 1958 and early 1959, “Karamanlis stressed that from now on we would have to cooperate more closely with the Archbishop because slender though the hope might be, we were now working towards some kind of settlement. It was no longer merely a question of how the case should be handed, on which we had the final say because we were handling it: the matter at issue was a final settlement, on which we were entitled to have an opinion, but only the archbishop as the authorized spokesperson for the Cypriot people, could actually reject or accept.”³⁴⁰ Recognizing the importance of Makarios’ position as *ethnarch*, Averoff and Karamanlis briefed Makarios on the talks after Makarios returned from a trip to the US in mid-January 1959. The minutes from the meeting show that Makarios expressed his support for the proposed constitution, but not for a Turkish base in Cyprus or a 50-50 split in armed forces personnel. Additionally, he wanted more details on the vice president’s veto, but “in general the attitude of the Archbishop towards the Prime Minister’s statements and the Foreign Minister’s explanations was positive and encouraging for the continuation of contacts with the Turks...”³⁴¹ Although Makarios was not present at the talks, his approval was still required for them to proceed,

³⁴⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 310.

³⁴¹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 324.

showing how successfully Makarios had secured for himself the position of *athnarch* on the international stage.

Between the 5th and 11th of February 1959, Karamanlis and the Turkish Prime Minister met in Zurich. The result of their discussion was a document which outlined the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. Upon the success of the negotiation, Greek and Turkish delegations flew to London, and from the 11th to the 19th they negotiated with the British. Only after this were Makarios and Turkish-Cypriot representatives allowed to enter the discussion directly. When Karamanlis returned to Athens on February 11th, he set up a meeting with Archbishop Makarios to explain the Zurich Agreement to him. Before the meeting, Makarios expressed to Azinas that “I know that tomorrow the opposition and many of our people either because of convictions or for other reasons will not be satisfied but now this may be the only thing we could achieve in order to get rid of partition and of the British as conquerors. Let a start be made and we shall fight for improvements in the future. It will be something very sudden for the people and there will be reactions.”³⁴² Going into the meeting, Makarios was aware he would likely have to accept a compromise which would divide the united community he claimed to represent. The meeting between Karamanlis and Makarios lasted for hours, which was not a sign of disagreement, just “simply to the sheer number and variety of the clauses in the three Agreements, on many of which the Archbishop sought clarification.”³⁴³ Makarios got permission from Karamanlis to negotiate down the size of the British bases, and afterwards he released a statement

³⁴² Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 751.

³⁴³ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 337.

to the press which read “I have expressed my gratification to the Prime Minister, Mr. K. Karamanlis congratulated him on the outcome of the talks between Greece and Turkey in Zurich. The agreement reached there laid the foundation for an immediate final settlement of the Cyprus dispute, whereby Cyprus is to become an independent sovereign state.”³⁴⁴ As a result of the Macmillan Plan, Makarios realized that he would have to go back on his plan of ‘*enosis* and only *enosis*’ and accept a compromised solution.

Although Makarios was supportive of the negotiations for independence, Averoff explained how “I was concerned Grivas-Dighenis was the biggest potential obstacle to the acceptance of the Agreements... Makarios was the Cypriots’ religious and political leader, and he enjoyed enormous prestige and authority; but Grivas was their hero, a legend in his own right. And whereas the Archbishop had been moving in international circles where he had been brought face to face with the powerful opposition which had to be contended with, Grivas had spent the last four years in isolation...”³⁴⁵ After his meeting with Karamanlis, Makarios notified Grivas of the Zurich Agreements in a letter which stated that “I think it would be as well to issue a proclamation giving your endorsement to the solution reached by the political leadership. I hope that we shall soon be in a position to meet and exchange views so that we can take joint-decisions in the future.”³⁴⁶ Likewise, the Greek government urged Grivas that “Serious dangers from the British side, from the Communists and from the Bishop of Kyrenia’s followers could be forestalled if you repeated your declaration of the

³⁴⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 337.

³⁴⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 338.

³⁴⁶ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 189.

past that the Cypriot people must obey the Archbishop.”³⁴⁷ Makarios and the Greek government were both acutely aware that Grivas’ dissent would weaken Makarios’ claim to represent all Greek Cypriots and thereby make negotiation less effective. Grivas’ response to Makarios and Averoff’s concerns was to reply with “When I have been fully informed about certain points of the agreement I shall not betray the struggle nor squander the sacrifices of the fighting people of Cyprus. Of this there must be no doubt. The only voice I obey is that of Cyprus. I ask only one thing of you all: obedience to my orders. The time has come for us to show that we are an organized body motivated by high ideals and patriotism, to show that we know how to win the battle both in the field of honor and in the political field.”³⁴⁸ Although Grivas was still refraining from breaking officially from Makarios, he made clear that he would not provide unequivocal support to Makarios.

As a result of the lack of support from Grivas, Makarios decided to highlight the consent of Greek Cypriots for his leadership by inviting “thirty-five Greek Cypriots, representing various shades of opinion and walks of life, to come to London with him when he went to sign the Agreements so that he could feel that he was signing them with the approval of a sort of Greek-Cypriot representative assembly.”³⁴⁹ This delegation event included the Cypriot political left. Averoff sent a warning to Makarios, telling him “I have good grounds for believing that EOKA will be displeased, as it will give left-wingers prestige, official recognition and an opportunity to exert indirect influence on the negotiations, and it is extremely important to have EOKA’s approval, but only in recognition of its

³⁴⁷ Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 188.

³⁴⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 340.

³⁴⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 340.

past heroic action but above all to ensure wholehearted acceptance of the Agreements.”³⁵⁰ However, this advice went unheeded, and Makarios “brought with him the Abbot of Kykko (his spiritual advisor), Bishop Anthimos of Kition, the five mayors, two representatives of AKEL and representatives of trade unions and professional associations.”³⁵¹ Just as Averoff predicted, this act enraged Grivas, who wrote in his memoirs that “As long ago as 10 November on the previous year I had written to ask the Bishop of Kition to ensure that EOKA was properly represented at any peace talks... and in particular that the mayors should not be invited... Yet without a word to me the Archbishop had summoned to London so-called representatives of his own choosing and the mayors were prominent among the delegates.”³⁵² Highlight his support from all sections of Greek Cypriot society in order to legitimize his acceptance of independence rather than *enosis*, Makarios further alienated Grivas.

When Grivas' concerns were relayed to Makarios by the Bishop of Kition, Makarios replied “Dighenis does not know the Cypriots better than I.”³⁵³ On his way to join the conference, the Bishop of Kition highlighted the people of Cyprus' support for the archbishop, declaring that “the people of Cyprus, who had stood up to the trials and tribulations of the last few years with admirable courage and patience, remain completely loyal to *Ethnarch* Makarios and look forward with absolute confidence to his handling of the national issue.”³⁵⁴ Makarios knew that he had to assert his leadership

³⁵⁰ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 341.

³⁵¹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 341.

³⁵² Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, 189.

³⁵³ Azinas, *50 Years of Silence*, 2: 753.

³⁵⁴ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 343.

in the face of those like Grivas who were more dogmatically committed to the idea of immediate *enosis*. Averoff explained his opinion that “it seemed to me that this incident was probably the root cause of the rift between Makarios and Grivas. Such quarrels as they had had until that time had been due either to outbursts of temper on the part of the lonely warrior, which soon passed over, or else to differences of opinion, which were soon resolved. Now, for the first time, the Archbishop had taken a major step at a critical moment without consulting the EOKA leader, and the latter felt that he had been passed over as if he counted for nothing in the Cyprus dispute.”³⁵⁵ Makarios' diverse entourage enabled him to legitimize his power and to compromise on *enosis*, but in the process he alienated Grivas even more.

After arriving in London on the 15th, Makarios made an about face and expressed his objections to the idea of the conference. This enraged Karamanlis, who grilled Makarios for his inconsistencies and declared that if Makarios decided to continue the struggle he could no longer expect support from Greece.³⁵⁶ Although Greece needed Makarios in order to negotiate on the Cyprus issue, Makarios also needed Greece to amplify his voice on the world stage. Historian Stanley Mayes proposed that “Makarios may have been troubled by appearing to go back on the oath he had taken at his enthronement as Archbishop that he would pursue ‘*Enosis* and only *Enosis*’.”³⁵⁷ To assuage his fears, Averoff went over the proposals with Makarios and all his representatives, and though all had criticisms, none voiced the opinion of not signing. Still, “the Archbishop felt extremely vulnerable. He

³⁵⁵ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 342.

³⁵⁶ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 348.

³⁵⁷ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, 131.

had still received no word from Dighenis, and meanwhile the members of his delegation, who were men of high standing in Cyprus and representative of most shades of Greek-Cypriot opinion, were urging him to sign, but at the same time they had a number of criticisms to make. Taken together their objections added up to a formidable weight of disapproval, and even taken separately they were highly critical of basic provisions of the Agreements which he himself had approved or in some cases insisted upon. He was in danger of being confronted with widespread opposition – and worse of all, he might have to face it without the support of Dighenis and EOKA, who were at that time the legendary heroes of the Greek Cypriots, and without even being sure that Dighenis would not publicly disagree with him.”³⁵⁸ Even with a Cypriot delegation to support his power, Makarios felt insecure in his ability to agree to independence without fracturing the Greek Cypriot community. “At one point in the discussion the Archbishop hinted that he would rather resign than back down, to which the Abbot [of Kykko, Makarios’ spiritual father] retorted sharply, in front of everyone present, ‘Then resign!’”³⁵⁹ Ultimately, on February 19th, 1959, with the support of the Greek government and the Cypriot delegation, Makarios agreed to sign the London Agreement and to establish an independent Cyprus.

On Sunday, March 1st, Makarios flew on a plane provided by Aristotle Onassis directly from London to Cyprus. Some 200,000 thousand people awaited Makarios in Nicosia, which was such a significant percentage of Cyprus’ population that some villages were left deserted. Driving directly to the Cathedral of St. John, where the doxology had been in progress for some time, Makarios entered,

³⁵⁸ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 350.

³⁵⁹ Averoff-Tossizza, *Lost Opportunities*, 347.

“kissed the ancient Bible on its golden lectern before placing himself on the throne which had been vacant for so long.”³⁶⁰ After five years, the archbishop-*ethnarch* had returned to Cyprus, free from British colonial rule. In his speech from the balcony of the Archbishopric later in the day, Makarios briefly praised EOKA, before quickly moving on to praising the resilience and bravery of all the Cypriot people. It was not until March 9th that Grivas and Makarios would finally meet in person. After a tense discussion, Grivas agreed to leave Cyprus. He was flown back to Athens on a Greek airplane, where he was promoted to Lieutenant General by the Greek Parliament.³⁶¹ Ultimately, although Makarios was successfully able to assert the power of *ethnarch* throughout the *enosis* campaign, in the end this power could not secure the goal of *enosis*.

³⁶⁰ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 321.

³⁶¹ French, *Fighting EOKA*, 291.

Conclusion

On 31st of August 1971, Grivas returned to Cyprus in secret. The differences of opinion which had developed between Grivas and Makarios during the last two years of the *enosis* campaign had only worsened during the intervening decade. Grivas' goal for his covert travels were the same as they had been fifteen years earlier – to achieve immediate *enosis*. This time, however, his enemy was not the British colonial government, but President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Through the group EOKA-B, Grivas organized violent resistance to Makarios' rule. This would culminate in a 1974 Greek coup against Makarios, promptly followed by a Turkish partition of the island. Grivas, however, would die just four months too early to see these events unfold.

Just as Makarios had proved unable to control Grivas' violence during the 1956-1957 negotiations with Governor Harding, so too was he unable to control Grivas in the 1970s. Both times, Grivas' actions had catastrophic results for Makarios' power; first with his exile and then with his coup. While the nature of his power as *ethnarch* gave Makarios significant influence over the *enosis* cause, this did not translate to direct control over all the factions within the movement. As he stated in his enthronement speech as Bishop of Kition, the power of the church and the *ethnarch* was not grounded in some political faction, but from its ability to unify all Greek Cypriots.

Makarios used the power of his title of the *ethnarch* to unify the various Greek *enosis* factions throughout the 1950s with varying degrees of success. First, as Bishop of Kition and then later as *ethnarch* in the early 1950s, Makarios rejected AKEL's attempts to work as equals with the Church towards the *enosis* cause, as it would reduce the Church to just the voice of the Cypriot right wing. In

Athens in the early 1950s, Makarios engaged with the Cypriot expatriates planning violence, hoping to keep their violence under his control with his strategy of sabotage. In 1955 when Makarios gained a seat at the negotiating table with Harding, he sought consensus with the more nationalistic members of the church before accepting any final decision. During Makarios' exile, this unifying power was lost, and the *enosis* campaign became more decentralized. The acting *ethnarch*, the Anthimos the Bishop of Kition, was less effective at curtailing Grivas, whose autonomy increased. While the Greek government had some success in working with Grivas, they were still unable to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem without Makarios' ability to unify all Greek Cypriots. Upon his release, Makarios was denied recognition of his role as *ethnarch* by the British government, so Makarios shared his power of speaking for the Greek Cypriot community with the Greek government. However, he was unable to assert his control over Grivas, who attacked Cypriot leftists and refused to attack Turkish Cypriots, in the process damaging the unity of Greek Cypriots. As Grivas increased his independence from Makarios, the archbishop turned to a coalition of Greek Cypriots in order to legitimize his power to accept independence rather than *enosis*. Ultimately, Makarios' leadership of the *enosis* movement was not simply provided to him because of his position as archbishop, rather, Makarios actively used the unifying power of *ethnarch* to establish himself as the leader of *enosis* cause.

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