

# PORTUGAL: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE

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*In the mid-1970s, Portugal underwent a social revolution which caused the dismantling of its far-flung colonial empire. In this article, José Santos draws the important link between Portugal's domestic situation and its international position in the world, particularly in NATO, Europe, and Africa. He points out that the 1974 coup, which resulted in near chaos in Portugal, was to a large extent precipitated by the African policy of the Salazar-Caetano regime. He argues that although Portugal has ended its 600-year quest for a global empire, it is performing a new role in Africa, especially in its former colonies. Because Portugal's policies in those countries are aimed at benefitting the Alliance, the members of the Atlantic community have an interest in assisting Portugal in pursuing its objectives in Africa.*

Atraves de uma agitada revolução social, transformámos uma Nação pluricontinental de trinta milhões de habitantes numa pequena república europeia de escassos recursos e reduzida população, encravada entre a Espanha e o Oceano Atlântico.<sup>1</sup>

António de Spínola

Shortly after midnight, on the morning of April 25, 1974, the national radio station of Portugal began playing "Grandola," a hitherto banned song. This song signaled a carefully planned coup which, within twenty-four hours, toppled one of the longest established authoritarian regimes in the history of the world, and ended the first and last European colonial empire. On the same day, hundreds of thousands of civilians poured into Lisbon streets in a show of support for the change. Internally, these and subsequent demonstrations together with ideological struggles within the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) began a social revolution that threw Portugal into near chaos (by European standards) for two years. Exter-

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1. António de Spínola, *Ao Serviço de Portugal* (Lisboa: Atica Livraria Bertrand, 1976), p. 430. Translation: By means of a social revolution, we transformed a pluricontinental state of thirty million people into a small European republic of limited resources and reduced population wedged between Spain and the Atlantic Ocean.

nally, it signified the demise of a scattered global empire which had been the third largest in the colonial period and was still twenty times the size of Portugal itself.<sup>2</sup> While the pursuit of empire had been the rule for centuries, that reality of the past became an illusion during the 1960s, when most European countries granted independence to their overseas territories. Revolutionary events in Portugal, because of the country's historical and strategic importance, had strong repercussions for southern Africa, Europe, and East-West relations in the context of détente.

This article examines the relationship between Portugal's domestic political upheavals and its international position in NATO, Europe and Africa. First, it describes the domestic and international position of the Salazar-Caetano regime and how, with its African policy, that government inadvertently laid the foundation for the coup (1961-1973). Second, it portrays the coup, the events that subsequently led Portugal into near revolutionary chaos, and the reaction of the Atlantic Community (1974-1977). Third, it argues that having regained internal order, Portugal is finding a new diplomatic mission in Africa based on its cultural and linguistic ties to the former colonies, and that this mission will form a key aspect of Portugal's role in the Atlantic community (1978 to the present). It concludes that while Portugal's limited resources may be insufficient to fulfill this role, it is in the interests of the Atlantic community to assist it in doing so.

### I. PLURICONTINENTAL STATE: THE SALAZAR-CAETANO YEARS

The Atlantic has always been the source of Portuguese national consciousness. The country's topography and history have made this inevitable since the Roman occupation, during which all communication lines focused on the sea.<sup>3</sup> As one of the earliest nation-states in Europe, Portugal used its Atlantic position to become the first European country to embark on the course of overseas expansion, and the first to create an empire composed of extensive holdings in non-European territory.<sup>4</sup> In the twentieth century this position was a key reason why NATO, an organization formed to defend Western democracy, included Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's authoritarian government as a founding signatory. "The military necessity to protect the Atlantic pointed to the

2. Thomas C. Bruneau, "Out of Africa and into Europe: Towards an Analysis of Portuguese Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 32 (Spring 1977): 288-289.

3. Yves Bottineau, *Le Portugal et sa Vocation Maritime* (Paris: Editions E. de Boccard, 1977), p. 379.

4. Lawrence S. Graham, *Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order* (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 12.

inclusion of Iceland, and of Portugal's Azores Islands,"<sup>5</sup> which has been called "the single most important airbase the United States has anywhere" in the NATO defense network.<sup>6</sup>

In Salazar's time, Portugal maintained that in case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the clash would occur along a first line of defense running down the middle of the continent. The second line, or reserve half, ran down the east coast of the U.S. and Canada. As such, Portugal's position would be key:

The ocean . . . appears as a hinge which one must inevitably dominate so that each group of nations will be able to carry out its part of the common task. And this immediately gives a dominant position to two countries: Iceland, in the Arctic Polar Circle, and Portugal in the Central Axis of transcontinental communications. Since the northern route presents obvious difficulties, our country is therefore the first and the best spearhead that the reinforcement zone possesses in the operational zone. . . . Portugal is the European country with which the allies of the other continent are most easily in liaison. The air bases of the Azores, in the middle of the Atlantic, are an indispensable pillar of the air bridge connecting the friendly margins of the great blue river.<sup>7</sup>

Also, the Cape Verde Islands (now a part of independent Guiné-Bissau) would allow the waging of antisubmarine warfare and subsequent domination of the Central and South Atlantic. Moreover, "Metropolitan Portugal, Madeira, and the Azores in effect constitute[d] a strategic triangle in the North Atlantic" from which an air and naval power could control large areas of the ocean and the gateway to the Mediterranean.<sup>8</sup>

These geostrategic aspects of Portugal have not changed since Salazar, but others have. Salazar's Portugal claimed that the country consisted of a pluricontinental, multi-ethnic state totalling nearly one million square miles in area. The African possessions were considered not colonies but integral parts of the country. The legal justification rested on royal decrees of the seventeenth century, and especially on the constitution of 1822. The constitution of 1933 formally made the territories provinces.<sup>9</sup>

5. William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 43-44.

6. David Abshire, "Strategic Implications," in David Abshire and Michael Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger Press, 1969), p. 435.

7. H. M. de Carvalho, "Portugal no Pacto Atlantico," in *Política Externa Portuguesa* (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, no. 70, 1974), pp. 91-92.

8. Abshire, "Strategic Implications," p. 435.

9. *Portugal Replies in the United Nations* (Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970), p. 180.

Salazar and many members of his government dreamed of a unified Lusotropical nation. The Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre defended Portuguese African policies from an ecological and social basis, and the Portuguese government published his works liberally. He theorized that the Portuguese were the ideal people for forming new and integrated societies "in part through miscegenation and in part through socially Christianizing non-Europeans rather than culturally Europeanizing them," as other Europeans had attempted. The Cape Verde Islands and Brazil served as examples of past successes.<sup>10</sup>

In 1960, Parliament passed several laws to further integrate the colonies into Portuguese society: (1) Ordinance No. 17,771 of June 17, 1960, set uniform standards for minimum wages throughout Portuguese land and applied to all people; (2) Ordinance No. 17,782 of June 28, 1960, created uniform criteria for labor agreements and union negotiations; (3) Ordinance No. 17,867 of July 29, 1960, set uniform regulations for health and safety in industry; and (4) Decree No. 43,537 of May 2, 1960, required labor inspections in all territories. The plan was to "complete political and administrative uniformity, through the extension of all ministerial functions to the overseas provinces — a process whereby the province of Minho would be really equal to Angola and the Algarve to Timor."<sup>11</sup>

But if these legal changes and policy objectives were sincere — and they probably were — they were never concretely realized. Indigenous peoples of Africa did not in fact have equal opportunities and at least 90 percent were illiterate. Some scholars have described these legislative efforts as "legal fictions."<sup>12</sup> Many writers throughout the 1960s emphasized that a Lusotropical society could be achieved in Africa only through massive settlement from European Portugal. But instead of leading migrations to Africa, the government encouraged migration to Germany and France in order to meet its foreign currency needs by means of emigrants' remittances. Although thousands moved to Africa, the great numbers needed to effect control could not be realized.<sup>13</sup>

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s many former possessions gained independence from European colonial powers, especially from France, England, Belgium and the Netherlands. The new countries gained sym-

10. Ronald H. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 48.

11. Adriano Moreira, *Portugal's Stand in Africa* (New York: University Publishers, 1962), pp. 196-197. The author was Portugal's Minister of the Overseas Provinces and Professor at the High Institute for Overseas Studies for the Technical University of Lisbon.

12. Victor de Sá, *Repensar Portugal: Reflexões Sobre o Colonialismo e a Descolonização* (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 1977), p. 17.

13. Interview with Elizabeth Leeds, Ph.D., expert on Portuguese Immigration, April, 1984.

pathy and influence in the United Nations, and Salazar's Portugal soon found itself isolated there. These new states successfully used the General Assembly and U.N. investigations to condemn Portugal and to try to effect a change in Portugal's African policy. Employing combinations of resolutions and collective measures, these countries linked Salazar's government to white majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia,<sup>14</sup> although Portugal's racial policy differed radically from those countries' practices.<sup>15</sup> During President Kennedy's Administration the US also pressed Portugal to grant independence to the possessions, but Portugal tenaciously maintained its legalistic position: the territories were not colonies but provinces.

Organized rebellions in the form of guerrilla warfare broke out in Angola in 1961, in Mozambique in 1963 and in Guiné-Bissau in 1964. All were financially and politically backed by Moscow. For strategic reasons, Guiné-Bissau received the most Soviet aid and the war there raged particularly fiercely. For Salazar, who thought in terms of East versus West more than any American Cold Warrior, these events threatened not only Portugal but the entire Western world. It threatened to introduce communism into large parts of Africa and also to menace the Atlantic. From 1961 to 1974, this three-front war increasingly sapped Portugal of its limited resources while diplomatically alienating it from much of the outside world. During some years up to 220,000 troops were stationed in Africa. These were wars which, as the U.S. learned during the same period, could be controlled but could not be won in the long-run — certainly not by a country of barely ten million people.

The commitment of Salazar's Portugal in Africa, however, was not measured in material sacrifice. Like absentee landowners, many Portuguese felt these parts of Africa were theirs; they had won them through five hundred years of discovery and war. They felt a natural right to them. Salazar never saw the three wars as liberation movements or as wars of self-determination; he saw them as East versus West, as communism versus Christianity (not democracy). In this conflict, each Portuguese soldier in Africa served as "a living stone on which our survival rests." The Portuguese were to consider their sacrifices a privilege and the world would one day hail them for such sacrifice. Salazar saw Portugal involved in a Western/Christian civilizing task in which "not even the slightest degree of compromise" could be admitted.<sup>16</sup> After all, as Por-

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14. Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 55.

15. David Abshire, "Emerging Policies and Alternatives," in David Abshire and Michael Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 449.

16. Moreira, *Portugal's Stand in Africa*, p. 19.

tugal's Permanent Representative to the U.N. said in the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, as the protagonist of communism, has "declared war on the United Nations . . . and . . . declared war on mankind itself."<sup>17</sup> Thus, Salazar's approach to the rebellions was to "hold-on" by maintaining a firm hand in the hope that world leaders would see Portugal's just cause in time to aid it and praise it. He hoped that other nations would see the true Soviet scheme of installing communist regimes in Portuguese territories and using them to spread communism, to threaten Christianity and to menace shipping lanes. When these realizations occurred, he reasoned, Portugal would have no shortage of help and it could then work toward the multiracial and pluricontinental society that he envisioned.<sup>18</sup>

Most European countries rejected Portugal's claims of domestic jurisdiction in Africa, but they also showed themselves uncomfortable with the right to self-determination about which African states were so vocal in the U.N. General Assembly and Council debates. Great Britain, however, held itself further away than did other European nations from the Portuguese cause. Perhaps because of its Commonwealth interests, Britain succumbed to the national and anti-colonial movements in Afro-Asia, leading to misunderstandings between the two allies: "the political and strategic circumstances had changed dramatically . . . and the nature of British obligations toward Lisbon had also to be revised."<sup>19</sup> With the rise of the two superpowers and the decline of British might, Britain no longer needed Portuguese territory for naval bases. The U.S., as the principal power in the West, sought Atlantic bases and *de facto* replaced Britain in its 600-year alliance with Portugal. But even though Portugal found lukewarm political support from the United States and some European countries, it found itself attacked in the U. N. and alienated from its old ally.

Relations between the US and Portugal were problematic. Although the two countries maintained close military ties, and the US almost stopped its criticism of Portugal after the Kennedy Administration, these ties were based on NATO, which the US defined as a defense network confined to European Portugal and as having nothing to do with African Portugal. In fact, Salazar succeeded in extracting American support in the U.N. as part of the price for use of the Azores.<sup>20</sup> It was a fundamental

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17. *Portugal Replies*, p. 182.

18. Antonio de Spínola, *País Sem Rumor: Contributo para a Historia de uma Revolução* (Lisboa, 1978), p. 19.

19. Luc Crollen, *Portugal, the U.S., and NATO* (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1973), p. 72.

20. Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life: 1914-1969* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), p. 428.

contradiction in American policy and one which caused Salazar to remain an irritant to American politicians. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. pointed out that "we need . . . these [European] countries to be strong, and they cannot be strong without their colonies and yet we do not like their colonies, and that is a contradiction in terms."<sup>21</sup> The US experienced the same dilemma with Portugal and its possessions that it had with Belgium and the Congo in 1960.

Internally, Portuguese economic structures at first supported Salazar's policies. A few large, domestically controlled monopoly groups dominated the economy. Typically, such a firm controlled a bank, a newspaper, an insurance company and firms in various branches of industry. The seven largest groups controlled 300 firms, and the largest, CUF, controlled 186. For these companies, the African territories were a source of capital accumulation and raw materials. They therefore strongly supported the government's African Policy.<sup>22</sup>

In 1968 Salazar had a stroke and remained incapacitated until his death in 1971. His replacement by Marcello Caetano in 1968 coincided with a period of rapid growth of Portuguese companies seeking greater European integration and access to sophisticated forms of financing. Increasing numbers of executives and technicians from these influential companies, familiar with the greater liberties in EEC countries, pressured Caetano for greater political liberalization. In response, Caetano granted autonomy to trade unions and more freedom for political opposition. But under pressure from aging President Americo Tomás, he continued the war for control of the colonies.

While the Government remained intransigent, the liberation movements in Africa and supporters of independence in Portugal became increasingly extremist.<sup>23</sup> Caetano's superficial liberalization created increasing popular unrest and dissatisfaction at home. The war forced almost every young Portuguese man to serve a two-year tour of duty thousands of miles from his family. By 1973, these families had suffered 4,800 combat deaths. The war consumed 30 percent of the country's budget, which, together with rapid industrialization, resulted in high inflation.<sup>24</sup> Increased freedom for trade union movements gave unions the ability to oppose the regime. Some groups even elected officials who

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21. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., *Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*, Hearings Held in Executive Session, p. 256.

22. John L. Hammond, "The Armed Forces Movement and the Portuguese Revolution: Two Steps Forward, One Step Backward," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Spring 1982): 75-76.

23. Mario Soares, *Democratização e Descolonização: Dêz Mezes no Governo Provisorio* (Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1975), Appendix on "Speech to NATO Ministers, 1974."

24. Hammond, "The Armed Forces Movement," p. 77.

openly opposed the government. Conscription and emigration created a manpower drain which weighed on the economic and national consciousness to the point where these losses began to outweigh the value of keeping the territories.

Portugal's strength in Africa was the loyalty, or at least the neutrality, of the majority of the population.<sup>25</sup> Increased repression there would only squander this asset. In contrast to the American army in Vietnam, the Portuguese army understood the necessity of gaining the friendship of the indigenous peoples. It was so successful that in 1974 40 percent of the Portuguese army in Africa was black.<sup>26</sup> Betraying the loyalty of these African supporters later became a major concern of the post-1974 government during independence negotiations. Thus, Portugal was not defeated in Africa — only in Guiné-Bissau where the Partido Africano para a Independencia de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) controlled most of the territory — “but neither could Portugal win.”<sup>27</sup> The knowledge of this fact further weighed on the Portuguese national consciousness.

## II. EUROPEAN NATION-STATE: THE COUP, UPHEAVAL, AND RETURN TO ORDER

Two competing views developed in Portugal in the early 1970s to deal with the African problem. The government's view consisted of Portugal as the pluricontinental state under which independence was impossible. Socialists, Communists, and other liberals pressed for complete independence. The latter group was usually censored and some leaders were exiled. Mario Soares, for example, became a professor at the Sorbonne, where he founded the Socialist Party (P.S.).

Two events catalyzed the coup. The first was a book, *Portugal e o Futuro*, written by universally-respected General António de Spínola. Spínola had tried to convince Salazar in 1968 that his policy on Africa was incompatible with trends in the modern world. The 1974 book argued that Portugal could no longer afford the wars and proposed what Spínola had privately sought from Caetano for years: a middle course solution consisting of a Portuguese federation. The territories would have complete local autonomy, but Lisbon would retain sovereignty. Caetano opposed the book while it was in manuscript form, but still allowed it to be published. Spínola reports in his memoirs that he was shocked at Caetano's opposition.<sup>28</sup> *Portugal e o Futuro* became an instant best seller

25. George Martelli, “Conflict in Portuguese Africa,” in David Abshire and Michael Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 429.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Hammond, “The Armed Forces Movement,” p. 77.

28. Spínola, *País Sem Rumor*, p. 77.



at all levels of society, even though the government attempted to discredit both Spínola and the book. The book publicized what many had secretly thought: Portugal could not win the wars for control of the colonies in the foreseeable future.

The second and more immediate catalyst of the coup was Decree-law 353 of July 13, 1973. This decree encouraged *milicianos*, university-educated conscripts, to remain in the service after their two-year tour of duty, and allowed them to climb into officer positions after a short training course. This implied a challenge to the privileged positions of regular officers — who were mostly sons of petty-bourgeois families — and to the value of their own career training. This issue sparked meetings in Portugal and Africa that took on sharp political significance. Many of these junior officers opposed not only the government's African policy, but also authoritarian rule at home — a reflection of the increasingly liberal ideas of the Portuguese universities of the 1960s. They had read Spínola's book, and many were conscious leftists. Most agreed on two things: the need for an end to the wars and for democratization in Portugal itself. The inability of the opposition to formulate a specific policy plan beyond these ill-defined objectives, however, was one of the elements which later caused political havoc.

These junior officers, especially Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, planned and carried out the coup with the knowledge and approval of some senior officers. General Spínola sympathized with the coup, hoping that the new leaders would administer his middle-course solution to the war. But the MFA allowed Spínola to receive the transfer of power not because they wanted to implement his plan, but because they needed legitimacy. Most leaders of the MFA were leftists, and a leftist head of government was unacceptable to the Caetano government, which would have refused to transfer power and might have even resisted forcibly with loyal forces. The MFA kept Spínola notified of its movements by telephone through the day and night of April 24.

On April 25, with the MFA in control of the media and government buildings, and with hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating in support of the coup, Caetano called Spínola at home to arrange an orderly transfer of authority. Spínola arrived at the President's Carmo headquarters at 5:40 p.m. and greeted a serene and dignified Caetano. Spínola told him: "The state in which Your Excellency hands over the country! All of this could have been avoided!" Caetano interrupted, saying this was no time for recriminations. Spínola respected his wish, and Caetano declared he was prepared to transfer authority.<sup>29</sup> On the morning of April

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29. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-117.

26, Spínola read to the nation an outline of the MFA's program. Two prongs to which Spínola was personally committed were soon to be discarded: (1) to guarantee the country's pluricontinental sovereignty and (2) to keep the MFA politically neutral in the democratization process.

Caetano, Tomás, and other high officials were exiled to the Azores and Madeira. No executions took place; the coup itself was peaceful. The transfer of power resembled more the abdication of a senile monarch than a military overthrow.<sup>30</sup> But it soon became clear that the MFA intended to make drastic changes in existing social structures and institutions. The Spínola-Caetano meeting meant the end of the coup, but it also signaled the beginning of a social revolution with both internal and external effects.

The MFA, the real power brokers, set up a committee of seven senior officers called the Junta de Salvação Nacional (JSN), which included Spínola. The JSN would: (1) guide the country through the next few months; (2) establish a provisional government; and (3) transfer power to a constitutional government once elections took place.<sup>31</sup> The MFA also organized a twenty-member Coordinating Committee (CCP) of junior officers which had no *formal* authority. In the JSN, most members were leftists, but they elected Spínola their President and temporarily accepted his domination.

On May 15, Spínola took office as President of the Republic and conferred authority on the politically moderate former law professor Palma Carlos as Prime Minister of the first provisional government. Palma Carlos faced the impossible task of restoring order at a time when dozens of political parties were being formed, the Communist Party began to show its organizational power, and spontaneous demonstrations took place in support of speedier democratization and an immediate end to the wars. Because Communist Party members and Czech agents had infiltrated labor unions and the armed forces before the coup, the Party found itself in an advantageous position after 1974. Nevertheless, Palma Carlos worked toward the three "D's": decolonization, democratization, and development. The ultimate objective was to integrate Portugal into a united Europe in which, many felt, it had always belonged.

The African question was the political focus of the revolution. Spínola held the original moderate position, but leftists sought complete independence. He publicly reiterated his desire for a Portuguese federation in which the colonies would be ruled by loyal indigenous people with

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30. Rona M. Fields, *The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 200.

31. Spínola, in Appendix "Proclamação do Movimento das Forças Armadas."

maximum local autonomy and insisted on protection of Portuguese and loyal blacks. He also called for the abolition of the MFA as an organization. This last position was not well received, for the people still credited the MFA with having overthrown the authoritarian government. In addition, rebel leaders in Africa announced they would not discuss autonomy and in some cases segments of the Portuguese army in Africa refused to continue the war against the rebels. It soon became obvious that the MFA was stronger than Spínola, and that they would not accept his moderate plan. Both the MFA and the populace increasingly saw Spínola as too rightist at a time when rightists were seen as potential fascists.

The MFA and leftist parties launched a campaign to discredit Palma Carlos, who sympathized with Spínola, as a rightist. Shortly thereafter Spínola recognized the impending clash between leftist and moderate forces. The Communist Party took the lead on the leftist side, fomenting mass demonstrations and disorder in order to create a social context in which to establish Communist takeover. In this struggle; Spínola first feared the absence of a moderate-rightist party, then rejoiced in the formation of the Social Democratic Party under Professor Freitas do Amaral in July, 1974.

President Spínola also took his case to Portugal's most influential NATO ally, the United States. He met with President Richard Nixon in Lajes on the Azores, and told him that Portugal wanted diplomatic relations with all nations and closer ties to the US. He lamented the extent of Communist influence in Portugal and expressed concern over the U.S.S.R.'s financial support of the P.C.P. He affirmed that a Communist takeover was unlikely, but asked for American assistance in the form of various types of pressures which included: (1) financial and economic aid to show support for democracy; (2) diplomatic support in the U.N. for Portuguese policy on Africa; (3) a repeal of American laws passed prior to 1974 which prohibited assistance to Portugal; and (4) an evaluation in NATO of the consequences of the establishment of Communism in Portugal and of a Soviet takeover of the strategic islands of Madeira, the Azores and Cape Verde. In essence, Spínola asked Nixon for American and European non-military intervention to prevent a Communist takeover. Nixon listened intently, agreed with the necessity to keep Communists out, and promised to work toward Spínola's requests. But because of Watergate, Nixon's influence on US policy was waning and he was forced to point out that his promises were subject to Congressional approval.<sup>32</sup> Although this meeting temporarily calmed Spínola's

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32. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

anxiety, he returned to Lisbon to find some of his worst fears coming true.

On July 8, 1974, the MFA instituted a second provisional government with Vasco Gonçalves, a leftist with Communist Party affiliations, as Prime Minister. Gonçalves had been head of the MFA's Coordinating Committee; his rise to Prime Minister meant the appointment of many Communists to key government posts. Dominated by this strong leftist element, Spínola finally accepted the idea of complete independence for the colonies on July 27. On this date the decision on the colonies had essentially been made; the last institutional opposition to independence capitulated. The leftists had won the first round, and in the process, the MFA had grown more radical.

While the MFA had intended to remain neutral in politics, their polarized ideology and the infiltration of Communist Party members into its ranks led it to demand its own long-term political institutionalization. The government headed by Gonçalves called for further institutionalization of the MFA to serve as "a driving force and guarantor of the Portuguese Revolution."<sup>33</sup> Of course, institutionalization served the ideological interests of both the MFA and the government. Both were dominated by strong leftist elements which sought institutionalization not only as the means to greater influence in society, but also for long-term security of that influence. Faced with these developments, Spínola resigned on September 24, 1974.

Institutionalization of the MFA continued to be opposed by moderates who feared military interference in the democratic process. To their dismay, the question was settled by an attempted coup on February 15, 1975, by supporters of the then-self-exiled Spínola. This failure resulted in the long-term merger (it would last almost eight years) of the JSN and CCP into the High Council of the Revolution (C.R.). To strengthen the MFA's position, all major parties signed a pact accepting the MFA's institutionalization and declaring their support for a constitution affirming a transition to socialism.<sup>34</sup>

Social chaos persisted for almost two years. Nearly fifty political parties were organized in the first few months after the coup. Intense demonstrations began spontaneously. Once-forbidden strikes hit all sectors of the economy and the government was reluctant to put them down for fear of either mutiny in the military or revolt by the strikers. *Saneamentos* (small scale coups) took place within small social and economic organizations such as labor unions and factories. Workers revolted against

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33. Hammond, "The Armed Forces Movement," p. 81.

34. *Ibid.*

owners and managers, and took over factories and newspapers. Students took over schools.

Many *Saneamentos* were instigated by the P.C.P. — not the largest, but certainly the best-organized party. It had been operated for fifty years from Prague by the intelligent Soviet-loyalist Alvaro Cunhal. All these events formed a popular revolt against any form of authority (except, generally, the church) in one long burst of anger against a half century of authoritarianism.

The MFA surpassed its original promises. It nationalized banks, insurance companies and basic industries; it encouraged landless farmers in the south to occupy two-thirds of Portugal's *latifundios*; it supported labor control of industry and direct democracy at the neighborhood level; it called for democratization within the armed forces; and it declared itself the leader of a national democratization process leading to a classless society. At the time, democracy meant that each person would interpret liberty for himself. All authority became synonymous with fascism.

The armed forces were not immune to the disarray. When the coup took place, "captains and majors challenged colonels and generals; during the following year, sergeants and privates were challenging captains and majors."<sup>35</sup> With the colonial wars coming to an end, soldiers in uniform were unsure what role to play. The breakdown of authority in society as a whole, and the revolution's politicizing effect forced every soldier to define an individual role for himself.

Many found a purpose in taking revolutionary rhetoric and community development ideas to backward areas of the north and south. The program in the north was called the "Cultural Dynamization Program" and was meant to help "civilians whose presumed backwardness prevented them from sympathizing with the revolution."<sup>36</sup> But while some areas of the north are backward, most people there own land and are staunchly conservative. Such efforts, therefore, often faced hostility and failed. The south was more hospitable: COPCON, (Comando Operacional do Continente) headed by the popular Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, whose purpose was originally to restore order,<sup>37</sup> acted as defender of local revolutionaries.<sup>38</sup>

Reaction outside Portugal took on mixed forms. In northwest Africa, Guiné-Bissau had declared independence in 1973. In Angola and Mozambique, where revolutionaries were too weak to do likewise even after 1974, black and white Portuguese citizens had begun returning to Por-

35. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Spínola, *País Sem Rumor*, p. 165.

38. Hammond, "The Armed Forces Movement," p. 85.

tugal in anticipation of independence. In Rhodesia, the coup in Lisbon signaled the end of white rule. And in South Africa, it heralded a new era of social anxiety.

In NATO, the US took the lead in worrying over the leftist government. The State Department consistently characterized events in Portugal as hostile to the US and NATO. Henry Kissinger privately and publicly criticized Communist influence in Portugal and compared Soares (who was a Socialist) to Kerensky in the Russian Revolution. Americans also became alarmed when, in 1975, they learned that the Soviets sought refueling rights for their fishing fleet on Madeira, or even in Lisbon.<sup>39</sup> The US had three basic interests: to keep Communism out, to keep Portugal's strategic assets within NATO, and to maintain Democracy. Since Salazar's authoritarianism had occasionally embarrassed NATO, a Democratic Portugal would be welcomed — but not one with strong Communist influence.

At a NATO meeting in May 1975 President Ford raised the question of continued Portuguese membership, implying expulsion. The US did not fear that Portugal would disclose secrets, since Portugal had voluntarily abstained from the Nuclear Planning Group, but it did not want to appear tolerant of communist-influenced governments in NATO.<sup>40</sup> These criticisms fulfilled Nixon's promise to Spínola to press the Portuguese military to decrease Communist influence. To some extent, however, it also reflected a real American fear of Communism in Europe. At a NATO meeting in December 1975 Kissinger expressed the idea that Communism in Portugal "could have a domino effect in France and West Germany and lead to the downfall of NATO, the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and the isolation of the US in the world."<sup>41</sup> Although the PCI (Italian Communist Party) had accepted NATO membership and relinquished the Moscow line, Kissinger apparently brushed this aside as a ploy to gain more votes. In Congress, some took an alarmist view. Senator James Buckley of New York said in March 1975 that he "considered nothing in the world, not even the Middle East, half so serious as the Communist drive to power in Portugal," because "it might leave the NATO allies squeezed between this country and Eastern Europe." Buckley favored military intervention to keep the Soviet Navy out of Portugal and the Azores if the situation deteriorated.<sup>42</sup>

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39. Tad Szulc, "Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Policy*, 21 (Winter 1975-1976): 28.

40. Ingmar Oldberg, "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75 and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics*, 17 (3) (1982): 182-183.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

In contrast to the United States, West European countries opposed both expulsion and intervention. This caused further uneasiness within the Alliance, especially as there was no machinery for expelling a member. A Communist government, it was felt, could at best becloud the objectives of the Alliance "and could at worst subvert its activities."<sup>43</sup> An even more uncertain situation might arise if a Portugal with heavy Communist influence remained a member. If this happened, differences would arise among other Alliance members over how to deal with Portuguese membership. On the one hand, exclusion of historically European-Atlanticist Portugal would raise divisive issues in the Alliance which would further weaken its political unity. On the other hand, acceptance of a Communist-influenced Portugal would set a dangerous precedent, encouraging Communist Parties in other states — particularly Italy and France.<sup>44</sup> A new domino theory troubled the United States.

In hearings before a Congressional Committee, Helmut Sonnenfeldt stressed the importance of such an effect. He argued that the US could not "permit even small shifts in the international balance in one region or another to occur," and especially not in the Atlantic, which he labelled "the keystone of American foreign policy" and upon which rested "our whole relationship with the Soviet Union."<sup>45</sup> Following this reasoning, Kissinger feared as early as October 1974 that "the Communists would gain full control in Portugal and precipitate similar takeovers in Spain, Italy, and Greece."<sup>46</sup> On the Portuguese side, Foreign Minister Mario Soares protested that Portugal was not the only West European country with Communists in the government. Portuguese ambitions, he argued, lay in joining the Common Market, not Eastern Europe.<sup>47</sup>

Portugal, then, had become an East-West issue in which American fears, initially mobilized by Spínola in 1974, were grounded in realistic concerns: the Soviet Navy was undergoing its most rapid expansion at this time and the P.C.P. still held on to a Stalinist ideology and was, if not the most popular, then certainly the best organized party in Portugal. The Soviet Union hoped that the P.C.P. would come to power in Portugal within the framework of détente. If this occurred Portugal could become a Marxist-Leninist state and then the Brezhnev Doctrine would apply.<sup>48</sup>

43. Leon Sloss, *NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities*, published as part of *The Washington Papers*, (London: Sage Publications, 1975), vol. III, no. 30, pp. 23-24.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

45. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974*. March 15, 1974. 93rd Congress, 2nd sess., 1974, p. 21; 28.

46. Oldberg, "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75," p. 84.

47. Soares, *Democratização e Descolonização*, p. 246.

48. David Rees, "Southern Europe: NATO's Crumbling Flank," *Conflict Studies*, August 1975, p. 21.

In addition to political fears, military considerations also arose. In the context of Soviet naval deployment in southern Europe, no area was "of more importance for NATO than the future of the Azores, Portuguese territory which in effect commands the mid-Atlantic."<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, communist control of continental Portugal "would open the way for Soviet military penetration of a country that geographically has made NATO's Atlantic gateway."<sup>50</sup> In addition, the issue had begun to endanger détente. President Ford privately told Brezhnev at the November 1974 SALT meeting in Vladivostok that Portugal fell within the Western sphere of influence and that "détente was not 'a license to fish in troubled waters.'"<sup>51</sup> Kissinger made similar public warnings to the Soviets and later pointed to the Helsinki pledges of non-interference.<sup>52</sup>

These warnings had a positive effect, and détente worked to lessen Soviet-American friction over Portuguese events. Soviet Ambassador Kalinini gave notice to Vasco Gonçalves that there would be no confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States over Portugal. While on a state visit to Lisbon in 1975, Edward Gierek of Poland called for moderation in Portugal.<sup>53</sup> These events served to reduce Soviet financial aid to the PCP, and helped boost moderate political forces in Portugal.

Many Portuguese felt that Washington took a wait and see attitude — at least until the March 1975 elections. Others were more pessimistic, giving credence to rumors of CIA activities. Indeed, the CIA had begun operations in Portugal, a fact symbolically confirmed by the sudden appointment of Frank Carlucci as Ambassador immediately following a pessimistic CIA report in Washington.<sup>54</sup> The CIA began to fund moderate parties, although Congressional surveillance under the Rockefeller Commission prevented the agency from doing much more.<sup>55</sup> The CIA's position was precarious: leftist parties would use evidence of its assistance to their advantage, despite the absence of strong anti-Americanism.

In addition to these efforts in NATO, both the US and Western Europe used economic resources to influence Portuguese events. Portugal's trading patterns and other ties to these countries made possible both overt and covert action. Some Western importers boycotted Portuguese exports, which hampered economic efforts by the new leftist government. Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO used his influence in Portuguese trade

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49. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

51. "Portugal: Revolution and Backlash," *Conflict Studies* 61, September 1975, p. 3. No author indicated.

52. Oldberg, "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75," p. 186.

53. Bruneau, "Out of Africa and into Europe," p. 299.

54. Soares, *Democratização e Descolonização*, p. 242.

55. Oldberg, "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75," p. 182.



union and labor disputes. West Germany's SPD (Social Democrats) began to aid the P.S. (*Partido Socialista*). More particularly, a critically timed American grant of seventy-five million dollars created the promise of future economic assistance if Portugal became more moderate. As Foreign Minister Soares stated, "This 75 million dollar assistance is certainly modest, but it is symbolic, because it is significantly granted before the March elections."<sup>56</sup> Similarly, EEC officials flew to Lisbon and offered aid if Portugal remained democratic and retained a free economy.<sup>57</sup>

Other external economic changes began to make the Lisbon government less popular. In retaliation for Portugal's allowing the US to use the Azores during the Arab-Israeli War, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) made Portugal one of its first targets of the oil boycott, causing prices to skyrocket. Because of wage increases and worker militancy, domestic and foreign capitalists postponed investment. Decolonization resulted in the loss of preferred markets and sources of cheap raw materials. The return of almost one million people from Africa drove unemployment up to 15 percent at the same time that the international economic crisis closed northern Europe to Portuguese emigration. The *retornados* who had lost property in Africa generally felt betrayed by the revolution and added to the ranks of moderate parties. Finally, Portuguese workers abroad lowered remittances, which had traditionally amounted to billions of dollars yearly, causing further reductions in foreign exchange earnings.<sup>58</sup>

Domestically, the first elections in April 1975 showed that leftists did not enjoy as much popular support as they had thought: the Socialists took the largest single bloc of votes, and the Communists came in fourth, leaving the two relatively conservative democratic parties in the middle. The Communists' use of the MFA to place its members in key government posts before the election had raised the suspicions of many. Cunhal had openly said in an interview with Oriana Fallaci of *l'Europeo* that the Communist Party would not accept the "game" of elections and stated: "I promise you that there will be no parliament in Portugal."<sup>59</sup> The leftist-inspired takeover of *Radio Renascencia*, the Lisbon Patriarch's radio network, alienated the previously neutral church.

After the elections, the PS began to oppose publicly the leftist revolutionary process. The church began to take a more active role. And especially in the north and center of the country, people began to regard

56. Soares, *Democratização e Descolonização*, p. 242.

57. Oldberg, "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974-75," p. 183.

58. Kenneth Maxwell, "The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and Portugal," *Orbis*, Spring 1983.

59. "I Could not Care Less About Elections" — Alvaro Cunhal, interview with Oriana Fallaci of *l'Europeo*, June 13, 1975, in *Conflict Studies*, September 1975, p. 28.

Communists as threatening the two most important values to the majority of Portuguese: land and faith. Because of this threat, the seasonal mass meetings of hundreds of thousands in front of the Basilica of Fatima drew enormous crowds in 1975 and took on significant political meaning.

Senator Pell (D — RI) reported that the revolutionary process increased the Church's credibility and reinforced its stabilizing image. To the far left, he said,

"This phenomenon of Fatima was . . . to be dispelled by the truth according to Karl Marx. They could not anticipate that religiosity, culture, and ingrained behavior would lead the usually passive masses, when politically aroused, to shatter leftist dreams of radical social change. Had they read fewer works on cultural materialism and more Clifford Geertz, they might have been less sanguine that promises of new water mains would be sufficient to win Portugal's . . . [people] to the cause of revolution.<sup>60</sup>

Indeed, the leftists' main problem was their failure to realize that popular demonstrations of support were not coming from the whole country but only from the Lisbon-Setubal industrial area and the belt of rent-farmers in Alentejo. One of my friends told me in 1977 that leftists began to lose because they were centered in Lisbon and thought Lisbon was the whole country.

The church thus became a rallying point against totalitarianism from both the right and left. Beginning in July, these developments resulted in an onslaught of anti-Communist attacks in north and central Portugal. PCP headquarters in more than fifty cities and towns were destroyed. As the violence spread, anti-leftist and anti-Communist sentiment throughout the country increased.

These anti-Communist efforts seeped into every rank of the army, which had been polarized between leftists and moderates. On November 25, 1975, paratroopers took control of four airbases around the country. Moderates immediately claimed that a far-left coup was taking place. They took the opportunity to move against left-wing units in Lisbon, arrest key leftist officers, install themselves in these positions, and to begin to enforce disciplinary codes.<sup>61</sup> One of these moderate leaders was General Ramalho Eanes who became Army Chief of Staff, and who was later popularly elected (and re-elected) to the Presidency.

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60. U.S. Congress, Senate, A Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, *Portugal (Including the Azores) and Spain in Search of New Directions*, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., 1976, p. 8.

61. Jane Kramer, "A Reporter at Large: The Portuguese Revolution," *New Yorker*, December 15, 1974, p. 131.

Hence, both internal and external pressures helped moderates to gain control of the country. The struggle that brought moderates to power culminated in four events which characterized 1976-1977 as the transition period from revolution to stability. First, a constitution was adopted which followed moderate lines, although it did reflect some leftist influence. That document has since been revised to conform more closely with conservative ideology. Second, the elections of 1976 brought the PS to power with Mario Soares as Prime Minister, giving the party an opportunity to enforce the new constitution. Third, the people elected the moderate and respected Ramalho Eanes to the Presidency. Fourth, a wave of laws in 1977 reversed many radical changes: firms that had been taken during the worker revolts were returned to the private sector, the right to strike was restricted, and worker control of nationalized firms was abolished.<sup>62</sup>

By this time Portugal had granted independence to Guiné-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, and had begun negotiations for the independence of East Timor (which became unnecessary after Indonesia initiated a genocidal invasion). Portugal also offered to return sovereignty of Macau to China. China declined, however, fearing that the return of Macau at this time would lessen its foreign exchange earnings and unnecessarily frighten Hong Kong investors. The Azores and Madeira, Portugal's other remaining extra-continental territories, constitute three provinces which historically have been represented in the Lisbon government. These islands were uninhabited when the Portuguese discovered them and their population is homogeneously Portuguese.

These grants of independence together with the internal revolutionary process, have psychologically and practically ended Portugal's obsessive concerns about world empire and focused its attention on its position in the Alliance. When asked about Portuguese interests in Macau, a senior Portuguese official recently responded that "Macau is far away. . . . Our economic problems, our relations with the European Community, even with our former colonies in Africa, have a much higher priority."<sup>63</sup> As Victor de Sá wrote in the same year, "The Portuguese homeland is this belt of European land in which we all — here yes, legitimately — must live. Like the Spaniards . . . like the Dutch and the Italians who since the end of the World War also returned to their metropolitan territory."<sup>64</sup> The result has been a redirection of Portuguese energy into three external goals: (1) EEC integration; (2) an active role in NATO; and (3) fulfillment

62. Hammond, "The Armed Forces Movement," pp. 95-96.

63. "Portuguese in Macau Uncertain Who Really Governs the Colony," *New York Times*, 22 April 1981, p. 14.

64. Sá, *Repensar Portugal*, p. 37.

of a diplomatic role in Africa on the basis of historic, cultural and linguistic ties.

There are both economic and political reasons for joining the EEC, but perhaps the strongest reasons are historic and psychological. Portugal has always been an Old World European nation in its deepest sense. By far the most important settlers there were the Romans who implanted their language, culture and Christianity. The Arabs, who were driven out of Portugal three-hundred and fifty years before their counterparts in Spain, did not leave as strong an influence on Portugal as on Spain. England has been Portugal's ally for 600 years, and France its intellectual model since the eighteenth century. To join the EEC is, for Portugal, to join its closest cultural counterparts.

The current government has been preparing legislation to alter the economy in order to facilitate integration: one bill allows companies temporarily to lay off workers; another will re-open nationalized sectors, including banking, insurance, and cement, to private industry in an effort to increase exports; a third takes aim at corruption and would prevent misuse of government funds or of public offices for private gain.<sup>65</sup>

Portugal's export of one-third of its textiles to EEC countries at 20 and 30 percent below average EEC prices had constituted the major stumbling block to integration until it was resolved in September, 1982.<sup>66</sup> But other problems linger. Portuguese wine production would hurt Italy and France, and because Portugal imports one-half of its food, membership could hurt domestic agriculture and further increase the balance of trade deficit. These problems suggest that Portugal's real reason for wanting to join is more political than economic: membership in a "democracy club" would create strong incentives to remain democratic if other dangers appeared.

In addition to legal measures, the Soares government has announced balance of trade improvements, with exports now covering 50 percent of imports. International bankers and investors have regained confidence, represented by a recent \$720 million loan from the IMF. Of course, Salazar may turn in his grave because of such loans. To him "borrowing was unthinkable. He always balanced his books and put a little away for a rainy day, which by the time he died amounted to 862 tons of gold." Forty percent of that total is now collateral for loans.<sup>67</sup> Ironically a socialist Prime Minister is implementing these conservative measures. Soares feels his government can take such steps, though, because political

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65. "Portugal Poised to Pass Lay-Off Laws," *London Times*, 22 August 1983, p. 13.

66. "European," *General News*, *London Times*, 20 July 1982, p. 13.

67. "Portugal Ready for EEC Showdown," *London Times*, 8 September 1983, p. 5.

parties have succeeded for the first time in placing national interests above political disagreements.

Considering these efforts, Portugal has become frustrated with EEC delays. Although Greece and Italy have actively supported Portugal's entry, Soares has expressed disappointment at France's failure to do likewise. He stated in September 1983 that Portugal would not wait passively for a decision and announced that if not admitted soon, "Portugal might decide to stay out of the EEC altogether and increase its trade relations with the US, Japan and EFTA countries of Europe."<sup>68</sup> Japan has in fact shown interest in Portugal: Mitsubishi Motors and Univex are now negotiating a joint-venture to produce Japanese trucks in Portugal.<sup>69</sup> But Portugal's most promising opportunity is in renewed links with its former colonies, which it could use as partial alternative to the EEC. More likely, however, it will use this alternative as a carrot for EEC membership, since other countries want Portugal's assistance in reaching those markets.

Another problem with EEC entry has been Portugal's economic relations with Spain. Portugal was Spain's thirteenth ranking customer until 1980 when the two signed agreements to increase trade. But, partly due to tariff barriers, Spanish exports grew much faster than Portugal's. To counter this surge, Portugal, in the first nine months of 1983, reduced the number of import licenses granted, lowering Spanish exports to Portugal from 290 million dollars in 1982 to 172 million dollars in 1983.<sup>70</sup> As the first Spanish Prime Minister ever to address the Portuguese Parliament, Felipe González in November of 1983 urged Portugal to agree to an Iberian free trade zone as a way of preparing for EEC membership. Portuguese Foreign Minister Gaime Gama responded that Spain should first lower its barriers in order to start from a more equitable footing. He argued that "Portuguese products have proved their capacity to compete in the more sophisticated British and West German markets" and that only "the excessive protectionism of the Spanish economy stops us from achieving the results we desire."<sup>71</sup>

Fishing and nuclear waste are also issues of contention between Portugal and Spain. Both countries have banned each other's boats from their territorial waters. This has resulted in the arrest of three Spanish ships by Portugal, four Portuguese ships by Spain, and the firing of shots across bows.<sup>72</sup> In addition, Spanish plans for a nuclear reactor close to

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68. "Portugal Ready for EEC Showdown," *London Times*, 8 September 1983, p. 5.

69. "Japan," *General News*, *London Times*, 23 July 1982, p. 15.

70. "Spain and Portugal Meet to Mend Fences," *London Times*, 11 November 1983, p. 8.

71. "Spain Wants Iberian Free Trade Zone," *London Times*, 12 November 1983, p. 5.

72. "Portugal Tows in Ship as Fish War Hots Up," *London Times*, 18 August 1983, p. 4.

the border on the Douro River have raised fears that a change in the water temperature might upset the delicate climate which produces the unique grapes for Port wine. Also, nuclear contamination would wash into Portugal in the case of accident. To avert these problems, Soares and González have agreed to annual meetings and negotiations to form a new fishing program and to lower Spanish tariffs.<sup>73</sup> Although Jaime Gama has complained that the Spanish application for EEC entry hurt Portugal because of problems which Spain would cause for the EEC,<sup>74</sup> the two Prime Ministers also renewed their previous agreement to coordinate membership efforts.

These coordinated efforts proved fruitful in October 1983 when, after eight years of deadlocked negotiations, an EEC agreement in Luxembourg on how to market Mediterranean agricultural products cleared the way for earnest negotiations for Portuguese and Spanish entry. The breakthrough resulted from irritation expressed by both Soares and González at the Socialist Summit in Athens.<sup>75</sup> Despite the economic failure of the Athens EEC meeting several days later, however, both countries have reasserted their wish to join. For Portugal, this reassertion supports the argument that its reasons for joining the EEC are more political than economic.

### III. NEW ATLANTIC ROLE: NATO AND THE NEW MISSION IN AFRICA

Portugal has moved closer to a NATO posture not only in its economic structure but also in its politics and diplomacy. In January 1980 Portugal suspended diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over that country's invasion of Afghanistan. In August of the same year it expelled four Soviet diplomats, including the Minister Vice-Consul, on charges of interfering in Portugal's internal affairs.<sup>76</sup> President Carter visited in 1980 to express American appreciation for then-Prime Minister Sá Carneiro's pro-Western Democratic Alliance (AD) policies. More recently, under Soares, Portugal joined other West European countries (except France and Ireland) in banning Soviet Aeroflot flights after the downing of KAL flight 007. In contrast to Spain, where isolationism is on the rise and exclusion from EEC could lead it to quit NATO, Portuguese Prime Minister Soares has been criticized by other European countries for being too pro-American. In response, he criticizes Europeans for seeking distance from the US and for equating it with the Soviet Union.

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73. "Soares Preempts Joint Iberian Approach," *London Times*, 14 November 1983, p. 5.

74. "Jaime Gama e a CEE," *Expresso*, 15 October 1983, p. 4.

75. "Surprise EEC Deal Clears Way for Iberian Entry," *London Times*, 19 October 1983, p. 6.

76. "Portugal Orders Expulsion of Four Soviet Diplomats," *London Times*, 21 August 1980, p. 1.

"The difference," he says, "is that one superpower wants hegemony, not the other."<sup>77</sup>

Portugal does not want to remain a passive holder of sovereignty over areas strategically crucial to NATO: it wants an active role. Some have even spoken of a Portuguese RDF for use in northern Africa.<sup>78</sup> To that end it is seeking to modernize its forces which were exhausted by the colonial wars, weakened by political upheaval, and technologically outdated by attrition. The Allies have already helped Portugal to equip its NATO brigade, and have shown a willingness to assist in re-equipping remaining forces. Britain is constructing three frigates for the Portuguese Navy which are to be partly financed by West Germany.

Portugal is attempting to give a new, European orientation to its military, a reflection of the general European orientation of the country since 1974. Its military plans for the 1990's include: (1) formation of a brigade similar to the NATO one within each branch of the armed forces; (2) organization of a special forces brigade to specialize in guerilla warfare, keeping in mind the lessons of Africa; (3) raising the level of combat and service support; and (4) raising the level of electronic warfare ability, army aviation, and anti-aircraft artillery.<sup>79</sup> Portugal's optimum military contribution to NATO will also be a function of its geography. Hence, it must also update its navy and air force for anti-submarine warfare and reconnaissance.

The United States has recently given increased recognition to Portugal's geographic importance. In 1980 the two countries began negotiations on using Lisbon as a base for a US aircraft carrier group, and both Lisbon and Sines have complete facilities to serve as home ports for the US Navy.<sup>80</sup> Negotiations are underway on stationing KC 135 refueling aircraft at Beja airbase, on building a satellite tracking station, and on further access to mainland bases.<sup>81</sup> The *quid pro quo* is American assistance for upgrading Portugal's armed forces. In addition, the US is planning the expansion of the Lajes facilities to include a submarine listening post. This could be "the only effective mid-ocean base from which to conduct anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic in the event of war."<sup>82</sup> The US

77. "Malaise in Portugal," *New York Times*, 22 November 1983, p. 31.

78. *The Security of the Atlantic, Iberian, and North African Regions*, Conference Report, Held at the Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon, Portugal. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983.

79. A. Garcia dos Santos, General, "A New Army for Portugal," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Special Issue no. 1, vol. 28, 1983, p. 74.

80. Dov S. Zakheim, "Of Allies and Access," *Washington Quarterly*, (Winter 1981): 92.

81. "U.S. Renews Accord on Azores Airbase," *New York Times*, 14 December 1983, p. 3.

82. Stewart Menaul, "The Geo-strategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula," *Conflict Studies*, 1981, p. 16.

also plans a new base on Madeira, closer to the African coast. Madeira is a logical alternative to the Canary Islands, on which Spain has indicated it would not allow any NATO base because of fragile internal politics.<sup>83</sup>

Spain's integration into NATO has given rise to increasing uneasiness in Portugal; its hitherto unique position in the Iberian Peninsula, and viewing Spain as a Johnny-come-lately on the NATO scene, Portugal fears reduced importance and influence in the Alliance. When details of Spanish pretentions to include Madeira in a unified Spanish NATO command emerged last year, "Portugal's foreign minister announced publicly that Lisbon would have 'no objections' if the Spanish Canaries were to be brought under CINCIBERLANT[!]"<sup>84</sup> Similarly, at a meeting of Parliament's Defense Committee with General Staff officers, it was stressed that Portugal's army could not accept a unified command based in Madrid and that "the commander of Portugal's NATO brigade at Santa Margarida was not the kind of man who would assent to such a move."<sup>85</sup> Likewise, when the Spanish Prime Minister flew to Bonn in April 1982 to discuss Spanish entry into NATO, President Eanes followed shortly thereafter to make certain that NATO would fulfill its promises of modernizing Portuguese military forces.

In fact, Portugal has little to fear. Its loyalty to the United States and NATO has always been secure while Spain's has been questionable. It is reasonable to assume that Alliance decision-makers recognize this, for Portugal was a founding member of NATO and the only country allowing American use of bases on its territory during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Loyalty to NATO is further assured by the voting power of the more than 15 percent of Portugal's citizens living abroad in NATO countries.<sup>86</sup>

The popular feelings and political pressures in isolationist Spain are different. As soon as Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra said in July of 1983 that pro-NATO people in the government should speak out, "four ministers spoke in favor of withdrawing, and none in favor of

83. "Lisbon Fears Reduced Importance," *London Times*, 31 July 1982, p. 7.

84. Richard Wigg, "Neighbors with their Backs to Each Other," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Special Issue no. 1, vol. 28, 1983. p.45.

85. "Lisbon Fears Reduced Importance," *London Times*.

86. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of all Portuguese citizens reside outside of Portugal. About 15 percent are in NATO countries, including:

France .....	858,000
West Germany .....	118,000
Canada .....	130,000
United States .....	180,000
Great Britain .....	25,000

*Portugal: Bulletin Anual*, Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Secretaria de Estado da Imigração, 1975. This source is well known for its conservative figures.



remaining. . . .<sup>87</sup> The Spanish argue that (1) NATO would not guarantee Spanish territorial integrity, which they feel includes Gibraltar, and Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa; (2) NATO would not cover Spain's security and defense needs, because Morocco is Spain's only threat; (3) NATO would increase nuclear risks to Spain; and (4) Spain would upset present force levels and provoke a troop increase in Warsaw Pact forces. Spaniards argue that their commitment to NATO should be proportionate to the threat from the Warsaw Pact. Thus, West Germany should be committed to NATO because it borders Warsaw Pact countries. But, says Felipe Gonzalez, "we will never reach that level of coincidence and for that reason our integration can be less."<sup>88</sup> Most Spaniards, especially the Socialists, want to take Spain out of NATO and are looking for a way to do it without hurting Spanish national defense interests.<sup>89</sup> Although Spain remains in NATO, it is clear that it is not fully committed to it.

This posture contrasts with Portugal's, in which, as stated by President Eanes, "Western solidarity assumes an increasingly higher importance. From our side, it will not be questioned. Portugal will fulfill all her engagements towards her allies."<sup>90</sup> In addition, Portugal's greater Atlantic interests in Africa, Brazil and the Azores and Madeira are likely to remain unique in NATO. The islands are especially important, as they offer control of the central Atlantic and, with the mainland, form a strategic triangle through which "nearly two-thirds of the oil and other important tonnage from the Persian Gulf, Africa, the Pacific, and South America must pass *en route* to Europe."<sup>91</sup>

The oil route along the East coast of Mozambique and West coast of Angola, and through a strait at Cape Verde and Guiné-Bissau, poses a particular strategic dilemma. While the most critical area is the Persian Gulf itself, these three former Portuguese colonies are now ruled by pro-Soviet regimes: Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau are ruled by Marxists with many debts to the Soviet Union; Angola governs itself with strong

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87. António Sanchez-Gijón, "Squaring the Circle of Spanish Defense," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Special Issue no. 1, vol. 28, 1983, p. 41.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

89. Wigg, "Neighbors with their Backs to Each Other," p. 48.

90. "Assurance in Lisbon on NATO support," *London Times*, 26 June 1980, p. 8. Ambassador Richard Bloomfield told me in an interview that as long as the Portuguese remain Portuguese and the Spanish remain Spanish, Portugal will remain more important to the Alliance. He referred to the difference in temperament; that Portugal is more the team player, while Spain makes even routine base visits and checks by diplomatic and military personnel difficult — supposedly out of a wish to demonstrate authority.

91. Louis A. Williams, Rear Admiral, "The Atlantic Connection — Iberlant," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Special Issue no. 1, vol. 28, 1983, p. 31. See also, Menaul, "The Geo-strategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula," pp. 16-20.

Cuban influence. The Soviets now have temporary bases in Angola which could become permanent. NATO is especially worried about Soviet positions in these new African countries and their effect on shipping in the event of conflict. There are plans to use the Island Command of Madeira, where airfields are capable of supporting operations south of the Tropic of Cancer, should the Soviets test the Alliance along this route. Military patrol craft operating from these former Portuguese colonies "could effectively survey the eastern South Atlantic, the Western Indian Ocean, and the seas south of the Cape."<sup>92</sup>

Despite Portugal's limited military capacity, it can use its links with its former colonies to defuse the pro-Soviet stance and bring them to a pro-Western, or at least neutral, stance. In addition, an arrangement with the US and the EEC countries to funnel economic and military assistance to these countries could prove advantageous for all sides: the Alliance would gain greater security and access to the markets of those countries, while Portugal's former colonies would gain development opportunities, while reducing dependence upon the Soviet Union. Portugal's strategy in the 1980's is to help develop these countries so that it can cultivate advantageous markets for its products, lure them away from Soviet and Cuban influence, and help make the South Atlantic safe for shipping. Additionally, it seeks to create a union of Portuguese-speaking countries which could include Brazil as leader.

Despite its lack of military strength, Portugal has three advantages in extending influence to its former colonies: 1) Portugal has cultural, historic, and linguistic roots in the former colonies; 2) chilly relations between the U.S. and Marxist Mozambique and Angola make meaningful diplomatic dialogue between those countries impossible, leaving Portugal in the position of possible mediator; and 3) since tens of thousands of Portuguese worked in the former colonies during the colonial period, Portugal already has personnel familiar with the social context of those countries.

Though these countries underwent an initial rejection of things Portuguese immediately after independence, Howard Wiarda writes that this is normal and that ex-colonies experience three stages of feelings toward the metropole. First is hatred and rejection of things associated with the colonial period. Second is nostalgia and rejection of the past, with a search for colonial roots. Third is a realistic basis for new relationships with institutional arrangements which combine the best of the colonial past with viable aspects of post-independence conditions.<sup>93</sup> Portugal

92. Abshire, "Strategic Implications," p. 435.

93. Howard J. Wiarda, "Iberia and Latin-America: Reforging the Historic Link?," *International Journal*, 37 (1), (Winter 1981-1982): 135.

hopes to speed the transition from the second to the third stage in the 1980s.

In Mozambique, for example, two hundred thousand Portuguese had left by mid-1975, including the most educated and skilled. Only forty doctors remained in a country of nine million people. "Production slumped and food shortages spread as transportation collapsed because of a shortage of spare parts and mechanics."<sup>94</sup> From 1975 to 1980 relations were cool because of Portuguese claims of assets left behind by Portuguese citizens, companies, and banks. But with President Eanes' visit to Mozambique, Portugal dropped these claims and companies began to sign new contracts, especially for construction projects in the former colony. Now Portugal is helping the flow to Maputo of "managerial expertise, equipment, technical instructors, and marketing skills to assist in the restructuring" of run-down textile and other industries.<sup>95</sup> Following Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão's visit to Africa in June of 1982, Maputo held an international trade fair that revealed the correlation between good relations and commerce. Mozambique honored the Portuguese pavilion as the best national exhibition and, more important, placed forty million dollars worth of orders.<sup>96</sup>

Although Marxist, Mozambique is far from anti-capitalist. This attitude was exemplified by President Samora Machel during his 1983 visit to Lisbon where, at a dinner, he turned to a Portuguese businessman, placed a hand on his shoulder, and asked "and you, how much do you want to invest in Mozambique?"<sup>97</sup> That visit resulted in a treaty of friendship and cooperation and three subsequent protocols. The first protocol called for increased trade which especially benefits Portugal. The second protocol embodies an agreement whereby Portugal is to establish a technical school specializing in metallurgy in Mozambique for 500 students. The third protocol opened negotiations on an eighty-five million dollar credit to Mozambique.<sup>98</sup> Reasoning that, "It was not the Portuguese but fascism and colonialism that were defeated,"<sup>99</sup> Mozambique seems eager for Portugal's expertise in developing its untapped agricultural and mineral wealth.

More significantly for the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal's new relation-

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94. "Mozambique Finds a New Friend in Portugal," *New York Times*, 27 December 1981, p. 19.  
95. Helen Kitchen, *U.S. Interests in Africa*, published in *The Washington Papers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), no. 98, vol. XI, p. 29.  
96. Shirley Washington, "Portugal's New Initiatives," *Africa Report*, November/December 1982, p. 12.  
97. "Visita de Machel: Amigos, Amigos, Negócios à Parte," *Expresso*, 15 October 1983, p. 23.  
98. "Cooperação com Moçambique: Assinados 3 Protocolos," *Expresso*, 15 October 1983.  
99. Interview with Mozambican information Minister José Cobaco, in *Africa Report*, September/October 1982, p. 53.

ship with Mozambique includes a military role. Through an agreement negotiated in Lisbon in 1982, Portugal has become Mozambique's second largest arms supplier after the Soviet Union. The two countries signed a formal defense treaty in 1983 that provides for counterinsurgency training for Mozambique officers in Portugal and for sending Portuguese military instructors to Mozambique.<sup>100</sup> Maputo's army, having previously known only guerilla tactics, is now a conventional defensive force. This is why it can logically ask Portugal, once militarily successful in the same position, for counterinsurgency training. Maputo hopes to reduce dependence on its Soviet allies and to help repel the threat from South African-backed rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Mozambique's new relations with Portugal have caused concern in Moscow: in June, 1982, the Soviets dispatched General Alexi Yepishev to Maputo to express Soviet indignation at this developing military relationship between Mozambique and Portugal.<sup>101</sup>

In Angola, two developments have made a new Portuguese role increasingly attractive. First, Cuba's new opportunities to use its influence in Central America will mean a reduction of its efforts in Angola. Second, Angola has shown mixed emotions about the millions of petrodollars which it pays yearly for Cuban troops and technicians.<sup>102</sup> On the one hand, Angola knows it cannot long depend on Cuba, whose interests rest traditionally in Latin America and the Caribbean, and whose mission may change depending upon attitudes in Moscow. On the other hand, Angola knows it can depend on Portugal, which traditionally has paid great attention to Africa and especially to Angola, which since Brazil's independence has served as the "India" of the Portuguese empire.

Rapprochement with Angola was marked by visits to Luanda by Portugal's Foreign Minister André Gonçalves Pereira in March, and President Eanes in April of 1982. Portugal is already Angola's second largest supplier of non-military goods, and imports increased by 55 percent in 1981.<sup>103</sup> Portugal's oil company, Petrogal, recently took a 10 percent share in a consortium to drill for oil in Angola. Oil constitutes 25 percent of Portuguese imports, and the purchase of Angolan oil would also diversify oil sources for Portugal, which was particularly hard-hit by the Arab embargo in 1973. Additionally, a consortium of Portuguese builders and engineers agreed in 1982 to help the Soviet Technoexport Company to build the Kampada Dam on the Quanza River. Four Por-

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100. Kitchen, *U.S. Interests in Africa*, p. 29.

101. Norman MacQueen, "Mozambique's Widening Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, January 1984, p. 23.

102. Kitchen, *U.S. Interests in Africa*, p. 29.

103. "African Update," *Africa Report*, May-June, 1982.

tuguese companies will construct the dam, open access roads, and perform geological work, while the Soviets will provide the equipment for it.<sup>104</sup> This Portuguese-Soviet joint venture, because it occurred during a conservative Lisbon government signals to the U.S. and EEC that if the ex-colonies cannot get economic assistance from Portugal's Western allies, Portugal is willing to work jointly with the Soviets to develop these countries. This cooperation illustrates the mutual economic and political interdependence of Portugal and its ex-colonies.

Portugal's new role in Mozambique and Angola has also predisposed nations like Zimbabwe and Zaire toward cooperation with Lisbon. The warmth of Zimbabwe's welcome to the Portuguese Prime Minister in 1982 "left no doubt that the new order in Lisbon has erased Portugal's dark legacy" with those countries.<sup>105</sup> But closer relations with Angola and Mozambique will complicate Portugal's relations with South Africa: while Portugal has always opposed South African racial policies, it simultaneously enjoys a large trade relationship with South Africa. In addition, as many as 800,000 Portuguese citizens moved to South Africa after decolonization, and are now legally permanent residents.<sup>106</sup> Perhaps only if the frictions between South Africa and Angola and Mozambique subside will Portugal be able to fulfill its potential in Africa.

In this context, the Namibia problem also poses a problem for Portugal; Lisbon has sponsored international conferences on Namibian independence and apartheid. These and other meetings have raised speculation that "Portuguese troops, technicians, and professionals might be available to supplant some of the Cubans whose departure from Angola" has become an American and South African condition for settlement of the Namibia problem.<sup>107</sup> On a visit to Angola in 1982, President Eanes hinted that Portugal might replace Cuban troops there.<sup>108</sup> Portugal will therefore play an increasingly important role in regard to wider aspects of African problems.

These enlightened policies have gained Portugal prestige in the Third World. On leaving office in 1983 Prime Minister Pinto Balsemão expressed satisfaction that Portugal had become a country to be consulted on African issues.<sup>109</sup> In fact, Lisbon seems to have become "a Diplomatic Port of Call on Africa[n] Issues," as headlined in a recent *New York Times*

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104. Ibid.

105. "Welcome for Balsemão in Zimbabwe," *London Times*, 2 July 1982, p. 6. See also, *Washington*, p. 10.

106. Washington, "Portugal's New Initiatives," pp. 10-13.

107. Kitchen, *U.S. Interests in Africa*, p. 29.

108. Washington, "Portugal's New Initiatives," p. 13.

109. "Lisbon Looks Abroad for Prosperity," *London Times*, 6 June 1983, p. 7.

article. The four months from October 1983 to January 1984 brought five foreign leaders to Lisbon, including Mozambiquan President Samora Machel, Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, South African Minister Roelof Botha, American Secretary of State George Shultz, and Zairan President Mobutu Sese Seko.<sup>110</sup> "All of this comes under the rubric of serving as a bridge — or as a 'marriage counsel,' as one Portuguese diplomat put it — between the two strategically situated Marxist countries and the West, especially the United States."<sup>111</sup> This is a fitting role for Portugal, a staunch member of the Western World with a long history of living with African and other Third World peoples.

The problem for Portugal is that, unlike France, for example, it does not possess the large-scale resources which some aid and development operations in these countries may require. The U.S., however, has begun to realize that Portugal's influence with its former colonies can work to the military and economic advantage of the West; therefore the United States and the EEC should grant Portugal financial support for some of these initiatives. Indeed, such coordination is presently in its trial stages in strategically important Guiné-Bissau, where Portugal sends technicians and other personnel to work on development projects while the U.S. helps with financial support.<sup>112</sup> Guiné-Bissau is an example of what the Western Alliance should do in coordination with Portugal, to help develop these countries, lure them away from strong Soviet influence, and in the process make the central and south Atlantic as well as the western Indian Ocean safer for shipping.

This new role is a product of the historical clash between the far-rightist views of the Salazar-Caetano government and the far-leftist views of the MFA from 1974 to 1976, refined by the return of moderate forces from 1976 to 1977. Whether Portugal's goals in influencing these countries are to benefit the Atlantic Alliance or to promote its own economic interests by forming a Portuguese-speaking union, Portugal now recognizes the sovereignty of its former colonies. In this sense, Portugal has ceased its 600-year quest for global empire (or pluricontinental nation), and accepted its position as a European nation-state with a wider Atlantic role.

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110. "Lisbon a Diplomatic Port of Call on Africa Issues," *New York Times*, 25 January 1984, p. 3.

111. *Ibid.*

112. Interview with Ambassador Richard Bloomfield, April 1984.