The People's Friend:
The Political Ambitions of the Roman *Gentes* and the Valerii in the Early Republic

A thesis

submitted by

Lee Adam Marmor

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Classical Archaeology

Tufts University

May 2012

ADVISER: R. Bruce Hitchner

Abstract

The Roman historians Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus describe the early decades of the Roman Republic as one dominated by conflict between powerful aristocratic *gentes*. The clans were originally backed by armed bands who attempted to seize the city by violence but as the government stabilized, the clan leaders looked for a new base of support. The Valerii were a major family in the histories of early Rome. Narrative accounts portray them as populist heroes, but a close examination of the texts reveals that the actions of the Valerii are best described as being those of a politically ambitious clan. From their early attempt at sole rule in Rome to their actions designed to build a political base among the People, the Valerii provide an ideal family to study the role of the clans in the early Roman Republic.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. R. Bruce Hitchner for his guidance and advice during the thesis writing process. He encouraged me to look at the my sources in new ways and his expertise has proved invaluable. I would also like to thank Dr. Marie-Claire Beaulieu for her support in this thesis as well as my other academic activities this year. I am indebted to Dr. David Proctor who, despite moving to a new building, has been there for me every step of the way.

Finally, I could not have written this thesis without the encouragement and camaraderie of my friends who are the reason I come to Tufts everyday.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction……2
A. Livy and Dionysius……....2
B. Annalistic Sources……...5
C. Modern Historiography……...10
D. Methodology……18
E. The *Gens*……20
F. The *Gens Valeria*……...28

II. Clan Conflict and Aristocratic Competition……32
A. The Arrival of the Valerii……..33
B. The Sabines and the Claudii……..36
C. *Provocatio*……38
D. Marcus Horatius……42
E. Lake Regillus……43
F. The Decemvirate……49
G. Conclusions……...57

III. Warlords and Sole Power in Rome……..59
A. The Expulsion of the Kings……..60
B. Publius Valerius Publicola……67
C. Lars Porsenna……73
D. Coriolanus……75
E. Spurius Cassius……..77
F. Appius Herdonius……..80
G. Conclusions……...82

IV. Building a Base of Support……...84
A. Publicola: The People's Friend……86
B. Manius Valerius……...88
C. Lucius Valerius……94
D. Valerius and Horatius……...96
E. Conclusions……...101

V. Conclusion……...……...102

Bibliography……..……107

The People's Friend:
The Political Ambitions of the Roman *Gentes* and the Valerii in the Early Republic

I. Introduction

The histories of Early Rome are filled with dramatic episodes describing the beginnings of the Roman Republic and the establishment of a system of government that would last for nearly five centuries. Modern historians have few resources available to study this period of Rome's past except for scattered references and ancient historical works. The most prominent of these are the Roman histories written by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the late first century BCE.[1] One of the most prominent features of these two historians is their focus on individual *gentes* or clans that dominate the early history of the Republic, a subject I will return to later. One *gens* in particular, the Valerii, attains major power from the establishment of the Republic and continues to play a major role in many of the most important historical episodes. The Valerii provide a way to examine the role of the *gens* in the Early Republic. To look more closely at the nature of the *gens* and the Valerii, one must deal with questions relating to the reliability of the sources in transmitting information that occurred five centuries before their writing. It is thus important to begin by analyzing both authors in terms of their historical validity before examining their content.

A. Livy and Dionysius

Livy was a Roman historian who lived about 59 to 17 CE. Beginning in around 29, he wrote *Ab Urbe Condita* in 142 books describing the history of Rome from its foundation to Livy's own time. Among the 35 surviving books are

[1] All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted. Other sources will be discussed below.

the first 10 which provide the most complete history of the early Republic. Livy's work is based on the annalistic tradition and records events on a year-by-year basis. Unlike earlier historians, Livy was not a senator and had no personal experience in politics or war.[2] Rather, he was a provincial from Cisalpine Gaul who came to Rome under the patronage of Augustus.

In constructing his history, Livy focuses on the personalities involved and is ignorant of general trends in Roman historiography. At the same time, however, Livy attempts to present moral exempla from the Roman past and such moral attributes are emphasized at the loss of individualized portraits of historical figures. Even if Livy is not creating biographical sketches, the personalities anchor the narrative and many episodes, according to Walsh, are structured around the deeds of a few great men.[3] Miles does note that while there is a focus on personalities, Livy is also aware of the activities of clans and other political groups as well.[4] This moral focus of Livy's work has been used to attack its historicity, especially of the first pentad.[5] This problem will be addressed shortly but it is important to see how Livy's focus compares with that of the other main source for the early Republic, Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Dionysius was a Greek from the Greco-Carian city of Halicarnassus in Asia Minor who lived about 60 to 7 CE. He came to Rome after the victory of Augustus over Antony and wrote 20 books of the *Roman Antiquities* which spanned the beginnings of Rome to the First Punic War. The first nine books

---

[2] Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*, 48.
[3] Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 212.
[4] Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*, 115, note 2.
[5] Ibid., 76, 77.

survive completely (with fragments from the others) and provide a balance to Livy for the early history of Rome. While the two authors were contemporaries, there is no evidence that they knew each other and neither references the other's work.[6] Dionysius and Livy mostly tell the same story but Dionysius has a different focus. He presents a "global history" of Roman society and often describes more mundane topics than just those of interest to the political class.[7] Dionysius also lacks the personal connection to Roman history that Livy has and is often less wary about presenting unflattering stories.[8] He, unlike Livy, writes for a Greek audience that required more background information since such an audience would not have been expected to know as much of the Roman historical tradition as the Romans of Livy's audience would.[9] At the same time, Dionysius does try to show the greatness of Rome but he does so by reinforcing the Greek influence on the early city.[10] To accomplish this, Dionysius must start with the "ethnogenesis" of the Roman people and devotes far more space to the regal period than Livy.

Both authors do write in a similar annalistic format and utilize long speeches to describe the thoughts and feelings of major historical figures. Both Greek and Roman historians accepted speeches as a necessary part of history though the lack of surviving evidence often necessitated the creation of speeches by the authors themselves.[11] To the modern historian, these speeches present a

---

[6] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 95.
[7] Ibid., 79.
[8] Ibid., 152.
[9] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 67.
[10] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 87.
[11] Ibid., 69, 72.

problem in establishing historicity of given events. The speech of Claudius recorded contemporaneously on the Lyon Tablet and later by Tacitus does provide evidence that some of speeches presented by the historians may be based off of real records but the gap between the speeches of the early Republic and the writing of Livy and Dionysius is substantial. This issue shall be dealt with shortly but it is worth remembering that this "rhetorical elaboration" was not usually one with the intent to deceive and was not meant by the authors to be taken as a substitute for truth.[12]

B. Annalistic Sources

To report on this early period of Roman history, however, the question of sources must be investigated. Neither Livy nor Dionysius frequently cites their sources. Both have scattered references to other writers and will sometimes even present multiple versions of the same event by different authors and then offer their own opinion. This is not the norm and Livy especially usually only follows a single source at a time with seemingly no explanation for his choice.[13] Most historians consulted the work of earlier historians and pulled information from those sources. Livy, for example, did not personally consult the *Annales Maximi*, the records of the pontiffs recording omens and momentous events.[14] Such records primarily had a religious focus and contained no historical narrative.[15] They are significant since, as Frier argues, the very actions they described were

[12] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 74.
[13] Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*, 1.
[14] Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 111.
[15] Frier, *Libri annales*, 92.

made "newsworthy" by their inclusion.[16] While Livy did not personally consult the *Annales Maximi*, his history clearly records such important omens at the start of many years indicating that at least his own sources did.

Among the most famous of Livy's sources were earlier historians, known as annalists, who included Fabius Pictor[17], Licinius Macer, and Valerius Antias. Livy is the last in this line of annalists and it is likely that he followed their lead in writing style. Dionysius also relied on these authors though he is often more critical of them than Livy.[18] The annalists were not the only sources of information on Rome's past. Livy is believed to have referenced the poetry of Ennius, a Latin poet of the early second century whose poem, the *Annales*, told the history of Rome from the fall of Troy to his own day.[19] Dionysius also relied on antiquarian material and is known to have stayed very close to his sources.[20] Such antiquarian material included writings and commentaries on aspects of Roman religious and political institutions, legal issues, and other social customs.[21] Antiquarian sources were independent from the annalistic tradition and provided a separate source of data to the historian.[22]

Both authors as well as their predecessors had to deal with a lack of documentation from early Rome that posed a serious problem for their histories.[23] While inscriptions, like those of major treaties, could have survived, any texts or

---

[16] Frier, *Libri annales*, 95.
[17] The first Roman writer of Roman history.
[18] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 82.
[19] Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 136.
[20] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 97.
[21] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 18. Varro's *De Lingua Latina* is the most famous of these antiquarian sources.
[22] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 64.
[23] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 159.

laws written on perishable material would be unlikely to survive from early Rome.[24] Texts and inscriptions that did survive were often unreadable and lacked contextual information.[25] Forsythe points to the complex of the *Lapis Niger* which, while always visible, was not understood by later Romans and often connected to Romulus' tomb.[26] The long centuries between early Rome and the first written histories do make it unlikely that much documentation was able to survive and be understood by the first annalists.

There was an additional source of information that the annalists heavily relied upon but was also often of doubtful historicity: family records of aristocratic *gentes*. These provided a crucial source of information and traditions concerning the deeds of past family members. There is no evidence that Livy personally investigated such material but it is certain that the other annalists did so. Dionysius makes explicit reference to his personal investigations of such records of censorial families which were passed down from father to son.[27] It is likely that earlier annalists consulted similar records and, as many were aristocratic themselves, would have had their own families' traditions to rely upon. The existence of such family stories has been the subject of some debate as to their nature. Both the *Annales* of the pontiffs and the censorial records of Dionysius would only have had a bare outline of past events. Cato the Elder describes the existence of past banqueting songs that would have preserved many

[24] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 73.
[25] Ibid., 73.
[26] Ibid., 74.
[27] Dionysius, 1.74.5.

"legendary" stories.[28] Niebuhr developed a theory that these songs were the ultimate source of much of early Roman history especially the deeds of the kings.[29] While the mechanisms have been debated, it is now believed that the oral tradition was heavily involved in creating the Roman narrative of the distant past.[30]

The Roman funeral, as famously described by Polybius, provided a method of transmitting the stories of a family's ancestors to both a wide audience and to the family members themselves. Wax masks, known as *imagines*, of office-holding ancestors of a Roman family were used at funerals by actors for dramatic impersonations.[31] The actors, dressed in magisterial garb, would speak on the achievements of the ancestors as part of a funeral eulogy.[32] The *imagines*, as Flower argues, could be used to present the family's personal view of Roman history through the context of their own ancestors.[33] As the funeral was a public event, both the elites in attendance and the common people would have access to the family traditions on display. Such traditions would likely stretch back to the earliest days of the family which could mean the beginnings of the Republic. Importantly, the use of *imagines* allowed a family to remember its own history which was passed on to the young.[34] *Imagines* were kept in the atrium, exposed to public view, along with painted family trees and paintings of historical

[28] Badian, "Early Historians", 10.
[29] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 12.
[30] Ibid, 11 and Raaflaub, "Conflict of the Orders", 2.
[31] Flower, *Ancestor Masks*, 2.
[32] Ibid., 102, 130.
[33] Flower, *Ancestor Masks*, 126.
[34] Ibid., 14.

narratives.[35] All of this shows that maintaining knowledge of past events was critical for the elite families of Rome and that such knowledge and records would have been accessible to historians who sought them out. There is thus more information that would have been available to the ancient historians than has previously been thought.

In light of the range of sources available to both Livy and Dionysius, the modern historian must be concerned about the historicity of the source material. The authors themselves did not doubt the tradition despite skepticism over certain "fantastic" events since there was still a lot of historical material among the embellishments.[36] The earliest stories of regal Rome were certainly questioned by Livy and others but the historians saw value in them as well as the possibility of truth and so they were included in the histories even if some of the tradition was questionable.[37] Both authors could be critical of their sources with Livy often doubting Valerius Antias' narrative[38] and reports of casualty totals during the Second Punic War. Cicero notes that funeral eulogies could be exaggerated and false consulships and triumphs were added to the records.[39] If Cicero noticed these exaggerations, it is likely that Livy and the other annalists would have as well and could set them aside.

---

[35] Ibid., 211.
[36] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 96.
[37] Ibid., 94.
[38] Badian, "Early Historians", 21.
[39] Flower, *Ancestor Masks*, 148. She references Cicero, *Brutus*, 62.

C. Modern Historiography

It seems fairly certain that Livy, Dionysius, and their ancient readers believed in the general truth of their histories. Despite justifiable skepticism of historicity by modern historians, there is still value for the histories in figuring out what Romans believed about their own past and how they conceived of themselves.[40] This is an important part of the study into early Roman history and narrative techniques should be examined in this light.

Badian and Wiseman hold the view that much of the annalistic writings are late inventions with little to suggest any real historicity. Wiseman says that most ancient historians did not question the sources that they based their work on and did not share the modern "passion" for accuracy.[41] Judgments were based on plausibility rather than accuracy.[42] For example, the murder of Servius Tullius by his daughter and the rape of Lucretia are plausible events, even to a modern audience, describing the excesses and tragedies of a dynasty.[43] In Wiseman's view, however, this plausibility is the only reason for inclusion with no thought given to its actual historicity. Wiseman criticized the historiographical tradition in general, deriding Livy and Dionysius as "cut-and-paste historians."[44] He is also skeptical of many of the outside sources that the annalists relied upon. He dismisses many stories as legends and the charge of fabrication of family eulogies.[45] He goes so far as to reject the consular *Fasti* as chiefly antiquarian

[40] Cornell, "Literary Tradition," 63.
[41] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 41.
[42] Ibid., 50.
[43] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 217. See below for a more detailed discussion of the implications of this fact for Cornell.
[44] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 50.
[45] Ibid., 39.

research and not an accurate record of the holders of the consulship.[46] Wiseman points to both Livy and Cicero as evidence that the point of history was to show historical exempla and not necessarily an accurate account of the past.[47] To Wiseman, the chief failing of the historians was their inability to see that the past was fundamentally different from the present.[48] Society functioned similarly and political change occurred schematically.

Badian is especially critical of the nature of the writers themselves. After the *Annales Maximi* were published in 133, their contents became public knowledge and membership in the senatorial class was no longer a requirement for composing history. Badian argues that this allowed writers like Livy who had no experience in politics or war to compose history dealing with subjects they had little direct experience with.[49] Entertainment then became the chief focus of history as deeper meaning was lost in Badian's view.[50] He sees this mainly as a class issue by suggesting the later annalists as "lesser names" who were shut out of the political elite and thus denied their view of the world.[51]

Badian and Wiseman's comments on Valerius Antias, who Livy used extensively, are especially critical since Antias is regarded as a generally untrustworthy source. Badian notes even Livy's mistrust of Antias in regards to reporting casualty totals.[52] Wiseman argues that most references to the Valerii found in Livy and Dionysius are based off of Antias' work which was designed

---

[46] Ibid., 15.
[47] Ibid., 37.
[48] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 42.
[49] Badian, "Early Historians", 15.
[50] Ibid., 19.
[51] Ibid., 18.
[52] Ibid., 21.

specifically to glorify his own family.[53] Wiseman actually goes so far to say that Antias created his history, and that of the Valerii, out of nothing.[54] Ultimately, Wiseman believes that none of the ancient historians were above lying and that the only necessary criterion for inclusion was plausibility rather than veracity.[55]

Forsythe follows the skepticism of Badian and Wiseman and mostly attacks the sources used by Livy and Dionysius. He believes, like Wiseman, that Livy and Dionysius are "synthesized redactions" of earlier narratives but that the basis for those earlier narratives lacks historicity.[56] Following Wiseman, Forsythe contends that Livy was not an analytical historian and that he did not conduct any original research.[57] Probability was the only argument for inclusion though Livy did exhibit skill in creating his narrative. Speeches were invented for entertainment purposes and to move along the narrative.[58] Forsythe does acknowledge the existence of a real historical tradition that Livy had access to and suggests that aristocratic banquets may have allowed for the formation of such a tradition.[59] Niebuhr had argued for banquet lays as a source of early Roman history but Forsythe rejects them as reflecting a tradition that is fundamentally true. The traditional basis of Livy and Dionysius' work is acknowledged but Forsythe believes it lacked historical veracity.[60]

Such views as those presented above do not take into account the purpose of Livy and Dionysius' writing. Gary Miles' study of Livy shows that his

[53] Wiseman, *Roman Drama*, 78.
[54] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 23.
[55] Wiseman, "Credibility of Roman Annalists," 21.
[56] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 59.
[57] Ibid., 66.
[58] Ibid., 63.
[59] Ibid., 75.
[60] Ibid., 3.

methods as a historian indicate an awareness of the limitation of his own sources.[61] Livy followed accepted standards of historical inquiry for contemporary events when he, like Dionysius, consulted accepted standard sources and learned men for details.[62] Since there were no contemporary accounts for the earliest periods of Roman history, Livy was wholly reliant upon the traditional view of the past. As such, Livy could not evaluate the tradition for historical accuracy since there was no way he could objectively judge due to the limitations of the sources.[63] Miles argues that while Livy is faulted for being vague on drawing conclusions from the tradition, he is actually showing his awareness of the problems of his sources.[64] The goal for Livy then was to make the tradition itself the object of the historian rather than historical truth.[65]

Miles' defense of Livy's methodology and purpose, while helpful for assessing his abilities as a historian, does not suggest that Livy, and by extension Dionysius, were recording historical details of the past. In light of the other views of Roman historiography explained above, one would have to discount almost entirely the written sources as having any claim to authority on the early past. As such, only sparse archaeological evidence would be available for study. The highly critical views of Badian, Wiseman, and Forsythe have been challenged by many scholars, most notably by Tim Cornell.

---

[61] Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*, 6.
[62] Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*, 9 and 12.
[63] Ibid., 60.
[64] Ibid., 62.
[65] Ibid., 6.

Cornell argues that Livy, Dionysius, and the other annalists "were not free to invent anything they pleased."[66] He then shows examples that while rhetorical embellishments were meant to add color, "the convention was acceptable only so long as the rhetorical elaboration did not do violence to the traditional facts."[67] He also comments on the consistent nature of the narrative of Roman history that has come down from the literary sources positing that if the authors had all lied, there would have been far more inconsistencies.[68] Inconsistencies in themselves would also have elicited comments from other Roman writers. The general outline of Roman history was public and known by the educated class. Cassius Dio even reports that gross attempts to distort the past could often be checked against public records.[69] An accurate record of the past was especially important to the ruling class who gained prestige based on the deeds of their ancestors.[70] To create fictitious events on a large scale (as opposed to smaller fabrications in eulogies) would require the complicity of every member of the elite since each would wish to glorify their own family. It is unlikely that such massive alteration of the past occurred. Archaeological evidence has also confirmed certain aspects of the Roman past such as the Sant'Omobono temple in Rome providing evidence for the Servian building program.[71] Cornell focuses his argument on the internally consistent nature of the literary sources, their support from archaeological evidence, as well as their plausibility.[72]

---

[66] Cornell, "Literary Tradition," 55.
[67] Cornell, "Literary Tradition," 54.
[68] Ibid., 57.
[69] Cornell, "Historical Tradition," 80.
[70] Ibid., 83.
[71] Cornell, "Literary Tradition," 67.
[72] Ibid., 65.

The issue of plausibility was attacked by Wiseman but Cornell offers a defense of it. Rather than a general dismissal of everything in the literary tradition, Cornell says that "the issue can only be tackled by examining each individual story on its own merits."[73] His general arguments already point towards acceptance of the tradition within the realm of plausibility. In this manner, Cornell concludes that those wishing to deny the historicity of a plausible story are the ones who have the burden of proof as something without proof is not necessarily untrue.[74] In this vein he disagrees with the criticism of earlier annalists like Valerius Antias. Since there are only a handful of surviving fragments of these earlier historians, Cornell believes that there is not enough evidence to make a judgment on their historicity.[75] Likewise, he also dismisses concerns about the practice of rhetorical elaboration. Speeches were an integral part of ancient historiography but they were primarily used to expand the narrative, not to introduce new facts.[76]

The crux of Cornell's argument is that the historical core was relatively sound and rhetorical elaboration was only a later development.[77] Even more pessimistic scholars have admitted the validity of the broad outline of history in Livy and Dionysius and only question the details of individual deeds and personalities.[78] This view, however, has been disputed by Mitchell and Holloway among others. Mitchell believes that most of the historical outline is a later

[73] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 11.
[74] Ibid., 11.
[75] Cornell, "Historical Tradition," 76.
[76] Ibid., 72.
[77] Ibid., 85.
[78] Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 276, 279.

invention of Livy created to provide a narrative for his telling of the Struggle of the Orders.[79] Such a narrative was based upon the political conflicts of the *optimates* and *populares* in the late Republic.[80] Mitchell does admit the existence of some genuine historical data and does support Cornell's method of finding "structural facts" in the narrative.[81] He describes the biggest problem, though, of relying on Livy as nearly the only source for early Rome which means it is harder to separate out the narrative from the underlying historical core.[82]

Holloway takes a more extreme approach than Mitchell through his attack on the Consular *Fasti*. He doubts any reliable record of magistrates before the Licinio-Sextian Rogations of 367 as well as the utility of the *Annales Maximi* for historical information.[83] The public records of the pontiffs, he argues, were actually a product of the annalists themselves and not a genuine record of the past.[84] Holloway proposes that actual source for the list of magistrates preserved in the *Fasti* was private family records.[85] Genealogical records provided the relative order of magistrates which were then correlated with military enterprises.[86] In Holloway's view, The *Fasti* were just a list reconstructed from family archives.

Raaflaub takes an approach somewhat akin to Forsythe in his criticism of Livy's use of contemporary events as a model for the past.[87] He faults Livy for

---

[79] Mitchell, *Patricians and Plebeians*, 227.
[80] Mitchell, *Patricians and Plebeians*, xi and Ungern-Sternberg,"Annalistic Tradition", 91.
[81] Mitchell, *Patricians and Plebeians*, x.
[82] Ibid., 228.
[83] Holloway, "Tribuni Militum", 108-109.
[84] Ibid., 114.
[85] Ibid., 116.
[86] Ibid., 119.
[87] Raaflaub, "Conflict of the Orders", 8.

accepting that the Republic emerged fully-formed in 509 and saw political change schematically rather like the patrician-plebeian dichotomy criticized by Mitchell.[88] Similar to Mitchell, however, is his belief that Livy can be useful if later retrojections are removed.[89] Raaflaub describes the use of the Comprehensive Method of historical analysis whereby all ancient sources are examined for potential value.[90] This includes the historical texts as well as antiquarian research which the historians often ignored.[91] Importantly, Raaflaub includes family histories in this category which, as seen above, Holloway has dismissed as a viable historical source. Raaflaub thus rejects hypercriticism of sources while maintaining skepticism over their value.[92]

Raaflaub ultimately faults Cornell for seeing the annalistic histories as legitimate historical accounts rather than as a literary genre as Raaflaub does.[93] Both Raaflaub and Ungern-Sternberg, however, acknowledge that there is value in the histories as long as they are studied from this approach.[94] Cornell defends his argument by saying that "the fact remains that our sources ultimately do depend on a hard core of authentic data, much of which is readily identifiable."[95] Raaflaub actually supports this argument while still maintaining a distinction between literary and historical evidence.[96] But by keeping such a difference between the historical core and the narrative superstructure in mind, as Cornell

[88] Raaflaub, "Conflict of the Orders", 21.
[89] Ibid., 23.
[90] Ibid., 9.
[91] Ibid., 24.
[92] Ibid., 10 and 22.
[93] Ibid., 48.
[94] Ungern-Sternberg,"Annalistic Tradition", 89.
[95] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 18.
[96] Raaflaub, "Conflict of the Orders", 50.

argues, it does become possible to study the texts for their historical value without becoming bogged down by the details of the narrative.

D. Methodology

In this thesis, I follow Cornell's views regarding the study of Livy and Dionysius. I do so because, as Cornell himself points out, without the texts, one is left with very little evidence concerning the earliest days of Rome. At the same time, his arguments in support of plausibility are logical since there is no reason to deny a plausible event without any justification for doing so. Such stories may not be completely historically accurate, but they likely have a historical core which I will assume is employable for the study of the early Republic.

It is also important to remember that ancient historians were working with a lot more evidence than they are often given credit for such as oral traditions and various documents and inscriptions that had been preserved. Raaflaub supports this Comprehensive approach to the sources as well.[97] Even family traditions, which Holloway seems to consider lacking in historical veracity, can provide valuable information which, especially if preserved in private records, would be unlikely to be purely falsified. Many of the personalities in the narratives were derived from these family records and as such, while subject to later embellishment, will be assumed to present at least a memory of real events which are embedded in the story.

While there was a significant time gap between the late Republican annalists and the early Republic, the Roman writers were much closer to those

[97] Raaflaub, "Conflict of the Orders", 9.

events than modern historians are and it is not unlikely that many documents and oral traditions from that time survived in some condition as well as accurate contemporary family records. For example, in the mid-2nd century, Polybius records a treaty with Carthage dating to 509 which is written in such archaic Latin that Polybius has trouble reading it.[98] While the changes in the Latin language may have led to problems in interpretation, it is likely that the treaty Polybius cites was not the only surviving archaic document in Rome.[99]

One, however, must account for a great deal of narrative exposition, especially in the speeches. It is usually, though, as Cornell says, "readily identifiable" where historical events have been overshadowed by narrative. Such distinctions can be observed in stereotyping of various families or when there are echoes of late second century domestic strife. Such retrojections, while not necessarily accurate for this early period, still have value, however, and reveal the terms by which the Romans conceived of their own past. The basic outline of the early Republic, to follow Cornell, is generally correct and the trends discussed in this thesis can be established by this basic outline. By keeping the narrative and historical core separate, it is possible to examine both what actually occurred in the early Republic and how the Romans conceived of this important time period from their past.

By focusing on the historical core, the *gens Valeria* can be studied not as a purely literary construct created by Valerius Antias and other annalists, but as a real aristocratic clan. It is important to remember that the annalists did engage in

[98] Polybius, 3.22.3.
[99] Indeed, Dionysius cites the Cassian treaty after the Battle of Lake Regillus.

rhetorical elaboration and that substantial coloring occurred in both Livy and Dionysius which often obscured the actions of the Valerii by working them into a greater narrative arc. The narrative can often provide a useful point of departure for this analysis and will be considered as appropriate. The tension between the rhetorical framework and the historical actions of the Valerii is the main focus of this thesis. Before examining the actions of the Valerii in particular, however, it is first necessary to detail the nature of the Roman *gens*.

E. The *Gens*

The *gens* is a kinship group often translated into English as "clan." All members of a *gens* claimed descent from a common ancestor and were blood relatives of one another.[100] All members would also have the same *nomen* though not all carriers of a given *nomen* are members of a *gens* as freedmen, for example, took on the *nomen* of their patron.[101] Evidence of the *gens* as an institution is sparse with most of the ancient sources only mentioning the *gens* in the context of inheritance, as in the first appearance of the word *gens* in the Twelve Tables.[102] Despite the lack of literary documentation, evidence from burial remains and other archaeological sources has made it possible to increase what is known concerning the *gens* and its importance for early Rome.

The literary tradition preserves the stories of these clans and the sources can show how the families defined themselves. One of the key ways the *gens*

[100] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 33. Members of a *gens* by adoption would be an exception to blood relation. Mitchell disputes that *gentes* constituted a kinship group and instead sees them as artificial units for purposes of army recruitment. (Mitchell, *Patricians and Plebeians*, 132).
[101] Ibid., 15.
[102] Ibid., 15.

could create an identity was through an account of their descent. In the Late Republic, legendary genealogies, often involving divine ancestry were created to account for the greatness of certain clans.[103] The Julii are most famous for claiming such an ancestor in describing their descent from Venus but they were not alone. The Fabii asserted a descent from Hercules but this claim replaced an original story that was unrelated to the hero and involved them with the companions of Remus.[104] There was also an increase in the use of the Trojan companions of Aeneas as mythic progenitors of a clan at the same time.[105] Mythic origins were not necessarily a creation of the late Republic and are believed to have existed before Fabius Pictor's history.[106]

There are older traditions, however, which did not involve mythic foundations for the origins of a *gens*. A mythic past was not required by the Claudii whose arrival in Rome in 495 is crucial for understanding the nature of the *gens*.[107] Likewise, other powerful families such as the Cornelii and, importantly for this paper, the Valerii, never boasted of divine or heroic descent.[108] It is likely that some of the older families did not require any mythic descent to increase their prestige while families whose members had not achieved consulships in a long period of time, like the Julii, needed some divine assistance.[109] Both patrician and plebeian families created these mythic

[103] Wiseman, "Legendary Genealogies", 153.
[104] Ibid., 154.
[105] Ibid., 153.
[106] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 44.
[107] Ibid., 42.
[108] Wiseman, "Legendary Genealogies," 162.
[109] Ibid., 169.

genealogies so their existence was not an issue of class.[110] The plebeian role in the *gentes*, however, requires further comment.

There has been considerable debate over whether plebeians could constitute a *gens*. Many scholars follow Livy's use of the word almost exclusively in connection with patricians.[111] Livy does occasionally have plebeian families act as though they are a formal *gens* but he never refers to any plebeian families explicitly as such.[112] Cicero does occasionally refer to plebeian *gentes* but Smith argues that he only uses the word when specific activities, like religious rites, are mentioned which are normally preserves of the elite families.[113] To a large extent then, the specifics of the *gens* are of little importance to the later historians outside of a few specific contexts, like religion and burial practices.[114] It in fact appears to be another way patrician families distinguished themselves from plebeian ones. Smith notes that most ancient references to the *gentes* occur in speeches and "reported thoughts" which shows that the existence of the *gens* was closely associated with how noble families wished to present themselves in public.[115] The sources unfortunately do not reveal much about the workings of the *gens* as an institution or even offer a set definition for the term. Smith suggests several definitions existed, some of which excluded plebeians, the tradition that Livy ultimately follows.[116] The extent of the *gentes* in the Republic

[110] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 39.
[111] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 55.
[112] Ibid., 56.
[113] Ibid., 60.
[114] Ibid., 69.
[115] Ibid., 62.
[116] Ibid., 63.

is thus left open though it is clear that, at the very least, it was an idea which the upper classes monopolized in the early Republic.

The elite nature of the *gens* is important when understanding their role in the early rise of Rome. Archaeological evidence on the *gens* can help to shed some light on their origin and the world in which they emerged. There are Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age "princely burials" of elite men and women who acquired a large amount of wealth which is seen in their grave goods.[117] Many of the early burials occur in chamber tombs that show the existence of large family units like clans.[118] The associated wealth indicates elite status as does the presence of iron weapons and chariots. Mitchell, however, cautions against using the presence of elite burial groups as representing a clan.[119]

Until recently, these tombs and their associated grave goods were the only archaeological evidence of elite clans existing at such an early date. In the last decade, the remains of villa dating from the early 6th century were discovered just outside the Aurelian Walls of Rome north of the city near the Tiber. The "Auditorium Villa" constitutes the first elite site linked with early history of Rome as well as one of the earliest pieces of evidence for Roman villas.[120] In addition to its origins in the archaic period, it is located within the *ager Romanus*, the original territory of Rome, implying a close connection with the earliest phases of the city's history.[121] Terrenato, Smith, and others have drawn conclusions about the site that involve the clans of early Rome. In particular, the

---

[117] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 109.
[118] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 84.
[119] Mitchell, *Patricians and Plebeians*, 35.
[120] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 7.
[121] Ibid., 11.

villa is posited as the "country seat" of an early *gens*.[122] The high level of architecture denotes an occupant of elite status and shows that archaic elites had access to private luxury since the sixth century.[123] The villa probably exerted control of the surrounding landscape through a system of dependent farmers who would become "clients" of the villa's owners.[124] The villa thus functioned as a power center for a clan in a manner that Terrenato sees paralleling Etruscan "petty kings."[125] Such a description shows the power and wealth that the clans had at this early date. Furthermore, it is likely that renovations for a second phase around 500 are related to the owners attempting to assert their dominance in the highly competitive environment surrounding the fall of the monarchy.[126] This has important implications for viewing the actions of the Valerii and will be discussed in more depth later on. In general, however, the archaeological record has provided evidence of wealthy and powerful elites who, in the late sixth century, were capable not only of exerting their authority over personal territory, but were responding to governmental upheavals by increasing their participation in a more competitive political environment.

Such a situation requires a closer look at the relationship between the *gens* and the formation of the state. The site of Rome itself shows human settlement from the start of the first millennium. Smith examines the concept of urbanization in early Rome which he says begins as a process in the 8th century.[127] From this

[122] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 17.
[123] Ibid., 18.
[124] Ibid., 17, 28.
[125] Ibid., 28.
[126] Ibid., 17 and Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 158.
[127] Smith, "Beginnings of Urbanization," 99.

time period, the so-called "Romulean Wall" on the Palatine has been dated as well as the earliest levels of the Regia and Temple of Vesta along with a general definition of public space.[128] Smith argues that competition among Central Italian cities for both resources and social display motivated the process of urbanization and monumentalization of public space.[129] These processes required the harnessing of labor and resources that would only have been available to an established state meaning that the state preceded the physical space of the city.[130]

The clans of landed elites would have been the primary agents of these processes.[131] Terrenato argues that what motivated these elite groups to create the city was the ability of the urban landscape to become a stage for the acting out of clan drama.[132] The urban arena would allow clans to work out disputes in a political fashion rather than through small-scale armed conflict which could damage fields and thus the economic basis of the clan.[133] This position makes the *gentess* the primary political actors in early Rome, a situation suggested by the sources which portray the interests of a few different families dominating the early Republic. Under this view, however, the clan would only work for the state when their interests intersected.[134] The clans would be able to function outside the bounds of the state when it suited them as their land and clients would provide an independent power base.[135]

---

[128] Smith, "Beginnings of Urbanization," 98.
[129] Ibid., 101.
[130] Ibid., 102, 103.
[131] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 233.
[132] Ibid., 236.
[133] Ibid., 241.
[134] Ibid., 235.
[135] Ibid., 243.

The wealth and strength of the clans is seen in the vast retinue of clients the Claudii brought to Rome as well as the story of the Fabii at the Cremera. The Fabii in particular may be a clan functioning independently of the state but such a status can also be seen to relate directly to the Valerii. In 1977, the *Lapis Satricanus* was discovered at Satricum containing an inscription referring to the "*suodales* of Poplios Valesios."[136] Dated to around 500, it is usually associated with Publicola. The *suodales*, related to the classical Latin *sodales*, refers to a military retinue of young men.[137] This institution is associated with Germanic raiding parties who were led by a *dux* and formed almost a separate society.[138] If this is the case, it suggests the existence of independent war bands under the control of clan leaders which were not affiliated with the state. Bremmer points out, however, that the *sodales* of the Fabii did *not* accompany them to the Cremera which may mean the *suodales* were not companions in a military sense.[139] He believes that this inscription refers to a single raid that does not imply the existence of any permanent group associated with the Valerii.[140] Botsford, however, in examining the size of individual *gentes*, notes that the *gens* was too small to have as many as 306 adult males as described of the Fabii at the Cremera.[141] This would then require the incorporation of some kind of client group in the Fabian band.

---

[136] Bremmer, "Suodales of Poplios Valesios", 133.
[137] Ibid., 134.
[138] Ibid., 138.
[139] Ibid., 136. Bremmer notes how the *sodales* exhort the Fabii to battle (*ire felices, ire fortes)*, a situation that doesn't make sense if the *sodales* accompanying the Fabii into the field.
[140] Ibid., 147.
[141] Botsford, "Roman *gens*", 682.

Holloway elaborates upon the idea of warrior bands in early Rome by proposing a new interpretation of military tribunes with consular power. Though they appear in the record after the time period of this thesis, Holloway suggests comparisons between these early warlords and the tribunes. Holloway sees the consular tribunes as being warlords leading semi-private armed bands on raids for plunder.[142] He cites the written accounts describing the lack of official organization of many of the "armies" the consular tribunes led as well as the lack of success they achieved which would have been expected of a full Roman legion.[143] The knowledge of these war bands and their leaders from family records was then used to fill in gaps in the *Fasti*.[144] Holloway's premise can be accepted as an explanation for the consular tribunes without necessarily believing in the unreliability of the *Fasti*. His arguments show that even after 449, Roman clans could field private armies in pursuit of clan or state interests who would be under the command of Roman unofficial warlords. This later evidence for such activity matches the earlier evidence concerning such warlords and their armed retinues who often attempted to seize power in Rome. It also provides a justification to look more closely at the actions of early Republican figures for similar incidences of military action under clans outside of established state control.

Based on such arguments from Holloway and the *Lapis Satricanus*, it is thus likely that a band like the Valerian warrior band was a real component of life in early Rome. The existence of such bands is likely based on the evidence of the

[142] Holloway, "Tribuni Militum", 123.
[143] Ibid., 123.
[144] Ibid., 124. See I.C for Holloway's views on the *Fasti*.

Fabii and on the models suggested by Smith and Terrenato for the early Roman state. This vision includes the existence of powerful and wealthy clans who not only dominated early Rome, but frequently operated outside of its control. The *Lapis Satricanus* provides the archaeological evidence that the Valerii were personally a part of such a system. It is the literary sources, however, that really place the Valerii in this world of competitive clans. This can only be seen, however, through a careful examination of the sources which can present a very different view of the family.

F. The *Gens Valeria*

The *gens Valeria* is present in the histories from the beginning of the Republic. The Valerii were said to have originally Sabines who came to Rome with the king Titus Tatius.[145] The Sabines were considered to be virtuous, brave, and rustic.[146] They also showed a strong sense of piety, a trait especially seen in Numa Pompilius.[147] The Sabines are also associated with Spartan immigrants (including one named Volusus[148]) which would reflect even more positively on those families associated with them.[149] This narrative is designed to associate the Valerii with a tough warrior ethic that later Romans idealized.

The great leader Publius Valerius Publicola is among those responsible for expelling the last king of Rome and was one of the consuls in the Republic's first year. The family existed throughout the Republic with many appearances in the

[145] Dionysius, 2.96.3.
[146] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 98.
[147] Ibid., 100.
[148] Volusus is the name of the first Valerius mentioned in Dionysius.
[149] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 90.

Fasti, and even survived into the Empire. Other than the *Lapis Satricanus*, there is no archaeological evidence for the Valerii from Rome though the sources indicate a strong association with the Velia, a hill that has strong associations with the kings of Rome.[150] Outside of the *Fasti*, knowledge of the family is wholly dependent upon the literary sources. This creates an issue due to the weight of the historical tradition concerning the family.

The Valerii are famous for being heroic soldiers and strong supporters of popular rights.[151] The literary tradition supports this view by frequently placing members of the family in situations where they can function as noble champions of the People against the Senate.[152] This stereotyping of families is very common in the sources and also appears in the characterization of the Valerii's frequent opponents, the Claudii, another Sabine family whose interactions with the Valerii will be discussed later. The theme probably emerges in part from political campaigning where each family would have a "family identity advertisement."[153] The clan name would indicate certain political and personality traits that voters were supposed to assume were common to the clan as a whole.[154] This would then be repeated in the funeral orations described above. The family name became a shorthand way to identify all of the basic attributes of a given historical figure in the sources.[155] The Valerii are clearly part of this tradition with all members of the family showing "enlightened plebeian sympathies."[156]

---

[150] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 218. See section III.B for a more detailed discussion.
[151] Vasaly, "Personality and Power," 203.
[152] Ibid., 203.
[153] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 20.
[154] Ibid., 21.
[155] Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 88.
[156] Ibid., 89.

The origin of this populist tradition is debated among scholars. Wiseman takes the most negative view by attributing the entire positive tradition to Valerius Antias.[157] He goes through many of the early events of the Republic commenting on how the Valerian character (usually Publicola) often appears unnecessary or out of place in a given episode. This may be true of certain individual stories, but to argue for wholesale fabrication appears to have little evidence to support it according to Cornell.[158] Walsh believes that at most, Valerius Antias augmented an already favorable tradition of the Valerii which Cornell supports.[159] Wiseman himself acknowledges this in a footnote where he refers to Cicero's *Pro Flacco* as recording a pro-Valerian tradition predating Antias.[160] The lack of surviving earlier annalists means that the origin of this tradition cannot be traced very far. It may have emerged around the association of the Valerii with the right of *provocatio* which they upheld in three successive laws. The Valerii themselves probably cultivated this tradition for their own political purposes. It also may come from real actions of the family in support of popular rights.

To really understand the Valerii, however, one must go beyond the narrative superstructure to reach the historical core that Cornell describes. Closely examining the actions of the Valerii in the writings of Livy and Dionysius, the narrative of noble *populares* type politicians gives way to a new image of the Valerii. From the end of the monarchy to the overthrow of the decemvirs in 449, the Valerii can best be explained as a powerful aristocratic clan who competed for

---

[157] Wiseman, *Roman Drama*, 78.
[158] Cornell, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 205.
[159] Ibid., 205 and Walsh, *Aims and Methods*, 89.
[160] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 119, note 41. The references are in Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 1 and 25.

power with the other great *gentes* of early Rome. This deeper Valerian narrative helps to corroborate the archaeological evidence that early Rome was the site of competition of various elite clans who often acted outside the bounds of the state.

The actions of the Valerii are symptomatic of the traits of the clans discussed above. They engaged in political struggles with other clans for dominance in Rome and had political ambitions to exercise sole rule in the city. These two themes reflect common patterns of clan activity in the late sixth and early fifth centuries which the Valerii fully participated in. In particular, roving warlords with their armed bands were not only a threat to Rome that the Valerii were forced to deal with, but provide a model for several early Valerian actions. The Valerii were thus at home in the world of the Auditorium Villa clan center and the warrior bands of the *Lapis Satricanus*. When such bands eventually faded as states began to stabilize, the Valerii looked for a new base of support and eventually found one through their support of popular political rights. Such a shift occurred as Rome reestablished its government after the fall of the decemvirs heralding a new paradigm, beyond the scope of this thesis, that the clans were forced to deal with. An examination of these themes of clan interaction, struggles for sole power, and the necessity of establishing a political base will reveal a new Valerian narrative. This will not only shed light on the relationship of the *gentes* to the early Roman state and their role in its formation, but also show the aspirations and ambitions of one of Rome's most politically active families.

II. Clan Conflict and Aristocratic Competition

Smith comments that "ambition and desire for power were constant themes" during the history of Early Rome.[161] The *gentes* had access to wealth since at least the sixth century as indicated by their lavish burials and were thus in the best position to exert control over a state. The Auditorium Villa shows the existence of clan centers that could exert authority over the surrounding territory[162] while the *Lapis Satricanus* reveals that clans had access to the physical force necessary to project such control. Such independence however, was tempered by the existence of a community center at Rome. Terrenato notes how the city itself was a creation of the aristocratic families and must have provided some benefit to them.[163] More detailed explanations for this tension between independence and the community has been discussed above but it is clear that the existence of the city did not necessarily hamper the political strength of the clans.

The interactions of the clans detailed below describe not only their relation to the state, but also their relationships to each other. The clans did have an interest in maintaining the state mostly, as Smith argues, for preserving their property rights.[164] At the same time, relationships between clans could be highly antagonistic. Smith posits that the distribution of offices during the early Republic was a beneficial effect of the *gentes* since it prevented any one family from dominating the city.[165] This would then serve to transfer clan quarrels into competition for office. This is certainly apparent in the narratives of the Struggle

[161] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 297.
[162] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 28.
[163] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 243.
[164] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 305.
[165] Ibid., 311.

of the Orders when certain candidates are backed by various factions. During the early Republic, however, warrior bands led by clan chiefs were still very much a part of this system of competition.[166] The clan would thus serve as a rallying point for ambitious families to assert themselves within the state.

The idea of a cutthroat world of clan relationships finds support in the evidence of the actions of the Valerii during the first decades of the Republic. As a major clan, they would have had an active desire to protect their interests within the state. Some of Publicola's actions appear to preserve the power of the clans in general but there were also personal struggles for power undertaken by the Valerii. Their actions during the Battle of Lake Regillus and the decemvirate show not just the family's desire to retain their influence, but that they had the means to actually defend it. There were feuds with foreign clans, like the Tarquins, and with domestic rivals, most notably the Claudii. Smith does not deny the competition of the clans but he focuses more on the actions of clans as a whole within the state. By looking at the Valerii, the actions of a particular clan can be examined to show the extent to which clan conflict played a part in many of the episodes of early Rome. To place such actions in context, it is necessary to look at the first time the family is presented in the narrative.

A. The Arrival of the Valerii

The first appearance of the Valerii occurs in Dionysius as he briefly describes the family's first appearance in Rome. In the aftermath of the battle between the Romans and the Sabines, the king Titus Tatius stayed in Rome as

[166] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 236.

king with Romulus. All of the Sabine commanders returned home with their men except for Tatius himself and three companions, among them Volusus Valerius. These three men were said to be "of illustrious houses" and received honors "which their descendents would enjoy from them."[167] This brief account of the origin of the Valerii in Rome allows the family to claim an origin that dates back to the earliest days of the Roman state. The association with Titus Tatius is important to the narrative due to the traits attributed to the ancient Sabines by later Roman writers.[168]

Removing the Sabine narrative, however, sheds some light on the early nature of both Valerii themselves and the early Roman aristocracy. Volusus is one of the ἡγεμόνες or commanders of the Sabine forces. The exact nature of the relationship between him and Tatius as well as the role of the Sabine king is never made clear in the text. It is possible to see the king as the central political figure that commanded the army and had men of ability and wealth, like Volusus, serve under him. This would make Volusus a prominent figure but one subordinated to the king. The text, however, implies that Tatius was leading more of a coalition of forces led by other great men. At the end of the battle, the other commanders lead home their own forces implying some degree of independence.[169] This suggests that Volusus may be more like his descendent mentioned on the *Lapis Satricanus* in command of a group of men or *suodales* who have a primary loyalty to him. The text says very little, but Volusus may ultimately be subordinated to

---

[167] Dionysius, 2.46.3.
τρεῖς ἄνδρες οἴκων τῶν διαφανεστάτων ὑπέμειναν ἐν Ῥώμῃ καὶ τιμὰς ἔσχον, ἃς τὸ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐκαρποῦτο γένος.
[168] See I.F for more detail on the Sabines.
[169] Dionysius, 2.46.3. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀναλαβόντες ἡγεμόνες ἀπῆγον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

Tatius, who is actually called a king. He thus appears to support the existence of aristocratic clans in control of warrior bands who owe primary allegiance not to any king but to a patron or clan leader. Volusus' status is confirmed by his choice to remain with Tatius in Rome after the battle. After Romulus' death, Plutarch actually reports that he was a contender for the throne that ultimately went to Numa.[170] Dionysius does not report this fact but Volusus' staying on in Rome as one of a select group with the king does imply a high status for Volusus and his family and can support the later statement by Plutarch.

This episode also reveals the "multi-ethnic" nature of the early Roman aristocracy. From the beginning, Rome had never been a single "race" but was rather made up of people from various central Italian ethnic groups.[171] In this episode, the Sabines were allowed to join to the Romans and Tatius becomes a co-king. The Romans doubled the number of patricians by adding the most distinguished families of the Sabines, presumably including Volusus, to the patriciate.[172] The aristocracy was particularly amenable to incorporating new members as best demonstrated with the arrival of the Sabine Claudii in 495 but the kings were also supposed to have added members from Alba Longa and other Sabines like the Valerii.[173] Such a practice was common among the city-states of Latium and indicates a high degree of "horizontal" social mobility.[174] That Volusus could move his family to Rome with no apparent mark against his foreign origins shows the open nature of aristocratic Latin and Roman society.

---

[170] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 384. See Plutarch, *Numa*, 5.1-2.
[171] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 3.
[172] Dionysius, 2.47.1.
[173] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 80 and Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 163.
[174] Cornell, "The City-States in Latium," 221.

The aristocratic clans could not only fight independently of a state, but they could change their allegiance to other cities in the area due to their independent wealth.[175] This power of the clans remained in the background as long as strong kings could control them but the excesses of the later monarchy allowed the clans to reassert themselves.

B. The Sabines and the Claudii

The Valerii share their Sabine descent with another great clan, the Claudii. The interactions of the Valerii and the Claudii constitute a major part of the narratives of both Livy and Dionysius. The Valerii are usually presented as the noble populist opponents of the hard-line aristocratic Claudii and many clan conflicts feature the two groups on opposite sides of an issue.[176] Their opposition has become stereotypical in the narrative and the families are often deployed as a shorthand way to describe an ideological conflict.[177] Many of the episodes described below involve a member of the Claudii as the antagonist of a Valerius. Vasaly says that the "static personality types" remain a constant despite the changes in the Roman state.[178] The specifics of such interactions are probably just made to fit with the pre-existing personality types of the clan members. As such, the specifics of such conflicts, usually made clear through speeches, will not be discussed since they form part of the narrative superstructure. The general

[175] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 234.
[176] Vasaly, "Personality and Power", 203 n. 2.
[177] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 113.
[178] Vasaly, "Personality and Power", 225.

conflict between the clans, however, is likely a reflection of real tensions between the two families.

Outside of the narrative of the Struggle of the Orders, there is little information given as to the reason for such enmity between the Valerii and the Claudii. Indeed both families claimed Sabine descent and were patricians.[179] The Sabine stereotype has been described in the previous section but it served to paint both families of members of an ethnic group associated with virtue and bravery.[180] There is actually evidence that the clans may have originally been on more friendly terms. The arrival of the Claudii, with all of their dependents, occurred during the consulship of Publicola in 495. The Claudii were not just welcomed to Rome as new citizens, but were actually allowed to become patricians. Farney sees this as a direct result of Publicola's consulship: both the arrival of the Claudii and their social status were due to feelings of commonality because of the shared Sabine descent of the families.[181] Neither Livy nor Dionysius provide evidence for this view but it is certainly possible that some kind of kinship could have been felt between the clans.

Wiseman notices the similarities in how both families arrived. As described above, Volesus was a companion of Titus Tatius who chose to live in Rome rather than among the Sabines. The Claudii leave the Sabine communities due to their desire for the freedom which Rome offers.[182] The families are thus very similar in both background and method of arrival in Rome. This is perhaps

[179] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 79.
[180] Ibid., 98.
[181] Ibid., 80.
[182] Wiseman, *Clio's Cosmetics*, 114.

the best place to look for the cause of conflict. While the Valerii initially welcomed fellow Sabines to Rome, the rapid rise in power of the Claudii would naturally make the Valerii wary as they were the current dominating clan in the city. The similarity in background may have meant a competition for support among the other Sabine clans. The Claudii thus became an alternative to the Valerii having the same ethnic background and positive associations of the Sabines.

The Claudian challenge to Valerian dominance may thus be born from the very things they have in common. As the two clans feuded, it is only natural that they would be on opposite sides of most ideological issues. The narrative of class conflict gave Livy, Dionysius, and the other annalists an established pair of opposing clans in which to act out this political drama. The specifics of Claudian opposition to the Valerii follow this narrative closely but they provided traces of a real struggle for dominance between two powerful and very similar clans.

C. *Provocatio*

The entire overthrow of the monarchy described in the last chapter incorporates elements of clan competition but the focus is on the desire for sole control of Rome by specific men. It is in the aftermath of Publicola's actions that the power of the clans begins to be exercised outside of this issue. When Publicola attempted to establish himself as a king on the Velia, the grumblings of the People forced him to back down.[183] In the aftermath, Publicola passed laws which Livy and Dionysius describe as establishing safeguards on the People's

[183] See III.B for description and analysis of Publicola's actions.

liberty. The most famous is the "right of appeal" or *provocatio* that allowed any citizen to appeal to the People as a whole against the decision of a magistrate.[184] This right was highly significant in the Republic and was often used by the plebeians in concert with the tribunes during the Struggle of the Orders. There is a large amount of debate concerning the historicity of this particular law. There were two later laws passed codifying the right of provocatio in 449 and 299 both by members of the *gens Valeria* thus highlighting the strong association between the Valerii and *provocatio*. Ogilvie and many others consider only the latest law to be historical.[185] The earlier two laws are often considered retrojection based off the law of 299. Cornell, however, notes that there is no real reason why either of the earlier laws must be artificial and interprets provisions of the Twelve Tables as presupposing an existing right to appeal.[186] If Cornell's premise is accepted, the Valerian involvement in all three laws becomes much more important. There is certainly nothing that prevents three different Valerii from proposing similar laws. The strong effect of the *mos maiorum* may even have encouraged later Valerii to emulate the first by issuing a similar law under similar conditions. From this point of view, then, the Valerii as a *gens* were intimately connected with the issue of *provocatio* and it is definitely possible that the Valerian association with *provocatio* in the texts reflects this.

The placement of the law on *provocatio* in the narrative does raise some questions. The law is proposed immediately after the failed attempt at the throne by Publicola. Ogilvie believes that the popular law is placed at this point,

[184] Livy, 2.8 and Dionysius 5.19.4.
[185] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 252.
[186] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 277.

regardless of its historicity, to contrast with the internal threats to tyranny.[187] Livy and Dionysius both make it clear that the law is passed in response to Publicola's power grab. This can be spun, as it was, to reflect the popular leanings of the Valerii, but even the authors who have been heavily influenced by that tradition cannot explain Publicola's rather sudden change from a potential king to a popular figure. There are several ways to interpret the passing of *provocatio* in light of this change. Cornell has commented that the oligarchic coup (dynastic or not) that ended the monarchy would have had to deal with both he army and the masses, two groups which had supported the monarchy.[188] He then states that these early popular measures, including retaining the *comitia centuriata* for magisterial elections, were born out of a need to compromise by the aristocrats in order to gain their support. The account of Publicola's tyranny provides the narrative justification for a law like *provocatio* without implying the original support the People had for the kings. The lack of a smooth transition of power as evidenced by the backlash against Publicola could then create the conditions whereby the People needed to be reconciled to the ruling elites.

The above conclusion does not necessarily link Publicola and *provocatio* but makes the passage of the law a part of the greater upheavals at the start of the Republic. There is no reason to disbelieve that Publicola was acting out of self-preservation in proposing a law limiting magisterial power but this action may has had a greater impact. The relationship between the great clans and the early state has already been examined but it is important to remember that, in Terrenato's

[187] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 252.
[188] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 238. This is based on the theory that the last two kings were actually popular tyrants. See III.A.

view, the city was a clan creation to, among other things, resolve power disputes among the clans in a civil manner.[189] As long as the state did not act against the clans, the *gentes* could continue to dominate as they saw fit.[190] Perhaps most importantly, the clans would have opposed the state imposing any measure that would curtail the privileges of the clan.[191]

In passing *provocatio,* Publicola may actually have been acting in the best interests of the clans. *Provocatio* would have provided a way for the clan to challenge the decisions of the magistrates in order to maintain control over their own affairs. This interpretation has the advantage that there is no explicit problem mentioned that *provocatio* would be able to solve. There is no evidence of actual oppression or lack of control on the part of the magistrates. Publicola's attempt at kingship, which *provocatio* would provide a check on, does not seem to be accompanied by any attempts at abuse either. There is no mention of the Senate or patricians as either being offended by Publicola's actions or abusing the People. It is likely that *provocatio* was as much a benefit for the aristocratic clan leaders as to the People as a whole since it guaranteed a degree of independence to both parties. Publicola's political career certainly benefited as he was surnamed *Publicola*, "the People's friend."[192] Publicola, having lost the chance at royal power, decided to preserve what power he had outside the bounds of the state as the head of one of Rome' great clans.

[189] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 240.
[190] Ibid., 243.
[191] Ibid., 237.
[192] Livy, 2.8.1.

D. Marcus Horatius

It is noteworthy that the law of *provocatio* was passed in Dionysius with Publicola's new co-Consul, Marcus Horatius. Livy does not have Horatius present until after the passage of the law "so that [Publicola] would be alone in thanks in these things."[193] This single phrase reveals the depth of Publicola's ambitions. Whether he was trying to help the People or preserve the power of the clans with his law, there was a strong desire that it was he and he alone who received the political benefit from it. This stands in contrast to the way a later Valerius and Horatius worked together in 449 to restore the Republic after the tyranny of the decemvirs. Publicola and Horatius did have a brief conflict which only Livy records though Publicola was not personally involved.

Horatius was chosen by lot to dedicate the Temple of Jupiter while Publicola went to fight against Veii. This did not sit well with the "friends" of Publicola who tried various ways to stop the dedication, even announcing the death of Horatius' son in the middle of the prayer.[194] The exact nature of the *necessarii* who supported Publicola is ambiguous though it can refer to friends, family members, and clients. This episode does show that there was a definite group supportive of Publicola. A broader definition could mean a faction of clients and others within the state though it could also refer to the *gens* as a whole. It is probably not the *sodales* of a war band but rather a kind of domestic faction whose support was critical for the political ambitions of the Valerii or any other great family. Whatever the exact makeup of the *necessarii* is, their involvement

[193] Livy, 2.8.3. *ut sua unius in his gratia esset*.
[194] Livy, 2.8.7.

shows the power and support that Publicola was able to marshal even when away from home.

E. Lake Regillus

In the aftermath of Lars Porsenna's siege and possible control of Rome, the Latin cities that were allied to Rome grew increasingly frustrated. The Latins had greatly suffered during the war with Porsenna and were also being courted by both Tarquin and his exiled supporters who dispersed throughout Latium. Tensions between Rome and the Latin League eventually exploded into the Battle of Lake Regillus in 498. Cornell places the battle in the context of a half a century of turmoil and upheaval throughout Central Italy.[195] He sees the fall of the monarchy in Rome and the repeated raids by Volscians, Aequians, and others as part of this cycle.

To Livy and Dionysius, Lake Regillus represents the culmination of Rome's struggle to be rid of the Tarquins. The battle combines both fact and legend and has the trappings of a Homeric episode.[196] Ogilvie notes that the battle was likely preserved as a hereditary legend among the Postumii, the family of the victorious commander Aulus Postumius Albinus.[197] This does not negate the historicity of the battle as Ogilvie himself notes that it is the logical cause of the passage of the *Foedus Cassianum*. The role of the Valerii in the battle may be contrived, as Wiseman suggests[198], but it may still preserve a memory of heroic

[195] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 293.
[196] Ibid., 293 and Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 285.
[197] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 285.
[198] Wiseman, *Roman Drama*, 87.

Valerian actions in the Republic's last attempt to fend off the Tarquins. These actions fit into the larger pattern of clan conflict that manifests itself in the struggle between the Valerii and the Tarquins.

While the Tarquins were all involved in the fighting, the Battle of Lake Regillus was fought primarily against the Latins. The battle was fierce and Dionysius reports the wounding of the Latin commander, Octavius Mamilius, and the Roman Master of Horse, Titus Aebutius.[199] Marcus Valerius, Publicola's brother, functioning as some kind of legate, then took over for Aebutius and led the attack.[200] He was killed in a counter-charge led by a recovered Mamilius. Livy reports a slightly different story as Marcus is not said to have assumed command but is merely a part of the attempt to maintain the Roman position after Aebutius' fall.[201] In fact, Livy has Marcus step forward only upon seeing Tarquin's son Sextus in the battle. Livy reports that Marcus charged Tarquin "so that his family which had the honor of expelling the kings would have the same honor of killing them."[202] Marcus is then killed by one of Tarquin's companions.

The difference in the stories between Livy and Dionysius is quite stark. Both make Marcus a hero but do so in different ways. Dionysius does not make this fight seem personal. Marcus steps up to fill a loss of command and dies in an attempt to end the battle by killing the enemy leader. Marcus, therefore, is made to do his duty as a patriotic Roman to defend the Republic without thought for his own gain. In addition, Dionysius, by making Marcus a legate and portraying him

[199] Dionysius, 12.11.3.
[200] Dionysius, 12.12.1.
[201] Livy, 2.20.
[202] Livy, 2.20. *ut cuius familiae decus eiecti reges erant, eiusdem interfecti forent.*

as effectively "filling in" for the Master of Horse, legitimizes his actions as being part of the chain of command established by the state. This fits the narrative of the Valerii being ideal citizens who serve the state but it is not inconsistent with the Valerii functioning as a powerful aristocratic clan. Among the reasons for state formation was a desire to manage foreign affairs and wars effectively as a group.[203] With the threat of the old king trying to re-impose his rule on the now clan-dominated Republic, it is no surprise that such a prominent family as the Valerii would take an active role for the communal good in defending the state.

Livy's account, however, takes on the tone of a personal vendetta. Marcus is assigned no official role in the battle and is not really described as doing much before Tarquin's appearance. Upon seeing Tarquin, Marcus' thoughts do not bring to mind a man intent on only defending his country, but rather are highly personal and concerned with bringing glory to his own family. This supports the view that the Valerii were a powerful clan who would certainly be concerned with enhancing their own prestige in competition with the other aristocratic families. Marcus' lack of official standing in Livy could indicate that while Postumius served as an overarching commander, individual clans furnished their own troops and leaders like the *suodales* of the *Lapis Satricanus*. Livy does not provide enough evidence to know the arrangement of the Roman army with any certainty but it certainly implies a role for Marcus Valerius that lay outside the tradition of a single unified Roman army so early in the Republic.

[203] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 240.

Marcus' role may also involve a degree of family pride. Livy explicitly references the tradition of the Valerii as those who expelled the kings.[204] While this would have happened only about ten years before in the narrative, it shows how even over the course of a few years, a family could have expectations put on it to emulate the deeds of its past members. Just as Publicola expelled the kings and his brother feels he must complement that action, so probably did later members of the *gens* imitate Publicola's actions in reaffirming *provocatio*. Such a response to family tradition indicates the power it had in influencing the decisions of later members and makes the stereotyping of families in the histories seem somewhat more based on fact. At the same time, if Publicola was involved in a struggle for the throne along with Brutus and Collatinus, a kind of feud may have developed between the Valerii and the Tarquins who would have seen the family as usurpers.[205] As such, it would be only natural for Marcus to have so eagerly attacked the primary rival of his own family's original regal ambitions.

The entire battle is often described as "Homeric" or "Iliadic" with attention focused on Marcus Valerius.[206] Ogilvie describes the duel in Livy between Marcus and Sextus Tarquinius as being modeled on the duel of Menelaus and Paris in the *Iliad*.[207] Paris dares Menelaus to fight just as Sextus' presence is enough to drive Marcus into battle. Menelaus defeats Paris but is wounded by an arrow just at Marcus is struck though his wound is mortal. Ogilvie cites other

[204] Livy, 2.20.
[205] See III.A and B for a more detailed discussion of this struggle.
[206] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy,* 285 and Wiseman, *Roman Drama*, 86.
[207] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy,* 286. The duel in the *Iliad* begins at 3.15.

parallels as well such as between Aebutius and Agamemnon.[208] The existence of these individual duels is highly suggestive of an epic source describing the duels of heroes. While the Homeric parallels do imply a great deal of narrative restructuring on the part of later annalists to create what is a kind of mini-epic, it is noteworthy that Marcus is associated with Menelaus. Sextus as Paris is a logical choice for the king's son but Menelaus was the independent king of Sparta. Agamemnon was the supreme commander but the Greek army at Troy was a collection of independent warlords with individual armies. Associating Marcus Valerius with Menelaus suggests that Marcus was viewed in a similar light as a clan leader with a private power base. The evidence from the *Lapis Satricanus* has already indicated the existence of private companies of *suodales*. The inscription explicitly describes the Valerii as a family who would have such a retinue. The Homeric links in the episode provide another framework for viewing the status of the Valerii in the battle.

In both Livy and Dionysius, Marcus dies but the effect is made to be a positive one reflecting his patriotism and commitment to liberty. After his death, Livy briefly comments on the accompanying loss of morale but Dionysius presents a more detailed story. The sons of Publicola, Publius and Marcus, cover their uncle's body with their shields and bring it back to camp.[209] The two of them then leap into battle and are killed by the enemy. Their actions further the narrative of the patriotism of the Valerii and their willingness to die for their country as well as their fine moral character through their valiant retrieval of their

[208] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 286.
[209] Dionysius, 6.12.2.

uncle's body. Wiseman notes the parallel of the sons of Publicola to the sons of Brutus.[210] Where Brutus' sons plotted against the Republic and were killed, Publicola's sons protected the body of their uncle and ultimately died for their country. They could also be seen to be the opposite of Tarquin's sons who, according to the narrative, fight to restore tyranny while the Valerii oppose it.

While Wiseman sees the entire episode as contrived to make the Valerii look good, this story does serve a purpose. It emphasizes the Homeric parallels at Lake Regillus as many of the Greek and Trojan heroes try to save the bodies of their friends in battle, most notably Patroclus. The actions of Publicola's sons also show the claims of the Valerii to heroic status through their performance in battle. It reflects well on the family that two of its members were willing to die for their country as well as protect their uncle's body which in turn contributes to the prestige they would have among the other aristocratic families. The entire Battle of Lake Regillus serves to mark the Valerii as Republican heroes of Rome. The individual actions of Marcus Valerius in Livy and the sons of Publicola in Dionysius show the family, while supporting the continued existence of Rome, looking out for their own interests in preserving a clan-dominated Republic. Likewise, Marcus' personal attack on Sextus may reflect continuing tension between the Tarquins and the Valerian clan that was born out of the earlier struggle for the throne. The highly personal nature of the Valerian actions suggests that the clan was not completely incorporated militarily in the state and that there was still a degree of independence held by the *gens*.

---

[210] Wiseman, *Roman Drama*, 87.

F. The Decemvirate

After the Battle of Lake Regillus, there are no large-scale clan conflicts of a similar nature. The attempts by various clan leaders and warlords to seize power in Rome will be discussed later. Such attempts reflect the unstable political system in Central Italy and Rome itself as the Republic slowly became better established. It is during the transformative period of the decemvirate that the Republic becomes more stable and is viewed as the legitimate system of government at Rome. The political maneuverings of the Valerii at this time shed light on the politics of the aristocratic clans as they jostled for control in the newly emerging form of the Republic after the decemvirs. In such a chaotic time, the Valerii even act in the fashion of the old warrior bands with Lucius Valerius Potitus' seizing of the Forum. Such actions are best understood in the context of the clan conflict examined above rather than the narrative concerning the tyranny of the decemvirs that Livy and Dionysius describe.

Beginning in 462, the tribunes had begun to agitate for the creation of a written law code that would be accessible to patricians and plebeians alike. IN 452, the Senate at last proposed that beginning the following year, the normal constitution of Rome would be suspended with all magistrates replaced by a board of ten men known as the decemvirs who would then be responsible for codifying the law. This event forms the centerpiece of Livy's first pentad and is a defining moment in the history of early Rome. Unsurprisingly, the Valerii are closely involved in the process, specifically in the resolution of the entire episode. As opposed to his usual position of finding some historicity in the narratives of Livy

and Dionysius, Forsythe sees the tradition regarding the decemvirs and the Twelve Tables as mostly false.[211] Cornell accepts the tradition as mostly true while Ogilvie regards the second tyrannical college as false.[212] The specifics of the drama that Livy and Dionysius portray can be open to debate but the general point of the episode is probably correct following Cornell. The effect of the decemvirate is seen in the aftermath of their fall in 449 as the Republic entered a new phase of existence as a government more inclusive of the plebeians.[213] The close Valerian involvement in what was in effect a "re-founding" of the Republic attests to their great power within the state as one of the great political families of early Rome.

In 451, the decemvirs under Appius Claudius produced ten tables of law. Feeling the need to finish their work over another year, a second board was elected for 450 again under Appius Claudius. This second board, however, quickly became tyrannical as the rights of the People were heavily infringed upon. Livy paints the decemvirs as classical tyrants on account of their cruelty.[214] *Provocatio* and the protections of the tribunes were lost and even the patricians were unhappy though their hatred of the tribunate kept them silent against the decemvirs' abuses.[215] Ogilvie believes the patrician reluctance to support the decemvirs stemmed from a desire to return to power themselves and that they therefore could not openly identify their interests with the decemvirs.[216]

---

[211] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 233.
[212] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 452.
[213] Ibid., 453.
[214] Ibid., 465.
[215] Livy, 37.2-3.
[216] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 465.

The view of the aristocrats is finally heard when the decemvirs summon the Senate in response to an Aequian attack as well as to Sabine raids. The Senators, especially the "moderates" refused to come at first but did so under the threat of fines.[217] The Valerii are presumably in this "moderate" class of senators as there is no class of populist senators mentioned and due to their criticism of the decemvirs, they would not have been among the conservatives. The Valerii are thus not involved in the beginning of the decemvirs' tyranny but have, like the rest of the aristocracy, left the city. There are apparently limits to what the Valerii would do for the People which may be affected by the lack of political power the People could provide them under the decemvirs.[218]

With the Senate assembled, the decemvirs asked for a levy to deal with the Aequians and Sabines who threatened the city. Lucius Valerius Potitus demanded the floor to discuss the political situation of the decemvirs. Livy provides no additional information but Dionysius describes him as the son of Publius who died defeating Appius Herdonius and the grandson of Publicola.[219] The cognomen Potitus means 'statesman' and it is likely anachronistic in the text since it refers to his political activities during his consulship the following year.[220] Lucius then, from his first introduction, is clearly set up to continue the Valerian opposition to tyranny as demonstrated by both his father and grandfather. Appius Claudius tried to prevent him from speaking but, in Dionysius, Lucius defended

[217] Dionysius, 11.4.1.
[218] See IV.D for a discussion of the role of the People as a political base.
[219] Dionysius, 11.4.4.
[220] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 468.

his right to speak "as a Valerius."[221] Lucius assumes his name will carry a great weight in the Senate due to the actions of his family providing evidence of the power of family legacies in Roman politics. It is noteworthy that this line is used against a Claudius, the traditional opponents of the Valerii.[222]

Lucius is defended by another Senator and "long a friend to Valerius," Marcus Horatius Barbatus.[223] Dionysius reminds the reader that Horatius was a descendent of the very Horatius who had served as consul with Publicola at the start of the Republic.[224] Livy has Horatius call the decemvirs "ten Tarquins" and reminds them that the kings were expelled under the leadership of the Valerii and Horatii.[225] This close association between the two *gentes* will prevail through the rest of the episode and Lucius and Horatius served as consuls together in 449 immediately after the fall of the decemvirs. Horatius has made Livy's general portrayal of the decemvirs as tyrants specifically reflect the nature of Tarquin thus setting up a similar overthrow of government headed by a Valerius and Horatius. It also implies the creation of a new form of government akin to how the expulsion of the kings caused a shift from monarchy to an aristocratic Republic. The narratives do not present the shift so dramatically but there is a greater inclusion of the plebeians after the decemvirate. Forsythe, who doubts this entire episode, believes that the coming violence and revolution is caused by the inclusion of a Valerius and Horatius in the narrative.[226] As the kings were

---

[221] Dionysius, 11.4.5.
[222] See II.B for links between the Valerii and the Claudii.
[223] Dionysius, 11.5.1. Οὐαλερίῳ δ᾽ ἐκ παλαιοῦ φίλος.
[224] Dionysius, 11.5.1. He is most likely a grand-nephew. See Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 469.
[225] Livy, 3.39.3.
[226] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 223.

violently expelled, so too must have been the decemvirs as the expulsions were by the same family. The narrative certainly makes such comparisons easy but there is no reason to doubt the historicity of the events. The pairing of Valerius and Horatius so early in the episode prepares the reader for what is to come but their close association in the texts may reflect some kind of family alliance to remove the decemvirs from power.

The end of the debate in Dionysius supports this more faction-based view of the situation in Rome. In his account, "the men with the best wishes of the state at heart were fearful of not having anymore power in government."[227] The concern is not with the tyranny of the decemvirs but the lack of power these men have in the state. The Valerii, whose source of power is based on the People, are certainly in this group as Dionysius later says.[228] The group led by Lucius and Horatius "armed their own associations" to plot against the decemvirs.[229] These "associations" are called ἑταιρία and are a group of ἑταῖροι or companions. The word ἑταῖροι is used by Dionysius as the translation of the Latin *sodales*.[230] The *sodales* have already been seen as the members of early warrior bands under clan leaders like Poplios Valesios on the *Lapis Satricanus*. Dionysius seems to suggest a group of armed clients rather than a roving warrior band as he later relates that Lucius and Horatius in particular surrounded their houses with "a guard of servants and clients."[231] While not a war band, Lucius and other elites,

[227] Dionysius, 11.21.1.
[228] Dionysius, 11.21.3.
[229] Dionysius, 11.21.2. ἰδίας ἑταιρίας κατασκευαζομένων.
[230] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 144. The archaic form is *suodales*.
[231] Dionysius, 11.21.3. φυλακὴν θεραπόντων καὶπελατῶν .

still have the ability to raise private armed companies of men to defend their interests.

After the defeat of the decemviral armies in the field, Dionysius notes that a "strong band" of men gathered around Lucius and Horatius who were the leaders of the "aristocratic groups."[232] Appius Claudius in particular feared that they would cause trouble so he garrisoned the city.[233] The associations with an actual war band are heightened by this passage though the arena of battle is clearly inside of the city. The entire situation is reminiscent of earlier war bands under Mastarna and others who posed a severe threat to the existing Roman order.[234] By gathering these bands, Lucius and Horatius are acting outside the normal bounds of the state as they seek to essentially defend themselves from the state in the persons of the decemvirs. Cut off from both the exercise of power and support base, it is understandable that while clan leaders like Lucius would see the need to defend their interests with arms. While the clans benefited from the state, they resented any attempt on its part to curtail their prerogatives.[235] Similar to their situation under the kings, the clans saw their access to power scaled back and once again, a Valerius would be ready to expel those who interfered with their power.

Lucius does not re-enter the narrative before the decemvirs suffer more defeats in the field as well as mutiny among the troops. In Rome, the tyranny of Appius Claudius is demonstrated through the trial of Verginia, a plebeian maiden

---

[232] Dionysius, 11.23.6. καὶ ἦν ἤδη καρτερὰ χεὶρ περὶτὸν Ὁράτιόν τε καὶ τὸν Οὐαλέριον, οὓς ἔφην ἡγεμόνας εἶναι τῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶνέταιρειῶν.
[233] Dionysius, 11.24.1.
[234] See III for discussions on armed bands and warlords.
[235] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 237.

he sought to make his own by having his pimp claim she was his slave. Verginius, the girl's father, eventually kills her after a sham trial to prevent her from being dishonored. Appius ordered Verginius to be arrested but Lucius and Horatius arrived on the seen and pushed back the lictor saying Claudius lacked the authority to order anyone's arrest.[236] Ogilvie points out that Lucius had no standing to challenge Claudius as he had no *imperium* and was not a tribune.[237] This situation is very similar to Publicola's action in Dionysius of arresting the Aquillii for their part in the conspiracy to restore the Tarquins without any seeming authority. Just as in that case, Lucius own position of power in the state as a clan leader as well as his now well-cultivated popular support allowed him to exercise power outside of official state channels.

Dionysius provides more detail of Lucius' actions as he describes Lucius and Horatius arriving in the forum with "many good youths" to make a stand before the body of Verginia.[238] The band of youths then physically engages with Appius Claudius and any who approached them. This sounds like a small battle occurring right in the middle of the Forum with a warrior band under Lucius and Horatius being one of the primary players. The situation in Rome has deteriorated to the point where the Forum, the necessary "no-man's land" in the state where clan disputes could be resolved,[239] is the site of physical battles between various clans and state agents. With the disintegration of a legitimate state authority, it is unsurprising to see the clans and their associated warrior bands become the main

[236] Livy, 3.49.3.
[237] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 488.
[238] Dionysius, 11.38.5. πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν νεότητα περὶ αὐτοὺς ἄγοντες ἵστανται πρὸ τοῦνεκροῦ
[239] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 243.

sources of power within the state. Lucius and his men actually occupy a part of the Forum and hold an assembly to inveigh against Claudius.[240] While not sanctioned by the government, the use of the formal ἐκκλησία to describe the assembly shows the power Lucius was able to exercise. Livy and Dionysius both report that after Claudius withdrew, Lucius acted as though he held legitimate authority.[241] Ogilvie's comment that Lucius had no official authority is once again pertinent but the political situation has arguably deteriorated so badly that Lucius' force of arms is enough for him to secure that authority.[242] As the man who now controlled the Forum, Lucius Valerius was effectively in control of the state though his method of achieving that control is most analogous to other clan leaders of war bands rather than through holding a formal magistracy.

Lucius, however, does not assume monarchic powers. Dionysius reports that he and his men "did not think it right to shed the blood of their fellow citizens."[243] Previous leaders subdued the city and took immediate control. Lucius is most obviously hampered by the fact that the decemvirs are all still around and have control of armies in the field. Lucius may have the Forum and much popular support but he is not in absolute control. The actions of the plebeians dictated what his ultimate response would be but it is enough to see that at this point, Lucius was in a powerful though precarious position in Rome that gave him immediate control of the Forum but did allow much projection of military power.

---

[240] Dionysius, 11.39.2.
[241] Livy, 3.40.5, *iam pro impero…* and Dionysius, 11.39.5, ἐξουσίας ὅσης ἐβούλοντο τυχόντες…
[242] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 488.
[243] Dionysius, 11.39.7. οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Οὐαλέριον οὐκ ἠξίουν αἵματι πολιτικῷτὸ νεῖκος διαιρεῖν.

The army was roused to rebellion by Claudius' actions and eventually removed to the Sacred Mount, the site of the First Secession. The Senate was convened by the decemvirs and the body passed a measure calling for conciliatory action since they recognized the decemvirs as the cause of the trouble.[244] No mention was made of Lucius or his control of the Forum. It is possible that the convocation of the Senate was enough to restore political balance against the decemvirs and that Lucius felt his actions were no longer necessary. It is also possible that Lucius, who never had a military advantage, saw the plebs organizing under its own strength outside the city. Just as Publicola had to back down from his attempt at the throne due to a lack of popular support, so did his grandson who did not have the army's support or any popular groundswell in his favor. Lucius likely saw and understood the political situation and returned to work within the established system.

G. Conclusions

The fundamental struggle the clans engaged in was for dominance within the state. By the time of Lucius Valerius Potitus, however, that struggle was mostly confined to operating within the framework of the Republic's political institutions. Despite some similarities to Publicola's earlier attempt at kingship,[245] Lucius' actions were not done with the same mindset. His refusal to shed the blood of citizens as well as his lack of real military power show that any kind of sole control of the state would never have been a real possibility. Rather, his

[244] Livy, 3.50.14.
[245] See III.B.

actions do suggest a clan asserting its status against the decemvirs and agreeing to work within the oligarchic system of the Republic dominated by the clans

Publicola's passage of *provocatio* and the Valerian actions at Lake Regillus show that the clan was a potent political and military force. *Provocatio* secured some degree of independence for the clans while Lake Regillus demonstrated their military power. Lucius Valerius Potitus was attempting to safeguard the prerogatives of his clan by overthrowing the decemviral regime which had been so hostile to it. Such actions occur within the framework of the state though Terrenato's claim that the existence of the city helped to reduce physical conflict is at odds with Lucius' actions in the Forum.[246] When Lucius returns to work with the Senate, however, it is possible to see the clans beginning to fit into the power-sharing arrangement described by Smith.[247]

The conflicts examined above were not the only types of interaction among the clans and the city. The political ambitions of a clan could expand beyond a desire to simply exert great influence on the state and could become a desire to actually rule. The emergence of powerful warlords, backed by the resources of a clan, represents a development of clan interactions in situations where the legitimate exercise of power in the state was unclear and great men sought to expand the power of their clans and themselves.

[246] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 241.
[247] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 313.

III. Warlords and Sole Power in Rome

Cornell sees the late regal period of Rome as being a struggle between opposing warlords trying to control the city.[248] He uses the example of Mastarna, an Etruscan mercenary who may have become the king Servius Tullius, to demonstrate the effect of a leader with a private band of armed followers. He further places Aulus Vibenna and Lars Porsenna in this category of war leaders who may have been able to seize control of Rome at the end of the sixth century.[249] Such examples are not unique to Rome. A palace at Murlo has been interpreted as the seat of a clan with regal ambitions but not large city to dominate.[250] Neither Livy nor Dionysius records Vibenna or Porsenna as kings of Rome due to the traditions they followed. Cornell, however, posits that rather than any necessarily patriotic gesture in abstaining to show Rome conquered by a foreign leader, neither Aulus Vibenna nor Lars Porsenna held power decisively or long enough for tradition to record them as kings.[251] He then suggests that Romans such as Publicola and Appius Claudius may be in the same category.

Following Cornell's reasoning, the actions of the Valerii in the first decades of the Republic do show that the family was either aiming early on for such power in Rome or was actively involved in preventing others from obtaining it. Publicola is particularly noteworthy due to his actions surrounding the fall of the monarchy and his poorly documented attempt at becoming king. Smith notes that without the power and legitimacy of the kings to suppress them, ambitious

[248] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 144.
[249] Ibid., 145.
[250] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 241.
[251] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 145.

men like Publicola, Spurius Cassius, and Coriolanus could make real attempts at seizing the throne[252] While Publicola and the others ultimately fail in those attempts, their actions fit into a pattern of other great clan leaders and warlords attempting to also seize power in Rome. After Publicola, the Valerii take on a more defensive role by actively opposing those who tried to accomplish this. To be king and remain as such required the consent of the clans to be governed, a consent the Valerii would never give.[253] While the texts never show them leading a band of warriors into battle, much of the early action of the Valerii is related to the actions of clan leaders attempting to establish themselves as rulers of Rome.

A. The Expulsion of the Kings

The most dramatic struggle for power involves the end of the monarchy and the expulsion of the Tarquin dynasty. The Valerii are not really heard of under the monarchy until the reign of the last king with the appearance of their most famous member, Publius Valerius Publicola.[254] Publicola first appears in the aftermath of the rape of Lucretia by Sextus Tarquinius. When Lucretia summons her father and husband to come "with a trusted friend," Collatinus brings Brutus while her father, Lucretius, brings Publicola.[255] Livy does not describe Publicola anymore than the "son of Volesus" and after pledging to support Brutus' oath to overthrow the Tarquins, he does not appear in the narrative again until he becomes consul after the resignation of Collatinus.

---

[252] Smith, *The Roman Clan,* 297.
[253] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 234.
[254] The name *Publicola* is given to Valerius later on and will be discussed at IV.A. Its use here is for convenience in identification.
[255] Livy, 1.58. *cum singulis fidelibus amicis*.

Dionysius makes Publicola's presence less conspicuous by only including him among the "friends and kinsmen" Lucretius is told to summon.[256] He is first mentioned by name after Lucretia kills herself and is described as "a man of action and prudence."[257] Dionysius then makes him responsible for informing Collatinus of the situation and rousing the army against the Tarquins.

Both accounts clearly place Publicola at the very start of the events that directly contributed to the end of the monarchy and the beginning of the Republic. Brutus is given credit as the one of the first consuls (with Collatinus) and the instigator of the revolt. In Dionysius, however, he is not even present when Lucretia kills herself nor does he have any influence in the initial proclamation by those present that they would rather die than give up their liberty to tyrants.[258] Rather, it is Publicola himself who informs Brutus (as he was returning to Rome with Collatinus) and sets up the situation where Brutus can rouse the Romans to action. Dionysius does not deny Brutus his central role but he makes Publicola have a more prominent role to play both by making him present at Lucretia's death and by his task of raising a revolt in the army.

Publicola's role must be considered in the context of the overthrow of the monarchy as a whole. The narrative tradition in both Livy and Dionysius is clear in attributing the fall of the monarchy to tyrannical behavior on the part of Tarquin that was exemplified by the rape of Lucretia. There was, however, a change in the nature of the kingship at Rome and its relationship to the aristocracy that presents these vents in a new light. Kings were originally acclaimed by the

[256] Dionysius, 4.66.3.
[257] Dionysius, 4.67.3.
[258] Dionysius, 4.66.2.

People from a nominee chosen by the patrician senators who could not hold the kingship themselves.[259] The king thus served as a neutral figure that was not from any of the great aristocratic clans. The kingship would have been dependent on the clans under this model as they controlled access to the office. Cornell attributes the beginnings of a change in the nature of the monarchy to Servius Tullius whose army reforms weakened the power of the clans.[260] By reorganizing the army based on centuries rather than the armed bands of the clan leaders, the clans lost their preeminent position in the state.[261] Cornell argues that this was a deliberate policy to weaken the aristocracy but that intent is not necessary for the reforms to have such an effect.

Forsythe also notes a shift in the inheritance of royal authority. Tarquinius Superbus was the son[262] of the fifth king Tarquinius Priscus. Forsythe argues that there was an attempt to institute hereditary succession to the throne on the part of Tarquin rather than an open process run by the Senate.[263] There is also a theory that there already was some amount of hereditary succession through royal daughters among the earlier kings but that is not seen in Livy or Dionysius which place primacy on Senatorial control of succession.[264] Such a change would effectively remove the clans from any say in who held the kingship thus weakening their power. Cornell proposes that this was already occurring as the last two kings were really popular "tyrants" who seized power against the wishes

[259] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 143.
[260] Ibid., 194.
[261] Ibid., 196.
[262] Or grandson depending on the author.
[263] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 98.
[264] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 386.

of the Senate.[265] This would serve to alienate the Senate who would not only be shut out of the nominating process, but would see its status as the ultimate source of royal power usurped by the People. In light of the loss of aristocratic power both in the army and concerning royal succession, it is understandable that the clan leaders would be generally unfavorable to a king. The abuses alleged of Tarquin may also reflect a real state of oppression which would have contributed to the feelings as well. There is additional archaeological evidence brought in by Forsythe who notes that the material record from the end of the sixth century shows a wealthy aristocracy.[266] Such a statement is confirmed by the prosperity of the Auditorium Villa at this time.[267] It is highly likely that a wealthy aristocracy that saw its powers being curtailed by the kings would not have stood by and done nothing. The clans, including the Valerii, could have risen up to restore not *libertas* for Rome as a whole, but to preserve their own power in establishing an oligarchic Republic.

The theory above is based on some archaeological evidence and requires less reliance on the literary sources. There is a second complementary theory that looks more closely at the individual figures of the overthrow and places their actions into a specific context. Cornell argues that the overthrow of the monarchy is a dynastic saga involving a power struggle between competing heirs to the throne.[268] Forsythe does acknowledge the effects individual ambitious aristocrats may have had but he prefers to see the event as reflecting a general trend of

---

[265] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 105.
[266] Ibid., 109.
[267] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 7.
[268] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 217.

increasing aristocratic power.[269] Cornell's theory hinges on the specific actors in the saga as well as their actions after the establishment of the Republic. Central to this view is the fact that most of the main plot movers are members of the family of the Tarquins. Besides the king himself, Collatinus carries the name of Tarquin and is the cousin of the king.[270] Brutus is Tarquin's nephew, the son of his sister.

The overthrow looks like a family struggle for the throne due to the many relatives who may have all been aiming at the kingship.[271] Brutus in particular may have been in the best position to become king as he could marry Tarquin's daughter since he was not part of the same *gens*.[272] This view is also supported by his position as Tribune of the Celeres, the elite royal guard of the king, which shows his high status within the royal family.[273] According to this theory, Brutus led a revolt against his uncle for the purpose of obtaining the throne. Publicola's involvement in the story implies that he had his own monarchic ambitions when looked at in this context. His brief appearance is enough to put him into this group though, with a lack of links to the royal family, Brutus would have taken precedence. The other figures in the story were all elites so it is likely that the general aristocratic dislike against the kings contributed support to Brutus. Brutus' actions after the overthrow of the Tarquins mark him as kingly and bring in the figure of Publicola.

---

[269] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 148.
[270] Specifically, he is a first cousin once removed as his grandfather, Arruns, was the brother of Tarquinius Priscus.
[271] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 217.
[272] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 411.
[273] Ibid., 401.

Livy and Dionysius have Brutus institute the dual magistracy of the consuls who served for one year as a check on their royal power.[274] His co-consul was Collatinus, the husband of Lucretia. Trouble, however, emerged between the two colleagues. Livy's account is very brief and gives little context for the strife. He has Brutus give a speech where he claims that all Tarquinii, like Collatinus, desire the kingship and have "an unpleasing name [that is] a danger to liberty."[275] Collatinus is then asked to leave Rome with assurances that his departure will be honorable and accompanied by no loss of property. Cornell notes how strange the episode is and asks two questions: how Collatinus was elected if his name was so "odious" and how Brutus was not affected by being related to the king as well?[276] Brutus is in fact more closely related to Tarquin as he is his nephew rather than cousin. Livy, unfortunately, does not provide any further details. In the context of a dynastic power struggle, however, this episode appears to be a competition for primacy in the state in which Brutus wins the conflict, perhaps based on his superior blood links. It is at this point that Publicola enters the narrative as Collatinus' replacement. Publicola's role in this is unclear though one could suppose that he is a partisan of Brutus since his role as Brutus' colleague caused no problems.

Dionysius provides a different take from Livy on the events of Collatinus' departure and Publicola's rise to prominence. Both writers describe a plot developed among the young aristocrats led by the Aquillii, the Vitellii, and the

---

[274] Livy, 2.1.
[275] Livy, 2.2.4. *non placere nomen, periculosum libertati esse.*
[276] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 217.

sons of Brutus to restore the Tarquins to Rome.[277] A slave heard of this and went, not to the consuls as in Livy,[278] but to Publicola "who was among the first four overthrowing the tyranny."[279] Publicola then personally seized the Aquillii and takes them before the consuls. At face value, this story is a continuation of the overthrow of the kings except that now, Publicola is saving the Republic by apprehending those who wish to destroy it by returning the kings. This episode, however, does raise serious questions about Publicola's actions, namely by what authority he seized the Aquillii and brought them to the consuls.[280]

This whole episode plays into the dynastic struggle as the Vitellii are from the family of Brutus' wife and the Aquillii are the sons of Collatinus' sister. The involvement of the Tarquins in the plot is another matter but the presence of so many members of the consuls' families suggests a continuation of a family struggle for power. As in Livy, the consuls prevail but Collatinus suffers. Collatinus asked Brutus to spare his nephews from punishment after Brutus ordered his own sons to be killed.[281] When Collatinus attempted to use his veto, Brutus summoned an assembly and accused Collatinus of aiding the Tarquins. He eventually is persuaded to lay down his office as proof of his good intentions towards Rome. Unlike Livy, Dionysius never has Brutus explicitly mention Collatinus as a member of the *gens Tarquinia* but he is clearly associated with them through his reluctance to punish his family members in the conspiracy. The

[277] Dionysius, 5.6.4.
[278] In Livy, Collatinus has already resigned so the consuls are Brutus and Valerius. In Dionysius, the consuls are still Brutus and Collatinus.
[279] Dionysius, 5.7.4.
[280] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 411.
[281] Dionysius, 5.9.2.

more personal nature of the attack does look like a blatant power grab on Brutus' part that sets up the entrance of Publicola.

B. Publius Valerius Publicola

The actions of Brutus in his overthrow of the Tarquins and his struggle with Collatinus are strongly indicative of an attempt on his part to seize sole power in Rome. The Valerii directly enter the conflict in the person of Publicola. While Publicola's early involvement in the revolt suggests some personal regal aspirations, the strength of Brutus' and Collatinus' claims would have trumped his own. Such claims are implied both from his participation in what seems to be a dynastic struggle as well as his later actions as consul. Livy has Publicola appear only after Collatinus' departure while Dionysius introduces him first in the conspiracy to restore the Tarquins. His actions in that conspiracy raise questions regarding the nature of his power. The slave goes to him and not the consuls with details of the plot and Publicola is able to arrest the Aquillii on the spot. Such actions suggest that Publicola was a "third power" along with Brutus and Collatinus though he had no official role.[282] It is probably too much to read into this episode that Publicola was already exercising independent power without holding the consulship but it does speak to his status at the start of the Republic. His authority to arrest was unchallenged and even supported by Brutus. Publicola was clearly a powerful man who may have had dynastic ambitions of his own for his clan.

[282] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 411.

Publicola's ascent to the consulship is described slightly differently by Livy and Dionysius. Livy has the *comitia centuriata* elect Publicola, "by whose help [Brutus] expelled the kings," nearly the same descriptor used by Dionysius to introduce Publicola for the first time during the Republic.[283] Dionysius does have an election, but he has Brutus call the election so that no one would think he had banished Collatinus from a desire to rule alone.[284] This fear of being thought to rule alone will appear again and, while Dionysius' intent may be to clear Brutus of such thoughts, it suggests that people did have them and Brutus' move was seen as a power grab. At the same time, the choice of Publicola shows the strength of his own support by the People and probably by Brutus who never entered into any recorded conflict with him.

As consuls, Brutus and Publicola enacted some administrative reforms including distribution of land belonging to the Tarquins, increasing the number of patrician senators, and recalling exiles from the monarchy.[285] The two were eventually forced to confront Tarquin on the field and did so at the Battle of Silvia Arsia. The Romans won the battle though it was only settled by a god proclaiming the Roman victory.[286] Publicola celebrated the first triumph of the Republic and thus established a reputation of defending the Republic against tyranny on the battlefield. Brutus, however, was killed leaving Publicola as sole consul. The exact sequence of events that followed is unclear and needs to be

[283] Livy, 2.2.11. *collegam sibi cmitia centuriate creavit P. Valerium, quo adiutore reges eiecerat*.
[284] Dionysius, 5.12.3.
[285] Dionysius, 5.13.2, 4.
[286] Livy, 2.7.

discussed in more detail but both authors indicate that a suspicion of tyranny hung over Publicola.

Livy reports that after the battle "Then to the consul who survived, as the minds of the crowd are inconsistent, not only was there ill-will from [earlier] favor but there was even suspicion [and the charge of] a foul crime."[287] Publicola was accused of seeking the power of the king based on two factors: "He did not nominate a colleague in place of Brutus and he built a house on the summit of the Velia."[288] Dionysius repeats the fear of the People that Publicola would make himself king.[289] The reasons are the same: not appointing a colleague and having his home on the Velia. Dionysius, however, explicitly compares Publicola to Brutus as the People complain that he should have appointed a colleague quickly, just as Brutus had done.[290] The accusations of both authors are thus mostly the same and probably derive from a similar source.

The first problem is the more straightforward issue. The entire point of the dual consulate was to prevent power from being exercised by one man alone. As the last wielder of sole power was the king, this is the obvious comparison for Publicola. His involvement in the earliest stages of the overthrow of the monarchy suggests his ambition for regal power.[291] The comparison with Brutus in Dionysius stands out since Dionysius also mentions Brutus' concern about appearing to have only exiled Collatinus for sole power.[292] This can be either an

---

[287] Livy, 2.7.5. *consuli deinde qui superfuerat, ut sunt mutabiles volgi animi, ex favor non invidia modo sed suspicio etiam cum atroci crimine orta.*
[288] Livy, 2.7.6. *qui nec collegiam subrogaverat in locum Bruti et aedificabat in summa Velia*.
[289] Dionysius, 5.19.1.
[290] Dionysius, 5.19.1.
[291] Koptev, "Three Brothers", 414.
[292] Dionysius, 5.12.3.

attempt to compare Publicola unfavorably with Brutus or as a way to highlight their similarities. Brutus was the more obvious regal heir and by placing Publicola in a similar position, albeit one handled with less political skill, his own status as a competitor for royal power becomes more apparent.

The nature of the complaint concerning the Velia is more complex. The Velia was a small hill near the Palatine that overlooked the forum across from the Capitoline. Livy describes it as being "high and defensible" causing fear that Publicola would make it into "an impregnable citadel."[293] Dionysius likewise describes it as lying above the "lofty" and "steep" crest of the Velia and commanding the forum.[294] Following the texts, it appears as though Publicola was building a large house conceived of as a palace that would provide a secure power base in the city. Such a dominating residence is similar to the large Auditorium Villa which was expanded at this same time.[295] There are also analogies with large Etruscan houses at Murlo and Acquarossa that resemble the Regia in Rome and are also believed to be aristocratic palaces.[296] The Forum area itself also has remains of large archaic houses along the Via Sacra and other routes around the Forum.[297] One house in particular, under the Temple of Antoninus and Faustina, is actually associated with the new house Publicola built at the base of the hill.[298] The presence of these large houses on the edge of the Forum may indicate the existence of politically active clans who wished to be

[293] Livy, 2.7.6. *ibi alto atque munito locoarcem inexpugnabilem fieri*.
[294] Dionysius, 5.19.1.
[295] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 17.
[296] Smith, *Early Rome*, 144 and 175.
[297] Ibid., 173.
[298] Ibid., 174.

close to the communal political center of the city. Publicola's house would then be a part of a common trend regarding the placement of houses for clan leaders. Like the villa then, the Valerian house can be seen as an attempt by a clan to assert its power and authority in the politically unstable times after the expulsion of the kings. Publicola's large house near the Forum should not be a problem alone. The issues are most likely related to the possible regal aspirations of family cited by Cornell as well as the association of the Valerii with the Velia.[299] Coarelli also links the Regia, the Temple of Vesta and other royal buildings with the Velia.[300] Cicero explicitly mentions that King Tullus Hostilius has his home on the summit of the Velia and that Publicola was building his house on the same spot.[301] Publicola was thus not only occupying a physically commanding position over the community's central space, the Forum, but also was constructing a residence of his own near that of the former kings.

Publicola's actions strongly indicate that the political situation at the end of the regal period was more complex than the sources say. Publicola's holding of sole consular power and the building of a large house near the site of the royal palace correlate with his early appearance in the overthrow of the monarchy in suggesting a prolonged struggle for the throne involving multiple members of the aristocracy. Publicola's inclusion in this group is a testament not just to his own prestige, but to the power of his clan and the *gentes* in general. In the struggle for domination of Rome, it is possible that independent warlords, often affiliated with

[299] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 218, note 10.
[300] Ibid.,, 240.
[301] Steinby, *Lexicon Topigraphicum Urbis Romae,* 111 and Smith, *Early Rome,* 173. The reference is Cicero, *De Re Publica,* 2.31.53.

a *gens*, played a role.[302] Cornell sees both Mastarna/Servius Tullius and Lars Porsenna as figures that seized Rome with the support of warrior bands and Wiseman notes the link to Publius Valerius from the *Lapis Satricanus.*[303] Whether or not this Valerius is Publicola cannot really be answered though his inclusion among other figures attempting to seize power is intriguing.

This view of Publicola being a regal contender is at odds with the rest of the Valerian tradition. Both Livy and Dionysius repeatedly emphasize the role of Publicola in overthrowing the tyranny of the kings and the family's strong association with popular rights. Both writers, however, did include this story in their texts and the story, or at least Valerian associations with the Velia are found in other sources.[304] Ogilvie favors accepting the tradition but cautions it may be used to explain the popular precedent of lowering the *fasces* when addressing the People.[305] The fact that this attempt at kingship is so different from the standard perception of the Valerii does suggest an accurate preservation of a real power struggle. Archaeological evidence from Rome shows that the burning of several major structures like the Regia, the Comitium and the Sant'Omobono temple all date to the last years of the sixth century.[306] This implies a more destructive political upheaval than the sources do which had a major effect upon the physical structure of the city as well as its internal balance of power.

Valerius Publicola, like Brutus and Collatinus before him, was a part of this struggle and, as the sources indicate, aimed at kingship though with

---

[302] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 144.
[303] Wiseman, "Roman Republic, Year One," 24 and Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome***,** 218.
[304] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy,* 250.
[305] Ibid., 251.
[306] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 237 and Wiseman, "Roman Republic, Year One", 24.

unexpected results. Hearing the grumblings of the People, Publicola backed down. In one night he dismantled his house on the Velia and began to rebuild it at the foot of the hill.[307] He also passed laws to establish safeguards on the People's liberty. This view of Publicola as a royal contender and warlord stands in contrast to the established narrative tradition and may reflect more of the reality of late sixth and early fifth century aristocratic politics. After the failure of Valerian attempts to control Rome, other leaders from outside the city attempted to fill the void left by the kings.

C. Lars Porsenna[308]

In the traditional narrative, Porsenna was the Etruscan king of Clusium who occupied the Janiculum Hill in 506 in an attempt to restore Tarquin to the throne. Both authors describe a siege situation where Publicola, one of the consuls for that year, does little more than conduct raids against Porsenna's army except when Dionysius involves him in the escape of Cloelia and a few small battles. This episode is not so important for Publicola himself who appears as a competent general who valiantly defends the city. The nature of Lars Porsenna's actions, however, has involved considerable controversy. Porsenna's attack is often viewed as one of the final upheavals of the young Republic that completes the transition away from monarchy. Cornell takes the view that Porsenna ended a

---

[307] Livy, 2.7.12.

[308] For additional information on Lars Porsenna, see Anne-Marie Adam, " Des 'condottiere' en Étrurie et dans le Latium à l'époque archaïque?," *Latomus* 60, 4 (2000) : 877-889, Massimiliano Di Fazio, "Porsenna e la società di Chiusi," *Athenaeum* 88, 2 (2000) : 393-412, William M. Gaugler, *The tomb of Lars Porsenna at Clusium and its religious and political implications* (Bangor, ME: Laureate Press, 2002), and Jean-René Jannot, "L'Étrurie intérieure de Lars Porsenna à Arruns le Jeune," *MEFRA* C (1988): 601-614.

series of power struggles between major political figures for regal dominance and effectively forced the Republic on Rome.[309] Forsythe agrees in general but proposes an elaborate new theory in which Porsenna actually deposed Tarquin and appointed Brutus and Collatinus as rulers loyal to himself because of their connections to the royal house.[310] The consuls were kept as part of a Republican system of government after the defeat of Porsenna at Aricia in 504 as a sensible arrangement by the aristocrats.[311] Cornell's broader view of Porsenna has some archaeological support (as does Forsythe's general argument) in the destruction layers at the end of the sixth century showing that the transition from monarchy to Republic may not have been so smooth.[312] Cornell's argument is more easily supported by the sources which only involve Porsenna after Brutus is dead. The domestic situation in Rome does calm down after Porsenna though the details, as always, are unclear. On the other hand, it is acknowledged by Cornell that Porsenna probably did occupy Rome that the sources glossed it over.[313]

The involvement of Publicola as a defender of Rome against the imposition of a new sole ruler of the city helps to build the narrative of Publicola's opposition to kings in Rome. At the same time, it is possible that as Publicola and his family had failed to achieve sole power in the city, so they would prevent anyone else from achieving that very goal. The Valerii would fight to uphold the power-sharing oligarchy of the Republic to prevent any other clan or warlord from attempting to exert control over them. Porsenna was the first to

[309] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 218.
[310] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 155.
[311] Ibid., 155.
[312] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 237.
[313] Ibid., 237.

try after Publicola's failure a few years before. This personal reaction to Porsenna thus forms a model in which to view later attempts by other men to seize power in the state. The exact effect of Porsenna's attack and occupation of Rome is unclear except that it seems to have put the Republican government on a surer footing than it was before. The clans remained strong, as evidenced by the continued actions of the Valerii and others, but the Republican regime, backed by the clans, emerged as the legitimate government of Rome.

D. Coriolanus[314]

The saga of Coriolanus can be examined in light of Lars Porsenna's attack on Rome. Once again, Rome had to resist a foreign leader in command of an armed band attacking the city. Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus was a patrician general who offended the plebs through his political attacks on the tribunes. In 491, the tribunes, supported by Manius Valerius, the brother of Publicola, brought him to trial for tyranny[315] but Coriolanus fled to the Volscians rather than be sentenced and began to attack Rome. When he was approaching the gates of Rome, he was only persuaded to turn back by the prayers and tears of his mother, wife, and young sons. According to Dionysius, Coriolanus' family only went to him because of an embassy of women led by Valeria, the sister of Publicola.[316]

---

[314] For additional information on Coriolanus, see Jane D. Chaplin, "Livy's Narrative Habit," in *Essays Presented to A.L. Boegehold*, ed. Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James P. Sickinger (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2003), 195-213, Tim Cornell, "Coriolanus: Myth, History, and Performance," in *Studies in Honor of T.P. Wiseman*, ed. David C. Braund and Christopher Gill (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2003), 73-97, Kathleen W.D. Hull, "Coriolanus and the Homeric Tradition," *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 11 (2003): 34-52, and E.T. Salmon, "Historical Elements in the Story of Coriolanus," *Classical Quarterly* (1930): 96-101.
[315] Dionysius, 7.58.1. Livy does not state the actual charges.
[316] Dionysius, 8.39.2.

Valeria's brief role in ending the threat of Coriolanus parallels her brother Manius' actions in precipitating the crisis.

The nature of Coriolanus' actions is somewhat muddied. Cornell believes that Coriolanus reflects a memory of the Volscians overrunning most of Latium and threatening Rome itself.[317] There were repeated raids of the Volscians and Aequians during the early 5th century which Cornell proposes as the context for Coriolanus' raid. This supports the view of the Valerii as Roman patriots against Volscian incursions. The figure of Coriolanus himself may be too mythic to really analyze. Ogilvie sees him as a creation of the *gens Mucia* to justify their later prominence.[318] The narrative has made Coriolanus' story a part of the Struggle of the Orders. If Coriolanus was a historical figure, however, he does resemble earlier warlords like Lars Porsenna in attempting to seize power in Rome.[319] Both Coriolanus and Porsenna do wish to overturn the existing order in Rome which for Coriolanus now includes the existence of the tribunes. The involvement of Manius Valerius does recall Publicola's own opposition to Porsenna. As with Porsenna, Manius may have been trying to prevent any other family from gaining more power in Rome than his own.

In the greater context of the early fifth century, the Valerii were a powerful clan who may have felt competition around this time from a rival clan or warlord like Coriolanus. There is no real direct conflict between the Valerii and Coriolanus but their general opposition may preserve the memory of inter-clan strife in competition for power in Rome. There is also evidence which suggests

[317] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 307.
[318] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy,* 315.
[319] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 297.

that the Valerii opposed Coriolanus as champions of the People who were utilized as a power base for the family but this point will be discussed in a later chapter.

E. Spurius Cassius[320]

From the Coriolanus episode to 449, the appearances by the Valerii become more sporadic and the family lacks the great figures of the likes of Publicola and his brothers Marcus and Manius. The family, however, does not fade away and members continue to hold the consulship and other magistracies. There's no apparent reason why the Valerii are less conspicuous in the record. It is possible that the rise of other families like the Fabii, who held seven consecutive consulships, forced the Valerii from their preeminent position in the state. This rise of new families and sources of power is part of a trend in the 480's that begins with Spurius Cassius.

Spurius Cassius had been consul three times and was known for negotiating the *Foedus Cassianum* with the Latin League after the Battle of Lake Regillus. He tried to divide land taken from the Volscians among both Romans and their allies but the inclusion of the allies offended the urban poor in Rome. He tried to win back support by distributing land and offering to forgive debts incurred from the purchase of grain but such attempts were seen by many as a

[320] For additional information on Spurius Cassius, see Olivier de Cazanove, "Spurius Cassius, Cérès et Tellus," *Revue des etudes latines* 67 (1989): 93-116, M.A. Giua, "La valutazione della monarchia a Roma in età repubblicana," *Studi Classici e Orientali* 16 (1967): 308-329, Annie Vigourt, "Les 'adfectores regni' et les normes sociales," in *L'invention des grands hommes de la Rome antique*, ed. Marianne Coudry and Thomas Späth (Paris : de Boccard, 2001), 333-341, and Annie Vigourt, ", "L'intention criminelle et son châtiment : les condamnations des aspirants à la tyrannie," in *L'invention des grands hommes de la Rome antique*, ed. Marianne Coudry and Thomas Späth (Paris : de Boccard, 2001), 271-287.

power grab.[321] Both Livy and Dionysius record the charge of tyranny being laid on Cassius who was eventually tried, found guilty, and executed in 485. Cassius' actions can be explained as being part of the trend of various clan leaders seeking sole power in Rome but he can also be studied in the broader context of societal upheaval in Rome. Ogilvie makes Gaius Gracchus and his grain law as the model for Spurius Cassius but the figure of Cassius need not be explained by later events.[322]

Staveley first brought to attention the existence of changes in Rome around 485 which he attributed to domestic strife.[323] According to Staveley, such disharmony in the state resulted in would-be tyrants like Cassius emerging and necessitated a shift from a military oligarchy to a more civil government to better guarantee the existence of the state.[324] Forsythe builds upon the proposed change by noting the rise of the Fabii immediately after Cassius' fall.[325] He proposes that the years around 485 witnessed a shift in the balance of power among the aristocratic clans that culminated in the disappearance of some families, like the Cassii, and the rise of others, like the Fabii.[326] This same time frame is also correlated with the "closing of the patriciate" as the aristocracy tried to consolidate its power.[327] Cornell and Smith both note that the core of Spurius Cassius' fall is probably the attempted tyranny.[328] Cassius' tyranny is thus a

---

[321] Livy, 2.41.
[322] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 339.
[323] Staveley, "Nature and Aims", 46.
[324] Ibid., 48.
[325] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 195.
[326] Ibid., 195.
[327] Staveley, "Nature and Aims", 47.
[328] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 271 and Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 311.

symptom of the domestic instability in Rome and his subsequent fall represents the shift in power to other aristocratic clans.[329]

The events of 485 allow for an examination of aristocratic clan politics in early Rome but the Valerii lack either a dramatic rise or fall at this time. The only clue comes from the brief notices in both Livy and Dionysius that one of the prosecuting quaestor was a Lucius Valerius.[330] Livy provides no details on the man but Dionysius calls him "the brother of the man who overthrew the kings," Publicola.[331] The involvement of a Valerius in prosecuting a man aiming at tyranny fits in well with the narrative of Publicola expelling Tarquin. Lucius comments that the tribunes were even opposed to Cassius.[332] This allows Lucius to continue the Valerian support of the official plebeian leadership even when their opposition is not the Senate. A third interpretation rests on earlier arguments explaining the Valerii as contenders for the throne. If Spurius Cassius made a move for sole power in the state, the Valerii would be natural opponents. The family would not have forgotten their own pretensions to greatness and would seek to punish those who could achieve what they could not. This can be looked at as either a personal affront to the Valerii who had seen their own ambitions dashed or as a general reaction of one aristocratic clan opposed to a power grab by another.

---

[329] This assumes that the *Fasti* preserves an accurate list of magistrates. See Introduction for discussion on the reliability of the ancient sources.
[330] Livy, 2.41.11 and Dionysius 8.77.1.
[331] Dionysius, 8.77.1. ἀδελφὸς τοῦ καταλύσαντος τοὺς βασιλεῖς. The editor believes that "nephew" is meant based on 8.87.2.
[332] Dionysius, 8.78.2.

F. Appius Herdonius[333]

There is not another Valerian consul until 460 when Publius Valerius, the son of Publicola and consul of 475, was elected. His consulship is memorable for the attack of Appius Herdonius. Herdonius was a Sabine who seized the Capitol with a force of 2500 men in the middle of the night.[334] Forsythe believes that this reflects a Sabine attack on Rome in the same way that Coriolanus stands in for a Volscian raid.[335] Dionysius attributes a desire for tyranny in Rome to Herdonius which puts him in a similar category to other would-be tyrants like Spurius Cassius.[336] Cornell follows this view and puts Herdonius in a tradition of coup leaders like Mastarna and Lars Porsenna who seized Rome and may even have been kings.[337] Cornell points out that Herdonius' failure is actually closest to Publicola's attempt to become king like Publicola on the Velia, Herdonius held the Capitoline which also commanded the Forum.

Herdonius' seizure of the Capitol was not possible without the help of the 2500 men who accompanied him. The presence of armed men brings to mind the armed *suodales* who accompanied Poplios Valesios and suggests a warrior band of similar nature. Like Valesios but unlike Lars Porsenna, Herdonius is no king and lacks the official title Porsenna had as king of Clusium. This implies a more informal war band under a charismatic leader rather than the more organized army under Porsenna. The composition of such a band also bears scrutiny as they are

---

[333] For additional information on Appius Herdonius, see E. Noè, "Il tentativo di Appio Erdonio nella narrazione di Dionigi," *RAL* 32 (1977): 641-665 and Emilio Peruzzi, "Le coup de main d'Appius Herdonius," *La Parola del Passato* 42 (1987): 440-449.
[334] Livy, 3.15.5.
[335] Forsythe, *Early Rome*, 205.
[336] Dionysius, 10.14.1.
[337] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 145.

described as "exiles and slaves."[338] Herdonius is not leading a completely clan-based band but rather is supported by Romans who opposed the current status quo in Rome. It is not hard to imagine that any of the previous men who sought to control Rome would have had supporters both within the city and from beyond its borders. Clan politics could involve the bringing in of outside leaders in order to supplement domestic elements in such a power struggle. Herdonius' actions thus not only follow in the pattern of other warlords, but also, by the composition of supporters, shed some light on the interactions between clan factions in Rome and such warlords.

The Valerian involvement in the story thus has multiple explanations outside of a straightforward desire to protect the state. Following Cornell, the narrative may be trying to effectively "atone" for the actions of the consul's father, Publicola, by having the son oppose this attempted tyranny. This interpretation, however, relies only on the narrative and ignores underlying issues. The reaction of Publius may be closest to that of Lucius Valerius in defending the state from Spurius Cassius. Like Lucius, Publius could be acting out of a desire shared by the whole aristocracy to oppose the sole rule of any one clan preferring the power-sharing arrangement of the consulship. It could also be a reaction of Publius against a man who could achieve sole rule when his own family could not. In either case, both Herdonius' actions and Publius' response show that the issue of clans seeking out sole rule, whether domestically or from abroad, was a problem that did not end after the defeat of the Tarquins.

---

[338] Livy, 3.15.5. *exules servique*.

G. Conclusions

Cornell's comparison of Publicola and men like Lars Porsenna and Appius Herdonius show that not only that there was a great competition for power in Rome during the first decades of the Republic, but also that the *gens Valeria* was a major player in these struggles. The dynastic struggle proposed by Cornell both accounts for the actions of Brutus and Collatinus and offers a fuller explanation for the brief references to Publicola's attempted tyranny. After Publicola, the Valerii themselves no longer attempt to hold such power, preferring instead to work within the confines of the power-sharing Republican oligarchy.

Men like Lars Porsenna, Coriolanus, Spurius Cassius, and Appius Herdonius should be viewed in the same light as Brutus and Publicola. Powerful men, backed by clans or war bands attempted to seize control of Rome and other cities throughout this period in Central Italy. The Valerian actions against these men certainly reflect a desire to maintain the existing oligarchic system of government whereby no one was able to establish sole rule over Rome. The extent of personal feeling, that as the Valerii could not hold sole power, neither should anyone else, is unknown but it is likely that this played some role.

After Appius Herdonius, incidents of men seeking such power in Rome nearly fade away as the political situation began to stabilize. Despite some actions by the Valerii during the decemvirate that are reminiscent of attempts to establish sole rule, the Republic would not face powerful men of this nature attempting to solely dominate the state until its last century. The power of the clans, however, was not broken by the successes of the Republic against these

clan leaders and warlords. These attempts at sole power are just a facet of the clan struggles of the early Republic which occurred throughout this period. As the Republic began to stabilize, however, the warrior bands and independent clan resources were no longer enough. The Valerii and the other clans were thus forced to seek out and court a new base of support.

IV. Building a Base of Support

The previous chapter examined instances of clan leaders or warlords attempting to seize power in early Rome. There were, however, very few families capable of supporting such a takeover of Rome and ultimately, after the kings no one man or family was able to successfully dominate Rome unopposed. As the clan brought the majority of their conflicts to be settled into the city, the warrior bands no longer provided adequate support for their political endeavors. As the clans struggled for dominance, each sought to establish a new base that would provide the necessary backing in the political sphere for future ambitions. Terrenato bases the practice of gaining such support on the existence of villas such as the Auditorium site. The clan would distribute land to its members and other farmers, who would then become clients, in exchange for military and political support.[339] The Valerii actively engaged in this process and began to build a constituency around a group marginalized by the ruling aristocracy: the plebeians.

Livy and Dionysius both have the plebeians present in Rome from the very beginning. They were citizens but lacked the ability to stand for higher office as the patrician clans had shut them out of access to power. Such a view has been challenged by historians like Cornell who argue that the emergence of the plebeians was a slower development that was more connected with the events of the First Secession and a proposed "closing of the patriciate" in the 480's.[340] Such an increase in plebeian agitation may be related to an economic crisis in the

[339] Terrenato, "The Auditorium Site," 15.
[340] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 256.

early 5th century.[341] This is confirmed by Raaflaub's assertion that early plebeian goals centered on economic issues rather than a struggle for political rights.[342] Regardless of their origin and aims, as the plebeians began to organize, their tribunes and assemblies provided a new avenue to power that could be manipulated by the upper class. The need for plebeian support, however, was a real one since the aristocratic vote would often be split.[343] As Flower argues, the regular non-elite vote would have to be courted as well.[344] Thus the People, in Farney's view, served as a mediator in the aristocratic struggles for political office.[345] The use of family "branding" in political appeals and funeral orations has been discussed above but they were effective means of mobilizing the People.

At the same time, however, the elite may have taken action to reduce the impact of the plebs. Richard suggests that the creation of the rural tribes in 495 was actually an attempt by the clans to secure their interests against the urban tribes dominated by the poor.[346] As confirmed by the Auditorium Villa, the elite had rural bases associated with their land holdings. If Richard is correct, it would explain why during the following plebeian struggles, the elite felt secure enough to generally resist popular demands until the army itself was threatened. It also raises questions about the political base of the Valerii prior to their courting of the People. The Valerian attention to the People may be a result of a failure to establish themselves among the new rural tribes with the result that they were

[341] Raaflaub, "Protection and Defense", 213.
[342] Ibid., 206.
[343] Flower, *Ancestor Masks*, 66.
[344] Ibid., 66.
[345] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 16 and 19.
[346] Richard, 126, note 81.

forced to rely upon the backing of the urban dwellers. The success of the family during this period, however, does not suggest a Valerian failure but may represent an attempt to gain an advantage over the clans who solely relied upon the rural tribes. The family would thus be attempting to sway a neglected group of citizens whose votes could tip the balance of power in the Valerii's favor.

The narrative presents the Valerii as heroic champions of the People who were well known for their support of popular causes.[347] Even when this narrative is pulled back, there is a strong affinity between the family and the People. Manius Valerius is the first to really exploit the neglected popular power base though Publicola may have begun the process. The actions of Publius and Lucius Valerius are based on the techniques used by Manius to win over the People. It is Lucius Valerius Potitus, however, who, after the fall of the decemvirs, shows what was possible for a clan who relied on the People's support with his popular legislation and triumph. It is likely that the Valerii, whether out of genuine ideological sympathy or a desire for political power, aligned themselves with the People to further their political ambitions.

A. Publicola: The People's Friend

According to the narrative, Publicola received his name, meaning "the People's Friend" on account of his lowering of the *fasces* when addressing the People as well as through the passage of the right of *provocatio*.[348] The cognomen was restricted to the Valerii as a way to indicate the popular leanings

[347] Vasaly, "Personality and Power", 203.
[348] Livy, 2.8.1.

of the family.[349] An alternative theory, linking *provocatio* to the desires of the clans to remain largely independent of a central city government, has already been discussed. In light of those previous arguments, it is likely that *provocatio*, even if for the People's benefit, was not passed to begin to establish a base of support for Publicola. Rather, it was a conciliatory gesture on Publicola's part, to both the clans and the People, in the aftermath of his failed attempt to seize sole control of Rome. The same process can be seen when Publicola ordered the fasces to be lowered before the People. It was taken as a confirmation that they were the ultimate source of authority in the Republic.[350] In Dionysius, the fasces are not lowered but Publicola ordered the axes to be removed when inside the city leaving only the rods.[351] Both actions were clearly ascribed to Publicola and the effect of each is the same. The lowering of the fasces and the removal of the axes immediately calmed the People as Publicola acknowledged their authority by effectively removing the threat of arbitrary corporal punishment from the People. Cornell comments on the need for the new regime to conciliate the People and the army who had both supported the monarchy.[352] This is not the same as establishing a political base but rather attempts to calm divisive elements within the state. It also differs from the more direct methods of courting popular support described below.

It is in Livy and Dionysius' portrayal of the Valerii as populist politicians that Publicola shows his support for the People. Dionysius has Brutus and

---

[349] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 253.
[350] Livy, 2.7.
[351] Dionysius, 5.19.3
[352] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 238.

Publicola as consuls introduce formal "administrative acts"[353] to deal with the forfeited property of the Tarquins. Moveable goods were given to the crowd to seize but land was divided and given to those who had no land.[354] This division of land to the poor is the standard action of later *populares* politicians. To follow Cornell's methodology, there is nothing implausible about Publicola's populist actions. It is in the division of land that Publicola may have acquired his reputation as the People's friend but his actions regarding *provocatio* and the lowering of the fasces do not appear to have been motivated by populist leanings. Rather, as previously described, they were attempts to conciliate the People to the new government of the Republic.[355]

It is certain that later Valerii were able to build off of the populist tradition surrounding Publicola but Publicola's own actions do not quite resemble those of later members of the family who actively sought to base their power on popular support. It is not until Manius Valerius' actions in the events surrounding the Second Secession that the Valerii really begin to take popular concerns seriously

B. Manius Valerius

The Battle of Lake Regillus in 498 reestablished Roman hegemony over the Latins and ended any hopes of restoring the Tarquins or the monarchy in general to Rome. Manius is the first major member of the Valerii to argue for traditional popular rights like debt relief. His actions in many ways form the precedent for later *populares*-type figures. While there is probably truth in this

[353] Dionysius, 5.13.1. πολιτεύματα.
[354] Dionysius, 5.13.2.
[355] For more discussion on *provocatio*, see II.C.

populist portrayal of Manius and the Valerii, Manius' actions still show the power of the Valerii as an aristocratic clan.

In 494, a debt crisis along with an attack of the Volscians and Aequians prompted Manius Valerius to be appointed as dictator. Dionysius remarks that the Senate thought that Manius being the brother of Publicola would make the dictatorship more amenable to the People while also commenting that he was an old man who would not cause any trouble.[356] Livy says the Senate sought a man of "moderate temper" due to the great power of the office.[357] After a successful victory, however, conservative factions within the state prevented any relief to debtors so Manius made a brief speech resigning and wishing for "domestic concord."[358] The plebs are reported as honoring him for resigning on their behalf despite failing to accomplish anything.

It is noteworthy that Livy reports that the plebs believed that Valerius had left office on account of "his anger at their misfortunes."[359] Livy implies that popular rights were now becoming an ideological issue for the Valerii. He does not, however, directly cite this feeling of Manius himself but attributes it to the People. It is possible that the People saw what motivation in Manius they wished him to have and Livy is being skeptical. That this would be a political move to garner popular support would be unsurprising at Rome or in most other cultures. As the Republic became more stable and accepted as the legitimate government of Rome, the clans would have had to compete for power among the actual voters in

[356] Dionysius, 6.39.2.
[357] Livy, 2.30. *mansueto…ingenio*.
[358] Livy, 2.31.
[359] Livy, 2.31. *suam vicem indignatem magistrate abisse.*

the city. Manius may be taking advantage of an underrepresented group in electoral politics in order to gain power for himself and his family. Livy's lack of comment on the matter suggests that he himself believed it to be a sincere move on Manius' part thought it certainly fits in with his popular characterization of the Valerii. The statement marks a shift in the narrative at least in which the Valerii become more personally involved in the struggle for plebeian political equality.

In Dionysius, Manius does attempt to stand up for the plebeians in the Senate but he is rebuffed by the young aristocrats who refuse any compromise. His family is specifically attacked as "mob-flatterers" and writers of "oppressive laws," specifically the right of appeal which the Valerii "prided themselves upon."[360] Much of the attacks come from Appius Claudius and his supporters which probably places such opposition of the clan struggles between the two families.[361] Manius became upset but the object of his anger stems from the attacks against his family and not the lack of support for helping the People. Indeed, his speech to the People is more concerned with the senatorial attacks on his name than with the misfortune of the poor. Dionysius has Manius say at one point that while both he and the People have been "cheated and misled," he has been so more than the People since his reputation has been tarnished.[362] The Senate ultimately accuses Manius of caving in to plebeian demands "desiring to procure the aid [of the plebeians] for [him]self."[363] The Senate does not see Manius' actions as sincere but as an attempt for political support from the People.

---

[360] Dionysius, 6.43.2.

[361] See II.B for reasons behind the hostile interactions between the two families.

[362] Dionysius, 6.44.1.
ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως πεφενακίσμεθα καὶ παραλελογίσμεθαἀμφότεροι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑμῶν ἐγώ

[363] Dionysius, 6.44.1. βουλόμενος ἰδίαν ὠφέλειαν περιποιήσασθαι

Manius, in speaking directly to the People, would obviously disagree with such an assumption though the Senate's accusation does fit in with Manius' concern for his prestige over the People's well-being. As discussed above, Manius' motivation for siding with the People may have been to court popular support and the Senate's beliefs may be a genuine reaction against him for that reason rather than being primarily motivated by class bias.

Ultimately, Dionysius' Manius is more concerned with protecting his own name though he remains sympathetic to the cause of the plebs and is conceived by both the Senate and People as being the best popular champion at the time. Livy's Manius is more personal in his defense of the People and resigns his command due to his failure to help them. Livy provides a much more condensed account so it is uncertain if these aspects of Manius' character were suppressed or just not part of the tradition Livy was following. Even in Livy, however, it would not be out of character for Manius, now the last of Publicola's brothers, to take an active role in not only defending his family's reputation, but in securing a new power base among the previously neglected plebeians.

The Senate's refusal to consider Manius' proposals left the plebs feeling alienated. The plebs finally revolted from the consuls and set up a camp outside of Rome at the Sacred Mount thus beginning the First Plebeian Secession. Livy focuses all of the credit for reconciling the plebs and patricians on the envoy Menenius Agrippa while Dionysius includes Manius Valerius. Wiseman asserts that the original story involved Agrippa and Manius was a later addition by

Valerius Antias in the first century, added to glorify the *gens Valeria*.[364] The absence of Manius Valerius in Livy's account does suggest that there was a reliable tradition connected with Agrippa and Livy is generally sympathetic to the Valerii so it is unlikely that they were removed from the story. It is also possible that there was another tradition involving the Valerii that Livy knew of and rejected but Dionysius, who relied more on family records, did not.[365] As Valerius Antias' writings do not really survive, it is impossible to know if Manius was inserted into the story by him or an earlier author.[366] What is clear is the persistent association in the narrative of the Valerii with popular rights and such a characterization which would certainly be in play at the creation of the tribunate. It is thus possible that it was considered natural to have a Valerius involved in the beginnings of an office which fought for plebeian rights and that someone inserted Manius to satisfy that expectation.

Whether Manius' role in the First Secession is factual or a later invention does not change his role in Dionysius' narrative. He delivers a speech in the Senate in which he says that the blame for the People's troubles did not come from the plots of "the most refined of the patricians" but rather those who were arrogant and greedy.[367] This becomes an attack on Appius Claudius who was chief of those wishing to deny any concessions to the plebs. Manius is clearly placing himself in the "refined" category though χαριεστάτους can also refer to someone who is well-educated or accomplished. Manius has sympathies with the

[364] Wiseman, *Roman Drama,* 87.
[365] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 86.
[366] Cornell, *Clio's Cosmetics,* 205.
[367] Dionysius, 6.58.3. οὐ τοὺς χαριεστάτους τῶν πατρικίων.

plebs, whether based on a need for their support or genuine concern, but he sees himself in the highest echelons of the Roman aristocracy, a fact which gives him great power within the state.

Appius Claudius defends himself against Manius' attacks but also goes on the offensive. He says Manius is a "flatterer of the People and desiring tyrannical measures."[368] He accuses Manius of egging the People on with his support and then comments on how previous tyrants have begun as "flatterers of the People."[369] These accusations, like the claims of Manius discussed above, are in a speech which means that Dionysius is elaborating the story for his audience but it is one based off of an underlying historical event.[370] The support for the People by Manius and the other Valerii, as discussed earlier, possibly reflects a desire to form a political base among the People. The comments of Appius Claudius show that he (and Dionysius) accepts this at least as a logical motivation for Manius' position. The Claudii are also in a competition for political power against the Valerii so there is likely a personal motivation behind such statements. The accusations of desiring to be a tyrant may be for rhetorical effect but Publicola had already aimed at kingship. The Valerii were well-established enough that it is not impossible that another member of the family would take aim at a similar high position of power in the state. The speech may just have Appius Claudius making a point about Manius getting above himself, but Manius' political maneuvering and family history do not rule out the possibility that he was in fact aiming at a more powerful position within the state for himself and his family.

---

[368] Dionysius, 6.60.2. δημοκοπίαν καὶ τυραννικῶνἔργων ἐπιθυμίαν.
[369] Dionysius, 6.60.2-3.
[370] Gabba, *Dionysius*, 74. See introduction for more detailed discussion.

The Senate eventually accepted the conciliatory proposals of Agrippa and Manius and sent the two of them as envoys to the seceding plebs. Menenius takes center stage in the negotiations, as in Livy, while Manius is a constant presence. Manius' few remaining appearances in this episode fall within the narrative of the Valerii helping the People gain political rights. Even if Manius was trying to secure a power base, to do so, he had to follow the plebeian agenda and get them to return to the state. Dionysius seems unclear about his role, though, as he, like Livy, eventually credits the entire reconciliation to Menenius Agrippa.[371] Without following Wiseman and rejecting Manius' involvement, the episode shows a growing Valerian interest in popular affairs though the words of Manius, as presented by Dionysius, suggest that Manius may have been trying to establish a popular power base for the future political ambitions of himself and the other Valerii. Later episodes show Manius' plan working effectively to maintain power for the clan.

C. Lucius Valerius

Manius Valerius died after the situation with Coriolanus. After his death, the appearances of the Valerii became more sporadic. Possible reasons have been discussed above relating to the fall of Spurius Cassius and an accompanying shift in the power of the major clans. After Cassius, the Valerii are scarce for a few years until 470 when Lucius Valerius, one of the prosecutors of Spurius Cassius received a second consulship. The tribunes were clamoring for land-allotments and Lucius, unlike in his first consulship, supported the tribunes.

[371] Dionysius, 6.96.1.

Dionysius states this came from a desire to mend fences with the People after overseeing the trial and execution of Spurius Cassius fifteen years earlier.[372] Both consuls actually supported the measure and were trusted by the tribunes.[373] Such a reversal on Lucius' part probably reflects the change in the political situation after fifteen years. As opposed to the unstable situation of the government in 485 with several clans losing a stake in the government, such issues were far more settled by 470. Lucius could thus turn his attentions to building a power base among the People by supporting, at this time, agricultural reform. His consulship in 485 was thus a deviation from the standard Valerian policy of supporting the People.

Dionysius' statement that Lucius was trying to "treat" or "cure" the anger of the People suggests an active campaign on his part to re-establish himself and his family as popular supporters.[374] Such effort could stem from the realization of the benefits of popular support. The lack of Valerii in high office between 485 and 470 (with the exception of Publius above) may indicate that in addition to clan disputes after the fall of Spurius Cassius, Lucius Valerius' actions may have damaged his family's standing among the People which resulted in the winning of fewer elections. Publius' election and warm reception in 475 are an exception though, as a son of Publicola, he may have had his father's name to help him. Lucius may thus be attempting to rebuild the popular base of support that the family needed to compete for the political offices of the Republic.

---

[372] Dionysius, 9.51.2.
[373] Dionysius, 9.51.3.
[374] Dionysius, 9.51.2. ἀποθεραπεῦσαι.

D. Valerius and Horatius

After the defeat of Herdonius in 460, the popular push to codify the laws became the main narrative in Livy and Dionysius. This led to the establishment of the decemvirate in 451. The tyranny of the decemvirs and the aristocratic power struggle occurring in the Senate and the Forum has already been discussed in detail.[375] The opposition of Lucius Valerius Potitus and Marcus Horatius to the decemvirs was mainly examined from the context of clan rivalries but it may have had a popular element as well. As the Valerian base was the People, if they were deprived of the power to elect magistrates, the Valerii would have no supporters in Rome outside of the feuding aristocratic clans. This assumes the decemvirs would ever agree to share power with the clans, which is unlikely. The decemvirs by their unelected nature (in 449) hurt both the Valerii, who could not hold high office, and the People, who now lacked political power. The overthrow of the decemvirs would thus not only allow the Valerii to hold magistracies again, but would also earn the favor of the People who were being oppressed. High office and the means to access it were thus primary motivating factors for Lucius and Horatius to lead the opposition to the decemvirs.

Such opposition was ultimately successful as Lucius and Horatius seized the Forum and the Senate eventually reasserted itself. Lucius' involvement, however, was not over. From the Aventine, the Plebs in the army specifically requested him and Horatius to be the envoys to them from the Senate. Quarrels in the Senate led to the troops leaving the Aventine for the Sacred Mount. At this point, Dionysius breaks off until the return of the consuls so Livy is the only

[375] See II.F.

source. Livy reports a joint speech by Lucius and Horatius which was to convince the decemvirs and many of the Senators as well that in order to end the secession, the tribunate will have to be restored. Lucius and Horatius are already setting themselves up as popular champions of the tribunate allowing them to reestablish their support among the plebs once the secession is over. The decemvirs eventually backed down and Lucius and Horatius went to treat with the plebeians.

The plebs welcomed the two men "with great joy" as "liberators" indicating the support they already had among the People.[376] Lucius and Horatius urged the plebs to forgo revenge saying that the state had had enough of civil war.[377] Lucius and Horatius were responding to a senatorial request to protect the decemvirs from the rages of the plebs.[378] Their personal feelings on the matter are unclear. It is likely that with the People's demands already being met as well as their support for Lucius and Horatius guaranteed that neither saw any reason to exact any further revenge and antagonize the Senate. The demands of the plebs were presented to the Senate which agreed to all terms. The plebs then returned to the city and elected tribunes.

Lucius Valerius and Horatius were then elected consuls of Rome no doubt due to their favorable views of the People. Dionysius comments that they were well-disposed to the People not just because of their innate personalities, but because of their "ancestors" as well.[379] This statement not only reflects the belief

[376] Livy, 3.53.2. *profecti gaudio ingenti plebis in castra accipiuntur, quippe liberatores.*
[377] Livy, 3.53.8.
[378] Livy, 3.53.1.
[379] Dioysius, 11.45.1. προγόνων.

that political personality was a family trait[380], but shows that the efforts of previous Valerii to gain the support of the plebs had paid off well for Lucius. The first actions of the consuls were the passing of the three Valerio-Horatian Laws. These three laws effectively re-established the plebeian organization after the decemvirs.[381] Ogilvie sees the legislation as the "triumph of the plebs"[382] and is generally supportive of their historicity. He argues that the laws were not the result of the tyranny of the decemvirs but were based on the plebeian realization that codification only enshrined their legal disabilities which previously had only been matters of custom.[383] The Valerio-Horatian legislation was then the actual resolution of the earlier struggles concerning codification and not just a settlement to win back the plebs after the fall of the decemvirs.

The three laws bound the entire state and not just the plebeians to the decisions of the popular assembly, reestablished the right of *provocatio* along with punishments for any who created a magistracy without it, and guaranteed the sacrosanctity of the tribunes. Dionysius only mentions the first law though he implies the existence of the others. None of these laws seem to have any great benefit for the Valerii outside of securing more popular support which would help the political fortunes of the family. The second law on *provocatio* in particular draws attention to previous Valerian involvement in such popular protections as under Publicola. The original creation of the right of appeal may have been to reduce state interference in the affairs of clans and this incarnation of the law may

[380] Farney, *Ethnic Identity*, 20.
[381] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 260.
[382] Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy*, 498.
[383] Ibid., 453.

have done the same thing.[384] The protection of the tribunate appears to only benefit that office and, by extension, the plebs while the binding nature of the Tribal Assembly may be a way for the Valerii to increase their power. Dionysius notes that in that assembly, the plebeians usually prevailed over the patricians unlike in the Centuriate Assembly.[385] With a strong base of popular support, the Valerii could move legislation through the tribal assembly to gain a legislative advantage over their rivals. Even if these interpretations are true, the main beneficiaries of the legislation were the plebeians who, as Livy reports, had their "status fixed" by the consuls and fully integrated into the Republic.[386]

The remaining events of 449 show the effect of the Valerian program of supporting the People on Lucius Valerius. After the trial of Appius Claudius, the consuls fought against the Aequians and the Sabines. Both were completely victorious and returned to Rome expecting triumphs. The Senate, however, refused to grant either Lucius or Horatius triumphs. Gaius Claudius, the uncle of the dead decemvir Appius Claudius accused them of being dishonest in allowing the tribunes to prosecute his nephew and also for passing their laws which weakened the patricians.[387] Such a statement is likely a continuation of the rivalry between the two families. The next sequence of events differs between Livy and Dionysius. Livy says that the tribune Icilius brought the question of a triumph directly to the People who unanimously approved it. Dionysius, on the other hand, states that Lucius and Horatius were offended and called an assembly where

[384] See II.B for in depth discussion.
[385] Dionysius, 11.45.3.
[386] Livy, 3.60.1.
[387] Dionysius, 11.49.4.

the tribunes then introduced a law regarding the triumphs.[388] Both accounts show that the standing of Lucius and Horatius was so great among the plebs, that the People would override the Senate on their behalf. This is in many ways the ultimate payoff the Valerii received for all of their populist measures as the family showed the Senate that it could rely on popular support at their expense. The spontaneity of the tribunes in Livy shows a somewhat greater power as Lucius did not even have to ask for the vote. Dionysius' account shows similar power in calling the assembly and persuading the tribunes though an extra step is required showing less absolute control.

It is not too far off to think that Gaius Claudius had a point when he said that Lucius and Horatius really "wished to triumph over the patricians and not their enemies."[389] Through the actions of Lucius Valerius, the decemvirs had been overthrown and the plebeians reintegrated into the state at the expense of sole patrician control. While many of his actions directly parallel his grandfather Publicola, especially in his possible tyrannical ambitions, Lucius Valerius ultimately worked within the existing machinery of the state by increasing his support among the plebeians. Such support allowed him to not only directly challenge the Senate over the issue of triumphs, but to build a power base for his family that would last through the Republic. The actions of Lucius continue the Valerian tradition of supporting the expansion of plebeian political rights while protecting the political interests of the clan.

---

[388] Dionysius, 11.50.1.
[389] Livy, 3.63.9. *maxime C. Claudio vociferante de patribus, non de hostibus consules triumphare velle.*

F. Conclusions

Lucius Valerius Potitus represents the ultimate rewards of Valerian popular support. Possibly since Publicola, the Valerii slowly associated themselves with the growing popular cries for greater political equality. Manius Valerius' actions show that fighting for the sake of the People was closely connected with Valerian desires for greater power and prestige in Rome. Publius and Lucius Valerius continued to build up popular support for the family while also experiencing, especially in the case of Lucius, what a lack of such support could entail. It is under Lucius Valerius Potitus that the popular base was finally harnessed to its maximum potential.

Lucius was not only elected consul with Horatius, but he was able to pass a series of laws that not only preserved the power of the clans through *provocatio,* but continued to endear the Valerii to the plebs. When the Senate objected to awarding the consuls triumphs, all the popular goodwill that had been accumulated was used to effectively triumph over the Senate. The two triumphs, voted on by the People, show that such political success for a clan was possible without any major support from the other clans in the Senate. The Valerii thus demonstrated that there was another avenue to power outside of the system of clan alliances that rested with the People. As long as the family could maintain this base of support, the avenues to power would be kept open.

V. Conclusion

At the end of the 6th century, Rome was a city dominated by several wealthy aristocratic *gentes*. These families, originating from all over Central Italy, based their wealth in land that could be given out to dependents. Their status was exhibited first in elaborate family burials and then through large public monuments. The clans interacted in the urban environment of the city where they could interact without risk to their fields. Clan leaders with bands of armed men roamed the countryside and raided neighbors. Rome was ruled by popular kings who theoretically governed with the consent of the clan leaders gathered in an advisory body resembling the later Senate.

The monarchy ended when several of the clans mobilized to seize power in the state. There is some evidence of the aristocracy chaffing under royal rule but a dynastic power struggle, as argued by Cornell, is also likely. The early Republic was characterized by this conflict between the clans as they tried to establish themselves as the new power in Rome. Without the kings to keep them in check, clan warlords tried to seize control of the state. Originally clans within the state tried to assert themselves but, as a new balance was achieved in Rome itself, outside warlords attempted to gain power. The early Republic thus lacked a strong central government. The few institutions it had, probably Senate-like council and magistrates who may have resembled the consuls, were dominated by rival aristocratic clans who competed with one another for influence.

This was the world in which the Valerii interacted and established themselves as one of the leading families of the early Republic. As seen in the

writings of Livy and Dionysius, they typify the actions of clans during an earlier stage of the development of the Roman state when the clans still often acted outside of the bounds of a central government. Descriptions of early Valerii migrating with Titus Tatius or fighting at Lake Regillus indicate a military strength of a clan that is not under the control of the government. *Provocatio* may even have been originally passed to preserve some of the independence of the clans.

After the tumult of the Republic's first decades, the political situation began to stabilize as the state became the legitimate arena for the exercise of power. As a result, clan interactions became more confined to the political arena. Clan conflicts and feuds continued but no longer did they involve roving warrior bands which faded away while struggles for sole control of Rome abated until the first century. The clans themselves, however, did not fade away. The politics of the Late Republic relied on clan networks for support and many of the great *gentes* were still in existence.[390] There were still feuds between families and the political base of families still mattered. These issues, though, were now wholly acted out within the confines of the state.

Perhaps the greatest change in clan behavior was the steady decrease in warlords or clan heads who attempted to seize sole power in Rome. The expulsion of the kings in 509 was related to dynastic struggles within the royal clan and Publicola himself attempted to rule the city as king from a palace of his own atop the Velia. The deeds of Lars Porsenna, Coriolanus, Spurius Cassius, and Appius Herdonius certainly follow the pattern of warlords trying to control

[390] Terrenato, "The Versatile Clans," 236.

the city as explained by Cornell.[391] Publicola was involved in this same process and later Valerii were active in trying to repel these men. The Valerian motives involved protecting their own established position in Rome but, may also have involved some form of personal grievance: as they had failed to rule alone, so must other families.

These attempts by warlords eventually faded as well though Spurius Maelius in 439 and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus in 384 are usually placed in the same category.[392] The path to power became more restricted and the clans were forced to find other bases of support for their political ambitions. The Valerii were a powerful family with large resources but they aggressively pursued a political base of support among the plebeians and established a reputation as popular politicians. Possibly beginning under Publicola but perfected by Manius Valerius, the family passed popular legislation and sided with the plebs in clan disputes, often against the Claudii. Such posturing gained the Valerii the plebeian support they needed for elections and allowed them to compete more effectively against rival clans.

The overthrow of the decemvirs in 449 marks the beginning of a new era in Roman politics. The Senate was forced to acknowledge the "state within a state" the plebeians had created with their tribunes during the First Secession and proposals to eliminate the tribunate were no longer viable options. Having secured these concessions, the plebeians began to push for full political equality via access to the consulship. The Valerio-Horatian legislation itself, in Cornell's

[391] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, 144.
[392] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 311.

view, established this new order by "cementing the alliance of convenience" between the plebeians and the Senate.[393] The Republic and its institutions were thus more inclusive and established as the legitimate government of Rome.

The popular triumph of Lucius Valerius Potitus in many ways represents the successful manipulation of these various traits of the Roman clans. His triumph was achieved with popular support gained from supporting the overthrow of the decemvirs as well as decades of populist Valerian politicians. The conflict against the decemvirs themselves was a kind of clan conflict that saw the Valerii triumph for a time over the Claudii. With his control of the Forum by an armed band, Lucius was even in a position to be sole ruler of Rome as his ancestor Publicola could not. His refusal to make that move shows his awareness that the political system had changed and would no longer tolerate such actions by individuals. He would now have to follow the rules of the state to gain power. Yet the independence of the clans remained. Lucius received his triumph not from the Senate, as was custom, but from the People. There was now an alternative path to power that reduced Valerian reliance on the other clans. At the same time, however, the Valerio-Horatian legislation made such a path a legal possibility.

The Valerii exemplify these clan attributes but they were not the only powerful clan in Rome to do so. Their great rivals, the Claudii, gained dominance in Rome and Appius Claudius the decemvir has even been thought to have attempted to be a kind of king in Rome in the manner of Publicola.[394] The Fabii

[393] Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome,* 276.
[394] Ibid., 145.

at the Cremera are the textbook example of the independent military power of the clans. All of the clans actively sought to build political power bases though few were able to match the skill of the Valerii in doing so. Like these other clans, the actions of the Valerii reflect the political situation of the time for an aristocratic clan.

Smith sees the clans as surviving in part due to their ability to simplify matters of inheritance as well as playing a role in the equitable division of magisterial offices among members of the elite.[395] The loss of status of the *gentes*, in his view, came in the fourth century during the Samnite Wars as the new patricio-plebeian nobility regulated itself via the Senate rather than power-sharing among the clans.[396] Such a trend towards centralization would weaken the power of the clans as they could no longer act independently of the state. During the early years of the Republic, the Valerii and other clans were able to maintain a degree of independence that manifested itself through inter-clan relations and the desire for greater political power through armed seizures or electoral politics. It is this model of clan behavior that best explains Valerian actions as opposed to Livy and Dionysius' portrayal of the family as representative of populist political heroes. Rather, the Valerii were part of a world where aristocratic clans battled with armed bands, schemed for the throne, and let their ambition to dominate the state drive their political activities.

[395] Smith, *The Roman Clan*, 323.
[396] Ibid, 323.

Bibliography

Badian, E. "The Early Historians." In *Latin Historians*, edited by T.A. Dorey, 1-38. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

Balsdon, J.P.V.D. "Dionysius on Romulus: A Political Pamphlet?" *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 61 (1971): 18-27.

Bickerman, Elias J. "*Origines Gentium*." *Classical Philology*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1952): 65-81.

Botsford, G.W. "The Social Composition of the Primitive Roman *populus*." *Political Science Quarterly*, 22 (1906): 498-526.

Botsford, G.W. "Some Problems Connected with the Roman *Gens*." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1907): 663-692.

Bremmer, Jan. "The Suodales of Poplios Valesios." *Zeitchrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, vol. 47 (1982): 133-47.

Bremmer, Jan and Nicholas M. Horsefall. *Roman Myth and Mythography*. London: University of London, Institute of Classical Studies, 1987.

Brunt, P.A. "*Nobilitas* and *Novitas*." *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 72 (1982): 1-17.

Carney, T.F. "Formal Elements in Livy." *Proceedings of the African Classical Association*, vol. 2 (1959): 1-9.

Corbier, Mireille. "Family Behavior of the Roman Aristocracy, Second Century BC-Third Century AD." Translated by Ann Cremin. In *Women's History and Ancient History*, edited by Sarah B. Pomeroy, 173-196. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

Cornell, T.J. *The Beginnings of Rome*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Cornell, T.J. "The City-States of Latium." In *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Center*, edited by Mogens Herman Hansen, 209-228. Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag, 2000.

Cornell, T.J. "Ethnicity as a Factor in Early Roman History." In *Gender and Ethnicity in Ancient Italy*, edited by Tim Cornell and Kathryn Lomas. London: Accordia Research Institute, 1997.

Cornell, T.J. "The Formation of the Historical Tradition of Early Rome." In *Past*

perspectives: studies in Greek and Roman historical writing : papers presented at a conference in Leeds, 6-8 April 1983 edited by I.S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman, 67-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Cornell, T.J. Review of *Clio's Cosmetics: Three Studies in Greco-Roman Literature*, by T.P. Wiseman. *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 72 (1982): 203-206.

Cornell, T.J. "The Tyranny of the Evidence: A Discussion of the Possible Uses of Literacy in Etruria and Latium in the Archaic Age," in *Literacy in the Ancient World*, edited by J.H. Humphrey, 7-34. Ann Arbor: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1991.

Cornell, T.J. "The Value of the Literary Tradition Concerning Archaic Rome," in *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 52-76. Berkley: University of California Press, 1986.

Dixon, Suzanne. *The Roman Family*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

Farney, Gary. *Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in Republican Rome*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Finley, Moses. "Myth, Memory, and History." *History and Theory*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1965): 281-302.

Flower, H. *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Forsythe, Gary. *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Fox, Matthew. "History and Rhetoric in Dionysius of Halicarnassus." *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 83 (1993): 31-47.

Frier, Bruce W. *Libri annales pontificum maximorum: the Origins of the Annalistic Tradition*. Rome: American Academy in Rome, 1979.

Gabba, E. *Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome*. California: University of California Press, 1991.

Hahn, I. "Plebeians and Clan Society." *Oikumene*, vol. 1 (1976): 47-75.

Hill, H. "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Origins of Rome." *The Journal of*

Roman Studies, vol. 51 (1961): 88-93.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-J. "Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the *Nobilitas*." Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 42, no. 1 (1993): 12-39.

Holloway, R. Ross. "Who were the 'Tribuni Militum Consulari Potestate'?" *L'Antiquité Classique*, vol. 77 (2008): 107-125.

Howard, Albert A. "Valerias Antias and Livy." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. 17 (1906): 161-182.

Keaney, Anne M. "Three Sabine Nomina: *Clausus, Consus, *Fisus*." *Glotta*, vol. 69, no. 3/4 (1991): 202-214.

Konstan, David. "Narrative and Ideology in Livy: Book 1." *Classical Antiquity*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1986): 198-215.

Koptev, Alexandr. "'Three Brothers at the Head of Archaic Rome: The King and his 'Consuls.'" Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 54, no. 4 (2005): 382-423.

Lipovsky, James. *A Historiographical Study of Livy: Books VI-X*." New York: Arno Press, 1981.

Luce, T.J. *Livy: The Composition of his History*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Luce, T.J. "Design and Structure in Livy: 5.32-55." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 102 (1971): 265-302.

MacMullen, Ramsay. *The Earliest Romans: A Character Sketch*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011.

Miles, Gary B. "The Cycle of Roman History in Livy's First Pentad." *The American Journal of Philology*, vol. 107, no. 1 (1986): 1-33.

Miles, Gary B. *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Mitchell, Richard E. *Patricians and Plebeians: The Origin of the Roman State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. "Perizonius, Niebuhr, and the Character of Early Roman Tradition." *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 47, no. 1/2 (1957): 104-

114.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. “Some Observations on the ‘Origo Gentis Romanae’.” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1/2 (1958): 56-73.

Münzer, F. *Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families*. Translated by T. Ridley. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

North, John. “Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic.” *Classical Philology*, vol. 85, no. 4. (1990): 277-287.

Ogilvie, R.M. *A Commentary on Livy: Books 1-5*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Ogilvie, R.M. “Livy, Licinius Macer, and the *Libri Lintei*.” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 48, no. ½ (1958): 40-46.

Palmer, Robert E.A. *The Archaic Community of the Romans*. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Pulgram, E. “The Origin of the Latin *nomen gentilicum*.” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 58/59 (1948): 163-187.

Radin, Max. ‘Gens, Famila, Stirps.” *Classical Philology*, vol. 9, no. 3 (1914): 235-247.

Raaflaub, K.A. “The Conflict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach,” in *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 1-51. Berkley: University of California Press, 1986.

Raaflaub, K.A. “From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders,” in *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 198-243. Berkley: University of California Press, 1986.

Richard, J.C. “Les Fabii à la Crémère: Grandeur et Décadence de l’Organisation Gentilice.” In *Crise et transformation des sociétés archaïques de l'Italie antique au Ve siècle av. J.-C.: actes de la table ronde*. Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome, vol. 137. Rome: L'Ecole française de Rome, 1990.

Richard, J.C. “Patricians and Plebeians: The Origin of a Social Dichotomy,” in *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 105-129. Berkley: University of California Press, 1986.

Rose, H.J. “Patricians and Plebeians at Rome.” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 12 (1922): 106-133.

Saller, Richard P. “*Familia, Domus*, and the Roman Conception of the Family.” *Phoenix*, vol. 38, no. 4 (1984): 336-355.

Salway, Benet. “What’s in a name? A Survey of Roman Onomastic Practice from c. 700 B.C. to A.D. 700.” *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 84 (1994): 124-145.

Shatzman, Israel. “Patricians and Plebeians: The Case of the Veturii.” *The Calssical Quarterly*, New Series, vol. 23, no. 1 (1973): 65-77.

Smith, Christopher. “The Beginnings of Urbanization in Rome.” In *Mediterranean Urbanization 800-600 BC*, edited by Robin Osborne and Barry Cunliffe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Smith, C.J. *Early Rome and Latium: Economy and Society c.1000 to 500 BC.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Smith, C.J. *The Roman Clan: The* gens *from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Solodow, Joseph B. “Livy and the Story of Horatius, 1.24-26.” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, vol. 109 (1979): 251-268.

Stadter, Philip A. “The Structure of Livy’s History.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 21, no. 2 (1972): 287-307.

Staveley, E. Stuart. “The Nature and Aims of the Patriciate.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 32, no. 1 (1983): 24-57

Steele, R.B. “The Historical Attitude of Livy.” *The American Journal of Philology*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1904): 15-44.

Steinby, Eva Margareta. *Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae*. Vol. 5. Rome: Edizioni Quasar, 1999.

Terrenato, Nicola. “The Auditorium Site in Rome and the Origins of the Roman Villa.” *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, vol. 14 (2001): 5-32.

Terrenato, Nicola. “The Versatile Clans: Archaic Rome and the Nature of Early City-States in Central Italy.” In *State Formation in Italy and Greece: Questionaing the Neorevolutionist Paradigm*, edited by Nicola Terrenato and Donald C. Haggis, 231-244. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2011.

Ungern-Sternberg, von J.. "The Formation of the 'Annalistic Tradition': The Example of the Decemvirate," in *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 77-104. Berkley: University of California Press, 1986.

Vasaly, Ann. "Personality and Power: Livy's Depiction of the Appii Claudii in the First Pentad." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vo. 117 (1987): 203-226.

Vasaly, Ann. "The Quintii in Livy's First Pentad: The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric." *The Classical World,* vol. 92, no. 6 (1999): 513-530.

Walsh, P.G. "Livy." In *Latin Historians*, edited by T.A. Dorey, 115-142. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

Walsh, P.G. *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods*. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Wiseman, T.P. *Clio's Cosmetics: Three Studies in Greco-Roman Literature*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979.

Wiseman, T.P. "The Credibility of Roman Annalists." *Liverpool Classical Monthly*, vol. 8 (1983): 20-22.

Wiseman, T.P. "Legendary Genealogies in Late-Republican Rome." *Greece and Rome,* 2nd ser., 21 (1974): 153-164.

Wiseman, T.P. *Roman Drama and Roman History*. Exeter: The University of Exeter Press, 1998.

Wiseman, T.P. "Roman Republic, Year One." *Greece and Rome*, Second Series, col. 45, no. 1 (1998): 19-26.

Wiseman, T.P. "The Wife and Children of Romulus." *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, vol. 33, no. 2 (1983): 445-452.,