

THE SOUTHERN MIND IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years.

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The noted historian of the South, C. Vann Woodward, has proposed as one of the ironies of American history that the "parochial" Southern experience is more universal than the American experience. The "eccentric" position of the South and the Southerner within the United States, Woodward suggests, need not be a handicap in dealing with the world. Actually, when interpreting the United States to other nations — which, like the South, usually also have experienced physical poverty, ethnic discrimination, and military surrender — the Southern perspective can be an advantage. "For from a broader point of view," Woodward declares, "it is not the South but America that is unique among the peoples of the world."¹

How is it possible that one section of the country, especially the one cursed with the historical legacy of the "peculiar institution" of slavery, can best represent the universal element, the fundamental humanity, of the whole of the United States? Woodward's truth may be too paradoxical. A quasi-universal *experience* does not necessarily generate a cosmopolitan *consciousness*. The "mind of the South," rather than being an all-inclusive mentality, is attached almost exclusively to its home region, as another famous Southern writer, W.J. Cash, has analyzed it.² Can it be, therefore, the basis of a genuinely internationalist outlook? Let us examine a prominent case.

Few Americans today are more widely admired than Dean Rusk, a man who served as secretary of state for a longer time — eight consecutive years through the difficult Kennedy and Johnson presidencies — than any other man except for his fellow Southerner, Cordell Hull, the secretary of state under President Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to 1944. Dean Rusk's present reputation depends on much more than an impersonal, social-historical process of post-Vietnam War reconciliation. Its basis is Rusk himself, whose life and biography I shall consider in this essay. I shall examine the significance

1. C. Vann Woodward, *The Burden of Southern History* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 167-68.

2. See W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941).

for Rusk himself and, for US foreign policy during his tenure in office, of his being a Southerner.³

The remarkable qualities of Dean Rusk, self-described as a “freckle-faced boy from Cherokee County, Georgia,” are readily apparent to all who encounter him in person. The former secretary has offered on several occasions glimpses of the shrewd insight and sound judgment that have earned him the regard he now enjoys. Speaking at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1984, he warned against the “constant battery of doomsday talk” regarding the danger of nuclear war, both from those trying to obtain increases in the defense budget and those attempting to avert disaster by forming peace groups. Rusk emphasized that since 1945 not a single nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. Nobody can put a finger, he insisted, “on a real situation in the real world which is moving us toward nuclear war.” He then advised eloquently:

We cannot afford to let a generation, which is facing several decades of serious problems like energy, the environment, the population explosion and things of that sort, have their imaginations stunted, their hopes dulled, their interest in tomorrow dissipated by a reckless kind of fatalism or sense of the tragic.⁴

For those who had seen him before only on television, and who may have remembered the tight-lipped and seemingly unreflective secretary “stonewalling” before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rusk’s expansiveness of thought and phrase came as a distinct surprise.

This same sense of discrepancy between the Rusk of the 1960s and the Rusk of the 1980s (“between the public image of Dean Rusk and the reality”) is apparently what prompted Thomas J. Schoenbaum to write *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years*. Schoenbaum is an international lawyer and a colleague of Rusk’s at the University of Georgia Law School where he directs the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law. Schoenbaum’s book, a detailed study based on numerous interviews with Rusk, is not the first biography of Rusk. An earlier personal account, a polished, interpretive study highlighting the Far Eastern aspects of Rusk’s long career, was published in 1980 by the diplomatic historian Warren I. Cohen.⁵

For the author of a biography about Rusk, Schoenbaum’s professional knowledge of law is a major asset, although technical legal issues as such are more often merely identified in the work than they are examined analytically. Some readers of *Waging Peace and War*, if they are skeptical about the actual

3. In a noteworthy passage in Lyndon B. Johnson’s memoirs, *The Vantage Point*, the former president reflected that he did not believe “the nation would unite indefinitely behind any Southerner,” commenting: “This is a subject that deserves a more profound exploration than I can give it here — a subject that has never been sufficiently examined.” Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 95.

4. *The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1933-34/1983-84: Fiftieth Anniversary Program, April 5-6, 1984* (Medford, MA: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1984), 7.

5. Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, N.J.: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), Vol. 19 in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis and Robert Ferrell.

or potential influence of international law on the affairs of the world, may feel that Schoenbaum's emphasis on this major aspect of Rusk's statesmanship is exaggerated. It is, however, just this tenacious adherence to legal principle that is, arguably, the Rusk style in American diplomacy.

That Rusk's intellectual approach has been distinguished by what some consider an excessively legalistic-moralistic approach is clear.⁶ Schoenbaum tells of an altercation in the late 1940s between Rusk and his State Department superior, Dean Acheson, that is typical of Rusk's tendency. After listening to a Rusk homily about the view of international law on a particular matter, Acheson grew more and more impatient. Finally, Acheson exploded: "Dammit, Dean, the survival of nations is not a matter of law." Unmoved, Rusk retorted: "On the contrary, in a nuclear world, the survival of nations may depend upon law" (p. 134).

Rusk's spacious view of the international system as a normative legal order sets his record as secretary of state apart both from much of that which preceded it (*viz.*, under Harry S. Truman) and from much of that which followed it (*viz.*, under Richard M. Nixon). The foreign policies of the Truman and Nixon periods were based theoretically on an indeterminate and shifting calculus of the "national interest." Countries, including the United States, were presumed to act mainly in accordance with the need to maximize and preserve their own power. There were no transcendent, universal standards, only prudent guidelines — guidelines which particular governments, even particular individuals within those governments, might decide to follow, or not follow.

The "geopolitical" approach of Henry Kissinger, though similar to Rusk's outlook in its globalization of international politics, differed profoundly in its dynamic-strategic quality, as well as in its emphasis on high-level negotiation. The difference is epitomized in the Nixon-Kissinger proposition: "We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."⁷ Rusk, a member of the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) in the State Department after World War II, had been "present at the creation" when the US government helped found the United Nations and then established the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For Rusk, commitments were primordial and eternal.

How did Rusk's extraordinary adherence to universalism, or a collective security-oriented liberal-internationalism, come about? Both Warren Cohen

6. The classic critique of "the legalistic-moralistic approach" is that of George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: Mentor Books, 1952), chap. 6, "Diplomacy in the Modern World."

7. *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), quoted by Alan M. Jones, Jr., ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World: The Nixon Administration, 1969-1973* (New York: David McKay, 1973), 25. On Kissinger's geopolitical thinking and diplomacy, see Alan K. Henrikson, "The Moralizer as Geopolitician," *The Fletcher Forum* 5 (Spring 1981): 391-414, and "The Archimedes of Diplomacy: Henry Kissinger and the Foreign Policy of Watergate America," *International Journal* 37 (Autumn 1982): 606-12.

and Thomas Schoenbaum locate one of its sources in the American South, without, however, developing a larger explanatory hypothesis on the basis of their perception. Is there something in Rusk's Southern background and the intellectual outlook associated with it that shaped his foreign policy and diplomacy? Moreover, is there something in the way Rusk, as a native Southerner who has now returned home, is perceived by other Americans, which accounts for the successive ridicule and esteem in which he subsequently has been held? Is his idealism, somewhat like the South's "Lost Cause," destined for defeat or success in a world of militant nationalism and superpower politics? Has this idealism become an essential part of America's psyche and tradition of statecraft, including its foreign policy? Is there, in short, a Southern mind in American diplomacy?

For Rusk's own generation in America, especially the Southern section of it, an internationalist attitude, if not a well-articulated conception of international interdependence, was natural. The reason was the election to the White House in 1912 of the Virginia-born and Georgia-, South Carolina-, and North Carolina-raised Woodrow Wilson (the region's "first President since Jefferson Davis"). While few Southerners had a consuming interest in the particulars of the peace program that Wilson developed, or even in his dramatic proposal for an international organization, most people in the South were strongly supportive of Wilson's diplomatic effort. The political scientist Charles O. Lerche, Jr. explains this almost reflexive internationalism of the region:

The opposition to Wilson's grand design and to the Treaty of Versailles was in Southern eyes part of the continuing campaign against the South, and to argue in favor of the League was also to continue the struggle for the vindication of the peculiar values of Southern society.⁸

As a student at Presbyterian-sponsored Davidson College in North Carolina, Rusk's interest in Wilsonianism was kindled. Under a favorite professor named Archibald Currie, Rusk studied in detail the diplomacy of World War I and the legal machinery of the League. Subsequently, as a Rhodes Scholar at St. John's College, Oxford, he seriously pursued his developing interest in international law and organization. These formative educational experiences, strengthened by Rusk's brief residence in Nazi Germany where he witnessed Hitler's rise to power, are what gave Rusk's Southern-inspired internationalism much of its intellectual and political content.

When Rusk returned to the United States in 1934, he first went to Mills College in California where he taught international relations and soon was elected dean of the faculty ("Dean Dean"). He also enrolled part-time at Boalt Hall, the law school at the University of California in nearby Berkeley. According to Schoenbaum's account, his teaching and study led Rusk "to

8. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 44.

search for a standard of justice" in dealings between nations, which he found in international law. He came to the conclusion that any analysis of international politics without consideration of international law was "empty speculation," focused either on the metaphysical dynamics of the balance of power or on the Machiavellian methods by which the strong manipulated the weak. "For Rusk," Schoenbaum states, quoting his words, "purely political considerations were inadequate in resolving disputes between nations because they left out what was most essential — morality." Schoenbaum adds: "Woodrow Wilson had made a noble effort to inject moral considerations into world politics, but had failed. Rusk saw himself as carrying on this work" (p. 69).

The next phase of Rusk's career, also directly related to his Southern background and views about world affairs, was his experience during World War II, the pivotal event of his life. The war raised him from relative obscurity to the beginnings of national (and even international) recognition. Rusk entered active military service as an infantry captain in the US Army's 3rd Division on the West Coast at the end of 1940. He soon was ordered to Washington, however, to form a new unit of military intelligence dealing with the British-controlled areas in Asia. Subsequently, he was picked to assist Lieutenant General Joseph W. ("Vinegar Joe") Stilwell in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. This position brought him into contact not only with high British and Indian officials, but also with Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders of Kuomintang China. Recalled to Washington near the war's end, Rusk became a member of a key policy section of the famous Operations Division (OPD). By this time, Rusk was a full colonel, assured of receiving a general's star. He was strongly tempted to remain in the military permanently.

"What people don't understand about Dean is how deep are his military inclinations," his brother Roger has said. "It's part of our Anglo-Saxon heritage. The South always had a military disposition."⁹ Dean Rusk has recalled that he "did not question the licking the South has received, but that didn't prevent [him] from idolizing the Confederate leaders, especially Robert E. Lee." After studying Lee's record, he came to admire the Confederate general's "patient courage, patriotism, and his love for his men." Lee was a great man, Rusk later reflected (with possible thought to his own role in the Vietnam War), "because he did not seek war, but he fought nobly and well when required by circumstances to do so." As his father had said to him, one ought "never to be ashamed of someone who fought for what he believed in" (p. 34).

Rusk's strong sense of the Southern military tradition opened him to the influence of the man who impressed him more than any other: George Catlett Marshall, the US Army chief of staff. "Rusk idolized the old general and agreed with President Truman that Marshall was the greatest living American," Schoenbaum remarks. "In an uncanny way he reminded Rusk of his boyhood hero, Robert E. Lee" (p. 144). It was Marshall's recognition of Rusk's ability, evident in the formal reports that Rusk drafted for General Stilwell

9. David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), 315.

from Asia, that brought Rusk back to Washington from the CBI theater. It also largely explains his eventual reorientation from the War Department to the State Department after the war. When in January 1947 it was announced that General Marshall would become the next secretary of state, Rusk immediately sought to follow him. He was made the director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) and placed in charge of all matters pertaining to the new United Nations organization.

At this point Rusk had "arrived." A Southerner from Cherokee County, Georgia, he was now "a member of the foreign policy elite, a preserve dominated by a handful of Ivy League lawyers and investment bankers" (p. 143).¹⁰ Marshall was his model, mentor, and protector. His highest position

"I've been able to see in my lifetime how that boyhood environment has been revolutionized with education, with technology, with county agents, and with electricity — all that helping to take the load off the backs of the people who live there. Now I can see that this can happen in one lifetime, I disregard those who say that underdeveloped countries still need two or three hundred years to develop because I know it isn't true. Because I've seen it with my own eyes." — Dean Rusk

in the State Department, which came under Marshall's successor Acheson, was that of deputy under-secretary of state — "[f]or [s]ubstance," as he came to describe Rusk's assignment.¹¹ Rusk then was considered by insiders as the second most important man in the Department.

Rusk's demonstrated loyalty and courage, together with his keen intelligence, emotional balance, and formidable capacity for work, made him an almost indispensable man. He was, as Acheson later characterized him for then President-elect John F. Kennedy, someone "who will close ranks with you when there is trouble" (p. 18). Rusk's self-conduct in World War II and in the early Cold War — in some respects, a Southern-coded behavior, but with all-American appeal — established a pattern of administration for himself

10. So acceptable did Rusk become that, when later working in New York City, he came to be identified, if somewhat tentatively, as head of "the American Establishment." Richard H. Rovere, *The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions, and Speculations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), 11: "I am not sure who the chairman of the Establishment is today, although I would not be altogether surprised to learn that he is Dean Rusk."

11. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 255.

and others that he would always follow. Rusk willingly accepted the Marshallian stamp and system: brevity of expression, completed staff work, confidence in subordinates, and, above all, a military belief in tireless service. When the rationale of US foreign policy was nearly self-evident, as it was in the 1940s and the early 1950s, such precepts might suffice, so long as they were animated by leadership. Even Rusk's concern perhaps was that he would be, in the wicked but not wholly unjust description by the journalist David Halberstam, "Rusk emulating Marshall," "Rusk as Marshall," "Marshall without Marshall."¹²

If Rusk's youthful period was self-consciously Wilsonian and his early manhood was deliberately Marshallian, his next phase of life — as president of the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1950s and as secretary of state in the 1960s — was characterized by another Southern quality. To Rusk, this was even more authentic than the others. He shared it with the man with whom he had the closest personal affinity while serving at the highest levels of government, a bond of friendship that was premised on something like equality. His partner was Lyndon Baines Johnson. The commitment they shared was a deeply felt, emotionally guided refusal to accept social backwardness, racial prejudice, and economic denial. On an international level, this meant a rejection of colonialism, Eurocentrism, and underdevelopment.

Rusk's work after 1952 at the Rockefeller Foundation involved him in a much wider range of activity than his previous work in government. His foundation period, although focused on private philanthropic problems, was in a sense the intellectual bridge for him between Roosevelt's New Deal and Johnson's Great Society. As Schoenbaum writes, "Rusk drew on his early life in Cherokee County for ideas on how to transform the developing world" (p. 250).

Rusk's own words are testimony to how his experience in the modernizing South was an example for him for the developing Third World.

I've been able to see in my lifetime how that boyhood environment has been revolutionized with education, with technology, with county agents, and with electricity — all that helping to take the load off the backs of the people who live there. Now I can see that this can happen in one lifetime, I disregard those who say that underdeveloped countries still need two or three hundred years to develop because I know it isn't true. Because I've seen it with my own eyes.¹³

When asked by President-elect Kennedy in December 1960 to become his secretary of state, Rusk probably was not chosen for his interest in development problems, but rather for his acceptability to his colleagues and elders ("the best man available," Kennedy rather ambiguously called him when announcing

12. Halberstam, *Best and Brightest*, 322.

13. *Ibid.*, 314.

the selection).¹⁴ Nonetheless, Rusk's opposition to European colonialism, originated in the South, stimulated while at Oxford, and confirmed by his wartime experiences in Asia and, later, elsewhere in the Third World, fit in well with the Cold War themes of the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy was determined to compete more effectively with communism in Asia, Africa, and especially Latin America, where Castroism posed the most direct challenge. The Kennedy-era Alliance for Progress, Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and Agency for International Development were fully consonant with Rusk's thinking and feeling — more so than many of the most prominent advocates of those initiatives knew.

With Johnson, even while he was still vice-president, Rusk felt an immediate harmony, which carried over into later policy cooperation. The childhoods of the two men were parallel, and in ways even interconnected.¹⁵ Especially in the sophisticated world of the Kennedy administration, Schoenbaum writes intuitively, they "shared secret feelings that they didn't quite belong." Both realized that some of Kennedy's advisers mocked them — cracked jokes about them, their styles, their concerns, and their convictions. "Each had suffered in silence," writes Schoenbaum, "but they shared the pain of wounded pride."

Rusk's personality, like that of Johnson, "metamorphosed" to some extent in order to compensate for being "rural Southern," Schoenbaum persuasively speculates. Johnson, a titanic personality, simply overwhelmed the Ivy Leaguers and jet-setters around him. Rusk, the gentler person but a no less canny one, developed a different method for gaining his way. "He learned very early to get what he wanted by careful preparation, total command of the facts of any situation, and complete mastery over himself and his emotions" (p. 410). Impressive in its way, but it is a picture of self-repression.

When Rusk and Johnson were together the two Southerners felt no need to be cautious with each other. They "chatted like boys." Associates noted that they communicated almost in a body language — "a kind of shorthand punctuated by winks, laughs, and gestures," as Schoenbaum describes. They would argue facetiously with each other about "who had grown up poorer," and recall "the shared details of their early years — old-fashioned telephone systems, life without electricity, the Southern food they both liked." A frequent visitor at the LBJ Ranch, Rusk on one occasion was taken on a tour of Johnson's boyhood home. "I don't have to tell you what that is," Johnson said, pointing out an old-fashioned metal potty under the bed, and the two men shared a hearty laugh" (p. 410).

Neither Rusk nor Johnson ever forgot their common background. Both consciously *used* their recollections — a shared regional memory at least as

14. On the choice of Rusk, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 138-41.

15. Rusk loved to regale Johnson, who had ancestors who came from Georgia, with accounts of his own remote kinsman, Thomas Jefferson Rusk. T.J. Rusk migrated to Texas and fought in the War for Texas Independence, assuming command of the Texan forces when Sam Houston was wounded during the Battle of San Jacinto. He later served as the Texas Republic's secretary of war and as the chief justice of its Supreme Court.

much as a jointly felt class consciousness — in order to power their social and economic liberalism. President Johnson's reformist credentials, as a disciple of the New Deal from the time of his entry into politics in the 1930s, are undeniable. Rusk's status as a liberal is less clear. Although disowned by many liberals in the 1960s, "Rusk was unquestionably one of them," argues Warren Cohen in his biography. He places Rusk in a "cohort" of State Department liberals, including Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. This distinguished him from such conservative Democratic diplomatists as Dean Acheson, and also such libertarian commentators on foreign policy as the Republican senator Barry Goldwater. Rusk's perspective differed from their more conservative views in being "intensely anticolonial, more deeply committed to liberal democracy at home and abroad." Cohen explains: "Rusk's universalism appears to derive from his experience in the rural South, in Europe in 1930s and in Asia in the 1940s. He concluded, simply enough, that men and women everywhere are alike in their needs and aspirations."¹⁶

Cohen further stresses that Rusk "was intensely sensitive to any slighting of colored people around the world."¹⁷ Possibly one of the contributory factors to his being chosen as secretary of state by Kennedy, who otherwise might have favored his friend and fellow senator, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, is that Rusk had escaped the traditional racial constraints of the South. Rusk had written a letter to President-elect Kennedy on November 22, 1960, beginning: "As a Georgia-born citizen who believes that the Supreme Court decision on integration was long overdue . . ." Kennedy may well have taken careful note of this commitment. In a moment that "many thought his greatest triumph," writes David Halberstam, Rusk as secretary of state startled a House committee considering civil-rights legislation by suddenly declaring: "If I were a Negro I think I might rise up."¹⁸

It was the South that originally had caused much of America's race-relations problem. So, too, was it the conversion of many Southern politicians — Lyndon Johnson, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, and others — that began to make it possible for the country to find a solution.¹⁹ Dean Rusk, though not central to this effort at home, was indispensable to its success abroad, in Africa most especially. He believed that "problems of discrimination here in our own country are the largest single burden we bear in the conduct of our own foreign relations" (p. 266). Rusk pressed accordingly for achievement of equality in American domestic society no less emphatically than he did for guarantees of ordinary respect for individuals overseas. Not as a measure of his own equal regard for others but as an indication of the traditions he had engendered within his own family, it happened that his daughter, Peggy, married a black man, Guy Smith. The wedding took place in late 1967, at

16. Cohen, *Dean Rusk*, 320-21.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Halberstam, *Best and Brightest*, 33, 310. Senator Fulbright had signed the Southern Manifesto, an anti-desegregation statement made by Southern members of Congress, and he had voted against civil-rights bills.

19. On the politics behind the passage of the Johnson-era civil rights legislation, see Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, chap. 7, "The Struggle for Justice."

the very height of the struggle within the United States over the Vietnam conflict and also at a time of widespread racial unrest and violence. The young couple, both Stanford University students, were featured on the front cover of *Time*. Although it sensationalized the event, *Time* had to acknowledge: "‘This is a family matter,’ the father of the bride insisted. ‘It’s going to be handled in a family way.’ And Dean Rusk made it stick."²⁰

American foreign policy as President Johnson and Secretary Rusk conducted it was self-divided between the progressivism (in some ways, the opportunism) of the United States as a whole and the prescriptivism (in some ways, the obstructionism) of its Southern region. The Vietnam War was a critical test. Dean Rusk, as the leading articulator of the principles that governed US policy in the 1960s ("the major architect," as Schoenbaum describes him),

“Vietnam was not an aberration, but an enactment of the central values that have dominated American foreign policy since the time of Woodrow Wilson. Those who prosecuted the war acted not out of arrogance — the thesis of David Halberstam’s book The Best and the Brightest — but out of faith and pride in America.” — Thomas J. Schoenbaum

felt this moral contradiction deeply. “I have always tried to be a man of peace,” Schoenbaum quotes him as saying in an unguarded moment to a colleague, “but now I have become a symbol of the war” (p. 460).

In fact, Rusk probably had felt reservations about the war, especially its military conduct, almost from the beginning of the American involvement in the 1960s. His deputy secretary and “alter ego,” George Ball, has recorded that Rusk seriously questioned the wisdom of committing combat forces. Rusk also believed, according to Schoenbaum, that the government of South Vietnam should have been encouraged to take a larger role in the military direction of the conflict (pp. 434-35, 450-51). Ball explains: “Given the nature of the struggle, he recognized that the political factor was fully as important — if not more so — than the military. But he did not want to get crosswise with McNamara.” Rusk evidently never forgot that during a long period in the Truman administration Secretary Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson were not on speaking terms. “Thus, no difference of

20. “Races: A Marriage of Enlightenment,” *Time* 90 (September 29, 1967), 28-31.

view between the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom was ever likely to surface publicly."²¹ Rusk's Marshallian concepts of order precluded such a contention.

Nonetheless, by late 1967 and, especially following the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive at the beginning of 1968, Rusk began, finally, to assert his views concerning the military as well as the political conduct of the war. It was he, and not the newly installed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who was the main influence behind President Johnson's announcement of an unconditional partial bombing halt in his "I-will-not-run-for-reelection" speech of March 31. President Johnson himself has acknowledged the force of Rusk's influence and ideas. "Early in March I was convinced that I should make some sort of peace offer along the lines Rusk had suggested on February 27," Johnson has stated in his own account, *The Vantage Point*. "I considered several other proposals during the month, and I considered doing nothing, but the weight of the evidence favored a move in this direction and I regarded Rusk's proposal as the best."²²

It is apparent that Rusk came to doubt more than just the strategy of the war. He seemed to question the acceptability, the very "Americanness," of his, and his fellow Southerner Lyndon Johnson's liberal-internationalist (or Wilsonian) philosophy itself. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations' continued effort to prevent the forcible takeover of South Vietnam, to make Hanoi "leave its neighbors alone," in Rusk's refrain, was not succeeding in that objective or, arguably, in the larger cause of vindicating the concept of universal collective security.

Continued adherence to such a goal did not seem to justify the increasing sacrifices required in Indochina. According to Schoenbaum, Rusk argued privately with Johnson early in 1968 that:

we have taken 60,000 casualties in dead and wounded since the end of World War II in support of collective security. We put up 90 percent of the non-Korean forces in Korea, 80 percent of the non-Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. And that's not very collective. So if my Cherokee County cousins were to say to me, 'Look, if collective security means 50,000 dead Americans every ten years, and it is not even collective, maybe it's not a very good idea (p. 471).

Whether he really thought the pure concept of collective security itself was too demanding or whether he believed its practical implementation, by the US government and its Southeast Asian and Western European allies did not measure up, is not altogether clear.

Schoenbaum concludes that Rusk "had an exaggerated vision of the capabilities of American leadership and rectitude in the world." He states further:

21. George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 368.

22. Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 423. Contrast Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention (an inside account of how the Johnson policy of escalation in Vietnam was reversed)* (New York: David McKay, 1969), 224: "Without question, Clifford played a preeminent — and I believe the decisive — role."

Vietnam was not an aberration, but an enactment of the central values that have dominated American foreign policy since the time of Woodrow Wilson. Those who prosecuted the war acted not out of arrogance — the thesis of David Halberstam's book *The Best and the Brightest* — but out of faith and pride in America (p. 499).

What is not sufficiently recognized is that this "faith and pride" also belonged to a distinctively *Southern* mentality — in Rusk's case, specifically Wilsonian, Marshallian, and Johnsonian.

By the end of the official phase of his life Rusk had become a man without honor, somewhat like Woodrow Wilson after the embarrassing national defeat of League of Nations membership. This was less true, however, in the South. "The only place in the country, the only place in the world," Wilson said

"I can understand those who say, 'If [Vietnam] is what collective security means, maybe it is not a very good idea,'" he has said. "I am concerned, however, that there is not enough public discussion on how to organize a durable peace, if not through collective security. To this question, each generation must find its own answer. I myself do not attempt to advise today's young people on how to answer the question. They must find out for themselves." — Dean Rusk

many years after leaving it, "where nothing has to be explained to me is the South."²³ Much the same could be said by Rusk who, when he finished his career of service in the nation's capital, gravitated to Georgia — where *he* did not have to explain anything. The offer he received from the University of Georgia to be the Sibley Professor of International Law gave him a chance, as he described, "to pull up stakes in Washington and go home" (p. 494).

What is evident is that Dean Rusk's own *personal* internationalist faith remains intact: "I can understand those who say, 'If [Vietnam] is what collective security means, maybe it is not a very good idea,'" he has said.

I am concerned, however, that there is not enough public discussion on how to organize a durable peace, if not through collective security. To this question, each generation must find its own an-

23. Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), chap. 10, "Woodrow Wilson: the Conservative as Liberal," 241.

swer. I myself do not attempt to advise today's young people on how to answer the question. They must find out for themselves (p. 496).

Such relativism is incompatible with the basic certitudes of the whole Ruskian vision. The "mind of the South" in him, however, does not consist of doctrine alone. It also has been formed by experience, strong experience. And it must make allowance for others' experiences — for the variety of life and for the variation in place and time. The pride of the South, like that of Dean Rusk himself, is grounded in humility, in having been humbled. His beliefs — Wilsonian, Marshallian, Johnsonian — have been severely tested. In that sense, even more important than in the sense of their being conformable to reason or adaptable to reality, they are fundamentally "true."

Rusk's upbringing in the South has powerfully informed his American outlook. It has given him his stability, and it has provided American foreign policy with much of its constancy. He inherited an internationalist tradition, and through his work in support of the United Nations and America's regional alliances, he further contributed to it. At times he was almost the sole defender of that very tradition. His solitariness is today his effectiveness. Owing to his steady example and steadfast effort, his Southern inheritance will be a continuing heritage for American foreign policy.

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States and Markets

Susan Strange

London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, 264 pp., including bibliography and index, \$49.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

The field of international political economy (IPE) has experienced tremendous growth, particularly in the past few years. This growth has been heralded by the publication of several important and pivotal texts by the field's most compelling figures. Robert Gilpin's *The Political Economy of International Relations* provided an excellent synthesis of neo-realist conceptions and is fast becoming the classic statement of American IPE. An equally good statement from the radical left is Robert W. Cox's *Production, Power and World Order*.

One of the more challenging books presently is Susan Strange's *States and Markets*. Our review will seek to demonstrate that Strange has formulated an interesting concept — that of structural power — whose usefulness is unfortunately limited by her treatment of it. In particular, we argue that hegemony need not be indispensable to the exercise of structural power, as Strange seems to allege.

To fully understand Strange's conception of structural power, it is necessary first to examine why she is currently dissatisfied with IPE and the questions which her analysis proposes. Strange's dissatisfaction is rooted in two separate but related claims. First, she argues that the field has failed to escape the conceptual straight-jacket imposed by conventional international relations theory. As a result, IPE has been too heavily concerned with the agendas set by states. Most current books in IPE, she argues, concentrate solely on those issues which arise among governments; they are essentially concerned with the politics of international economic relations. Second, Strange charges that IPE has been dominated by American academics and consequently has "been permeated by many hidden and even unconscious value judgments and assumptions based on American experience or on American national interests" (p. 12). Thus, IPE has been narrowly concerned with the declining position of the United States in the world economy. In short, IPE is presently deficient on two counts: it is state-centric and ethnocentric.

Strange is as clear about what IPE should be as what it should not be. IPE should be a critical academic discipline. It should not be simply a reflection of the concerns of government, but a reflection of the concerns of people, the starting point for critical analysis being the examination of values which individuals seek to fulfill through social organization. These values, Strange suggests, are essentially four: wealth, security, freedom, and justice. All social organizations provide for a measure of each, but differ from each other in the proportion in which they combine them. IPE should thus focus on the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of produc-

tion, distribution and exchange, and the mix of values reflected therein. Since political realism and economic liberalism weigh so heavily on mainstream IPE, many academics have failed to pay attention to the values which have been sacrificed in the pursuit of efficiency or the change which has been obstructed in times of peace.

Drawing on the work of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Strange criticizes American academics for "becom[ing] the servants of state bureaucracies, not independent thinkers and critics" (p. 13). In presupposing that there are significant issues in the political arena, they take for granted the very question which should be under scrutiny, that is, in Schattschneider's terms, "how some issues are organi[z]ed into politics whil[e] others are organi[z]ed out?" The factor which determines the setting of agendas and the allocation of values in the world political economy, Strange concludes, is power. It is no surprise then that Strange devotes the bulk of her book to exploring the nature of power.

In coming to terms with the problematic notion of power, Strange distinguishes the concept of "relational power" from that of "structural power." Relational power refers to the popular pluralist notion of power — namely, the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do. In other words, a situation in which one party prevails when there is an observable conflict over a desired outcome. Structural power, by contrast, refers to a state's ability to shape and determine the overall structures of the global political economy within which other states and non-state actors must operate.

Strange's notion of structural power is more radical than Bachrach and Baratz's two-dimensional view of power. While Strange agrees that it is important to identify the potential issues which "non-decision-making" prevents from being actual, she rejects the idea that a consensus must be presumed if no observable conflict has occurred. Such a presumption would ignore that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.

Strange is less interested in defining power than in examining how it is exercised. While the term structural power has been used before (the concept was used both by radical authors such as Johan Galtung in the 1960s, and by mainstream authors such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s), Strange's conceptualization is new. In contrast to Cox, whose *Production, Power and World Order* characterized structural power as residing solely in the structure of production, Strange conceives of structural power as residing in four separate but related structures. Like a pyramid, each facet is supported by and joined to the other three. The four sources of structural power correspond to the four planes of a pyramid. Thus, structural power resides with those who are best able to exercise control over people's security (the security structure); with those who decide and control what goods and services are to be produced (the production structure); with those who control and supply the distribution of credit (the financial structure); and with those who can limit or decide the terms of access to knowledge (the knowledge structure). It is structural power which determines the relationship between authority

and market; markets exist by permission of the wielder of authority, and function in an environment which is affected by the exercise of structural power.

While Strange tacitly admits that power is not wholly fungible, she takes issue with Keohane and Nye's claim that issue-areas are partially insulated and that political and economic power are distinguishable. In contrast to them, Strange does not draw a strong distinction between political and economic power. She claims that it is impossible to have political power without the power to deliver credit or determine what is produced; equally, economic power cannot truly exist in the absence of physical security, which can be supplied only by the state. Thus, while Keohane and Nye may be correct in pointing out that the Soviet Union plays no role in international monetary affairs, they are wrong to conclude that prominence in the security structure will have no tangible impact in international economic affairs. Likewise, it is not credible to suggest that Japanese economic diplomacy is unaffected by the possibility that the American security umbrella will be removed. The popular claim that US hegemony has eroded is, Strange concludes, a myth; its structural power remains unchallenged.

Unfortunately, it is when Strange actually comes to defining this power and operationalizing her definition that fundamental problems arise. Using her definition of structural power, Strange effectively establishes a second tier where power may be exercised. However, she also attempts to differentiate the way in which the two powers are exercised. This difference becomes confusing when the sources of structural power, the structures, are examined more closely.

The central problem with Strange's conceptualization of structural power is that it does not seem to be able to dispense with the notion of hegemony. This is because she does not supply a definition of hegemony which is independent of structural power. Instead, Strange defines a hegemon as that state which leads in most aspects of structural power.¹ Such a definition should be rejected for it fails to provide an independent criterion by which the existence or non-existence of hegemony might be ascertained. If we accept the definition of hegemony supplied by Gilpin and take it to mean political leadership, then it surely becomes necessary for Strange to define how dominant a state must be in the four primary power structures in order to be able to provide political leadership.² The state which leads in most aspects of structural power still may not be powerful enough to provide political leadership.

Since Strange does not appear to conceive of structural power as existing prior to, and independently of, political leadership, she is unable to recognize that the former may exist in the absence of the latter. It is more realistic to presume that one state, for example the United States, could have maintained

1. See Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987).

2. Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 66.

a fairly significant position in each of the structures but suffered considerable losses to another player or players, be it state or non-state actors. For Strange, a loss of the commanding position in any one of the structures would cause the structural pyramid to tip over. In contrast to Strange, we will seek to argue that structural power need not depend for its existence on the presence of a hegemon. Structural power may be seen as a second realm for interaction, not just as a source of superior power. In this way, explicit or implicit bargaining and trade-offs may be considered at this level.

Strange is correct to note that in the security structure, the United States has an unquestionable superiority in the Western world, and is essentially in control of NATO. We concede to US dominance in the security structure, and the power which this signifies. The other structures, however, are the real concern. In neither the credit, production, nor the knowledge structure can the predominance of the United States be so easily assumed as in the security structure. This may be demonstrated by examining each structure in turn.

The power to create credit, Strange argues, entails the ability to control when and who will be allowed to exercise purchasing power. US power in the financial structure derives from the special position of the dollar in the international monetary system — as the currency in which three quarters of Eurocurrency deals are conducted, oil is priced, and a large proportion of international trade is invoiced, the dollar confers upon the United States privileges of seigniorage. Since only the United States is capable of creating dollar assets which are globally accepted, it can exert primary influence over the creation of international credit. Hence, conventional indicators are inappropriate for the United States. Although balance of payments deficits usually indicate the weakness of a country's financial position, the United States is protected from such an economic measuring stick. The ability of the United States to run a payments deficit, Strange argues, is a measure of US power over the monetary system. It reflects the ability of the United States to print dollars, be it through treasury bills or actual currency, which are universally accepted because of the dollar's special role in international transactions. Through the medium of the Eurocurrency markets, moreover, US corporations can continue to raise money and send it abroad so that the rate of inflation in the United States need not necessarily correspond with the rate of credit creation.

Strange may be right in arguing that interdependence in the international monetary system is asymmetrical, but her claim that political authority over markets is total may be challenged. She defines the financial structure not only as those arrangements which govern the availability of credit, but also as those which determine the terms on which currencies are exchanged. Exchange rates, however, are determined not only by the macroeconomic policies which governments pursue but also by the operations of markets. Strange correctly emphasizes that markets exist under the permission of state authority, but this need not imply that markets operate only as governments wish. The ineffectual maneuvers by governments to control the rise of the

dollar since the beginning of 1989 bears testimony to the autonomy of the market. Close cooperation of the G-7 is necessary precisely because the foreign exchange markets are so difficult to tame.³

Just as the US government does not control the market, so it does not control the actors who exert authority over it. The actions of the Federal Reserve Board as an independent arm of the American state has had substantial implications for the US government's capacity to achieve its economic objectives. As Yoichi Funabashi has recently shown, efforts by finance ministers in the G-7 to pursue policy coordination have been resisted by a transgovernmental alliance of central banks which share an institutional interest in preserving "monetary sovereignty."⁴ The United States, moreover, has lost some of its power over the financial structure to Japan. Through its continuous provision of credit to the United States, Japan has been able to discipline the US government by imposing a *de facto* conditionality on its American loans. The United States was made aware of Japanese power both in 1985, when former Prime Minister Nakasone considered capital controls to slow lending to the United States, and again in the fall of 1987, when the Japanese arrested purchases of US government debt, thus raising US interest rates. In both cases, the Japanese were attempting to force the American administration to reduce its budget deficit.

Strange devotes her analysis of the production structure to an examination of two principal characteristics. These are the emergence and spread of a capitalist market-oriented mode of production, and "the apparently inexorable supplanting of a production structure geared primarily to serve national markets to one geared primarily to serve a world market" (p. 63). Together, these factors have helped to sustain one of the most important values to which the United States has traditionally been committed, namely an open world economic order. Today, protectionist pressures in the world economy are largely contained because international production now exceeds the volume of world trade, and because a growing proportion of world trade is accounted for by intra-firm trade.

Such an analysis is problematic. Although the global production structure sustains American values, it does not necessarily follow that the United States control the production structure itself. Unfortunately, Strange fails to address in this work the question of the relationship between the United States and "its" transnational corporations (TNCs).

An article in the Winter 1987 issue of *International Organization*, however, does contain Strange's reflection on the matter. In the article, she argues that estimates of a state's power should be based neither on its share of industrial manufactured products made within its territory, nor on the country's share of exports in manufactures to world markets. Instead, Strange suggests that estimates of US power be based on the proportion of total world production

3. The term G7 is used to identify the group of governments which are most heavily involved in coordinating macro-economic policy and managing exchange rates: United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and Canada.

4. See Yoichi Funabashi, *Managing the Dollar* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1988).

of goods and services produced both in the United States and “by enterprises ultimately headquartered in the United States and responsible to Washington.” Following these criteria, Strange concludes that US dominance over the global production structure is assured.

This conclusion squares neither with the evidence nor with much of what Strange asserts in *States and Market*. Strange repeatedly argues there that the TNC has “filched power from the state,” that it sometimes has become the state’s adversary, and that it has moderated the state’s decision-making autonomy over the production structure. This idea, discussed in much of the IPE literature of the 1970s, is illustrated by Gulf Oil’s payments to the Angolan government in defiance of US policy. It is logically difficult to reconcile the argument that private operators have curbed the autonomy of states in the production structure with the claim that the United States ultimately controls them.

Further, Strange’s proposal for estimating US power is inconsistent on two counts. First, while she argues that the output of foreign TNCs established in the United States be counted in any estimation of US power, she also proposes that the output of US subsidiaries abroad be included. But Strange cannot have it both ways. In the event of a crisis in which the United States froze foreign assets within their territory, the United States surely would lose their domestic assets in foreign territory. Second, if it is too expensive for foreign corporations not to be in the US market, it is equally too expensive for American corporations not to be in foreign markets (especially in light of the projected completion of the European internal market by 1992). Although our treatment of the production structure has been sketchy, enough has been said to suggest that Strange exaggerates US dominance in the production structure.

If Strange includes knowledge as one of the four primary structures in her model, it is because of her belief in the adage that “knowledge is power.” She argues that power in the knowledge structure will be conferred upon those actors who are able either to acquire sought-after knowledge, and upon those who are able to control the channels through which such information is communicated. Strange’s treatment of the knowledge structure is nebulous, since it is clear that she takes it to embrace both ideology and technological know-how. Predictably, her conclusion is that the United States dominates the knowledge structure.

With respect to ideology, there can be little doubt that a growing convergence of values is occurring in the world political economy. It is true, for example, that tastes and values are being increasingly globalized by the “Cocacolonization” of societies throughout the world. It is also true that the clamour for a New International Economic Order in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization reflects a growing recognition that the information order is skewed in favor of Western values. But the very fact that such arguments are being made ought to temper one’s judgments on the purported extent of US power in the knowledge structure; minds and tastes may be manipulated, but only up to a point. In any case, if the United States

may be said to benefit from arrangements in the knowledge structure, it cannot seriously be claimed that it actively controls them.

In her discussion of technology, Strange points to the United State's advantage in "leading edge" technology, be it in artificial intelligence, microelectronics, or telecommunications. US dominance in high technology, Strange judiciously suggests, is sustained by the size of its domestic market, large defense programs, and the wealth and size of American universities. However, if Strange is correct in pointing to the US advantage at the "leading edge," this advantage is not uncontested. For one, Japanese performance in many high technology sectors has raised more than the occasional eyebrow in Silicon Valley. For another, examples such as nuclear proliferation illustrate either the ease with which states may access through their own means the sensitive technology which Strange discusses, or the failure of the United States to restrict access to American knowledge. Either way, US control of technological know-how is not what Strange implies.

If, then, the United States does not hold an unquestioned superiority in each structure, we must ask how much does it hold, and is this enough to constitute structural power? Would a state have to possess more than a specific level of power in each structure to be able to shape the system? Or would a state only need a certain percentage of the total power from the four structures with its specific constitution being irrelevant? If, as we suspect, it is not possible to determine, then structural power falls into the pitfalls of other discussions of power, and turns into a proverbial elephant: that is, difficult to describe but easily recognized.

It is our belief that some degree of bargaining, concessions, and coercion must go on at the structural level between players. If this is the case, then Strange's concept of structural power is obscured since, as we have seen, the structural level (the second tier) appears instead as an additional domain where relational power is exercised. At this level, relational power bargaining is made possible by interdependence which by definition allows power to other players.

If we have been critical of Strange, it is because we believe that the usefulness of her concept of structural power has been limited by her narrow treatment of it. Three objections have been implicit. First, Strange exaggerates the dominance of the United States because her treatment of structural power cannot dispense with the concept of hegemony. Since she defines a hegemon as a state which leads in most aspects of structural power, it is clear that she cannot conceive of the structural power without a hegemon. Second, while Strange occasionally concedes that private actors in global markets now curb the effectiveness of political authorities, she fails to draw the logical conclusion that markets have a measure of autonomy of their own. Strange is guilty of the very state-centric habits she exhorts us to escape. Finally, Strange's concept of structural power carries deterministic overtones since it does not seem to allow for any limits to the power of manipulation.

Although we believe Strange's concept of structural power is useful for IPE, we believe that it needs to be rescued from these three shortcomings. We

contend that hegemony need not be necessary to the concept of structural power. Structural power may be exerted without any one actor necessarily obtaining direct control over all of the structures. Since no one monopolizes structural power, state and non-state actors compete to shape the overall power structures which, in turn, will delimit their options. While states still dominate the competition to obtain dominance in structural power, scope does exist for the private sector to shape structural arrangements as well. This scope for private action derives from the limits of political authority in curbing it. Finally, though Strange's version of structural power is useful in freeing us from the limiting assumptions of rational choice theory, it is deficient because it exaggerates the structural determinants of individual behavior.⁵ Individual behavior is neither wholly determined nor wholly undetermined. While structural power limits the range of options open to individual actors, some scope for autonomous choice still exists. Change cannot be explained unless this capacity for individual autonomy is recognized.

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5. Rational choice theory is an approach which assumes that individual behavior is determined wholly by rationality. It postulates that individuals seek to maximize certain values or interests at the lowest possible cost. It does not examine what initially determines those values and interests.

*Male Fantasies**Volume 2. Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror*

Klaus Theweleit

Translated by Erica Carter and Chris Turner

Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, 508 pp., including bibliography, index, and notes, \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Few scholars have tried to make sense of the huge pile of fascist literature and cultural artifacts of the interwar period in Germany. As a result, theories about fascism's rhetoric have been abstract, resting more on a given commentator's explanation for the phenomena of fascism than on a thorough examination of the texts and remnants. Nazi and fascist argumentation has typically been dismissed in three ways: the language of fascism is pure propaganda, meaningless deception for the masses; Hitler and his cohorts/predecessors were uniquely disturbed and, therefore, their arguments do not require serious attention; and, finally, any attempt to discover a logic in fascism grants to the movement a moral legitimacy which it does not deserve. Therefore, the commentators conclude, all we need is to distance ourselves from those who are so obviously morally repugnant. None of these positions satisfactorily explains the extraordinary success enjoyed by the radical right after World War I and during its heyday under the NSDAP (*Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei*), nor do they contribute to a broader understanding of the relevance such movements have for us today.

Given the paucity of compelling treatments of fascism, the English translation of Klaus Theweleit's *Male Fantasies* is an important event. Originally published in Germany in the late 1970s, this provocative study has become a modern classic. The English translation of the first volume, *Women, Floods, Bodies, History*, was greeted with such controversy, curiosity, and enthusiasm that *The New York Times* listed it as one of the Notable Books of the Year 1987. Finally, English readers can begin reading the anxiously-awaited second volume, *Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror*.

While on the surface Theweleit's study analyzes male socialization and self-identification among German officers after World War I, many of whom later became National Socialists, on a broader level the work posits a model of male identity which attempts to explain a basis for violence, brutality, murder, and, indeed, even war. Theweleit consults two types of source material to address his topic: psychoanalytic models of human development and behavior from Freud to Margaret Mahler; and the novels, songs, speeches, memoirs, and letters produced by German army officers and their popular culture spokesmen.

Most of these men, whom Theweleit terms "soldier-males," were forced to leave the military after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. They quickly

joined the *Freikorps*, semi-illegal battalions that conducted independent and government-sponsored activities, ranging from quelling strikes to murdering opponents. Interestingly, Theweleit finds the early *Freikorps* writings more purely fascist than those of the Nazis whose broader audience forced them to address groups, such as women and industrialists, who could never belong to the core of the movement.

The heart of Theweleit's argument lies in his description of the ways in which these German men, together with many of their European contemporaries, were raised to see the creative, living, emotional wellspring within themselves as a source of mortal danger. Educated from the age of twelve at cadet schools, these men endured beatings, endless degradation, arbitrary punishment, and near starvation in the name of discipline and character-formation. Those who survived to become officers were willing, even eager, to tolerate physical hardship in return for the power and right to punish and destroy "soft" civilians. Theweleit postulates that the constant tense alertness necessary to survive military drills forced many men to find an acceptable way to express their inner turmoil. Reduced psychologically to fighting machines, these men could only be satisfied by heroic triumphs in violent battle. An integral part of this educational process was the rejection of woman, especially those who dared to oppose the soldiers' supremacy. For this reason, working class women, sexually active and potentially communist, were often mentioned targets of *Freikorps* violence during the Weimar Republic's early years.

What eventually set the Germans apart and sewed the seeds for Hitler's rise to power was the fact that Germany lost the Great War. The National Socialists appealed to the desire for violence and domination built into the self-understanding of the *Freikorps* officers who were frustrated by defeat and unable to return to a mundane civilian life devoid of ultimate power over other people.

What happened then to their fellow travellers in fascism? Theweleit distinguishes carefully between the core of the fascist movement, which he argues the *Freikorps* were a part of, and those who joined later. At the same time, he contends that all who participated, and National Socialism was very much a popular movement, shared to some degree the desire to contain their frightening inner emotions by external discipline.

Theweleit documents his model using the German experience as an example, not as an unique case. While the events in Germany were rooted in preexisting cultural and political patterns, the idea that men can be trained to see brutal murder as not only morally acceptable, but as a personal and political imperative, is not, he argues, culturally specific or applicable only to the past. Once their indoctrination is complete, such individuals will not be restrained by laws or ethical standards which stand in the way of their psychic security and their drive to overcome fears through violence. Of course, the violent actions are defended as patriotic, necessary to protect or serve the "Nation" or the "People." One could argue Oliver North's role in the recent Iran-Contra affair is a case of just such a conflation of the personal with the political in the service of a "higher" cause. The universal nature of Theweleit's psychological

model means that even countries holding anti-fascist political views could use the tactics he outlines to train their military forces, thus exposing democratic regimes to the dangerous virus of unleashed violence.

There are several striking implications of Theweleit's model. It is frightening to think that American boys are still raised to believe that men are tough, non-emotional, strictly disciplined creatures who can endure pain silently, and who are allowed, therefore, the right to shoot at "enemies," be they the Viet Cong or big black men on subways. If any society truly wants peace, if genocide is to become an impossibility, such cultural norms must change. How such a change should occur is a problem Theweleit only speculates about briefly. Clearly the first step is to recognize the social and psychological dynamics which have caused such extreme damage in the past, and to acknowledge that we are not immune. In short, if Klaus Theweleit's work is correct about the values which generate the potential for fascism, recruiting slogans like, "The few, the proud, the Marines," express an ideology which ultimately undermines the democratic ideals we espouse as a nation.

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The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85

Thomas E. Skidmore

New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, 420 pp., including index, \$29.95.

The military regime which governed Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was arguably popular and unpopular, pragmatic and ideological, nationalistic and open to foreign influence, ruthless and liberal. Brazil became the model for other authoritarian regimes on the continent, but perhaps truly like none of them.

In *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85*, Thomas Skidmore comes as close as any scholar to unraveling the puzzles and paradoxes of recent Brazilian politics. As the leading historiographer of Brazil, Skidmore has produced what is undoubtedly the definitive history of the period, a fitting sequel to his widely-acclaimed history of Brazil's troubled postwar democracy.¹ In his latest volume, Skidmore surveys the major economic, political and social trends of each military administration, a journey which follows Brazil's descent into and climb back from repression.

The book is exhaustively researched. Skidmore has interviewed every major protagonist in the drama, reviewed virtually every piece of published and unpublished evidence, and weighed all interpretations of the problems he addresses. Students of Brazil will eagerly mine the book's one hundred pages of endnotes.

Skidmore's awesome command of this dense material is what makes possible the book's second strength — its accessibility. The author is equally clear when describing macroeconomic policy, military intrigues, and party politics. He explains with eloquent simplicity such complex events as the reshuffling of cabinet ministers, and Brazil's recourse to foreign loans in the 1970s to keep the pump of the economy primed.

Perhaps the most remarkable virtue of the book is its balance and the voice it gives to the goals and beliefs of different participant groups. Skidmore conveys vividly the fears that the military held of subversion and anarchy befalling Brazil, as well as the rationale offered by such technocrats as Delfim Netto for a growth model which "sacrificed millions." "You can't put distribution ahead of production. If you do, you'll end up distributing what doesn't exist" (p. 144). The author soberly describes the American approach to the regime which vacillated between backing the revolution of 1964 (as its proponents preferred to call their *coup d'état*) with symbolic and material support, and recoiling from the regime because of its gross abuses of human rights.

1. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Skidmore describes how a regime which achieved extraordinary economic success was unable to achieve hardly any of its long-term political objectives (though military rule was not without significant political consequences). Economic growth was an obsession of the Brazilian military, an obsession which subordinated all other economic objectives. To achieve growth, inflation was allowed to accelerate after 1967, and income became increasingly concentrated. The regime pursued policies which pleased few who did not share the same obsession. The International Monetary Fund could hardly approve of indexing and steady mini-devaluations of the *cruzeiro*, measures which allowed Brazil to "live with inflation," which even at its lowest point approached an annual rate of 20 percent; nationalists decried the excessive dependence on foreign investment and technology; and the Catholic Church and those concerned with social justice argued that an expansion of the economic pie would not produce a future redistribution of income in an economy geared toward the manufacture of automobiles.

In stark contrast with the neo-conservative experiments in monetarist economics soon to be launched in neighboring Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, the architects of the Brazilian economic miracle pursued an eclectic package of neo-liberal policies. They expanded the state enterprise sector, imposed price controls, and skillfully managed the country's balance of payments by encouraging foreign investments and loans. That this development model more closely resembled the 1950's style of civilian President Juscelino Kubitschek than other Latin American military regimes is not ignored by Skidmore. Indeed, he depicts the Brazilian military and their technocrats as pragmatic and shrewd, if not always rational, as when geopolitical considerations and visions of national grandeur prevailed over sound economic principles in the Médici government's decision to blaze the Trans-Amazon Highway.

The impressive extent to which the military succeeded in its economic objectives is understated in the book for good reason. Few can fathom praising a regime that achieved growth at the expense of terrorizing and pauperizing the majority of its own population.² Moreover, the price tag of the "miracle" is today's crippling \$120 billion foreign debt whose annual interest payments amount to 5 percent of GDP. Yet, to their credit, the economic planners of the military rule succeeded in controlling the levers of the economy. They constructed a sophisticated financial system including a central bank, increased revenue from the collection of the national income tax, and controlled wages *and* prices, the latter through an inter-ministerial price council. Further, they marshalled savings and investments in an inflationary economy through such instruments as a state pension system (FGTS) and adjustable treasury bonds (ORTNs). Credit must also be given for stimulating and diversifying exports — more than half of Brazil's exports today are industrial products — and for developing the capital goods sector.

If economic growth was the proudest and most lasting achievement of military rule, the most haunting question raised in the book remains: How

2. This point is made by Albert O. Hirschman in his "The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection," *Latin American Research Review* XXII, no. 3, (1987): 19-22.

necessary was a repressive government in achieving economic growth?³ In recalling the unsuccessful stabilization attempts of the 1950s and early 1960s, Skidmore implies that a civilian government which faced popular electoral pressure could not have sustained the kind of stabilization plan implemented from 1964 to 1967. He addresses more directly whether repression was necessary to enforce stabilization rather than addressing whether repression made growth possible. Yet, it is the latter question which is arguably more intriguing and ultimately more significant. It is not clear whether flexible exchange rates, foreign loans in a context of excess international liquidity, and state investment, could have produced growth only under a dictatorship. Whether or not hard economic choices can be made in a democracy is a question that remains unresolved.

Whether repression was ultimately necessary for economic success or not, the military government did not hesitate to resort to repressive tactics. The grisly accounts of torture committed in the name of national security are no less chilling to the reader because they are, by now, familiar. But in a regime in which the security apparatus often acted beyond the boundaries of behavior sanctioned even by the military high command, top-ranking officers struggled to make arbitrary acts appear legal, even taking the extraordinary step of producing two new constitutions (the second a substantial amendment to the first) and an endless string of constitutional amendments and decrees.

The military regime, however, also demonstrated leniency. At the height of the repression (1969-73), the Supreme Military Tribunal acquitted 45 percent of the cases brought before it, and for the entire period from 1965-77, 68 percent. Indeed, as Skidmore describes, "So often there was an incompleteness about their dictatorial practice. It seemed to signal a lack of total confidence in their ideology and a lack of total commitment in applying it" (p. 150). The account of military repression produced by the Archdiocese of São Paulo from the records of the military tribunals, *Brasil: Nunca Mais*, reported that the government was responsible for "only" 333 deaths from 1964-81. This number works out to a per capita death toll one hundred times lower than that of neighboring Argentina. The tempering of military "justice" in Brazil undoubtedly allowed the military to return to the barracks in 1985 without excessive fear of retribution from ordinary citizens; political elites already had agreed to a policy of "no revenge."

Ambivalence by the military about its proper role is reflected in its ambiguous political project. The national congress met during most of the regime, although it was deprived of any real power and reduced to a debating society whose most meaningful speeches were censored. Elections contested by both a pro-government *and* an opposition party took place at regular intervals, but the pro-government party was always assured of victory, either through the

3. This question spawned considerable academic debate. The most famous thesis regarding the elective affinity between industrial development and authoritarian regimes was advanced by Guillermo A. O'Donnell in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973), and more forcefully in "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin America Research Review* XIII, no. 1, (1978): 3-38.

denial of media time to opposition political parties, the instrument of "indirect election," or the stripping of political rights of any figure who was likely to produce dissidence. The military stopped short of abolishing elections altogether out of the belief, according to Skidmore, that they were important as a legitimizing process for the regime.

This answer, however, strikes me as incomplete, as is his answer to a related question of why the military did not attempt to institutionalize authoritarian rule. To argue, as Skidmore does, that the regime could not institutionalize authoritarianism because Geisel (a soft-liner eager to restore the military to its professional role) succeeded Médici (the hard-liner who preferred to implement an authoritarian corporatism) as president is to beg the question of how the "soft-liners," who were out of power, were able to outmaneuver the incumbent "hard-liners."

The process of disengagement from power started at the beginning of the second decade of authoritarian rule. The military's long tenure, and even longer exit, can be attributed to its inner turmoil and the ambivalence it generated from many sectors of the elite. Both the "hard-line" and "soft-line" camps within the military placed a premium upon preserving institutional unity, a concern which necessarily committed them to the principle of non-succession. The Brazilian armed forces were determined that power would not be personalized and that military rule would not breed *caudillos*, or a "strong-man" class of rulers.

Yet, institutional unity was most threatened by presidential successions and the struggle to stay in power. The soft-liners ultimately won the argument and permitted the system to become more open. Seizing the opportunity, Brazilian businessmen who helped to plot the *coup* (and reportedly financed death squads which worked in tandem with the dreaded security forces) protested the statist economy in the mid-1970s and joined the growing chorus of voices for democratization. Those voices were led by the Conference of Bishops of the Brazilian Catholic Church whose spokesmen had also once congratulated the military conspirators for saving the country from communism and João Goulart. The erosion of support for the regime among citizens, various organizations, and many of the political elites accelerated its demise.

Perhaps the most disturbing question centers on popular and middle-class attitudes toward the government of Emílio Garrastaz Médici. It is disturbing because the reader cannot deny that the regime enjoyed support from those it repressed and trampled. During the worse years of the dictatorship, urban terrorists and innocents alike were tortured to death while a nation cheered its third soccer World Cup victory and double-digit growth rates.

Skidmore documents the apparent swing of Brazilian opinion from tacit support while Médici occupied office, to widespread opposition by the time of the first national-level elections in 1974.⁴ On the one hand, he argues that

4. Although there had been municipal elections in 1970 and 1972, it is generally acknowledged that voters in Brazil cast their ballots in local elections according to clientelistic considerations; only in national elections is the vote taken as a referendum on the regime.

many Brazilians ignored increased repression and torture because of rising incomes; the middle class especially was silenced by some of the highest managerial level salaries in the world. Skidmore's claim that the middle class supported the military-sponsored ARENA party in 1970 is partially substantiated by the few public opinion surveys which were conducted during this most authoritarian period. Yet, his accounts of massive blank balloting, of voting based on the promise of patronage — under-funded cities and towns were easy targets of federal government political pressure — and of a deeply demoralized and terrified populace, convince the reader that the regime was unpopular.

Most problematic for Skidmore's thesis is how, if Médici enjoyed such considerable support, could the government of his successor, Ernesto Geisel, have been so humiliated in the elections of 1974 by the MDB, the official opposition party created by the military. The MDB has confessed that it in fact waged its campaign not against Geisel, but against Médici. Skidmore would have us believe that either it was only in 1974 that the economic rewards of growth, which had produced such euphoria only a few years earlier, were recognized as highly unequal, precipitating a "massive movement toward the PMDB" the successor to the MDB, or that the ARENA party was inept (p. 188). An assessment of the skills and the shortcomings of national, state, and local ARENA politicians, however, should surely hinge on whether they were mobilizing support for a despised dictatorship or seen as the symbol of good economic times and national grandeur. The level of consensus achieved by the military is indeed one of the intractable questions on which very little research has been done, and one which may never be answered definitively.

Perhaps most crucial of all, is the question of the legacy of this regime for democracy in Brazil. Even if democracy can become consolidated, politics has been shaped and forever changed by Brazil's authoritarian experience. Skidmore regrettably traces the many obstacles to democratization to "habit" when a more thoughtful analysis might have identified the real constraints imposed by the legacy of authoritarianism. I would like to share Skidmore's optimism about the liberalizing political effects of urbanization. If urbanization produces democratic politics, then democracy in Brazil should be inevitable. Were it only so easy!

The most salient and important questions surrounding this important chapter of Brazil's history are extraordinarily well-framed, and scholarly debate will be indebted to this impressive volume. The challenge now confronting social scientists is to answer convincingly some of these more intractable questions. Thomas Skidmore has made that task infinitely more manageable.

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China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture

Suzanne Ogden

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989, 375 pp., including bibliography and index, \$17.25 paperback.

During the past decade the rapid and dramatic policy reversals that have taken place in China have surprised even the closest of Western observers. China's new pragmatic reform leadership, led by the venerable Deng Xiaoping under the banner of "market socialism," has achieved remarkable success in rectifying the damage wrought by the "ten bad years" of the Cultural Revolution and in setting China firmly on the course of economic modernization. In fact, there is even an indication that China's sometime antagonist to the north is recognizing the value of China's new methods and is instituting Chinese-style reforms despite deep-seeded Russian cultural arrogance.

Despite their enormous success and a demonstrated ability to deflect political opposition, China's new leaders are confronted with policy hurdles which may yet threaten their political future and their reforms. Even knowledgeable outsiders harbor suspicions that the recent changes in China are simply the latest in a number of wild policy swings which have characterized China's 40-year socialist history. They wonder, indeed, if China's new leaders can permanently steer clear of the ideologically motivated, but almost consciously counterproductive policy measures of the Maoist past.

Suzanne Ogden's recent work, *China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture*, is a highly detailed, scholarly attempt to invest China's turbulent political past with a degree of rational explanation, and to analyze why PRC leaders have found some of their country's problems so difficult to resolve. Ogden focuses particularly on seven general classes of problems — leadership, socialist democracy, socialist legality and control, class and class struggle, economic development, education, and the meaning of socialism — which she maintains represent the greatest threat to a secure, prosperous Chinese future. Her basic thesis is that China's problems are most intractable when they create tension between three major "clusters" of Chinese values: those stemming from China's traditional cultural heritage; those that reflect orthodox socialist ideology; and those related to developmental aspirations. For example, she notes that the traditional Chinese obsession with hierarchy and rank flies in the face of the socialist leadership's insistence upon absolute economic equality. Likewise, Mao Tse-tung's concern with political education and continuous revolutionary struggle severely hampered China's modernization efforts. Ogden asserts that China's developmental shortcomings, such as a lack of sophisticated technology and an uneducated work force, have interfered with the country's growth and dynamism far less than has an inflexible

socialist ideology, especially when that ideology is reinforced by counterproductive traditional norms such as the existence of an entrenched, self-aggrandizing bureaucracy.

Although Ogden's work occasionally bogs down in repetitive descriptive detail, it does contain some valuable new insights about the rapidly changing Chinese political system. Her discussion of the differences between our Western liberal notion of democracy and that of the Chinese socialists provides a useful framework for an objective assessment of Chinese political problems as well as accomplishments. Specifically, the concept of democracy in China implies only that policy suggestions originate with the masses. Once decisions have been taken by the central leadership, however, the citizenry has the duty and obligation to implement these decisions with unswerving obedience. "Democracy" is thus carefully orchestrated by the Center for the purpose of unity rather than pluralism.

The emphasis on the continuity of Chinese history and cultural values is also particularly appealing. Unfortunately, many studies of Chinese history treat the modern era as divorced from the imperial past. This fallacious notion of independent epochs has been reinforced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership itself which seeks to deny any links with a decadent "bourgeois" past. Ogden, however, firmly debunks the myth of historical discontinuity and, by proving how enduring is China's political and cultural heritage, sheds a great deal of light upon current political practices in China. For instance, she argues that the modern Chinese propensity to view politics in terms of moral absolutes and leaders as infallible is reminiscent of the days when China's emperor was considered the Son of Heaven and the embodiment of human wisdom and morality. An ancient tradition of paternalistic and authoritarian rule by a privileged bureaucracy likewise contributes today to blind acceptance of the CCP and the maintenance of absolute political orthodoxy. Further, since traditional wisdom holds that power resides in wise individuals rather than in institutions or legal precedent, little premium has yet been placed on the development of a coherent body of law that would protect the Chinese citizenry from arbitrary authority.

Ogden's careful dissection of recent reforms and organizational changes is impressive for its precision and clarity. She rightly emphasizes that although change is far-reaching, political liberalization is tolerated only so long as it serves the Central leadership's political purposes. Thus far, for instance, Deng and his faction have sanctioned limited local electoral participation as a means of preventing cadres affiliated with the old leftist leadership from handpicking local leaders of their own political persuasion. Ogden also notes that pressure for legal reform still comes mainly from foreign business interests and that law itself continues to be used as an *ex post facto* justification for policy changes. Economic reforms, too, are carefully couched in the orthodox language of socialism, and, although almost any pragmatic program based on capitalist precepts can be cleverly masked as "socialism with Chinese characteristics" these days, it is still heretical to denounce socialism itself as responsible for past policy mistakes.

Ogden uses the notion of fundamental incompatibilities between traditional, socialist, and developmental goals to organize an exhaustive and highly sensitive study of China's most difficult political problems. Their seriousness should not be underestimated; the educational system has barely begun to recover from a Cultural Revolution which left it in shambles; rationalization and deregulation of the pricing system has run into serious roadblocks and threatens to create runaway inflation; and China's precious capital and resources are still misallocated or tragically wasted. The Party leadership has great difficulty exposing and rooting out corrupt or incompetent officials when would-be reformers hesitate to turn on their colleagues, knowing that they themselves may be the next victims. Perhaps most serious for the CCP's future, China's youth has become contemptuous of the Party's abilities and increasingly cynical about the utility of their own participation in politics.

Although a wealth of information is contained within the pages of *China's Unresolved Issues*, Ogden's organization of the material sometimes lacks focus. She frequently intermixes discussions of China's problems, explanations of socialist theory and organization, synopses of political history, and delineations of major reforms. Finally, Ogden's book could perhaps benefit from less descriptive detail and more analytical prognosis about China's chances of resolving her most intractable problems. For instance, the author only touches on the issue of the imminent incorporation of the staunchly capitalist society of Hong Kong, and a less likely but potential reconciliation with Taiwan. Given her depth of understanding about the complexities of China's socialist politics and problems, Ogden could have profitably speculated about the future impact of these events on the resolution of competing political goals.

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The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia

Vladimir Tismaneanu

London and New York: Routledge, 1988, 232 pp., including index, \$35.00 cloth.

Vladimir Tismaneanu's small but impressive volume must be something of a rude challenge to communists aspiring to reform Eastern European regimes. In the absence of true change in Marxist-Leninist ideology, Tismaneanu argues *glasnost* and democratization are doomed to failure and that reform efforts are mere tactical maneuvers. Far from believing the Stalinist system to be an aberration of communist doctrine, the author is convinced that the problem with Marxism is not Leninism or Stalinism, but Marxism itself. Revisionist movements which embrace a more humane form of Marxism — and do not, therefore, squarely oppose Marxism — cannot hope to succeed. The dissident movements which exist in Eastern Europe today are the descendants of the erroneous belief in revisionism and the possibility of systemic reform.

In the opening chapters Tismaneanu conducts an "autopsy" of Stalinism and recounts the familiar litany of Stalinist crimes in Eastern Europe. He describes the impoverishment of any independent thought (especially Marxist), the rejection of the Western humanist legacy based on critical reasoning, and the subjugation of natural sciences to the dictates of the Party line. As Tismaneanu emphasizes, this intellectual annihilation was accomplished all in the name of Marxist ideology. Even many Eastern European intellectuals who possessed a sophisticated knowledge of Marxist thought embraced Stalin's simple-minded platitudes.

What is interesting here is not so much the description of Stalinism, but Tismaneanu's claim that Stalin was not only a true Leninist, "but also a legitimate inheritor of a certain authoritarian trend in the Marxist revolutionary movement" (p. 63). For those who argue that true "socialism" under Marx in no way resembled what Stalin (or, for that matter, Lenin) promulgated, the author, while recognizing Marx's dream of a humanized order, argues that Marx's radicalism accounted for and even encouraged Stalinism. Stalin was not a monstrous deviation of an otherwise wholesome ideology, but was its natural product.

One of the most successful aspects of the book is its historical description of East European revisionist thought. Khrushchev's rise to power and the subsequent thaw in civil life gave intellectuals in the region the chance to assert themselves, to use their talents to restore what they saw as the "humanist core" of Marxist philosophy, and to expose Stalinism for the apostasy it was. At the time, intellectuals like the East German Ernst Bloch and the Hungarian George Lukács, believed that reform was possible within the existing political

and social structure. Over time, however, and certainly by the 1968 invasion of Prague, these revisionists realized that such reform was not possible. By acceding to the existing power structure and intellectual matrix of Marxism, rather than opposing the entire system with non-Marxist ideas, Eastern European intellectuals had relegated themselves to a peripheral, almost inconsequential position.

Coupled with this realization is what Tismaneanu calls the "poverty of utopia," or the abject failure of communist regimes to achieve anything approaching the hypnotic promises of its ideology. The Polish intellectual Stanislaw Baranczak (writing in 1986) observes that:

[t]he long road that lay ahead can be defined as a gradual process of shaking off misconceptions and illusions as to the nature of the ruling system — from the naive "revisionist" belief which still prevailed in the late fifties, that the system could be "humanized" or improved from within, without changing its fundamental premises, up to the clear-sighted awareness, characteristic of recent times, that totalitarian inhumanity is an innate and unavoidable component of the system.¹

Tismaneanu ends his work by speculating on the relatively recent phenomenon of dissidence turning into opposition in Eastern Europe. Intellectuals are no longer interested in reforming a dead system with a dead ideology, but have joined with workers in demanding respect for what they see as inalienable human rights. The rise and dogged existence of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity in Poland, and human rights groups throughout the region, is testimony to the rejection of the reformability of Marxism, and the desire for a standard of human rights and behavior — what the author terms the development of a civil society. Vaclav Havel, the recently-arrested Czechoslovak playwright, has written that the revisionist mentality has given way to what he has called the "'human order,' which no political order can replace" (p. 175). Integral to this human order and to Tismaneanu's discussion of this "new" dissent, is the imperative of living in truth, without the interference and coloring of Marxist ideology.

Western peacenik groups, Tismaneanu argues, have just come to realize that respect for human rights must be fundamentally linked with questions of East-West peace. For some time, Eastern European dissidents were looked on as hindrances to the larger, more important matters of nuclear disarmament and peace. Now, it is generally recognized among these group in the West that the word "peace" has been so abused in totalitarian societies, it cannot be separated from the condition of human rights that these dissidents have fought so hard to improve.

Tismaneanu's book serves as an important eye-opener for those who strongly believe *glasnost* might well produce true reform in Eastern Europe. Ideology in the Soviet bloc may be a fossil, but it still serves as the only source of

1. See Stanislaw Baranczak, "The Polish intellectual," *Salmagundi* (Spring-Summer 1986): 223.

legitimacy for these regimes. The emergence of human rights groups imbued with non-Marxist ideas and their increasing contacts with the West perhaps pose a more serious challenge to reform than does a stagnant bureaucracy. It remains to be seen if Gorbachev is the neo-Stalinist Tismaneanu says he is, or the reformer who can somehow transform a still-existing Stalinist system into socialism with a genuine bill of rights.

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International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements

Heather Ann Wilson

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 209 pp., \$58.00.

Prior to 1949, the question of when the international law of war applied to an armed conflict between a defending "government" and a rebel force was analyzed as an issue of both positive law and natural law. To positive lawyers, the answer depended on the policy choice of whoever might have to make one. French "recognition" of the belligerent capacity of the United States in 1778 was regarded by the British as "premature" and an intervention in the internal affairs of the empire. But the French and Americans viewed it as a political step in harmony with evolving realities and in no way inconsistent with French legal obligations to Great Britain or anybody else. To natural lawyers, the law of war applied whenever public force was being used regardless of how one of the parties characterized the conflict or the opposing force's legal personality. With regard to whether one of the "parties to the conflict" was "public" or not, the tests were never fully agreed to, but involved such factors as control of territory, ability to obey the laws and customs of war (the *jus in bello*), duration and intensity of the military action, command by upstanding members of the community, and the existence of an actual struggle for authority, not merely the use of force as if by robbers or pirates for personal or small group aggrandizement.

Normally, governments allowed policy to dictate the resolution of disputed claims while papering over legal disputes. For example, the federal government of the United States never did accept the Confederacy as a legal belligerent in 1861-65. Nonetheless, as a political "concession," the Union applied the *jus in bello* to the conflict from its inception to its end while insisting that third states would be intervening in American internal affairs if they proclaimed "neutrality." Meanwhile, the Confederates insisted that they met all the characteristics of a "state" at war and that the *jus in bello* applied as a matter of natural law. The British government insisted that the *jus in bello* applied to protect neutral British shipping if it applied to justify American blockades of Southern ports or rights of search and seizure of contraband in British ships on the high seas. The disagreements, which were never fully resolved, nearly resulted in war at one point between the Union and the British. The international legal order does not require that competing intellectual models be harmonized.

Except in occasional naturalist writings, the "justice" of the competing parties to an internal conflict was not an issue. The *jus in bello* was applied by the leaders of the parties to such a conflict in their own interest: to maintain discipline, spirit, and a sense of moral rectitude among their own supporters;

to avoid reprisals (e.g., maltreatment of surrendered personnel); and to ease the return to peace under terms that should assure an economically and politically viable state or states. They usually presented this self-interested policy to the other side as a concession adopted for moral reasons, and to third countries as an accommodation to the *jus in bello* undertaken not under legal compulsion but as a matter of policy to avoid needless quarrels. The effect of this was to protect the victims within the embattled state no matter what the moral value of the object of their sacrifices. The outcome of the struggle would determine whose value system would be implemented by the municipal legal order convulsed by arms. To prejudge that outcome would render every battle an Armageddon with each side deriving legal "rights" from its own righteousness and inhibited from even "conceding" humane treatment to innocent victims because nobody could be morally or legally "innocent."

At the close of World War II, an attempt was made to harmonize the naturalist and positivist approaches by developing a treaty by which all parties agreed to accept fact-based labels for conflicts in lieu of national-discretion-based labels. The result was the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflict. But the price the colonial powers insisted on at the negotiation was the abandonment of the traditional natural law criteria for the application of the *jus in bello*. Instead, a territorial test was adopted: Armed conflicts involving two or more parties to the Conventions would be governed by the *jus in bello*; but, under article 3 common to all four Conventions, armed conflicts "not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" would be governed by a different set of rules dominated by the municipal law of the territorial sovereign.

The provision that the "international" or "non-international" character of the conflict could be linked to whether the conflict was occurring in the territory of one party only created unresolvable legal problems. For example, it could be argued that it is legally different for a rebel cruiser to exercise a belligerent right of search against a neutral cargo ship on the high seas, than for the identical incident to occur a mile away within the embattled state's territorial waters. In the first case, the neutral would likely concede the belligerent right and demand restitution of non-contraband cargo seized. In the second, the defending government would argue that such an approach was an intervention in its internal affairs forbidden by the Conventions' positive categorization system, and that the rebels were common criminals or pirates who should be apprehended and, if possible, brought to "justice" by the "neutral." Had this rule been applied during the great formative experiences of the American Civil War it would have reversed actual state practice.¹ The natural law criteria for the application of the *jus in bello* — duration, intensity, command structure — were now irrelevant to revolutions and civil wars. It was a great retroactive "victory" for the British of 1778. The artificial

1. At that time, the seminal Lieber Code was promulgated; it codified the *jus in bello*. Some Confederate raiders on the high seas were in fact called "pirates" in British criminal law proceedings.

distinction assured that in the positive law world the protection of innocent victims of "internal" struggles would be taken out of the *jus in bello* and left to the policies of elites struggling to survive and to rebels whose first priority was to destroy the existing rival governmental infrastructure.

Concern with internal discipline, spirit, and moral superiority faded with the de-personalization of the battlefield and the increasing acceptability of ideological conversion by force as the object of victory rather than a revived economic and political system. Contemporaneously, the policy underpinnings of the embattled leaders' choice of legal framework shifted from applying the *jus in bello* as a "concession" to denying the applicability of any legal restraints. The notion that an internal struggle was governed in any way by international law seemed self-contradictory. Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and which placed the internal conflicts under some minor humanitarian legal restraints, was regarded as a major concession. To humanitarians unfamiliar with the history and logic of the *jus in bello*, common article 3 now seemed a "victory."

This "victory" by those claiming to be concerned with human rights in time of war was then further entrenched by the conclusion in 1977 of two Protocols to the 1949 Conventions. These Protocols elaborated and further distinguished the substantive rules applicable to international armed conflicts and to internal conflicts. The 1977 negotiations were dominated by two parties: humanitarians seeking to return to the natural law pattern under which all conflicts above the threshold of minor riots could be seen as governed by the international rules, and Third World leaders still resentful of rules that had denied their belligerent rights until after they had been successful in the battlefield or at the conference table at the close of hostilities. So, the 1977 Protocols took the predictable but politically and intellectually shallow twist of dividing internal armed conflicts into two more categories: those in which the recognized or historical government was favored by maintaining the inapplicability of the *jus in bello*, and those assumed to favor rebels politically by requiring application of the *jus in bello*.

The determining factor in this radical split was found in the *jus ad bellum*, the right of the rebels to use force. The rebels to be favored by the application of the *jus in bello* were to be those justified in using force by the *jus ad bellum*: those whose cause was "national liberation" from "colonial and racist regimes." It was apparently forgotten that international law has never forbidden revolution and that ever since the Westphalian constitution became the pattern of international society, with the exception of the days of the Holy Alliance under Metternich, violent changes in the municipal legal order of any state were considered beyond the legal concern of third states. Instead, a special provision was adopted by which the authority controlling a "national liberation movement" (NLM) was authorized to declare that his was an international armed conflict. The states which are parties to Protocol I would be obliged to accept that characterization as binding on themselves. The commanders of less virtuous military movements otherwise identically successful and meeting

the natural law criteria for belligerency were not accorded the same legal power.

The result has been to raise to a matter of extreme importance for the positive laws of war the questions of who is an NLM, and when does its leader get the authority to bring into play by unilateral declaration the body of law that the defending elite insists under the 1949 Conventions is inapplicable to internal struggles for authority. Because the United States insists on its own discretion regarding the status that it is willing to accord any party to any conflict, it has refused to ratify Protocol I. Other major powers have attached conditions on ratification or interpretation of key terms of Protocol I which have the effect of nullifying the special authority of NLM leaders and leaving untouched the legal advantages gained by existing elites over NLMs and others in 1949.

Heather Ann Wilson has written an analysis entirely within the world of the 1949 Conventions and 1977 Protocols. In my opinion, she does as well as can be expected of one who does not question the fundamental assumptions of the negotiators, or see how they have adjusted the law to suit their parochial interests and then eviscerated it. The book won the Paul Reuter Prize awarded by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a "major work in the field of Humanitarian Law," which by ICRC definitions means the codified laws of war. Within that framework, as a commentary and analysis of the effect of the 1977 Protocols on NLMs and those interested in classifying the military phases of their struggles with defending elites, it has value.

To those, like myself, who have serious doubts about the fundamental assumptions of the ICRC as reflected in the 1977 Protocols, the book is filled with questionable assertions and tendentious arguments. They begin with the opening chapter, "The Concept of Law." Wilson argues that the true subjects of the legal order can be individuals and organizations other than states, and concludes that "No arbitrary definition precludes national liberation movements from assuming status in international law when the requirements of international life necessitate their inclusion" (p. 8). True enough, but unless it can be shown that the requirements of international life necessitate their inclusion when not necessitating equally the inclusion of less well-motivated but equally successful "rebels," the argument assumes the validity of the *jus ad bellum* test. It requires moral value judgments in the process of determining what body of law is appropriate to the protection of the victims of public armed conflict. The tacit assumption throughout the rest of the volume is that NLMs are entitled to special legal status not as a result of the positive law of the Protocols (which would not bind non-parties), but as a result of the moral values implicit in the legal order binding on all.

Wilson is also wrong in some of her assertions of fact. For example, in the same chapter she states as if non-controversial that "By the twentieth century the authority to wage war was firmly restricted to sovereign States. Subordinate princes could not legitimately wage war with their own private armies. Pirates were criminals under international law" (p. 16). In fact, pirates were not

criminals under international law, but under the municipal laws of the leading maritime states, and whether a "subordinate prince" could legitimately wage war with any army depended on who was determining that "legitimacy." The *jus in bello* certainly applied to civil wars and internal power struggles which passed the naturalist tests or which were placed within the category of "war" by positivist statesmen for their own policy reasons. Her explanation that the British South Africa Company did not wage war as a subordinate "prince" in its own right and with its own army, but acted as an agent of the British Crown, is a British construction of marginal interest to the Zulus and Boers and irrelevant to the point of her argument: that NLMs did not have the authority to engage in war. In reaching her general conclusion, she seems not to have considered the status of the American Confederacy of 1861, perhaps because it was before the turn of the century or the Latin American (particularly Cuban, Haitian, and Colombian) independence movements.

In the main, three major confusions in the opening chapter set the framework which makes the rest of the work seem unpersuasive. There is a pervasive confusion between the humanitarian rules aimed at protecting the victims of war and the rules regarding the status of the parties to the conflict. The *jus in bello* seems to be regarded as dependent on the *jus ad bellum*. Second, her generalities and the need to ignore much fact and alternative models to reach them seem to violate Occam's Razor: her model is not the simplest that will rationalize observable fact. Finally, her evidence is heavily based on a selection of publicists' conclusions without any consideration of the counter-arguments to, and the political biases of, the cited publicists, most of whom are English and writing in support of the legitimacy of British force to maintain the Empire and the illegality of the use of force to resist British expansion or legal consolidation.

The concept of "Self-Determination in International Law" is analyzed in Part II. Again, there seem to be major confusions of thought growing out of the attempt to find self-determination to be a legal, as distinguished from political or moral, factor in international relations. This leads to some peculiar assertions. For example, Wilson asserts that the reason the international community refused to recognize the independence of Southern Rhodesia under the Smith government was "because it was a State created without regard to the principle of self-determination" involving "the freely expressed will of the people" (p. 69). Are not the white settlers "people"? How many states today better reflect the "freely expressed" will of the people to form a state? Wilson contrasts this with the situation created by the Indian annexation of Goa: "Self-determination, although not yet justifying the use of force in the minds of the majority of representatives to the Security Council, did justify the tacit acceptance of the annexation" (p. 70). Is the Indian invasion of territory that had been ruled more or less peacefully by Portugal for about 450 years "self-determination"? By whom? Surely not by the people who lived there. She argues that "[t]he acceptance of the PLO as an actor in world politics without an established State is strong evidence of the existence of a right to self-determination in international law" (p. 75). Is it? Does she really believe that Syria, Jordan, and Egypt would be reluctant to swallow the Palestinian state

without a legal qualm if they thought they could? Can she not distinguish between a legal right and political ploy which might be part of the legislative process but which cannot be given effect as law without much more?

Part III tries to find principles by which some military authorities can claim the benefits of the *jus ad bellum* and others cannot. It is called "Right Authority." This seems to get lost in a long discussion of why NLMs are legally entitled to an exemption from the prohibition on the threat or use of force in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. The legal problem seems superficial. The prohibitions on the use of force in articles 2(3), which she does not seem to think worth discussion, and 2(4) are prohibitions addressed to "All Members" of the organization and deal with "international disputes" and "international relations" only, not with internal conflicts or the creation of new international persons. She seems not to have noticed article 2(7) which forbids the organization to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Further, Wilson's arguments concerning United Nations General Assembly resolutions do not take account of the fact that those resolutions are not legally binding and, if they were, they would not likely have passed. Many of the affirmative votes are hypocritical, asserting rules for others which few voting states would want applied to themselves. Indeed, when it is noted that the supposed moral insights argued are not applied to their own situations by those stating them, and that the antagonistic values, like historical continuity and stability, are not mentioned, her entire argument seems polemical.

The "protection of victims" in Part IV seems based on the notion that the laws of war are fundamentally moral rules made into binding legal rules by mere assertion. Further, these rules, derived from a sense of virtue, are binding on all individuals and are necessarily enforced by states which violate the law when they do not enforce completely those rules against all within their jurisdiction. It is the usual naturalist human rights model. But the experience of several hundred years has been that statesmen and legislators determine the criminal laws of their societies without much concern for the moral insights of publicists who are not responsible for the well-being and continuity of the elites whose care has been confided to national political leaders.

In sum, the book serves a purpose within the community of like-thinking scholars who share its assumptions and cannot understand why the United States has refused to ratify Protocol I of 1977. It will have no impact on those whose model of international society involves the conception of a legislative process which rests on consent influenced by the evolution of traditions and calculations of self-interest rather than perceptions of political virtue. It will not advance the difficult struggle for human rights and the protection of war victims.

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Mirror in the Shrine: American Encounters with Meiji Japan

Robert A. Rosenstone

Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1988, 310 pp., including index, \$25.00.

When Meiji Japan first opened its shores to foreigners in the late nineteenth-century, among the first Americans to venture to the unknown land were the missionary teacher William Elliot Griffis, natural scientist Edward S. Morse, and writer Lafcadio Hearn. Together, they comprise the focus of the biographical *Mirror in the Shrine: American Encounters with Meiji Japan*. What makes these individuals (and Rosenstone's book) so compelling is that they provide an eloquent testimony to the indelible power of Japanese culture. The experiences of these three cross-cultural travellers are timeless and provocative.

How does Rosenstone reconstruct a history of three lives, evoke a bygone era in a foreign land, and bridge the past and the present? First, Rosenstone concentrates his biography on the relationship between Japan and each man's life. This allows him to skip some of the more insignificant personal details included in typical biographies and to emphasize directly, and more dramatically, the influence of Japan in each man's life. The book is written as a narrative. The personal and flexible style provides Rosenstone the opportunity to accomplish three tasks: to express the emotional and intellectual encounter between the Americans and the Japanese; to describe in vivid detail Meiji Japan; and also to interject from time to time with his own outside observations and insights. This writing strategy allows everyone, Rosenstone and his readers, to take their own journey to Meiji Japan alongside Griffis, Morse, and Hearn.

While acknowledging that his approach is ambitious, Rosenstone is careful not to overstep the fine line between biographical history and fiction. When he is unable to describe his subjects, he says so. As Rosenstone articulates so well, "One breathes life into them, and they give back the wisdom of perpetual incompleteness" (p. 274). At times it is disconcerting to have the biographer so clearly announce his limitations, but the reader ultimately understands Rosenstone's reasons, appreciates his honesty, and respects his methods.

As a scholar concerned with expanding the range of historical models, Rosenstone provides a convincing example of the possibilities of historical narrative. He explains that the historical narrative is useful for conveying ambiguity, something which historians typically prefer to gloss over. His message is that history need not be neat, especially if it is to be true.

Some may wonder, why focus on these three particular men who few outside of academia even know? Simply put, their timing was good. Griffis, Morse, and Hearn arrived in Japan when Westerners were beginning to travel there for the first time. Emerging from centuries of feudalism and self-imposed

isolation, Meiji Japan was actively propelling itself into the modern era and was eager to learn from the West. There was a certain mystique to Japan, and the more tangible promise of professional opportunities. Of course, and as Rosenstone makes clear, part of the motivation in selecting these three men is distinctly personal. Rosenstone is obviously and fully engaged with each of these historical figures.

Rosenstone argues that three distinct dimensions of the American encounter with Japan are characterized by Griffis, Morse, and Hearn. Griffis, full of religious fervor, seeks to aid the less fortunate Japanese with his missionary activities. Although he becomes a prominent educator, he fails in his goal to save thirty million souls. Dedicated to the pursuit of science, Morse leaves his mark in the fields of natural science and zoology, and introduces Americans to Japanese folk art and customs. Meanwhile, Hearn, an inveterate wanderer and romantic, travels to Japan for no other reason than to avoid going somewhere else, and in the eternal hope of "finding himself." He does just that, making a home in Japan and becoming an acclaimed novelist.

For our three travellers, Meiji Japan is a challenge to their preconceived beliefs, attitudes and ideas. It is viewed through two lenses: one highlights the many differences between American and Japanese culture, and another captures the contrasts within Japan resulting from the push toward modernization. Morse finds himself constantly comparing American and Japanese ways, whether they are manners, aesthetics, physical landscapes, or public morality. All three men are startled by the coexistence of the modern and the traditional. While riding down the street in a *rickscha*, they see telegraph lines, gas lamps, brick buildings, and university students dressed in *kimonos* performing chemical experiments in new laboratories.

The visual impact of Meiji Japan on the senses cannot be minimized, for it is the source of impressions which stimulates reflection in each man. Griffis, Morse, and Hearn are moved by the beauty and charm of Japan, its people and its customs. Even Griffis, the self-appointed savior of Japanese souls, is struck by the poignancy of the events he witnesses. When the feudal domains are abolished in 1870, Griffis watches three thousand armed *samurai* kneel and bow their heads before their lord in a farewell ceremony. He writes of the "quiet sadness" and his own sense of loneliness upon experiencing the end of an era.

By immersing themselves in Japanese culture, all three men undergo a process of cultural assimilation. By comparing their beliefs with those of the Japanese, and, as a result, questioning their own values, they learn to respect that which appears to be the reverse, and to reconcile the apparent contradictions. This is not to say that the men are completely open to change; they are open only to varying degrees. Griffis, for example, finally comes to respect the Japanese, but he can never truly accept that the Japanese may be civilized *and* disinterested in Christianity. He spends the remainder of his post-Japan life rationalizing this fact.

Morse accepts more. His pondering over the cultural differences between the Americans and the Japanese gives way to an active, tireless effort to introduce Americans to the wealth of Japanese folk art and customs. He

progresses from a state of complete self-absorption in a very specific area (the study of *brachiopods*) to a fascination with the Japanese world around him and a driven desire to introduce aspects of it to the American public. In the process, he comes to terms with his own attachment to the United States and his new-found respect for Japan.

Hearn is incredibly open to Japan at first, even naive in his infatuation with the quaint and exotic. His love for the smooth surfaces of Japanese life gives way to a gradual recognition of the truth behind the alluring facades, such as the ingrained system of repression disguised by a lovely *geisha's* smile. His final work completed in Japan is quite different from his earlier novels. Finally able to eliminate the superlatives of this foreign culture, Hearn reveals the substance beneath the deceptively elegant veneer of Japanese society.

Ultimately, the reader is left with the distinct impression that the experiences of our three Americans in Meiji Japan survive their protagonists and their historical setting. Hearn is the source of the book's most vivid example. After struggling up a long flight of stairs at the end of a day of sightseeing, he enters a small, gray building and confronts the unexpected:

I reach the altar, gropingly, unable yet to distinguish forms clearly. But the priest, sliding back screen after screen, pours in light upon the gilded brasses and the inscriptions; and I look for the image of the Deity or presiding Spirit between the altar groups of convoluted candelabra. And I see — only a mirror, a round pale disk of polished metal, and my own face therein.¹

Certainly, a similar experience could happen to anyone who ventures to foreign lands as well. Time does not diminish the power of self-discovery no matter where or when it occurs. The great beauty of this book is just when you think that you are about to settle into a tale belonging to the past, you are struck by its remarkable message for today.

Robert A. Rosenstone has crafted this work with incredible care. He has high ambitions for this book, and it clearly meets all of them and more. It is an experience that will pique the curiosity of many a reader — novices to Japan, "Japan hands," historians interested in unique angles and approaches, and those fascinated by cross-cultural communication in general. This is a book for one's library, to be read again and again.

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1. Lafcadio Hearn, "My First Day in the Orient," as quoted in Rosenstone, *Mirror in the Shrine*, 7.

Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s

Edited by Nora Hamilton, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, 272 pp., including appendix and index, \$38.50 hardcover and \$14.95 paperback.

Among the foreign policy challenges confronting the new Bush administration, few are as daunting or potentially explosive as the situation in Central America. Indeed, at a time when events in many of the world's trouble spots appear to be favoring the United States — Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Cuban withdrawal from Angola, progress toward a settlement in Kampuchea, durability of the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, and vastly improved relations with the East bloc generally — the failure of US policy in Central America stands in dramatic contrast. The economic and political situation in this geographically vital region has declined in precipitous fashion in the 1980s. Today the region borders on chaos. The misguided initiatives of the Reagan administration throughout the region are widely cited as contributing factors to this deep crisis.

With Central America certain to occupy a visible and continuing place on the new administration's foreign policy agenda, the appearance of *Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s* could not be more timely. The volume is a collection of essays on relevant political and economic themes, some common to the region as a whole, while others concern individual countries. The contributors comprise an impressive list of academic experts from both the United States and Central America. While there is a rather conspicuous absence of actual government policymakers from Central America as authors, the essays make for informative and insightful reading.

The book is divided into two sections. The first, "U.S. Policy in Central America: Recasting Hegemony," examines the development of various aspects of US policy toward Central America in the 1980s, both in terms of the dynamics of Washington political decision-making and the application of those decisions in the region itself. The second section, "Central America: External Pressures and Internal Dynamics," is a broad overview of the internal workings of Central America that seeks to explain current conditions as a combination of the historical legacy of the region, as well as external influences, primarily from the United States. The careful attention paid in this section to individual countries and the uniqueness of many of their problems is a strength which distinguishes this book from others on the region which have appeared in the last few years.

The first two essays concern the formulation of Reagan administration policy toward Central America and particularly the president's relations with Congress on this sensitive issue. "U.S. Policy Toward Central America: The Post-

Vietnam Formula Under Siege" by Kenneth E. Sharpe, is a provocative examination of Congressional attempts to place legislative restrictions on executive authority in foreign policy matters in the wake of perceived abuses during the Vietnam era, and of former President Reagan's success in evading most of the restrictions imposed. Sharpe documents in minute fashion the maneuverings and stratagems employed by the Reagan administration to channel support to the government of El Salvador and particularly to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.

While the details Sharpe provides are quite interesting, his strong personal biases against Reagan policy are not well disguised and the essay deteriorates into a diatribe on the evils of an "imperial presidency." He suggests that only a valiant and "freedom-loving" Congress has prevented the devolution of the US political system into a virtual dictatorship during the 1980s. This extreme conclusion ignores the fact that the executive and legislative branches have been sparring over Central American policy ever since the early days of this century. In addition, Sharpe accepts as a foregone conclusion that congressional control of most aspects of US foreign policy-making would be a desirable development in the wake of such fiascos as the Iran-Contra scandal.

While abuses have certainly existed, it is naive to accuse the entire executive branch of criminal behavior with respect to Central American policy, and even worse to assume that Congress is more capable (not to mention constitutionally empowered) of directing US foreign policy in a responsible fashion. Cynthia Arnson's follow-up essay "The Reagan Administration, Congress, and Central America: The Search for Consensus," is a much fairer assessment of the dynamics of executive-congressional interaction on Central American policy.

Outstanding in the second section of the book are two articles concerning the economic problems of Central America. The economic crisis has been dismissed by most US policymakers as a consequence of the regional military struggle against leftist insurgency, when it should be interpreted correctly (as in these two essays) as a prime factor for producing the unrest and insurrection targeted by US policy. "The Central American Economy: Conflict and Crisis" by Xabier Gorostiaga and Peter Marchetti, is an excellent historical analysis of economic development in the region, and of the resulting structural defects which have increased the inequity of distribution and heightened dependence on the international economy, and particularly on the United States.

"The Central American Crisis and the Common Market" by noted Costa Rican economist Edelberto Torres Rivas, cogently outlines the constraints faced by small, primary export-oriented economies like those of Central America in promoting development and decreased dependence. Rivas explores the need for greater integration of the regional economy in the face of past failures through the vehicle of the Central American Common Market. Any reader unfamiliar with Central America should make these essays the focal point for understanding the wider political and social problems which the region faces.

Some essays included in the volume will cater to the specific country interests of individual readers. "The Hidden War: Guatemala's Counterinsurgency Campaign" by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, is a rather perfunctory examination of the only country where counter-insurgency operations by the US-

backed military have been largely successful. Peralta should stress, rather than mention, that this military success has come at a very high human cost and that it has failed to address the underlying structural inequities which continue to produce popular discontent. The two essays on El Salvador by Terry Karl and Ricardo Stein provide a good review of the tumultuous politics of that strife-torn country, but do tend to overstate the ability of the United States to impose its will on political and military leaders and on the electoral process generally.

Although there are useful insights, the final two essays, like many of the others, are inconsistent in the quality of their analyses. While Michael Conroy and Manuel Pastor, Jr. correctly argue in "The Nicaraguan Experiment: Characteristics of a New Economic Model" that the Nicaraguan economy under the Sandinistas does not follow the Cuban model, as US leaders assert, but remains largely a market-oriented system, they are extremely soft on the Sandinistas' human rights record. Their assertion that Nicaragua today has a political environment which is essentially democratic is much more a statement of apologist propaganda than it is a statement of fact.

"Religion and the Central American Crisis" by Margaret E. Crahan, suffers from a similar fault in regard to the Nicaraguan Catholic Church. While Crahan's treatment of the role of the Church in El Salvador is quite accurate, she understates the degree of opposition to the Sandinistas by much of the Nicaraguan Church hierarchy under Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and glosses over the attempts by the Sandinistas to subvert Church authority through promotion of "popular churches."

In sum, *Crisis in Central America* is a comprehensive treatment of Central America's current problems and US policy, but many of the analyses exhibit weaknesses. It is clear that the authors share a generally critical view of US policy toward the region in the 1980s, though the degree of their criticism varies. While such criticism may be justified (though in a few cases it strains the limits of credibility), the reader should be wary.

One final observation is that any book on such a dynamic and explosive region is bound to be somewhat dated by the time it is published. This volume describes events in Central America up through early 1987, but much has happened since then which would qualify the contributors' conclusions. The Contra war is now for all intents and purposes over, while the insurgent war in El Salvador (and conditions there generally) appear to be worsening by the day. The Arias Peace Plan has been launched, then stagnated, and now apparently shows signs of being revived. In short, while this book may represent some of the most up-to-date analysis on Central America currently in print, developments in the region have left the analysis behind to such an extent that it now must largely serve as history rather than current commentary.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary

William J. Medland

New York: Praeger, 1988, 167 pp., including bibliography and index, \$35.95.

An important but neglected aspect of the Cuban Missile Crisis is its historiography. Unfortunately, William Medland's brief book only confirms rather than satisfies that need.

Medland begins with two chapters which outline the crisis. The first describes the "national clandestine phase," October 14-22, 1962, the period between the US discovery of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba and President Kennedy's televised address, in which he announced establishment of the US naval blockade. The second discusses the "international confrontation phase," October 23-November 20, during which the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles and IL-28 bombers. The Soviets did so in the face of a big stick (the threat of US military attack) and for two carrots (a public pledge not to invade Cuba, and a private promise to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey).

The remainder of the book is devoted to a systematic summary of the main historiographical interpretations of the crisis. These are:

1. The "traditional interpretation" of participants and contemporary observers, who applaud Kennedy's brilliant handling of the confrontation.

2. The right-wing revisionist interpretation, which criticizes Kennedy for having failed to press the overwhelming US military superiority and preserving Castro's communist regime.

3. The left-wing revisionist view, which sees Kennedy as having needlessly risked nuclear Armageddon for personal and political reasons.

4. The sovietologists' perspective, which focuses on the puzzle of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's motives for deploying nuclear weapons in Cuba. Medland ends with his own quick, moderate judgment, picking the pieces of each interpretation that he finds most convincing. The missile crisis, he concludes, was defused "as much by fortune as by human design" (p. 148).

This is a frustrating study. The various books and articles of any one interpretive school agree on many points, but Medland summarizes each work anyway, leaving a repetitious and tedious read in his wake. Moreover, neither in the narrative introduction to the crisis nor in the conclusion does the reader find anything new. Relying almost entirely on older secondary sources, Medland rehashes well-known material and at a few points repeats long-refuted misconceptions, such as Kennedy's allegedly having ordered the Jupiters out of Turkey before the crisis (p. 58). At least in this case, even more seriously, he appears not to have read one of the articles he cites, nor to have cited important works listed in his bibliography. He also fails to examine books like David Detzer's *The Brink* (1979) and Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*

(1971), the latter of which is vital to any discussion of crisis historiography — one suspects Medland omitted them because they do not conform to his interpretive groupings.

The book's greatest weakness, however, is that it fails as a historiography. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a uniquely rich subject, in part because it remains a subject of debate and source of "lessons," both of which are still influenced by crisis veterans such as McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara. Medland ignores these and related issues.

For example, how do the older accounts hold up when compared to the wealth of primary sources now available? Audiotape transcripts of the "Ex-Comm" meetings of October 16 and 17, 1962 are now declassified; had Medland used them, he could have compared the recollections of Kennedy's advisors with what was actually said, verbatim. Or, apart from primary sources, how do older accounts compare with more recent accounts? To what extent are views of the crisis influenced by the time and setting in which they are written? Have the views of participants changed over time, and does this reflect their involvement in current policy debates?

From a different angle, a historiography of the crisis should examine how information on the subject is obtained and released. For example, why is it that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has enjoyed exclusive access to Robert Kennedy's papers regarding the crisis? Could it be because it was known Schlesinger's *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (1978) would hardly turn out to be a scathing indictment? Or, why have revisionist historians been absent from the several conferences on the crisis held over the last two years? Were they not invited? If not, why? More broadly, what have been the nature and impact of the relationship between crisis veterans and Harvard University academics?

Issues of these sorts are important in historiography, and crucial to any study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Why people view the crisis in the way that they do, particularly because the crisis still exerts influence on contemporary thinking and policy, remains a most salient question. Medland provides useful, concise summaries of works on the crisis, but does not approach this vital question.

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United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations

Edited by Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 287 pp., including appendices and index, \$48.00.

Whatever else they might achieve, the commemorations of events such as the founding of nations or the establishment of organizations generally succeed in provoking the publication of a number of useful scholarly works on the subject in question. In the case of the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations, celebrated in 1985, the "celebrations" were somewhat muted and the scholarly output, at least in English, was not particularly impressive. The volume under review, however, is a welcome exception in that regard. As is almost invariably the case with literature on the work of international organizations, the contributors are, with few exceptions, either current and former officials of, or former delegates to, the United Nations. Happily, the result of this particular effort is neither an accumulation of laudatory puff nor the often seemingly interminable recitation of the provisions of resolutions of dubious significance.

The introductory chapter by the editors, Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, provides a particularly useful overview of current developments and seeks to present both sides of the balance sheet in an appropriately critical manner. They are dismissive of both extremes in appraising the United Nations and conclude that it "is not itself fundamentally concerned to restructure or replace the system of sovereign states, so much as to ameliorate the problems spawned by its imperfections, and to manage the rapid changes in many distinct fields" (pp. 3-4). The title of the book, "United Nations, Divided World," is justified by the observation that division rather than unity "has been the more conspicuous feature of the world since 1945 . . ." The United Nations is composed not of "nations" in any real sense but of states which are divided "within . . . as well as between divisions of regions, race, nationality, tribe, religion, and class" (pp. 9-10).

While the editors do not flinch from raising difficult questions or from offering policy prescriptions for them, there are issues which demand greater attention than what they receive. A notable example in this regard is the suggestion that the United Nations "has sometimes been too rigid in its adherence" to the principle of non-intervention. Roberts and Kingsbury advocate giving more thought "to the general circumstances in which some kinds of interventions may be, if not desirable, at least defensible" (p. 18). Unfortunately, the proposal is, presumably for lack of space, not the subject

of any further elucidation, despite the central importance of non-intervention in international relations.¹

In a brief contribution which bears the hallmarks of the original lecture format of all the contributions, Michael Howard of Yale University evaluates the UN record in providing for an effective framework for international security. He concludes, unsurprisingly, that the record is dismal. He is particularly critical of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament area. While he concludes that it probably has made it more difficult for the superpowers to abandon arms talks, he laments the tendency "to substitute grandiose and unrealistic declaratory policies for careful and unspectacular incremental agreements." He also criticizes the disproportionate importance accorded to superpower arms negotiations "at the expense of discussions about more immediate and potentially explosive areas of conflict such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Middle East" (p. 43). I am tempted to go even further and suggest that, at least on some occasions, UN disarmament negotiations have been misused by the superpowers to present an illusion of progress, or at least activity, which masks underlining intransigence on both sides.

Anthony Parsons, a close confidant of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and her first UN ambassador, concludes that the United Nations cannot provide collective security and "is *not*, and should not try to be, a forum for the *solution* of disputes." He greatly reduces the significance of this conclusion, however, by adding that "what the UN can do is to ameliorate disputes, to define crises, and to act as a catalytic agent to persuade the parties to come together and negotiate" (p. 51).

Two contributors focus on the pivotal role of the UN secretary-general. One of them is the current holder of that office, Javier Perez de Cuellar, and the other is Thomas Franck, who teaches at New York University Law School. While the latter suggests that the former's chapter is "remarkably candid," it strikes me at best as unremarkable. It is a little surprising that de Cuellar places such emphasis in his essay on human rights, which he claims is "one of my daily preoccupations and a major anxiety" (p. 74). Given Mr. de Cuellar's singularly unsatisfactory performance as a special envoy to investigate the human rights situation in Uruguay during the time of the military regime, and the fact that one of his first acts in office was to dismiss the director of the UN's Human Rights Division, Theo C. van Boven, for being too active, one can only hope that this assertion signals a welcome change of heart.

Professor Franck's chapter analyzes the secretary-general's "good offices" role and concludes with a number of particularly useful recommendations for the future. He proposes the establishment of a diplomatic network of personal representatives of the secretary-general in twenty to thirty countries, selected on the basis of their importance in both global and regional terms. In addition, he suggests a restructuring of the secretary-general's duties so as to reduce the

1. See generally A. Cassese, ed., *The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).

current burden imposed by ceremonial functions, and the establishment of "a small team highly skilled in assessment, data flow, and crisis management to receive and analyze reports from the field, filter them for consumption, and set out options" (p. 93). Finally, there is the suggestion that the secretary-general's term of office should be extended from five to either seven or eight years and that (s)he should not be eligible for reelection. Given the extent to which states tend to opt for the status quo in selecting international officials, and the near fanaticism with which the executive heads of most UN agencies have repeatedly sought reelection, it is difficult to over-estimate the importance of such a reform.

Professor Farer's chapter on the United Nations and human rights is the longest and most scholarly in the volume. It is a masterly overview by one of the most perceptive observers in the field and contains a dose of bad as well as good news. Despite the double standards that prevail all too often and the somewhat ineffectual nature of some of the responses that the United Nations is able to muster, he sees several reasons for optimism, not the least being the extent of the efforts which so many governments make to evade the UN's "primitive machinery of enforcement." The other principal "legal" contribution is the chapter on "The UN and The Development of International Law" by Nagendra Singh, the late president of the International Court of Justice. It is a methodical but rather plodding overview which contains few real insights.

By contrast, the chapter by Kenneth Dadzie, the secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "The UN and The Problem of Economic Development," is considerably more thought-provoking. As a senior UN official, he struggles valiantly with the challenge of responding forcefully to the attacks on multilateralism and international development cooperation launched by the Reagan administration, while at the same time not appearing overtly political or combative.

The final two chapters present a valuable contrast between the views of Maurice Bertrand whose original and creative analysis suggests the need for radical and far-reaching reforms, and those of Evan Luard who, in essence, calls for a greater commitment to more of the same.

Overall, this volume provides a well-integrated and measured overview of the UN's current problems and achievements. One wonders, however, whether it might not have been further enriched by the inclusion of one or more contributions by some of the UN's more ardent critics.

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Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution

Anthony McDermott

London and New York: Croom Helm, 1988, 311 pp., including bibliography and index, \$52.50 cloth.

Though Anthony McDermott fails to break any new ground in his interpretation of Egyptian politics and society, *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak* offers a highly readable introduction to modern Egypt. The book's greatest strength lies in McDermott's understanding of Egyptian cultural values and mores, borne of many years of residence in Egypt (most recently as correspondent for *The Financial Times* from 1980-83). An overview of Egypt's post-1952 leaders and the major policies of their regimes begins the volume. This material is later reexamined in greater detail in chapters such as "Politics and Government" and "Egypt and its Image." Though this structure leads to some repetition of factual information, it provides a format easily accessible to the layman.

McDermott does not aspire to critique or broaden the traditional lenses on Egypt. He settles for a clear, cogent application of widely-accepted frameworks: Nasser's lack of a clear political agenda at the time of the *coup*; the unsustainability of Egypt's massive welfare state in light of rapid population growth; Anwar Sadat's isolation from his people as he increasingly concentrated on his Western audience rather than solving Egypt's formidable problems; and Mubarak's tendency to choose technocrats for senior positions in government, resulting in leaders with technical competence who lack the political skills to implement policy.

A few of McDermott's observations may strike the reader as controversial. He argues that the resurgence of Islam has impeded Egypt's political and economic development, proposing that "Islam has provided comfort . . . at the expense of modernity" (p. 13). This interpretation ignores the very important question of how Islam and Islamic institutions have adapted to modern society. One of the most interesting problems confronting modern Egypt lies in its need to modernize in a manner consistent with its traditional values. The expanding role of Islamic banks, the important impact (especially in the early 1980s) of Islamic investment houses, and the increased influence of *da'wa* (charitable/propaganda) activity by private mosques all reflect this continuing struggle. This important topic, so frequently discussed among Egyptians, unfortunately, receives little attention.

The claim that Sadat was "somewhat close to madness" by 1981, a conclusion which McDermott "documents" by reference to Sadat's dropping his papers at a speech and his terse handling of a news conference, is one of the more far-fetched in the book (p. 59). McDermott also proposes that Mubarak has made "genuine attempts" to involve the opposition in decision making

— an interpretation which opposition leaders would vigorously contest. Finally, the suggestion that the Egyptian people are ill-suited to participate in a more representative form of government due to their unwillingness to accept responsibility for public decisions, may rise a few eyebrows. According to McDermott, Egyptians may “prefer to give hints . . . and only then pass judgement by passivity or revolt” (p. 119). Such a controversial observation about the potential cultural obstacles to democratization warrants much more rigorous analysis and documentation.

The book also leaves several important issues unexamined. The chapter on the military fails to explore the current political role of the armed forces in any detail. In light of McDermott’s journalistic connections, one would have hoped for at least some insight into the strength of military support for Mubarak, the political influence of Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, and the degree to which the rank-and-file are sympathetic to the Islamic radicalism, which retains considerable popularity among Egypt’s youth.

Similarly, McDermott’s discussion of Islamic groups is disappointing. He makes several references to the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts at “infiltration of every [political] party,” yet he makes little effort to describe or analyze the Brotherhood’s political agenda and (apparently) conducted no interviews with their leaders. This deficiency is particularly serious in light of the Brotherhood’s expanding popularity and organization, as well as its alliance with the Wafd Party (1984) and with the Labor and Liberal parties (1987). Recent research indicating that the followers of Islamic radical groups are most frequently drawn from the middle class seems to be ignored altogether. Instead, McDermott implies that radicalism is strictly a lower-class phenomenon. Finally, he offers no discussion of opposition political parties in Mubarak’s Egypt, leaving the reader with little foundation for assessing the future direction of Egyptian politics.

Despite these reservations and concerns, McDermott presents an introductory text on Egypt which is both more current and more readable than the standard texts in the field (i.e., Hopwood, Waterbury, Baker). He also provides an excellent bibliography for scholars interested in further reading on Egypt.

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The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America

Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone

New York: Basic Books, 1988, 242 pp., \$19.95.

The standard of living of average Americans has taken a "great u-turn." Following World War II real wages and median family income grew steadily. After the first oil crisis in 1973, however, growth in these areas declined sharply. Between 1973 and 1979, only 20 percent of year-round full-time employees earned less than \$11,000 annually (1986 prices). Since 1979, over a third of these employees have fallen below this level. Profits also plunged, dropping below 6 percent in the mid-1970s from almost a 10 percent level in 1965, before recovering in 1982.

This "great u-turn" is the subject of a recent book by Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, who earlier awakened Americans to the consequences of the "rust belt" in *The Deindustrialization of America*. In this latest volume, the authors attempt to explain the erosion of income and wages, and the initial decline and subsequent recovery of profits. They use two arguments to explain this phenomenon: an economic crisis and a political response.

The economic argument links the "great u-turn" to a disruption in the accumulation process. Post-war prosperity was interrupted by increased international competition, illustrated by the tremendous growth of manufacturing imports. Constituting only 14 percent of all manufactured goods in 1969, imports amounted to nearly 45 percent of goods consumed in the United States by 1986. Where once we enjoyed a comparative advantage in many industrial sectors, our manufacturing agenda has now been replicated across the globe. US firms have contributed to their own decline with management strategies that emphasize short-term financial return instead of long-term productive investment in strategic products and processes.

Harrison and Bluestone devote the bulk of their book to the political dimension. The crisis of accumulation precipitated a political response by business (and later government) which reinforced the downward trend in wages and median family income, reversing the plunge in profits. Business efforts targeted three ends: lower labor costs, a shift from productive enterprise to financial ventures, and secure government policies which would absorb some of the costs of the economic decline.

To reduce the price of labor (and thereby lower workers' share of value-added), US firms moved production beyond America's borders and waged war on labor at home. Although the globalization of American industry was originally undertaken to circumvent foreign protectionism, this strategy has now contributed to a decline of US manufacturing. US firms repatriated some \$1.5 billion in profits in 1950, and \$42.5 billion by 1980.

The taming of domestic labor involved a variety of tactics to reduce wages and break the strength of unions. Industries demanded concessions in contract negotiations, often trading job security for lower wages. Some firms sought to implement a two-tiered wage structure. New employees were to be brought in at much lower wage rates. Subcontracting and part-time positions offered other ways to reduce costs by eliminating fringe benefits and creating a pool of expendable workers.

Financial restructuring offered a second realm in which businessmen hoped to recapture their elusive profit margins. Lower rates of return on investment in "mature" industrial sectors motivated a large-scale shift toward nonproductive financial ventures. The authors point to the exponential increase in the volume of stock market trading as evidence of the increasing popularity of financial ventures.

Finally, business strategies to prop up profit margins have been boosted by a *laissez-faire* government program. Accumulated-oriented tax cuts reduced the tax burden of corporations and upper-income individuals. Only partially paid for by deep spending reductions, the tax cuts contributed to a monumental budget deficit. In addition, deregulation relaxed restrictions on many sectors of the private economy.

Harrison and Bluestone argue that business efforts to protect profits in the face of economic uncertainty have been responsible for a dramatic reversal in the lives of many Americans. Thus, the *laissez-faire* approach has grossly undermined equity. The authors also judge these economic policies a failure in achieving stable growth. Although profits have rebounded, capital goods production has remained sluggish, the productivity growth rate has yet to pick up, and the GNP continues to grow more slowly than it did during the 1950s and 1960s. Most of our growth in the 1980s has been achieved through military spending and debt.

What could be done differently? The authors suggest as an alternative to *laissez-faire* an economic strategy which emphasizes both growth and equity. The US economy should be rationalized through industrial policy, "reregulation" of finance and other market activities, and managed international trade. Workplace democracy and favorable treatment of unions would strengthen labor's commitment to productivity growth. A strategy for renewed growth would make the fulfillment of universal social benefits possible. Zero-sum choices between accumulation and legitimation benefits are thus avoided in the authors' ideal economic world.

This is in many ways an impressive work. The authors' presentation of the u-turn phenomenon is elegant and persuasive. By combining econometric insights with more qualitative data, the numbers "come alive" with the many empirical illustrations. This makes the book exceedingly easy to read, despite its dense subject matter.

Somewhat lacking, however, is a sense of how the shifts in private and public sector policy have been orchestrated. The authors suggest that the behavior which led to the "great u-turn" represent strategies or "experiments" to cope with the economic crisis. Strategies entail motivation, and a series of

questions come to mind. Who conceived of these strategies? How were they transmitted from one firm to another? Was this dynamic guided by the proverbial invisible hand, or was some collective action pursued?

Even more critical to the authors' argument is a political theory. How did business promote *laissez-faire* to such a central place on the public agenda? A theory of politics is necessary in order for the authors to assess the political possibilities for their alternative scenario. Yet, to be fair, this is not what they set out to accomplish. Their agenda — to empirically establish the “great u-turn” and to link it to broad trends in labor negotiation and financial restructuring — is by itself a considerable contribution.

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Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era

Peter Jenkins

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988, 417 pp., including bibliography and index, \$25.00.

After 1945 there was little visible evidence that Britain was capable of coping with the brave new world *antebellum*. The end of this chapter of misfortune in British history was, arguably, May 1979, when the British electorate went to the polls and elected a shopkeeper's daughter, Margaret Thatcher. In her electoral campaign, Thatcher appealed to the public by her resolution to put an end to the "great British decline": "Enough is enough!" she shouted demonstratively. Thatcher promised the British people "conviction politics" as opposed to "consensus politics." A decade later, Thatcher goes down in history as not only the first woman British prime minister, but also as the longest serving prime minister in this century.

In spite of the many temptations which might beset someone analyzing such an evocative subject as Mrs. Thatcher's premiership, Peter Jenkins has approached his subject with enviable objectivity. The thesis of his argument is that "the Thatcher Revolution was as much the product of her own times as the shaper of them" (p. xiii). Moreover, Jenkins claims that there is nothing new with most of Thatcher's ideas or policies. What sets her apart from her postwar predecessors is her style:

"Thatcherism" is more usefully regarded as a style than as an ideology: an ideology is a consistent system of ideas whereas what she called her conviction politics are largely instinctive and very much the product of her own experience (p. 81).

Regardless of the semantics of "Thatcherism," it has clearly succeeded in producing fundamental changes in British society. Indeed, capitalism has generally been thought to render a "divided society," with a small section of "haves" and an indisputable majority of "have-nots." Jenkins argues that while there remain unmistakable divisions in British society, there has been under Thatcher's government an enlargement of the "haves" with a simultaneous decrease in the number of "have-nots." Thatcher's emphasis on the individual, on "individualism," has struck a deep responsive chord in British society:

What's irritated me about the whole direction of politics in the last thirty years is that it's always been towards the collectivist society. People have forgotten about the personal society. And do they say: do I count, do I matter? To which the short answer is, Yes I set out really to change the approach, and changing the economics is the means of changing that approach. If you change

the approach you are really after the heart and soul of the nation (p. 159).

Peter Jenkins does not simply focus on "Thatcher's rise to power," or just recount British politics during the last four decades. Rather, he highlights the turn-around in British attitudes under Thatcher. In order to place in context Thatcher's political inheritance at the time she assumed office, the first part of the book provides a background of postwar British politics. This review of history serves as an important point of reference to judge the later accomplishments of the "Thatcher Revolution." The second part, aptly entitled "The Mould Broken?," examines Thatcher's first term in office, when her monetarist approach to the British economy plunged the country into a recession in 1981, and when the controversial Falklands War propelled her to a second term in office. The Westland Affair, which embroiled many members of her Conservative Party and the civil service, is the major focus of Thatcher's second term. The final section of the book indicates some further areas which Thatcher will seek to implement her agenda for Britain, which, simply stated, is to "make Britain great again."

The Trade Union Movement, Thatcher's *bete noire*, and her determination to undermine their role as a factor in British politics is analyzed in detail. The major features in this saga are the year-long coal miners' strike in 1984 and the figure of Arthur Scargill, the head of the National Union of Mine-workers. The strike helped to discredit the Labour Party by splitting it down the middle between those who were for or against the "flying pickets." (Scargill became known for mustering troops of workers to picket at coal mines with great initial success.)

In assessing this and other events, the author draws parallels between what was happening in Britain with events around the world. Great Britain did not preside alone over the decline of socialism. Western Europe witnessed a decline in socialist politics as well. More important, perhaps, was Ronald Reagan's election across the Atlantic, which coincided with Thatcher's rise to power. Their close relationship provides the focus for an analysis of Thatcher's foreign policy. Many valuable insights are gained by the events which tested Britain's relationship with the United States, and with the NATO Alliance. For example, the calculations and conflicts which took place within the British government on allowing America to use British bases to launch the attack on Libya in April 1986, and on Reagan's negotiations with Gorbachev on nuclear disarmament at Reykavik.

A very rewarding part of the book is the analysis of Thatcher's style of government and the changes within the Conservative Party under her tenure. The systematic replacement of the "old guard" becomes obvious through the emerging pattern of Thatcher's selection of cabinet members and close advisors. Thatcher seems to have little regard for the concept of the cabinet as a committee for policy formulation. Usually, policies are decided in advance of cabinet meetings by her inner circle whom she hand-picks. Thus, the principle of *primus inter pares* (first among equals) receives little notice. Her innate

mistrust of Whitehall, the headquarters of the British Civil Service, is also highlighted. Perhaps the most interesting feature of all is the attention given to the method of using leaks to the press as a form of policy implementation.

After ten years in office one cannot help but ask: How permanent and far-reaching will Thatcher's "revolution" be? Jenkins remains skeptical. His main reservation is that there have been no true structural changes in British politics. Thatcher has not reformed the electoral system, for example, which could have been used as a means to keep the Labour Party from power; but then again, it could conceivably do the same to the Conservative Party one day. Perhaps Thatcher can take comfort in the thought that the leader of the Labour Party decided to revamp the meaning of "socialism," to become what he now calls "socialist individualism." But, as the author emphasizes, "there [is] nothing socialist about individualism." While recognizing that the changes might be overturned in the future, Jenkins believes that Thatcher has succeeded in altering the fundamental attitudes of the majority of the British people: "the future may not be hers but she has set the agenda" (p. 379).

Jenkins's scholarly approach toward his subject earns *Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution* a place on any list of essential reading in contemporary British history. His lively style of writing, though, manages to bring the book within the reach of the layman. My only regret is that there is not a substantial examination of Thatcher's policies toward the European Community, which is increasingly a major domestic and international concern. This might, however, only serve to divert the attention from what is already a mighty topic. For what Jenkins has set out to achieve, to put Thatcher's premiership within the context of its times, justice is certainly done.

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U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons

Edited by Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin

New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 746 pp., including appendix and index, \$39.95 cloth and \$17.95 paper.

When the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security-building measures in Europe convened in January 1984, the Soviet Union made clear its low tolerance for the philosophy that less secrecy and more cooperation in military affairs would enhance security. Yet, by the time the conference adjourned in September 1986, the Soviets had agreed to provide an unprecedented amount of information about their military maneuvers in Europe and had even departed from their longstanding reluctance to accept on-site inspections. What incentives prompted Moscow to make such a turnabout? What obstacles to cooperation existed and how were they overcome? What factors and strategies facilitated this cooperative effort?

These and other questions are examined in *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*, which the editors bill as "the first comprehensive and systematic study of the efforts the United States and the Soviet Union have made since World War II to develop and carry out cooperative arrangements to improve their own security and that of other nations" (p. vii). It is surely that and more. Indeed, this volume should be required reading for Bush administration policymakers who may be — and hopefully are — seeking to redefine what should be our long-term relationship with the Soviets.

The distinguished group of editors have collected twenty-two first-rate case studies of superpower efforts to promote stabilization in Europe, to cooperate on arms control issues, and to enhance regional security, crisis avoidance and crisis management. The volume concludes with a section of analyses and lessons drawn from the case studies.

The cases themselves are designed to help us understand the conditions under which security cooperation does or does not take place. The issue of superpower cooperation is viewed from the standpoint of regime theory, which emphasizes the relevance of agreements which establish principles, procedures and institutions for regulating competition as well as for facilitating cooperation.

What is remarkable to one who attempts to keep a more balanced perspective on US-Soviet relations is how much cooperation actually *has* taken place. The editors identify three types of cooperative agreements. First, there are agreements which seek to avoid or reduce competition by removing an existing or potential source of conflict. These include the agreement on joint occupation and administration of Germany after World War II, the Austrian State Treaty

of 1955, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the evolution in the 1960s of a tacit agreement not to interfere (at least in peacetime) with each other's satellite reconnaissance activities.

Second, there are agreements to limit competition which, if left unrestrained, entail mutual disadvantage or harmful consequences that both sides prefer to avoid. Many arms control accords fall into this category. (Philip J. Farley points out in the chapter "Arms Control and U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation," that twenty-four cooperative bilateral or multilateral agreements involving the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiated.)

Finally, certain agreements reduce costs, risks, and uncertainties associated with continuing competition or with failure to cooperate to avoid a common danger. These include the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972, some confidence-building measures, efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation, and provisions for dealing with events that might trigger accidental war.

Yet few Americans are aware of most of these agreements, and, more important, many policymakers sometimes may not adequately understand how agreements in one arena of competition can support progress in other areas of competition and gradually boost stability. Europe provides the best example. Significant progress in building a cooperative Soviet-American relationship on Europe has been achieved. The emergence of a partial security regime in Europe reflects, the editors argue, certain underlying principles and norms which rest on acceptance of the superpowers' role in European security: a status quo division of Europe, a divided Germany, a neutral Austria, the special status of Finland, an independent Yugoslavia, and the anomalous status of West Berlin. Thus, the superpowers and the European states have developed a long-run interest in maintaining and building on gains in security made since 1945.

A good example of the step-by-step nature of this progress was the leap made between the Helsinki and the Stockholm agreements. A major motivation for convening the Stockholm conference, as James E. Goodby emphasizes in his chapter, was to build on the militarily meaningless provisions for advance notification and observation of military maneuvers in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. (Both agreements, of course, also helped to pave the way for the verification provisions of the INF treaty, which was concluded after this volume went to press.) In short, the principles and procedures devised in one agreement led to more substantial progress in a later accord.

A similar dynamic exists in arms control talks and even in conventional arms negotiations. As Condoleezza Rice describes in her chapter, the limited and still fragile arms control regime has been based clearly on several principles and norms which emerged during the SALT talks, and which were indispensable for facilitating, structuring, and rationalizing agreements on quantitative and qualitative aspects of strategic forces. For example, the Standing Consultative Commission was created to assist in implementing the agreements, and define and formalize the principles for continuing negotiations. In the same way, Coit D. Blacker explains how negotiators in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks which, though a failure thus far, have created

an institutional framework with important procedures and principles which could bring about quick progress if some other hurdles were suddenly cleared away.

Skeptics deride the importance of these agreements. They argue that superpower security cooperation, as it exists or is likely to develop, results more from elementary considerations of prudence than a desire to develop well-defined, institutionalized security regimes based on norms, rules, and procedures around which superpower expectations converge. The editors dismiss such pessimism. While they do not believe a comprehensive security regime — one which would deal with all or even most aspects of the rivalry — is possible, they conclude that the superpowers have made considerable progress in developing patterns of restraint, tacit “rules,” and partial regimes already mentioned in support of an uneasy coexistence. “The bottle that was virtually empty at the onset of the Cold War more than 40 years ago is now perhaps half full,” they write (p. 712).

Areas where the least progress has been made include superpower regulation of their involvement in Third World areas (Harold H. Saunders provides perhaps the most incisive account to date of the US-Soviet Middle East rivalry), and, perhaps most significant, the lack of a basic political framework of relations. Though both sides have shown a desire to replace the “confrontational competition” of the Cold War with a mixed “competitive-collaborative” relationship, little progress has been made in developing norms of competition and collaboration that are sufficiently clear, mutually understood and accepted. While the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972 was meant to accomplish this, Leonid Brezhnev and Richard M. Nixon never established procedures for implementing and clarifying the general norms to which they subscribed. Further, they tried to define the terms of competition and collaboration in ways more geared to maximizing unilateral advantage than to expanding the mutual interest in institutionalizing the relationship. “In the absence of a basic political framework that holds out the promise of important mutual security benefits in the long-run,” Alexander George writes, “it is less likely that a superpower will be willing to pass up opportunities for short-term gains at the expense of its adversary” (p. 668).

In an excellent chapter on incentives for security cooperation, George skewers the concept of mutuality of interests, finding it as inadequate as the much-maligned phrase “the national interest.” Mutuality of interests may be a necessary condition for cooperation but it is not sufficient. It does not enable us to predict when the actors themselves will experience it or when they will perceive the possibility of offsetting interests and trade-offs on several issues of sufficient magnitude to motivate attempts to cooperate. It does not tell us when such efforts will be successful and obscures the fact that actors can agree on cooperative arrangements for different reasons. While superpower interests were exactly the same in the Hotline Agreement, for instance, they diverged in the Helsinki Accords. Even when strong shared and/or divergent interests converge on a particular issue, cooperative efforts may be scuttled by domestic constraints, psychological barriers, and other factors.

The editors consider two factors important for generating incentives to cooperate: the shared perception that each superpower is dependent on the other's behavior for its security; and the shared judgement that strictly unilateral measures, however important and necessary, will either not suffice to deal adequately with a particular threat or are too expensive or risky. The degree of perceived vulnerability, however, varies greatly in different segments of the superpower relationship. In general, the greater the perceived sense of vulnerability, the stronger the incentive to seriously explore a cooperative agreement. But the editors go beyond this and refine and differentiate perceptions of dependence and vulnerability. How tight (or loose) the dependency is perceived to be and how central (or peripheral) the issue area is judged to have for a superpower's fundamental security interests determine the strength of incentives to cooperate. Based on these concepts, the editors usefully identify four types of security issues.

The negotiation of agreements is not the only cooperative means to realize greater mutual security, the editors acknowledge. Three other ways cited for future study are: mutual adjustment stemming from respect for each other's power and interests; reciprocal coordination of unilateral policies and actions; and unilateral actions that either side can take without expectation of reciprocity. (In announcing unilateral troop and military equipment cuts in Europe, for instance, Gorbachev may be attempting to contribute indirectly to Soviet security by reducing American and European insecurity.) Given the adversarial nature of superpower relations, the editors conclude, a mix of unilateral and cooperative arrangements will continue to be essential to strengthen mutual security.

Currently, US policymakers appear paralyzed by Gorbachev's political boldness. They are bedeviled by doubt, fed by repeated earlier disappointments, of whether changes in Soviet outlook and policy objectives are genuine. But as Alexander Dallin correctly points out, whatever our individual convictions, the only "proper response" to new Soviet proposals is to test them through negotiation. "To dismiss them *a priori* as mere propaganda or grandstanding is not only to prejudge the issue but to risk missing valuable opportunities — to close windows of opportunity that may not long stay open" (p. 615).

Alternatively, of course, the United States could counter Gorbachev's ambitious diplomacy with bold initiatives of its own, ones aimed at capping or even reducing Soviet influence, even if agreement on such proposals would mean a relative reduction in our own influence. Given the apparent strong Soviet desire for an improved superpower relationship, the United States has a rare chance to press aggressively not only for more cooperative arrangements, but also for the development of a formal, unambiguous framework for regulating the overall superpower relationship in the interests of stability.

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Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead

Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr.

New York: Basic Books, 1988, 365 pp., including bibliography, notes and index, \$19.95 hardcover.

The story has become all too familiar — in industry after industry, the United States has ceded to Japanese superiority. *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* by Clyde Prestowitz, Jr. is the best explanation on record of America's inability to compete with its major Asian ally. Prestowitz has observed this "trading places" from a frontline position as a leading trade negotiator in the Reagan administration, a senior executive living in Japan, and a lifelong student of Japanese society.

In *Trading Places*, Prestowitz does not echo the pedants and doomsayers of American decline, nor does he embark on Japan bashing. His respect for the Japanese resonates throughout the book. Instead, he introduces readers to US business leaders from Silicon Valley, Detroit, and Wall Street who describe how the Japanese have come to dominate previously sacred American industries while virtually locking foreign competitors out of their own home market, and why the current US system is incapable of mounting any formidable response. "Today the real challenge to American power is not the sinister one from the Eastern bloc, but the friendly one from the Far East. U.S. industry is not withering in the face of Soviet competition and the Soviets are not sending shivers through our financial markets" (pp. 21-22).

The United States, the world's most open market, has permitted its incipient drift toward colonial status — and it is gaining momentum. What is truly remarkable about "colony-in-the-making" America, according to Prestowitz, is that it continues to bear the heavy military burden of a hegemonic power. "This is surely the first time in history that a territory in the process of being colonized has actually paid for the right to defend the colonizer" (p. 311).

Prestowitz attempts to demystify the seemingly unstoppable success of Japan (and the decline of US industry) by devoting one-third of his book to "What Makes Japan Run." Here, drawing from his vast personal experience, Prestowitz dismantles the complexities of "Japan, Inc." into comprehensible parts. First, the primacy of the group in Japan cannot be overstressed. Economic groups, or *keiretsu*, provide stability for its member companies and exclusivity to foreign firms. In addition, Prestowitz underscores the vital role played by the powerful ministries in implementing Japan's well-formulated industrial policy. Japan's bureaucrats enjoy an elite status and prestige which are rarely given to American civil servants. Japanese trade negotiators simply outclass most of their American counterparts. US trade negotiators, the "last bastion of macho," are usually political appointees with limited expertise. In contrast, Japan's negotiators remain in their ministries forever, and, as illus-

trated in numerous examples, their institutional memory always works to their advantage in negotiations with the Americans.

Throughout *Trading Places*, Prestowitz refers to US industries, such as semiconductors and machine tools, being "held hostage" to foreign interests. The day of the cowboy — the gun-slinging American entrepreneur — is over. Japanese firms have the financial resources to sell at below-market prices and simply wait for non-discretionary US consumers to bring American producers to their knees. Americans need to remember that they are largely descendents of settlers, of immigrants who had to band together for survival, rather than cowboys who go it alone.

Something very fundamental in the United States must change, says Prestowitz. In the last chapter of the book, appropriately titled "Waking Up," the author makes his most significant contribution to US-Japan relations by recommending several measures for policymakers to restore the US industrial base. The most critical priority for the Bush administration, Prestowitz argues, should be to maintain America's economic might. Otherwise, the United States will eventually have no arms over which to negotiate its supposed security. "It is not a matter of whether the U.S. government intervenes in the economy — it does and will intervene, massively; but whether it will do so in a way that helps or hurts" (pp. 315-16).

How has the United States gone wrong? The US economic environment, says Prestowitz, is primarily conditioned by the doctrine of perfect competition and free trade, on the one hand, and the exigencies of national security, on the other. Japan and other countries have integrated these often conflicting imperatives to exploit comparative advantages, while US leadership historically has viewed national security as a priority of the government and economic security as naturally borne out of open markets and perfect competition. The interplay of American trade theory, trade laws, and security concerns works to the *disadvantage* of US industry and ultimately of the US economy.

Prestowitz cites many examples of how America's obsession with consumer welfare and narrow questions of immediate national security serve to undermine its long-term security interests. The American commercial airline industry, for example, which has long dominated world markets, is deteriorating not because others produce better or cheaper airplanes, but because of the American approach to free trade. America's leading airplane producer, Boeing, is involved in a joint venture with several Japanese companies to develop the next-generation airliner. Boeing would have preferred to develop the plane itself using Japanese subcontractors, but Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry offered a financial guarantee of between \$1 billion and \$2 billion to Boeing — a move motivated not by philanthropy, but by Japan's desire for technology transfer. Now teams of Japanese engineers are working at Boeing learning critical aspects of aircraft design which will inevitably be used at home as part of Japan's long-term plan for aerospace development (one of the few fields in which the United States still leads).

The reason for this Boeing-Japan joint venture is the European Airbus. Heavily subsidized by European governments, the Airbus jetliner sells at

lower prices on world markets than its American competitor. The US government did little to protest the Airbus subsidy, which is harmful to US aircraft makers. "Thus we have the ultimate irony of the Japanese government subsidizing an American industry upon which our own government has turned its back" (p. 240). The US government did not protest the Airbus subsidy as unfair trade because, as then-Secretary of State George Shultz said, it would sour relations with European allies, especially the French, and that this ultimately would undermine national security.

The question of whether a healthy aircraft industry might also be important to national security was not addressed. There was an implicit assumption that the American industry will always be dominant because it always has [been] (p. 241).

Thus, in the name of the consumer and national security, the United States has created an environment inimical to the interest of its own aircraft industry, in fact, promoting its demise.

The real relevance of this book is its detail of America's utter failure to meet — or even comprehend — the challenge of Japan's industrial policy. The magnitude of the Japanese inroads into US strategic industries and the negligence of US policymakers to deal effectively with a world record trade deficit is a national scandal.

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Women, Human Settlements, and Housing

Edited by Caroline O.N. Moser and Linda Peake

London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1987, 222 pp., including bibliography and index, \$49.50 cloth and \$14.95 paper.

Great strides have been made in recent years toward heightened sensitivity to women in development. Yet the collection of case studies presented in *Women, Human Settlements, and Housing* is a stark reminder that much remains to be done. In order to reduce costs, many Third World governments have responded to the increasing need for housing with self-help housing schemes which require the active participation of the future owner. This book clearly demonstrates that such programs have not been viable because they have ignored the specific gender needs of women.

The book's analysis is premised on the idea that women have specific needs stemming from their "triple role" as reproducers, producers, and community managers. The authors of the case studies (covering Asia, Africa, and Latin America) consider to what extent the planning of human settlements has addressed the needs of women. That these needs have been largely ignored, especially in the urban areas of developing countries, is demonstrated by the biased eligibility criteria for government programs, the continued failure to consult women in the design of homes, and the lack of awareness of the unequal capacity of women to participate due to constraints imposed by their triple role.

The severe housing shortage which has arisen in recent years has prompted governments to upgrade squatter settlements and to provide housing to those who would not otherwise have access to property. The eligibility criteria, however, are usually based on traditional quantitative data which adversely affect women. In Kenya's Dandora Project, for example, eligibility criteria included a documented minimum monthly income. This requirement often precludes women because many work in the informal sector where monthly income is subject to fluctuations and documentation is impossible. Sixty-three percent of applicants for the Dandora Project worked in the informal sector. The income criterion persists in spite of research which proves that there is no correlation between household income and house quality, and that "households headed by men lived in inferior dwellings to those headed by women, despite having higher earnings" (p. 42).

In addition, the Dandora Project required applicants to complete a number of forms. Thirty-three percent of the applicants were illiterate, sixty-seven percent of whom were women. The true impact of illiteracy did not reveal itself until the point of implementation, when it became clear that many women had expected houses, not empty plots of land on which they had to build homes. Most of the women were forced to hire labor for the construction.

Since women typically had other responsibilities due to their triple role, they usually could not be present at the work site to supervise construction. Consequently, women were often exploited by contractors, and building costs became exorbitant. To make matters worse, women's low income and small savings severely restricted their access to official sources of loans. Informal loans compounded their interest payments and placed many women inextricably in debt.

Another point of concern arises from the failure to consult women in the design and planning stages of construction, despite the fact that women are the primary users of housing and that fifty percent of households in the urban areas of Latin America and Africa are headed by females. Thus, many homes do not accommodate important gender needs particular to the culture. For example, women in El Salvador refused to use latrines because the gap between the floor and the bottom of the door exposed their feet.

In the San Judas project in Nicaragua, the only case presented where project goals specifically included women and recognized the legitimacy of their activities in the informal sector, a female architect was assigned. Consultation with local women at the design stage resulted in significant changes from the original plan. The new plan favored detached rather than semi-detached units, a small enclosed area with no partitions for additional flexibility, and a large plot for small-scale cultivation.

Equal participation, which figure prominently in housing policy for the poor, plays a key role in all self-help projects. Even the Nicaraguan project mentioned above failed to realize that during pregnancy many women could not contribute physical labor at the construction site. Unfortunately, a non-feminist perspective of what constitutes participation has clearly penalized women. The role of women as community managers is often unrecognized because it is not as visible as the output generated by men's physical labor. In the San Judas project, the female director handled all the fundraising, negotiation for services, and other business aspects of the collective, but was not physically present at the work site. The men criticized her for not contributing equally. The value of her work was not recognized until she resigned.

Historical reinforcement of the sexual division of labor has allotted the construction of houses to men, and maintenance to women. Recognizing the prevalence of households headed by females, women in the Kirillapone program in Sri Lanka, were trained as masons so that they could effectively participate in the construction of their own homes and acquire a marketable skill. One result was considerable domestic destabilization. Additionally, in spite of their training, women were not accepted as masons for employment outside the project. Thus, the program "has not opened up new frontiers of freedom, but simply provided an escape route from domestic slavery into wage slavery" (p. 109).

Since households headed by females are increasing, it seems obvious that programs for the poor should accommodate the gender needs of women in their triple role. Loan repayment schemes must be more creative to accom-

moderate informal sector incomes. The author of one case study, Nimpuno Parente, recommends flexible repayment schedules tailored to individual income patterns, and the redefining of acceptable forms of collateral. Non-cash methods of cost recovery might also be considered.

In presenting these case studies, Moser and Peake are advocating not only gender awareness in housing policy, but also fundamental changes in traditional attitudes toward women. Indeed, they presume that such changes are a prerequisite for sound housing policy. Though it is true that housing programs are an important place to begin emphasizing equal rights for women, the pragmatic approach would suggest the immediate problem of adequate housing for women may be resolved without this wider change in society. Homes have traditionally been the domain of women, and, therefore, increased input by women in housing-related issues may be more palatable to men than female participation in other areas. New societal attitudes regarding housing and other development issues could foster an awareness of the necessity of a broader shift in perspectives toward equality.

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Politics in the United Nations System

Edited by Lawrence S. Finkelstein

Durham N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 1988, 503 pp., including indexes, \$65.00 cloth and \$22.50 paper.

Is the United Nations moving toward a more centralized authority structure? Has UN decision-making evolved from a diplomatic style, based on state consent, to a political style, based on majority will? *Politics in the United Nations System* attempts to answer these questions by examining the political processes in the United Nations as a struggle over the authoritative allocation of resources, and the implicit values which accompany those decisions.¹ Unfortunately, the different essays do not consider these questions in a consistent manner, which makes it difficult to draw comparisons or reach valid conclusions about the usefulness of this approach.

In his introductory chapter, the editor of this volume, Lawrence S. Finkelstein, hypothesizes that, indeed, "the predominant movement on the spectrum has been from required consent toward majority procedures" (p. 6). Of course, the UN system is expected to exhibit some contradictions in this regard. Some of the specific factors influencing the evolution of decision-making in the United Nations and examined in this volume include the salience of states' objectives, the characteristics of the allocative processes, and the political roles of different actors in the system (states, blocs of states, executive heads, secretariats, and non-governmental organizations).

Such ambitious objectives are only partly achieved in *Politics in the United Nations System*. The thirteen essays which provide the "comparative investigation" which the "framework called for," are disparate in content and quality. Five cover specific issue areas (lawmaking, peacekeeping, economic cooperation, environmental issues, and human rights); five others examine individual agencies or other UN bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and International Telecommunications Union (ITU); the final three discuss the role of certain actors in the system (two on the executive heads of the World Bank and UNESCO, and one on the secretariat in general). Given the different emphases, Finkelstein's theoretical framework is treated in a very uneven manner.

In effect, the comparative element of the entire study is left to Finkelstein, who struggles valiantly in the last chapter to draw together common elements from the collection of essays and to reach some conclusions. Rather than an

1. See David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1959), 129-131.

adequate analysis of his hypothesis, the essays in this volume seem more concerned with their own specific focus.

On their own terms, most of the essays are fairly interesting. The analysis remains at an introductory level, and will probably be more valuable to the layman than to the specialist. Experts will be familiar with the description of the historical evolution of issues or UN bodies which occupy a substantial part of each chapter.

Unfortunately, Finkelstein's theoretical framework is not developed in detail and applied more thoroughly within the individual essays. Two good attempts, however, are "The Politics of International Economic Cooperation and Development" by Robert W. Gregg, and "Value Allocation and North-South Conflict in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference" by Robert L. Friedheim, which concentrate on the extent to which values have been allocated by the United Nations and on the characteristics of the process.

Many of the other essays seem more preoccupied with establishing whether the United Nations has had an impact on specific areas of concern and proving how large that impact has been. Whether authority has grown more centralized or decentralized and whether decision-making is based on state consent or majority process is evaluated more implicitly than explicitly.

The chapters on "The Political Roles of Recent World Bank Presidents" by Michael G. Schechter, and "The Political Role of the Director-General of UNESCO" by Lawrence S. Finkelstein, are revealing studies of the impact of executive heads on allocative processes within the United Nations. Both essays, however, disregard other factors at work. For example, the interaction between the executive heads and the rest of the secretariat is ignored, which makes the comparison with other parts of the study less useful.

It would have been interesting to see the theoretical framework based on such a concept of politics used more thoroughly and systematically than in this collection. As it is, Finkelstein concludes that if the definition of "authority" in the allocation of values includes the expansion of legitimacy and activity, then centralization of authority has indeed grown in the United Nations, as he hypothesized in the introduction. But "when the value sought requires change in the behavior of states . . . the allocative efforts often fall short of authority" (p. 469). Thus, decisions including changes in state behavior, often seen as the most relevant ones, are still based on state consent.

The reader is left with this conditional answer. Of course, this conclusion is probably unavoidable if the highly differentiated and complex political processes taking place within the UN system are to be accurately reflected. Yet, the topic and the theoretical framework seem worthy of more consistent study.

Politics in the United Nations will prove more interesting to readers looking for an introduction to some of the subjects covered in the essays than for experts searching for new insights. Still, the volume covers a wide range of UN activities and bodies, some of them relatively unknown even for students of international organizations. A collection of essays on a variety of UN topics

was long overdue, and *Politics in the United Nations System* will, as such, be a useful addition to the literature.

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Cold Will: The Defense of Finland

Tomas Ries

London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988, 394 pp., including bibliography, glossary and index, \$49.00.

Mention Finland and you are likely to receive a blank stare. In fact, Finland and the entire collection of Nordic states (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) generally attract scant attention. In the security-political arena, the Nordic nations have generally been considered to constitute a quiet, uneventful, and unimportant corner of the world.

The strategic importance of the area, however, has long been apparent to those who have paid attention. Recently, the massive Soviet naval buildup in the area and the subsequent formulation of the forward-based American Maritime Strategy have conspired to heighten concern over the superpower rivalry in the area. Yet, it is not only superpower forces and strategies which count in the important Nordic security equation. The ability of the small Nordic countries to defend themselves is also a vital element, for the more effectively they are able to do so, the less the temptation for a superpower to fill a real or perceived power vacuum.

In this context Finland, the only small, non-aligned state bordering the Soviet Union to retain its independence, warrants a closer look. Thomas Ries has redressed the knowledge deficit with his book, *Cold Will: The Defense of Finland*. After "five years [of] exhaustive research," as the book jacket proclaims, Ries provides us with the most meticulous and informative source available on the subject. The book is divided into two independent but related parts: first, the history of Finnish defense up through World War II (essentially, a history of struggle against domination from the East); and second, the subsequent attempts to build and modernize Finnish defense capabilities.

The historical section provides a fascinating account of the desperate struggles against less than favorable odds in one bloody civil war and two collisions with the Soviet Union. Although more exhaustive accounts exist of both the military and political aspects of these struggles, plenty is here for the history buff. More important, Ries outlines lessons from this military and political history which remain relevant to Finnish defense today: that Finland must prepare to defend itself alone; that it can mount a credible if not indefinite defense if it maintains a large body of trained personnel, sufficient heavy firepower and anti-tank capabilities, and maximum tactical and operational flexibility; and, finally, that Finland must guard its neutrality and territorial integrity scrupulously, especially so as to reassure the Soviet Union that its vital security interests are not threatened.

The second part of the book is dedicated to proving Ries's assertion that "the notion of the weak Finnish defense is a myth." After World War II the Finnish military men retained an almost mythical reputation as fighters, but they were viewed as poorly armed and equipped. Finland, especially northern Finland, was seen as virtually defenseless. Ries concedes that in the postwar period there is partial truth in this assertion. But the author details the subsequent modernization programs, pursued erratically in the late 1950s and 1960s, more steadily since the 1970s, which to some extent have mitigated the problem.

In describing the modernization programs, Ries reveals the two military objectives of Finnish defense policy: preventing violations of Finland's neutrality (mainly to reassure the Soviet Union that it will not be vulnerable through Finnish sea or air space); and defending Finland against a major military attack. These goals are linked but not identical. For example, coastal patrol vessels designed to monitor Finnish sea space are not as useful in preventing a decisive strike at the Finnish heartland. The Finnish defense modernization program initially concentrated resources on the "neutrality watch" forces, while resources designated for the bulk of Finland's large army reserves for defense against a major attack remained insufficient. Beginning in the 1970s, and especially since 1981, however, the army reserves have received increased funding.

As modernization programs continued, Finland chose to incorporate major revisions in its basic military doctrine. In the immediate postwar period the military adopted a somewhat traditional linear defense doctrine. Wartime experience, however, showed the disadvantage of this strategy for the relatively weak Finns. Therefore, as the modernization program increased the mobility of Finnish forces, the military gradually adopted a more flexible "territorial" defense doctrine, which envisioned first delay and then attrition of the foe by independent and self-contained forward units, and the destruction of the remaining enemy forces by a mobile modernized core of Finnish forces. Ries applauds this shift as capitalizing on Finland's proven comparative advantage in fluid and even guerilla warfare tactics.

Cold Will is meticulously researched and presented. Ries reveals no classified information, but he uses his excellent sources and contacts to produce an outstanding analysis of Finnish military capabilities. Ries falls short, however, when he attempts to analyze Finnish security in a wider political context. For example, his description of the "deterrence versus reassurance" policy toward the Soviet Union lacks the originality of his military analysis. In addition, Ries neglects to properly assess the military forces which Finland would potentially face in a conflict. The superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union, hardly have been sitting on their hands while the Finns have modernized their military forces. Ries's assertion that Finland now exhibits a credible defense would be stronger if he had demonstrated its relative, rather than absolute capabilities. Admittedly, he does not ignore the broader military context entirely, but a comprehensive treatment, perhaps even a chapter on the perceived "threat," would have been a worthy addition.

Despite a warm reception for his book in Finland, Ries has been a target of some criticism for a seemingly tangential issue: the author's attitude toward Swedish defense. Although he does not analyze the Swedish military in depth, Ries makes continuous jabs at its effectiveness. Ries argues that a strong Swedish defense prevents a potential military vacuum, which would tempt greater superpower involvement in the North. Swedish defense, therefore, is a vital complement to Finland's military efforts. Ries laments that:

over the last twenty years, the Swedish Air Force has been halved (44 to 22.5 squadrons), the Swedish Navy has been almost halved and reduces essentially to a coastal anti-invasion force, and the Swedish Army qualitatively reduced from 30 to 20 modern brigades, with further reductions presently planned (p. 373).

The author accuses Sweden of "negligence" and of undercutting the positive returns gained by Finland's increased defense and modernization efforts. These negative remarks about the Swedish military raised considerable concern and debate in Finland. Paul Järvenpää of the Finnish Defense Ministry in the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* warned against elevating Finland above Sweden: "From Finland's standpoint, the comparison is not even necessary."

Ries, however, is hardly alone in his assessment of Swedish military capabilities, although he is perhaps harsher than most. Incidentally, at approximately the same time that *Cold Will* was published last fall, the commander-in-chief of the Swedish military, Bengt Gustafsson, in an unusual move, publicly promoted an official defense report which declared that the Swedish military could not fulfill its assigned tasks at current levels of funding. Gustafsson described the Swedish military as being at a vital "crossroads."

Citizens of the Nordic nations have always taken pride in the low level of superpower tension and rivalry in the region, the so-called "Nordic balance." A neutral and militarily strong Sweden has generally been described as the linchpin of this fortunate system. Thus, if Ries is to be criticized for the opinions he expresses in his book, it should be for not adequately substantiating his concerns about Sweden's current military posture in a more specific manner. I hope that in his next publication he will contribute a more complete analysis of his claims about Swedish defense to complement his excellent analysis of Finnish defense in *Cold Will*.

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Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan

Thomas G. Paterson

New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 317 pp., including index, \$24.95.

Today we witness a world in which the appeal of communism lies shriveled from exposure, revealing a doctrinal carcass bereft of influence. This defeated image begs an explanation for postwar American policy obsession with communism. In *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan*, American historian Thomas G. Paterson attempts "to find out why and how Americans and their leaders have perceived, exaggerated, and devised policies to meet the Communist threat" (p. xi).

The book builds on Paterson's earlier work, especially *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973), and *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War* (1979). But while Paterson incorporates subsequent players and events in his latest effort, his implicit explanation differs little from his analysis in *On Every Front*. During the Cold War, "American 'fundamentals' — ideas, economic and strategic needs, [and] power" — drove American foreign policy.¹ Throughout the next four decades, Paterson reasons, this same recipe dictated American diplomacy. Indeed, the continued utility of the communist threat as a justification for action survives because the resulting programs satisfy those fundamentals, thus earning broad-based political support.

The label "communism," however, often was applied indiscriminately and at great cost to genuine foreign policy challenges to the United States. The Eisenhower Doctrine, explains Paterson in chapter nine, "Threat to the Middle East? The Eisenhower Doctrine," "did not thwart 'international Communism,' because such a thing had never visited the Middle East in the first place." Instead, the United States became "the villain in the Middle Eastern drama" because of its ill-conceived policy (p. 189).

Unfortunately, chapter nine seems to be the only one of fourteen chapters to be written exclusively for this book; the others were published previously or delivered as speeches. Such a composition inevitably leads to duplication, simplification, and underdevelopment of important themes. The resulting hodgepodge of trends and characters is frustrating precisely because of Paterson's skill at blending historical documents to present a balanced description. His introductory catalogue of the consequences of American exaggeration of the communist threat feeds the reader's desire for more analysis of how this came to be. Moreover, Paterson's structure, which focuses on presidents and other key players, emphasizes personal tactics over the power dynamics of the

1. Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War* (New York: Norton, 1979), 70.

international system and the economic and institutional needs of the two superpowers. Whether this highlight is intended or not is unclear.

Nonetheless, Paterson offers some intriguing analytical samplers of American policy. The ignorance or apathy of the mass public, he says, "permitted Washington officials wide latitude and independence in making foreign policy" (p. 81). One example of this lack of knowledge is explored in the first chapter when Paterson describes American ideological illiteracy: equating communism with "Red Fascism." Mass media, including author George Orwell and journalist Walter Lippman, fused Nazi and Soviet images to create a totalitarian giant summoned at every discussion of the communist threat.

This slippery manipulation of absolutes did not go unchallenged. In chapter six, "Resisting Exaggerations of the Threat: Critics of the Early Cold War," Paterson examines a neglected component of policy history: policy dissenters. He looks at the issue of labels. In hindsight, was a Cold War critic less of a "realist" than a Cold War warrior?

Paterson visits Capitol Hill again in chapter thirteen to review the relationship between CIA covert action and congressional oversight. The result is a clear and accurate picture of the Senate bureaucracy and ego that encourage unchallenged policies and allow political expediency to override thoughtful planning.

Paterson closes his book by quoting Republican Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon. In a Senate debate over aid to Nicaragua, Hatfield said: "Here we are again, old men creating a monster for young men to destroy." One leaves Paterson with a vivid image of the monster created by American exaggeration of the communist threat. But one also leaves dissatisfied, missing a strong sense of why such policies dominated so widely and for so long. If this murky understanding of the impetus for their creation and advocacy results from the complexity of their origins, it is an analysis derived by the reader, not one forcefully presented by the author.

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Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era

Mark Cioc

New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 251 pp., including bibliography and index, \$27.50.

No issue in the first postwar decade sparked greater controversy and emotion in Europe than the rearmament of West Germany. American pressure for West German units within an integrated North Atlantic defense force began following the outbreak of the Korean War. Whatever its politico-military logic, the prospect of a rebirth of German military power created "the worst possible effect on public opinion in Europe, especially in France" and aroused "strong resentment" in Germany.¹ Haunted by memories of the total defeat of 1945 and persuaded by five years of Allied preaching of what Mark Cioc terms "the gospel according to Potsdam: de-Nazification, demilitarization, democratization," West Germans, not surprisingly, showed little enthusiasm to take up arms again (p. 12).

When Konrad Adenauer set about to persuade his fellow citizens to rearm within a collective Western defense, he encountered a pervasive *ohne mich* (count me out) sentiment as well as opposition from political, religious, and labor leaders. Adenauer argued for an enhanced security through economic and military integration with the West, maintaining that a Western anchorage would be a stepping stone and not a roadblock toward eventual German reunification. By September 1953, Adenauer and his party, the Christian Democrats, had prevailed. The *Bundestag* ratified the European Defense Community treaty with additional plans being prepared for a 500,000-strong conventionally-equipped army, the *Bundeswehr*, when the Federal Republic joined NATO in 1955.

Far from fading into oblivion, however, defense policy had only just begun its long and still active career on the center stage of West German political and public life. Attention shifted to new and equally divisive questions as increasing emphasis was placed on nonstrategic nuclear weapons within NATO: What role would West German ground forces be expected to assume within the overall Western defense strategy?

Mark Cioc, a historian, skillfully reconstructs this passionate debate and assesses its principal protagonists in *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era*. With a good combination of narrative and analysis, Cioc illustrates how the moral and strategic questions surrounding nuclear weapons fueled a society-wide discussion among the West Germans

1. Drew Middleton, *The Defense of Western Europe* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), 91.

in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Far from being limited to politicians in Bonn, the nuclear defense and German rearmament issues were discussed by all elements of society, including clergy, scientists, and trade union leaders. One of the valuable features of this survey is the fact that Cioc has included excerpts from a number of primary documents: scientific and peace movement manifestos, religious theses, political parties' memoranda and resolutions, and, most expressive of all, political cartoons which help characterize the range and depth of the public debate.

The birth of West Germany's military forces, as Cioc underlines in the first part of his study, was marked by irony. Plans for rearmament were initially linked to Adenauer's 1954 pledge that West Germany would not manufacture its own nuclear weapons. Plans were also made within the context of a 1952 NATO strategy which prescribed a forward defense of West German territory with fifty conventionally-armed divisions backed by the US strategic arsenal.

It soon became clear, however, that the ambitious force goals for implementing this strategy could not be achieved even with the anticipated West German contribution. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration implemented its "New Look" strategy — officially approved by NATO in late 1956 — which called for "massive retaliation," fewer soldiers, and increased reliance on low-yield, battlefield nuclear weapons. While these new weapons pushed Western defense capabilities closer to the inter-German border:

the forward defense strategy boomeranged on the West Germans: it transformed Central Europe into a potential nuclear battlefield *Bundeswehr* troops became the footsoldiers of NATO, the atomic cannonfodder of a future war. Nor did the New Look offer much solace to West German citizens If Eastern bloc troops attacked Western Europe and NATO responded with nuclear weapons, civilian casualties would be high, regardless of how "limited" the war remained [N]uclear weapons would most likely devastate the region they were supposed to defend (p. 9).

Such was the unique version of the nuclear dilemma which tactical nuclear weapons began to pose for West Germans.² As NATO introduced US nuclear-capable systems in 1953 and as it became clear four years later that NATO planned to instruct the *Bundeswehr* in the use of these systems, "the nuclear specter had begun to cast its shadow over West Germany's domestic politics" (p. xx).

Alarmed by Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss's ideas for a supranational West European atomic defense, eighteen nuclear physicists issued their "Göttingen Manifesto" in April 1957 urging that West Germany

2. See Robert Osgood, *The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), 1; and Theodore Draper, "The Phantom Alliance," in *The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics*, ed. Robert W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley (New York: Frederick Praeger, Lehrman Institute, 1983), 17-21.

remain resolutely non-nuclear. Theologian Helmut Gollwitzer and the Church Brethren (many of whom had belonged to the Confessing Church that had opposed Hitler) called on Christians to take a resolute stand against nuclear armaments. Both the scientific and religious communities were divided, just as the political parties lined up on different sides for the 1957 elections. While the Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) opposed nuclear deployment, Adenauer sidestepped the nuclear issue and led the Christian Democrats to an absolute majority in the *Bundestag*. The overwhelming Christian Democratic election victory prodded the SPD and FDP to rethink their defense programs, and by the end of the Adenauer era a tripartisan defense policy seemed to be emerging. "Though most SPD and FDP leaders still felt NATO was overreliant on nuclear weapons, they had no intention of continuing the discussion outside governmental corridors" (p. 182).

Readers who gained their first exposure to West German and NATO nuclear controversies during the post-1979 furor over the deployment of intermediate-range missiles, or the current debate over modernization of short-range nuclear systems, may experience *déjà vu* upon learning that a generation earlier:

West Germans debated NATO's nuclear doctrine in cafes and beer halls, in theaters and on the radio. The discussion aroused conservatives and socialists, communists and capitalists, theologians and laymen . . . "There was a total division, a total tearing apart that revealed all the old wounds," one observer noted with only slight exaggeration. "There seemed no basis for consensus; it was impossible even to talk — you were either for or against and that was that" (p. xx).

Cioc, who conducted his research in West Germany between 1981 and 1983, admits that "the temptation to compare the nuclear debate of the 1950s with the more recent controversy is difficult to resist." Both began with the deployment of US nuclear weapons on European soil at the behest of West German governments anxious to strengthen deterrence. Both were opposed by a significant portion of the populace convinced that deployment would increase the probability of a catastrophic superpower confrontation in Europe. In some respects the Adenauer-era controversy was a dress rehearsal for the early 1980s. Cioc concludes that recent debates are best seen as "an aftershock to the debate of the 1950s: [for] it was under Adenauer that West Germans sought to regain their confidence and prove themselves worthy of the West's trust" (p. xxii).

Pax Atomica, as well as current headlines, furnish eloquent reminders that one of the more poignant and painful implications of maintaining that trust has been for West Germany to host NATO nuclear weapons on its soil. Even if the major political, social, and religious forces in West Germany currently maintain "an unswerving commitment to NATO," the nuclear price tag which

comes with that commitment promises to evoke no less controversy in the years ahead.³

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3. The political exception to this consensus on NATO is the Green Party.