

# Internal displacement to urban areas: the Tufts-IDMC profiling study

## CASE 3: SANTA MARTA, COLOMBIA



# **Internal Displacement to Urban Areas: the Tufts-IDMC Profiling Study**

## **Santa Marta, Colombia: Case 3**

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In many conflict zones today, the targeting and uprooting of rural populations and their forced displacement is an integral part of the war strategies of rebel or government forces. Notable recent examples include Sudan, northern Uganda, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burma and Somalia. Many of these displaced people flee across borders to become refugees, but even more become internally displaced and a large and growing proportion migrate to the urban areas and particularly the capital of their own countries.

Unlike internally displaced people (IDPs) in camps who are more easily identified and assisted, IDPs in urban areas comprise a hidden population, and aid agencies and governments have difficulty identifying them and understanding their experience relative to the urban population amongst whom they live. Relatively little is known about their precise numbers, demographics, basic needs and protection problems. Donor governments and humanitarian organizations have recognized this information gap, and in 2006, the Norwegian Refugee Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre commissioned the Feinstein International Center to conduct a research study that would address this gap.

The study had three main objectives:

- to develop research tools to be used for profiling urban IDPs, including to make population estimates;
- to generate comparative data on IDPs and non-IDPs in urban areas— including demographic and livelihood characteristics, access to services,

economic integration, and whether the assistance and protection needs of IDPs differ from that of non-IDPs;

- to use the data to work with governments and humanitarian organisations to develop programs and advocacy strategies that assist IDPs and protect their rights.

The study took place from 2006-2008, in three urban locations: Khartoum, Sudan, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire and Santa Marta, Colombia. Surveys were conducted in each city, and the outcome was a tested profiling tool, a full report and three case studies.

These outputs can be found at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org) or <http://fic.tufts.edu>.

For information on the studies, please contact the author at [Karen.Jacobsen@tufts.edu](mailto:Karen.Jacobsen@tufts.edu). For more information on the IDP situations in Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire and Colombia please visit IDMC's website at [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org).

## *Santa Marta, Colombia: Case 3 of the Tufts-IDMC Profiling Study of IDPs in Three Urban Areas*

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Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Geneva

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For more than 40 years, Colombians have been subject to chronic violence perpetrated by left-wing guerillas, paramilitaries, government forces, and drug cartels. In the past 20 years, an estimated four million people have been forced to leave their homes. Generally, the pattern of displacement has been within rural areas or to small administrative centers or larger cities. More recently, this pattern has changed, with displacement occurring within city limits or between city centers. This new pattern of intra-urban displacement has been notable since the conflict began to become 'urbanized' (primarily in Medellin and Bogota) from around 2000, leading to new forms of conflict and social tension in urban areas.

Magdalena Department in the north of Colombia has experienced one of the highest rates of internal displacement. From 1996 to 2004, Magdalena was the site of a major paramilitary campaign against the guerrilla groups (primarily the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC). The targeting of civilians was part of the strategies of both guerillas and paramilitaries and large numbers were displaced to rural and urban areas, including Santa Marta, the capital of Magdalena, and the site for this study. After the paramilitary demobilization program was implemented in 2006, Santa Marta became the center of violent power struggles between demobilized paramilitaries, politicians and drug traffickers. Organized crime and gang-related violence increased, leading to new waves of intra-urban displacement, as well as new insecurity for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and urban poor.

## METHODS

The Santa Marta study began in November 2007, the survey data was collected in February 2008, and the analysis was completed in June 2008. The survey used the 2005 census figures, and a three-stage, random stratified sampling strategy. The first sampling stage used a sampling method known as “probability proportional to size” to select 45 *barrios* (administrative areas) across the city of Santa Marta. We then stratified the *barrios* into expected low and high IDP density, based on extensive local consultation with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) country office. In the second stage, we generated different numbers of random (GPS) sampling points in each selected *barrio*. In the third stage, households were randomly selected around each sampling point. The number of sampling points and households around those points were weighted depending on the population and expected IDP density of each *barrio*. On the ground, sample points were recorded using hand-held GPS units. This allowed for spatial representation of the data. The final sample contained 909 complete interviews, with a skewed gender bias (68% women).

## OVERVIEW OF SURVEY FINDINGS

### MIGRATION TO SANTA MARTA

Of our 909 respondents:

- Nearly half (49%) were born in Santa Marta and another 9% came as children.
- 88% had been living in Santa Marta over the past five years, including 69% in the neighborhood they were being interviewed in, and 19% elsewhere in Santa Marta. Four percent had lived in another municipality in Magdalena, and 8% had lived in another department within Colombia.
- 72% were born in the department of Magdalena (of which Santa Marta is the capital), with smaller numbers from the neighboring departments of Atlantico (5%), Cesar (5%), Bolivar (3%), and La Guajira (3%).

We defined migrants as those who came to Santa Marta after age 18, or who had lived outside Santa Marta prior to being interviewed. Migrants constituted 52% of the sample. Of our migrant respondents:

- A third (38%) said they came to find work;
- A quarter (23%) said they came to escape conflict;
- 16% came to join their family;
- 13% for education, and
- 9% because their livelihood failed.

Of the 113 respondents who came to escape conflict, almost half (44%) said they came to escape assassinations in their area, one third (31%) to escape various threats, and 26% to escape “massacres”. Others came to escape from armed confrontation (18%), forced disappearance (17%), forced recruitment (7%), and antipersonnel mines (5%). No one reported coming to Santa Marta because of development projects or fumigation.

Our respondents mentioned a total of 195 offenses. Paramilitaries were blamed for 40% of them, FARC for 28%, the National Liberation Army (ELN) for less than 4% and government security forces for about 2%. Twenty six percent of offenses were said to be perpetrated by “others”.

#### IDENTIFYING AND ESTIMATING IDPS

Our survey did not explicitly seek out IDPs. We used secondary analysis of the data to construct an IDP variable based on three indicators. A respondent was defined as an IDP if he or she met any of the following criteria:

- 1) They had ever been forced to leave their place of residence because of violence or conflict. We included those who had experienced intra-urban displacement as well as rural to urban displacement. Of our respondents, 112 (12.3%) met this criterion.
- 2) They had come to Santa Marta to escape violent conflict or conflict over land issues. 115 respondents (12.7%) met this criterion.
- 3) They had applied to register as an internally displaced person. 78 respondents (8.6%) met this criterion.

Of our 909 respondents, 131 or 14.4% of our sample met our criteria for being IDPs.

Those who arrived in Santa Marta after 1996 were more likely to be IDPs. This was the year when conflict broke out between a paramilitary leader and one of the guerrilla groups in the area.

Our data on household composition allowed us to include in our estimate IDPs who were living in the households of non-IDP respondents. When we added those IDPs, the proportion of IDPs in our sample increased to 15.8%.

Based on the latest census data, we estimated the IDP proportion of Santa Marta's population to be approximately 65,806 IDPs, or 15.8% of the city's population. This estimation includes IDPs living in non-IDPs households. Using a confidence interval  $\pm 2.37\%$ , we are 95% certain that the number of IDPs living in Santa Marta lies between 56,055 and 75,839 (13.4% and 18.2%) of the total population of the city.

This number represents an average for the whole city of Santa Marta. As with most urban settings, although IDPs live in most parts of the city, they are not evenly distributed but are clustered in certain areas. Using the local knowledge of NRC and other local organizations, we stratified the city into barrios of expected high and low densities of IDPs and found the following:

- In low density areas (65 *barrios*, n=451) the proportion of IDPs was 14.94% (including both respondents and non-IDP households with IDPs)
- In high-density areas (19 *barrios*, n=458) the proportion of IDPs was 17.04% (including both respondents and non-IDP households with IDPs).

We also surveyed in three so-called 'extension areas', which are not officially incorporated into Santa Marta, and were not included in the census. Here we found higher concentrations of IDPs. Across these three 'extension areas', we found that 25.7% of our respondents were IDPs (n=18 of 70 respondents).

#### IDP REGISTRATION AND ASSISTANCE

Of our 131 IDP respondents 60% had applied to register as IDPs, and 37% had not. Asked why they did not apply to register, more than half said that they did not know how, and other reasons were that it would not be helpful or benefit them, or that they would not be believed.

Of the 78 IDPs who did apply to the registration process, 66% were accepted, 20% were denied and 13% were unsure of the results.

Half of our IDP respondents (n=66) said they had received some form of assistance. The most common type was emergency assistance (received by 46%), then health services (12%), advice about protection and legal matters (12%), funeral assistance (10%), and educational services (4%).

#### COMPARISON OF IDPS AND NON-IDPS IN SANTA MARTA

We compared IDPs and non-IDPs across a range of demographic and livelihood measures. We found significant differences related to potential vulnerability. These differences tended to be more significant in *barrios* with low IDP density. Statistically significant findings are as follows:

- Household size  
IDPs had a larger household size (mean 5.8 household members) compared with non-IDPs households not sharing with IDPs (mean 5.0 members) or non-IDPs households sharing with IDPs (mean 5.4 members).



- **Place of origin**  
IDP and non-IDP migrants' place of origin is similar, with a somewhat larger proportion of non-IDPs from Magdalena (73% vs. 63% IDPs). A larger group of IDPs come from the department of Cesar.
- **Education**  
IDPs had lower levels of education than non-IDPs. IDPs were more likely to have no formal schooling, or to have stopped at the primary school level. Non-IDPs were more likely to have attended secondary school, vocational or technical programs and university.
- **Employment**  
Half our total sample (51%) was housewives (reflecting the gender bias and time of day of the interview). IDPs and non-IDPs reported difficulties with finding employment at similar rates, but non-IDPs were more likely to have contractual employment, which means their job security is greater and their wages are probably higher (but we did not explore this). IDPs were more likely to be unemployed than non-IDPs. This pattern was similar in both low and high IDP density barrios.
- **Housing materials**  
Overall, most of our respondents (83%) lived in houses made of concrete, but IDPs were more likely to live in dwellings made of wood, which is considered inferior to concrete.
- **Living arrangements**  
Overall, 68% of our respondents owned their own home, and a quarter (24%) rented. Some 7% live with other families, or in "temporary" situations, possibly squatting. 19% of the sample live on "invaded land", that is, land that is illegally occupied and taken over. IDPs were more likely to rent, and less likely to own their homes (especially with a title) than non-IDPs. IDPs were more likely to live with other families and more likely to have temporary housing.

- **Water**

Of the total sample, 71% has direct access to water within their house. Nine percent get water at a standpoint, and 9% buy water from vendors, while 6% get their water from bottles or plastic containers. IDPs were less likely to have a direct water connection to their home.
- **Household difficulties**

When asked if their household experienced any difficulties, a third of our respondents said they experienced no real problems, but another third mentioned lack of water access, and a quarter mentioned problems with sewerage, garbage or filth. Other mentions were: the area was unsafe due to crime (17%), and they were unable to find work (14%). IDPs mentioned more problems and at higher rates than non-IDPs, particularly poor infrastructure, insecurity, troublesome relations with the authorities, and difficulties with the community or neighbors.
- **Disabilities**

IDPs were almost twice as likely as non-IDPs to have someone with a permanent disability living in their household (16% vs. 8.6%).
- **Assets left behind**

Compared with other (non-IDP) migrants, IDPs were more likely to have left or abandoned land, a house, harvest, livestock and possessions. IDPs were more likely to report that they would not have access to their land should they return to their home areas, because their land had been sold under threat, or was occupied by others.
- **Return intentions**

Asked whether they wanted to return home or to stay in Santa Marta, most migrant respondents (83%) said they wished to stay in Santa Marta, largely because of work or livelihood reasons. Only 8% wished to return home. There were no significant differences between IDPs and non-IDPs in their desire to stay in Santa Marta or return home.

- **Problems anticipated in return area**  
IDPs were less likely to believe it possible to return home and more likely to anticipate problems in the return area. Such problems include access to food, education, healthcare and housing in the return area. IDPs were more likely to anticipate finding their property occupied or destroyed, or problems with security than non-IDPs. IDPs were less optimistic than non-IDPs about the possibility of obtaining new land outside their home area through special land programs.
- **Demobilization**  
The majority of both IDPs and non-IDPs did not think that the demobilization process would increase their prospects for returning home.

The study provided evidence that IDPs across the city of Santa Marta fare worse on almost all indicators of wellbeing than non-IDPs, and are more vulnerable than non-IDPs. However a structured survey can only yield certain types of information. Our survey method gave us a wide but rather superficial perspective on the problems facing IDPs. The limitations of our study included that we were unable to estimate how many IDPs had been displaced both within the city of Santa Marta (intra-urban displacement) and from outside Santa Marta. Other limitations were that we could not explore in depth problems concerning registration, discrimination (on such issues as employment and housing), or harassment by the authorities or non-state actors. Targeted and in-depth interviewing is necessary to draw definitive conclusions about these issues.

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**Map A Colombia and Santa Marta**



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Any errors are fully attributable to Karen Jacobsen who directed the project.

## COLOMBIA'S DISPLACEMENT CONTEXT

Some four million people have been forced from their homes during the last twenty years of the armed conflict in Colombia. Most flee the countryside to smaller administrative centers or to a nearby village and then migrate further to end up in the slums and shantytowns around the country's largest cities. According to the Bogotá planning department, Bogotá receives most of these IDPs, and the regional capitals receive about 40% of the displaced. Medellín, in the eastern Antioquia department has been the second largest recipient of IDPs, with Florence, the capital of Caquetá as the third. Other cities such as Pasto, Cali, Arauca and Santa Marta have also received thousands of IDPs seeking protection and anonymity during the last ten years.

In 2006, the government concluded the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, a paramilitary force set up in 1996 to support the army against the rebels. The paramilitaries had become a brutal armed force feared by many civilians<sup>1</sup>, and while they were formally demobilized from the end of 2002, they remain a continued threat for civilians and IDPs. From the beginning of the demobilization process on 1 December 2002 until 30 April 2007, paramilitary groups or their successors were held responsible for the killings or disappearance of more than 3,000 non-combatants<sup>2</sup>, many of them IDPs, community leaders and human rights defenders. Very few of these crimes have ever been investigated. Other crimes attributed to the paramilitary groups or their successors include smuggling, arms-dealing, enforced prostitution, death threats, and the imposition of socially repressive rules for those the paramilitaries deem to be socially unacceptable, such as drug-addicts, homosexuals and beggars. Some of the violations have been committed by 'cleansing squads' set up with army backing to respond to the crime wave related to drug trafficking and the armed conflict.

<sup>1</sup> The official paramilitary agenda was to defend state institutions, but there is evidence that enrichment was a primary motivation for their activities and atrocities. Demobilised paramilitary leaders have acknowledged a pattern of collusion with state agents and politicians, which undermined the state institutions they claimed to defend.

<sup>2</sup> CCJ, 30 April 2007: [http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/documentos\\_pag/pop.htm](http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/documentos_pag/pop.htm)



Intra-urban and inter-urban migration – in which people move within cities or from one city to another – emerged from around 2000 as a response to armed conflict, threats and violence in urban areas and the government’s limited capacity to protect urban IDPs<sup>3</sup>. In 2007, the government registered more than 321,820 newly displaced people<sup>4</sup>, and another reliable source counted more than 300,000 newly displaced people in the same year.<sup>5</sup> Paramilitary groups or their successors are held responsible for much of the intra- and inter-urban displacement<sup>6</sup>. Demobilized groups have seized control of illegal territorial networks, often in parts of cities with high concentrations of IDPs, such as Soacha (Bogota). These networks utilize informants and checkpoints, and use incentives or threats to ensure votes for political candidates who collude with them. The absence of a sustainable economic reintegration process means demobilized paramilitary rank and file combatants have been easily recruited in urban and rural areas.

Colombia has one of the most unequal land distributions in the world with 0.4 per cent of landowners owning 61% of rural land<sup>7</sup>. Indigenous communities and Afro-Colombian communities legally control around one third of the territory, but their ownership rights are rarely respected. Most fertile land is owned by a few families belonging to the historical elites of Spanish descent.

In the 1980s land struggles and ensuing forced displacement were compounded by drug production and trafficking. The armed groups’ non-military objectives have resulted in a large-scale land-grabbing scheme described as a ‘counter-agrarian reform’. Estimates range from four to six million hectares, mostly grabbed from the IDPs. While both the guerrillas and paramilitary groups are held responsible for forced displacement, the abandoned land is largely controlled by drug traffickers in association with

<sup>3</sup> CODHES 13 May 2008. The Colombian government does not recognise “intra-urban” displacement, and this contributes to the gap between the number of officially registered IDPs and the number recognised by civil society organisations, like CODHES.

<sup>4</sup> Acción Social, 31 July 2008. The numbers for 2007 will become final at the end of 2008 because individuals have a year from their displacement to register.

<sup>5</sup> CODHES, 13 February 2008

<sup>6</sup> Acción Social, 31 March 2008

<sup>7</sup> Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 19 March 2004.

demobilized paramilitary groups<sup>8</sup>. Drug traffickers are reported to control 48% of the most fertile land in the country<sup>9</sup>. The consequences for the civilian population are reflected in the IDP statistics; almost 80% of the IDPs fled rural areas and around 70% had land before fleeing<sup>10</sup>. Despite a judicial framework guaranteeing the victims' right to truth, justice and reparation, only around 22,000 hectares of land was returned to IDPs from the beginning of the demobilization process in 2002 to the formal end of it in 2006<sup>11</sup>.

The huge profits from drug trafficking have fueled a cycle of violence against Colombia's citizens, particularly in rural areas. Both rebels and paramilitary groups hire or force landless and small-scale peasants to grow or pick coca leaves, and the armed groups often seek revenge on populations in areas controlled by the enemy, with ensuing human rights violations and displacement. In 2006, 23 out of Colombia's 34 departments had coca plantations, up from nine departments in 1999<sup>12</sup>. Often the urban areas provide the only relatively safe space.

To combat coca cultivation and drug trafficking, the Colombian government, in collaboration with the U.S., initiated in 1999 a large-scale fumigation campaign with mixed results. The campaign has frequently led to relocation of the coca cultivation, resulting in new patterns of violence and forced displacement, such as in Putumayo and Nariño.

A complicating factor is the government's plan to increase the area covered by palm oil plantations from the current 300,000 hectares to three or even six million hectares. The government presents the palm oil plantations as an alternative to illegal coca production, but the plan has clashed with the interests of the illegal armed groups. Civilians on the land wanted for palm oil plantations often produce coca leaves to survive, or because they are forced to by both paramilitary groups and the guerrillas. The result is that the civilian population is caught in the middle: the illegal armed groups pushing them to continue growing coca and

<sup>8</sup> UNHCR, 21 May 2008; Contraloría de la Nación, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Contraloría Delegada para el Sector Defensa, Justicia y Seguridad, Dirección de Estudios Sectoriales. Luís Bernardo Florez, Vice-Controlor General de la Nación, *Desplazamiento Forzado: Un impacto territorial*, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Comisión de la Sociedad Civil para el Seguimiento

<sup>11</sup> UNHCR, 21 May 2008

<sup>12</sup> WOLA, February 2008

the authorities pressuring them to accept the palm plantations. Many have no alternative but to flee to urban areas.

It is fair to claim that both the historical and current forced displacement in Colombia is more of a deliberate strategy by the armed groups to control territories economically than an unintended consequence of politically and ideologically motivated armed confrontations.

Many civil society organizations have distanced themselves from the armed groups, whether guerrillas, paramilitaries or their successors, by advocating for non-violence and for the right to truth, justice and reparation, as stipulated by the legal framework of the demobilization process. This strategy puts them in danger. The demobilization process has not led to the full dismantling of the illegal economic structures that have caused and benefited from the violence and forced displacements. Human rights defenders have provoked violent responses, such as threats, assassinations and more forced displacement.

In 2004 the Colombian Constitutional Court made a landmark decision. It declared that the government's response to the prevention of internal displacement and the protection of and assistance to internally displaced people was unconstitutional. Since the ruling, the government has increased funding for protection and assistance activities, and continues to manage an IDP registration process. However, local organizations have been concerned that the registration process is restrictive and discourages some IDPs from receiving benefits.

## **TUFTS-IDMC STUDY IN SANTA MARTA**

The department of Magdalena, of which Santa Marta is the capital, has endured many of the conflict and displacement dynamics sketched out above, and has one of the highest IDP populations in the country. The conflict was particularly violent between 2001 and 2004, when a paramilitary leader fought one of the guerrilla groups in the area. Massacres, forced disappearances and massive displacement were widely reported. In 2007, in the wake of the demobilization process, Santa Marta witnessed violent power struggles involving politicians and drug-traffickers. As in other cities, the presence of paramilitary-backed militias or their successors pose more serious threats to IDPs than to the resident population who live in more affluent and protected areas. Human rights and humanitarian organizations have expressed concerns about increased intra-urban displacement. The local authorities provide only limited protection or assistance, and there is reduced space for civilians fleeing violence. It is in this context that we conducted the third case study of our Urban IDP profiling project.

### **METHODOLOGY AND CHALLENGES**

The research in Santa Marta took place in three phases, beginning with a team visit to the field in October 2007, data collection in February 2008, and the data analysis and write-up phases followed by dissemination of results from March 2008.

During the first phase of the study, the Tufts/IDMC team visited the Bogota office of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and met with the executive director of CODHES, the country's largest human rights organization, in order to review and discuss the questionnaire. In Santa Marta, we held a series of meetings with the NRC office to understand the layout of the city and *barrios*, review and field test our methodology, and refine the questionnaire. NRC arranged meetings with representatives from local universities, NGOs, and the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation concerned with IDPs, known as Acción Social. We also met with the Municipal Planner of the city who provided us with updated maps and census information. During this visit, the questionnaire was translated, back translated, and tested.

The second stage of the study began in late January 2008.<sup>13</sup> In Santa Marta, our consultant, Eric Levron, who had conducted our previous study in Abidjan, recruited and trained enumerators, supervisors, and a data entry person from two local universities, Universidad Nacional Abierta y a Distancia and Universidad de Magdalena. The team was joined by a GIS specialist from Tufts, Patrick Florance, who field tested the GPS devices, and trained the team on using maps to locate and record sample points. After field tests, the survey took place between February 7 and 21, 2008. Data was gathered during the day, and entered into the database. Once the data was complete and checked, they were sent for analysis to Tufts. The third stage of the study comprised the data cleaning and analysis phase. Data was extracted from Access and converted into Excel. Analysis was done using STATA and SPSS. Geographic data was analyzed using ArcGIS, from which maps were generated.

#### SAMPLING STRATEGY

The survey used the 2005 census figures compiled by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE)<sup>14</sup> and a three-stage, random stratified sampling strategy. Aiming for a sample of approximately 940, the first sampling stage used the 'population proportional to size' (PPS) technique to select 45 *barrios* (administrative areas) from Santa Marta's 85 *barrios*. This selection was based on the 2005 census data.<sup>15</sup> The selected *barrios* were imported into Google Earth and we produced a series of maps of the city. We then stratified the sample according to expected low and high IDP density, based on extensive local consultation with local NRC staff knowledgeable about the city. Appendix A includes a list of stratified *barrios*.

In the second stage, we weighted the sample in accordance with the stratification, and generated different numbers of sampling points within each selected *barrio*. We used GIS software to

<sup>13</sup> We postponed the start of the survey to avoid the municipal elections that took place in Santa Marta in December 2007. We were concerned about the safety of the enumerators during this potentially volatile time, and we did not want to risk the possibility of respondents associating our survey with the election or political activities.

<sup>14</sup> We obtained the DANE census data from a commercial organization, as it proved impossible to obtain the census data directly from the government.

<sup>15</sup> For detail of the PPS and our sampling method, see the Methods Annex.

randomly select sample points (“dots”), or geographic coordinates tied to a map. We assigned six dots to high-density IDP *barrios*, and five dots to low-density IDP *barrios* (see Table A). Our geo-spatial information allowed us to produce detailed maps of each selected *barrio* with the dots displayed, and including boundaries, blocks, streets and other landmarks. If dots occurred on mountaintops, water bodies, or other unsurveyable areas, we purposely moved the dot to another part of the *barrio* that was not already being sampled, in order to create a more equal distribution within the *barrio*. The distribution of sample points is seen in Map B below.

In the third stage, households were randomly selected around each sampling point. The team leader spun a pen on a clipboard and approached the first dwelling in the direction of the pen. The number of households around each point was related to the population density and anticipated density of IDPs. In high-density areas, four households were randomly selected around each of the six sample points, and in low density *barrios* three households were selected around each of the five points. During the survey, each enumerator team carried a map and a GPS device. The team navigated to a sample point on the map, and recorded the location with the GPS unit.

After consultation with local staff and municipal authorities, we decided to include three additional areas to the sample. These were ‘extension areas’, or shantytowns, outside the administrative boundaries of the city of Santa Marta, and considered to have a high density of IDPs. Because we do not have census data on these areas, they are not included in the total IDP estimation for the city.

The final sample contained 909 complete interviews, with a heavily skewed gender bias (68% women).

The number of interviews conducted in each *barrio* reflected both the overall urban population density and anticipated IDP density. Since there were a larger number of low-density areas, even with weighting, a slightly larger proportion of our sample is in low-density areas. Random selection was used for each stage of our sampling. Taking GPS coordinates at each sample point allowed us to make sure supervisors were sampling in the correct areas, and enabled us to tie information from the actual questionnaires to geographic locations. As such, our results can be represented spatially on maps in the city. For example, we will be


able to show which sampled areas of the city have higher rates of IDPs, problems with security, infrastructure, etc.

The distribution of our sample is shown in Table A and Map B.

**Table A: Distribution of Sample by IDP Strata**

<b>Strata</b>	<b># of Barrios</b>	<b># of Respondents</b>	<b>Percent of Respondents</b>
Low IDP	30	451	49.6%
High IDP	16	388	42.7%
Extension areas	3	70	7.7%
Total	49	909	100%

**Map B Distribution of Sample Points in Santa Marta**



For the comparative analysis of IDPs and non-IDPs, we combined High IDP areas and 'extension areas' because a) the extension areas proved to be high IDP density areas and b) the number of respondents in the extension areas was too small to use parametric statistics.



#### LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY DATA

Our sample is fairly representative of the bounded survey area covered by the DANE census. But the census did not fully cover the shanty areas that spilled over the *barrio* limits. We sampled in three such 'extension areas', but without using the PPS sampling strategy. Since the census data did not include these areas, we could not include it in the overall population estimation.

Another limitation was that the security situation in Santa Marta required us to survey during the daytime. As a result, we interviewed people who are more likely to be at home during the day, and in turn this gave us an unequal gender distribution in our sample, with a majority of women.

#### USING ACCESS RATHER THAN EXCEL

For this case study we elected to use Access database software instead of Excel (which we had used in our previous two studies). This switch was prompted by our desire to reduce data entry errors, because cleaning of the data had consumed a considerable amount of time with earlier studies. An outside consultant using our questionnaire created the Access database. However, once the database was complete, it was difficult to edit or make changes in the field, as this requires specialized knowledge. Editing required constant back and forth discussions between Tufts and the field, which proved to be very time consuming. However, once the database was finalized, and the data entry staff trained, the data was of very high quality and required little to no cleaning. This allowed for a much shorter analysis phase than the other two case studies.

#### USING HANDHELD GPS DEVICES

In this study we used handheld GPS devices for the first time, to find the sample point locations. While the devices proved very useful for navigating the city and ensuring the exact location of our interviews, there was a risk they would be stolen or confiscated. We were also concerned that the team leaders would feel unsafe carrying the devices around with them, as they are in demand by militias. However, after consulting with the local NRC office we were satisfied that the risk was low.

#### DIFFICULTIES WITH URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

We sought to provide enumerators with the most up-to-date maps of the *barrios* but the boundaries delineated by DANE did not always match with Google Earth “layers”, particularly in peripheral areas. In addition, some street names had been changed or were missing, making it difficult for supervisors to navigate to some sample points. In addition, some areas were physically difficult to survey, because of steep terrain.

Although there was generally a high response rate within the sample, those in the wealthier areas of Santa Marta were more likely to refuse interviews. In some of the poorer *barrios*, people were eager to participate. At times, enumerators had difficulty explaining to groups of people why they could not be included in the survey.

## **SURVEY FINDINGS**

In Sections 1 and 2 we describe our demographic and migration findings for the entire sample, then Section 3 explains how we used secondary analysis to define and disaggregate IDPs from the sample. In Section 4, we report our findings about the differences between IDPs and non-IDPs.

### **I. DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL RESPONDENTS**

As shown in Table 1.1, of our 909 respondents 26% are men. The mean age is 41 for males and 40 for females.

#### **HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION**

The mean household size was slightly more than five persons, the median number of children in each household was two, and 25% of the households did not have any children.

The average household size for the sample was 5.3, with a range from 1-18 people. Twenty five percent of the households did not have any children. The mean number of children per household was 2.4. Children make up 34% of all people living in households, adults over age 16 make up 57.5% and those over 60 account for 8%.

The households of our 909 respondents included a total of 1,632 children, of whom 29% were under the age of five. Boys and girls between the ages of 5-16 each comprised approximately 35%. Most school age children (95% boys and 98% girls) were attending school. The main reasons cited by the 43 respondents whose children were not in school were that uniforms or supplies were too expensive.

#### **DISABILITIES**

Of our sample, 88 respondents (9.7%) said at least one household member had permanent health conditions that make it difficult to carry out daily activities. These disabilities included walking (36% of sub-sample), mental disorders (19%), problems with hands or arms (11%), hearing (9%), vision (4.5%), and “other” (19%).

DWELLING CONSTRUCTION

The majority of the respondents lived in a structure made of concrete (95%). Most respondents (83%) lived in houses, with 3% living in shacks or temporary dwellings.

**Table 1.1 Gender, household composition, and dwelling**

(n=909)

Percent male		26
Mean age by gender	Male	41
	95% Confidence Interval <sup>1</sup>	39-43
	Female	40
	95% Confidence Interval <sup>1</sup>	39-41
Total: Household size	Mean	5.29 (SD 2.47)
	Median	5
	Range	1-18
	Total number in households	4810
Children in Household	Range	1-10
	Mean of sample with children in HH	2.4
	Median of sample with children in HH	2
	No. households with no children	230 (25%)
	Total number children in households	1636
	% of Total HH size (4810)	34%
No. Children under age 5	Mean	1.5
	Median	1
	Total	474
Children 5-16	Percent boys attending school	95%
	Percent girls attending school	98%
Reasons for not Attending School (43)	Uniforms/Supplies Too Expensive	5 (11.6%)
	Transportation	0
	Children Must Work	0
	School Not Important	0
	Lack of Food	1 (2.3%)
	Children Discriminated Against	1 (2.3%)
	Other	29 (67.4%)
	Refused to Answer	7 (16.3%)
Adults over 16 in HH (including respondent)	Mean	3.06
	Median	3
	Total Number Over 16	2776
	% of total HH	57.5%
Adults over 60 in HH (including respondent)	Mean	1.34
	Median	1
	Total Number Over 60	381
	% of Total Household	8%

Household with someone with disabilities	Total no. of people with disabilities	88 or 9.7%
	Number Under Age 16	16
	Number Over Age 16	69
Type of Physical Problems (88)	Walking	32 (36.4%)
	Hands/Arms	10 (11.4%)
	Hearing	8 (9.1%)
	Seeing	4 (4.5%)
	Mental	17 (19.3%)
	Other	17 (19.3%)
Dwelling Material:	Concrete	860 (95%)
	Wood	40 (4%)
	Other	10 (1%)
Dwelling Type:	Cambuche, Rancho – shack	32 (3%)
	Room	51 (6%)
	Apartment	55 (6%)
	House	753 (83%)
	Other	19 (2%)

#### ETHNICITY

Most respondents (89%) did not identify with a particular group. A few identified as Afro Colombian (1%), “mixed” (2%), or indigenous (less than 1%), and 6% did not know.

#### EDUCATION

Of the sample, 31% had completed primary school, 42% had completed secondary school, 9% had completed vocational or technical schooling, and 11% had attended university. Six percent had no formal schooling.

#### EMPLOYMENT

Half of our respondents (51%) were housewives (reflecting the gender bias and time of day of the interview), with 9% unemployed, 7% students, 6% working full time, and 16% working in “other arrangements”. None of our sample reported that they were self-employed.

#### IDENTITY DOCUMENTS

Most of our sample (96%) held at least one type of legitimate identity document.

**Table 1.2 Ethnicity, education, employment and documents**

(n=909)

Ethnicity	Afro-Colombian	11 (1%)
	Indigenous	6 (<1%)
	Mestizo	19 (2%)
	Other	1 (<1%)
	None	809 (89%)
	Don't Know	55 (6%)
	Refused to Answer	4 (<1%)
Education Completed	No School	57 (6%)
	Primary (1-6)	285 (31%)
	Secondary	380 (42%)
	Vocational/Technical	85 (9%)
	Any University	97 (11%)
Employment	Unemployed	80 (9%)
	Working Part-Time, Contract	18 (2%)
	Working Full Time, Contract	51 (6%)
	Casual Employment, Temp	25 (3%)
	Self Employed	0
	Unpaid Services	3 (<1%)
	Housewife	463 (51%)
	Student	65 (7%)
	Other	144 (16%)
Identity Documents	Libreta Militar	104 (11%)
	Cedula de Identidad	874 (96%)
	Registro Civil	679 (75%)
	Lost Documents	10 (1%)

#### HOUSING SITUATION

Of our sample 68% owned their own home, of which about half (47%) held the title. A quarter (24%) rented, with 48% paying less than \$200 in monthly rent (see Table 1.4). Some 7% of the sample lived in other situations, including with other families, or in “temporary” situations, possibly squatting. About 19% of the sample (170) lives on “invaded land” that is illegally occupied.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> According to our Santa Marta sources, this form of squatting can happen quickly, often within a few hours. These invasions are often planned—someone gathers support from landless or land-seeking people, a shack is built over night and occupation the next morning makes it difficult for the authorities or the absent landowner to stop.

**Table 1.3 Living situation**

(n=909)

Renting	222 (24%)
Own with title	429 (47%)
Own with no title	195 (21%)
Living with another family in exchange for services	19 (2%)
Live at workplace	6 (<1%)
Temporarily, no rent	22 (2%)
Other	16 (2%)

**Table 1.4 Rent**

(n=222, all figures in Colombian pesos)

< 99,900	35 (16%)
Between 100,000 and 149,900	70 (32%)
Between 150,000 and 199,900	51 (23%)
Between 200,000 and 249,900	34 (16%)
Between 250,000 and 299,900	10 (5%)
> 300,000	8 (4%)
Don't know / refused to answer	10 (5%)

#### ACCESS TO WATER

Seventy-one percent of the sample had direct access to water within their house. Nine percent get water at a standpoint, and 9% buy water from vendors, while 6% get their water from bottles or plastic containers (see Table 1.5).

**Table 1.5 Access to water**

Direct water pipe connection to house	638 (71%)
Water stand point	80 (9%)
Open well	8 (<1%)
Hand pump	34 (4%)
Rain water collection	3 (<1%)
Bottled water or plastic containers	58 (6%)
Water vendors	84 (9%)

ACCESS TO SERVICES AND EXPRESSED DIFFICULTIES

Table 1.6 captures the distance respondents live from public services; this can affect their quality of life and standard of living. Most respondents live within one kilometer of their children’s school (75%), public transportation (86%), and a water source (57%). Half of the sample lives within one kilometer of a recreational park, but one third (33%) do not know where one is. About a quarter (27%) live within one kilometer of a health facility and 11% do not know where one is. Some 37% live within one kilometer of a police station, but a quarter (26%) do not know where one is.

**Table 1.6 Distance from domicile to public services**

	<b>Children’s school</b>	<b>Health facility</b>	<b>Water source</b>	<b>Police station</b>	<b>Transport (bus, taxi)</b>	<b>Recreational place (park, sports)</b>
<b>Within 1km</b>	676 (75%)	426 (47%)	519 (57%)	336 (37%)	780 (86%)	451 (50%)
<b>2-5km</b>	133 (15%)	267 (29.5%)	69 (8%)	249 (27%)	98 (11%)	110 (12%)
<b>6-10km</b>	20 (2%)	78 (9%)	23 (3%)	53 (6%)	19 (2%)	26 (3%)
<b>+10km</b>	9 (<1%)	39 (4%)	12 (1%)	34 (4%)	2 (<1%)	15 (2%)
<b>Don’t know where one is</b>	68 (8%)	95 (10.5%)	282 (31%)	234 (26%)	7 (<1%)	300 (33%)

We asked respondents if their household experienced any difficulties. Almost a third said they experienced no real problems, but 31% mentioned lack of water access, and 23% mentioned problems with sewerage, garbage or filth. Seventeen percent said the area where they lived was unsafe due to crime and 14% said they were unable to find work. Other problems mentioned included neighbors (5%), flooding (9%), distance from transportation (6%), problems with health care (5%) and problems with housing (6%). Only four respondents described harassment from guerillas, paramilitaries, authorities, or other armed groups. Twenty percent said they face other household difficulties.



**Table 1.7 Household difficulties**

(More than one option allowed)

No real problems	277 (30%)
Cannot find work	126 (14%)
Too far from transportation	51 (6%)
Harassment from authorities	1 (<1%)
Difficulties with landowner/landlord	4 (<1%)
Community (neighbors) unfriendly	50 (5%)
Area is unsafe (crime)	150 (17%)
Harassment from paramilitary groups	2 (<1%)
Harassment from armed opposition groups (guerrillas)	0
Harassment from non state actors (grupos armados al margen de la ley)	2 (<1%)
There is no water	285 (31%)
Sewerage, garbage, filth	207 (23%)
Flooding	84 (9%)
Health care	45 (5%)
Problems with housing	57 (6%)
Other	181 (20%)
Don't Know/Refused to Answer	1 (<1%)

## II. MIGRATION TO SANTA MARTA

Nearly half of the sample (49%, 444) was born in Santa Marta and another 9% (81) came as children. Twenty percent (185) came to Santa Marta before 1996. Between 1996 and 2008, nearly equal portions, from one to three percent, migrated to the city each year.

We defined migrants as those who came to Santa Marta after the age of 18, or had lived outside Santa Marta prior to being interviewed, and they numbered 482 or 52% of the sample. Non-migrants, i.e. those who were either born in Santa Marta or came as children, and who did not respond to migration questions, numbered 427, or 48% of the sample.

PLACE OF ORIGIN AND RESIDENCE IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS

As shown in Table 2.1, most of our respondents (72%) were born in the department of Magdalena (of which Santa Marta is the capital), with smaller numbers from the neighboring departments of Atlantico (5%), Cesar (5%), Bolivar (3%), and La Guajira (3%). Migrants also came from Santander (3%), Norte de Santander (3%), Antioquia (2%), Cundinamarca (1.4%), Cordoba (1.2%), Sucre (1.2%), and other areas (2%). In all, 17 of Colombia's 33 departments were represented.

**Table 2.1 Departments of origin**

<b>Department</b>	<b>Respondents (908)</b>	<b>Non-IDPs</b>	<b>IDPs (131)</b>
Magdalena	650 (72%)	568 (73%)	82 (63%)
Atlantico	43 (5%)	38 (5%)	5 (4%)
Cesar	42 (5%)	31 (4%)	11 (8%)
Bolivar	29 (3%)	27 (3.5%)	2 (1.5%)
La Guajira	26 (3%)	22 (3%)	4 (3%)
Santander	24 (3%)	18 (2%)	6 (5%)
Norte de Santander	23 (2.5%)	18 (2%)	5 (4%)
Antioquia	17 (2%)	13 (1.7%)	4 (3%)
Cundinamarca	13 (1.4%)	11 (1.4%)	2 (1.5%)
Cordoba	11 (1.2%)	9 (1%)	2 (1.5%)
Sucre	11 (1.2%)	7 (<1%)	4 (3%)
Other <sup>1</sup>	19 (2%)	15 (2%)	4 (3%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>908 (100%)</b>	<b>777 (100%)</b>	<b>131 (100%)</b>

<sup>1</sup>Other = Boyaca, Caldas, Huila, Meta, Risaralda, Tolima, Valle, (2 Unknown)

When asked about their residence over the past five years, 88% of our sample had been living in Santa Marta, (69% in the neighborhood they were being interviewed in, and 19% elsewhere in Santa Marta). Four percent had lived in another municipality in Magdalena, and 8% had lived in another department within Colombia.<sup>17</sup> One person reported living outside the country in the past five years.

<sup>17</sup> Of the 69 respondents who had lived in other departments in the past five years, the most common two departments were Cesar (12, 17%) and Atlantico (11, or 16%). Of the 35 respondents had lived in other municipalities of Magdalena in the past five years, the most common was Cienaga (8, 22%),

#### HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION

Table 2.2 shows who accompanied the 452 migrants to Santa Marta. Five percent came alone, just over a quarter came with children from their previous household, almost half came with adults from their previous household, 3% came with children outside their household and 4% came with adults outside their household.

**Table 2.2 With whom did migrants come to Santa Marta?**

(n=452)

Came alone	24 (5.3%)
With children from previous household	120 (26.5%)
With adults from previous household	219 (48.5%)
With other children	12 (2.7%)
With other adults	17 (3.8%)


#### REASONS FOR MIGRATION

Just over a third of migrants (38%) told us that they came to find work, and just under a quarter came to escape the conflict (23%). Sixteen percent came to Santa Marta to join their family, 13% came for education and 9% came because their livelihood failed. Less than 2% came to seek social services such as health, water, electricity, or to escape natural disasters, and 12% listed “other” reasons. Less than 1% stated that they did not know why they came to Santa Marta and 2% refused to answer the question.

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Aracataca (5, 14%) and Fundación (5, 14%). Of the 171 respondents who had lived elsewhere in Santa Marta, the largest group, 9%, had been previously living in one of the 5 barrios that does not officially have a name (16).


**Chart 2.1 Reasons for migration to Santa Marta**



Of the 113 respondents who came to escape conflict, 44% said they came to escape assassinations in their area, 31% to escape various threats, and 26% to escape “massacres”. Eighteen percent escaped armed confrontation, 17% came because they feared forced disappearance, and 7% because of forced recruitment. Six respondents (5%) left because of antipersonnel mines. No one in our sample reported coming to Santa Marta because of mega-projects or fumigation, probably because this area of Colombia is not subject to fumigation. (See Appendix B for complete table).


Note: we did not ask people about their actual experience. We asked only what kind of violence or conflict they had escaped. Their reasons could have alluded to fear of certain things happening, or actual experience.

**Chart 2.2 Types of violence mentioned**



In total, our respondents mentioned 195 offenses. When asked who they thought was responsible, 40% blamed paramilitaries and 28% blamed FARC. Less than 4% blamed the National Liberation Army (ELN) and about 2% blamed government security forces. “Others” perpetrated about 26% of the reported offenses.

**Chart 2.3 Violence committed by authority type**



### III. IDP INDICATORS AND POPULATION ESTIMATES

Our survey did not explicitly seek out IDPs. Instead, we asked a range of questions that allowed us to determine whether respondents had been internally displaced or not.<sup>18</sup> We defined IDPs as those who said:


- 1) they had ever been forced to leave their place of residence (including urban areas) because of violence or conflict. Of 909 respondents, 112 or 12.3% met this criterion.
- 2) they had come to Santa Marta to escape conflict over land issues. 115 respondents or 12.7% of the sample met this criterion.
- 3) they had applied to register as an internally displaced person. 78 respondents, or 8.6% of the sample met this criterion.

Combining these three indicators to create the IDP variable (and ensure we weren't double-counting), we found that 131 individuals, or 14.4% of the sample, met at least one of the criteria. Our confidence interval is +/- 2.34, and our range is 12.19 to 16.86%.

The distribution of IDPs in Santa Marta is shown in Map C below.

<sup>18</sup> Our IDP indicators are derived from the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* which define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters”.

**Map C: IDP households by barrio, Santa Marta**



As shown in Table 3.1, when we divided the sample into migrants and non-migrants, we found that of our 482 migrants, 127 (27%) 'qualified' as IDPs, compared with just four (1%) of our 423 non-migrants. It is possible that a proportion of people who were born in Santa Marta and then subsequently migrated and returned, also experienced intra-urban displacement after their return.

**Table 3.1: Migration and internal displacement**

	Non-IDP	IDP	Total
Non-Migrant	423 (99%)	4 (1%)	427 (100%)
Migrant	355 (74%)	127 (27%)	482 (100%)
Total	778 (85.6%)	131 (14.4%)	909 (100%)

#### DATE OF ARRIVAL AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Those who arrived in Santa Marta after 1996 were more likely to be IDPs than those who had come earlier or been born and raised in Santa Marta. Of the 200 migrants who came after 1996, 72 (36%) had been forcibly displaced, compared with 15% of the 185 migrants who came prior to 1996. Of the 524 people who were born in Santa Marta or came to Santa Marta as children, 31 or 6% had experienced displacement.

This pattern of increased IDP arrivals after 1996 fits with our expectations. Conflict and forced displacement increased sharply in the rural areas of Magdalena Department after 1996, when a paramilitary leader decided to fight one of the guerrilla groups in the area.

#### INTRA-URBAN DISPLACEMENT

Santa Marta, like other cities in Colombia, experienced intra-urban displacement in the wake of the power struggles and increased crime that followed the paramilitary demobilization in 2006. Since more than half of our respondents have migrated at some time; it is difficult to determine when and where their displacement occurred, without doing a detailed migration history for each respondent. Of the 427 non-migrants in our sample, i.e. those who never left the city, only four met our IDP criteria, constituting 3% of the IDPs in our sample. This is a conservative estimate of intra-urban displacement, because it excludes the 127 migrant IDPs who might have been displaced within Santa Marta after their arrival in Santa Marta.

#### IDPS LIVING IN NON-IDP HOUSEHOLDS

The 131 IDPs represent only our individual respondents and thus the lowest possible number of IDPs in our sample. In order to get



a count of all the IDPs in our sample we need to include those living in the households of our non-IDP respondents.

As discussed above, working with our expert local advisors, we stratified the sample into *barrios* of high and low IDP density. We assigned 65 *barrios* to the low IDP density category, and 19 *barrios* to the high IDP density (see Appendix A). We excluded the 'extension areas' in the total population estimation because we did not have accurate census data for those areas.

Of the 449 respondents living in the *Low IDP Density Barrios*, 15% said they had IDPs living in their households. Of these, 57 (12.7%) were IDPs themselves, and 9 were not (2%). As shown in Table 3.3, there were a total of 330 IDPs living in IDP households, and 14 IDPs living in non-IDP households (of which four were under 16, and 10 over 16), for a total of 344 IDPs household members in our sample. The total number of household members in the sample was 2,302 (Columns A, B and C of Table 3.4). So our IDP proportion in the low-density *barrios* is  $344/2,302=.1494$  or 14.94%.

Of the 386 respondents living in the *High IDP Density Barrios*, 18% (69) said they had IDPs living in their households. Of these, 56 (14.5%) were IDPs themselves, and 13 were not IDPs (3.4%). As shown in Table 3.3, there were a total of 329 IDPs living in IDP households, and 28 IDPs living in non-IDP households (of which 8 were under 16, and 20 over 16), for a total of 357 IDPs household members in our sample. The total number of household members in the sample was 2095 (Columns A, B and C of Table 3.6). So our IDP proportion in the high-density *barrios* is  $357/2095=.1704$  or 17.04%.

**Table 3.2 Household composition**

		A	B	C	D	E
		IDP Households	Non-IDP Households not sharing with IDPs	Non-IDP Households Sharing with IDPs	IDPs under 16 in non-IDP households	IDPs over 16 in non-IDP households
<b>Low Density Barrios 449</b>	Number households	57	383	9	3	7
	Total # in Household	330	1923	49	4	10
	Mean	5.8	5	5.4	1.3	1.4
	Std Dev	2.7	2.5	3	.58	.53
	Range	1-13	1-18	2-10	1-2	1-2
<b>High Density Barrios 386</b>	Number	56	317	13	3	13
	Total # in household	329	1657	109	8	20
	Mean	5.9	5.2	8.4	2.7	1.5
	Std Dev	2.8	2.2	3.25	1.5	.78
	Range	1-14	1-13	4-15	1-4	1-3

**Table 3.3 IDP proportion calculator**

		Low Dens	Hi Dens
A	IDP respondents	57	56
B	IDPs living in IDP household	$(330-57)=273$	$(329-56)= 273$
C	IDPs living in non-IDP household	14	28
D	Total IDPs in sample	344	357
E	Total household members in sample (including respondents)	2,302	2095
F	Proportion of IDPs in sample	$344/2,302=.1494$	$357/2095=.1704$
G	Estimate of IDPs in S.Marta $(252,861 * F)$	37,777	28,029

#### IDP POPULATION ESTIMATES

According to the most recent census conducted by DANE in 2005, the total population of Santa Marta's 84 *barrios* was 417,348.

Using the census data, the *barrio* stratification and our calculated proportion of IDPs, we estimated the total population for high and low IDP density *barrios*. As shown in Table 3.7, our

estimate for the number of IDPs in the 65 low IDP density *barrios* is 37,777 (14.94% of 252,861), and for the 19 high IDP density *barrios* the estimate is 28,029 (17.04% of 164,487). Combined, we estimate the number of IDPs in Santa Marta at 65,805 or 15.8% of the population of the city. Our confidence interval is +/-2.37%,<sup>19</sup> for a range of 13.43% to 18.17%. We are thus 95% confident that the number of IDPs living in Santa Marta is between 56,055 and 75,839.

**Table 3.4 IDP population estimate by barrio type**

	# of <i>Barrios</i>	% of Total <i>Barrios</i>	Total Population of <i>Barrios</i>	% of IDPs	Population Estimate of IDPs
<b>Low Density</b>	65	77.4%	252,861	14.94%	37,777
<b>High Density</b>	19	22.6%	164,487	17.04%	28,029
<b>Total</b>	84	100%	417,384	15.8%	65,806

The number of IDPs in the city is likely higher than our estimate because the census did not include all the outlying areas of the city, so our estimate does not include these either. As mentioned above, we surveyed in three areas that were outside of the official census boundaries, and discovered high proportions of IDPs living in those areas.

Our estimate is similar to that of a recent report prepared by the NRC country office in Colombia in March 2007, which estimates the total number of IDPs in Santa Marta between 1995 and 2007 at 69,944, or 16.8% of the population.

#### IDP REGISTRATION PROCESS

Of our IDP respondents 60% (78) had applied to register as IDPs, and 37% (49) did not. Three percent (4) were unsure. When asked why they did not apply to register, the following reasons were given: 57% did not know how (31), 17% (9) thought it would not be helpful or benefit them, and 7.4% (4) thought that they would not be believed. One person feared the government or the bureaucracy, and two (3.7%) feared armed or illegal groups.


<sup>19</sup> Using <http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm>, and a sample size of 905 and percentage of 17.13.

Thirteen percent (7) were unsure of why they did not apply.

Of those IDPs who did apply to the registration process (or were unsure if they had applied), 66% were accepted (55), 20% were denied (17) and 13% were unsure of the results (11).

As shown in Figure 3.1, of the eighteen IDPs who were not accepted as IDP registrants, seven reported that they were not believed, and six did not know why they were rejected. Three refused to answer, one said that the time limit had expired, and one stated that the authorities had not explained why the respondent had been rejected. Since registration can enable a more comprehensive protection response, it is worth exploring IDPs' experience with the registration process in more detail, through qualitative research.

**Chart 3.1 Why IDPs were not included in the IDP registry**



IDP ASSISTANCE

As shown in Table 3.8, half of our IDP respondents (66) said they had received some form of assistance. The most common type was emergency assistance (received by 46%), then health services (12%), advice about protection and legal matters (12%), funeral assistance (10%), and educational services (4%). Less than 1%

received housing assistance, and no one reported having accessed an income generation program.

**Table 3.5 Main types of assistance to IDPs**

(n=130)

Emergency assistance	60 (46%)
Funeral assistance	13 (10%)
Health services (hospital emergency)	15 (12%)
Advice about rights, protection, legal matters	15 (12%)
Education	5 (4%)
Other	12 (9%)
Don't Know	6 (4.6%)

#### IV. COMPARISON OF IDPS WITH NON-IDPS IN SANTA MARTA

In this section, we compare IDPs and non-IDPs in our sample. We ran tests for all indicators, to determine if the two groups were statistically different.

##### HOUSEHOLD SIZE

As shown in Table 3.3, IDPs had a larger household size (mean 5.8 household members) compared with non-IDPs households not sharing with IDPs (mean 5.0 members) or non-IDPs households sharing with IDPs (mean 5.4 members).<sup>20</sup>

##### PLACE OF ORIGIN

As shown in Table 4.1, IDP and non-IDP migrants' place of origin is similar, with a somewhat larger proportion of non-IDPs from Magdalena (73% vs. 63% IDPs). A larger group of IDPs come from the department of Cesar (11.8%).

<sup>20</sup> T-test assuming unequal variances: t stat -2.78: p=.0060

**Table 4.1 Place of origin by IDP**

Department	Non-IDPs	IDPs (131)
Magdalena* (p=.015)	568 (73%)	82 (63%)
Atlantico	38 (5%)	5 (4%)
Cesar	31 (4%)	11 (8%)
Bolivar	27 (3.5%)	2 (1.5%)
La Guajira	22 (3%)	4 (3%)
Santander	18 (2%)	6 (5%)
Norte de Santander	18 (2%)	5 (4%)
Total	692 (100%)	131 (10%)
Antioquia	13 (1.7%)	4 (3%)
Cundinamarca	11 (1.4%)	2 (1.5%)
Cordoba	9 (1%)	2 (1.5%)
Sucre	7 (<1%)	4 (3%)
Other	15 (2%)	4 (3%)
Total	777 (100%)	131 (100%)

DISTRIBUTION IN SANTA MARTA

Within Santa Marta, our IDP respondents were mainly concentrated in the *barrios* of Ondas Del Caribe, Chimila II and Bolivar and the extension areas of Las Colinas; see Map D.

Non-IDPs were more likely to have lived in the same neighborhood for the past five years (73% vs. 47%). IDPs were much more likely to have lived in another municipality in Magdalena or another Department (see Table 4.2).

**Table 4.2 Where living in the past five years?**

	Non-IDPs (777)	IDPs (131)
Lived in Same Neighborhood*	566 (73%)	62 (47%)
Elsewhere in Santa Marta	141 (18.2%)	30 (23%)
Another municipality in Magdalena*	17 (2%)	23 (18%)
Another Department	53 (7%)	16 (12%)
Total	777 (100%)	131 (100%)


\* (p=0.00)

Of the 30 IDPs who lived elsewhere in Santa Marta over the past five years, most lived in one of the unnamed *barrios* or in 11 de Noviembre.

EDUCATION

IDPs tended to have lower levels of education than non-IDPs, particularly in *barrios* with lower concentrations of IDPs. In these *barrios*, 17% of non-IDPs had attended university compared to less than 2% of IDPs. No IDPs in these *barrios* had vocational training compared to 11% of non-IDPs. IDPs were also less likely to have secondary schooling than non-IDPs. Trends were similar in the high-density IDP *barrios*, but fewer of these differences were found to be significant.


Chart 4.1 Education levels in barrios by IDP density



EMPLOYMENT


As expected, non-IDPs are generally better employed than IDPs: their job security is greater and their wages probably higher, as indicated by whether or not one has a contract. Across all the *barrios*, none of our IDP respondents was working full time with a contract, compared to 7% of non-IDP respondents. In both low and high IDP *barrios*, IDPs are more likely to be unemployed. The rates of “housewife” are similar across IDPs and non-IDPs, but the high-density IDP *barrios* have a greater percentage of housewives than the low-density *barrios*.

Chart 4.2 Employment in barrios by IDP density



\*Groups showed statistical differences by Pearson’s chi-square at the p=.05 or lower.





\*Groups showed statistical differences by Pearson's chi-square at the  $p=.05$  or lower.

#### DWELLING MATERIAL

In the low-density *barrios*, IDPs were more likely to live in dwellings made of wood (18% vs. 2%), which is considered inferior to concrete. In the high-density *barrios* differences were smaller, but IDPs were still more likely to live in wood structures than non-IDPs (10% vs. 4%).

#### LIVING ARRANGEMENTS

Across all *barrios*, IDPs are more likely to rent, especially in the high IDP *barrios* (45% vs. 22%). Non-IDPs are more likely to own their own homes, and more likely to hold a title for their property than non-IDPs. These differences are most striking in the low-density *barrios* (56% of non-IDPs v. 21% of non-IDPs). IDPs are more likely to live with other families, and more likely to have temporary housing.

#### ACCESS TO WATER

In all areas of the city, non-IDPs are more likely to have a direct water connection to their home. The differences were most striking in the low-density *barrios* (80% of non-IDPs to 60% of IDPs). However, both non-IDPs and IDPs were within one kilometer of a water source across all sampled areas of the city.



#### REPORTED DIFFICULTIES

In all sampled areas, IDPs reported experiencing household difficulties at higher rates than non-IDPs. While non-IDPs were more likely to report having “no real problems,” IDPs were more likely to describe problems with infrastructure, security, and relationships with authority, community and neighbors, as well as “other problems”.<sup>21</sup> As with the other indicators described above, the difference between IDPs and non-IDPs in the low-density *barrios* was more significant. In low-density *barrios*, nearly 80% of IDPs experience problems with infrastructure versus 44% of non-IDPs. Thirty-five percent of IDPs experienced problems with

<sup>21</sup> Respondents were invited to describe household problems that were not a part of the pre-coded survey. Problems described include: electricity, no gas, noise, unpaved roads, no place for children to play, traffic, among others.

security versus 21% of non-IDPs. However IDPs and non-IDPs reported trouble with finding employment at similar rates.

**Chart 4.3 Household difficulties by IDP barrio type**



**DISABILITIES**

IDPs are also almost twice as likely to have a member of their household with permanent health conditions that make it difficult for them to carry out daily activities or community life (16% vs. 8.6%).<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Pearson's Chi-Square significant at the p=0.008

**Table 4.3 Comparison of living situation between IDPs and non-IDPs  
by barrio type**

	<b>Low IDP Barrios</b>		<b>Hi-IDP Barrios &amp; Extension</b>	
	Non-IDPs(394)	IDPs (57)	Non-IDPs (384)	IDPs (74)
<b>Dwelling Material</b>				
Concrete	382 (97%)*	46 (80.7%)	364 (94.8%)	67 (90.5%)
Wood	8 (2%)*	10 (17.5%)	15 (3.9%)*	7 (9.5%)
Other	4 (1%)	1 (1.8%)	5 (1.3%)	0
<b>Living Situation</b>				
Renting	95 (24.1%)	15 (26.3%)	79 (20.6%)*	33 (44.6%)
Own with Title	220 (56%)*	12 (21.1%)	182 (47.4%)*	15 (20.3%)
Own no Title	49 (12.4%)*	20 (35.1%)	109 (28.4%)	16 (21.6%)
Live with other family (in exchange for service)	8 (2%)	3 (5.3%)	3 (<1%)*	5 (6.8%)
Live at Workplace	5 (1.3%)	1 (1.8%)	0	0
Temp, no rent	7 (1.8%)	3 (5.3%)	8 (2.1%)	4 (5.4%)
Other	10 (2.5%)	3 (5.3%)	2 (<1%)	1 (1.4%)
<b>Access to Water</b>				
Direct connection	315 (80%)*	34 (59.7%)	249 (68.8%)	40 (54%)
Other H2O Access <sup>1</sup>	75 (19%)*	23 (40.4%)	135 (35.2%)	34 (46%)
<b>Distance To Water Source</b>				
Within 1 km	250 (64%)	31 (54.4%)	197 (51.3%)	41 (55.4%)
2-5 km	26 (6.7%)*	13 (22.8%)	28 (7.3%)	2 (2.7%)
6-10 km	7 (1.8%)	0	14 (3.7%)	2 (2.7%)
+10 Km	3 (<1%)	1 (1.75%)	7 (1.8%)	1 (1.4%)
Don't Know	104 (26.7%)	12 (21.1%)	138 (36%)	28 (37.8%)
<b>Household Difficulties:<sup>2</sup></b>				
No real Problems	145 (36.)*	9 (15.8%)	112 (29.2%)*	11 (14.9%)
Cannot Find Work Infrastructure <sup>3</sup>	60 (15.2%)	13 (22.8%)	42 (10.9%)	11 (14.9%)
Security/Relations <sup>4</sup>	175 (44.4%)*	45 (79%)	228 (59.4%)*	56 (75.7%)
Other	83 (21.1%)*	20 (35.1%)	68 (17.7%)	22 (29.7%)
	16 (15.7%)*	19 (33.3%)	44 (14.3%)	13 (17.6%)

\* p=0.00

<sup>1</sup> Other Water Access includes the following: water standpoint; open well; hand pump; river, natural pond; rain water collection; bottled water or plastic containers; water vendors; other

<sup>2</sup> This question allowed for more than one answer

<sup>3</sup> Infrastructure Problems Include the Following: Too far from Transport; No Water; Sewerage, Garbage, Filth; Flooding; Healthcare; Problems with Housing

<sup>4</sup> Security/Relational Problems include: Difficulties with Landowner/Landlord; Community (neighbors) unfriendly; Area is Unsafe (crime); Harassment from Authorities, Paramilitaries, Guerillas, Armed Groups on the Fringes of the Law; It should be noted that only four respondents (<1% of entire sample) indicated some form of harassment as a household difficulty

In sum, based on variables that describe education, employment, and the overall living situation of IDPs and non-IDPs, IDPs are worse off than non-IDPs in nearly all respects. Particularly in low-density *barrios*, IDPs appear to be more disadvantaged than their non-IDP neighbors. IDPs in high-density areas tend to be somewhat worse off than their non-IDP neighbors, but this difference is not as marked.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF RETURN, "HOME" AND SECURITY

We compared the responses of IDPs with non-IDPs on questions about the property they left behind and their views on return.


#### *ASSETS LEFT BEHIND (PROBABLY ABANDONED)*

This question sought to establish whether migrants had had to abandon their property, as opposed to leaving it in the care of family or others from whom it could later be regained. As shown in Chart 4.4, when asked what assets they left behind, 478 respondents answered as follows: a house (16%), a harvest (10%), livestock (12%), land (7.5%), possessions (6%), and a business (2%). Some 59% said they left behind "other" things. Six percent said they didn't know and 10% refused to answer the question.

There were significant differences between IDPs and non-IDPs. More IDPs reported leaving property behind than non-IDPs, including land (24% vs. 2% of non-IDPs), a house (44% vs. 6%), harvest (37% vs. <1%), livestock (44% vs. <1%), a business (6% vs. <1%), and possessions (21% vs. <1%). Non-IDPs were more likely to say they did not know, or refuse to answer the question.

**Chart 4.4 Assets left/abandoned**

All differences were statistically significant: Pearson’s Chi-Square at p=.05 minimum



We asked whether respondents held title to the houses or land left behind. Sixteen of the 29 IDPs who left land behind reported that they held title to their land. Five of the six non-IDP migrants who left land behind did not hold title. Of the 54 IDPs who left a house behind, more than half (28) did not hold title while 21 did. Of the 21 Non-IDP migrants who answered this question, four held title and 12 did not.

*ACCESS TO LAND*

Respondents were asked whether they would have access to their land if they returned home. Of the 227 who answered this question, nearly half (104) answered that they would not. Of these, one third told us others occupied their land, and five (3.5%) said they had sold their land under threat. The others were either unsure or did not specify why. Another 41% did not know if they would have access to their land if they returned. Only 13% responded positively.

IDPs were significantly less likely to believe they would have access to land in their home areas, whereas non-IDPs were mostly unsure. Of the 114 IDPs who answered the question, most (68%) said that they would not have access to their land, 12% said that they would, and 20% were unsure. Of the 113 non-IDPs who

answered this question, 23% said that they would not have access to their land, 15% said that they would, but the majority were unsure (62%).

When asked why they could not access their land, nearly half of the IDPs who replied said they believed it was occupied by others (48%), as opposed to only 9% of non-IDPs (5 of 55). Six percent of IDPs (5) stated that their land had been sold under threat, whereas no non-IDPs said this. Thirty percent of IDPs named other reasons and 17% did not know why. Twenty five percent of non-IDPs listed other reasons, and the majority (64%) did not know why.

#### ACCESS TO NEW LAND

We asked if there were opportunities to obtain *new* land in areas other than their home area. Of the 368 respondents who answered, about half (52%) said that there were no opportunities, and about a third (37%) were unsure. Eleven percent (40) said that there were opportunities through government or non-government programs. IDPs were less optimistic than non-IDPs about such opportunities. Of the 125 IDPs who answered this question, 64% said there were no opportunities compared to 46% (112 of 243) of non-IDPs.

#### RETURN HOME AND ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS

Of the 490 respondents who answered whether they wanted to return home or to stay in Santa Marta, most (83%) said they wished to stay in Santa Marta, largely because of work or livelihood reasons. Some 61% of IDPs vs. 47% of non-IDPs described their work as being central in their decision to stay. Twenty percent of IDPs said problems in their home area were a factor in remaining in Santa Marta, as opposed to only 2% of non-IDPs. Twelve percent of both groups listed children's needs as influencing their decision to stay.

Only 8% of migrants wished to return home; the rest wanted to relocate to another part of Colombia (2%) or were undecided (4%). No significant differences were found between IDPs and non-IDPs in their desire to stay in Santa Marta or return home.

We asked if our migrant respondents believed it was possible to return home at present. Only 7% of the 393 people who answered responded positively, compared with 69% who did not

think it possible and almost a quarter that were unsure. IDPs were significantly less likely to believe it possible to return home (76% of 102) than non-IDPs (66% of 291).

When asked what problems they would face should they decide to return home, the most commonly mentioned problem (by 195 of 488 who answered, or 40%) was finding employment in their home areas (Chart 4.5). Sixteen percent anticipated insecurity in their home area because of armed actors. Nineteen percent foresaw no problems in returning home. Other problems mentioned were: housing problems (13%), finding food in home areas (7%), and education (9%).


Non-IDPs were much less likely to expect problems in their home areas. IDPs were significantly more likely to anticipate problems regarding access to food, education, healthcare, and housing. They were more likely to expect destroyed or occupied property, and IDPs anticipated having problems with security in return areas at much higher rates than non-IDPs. Anticipated employment problems in return areas were consistent between IDPs and non-IDPs across the sample (just as both groups are similarly concerned about employment in Santa Marta).

People were generally not concerned about coca cultivation in their return areas, probably because this was not an issue in these areas.




**Chart 4.5 Anticipated problems of return**

All differences were statistically significant: Pearson’s Chi-Square at  $p=.05$  minimum



*DEMOBILIZATION*

In light of the recent demobilization program and concerns about increases in intra-urban displacement, we asked our respondents if they thought demobilization would increase their chances of returning home. Most non-IDPs (59% or 212) and half of IDPs (50% or 66) did not believe it would increase their chances of return. Of the IDPs, 35% said demobilization did increase their prospects for return, compared with 10% of non-IDPs. A third of non-IDPs were unsure how demobilization would affect return (31% versus 14.5% IDPs).



## V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our study found, with 95% certainty, that between 13.4% and 18.2% of the population in Santa Marta are IDPs. We assume that due to design constraints – such as outdated census information described above – these estimates are low.

Our survey did not allow us to estimate how many IDPs had been displaced both within the city of Santa Marta and from outside Santa – Marta. We estimated that 3% of our respondents had only been displaced within Santa Marta, but we do not know what proportion of migrant IDPs had also been subject to *intra-urban* displacement. Determining this figure would have required a much longer and more detailed questionnaire, and time constraints did not allow this. It is an area that could be followed up with more in-depth qualitative research.

Our study shed some light on the IDP registration process in Santa Marta. We found less than half of IDPs (42%) had been included in the national registry. Our survey revealed some of the barriers IDPs face in applying for and being accepted into the registry, but as with the intra-urban displacement issue, more targeted and in depth interviewing is necessary to draw definitive conclusions.

Nearly a quarter of migrants came to Santa Marta to escape violence, including massacres, assassinations, threats and armed confrontations. Most of this violence was reportedly committed by paramilitaries (40%) and FARC (28%). However, over a quarter stated that “other” groups were responsible. This vagueness could be related to people’s fear about implicating a group during a survey of this kind, or our respondents might have been unsure about the author of the crime. “Other groups” could reflect the increase in organized and narcotic related crime in the wake of the paramilitary demobilization program. Again, in-depth qualitative interviews have the potential to address some of these deeper questions.

The study showed that IDPs fare worse on almost all indicators of wellbeing than non-IDPs: levels of education, contracted work, housing material, household size, number of disabled in the house, and a wide range of household difficulties. We conclude that IDPs are indeed more vulnerable than non-IDPs in Santa Marta. The methods used were precise enough to indicate the scale of the gap between IDPs and non-IDPs. It also allowed us to compare these groups within two different types of *barrios*: those that had a low density of IDPs and those that had a high density of IDPs. Our results suggest that in *barrios* where there are fewer IDPs, the gap between IDPs and their non-IDP neighbors is the greatest. One hypothesis is that higher IDP density *barrios* are generally poorer than areas with fewer IDPs. However, as we did not collect interval data on household economic circumstances, it is difficult to test such a hypothesis.

This study also allowed us to compare urban migrants (non-IDPs) with IDPs. We found that IDPs were more likely to report having abandoned assets in their home area, and anticipated many more problems should they attempt to return to their home areas than urban migrants. However, the majority of urban migrants and IDPs did not believe the demobilization program would increase their chances of returning home.

It should be noted that there was one area where both groups are similarly concerned and vulnerable: employment. IDPs and non-IDPs reported employment as a household difficulty at similar rates. Urban migrants and IDPs also similarly anticipated employment problems should they return to their home areas. In addition, although non-IDPs were generally currently better employed than IDPs (except for contract work as mentioned

above), this was the area where the fewest differences were observed between the two groups.

Our study sought to make scientifically sound estimates of IDPs in the city of Santa Marta, and compare the experience on IDPs and non-IDPs. However, a structured survey can only yield certain types of information. In order to get a deeper sense of people's protection needs, their experiences and beliefs about sensitive topics such as the IDP registration, paramilitary demobilization programs and crime, it is advised to conduct a complementary follow-up qualitative study in Santa Marta. Results from a qualitative study would be extremely beneficial to IDP policy makers and programmers.

## **APPENDIX A: BARRIOS SAMPLED AND IDP DENSITY**

<b>Barrio Name</b>	<b>IDP Density</b>
Olaya	Low
Los Troncos	Low
Bolivar	Low
Boston	High
Los Angeles	Low
13 De Junio Ii	Low
Bethania	Low
San Francisco	Low
Almendros	Low
Juan Xxi Ii	Low
El Yucal	Low
Santa Fe	Low
San Jorge	High
San Martin	Low
Centro	Low
17 De Diciembre	High
Santa Helena	Low
Bastidas	High
Ondas Del Caribe	Low
<i>Barrio Sin Nombre</i>	High
El Bosque	High
Cantillo	Low
<i>Barrio Sin Nombre</i>	High
11 De Noviembre	High
R Ahumada	Low
El Cisne	Low
Bolivariana	High
19 De Abril	Low
La Concepcion Ii	High
El Parque	Low
Bolivar	Low
Las Americas	High
1 De Mayo	High
Maria Eugenia	High
El Rodadero	Low
Tamaca	Low
La Quemada	Low
Centro (Rodadero)	Low
Las Colinas	High
Las Acacias	Low

*Internal Displacement to Urban Areas: the Tufts-IDMC Profiling Study. Santa Marta,  
Colombia: Case 3*

Jacobsen & Howe, with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Plenomar	Low
Villa Rosa	Low
Pozos Colorados	Low
La Gloria	High
Simon Bolivar	Low
Chimila Ii	High

### APPENDIX B: TYPE OF CONFLICT

<b>Type of conflict/ violence mentioned</b>	<b>No. mentioning type of conflict (n=118)</b>	<b>% of the entire sample (n=909)</b>	<b>Authority Responsible (some respondents named more than one)</b>
Antipersonnel mines	5.2% 6	0.67%	Paramilitares: 3; FARC: 2 ELN: 0; Security Forces: 0 Other: 1
Threats (political activity)	31% 37	4%	Paramilitares: 19; FARC: 9 ELN: 1; Security Forces: 0 Other: 8
Massacre	26% 30	3%	Paramilitares: 13; FARC: 10 ELN: 0; Security Forces: 1 Other: 6
Assassination	43.5% 50	5.5%	Paramilitares: 21; FARC: 13 ELN: 1; Security Forces: 1 Other: 15
Forced Disappearance	17.4% 20	2.2%	Paramilitares: 8; FARC: 5 ELN: 2; Security Forces: 1 Other: 5
Forced Recruitment	7% 8	0.89%	Paramilitares: 1; FARC: 5 ELN: 0; Security Forces: 1 Other: 5
Armed Confrontation	18.3% 21	2.3%	Paramilitares: 5; FARC: 10 ELN: 3; Security Forces: 0 Other: 2
Attack	2.6% 3	0.33%	Paramilitares: 1; FARC: 1 ELN: 0; Security Forces: 0 Other: 1
Mega-projects or Fumigation	0	0%	
DK/RA	13% 15	1.7%	